1 Tuesday, 23 May, 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Well, technical problems have been resolved, or did they not?
11 MR. STEWART: Well, with the assistance of the Prosecution, we're
12 able to do what we wanted to be able to do. Thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
14 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I do understand that you made a list of
15 questions, quite a long list. May I take it that you wanted to draw the
16 attention of Defence counsel to this list of questions so to see whether
17 they could include those in the examination? Because the rule is any
18 additional questions, first consult with counsel, and then if that's --
19 and then questions to be put to the witness, which is you yourself at this
20 moment. May I take it that you first want the counsel to have a look at
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. However, there will be
23 other questions, too, and I didn't have time to write them up because my
24 time was so short. I do apologise because I made so many mistakes, as I
25 had to write this quickly, but I did this on the basis of what I agreed
1 upon yesterday with the lawyer.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I think the obvious course to take is to
3 provide it to you, Mr. Stewart, and to see whether you can decipher it,
4 perhaps with the assistance of Mr. Sladojevic.
5 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you very much, Your Honour. No doubt
6 about it, Your Honour, I'm going to need it absolutely.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then I'll return it, Mr. Registrar, one copy to be
8 provided to the Defence. I take it that if the Prosecution would like to
9 look at the document in order to satisfy itself that these are questions
10 suggested by Mr. Krajisnik -- but if you want to receive a copy --
11 MR. TIEGER: We'd appreciate that, Your Honour. We certainly take
12 the Court's assurance on that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, of course, I can't give any assurance. It's
14 finally -- Mr. Krajisnik presents what he says is a list of questions to
15 Mr. Stewart. I'm not in a position to verify that, but if you would
16 consider that -- we will keep one copy, at least, so that if there's any
17 dispute about whether this is hidden correspondence or whether it's really
18 a list of questions, then --
19 MR. TIEGER: That's probably a suitable safe-guard, Your Honour.
20 MR. STEWART: Probably in the spirit of the way we deal with
21 things, my assurance, based on what Mr. Sladojevic tells me, will go a
22 long way, I hope.
23 MR. TIEGER: Yes, of course.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Can Mr. Stewart adjust his
25 microphone. The interpreters cannot hear him.
1 MR. STEWART: Certainly.
2 JUDGE ORIE: It's been done.
3 MR. STEWART: I hope it's been adjusted in the right way.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you're invited to continue the
5 examination-in-chief of Mr. Krajisnik once I've reminded Mr. Krajisnik
6 that he is still bound by his solemn declaration he gave when he started
7 his testimony -- but you're raising your hand, Mr. Krajisnik.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Through your secretary I asked for a
9 favour. I don't know whether it will be conveyed to you. Would you like
10 me to tell you what it's about?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, that's -- yes. We have been informed about it,
12 and we have to check with our agendas. Is there any day -- it's about --
13 perhaps I could say it in public. It's about the possibility to see the
14 dentist somewhere next week, which would delay, most likely, the start of
15 that day. We have to look in our agendas first. Is there any specific
16 day on which you would have an opportunity to see the dentist? Yes, I see
17 it should be Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, between 8.00 and 9.00 in the
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a look at it and we'll inform you as soon
21 as we can.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the Prosecution have offered to play
25 the CD which was introduced a long time ago, which is P70, P7-0. It's not
1 the whole thing we need, to remind Your Honours, because it's been in
2 evidence, but it's a clip which includes a passage where Mr. Krajisnik is
3 standing in front of a map. It's from --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I remember the --
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour will remember it, but I would -- it's
6 unusual, of course, to be wanting to play again something already played,
7 but Your Honour will see that there is an obvious reason for doing that in
8 this case. And we have the transcript of this, Your Honour. It's P70 --
9 JUDGE ORIE: It's been received.
10 MR. STEWART: -- if Your Honours have that. And I've got -- oh,
11 Mr. Krajisnik has it as well. I don't know whether anybody's getting any
12 sort of sound at all.
13 Sorry, is anybody getting any sound? I see shaking heads. So --
14 Mr. Krajisnik --
15 [Videotape played]
16 JUDGE ORIE: The sound is gone again.
17 MR. STEWART: Yes, it was rather short-lived, wasn't it, Your
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could we play it and see whether we get sound now?
20 Yes, the volume is at maximum.
21 MR. STEWART: I suppose I could say, Your Honour, that if
22 nobody --
23 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
24 MR. STEWART: All right.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Sound again is not there --
1 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour --
2 JUDGE ORIE: -- for whatever reason.
3 MR. STEWART: If the Trial Chamber, including nobody else,
4 including Mr. Krajisnik, feels not greatly disadvantaged, it's for the
5 soundtrack I'm playing it. We have the transcript and we've played it
6 before. It's important for the visuals to see it, the map there, and see
7 what we're talking about. That's what it's about, Your Honour. I'm not
8 fussed, Your Honour, about getting the sound if nobody else is.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's proceed. The picture is still of a
10 younger Mr. Krajisnik, if I remember. Yes.
11 MR. STEWART: Well, we're all in that position, Your Honour.
12 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all -- it may be that we need to play on
16 just to see you -- there's some point, we know, where you lift up --
17 there's an overlay on this map. I think we need to see that happen.
18 We've got you back where --
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, for practical purposes, that's really
21 all we need to see, then. We can look at the transcript.
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, the -- you remember this and you've
23 seen it before anyway in court. This was in 1992. We do know that much.
24 Do you remember yourself exactly when it was?
25 A. I don't think this was 1992. At least, that's what I think.
1 Because there was no such map in 1992. But never mind, that doesn't
3 Q. Well, it's not insignificant, Mr. Krajisnik. If you can do your
4 best to remember -- well, as best you can when it was, but you can't say
5 any more than you don't think that it was 1992?
6 A. I think that there was no such map in 1992. There was Srebrenica,
7 Zepa, Gorazde, and so on. All right. I say this with a degree of
8 reservation. Perhaps this map had been drawn, and perhaps this was not
9 the actual state of affairs. This was what was held by our troops.
10 That's what the text says, but that was not the situation in 1992. They
11 didn't hold Gorazde, Zepa, or Srebrenica; none of that.
12 Q. Now, the map that's underneath the overlay on that video,
13 Mr. Krajisnik, is that either exactly the same as one of the maps that we
14 have here in court or which one is it?
15 A. Yes, the OTP has the original, the big map, whereas we have the
16 small map, bluish-green, if I can put it that way; blue, green, and
18 Q. Yes, so it's -- sorry, I'm just retrieving it. It's the map that
19 -- well, we've got it at --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. It's the same one you used for your markings the other day.
22 A. Yes, just bigger, yes.
23 Q. I've forgotten the number for a moment -- is it 293? Yes, 293.
24 Thank you, Mr. Haider. P293.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could we first clarify the date. Mr. Krajisnik, you
1 said it's not 1992. Would it be later? Would it be earlier?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know when it was, but I
3 would like to draw your attention to this, the attention of the Trial
4 Chamber, to what it says here, Momcilo Krajisnik, where it says: This is
5 held by the Army of Republika Srpska, these borders. But those were not
6 the borders in 1992. So I saw that, I noticed that. I guess this would
7 be 1995 or I don't know what year. In all fairness, Gorazde isn't there
9 MR. STEWART:
10 Q. Well, let's, Mr. Krajisnik, have a -- I don't know whether you've
11 had a chance to read the text again recently, but the -- let's go through
12 it. "We are standing in front of the ethnic map of former Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina with marked borders of the territory that is presently
14 possessed by the Bosnian Serb army."
15 And that's the overlay - is that right? - that we see. The marked
16 borders there, we can see those, can we, on that map?
17 A. I think that it is the map underneath the foil. What we see here
18 is a foil.
19 Q. What we're seeing on the screen, Mr. Krajisnik, at the moment,
20 that is showing, is it, the marked borders of the territory that, at the
21 time you were speaking, you were saying was presently possessed by the
22 Bosnian Serb army. Is that right?
23 A. That's what the text says, that what we see here is what was held
24 by the Army of Republika Srpska.
25 Q. And does that -- that being at the time you were speaking, what
1 you were saying was held by the Bosnian Serb army, how accurately, if at
2 all, does that enable you to date this presentation that we see on the
4 A. I remember this interview and everything I said. I can give my
5 comments on this, but I cannot pin-point the time. What struck me now was
6 that in 1992 neither Srebrenica nor Zepa were marked, at least, and those
7 were enclaves in 1992. And Gorazde was not marked either. So this brings
8 me to this dilemma as to when this interview was actually filmed.
9 However, I can give you my comments on the entire interview right now.
10 This wouldn't really matter.
11 Q. Well, we'll take it point by point, Mr. Krajisnik, and then you
12 can, no doubt, sweep up any comments. You -- after saying what the map
13 is, you say: "I can only say that what was being said, that we are
14 possessing the territories ethnically populated by the other national
15 communities, that is not true, which can be seen on the ethnic map of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we can cover with the transparent sheet on
17 which the territories are exactly marked, which is possessed by our army,
18 that those are in fact areas that belong to our people."
19 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, it's a simple observation to make and it can
20 be seen by anybody looking at the maps, that the map P293, if one compares
21 it with the territory -- and it's -- the -- of course it's that swathe of
22 outer territory on this map we see on the screen, which is the territory
23 you're saying is held by the Bosnian Serb army, it's clear that that
24 territory, as on that overlay, does include, according to P93 [sic], quite
25 a number of areas of land which are marked as majority populated by other
1 ethnic groups. And I see you're nodding. You seem to accept that basic
2 point so far.
3 So the question is: How does that --
4 A. Yes, yes.
5 Q. -- reconcile with what you're saying in the interview?
6 A. First of all, I'm grateful for the fact that this question is on
7 our agenda because it is on my list of questions. If we were to hear the
8 soundtrack, at one point we would see that the tape breaks down and then
9 there is a continuation precisely when I was giving that answer, that we
10 are holding only our own territory. I mean, you cannot say that in the
11 eastern part of the territory, the scarcely populated territory is
12 majority Muslim territory. The sentence that is missing from the text and
13 which I did utter then was: There are more Serbs in Sarajevo that we are
14 prepared to cede to the Muslim side than in all of the eastern part, the
15 sparsely populated part, than there are Muslims in that sparsely populated
17 I know exactly how I was explaining all of this because this had
18 to do with an ethnic map. And of course, in the eastern part of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are many very small settlements, and then if you
20 were to add all of them up, there are more Serbs in the centre of Muslim
21 Sarajevo, the Sarajevo that would belong to them, than in -- than there
22 are Muslims in all of these towns from Trebinje to Zvornik. Perhaps the
23 map isn't exactly right, but that would be it, more or less. So that was
24 the explanation I provided when I was explaining this map, and I said that
25 we had envisaged some enclaves in this territory of ours. Well, it's not
1 exactly drawn here, but in all negotiations we thought about these
2 enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and so on.
3 That's the core of the matter, and that is why I wish we could
4 have heard the soundtrack of this video clip. I saw exactly where the
5 tape was broken off. I don't know whether somebody did this intentionally
6 or unintentionally, but that could have been heard and I can tell you
7 exactly where it was and where this one sentence is missing.
8 MR. STEWART: Perhaps -- Your Honour, it seems it's more
9 significant to Mr. Krajisnik to hear it. Perhaps when we're confident
10 that we're in a position, perhaps after a break, to play it quickly, we
11 can interject at that point?
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that has been played before. Nothing
13 is spoken which appears on the transcript, but of course the other issue
14 is whether Mr. Krajisnik said anything in addition to that when the
15 interview was recorded. And if you have a solution for that --
16 MR. STEWART: Well, he's keen to -- here we go maybe --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that they do not have the
18 transcript so they cannot work off the transcript directly. Thank you.
19 [Videotape played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "... which we can cover with the
21 transparent sheet on which the territories are exactly marked, which is
22 possessed by our Army, that those in fact are areas that belong to our
23 people. A map, similar to this, as far as I am informed, was offered in
24 Geneva, and it was made clear that Serbs want that the border of our
25 country be ... that is the Neretva River Valley, and that is mostly
1 territory of Republika Srpska. Knowing that we allow that there are
2 certain enclaves on our territory that may be populated with the other
3 ethnic communities. Sarajevo is a separate problem. At the moment, it is
4 marked as ... the area of the city proper is marked as future Muslim
5 territory, but we shall work for demilitarisation and division between the
6 two ethnic communities, primarily Serbian and Muslim, and maybe a
7 municipality for ... I mean, municipality populated by the Croatian
8 community. Territory of the Republic of Republika Srpska represents in
9 fact the border belong the Una River, the Sava River, with a small area
10 that is not yet under our forces, I mean, it is not liberated yet. That
11 is Orasje, that is the border, this is the territory of Semberija, of
12 Ozren, and territory of Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. We presented, as
13 our territory, to the Croatian community in Graz, that our border should
14 be between our two ethnic communities that would be the Neretva River. In
15 any case, this continuity of our territory, it is ... it is in one piece,
16 if I may say so, and we will do our best that there is one constituent
17 unit of Republika Srpska, and we shall allow the possibility of more
18 constituent units of the Croatian and Muslim people. Simply, that is not
19 a precondition. What is a precondition is that our Republic should be
20 integral, and not divided into several parts."
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I should say we do our best to help the
22 interpreters. I'm assured that, although it's a bit late now, the
23 transcript is in the clip of documents they were given before the start of
24 the session.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Unfortunately, not in the English booth. We're
2 MR. STEWART: Well, we do our best, Your Honour. I don't know
3 what happened there.
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did you have some comment to add, having heard the
6 A. Just now I listened to this text that was so fast, and I know that
7 when I was listening to this in this same room I remember hearing the
8 soundtrack with this break. Could I please have the tape and I can
9 identify where the break is and where this sentence was left out? Right
10 now I couldn't notice it because it was extremely fast, the text went
11 extremely fast, and I know what it was that I said.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Is there -- is there an opportunity to -- during the
13 next break, that if Mr. Krajisnik is returned a bit earlier to the
14 courtroom that he could re-hear and review the -- this -- this video clip
15 so that he could identify where there is a break? I didn't notice one,
16 but it could be. If, of course, there should be a break, then, in the
17 gestures and the movement of -- or if Mr. Sladojevic can --
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we can play it on my computer here
19 then, if that's acceptable.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then the security is invited to see if there is a
21 possibility to have Mr. Krajisnik a bit earlier in court so he can see
22 again and there is no need to make that part of that recording part of the
23 hearing because it's not part of the trial but just for the information of
24 Mr. Krajisnik.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
1 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, on the -- you've given some explanation of that,
3 but on the fairly straightforward point of whether the Bosnian Serb army
4 was, at the time of this television programme, possessing territories
5 ethnically populated by other national communities, were there in fact
6 within the area occupied by the army some such territories?
7 A. Well, I think that it's perfectly clear to everyone in this room
8 that in 1992 Srebrenica and Zepa were - how should I put this? - were not
9 held by the Army of Republika Srpska. That cannot be seen on this sheet.
10 Perhaps this was made later, perhaps it was drawn in a different way and
11 handed in as a map in Geneva. But this is not the border that was held by
12 the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska. That is very easy to
13 establish. It was only in 1995 that our forces took Srebrenica. After
14 all, this is part of a case before this Court. So that confused me a bit.
15 I know this entire interview, and I know how it went, but I cannot
16 remember the time. I see that I was young and that my hair was dark, but
17 I don't know when that was.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, during the course of 1992, did the Bosnian Serb
19 army take territories that had been majority occupied by other ethnic
21 A. Mr. Stewart, a similar question was one put -- once put by the
22 Presiding Judge, but he phrased it differently. I'll try to answer your
23 question, though, and, by your leave, I should like to give an answer that
24 is fairly similar to what you just said now.
25 The Army of Republika Srpska was fighting - if I can put it that
1 way - with the other side and the situation changed very often. The
2 territory that was held by the Army of Republika Srpska was much bigger in
3 1992 than it was at the end of the war. However, there were many changes
4 in the territory. There was a front line, and then it depended on whether
5 there was a clash at the front line and who pushed who away. Most often
6 this was handled by the local commanders, depending on the situation. I
7 don't know what -- what happened, when, and who would have what, but very
8 few changes took place from the beginning of the war until 1995, when
9 there was a problem with Srebrenica and Zepa. Practically the entire area
10 was more or less - well, how should I put this? - the situation was the
12 Now I can answer the other question, too. So what the army took -
13 I mean the people in 1992 - except for a few changes, like the corridor,
14 practically all the way up to 1995 until the case of Srebrenica and Zepa,
15 that was it, you can see it on the maps. In Sarajevo changes were minor,
16 and in all other areas as well.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to ask you about --
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I haven't done this before, but it seems
19 appropriate in this circumstance, and whatever questions Mr. Krajisnik was
20 answering did not include the question that was asked by Mr. Stewart. I
21 would say it's non-responsive, and it's up to the Court, of course, and
22 Mr. Stewart as well, but I bring that to everyone's attention and I think
23 the question and/or questions asked should be the ones responded to.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I take it that you solicited an answer
25 in your question from Mr. Krajisnik.
1 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, it's not a -- it's not a topic
2 which I propose to leave alone until the very end of Mr. Krajisnik's
4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So we'll -- you'll put that question again
5 to --
6 MR. STEWART: In some form or another, Your Honour. It's not a --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's --
8 MR. STEWART: It doesn't suit me to leave it dangling in the air,
9 but I'm perfectly happy to deal with it now. That seems to be the most
10 convenient thing. I was going to come back to it.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you see the point. You gave some sort of
12 explanation, but the essential question whether during that year, 1992,
13 the Bosnian Serb army did take territories that had been majority occupied
14 by other ethnic groups, that question remains.
15 A. I gave an answer. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough. The army was
16 established on the 12th of May. Before that, a large part of the
17 territory, that is to say the armed people on both sides, separated, and
18 the army made slight corrections from its formation up until 1995.
19 Zvornik happened, Bijeljina happened, and everything else, except for the
20 corridor. And I have already given an answer, and that is that when the
21 army was established, all it had was the problem of the corridor. In
22 Sarajevo the situation in April was what it was, Vlasenica was what it
23 was, and so was Zvornik, all before the establishment of the Army of
24 Republika Srpska, which means that the armed people had already set up
25 borders before that --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, I think as a matter of fact what
2 we'd like to know is whether when the Army of Republika Srpska was
3 established, whether they took or continued to exercise control over
4 territories that were before the conflict inhabited by a Muslim majority.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me repeat: Certain corrections
6 of the border were made, and those corrections were that a smaller portion
7 of the territory where the Muslims were, and Serbs as well, that the army
8 broke through the corridor in Konjevic Polje, for example, or things like
9 that. But there weren't any major moves, large-scale moves, as there had
10 been in April - that would be in line with that answer - except for the
11 corridor. The army did not make any large-scale interventions because all
12 the battles -- these battles took place before the army was established,
13 and you can see that on the basis of the dates.
14 JUDGE ORIE: You have not carefully listened to my answer [sic]
15 because I was referring to the -- whether the army kept or took. "Kept"
16 means that it was taken already by armed forces before, but territories
17 which were, by majority, inhabited by Muslims before the armed conflict;
18 not whether what exactly changed after that. But once the Army of
19 Republika Srpska was established, did they control territories which
20 originally, that is before the outbreak of the armed conflict, that were
21 by majority inhabited by Muslims? And I'm not talking about one village
22 but a bit larger area.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything that the army received --
24 well, it won certain portions and lost others during that period of time.
25 If we look at it unilaterally, the positive side is that it took some
1 territories. These were minor corrections, though, compared to the
2 situation that the army found on the ground when it was established. All
3 the main operations had been completed before the army was established,
4 except for the corridor. So the army did have control of certain regions
5 and it lost others; it gained some and lost some.
6 JUDGE ORIE: So it did have control of certain regions by majority
7 inhabited by Muslims?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't understand your
9 question, actually. If you want an answer, then my answer is yes, but I
10 don't think that's the real answer.
11 JUDGE ORIE: You want to create a total picture, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 This was just, perhaps, part of a picture but the subject of the question.
13 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in that case, I didn't
15 understand Mr. Stewart's question because he didn't pose it in the proper
17 MR. STEWART: Well, I do my best.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Let's go to the next question.
19 MR. STEWART:
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you were asked by His Honour Judge Orie whether the
21 Bosnian Serb army had control of certain regions by majority inhabited by
22 Muslims. That was the question. And you said: Well, you didn't
23 understand. Your answer was: Yes, but you didn't think that was the real
24 answer. So what is the real answer, Mr. Krajisnik?
25 A. I don't understand you either.
1 Q. Well --
2 A. I don't understand the question.
3 Q. Sorry. Mr. Krajisnik, you've --
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I try to see whether --
5 MR. STEWART: Well --
6 JUDGE ORIE: From what I understand -- from what I understand,
7 Mr. Krajisnik, I do understand that you say don't put such a unilaterally
8 oriented question to me, but rather ask me what the totality was. And you
9 said: We gained some and we lost some. And by saying you gained some, I
10 understood that the armed forces -- not major changes having been made
11 after the Republika army had been established, you gained control of some
12 areas which were by majority inhabited by Muslims, whereas you lost
13 others. Is that a correct understanding?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, why did I say I
15 didn't understand? Well, that's another question you've just asked.
16 Mr. Stewart asked whether the army won over territory, whereas you asked
17 whether it held control of the territory that the armed people had gained
18 before that. Yes, it did. It had control of that. It was a territory
19 where the Muslims had been previously. So I was a bit confused by the two
20 aspects of the question. It didn't leave Vlasenica, Zvornik, and so on,
21 it safe-guarded those territories which, prior to that, had been inhabited
22 by a majority Muslim population. That's why I said that I didn't
23 understand the question.
24 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
1 MR. STEWART:
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you remember that Mr. Okun gave evidence; it was a
3 rather long time ago now in this trial. The -- I'm going to ask you about
4 a number of things that Mr. Okun said.
5 MR. STEWART: And I indicated, Your Honour, that a lot of the
6 transcript of Mr. Okun's evidence would be needed today. He gave evidence
7 starting on the 22nd of June, 2004, and I'm going first to page 4152,
8 which was in his evidence in chief. And he was asked if he accepted a
9 generally -- his diaries which he produced reflecting approximately 50 to
10 60 meetings with members of the Bosnian Serb leadership. And then he went
11 on, at the top of page 4153, to say that although he hadn't counted them,
12 it was put to him that he'd had more than 25 meetings that included you,
13 and he said there were certainly many, many meetings of varying lengths.
14 Is a figure of something like 25 meetings that Mr. Okun attended,
15 including you, is that in the right range of the number of meetings?
16 A. Are you referring to 1992?
17 Q. Well, he was talking about the overall period.
18 A. What I know is that, as far as I remember, I met Mr. Okun -- or
19 rather, saw Mr. Okun only once, and I think that was in Geneva, or perhaps
20 London. I'm not quite sure. But I remember him well. He was Mr. Vance's
21 assistant, and at those joint meetings he did attend, but how much, how
22 many times, I don't know, but not in 1992. In 1992, as far as I recall,
23 there was just one meeting, or perhaps two. But at those meetings, I
24 didn't speak a single word to him. I attended the session. I don't think
25 I took the floor either. So I cannot confirm anything about this. I
1 don't think Mr. Okun was right when he said that. I couldn't have had a
2 meeting with Mr. Okun. Far from it; no.
3 Q. He said at page 4165 - this is of the transcript - he was asked
4 whether in the discussions --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, I just looked over the question. So
7 there's no confusion - and I know Mr. Stewart tried to clarify this - the
8 question was whether the reference was to 1992. Mr. Stewart clarified
9 that it wasn't limited to 1992, but included, for example, without saying
10 so, 1993. And then it was difficult to tell whether Mr. Krajisnik was
11 limiting his answer to 1992, and if he was, then I would again -- it's
12 either a misunderstanding or it's non-responsive.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Is there -- the only thing we should do at this
14 moment when there's any misunderstanding -- Mr. Krajisnik, the question
15 related to part of the testimony of Mr. Okun. It was read to you -- at
16 least, it was summarised to you. When the question was put to you, you
17 asked whether Mr. Stewart was referring to 1992, and then Mr. Stewart said
18 Mr. Okun -- or at least he, that is Mr. Okun, was talking about the
19 overall period.
20 Did you include in your answer where you said no more than two,
21 have you included 1993? And if not, could you tell us please whether that
22 would change your answer.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was speaking about the entire
24 period, because Mr. Stewart's question was quite clear, as far as I was
1 MR. STEWART:
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- Mr. Okun indicated that it was really from
3 early 1993 that the -- the frequency of these talks increased and they
4 became intensive. Does that accord with your recollection?
5 A. Yes. In 1993 you had the Vance-Owen Plan up until May when
6 everything was completed with respect to our Assembly. So all the
7 meetings took place during that period of time, the ones that Mr. Okun
8 refers to.
9 Q. Now, he refers in his evidence - at page 4157, that is - to the
10 Bosnian Serb wartime goals. And what he says is this -- he was asked at
11 the middle of that page, by Mr. Tieger, Mr. Tieger said: "... you
12 indicated that Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik were firm advocates of the
13 Bosnian Serb political objectives, their wartime goals. Can you tell the
14 Chamber now, please, what you understood those political objectives or
15 wartime goals to be?"
16 And then there was a technical hitch, and then he continued:
17 "Yes. All the parties to the conflict, of course the three parties had
18 goals. The Bosnian Serb wartime goals, as they were enunciated to us
19 directly - and publicly as well - were six." And then he describes them.
20 And it's not an elaborate description, Mr. Krajisnik, so I'll read it.
21 "First --" well, I'll stop at each one and ask you whether you
22 agree that it was a Bosnian Serb wartime goal.
23 "First, to have their own state, Republika Srpska juridical
25 Do you agree with what Mr. Okun says, that that was one of the
1 Bosnian Serb wartime goals?
2 A. I don't agree with the whole observation of Mr. Okun. They
3 weren't wartime goals; they were political goals which he didn't
4 understand because he hadn't taken part in the previous negotiations. And
5 we only spoke about political goals at the conference, not wartime goals.
6 We were discussing the conference. Now, had the goal been political for
7 the negotiators, that we should have our own Republika Srpska, that is
8 true because that was a precondition from beginning to end, from the start
9 of the negotiating process to the end. So that was the political goal,
10 but not the war goal, wartime goal.
11 Q. And the second was that the state, that is Republika Srpska,
12 clearly, "was to have continuous territory and to be contiguous with
13 Serbia, not chopped up, patches."
14 Now, again, Mr. Krajisnik, was that a wartime goal?
15 A. In negotiations we kept repeating our starting positions, and one
16 of those was the corridor that I explained to you. And he mentions this
17 in one part. We asked that it -- that Republika Srpska be a whole, in one
18 block, because by exchange of territory we could arrive at that goal. But
19 that was a political proposal in the commission that he was a member of on
20 the part of the international community.
21 Q. And then the -- the third one, he says: "Third, to be ethnically
22 pure Serb or overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb as they could make it ..."
23 Now, was that a wartime goal of the Bosnian Serbs?
24 A. That was never a goal, and you can see that from all the
25 documents, that the prime goal discussed was separation to form Republika
1 Srpska where the majority of the population were Serbs, then a Muslim
2 republic where the majority were Muslims, a Croatian one where the
3 majority were Croats. But of course there would be other ethnic groups
4 living there, too, and this was not discussed in any of the talks. No
5 mention was made of any kind of pure territory. So that was quite
6 impossible. It wouldn't have been appropriate to discuss things like that
7 at meetings of that kind, let alone realistic.
8 Q. And: "Fourth, to have a special relationship with Yugoslavia or
9 Serbia as the case may be."
10 Was that a wartime goal?
11 A. That is not only about war. We got agreement from the Muslim side
12 and the international community. They agreed that we can have special
13 relationships with the neighbouring republics. Ask the Croats, the
14 Muslims, all the three ethnic communities, that they can create and forge
15 special relationships. Everything that wouldn't challenge the survival of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that's what that was about. He probably defined
17 it in a different way, and I'm sure he must have understood it wrongly,
18 and that is what was gained in the Dayton Agreement. Everything, all the
19 agreements, all this was stipulated in all the agreements.
20 Q. And then: "Fifth, to divide Sarajevo into a Muslim and a Bosnian
21 Serb section."
22 Was that a wartime goal?
23 A. It was always our goal not to be expelled from Sarajevo, so we
24 wanted to have the peripheral parts of Sarajevo, to have our local
25 administration there. We never sought, in figurative terms, to erect
1 Berlin Walls anywhere. What we wanted to see was the transformation of
2 Sarajevo where certain parts and districts would form separate
3 municipalities where the Serbs would be the majority population. And
4 there are documents to back that up, documents from contemporaneous
5 documents about the proposals that were put forward for Sarajevo, and they
6 were along the lines of what I've just told you now.
7 Q. And then: "Sixth and last, to have a veto power over any residual
8 powers that would be held by the central government of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina ..."
10 Was that a wartime goal?
11 A. That was not one of the goals. It was a point, an item, advocated
12 by all three sides. And from the very beginning there was discussion
13 about the fact that certain items and issues should be resolved by
14 consensus in -- on other issues, you had to have a four-fifths majority so
15 as not to jeopardise the national interests at the level of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that was the position taken by all three sides,
17 and that exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. In all the agreements, that
18 was provided for. It wasn't just a Serb proposal; it was an issue that we
19 discussed, an item on the agenda that we discussed, and that was
20 incorporated into all the agreements. It wasn't a veto; it was a way in
21 which -- by which to solve the situation and to avoid violations in the
22 constitution and things like that.
23 Q. Mr. Okun said in his evidence that those six Bosnian Serb wartime
24 goals, as he said they were, had been enunciated to him and his colleagues
25 in those negotiations directly. Is that correct?
1 A. That's not true. He must have heard that there were six strategic
2 goals, and now he attempted to formulate this and highlight questions that
3 were often mentioned in negotiations when Mr. Vance was present, and
4 Mr. Owen as well, the co-presidents of the conference, but that was never
5 formulated as goals, they were just issues that we discussed.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm getting a bit lost.
7 Mr. Krajisnik, in one of your earlier answers you said Mr. Okun
8 was not correct when he said he had up to 25 meetings which included you.
9 You said: "I don't think Mr. Okun was right when he said that. I
10 couldn't have had a meeting with Mr. Okun. Far from it, no." Now you
11 were asked about what was told to Mr. Okun during these negotiations, and
12 you quite clearly say that this could not have been said to him.
13 I'm -- when you said that Mr. Okun was not right, did you intend
14 to say that you had no meetings with him, which is not the same as what he
15 said, because he was talking about meetings that included you, which might
16 be something different from a direct meeting with you. Is that what you
17 meant? Or did you mean to say: Well, it may well be that Mr. Okun has
18 been present during a meeting some 25 times where I was present as well.
19 Since you're quite explicit on what was not said to Mr. Okun, could you
20 clarify this for me.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There could not have been,
22 theoretically speaking, 25 meetings that I attended with Mr. Okun
23 throughout his participation in the conference because there weren't that
24 many days, there weren't that many meetings between us. He was there from
25 the beginning of 1993 until May or June. He wasn't there later on; later
1 on it was Owen and Stoltenberg. So what I'm saying is that as far as I
2 recollect, there could not have been that many meetings. Now what I'm
3 saying now --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I interrupt you. How many, approximately, could it
5 have been; ten, 15, 20? Because you say it's not 25 -- couldn't have been
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, what I'm telling you
8 is this: I cannot give you an exact number. I can't guess. But 25 is
9 much too many. I can't say whether it was two or three or five, but I
10 tell you the time period when he was there, and I can find out exactly
11 when we had a meeting with him, from January until the end of April, until
12 the Athens meeting, and then Mr. Okun was no longer there, nor was
13 Mr. Vance in 1993. And there was one meeting in 1992. So I'm trying to
14 tell you this. Now, whether it was five, six, seven meetings, I don't
15 know, but 25 is much too high a figure. And I can answer the other
16 question as well, if you're interested in hearing.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you did not attend all of the meetings, of
18 course we ask ourselves how could you know what was not said during these
19 negotiations to Mr. Okun -- or at least to those who attended that
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me explain what I meant. If
22 there was a visit to Geneva, for example, and if there are a number of
23 meetings during that visit to Geneva, perhaps three, four, five, six
24 meetings, that might have been what Mr. Okun was counting, with other
25 people attending; Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Karadzic perhaps. Then, possibly,
1 there could have been more meetings than I know about. Are you following
2 me? I didn't sit down to a meeting with him where he was present. If I
3 was to say two or three times, that, too, would be guesswork on my part.
4 So quite possibly he meant one meeting, one visit to Geneva, with a number
5 of meetings within that one visit. And that's something else again,
6 because there were discussions held all day; bilateral, separate meetings,
7 held in the morning, held in the afternoon, but I count that as one
8 meeting, the Geneva meeting, although we might have spent a whole day's
9 discussing and putting forward various proposals.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
11 MR. STEWART:
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you consider it possible that your colleagues at
13 a -- your Bosnian Serb colleagues at a meeting which you were not present
14 enunciated those six wartime goals as Mr. Okun had described them in his
16 A. I'm quite convinced that goals formulated in that way could not
17 have been presented; however, what is possible is this: During a
18 conference or a meeting scheduled in Geneva, for example, if we had an
19 issue, one issue, several issues or questions, and if Mr. Koljevic and
20 Mr. Karadzic had been with him and with Mr. Vance and had separate
21 meetings, perhaps they might have put forward their attitudes and
22 positions with respect to certain issues: We want to have a united
23 territory, we want to avoid out-voting, we want this and that. So that he
24 might have considered to be our strategic goals, but that was in the
25 course of formulating a concept on how to achieve a peace agreement.
1 There were no official goals that he was presenting; that's what I said.
2 Quite simply, when you discuss things, you look at different variants, how
3 to solve problems, the problem of the corridor, the problem of Republika
4 Srpska, and things like that. And his main task - that's why he
5 remembered this - his commission's main task was not to have Republika
6 Srpska and to abolish something that we had agreed upon, the basic things
7 we had agreed upon. And that's why he remembered that as being our goals,
8 and it was our goal indeed to be consistent in persevering what we had
9 started from the very beginning and what the international community had
10 agreed to, but that didn't suit him because he didn't want to see that
11 happen. And they proposed that Republika Srpska should not be
12 incorporated into the Vance-Owen Plan, and that's why it was rejected.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, one of the things Mr. Okun said, and this is found
14 at page 4165 of the transcript, he was asked by Mr. Tieger: "Ambassador
15 Okun, was one of the issues of considerable significance, perhaps central
16 significance during the course of these negotiations, the amount of
17 territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Bosnian Serbs laid claim
19 And he said: "Yes."
20 Mr. Krajisnik, is -- if the same question is put to you, is your
21 answer yes or no or something else?
22 MR. TIEGER: In this case - I know it wasn't intentional - I think
23 it would be helpful to read the entire response.
24 MR. STEWART: It would and I was going to, but I was going to do
25 that as a separate question, Your Honour, which is a legitimate way of
1 approaching it, I suggest.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
3 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
4 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, at this point -- the question then was: Was
5 one of the issues of considerable significance, perhaps central
6 significance, during the negotiations the amount of territory within
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina that you, the Bosnian Serbs, laid claim to?
8 A. The size of the territory was not the question that was of crucial
9 importance as far as the Serb side was concerned; however, the question of
10 territories was the only question and the most important question during
11 the peace process. It was only the maps that were a problem; everything
12 else was easy to resolve. We were prepared to have joint maps made,
13 regardless of the actual size of the land involved and regardless of the
14 situation on the front line. We just wanted to have a peaceful separation
15 and three constituent units. It wasn't the size of the territory that
16 mattered to us, 64 per cent or whatever, but to have it done through
17 peaceful means. And that can be seen on the basis of all these plans,
18 that we even reduced our territory to 50 per cent, later on it turned out
19 to be 40 per cent, and that shows exactly how ready we were to withdraw
20 from territories and all that. You will see that not in the
21 Owen-Stoltenberg plan but in Mr. Owen's book, that we agreed to all these
22 maps. So there is no dilemma as far as that is concerned. Of course we
23 were prepared to accept even smaller territories. It was only about
24 territories that the sides were having a dispute on, to know where the
25 separation line would be.
1 Q. You see, having answered that question in the affirmative himself,
2 he said, yes, it had been one of the issues of considerable significance
3 during the negotiations, Mr. Okun continued. He said that was another
4 constant refrain, and they - that's you, the Bosnian Serbs - they had a
5 formula for it. It went this way: We are 35 per cent of the people, but
6 we own 65 per cent of the land.
7 Now, was that a formula or a constant negotiating point that you,
8 the Bosnian Serbs, were putting forward in these negotiations?
9 A. Those were the arguments of the Serb side. When we say that we
10 have to get a territory that would exceed the figure of 30 per cent, which
11 was the population figure. The population cannot be the only criterion,
12 but territory, too. Our territory, where the Serbs lived, is primarily
13 rural with very few towns. All the industries and all the big towns are
14 in Muslim-held territory. Quantity is not the same as quality, and that
15 was our argument when we were trying to explain why there should be a
16 disproportion with regard to territory, why the Serb side should have more
17 territory. That is why the Serb side actually got 49 per cent, half of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rural part, whereas the central part, the richest
19 part, was what the Muslim federation -- the Muslim-Croat federation got.
20 Q. And he said that, "We heard it repeatedly that this formula," as
21 he described it -- I think that was his word. Yes, formula of 35 per cent
22 of the people, 65 per cent of the land, he said: "We heard it repeatedly
23 from Mr. Milosevic. We heard it from Dr. Karadzic. We heard it from
24 Mr. Krajisnik, Koljevic, Buha, all of them."
25 Is it correct that they heard it from, among other people, you,
1 Mr. Krajisnik?
2 A. I believe that they heard it from me the way I had put it, and I
3 heard it from experts. I didn't do the measuring. I heard it from
4 experts, this 64 per cent, the experts who drew this map, that the Serbs
5 own 64 per cent of the land of Bosnia-Herzegovina; forests, meadows,
6 fields, whereas the central part is the most densely populated and that is
7 where the predominant population is Muslim and Croat. And in percentage
8 terms, that's less. Probably he could have heard this from me; I don't
9 exclude that possibility. I'm not saying that I said it, but I do not
10 exclude the possibility that I did say that Serbs, in terms of the land,
11 have 64 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of what experts in
12 this field say. Now, whether that is correct or not, I cannot tell.
13 Q. Now, there's a short passage I'm just going to read but not ask
14 you a question, Mr. Krajisnik, because otherwise one doesn't understand
15 the bit I am coming to for a question. But on page 4166, 4166 of the
16 transcript, after this answer about territories and the formula, Mr. Okun
17 was asked by Mr. Tieger: "Was the genocide committed against the Serbs
18 during World War II raised in the context of the enunciation of the amount
19 of territory to which Bosnian Serbs were allegedly entitled?"
20 To which he answered: "Yes. That was also a factor."
21 And then a page or two on - it's 4167 of the transcript, line 20 -
22 Mr. Tieger asked: "Ambassador Okun, with regard to your previous answer
23 about the emphasis on the genocide of World War II, did that mean that
24 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and the other Bosnian Serb leaders asserted a
25 claim to territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina on which non-Serbs were a
1 majority and Serbs were a minority?"
2 And his answer to that was: "Yes. They made that explicit."
3 Is that correct, Mr. Krajisnik? Again, I come to the rest of the
4 answer in a moment, but is that correct that you, among others, made it
5 explicit that you asserted a claim to territory within Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina on which Serbs were a minority?
7 A. That is not true. That is not true because we were consistently
8 saying, from the beginning to the end, that Serb territories should be
9 where Serbs are a majority. If this were to be possible, it could only be
10 achieved through an exchange of territories, when we agree on that. So if
11 some territories where Muslims are a majority come to belong to the Serbs,
12 and vice versa, then we would try to apply to principle, but it's not that
13 we have the right. In the talks, there were proposals to that effect,
14 especially our talks with the Croat [Realtime transcript read in error
15 "Muslim"] side: You cede this to us, and we will cede that to you. It
16 is a well-known fact what is traditionally Croat and what is traditionally
18 So this was the other principle that was also very important when
19 we started working on the maps from the very beginning. It's not that we
20 were saying, say, Zvornik is ours. No. Zvornik is majority, and that is
21 what I can say. If somebody says: Well, why did you take Zvornik? I can
22 give an answer to that, too.
23 So if we analyse things from the beginning to the end, everything
24 can be established why things happened, but this one principle where there
25 -- where one people is a majority, that is their territory, and where the
1 second people is a majority, that's their territory, and where the third
2 people is a majority, that is their territory, and then we can work on the
3 establishment of these constituent units in that way. Well, that did not
4 suit them because Mr. Okun and Mr. Vance didn't like that, and they gave
5 up on the Republika Srpska, and then we didn't like that because we had
6 already -- we had already given up on Yugoslavia because we were promised
7 a Republika Srpska. And now we were being denied a Republika Srpska, too.
8 That is what he didn't understand because he hadn't been there from day
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Krajisnik said he could answer the
11 question why they had taken Zvornik.
12 Could you try to do that in five to ten lines, Mr. Krajisnik, why
13 Zvornik, although being a majority Muslim inhabited municipality, why it
14 was taken?
15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just, before it goes off the
16 screen, just clear up a point. At line 12, which is going to go off the
17 screen in a minute, it says: "Especially our talks at the Muslim side,"
18 and Mr. Sladojevic assures me that it was Croat that was said there. And
19 Mr. Krajisnik is nodding. So may we make that correction. I'm sorry to
20 interrupt Your Honour there, but otherwise it goes off the screen and it's
21 a nuisance then.
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you've been asked by His Honour to try to say in
23 five or ten lines why Zvornik was taken although being a majority
24 Muslim-inhabited municipality.
25 A. Honourable Judge Orie, about ten or 15 days ago, put a question
1 whether Republika Srpska or the Serb leadership thought that Zvornik
2 belonged to Republika Srpska, because it was taken by the army, it was
3 taken by paramilitary formations. The answer is as follows: There was
4 one situation before the outbreak of the war. Before the beginning of the
5 war, talks were held, negotiations were held, on the division of Zvornik
6 into two municipalities. I have documents about that, and the Serb part
7 of the municipality, that is to say the Serb local communities, is what
8 the Serb side thought that they had a right to, not the urban part of
9 Zvornik, where they did not have a majority. And these negotiations that
10 were held -- well, I mean the local leadership agreed on this. And then
11 the Muslims set up barricades and this initiative first came from them,
12 and all the Serbs fled from Zvornik. And then Arkan called the leadership
13 to Mali Zvornik, I learned about that later, and he slapped all of them
14 around and said: Why did you allow the Muslims to deceive you? And then
15 they took all of Zvornik.
16 That did not mean that in the negotiations when we were
17 negotiating we had to disregard taken territories. I must assure you that
18 Mr. Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg were on a terrace at Lake Zvornik when that
19 question was discussed, and we said that we would be interested in
20 exchanging territories with the Muslim side to get Zvornik on our map
21 because we needed for the corridor. But that was not a precondition by
22 our authorities because somebody had taken all of Zvornik. That is to say
23 we simply wanted that part of Zvornik which was ethnically Serb. That is
24 the whole truth with regard to Zvornik, Vlasenica, and I don't know what
25 other municipalities; however, once the war broke out, that was a
1 different matter.
2 But according to the maps, the Muslims had the right to those
3 territories in Zvornik where the Muslims had a majority. The Serbs did
4 not have a majority there, and that was it. And we could not have had a
5 corridor if we could not reach agreement on this and if we did not agree
6 through the international community, too, so nobody has the right to say,
7 "This is my territory" if another people are a majority there. You can
8 only reach agreement if there is mutual consent, and that was the
9 philosophy from day one.
10 Mr. Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg were on a terrace in Zvornik. There
11 is this restaurant there and we were sitting there and talking precisely
12 about that problem. And the Muslim side, afterwards, accepted that the --
13 that Zvornik should belong to the Serb side because they were looking for
14 other parts when we were working on maps. It's not that we said: Ah, we
15 are 20 per cent there -- or actually there's 46 per cent of us -- rather,
16 36 per cent, I'm sorry, and we didn't say, But we want all of this to
17 belong to us. No, no one has the right to take someone else's territory.
18 You have a territory, then you can exchange it, you can reach agreements
19 on the basis of the priorities you have. That's the way it was. That was
20 the principle from the beginning to the end. It's not that that was it,
21 but certain principles were established and we had to abide by that, and
22 I'm saying what the international community, the Muslims, the Croats, and
23 the Serbs knew when the talks were being conducted.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I invited you for five or ten lines
25 because if you give very long answers, there will be less time for
1 additional questions to be put to you.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart. I'm also looking at the clock.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm so sorry. I'm so sorry. I
4 think I spoke temperamentally. Mr. President, I do apologise. I should
5 have spoken less.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. One second, please.
7 Yes, we'll adjourn until a quarter past 4.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.32 p.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We had a bit of a late start. That's due to the fact
11 that the Judges wanted to deliberate on the request for more further time
12 from Defence. The decision will be delivered today orally.
13 I was informed that the review of the CD-ROM was not successful --
14 DVD video. If a copy could be made by the Defence, nothing else on it, so
15 that Mr. Krajisnik could look at it in his cell, fine. Otherwise, next
16 break, new chances, I would say, to be successful -- but I take it if it's
17 on a CD-ROM or a DVD, that it could be easily copied.
18 MR. STEWART: We can easily do that, I'm sure, Your Honour --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
20 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, during the negotiations -- and I'm talking about
22 the -- the later negotiations in which Mr. Okun was involved, did you, the
23 Bosnian Serbs, did you seek to recover in those negotiations territories
24 which you regarded as having been lost to Serbs during the Second World
1 A. No. No, we did not ask for those territories, but in various
2 talks, at Assemblies, when different maps were drawn, and perhaps even in
3 talks with various representatives, we presented this problem of the
4 ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially certain areas, had
5 changed because of the genocide against the Serbs during the Second World
6 War. That was one reason. So it's not that it was that important a
7 reason in the drawing of the maps, but in the talks it was important and
8 this was done with the aim of obtaining a better position in the
9 negotiating process. We did the maps on the basis of the census that was
10 carried out after the Second World War; '71, '81, '91, that is.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
12 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this is at page 4168 of the
14 Q. -- the -- Mr. Okun had made a note in relation to a comment by
15 Dr. Karadzic that, as he recorded it: "Muslims want the whole of Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina: High birth rate." And he was asked by Mr. Tieger: "Was
17 the reference to the alleged birth rate of the Muslims a reference that
18 was unique to a particular meeting in question or was it a recurring
19 theme?" And he said it was a recurring theme. And then in his next
20 answer, he said: "The Bosnian Serb leadership held steadily to the point
21 of view that they needed their own Republika Srpska with their own ruling
22 institutions in order to ward off majoritarian rule by the Bosnian
23 Muslims ..." and I won't bother with the rest of the answer,
24 Mr. Krajisnik, because my question is: Did you in those negotiations,
25 those talks, mention or raise the question of the Muslim birth rate?
1 A. Yes, it was mentioned during the course of the negotiations.
2 That's a fact. But that was of secondary importance, not primary
3 importance. It was mentioned that the Muslims had a higher birth rate,
4 higher than the other two ethnic groups.
5 Q. And then - and this is 4169 of the transcript - Mr. Okun was
6 asked: "And was the emphasis on the number of Muslims who would live
7 within territories held or occupied by Bosnian Serbs a matter of recurring
8 interest to the Bosnian Serb leadership?"
9 And he said: "No. They didn't emphasise that so much because
10 they knew what they were doing. They were removing Muslims from the
11 territory. It was happening, they knew it. They were ordering -- I mean
12 they were in charge of it, so they were aiming to make their future
13 Republika Srpska as ethnically pure as they could. This was one of their
14 six goals, and they made no secret of that fact, but of course they didn't
15 advertise it either."
16 Mr. Krajisnik, at -- at any time when you were engaged in
17 continuing talks in which Mr. Okun was also engaged, was it the position
18 that you, the Bosnian Serb leadership, were removing Muslims from
19 territory or causing them to be removed?
20 A. That is absolutely incorrect. I don't know how Mr. Okun could
21 come to that conclusion. We never said that, not at a single meeting that
22 I attended, and where I know that my colleagues attended, too, along with
23 them. In all talks it was quite clear that everybody should return to
24 their homes, and that was our objective, and we agreed on that in every
25 one of these agreements that was made, not to remove anyone by force.
1 That was not the policy and we never said that.
2 Q. My question was very strictly different, Mr. Krajisnik, which was
3 not whether you said it but whether it was, in fact, happening. Could you
4 answer that question in those specific terms, please.
5 A. As for the knowledge I had, it was -- well, knowledge. I mean
6 what I managed to hear from my colleagues and what they said publicly,
7 that these were voluntary departures of the Muslims, that they were
8 exercising their right to the freedom of movement. I don't know on what
9 conditions people from the municipalities who testified here left, but I
10 heard this same story that was presented here from Serbs, too, Serb
11 witnesses who appeared before this court.
12 Q. Then further on in the transcript, it was actually the following
13 day, 23rd of June --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask for one clarification. Only on the first
15 part of your answer, Mr. Krajisnik. You said you heard from your
16 colleagues and what they said publicly. Who did you have in mind?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I heard the statement of
18 Mr. Karadzic after the meeting with Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen in Banja Luka.
19 "There is no ethnic cleansing in our parts. We allow the freedom of
20 movement." I heard that when he returned, too, when he returned to Pale.
21 That's what I heard. It was made in public, that statement. It's in the
22 newspapers, too.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Were you aware of the numbers, approximately?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I knew nothing of that
25 phenomenon. I'm just saying that I heard this in general terms. I know
1 about the Muslims leaving Pale and I can talk about that; as for the rest,
2 I didn't know who left how and in which way and from which areas and
3 whether they actually left at that point in time.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And -- you said: "I heard this same story that was
5 presented here from Serbs, too, Serb witnesses who appeared before this
7 What did they tell us?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Serb witnesses said that Muslims put
9 forth requests that they wanted to leave and that they were leaving
10 voluntarily. That is what I heard later, I'm saying later, that there
11 were departures of Muslims. And before I got here, I never heard of
12 expulsions of Muslims, but here I heard Muslim witnesses stating that they
13 had been expelled. But now I'm talking about my own knowledge.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Is it your testimony that before you arrived in The
15 Hague you never heard about expulsion of Muslims, Mr. Krajisnik, not from
16 1995 up till the moment that you were arrested?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assure you, Mr. President, from
18 every municipality from where Muslims left, whoever I talked to in the
19 following years, everybody told me that Muslims wanted to leave and that
20 they left voluntarily. I never heard from a single local official that
21 they said that they had expelled Muslims. I'm talking about something
22 that was perhaps a rare topic of conversation. But that there were
23 population movements, I knew that. And I knew that that happened
24 throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I did not hear of
25 anyone expelling anyone.
1 JUDGE ORIE: You now limit your source of knowledge as local
2 officials. Did you hear any such story from others than, perhaps, these
3 local officials?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're asking me about up until
5 1995, whether I had heard of expulsions of Muslims. I'm saying --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No --
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You asked me about before that --
8 JUDGE ORIE: I asked you about until your arrival in The Hague,
9 because that was your testimony.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could you please be
11 clearer, and then I'm going to give you an answer. Could you just tell me
12 what the question is that I'm supposed to answer. I told you about what I
13 knew up until 1995, and now you're asking me whether I heard about it from
14 somebody else. Tell me who this somebody else is and then I'm going to
15 tell you, gladly, who I heard what from. But who do you have in mind?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, your testimony is on the transcript as
17 saying: "And before I got here, I never heard of expulsion of Muslims,
18 but here I heard Muslim witnesses stating that they had been expelled.
19 But now I'm talking about my own knowledge."
20 Then I asked you whether it was your testimony that before you
21 arrived in The Hague, because the word "here" expressed twice, I
22 understood that as here, in The Hague, I asked you whether you -- whether
23 it was your testimony that before you arrived in The Hague that you never
24 heard about expulsion of Muslims. And I added to that: "Not from 1995 up
25 till the moment that you were arrested," so that's after the conflict.
1 And then in your answer you said: "Everybody told me that Muslims
2 wanted to leave and that they left voluntarily. I never heard from a
3 single local official that they said that they had expelled Muslims."
4 And then I said: "But did you hear that from anyone else,
5 perhaps, between 1995 up till your arrival in The Hague?"
6 That's what I asked you. I thought it was a very clear question.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm just asking who you mean? Do
8 you mean local officials or some objective foreigner?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Whoever. Whoever, Mr. Krajisnik. You said: "I
10 never heard about it until my arrival in The Hague."
11 Then I asked you, "Is it true that you tell us that you never
12 heard that even after 1995?"
13 And then you said, "I never heard it from local officials."
14 My next question then was: "Did you hear it from anyone else
15 since 1995?" I'm not saying by whom -- from whom, but I'm just asking
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm a mature person. I
18 cannot be playing games of riddles. I'm going to tell you what I heard in
19 1993, 1994, 1995. I'm going to tell you that I heard the statements of
20 Owen and Vance, and I heard what Mazowiecki, said, and when I asked my
21 colleagues, the locals, whether that was true, they said: No, it's not
22 true. That's the point of my answer.
23 And then as for these people who were on the ground who were
24 objective, they said: That is not correct. And I said that from them I
25 did not hear that anybody had been expelled. There were Muslim statements
1 about expulsions, there were different statements, but this is the point
2 of my answer. I mean, I'm not used to this, whether I'm going to make a
3 mistake in using a word or two. Just ask me and I'm going to tell you
4 everything; what I heard, who I heard it from, whether I heard it from a
5 president of a municipality or whatever. No, I did not hear it from a
6 president of a municipality. They said that they left voluntarily. I
7 heard Mazowiecki, I heard Vance, I heard Owen. I heard different
8 statements from Muslims too, and so on and so forth. That's the truth,
9 and that's why I'm saying that I'm afraid I'm going to fall into a trap.
10 I don't want this to be like I'm in a quiz, and I want to tell the truth.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I now understand your testimony to be that the
12 internationals, to put it briefly, confronted you with accusations,
13 allegations, of Muslims being removed, and you heard from your people that
14 they only used their freedom of movement and they all voluntarily left.
15 And your conclusion then was that your people were given the right
16 information and the internationals gave you wrong information. Is that a
17 correct understanding of your testimony?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just one slight correction: It
19 wasn't the international representatives who confronted me with this, but
20 I heard their statements in the media, in the newspapers. And I saw
21 Karadzic's statement and Vance-Owen's, and I asked Karadzic which of this
22 is correct, tell me. And he said it's not a correct what they say. I
23 have a written report from the army that met with Vance and Owen at that
24 time and they took pleasure in hearing them say positive things, and then
25 they went to the Muslim side, sat down with them, and gained a different
1 impression, saying that there was ethnic cleansing.
2 So I have all this indirect information. And when I met some
3 local representative, I don't know -- I can't say when I met local
4 representatives, but anyway, they always spoke about the voluntary
5 departure of Muslims. So that's why I say that I don't know that anybody
6 was expelled. I have no direct knowledge of that because I was under the
7 conviction that it was as I was told. I don't deny that it happened, but
8 I'm just saying what my role was. It wasn't that Owen and Stoltenberg
9 told me, and Vance, it was that Karadzic in Banja Luka told me about it,
10 and I read it in the papers and I asked him, and he got his answers from
11 the local structures as to whether this was correct or not correct.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And it was never raised during any meeting with
13 representatives of the international community at which you attended?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If there was some conference or
15 other, then I don't exclude that at such conferences the question was on
16 the agenda and a debate on the matter was held, and then various sides put
17 forward pro and con arguments and I, as an observer, heard each side out.
18 And when they went back, they would check it out, Mr. Karadzic, Mr.
19 Koljevic, or I don't know who, and then they would receive information
20 from the field saying that that wasn't the case, that the case was
21 different, just like people testified here before the court. So that's
22 the truth of it. Now, I don't say that this was not discussed at some
23 conference, but it was denied by people who were well-informed, who
24 received information, not me -- not I myself; I didn't receive any
25 information or reports.
1 JUDGE ORIE: What newspaper did publish about these allegations
2 made by the representatives of the international community?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I have the papers here. I've
4 got them with me. Whether it was Glas, Srpski Glas, or the Politika Glas
5 from Banja Luka or Politika, the daily from Belgrade. I don't know when I
6 received it, but I know that I did read that somewhere there. And I can
7 document that for you and show you the newspapers, and I can also provide
8 you with the military report as well.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
10 No ...
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
13 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the transcript reference now is 4187. Mr. Tieger
15 asked: "Ambassador," Mr. Okun, "I would like to begin with something you
16 raised in your testimony yesterday. In response to a question about the
17 number of Muslims who would live within territories held by the Bosnian
18 Serbs, you referred to the removal of Muslims from the territory and the
19 ethnic cleansing of Muslims by the Bosnian Serb forces. First, can I ask
20 you about the sources of information that you and the Secretary Vance and
21 the other negotiators had concerning the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from
22 territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina by Bosnian Serb forces?"
23 And Mr. Okun's answer was: "The first indication, and it was
24 official and written, came from the plebiscite that the Bosnian Serb
25 Assembly ordered in November, 1991. There was a plebiscite of the Bosnian
1 Serb people to decide whether to opt for remaining in a Bosnian Serb
2 entity and also Yugoslavia. And one might have thought that there would
3 be just a general plebiscite, you know, of the million and a quarter or so
4 Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it was not organised that
5 way. It was organised opstina by opstina. And a very important,
6 significant aspect was the decision written into the rules of the
7 plebiscite that in any opstina where more than 50 per cent of the Serbs
8 voted in favour of Republika Srpska, regardless of the size of the
9 opstina, regardless of their percentage in the opstina, that opstina
10 became part of the Republika Srpska."
11 Now, the -- Mr. Krajisnik, the answer hasn't finished yet, but I
12 just want to ask you: So far, are you in agreement simply with Mr. Okun's
13 description of how he understood the plebiscite to have worked?
14 A. His conclusion was erroneous, Mr. Okun's, as to the goal of why
15 the -- or the reason why the plebiscite was organised. I can explain that
16 to you, if you like.
17 Q. Well, we'll take it in stages, Mr. Krajisnik. First of all, his
18 description of the mechanics of the plebiscite, do you agree that he's got
19 that correct, without going any further?
20 A. No, he didn't give the right description. The plebiscite has --
21 had as its goal that the Serbs, and the others, should state their views
22 to say whether they thought Bosnia should remain in Yugoslavia or not.
23 Q. Well, as far as this specific bit is concerned he said: "A
24 significant aspect was that it was written into the rules of the
25 plebiscite that in any opstina where more than 50 per cent of Serbs voted
1 in favour of Republika Srpska, that opstina," however many Serbs there
2 were there, "became part of Republika Srpska." Was that technically a
3 correct description of the way the plebiscite worked?
4 A. No, that's not the correct description. It was clear that the
5 areas which came out in favour of Yugoslavia, that population in those
6 areas, was considered -- or rather, it voted for Bosnia and Herzegovina to
7 remain within Yugoslavia; and therefore, it can be considered that they
8 gave this positive opinion and represented part of Yugoslavia in the
9 figurative sense, not in the --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I have to stop you here. First you
11 answered the question by saying that Mr. -- the witness at that time
12 didn't give the -- didn't give the goal of it. He never said anything
13 about the goal; he just described the rules applicable. Now in your last
14 answer you, again, do not respond to what it is. He said what the rules
15 were. He explained that. Is there anything wrong in the rules as he
16 explained them? And please then tell us what is wrong.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't understand what his rules
18 were. I'm saying what the aim of holding a plebiscite was. There were no
19 rules. It was just answering a question: Were you in favour of
20 Yugoslavia or not?
21 JUDGE ORIE: No. He is talking about how -- and let me just -- it
22 was the portion read to you by Mr. Stewart. One second, please --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand what Mr. Stewart read
24 out. I understand that. Those were the results of the plebiscite --
25 JUDGE ORIE: No, he said it was organised opstina by opstina. Is
1 that correct?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right; in every opstina
3 -- or almost every opstina.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then he said a significant aspect was the decision
5 written into the rules of the plebiscite, and then he explains that:
6 "In any opstina where more than 50 per cent of the Serbs voted in favour
7 of the Republika Srpska, regardless of the size of the opstina, regardless
8 of their percentage in the opstina, that opstina became part of the
9 Republika Srpska."
10 So the rule was if a majority of Serbs voted in favour of - well,
11 let's say Republika Srpska - then that would be enough to become part of
12 Republika Srpska. He -- that's the rule he explains. What -- if it's not
13 correct, please tell us what's wrong; if it is correct, please tell us as
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That rule did not exist because we
16 didn't vote for Republika Srpska but for Yugoslavia.
17 JUDGE ORIE: For Yugoslavia, same question. Let's say if more
18 than 50 per cent of the Serbs voted -- well, let's say then in favour of
19 Yugoslavia, that that would be an outcome that would guide the politicians
20 or whoever was in charge of that what should be done. Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, you asked me what the
22 rules were --
23 JUDGE ORIE: No, no --
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was the rule --
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking you --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, with your permission --
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking you what is wrong in what Mr. Okun said
3 about the rules, the core being that if more than 50 per cent of the Serbs
4 voting -- voted in direction A, that it would be direction A. That's the
5 rule he describes.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I described to you -- how is
7 it that you don't understand me, Mr. President, you're not understanding
8 me? I'll explain, if you have the patience to listen. His rules were
9 wrong. The general rule was that each and every Serb could state their
10 views when this plebiscite was organised, every Serb in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, to say whether he was in favour of Yugoslavia or not. Two or
12 three opstinas did not vote, but when the results came out, then those
13 were the consequences of the plebiscite, whereas he is talking about the
14 rules of the plebiscite. So the rules had to exist before the plebiscite
15 was organised. That's why I'm saying that his rules weren't good. We
16 didn't vote in Republika Srpska on percentages and so on. It was a vote
17 on the part of the Serb people, saying whether they were in favour of
18 Yugoslavia or not.
19 And I can answer your question, that's another matter, that is the
20 consequence of the plebiscite and the discussions later on. So that's the
21 essence of it.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please -- Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise for being so
24 temperamental. I don't want to lead anyone astray, but you have the rules
25 of the plebiscite, you can see that quite clearly, that's why I said they
1 were wrong. The question was: Do you want to live together in
2 Yugoslavia, not Republika Srpska. What you're saying happened later on,
3 in the Cutileiro Plan, that if there was a majority population, it would
4 belong to that ethnic group and so on, but not at this time. That was
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Okun gave a clear example of how it
7 worked immediately in the passage following the -- where he said this was
8 a significant aspect of it. Would it be of any use to put that to
9 Mr. Krajisnik and then ask whether that is a correct understanding of how
10 it worked?
11 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm going to try that. If that doesn't
12 work, Your Honour, and gives rise to the same confusion, then I have an
13 alternative strategy, Your Honour, to try to come back --
14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm glad to hear that you want to put the example to
15 Mr. Krajisnik.
16 MR. STEWART: Yes, that's certainly what I had in mind, Your
17 Honour, but I might go to the alternative strategy and come back later.
18 We'll see how we go.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. STEWART: Mr. Okun put some flesh on it by giving a specific
21 example with numbers. He said, for example, you take an opstina -- I'm
22 going to summarise where I think it will help, Your Honour.
23 Q. You take an opstina that's got 10.000 voters, and half of them are
24 Muslims, 5.000 Muslims; only 3.000 Serbs; and only 2.000 Croats, but I
25 don't think that Croats are particularly important in this example. The
1 point is that the 3.000 Serbs are a minority. If -- what Mr. Okun was
2 saying, the way the plebiscite worked was that if 2.000 of those 3.000
3 Serbs voted to remain in Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia, so that was a
4 clear majority of the Serbs voting in the plebiscite, that the result of
5 the way the plebiscite was organised and the way the results were applied
6 was that that opstina then was automatically declared a part of Republika
7 Srpska --
8 A. No. Look at Tuzla. 20.000 Serbs. Had all 20.000 voted, if you
9 have 80.000 Muslims, it couldn't be Serb. But those people came out in
10 favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that didn't mean that Tuzla would be
11 Yugoslavia. How could that be? I don't understand.
12 Q. And you see, what --
13 A. I do apologise. Just a moment, please. 99 per cent of Serbs
14 voted in favour of Yugoslavia. That would mean that 99 per cent of Bosnia
15 ought to be Republika Srpska, or 98 per cent. That would be impossible.
16 Somewhere you have five individuals, ten, 10 per cent or whatever. It was
17 just the will of the Serb people, asking the will -- what the will of the
18 Serb people was, whether they were in favour of Yugoslavia or not, and it
19 had nothing to do with territorial rounding off of the territory. That's
20 why his conclusions were erroneous.
21 Q. What Mr. Okun was suggesting was that the plebiscite was -- and he
22 used the phrase, "the first indication," and it's clear that he meant the
23 first indication of ethnic cleansing. That is plain from the totality of
24 his answer, that that was the first indication of ethnic cleansing
25 because, as he put it, what was going to happen to the 7.000? So you have
1 the 5.000 Muslims, the 2.000 Croats, and the 3.000 Serbs. And what
2 Mr. Okun was saying was the way it worked was that if the majority of
3 Serbs voted yes in the plebiscite, yes to being in Yugoslavia, yes to
4 being in Republika Srpska, that that involved contemplation by the Bosnian
5 Serb leadership that at some point those 7.000 would have to leave that
6 opstina. That is --
7 MR. STEWART: I think, Your Honour, that is a fair summary of what
8 Mr. Okun was plainly saying.
9 Q. Was that correct or not?
10 A. The question was asked of Your Honour, as far as I understood it.
11 Q. No, Mr. Krajisnik, I was just checking that the -- that the Trial
12 Chamber, who is important, were happy that I had correctly summarised -
13 and I'm sure Mr. Tieger or Mr. Harmon would have objected if I hadn't -
14 that I had correctly summarised the essence of Mr. Okun's answer. And so
15 the way I have described it to you seems to, for the purposes of the
16 question, to have general approval. He was saying it involved a
17 contemplation, even at that fairly early stage in November, 1991, that at
18 some point those 7.000 Muslims and Croats together would have to leave
19 that opstina. That's the point that's being made by Mr. Okun, and the
20 question is: Was he right?
21 A. No, he was not right because the plebiscite came after the
22 proclamation on the declaration of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 That means all the Serbs should take flight and say we have to leave
24 because we don't recognise a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas
25 they did not leave. We considered that the Muslims wanted us to leave
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plebiscite was testing the will of the Serb
2 people, nothing more than that.
3 Q. Then what Mr. Okun went on to say was that we -- and he clearly
4 meant he and his colleagues from other countries participating in the
5 various talks: "We had noticed and saw the request for assistance from
6 the JNA in December, 1991, to protect the Bosnian Serb people in these
7 places," he was talking actually about a request made to the JNA for their
8 assistance, "to protect the Bosnian Serb people in the areas where the
9 plebiscite had been held." He said that was very similar to what had
10 happened in Croatia by way of request to the JNA for assistance. The way
11 he put it was: "The same game was being played," though he meant game in
12 a sinister way, plainly. "That was December, 1991, and these were
13 official documents."
14 So again, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to risk summarising the essence
15 here. What Mr. Okun was saying was that this request for assistance to
16 the JNA was a disguised way of saying to the JNA: We are going to want
17 your help in driving these people and getting these people out of this
18 municipality or these municipalities. That's what Mr. Okun was saying.
19 Was he right about that?
20 A. No, he wasn't right. On the 15th of December a request came from
21 the European Community that Bosnia and Herzegovina should put itself
22 forward to become an independent country, unconstitutionally, bypassing
23 the members of the Presidency and the government, and the request was sent
24 out bypassing them, and we felt ourselves to be jeopardised and we sent
25 out a request to say we were jeopardised. And to the armed forces we
1 said: You should protect the Serb people if they were jeopardised and
2 under threat because the declaration foresaw Bosnia-Herzegovina to adopt
3 certain conventions on national minorities, and we were supposed to become
4 a national minority if that went through. This would lead to untoward
5 consequences. We just felt jeopardised. We didn't send this out to
6 anybody else except to a legal armed force, the sole legal armed force
7 that existed. We didn't send our request out to any paramilitaries or
8 anything like that.
9 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour.
10 [Defence counsel confer]
11 MR. STEWART: Yes, Mr. Sladojevic suggests, Your Honour, that a
12 word is missing from the transcript. At line 16 and 17, Mr. Krajisnik
13 said "become an independent country, unconstitutionally, bypassing the
14 members of the Presidency," and Mr. Sladojevic heard it as the Serb
15 members of the Presidency, which -- well, Your Honour, I venture it, that
16 -- it makes some sense, but we can, no doubt, confirm as necessary.
17 Mr. Krajisnik's nodding --
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, yes, Mr. Sladojevic is
19 quite right.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then please proceed.
21 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
22 Q. Yes, on -- this is a different page. Moving on. On page 4189 of
23 the transcript of Mr. Okun's evidence, he mentioned the proclamation of
24 Republika Srpska. He was asked halfway down the page: "Were there
25 organisations -" and the question was about international organisations -
1 "responsible for monitoring what was happening in those -- those regions?"
2 He had been talking particularly about areas along the Drina, but I -- it
3 doesn't probably matter for these purposes to identify specifically the
4 regions. It was the regions where there were problems and conflict.
5 "Did you receive information from such organisations about what
6 was happening on the ground?
7 "A. Yes, at first we received quite detailed information from the
8 EC organisation -- EC Monitoring Mission and then from the UNPROFOR troops
9 as well.
10 "Q. And after the conflict erupted with more intensity in April
11 and May and June -" and that's 1992 we're talking about - "did you receive
12 information from such organisations as the ICRC -" International Committee
13 of Red Cross - "UNHCR and others who had representatives in the region and
14 were monitoring what was happening?
15 "A. Very much so. By June -" and that's June, 1992 - "camps were
16 already being formed. Detention centres, large-scale detention centres,
17 particularly in the west of Banja Luka, around Prijedor, Trnopolje, a
18 very, very big, the Omarska camp, which was much worse, a real
19 concentration camp, these had already been formed and there were thousands
20 upon thousands of primarily Bosnian Muslims but also Bosnian Croats
21 civilians, men, women, and children held in these centres. There then
22 ensued quite a lengthy and painful discussion among the humanitarian
23 agencies with the Bosnian Serb leadership about what to do with the people
24 because it's a terrible moral dilemma."
25 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, do you -- let's take this in specific
1 stages and specific questions. Do you at this point, Mr. Krajisnik, in
2 2006, do you dispute that by June, 1992, such detention centres and camps
3 had been established?
4 A. I learnt that here, and I don't challenge that. And I can provide
5 you with documents which the MUP sought information and received reports
6 that there were no camps in Prijedor from the chief of police. That means
7 that the wrong information was provided to the minister, Mr. Stanisic, and
8 I can give you indictments to bear that out. Now, I can see that, yes,
9 Omarska existed and so did Keraterm and the rest of them.
10 Q. Were you involved in any discussions, in the first place, up to or
11 during June, 1992, any time before that or during June of that year, with
12 any humanitarian agencies about what to do with people in camps, problems
13 about prisoners, this terrible dilemma that Mr. Okun was referring to?
14 A. I did not talk to anyone; other people talked later.
15 Q. When did you first come to realise that the existence of such
16 camps was a real genuine possibility?
17 A. That's in the records of the Presidency exactly; sometime between
18 July and August, where strict instructions were given to the government to
19 investigate that. Information was received in return, and after that,
20 concrete measures were taken to disband the camps, to check things out, to
21 release people, for international organisations to come in, and so on and
22 so forth. Before that, I was not aware of any information from that area
23 and I did not have any information from there.
24 Q. Mr. Okun was asked - and this is page 4191 of the transcript:
25 "Did you and Secretary Vance have occasions to let the Bosnian Serb
1 leadership, including Mr. Krajisnik, know that you were aware of
2 widespread ethnic cleansing or ongoing ethnic cleansing?"
3 And I'm going to read the next question and answer first,
4 Mr. Krajisnik.
5 He said: "Yes, repeatedly."
6 The question was: "What was their response, Ambassador? Was
7 there any meaningful attempt to deny that cleansing had taken place or was
9 He said: "No, they didn't deny it. The typical, indeed, almost
10 invariable response was to point out the genocide that had been practiced
11 against the Serbs in World War II and earlier periods or to point to
12 crimes that were allegedly being committed in -- at the present time,
13 1992, 1993, 1991, whatever, mostly in 1992 and 1993, that were crimes
14 against them."
15 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I believe it's only fair on your behalf, as it
16 were, to observe that clearly Mr. Okun is not being absolutely precise
17 about dates in that answer. That's absolutely plain. But what he is
18 saying very clearly is that at some point in the discussions with you and
19 your colleagues, they made it very clear to people, including you
20 specifically, that they, Mr. Okun and his colleagues, were aware of
21 widespread ethnic cleansing. Is that correct, that they did let you know
22 about that?
23 A. I've already said that in 1993, from January to May, there were
24 negotiations in which Mr. Okun took part, except for this one meeting, as
25 far as I can remember, and that was in 1992. At that time, in 1993, there
1 were some discussions and I mentioned that there were self accusations of
2 ethnic cleansing and they were given answers by Mr. Karadzic and
3 Mr. Koljevic, stating that that was not true. I will remind you of this:
4 Mr. Koljevic, with the president of the International Red Cross made a --
5 reached an agreement in October, 1992. There's a statement of the
6 International Red Cross stimulating the moving out of population from
7 jeopardised areas in 1993 and 1994. I have all of that, where the
8 population is in jeopardy. Also on the 15th of June the Muslim side set
9 up a commission making it possible for the population to leave endangered
10 areas, that is to say, population movements. So that was the case.
11 And then there is this statement made by Mr. Owen and Stoltenberg
12 -- no, sorry, Mr. Vance, from October, 1992, where they stated publicly
13 that they knew about ethnic cleansing after having spoken to the Muslim
14 representatives separately from the Serbs. There is a report, an official
15 report, of the army about a meeting with Vance and Owen before that when
16 they were pleased with what they saw. There is also a public report of
17 Minister Kushner [phoen] who visited prisons, who said: Yes, these are
18 prisons but not concentration camps. That's the information that I
20 At these meetings that were held, I did not gain the impression
21 that Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic ever accepted ethnic cleansing. No,
22 that is certainly wrong. They were receiving information that Muslims
23 were leaving voluntarily. I never heard them confirming that they were
24 pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing. If there was a meeting apart from
25 me, then I would like to know what time that was and then I can see. But
1 I never heard of the Serb side agreeing to ethnic cleansing; this is not
2 to say that it never took place, though.
3 Q. Is it -- he says very clearly -- Mr. Okun says in his evidence
4 that you and your colleagues didn't deny that ethnic cleansing had taken
5 place or was continuing. Is that -- is he right about that, that you
6 didn't deny it?
7 A. I can say that at all meetings that I attended, no such thing ever
8 took place. I mean - how should I put this? - the Serb side never
9 accepted that they were conducting ethnic cleansing. Let me be quite
10 clear on that. On the contrary, they were denying ethnic cleansing.
11 That's what I know. As for movements of population, they did take place,
12 and it was clearly explained why. At that time, that's the way it was.
13 Q. When you say it was clearly explained why, you mean you and your
14 colleagues explained to them why that was happening. Is that what you're
16 A. I did not explain anything because I was not out in the area, but
17 I heard the explanations given by Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic who, in a
18 way, took part in the negotiations with Mr. Semaruga [phoen] and all the
19 rest and they were explaining this what I explained previously, they
20 probably said that there was this agreement with the International Red
21 Cross where certain populations were endangered, but I could not explain
22 anything because, quite simply, I participated by way of hearing the
23 things that I'm telling you about now. I can give you all these
24 statements, all these agreements so that you can have a look at them and
25 so that they can be admitted here as documents.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, at, no doubt, some slight risk of repetition, when
2 you said a moment ago that it was clearly explained why movements of
3 population were taking place, what was, essentially, the explanation
5 A. I cannot link this up. I'm saying that it was clear that there
6 had been population movements. It was clear. I mean the population was
7 moving. That's it. Well, not why but that they were moving, the
8 population was moving in different directions. Serbs were leaving some
9 territories and Muslims were leaving Serb territories. We knew about it.
10 I don't know how we knew about it, but we did know. So we knew that there
11 were population movements. As for why, there was this explanation. I
12 told you what I heard later, that it was voluntary. But then it was known
13 to us that there were population movements.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm looking at the clock.
15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm entirely in your hands.
16 JUDGE ORIE: If this would be a suitable moment, we would have a
17 break until ten minutes to 6.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 5.59 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
21 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- Mr. Okun was asked about the relationship
23 between the six strategic objectives, and he was there not talking about
24 the war goals -- wartime goals, as he described them, but the strategic
25 objectives which were discussed in the Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992,
1 and then set out later in the Official Gazette. And the Cutileiro Plan.
2 And he -- it was put to him by Mr. Tieger: "Ambassador, there has been a
3 suggestion in this case that there's a close correlation between the
4 Cutileiro Plan and the --"
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: I didn't get the page, if it was mentioned.
7 MR. STEWART: Oh, I'm so sorry, I didn't give it. That's why,
8 probably. 4194, my apologies. Foot of 4194.
9 Q. "Ambassador, there has been a suggestion in this case that there's
10 a close correlation between the Cutileiro Plan and the strategic
11 objectives and I would like to know from you whether you share that
12 assessment or whether you see significant distinctions between the two."
13 And Mr. Okun said: "Well, there's not a close relationship.
14 There's a relationship insofar as it discusses the three constituent
15 peoples and would give the each of the three peoples -" he mentions - "a
16 juridical identical."
17 And he draws distinctions. He says first of all -- he says, the
18 Cutileiro map didn't give territorial continuity to Republika Srpska,
19 whereas clearly he's saying, well, the six strategic objectives did. Now,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, that's -- you accept that is -- that is a difference
21 between the six strategic objectives and the Cutileiro Plan, is it not?
22 A. That's right. That's the difference between the Cutileiro Plan
23 and the six strategic objectives --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Krajisnik's
25 microphone please be turned on. Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could you turn on the other microphone as well,
2 Mr. Krajisnik, because you're --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm so sorry, I didn't see. It's
4 correct, it's correct, so my answer is yes.
5 MR. STEWART:
6 Q. And the second distinction he drew was that the Cutileiro Plan
7 didn't call for the establishment of a corridor linking Serbia to the
8 Krajina, whereas the six strategic objectives do include a corridor. You
9 would accept, Mr. Krajisnik, would you, that was also a distinction?
10 A. Well, that's the first thing that you said, the territory was not
11 linked up. There was no corridor, so it's one and the same thing,
13 Q. So -- yes. Right. And then he was asked at page 4196: "Did the
14 Cutileiro Plan call for the physical division of Sarajevo into Muslim and
15 Serb parts, separate parts with people segregated?"
16 "I don't believe so" was his answer. So, so far, do you accept
17 that distinction as well, would you, Mr. Krajisnik?
18 A. The Cutileiro Plan envisaged that this be under the UN and that
19 Sarajevo be resolved later, but all other plans envisaged - how should I
20 put this? - a transformation of Sarajevo, one-third/two-thirds, except for
21 his plan -- rather, the Vance-Owen Plan.
22 Q. And he was then asked: "Finally, Ambassador, was the Cutileiro
23 Plan intended as a proposal that would be implemented by agreement?"
24 And he said: "Oh, yes, there was no question of that."
25 Mr. Krajisnik, you would agree with that as well, would you?
1 A. I didn't understand. Perhaps it was misinterpreted. The
2 Cutileiro Plan was supposed to be an agreement among the three parties,
3 but I did not understand your question well -- or rather, I didn't
4 understand this quotation.
5 Q. Just Mr. Okun was saying that the Cutileiro Plan was intended to
6 be implemented by agreement, and I was simply asking you whether you held
7 the same view as Mr. Okun, that it was intended to be implemented by
9 A. Yes, but I understood it differently. I assume it was interpreted
10 differently. Yes, it was supposed to be by way of agreement. Yes.
11 Q. Now, the -- Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we've considered -- I'm not
12 going to go in detail now into the Cutileiro Plan because we've been over
13 that, and we've also considered the six strategic objectives. So far as
14 territory was concerned and any question of gaining of territory in the
15 summer of 1992, were you aware of any instructions or condoning of
16 territory being gained by deliberate driving out of Muslims or Croats?
17 A. Absolutely not. That was no plan, and I do not know of anyone who
18 ordered anyone else to expel the civilian population. If anything did
19 happen, it was the movement of the population. And that happened in every
20 territory that I knew of; Serb and Muslim. Now, was it fear or was it
21 something else? But anyway, that was my understanding of it then, of what
22 I managed to see around Sarajevo.
23 Q. Now, as far as Sarajevo itself is concerned, just go -- it's back
24 in the transcript at 4191, Mr. Okun said that -- he indicated that the
25 question of shelling of Sarajevo was brought up by him and/or his
1 colleagues in meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership. Now, first of
2 all, is that correct? Do you recall that they did bring up the question
3 of shelling of Sarajevo by Serbs?
4 A. I don't know whether they brought that up, but there was this
5 ongoing question of Sarajevo and the shelling of Sarajevo. I would like
6 to explain this. When I attended meetings, when the military were
7 supposed to explain to us why we were being accused of shelling Sarajevo,
8 the answer we always got was that they were attacking Serb positions, that
9 they had a lot more - how should I put this? - a lot more infantry. And
10 the only way in which one could respond was to respond in that way to
11 these attacks. There are a few cases here where we said or, rather, where
12 there is this conclusion by way of request, a bit more strongly worded,
13 that they should not shell Sarajevo because that harms our political
14 objectives. And the chairman once asked one witness: Why do you not want
15 to shell Sarajevo now? Is it because of the international community? So
16 this was on the assumption -- see, even if you are right, if you have to
17 defend yourselves from Muslim attacks, do not shell because we keep being
18 accused of shelling Sarajevo and it, therefore, becomes impossible to
19 continue negotiations. So even if you were attacked, do not respond by
20 gun-fire because that harms the negotiations. And that's why it was said
21 on account of the international community.
22 I cannot say that hundreds of times the problem of Sarajevo was
23 not referred to. Was somebody attacking, were Serbs encircling Sarajevo?
24 And on most occasions it was the Serbs that were accused most of the time.
25 I don't know whether it was at conferences, but it was on an everyday
1 basis, if I can put it that way, and even the Serb artillery was
2 eliminated, and so on.
3 Q. At page 4205 of the transcript in answer to a question -- I don't
4 really need, I think, the question here, Mr. Okun said: "That was the
5 position of the Bosnian Serbs throughout the whole period, that the
6 communities, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had to be separated. They
7 could not live together. Now, again it has to be borne in mind that very
8 large sections, most of Bosnia, was thoroughly intermixed. This was not a
9 physical area which, while it had 44 per cent Muslim population, 31 per
10 cent Serb, 19, 20 Croat, et cetera, that the people were living apart,
11 they were thoroughly intermixed and -- but the burden of that remark -"
12 and the remark was the remark by Dr. Karadzic that the communities could
13 not live together - "was that they had to be taken apart. And that, of
14 course, is what ethnic cleansing was designed to do."
15 And again, Mr. Krajisnik, the clear thrust is that ethnic
16 cleansing -- and we explored a definition of ethnic cleansing not too long
17 ago in this court, that ethnic cleansing was a deliberate policy of
18 Bosnian Serb leadership. Was that true at any time?
19 A. I am going to say no, but please, could I give an additional
20 answer as well?
21 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, your answer, therefore, is no. You've made
22 that clear. And if you then wish to supplement it, please do.
23 A. In the quotation you read out in terms of Mr. Okun's testimony,
24 you said that the Serbs advocated a policy whereby they did not want to
25 live together with the Muslims and Croats. In Yugoslavia we all lived
1 together, and the main point of the Muslims and the Serbs was that they
2 did not want to live in the same state with the Serbs because they were
3 afraid of being out-voted. And then they started out-voting the Serbs in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then we said: Now we are afraid to stay with you
5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, because if you're violating
6 the constitution now, what are you going to do later when there is an
7 independent state? So the reason was that you didn't want to be a
8 minority in Yugoslavia. Well, we don't want to be a minority with you
9 because you violate the constitution and you keep out-voting us in an
10 unconstitutional way. And that is why the deal was made. Give up on
11 Yugoslavia and we are going to give up on the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina,
12 and you will get a constituent unit of your own.
13 So it's not that the Serbs started saying from that moment: We
14 cannot live with you. Before that it was the Muslims who said: We cannot
15 live with you in Yugoslavia because we are going to be a minority. We
16 want to be in Bosnia. If you want to be in Bosnia, what we give you in
17 Yugoslavia, you should give us in Bosnia. The whole philosophy was that.
18 Now, he is starting this lesson from the middle; he's not starting from
19 the very beginning. The times were such that everybody wanted to have
20 some kind of autonomy and decision-making. We made them an offer.
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina with all the prerogatives of a state but let it just be
22 under the umbrella of Yugoslavia. They didn't want that. Give that to us
23 in Bosnia, nothing more than that.
24 As for this separation -- as for this separation that Mr. Okun is
25 referring to, you see, principles were set. And of course there would be
1 arbitration, commissions, is it going to be this census or that census?
2 It is not correct that something cannot be divided, but we didn't want to
3 divide. Somewhere you'd be a minority and -- like in any state -- I mean,
4 I hope that there is not a single state that is pure. There are
5 minorities, they live there, they enjoy all their ethnic rights. But -
6 how should I put this? - the majority is satisfied autonomously and at the
7 level of Bosnia we all have the same rights. And this was ultimately
8 achieved but through a war. We should have done it without a war.
9 As for ethnic cleansing -- sorry. Well, if you want, I can
10 explain some other things, too, but I already said that our -- that ethnic
11 cleansing was not our policy. As for me, you have explicit statements
12 made in 1992 where I oppose ethnic cleansing. I left my own home and my
13 hearth, and I know what it is to be a refugee. I know what it's like. I
14 wouldn't wish for anyone to be a refugee. I want everybody to go back
15 home and to go back to their property, because that cannot be replaced by
16 anything else. I would never want to advocate a policy vis-a-vis others
17 of something that I would not wish upon myself. And this indeed happened.
18 Many people left their homes. And now an analysis should be made as to
19 why this happened. There are several reasons for that. One of the
20 reasons is forcible expulsions. I mean by force, things done by force.
21 And there are many things that happened during the war by way of
22 population movements.
23 Your Honours, I'm just going to take up a bit more of your time.
24 I already mentioned that there is this brochure that was officially
25 written by Bosnia-Herzegovina where there are 260.000 Serb refugees,
1 216.000 Muslims, and 54 per cent of all Serbs are refugees. But I do not
2 think that they were all expelled. Many fled from the war. You have
3 indicators here showing that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina during
4 the war reached a conclusion to the effect that the population can move
5 out of endangered areas, just like our objective was a certain principle,
6 namely that anyone during the war can have freedom of movement and decide
7 where they want to go until the war is over.
8 Let me just say one more thing. On the 12th of May there was an
9 Assembly meeting, in 1992. The next one was at the end of July. So for
10 almost three months there were no Assembly sessions. That's why I didn't
11 know about camps or anything else. Then I went to the London Conference
12 at the end of July, and then in the month of August there were various
13 activities regarding camps, movements, et cetera. That can be checked
14 out, and on that session of the 25th of July, look at the transcript,
15 Karadzic said: I was informed - probably by these MPs - that there are
16 some criminal actions that were taken, impermissible actions that were
17 taken, and also some criminal acts. He probably thought in the case of
18 these exchanges. All of that is going to be annulled and all of those
19 committing crimes are going to be punished. You will see that in the
20 record. The first time prisons were referred to was on the 10th of
21 August, 1992, in Banja Luka, and the objection was that I did not allow
22 that to be part of the session. And I will explain that, if anybody asks
23 me about this, because also on the 11th of August there was a session and
24 the government was supposed to prepare material for us to have a debate
25 about this, that is to say about prisons and prisoners. The material had
1 not been prepared, but measures had been taken to disband these camps and
3 Just one more thing: There were some Serb witnesses here too,
4 from Banja Luka. They did not know about the camps in Prijedor. When
5 delegations went there, then they established what was going on. How
6 could I know in Pale what was going on? The MUP didn't know either. They
7 even received return information to the effect that there were no camps,
8 and I could not receive information from anybody else. And on the 25th of
9 July I had to go to London urgently, so I didn't even stay in that session
10 and didn't talk to the MPs. This was in 1992.
11 I'm so sorry, but there is information about all of this.
12 Mr. Okun is probably talking about some different period of time, but at
13 that time that's the way it was, all of it.
14 Q. I want to ask you about Sarajevo. This came up at page 4210 in
15 Mr. Okun's evidence. The question put to him was that: "Did he -- did
16 you -" that is Mr. Okun. "Did you become aware of efforts by Bosnian Serb
17 forces to forcibly achieve the objective was to physically divide Sarajevo
18 into a Serbian and Muslim part where Serbs would live and Muslims would
19 live separately, and that was during the period summer and fall -- summer
20 and autumn of 1992?"
21 And he said: "Yes. That's what the shelling was all about. The
22 shelling was designed to create a, you know, a wall of fire, if you will.
23 I don't want to be melodramatic, but the shelling, in effect, provided a
24 wall of fire between the communities. That's what it was designed to do.
25 The shelling was directed. This was not erratic, unaimed fire.
1 Dr. Karadzic would point that out to us. He would say, for example, after
2 we divide the city, you know, it will be all right for the Muslims to live
3 in, and then he would list two or three areas. So the shelling was part
4 and parcel of the effort to divide the city."
5 Now, does the way Mr. Okun puts it there, does that accurately
6 reflect the factual position and the Bosnian Serb leadership position as
7 far as Sarajevo was concerned in the summer and autumn of 1992?
8 A. Let me repeat, and I think this is important: Whether somebody
9 shelled or whether somebody will shell Sarajevo or not was something that
10 the army decided. But the shelling had political consequences. Whenever
11 we talked to -- or the negotiating team discussed this and said we were
12 receiving objections, the answers we received was that the Muslims have
13 five or ten times more infantry and were breaking through in certain areas
14 and that we were preventing their breakthrough. And then you saw some of
15 the orders and conclusions made, that they should not shell at the cost of
16 I don't know what happening, because that caused problems for us with the
17 international community because they were blaming us and we weren't able
18 to continue the negotiations.
19 So I'm a layman in these terms in -- where the army is concerned.
20 And Mr. Okun was explaining this unprofessionally. You couldn't divide
21 Sarajevo in that way. I don't know what way he had in mind, to be honest.
22 And I don't think that was the purpose of the shelling of Sarajevo. What
23 I learnt through analysis and after the testimony of a protected witness
24 here is that I don't remember that there was any major shelling of
25 Sarajevo ever. I can only assume that some shelling might have taken
1 place which was linked to pulling out the barracks, the people in the
2 barracks. That's what I can assume. But I never -- I can't pin-point
3 that time. I can't identify it in any way. I can't identify any major
4 shelling, particularly not with regard to Sarajevo's division. The map of
5 Sarajevo, from start to finish, only underwent very minor changes, and
6 that was to the detriment of the Serb side in Zabrdje and to the detriment
7 of the Muslim side at Grbavica. All the rest stayed almost the same. So
8 if this was done by some expert to divide Sarajevo, why didn't he divide
9 it by the shelling? I don't think you can divide Sarajevo by the
10 shelling; all you can cause is damage and destruction and commit a crime.
11 So as far as that kind of activity goes, I've never heard about
12 any of that. I didn't hear Karadzic say it. And as far as saying that
13 everybody has his part of Sarajevo, that the Muslims would have a better
14 life in one place and the others in the other, that meant that we would
15 have certain municipalities in Sarajevo, opstinas in Sarajevo, and that
16 was the prime condition of Mr. Cutileiro: Let there be the United
17 Nations, but let also we have parts of Sarajevo where we could have our
18 own power and authority. The Muslims wanted to gain the whole of
19 Sarajevo. They didn't want any transformations to take place whatsoever
20 because they were the majority everywhere, they said.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honours --
22 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik --
23 MR. STEWART: I was proposing to handover to Mr. Josse, Your
24 Honour, at this point because he's got a number of matters to deal with.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
1 MR. STEWART: We take it, Mr. Josse and I, that Your Honours are
2 going to need a few minutes at the end of the session today?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Umm --
4 MR. STEWART: I had in mind the decision that Your Honour's
5 giving --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course you provided the Chamber additional
7 on the basis -- with additional information --
8 MR. STEWART: Well, we used the additional information from the --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
10 MR. STEWART: -- to further the submissions, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: To further make submissions.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: What the Chamber, on the basis of your initial
14 request and upon the further submissions in writing, wants to deliver a
15 decision. We need, I think, seven, eight minutes for that.
16 MR. STEWART: Well, that's helpful, Your Honour. Mr. Josse will
17 be in the driving seat for the next half-hour on our side, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. STEWART: So that's helpful to know.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse.
21 MR. JOSSE: Could I deal with one procedural matter, Your Honour?
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. JOSSE: We'd like to seek leave of the Chamber under Rule 126
24 bis to file a reply to the Prosecution's response to the motion that deals
25 with jurisdiction, in effect.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Jurisdiction.
2 MR. JOSSE: Term of office of Judge Canivell, to be precise. I
3 sent an e-mail to the Legal Officer this morning. It will be filed
4 tomorrow, Your Honour, let me hastily add.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber is not inclined to give an opportunity to
7 file a reply to the Prosecution response, Mr. Josse. You just asked for
8 it. The Chamber would -- you have not given any specific reasons why you
9 would need to reply --
10 MR. JOSSE: Well, Your Honour --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. JOSSE: -- that would take time. It's going to be done
13 tomorrow. It's in the process of being drafted. It will be filed
14 tomorrow. I mean, we're slightly at a loss as to why the Chamber would
15 want to decline further information submissions on what the Defence
16 regards are a rather important topic.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Because the Chamber would like to decide that matter
18 as quickly as possible.
19 MR. JOSSE: Well, if we say it will be filed by 1.00 tomorrow?
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE ORIE: How many pages did you have in mind, Mr. Josse?
22 MR. JOSSE: No more than four.
23 JUDGE ORIE: By 1.00 sharp tomorrow you're allowed to file a
24 response. The Prosecution is invited to look at it immediately because
25 the Chamber wants to dispose of that motion as soon as possible.
1 MR. JOSSE: I will e-mail them a courtesy copy as soon as it's
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Also not more than four pages for the
5 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.
6 MR. JOSSE: The next matter I would like to try and turn to, Your
7 Honour, is to tidy up some of the areas of examination that I've been
8 dealing with with Mr. Krajisnik that still have loose ends, and the first
9 is the map that he drew over the course of the weekend. I hope this
10 won't take very long. Could he have it back and could it have a number,
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, number would be?
13 THE REGISTRAR: D196, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
15 Examination by Mr. Josse: [Continued]
16 Q. Let's take this quite quickly, please, Mr. Krajisnik. You, very
17 helpfully, added a portion to this map to show the route. You've also
18 written two references on it. Perhaps you'd talk the Chamber through it.
19 A. Well, I've found part of the map at a general's place, so these
20 are his markings, Howitzers of some kind or other. But this is the
21 important part of the map, as far as I'm concerned, so I can show this
22 long route that doesn't end here but goes on further towards the north and
23 then turns towards Pale, whereas the other map was just up until this
24 portion here. And here we have the separation line in 1994. That's what
25 it looked like.
1 Q. In red?
2 A. Yes, that's right, the red is the separation line according to --
3 or rather, towards the central part of Bosnia, Visoko, et cetera. So this
4 is part of a military map that I copied. The scale is the same.
5 Q. So the black marks in, I think, Cyrillic have got nothing to do
6 with your diagram?
7 A. No. As this is the line between the Muslims and the Serbs, then
8 he explains some Howitzers, some weapons, but if you can forget about
9 this, for our purposes it's not necessary. What is important is this
10 road, this route, taken by the prisoners.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 I'd like to move to a different topic, if I may. On Wednesday,
13 the 17th of May, I was asking you a series of questions about the
14 departure of the Muslims from Pale. And we got to the point where you had
15 mentioned a series of documents.
16 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, the position is this: That these
17 documents have been reviewed by the Defence, the Defence are anxious to
18 adduce them all, frankly, probably not through this witness but through
19 some other means. I have shared them with Mr. Tieger, frankly, only
20 earlier today. I'm going to ask Mr. Krajisnik some more questions about
21 the departure. It may be that he will want to refer to specific documents
22 in a bundle that I'm about to give him. If he does that, then clearly he
23 should be allowed to, but otherwise we'll try and introduce the documents,
24 as I've already said, by some other means. It will simply be too
25 time-consuming to do it any other way.
1 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it there are no translations?
2 MR. JOSSE: There are no translations. What there are are
3 summaries of all the documents, and they have been attached to the bundles
4 that I can hand out.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
6 Unless, Mr. Tieger, there are any -- we can see at a later stage
7 how we can operate with untranslated documents, but sometimes they're very
8 short and I've got no idea what it is.
9 MR. JOSSE: They've been sent to the CLSS, but we're clearly not
10 going to get them back for a period of time.
11 Q. Now, whilst these are being handed out, Mr. Krajisnik, you had, in
12 fact, told the Chamber a little bit about your knowledge or lack of
13 knowledge of the departure of these people and, in particular, your
14 assertion that, as far as you were concerned, they left voluntarily.
15 That's correct, isn't it?
16 MR. JOSSE: Could I have one of the bundles, please?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right.
18 MR. JOSSE:
19 Q. Now, for the purposes I am asking you, I'm not terribly interested
20 in what the Crisis Staff or the MUP in Pale did. What I'd like to ask you
21 - and please concentrate your mind on this - is what you knew of the
22 activities of either the Crisis Staff in Pale or the MUP in relation to
23 the local Muslim population. What was your state of knowledge in May and
24 June of 1992?
25 A. I knew from a Muslim - he was an acquaintance of mine before the
1 war - and he found my family members -- or he asked my family members
2 where I was and he came to see me and said could he leave Pale? I said
3 that that was unnecessary. I wanted to convince him that that was
4 unnecessary, that that would be a great pity. At the same time a Croat
5 came to see me, and I told him the same thing. I managed to persuade the
6 Croat, but the other man went to see, with his other Muslims, what he was
7 going to do. So for purposes of illustration, the Croat stayed -- the
8 Croatian stayed, and a church of theirs stayed. I mean, it wasn't damaged
9 or destroyed or anything like that. There was no mosque in Pale itself,
10 but they did leave later on.
11 So what I know is this: At that time the problem was these people
12 being killed at Zepa, and Mrs. Plavsic was put in charge of talking --
13 given the assignment of talking to the families. And Mr. Koljevic
14 appointed her as president of the commissioners for Pale. I do not
15 believe that she dealt with the matter either, because I know that none of
16 us knew in greater depth how the Muslims left. We heard about it later
17 on, and there is the minutes of the 25th of July when Karadzic says the
18 Muslims are still in Pale, which means that we learnt that they had left
19 later on.
20 So that is the extent of my knowledge. All the people that talked
21 to me about this later on said that the procedure was respected, that
22 people left of their own free will, voluntarily, and all the documents
23 deny the testimony by the witness here, that they were forcibly expelled.
24 And I can explain why those documents challenge and deny and refute his
1 Q. Well, as I've already said, I don't think I'm going to invite you
2 to do that by reason of time. I want to ask you about some specific
3 further allegations that the witness concerned made. At page 5340 of the
4 transcript, he talked about half-dressed, bare-chested young men, with
5 bands around their heads, knives on both of their flanks, driving
6 convertible cars - and I'm summarising here - in effect terrorising the
7 Muslim population in Pale.
8 Did you have any knowledge of that?
9 A. I had no knowledge of that except for the case of the Croat I
10 mentioned. He was a doctor who treated people in Pale. He came together
11 with a relative of mine and said that an individual, a local person, had
12 threatened him. I called the chief and asked him to protect the man, and
13 he did protect him. And he stayed there throughout the war. He gave us a
14 statement, but unfortunately, he died some time ago. So that's what I
15 knew on a personal level. I knew of no other kind of mistreatment or
16 abuse. And the Muslim that came to see me didn't mention any abuse
17 either. He just said that they wanted to leave even before the conflict
18 because there were lots of Serbs in Pale and they wanted to go away and be
19 with their own people because they thought that would be better. But I
20 did everything in my power to persuade him to stay, but nonetheless he
21 left ultimately.
22 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, could I ask for these bundles to be -- to
23 be handed back because they're -- it's my fault entirely, but there's some
24 work product on them.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, clearly there's a lot of comment by -- I think
1 by Mr. Sladojevic.
2 MR. JOSSE: Yes, we're going to have to redo them. I'm sorry.
3 That's my fault. I take responsibility for that. The bundle can remain
4 with Mr. Krajisnik, however, as long as he doesn't follow the English.
5 And secondly, in case he wants to refer to any of these documents. I'll
6 collect that back from him at the end of the day.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I was just about to ask you about that.
8 MR. JOSSE: Yes. Thank you.
9 Q. Let me go on, Mr. Krajisnik. At page 5411 the same witness said
10 that he was told by Malko Koroman that he couldn't keep the Red Berets
11 under his control for long.
12 A. I remember that testimony, but I have no knowledge of that.
13 Q. Thank you. He talked, at page 5332 and at various pages
14 thereafter, about roadblocks being instituted around Pale and Muslims
15 being stopped at those roadblocks. Can you help the Chamber about that,
17 A. I did not see any roadblocks, any obstacles, when I came to Pale.
18 Whether they existed before that, I really can't say, I don't know.
19 Because I arrived in Pale for the first time then. I'd just been once
20 before. I was quite a long way away from Pale.
21 Q. I'm going to move on to a different but related topic in the same
22 witness's testimony, and this relates to the arrival in May of 1992 of
23 three civilian transport trucks full of Muslim men from Bratunac,
24 apparently escorted by Serb paramilitaries. He said at page 5292 that the
25 trucks stopped in front of the police station, that Mr. Starcevic came
1 out, said he didn't have a place for all these prisoners, and he directed
2 that these men be taken to a nearby cinema. What do you know of those
3 events, please?
4 A. I did not know when those Muslims came, but I do know that
5 Mr. Starcevic protested strongly for the fact that the Muslims had come to
6 Pale, and I heard from someone that as a revolt -- people were saying that
7 as in revolt Mr. Deronjic sent the Muslims to Pale. Now, the government
8 was in charge of all further activities and it did not know of any
9 previous activities until the Muslims arrived in Pale, nor did any of us
10 know anything about it. That wasn't something I dealt with myself, but
11 that's what I heard.
12 Q. So I want to be clear about your state of knowledge of these men
13 from Bratunac. Did you know anything about their arrival at all at the
15 A. I think I learnt about it from Mr. Starcevic, who came to Kikinda.
16 He was quite revolted and protested why somebody had brought the Muslims
17 to Pale. I remember that, and I know that somebody took it upon
18 themselves to check out the situation, to see what this was all about, and
19 that it was done. I remember receiving some sort of feedback information
20 to the effect that Mr. Deronjic had sent the Muslims to Pale for some
21 reason because he was revolted by something. Now, what actually happened,
22 I don't know; all I do know is that the job was done.
23 Q. When you -- have you any idea where these people were
25 A. I really did not know where they were accommodated. I learned
1 here where they were, and I know that now, but at the time I didn't know.
2 I didn't know Pale that much -- that well either at the time.
3 Q. I am aware that the documents that you have produced deal with the
4 specific departure of the inhabited Muslims of Pale. Just to be clear
5 about this, the detail that the witness gave in the course of his evidence
6 to this Chamber and, indeed, the detail that's contained within the
7 documents, did you have any knowledge of that at the time?
8 A. No, I didn't know about anything at that time. But the
9 investigators collected this up in response to that witness's testimony,
10 but I didn't know about any of these activities at the time at all, not
11 one of them.
12 Q. I'm sure that's clear, but what you're saying is your
13 investigators obtained the documents that you have there subsequent to
14 these events and subsequent to the testimony. Is that what you're saying?
15 A. Your investigators -- well, I meant Mr. Stewart's investigators,
16 the Josse/Stewart team and their investigators at Pale.
17 Q. Yes. At page 5293, the same witness said that during May to June
18 of 1992 he noticed increased concentrations of military equipment and
19 personnel in the Pale area, including hundreds of paramilitaries, and went
20 on to say that several Muslim men were arrested in their homes by
21 paramilitaries and killed.
22 Were you aware of the presence of hundreds of paramilitaries in
23 the place that you were living and working?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. STEWART: Sorry, it may be a relatively minor matter, but it's
1 probably always good to get the recitation from the transcript as accurate
2 as possible. I read it as: "From April there were random arrests of
3 Muslims, and in June and July several Muslims men were arrested in their
4 homes by paramilitaries and killed."
5 I think the paraphrase was to the effect of several arrests and
6 several people killed, at least as I gathered it.
7 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't hear of a single case of a
9 Muslim being killed at that time. Whether that happened, well, their
10 statements, you have the statement of the chief, Koroman, and you can
11 establish that quite easily. But I didn't hear of a single killing
12 taking place at that time in Pale.
13 MR. JOSSE:
14 Q. The witness alleged that after his departure or, as he put it,
15 removal, he heard that three mosques in the Pale area were destroyed.
16 What do you say about that?
17 A. The small town of Pale proper did not have a single mosque, and I
18 could see that, whereas the municipality, whether there was a mosque
19 somewhere in some village in the municipality, I don't know that. But I
20 know that in Pale itself, where I was, there was not a single mosque. In
21 the far-off villages, if there had been one, but I didn't hear of anything
22 like that. I didn't know of anything like that. You had the Orthodox
23 church and the Catholic church, a wooden one, and that one is still
24 standing and being used. There was no mosque in that settlement in the
25 centre of Pale.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, my attempt at a helpful intervention may
3 have disrupted the question and answer. The question that Mr. Josse had
4 asked was: Were you aware of the presence of hundred -- several hundred
5 paramilitaries. Then I intervened with respect to another part of the
6 predicate to the question, and Mr. Krajisnik responded to that only. I
7 wanted to bring Mr. Josse's attention to this if, in fact, he still wanted
8 an answer to the original question asked. I was afraid that my
9 intervention had disrupted that.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I take it it's the first thing Mr. Josse will do
11 tomorrow morning.
12 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Unless you want --
14 MR. JOSSE: I'm near the end of this but probably not sufficiently
15 near the end.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And I might have been a bit optimistic in that seven
18 MR. JOSSE: We will need to return to this topic tomorrow.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We'll do that then tomorrow.
20 So the last thing I have on my list for today is to deliver a
21 decision on applications by Defence and by the Prosecution regarding the
22 timetable of Mr. Krajisnik's evidence.
23 The Chamber will deliver its decision on the Defence application
24 filed on the 22nd of May, 2006, to deal "fairly" with the timetable,
25 preparation, and presentation of the evidence of the accused. Today the
1 Chamber also received a supplemental submission from the Defence on this
3 In summary, the Defence requests three additional days for
4 Mr. Krajisnik's examination-in-chief; that is, up to and including Monday,
5 the 29th of May, 2006.
6 The Chamber will first give a brief overview of the procedural
7 history of the scheduling of this trial, thus making reference to the
8 procedural history outlined in the decisions of the 27th of January, 2006,
9 and the 27th of February, 2006.
10 On the 18th of November, 2005, the Chamber extended the closing
11 date of the Defence case from the 10th of March, 2006, to the 28th of
12 April, 2006. The Chamber granted the Defence an extra seven weeks to
13 prepare and present its case. The Defence case was then due to close on
14 the 28th of April, 2006, unless exceptional circumstances were shown. At
15 the same time the Chamber expressed its concern about significant forced
16 gaps in the sitting schedule caused by the Defence, the inability of the
17 Defence to plan witnesses beyond the very short term, and the seriously
18 deficient Rule 65 ter summaries submitted.
19 Since it was not possible for the Chamber to put in place a
20 schedule of hearings due to the paucity of information supplied by the
21 Defence, the Chamber reluctantly granted the Defence the possibility to
22 allocate, as it deemed best, the time allotted to it. In practice, the
23 Defence was given unprecedented and ample leeway to allocate its increased
24 amount of time between time for preparation and time for presentation of
25 evidence. The conditions were that the Defence would give two weeks'
1 notice of the Defence's developing schedule and that its case would in any
2 event close by the 28th of April, 2006.
3 By the end of January, 2006, the Chamber made "optimistic
4 calculations" with regard to the schedule of the Defence case, and on the
5 27th of January, 2006, expressed "grave concerns" about the possibility of
6 closing the case by the 28th of April, 2006, given the failure of the
7 Defence to comply with its Rule 65 ter obligations and the very large
8 number of proposed witnesses.
9 On the 27th of February, 2006, the Chamber granted a total of 20
10 days for examination-in-chief of the accused, to begin on the 11th of
11 April, 2006. In this order, the Chamber further noted the failure on the
12 part of the Defence to present a feasible scheduling proposal. The order
13 read: "The accused's examination-in-chief would then start on Tuesday, 11
14 April, and last for up to 20 days, that is, until Friday, the 12th of
15 May." The 20 days scheduled for examination-in-chief were to include, of
16 course, the usual time to be spent on matters other than
17 examination-in-chief, such as procedural matters.
18 On the 24th of March, 2006, the Chamber granted the Defence
19 additional days for another testimony and set aside four days for the
20 preparation of the examination-in-chief of the accused. The starting date
21 for the testimony of the accused was thus postponed until the 20th of
22 April, 2006.
23 On the 11th of April, 2006, the Chamber granted the Defence an
24 additional three days, in compensation for an error in the Chamber's
25 database reports on the time spent with the Defence witnesses in court.
1 The Defence had the option of spending these additional days either on the
2 preparation of the testimony or on hearing the testimony of the accused.
3 It chose the first option. This pushed back the start date to the 25th of
4 April, 2006, and the end date to the 23rd of May, 2006.
5 On the 19th of May, 2006, in order to reach the parties as soon as
6 possible, the Chamber directed one of its Legal Officers to inform the
7 parties by e-mail of the Chamber's decision to grant the Defence another
8 day for the completion of the examination-in-chief. As stated in the
9 e-mail, the reason for granting this extra day was the amount of time
10 spent on procedural matters on the first day and the fact that on the 12th
11 of May the court session finished earlier than usual.
12 As I have indicated, the Defence never gave a clear schedule for
13 its case. The Chamber left it to the Defence to decide how to apportion
14 time in preparation and time to present its evidence. The Defence decided
15 to spend a large proportion of the time allotted to it for the preparation
16 of the examination-in-chief of the accused.
17 Despite this significant amount of time spent on the preparation
18 of the examination-in-chief of the accused, the Defence did not make any
19 discernible efforts to tailor the presentation of evidence to the
20 Chamber's original order to complete the examination-in-chief in 20 days.
21 The Chamber had no realistic possibility to intervene, since it was left
22 in the dark: We were not provided with a Rule 65 ter summary and we were
23 not informed about the time the Defence needed to cover topics addressed
24 by other witnesses and documents previously admitted.
25 The Chamber, moreover, made a deliberate effort to avoid being
1 directive as to the course of the accused's testimony, since we had made
2 it well understood that the Defence was to have exactly 20 days to focus
3 on the important issues in this case. The Defence blames the Chamber for
4 having become increasingly "inquisitorial," when in fact the opposite is
5 true: The examination-in-chief of Mr. Krajisnik has been left entirely in
6 the hands of the Defence.
7 As for the average hours per day which could be expected to be
8 available for the examination-in-chief of the accused, the Chamber notes
9 the following: There has been no significant difference between the
10 average daily testimony time in the Prosecution phase of the case and the
11 Defence phase of the case. During the Prosecution phase of the case, the
12 average hours per day spent on testimony, excluding procedural matters,
13 amounted to 2.82 hours, whereas during the Defence case - and I am here
14 excluding the testimony of the accused - it amounted to 2.89 hours. One
15 could have expected the Defence to take into account these averages. In
16 fact, during the first 18 days of the testimony of the accused, the
17 average hours of the testimony per day amounted to 2.94 hours. This is a
18 higher average of testimony time per day than the average for the case as
19 a whole.
20 As far as the time spent on questions put by the Judges is
21 concerned, in the Prosecution phase of the case the questions of the
22 Judges consumed around 8 per cent of the testimony time. This rose to
23 about 20 per cent during the Defence phase. Yet, for the course of the
24 accused's testimony, time spent on Judges' questions dropped to 9 per cent
25 of the testimony time. This would have been within the Defence's
2 Finally, the Defence filed its application at a very late stage of
3 the examination-in-chief. The issue was not raised prior to the 16th day
4 of the accused's testimony, that is on the 17th of May, and the motion was
5 filed as late as the 19th day of his testimony. Thus, the Defence has
6 presented Chamber with a fait accompli, and not for the first time.
7 The Defence seems to attach little weight to the Chamber's
8 scheduling orders, proceeds as if these orders were not compulsory, and,
9 when time is out, asserts that the trial is being conducted unfairly. The
10 Chamber finds no reason to approve this approach.
11 The accused's testimony through the 18th day of his
12 examination-in-chief totalled 47.8 hours, excluding 4.9 hours of questions
13 from the Judges. By the end of tomorrow - which will be the 21st day -
14 the accused will have had around 56 hours to present his evidence in
15 chief, not counting the time taken up by the Judges. We consider this to
16 be a sufficient allocation of the time.
17 The Chamber has warned the Defence as early as the 18th of
18 November, 2005, that the lack of a well-developed schedule for the
19 presentation of evidence might impact on the possibility to deviate from a
20 previously set schedule.
21 Despite the above considerations, the Chamber will grant the
22 Defence an additional day. This is to compensate for the late delivery of
23 the Chamber's present decision, which lateness, needless to say, is due to
24 the last-minute filing of the Defence's motion. One additional day will
25 enable the Defence to conclude its examination of Mr. Krajisnik in an
1 orderly and considered manner.
2 In summary, the examination-in-chief will end on Thursday, the
3 25th of May, 2006. The Prosecution will start with its examination on
4 Monday, the 29th of May, 2006. From that day on, the cross-examination
5 and the questions by the Judges will take together no more than 15 days.
6 The Defence's motion is dismissed in all other respects, and this
7 concludes the Chamber's decision.
8 We adjourn until tomorrow afternoon, quarter past 2.00, same
9 courtroom, but not until, Mr. Krajisnik -- but I see that you wanted to
10 say something to us as well -- but I first remind you that you should not
11 speak -- I instruct you not to speak with anyone about the testimony
12 already given or - and now you know it - the remaining two days as far as
13 examination-in-chief is concerned to be given.
14 Mr. Krajisnik.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I just remind you
16 about my dentist? You said you would tell me.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we have not dealt with it, but I'll certainly
18 come back to the matter tomorrow.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any moment that you have to indicate that
21 would be the day, or could it still be done tomorrow? Otherwise, we might
22 even spend time --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. No problem.
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... it's on our
1 We stand adjourned.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.07 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of
4 May, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.