1 Friday, 2 June 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 The Chamber received this morning another clipping from a
11 newspaper, 19th of March, 1992. It seems that it also is from Politika.
12 It's now -- can't see what page it is, but it has got something to do with
13 the referendum, Cutileiro, from what I understand from the heading of this
14 article, and attached to it is a page we saw before.
15 It has been distributed to the parties, Mr. Krajisnik, so that
16 they can decide whether it assists -- whether it assists them in the
17 course of the examination or otherwise, and then we'll hear from the
18 parties whether they want to tender it.
19 Mr. Krajisnik, I was informed that you'd like to add something to
20 your testimony of yesterday and you could do it in two minutes. Please
21 proceed. But not until after I have reminded you that you are still bound
22 by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony.
23 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
2 I only wish to say that I'm concerned by the way I'm being
3 examined by the Prosecutor. I cannot provide adequate answers concerning
4 material that I'm seeing for the first time. Let me take for example the
5 club of deputies of the 28th of February. It says explicitly what Jovan
6 Cizmovic was tasked to do, but I didn't know about it. And it is
7 constantly being put to me that his task was the implementation of
8 Variants A and B. And I can give you the number.
9 Second, it makes mention of the document, that study prepared by
10 the economic institute concerning the feasibility of the state of Krajina.
11 Mr. Cizmovic says here that he gave his own report rather than somebody
12 else's to Mr. Karadzic and me.
13 That's all I wanted to say.
14 I don't think this is the proper way to get at the truth.
15 Instead, it only leads to wrong conclusions. I have reviewed this, and I
16 can say that all the conclusions drawn yesterday are completely wrong
17 because I was not familiar with the document, and I can point out to the
18 things that I believe are wrong.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, if the way of questioning is improper,
20 I expect your counsel to intervene.
21 Second, if you say I see for the first time the document regarding
22 the club of deputies, you now say, I didn't know about it. I think no
23 question has been put to you as to whether you were present at that
24 meeting. So, therefore, if you were not present, or at least if that's
25 unclear, then it does not come as a surprise that you wouldn't know about
2 Mr. Tieger?
3 MR. TIEGER: Just to clarify. I believe that Mr. Krajisnik was
4 saying he was unfamiliar with the club of deputies meeting or that he
5 wasn't present. I think we addressed that before. I think he was talking
6 about the document Mr. Cizmovic was referring to.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes. Then I misunderstood that.
8 But most important, Mr. Krajisnik, Defence counsel will have an
9 opportunity to further question on these matters. Conclusions were not
10 drawn yesterday by this Bench, and that's I think most important. Of
11 course, and that is part of the procedure followed in this Court, that the
12 Prosecution is allowed to put to you documents, to put to you inferences
13 they think these documents would justify to make and then to seek your
14 answers to those matters. This does not allow you to tell us everything
15 you know. Your first -- we expect you first to answer those questions.
16 As I said before, at the very end, you'll have an opportunity to
17 add something. And again, if the questioning is improper, I expect your
18 counsel, who know, of course, the rules, the technical rules of
19 examination of witnesses, that they will object to the way you are
21 But we listen carefully to you, and if it comes to decisions to be
22 taken on whether and to what extent you can expound on the questions put
23 to you by the Prosecution, I'll keep that certainly, and the Chamber will
24 keep that certainly in the back of its mind.
25 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, can we begin by
2 having Mr. Krajisnik presented again with several maps, including D7. The
3 maps depicted in the Politika article, I think is D247. And I'm sorry, my
4 mistake, Your Honour. The Politika article received the number P1194.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, as we discussed yesterday, P1194 depicts three
6 maps which you've described as the proposals of the three parties, and
7 from top to bottom, the Serb, Muslim and Croat maps. D7 contains a map --
8 or depicts a map that you've described as the Muslim map. And I'd like to
9 look at three areas of both of those maps in somewhat more detail.
10 So if we look at the middle map on P1194, the Muslim proposal.
11 Let's look in particular at three municipalities. And perhaps that can be
12 put on the ELMO so that we can ensure we are all talking about the same
13 municipalities at the same time.
14 If we can first -- if we look at the Muslim map, please? Thank
15 you. That's fine.
16 And Mr. Krajisnik, is there a pointer available to you or a pen
17 that you can use to point out some aspects? Can you point to the Court
18 where Cajnice and Rudo are, please?
19 A. Rudo is here, and Cajnice is also here. Here is on the extreme,
20 Rudo and Cajnice should be one of these two. I cannot quite make it out.
21 So Rudo and Cajnice are in this part here.
22 Q. And as we can see from the legend, those are shaded portions which
23 were part of the areas that fell within the Muslim area, according to this
25 A. I cannot explain the Muslim map. It was put there as the Muslim
1 map, and it's unclear. You see it says "Muslim map" here. I can only
2 explain the Serb map, and I can explain the Cutileiro map.
3 Q. I'm not asking you to explain beyond it, Mr. Krajisnik. I'm just
4 pointing out these areas, and the Court can determine from the legend
5 itself and from the shading which areas were claimed within -- claimed to
6 be within the boundaries of the particular national group according to
7 that map.
8 And if you could also point out Sekovici to the Court?
9 A. Sekovici should be -- I really can't make anything out here, but I
10 think Sekovici is somewhere here, right.
11 Q. Okay. And --
12 A. I think Sekovici is there. Sorry, maybe a little further above,
14 Q. All right. Well, and again, where you pointed, we can see from
15 the shaded portions of the map and the legend that appears on the map that
16 that would be a Muslim area according to this map.
17 Now, if you would turn quickly to D7. Put that on the ELMO as
18 well, sir, or if the usher would. And look again at those same three
20 A. Yes. This is Rudo and Cajnice, the Serb part. This is Sekovici.
21 And the rest, let me see. The rest is mainly the same, but I don't see on
22 this -- Sekovici is not marked as Serb territory on the Muslim map. Rudo
23 and Cajnice is marked as not Muslim, because this entire part here is
24 Muslim, apart from the Croat enclaves.
25 Q. That's -- that's correct. And specifically referring to those
1 three municipalities, we can see that they are marked as Serb areas. And
2 in fact, in 1991, according to this the census, those three municipalities
3 were majority Serb?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And, in fact, this entire map reflects the municipalities of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the absolute and relative majorities
7 in those municipalities; correct? In so far as you can see it.
8 A. I cannot see exactly whether it's all correct, but I suppose it
9 is, if you took the entire municipalities into account, not individual
10 parts of municipalities.
11 Q. Which, of course, is precisely what the statement on principles
12 indicated was annexed to it, that is, a map reflecting the absolute and
13 relative majorities, and as you knew from before, from the very first time
14 this issue came up and the Prosecution presented it, this map was provided
15 to the Prosecution by Mr. Cutileiro.
16 MR. TIEGER: And if I could have this marked, Your Honour. And it
17 should be distributed as well.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1195, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Is this -- needs a number? It's not in evidence yet?
20 MR. TIEGER: Well, the statement of principles is in evidence,
21 Your Honour. The annexed map is in evidence. There was representation
22 made in court or -- and a discussion in court about the fact that it had
23 been provided by Mr. Cutileiro and only including the first -- the cover
24 page, for completion.
25 JUDGE ORIE: So now we have the combination together.
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And it comes from Mr. Cutileiro, from what I see on
3 the cover page.
4 MR. TIEGER: Yes. And as I mentioned before, that was the subject
5 of discussion between the parties much earlier.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. And if we could turn also to tab 84 --
9 A. But may I say something with regard to this map?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so, Mr. Krajisnik.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If -- I want to -- us to look at the
12 record from the 16th Session of Republika Srpska where Karadzic says
13 Cutileiro gave us a border on the Una River, and that proves that this is
14 not the Cutileiro map because there is no border on the Una River here.
15 And it's not Cutileiro's map; you have proof of that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, let's go through it in all detail. I
17 tend to agree with you that we have to make some distinctions. First of
18 all, what map has been attached to the statement of principles, what
19 happened during further negotiations, and the mere fact, and I'm stressing
20 the mere fact, that Mr. Karadzic says something is not 100 per cent proof
21 of that being correct and something else that contradicts that is not
22 correct. Just to -- not to say that Mr. Karadzic was not telling the
23 truth but just to say that matters are not as simple always as they seem
24 at first sight.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the article at tab 84, from Oslobodjenje
2 on 19 March will need a number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1196, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in front of you now is, as indicated, an article
7 from Oslobodjenje of 19 March 1992. The headline says: "Agreed but not
8 signed, three Bosnias." And as you can see, there is a large picture of a
9 map. We have also provided a clearer version of that and a blowup of that
10 as well for ease of reference for the Court and the parties.
11 As you can see from the caption under the map, Mr. Krajisnik, it
12 states: "Map offered as part of the document and is the basis for the
13 work of the group formed with the aim to define the territories of
14 constitutive units."
15 And, again, looking more closely at that map, and you may find it
16 easier to distinguish the shading if you look at the last two pages
17 provided, we can see again that Cajnice, Rudo and Sekovici fall within
18 what is described as Serb territory, consistent with the absolute or
19 relative majority population in those municipalities as in the other
20 municipalities depicted in that map. So this is a contemporaneous
21 reflection of the fact that the map that was annexed to the statement of
22 principles of March 18th, 1992 was a map as stated explicitly in the
23 principles themselves reflecting the absolute and relative majorities of
24 the municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 A. This map that we looked at just now was a Muslim map. The Muslim
1 newspaper, Oslobodjenje, depicted it as a map discussed in Lisbon or in
2 Sarajevo, I'm not sure. This is not Cutileiro's map. I claim with
3 absolute certainty that it's not Cutileiro's map.
4 Q. Because you've claimed with similar absolute certainty that the
5 map that was under discussion or that was attached to the statement of
6 principles was a map that dealt with territorial units smaller than
7 municipalities, such as settlements; indeed, settlements. That's it,
8 isn't it?
9 A. I claim that the map that I showed is Cutileiro's map. D7,
10 whatever the number was, not this one that you are showing me now, because
11 I know that. I know that, I saw that map, I participated in that.
12 Q. Well, clearly the map in the Oslobodjenje article, the map in --
13 that is D7, are maps reflecting municipality breakdowns, maps that are
14 distinguished by municipalities --
15 MR. JOSSE: Sorry to interrupt, could Mr. Krajisnik clarify
16 whether he means D7 or D7B.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I took it that he referred to D7B.
18 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: That's how I understood his answer. He was uncertain
20 about the number but it is the map --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- saying in Cyrillic "Cutileiro."
23 MR. TIEGER: I understand that the question was not -- thank you,
24 though, for that clarification.
25 Q. I just want to -- let's try to get that clear. So the map in the
1 Oslobodjenje article, the map that we've looked at this morning, in
2 focusing on Cajnice and Rudo and Sekovici, those are maps of
3 municipalities, right, and the map that you were talking about during the
4 course of your examination-in-chief at length was, as you explained to the
5 Court, a map that was based on territorial units smaller than
6 municipalities, based on settlements?
7 A. The map that you mentioned first, that's the Muslim map, you're
8 right on that. Muslims opted for a relative or absolute majority,
9 whatever, I don't know what they wanted, and it has to do with
10 municipalities; whereas the Cutileiro map did not rely exclusively on
11 municipalities. That is to say, municipal borders. Because there is the
12 territorial principle, the economic principle, and the rest.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Seems to be some confusion. The first map,
14 Mr. Krajisnik, as you said, was introduced by Mr. Tieger, as far as I
15 understand, as a map just depicting population majority in municipalities,
16 rather than Muslim map.
17 MR. TIEGER: Just to make the chronology clear, Your Honour, the
18 map we've been -- the map that I presented to Mr. Krajisnik first this
19 morning, along with the maps shown in the Politika article, was
20 labelled D7. That's because it came up during the course of, I think,
21 Mr. Treanor's testimony, if I remember well, and it got a marking by the
22 Defence. But it was during the course of the Prosecution's case, so if
23 there is any confusion about that, I didn't want that to be left unclear.
24 And, yes, that's the map to which I was directing my questions now and
25 asking Mr. Krajisnik whether or not it's a map based on municipalities and
1 that the distinctions between the Serb, Muslim and Croat areas are
2 rendered on the basis of municipalities. So I think we can see that from
3 the map.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could we in one way or the other come to the core of
5 the matter? The core of the matter seems to be that Mr. Krajisnik says
6 the map I pointed at, that's D7B, was the starting point Mr. Cutileiro
7 gave us for further negotiations, whereas you say the only thing
8 Mr. Cutileiro did and that appears from the statement of principles is
9 that he gave a map just depicting in what municipalities which nationality
10 had a majority, yes or no. I mean that seems to be the issue.
11 Mr. Krajisnik insists on D7B to be the map attached to the
12 Cutileiro Plan. You insist to say -- well, in your questioning you very
13 much insist on Mr. Cutileiro presenting the other map as being attached to
14 the statement of principles.
15 I'm very curious to know if Mr. Krajisnik is right, the question
16 what D7B is has been answered. If Mr. Krajisnik is not right, I'd like to
17 know where D7B comes from. Do you -- because you take the position that
18 Mr. Krajisnik is, at least that's the line of your questioning, is not
19 right -- as the map attached to the statement of principles, do you
20 know -- do you have any idea where it comes from and could that -- if so,
21 could that be included in your questions?
22 MR. TIEGER: Well, the answer is, Your Honour, I can't enlighten
23 the Court on that.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we -- there is a difference of view, and
25 we have newspaper articles, we have a card of Mr. Cutileiro, we have the
1 statement of principles which gives some clue. We have a couple of --
2 MR. TIEGER: May I offer one more clue that I was about to ask
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. I had an opportunity, Mr. Krajisnik, to examine the Politika
7 article that you provided. It was about to be translated, as we discussed
8 yesterday, and we did get some of it translated. And at page 1, we see
9 some comments by Dr. Karadzic who says at the bottom of page 1, and
10 Mr. Krajisnik, you will find that quote at the last column to the right in
11 the article, about the third paragraph down, where Dr. Karadzic says: "It
12 is obvious that others have had their own maps, although only the Serbian
13 Democratic Party has been accused of making maps. They have existed for a
14 long time, based on the present municipal borders. It was proposed to set
15 a framework which will contain the undisputed municipalities while the
16 contested places will be determined by a work group that will deal with
18 So on the 18th of March, the date of the statement of principles,
19 Dr. Karadzic appears to confirm that the map that was to serve as the
20 basis for further discussions, the map that was annexed to the statement
21 of principles, was a municipal map, or a map based on municipalities.
22 A. I have to say that I admire you, Mr. Prosecutor. I assure you
23 that the map that I showed you is the Cutileiro map. There are 20
24 documents where it is recorded. Believe me, there is a brochure, there is
25 papers where it was recorded when no one ever knew of The Hague Tribunal
1 and now, if that is in dispute in this court, that is a big time problem.
2 I assure you that Karadzic was referring to the eastern part because there
3 is no corridor there. I don't know what he meant. But on the map, the
4 Una was the border, on every map. Look this up. That's what Cutileiro
5 did. Look at other agreements too. So, of course, this is not the
6 Cutileiro map, the one that he provided then.
7 Q. Well, speaking about settlements and areas of land or areas broken
8 down in units smaller than municipalities, you indicated that that was
9 based in part, or reflected very closely, the ownership of land, which was
10 a part of the basis for the claims made by you and the other Bosnian Serb
11 leaders involved in the negotiations. Is that a -- is that correct?
12 A. Well, I've already said that one of our arguments is the area that
13 was held by the Serbs, 64 per cent or whatever. I don't know whether
14 that's the actual figure but that's the figure that we used. You're
15 right. That's why we got 49 per cent, half of Bosnia. We didn't get 30
16 per cent, which would be the population ratio, or 35 per cent or 33 or
18 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, it was known, not -- first of all, the Muslims
19 strongly disputed that, and there were even discussions in the Assembly
20 reflecting the fact that the Muslim side strongly disputed that claim by
21 the Serbs and even submitted studies that they felt demonstrated the
22 contrary. So that dispute existed, right?
23 A. I do not recall any study. As for the Muslims disputing this,
24 that's true. They always kept saying, how did the Serbs do that math? So
25 you're right on that. But I tell you that the land survey office gave us
1 these figures in this map. I haven't got any studies or -- I don't know
2 of any other thing. I just know what I heard and that is what we used as
3 an argument. But probably a land surveyor or whoever could calculate
5 Q. And there were even Serbs who asserted that that position was
6 incorrect and even ridiculed that position; isn't that right?
7 A. I do not remember such Serbs. If there are such Serbs, I really
8 wonder at you. I did not observe any Serbs who ridiculed that but
9 possibly, possibly some individual did that as well.
10 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, could we go into private session?
11 JUDGE ORIE: We turn into private session.
12 [Private session]
11 Pages 25133-25140 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
9 I would like to remind the parties that we are spending an
10 enormous amount of time at this moment on one matter which seems to be in
11 dispute. That is, with what map Mr. Cutileiro sent the parties, the three
12 parties at that time, into further -- yes.
13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I apologise for interrupting, but if
14 it's of any use to the Court I was moving on. I didn't have another
15 question about --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Nevertheless, it's worthwhile to spend one
17 minute on it in order to avoid this to happen again.
18 We spent an enormous amount of time on -- with what map
19 Mr. Cutileiro sent the parties to further negotiate. It's clear that in
20 the answers of Mr. Krajisnik the emphasis was laid on agreement reached
21 on the principles which he considered very important, whereas the fact
22 that further negotiations were needed was very much emphasised in the
23 questioning by the Prosecution. It is also clear that at least we heard
24 quite some evidence that the Muslims withdrew from further negotiations
25 and did not want to start these further negotiations on the basis of the
1 statement of principles. Now, whether the starting point for something
2 that has never really started was more or less favourable and whether you
3 would have a view on that, whether that is of such vital importance for
4 this case that it would justify so much -- such a great amount of time
5 spent on it is a question which I would not answer easily by a yes.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, just before my learned friend does that,
8 very, very briefly, I'd like to turn to something Your Honour said really
9 at about the bottom of page 10, top of page 11 of LiveNote today, when
10 Your Honour said, asked in effect what the Prosecution was saying about
11 map D7B. Much of this confusion, in my submission, might be helped if the
12 Prosecution put their case to Mr. Krajisnik, because for my part it's
13 still not clear exactly where this cross-examination was going. If they
14 put the case robustly to the witness.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I try to express what I -- I understood the
16 Prosecution's case to be that -- first of all, that Mr. Cutileiro did not
17 give anything else to the parties than a map depicting in what
18 municipalities, what ethnicity or what nationality had a majority, and
19 that any claim that Mr. Cutileiro took already a more favourable position
20 to the Serbs by pointing at map D7B is incorrect.
21 Is that a proper understanding of what your case is, Mr. Tieger?
22 MR. TIEGER: As stated in my own words, Your Honour, I think what
23 we -- the Prosecution's case was, in -- first of all in response to an
24 enormous amount of time spent on D7B during the course of Mr. Krajisnik's
25 evidence, with linkage to a variety of subsequent events and actions and
1 the assertion during the course of the Defence case that that was the map
2 that was annexed to the statement of principles and therefore an
3 agreement. The Prosecution's case was -- is that the map that was annexed
4 to the statement of principles was precisely what it said in the statement
5 of principles, the map of the absolute and relative majorities.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and not D7B.
7 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
8 MR. JOSSE: And do the Prosecution have a case as to where D7B has
9 come from?
10 JUDGE ORIE: I asked him already and I didn't receive any positive
11 response to that. But, of course, if it is the position of the
12 Prosecution, right or wrong, that it was another map, then, of course, the
13 Prosecution is not under an obligation to tell us where D7B comes from.
14 If it is -- if they are right. Just as the Defence is not in a position
15 to tell us why it was anything -- D7B.
16 MR. JOSSE: I accept that entirely. I submit what the Prosecution
17 needs to do is say to Mr. Krajisnik, D7B is a figment of your imagination,
18 or whatever their case is. Put the case robustly. That's what I invite
19 my learned friend to do.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well -- yes. In another way, it was robust but
21 I leave it to Mr. Tieger whether that's -- I mean, it's clear if D7B was
22 not attached to the statement of principles, then it must come from
23 somewhere else, and until now, although I specifically asked for it, no
24 one could tell me that it came -- the Prosecutor can't tell me that it
25 comes from -- well, that it comes from somewhere else but not from where,
1 and, of course, from Mr. Krajisnik, there is no reason to give any such
2 explanation because he says it comes from the statement of principles. So
3 the mystery is unsolved, and I think in view of the questions -- of the
4 answers given by Mr. Krajisnik, that there is no -- really no need to make
5 it more robust than it is already.
6 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, of course, I'm reluctant to take any
8 more time on this particular issue than has already been consumed.
9 However, I think it needs to be put in context, especially when there is
10 an assertion that the Prosecution is not putting its case to the witness.
11 Of course, the Prosecution case, as the Court knows, during the course of
12 our case in chief was not about the Cutileiro Plan. Instead this issue
13 came to the fore during the course of the Defence case when it suddenly
14 emerged as an explanation for a great deal of --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Of the events, yes.
16 MR. TIEGER: And so the Prosecution is responding to a few
17 elements of that. And it should not --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Let's proceed and see what your next question is.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to turn from the maps and turn as quickly
21 as we can to the principles. As the Court noted and suggested earlier,
22 the extent to which the Bosnian Serb leadership accepted those principles
23 and the extent to which it -- any of those principles may have been
24 incompatible with Bosnian Serb objectives, and in that connection, if I
25 could turn to tab 81. Which will need a number, Your Honour. It's a tape
1 recording of the 49th Session of the RS Assembly held on 13 February
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1198, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Turning to page 116 of the English, and page 02153828 of the B/C/S
8 version, Mr. Krajisnik, the beginning of the second paragraph of that
9 page. This is Dr. Karadzic speaking saying: "The first position in all
10 Cutileiro's principles, if you remember, was that Bosnia was a state
11 consisting of this and that, but it always said that Bosnia was a state
12 and we never accepted that, and we demanded the maximum that we could
13 accept, Bosnia is a confederation of states, if we have to stay in some
14 kind of a federation, but our minimum is that our state is a state and
15 that it cannot be drowned in anyone else's statehood and sovereignty,
16 except for the statehood and sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, if we
17 so wish, not even Yugoslavia, because if it's Yugoslavia, then we want to
18 preserve our federal unit, our state as a federative unit of this
19 federation, even though our priority was to become a part of Serbia."
20 Mr. Krajisnik, was Dr. Karadzic correctly stating the Bosnian Serb
21 position, that the statement of principles was, in insisting that Bosnia
22 was a state, was inconsistent with Bosnian Serb objectives to ensure that
23 Republika Srpska was a state and had its own sovereignty?
24 A. There is a difference between a state and a state union. I gave
25 you this morning this document where Cutileiro says there were certain
1 terminological problems that we bypassed deliberately, we circumvented
2 them. We had accepted for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be an internationally
3 recognised entity, a member of the United Nations, but what form it would
4 take was subject to agreement. We wanted a confederation. So it could
5 have only been a Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's
6 written here. And the name is on the -- on par with names like Bavaria,
7 et cetera.
8 Q. Your Honour, just for clarification of the record, at 10.10.48,
9 line -- it's page 26, line 23, where it says "federation," I either
10 misread confederation from the text or it wasn't picked up. But in any
11 event that word should be "confederation."
12 Mr. Krajisnik, was it or was it not the case that irrespective of
13 the steps along the path to that goal, that had to be temporarily that
14 might have to be temporarily accepted, the Bosnian Serbs' objective was to
15 establish a separate state and then unite all Serb states?
16 A. No, no, that's not correct. That was rhetoric. I've already said
17 this. We had accepted from the outset to be within Bosnia as a separate
18 entity, and that's the only truth. And whenever there were times of
19 crisis, we used that rhetoric. Otherwise, in all plans, Republika Srpska
20 was to be within Bosnia, and we stated that.
21 Q. All right. So the repeated assertions to the effect that I've
22 just stated about the insistence on a Bosnian Serb state and the
23 unification of all Serb states, when they appear in the 11th Session of
24 the Bosnian Serb Assembly or in any other sessions or public appearances,
25 your assertion is that was mere rhetoric, in order to obtain the
1 objectives of negotiations?
2 A. Absolutely, absolutely. Because one can see in negotiations what
3 it is we were working for, and we had to serve that plan to the deputies.
4 Q. And what about more privately, in talking to colleagues who were
5 close to you personally and who you had a chance to share your views on
6 the need for or determination to obtain a Bosnian Serb state? Did you --
7 sorry, did you use political rhetoric with them as well or did you tell
8 them what you thought?
9 A. In private conversations, people always voiced their wishes, and
10 it was always the wish of the Serb people not to be separated from the
11 rest of the Serb people. However, the policy we conducted was
12 real politik [phoen] and we always reckoned with Bosnia being an
13 internationally recognised entity, a state, with Republika Srpska in it.
14 Q. Let me ask you about one telephone conversation not directly
15 involving you but about you, Mr. Krajisnik.
16 MR. TIEGER: It will be distributed and needs to be marked, Your
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1199, Your Honours.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is --
22 JUDGE ORIE: I missed the number, Mr. Registrar. It doesn't
23 appear in the transcript.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, P1199.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is a conversation between Zika and Kole, who
3 was we know from previous evidence was Mr. Tintor. And if you'll look at
4 the beginning part of the conversation, we can see Mr. Tintor and Mr. Zika
5 talking about negotiations. And so we can see from the date these were
6 the continuing Cutileiro negotiations that resulted in the statement of
7 principles on March 18th, 1992, a week after this conversation.
8 Mr. Tintor says: They wanted to force them into signing. Had MK
9 not been there, it would have turned into major trouble.
10 Zika: What happened?
11 Tintor: MK saved the day.
12 What did they want to sign, says Zika.
13 Tintor: Well, they persisted ... he says they had seven hours
14 long confrontations, man ... yes ... and Doktor was ill.
15 Zika: Yes.
16 Tintor: And MK said, the lord may strike me down dead, but it can
17 certainly not be sovereign.
18 And then they had a showdown, and they told him he was stubborn
19 and an imbecile ... and they called him names, whatever you can think of.
20 They were all over him, for God's sake, he says he was afraid.
21 And then it goes on to talk about the pressures and difficulties
22 of negotiations.
23 And then if we can turn to page 4 of the English. And,
24 Mr. Krajisnik, I believe that will be on -- at the bottom of page 4 of
25 your version, continuing on to the next page. And in the English it
1 begins about the fourth passage from the top:
2 Tintor: So help me God, you know how much I appreciate my best
3 man MK, he's more than a brother to me. I told him, my man, God forbid
4 that you sign such a thing, or else I'd have killed yourself and the
5 Doktor and NK, and God grant I never saw my children again.
6 That's my opinion, no one has the right to betray the Serbian
8 He said: I'd have killed myself, if I had to do that. There is
9 no God up in the sky and no devil beneath the sea that could make me do
10 it, he said. There'd be no need to kill him. He would have killed
12 And then Zika says: They must have offered them marks.
13 And Tintor: Everything, man, the whole world, he said, we can get
14 killed, all of us, what's the matter with you.
15 Zika: Fuck it, man, they are real Serbs then, they are.
16 Tintor: Well, until he's ... until it's -- he alone can
17 negotiate ... nothing more ... no one is to be authorised except him and
19 All the rest can go to hell.
20 Hats off to you, Professor NK, and these other ones, all of them
21 are able and let them remain down there where they are, but in
22 negotiations, there is no one but him and Doktor, no one else.
23 Zika: Exactly, exactly.
24 Tintor: There is no third one, and there need not be a third one.
25 Zika: Exactly.
1 Mr. Krajisnik, you recall that conversation with Mr. Tintor that
2 he's referring to?
3 A. You mean a conversation with me?
4 Q. Mr. Tintor is referring -- seems to be referring to a conversation
5 with you. Do you recall that conversation with him?
6 A. I don't remember. It's possible that I had a conversation with
7 him but I don't recall it. But I can say what happened at this session on
8 the 11th of March, at the conference.
9 Q. Well, I'm not interested at the moment in the details of that
10 session, that particular session in March, but whether or not you in fact
11 told Mr. Tintor that Bosnia and Herzegovina will certainly not be
12 sovereign, and that you'd -- there is no force on earth that could -- or
13 in heaven that could make you sign something that would give Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina sovereignty, if you were expressing your real position or just
15 engaging in political rhetoric?
16 A. First of all, there was nothing for me to sign. That's a mistake.
17 I don't know how Mr. Tintor interpreted that. I cannot remember the whole
18 conversation with him. I can only remember what happened at the
20 As to that conversation with him, if I had any conversation with
21 him, I cannot remember what it was about. But the references to the
22 conference seem to be correct. Because I'm not the one who signed
23 agreements. There was nothing for me to sign. Karadzic could have signed
24 something or not signed something.
25 Q. Okay. I asked you a moment ago about Bosnian Serb objectives and
1 whether -- whether or not certain positions taken or accepted during the
2 course of negotiations were simply steps along a path to a longer-term
4 It's the case, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik, that from rather early in
5 the existence of the SDS, at least from 1991, the Bosnian Serb leadership
6 had a sense of where it was going and steps planned to take along the path
7 toward a Bosnian Serb state?
8 A. Your question is complicated. I would have to be more specific.
9 I just cannot understand the point of your question, whether we had
10 anything of our own. Of course, we had our own vision of -- I don't get
11 it. We had certain visions as to what we want, but just tell me more
12 specifically what you're aiming at and then I'll try to answer.
13 Q. That's not a problem. You merely have to say that, and if the
14 question lends itself to any problems I'll certainly reframe it.
15 You told us earlier that the actions taken by Bosnian Serbs, such
16 as regionalisation, for example, were reactions only to steps, to actions
17 taken by the other side. And I'm putting to you that in fact the Bosnian
18 Serb leadership had in mind the steps it wanted to take and merely waited
19 for the Muslim side to do certain things in order to put those actions
20 into effect, in order to give either seeming legitimacy to their positions
21 in the eyes of the international community or to use actions taken by the
22 Muslims to inspire the Bosnian Serb people to follow the SDS. They
23 weren't reactions, they were planned out steps.
24 A. No, they were not. And I would have been happy if you were right,
25 if we were such a smart people as to outsmart the Muslims and foresee
1 their steps.
2 Q. Well, maybe you'll tell me again this is political rhetoric, but I
3 would ask you to turn next --
4 A. May I, however, explain that conversation you asked me about, the
5 conference of the 11th of March? You need to understand why I was
6 opposed, as this man seems to convey, the agreement of the 11th of March.
7 Q. First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, we are just about to hit a break, I
8 see. Secondly, the answer, as far as I'm concerned, is no. I asked you
9 that question and showed you the intercept because I --
10 JUDGE ORIE: That's not the intercept but, of course, in order to
11 better understand.
12 Mr. Krajisnik, if you could do it in approximately one minute, to
13 be as concise as possible, please explain.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a minute, one minute.
15 We had reached an agreement that we recognise Bosnia and give up
16 on the idea of Yugoslavia. After that, we were served a proposal that did
17 not meet those requirements. It did not give us a constituent unit. And
18 the assembly later rejected that agreement.
19 However, I didn't attend that session because they had attacked me
20 in advance at the conference saying that I would put the assemblymen off
21 accepting that agreement, that I would dissuade them from accepting it.
22 Milanovic was there. Milanovic was chairing the session instead of me.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
24 Mr. Josse.
25 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I'd like to think about it but reserve
1 our position. I may take the same point in relation to P1199 that I did
2 in relation to P1193 yesterday.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You mean context and --
4 MR. JOSSE: Well, not being used as part of the Prosecution case,
5 is the point.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We've heard already some of the response by the
7 Prosecution. We'll hear from you if the matter comes up again.
8 MR. JOSSE: We haven't heard the Prosecution's response. But,
9 Your Honour --
10 JUDGE ORIE: They gave it to us as a glance but --
11 MR. JOSSE: I don't think they have yet. But I agree, I can
12 discuss that very topic with Mr. Harmon at the next break.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that would be a good idea.
14 Then before we break, Mr. Krajisnik, you added one element to the
15 discussion of what was the starting point Mr. Cutileiro sent you to
16 further negotiate, and you said Mr. Karadzic said that we got certain
17 territory, I think it was somewhere at the border, and that appears from
18 the 16th Assembly Session, that's the 12th of May session. If you
19 could -- I'm not asking for any further explanation. I'm just asking for
20 you to point exactly what -- where to find in the 16th Session
21 specifically where Mr. Karadzic said that -- perhaps you could find that
22 during the break or think about it and then tell us after the break.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That he said that the Una
24 was the border, that that's what Cutileiro gave us? Just give me the
25 16th Session and I'll find it for you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That's the reason why I raised the issue. Could the
2 B/C/S version of the 16th Assembly Session be provided to Mr. Krajisnik
3 during the break?
4 We'll adjourn until 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let's turn into private session for a moment.
8 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I invited you to point at the specific
8 page where I find in the 16th Assembly Session -- so I'm not seeking at
9 this moment any further explanation but, first, to spot exactly where to
10 find Mr. Karadzic's remark.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 00847723 is the page. The fourth
12 strategic objective.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We'll have a look at it. Thank you very much.
14 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. If I can just have one
16 moment to look at the English version of that, as long as we are on the
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see it's on page 13 of the English. And it
19 literally says -- working maps proposed at the last session, I don't know
20 exactly what had been the last session prior to the 12th of May, but it
21 could have been the 18th of March.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Just trying to see what it says at this moment.
24 "The European Community recognised the border on the Una, that is
25 then one of the two rivers mentioned in the fourth strategic goal." This
1 is my observation. "They marked the Una as our wartime border and painted
2 everything east of it blue."
3 Mr. Krajisnik, what was the last session before the 12th of May?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just want to say something. I
5 want to correct myself.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please do.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In order to be of assistance.
8 I said that I would be telling the truth here. That is the
9 Cutileiro map, the one that I said. But it seems that there was a session
10 in Lisbon after the 18th of March, so possibly at that session, well, I
11 don't know, but perhaps at that session this map was presented. I don't
12 want to say anything that would be a sin but perhaps there was this other
13 map. Because they say here the last session. As far as I know, it was
14 the 27th of April.
15 JUDGE ORIE: What possibly may have been the case is -- comes
16 easily to speculation.
17 Mr. Krajisnik, you said that we would find in the 16th Assembly
18 Session that Mr. Cutileiro had given -- and I have to reread.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- at least, I mean, it's so easy to verify that.
21 There is nothing on my mind which would think of you trying to deceive us
22 because -- I mean, if ever. I find you intelligent enough not to do it,
23 in such a way, because it could be verified easily, but it does not
24 exactly say here what you said it would say. So therefore, it causes me
25 to ask you also to be very precise in whatever reference you make to
1 documents or other sources.
2 Mr. Tieger, you made proceed.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it says here that the
5 Una is the border.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it says, as a matter of fact, that "they," and
7 that is the European Community, "marked on working maps proposed at the
8 last session the Una River as our wartime border," which I don't know
9 whether Mr. Cutileiro drafted wartime borders or -- but it needs at least
10 some further thought before we can -- but it's certainly -- you pointed at
11 this source as being of relevance for -- for the whole of that map issue
12 and that's clear to us now.
13 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I'd like to have this --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, excuse me, it doesn't
16 say "they." It says "the European Community." That's what is written
17 here, "the European Community." At the last session, et cetera.
18 Not "they." "The European Community." I'm sorry, I beg your pardon.
19 Please go ahead.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think you had earlier said that Mr. Cutileiro
21 did something and I pointed that it was the European Community. Whether
22 that's the same is a matter that we could consider.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, before the break I had asked you about steps taken
1 by the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Serb leadership, and in that
2 connection I would like to turn to a portion of the 38th Session of the
3 RS Assembly held on 17 January 1994. I think that may need to be
5 Your Honour, this needs a number, I believe.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1200, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
8 MR. TIEGER: Oh, and -- sorry. I believe that ours should
9 be P1199. The previous exhibit marked as P1199 had a number that was
10 P762, tab 6, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. So now the extract of the 38th Session
12 would be P1199.
13 MR. JOSSE: For what it's worth, Your Honour, I had agreed with my
14 learned friend I was going to withdraw my objection to it in any event.
15 That was before I knew that it was part of the Prosecution case, and I
16 think Your Honour will hear later, perhaps from my learned friend
17 Mr. Harmon, about P1193.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
19 Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if I could direct your attention to the --
22 basically the third page of the English but the first written page or --
23 that's in English and also the first page of your version, at the --
24 toward the bottom, beginning at about seven lines from the bottom on
1 And also, Your Honours, beginning in the last four lines of the
2 first page in English, where Dr. Karadzic states: "Let us use Alija's
3 mistake to increase the price of wine. Remember how all the SAOs and all
4 those measures before the war always took place following Alija's
5 mistakes. There were nine to ten actions that we carried out. We
6 brain-stormed them all together. However, we did not pull all nine moves
7 straight away. But we carried them out after Alija made a mistake. It is
8 then that we would make a move. And the Muslims would curse his mother
9 afterwards and not ours. We have to let the Muslims make a mistake so
10 that the world could say, well, what do those Muslims want? They have
11 been offered 33 per cent. Europe requested 30 per cent. We consented to
12 30 per cent at this Assembly."
13 And then Dr. Karadzic continues discussing the percentages and
14 that the difference in the percentages does not come at Serb expense but
15 at the expense of, in that case, the Croats.
16 As I indicated, before the break, I had asked you a question
17 related to precisely that, whether or not the Bosnian Serb leadership had
18 in mind the steps to be taken and waited for the Muslim side to make
19 certain, as they called it, mistakes, before implementing each of those
21 A. No. I will give you many examples, proving that we did not know
22 where the Muslims would make mistakes, and I'll give you many examples
23 from 1991 up to the end of the war. I can also explain what Karadzic was
25 Q. Well, first of all, is Dr. Karadzic accurately recalling the
1 anticipated actions, the brain-storming, and the sequential moves made by
2 the Bosnian Serbs, or is this more political rhetoric, according to you?
3 A. No. You're misinterpreting what Karadzic said. He said very
4 nicely, remember how we took moves that were the result of brain-storming,
5 that were well thought out, after every mistake made by the Muslims. Now,
6 that's in the past. And now, what, again we are supposed to wait for the
7 Muslims to make a mistake, if they make a mistake, because they agreed on
8 33 per cent of the territory and then they gave up on that. All of that
9 is written here. We did not know what the Muslims would do. We could not
10 anticipate that or foresee that in any way.
11 Q. And that would -- that explanation, Mr. Krajisnik, would appear to
12 ignore Dr. Karadzic's remark that "we did not pull all nine moves straight
13 away but only after Alija made a mistake."
14 A. Mr. Karadzic says, "We made nine moves." That's in the past. But
15 we did not make these moves straight away. As a mistake was made, we
16 would make our move. He did not say, "We thought of nine moves, and then
17 we took these moves when Alija made mistakes." So now he's saying to
18 Vjestica, "Let's not do what you're suggesting but if the Muslims make a
19 mistake, then let's do that." That is the essence of what he's saying.
20 I can say that every time we were surprised and then we would go
21 on thinking and discussing this for a long time after every one of these
22 mistakes that was made.
23 Q. Let's turn next then to the shorthand notes of a meeting of the
24 Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia held on
25 9 December 1991.
1 MR. TIEGER: And it needs a number, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1200, Your Honours.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. First of all, turning to page 2 of the English, and page 04663374
6 of the B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic begins by saying, "Yes, the constitution is
7 being" -- before I begin that, let me ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, if you were
8 present at this meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 9th of December 1991.
9 A. It says here that I was present. I can't remember but then I
10 probably was present. I thought that I was not there but it says here
11 that I was. That's what's written here.
12 Q. Dr. Karadzic [Realtime transcript read in error "Dragan Kapetina"]
13 says, "Yes, the constitution is being violated and now, therefore, it's
14 accepted because the Krajinas have existed for so long and have become a
15 reality. You can see the behaviour of Europe. When it's suitable, Europe
16 accepts legality. When not, it doesn't accept legality but the factual
17 status. Therefore, we have to be wise enough and prepare both legality
18 and the factual status. We always have to act from the standpoint of
19 legality and of factual status. We have to be that way because that's the
20 way Europe is, inconsistent, that is consistent in following its own
22 And somewhat -- just a little bit farther down, about four lines
23 down, Dr. Karadzic starts -- or speaks about moves. "We have made a list
24 of moves, ten moves in the direction we want, so that there are results.
25 Bosnia remains in Yugoslavia, either as a whole or in our areas, but we
1 won't do anything until Alija messes up. When Alija messes something up,
2 we make move number 5 and then we wait. When Alija messes something else
3 up, we make move number 6. For example, we held the plebiscite now. Had
4 we held it when our hawks suggested, not more than 60 to 70 per cent of
5 Serbs voted but since we waited for Alija and that illegally adopted
6 memorandum and then announced the plebiscite, even people on their
7 death-beds got up to vote, so we must all play the same string."
8 Now you explained Dr. Karadzic's -- I see it, Your Honour, at
9 page 41, line 19, it says Dragan Kapetina, and I'm certain I said
10 Dr. Karadzic and, of course, that's what the transcript of the session
12 JUDGE ORIE: It's on the record now.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you explained Dr. Karadzic's remarks about the nine
15 to ten moves in 1994 as being moves only taken and brain-stormed after the
16 so-called mistakes of Mr. Izetbegovic were made. But we see here in 1991,
17 before all the moves were made, that Dr. Karadzic says we have made a list
18 of the moves. Ten moves --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Before we invite Mr. Krajisnik to answer this
20 question, your first question to Mr. Krajisnik was did you attend this
21 meeting? And then Mr. Krajisnik said, I don't remember, but it states my
22 name. Of course, I looked at the English version. I didn't find anything
23 yet. Then I -- my attention was drawn by the first line which says "part
24 of text untranslated." In the original, it seems that there is a list of
25 those present and the time, I take it, at which the meeting started,
1 quarter past 1.00 in the afternoon. However, Mr. Krajisnik, if you say my
2 name is there, so although I don't remember, I don't see your name. Could
3 you tell us where you see it?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.
5 JUDGE ORIE: So you have no recollection.
6 And, Mr. Tieger, unless I overlooked something the document as
7 such does not, as was more or less accepted by Mr. Krajisnik, the answer.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I made a mistake. You're right. I
11 see here President of the Assembly, so --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There were lots of presidents of assemblies but
13 from other -- other bodies.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when Dr. Karadzic is referring in 1994 to a list of
17 nine to ten moves that had been brain-stormed -- that we had, as he said
18 it, brain-stormed together but did not pull all of them out straight away,
19 that was a list of moves that had been prepared by the time of this
20 meeting on December 9th, 1991, and the Bosnian Serb leadership was waiting
21 for the opportunity to pull those moves out, to implement those moves.
22 Isn't that the case?
23 A. I assure you, Mr. Prosecutor, that that is not the case. We had a
24 policy, and then we made our moves after something had been made incumbent
25 upon us to do. Every time they did something, it was a surprise for us.
1 I will explain to you that we could not have foreseen any one of the moves
2 made by them.
3 Q. What was the list of moves that Dr. Karadzic was talking about at
4 the beginning of December 1991, if you know?
5 A. I don't know what list this is. I know what we were doing, so
6 maybe it was nine or ten. I can tell you all the things that we did by
7 way of counterproposals to some of their moves. I can explain all of that
8 to you. I think I've already said that but I can repeat it. And also,
9 why we did not know in advance that they would make a particular move.
10 Q. I was not suggesting to you, Mr. Krajisnik, that you were in a
11 position to predict the particular moves that Mr. Izetbegovic would make,
12 and I don't read anything in the text that suggests that Dr. Karadzic was
13 saying he was in a position to predict the precise moves they would make.
14 Instead he was saying the Bosnian Serbs had prepared a list of moves and
15 would wait until certain opportunities presented themselves before
16 implementing one after the other. And so I asked you: What was that
18 A. I assure you that there was no such list. There were just some
19 thoughts as to how to deal with certain things and to get out of some
21 As for the proclamation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, I'm going to tell you how that happened and you will see that
23 we did not plan anything in advance. I'll show you that on that one
24 particular example and on any example, for that matter.
25 Q. I don't believe that's necessary, Mr. Krajisnik, particularly
1 after I indicated to you that I wasn't suggesting that you were -- that
2 the list was necessarily dependent upon the particular moves that the
3 Bosnian Muslim leadership took. If the Court wants to hear it, I'm at
4 their disposal of course.
5 JUDGE ORIE: If the Court would like to hear this further
6 explanation, we'll let you know.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Can we turn next to tab 42, please. I'm sorry, tab 86. My
9 apologies. Sorry, the two tabs were stuck together, so it's tab 87.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Already in evidence, Mr. Tieger?
11 MR. TIEGER: There is an inversion on the list, Your Honour, so I
12 needed to make sure the Court has the -- is looking at the same document I
14 JUDGE ORIE: 87 is a Serbian television, Colonel S, recording of
16 MR. TIEGER: Then it's tab 86 in that case.
17 JUDGE ORIE: 86 seems to be the -- from what I see, the 42nd,
18 although it's not translated, 42nd Session of the Assembly of the People's
19 Assembly of Republika Srpska, 18th and 19th of July, 1994. Oh, yes, it
20 says minutes and tape recordings. It's a stamp on the top of the page.
21 MR. TIEGER: That is correct. And if we could -- it does need a
22 number, Your Honour.
23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1201.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn first to page 5 of the English.
1 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, that would be -- that would correspond to
2 02152883 of the B/C/S, beginning at the very end of the fifth sentence
3 from the bottom.
4 And, Your Honours, on page 5 of the English.
5 JUDGE ORIE: It seems that, yes, that's the same five, four lines
6 from the bottom, 18th of March. Is that where we start?
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, correct.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Dr. Karadzic speaking saying: "When we won the battle for our
11 republic on 18 March, we won it on 18 March, thanks to Mr. Krajisnik's
13 He continues talking about the length of the talks. Says: "So
14 when the Muslims agree that there would be three Bosnias on ethnic basis,
15 they should call us and then we would agree to it."
16 Then continuing on the next page in English, and the next page on
17 your version, about six lines down from the top of the page, in English,
18 and --
19 A. On the next one, you mean?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. That's right. And about eight lines down, eight or nine lines
23 down for you, Mr. Krajisnik. "That was the first time that Alija" --
24 A. Please, sorry, I didn't follow. Can you just tell me which line?
25 Because I've found the passage referring to Cutileiro's map.
1 Q. Excuse me, you want to be on page 881 --
2 A. 884?
3 Q. 84, yes, that's right. Ten lines down, beginning in -- you'll see
4 the word "Alija" there in the middle of the sentence.
5 "That was the first time that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on
6 ethnic basis ..."
7 Do you see that, sir?
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 Q. So Dr. Karadzic continues as follows: "That was the first time
10 that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on ethnic basis and that was fatal
11 for him. The maps they showed us were completely unacceptable but
12 Cutileiro asked us if we would accept them as the basis for future
13 negotiations. We held on to it as the basis for future talks. It was
14 important to us that it was divided in three, that it was on ethnic basis
15 and that some kind of map actually exists, by which we territorialise our
16 rights between 45 to 50 per cent. You know what Cutileiro's map looked
17 like. That was the moment when Bosnia collapsed and we were accepted as a
18 party to the conflict -- in the conflict. The international community
19 made a huge mistake by sending Cutileiro and Carrington to see us before
20 the war and by accepting us as a party in the conflict. If they had
21 ignored us, kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then said afterwards
22 that some rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced
23 difficult problems; nobody would have talked to us. By our softness" -
24 there is a question about that precise translation - "and ability to
25 negotiate ... it seemed to them that the Serbs would accept it at any
1 moment. It has been like that from the beginning until now. We made them
2 think that they would be successful if they enter the process, if they
3 internationalise the issue of Bosnia. Because Bosnia becomes done at the
4 moment it gets internationalised and we are recognised as a party in the
6 Was Dr. Karadzic speaking accurately when he told the
7 representatives in the Bosnian Serb Assembly that the critical aspect of
8 the statement of principles on March 18th was that to the Serbs Bosnia had
9 been divided in three and that it meant that the Bosnian Serbs had been
10 acknowledged as a party and that therefore would not face being accused of
11 being rebels and overthrowing their own state but that the international
12 community would consider them a party?
13 A. I would say so, yes. Because it was a great achievement to be a
14 party to the negotiations.
15 Q. Now, Dr. Karadzic, in the meeting on the 9th of December, 1991
16 that we looked at a moment ago, spoke about the need to act from -- in two
17 ways, referring to both the legality and the factual status. And it's the
18 case, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik, that a few months later, when the Bosnian
19 Serb leadership returned from the Cutileiro discussions to the Bosnian
20 Serb Assembly on 18 March 1991, that they began to implement steps
21 necessary to establish a de facto situation that would achieve their
22 objectives? And when I say "they," I should say you and the other members
23 of the Bosnian Serb leadership.
24 A. Our objective was to have a constituent unit. And you're right,
25 from the 18th March onwards, once we reached an agreement to give up on
1 Yugoslavia and to accept Bosnia, then for practical purposes,
2 regionalisation in the field was accelerated, spontaneously or not
3 spontaneously, to make sure we all knew which ethnic areas belonged to
4 whom. Not to win these areas but to identify them so that we know what we
5 are talking about when maps are drawn.
6 Q. And in what sense is it necessary, Mr. Krajisnik, to accelerate
7 regionalisation in a de facto manner in order to identify the territory
8 sought by the Bosnian Serbs?
9 A. I meant to identify ethnic areas, because we were given permission
10 to make adjustments of municipalities and it was allowed to change
11 municipalities, areas, territorially, to identify which settlement, which
12 village was Serb, within one municipality. All sides did the same thing,
13 Muslim, Croat and others, but I am talking only about the Serbs, in order
14 to be able to assist the commission that was to begin that work the next
15 day or the day after next.
16 But maybe I should point out one more thing that could be of
17 interest concerning the map. The map is 40 to 50 per cent, whereas your
18 map is no more than 20. It says here that we got from Cutileiro 40 to
19 50 per cent of Bosnia, and in that other map that we reviewed this
20 morning, there is no more than 25 per cent. I just want to stress it
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I do not understand one part of your
23 previous answer. You said the de facto manner in order to identify the
24 territory. You say it was to identify which settlement, which village,
25 was Serb within one municipality.
1 Now, I imagine that as one way of doing it, saying at the
2 negotiation table, "This village or that hamlet or this area, we consider
3 to be Serb, and therefore we claim it would be part of our territory."
4 De facto regionalisation, I understand, but please correct me if I'm
5 wrong, that you do not say at a negotiation table this village or this
6 hamlet is Serb but that you take a decision that it's now part of the
7 region, whatever region that will be, but whatever Serb region, and say,
8 this is it now. Where you create a fait accompli. That's how I
9 understand de facto. De facto manner in order to identify by accelerating
10 regionalisation. Tell me what is -- if I wrongly understand the
11 distinction between de facto accelerating regionalisation by identifying,
12 from just pointing at a certain village, hamlet, area, at the negotiation
13 table, which asks nothing else than to say, this and this and this,
14 without any de facto movement on the ground.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, just a small
16 correction. You are right to a large extent but I want to make one small
18 Apart from the autonomous regions, we had regions on paper. They
19 did not function, and it was well known what ethnic Serb areas were. And
20 then we needed to identify certain small, minor ethnic territories within
21 municipalities that were not part of those regions. So that we have
22 arguments at the negotiating table, saying that we need to include these
23 territories because we needed to enlarge the Serb ethnic area. That was
24 our task, and that's what we were doing across Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
25 just needed to be known. The negotiations had started. There was no more
1 any working regionalisation.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. De facto and on paper.
3 Please proceed.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe -- maybe I misused the word
5 de facto.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I asked whether the distinction I perceived was
7 correct, and you said with a small correction it was.
8 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Now, the concern that in particular that animated the interest in
11 moving -- in implementing a de facto approach was the concern that the
12 Muslims wanted an internationally recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina,
13 right? And that's what you have told the members of the parliament at the
14 March 18th, 1991 session.
15 A. On the 18th of March, that agreement was reached, and it was
16 envisaged that we could work on parts of municipalities, and we had
17 decided what to do to implement that plan.
18 Now, when you are discussing with people and trying to get them to
19 accept the plan, you have to scare them a bit into accepting it, because
20 it was a major responsibility, but our intention was to advance the
21 preparations as much as we could and prepare the plan for implementation,
22 because the negotiating team did not know where the Serb ethnic areas
23 were, spread across Bosnia. How could we know that?
24 Q. And the way in which you scared them is by telling them that you
25 thought the problem is that they, meaning the Muslims, want Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina to be internationally recognised at all costs?
2 A. Well, we knew that, we knew that Bosnians wanted to have Bosnia
3 internationally recognised without any transformation. But it's a
4 different matter that we had agreed with Cutileiro to conduct the
5 referendum after the agreement, and they agreed with us on that. You have
6 that in the material I produced to you yesterday. But they wanted
7 recognition without transformation. If I said that, there was nothing
8 wrong with it, and that turned out to be true ultimately.
9 Q. And that was the reason you gave the delegates for why it would be
10 a good thing if the Bosnian Serbs could do one thing for strategic
11 reasons, if we could start implementing what we have agreed upon, the
12 ethnic division on the ground, and to thereafter implement a de facto
13 ethnic division on the ground?
14 A. I explained that more than once. We had agreed on the 18th of
15 March, that's the agreement. I said let's implement this now. Let's
16 identify the areas. Let's know what is ours, so that we are able to say
17 it at negotiations. I didn't say that we Serbs should do it on the
18 ground. My idea was to implement what had already been agreed and then
19 see what to do next, the ethnic division as reflected in Cutileiro's
21 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, in fact, at page 13 of the English, and this
22 was raised during the course of your examination-in-chief, you did
23 say, "The ethnic division on the ground." And perhaps it's also useful to
24 look at what the other deputies said after you suggested implementing the
25 ethnic division on the ground.
1 Let's look at page 21 of the English and page 27 of the B/C/S.
2 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honours, this is, of course, the
3 11th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on March 18th, 1991.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we are slightly puzzled. We don't
5 suppose it's of any great importance, but both Mr. Josse and I heard my
6 name mentioned. One tends to hear one's name quite naturally. But we
7 both heard it. It doesn't appear anywhere on the transcript. It may be
8 absolutely trivial, in which case we can ignore it, but it's best to be
10 MR. JOSSE: [Microphone not activated].
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note Mr. Krajisnik said,
12 "Mr. Stewart asked me about it." He speaks very fast. It's very
13 difficult to get everything.
14 MR. STEWART: [Previous translation continues] ... the
15 difficulties, Your Honour. That's just -- okay. Well, that's probably,
16 then, Your Honour, perhaps a point at which Your Honour might remind
17 Mr. Krajisnik, once again, to serve his interests best by --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I was just about to do that.
19 Mr. Krajisnik, we missed although a not very important part of
20 what you said due to the fact that the interpreters had difficulties in
21 following your speed of speech.
22 MR. TIEGER: In fact, let me ask you to turn to page 23 through 24
23 of the English, page 30 through 31 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. And
24 the remarks of Mr. Bjelosevic.
25 He says, in the second paragraph of his comments: "First and most
1 importantly I would like to welcome Mrs. Plavsic's advice which she
2 offered last time when she was speaking about Croats, which concerns the
3 creation of a de facto situation. In this moment there is simply no
4 reason for us to think of something new when we can use the Croatian model
5 of political action on the ground in BH. The model consists of the
6 following: Their armed units are occupying the areas they consider to be
7 theirs. I suggest that we adopt the Croatian model of creating a de facto
8 situation on the ground to continue working in the Serbian Assembly and to
9 have the negotiating team continue its work."
10 Mr. Perisic, on page 28 of the English, and page 37 through 38 of
11 the B/C/S, at the very top of the page at page 28. "A very important
12 matter," he states, "and one highlighted by many people is that a state is
13 created in two ways, by negotiations, talks, diplomatic methods, political
14 moves, et cetera. The other way, which is more important, entails
15 practical moves on the ground."
16 And I think one more reference at the moment, and that's
17 Mr. Ijacic at page 30 of the English, and page 41 of your version in
18 B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik. And it's at the very top of the English. "It has
19 been stressed here that the actual situation on the ground was very
20 important, and I would like to add that the more we achieve on the ground
21 the less will have to be said by our negotiators to achieve more. And
22 secondly, the more we achieve on the ground, the more time will be on our
23 side and the negotiations can last even longer. In the opposite case,
24 time is our enemy."
25 Mr. Krajisnik, just as Dr. Karadzic had mentioned on December 9th,
1 1991, the discussion here was about attempting to achieve Bosnian Serb
2 objectives by moving forward in two ways: Continue to negotiate but move
3 forward to implement a de facto solution on the ground. Correct?
4 A. Yes. But not by armed force. That's not the meaning. What it
5 means is we need to take control where we can because in many places
6 control had not been taken of; whereas Croats had taken control using
7 their units, and they had even crossed over into Posavina. That's what
8 has been recorded here.
9 Q. And by taking control of territories claimed to be Bosnian Serb,
10 the Bosnian Serbs would be able to go to the negotiations and say, "This
11 is our territory."
12 A. No, no. It's just that if you don't have control in a certain
13 place, and the other side is physically capturing your territory, then you
14 will end up in a situation where Europe, as it says here, might recognise
15 the de facto situation and you will lose your territories. And it was
16 drawn on a map. It wasn't warfare. We didn't have warfare on any -- on
17 any territory at that time, as far as Serbs are concerned.
18 When we create a region, that's the de facto situation, when you
19 take control it's de facto situation. All the way until then,
20 authorities, governments simply were not functioning, and we had the right
21 to have our authorities in that particular municipality. I do not doubt
22 that there are people who meant it differently, but the passage you read
23 means what I just explained, and that's the way Karadzic thought.
24 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you one question, Mr. Krajisnik?
25 You explained that the other side, if the other side is physically
1 capturing your territory, that was a risk of this being accepted as a
2 factual situation. Would that be any different for your side, physically
3 capturing territory? Would that not create a risk for the other side
4 then? That it would be accepted as a de facto situation? I mean, why
5 would it be true one way and why would it not be -- exactly be true the
6 other way?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here is why, Your Honour. As it
8 says here, forces from Croatia came in and physically captured those
9 areas, because the warfare was going on in Croatia, in Posavina, and the
10 deputies say, Europe might recognise the de facto situation because we had
11 let go of power. We don't have any units on that day that we are
12 speaking, the 18th of March, in order to go forward and take over somebody
13 else's territories.
14 JUDGE ORIE: But at the same time, some of the assemblymen say, if
15 we move on the ground, there is less need to further negotiate. I do
16 understand that one of the basics of the negotiations were where to draw
17 the lines. I mean, what, then, does that mean, if you say we have to
18 negotiate less if we are making our movements on the ground or if we --
19 how could we understand this and also the reference to the Croatian
20 method, as one of the assemblymen said, how could we understand that other
21 than - please help me out - other than that if you would have created
22 de facto situation on the ground, that it would -- might be favourable in
23 further negotiations because the factual situation might be accepted as it
24 was developing?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is being said is that Europe
1 could recognise the de facto situation. Croats took some territories. We
2 did not have authority there but we were supposed to. And I'm saying, and
3 what they are saying, and I'm explaining it, is that we did not have
4 the -- our police or anything else there because nobody held authority
5 there. They simply came there and they took those territories.
6 You're right. Perhaps implicitly this MP was saying, although I
7 didn't understand it then but I think it's correct, look at what the
8 Croats are doing. And perhaps implicitly he was saying that some force of
9 ours should be doing that kind of thing but we didn't have an army at the
10 time, so we couldn't do that kind of thing. I mean I'm not trying to say
11 that he didn't say this, but we didn't have any force at the time, and how
12 could we issue orders to have the territories taken?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Do you understand it to be that even if they were
14 hinting at such a thing to be done or to happen, that it could not be a
15 real suggestion because there were no forces anyhow that could do such a
16 thing? Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that's what happened. We
18 didn't have any forces that could take the territories of others then, and
19 we did not take any territories. So yes, you're right. They were worried
20 because Croats were taking territories, as they put it here.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you just said "we didn't have any force at the
24 time," and asked rhetorically how could we issue orders to have the
25 territories taken? At page 36 of the English and page 53 of your version
1 in B/C/S, Mr. Vjestica begins to speak, and says, at page 38 of the
2 English, in about the fourth paragraph, that's still page 53 of your
3 version, Mr. Krajisnik: "We need to establish the authorities and the
4 Serbian state of BH."
5 He mentioned a couple of particular things that need to be done,
6 "arrangements for the next session and for implementing the constitution
7 we have adopted. Implementing all the laws we have adopted."
8 And then he states: "In addition to these two conditions, we must
9 urgently establish a Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina. We must establish national defence. Our Serbian army, which
11 is already there on the ground, we just need to transform it into what we
12 need to have."
13 At the bottom of the page on 38, he offers Bosanska Krupa as a
14 textbook example, noting in the very last sentence of the English: "We
15 have de facto occupied our own territories."
16 And then states: "Mr. President, I think that you have to give us
17 an order that after the next assembly, you should order this, that we
18 arrange it for the areas where it has not been done and to implement this,
19 that the Serbs should occupy their territories so that no other forces
20 could enter them. Thank you."
21 In urging the establishment, indeed the need to urgently establish
22 a Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Vjestica
23 was making reference to his concern about what you just said, that at that
24 moment, your quote was, "We didn't have any force at the time, and how
25 could we issue orders to have the territories taken?"
1 Is that right? That's the gist of Mr. Vjestica's concern at that
3 A. First of all, a correction. It's not Mr. Chairman, what it says
4 here, it's Mr. President, and he probably meant Karadzic because he was
5 the president and he was present.
6 Also in response to your question, all of this was explained by
7 Mr. Vjestica in your interview. I can just repeat what he thought,
8 that -- or, rather, he denied all of this. Obviously --
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
10 A. I'm telling you what I know.
11 Q. I understand precisely what you're telling us. You said in
12 response to an earlier question by the Court, that at that time we didn't
13 have any force and how could we issue orders to have the territories
14 taken? You were present at March 18th, 1991, at the 11th Session, when
15 Vjestica said this. And by --
16 A. Yes, I was. And we didn't have any forces that we could issue
17 such orders to. And this is not correct. I did not know about this.
18 What he was saying was just -- well, how should I put this -- an
19 exaggeration of his own territory. We didn't have any forces. The JNA
20 was there.
21 Q. Mr. Vjestica is urging the establishment of such forces including,
22 and in particular, the MUP, for just that purpose.
23 A. No -- I mean yes. But we adopted a law, and he is saying let's
24 form a MUP as soon as possible, and we didn't form one until the end of
25 March, until the war started.
1 There were different proposals. I agree with you there were
2 different proposals. But we did not have an armed force of our own that
3 we could issue orders to. At least I did not know about any such thing.
4 How can I know whether somebody had something on a local level?
5 Q. You mentioned the comment about Mr. -- or that Mr. Vjestica
6 directed his remarks at the end of his comments to Mr. President.
7 Mr. Krajisnik, this probably won't come as news to you in view of the
8 many, many sessions over which you presided, but it appears, looking at
9 this session in particular, that you call on -- you give an order of -- by
10 which people will be called upon and speak. Everyone rises and says,
11 "Mr. President, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen," that's all directed
12 to you, right?
13 A. Yes, yes. You see what this was all about. Although this was not
14 correct, I know who Mr. Vjestica considered to be the Supreme Commander at
15 the time, although there was no war on. But you're quite right, I was
16 chairing that session and everybody was addressing me as Mr. President, as
17 of Mr. President of the Assembly.
18 However, I'm sure that he meant Karadzic, as far as issuing orders
19 was concerned. But even if he addressed me, it doesn't matter. I was not
20 in charge of that. I could not do that. But he considered Karadzic to be
21 the top person, although he was only president of the party.
22 I'm saying that for the sake of the truth. It's not that I'm
23 trying to disassociate myself.
24 Q. Now, as you said here at page 59, line 7: "We didn't form a MUP
25 until the end of March, until the war started."
1 And you were asked during the course of your examination-in-chief
2 about the establishment of the MUP.
3 A. Tell you what I meant, if you want. When this dispatch was sent
4 by Mr. Mandic. That's what I meant. That's what I meant. That's what I
5 was referring to. That was the end of March, beginning of April. That's
6 what I meant.
7 Q. So Mr. Mandic's dispatch, then, represented the formation of the
8 Bosnian Serb MUP?
9 A. Oh, no. I'm saying that up until that moment, there was a joint
10 MUP, and I indicated something that was debatable here, that was in
11 dispute, because the MUP split up. And then at just one moment -- I was
12 saying that before that there shouldn't have been a separate Serbian MUP,
13 although a minister had been appointed on the 24th of March.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, a separate, Serbian, Bosnian Serb MUP came into
15 effect on April 1st or March 31st, depending on how you count, that is
16 eight days from the promulgation of the law on internal affairs.
17 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I was quite precise. At Vjestica's proposal to
18 establish a MUP, I said that we had not established a MUP until the end of
19 March, and I meant a particular point in time. Mr. Mandic's dispatch. Up
20 until that moment, it certainly had not been formed. And when it was
21 actually formed, you can see that in documents, certainly. You can find
22 all of that when it was established and so on and so forth. But I am
23 saying that up until the end of March, nothing was done. Until the war
24 broke out there wasn't a MUP, for sure. Or that's what it looks like
25 here, too.
1 Q. Well, perhaps there is some confusion, so let's get it clarified.
2 I understood you during the course of your examination-in-chief to be
3 essentially suggesting that Mr. Mandic's dispatch represented some kind of
4 irresponsible or unauthorised action by a single individual or maybe two
5 individuals contrary to the wishes of you and Dr. Karadzic.
6 A. Correct, correct. That's exactly what I said. And I'm saying now
7 that that is true as well. He did this in an unauthorised way. And it
8 didn't really result in any effects because Mr. Delimustafic had him
10 Q. The fact, Mr. Krajisnik, is that Mr. Mandic's dispatch did nothing
11 more than essentially recite the terms of the law on internal affairs;
12 that is, simply recite what the Bosnian Serb Assembly enacted and what you
13 signed, which came into effect on April 1st, 1992, thereby splitting up
14 the joint MUP.
15 A. I've already explained that that was not true. That Mr. Mandic
16 made some mistakes. He said that Bijeljina was the centre rather than
17 Ugljevik. And he didn't have the right to do that. It's the government
18 that has to do that. The government should have done that. I'm not
19 trying to say that the law was not passed, but it was the government that
20 was supposed to do that. We discussed that last time. Why he was not
21 authorised to do that. Even the minister could not do that without the
22 government. To this day, I think that was irresponsible. He shouldn't
23 have done this. He had some reason. Well ...
24 Q. Well, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, we didn't discuss it. I think you
25 and Mr. Stewart discussed it, and it's a matter I'd like to now raise with
1 you in somewhat more detail.
2 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'll be moving on to that topic. I
3 don't know if you would like me to begin or if you would like to break
5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it might take some time. Although I hope
6 that -- not too much.
7 Therefore, we'll first have a break now until quarter to 1.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. If the next bundle has not
12 been distributed yet, I'd ask that that be done.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, before the adjournment, or the break, I had
16 suggested to you that the dispatch sent by Momcilo Mandic on 31 March 1992
17 represented essentially a recitation of the state of affairs, that is the
18 law that had been enacted by the Assembly and signed by you with respect
19 to the establishment of a Bosnian Serb MUP. And perhaps the best way of
20 addressing that is simply to look at the dispatch, which is found at
21 tab 92. And although normally a comprehensive review of or line by line
22 review of a document is not feasible logistically, in this case we have a
23 relatively short document so I think we can try to do that.
24 So let me ask you first to begin at the beginning. Mr. Mandic's
25 dispatch says: "At its meeting held on 27 March 1992, the Assembly of the
1 Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the political
2 orientation of the Serbian people and the Sarajevo agreement, promulgated
3 the constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
4 That's correct, right? That's simply a recitation of what
6 A. Yes, yes. Yes. The constitution of the Serb republic was
8 Q. "In addition, the Assembly of the Serbian People passed a number
9 of laws and other regulations necessary for the functioning of the
10 Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that
11 respect, it passed a Law on Internal Affairs, which shall be uniformly
12 applied on the territory of the Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia
13 and Herzegovina as of 1 April 1992, and appointed Mico Stanisic, until now
14 an adviser in the Bosnian MUP, as minister."
15 And it is correct, is it not, Mr. Krajisnik, that on the 28th of
16 February, 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly passed the Law on Internal
17 Affairs, and at its 13th Session on March 24th, 1992 the -- Mr. Stanisic
18 was appointed as Minister of the Interior?
19 A. Yes, yes, that's correct.
20 Q. "This Law, among other things," the dispatch continues, "regulates
21 a unified Public Security Service, regulates and organises the National
22 Security Service within the framework of the rights and duties of the
23 Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regulates the
24 duties and powers of MUP employees, mutual relationships and cooperation
25 between the organs of the Interior, and the education, professional
1 training and specialist training of employees."
2 And that's simply an accurate account of the Law on Internal
3 Affairs, perhaps not fully comprehensive but accurate in capturing its
5 A. Yes. I suppose so.
6 Q. And the dispatch continues: "In order to conduct internal affairs
7 on the territory of the Republic of Serbian People in Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, the Minister of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo, is setting up the following
10 Security Services Centres as territorial units:
11 Banja Luka, for the area of the Autonomous Region of Krajina;.
12 Trebinje, for the area of the Serbian Autonomous District of
14 Doboj, for the area of Serbian Autonomous District of Northern
16 Sarajevo for the area of Romanija-Birac Serbian Autonomous
18 Ugljevik, for the area of the Serbian Autonomous District of
20 And as you've noted before, and have stressed more than once,
21 Ugljevik was, as you said it, I think -- you said Bijeljina was in play
22 rather than Ugljevik. And if we look to Article 28 of the Law on Internal
23 Affairs, we see that Mr. Mandic's dispatch faithfully recites the first
24 four, although Northern Bosnia is not there. But you are correct that the
25 Law on Internal Affairs -- which is found at tab 91, Your Honours.
1 Article 28 states: Bijeljina for the territory of the Serbian
2 Autonomous District Semberija rather than Ugljevik.
3 Now, Mr. Mandic -- Mr. Mandic, excuse me, Mr. Krajisnik. Can you
4 turn, please, to tab 94 and take a look at that.
5 A. Yes. I know. I mean, I think he corrected that later.
6 Q. Tab 94, which does need a number --
7 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1202.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Is a letter sent or dated 16 April 1992 from Mr. Mandic, the
10 Deputy Minister of the Bosnian Serb MUP, to Predrag Jesuric at the Public
11 Security Station, Bijeljina. And in it Mr. Mandic states: "At a meeting
12 of the Professional Collegium of the Serbian MUP held on 16 April 1992, it
13 was proposed that the Majevica and Semberija security -- CSB, or Security
14 Services Centre be established in Bijeljina rather than in Ugljevik, since
15 Bijeljina has better material and technical equipment and a more
16 substantial human potential.
17 "A proposal was sent to the government to correct what was most
18 probably a misprint in the Law on the Interior of the Serbian Republic of
19 the BH.
20 "Carry out all preparations in connection with the takeover of
21 the CSB and inform the government of Majevica and Semberija."
22 So it would seem, Mr. Krajisnik, that the simple answer to the
23 discrepancy between Ugljevik and Bijeljina in Mr. Mandic's dispatch rests
24 in what is reflected in the letter of April 16th, that he had either a
25 different version of the law or an earlier draft or something that led him
1 to believe that the Law on the Interior inaccurately, as he noted there,
2 indicated Ugljevik rather than Bijeljina.
3 A. Well, the seat of Semberija, Majevica, that SAO, was in Ugljevik,
4 and he referred to that just by way of an automatic response. That's the
5 reason why he mentioned Ugljevik. It wasn't Bijeljina at the time.
6 Q. No, that's not what the letter of April 16th seems to indicate.
7 It indicates instead that Mr. Mandic believes that there was a misprint in
8 the Law on the Interior.
9 A. Well, I'm telling you, in the law it says Bijeljina. However,
10 when he wrote that paper, he probably looked at the seats of different
11 regions, and he said Ugljevik. In the decision on the establishment of
12 Semberija and Majevica, it says that Ugljevik is the seat of that region.
13 That's what I assume. I don't know what other reason he could have had.
14 It's not a misprint. He simply made a mistake. He didn't look at the
15 law. He simply looked at the seats of autonomous regions.
16 Q. Well, the Court will be able to determine what prompted Mr. Mandic
17 to indicate Ugljevik rather than Bijeljina. But at a minimum,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, it does seem to be the case, doesn't it, that Mr. Mandic,
19 who has been faithfully reciting the law up to the point he lists the
20 Security Services Centres that will be set up as territorial units, was
21 attempting to do precisely the same in listing the locations of those
22 Security Services Centre. He was simply trying to follow the law. And
23 when he found out there was a discrepancy he wrote the government and said
24 there was a misprint. Now, whether correct or not, that's pretty clearly
25 what he was trying to do there, isn't it?
1 A. Yes. But he couldn't have sent the dispatch before that, before
2 he got an answer from the government. I hope. And now he's sending this
3 to the government? And before that, as deputy minister, he had already
4 issued instructions in order to have this corrected. He should have
5 presented this to the government, if that's important. As deputy
6 minister, he could not have done any of the two. On the 16th of April
7 he's deputy minister. And before April he was completely unauthorised.
8 Q. The point, Mr. Krajisnik, as I indicated more than once when we
9 were going over this, is that Mr. Mandic's dispatch is not an attempt by
10 him to engage in any unauthorised unilateral action but merely a
11 recitation of the law, as he understands it, which will come into effect
12 on the dates he indicates. But let's continue with the rest of the
14 "Within the above-mentioned Security Services Centres, in order
15 to carry out specific tasks and duties within the competence of the organs
16 of internal affairs, Public Security Stations are set up for the
17 territories of municipalities."
18 And that's correct, too; nothing controversial about that, right?
19 You're looking at me, Mr. Krajisnik, but that's -- I'm reading
20 from the first sentence of the third paragraph of the dispatch.
21 A. The problem is that he couldn't have sent this. That's the only
22 thing that's a problem. And this law could not enter into force before
23 the constitution entered into force.
24 Q. We'll look at the -- when the law enters into force in just a
25 moment, but let's take it one step at a time. So.
1 I take it that your answer indirectly is an affirmation of the
2 question I posed to you that there is -- that that sentence that I read to
3 you is also legally accurate and just a recitation of what the Law on
4 Internal Affairs provides?
5 A. Yes. There is no controversy there. Everything that he says in
6 the dispatch is more or less in accordance with the law. Perhaps there is
7 something that's exceptional but that is of no importance. Even Ugljevik
8 is of no importance.
9 Q. Now, next sentence says: "On the day this Law comes into force,
10 the Security Services Centres and Public Security Stations of the Serbian
11 Republic of" -- I'm sorry -- "of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina MUP," that is the joint MUP, and then continuing, "on the
13 territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are abolished
14 and cease to function, and their authority, that is, tasks and duties
15 within the competence of organs of internal affairs are taken over by the
16 above-mentioned organisational units of MUP of the Serbian Republic
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
18 And that, Mr. Krajisnik, is simply a recitation of Article 126,
19 the Law on Internal Affairs, isn't it? And please turn your attention to
20 tab 91, Article 126.
21 MR. TIEGER: That's found at page 30 of the English, Your Honours,
22 and page 01138938 in the B/C/S. And it states: "On the day of entry into
23 force of this" --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, is it really necessary to read it again?
25 I mean, we can read it more quickly than the translators can.
1 MR. TIEGER: Great, of course.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And Mr. Krajisnik can read it as well.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. So that second sentence of Mr. Mandic's third paragraph in the
5 dispatch is simply a recitation of Article 126?
6 A. Well, yes, but I mean -- well, yes, I confirm that all of that is
7 from the law. There is no need for you to move on this way gradually.
8 There is no dispute about that, that he had the law before him, yes.
9 Q. So the entire dispatch, with the exception of that minor
10 discrepancy involving Ugljevik and Bijeljina is a simple and faithful
11 recitation of the law enacted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that has been confirmed by now. Let's try to
13 move on a bit more -- I do understand, Mr. Tieger, that you wanted to take
14 it step by step but if you could make the step a bit more -- a bit
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. And that law, Mr. Krajisnik, was self-implementing. It came in
18 effect eight days from the promulgation -- from its promulgation on
19 March 23rd, 1992, and there was no dispute that it was promulgated on that
20 date, as you indicated in your examination-in-chief?
21 A. No, no. I did not say that. I said it is written there, eight
22 days after promulgation. But I didn't know when it would be promulgated
23 or when somebody would place it in the Official Gazette. And I said that
24 within 15 days, organisation would be done, and Mr. Mandic did all that in
25 his dispatch.
1 Q. To whom did you say -- okay. So the reference about organisation
2 being done within 15 days, that's another reference to the fact that since
3 regulations had not been promulgated that rendered the -- what would
4 otherwise appear to be the self-implementing provisions of the Law on
5 Internal Affairs null and void, or at least not in force?
6 A. No. This law should have been given by the minister to the
7 government, the government should have endorsed the method of
8 organisation, after which this dispatch would be sent, and centres were
9 envisaged by the law. He shouldn't have done all this by himself, even if
10 he had been minister. He should have consulted the government. I think I
11 have said this previously in my examination.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the constitution of the Serbian Republic entered
13 into effect on the day it was promulgated, didn't it? That's provided in
14 the constitution, if I recall correctly.
15 A. Well, Mr. Prosecutor, every lawyer knows this has to be published
16 in the Official Gazette and that somebody has to enforce it. We never
17 approved, we never endorsed, those minutes of that Assembly session. On
18 the 27th of March, we didn't endorse any minutes of the Assembly session.
19 Only then could it have been promulgated.
20 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you were president of the Bosnian Serb
21 Assembly responsible for the enacting -- for overseeing the preparation
22 and enactment and implementation of the legislation emerging from that
23 body. We are now looking at a piece of legislation that states explicitly
24 in its provisions when and how it comes into effect. Now, you've told us
25 that among the reasons why those provisions should not be relied upon is
1 Article 129, which refers to the regulations of the Law on Internal
3 First of all, Article 129: "General acts on the internal
4 organisation of the Ministry and the National Security Service shall be
5 adopted not later than within 15 days of the entry of this law into
6 force," is what I guess we lawyers would call a condition subsequent, and
7 something I suspect was familiar to you as a legislator. That is, it
8 can't prevent the law from coming into effect; it's only meaningful after
9 the law comes into effect. Isn't that the case?
10 A. Well, Mr. Prosecutor, with all due respect, that's not the way it
11 is. It's stated in the constitution that we worked on the 27th, that we
12 may do the linking up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We took that to
13 Brussels. It wasn't published. It wasn't promulgated. All those were
14 moves that would leave us some room. If that law were to be enacted, it
15 would apply to the Serbian MUP within our constituent unit, not in
16 isolation. Find it in the constitution and you will see that that's the
17 way it's stipulated and that was supposed to be endorsed as part of the
18 minutes and the problem would have been solved. All this is linked to the
19 issue of promulgation, which is something I know nothing about. That was
20 a job done by technical services.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber thinks that this repeated
22 course in constitutional law and the technique of implementing laws has
23 been sufficient for the time being, and the Chamber is also aware that it
24 should look both at the formal legal aspects of these matters, which have
25 been very much emphasised by Mr. Krajisnik, and also on what actually
1 happened, even if it would not fulfil all the legal requirements. But to
2 spend more time on this aspect doesn't seem to assist the Chamber at this
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, I hope the next couple of exhibits
6 I turn the Court to won't run afoul of that guidance. I apologise in
7 advance if it does.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you can do it, if you say this is a document
9 saying so and so, Mr. Krajisnik, would this support or would this not
10 support, then we know what we are talking about, but if every document and
11 every question takes us ten minutes, then the Chamber might write a thesis
12 on constitutional law soon.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, please turn to page 93 -- to tab 93. That's the
15 decision on proclaiming the constitutional law for implementation of the
16 constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And in
17 particular please turn to Article 12, which states: "Until the" -- well,
18 you can read it, but it is basically an article stating that until
19 regulations are passed, the laws and regulations of the Serbian -- the
20 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be applied.
21 That's a reflection, Mr. Krajisnik, isn't it, of the fact that in
22 getting this -- these organs and authorities off the ground, there wasn't
23 time to write all the regulations necessary for their functioning and it
24 was in fact perhaps pointless not to adopt many, if not most, of those
25 that had been used over the years in such institutions as the joint MUP?
1 A. No, no. That's not the way it is. On the contrary, it says quite
2 the opposite here. It is meant that once the constitutional law and the
3 constitution are proclaimed, pending the adoption of new laws, the
4 legislation of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be
5 applied, as long as they are not contrary to the laws of Republika Srpska.
6 It's the same date but the proclamation of both enactments was on
7 the 27th of March. Both of them were adopted on the 28th of February. I
8 mean they were passed on the 28th of February, but somebody published
9 them ...
10 Q. And in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, the --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just see. Mr. Krajisnik referred to the 27th
12 of March. It looks as although it is not part of the translation, that it
13 was published the 16th of March, 1992.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said the 28th of February. Yes,
15 the 16th of March it was published.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Not the 27th but the 16th. Okay.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. And in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, we've heard previous evidence in this
20 case that the regulations for the internal organisation of the Bosnian
21 Serb MUP were not adopted until at the earliest September 1992?
22 A. Sorry, which regulations? Yugoslav and Bosnian regulations were
23 applied in the meantime. That's not a problem. I don't know what
24 regulations you are referring to, but I would be happy to answer. Because
25 we said that we would adopt all positive legislation, both of Yugoslavia
1 and of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. I believe you've answered the question, Mr. Krajisnik, and that is
3 that until the adoption of regulations for the Bosnian Serb MUP in
4 September of 1992, that the previous regulations applied.
5 Now, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, the -- in the field, people were
6 waiting not for any dispatch by Mr. Mandic or any unilateral action by any
7 minister or deputy minister of the Bosnian Serb government, but were
8 waiting to be notified that the Law on Internal Affairs of the Serbian
9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had in fact come into effect.
10 And in that connection, sir, please turn to tab 95. Tab 95,
11 P763.C tab 67, is a report dated March 23rd, 1992 from the State Security
12 Service of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs, reporting about
13 findings and observations in a number of areas. If you could turn to
14 page 8 of the English and page 8 of your version, both at the top. That
15 report indicates --
16 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honour, because I am completely confident
17 that you will catch this, it appears that the first most of the first
18 three sentences in English are some kind of transposition from another
19 document. They don't appear to have any relationship to that. We'll have
20 to get that addressed.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Starting with the words "were attempts."
22 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: That's one. And then up until?
24 MR. TIEGER: "The situation." It doesn't appear to be any kind of
25 comprehensible segue from the previous point.
1 In any event, as you can see the -- part 3 on the previous page
2 begins "Bosanska Krupa" and although I haven't had it specifically
3 translated, it would seem to start at "situation in the area of
4 Bosanska Krupa municipality."
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. And the report states: "Reserve police of the Serb municipality
8 Bosanska Krupa (about 200 men) and the rest of active and reserve police
9 of Serb nationality from this area have occupied the roads and the posts
10 on the right bank of Una River in order to forestall any possible events.
11 Lately they have been ready to block the critical territories within the
12 town itself for the purpose of division should the decision on merging
13 with Banja Luka region and CSB Banja Luka become effective. Other than
14 that, during our last contact in Banja Luka on March 3rd this year, chief
15 of CSB Banja Luka informed us that such decision was not going to be
16 implemented before the Law on Internal Affairs of the Serb Republic Bosnia
17 comes into effect."
18 Now, first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, the reference to the chief of
19 CSB Banja Luka, that's a reference to Stojan Zupljanin; correct?
20 A. Probably, yes. At that time he was both in the Bosnian and in our
22 Q. And do you have any reason to dispute that what Mr. Zupljanin was
23 waiting for, in order to implement the decision to block the critical
24 territories for the purpose of division, was for the Law on Internal
25 Affairs to come into effect?
1 A. I did not understand that this is a reference to Mr. Zupljanin
2 having done that, but the Bosnian -- but the police from Bosanska Krupa,
3 that they took control of it on their own initiative. I mean the reserve
5 Q. Well, maybe you need me to ask to you look at the document a
6 little more carefully and then we'll leave it but it clearly says --
7 A. Yes, I can see the following passage where Mr. Zupljanin said on
8 the 5th of March that -- otherwise this would not be applied pending the
9 adoption of the Law on Internal Affairs, meaning the annexation of the
10 Security Services Centre or Public Security Station, that they would not
11 annex it until the law is enacted. This concerns, I don't know, maybe the
12 division of the MUP -- no, sorry, MUP and the outside territory.
13 This is a brief from the 13th of March.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, the question has been answered.
15 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Now, one of the other things that you said when addressing this
18 issue during the course of your examination-in-chief was that, as dismayed
19 as you and Dr. Karadzic were by Mr. Mandic's dispatch, there wasn't really
20 time to do anything about it, to clarify that it had not been the
21 intention of Bosnian Serb leaders to split the MUP.
22 A. No, no. I said they couldn't do anything because war started very
23 soon afterwards. There was no time to do anything after the 31st because
24 the war started almost immediately afterwards. That was the point of what
25 I said. I didn't say that we were not going to divide MUP. We wanted our
1 own MUP within Bosnia and Herzegovina, in line with the Cutileiro
2 principles because that's what we had a right to. But we didn't want to
3 do it arbitrarily. We wanted to do it according to the principles.
4 Q. Well, if you'll turn to tab 96, we'll see that there was certainly
5 time for Mr. Stanisic to verify and underscore Mr. Mandic's dispatch.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this needs a number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1203.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Now, this was sent by Mico Stanisic on the 3rd of April, 1992 to
11 all CSBs and to all SJBs, and it concerns information that Mr. Stanisic
12 has received to the effect that a dispatch with Momo Mandic's signature
13 has been sent out on behalf of the Serb Republic of BiH MUP inviting all
14 Department of Internal Affairs employees to return to their regular jobs
15 and posts.
16 And in the second paragraph, Mr. Stanisic states that: "... this
17 is an already established way of misinforming and waging a special war on
18 behalf of individual management employees of the ex-MUP," and informing
19 the employees of the Serb Republic of BiH Ministry of Interior not to fall
20 for such tricks and misinformation.
21 And concluding: "We are warning again to abide by the Serb
22 Republic of BiH constitution and Law on Internal Affairs as well as the
23 orders issued by Mico Stanisic, Minister of Interior."
24 A. This is a reference to some sort of dispatch of the 3rd April,
25 that is a forgery, signed by Mr. Mandic, urging everybody to go back to
1 their jobs. So Stanisic, referring to that dispatch, tells people not to
2 fall for that provocation.
3 It's not the same dispatch sent by Mr. Mandic that we discussed a
4 moment ago. But he, Stanisic, was probably aware of that other dispatch
5 that was sent in end March that was in dispute. At least at this moment
6 he knew about it.
7 Q. He clearly knew about it, and in fact, what he's referring to as
8 you indicate is -- and what you indicate was a forgery, was that someone
9 sent something out very quickly apparently after Mr. Mandic's dispatch,
10 attempting to effectively rescind it. You were asked by the Chamber why,
11 if you and Dr. Karadzic so adamantly were against this unauthorised and
12 irresponsible action by Mr. Mandic, you didn't send out a dispatch or
13 notice that it was, in fact, unauthorised and irresponsible, and your
14 answer was that there wasn't sufficient time and the war events overtook
15 the opportunity to do so.
16 A. First of all, there are several questions in that one.
17 I just wish to explain, here in paragraph 1, it says that somebody
18 sent a false dispatch under the name of Mr. Mandic. Well, several
19 questions were asked.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Let's focus on the most important one. The issue
21 Mr. Tieger raises is the following. You said we had no time, the war was
22 about to start, started, we had no time to respond to what you called an
23 irresponsible dispatch of Mr. Mandic.
24 The question now is that if a couple of days later, another false
25 dispatch is sent, how it could be that you found time to respond to that
1 and not to the earlier one, although the war was even closer.
2 That's, I take it, Mr. Tieger, the issue you wanted to raise.
3 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you please answer to that and focus on
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's all intertwined.
7 Everything is mixed up, Your Honour. Please, I know exactly what I said
8 and I can explain it.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I'd rather first have an answer to my question.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was Delimustafic who reacted to
11 Mr. Mandic's dispatch. He cancelled it and he replaced Mandic.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So now your answer is that because some other
13 action had been taken, there was no need to respond to it anymore. Is
14 that -- is that your answer?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. It's just that when
16 Delimustafic sent out his notice we just had only one day to agree with
17 the Muslims how to deal with the problem. This was on the 3rd. I'm just
18 saying that we had only two days from Delimustafic's reaction until the
19 war. We had only two days to sit down and deal with the problem, whereas
20 on a parallel track the conference was going on. We were working on it.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And now Mr. Tieger's question was even if you
22 had so little time, why was there time to respond to the forged dispatch?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is what the minister did,
24 whereas we sat down with the Muslim side in Lisbon and we discussed this
25 dispatch and we said we would continue negotiations, and Delimustafic
1 rendered it null and void. However, negotiations did not continue.
2 Instead the war started. And Republika Srpska took this path.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I will be finishing with this subject
5 soon. I think Mr. Harmon needs a couple of minutes, or Mr. Josse, one of
6 the two, and although I probably need only about ten or 15 more minutes on
7 this subject, I don't think it's a good idea to begin.
8 JUDGE ORIE: We've only five and a half minutes left.
9 Mr. Harmon, Mr. Josse, who is to take the initiative?
10 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I will take the initiative.
11 Yesterday, in court, in respect of Exhibit 1193, Prosecution
12 exhibit, the Defence posed a question why we didn't put that exhibit in
13 our case in chief, why we didn't rely on it. We had that document before
14 and during the course of our case in chief. We disclosed it twice to the
15 Defence. There was a question raised by the Defence that an inference
16 could be drawn that we purposely withheld that document so we could ambush
17 the defendant with it should he take the stand. I simply state that
18 categorically that was not the case. Unfortunately, with the tens of
19 thousands of documents that we review, we came to the realisation that the
20 contents of this document only when we were preparing for the
21 cross-examination of Mr. Krajisnik.
22 We have produced considerable evidence in respect of Variant A and
23 Variant B in the course of our case in chief. We are not going to rely on
24 this particular document, and we are prepared to withdraw it.
25 MR. JOSSE: I, of course, accept the assurance that my learned
1 friend has just given to the Chamber and, in effect, the Defence, that no
2 ambush was intended, and, of course, I welcome the withdrawal of that
3 particular exhibit from the evidence in this case.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Registrar, you are instructed to vacate the
5 number P1193 and to return the exhibit to the Prosecution. And we'll
6 destroy our copies of the document.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I just have one small matter.
8 Your Honour, I wonder if we might have the Court's permission on
9 Tuesday, when we resume and sit in the afternoon, to see Mr. Krajisnik
10 before court. It wouldn't affect the starting time. It's much easier to
11 see him before than after actually. Could we see him say at half past
12 1.00 just for, well, those ten minutes or so? Of course, Your Honour, not
13 to impinge upon his evidence at all but a number of practical matters as
14 to the future planning of the case beyond his evidence.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If it's just about practical matters,
16 Mr. Tieger, I take it that there is no objection.
17 MR. TIEGER: No, of course, Your Honour.
18 MR. STEWART: When I say "practical matters," Your Honour, of
19 course I don't want to mislead. It may touch on aspects of the case
20 itself but not his evidence.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: No. I mean, Mr. Stewart is aware of the boundaries
23 of appropriate discussion, and I have no doubt he'll follow those.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. STEWART: Thank you for that, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart, that's no problem.
4 Mr. Tieger, you said, of course, you know that Mr. Stewart is
5 aware of the restrictions that are there at this moment.
6 I'd like to add to that - and I'm addressing you, Mr. Krajisnik -
7 that you should also be fully aware of the restrictions that are
8 applicable at this moment, which would include any telephone conversation
9 with any person, member of a team on investigative matters.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I just want to clarify
11 something. When my mother asks me how are you doing, I say fine. But, if
12 I'm not supposed to talk to the members of my team, just tell me, and I
13 will --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Not about anything that is related to this case, and
15 if there is contact to members of the team, which we clearly set the
16 conditions. The conditions were that counsel and members of the team
17 would not have any contact with any -- with an investigator at a certain
18 moment. That, of course, would be true for you as well, in the capacity
19 of that person, as a member of the team, and I take it that asking to find
20 documents is a matter which directly relates to the case and is beyond a
21 private atmosphere.
22 Mr. Josse.
23 MR. JOSSE: Well, I need to make something clear, Your Honour.
24 And Mr. Krajisnik probably won't know this, but I gave instruction to
25 Mr. Sladojevic yesterday to contact yesterday one of the investigators but
1 not the investigator whom Your Honour had forbidden us to speak to.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'm talking about Mr. Krajisnik himself.
3 MR. JOSSE: I was a little concerned about what Your Honour had
4 just said.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I was just talking about Mr. Krajisnik himself.
6 MR. JOSSE: That's fine.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing else.
8 MR. JOSSE: That's fine, Your Honour. And I set up the parameters
9 extremely clearly to Mr. Sladojevic and he relayed that to the
10 investigator concerned.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not talking about Mr. Sladojevic. I'm not
12 talking about Defence counsel. I'm just talking about telephone
13 conversations from Mr. Krajisnik himself.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, my understanding was
15 that I could not discuss the case, that I cannot discuss my testimony or
16 anything I will say in my testimony in the future. And if I cannot talk
17 at all, just tell me. I won't.
18 JUDGE ORIE: No. I was just saying that requests or instructions
19 to discover documents or potential exhibits falls within the scope of what
20 is at this moment what should not be discussed with members of the team,
21 unless --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Unless consent has been given by the Chamber. I just
24 want to explain that to you clearly.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right.
1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... full
2 understanding of what the limits were, were assumed, and the Chamber
3 received information that it might not have been fully understood. So
4 that has now been addressed.
5 We adjourn until next Tuesday. Of course, Mr. Josse.
6 MR. STEWART: May I just inquire, just a reference to the Chamber
7 receiving information that might not have been fully understood. I'm not
8 aware of any information having been conveyed in court. May we receive
9 clarification as to what that is?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then, perhaps go into private session.
11 MR. STEWART: Yes, certainly, Your Honour. I can see that might
12 be appropriate.
13 [Private session]
11 Page 25206 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We adjourn until next Tuesday, quarter
13 past 2.00.
14 And, of course, Mr. Josse, if it can be arranged for to see
15 Mr. Krajisnik before that session, the Chamber has no objection
17 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: And I wish everyone a good weekend, a little bit
19 longer than usual.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th day of June,
22 2006, at 2.15 p.m.