1 Tuesday, 6 June 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.37 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Two procedural issues. First, we received a new set of potential
11 exhibits by Mr. Krajisnik. We'll follow the same procedure as we did
12 previously. That is, copies will be given to the parties to consider,
13 perhaps assisted by language assistants or by native speakers to see
14 whether this material is of a kind that could assist their case. Then, of
15 course, we have to consider whether or not it should be translated. The
16 Chamber, of course, always leaves it open that it could ask for any of
17 these materials to be tendered into evidence at the request of the Chamber
18 but the Chamber would first like to wait for the parties to see whether
19 they think it could be -- could assist them in the presentation of their
20 case. Of course, the Prosecution has presented its case already, but
21 since it's now provided by Mr. Krajisnik, it might be new material for the
22 Prosecution. So therefore it will be distributed.
23 Second issue, the Prosecution, until now, had to guess on which of
24 the 15 days would be for the Prosecution and which would be for the
25 Chamber, since we said 15 days cross-examination and questions by the
1 Bench. One of the reasons why the Chamber left that open until now is
2 that, of course, we did not know to what extent the Prosecution would put
3 questions to the witness which the Chamber had in mind as well. I mean,
4 it's difficult to say exactly prior even to the beginning of the
5 cross-examination whether most of the issues would be covered by the
6 Prosecution. Taking into account the way matters went until now, and also
7 encouraging the Prosecution to even improve the efficiency of the
8 examination of Mr. Krajisnik, the Chamber at this moment - but we have
9 started only since a couple of days - has in mind that most likely we
10 would end up with a division like 11 days Prosecution, four days Chamber.
11 This is not final, but I can imagine that the Prosecution would like to
12 have some guidance as to what to expect. And again, this is not a final
13 decision. It also depends on what will happen in the days to come. The
14 Prosecution has taken until now a little bit over four days. This week
15 gives another four days. So therefore it would be next week, Wednesday
16 approximately, that the Prosecution should head for finishing its
17 cross-examination. If our assessment on the division of time would
18 meanwhile change, we'll inform the parties.
19 Then Mr. Tieger. You may proceed --
20 MR. JOSSE: Could I raise two matters, please, Your Honour?
21 Firstly, so far as the first matter that Your Honour has raised this
22 morning is concerned, is there an accompanying CD?
23 JUDGE ORIE: There is an accompanying CD, yes, of course.
24 MR. STEWART: That could we be provided as well.
25 JUDGE ORIE: If there is only one, first of all I have to take
1 care that it's copied. That goes relatively easy. There is -- the second
2 document is a -- is a -- just a listing of files on that CD.
3 MR. JOSSE: Secondly, we went to see Mr. Krajisnik this morning.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. JOSSE: The first thing he did -- I beg your pardon, this
6 afternoon, shortly before the Chamber sat. First thing did he was to try
7 and draw to my attention various comments that he's got about the
8 destruction material that has been served by the Prosecution on the
9 Defence. Could I ask to see him again at one of the two breaks today to
10 discuss that with him? I deliberately said I needed to ask the Chamber's
11 permission, although looking back on the record, I note Your Honour has
12 suggested I do that in any event at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There is no problem. Perhaps I did not fully
14 understand it. You said comments he received or --
15 MR. JOSSE: That he's made. He's been given the material.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. JOSSE: I've got a copy of the material, and he wants to draw
18 various comments to my attention because, Your Honour, our deadline to
19 respond, at the moment, is the 8th of June.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No problem. You may further discuss any
21 comments Mr. Krajisnik has on the --
22 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- on the material received. I didn't ask whether
24 the Prosecution would have any objections against it. I should have
25 asked, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. No, we don't.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
4 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just a couple of matters fairly quickly, I think,
8 before we move to a different subject. First of all, it's correct, isn't
9 it, that on April -- turning your attention back to the beginning of
10 April, 1992, as we were discussing last week. And it's correct, isn't it,
11 that on April 3rd, 1992, you telephoned Mr. Zepinic and asked him to come
12 to a meeting at the Holiday Inn.
13 A. No. I met with Mr. Zepinic at my office. There were
14 representatives of the MUP who had called him; I didn't call him. But I
15 did meet with him. I don't know whether it was the 3rd but it was on the
16 eve of the war.
17 Q. At that meeting, Mr. Zepinic tendered and you accepted his
18 resignation as the deputy minister of the joint MUP?
19 A. No. I didn't even know, and I was not the one who had to accept
20 his resignation. He had to submit it to the government of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina because he was their staff. I must have known then
22 that he had resigned in anger because he had a quarrel with MUP
23 representatives. I neither demanded nor accepted his resignation. I had
24 no authority to demand it. Maybe I just discussed it with him. Because
25 he was appointed by the government not by the president of the Serbian
1 Assembly, and he wasn't our staff member. Before that, the Ministerial
2 Council was dissolved.
3 Q. Well, let me -- and perhaps -- first of all, perhaps I misspoke
4 with regard to the date. It may have been April 4th, but I take it that
5 you weren't fixed on the particular date of April 3rd rather than April
6 4th in answering the question.
7 A. Yes. One of those dates. You're right. I can't remember exactly
8 which date.
9 Q. And secondly, the meeting to which I'm referring would be a
10 meeting at which you and Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Mandic and Mr. Stanisic,
11 among others, would have been present.
12 A. I know that I was there, Mandic, Stanisic and Zepinic were there.
13 I don't know about Karadzic or others. I know it was at my office at the
15 Q. And the subject matter of that particular meeting was the
16 splitting of the Special Forces of the joint MUP, the splitting of the
17 unit on an ethnic basis, and Mr. Zepinic's role or failure to act in
18 connection with that; is that correct?
19 A. All is correct apart from the last bit. Issues of the MUP were
20 the subject of discussion, especially the special units of the MUP. As
21 for failure to act, it wasn't exactly like that, and I can explain.
22 Q. Well, Mr. -- at the time of the meeting, it's correct, isn't it,
23 that your understanding and the others' -- understanding of the others
24 present whom you mentioned, was that Mr. Zepinic was either blocking or
25 not facilitating the split of the special unit.
1 A. You want me to tell you exactly what happened to avoid any
2 confusion? I know exactly what happened. It's not true that he was
3 blocking the split.
4 Q. Well, let me turn your attention -- and I don't know if you have
5 the tabs in front of you -- to tab 97. And before I ask you any questions
6 about that, Mr. Krajisnik, let me ask you one additional question. I had
7 asked you earlier about Mr. Zepinic's resignation. Did you seek or accept
8 on that occasion Mr. Zepinic's resignation as -- resignation from the
9 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of
11 A. I don't remember that you've ever asked me about Zepinic. This is
12 the first time you're asking me. If you did ask me before, would you
13 please remind me. I don't think I discussed Zepinic and his resignation
15 Q. I wasn't turning your attention back to questions before today.
16 Just noting that I had asked you a question about his resignation and I
17 think your answer focussed on his resignation from the Bosnian MUP, and I
18 simply wanted to clarify whether you sought or obtained Mr. Zepinic's
19 resignation from either the Bosnian MUP or the MUP of the Serbian Republic
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 A. I was sitting there while they argued. They argued all the time.
22 And I didn't have a word with Mr. Zepinic and I didn't ask for his
23 resignation. All that he did and all that he wrote, I know it's not true.
24 I was just there while they were attacking him. They attacked him even
25 before, over that special unit.
1 Q. And did Mr. Zepinic ultimately submit his resignation; and if so,
2 to whom?
3 A. You have to believe me when I say that I don't know. I just saw
4 the resignation. Whether he submitted it to somebody then and there, I
5 don't know. He didn't submit it to me. He was to submit it to the
6 government. The Ministerial Council had already been dissolved. He had
7 no post, no position, in the Assembly or the Serbian Assembly. The only
8 authority he could submit it to was the government, because the government
9 appoints ministers, not the Assembly. I couldn't do anything about it. I
10 don't remember to whom he submitted his resignation. I don't know whether
11 I was asked about this before. I don't remember.
12 Q. I indicated I wanted to turn your attention to tab 97, and if we
13 can look at that quickly now, that's a record of a statement given by
14 Mr. Zepinic to the state security officials of the Republika Srpska MUP a
15 few days before his arrest as, I believe, an enemy of the state, but we
16 can look at the specific allegations. On -- at the top of page 3 of the
17 English, and also at the top of page 3 of the B/C/S, Mr. Zepinic stated
18 that, "Momcilo Krajisnik, the chairman of the BiH Assembly, called me
19 during the meeting --" he relates on the previous page "-- on the phone
20 and asked me to go to his cabinet after the meeting. After the meeting, I
21 went to see Krajisnik and Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic --" and
22 others, including the people you mentioned; Mr. Mandic and Mr. Stanisic,
23 and we see Mr. Karadzic, all of whom were already there. He indicates
24 further that, upon arriving, he was immediately attacked by those present
25 because of the meeting he had held with the special unit, since the
1 division of the special unit had been agreed upon before. Now,
2 Mr. Zepinic indicates, the division would be impossible, referring to the
3 meeting he had with other members of the special unit and to the fact that
4 his actions had seemingly prevented that. "Now the division would be
5 impossible," he stated, "since Repija and Maric would not participate in
6 it because these two were bigger authorities in the special units than
7 Vikic or Karisik."
8 Now, is that essentially the situation, Mr. Krajisnik, that the
9 subject of the meeting was the fact that those present had learned that
10 Mr. Zepinic had met with certain members of the special unit and that his
11 contact with them was making the division of the special unit impossible?
12 A. The truth is this: They had agreed about the division of the unit
13 in the presence of Mr. Zepinic. I had nothing to do with it and I didn't
14 know about it. In the meantime, Mr. Zepinic met with Mr. Delimustafic or
15 I don't know who else, and then he changed his mind and interpreted this
16 agreement differently. And those people from the MUP complained about
17 him. It wasn't I who called up Mr. Zepinic. It's probably the secretary
18 who invited him, and he came.
19 Many things stated here are correct. They did attack him. But I
20 was not one of those who attacked him. I sat there all the time and
21 observed, and he was really under fierce attack for going back on his
22 decision and for practically going back on that agreement. That's how I
23 understood it. As for resignations, I never got an offer of a resignation
24 from him, nor did I demand it. And anyway, I would have been the wrong
25 person to submit a resignation to because he had nothing to do with me.
1 He knew exactly who had appointed him. He could have offered his
2 resignation elsewhere. I did not attack him. My close family took him
3 out of Sarajevo in the back of the car, in the boot of the car. They
4 saved him. He lives in Australia. You can call him up and ask him. I
5 don't know to whom he gave this statement. I thought he had given a
6 statement to the Serb MUP, but I see from this document that it was the
7 joint MUP.
8 Q. No, you're correct, Mr. Krajisnik. It was to the Serb MUP, and
9 that's clear from the context of the document itself and also from
10 Mr. Zepinic's arrest a few days later by the Serb MUP.
11 Could I ask you to turn quickly to tab 98, please.
12 A. 98, right?
13 Q. Yes. That's a document dated April 4th, 1992, from Mr. Zepinic to
14 the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the
15 attention of Mr. President and the subject is a resignation letter.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, Mr. Tieger, could I just ask one
17 question in relation to one of the previous answers?
18 Mr. Krajisnik, you told us that Mr. Zepinic did come and that you
19 were not actively involved in this meeting where he arrived. You said,
20 "I sat there all the time and observed, and he was really under fierce
21 attack for going back on his decision and for practically going back on
22 that agreement."
23 In the statement, the meeting is described as you, Mr. Karadzic,
24 Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, Mr. Djeric, Mr. Simovic, Mr. Mandic, Mr. Stanisic,
25 and Mr. Karisik being present. What kind of a forum was that? I mean,
1 what made these people to meet together? I mean, what -- why those
2 persons? I mean, as far as I understand, it's not the Presidency, it's
3 not what some people called the expanded Presidency, it's not the cabinet.
4 It's -- what made this meeting be composed as it is described by
5 Mr. Zepinic, if the description is correct?
6 A. I don't know if the entire Presidency was there but I can answer
7 your question. I was constantly at my office. People worked little and
8 they dropped by. It was a very hard time. There was no special reason
9 apart from the fact that those people from the MUP had raised the issue
10 then. It was a completely informal meeting. It was not called in advance
11 and it was nothing special. Very often Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Karadzic, and
12 Buha and MPs would drop by to see me. It was nothing special. It was not
13 a group. All of them were some sort of officials, either in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina or in our Assembly. They would drop by like to have coffee.
15 Not exactly like that, but it was nothing special either.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That was at what time of the day, Mr. Krajisnik,
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know, Your Honour. I worked
19 from dusk until dawn. I can't really remember. It wasn't by night.
20 That's not what I mean. I think it was in daytime but I wouldn't know
21 exactly when.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Because Mr. Zepinic describes it as "When I arrived
23 home in the evening," that some people called him and asked whether he
24 could drop by since they had heard everything on television. "I accepted
25 their suggestion immediately," only they had a meeting the next day. Yes.
1 Now, thank you for your answer.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger. I think Mr. Tieger was taking you to
3 tab 98.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I heard was 99.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Sorry, His Honour is correct; 98, Mr. Krajisnik.
7 A. Yes, yes. I can see it.
8 Q. And that would be the resignation to which -- resignation letter
9 and the resignation to which Mr. Zepinic refers in his statement; isn't
10 that right?
11 A. Probably. I mean probably. It probably is. I don't know.
12 MR. TIEGER: Just one moment, Your Honour.
13 Q. There was reference made to Mr. Mandic's authorisation during your
14 testimony on Friday. We've already had an opportunity to review the --
15 both the conclusions of the Ministerial Council at its meeting on January
16 11 and the formation of the steering committee of Serbian cadres of the
17 MUP formed pursuant to those conclusions. That's the meeting on February
18 11th that was discussed earlier. And at that meeting on February 11th,
19 Mr. Mandic was placed in charge of the Serbian advisory board which was
20 responsible for carrying out all preparations for the functioning of the
21 Serbian MUP. I'd like also to bring your attention to another document
22 found, I believe, at tab 101 -- I think 101.
23 And that would be a decision of 6 February, 1992 -- not a decision
24 but a -- well, an order or authorisation by Dr. Karadzic as president of
25 the SDS referring to personnel matters regarding the MUP, and if you could
1 turn, please, to the third section of that order by Dr. Karadzic, found on
2 the second page, and it's headed III, it states: "I hereby authorise and
3 order Mr. Momcilo Mandic, assistant in the MUP of BH, to participate in
4 solving personnel and organisational matters in the MUP of BH on behalf of
5 the Serbian Democratic Party." So would it be correct, Mr. Krajisnik,
6 that by February of 1992, Mr. Zepinic [sic] had the authorisation from Dr.
7 Karadzic for responsibility to solve personnel and organisational matters
8 in the MUP in addition to the responsibilities which he received from the
9 steering committee of Serbian cadres for carrying out all preparations for
10 the functioning of the Serbian MUP?
11 A. Maybe it was not interpreted very well. I don't know what this
12 steering committee is. Can I look at the original to see what the Serbian
13 for "steering committee" is?
14 Q. That's located at tab 100, Mr. Krajisnik, if it's helpful.
15 A. Give me just a second.
16 Q. While you're taking that moment, perhaps I can correct the
17 transcript. It states at 12 -- page -- excuse me, page 12, line 5, that
18 -- I can only assume it took it down correctly and I asked the question
19 incorrectly: "Would it be correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that by February, 1992,
20 Mr. Zepinic had the authorisation from Dr. Karadzic?" and, of course, we
21 were talking about Mr. Mandic's authorisation.
22 A. No. It's not an authorisation. This is what it's all about: The
23 person in the SDS who was in charge of appointing personnel was
24 Mr. Karadzic, with Mr. Dukic. However, implementation of agreements was
25 always the job of ranking representatives of the region concerned. Since
1 -- or rather, the jurisdiction concerned. Since Mr. Zepinic was the
2 highest-ranking Serb staff member in the police, his job was to implement
3 the agreed appointments. And now, Mr. Mandic, similarly, got the
4 authorisation to implement what had been agreed, not to decide on
5 appointments himself. Because Mr. Zepinic no longer enjoyed the
6 confidence of the Serbian Democratic Party, and that's what Mr. Mandic
7 himself said here when he testified.
8 Q. And with that clarification, then, that would reflect in so far as
9 -- that would reflect two of the authorities that Mr. Mandic enjoyed as
10 of February 1992, then. That is the one referred to in tab 101 bestowed
11 by Dr. Karadzic, and that indicated in the document at tab 100, the --
12 reflected in the minutes of the meeting on February 11, 1992.
13 A. Mr. Mandic had no other authority, no other powers. This record
14 that you've just mentioned, I saw it here for the first time, and
15 Mr. Mandic himself had explained that they had met in Banja Luka on their
16 own initiative to discuss problems of the MUP. It was their internal
17 meeting. And Mr. Mandic did not have any powers, if you mean the
18 dispatch, because at that time there was a minister and there was a Prime
19 Minister of the Serb Republic who had to be consulted, should he have sent
20 it on behalf of some sort of Serb MUP. He had absolutely no powers.
21 As for staffing issues, Mr. Mandic only had the obligation to
22 implement what the parties had agreed amongst themselves, because
23 Mr. Zepinic did not do it. In other words, to implement the appointments
24 that people from the SDA were blocking.
25 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, at this point -- if I could distribute
1 one more document.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I had indicated in response to your comment about
3 the statement that I would provide the decision regarding Mr. Zepinic's
4 arrest or being taken into custody, and that's the document before you.
5 And as you can see, it's dated September 2nd, 1992, bearing the names at
6 the bottom, Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Kovac.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that document will need a number.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1206, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I don't have any particular questions about that.
13 It had come up during the course of the question and answer and I wanted
14 it to be presented to you.
15 A. If you want, I can give you a comment. It would be useful.
16 Q. Well, as I say, I presented it to you only in connection with the
17 issue of whether or not the statement -- to whom the statement was given
18 or to which agency the statement was given. Insofar as I'm concerned,
19 that are the only questions I have about the arrest.
20 A. Yes. But you said that he tendered his resignation in me in April
21 and this was part of the protocol of the Serb Assembly. He didn't give it
22 to me. You saw it written down; the 4th of April. For four months he was
23 in the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so he did not resign. He was there. He
24 held that post. And only when he got fed up down there, when they wanted
25 to kill him, then he came to Serb territory. That's the whole truth. And
1 then they arrested him here and then they let him go, although there was
2 -- there were criminal charges brought against him, but then he was in
3 this car boot and he got to Serbia and ultimately to Australia, so that
4 was the point and that's the way it actually happened. For five months
5 during the war in 1992, he was there with them after this resignation.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I am also advised that tab 101 needs a
7 number, and I'm sorry, I led the Registry to put those out of order. But
8 I don't think it will cause a problem.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, tab 101 seems to be a -- yes -- a
10 document issued by president of the BH SDS, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, dated
11 the 6th of February, 1992. Madam Registrar, that would be number?
12 THE REGISTRAR: P1207, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. At this point I'd like to
15 yield, at least momentarily, to Mr. Harmon.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me just -- yes. Mr. Krajisnik, you said
17 Mr. Zepinic did not tender his resignation in April and then you later on
18 said because he stayed for another couple of months with them. The
19 resignation seems to be addressed to the Serbian Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina and "staying with them," I understand to be staying
21 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, not necessarily the Serbian Republic. So I'm
22 not quite sure that I fully understood what you meant to say there.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, he tendered his
24 resignation as deputy minister in the joint MUP. It was sent to the wrong
25 address, the protocol of the Serb Assembly. It was not in my office. I
1 don't know where it was. So he was supposed to submit this resignation to
2 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that, after April, up until
3 the month of September, he stayed on in Sarajevo. When I say "with them,"
4 I mean, well, I mean in Sarajevo. In the government of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina. Had he resigned
6 then, in April, he would not have stayed there and he would not have been
7 in the MUP. That's what I was trying to say. I mean, I --
8 JUDGE ORIE: But the letter as such says that he is resigning, he
9 addresses it, and you say he did wrongly so but he addresses it to the
10 Assembly of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he makes
11 reference to the agreement on personnel policy realisation at the Ministry
12 of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
13 that he is submitting irrevocable resignation. So the letter very much
14 says that he resigns from a position in the Serbian Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or as you say that's wrong, he should have addressed
16 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's unclear to me, because
17 what he did, at least from what appears from this letter, is different
18 from what you considered that he should have done. Is that correct? A
19 correct understanding?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, he was appointed by
21 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's only those who appoint him
22 that can have him resign. You also have stenographic notes and
23 transcripts of the Serb Assembly. Zepinic is not on the agenda at all.
24 The president of the Assembly cannot remove him from that position. I
25 didn't know about it. This was never at Assembly sessions. There were
1 several Assemblies after that. And he didn't submit this resignation to
2 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I mean, he had -- he had no
3 position, no post, in the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
4 Ministerial Council had been dissolved before he resigned, as a matter of
5 fact. So this was just formal. This resignation doesn't make any sense
6 at all. I mean, why would he submit it to me or the Assembly? We never
7 appointed him; how can we remove him? Well, formally, he could have
8 submitted it, say, to the party, but I guess it never crossed his mind.
9 JUDGE ORIE: So he is resigned from a position he never had. Did
10 you ever receive this letter or did you never receive this letter? Apart
11 from whether it was wrongly addressed to you, but did you ever receive it?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I would be dishonest if I
13 would say anything else. I don't know. I never paid any attention to
14 this. I don't know. I guess then I would have put it on the agenda, had
15 I known about his resignation. But he didn't carry this through because
16 he stayed on in the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger -- or, rather, Mr. Harmon, from what I --
18 MR. TIEGER: Just one last question, Your Honour, about that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Setting aside the question of technical or legal niceties with
22 respect to the resignation, there is no question, is there, that this
23 document, that is the resignation letter of April 4th, 1992, emerged from
24 the meeting that we discussed a few moments ago?
25 A. I don't know. I don't know whether he wrote it. There were
1 quarrels there and it's possible that he submitted this because everybody
2 attacked him. I don't know. The war started the very next day. I had
3 nothing to do with this. I have no idea who he gave it to, whatever. I
4 have no idea. I know that everybody attacked him. I didn't. I was the
5 host, so to speak, and frankly, since there were so many people there, I
6 didn't have the time to say a word to him. I didn't agree with him anyway
7 because he was unfair. I mean, why did he lie? Why didn't he say
8 straight away, I don't agree with this? The background is different, but
9 that's the point. I did not attack him. Quite simply, I was the host
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. And yes, you're right,
12 Mr. Harmon will be --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, forgive me if it has been said before.
14 This letter by Dr. Zepinic addressed to the Assembly of the Serbian
15 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 4th of April, where was that found?
16 MR. TIEGER: I'll find out for you, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Harmon:
19 JUDGE ORIE: And perhaps one final question, I'm sorry,
20 Mr. Harmon.
21 That -- the stamp, Mr. Tieger, of what we find under tab 98 is
22 translated as Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then illegible. First
23 of all, I can already decipher "Sarajevo" so not everything is illegible
24 what appears under that.
25 Mr. Josse --
1 MR. JOSSE: I'm sorry, I mumbled.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you're mumbling. I always take it these are
3 meaningful mumbles.
4 MR. JOSSE: Yes, it says "Sarajevo" in the translation, bottom
5 left-hand corner.
6 JUDGE ORIE: But the stamp on the top right-hand --
7 MR. JOSSE: I beg your pardon. I'm sorry. I was right to mumble.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I was focussing on the stamp. I mentioned the stamp,
9 as a matter of fact. Of course, one of the things that's wondering me
10 whether in one way or the other if it could be -- of course, it would be
11 interesting to know whether the stamp, which might be a stamp of
12 reception, would be from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or
13 just of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so since "Sarajevo" is
14 certainly legible, I would like, if you make any inquiries as to where
15 there was found, I would like you to make some further inquiries as well
16 as to whether we could decipher the stamp.
17 MR. JOSSE: Can I make one, I hope, constructive suggestion?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. JOSSE: Could I invite Your Honour to ask Mr. Krajisnik to
20 read that stamp out as best he can.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if he's able to do so. Mr. Krajisnik, at the
22 suggestion of Mr. Josse, I ask to you read in text in tab 98 whether you,
23 perhaps by reconstructing the text, whether you, with a certain level of
24 certitude, could decipher what it says in the stamp, at the right-hand top
25 of that letter.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I can decipher, seems to point
2 to this being the stamp of the Assembly of the Serbian people. However, I
3 cannot read line 1 because it says down here in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it
4 says Assembly. It could have been of the Serb people in this second line,
5 but I cannot read the first line. I think that this is something like the
6 offices. It's not Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's more probable that it will be
7 the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this is written in
8 Cyrillic. If it were Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be both in Cyrillic and
9 in the Roman script. This is the first time I see this stamp, by the way.
10 I don't remember it from before.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And then the first line you're reading, your
12 understanding that it says the Republican Assembly or Republican
13 Skupstina, or is that what you take it from that first line?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the second line. Looks like
15 "Skupstina Srpska Narodna," "Assembly of the Serb People." And the third
16 line "in Bosnia and Herzegovina" "U [phoen] Bosnia Herzegovina," and then
17 "Sarajevo." But I don't know what line 1 is, so there is a bit of a
18 reservation here because you can't see it properly, but it's not
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Absolutely not.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And by the E [phoen] in the beginning of the third
21 line, you consider it to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes. Thank you very
23 Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, if we could proceed by distributing,
25 first of all, the next bundle of exhibits.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon, to keep ourselves organised, any
2 reference being made to the lower numbers in the near future? Because
3 otherwise the pile grows and grows. If not then --
4 MR. HARMON: No, there will not, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Thank you.
6 MR. HARMON:
7 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Krajisnik.
8 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Harmon.
9 Q. I am going to ask you a number of questions particularly and
10 beginning with a response that you gave to one of Mr. Stewart's questions.
11 You were asked by Mr. Stewart who was running the war in the period before
12 the Assembly session that occurred on the 12th of May, 1992, and your
13 answer was that it was the armed people, and you went on further to assert
14 that up to that point in time, the JNA was neutral to a maximum - and I'm
15 quoting your answer. You also asserted that the policy of the Yugoslav
16 People's Army was to be equidistant to all sides and have the role of an
17 intermediary. Those are the assertions that I would like to explore with
18 you, Mr. Krajisnik.
19 To begin with, there is no dispute that both JNA and the
20 leadership of the Bosnian Serbs shared similar views on preserving the
21 integrity of the state of Yugoslavia; is that correct?
22 A. You're quite right.
23 Q. Indeed, they worked closely together, the leadership of both what
24 became the Republika Srpska and the JNA to achieve that end.
25 A. Well, I could not fully confirm that answer that you provided. We
1 were in contact but we did not work together. You see the report of the
2 2nd Military District where they treat us equally.
3 Q. Let me direct your attention, first of all, to an intercept. It
4 will need a new number. It is found in tab 110. Mr. Krajisnik, if you
5 could direct your attention to tab 110, and if I could get a number for
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1208, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, may I ask you, both on the 15th and on
10 the 16th of May, the neutrality to a maximum was mentioned by
11 Mr. Krajisnik. Could you tell me which one you had in mind so that I can
12 have a look at it. The first one is he's talking about the army was
13 neutral, the other one it was I think that the JNA was neutral.
14 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. The 15th, that reference is found
15 at 94109. Starting -- the answer starting at that point.
16 JUDGE ORIE: 15th of May?
17 MR. HARMON: Day 15, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Day 15?
19 MR. HARMON: Day 15.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I have a different numbering. Day 15 of his
21 testimony or --
22 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. That's the reference I have.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I have not any --
24 MR. HARMON: And I don't have --
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'll check. I'll find out. Thank you.
1 MR. HARMON: All right. I can get that, Your Honour, in just a
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is an intercept I'd like you to cast your eye
4 on. This is a conversation that occurred between Radovan Karadzic and
5 General Simovic, General Tomislav Simovic. It was held on the 2nd of
6 November, 1991. I'd like you to cast your eye on that for just a moment.
7 While you're examining that intercept, Mr. Krajisnik, do you know who
8 General Tomislav Simovic was and do you know which position he held in
10 A. I know that he was a general. I mean, I heard of General Simovic.
11 He held a high position in Belgrade. I could not define it exactly,
12 unless he was, say, in security or something like that.
13 Q. If I were to inform you that he was the Serbian minister of
14 defence, would you accept that, Mr. Krajisnik?
15 A. Believe me, I don't know. Well, possibly. I don't know. I never
16 met him.
17 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, the reference to Mr. Krajisnik's
18 testimony is on the 16th of May, for your information.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, I found it.
20 MR. HARMON: All right. Thank you very much.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in this conversation between Dr. Karadzic and
22 General Simovic, if you turn to page -- the page in the B/C/S bearing in
23 the upper right-hand corner the ERN 03236325, it is the second page in the
24 B/C/S. And Your Honours, if Your Honours also turn to the second page. I
25 want to refer Your Honours and Mr. Krajisnik to the following dialogue
1 between Dr. Karadzic and General Simovic:
2 "Radovan Karadzic: How are you?
3 "General Simovic: It could be better, but as long as Bosnia is
4 ours it is fine.
5 "Radovan Karadzic: Well, how long will Bosnia be ours?
6 "General Simovic: As long as you are there, and I am here."
7 Now, this intercept goes on at the bottom of the page,
8 Mr. Krajisnik, to discuss the purpose, why Dr. Karadzic is calling General
9 Simovic. He says, at the bottom of page 2 in the English, and it's just
10 below the part I read to you in B/C/S, he is describing a big problem with
11 Uzelac, who, according to Dr. Karadzic, "he lacks five to 6.000 people.
12 He's short of equipment." and something urgently has to be done to assist
14 Dr. Karadzic, I'm referring to page 3, in the middle of page 3,
15 and, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm referring to the third page in the B/C/S, the
16 third box. Dr. Karadzic says that he was working on arranging to have
17 "two and a half thousand guys from Ozren to go there to him, but I'm
18 afraid he does not even have equipment there."
19 If you turn, finally, Mr. Krajisnik, to the fourth page in the
20 B/C/S, and, Your Honours, to the fourth page in the English, third box
21 from the bottom, Dr. Karadzic, in his conversation with General Simovic,
22 says: "I gave the order, I gave the order to all the municipalities there
23 and all the presidents of the municipalities. I gave the order, they
24 introduced the command posts. They also introduced --"
25 A. I'm sorry, you said page 3, but I can't find it -- oh, sorry,
1 here it is. It's page 3. The third box, rather, in Serbian. Sorry about
3 Q. Okay. Let me carry on with what I was reading I'll start again,
4 actually: "I gave the order --"
5 A. I'm so sorry.
6 Q. "I gave the order, I gave the order to all the municipalities
7 there and all the presidents of the municipalities. I gave the order,
8 they introduced the command posts. They also introduced the wartime,
9 completely wartime, wartime conditions of economy and work and all. I
10 announced general mobilisation to them because it is going -- it is
11 ongoing, from earlier on, like, er, so I said they had to hand over the
12 military conscripts, and so on."
13 And then he goes on in that same box to say: "I'm asking you to
14 see a bit with Slobo and with Adzic and Kadijevic if they want us to save
15 a part of the country this is the chance when."
16 If you go down further, two boxes down, Dr. Karadzic says: "Well,
17 that is the problem. We have to do something here. I gave the order to
18 provide 10.000 people there in one week, I gave the order and now that
19 order is given again, it is being issued this very moment."
20 Finally, Mr. Krajisnik, if I can turn you to the last page in the
21 B/C/S, and if I can turn the Court, refer the Court to page 5 of the
22 English translation, third box from the bottom, part way into that
23 particular box, Dr. Karadzic says: "The most important thing for us is
24 that here, on their map, on their threshold, that we stop them, that we
25 fortify the Western Slavonian front and put all the Serbian villages under
1 control -- and we put all the Serbian villages under control. That is the
2 most important thing on the point -- and the point on which Yugoslavia
4 Now --
5 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I know my learned friend hasn't asked his
6 question yet, but I am hesitant for him to ask any question until
7 Mr. Krajisnik has had an opportunity to briefly cast his eye over the rest
8 of this. It's very different to when I was asking questions about
9 intercepts, because I knew that Mr. Krajisnik had read all of those
11 MR. HARMON: I have no problem with that, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, would you please read to such an
13 extent that you have a fair impression of what this telephone conversation
14 tells you.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Thank you. Thank you
16 for -- thank you to Mr. Josse for protecting me. That's very useful.
17 Please go ahead, Mr. Prosecutor.
18 MR. HARMON: All right.
19 Q. You've had an opportunity to examine that intercept,
20 Mr. Krajisnik? Okay. Now this intercept --
21 A. No. I haven't read the whole intercept but I want to be as
22 expeditious as possible so that I don't use up too much time.
23 Q. Well, I want you to be as accurate as possible as well, so if you
24 need the time, take it, Mr. Krajisnik.
25 This intercept clearly shows that the minister of defence, General
1 Simovic, and Dr. Karadzic are working jointly together in an effort to
2 preserve the former Yugoslavia; isn't that correct?
3 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I'll tell you, because I don't know anything about
4 this conversation but I'll tell you what Mr. Karadzic was advocating.
5 Western Slavonia was -- there was a counter-propaganda going on and
6 two-thirds of Western Slavonia, of Serb villages, had withdrawn, creating
7 a real exodus, moving into Republika Srpska. What happened was really
8 horrific, and here, Mr. Karadzic, is calling and asking for the protection
9 of this area because, he says, it's treason. There was a party from
10 Serbia that was blamed for it because they had withdrawn their men, there
11 were not enough men, and they had to ask for volunteers. Everybody had
12 pulled out - I don't know how many people were driven out by the Croats -
13 and if this is Mr. Simovic, the minister of defence, as you say - I take
14 your word for it - the request is that he help General Uzelac, who was
15 commander of the corps in Banja Luka, and he had those villages on the
16 territory of Croatia under his jurisdiction. That's what I know.
17 As for cooperation, there are several telephone conversations in
18 which Mr. Uzelac called up Mr. Karadzic, because he realised there was
19 only one political party supporting him there, asking Mr. Karadzic to
20 promote mobilisation, to promote the call-up, to help the defence of that
21 area. That's how I understand this.
22 Q. Okay. Now, let us turn to another document. If you could turn to
23 tab 125. And Mr. Krajisnik, if I can -- this is the plebiscite speech.
24 This is already an exhibit in the case. It's Prosecution Exhibit 1191.
25 Mr. Krajisnik, if I can direct your attention to the second-to-last page
1 in the B/C/S, it bears an ERN number 00270638 at the bottom, and if I can
2 direct Your Honour's attention to page 10, to the last paragraph, again,
3 focusing on the unity of view between the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs,
4 Dr. Karadzic says, and I quote: "So that's it. There will probably be
5 more discussions and questions concerning the army. Please, Serbs do not
6 need any party army. There is an army here. By chance, their aims and
7 our aims coincide 100 per cent."
8 Now, that speech, Mr. Krajisnik, was a speech that was given in
9 November of 1991, and you can see in that speech that Dr. Karadzic has the
10 view that the aims of the JNA and the -- his own views, the views of the
11 Bosnian Serbs, coincide 100 per cent. And that's the case, isn't it, at
12 that point in time?
13 A. Unfortunately, not. I have to tell you that Karadzic thought they
14 did, and I thought they did, but it wasn't true, because the army, soon
15 afterwards, left our region, pulled out, and took the weapons with them.
16 However, at this point, Karadzic expressed what he was thinking, what we
17 were all thinking.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Wanting to preserve Yugoslavia.
20 Q. So at that point in time, Dr. Karadzic, at least, believed that
21 the views of the army and the views of the JNA were essentially in -- 100
22 per cent together in their views? That's what Dr. Karadzic expressed at
23 this point in time.
24 I want to direct your attention, sir, to the tab, document found
25 in tab 109.
1 MR. HARMON: This needs an exhibit number.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit P1209, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
5 MR. HARMON:
6 Q. And this is really two documents, Mr. Krajisnik. What I want to
7 do is I want to direct your attention first of all to the document that is
8 found on the second page of the B/C/S, the document that is dated the 10th
9 of December, 1991. It is from the federal Secretariat for National
10 Defence, SFRY armed forces Main Staff, it is a military secret, strictly
11 confidential, and it is entitled, "Directive on the use of the armed
12 forces for the preparation and performance of combat operations in the
13 forthcoming period." And the author of this document is the federal
14 secretary for national defence, General Kadijevic. Now, this -- first of
15 all, have you seen this document before, Mr. Krajisnik?
16 A. Not that I remember. I don't think so.
17 Q. I want to direct your attention to the first page, I, the three
18 paragraphs in there, and the first paragraph under II. Now, in this
19 directive, Mr. Krajisnik, the first three paragraphs under I, General
20 Kadijevic is talking about the Yugoslav crisis, and essentially in
21 paragraphs 2 and 3, is looking back at the developments in Croatia, and
22 he's discussing the events at -- following the fall of Vukovar and events
23 in the political developments.
24 But if we go to paragraph 2, General Kadijevic - II - General
25 Kadijevic looks ahead, in other words, he's looking ahead to the future
1 beyond the 10th of December of 1991. Let me read this part into the
2 record: "Our armed forces are entering a new period of exceptional
3 significance for the accomplishments -- for accomplishing the ultimate
4 goals of the war: Protection of the Serbian population, a peaceful
5 resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and the creation of conditions in which
6 Yugoslavia may be preserved."
7 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you went to Belgrade on a number of occasions,
8 your colleagues went to Belgrade on a number of occasions, Dr. Karadzic,
9 other representatives of the Bosnian Serbs, and in the discussions that
10 you had and your colleagues had with both military and political leaders,
11 the protection of the Serbian people was a central topic of discussion;
12 wasn't it?
13 A. The main thing is that our cooperation with the JNA took place in
14 Sarajevo, with General Kukanjac, and when I spoke about cooperation I
15 spoke about people who were in Sarajevo. Now as for people who were in
16 Belgrade, I did not have many meetings with them. But it is true that
17 there was one meeting of that kind, maybe two. All they wanted to do was
18 to perform their constitutional role, to preserve peace. Why is it
19 written Serb people here? Because the Slovenes turned against the JNA.
20 Croats too. Muslims had already voted for sovereignty by that time and
21 started creating problems in Bosnia. They had nobody else who wanted to
22 preserve Yugoslavia apart from Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were minorities. Right here, Mr. Kadijevic - and
24 I don't need to emphasise this - he is not a Serb, he's half Serb, half
25 Croat, he was dedicated, he was really committed to Yugoslavia. He wasn't
1 saying this because he was a Serb but because Serbs needed protection. He
2 was a committed Yugoslav. That's how I understood him. And in all the
3 contacts I've seen him in, he was always in favour of preserving peace and
4 protecting those who needed protection, those who were vulnerable. But on
5 his territory, Serbs were the only ones who were responding to
6 mobilisation, to call-ups, and the others had turned against the JNA and
7 became enemies, and Serbs were in the minority, all the way until the end
8 of 1991, and I'm speaking now about 1991.
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, my question was this, and I want to know if you're
10 disputing this: In the meetings that representatives of your government
11 had with Slobodan Milosevic, with representatives of -- from the federal
12 government, the issue of the protection of the Serbian people was an issue
13 that was discussed. That's correct, isn't it?
14 A. Not only the Serbian people. I'm speaking sincerely. Slobodan
15 Milosevic is dead. He spoke more about the protection of Muslims than the
16 protection of Serbs. He's no longer with us. He's no longer on trial.
17 But I'm telling you the way it was. He -- I'm telling you what is true
18 and what is correct. Kadijevic and Milosevic are no longer alive and, of
19 course, we were interested in the fate of Serbs. I have responded.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would first answer the question. The
21 question was not whether the protection of the Serbian people was more
22 important than the protection of any other people. The question simply
23 was whether the issue of the protection of the Serbian people was an issue
24 that was discussed. Is that correct or not? Because you did not, and if
25 so only indirectly, answer the question. Was it an issue? Perhaps not
1 the most important one.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It was a topic, yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, looking at the clock, are we going to
5 take a break at 4.00 or are we going to go past 4.00?
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We are going to take a break. We had a late
7 start, which means that we have to break also a quarter of an hour later.
8 If this would be a suitable moment.
9 MR. HARMON: I'm happy.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break until 25 minutes past 4.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 3.59 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 4.33 p.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.
14 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were still dealing with the document that is
16 found in tab 109, and if you could turn to the first page of that tab, I
17 had finished exploring with you the directive of General Kadijevic. The
18 document on the first page is also dated the 10th of December, 1991. It's
19 a transmission letter that accompanied the directive. It is, as I say,
20 dated the 10th of December, 1991. It is a military secret, strictly
21 confidential. The copy that was transmitted on this occasion to the 9th
22 Corps was a copy number 25, and the text of this transmission letter
23 reads: "We hereby enclose the Directive of the Federal Secretary for
24 National Defence on the use of the armed forces in the forthcoming
25 period." So it is clear, Mr. Krajisnik, that as of the 10th of December,
1 what was transmitted from the federal Secretariat of National Defence to
2 subordinate units of the JNA - in this case to the 9th Corps commander -
3 was the directive of General Kadijevic in which he outlined the ultimate
4 aims of the war, which included the protection of the Serbian population.
5 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you testified that while there had been
6 discussions about the protection of the Serbian people, that those
7 discussions had taken place prior to the commencement of the war,
8 specifically, Mr. Krajisnik, did you personally become aware, through any
9 source, through -- at any period of time up to the 12th of May, 1992, that
10 the JNA's actions and conduct was directed toward the protection of the
11 Serbian people?
12 A. I don't know whether I learned about it, but it was implied. I
13 understood that, that the JNA was supposed to and was our guarantor. That
14 was my firm conviction. Because let me just remind you that in all our
15 papers we said we were not going to attack anybody, we only want
16 protection because we are a minority. You have that statement by
17 Mr. Karadzic at the Assembly session on the 27th of March. We were
18 relying to a great extent on the JNA as our protector. I believe I even
19 sent a letter asking them to protect us at the end of 1991.
20 Q. Yes, indeed. That is an exhibit already in this trial.
21 Mr. Krajisnik, on the 18th of March, 1992, at the 11th session of
22 the Assembly, where you and others reported on the latest session of the
23 conference on the Cutileiro developments, you are quoted in the Assembly
24 session as saying, and I quote: "I think the problem is that they want BH
25 to be -- Bosnia-Herzegovina to be internationally recognised at any cost.
1 They want it to be a state. In this respect, it would be good if we could
2 do one thing for strategic reasons, if we could start implementing what we
3 have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground, that we start
4 determining the territory and once the territory is determined, it remains
5 to be established in additional negotiations whose authorities are to
6 function and in what way."
7 Now, after the Cutileiro sessions concluded on the 18th of March,
8 1992, there was another session in the negotiations in Lisbon on the 31st
9 of March, 1992. That's correct, isn't it?
10 A. I think it was at the end of March, you're right.
11 Q. And thereafter, another session was to be called on the 1st of
12 May, 1992, in Lisbon, and I believe you and Dr. Karadzic and others
13 attended that session, but ultimately that session was called off because
14 of a failure to honour a cease-fire. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes. We went to Lisbon and then we went to Graz to meet with the
16 Croats. Mr. Izetbegovic did not come but Mr. Silajdzic did.
17 Q. Now, this Trial Chamber has heard considerable evidence, as have
18 you, Mr. Krajisnik, about events on the ground between the 18th of March,
19 1992, and the 12th of May, 1992, and I want to focus your attention on
20 some of that evidence. Mr. Krajisnik, if you could turn first of all to
21 tab 103. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to be directing your attention to --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, we have not received any index, so it's
23 difficult for us --
24 MR. HARMON: Oh, you don't have it?
25 JUDGE ORIE: At least -- unless it's in one of the other indexes,
1 but at least it's not on the top of this bundle.
2 MR. HARMON: Let me see if I can remedy that.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Because then I don't have to ask you whether
4 something is in evidence or not because it's usually indicated on the
6 MR. HARMON: There is an exhibit number, I was going to say, on
7 this particular exhibit, Your Honour. In any event, it's Prosecution
8 Exhibit 184.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see it is.
10 MR. HARMON:
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik -- Your Honours, I'm going to be directing your
12 attention to page 2, paragraph 4, about a third of the way down. And
13 Mr. Krajisnik, if you go in, in the B/C/S version, it is pages 3 and 4,
14 about a little below halfway down on that page, the page that bears ERN
15 number 00478674.
16 Now, this is a document that is the war record of the 6th Infantry
17 Brigade, Colonel Branko Basara, and evidence that has been adduced in this
18 trial is that Colonel Basara was a JNA officer, and I want to direct your
19 attention to those portions beginning on page 3. Mr. Krajisnik, I will
20 read --
21 A. 674 being the last number; right?
22 Q. Yes, 674. And about, probably -- on the B/C/S copy it looks about
23 a little below halfway down the page, Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Basara,
24 according to this record, this war record, says, and I quote, "With the
25 arrival of the brigade on this territory, the Muslims and the Croats
1 became afraid and the Serbs heaved a sigh of relief."
2 And I'll skip the next sentence and continue reading: "We ordered
3 the Serbs to arm themselves quickly and replenished the units, since our
4 task, as a JNA unit, was to prevent conflicts between the nationalities,
5 that is to prevent the slaughter of the Serbian people, we could not
6 publicly arm the Serbs. We then worked along two lines. The first was
7 organising and arming the Serbian people. And the second was negotiating
8 and persuading the Muslims and Croats to remain loyal and that we could
9 live together. The negotiations dealt with the share out of power. We
10 had to resort to a trick to make it possible for to us arm the Serbs
11 publicly and legally. The story was devised that the commander of the 1st
12 Krajina Corps had ordered the 6th to be promoted from a light to an
13 infantry brigade and that it could have as many as 15 battalions, that the
14 brigade should be demobilised as soon as possible. So that the Muslims
15 and Croats would not enlist in the brigade, it was put about that as soon
16 as mobilisation finished, it was leaving for Kupres. Then conditions were
17 made to legally arm and form nine battalions. In addition to this, the
18 battalion was armed in Kotor Varos and one in the Kljuc Brigade. We also
19 helped considerably in arming the Ministry of the Interior in Banja Luka."
21 Now, if we go down to paragraph 5 of this letter, then we are
22 going to -- Colonel Basara is going to be discussing what his unit did in
23 Bosanska Krupa, and Bosanska Krupa, according to the 1991 census, was a
24 Muslim majority municipality.
25 Paragraph 5: "Take time from the battle report for the liberation
1 of Krupa. The Muslims considered Bosanska Krupa to be a fortress and that
2 the Serbs could not liberate it. Following a call from the Serbs in Krupa
3 that about 200 fighters from the Territorial Defence surrounded in the
4 area of the department store needed to be freed, volunteers were collected
5 and they set out. About 150 fighters were engaged in the operation with
6 the support of armoured combat vehicles, mortars, 128 millimetre guns and
7 rockets. The operation was carried out swiftly and effectively. The
8 enemy forces were scattered and heavy losses were inflicted on them. By
9 nightfall on the same day we emerged on the Una River. Since we belonged
10 to the JNA, we were not allowed to reveal our results."
11 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence from
12 victims from Bosanska Krupa who have testified that on the 21st and the
13 22nd of April, 1992, the municipality was taken over by both the JNA and
14 local Serbs. And at the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, you
15 may recall that Mr. Vjestica stood up and he reported about the takeover
16 of the municipality, and he said, among other things, Mr. Krajisnik, "What
17 have we done in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa? I must tell you to
18 remind you that there was only 24 per cent of Serbs in the Serbian
19 Municipality of Bosanska Krupa. There is 14.500 of us and there is 47.000
20 Muslims. For a year and a half we have been preparing for the war in the
21 Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa because we knew there -- that there
22 would be war and that it could not be avoided."
23 Went on to say, at the Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik: "That was what we
24 claimed and that is why we did get to the right bank of the Una River. On
25 the right bank of the Una River there are no more Muslims in the Serbian
1 Municipality of Bosanska Krupa."
2 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Vjestica described very dramatic events that
3 took place in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa, that took place prior to
4 the intended negotiations on the 1st of May that were to take place in
5 Lisbon. Were you aware, Mr. Krajisnik, prior to going to Lisbon on the
6 1st of May, or prior to the 12th of May, 1992, that the Bosnian Serbs had
7 taken power in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa and that they had done
8 so with the assistance of the JNA?
9 A. I didn't know and they did not take over power. They took over
10 just half of Bosanska Krupa because the Una River separates the Krupa
11 river -- the Una River in two parts [as interpreted]. On the right-hand
12 side there is only Radusa, one single Muslim village. The other villages
13 are Serb. And I didn't know that they had done that.
14 Q. Okay. Well, let me -- so when Mr. Vjestica raised that with you
15 at the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, that was a
16 revelation to you; is that correct?
17 A. Mr. Vjestica explained it all to you in that interview. He told
18 it to you here as a witness, as an accused.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... was that, when Mr. Vjestica
20 stood up at the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, and
21 revealed the dramatic events that he reported, was that a revelation to
22 you? Was that the first time you had heard of that?
23 A. I really don't know. Maybe I've heard about it in some form or
24 other, but I don't remember it. I understood his contribution as an
25 exaggeration, a well-meant one - there was nothing ill-intentioned about
1 it - and he explained it all in the interview.
2 Q. Let's take a look at tab 104, which is already exhibited, Your
3 Honours. It's Prosecution Exhibit 168. This deals with Sanski Most,
4 which is another municipality that was a Muslim-majority municipality.
5 And this is a municipality, the evidence that's been produced in this
6 Court, is that the JNA and the Serbian Territorial Defence took over power
7 in that municipality on the 19th of April, 1992. And if we turn to the
8 exhibit that is in front of you, Mr. Krajisnik, this is a -- first of all,
9 let me identify it. It's an order from the commander of the Sanski Most
10 Territorial Defence, and you will see, at item number 4, it says as
11 follows: "I have decided to defend, with Serbian --" I'm sorry: "I have
12 decided: To defend sectors with Serbian settlements and vital facilities
13 in the municipality using the main forces, and to take over municipal
14 buildings with part of the forces in order to protect the population and
15 material wealth, and to secure the functioning of the Serbian government
16 and peaceful life in Sanski Most. Readiness for operations at 2200 hours
17 on 19 April 1992."
18 If you go directly above paragraph 4, Mr. Krajisnik, you'll see a
19 reference which directs the 6th Krajina Brigade shall occupy, and it gives
20 a number of axes and directions which the 6th Krajina Brigade should
21 operate. The evidence before this Chamber is that the 6th Krajina Brigade
22 was Colonel Basara's unit.
23 Now, Colonel Basara, being a JNA officer, participated, according
24 to this directive and according to the evidence that's before this Trial
25 Chamber, Mr. Krajisnik, in the attack and takeover of the parts of the
1 municipality of Sanski Most.
2 Mr. Krajisnik, prior to either May 1st, 1992, when you went to
3 Lisbon, or prior to the 16th Assembly session on the 12th of May, 1992,
4 were you aware that the Bosnian Serbs, with the assistance of the JNA, had
5 taken over power in the municipality of Sanski Most?
6 A. Again, I believe I didn't know. But I'm sure I don't know about
7 this particular action, how they did this.
8 Q. When did you learn, Mr. Krajisnik, for the first time, that the
9 Bosnian Serbs had taken over power in the Muslim-majority municipality of
10 Sanski Most?
11 A. I don't know. Was it before the 16th or on the 16th? I don't
13 Q. Let's turn to another document, Mr. Krajisnik. If we could turn
14 to the document that is found at tab 105. 105 has an exhibit number, Your
15 Honours; P1059.
16 Mr. Krajisnik, this is a document from the command of the 1st
17 Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, it's dated the 19th of December, 1994,
18 and it is addressed to the Drina Corps command. It is in part a
19 retrospective document. Let me read to you the first portion of the first
20 paragraph: "On 20 April, 1992, the forces of the Yugoslav army and the
21 formed unit coordinated by the SDS Crisis Staff liberated the town of
23 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the same question to you: Prior to the 1st of
24 May, 1992, before you went back to Lisbon, and also prior to the 16th --
25 to the 12th of May, 1992, the 16th Assembly session, were you aware that
1 the JNA, in conjunction with Bosnian Serb forces, had liberated the town
2 of Vlasenica?
3 A. To be very clear, as far as all of your questions are concerned,
4 possibly I did know that these areas were liberated. I never knew what
5 forces were used to do that. And this being in concert between the JNA
6 local units, I didn't know that. So if there are some documents, I would
7 be happy to comment on them. The JNA was there. I'm not excluding that,
8 that it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It consisted of people from that area
9 as well. Perhaps there were some people from Serbia too, but I don't
10 know. I don't know when I heard of Vlasenica. I don't know.
11 Q. Let me turn to another document, Mr. Krajisnik. It's found at tab
13 MR. HARMON: It needs an exhibit number.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1210, Your Honour.
16 MR. HARMON:
17 Q. Now, this document, Mr. Krajisnik, is a short document, two pages.
18 It is from the 17th Corps command, the JNA unit, dated the 26th of April,
19 1992. It's very urgent. It's a decision to conduct combat operations and
20 it is directed to the Main Staff of the armed forces of the Socialist
21 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and to the 2nd Military District
22 command. And if you turn to paragraph 1 of the document, you can see that
23 the author of this document, the author was Major General Milan
24 Nedeljkovic says, and I quote: "I have made the following decisions:
25 Upon completion of preparations, regrouping and necessary reassignment,
1 units located in Bosnian Posavina (Operation Group 1, Tactical Group 17
2 and 395th Motorised Brigade), in cooperation with the Serbian Territorial
3 Defence and police units, and with aerial and artillery support, are to
4 start with offensive, defensive and other various combat activities."
5 It goes on to say, in this document, Mr. Krajisnik, at paragraph
6 2.1, under the paragraph that deals with the unit tasks, it says: "Make
7 adequate preparations, regroup and concentrate forces, then with aerial
8 and artillery support and in cooperation with Lijesce TO units, launch an
9 attack along the chosen axis, break up the enemy, inflict as heavy losses
10 as possible, and reach the Sava River south-west of Bosanski Brod as soon
11 as possible, cleanse Bosanski Brod, capture it and destroy the bridge on
12 the Sava River in Bosanski Brod."
13 If you go down to paragraph 2.2, Mr. Krajisnik, it says: "Perform
14 the necessary regrouping with the artillery and -- with the aerial and
15 artillery support and in cooperation with the Serbian TO and police unit
16 prevent the OS RH from crossing the Sava River in the zone of
17 responsibility, at the same time breaking up attacks of paramilitary
18 formations and infiltrated sabotage terrorist groups."
19 And finally, paragraph 2.3, for the 395th Motorised Brigade, it
20 says: "In cooperation with TO and police units and with aerial and
21 artillery support, the brigade is to prevent the OS RH from crossing the
22 Sava River in the brigade's zone, exercise combat control of the
23 territory, prevent interethnic conflicts, and constantly control roads in
24 its zone of responsibility."
25 Now, this document, Mr. Krajisnik, again shows that in April of
1 1992, in the area of the Posavina, the JNA was working along with
2 territorial police units, Serbian Territorial Defence units and police
3 units in offensive and defensive operations. Were you unaware of that, of
4 these operations taking place, Mr. Krajisnik, unaware of the JNA assisting
5 the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence and police units in these kinds of
6 operations in an area that later was to be defined as a strategic
7 objective of the Bosnian Serb people?
8 A. I know that none of this was done by the JNA. Not a single one of
9 these things that is contained in the order. They didn't take Brod, they
10 didn't get to Sava, they didn't take the road - nothing. I'm aware of
11 that. And I know that at that time, Mr. Efendic issued an order to block
12 all barracks. He probably asked for the protection of the JNA, did he? I
13 mean, Mr. Efendic, the commander of the Muslim forces. He issued this
14 order to have JNA barracks sealed off. As for all of this contained in
15 this order, none of it was done at the time.
16 Q. Okay. Mr. Krajisnik, let's turn our attention to Bratunac
17 municipality, which again was a Muslim-majority municipality. The
18 evidence before this Court, Mr. Krajisnik, was that power was taken over
19 in the municipality on the 17th of April, and ethnic cleansing in the
20 municipality commenced on the 9th of May, 1992. The evidence also before
21 this Court, Mr. Krajisnik, is that there -- the participants in the ethnic
22 cleansing on the 9th of May, 1992, and in the disarming of Muslim
23 settlements before the ethnic cleansing began on that date, included a
24 small armoured JNA unit under the command of an individual named Captain
25 Reljic. The evidence also before this Court, Mr. Krajisnik, is that the
1 JNA participated in the planning and the execution of the ethnic cleansing
2 of the village of Glogova. Now, again, Mr. Krajisnik, when did you first
3 learn, prior to the 16th session of the Assembly, about the takeover of
4 power in the village of -- in the municipality of Bratunac? When did you
5 learn that for the first time?
6 A. I really don't know. Was it before or then? I really don't know.
7 As for how it was taken, that's what I heard from this man here, Mr. --
8 oh, Deronjic, yes, but I did not know that Bratunac was in Serb hands,
9 let's put it that way.
10 Q. When did you learn for the first time, Mr. Krajisnik, that the
11 village of Glogova and other Muslim settlements in the Bratunac
12 municipality had been ethnically cleansed?
13 A. Never. I never learned of that. I did not hear that it was
14 cleansed. I heard that it was liberated. I had no idea what Glogova was
15 and who was there. I mean, perhaps there is some information, but really
16 over here I heard from Deronjic what happened in Glogova. I only heard
17 about crimes committed against Serbs throughout the war. That's the only
18 thing that I heard. And there is tonnes of evidence to point to that;
19 books, brochures, what have you not.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let me focus your attention on the events in
21 Bratunac. When did you hear for the first time that Bratunac had been
23 A. I don't know.
24 Q. Did you hear about it prior to the 16th Assembly session on the
25 12th of May?
1 A. Believe me, I don't know. Well, maybe I did, maybe I didn't. I
2 don't know. But I heard that I learned about -- but I know that I heard
3 about it in 1992. But it would be dishonest if I were to say before or
4 later because I cannot say exactly when it was that I heard about it and
5 who it was that I heard about it.
6 Let me just tell you something else. Immediately after
7 Mr. Deronjic came, the government sent their own people to the ground.
8 That's in government records. I didn't know about it at the time. Maybe
9 they knew; I don't know. You have that in the government records. I
10 found it here.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, shortly after the events in Glogova and shortly
12 after Bratunac was liberated, 400 Bosnian Muslim civilians appeared in
13 Pale. Does that in any way refresh your recollection and give you the --
14 an ability to think back on when you first learned of the events in
16 A. As for the people who were in Pale, I knew about them. And this
17 is the information, that people from the leadership of Pale were very
18 upset and Mr. Deronjic, in revolt, sent the Muslims to the leadership in
19 Pale. That's the only thing I know. And then people carried this
20 through, and I had no idea who they were, what this was all about, what
21 happened. Even then I didn't know what Glogova was. I mean to this day
22 -- well, okay, to this day, I have found out. It's some village. In
23 1991, I know that there was unrest in Bratunac. I mentioned that.
24 Between the Serbs and Muslims, when those two people were killed, when I
25 was president of the Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, based on the evidence that you've heard in
2 this Court, and based on the evidence that I presented you with today,
3 it's -- do you dispute the fact, Mr. Krajisnik, that the JNA was involved
4 in the attacks and the takeover of power in various municipalities
5 throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the 1st of May, 1992?
6 A. Well, with the best of intentions, on the basis of what I'm
7 reading now, if the JNA was there, and it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it
8 certainly participated in the fighting. Now, was this fighting by way of
9 an offensive or defence, I cannot say, but as the only regular armed
10 force, it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was not on the Muslim side, it
11 was not on the Croat side because they had turned into its enemies.
12 That's clear. And I cannot say anything that's different from that. Now,
13 I cannot say whether it was attacking or whether it was defending itself
14 because Efendic said surround all the barracks, don't give them water,
15 don't give them electricity. That I know. It would be dishonest of me to
16 say now that they were sitting there and watching television or whatever.
17 That's not correct.
18 For the sake of the truth, I have to say that the JNA for the most
19 part took care of itself because they had experienced a catastrophe in
20 Croatia and Slovenia and they were afraid that they would be under siege,
21 and they were under siege in Sarajevo, and they did whatever they could to
22 protect their own members who were from Serbia, and they were there at the
23 time, whereas the local population remained there, of course. Of course,
24 I'm not denying -- I'm not denying that they took part in the fighting but
25 I do not know in which way. I cannot confirm this, I cannot deny this,
1 whether it launched any offensives; maybe it did.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in fact the JNA was coordinating with the Bosnian
3 Serb leadership, on both the republic and the municipal level, prior to
4 the 12th of May of, 1992, and you were aware of that; is that correct?
5 MR. JOSSE: Two questions there really [indiscernible].
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon?
7 MR. HARMON: Okay, let's start with I'll withdraw the question.
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the JNA was coordinating with the municipal
9 leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, and that information was being conveyed
10 to the republican level. That's correct, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?
11 A. First of all let me answer your question as far as the
12 municipalities are concerned. Wherever the JNA happened to be, it had to
13 cooperate with the civilian authorities. And it did cooperate with the
14 authorities, the Serb authorities, because it was not in the Muslim
15 territories. And that's why they had to leave all their weapons behind
16 and to get out, if they survived. If they were in Serb territories, they
17 cooperated with the Serb authorities. If they were in the Muslim
18 territories, they were blocked, that's true, so they could not cooperate
19 with the authorities.
20 Now, I'm so sorry, but what was your other question? The
21 republican authorities? The republican level?
22 Q. I asked you if you were aware that the Bosnian JNA was cooperating
23 with the JNA on a municipal level, and I think you answered that question.
24 I want to direct your attention to the item that is found in tab
25 111, Mr. Krajisnik, if you could take a look at that. That has a
1 number already. It's Prosecution Exhibit 653. This, Mr. Krajisnik, is a
2 letter, it bears the stamp of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina, it's dated the 23rd of March, 1992. It's for the attention
4 of Minister Ostojic, and it is from the president of the Serbian
5 Municipality of Kalesija, Petar Jankovic. And in this letter to Minister
6 Ostojic, he indicates that the situation in Kalesija is complex and
7 unpredictable, and in the penultimate paragraph he says, "Political and
8 strategic decisions are being coordinated with the corps command in the
9 4th Armoured Brigade. I wish you success in the creation of Serbian state
10 in BH."
11 Now, Minister Ostojic is Velibor Ostojic; is that correct,
12 Mr. Krajisnik?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you knew him?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you met with Mr. Ostojic frequently in the period of time
17 prior to the 12th of May, 1992, didn't you?
18 A. Mr. Ostojic worked in the party and he was in the government. I
19 was in the Assembly. So it wasn't often but I did meet with him. Not
20 often for sure. Well, I mean, it wasn't very few times either.
21 Q. Did he -- did Mr. Ostojic keep you informed about the developments
22 that were occurring in the municipalities and particularly the events
23 where -- for example, in Kalesija where the situation was both complex and
25 A. First of all, there was no municipality of Kalesija. Secondly,
1 this man Petar Jankovic is an unusual man. I don't want to phrase it
2 differently. Mr. Deronjic mentioned him, if you remember, that he was the
3 best man of Commander Jankovic from Tuzla. How should I put this? What
4 he's saying here is a pure pamphlet. Mr. Ostojic probably just put this
5 away as soon as he received this document. It has nothing to do with a
6 system of support or anything. This man was no president because Kalesija
7 was not a municipality. Well, they established something on their own but
8 it was never officially proclaimed. You will see that Momcilo Micic said
9 that to you. That Tesic at one meeting of the Assembly said we formed
10 Kalesija, nobody knew that we had formed it.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, are you disputing what Mr. Jankovic says, that the
12 political and strategic decisions were being coordinated with the corps
13 command and the 4th Armoured Brigade? Are you taking issue with that?
14 A. If his friend, his close friend, his best man, was corps
15 commander, as Deronjic said, I believe that he did this along private --
16 through private channels. If he was not his best friend, then this corps
17 commander is a fool for having talked to him.
18 Q. Well, let's turn to another document, Mr. Krajisnik. It's tab
19 112, and tab 112, Exhibit P529, tab 263, this is a document that's a very
20 brief document, Mr. Krajisnik. It is --
21 A. 112, you said?
22 Q. Yes, sir.
23 A. May I just find it.
24 Q. This has been exhibited before. This is a document that is from
25 the 2nd -- from the JNA 2nd Military District reserve command post. It's
1 dated the 6th of April and it's directed to the command of the 2nd
2 Military District operations centre, and it is a regular operations
3 report, Mr. Krajisnik. It is from Colonel Branko Filipovic, and in the
4 penultimate paragraph, Colonel Filipovic says, "We have maintained
5 constant contact and coordination of operations with the Pale Crisis
7 So this document, Mr. Krajisnik, is another individual - this time
8 a JNA officer - referring to coordinating with the Bosnian Serb
9 authorities, this time in the municipality of Pale. Now, Mr. Krajisnik,
10 were you aware that -- of the coordination between the JNA and the Pale
11 Crisis Staff authorities prior to May the 1st of 1992 or prior to the 16th
12 Assembly session on the 12th of May, 1992?
13 A. I did not know about this contact. Before that, I had been in
14 Pale only once. So that's it as far as this contact is concerned. Later,
15 when I came in April, it was already different. As far as what I can see
16 here -- sorry, it's the 6th of April. The 6th of April, 1992. I wasn't
17 there. I just had this graduation party before that, that I celebrated in
19 Q. So let us turn, then, Mr. Krajisnik, to another document. This is
20 a document, Mr. Krajisnik, that is found at tab 114. This needs an
21 exhibit number.
22 A. This?
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. This one, where the translation was inserted? Is that right?
25 Yes. Yes. It's all right.
1 Q. It's tab 114, Mr. Krajisnik. I'll identify the document for you.
2 MR. HARMON: First of all, if I could get a number and then I'll
3 identify it.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: P1211, Your Honour.
6 MR. HARMON:
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is a document that is from the Serbian
8 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the Ministry of Defence, it is dated
9 the 27th of April. It is to the 2nd Military District command. It's a
10 request for reinforcement of active duty military personnel, and the
11 author of this document is the minister, Colonel Bogdan Subotic. I'll
12 read the first paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik: "In view of the essential need
13 to bring the Territorial Defence in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina up to the basic level of manpower, in accordance with an
15 agreement reached and a promise made in Belgrade, we request your urgent
16 assistance in providing us with the following officers:"
17 And then cast your eye on this document, Mr. Krajisnik. You will
18 see that item number 1, the Republican Territorial Defence Staff, they
19 identified the positions that are needed. Item number 2, the Sarajevo
20 Territorial Defence city staff, they identify the positions that are
21 needed, and they identify persons as well. And for the Doboj region in
22 item number 3, they do the same.
23 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, let me ask you, Minister Subotic
24 -- first of all, were you aware of this order, Mr. Krajisnik, prior to
25 the 1st of May, 1992, before you went to Lisbon? That the minister of
1 defence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was asking the
2 2nd Military District command to supply the Ministry of Defence with
3 personnel? Were you aware of that?
4 A. I was not.
5 Q. Now, as --
6 A. I knew that there was a commander of Territorial Defence, but I
7 don't know how he was appointed. He was there briefly and then he left.
8 He had seen Lukic [as interpreted]. And I don't know about this
9 communication. It was within the province of the minister, so he dealt
10 with it on his own. It's nothing unusual. All of these people that he
11 requested, they were all from Bosnia-Herzegovina, you know that.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did you meet with Colonel Subotic, the minister of
13 defence, at any time prior to the 1st of May, 1992?
14 A. Yes, yes. I frequently -- in fact not frequently, but I met with
15 him, yes.
16 Q. Did he not tell you that he had been making -- that he had made a
17 request for army personnel, active duty military personnel, to bring up
18 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina forces up to proper manpower
19 levels? He didn't bring that up with you at all?
20 A. I don't rule out the possibility that he said that but it was
21 within his jurisdiction any way. We did not have Territorial Defence.
22 And all these things that he did were rightly within his province because
23 the Territorial Defence wasn't functioning properly. He was requesting
24 staff, just like Muslims had their own TO, we should have our own TO,
25 because the Serb TO had been proclaimed but did not operate. You see, it
1 didn't operate until April, since all this stuff was missing at the end of
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the document from Minister Subotic in the first
4 paragraph refers to an agreement that was reached and a promise that was
5 made in Belgrade. Can you enlighten us as to what that agreement and
6 promise, what they were?
7 A. I don't know specifically whether it's related to this but I know
8 that whenever there was any discussion about -- I don't believe there was
9 any discussion about it at that time, but when the decision about the
10 withdrawal of the JNA was taken, it was said that all staff from
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the JNA could remain in our army, but I don't think
12 that relates to this TO issue. Because it was later agreed that staff
13 should come over. I don't know about this agreement. The one I mentioned
14 took place later. I know about the other agreement, when our army was
15 being established.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's turn to another document, then,
17 Mr. Krajisnik. It's the document that's found on -- at tab 102. Again,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, the focus of these questions is the neutrality of the JNA.
19 And if we turn to document that is found at tab 102, it bears a
20 Prosecution Exhibit number P892, Ewan Brown tab 74.
21 This, Mr. Krajisnik, is a document that's dated the -- first of
22 all, it's from the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Autonomous
23 Region of Krajina war staff in Banja Luka. It's dated the 6th of May,
24 1992, and it is the telephone numbers of members of the Krajina Autonomous
25 Region war staff. Number 8, General Momir Talic, is a JNA general. And
1 if you cast your eye, Mr. Krajisnik, on a number of people whose names are
2 quite familiar in this Court: Radoslav Brdjanin, he was a member of the
3 Bosnian Serb Assembly, wasn't he?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And if you go to number 3, Vojo Kupresanin, he was a member of the
6 Bosnian Serb Assembly, wasn't he?
7 A. Yes, yes, he was.
8 Q. And did you know Predrag Radic, number 5, the man identified at
9 number 5?
10 A. Yes, I knew him.
11 Q. Did you have contact with him prior to the 1st of May, 1992?
12 A. Well, he testified that I had not been in contact with him. I
13 didn't. Even later I had very few and rare contacts with him.
14 Q. And the Stojan Zupljanin, who was identified in number 10, did you
15 have contacts with him prior to the 12th of May, 1992?
16 A. I don't believe so. I had very few contacts with Zupljanin
17 throughout the war; few and far between.
18 Q. If you look at the names I did not identify, did you have contact
19 with any of those other persons in that list prior to the 12th of May,
21 A. I really don't know whether I had been in contact with anybody,
22 but I really don't remember being in contact with anyone concerning this
23 document. Not one single person. As far as this document is concerned, I
24 didn't even know that there was a war staff. I certainly wasn't in
25 contact with General Talic, because I had seen the man only once before
1 the war, and even that was by chance.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in your contacts with your fellow legislators,
3 Mr. Brdjanin and Mr. Kupresanin, did they inform you at any time prior to
4 the 12th of May, 1991, that the JNA was actively participating with them
5 in -- and assisting them in their regions?
6 A. From the 27th of March until this date, I had no contact
7 whatsoever with MPs and they did not report to me what was going on,
8 whether the JNA had been in contact with them or not. But I told you
9 already: I personally believed that if JNA existed there, it did take
10 part. I just don't know in which form; in offensive operations, defensive
11 operations, but it was there at that time. There is no dispute about
12 that. We did not have a Territorial Defence, so the JNA probably took
14 Q. We all can agree, Mr. Krajisnik, that the JNA was present in
15 Bosnia prior to the 12th of May. I've shown you a number of documents,
16 you've heard considerable amount of testimony regarding the participation
17 of the JNA in cooperation and in coordination with Serbian -- Bosnian Serb
18 forces, taking over municipalities and taking over power in
19 municipalities. Mr. Krajisnik, do you still assert that the JNA was
20 entirely neutral in the events prior to the 12th of May, 1992? Or does
21 the evidence that you've seen in this courtroom change your view and
23 A. Mr. Prosecutor, Your Honours, I will repeat what I have already
24 said: The Yugoslav People's Army played a neutral role all the way until
25 the moment when Croats and Muslims started viewing it as a hostile army
1 and turned against it. The moment when they started laying siege to the
2 barracks, which is at this time, when they started cutting off their
3 electricity and water supply, they had only one natural ally in that area;
4 the Serb authorities. In Muslim areas, there were no bases of the JNA
5 because they had left their weapons, up and went.
6 As for cooperation and what forms it took, I can only tell you
7 what I have seen myself in Sarajevo. Cooperation with Mr. Kukanjac and
8 his public appearances. I'm speaking about that level. As for the local
9 level, I gave you the example of Rajlovac, where the local commander
10 distributed weapons among Serbs and Muslims equally. And my modest [as
11 interpreted] about the local cooperation, cooperation at the local level,
12 is modest. That is my entire knowledge about the role of the Yugoslav
13 People's Army, and I hope I have answered your question, Mr. Prosecutor.
14 The JNA lived a disaster in Bosnia because it barely managed to
15 pull out, with enormous losses. It was victimised in Sarajevo, in Tuzla,
16 and they barely pulled out.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, would you agree with me --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one question? Mr. Krajisnik, you said
19 several times, "We had no TO." On from -- for what period would that be
20 valid? Did finally a Serb TO come into existence and on from what date,
21 if so?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, on the 6th of April or
23 maybe the 7th of April, I'm not sure, right at the beginning of April, the
24 TO of the Serb Republic was proclaimed, but in practice, as I said, it did
25 not function, and we can see that from one of those papers where it says
1 on the 26th of April, they still have no commander. In practice there
2 were just armed people, armed citizens. That's why I said we didn't have
3 a TO in practical terms. It only existed on paper. I don't know how it
4 was in municipalities. Maybe it did function in some places, because it
5 was a structure that existed before the war, in the former
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The structure was there. But what I'm saying is that
7 we had this commander, Vidoje Lukic, and Subotic and when we asked them,
8 Are you capable of doing something? and they said no. From that, I
9 conclude that they did not function. They were impotent; they couldn't do
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now you say that you don't know how it was in
12 the municipalities. Maybe it did function in some places.
13 Most of the questions put to you by Mr. Harmon were about what
14 happened in the municipalities, and when you said "We did not have a
15 Territorial Defence," I understood that to be your answer as well in
16 relation to the municipalities, but I might have misunderstood you. You
17 said, "From the 27th of March until this date, I had no contact whatsoever
18 with MPs and they did not report to me what was going on, whether the JNA
19 had been in contact with them or not." I understood that to be reporting
20 or a lack of reporting on what happened in the municipalities. And in
21 that same answer, you said, "We did not have a Territorial Defence so the
22 JNA probably took part."
23 I'm a bit confused about what your testimony now is, whether there
24 was no TO at all or whether you did not know about the functioning of the
25 TO in some of the municipalities, because all the questions were about
1 cooperation on the municipality level primarily. I'm not saying that
2 nothing related to the central level but that was at least an important
3 part of the questions put to you and the answers you gave. Could you
4 please enlighten me in this respect.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, when I said we did not
6 have a Territorial Defence, I went on to explain that this commander, and
7 the minister, and the first thing you need to have an efficient
8 Territorial Defence, you have to have those two people in place, and I
9 said they were impotent. Something cannot function well in municipalities
10 if you do not have the vertical line starting with the commander and all
11 the following elements of organisation. That's why I gave that negative
12 assessment of the Territorial Defence, which had been established on
13 paper. When I said Did it function in municipalities? I said the TO
14 existed in pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there was supposed to be a
15 municipal commander at the municipal level and maybe that person had
16 organised a TO. I didn't know about that, but I don't rule out the
17 possibility. So much about Territorial Defence.
18 The Prosecutor, however, asked me whether I had contacted with
19 MPs, Brdjanin, Kupresanin, and others, and whether they had informed me
20 about cooperation with the JNA. I said I had no contact with them because
21 there had been no sessions from the 27th of March until the 12th of May,
22 and they did not report to me about it. And I didn't know about that war
23 staff. That was my attempt to briefly explain in response to two or three
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon. But if you
1 have a subject, or if you want to finish this subject in a couple of
2 minutes, fine. Otherwise, we will have a break.
3 MR. HARMON: Let's take a break, Your Honour, thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll have a break until 6.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 6.05 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Harmon, I have a few
8 procedural decisions -- well, as a matter of fact, it's a few procedural
9 matters to raise. It's about exhibits.
10 First of all, in regard to the Prosecution's evidence of
11 destruction in 1992, a CD was given to the Defence on the 25th of May to
12 review, and two sets of photographs were made available to the Defence on
13 the 29th of May. In an e-mail to a legal officer on the 26th of May, the
14 Defence has requested seven days to review this material. Today, the
15 Defence informed the Chamber that it is in the process of discussing this
16 material with Mr. Krajisnik. The Chamber grants the Defence until Monday,
17 the 12th of June, to raise any objections to the material. These
18 objections, as well as all other objections referred to in this decision,
19 may be raised orally at a suitable moment in court or submitted in a brief
20 written filing.
21 MR. JOSSE: That's very helpful, Your Honour. I can inform the
22 Court there will be objections. I'm going to talk to Mr. Harmon first of
23 all and then choose my moment, if I may.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 The date was set because earlier, as a matter of fact, there was
1 some time asked for in e-mail but the Chamber never decided on how much
2 time would be granted.
3 MR. JOSSE: As I say, I really am very grateful for that.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then I continue: The parties have submitted the
5 following documents in relation to double pension legislation: That's
6 D236, the law on the rights of fighters, disabled servicemen, and family
7 of those killed in the Republika Srpska homeland defence war, printed in
8 the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, dated 21st of May 2001.
9 Then D237, a letter from Slavko Basic, director of the pension and
10 disability insurance fund of Republika Srpska, dated the 3rd of April,
12 P1178, Articles 94 and 157 of the law on pension and disability
14 And P1179, Article 42 of the law on pension and disability
16 These exhibits are hereby admitted into evidence.
17 On the 25th of May, the Prosecution submitted the decision on the
18 return of displaced persons to the territory of the Serbian Republic of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in issue number 8/92 of the Official
20 Gazette of the Serbian people. This item, however, is already admitted
21 into evidence as Exhibit number P529, tab 165.
22 On that same day, the Prosecution also submitted the correction of
23 the decision on the return of expelled persons to the territory of the
24 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in issue number
25 11/92 of the Official Gazette of the Serbian people. This item is not yet
1 in evidence and needs to be assigned an exhibit number.
2 Madam Registrar, could we please have a number for that exhibit.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1212, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
5 The Defence has until Monday, the 12th of June, to raise any
6 objection to this item or it will be admitted into evidence without
7 further action.
8 All documents and translations have been received by the registrar
9 regarding the following items: D144, an extract from newspaper Dnevni
10 Avaz, dated the 19th of May, 2005; D170, a letter to Ambassador Cutileiro
11 from Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic; D177, a video clip of the television
12 programme Club 91; D178 an intercept of a conversation between
13 Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic dated the 16th of July, 1991; D179, an
14 intercept of a conversation between Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic dated
15 the 11th of December, 1991; D183, an intercept of a conversation between
16 Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic dated the 4th of October, 1991; D186, an
17 intercept of a conversation between Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic dated
18 3rd of December, 1991; D190 through and including D192F, D195 and D196,
19 which are maps on which Mr. Krajisnik has marked various items; P1086,
20 minutes of the first meeting of the committee for mass communications
21 dated the 8th of October, 1991; D1149, a postal money order dated the 30th
22 of December, 1991.
23 The parties have until Monday the 12th of June to raise any
24 objections or on that date these items will be admitted into evidence
25 without further action.
1 With regard to all other exhibits, the Chamber is hereby setting a
2 deadline of Tuesday the 20th of June for the parties to provide the
3 registrar with any outstanding missing items and translations.
4 The parties should refer to the exhibit lists which are
5 continuously updated and provided by the registrar.
6 Thereafter, the parties will have until the 27th of June to raise
7 any objections or the items tendered by the 20th of June deadline will be
8 admitted into evidence without further action.
9 This is, of course, without prejudice to the possibility that the
10 Chamber itself may decide not to admit any piece of evidence for other
12 The registrar has received English translations for a group of
13 documents which were provisionally marked on the 24th of May, 2006, as
14 Exhibits D197 through and including D216. As we did with documents which
15 were received from Mr. Krajisnik at a later stage, the Chamber would like
16 to leave it to the parties to review the material and to indicate to the
17 Chamber which, if any, of these documents they wish to offer into
19 Lastly, Exhibit D169 is hereby admitted under seal. It is in fact
20 the pseudonym sheet of Witness D24 which was not formally admitted into
22 This concludes the Chamber's order, and Mr. Harmon, I'd like to
23 invite you to proceed.
24 MR. HARMON:
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, will you agree with me that in late 1991 and early
1 1992, prior to the commencement of the war in Bosnia, the fact that the
2 JNA was providing voluminous amounts of arms and materiel to only one of
3 the parties, potential parties to the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs, that
4 that was not a neutral act?
5 A. I cannot agree with you, sir.
6 Q. You believe that the JNA, in providing volumes of arms, materiel,
7 to only the Bosnian Serbs, was an act that showed neutrality; is that your
9 A. I don't know whether at that time the JNA was providing only the
10 Serbs with weapons or whether it was providing weapons at all. That's
11 what I'm trying to say.
12 Q. I see.
13 A. This was before the war start.
14 Q. All right. Well, let's look at your evidence, because you gave
15 evidence on a number of days, Mr. Krajisnik, in respect of the JNA
16 providing arms. On day 259, your testimony was that you did not know in
17 which way the Serbs were arming themselves or if they were arming
19 On day 262, in response to a question put to you by Judge Hanoteau
20 you answered: "But I emphasised I did not have any information at the
21 time that the Serb side was arming itself."
22 On day 268, you were asked a question whether the Bosnian Serbs
23 had armed themselves and you said, "As for things I heard second-hand,
24 stories circulated that people were receiving weapons, and I heard some
25 stories like that, like rumours but nothing specific."
1 And finally, you were asked a question by Judge Hanoteau in
2 respect of the knowledge of Dr. Karadzic and his knowledge of arming, and
3 your answer, in part, was that arming people was a secret.
4 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you travelled often to Belgrade and
5 representatives, including Dr. Karadzic and other representatives of the
6 Bosnian Serb administration, travelled to Belgrade, and they held
7 discussions with both political and military leaders prior to the
8 commencement of the war. That's correct, isn't it?
9 A. No. I've said that before the war I did not go to Belgrade often,
10 because I was an official. I could not go like someone who was just a
11 party member. I didn't go often but I was there a few times. I don't
12 know exactly how many times. For the most part when we would go to some
13 conference or something like that, people had to know about each and every
14 time I went to Belgrade.
15 Q. In addition to you, Dr. Karadzic went to Belgrade numerous
16 occasions, didn't he, Mr. Krajisnik, prior to the beginning of the war.
17 A. I think so. Well, not that much but I don't know exactly to what
19 Q. And in Bosnia, Mr. Krajisnik, you had meetings with
20 representatives of the JNA prior to the beginning of the war, as did
21 Dr. Karadzic.
22 A. I stated here that I was in a delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
23 with the top echelons of the military in Sarajevo. We also had a meeting
24 in Belgrade. But I didn't have any other meetings with the JNA except for
25 what I said, that I had a meeting with Kukanjac once the war had already
1 started. That's what I remember. Perhaps there was some meeting that I
2 really cannot remember now.
3 Q. Dr. Karadzic was fully informed and aware of the fact that the JNA
4 was providing weapons to the Bosnian Serbs prior to the beginning of the
5 war; is that correct?
6 A. I have to say that on the basis of all these papers that I saw,
7 Mr. Karadzic was only engaged in political activity aimed at helping the
8 mobilisation of people who would be under the JNA. I don't see any logic
9 involved in this. Why would he give Serbs weapons if they were under the
10 JNA? I'm speaking only on the basis of logic. I don't have any other
11 knowledge apart from that. Whether there was anything else apart from
12 that, I cannot say by way of testimony because it would be a sin for me to
13 say something I don't know.
14 Q. Let's take a look at tab 115, Mr. Krajisnik. This is an exhibit
15 that's P46. This is an intercept between Dr. Karadzic and Mihalj Kertes
16 on the 24th of June, 1991. And you will recall, Mr. Krajisnik, that
17 Mr. Kertes was identified in the testimony of Miroslav Deronjic as the
18 person to whom he and Mr. Zekic went in 1991 to visit in Belgrade and who
19 was principally involved in the providing of arms to Eastern Bosnia.
20 Now, in this intercept, Mr. Krajisnik, it has been played before
21 in this court, you'll see on the first page Mr. Kertes, the fifth box down
22 with Mr. Kertes, and on page 1 of the English, Your Honour, again the
23 fifth box down, Mr. Kertes informs Dr. Karadzic, "This could be going much
24 better. However the main problem is that Junackovic is holding up
25 everything." First of all, do you know who Mr. Junackovic is? Is that a
1 name that's familiar to you?
2 A. No, I have no idea, no.
3 Q. Okay. The next time, two boxes -- the next box down with
4 Mr. Kertes, he says -- I'm reading from the second sentence: "He wouldn't
5 let anything -- it's probably be done. Jovica's hands are tied. Jovica
6 went mad and I'm worried that he'll soon be your patient."
7 Now in this intercept, the evidence was adduced about it, Jovica
8 was Jovica -- was identified as Jovica Stanisic, and who was a state Serb
9 minister of state security, and Slobo, who we'll see later, was identified
10 as Mr. Milosevic.
11 If you read down to Mr. Karadzic -- I mean Mr. Kertes, down -- the
12 fourth box down following the passage that I quoted, Mr. Kertes says, "For
13 50 pieces of furniture, he held until 5 p.m."
14 Now, on page 3 of the English, at the top of the English, and I'm
15 sorry, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to give you some time to try to find this
16 passage. I didn't locate it. Mr. Kertes -- actually, it's the second box
17 after the passage that I just read -- says, "If we are going to do 50 a
18 day, then --" if you go down four more boxes where Mr. Kertes again
19 speaks, and this is on page 3 of the English, Mr. Kertes says, "No, Slobo
20 has given Jovica and me carte blanche, but then he's Jovica's boss and
21 he's driving Jovica crazy."
22 And Karadzic says, "I see."
23 And Kertes says, "He wouldn't let him do anything. Jovica ..."
24 Karadzic: "Yes."
25 Kertes: "He's gone crazy. He rang me twice today and he couldn't
1 ... believe they did 50 pieces today. He let them -- he let him five
2 hours there."
3 Karadzic: "Right. Okay, tell me ... other, other things. Is
4 there any other news?"
5 Kertes: "Well, we're prepared to do everything ..."
6 And this intercept is, the testimony of Mr. Deronjic was that was
7 coded language between Mr. Kertes and Dr. Karadzic dealing with the
8 provision of arms.
9 Now, you can see, Mr. Krajisnik, that the date of this is the 24th
10 of June, 1991. My question to you, Mr. Krajisnik, is: Between the 24th
11 of June, 1991, and the 12th of May, 1992, did Dr. Karadzic at any time
12 inform you that the Bosnian Serbs were receiving arms from Belgrade? Or
13 did he leave you completely in the dark on that significant event and
15 MR. JOSSE: I am going to object, Your Honour, because surely my
16 learned friend needs to have groundwork first of all and ask Mr. Krajisnik
17 if he accepts the proposition that Mr. Deronjic advanced in relation to
18 this particular intercept. That's the first stage. And the second stage
19 of the question he has just asked.
20 MR. HARMON: Well, Your Honour -- let me ask you this question,
21 Mr. Krajisnik:
22 Q. When Mr. Kertes is dealing with 50 pieces of furniture, you knew
23 who Mr. Kertes was, didn't you, Mr. Krajisnik?
24 A. I know who Kertes is.
25 Q. Was he a furniture merchant?
1 A. Well, I have no idea what the furniture is. Maybe it's what
2 you're saying, maybe it's something different. I don't know. Well,
3 obviously, it is some kind of code, so kind of coded language. But it
4 doesn't have to mean it's weapons. Maybe it's something else. Maybe it's
5 something much bigger than that.
6 Q. Okay. Well, I take it that you're unable to assist us in that
7 code language, so let me go to the second part of my question,
8 Mr. Krajisnik. Did Dr. Karadzic at any time between the 24th of June,
9 1991, and the 12th of May, 1992, ever tell you that Belgrade was providing
10 weapons to the Bosnian Serbs?
11 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I've said that I heard rumours. I can tell you
12 what I knew about weapons, if you're interested, and I can also answer
13 your question, if necessary.
14 Q. Well, please. Answer my question, if you would.
15 A. I do not remember having talked to Mr. Karadzic about any kind of
16 arming, and I'll tell you what it was that I heard.
17 Q. Well, let me just ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, beside Dr. Karadzic, did
18 you hear from any other person who was in either the Bosnian Serb
19 administration, either the minister of defence, any of your other
20 colleagues, that the Bosnian Serbs were receiving weapons from Belgrade?
21 Or was that something that you assert today in this Court you were
22 completely ignorant of, no one ever informed you of that fact?
23 A. At the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were three affairs.
24 Serbs were blamed for two of them and Muslims for one. It had to do with
25 trucks full of weapons that were captured, and a prosecutor even let the
1 suspects go, and so on and so forth. So I heard lots of rumours, locally.
2 There was a debate at an Assembly meeting about this problem. So it is
3 not that it was totally unknown that there was some kind of arming but I
4 didn't want to get involved in that kind of thing. There are law
5 enforcement agencies and let them deal with that.
6 As for Mr. Karadzic, I did not talk to him about such problems. I
7 did not know that the Serbs were being armed. As for this conversation
8 with Kertes, I don't know. If this had to do with arming, that is.
9 And, please, just one more thing, I'm sorry. When Mr. Deronjic
10 testified, Mr. Rajko Dukic spoke for the newspapers. We have that. And
11 he said that Mr. Deronjic's statement has nothing to do with anything. He
12 spoke up on the very next day, and we have that piece of paper, and if you
13 want, I can provide it to you.
14 Q. Well, let me ask you, isn't it a fact, Mr. Krajisnik, that
15 Dr. Karadzic did raise with you directly the fact that the Serbs did not
16 have enough arms?
17 A. Correct, correct. When he said the Serbs do not have enough
18 weapons, I said, well, let's move on. And I did move on. But he did not
19 tell me whether they got weapons, how they got weapons. The Serbs could
20 have armed themselves. Later on I saw that Serbs had weapons, all Serbs,
21 or rather, everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina had weapons. So if you want to
22 look at the intercept and you will see what my answers were. If I knew
23 what this was all about, I would have said, What? And so and so forth.
24 He says to me, Serbs do not have weapons, and the Muslims are establishing
25 the police as their army. If I remember correctly, that's what he said in
1 that conversation.
2 Q. Well, you anticipated my next question, Mr. Krajisnik, because
3 we'll turn to tab 116. It's Prosecution Exhibit 67, tab 15. Also bears
4 the number P154 and P292 KID 30511. Since you appear to be quite familiar
5 with this intercept, Mr. Krajisnik, I won't direct you to the passages but
6 I'll direct the Trial Chamber to the passages.
7 MR. HARMON: First, Your Honour, this is a conversation between
8 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik on the 23rd of September, 1991, and it is a
9 conversation, as Your Honours can see, at the first page, middle of the
10 page, where Dr. Karadzic is -- says: "Well, our people are incapable of
11 doing anything. Alija is trying to mobilise ... to create an army through
12 expansion ... the unlimited expansion of part of the reserve force."
13 Mr. Krajisnik says, "Protection, right?"
14 Karadzic says: "Mobilising the reserve force. We would have to
15 call him urgently, urgently ... the two of us, to sit down with him and
16 tell him that that's civil war."
17 On page 2 in the English, Your Honour, starting at the third box
18 from the top, Dr. Karadzic says, "Yes. Well, all right, what, what ... I
19 mean in Serb areas they don't have enough weapons."
20 Mr. Krajisnik: "Hm?"
21 Karadzic: "They don't have enough weapons."
22 Mr. Krajisnik: "All right, but we're analysing, Radovan, please.
23 Let me tell you something, I would like to ask you for something in
24 connection to that. We should weigh things well. What you said last
25 night was smart. We must always see what that means."
1 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Karadzic raised a very, very serious issue
2 with you on this telephone call, the Serbs didn't have enough weapons, and
3 we have heard evidence, including your evidence, that the Serbs were
4 concerned about genocide being committed against the Serb people. And
5 what Dr. Karadzic is saying to you in this intercept is the Serbs don't
6 have enough weapons. As a result of that conversation that you had with
7 Dr. Karadzic, that conversation on the 23rd of September, 1991, did you
8 have a conversation with Dr. Karadzic to explore the potential dangers to
9 the Serb people that Dr. Karadzic, at least, had foreseen and
11 A. Maybe the interpretation is not good. Mr. Prosecutor, the subject
12 here, the central subject here, is that Mr. Karadzic is upset over the
13 fact that Mr. Izetbegovic is establishing his own army and he is
14 aggravating the situation. And I'm trying to calm him down and he said we
15 haven't got weapons, and I simply moved on to another subject. In three
16 or four days we were supposed to have an Assembly meeting and we were not
17 supposed to impose solutions to one another. And you know that on the
18 30th of September we had an Assembly meeting. It has nothing to do with
19 weapons here. And I was not naive. There was shooting all over the place
20 in Croatia. So there were weapons all over Bosnia, but I was not
21 discussing this that somebody was coming from Belgrade, from Podgorica and
22 I don't know where else. The central point here is that Mr. Izetbegovic
23 is trying to establish his own army through the reserve police, and I
24 said, okay, calmly, let's take it easy. That's the point. Bosnia was
25 full of weapons because volunteers came from Croatia, wherever. I did not
1 know who had weapons and how much and who was distributing weapons to who,
2 and that's what I said. And that became so obvious in Bosnia. As soon as
3 the shooting started, everybody had weapons in Bosnia. I would be naive
4 if I were to say that I didn't know. We saw people who were marching with
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
7 A. Well, as always, we would see it only on the other side, not in
8 our own ranks, but --
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, my question to you was, as a result of that
10 conversation that you had with Dr. Karadzic, did you have a conversation
11 with Dr. Karadzic to explore the potential dangers to the Serb people that
12 Dr. Karadzic, at least, had foreseen and foreshadowed, that is the lack of
13 arms by the Bosnian Serbs?
14 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I have answered. What was discussed here were
15 reserve forces. Whether there were other conversations has nothing to do
16 with this conversation. I could have said something about what you were
17 saying now but not in connection with this conversation. This
18 conversation had to do with the reserve police, and that's what I was
19 talking about. And perhaps I was having a discussion with him about
20 something completely different that was totally unrelated.
21 Q. You said I could have had -- I could have said something about
22 that -- about what you were saying but not in connection with this
23 conversation. Okay.
24 Did you have a conversation with Dr. Karadzic in connection
25 perhaps not with this conversation but with any other conversation about
1 the Serbs not having enough weapons and needing to acquire weapons?
2 A. I don't know. I don't know. If you were to ask me now, I don't
3 know. Give me this conversation, then I'll tell you what I discussed. As
4 for everything I've said so far, it's true.
5 Q. Well, in November of 1991, you were aware, weren't you, that the
6 Serbs indeed were better armed than the other parties, potential parties,
7 to the conflict?
8 A. In November?
9 Q. In November, 1991, that's correct.
10 A. No, no. I don't know. Show me that and I'll explain it to.
11 Q. Okay. Well, let's turn to tab 125. This is an exhibit, it's the
12 plebiscite speech, it's Prosecution Exhibit 1191, and let's turn to two
13 portions of this speech, Mr. --
14 For the Trial Chamber's benefit and counsel's benefit I'm going to
15 direct Your Honours and counsel to page 5 of the English, third paragraph
16 from the bottom, and I'm going to direct Your Honour -- and Mr. Krajisnik
17 for your benefit, that is found on the page that bears the ERN number
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. About mid-page. And in this particular speech, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr.
21 Karadzic says, in the middle of that paragraph that begins with the words,
22 "There is a chance that we will fight. In that case, let the chips fall
23 where they may." In the English version, if you go down about four lines,
24 Mr. Karadzic says, "They know we are better armed."
25 Now, also --
1 A. Would you just tell me where this is exactly? I don't know. I
2 mean, you keep leaving certain sections out and I can't see it very well
3 here. Yes, yes, now I've found it.
4 Q. I'm going to direct Your Honour's attention to page 10, to the
5 last paragraph that starts with, "So that's it." If you go,
6 Mr. Krajisnik, to the second-to-last page in the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, the
7 page that bears the ERN number with the last three digits 638, and direct
8 your attention to the middle of the page. Second to the last page,
9 Mr. Krajisnik. And in this part of Mr. Karadzic's speech, he says -- I'll
10 read part of the paragraph: "The army is here. By chance, their aims and
11 our aims coincide 100 per cent. Do not leave that equipment and that army
12 on its own. Don't! That would be a disgrace. We would lose the state if
13 we lost that army. It's been a year now, you've seen it at rallies, Serbs
14 have been asking for weapons. They are asking for weapons. We did not
15 have weapons. They got some themselves, and they got themselves a lot.
16 Finally, the army -- finally, there is the army, which is three times
17 stronger. They even removed the red star. They have weapons, equipment
18 and other materiel."
19 So in November of 1991, at this particular speech, Mr. Krajisnik,
20 Dr. Karadzic is affirming that the Serbs were better armed than their
21 potential adversaries and that they had acquired lots of weapons.
22 Mr. Krajisnik, were those facts about which you were entirely
24 A. Mr. Prosecutor, these are no facts. This is a political speech.
25 It doesn't have to be incorrect necessarily, but for me to listen to this
1 today, I mean, I never would have remembered this. He is saying, well,
2 who has more weapons, and they were trying to resolve things on their own.
3 It is obviously addressed to the other side, to avert them from their
4 intentions. He is saying here we have the army, the army is armed, and so
5 on. I'm not trying to say that the Serbs were not arming themselves, but
6 I don't know about that. So what Karadzic is saying here, I mean, even if
7 I were to listen to it today, I would not take it as the truth. I would
8 take it as propaganda. I don't think that the Serbs did not have weapons,
9 but at rallies, he says Serbs were asking for weapons, and we don't have
10 them. I don't know how else I could explain this. If you think I heard
11 this, believe me, this is as if I were hearing it for the first time. And
12 I'm not saying that I was not there. I probably heard it, but it didn't
13 mean a thing to me. The war was about to start.
14 People kept saying that Muslims, Serbs, Croats, were selling, say,
15 a cow in order to buy a rifle. There was talk like that all over the
16 place. And I remember one rally, Karadzic saying we have weapons. And
17 the people say, give us weapons, and he says but our weapons are peace,
18 the truth. You have that speech. You can read it.
19 I'd really say this if I knew it. There is no reason for me not
20 to do so.
21 Q. Let's turn to tab 117, Mr. Krajisnik. This is an intercept,
22 Exhibit number P259. It's a conversation between yourself and Rajko
24 Mr. Krajisnik, this is a conversation that's been in evidence, and
25 you're familiar with the contents of this intercept, Mr. Krajisnik?
1 A. Yes. I've read this, just as the previous conversation. It had
2 been produced here before. That's why I know about it.
3 Q. Mr. Dukic is the man who Mr. Deronjic identified as the person who
4 was -- who informed he and Mr. Zekic to arm their municipalities on April
5 or May of 1991. I would like you -- Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to read part
6 of this intercept to you, and I'm referring, Your Honour, to the second
7 page of the intercept, starting --
8 MR. JOSSE: I appreciate this has been exhibited. Can my learned
9 friend help us to the date the Prosecution alleged this conversation took
11 MR. HARMON: Well, I was going to ask Mr. Krajisnik that question
12 because this is undated.
13 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
14 MR. HARMON:
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, after looking at this interview, when do you
16 believe this conversation took place?
17 A. I really don't know, although I would like to answer. I saw it
18 here when you produced it. But it must be from 1991, the end of 1991,
19 when there was this problem with the MUP.
20 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, this conversation, Mr. Dukic is
21 quite upset, as you can see, and Mr. Dukic says, and I'm reading,
22 Mr. Krajisnik, starting at the fourth box from the bottom of the second
23 page, fourth box of Mr. Dukic. He says: "No, my man, they should be
24 told, if you want to, to work like human beings. If you don't want to,
25 let us go our separate ways so we know what belongs to whom in the
1 republic. Why would I, I live in the bigger fear that when I was born, my
3 You answer: "I agree."
4 Dukic: "My head is all under pressure, my man."
5 You answer: "Earlier, earlier a bit, so we can have coffee."
6 Now if you would be so kind, Mr. Krajisnik, as to read slowly in
7 your language the response of Mr. Dukic to that, I would appreciate it,
8 because I think there is a -- may be a potential translation error here.
9 Would you kindly read that box in your language, very slowly, starting
10 with "Od ..."
11 A. "From mujahedins," or F word, "I ordered a thousand automatic
12 weapons, my man. I will officially purchase them through the company.
13 Fucking motherfuckers -" I apologise for this - "I will set up barricades
14 there in seven days." "I apologise for this" was -- were my words.
15 Q. Then, okay. So Your Honours I do believe there is a translation
16 error and we will -- we have a new translation for that but I can
17 distribute that if the Court wishes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps that's a good idea.
19 MR. HARMON:
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in this particular intercept, Mr. Dukic has
21 informed you that he ordered a thousand automatic rifles and he was going
22 to get them officially for the company. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you don't
23 seem at all surprised by your answer to that -- by that statement by
24 Mr. Dukic. And you were directly informed that thousand automatic weapons
25 were to be acquired by Mr. Dukic. Can you comment on that, please?
1 A. Gladly. First of all, Mr. Dukic is very frustrated here because
2 he's unable to complete the job that had been agreed with the Muslims
3 concerning appointments in the MUP, and I'm trying to calm him down, to
4 tell him that we should sit down together and have a coffee with him to
5 persuade him not to do anything in that state of frustration. And he is
6 saying, I've never been more afraid in my life. And he's afraid because
7 he sees what the Muslims are doing; they are setting up barricades,
8 whereas he's not allowed to set up barricades.
9 Now, this last sentence that I just read out, Mr. Dukic says, I'll
10 tell them, I'll purchase automatic weapons publicly for the company. Even
11 after the war, Mr. Dukic had, in the bauxite plant, a so-called internal
12 guard, internal security, and they really did have weapons, automatic
13 weapons in that company. He's not referring to distributing arms to
14 people, he's just saying out of frustration that I'm going to do that and
15 we are going to hand them out. The consequence of what he's suggesting is
16 not that he's going to distribute weapons but that he is unable to carry
17 through this -- these appointments, because they were not letting him do
18 that although it had been agreed. He had a security detail in the mine,
19 and even after the war there were some objections and criticism that maybe
20 it wasn't legal. Not an enormous amount but maybe a thousand.
21 THE INTERPRETER: It was not a thousand. Interpreter's
22 correction: It was not a thousand or anything like that. It was 200 to
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, when Mr. Krajisnik reflects what has been
25 said, he says, "I will purchase automatic weapons publicly for the
1 company", whereas the transcript reads that he -- he ordered, which means
2 that it has happened already, whereas the other language suggests that
3 it's still to be done. I've got no idea whether there could be any doubt
4 as to what was said, so therefore the parties are invited, since
5 Mr. Krajisnik -- it might not be a matter of translation but it might be a
6 matter of hearing what has been said. Of course, the translation we could
7 easily check that by putting on the ELMO the relevant line and ask the
8 interpreters what it says.
9 Could we perhaps have the B/C/S original on the ELMO, and could we
10 invite the interpreters, looking at the text in the third box from the
11 bottom of the second page -- let me just check whether we have it. Yes,
12 could the interpreters tell us where the three lines spoken by Mr. Rajko
13 Dukic, whether it indicates that he will or that he -- he will order or he
14 will purchase or that he ordered or did purchase?
15 THE INTERPRETER: The second sentence reads, "I have -- I have
16 ordered a thousand pieces of automatic weapons, man."
17 The third sentence reads, "I will officially purchase them or
18 obtain them into the company."
19 JUDGE ORIE: I see. Then, of course, there is still a possibility
20 that by listening to this audio recording, some mistake has been made.
21 Mr. Josse, if there is any reason to believe this is wrong, I take
22 it you'll check that on the basis of the CD on which this appears. It's
23 just raising the issue, not because I have any reason to believe that it's
24 wrongly understood but I noticed that Mr. Krajisnik, who as a matter of
25 fact only read the text at this moment, he did not hear it, gave a
1 different interpretation of what was said, which now turns out, at least,
2 not to be in accordance with the B/C/S version of this document.
3 MR. JOSSE: We'll try and scrutinise the audio file, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: At least if you consider this to be useful.
5 Then another matter is that -- for the registrar, that the -- what
6 is it P259, the translation should be replaced by the improved
7 translation, the new one, and the old one to be removed.
8 Mr. Harmon.
9 MR. HARMON:
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did you have a conversation with Mr. Dukic
11 afterwards, after this conversation, to follow up on what Mr. -- what
12 Mr. Dukic had said?
13 A. I don't know that I did, and I didn't understand this as a serious
14 threat either. I understood this as a speech by a frustrated man. If I
15 failed to explain something, I would like to explain it. I just don't
16 understand where the misunderstanding lies.
17 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I have concluded for the day. I think
18 it's --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I have one additional question: Mr. Krajisnik,
20 do you happen to know -- let me just -- the security personnel of the
21 bauxite company Mr. Dukic was in charge of, do you happen to know how many
22 men, approximately, were in these security personnel?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I know that he had some security
1 personnel after the war, and that there was some sort of problem.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, you also told us that -- and that was --
3 we read it from a correction of the interpreters, that you said it was not
4 an enormous amount but -- it was not a thousand or anything like that, it
5 was 200 to 300. What's the source of the knowledge that it was 200 to
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know because when I was a member
8 of the Presidency, we had problems there, and I know that he had his own
9 security service, security detail, politically. I don't know which year
10 it was, '87 or something. I just named a number off the cuff. And I know
11 the MUP intervened at that point. It was something that happened in '87
12 -- '97, sorry.
13 JUDGE ORIE: So when you were referring to the number, you were
14 referring to the strength of the security personnel in the bauxite mine?
15 Is that a correct understanding, as you learned about it in a later stage?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Later on, I found out, there were
17 political rifts in Republika Srpska. The police went there and ran into
18 this security detail of the mine. There was some sort of respectable
19 group there. I don't know how many.
20 But, please, it's very important, there is a very important word
21 that he said. He said, "I'll purchase officially." He didn't say
22 "legally [as interpreted]." He will officially purchase a certain number
23 of automatic weapons. That's how I understand it now. Not then.
24 JUDGE ORIE: My question was whether you were talking about 200 or
25 200 to 300, were you talking about men employed in the security services
1 of the bauxite mine or were you talking about a number of -- an amount of
2 weapons? That was my question.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was just saying any
4 number. Not a thousand, but it -- I was saying it off the cuff. It could
5 have been 200, 300. I don't know the number.
6 JUDGE ORIE: My question is, is the number about men or is the
7 number about weapons?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Men with weapons. That's what it
9 could be.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I was asking what you were referring to. You
11 said it was not a thousand, it was 200 or 300, and I do understand that
12 you had no precise knowledge, but were you talking about armed men of that
13 service and are you then referring to what you learned later on, well,
14 let's say after 1995?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found out later, and I assumed
16 that that could have been the number of the security detail.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Let me then try to tell you how I now understand,
18 after these additional questions, what I understand your testimony to be:
19 That since you learned, well, let's say, after 1995, about the number of
20 armed men being in the security department of the bauxite company, that
21 from that, you make an inference that when he said at an earlier stage
22 that he had ordered weapons and where he used the number a thousand, that
23 it could not be correct because your knowledge goes as far as 200 to 300
24 armed men in the company only.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I spoke about a thousand
1 automatic weapons, I said that the reason he could have had for ordering
2 weapons was this security service, the security detail, but I don't
3 believe that there were 1.000 men. There were less on that security
4 detail; 200 or 300. I only later learned about it. How many people he
5 employed in that service during the war, I don't know. And whether there
6 were a thousand of them, I don't know.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for these answers.
8 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, one correction. Page 80, line 16, the
9 transcript reads, "He didn't say 'legally,'" I am told Mr. Krajisnik said
11 JUDGE ORIE: Just check, one second. Yes. That's how I
12 understood the answer. Otherwise, it doesn't make much of a logic.
13 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Mr. Krajisnik was nodding.
14 JUDGE ORIE: "Officially." He didn't say "illegally" but, on the
15 contrary, "officially." Yes, that's how I understood the answer.
16 MR. JOSSE: Yes. I thought that was quite important, that's why I
17 made the observation.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for this correction, Mr. Josse.
19 Mr. Krajisnik, I instruct you not to speak with anyone about your
20 testimony already given or still to be given, and we will adjourn until
21 tomorrow, quarter past 2.00, in this same courtroom.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.07 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 7th day of June,
24 2006, at 2.15 p.m.