1 Friday, 9 June 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.29 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon. Yes, the symmetry is a bit lost
6 here. Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. A few procedural matters
10 first. Mr. Stewart, I was informed that you'd need two minutes to address
11 the Chamber for a procedural matter.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, please, Your Honour. If Your Honour can see us
13 all the way over here. Your Honour, it was only this. I'll say it
14 discreetly, Your Honour, and not ask to go into private session but
15 reminding Mr. Krajisnik and everybody that we -- anonymity is required in
16 relation to these issues. Your Honour, we just wish to inquire what the
17 position is in relation to the transcript which, it was indicated the
18 other day, would be on its way of a recording of interviews in relation to
19 one of the prospective Chamber's witnesses, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I had on my list to go into private session and
21 tell you something about. It perhaps we could do that right away.
22 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, indeed, certainly, thank you.
23 [Private session]
11 Page 25462 redacted. Private session.
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 Next issue, the Defence has asked the Bench for the reasons that
15 the Trial Chamber had requested the photographic material on the
16 destruction in municipalities and in this respect the Chamber refers to
17 the -- the Defence to the Chamber's statement on the 8th of March in which
18 the Chamber requested the parties to submit material on indictment and
19 non-indictment municipalities. In this statement, the Trial Chamber
20 reasons for requesting the material were explained in quite some detail so
21 therefore it's not entirely clear what the Defence seeks at this moment.
22 If there are any specific questions which would go beyond the explanation
23 in quite some detail already given, then we would like to hear from you.
24 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then, another matter is we yesterday briefly said
1 something or at least there was some discussion about medication,
2 specifically in relation to the dentist's treatment Mr. Krajisnik
3 undergoes at this moment. We have no further details in that.
4 Mr. Krajisnik, we did understand that you approved information
5 about medication prescribed to you was given and therefore, the Chamber is
6 by now informed, I would say, on the regular medicaments Mr. Krajisnik
7 receives. That is available to the Defence as well, Mr. Josse and
8 Mr. Stewart, if you would like to receive that information about the -- I
9 would say the medication which is prescribed to be taken in the evenings,
10 from what I understand. Then it will be e-mailed to you.
11 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour, yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Since Mr. Krajisnik has given his consent, we do not
13 know exactly what -- whether it is medication at all to -- which was put
14 in place by the dentist. We have no further information on that yet
15 because it's of course not directly given by the detention unit. If you
16 want to pursue that matter, Mr. Josse, then since Mr. Krajisnik has given
17 his consent, you are of course free to further explore that matter.
18 MR. JOSSE: Again, thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then finally, we were informed that you,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, would like to add something to what you said yesterday in
21 relation to the 19th session of the Presidency, 13th of July, 1992,
22 especially in relation to agenda item -- yes. Since -- let me just have a
23 look. One second, please. You'd like to add something to item 2 of the
24 minutes of the Presidency session 19th, Presidency session 13th of July
25 1992. Mr. Krajisnik, before I invite to you do so, I remind you that
1 you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning
2 of your testimony, and I'll give you an opportunity to add whatever you'd
3 like to add in this respect.
4 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I only wanted to point out to the
7 Trial Chamber, the Defence, and the Office of the Prosecutor, in fact, to
8 corroborate my assertion that the problem of shelling was on our agenda
9 more than once, and this is one example, the 13th of July. How the
10 civilian authorities in the presence of General Mladic and General Gvero
11 reacted. Let me read this.
12 Second paragraph, AD 2: "There have been proposals to appoint
13 observers and monitors by civilian authorities, who would, together with
14 UNPROFOR observers, oversee the use of the artillery. At the proposal of
15 General Mladic, it was agreed that this oversight of the use of artillery
16 be performed exclusively by the army pursuant to an order from a
17 commander, to be issued by the competent commander." This is a
18 confirmation of what I said, that our military always told us that they
19 were only acting in defence, that they never attacked, and we in the
20 Presidency wanted to place civilian representatives, observers, who could
21 verify that explanation, and see if in fact the other side was responsible
22 for the beginning of all attacks.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's a very free interpretation of this text,
24 Mr. Krajisnik, but I do understand that it's your interpretation at this
1 Mr. Tieger, are you ready to continue?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, I also provided a CD
3 yesterday with a two and a half minute -- with a two and a half minute
4 statement by MacKenzie.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I invited the parties to locate any MacKenzie
6 statements. I now do understand that Mr. Krajisnik has provided us
7 electronic material which I first, as usual, give to the parties to see
8 whether they think it useful to tender it. At the same time, I think I
9 showed some interest in finding that material yesterday. So --
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I say on the MacKenzie matter, I
11 looked at it. There are quite a number of video files. I really need
12 Mr. Krajisnik's help in pointing us to which one. First of all, I don't
13 know what General MacKenzie looks like.
14 JUDGE ORIE: But he now gives, at least that's the MacKenzie
15 statement, I take it, he referred to yesterday. You have it now on the CD
16 so you can --
17 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I'm confused. I thought it was
18 on -- may I clarify, I though it was yesterday's CD. I therefore --
19 that's what I understood and I looked through yesterday's CD. I'm not
20 clear whether we have been given a new CD.
21 JUDGE ORIE: It happened when you were speaking, Mr. Stewart.
22 MR. STEWART: Well, I saw that Your Honour but I still don't know
23 whether it's the same CD that's come back.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No. It's -- this is -- from what I decipher from the
25 Cyrillic this is MacKenzie material.
1 MR. STEWART: Well, that's --
2 JUDGE ORIE: I think it says two and a half minutes, I think it
3 says two minutes 25 -- no, yes, 2, 25 minutes.
4 MR. STEWART: That's fine, Your Honour, I was told it was on
5 yesterday's CD, spent ages looking on yesterday's CD and didn't find it.
6 But it's all right, never mind, now we've got it.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
8 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Tieger.
13 Q. At the end of yesterday's proceeding, we took a look at a number
14 of intercepts in connection with your assertion that your contact with
15 those individuals and your awareness of what was happening in Sarajevo in
16 that connection was on a personal basis. I'd like to look at a few other
17 examples relatively briefly, given the time, of what was happening in
18 Sarajevo, your awareness of it, and your involvement in it. First, I'd
19 like to turn to tab 170.
20 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this is P64, P65, tab 128, P529, tab 49.
21 Q. It's an excerpt from the 50th session of the RS national assembly
22 held on 15 and 16 April, 1995, which you chaired, Mr. Krajisnik, and if we
23 turn to page -- first 303 to see who is speaking that's Mr. Tintor, about
24 whom we've heard before, and in your version, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Tintor
25 begins at 00846040 and the portions to which I'll be directing your
1 attention appear in the middle of the first paragraph at 6041, and the
2 first part of the second paragraph of that page. And here, Mr. Tintor
3 describes events at the beginning of the conflict, saying, "I went from
4 municipality to municipality and created military formations on order from
5 my president and this is true. Here are people who know this to be truth
6 and have papers to prove it. We created brigade commanders down to
7 platoon commanders. All this was done by SDS for the good of the Serbian
8 people and all this we did as best we could."
9 Again, here, Mr. Tintor, as you can see from the next sentence,
10 "However the time of war came" --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, 303? Where does that --
12 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. 303 was where Mr. -- I apologise for
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tintor starts speaking.
15 MR. TIEGER: The portion to which I was referring was in the
16 middle of the first paragraph at 304.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. And here Mr. Tintor indicates by the next sentence, "However the
20 time of war came," so he was indicating his activities prior to the
21 outbreak of the conflict and then in the -- at the beginning of the next
22 paragraph, he describes what happened. "We took the territory of six
23 municipalities, parts of six municipalities. Gentlemen, I did not have
24 two minutes of military education but I knew very well what was to be
25 done. I was not a soldier, then, General, I was only a man who at that
1 moment believed that he should lead his people. Because, as a politician,
2 having opted for politics, I have accepted to lead my people."
3 Mr. Krajisnik, you were aware, prior to the outbreak of the
4 conflict, and then after the beginning of the conflict, of the efforts by
5 Mr. Tintor and other local SDS leaders to create military formations and
6 then with those formations take the territory of various municipalities
7 within Sarajevo; is that correct?
8 A. No. I didn't know. Those six municipalities that are referred to
9 here were our municipalities on the outskirts of Sarajevo, so he wasn't
10 taking them.
11 Q. Well, he'd be referring to Vogosca as well, wouldn't he, his
13 A. Yes. Part of Vogosca, part of Ilijas, part of Rajlovac, part of
14 Ilidza, part of Hadzici, those are the municipalities he probably had in
15 mind, the suburbs where Serbs lived.
16 Q. And you had contact with Mr. Tintor in connection with SDS and
17 then RS matters before the war and after the outbreak of the conflict,
19 A. I did meet with him a couple of times and on one occasion he even
20 called me when he was experiencing some problems. You have some of those
21 intercepts here. But on this particular issue, I had no contact with him
22 whatsoever. I wasn't aware he was doing it. In fact I can explain why he
23 said what he said at this assembly session.
24 Q. Did he tell you what he said? Why he said what he said at the
25 assembly session?
1 A. No. He didn't. But I know why he said it. I mean, I know how
2 this assembly session went, and why his contribution sounded like this and
3 why the entire assembly session proceeded the way it did.
4 Q. Let me get this straight. Are you saying what Mr. Tintor is
5 saying is not true and you want to explain why he said something that was
6 not true, or are you just explaining to me why he said something that was
8 A. I don't know whether it's accurate. I'm only saying that I know
9 why he was saying this, and he was at least exaggerating. I don't know
10 whether there was any truth in this. But why he said it is a different
12 Q. Okay. Let's just break that down slightly because I don't want to
13 dwell too long on that. You say he was exaggerating that military
14 formations were created or not?
15 A. Well, if he was doing that, then he wasn't doing it very
16 successfully because there was chaos all around, armed citizens, but
17 whether he was doing that before the war, I really don't know.
18 Q. Well, let's move, can we, to tab 165?
19 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, tab 165 is P529 tab 223. It's a
20 transcript of an interview with Mr. Tintor in July or August 1994.
21 Q. Now, that was referred to earlier, Mr. Krajisnik. That was the
22 interview when Mr. Tintor spoke about the mock wedding party by which he
23 was able to smuggle in weapons. If I could ask you to turn to page 7 of
24 the English, which would be at your page 00255238 through 39, I believe.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And Mr. Djogo asks him, and then you were president of the Crisis
2 Staff Vogosca and Mr. Tintor responds "Yes, I was the commander of the
3 Crisis Staff that was superior to the military and civil authorities --
4 A. Just a moment, let me find the passage. I can't see it. On 239
5 there is just Tintor speaking, no Djogo.
6 Q. 238, Mr. Krajisnik, toward the bottom of the first quarter of the
8 A. Okay. Yes. It's in the first half. You were president of the
9 Crisis Staff.
10 Q. Correct. I took the job very seriously and understood what had to
11 be done at that time because you know that the war in Sarajevo started on
12 the 6th of April. We grappled with our guns, people received their
13 specific tasks, and of course I went along with my people with my units
14 there where the Serbian territory is to defend it and to establish the
15 absolute peace and the authority on our territory.
16 And if you'll look next at what would be the bottom of page 7 and
17 moving down on to page 5238 and then 39 in your version, Mr. Krajisnik,
18 Mr. Tintor begins by explaining the size of the front line that he held.
19 It wasn't only Vogosca and then he continues by explaining the length of
20 that front line. That's on -- at the top of page 8. And then continuing
21 in that first long paragraph on page 8 in the English and as that moves on
22 to page 5239 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Tintor explains, we came
23 to Zuc and we conquered that very important strategic point and we
24 connected to Pofalici. However once I officially asked from Pofalici
25 representatives to come for a discussion, they came a few times and one
1 time I said they should come up, et cetera. After that I issued the order
2 twice that they have to retreat so that we can make an action and go down
3 to the city, because I was informed, I was present at meeting in Vraca
4 where Mr. Kukanjac was supposed to be present too. I wasn't so lucky to
5 meet him that time but I met our --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's apologies, we cannot find it in
7 B/C/S version. Can you please indicate exactly where it is, thank you.
8 MR. TIEGER: 5239, beginning at the -- this portion is toward the
9 bottom of the page and moving now it's probably at the top of 5240. Does
10 that help?
11 I'll start over again, I was present at a meeting in Vrace, which
12 would be at the top of 5240.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, thank you very much.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Okay, where Mr. Kukanjac was supposed to be present too. I wasn't
16 so lucky to meet him that time but I met our president, General Subotic,
17 President Karadzic, President Krajisnik, Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic.
18 On that meeting we spoke about getting together to cut the city in two
19 and, well, to enter the city. Using that bridge, the former Bratska i
20 jedinstva. And Djogo says, the bridge of Serbian warriors. And then
21 Tintor continues: The -- the bridge of Serbian warriors to connect using
22 that bridge and go up towards Vrbanja bridge. Of course I had an order --
23 well, actually it was just an agreement to take the military hospital as
24 well and to connect that way also. I was given those instructions and
25 they told me, You go to Zuc and wait for the command, connect with
1 Pofalici and when you receive the order, Mr. Kukanjac will give the
2 order. Then you will go down and cut the city in two. In that way we'll
3 establish contact with both the Serbian sides. And he continues that, And
4 I personally believe that if we did it then, the war would stop right
5 away, Sarajevo would be divided in two enclaves, and there would be
6 nothing Muslims could do. They would have to agree to peace.
7 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, do you recall that particular event
8 at Vraca at which Mr. Kukanjac was supposed to be present but was not and
9 the subject of discussion was cutting the city in two in the manner
10 described by Mr. Tintor?
11 A. I don't recall that there was a meeting without Kukanjac present.
12 However, there was a meeting attended by Kukanjac where people presented
13 such ideas. I don't know whether Tintor was among them. Kukanjac clearly
14 said on that occasion that this is complete rubbish and nonsense and he
15 rejected it. As for a meeting to which Kukanjac didn't come, at which
16 this would have been discussed, I don't recall any such thing. I remember
17 a meeting, I don't know if it was at Vraca where the general situation in
18 Sarajevo was discussed, and war had already begun by that time. I don't
19 remember Tintor and I don't remember anybody telling him go there and wait
20 for orders because he seems to be saying that such an order would have to
21 be issued by Kukanjac, who did not attend the meeting. I think this is
22 something that he actually made up. I don't know for what purpose.
23 Q. You were a guest on Mr. Djogo's show and you know the extent of
24 the broadcast audience. Did you watch this particular interview,
25 Mr. Krajisnik?
1 A. No. I didn't watch my own appearances or any -- anyone else's. I
2 had too much work to do to watch any TV shows, even if they featured my
3 interviews. It was seen certainly in Sarajevo and Pale, although their
4 range wasn't very far. It lasted until the -- 1994, I think.
5 Q. Let's talk more generally, then, about the broader subject matter
6 of Mr. Tintor's comments, and that is military operations by Serb --
7 Bosnian Serb forces within Sarajevo to take territory -- well, precisely
9 A. As he describes it, the Serbs in Sarajevo did not take anything
10 that was not Serbian. He mentions Zuc. A witness told you that half of
11 Zuc is Serbian and half is Muslim. Later on, they took all of Zuc and
12 expelled the Serbs. In 1994 Zuc was in the hands of the Muslims, I
13 believe, as my own Zabrdje was. It was in Muslim hands. But here he
14 boasts about what happened in 1992. Maybe that's how it was. I don't
15 know. No, it's not that I don't know but I don't know what made him say
16 that, because at that point in time Zuc was in Muslim hands. That's in
17 1994. You saw that I said that half of Zabrdje had been taken. They went
18 down through Smiljevici and took half of Zabrdje and Zuc, and now he's
19 saying that he took Zuc. A lady witness told you about that, if you
20 remember, who testified in these proceedings.
21 Q. Well, let's look at some contemporaneous accounts of what was
22 happening in Sarajevo?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would like to put a question.
24 MR. TIEGER: Sorry.
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
1 Mr. Krajisnik, at the beginning of Mr. Tintor's intervention, if you don't
2 mind having a look, he says, and this is what the Prosecutor read for
3 us, [In English] "I was a commander of the Crisis Staff that was superior
4 to the military and civil authorities at the time." [Interpretation] What
5 do you think about this statement?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise. What page is it on,
7 Your Honour?
8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know about your
9 B/C/S version, but it is the beginning of Mr. Jovan Tintor's speech at 20
10 hours 07.
11 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I think the problem is that there are
13 no times in the B/C/S.
14 MR. TIEGER: It's -- sorry, Your Honour, I think it's not hard to
15 find it. It's 5238, at the --
16 JUDGE ORIE: You find that one third from the top of the page
17 where it says --
18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [No interpretation]
19 MR. TIEGER: I didn't get any translation so --
20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [No interpretation]
21 THE INTERPRETER: It's a section that you -- it's a passage that
22 you have read, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Precisely the section to which I directed his
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [No interpretation].
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, that. Well --
2 MR. JOSSE: I'm sorry, I'm going to interrupt, because what's
3 happened is, Your Honour's comment in French was translated into B/C/S but
4 not into English. Mr. Sladojevic has just confirmed that. So perhaps it
5 could be translated into English.
6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, I'm very sorry.
7 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... was said, and I
8 follow both French and English, was that Judge Hanoteau and Mr. Tieger
9 tried to find the place and I think as a matter of fact in the second
10 round it was translated when Mr. Tieger said, "that's the passage I
11 directed his attention to," because that was what Judge Hanoteau asked for
12 in the transcript two lines above that, where it says "[interpretation]
13 [no interpretation]." The only thing they are trying to do is to locate
14 and finally the result was that Mr. -- Judge Hanoteau was asking for a
15 comment on the line which starts in B/C/S with [B/C/S spoken]. That's the
16 portion, and that's exactly the same place where Mr. Tieger started
17 reading earlier.
18 MR. JOSSE: My apologies if I have confused the situation.
19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, could you please
20 answer the question, please?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have found it, Your Honour. He
22 says here that military and -- the military and the civilian authorities
23 were subordinate to the Crisis Staff. And that is completely incorrect.
24 The Crisis Staff was a civilian body. It was an ad hoc body. The army
25 was separate. The municipality separate. And the executive council
1 separate. The army did not report to the Crisis Staff. He speaks here
2 about the armed people. Maybe that's what he was referring to. Maybe
3 that's how it was at his place.
4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, this is a theoretical
5 answer, but what Mr. Tintor says is -- in fact, what he's saying is that
6 on the field, in some cases, maybe, the Crisis Staff was superior to the
7 military and civil authorities.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If that's how it was, then you are
9 right. But I don't know that that's how it was, and it shouldn't have
10 been like that. However, if it was like that, then you are right, the
11 Crisis Staff would be at the top and everything else would be below it.
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, I have one question to
14 Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Krajisnik, you said when you commented on what Mr.
15 Tintor said he had taken as territory, is that this was also in Vogosca
16 but only I think you said what was Serb villages or at least places -- let
17 me just find your exact words. Yes. "He probably had in mind the suburbs
18 where Serbs lived," and now, we heard some evidence, for example, on the
19 village of Ahatovici, which was part of Vogosca municipality, if I
20 remember well, which according to that evidence, was militarily taken by
21 Serbs, and I got the impression from that testimony that it was a
22 Muslim-inhabited village. Could you comment on the specific situation in
23 Ahatovici in light of the evidence presented and compare it with what your
24 testimony was that it was only suburbs where Serbs lived were taken?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I probably have to speak slowly.
1 Mr. Tintor did not take any, because here we are talking about six
2 municipalities, not settlements or villages. I said I didn't know what
3 municipalities he was referring to, and I started enumerating, Ilijas and
4 so on. I don't know what other municipality he could have meant. But all
5 that is in the Serbian part of Sarajevo, to the north, whereas awe
6 Ahatovici was an almost 100 per cent Muslim inhabited village and it's far
7 away from Vogosca. I know for a fact that Mr. Tintor was --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Let's look at what was said, what was asked of you,
9 Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Tieger asked you whether you were aware prior to the
10 outbreak of the conflict of the efforts by Mr. Tintor and other local SDS
11 leaders to create military formation, and then with those formations take
12 the territory of various municipalities within Sarajevo. And he mentioned
13 six. Then your answer was, No, I didn't know. Those six municipalities
14 that are referred to here were our municipalities on the outskirts of
15 Sarajevo, so he wasn't taking them. And then Mr. Tieger asked, he said,
16 well, it would be referring to Vogosca as well, wouldn't he, his
17 municipality? And then you said yes, part of Vogosca, part of Ilijas,
18 part of Rajlovac, part of Hadzici, those are the -- and then it's, the
19 transcript is not quite clear but those are the so and so, he probably had
20 in mind, the suburbs where Serbs lived. So you're talking about parts of
21 municipalities where Serbs lived, including Vogosca, taken by Mr. Tintor,
22 or at least by the formations Mr. Tintor tells us about, and you said they
23 were not really taken because they were Serb anyhow. Now I'm asking you,
24 Ahatovici, which, as you just also said, was a mainly Muslim-inhabited
25 village within the Vogosca municipality and nevertheless we heard evidence
1 that this was taken by Serbs, which would, to some extent, contradict what
2 you -- how you just interpreted Mr. Tintor's words. That is, that only
3 Serb-inhabited portions of the municipalities mentioned, including
4 Vogosca, were militarily taken. Could you please comment on that?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Will you please allow me a minute to
6 finish and I will explain exactly what I said and what is written here.
7 Mr. Tieger asked me whether I was aware that Mr. Tintor had formed
8 units and taken areas. My answer was no.
9 When he mentions six municipalities here, I said he didn't take a
10 single municipality.
11 When he enumerates the municipalities, I started enumerating all
12 the municipalities that exist there in the vicinity. Ahatovici, a part of
13 Novi Grad in the Rajlovac municipality, not in Vogosca, and it has nothing
14 to do with Vogosca, which is why I tried to explain that I don't know what
15 Tintor was doing. I don't know what he was doing at all. If he was
16 boasting about having taken six municipalities, I started enumerating
17 those he meant and those were municipalities that had Serb majority parts.
18 I don't know about anything taken by the Serbs except half of Vogosca. He
19 didn't take part in Ilijas or Rajlovac or anywhere, and he's talking about
20 six municipalities here. Ahatovici is in Rajlovac.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I might have mistaken there, although from what
22 I remember not very far from Vogosca. But it could well be that it's in
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Over the hill. Just over
25 the hill. Yes, you're right.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And you said he didn't take part in Ilijas and
2 Rajlovac. What's the basis of the knowledge for where he took part in --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I listened to others
4 boasting about taking their municipalities, about defending them. When I
5 was talking to the president of the municipality of Ilijas, everybody was
6 defending his own municipality and nobody mentioned Tintor at all, which
7 is why I think he was only in Vogosca.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, it was you who said in your testimony
9 that it was -- part of Ilijas was included. But let's continue.
10 Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: In connection with that, if we could turn to page 12
12 of the English, page 00255243 of the B/C/S of the interview.
13 A. The same?
14 Q. 5243, Mr. Krajisnik, right in the middle.
15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that would be at the very top of page
16 12 in the English.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I found it.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Here again, we see Mr. Tintor speaking and he mentions in so far
20 as I can see, six municipalities, Vogosca, Rajlovac, my Ilidza, my
21 Hadzici, my Novi Grad, my Novo Sarajevo. Just a coincidence,
22 Mr. Krajisnik, or the municipalities to which you think he may have been
23 referring at the 50th assembly session?
24 A. As far as I know, it was here that he mentioned six
25 municipalities, not there. It's possible. I don't know. I don't know.
1 I don't know whether he participated. All I know is that he was in
3 Q. All right. Let's see if we can look at some contemporaneous
4 accounts, Mr. Krajisnik, to see if that brings additional clarity to the
5 situation. In that connection, I'd like to turn to tab 177. Telephone
6 conversation between Mr. Momcilo Mandic and Brano Kvesic.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this is P67 tab 31 and P9 -- 292, KID
8 31272. This conversation took place on the 5th of May 1992. And if we
9 could turn first to page 4 of the English, the bottom third of the page,
10 and for you, Mr. Krajisnik, that would be page 0322-0109, Mr. Kvesic
11 beginning, so you are right there in Pale, are you?
12 Mandic: Well, we are not. We came down to the city.
13 Kvesic: Yes, yes.
14 Mandic: We came down and cleaned Grbavica.
15 Kvesic: Is that so?
16 Mandic: There we hold Ilidza, Dobrinja, and Nedzarici, all the
17 way to student campus and so on.
18 Then if we can turn to page 8 of the English, and for you,
19 Mr. Krajisnik, that's 0113, now we -- and Mr. Stojic is on the line
20 speaking with Mr. Mandic. Please tell me I have heard they're fucking
21 pushing, you know?
22 Mandic: But of course. They pushed us all the way to Skenderija.
23 Stojic: To Skenderija, laughing.
24 Mandic: They pushed us all the way to Skenderija.
25 Stojic: Listen, is there any way to resolve this peacefully?
1 Mandic: What?
2 Stojic: Well, this is Sarajevo.
3 Mandic: Only when they give up everything from Skenderija and
4 around there. Then we will accept and leave for them everything from the
5 eternal flame and all the way up.
6 Stojic: But they are left with nothing, then.
7 Mandic: Fuck them. They didn't want to do it nicely through
8 negotiations. Well, now they will get nothing.
9 And on the page over, page 9 of the English, and the subsequent
10 page for you as well, Mr. Krajisnik. Actually it would be 0115 in your
11 version, I think.
12 Stojic: What else is going on?
13 Mandic: Nothing special. We ocistiti, cleansed or mopped up,
14 Novo Sarajevo. We've taken everything. We have taken Ilidza, we have
15 taken Dobrinja, and our cistimo, everything is ours around it. Nedzarici
16 we have taken the student compound, Lukavica, Rajlovac is ours, Vogosca is
17 ours, Ilijas is ours, so is a part of Hadzici.
18 Stojic: Geez, you are dividing it up for real.
19 Mandic: Huh?
20 Stojic: You're dividing it up for real. You motherfuckers.
21 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, that exchange between Mr. Mandic, Mr. Kvesic,
22 and Mr. Stojic is a reflection of what was happening in Sarajevo at the
23 time through the efforts of Bosnian Serb forces such as the police, the
24 forces under the direction of Crisis Staff commanders such as Mr. Tintor,
25 and other forces under the control of the Bosnian Serbs.
1 A. This is not correct. This is only a humorous conversation between
2 former colleagues from the MUP. There is nothing here grounded in fact.
3 They were just bragging. And Mr. Mandic says this here, if you recall.
4 He said it here when he was a witness. I think he said it. I know you
5 asked him about it.
6 Q. I had the impression from your examination -- testimony during
7 examination-in-chief, Mr. Krajisnik, that you weren't very aware of what
8 was happening in Sarajevo. So what's the basis for your knowledge that
9 Mr. Mandic was inaccurate when he described what was happening in
11 A. I listened to Mr. Mandic testifying here, and he said he was just
12 joking around with his colleagues from Herzegovina, Croats who had left.
13 I know that not all of Ilidza was ours, not all of Vogosca was ours,
14 Dobrinja wasn't ours. I know that. I simply know because where the lines
15 were set in Sarajevo, that's where they remained until the end of the war.
16 In Ilidza that's where the demarcation line was. He was just bragging to
17 Stojic and the others. It's the kind of humour they use and it's actually
18 irresponsible what they were saying. And ultimately that's what he said
19 so I can't really interpret for what purpose. Everybody liberated these
20 areas, Tintor, Stanisic, Mandic, they all brag about it. They all brag
21 that they are the ones.
22 Q. Well, let's look at a few more intercepts. Next conversation
23 between Mr. Mandic and --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Could we -- could I ask one thing?
25 Mr. Krajisnik, you're using the term liberated in this respect.
1 Liberate from what exactly, at this point in time?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way the lines were set up at the
3 beginning of the war, that's how they remained until the end of the war,
4 in those parts, except for those enclaves such as Ahatovici that we
5 mentioned. But the line stayed the same from the beginning to the end of
6 the line with only minor changes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: But that's not an answer to my question. You used
8 the word "liberated." I can't really interpret for what purpose, you
9 said, everybody liberated these areas. They all brag about it. Liberate
10 from what exactly?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, yes, yes. When people
12 boast, they say, "We liberated certain areas." They don't say, "We took
13 up lines." Because you don't brag about standing there and defending your
14 house but about liberating something. So one person said he liberated six
15 municipalities, another said he liberated five. And a third said he
16 liberated another number. And so it went on.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that had got nothing to do with
18 liberating? It was just establishing lines? Is that how I have to
19 understand your testimony?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He's telling his colleague about how
21 he liberated those municipalities because he is bragging, and I told you
22 about the demarcation line.
23 JUDGE ORIE: There are two possibilities, either it is a
24 liberation, and then I'd like to know from you, from whom, of what, this
25 territory was liberated, or it was no liberation and just establishing
1 lines, and then of course the first question doesn't need any answer.
2 Which of the two is it?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't liberation. He was
4 talking about the city. He said he took a part of the city, Skenderija,
5 and other areas. He was boasting that he had taken other people's
6 territories, as far as the eternal flame, which is in the centre of town.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So establishing lines at that time had nothing
8 to do with liberation. Is that then a correct understanding?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct, yes. But he said
10 that he had taken something that was not in Serb hands.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I have one other question, again related
12 to Ahatovici. You correctly drawn my -- drew my attention to the fact
13 that Ahatovici was in Novi Grad, at a distance of approximately 1
14 kilometre from one of the neighbouring, I think it is -- one kilometre
15 approximately from Ilijas also approximately one kilometre from Ilidza and
16 three kilometres to the closest border of Vogosca. Well, that's what the
17 map tells me, consulting the maps, well, as the crow flies, but whether
18 it's one kilometre or two or three, so but that's -- we heard testimony
19 about people fleeing from Ahatovici through the woods and then later being
20 confronted with armed forces again. Do you -- are you telling us that
21 these activities in Ilijas and in Ilidza and in Vogosca, that that was
22 quite different from what happened in Novi Grad, in Ahatovici, at a very
23 short distance from those -- the borders with those neighbouring
24 municipalities? Was it unrelated or was it one type of operation which
25 would be cross border as far as municipalities were concerned, in that
1 area, that is there where Ilidza, Ilijas and Novi Grad are coming close to
2 each other?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know it looks different on the
4 map. The distance is actually much greater. As regards Ahatovici, it's a
5 completely different problem from Vogosca, Ilijas, Rajlovac, Ilidza and so
6 on. Because in these other areas, they took -- they stood on the lines of
7 their ethnic he can territories whereas Ahatovici as a Muslim village was
8 taken. That's the difference.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And, now, if that was taken, do you consider that to
10 be taken although it didn't belong to Serbs but nevertheless was taken by
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. Certainly. The ethnic
13 area was a Muslim ethnic area but Serbs took it in some sort of conflict.
14 Yes, it was part of a Serb enclave in that area but that particular
15 village was Muslim.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then you also could call it a Muslim enclave in
17 Serb territory, isn't it?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Just like Muslims took my
19 village. But it's correct that this Muslim village was an enclave within
20 Serb territory.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And you consider that to be not correct because it
22 was a Muslim village, they should have kept out?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I believe that they should
24 have found a way to leave it alone, just like Soko and Zabrdje, until the
25 end of the war, because there were always good relations there between
1 Serbs and Muslims. I don't know how the conflict started, what caused it.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. At the beginning of the conflict, Mr. Krajisnik, wasn't there a
5 decision by the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs to take Vogosca?
6 A. Not that I know of. This is the first I hear of it. Which
7 political leadership? Just let me know. If you mean --
8 Q. The Bosnian Serb political leadership.
9 A. No, no. I don't know of any such decision. In fact, I know for a
10 fact that such a decision was not taken by the leadership in my presence.
11 I don't know if anybody else took any such decision. In fact I know that
12 everybody on their own initiative decided to take whatever place they
13 lived in. Two-thirds of the territory of Vogosca remained in Muslim
14 hands. Only one-third, the urban part, was in Serb possession.
15 Q. Can we turn next then to the minutes of the third meeting of the
16 Vogosca Serbian municipal assembly held on November 14th, 1992? I think
17 that needs to be distributed.
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that is P762, tab 10.
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, and Your Honours, this was a meeting, as I
20 mentioned, on the 14th of November. Mr. Krajisnik, you attended that
21 meeting as the minutes reflect. And if we turn to page 3 of the English,
22 and page RR 041149 of the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, we see you speaking. And
23 if we look at the fifth short paragraph, you tell the deputies of the
24 Vogosca Serbian municipal assembly and the others present, "The opinion of
25 the political leadership about Vogosca is positive. In the beginning, the
1 opinion was take Vogosca because of its industry."
2 A. Could you just tell me where it is.
3 Q. Top of the page and that portion is located at the bottom of that
5 A. Yes, uh-huh. Let me just find it.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Just below the 15 days mentioned underlined, could
7 the very bottom of that page.
8 MR. JOSSE: Could my learned friend invite the witness to clarify
9 who, in fact, was speaking at this point? Bearing in mind what it says in
10 the translation.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik is there any question that it's you speaking at this
14 A. Let me just see what was said, then I'll be able to tell you
15 whether it's me or not. Maybe your translation is different because my
16 passage, if that's the passage, says postponed by 15 days or something
17 like that.
18 Q. Immediately below that, Mr. Krajisnik.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, just under that, is it?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Please go ahead.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. You told -- first of all, that is you speaking, correct?
23 A. You want me to answer? I was at that session, yes. And what's
24 the problem here? Just tell me.
25 Q. And this portion of the minutes of that session reflect your
1 remarks to the session. You begin by saying, "I wanted to come to this
2 assembly with pleasure and not to be the arbitrator. There are no Muslims
3 so one should look for an Albanian in order to prevent that Serbs quarrel
4 with each other." And then you continue, the portion I mentioned,
5 explaining to the delegates that the opinion of the political leadership
6 about Vogosca is positive. In the beginning the opinion was, take Vogosca
7 because of its industry.
8 A. No. I don't know what this man wrote here but I can tell you that
9 there was a quarrel among the leaders in Vogosca and I came to arbitrate,
10 to help them reach an understanding, and the subject of discussion was
11 Vogosca was sold and I said Vogosca was important to us because of its
12 industry. And the man here says that the political leadership had ordered
13 Vogosca to be taken, which is not true. It was just divided into two
14 halves. I remember there was a quarrel and I said to them, clearly,
15 Vogosca has not been sold, so I came to tell them what really happened at
16 the negotiations, that there was a quarrel among the political leadership.
17 The political leadership in Pale never issued such an order. They had
18 taken Vogosca before I came from Pale. When I say took it, they actually
19 put their demarcation line where they put it. All on their own
20 initiative. But the discussion was, then, whether the Serb negotiating
21 team had sold Vogosca, and I played arbitrator.
22 Q. And in the section sentence, Mr. Krajisnik, where you said, "You
23 had to enter an unequal struggle against Muslims," that was because
24 Muslim -- that was because Vogosca was a majority Muslim municipality,
25 correct? There were thousands more Muslims in Vogosca than Serbs.
1 A. No, no. It's written here, you are fighting an unequal struggle
2 with Muslims. The question was whether Vogosca had been sold. None of us
3 who are representing you will give Vogosca away. If we preserve it, it's
4 propaganda and beware of propaganda. That's what was said. I don't know
5 what was written there. Below this, Vogosca, because of its industry, it
6 says, you are fighting an unfair struggle with the Muslims because the
7 question asked was: Had Vogosca been sold?
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I indicated I wanted to move on to some
9 contemporaneous accounts of what was happening in Sarajevo and I'd like to
10 move next no a conversation?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just ask one additional question?
12 Mr. Krajisnik, only in this same portion, you are reported to have
13 said, "There are complaints about the army. SDS organised everything and
14 the army must cooperate with the party and authorities." Which gives a
15 not very much an independent role to the army but, rather, seems to give a
16 role to the party where it should assist the SDS and the authorities.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. The commander of
18 their brigade clashed with the local authorities. I know him. Mladen.
19 He used to be a civilian before the war. So I told them, you have to
20 cooperate. He wasn't a professional soldier. And I was telling them that
21 they had to cooperate because the conflict occurred between the army and
22 the civilian authorities. And I'm trying to reconcile the two sides.
23 Finally I failed, and they went their separate ways. And I'm saying
24 here -- I don't know, I mean, this is very bad handwriting. I said, we
25 were slaves in Yugoslavia, we lost a great deal.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That's not the portion I draw your attention to.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I answered you. There was a
3 conflict between the local army, the local command, and its commander, on
4 the one hand, and authorities on the other hand, and I kept telling them,
5 You have to cooperate. Because the SDS had civilian authority and the
6 commander clashed with that civilian authorities. Everybody was in
7 conflict with the others.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, it may be a minute or two early.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you're start ago new -- of course, we had
11 late start so I would not mind if you would continue for five or ten
12 minutes but if you say this is a better moment then we'll have a break
14 MR. TIEGER: If it's five or ten minutes, I can move forward.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I had indicated -- again, if we could distribute
18 this next item. It's a conversation between Mr. Mandic and Mr. Ninkovic,
19 P465, it took place on 18 June 1992. And at the beginning of the
20 conversation, we meet Radmila again, and she is connecting Mr. Mandic with
21 Serbian television and then at page 3 of the English, and page 2498 of
22 your version, Mr. Krajisnik, the fourth line down from the top, and,
23 Your Honour, at approximately the middle of page 3.
24 Mandic says: Ninkovic, we arrested, among others, a few women
1 Ninkovic: Yes.
2 Mandic: Who want to give. They would be willing and we will set
3 it up here, to give a statement against Alija Izetbegovic.
4 Ninkovic. Uh-huh.
5 Mandic: How he's pushing them towards death, this and that, so
6 send a team over here to KP Dom Butmir to film them, you know. And on the
7 next page, page 4, and it's still on page 2498 for you, Mr. Krajisnik.
8 Ninkovic: Tell me what's the situation like down there in
9 Dobrinja since you're on the line?
10 Mandic: We are cleaning up.
11 Ninkovic: Well, is it successful?
12 Mandic: What do you mean successful?
13 Ninkovic: Is it?
14 Mandic: What do you mean? How come? How can you ask such a
15 question? You really -- I don't know, Ninkovic, since you became a
16 reporter and surrounded yourself with those pussies you've lost the sense
17 of every reality.
18 Ninkovic: Is that so?
19 Mandic: I swear, how can you say that, you motherfucker, and then
20 he continues on page 5 of the English and page 2499 of the [B/C/S] The
21 Serbs are liberating and you are not managing to film it. Ninkovic: I
22 can hardly hear you Momo. And Mandic different repeats: The Serbs are
23 liberating and you're hardly managing to film it.
24 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you were -- were you aware of actions taken by
25 Bosnian Serb forces to liberate what they regarded as Bosnian Serb
1 territory within Sarajevo?
2 A. I heard this intercept here for the first time and the answer to
3 your question is no.
4 Q. You made a point earlier of explaining that what Mr. Tintor had
5 been talking about, and the extent of the territories taken by Bosnian
6 Serb forces was an exaggeration. What were -- through what sources were
7 you learning, in April, May, June, of 1992, how much territory Bosnian
8 Serb forces were taking, what actions they had engaged in, for that
9 purpose, and who was involved?
10 A. Well, at Pale, when children quarrel, then they tell each other
11 the same things that they hear from their parents. Quite simply we had
12 information concerning Sarajevo where Serb territories were, where Muslim
13 territories were, there was no secret so I knew what was what, but about
14 this I heard for the first time what Mandic said when he testified. As
15 for Ninkovic, Radmila was a secretary, but I know nothing about this
16 conversation and Mandic did explain what it was all about. I heard his
17 testimony here.
18 Q. We all heard his testimony. What he said, Mr. Krajisnik, was
19 that the Muslims were putting people on Serbs on TV who were complaining
20 about Serb actions so he wanted to reciprocate by putting some of the
21 women he was holding in Kula on television to condemn Alija Izetbegovic.
22 That's what he said, wasn't it?
23 A. I understood that he wanted to put two Muslim women on television
24 to talk against Alija Izetbegovic. He probably meant that they would be
25 saying that Alija Izetbegovic forced them to go to war or something like
1 that. It's a propaganda trick. That is not a totally fair, unless it was
2 something totally rigged, and I had heard a lot of such orchestrations
3 throughout the war from both sides, and I heard a lot of disinformation
4 deliberately placed, including against my family and myself. I do not
5 support these forms of propaganda, absolutely not.
6 Q. Well, let's not get distracted by propaganda efforts because we
7 could talk about that for a long time. The point here is that Mr. Mandic,
8 as he explains to Serbian TV is liberating territory, is cleaning up, has
9 Muslims, including women in Kula, and during this period of time he's in
10 contact with you.
11 A. Well, no. He told you here that those people were waiting outside
12 Kula to leave for Sarajevo. He said they were not prisoners, they were
13 just people outside Kula. That's what I understood him to be saying.
14 They were not kept prisoner there. They were just waiting. That's what I
15 understood him to be saying when he testified here. And he was in contact
16 with me about attempts to liberate a colleague of mine. That's the reason
17 why I talked to him, if you remember. My Muslim colleague.
18 Q. Well, before the Judges get the impression that that -- your
19 conversations with Mr. Mandic were simply about efforts to have a
20 colleague of yours released, maybe before the break, we can look quickly
21 at tab --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Before doing so, I might not have fully understood
23 you, Mr. Krajisnik. Are you -- Mr. Tieger asked you about Muslims,
24 including women in Kula, and wanted to say something on Serbian
25 television. And then in your response you said, well, no, he told you
1 that those people were waiting outside Kula to leave for Sarajevo. Which
2 makes it more difficult for me to understand what Mr. Mandic meant by, we
3 arrested, among others, few women Turks. I mean, an arrest is for me
4 different from spontaneously gathering before a prison in order to leave.
5 At least I make a distinction there. And therefore I might not have fully
6 understood your answer.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are completely right. An arrest
8 is different from waiting outside a prison. I just reminded you how
9 Mandic explained it, and I have no clue whether they were really arrested
10 or they were waiting outside Kula. But he explained that a group of them
11 were waiting outside Kula to leave for Sarajevo. I remember that passage
12 when he explained it here. And I have no idea. Maybe they were inside,
13 maybe they were outside.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I have to check whether it was exactly about the same
15 women and the group outside but we'll do that.
16 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour in fact I was going to make this very
17 point and I was going to invite my learned friend to ponder over the break
18 whether he accepts the assertion made by the witness in relation to his,
19 that is the Prosecution's own witness, and whether -- because the
20 Prosecution called Mr. Mandic and for them to impute him in this way is
21 not proper in an adversarial system, certainly.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, again, I don't know the precise
23 approaches in the system from which Mr. Josse comes, and where he was.
24 It's very clear that I confronted Mr. Mandic on a lot much issues during
25 the course of his testimony. I don't think that at this point, in this
1 examination, the Prosecution is under any obligation to respond to
2 inquiries by the Defence and I don't welcome these interventions.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first try to find out what exactly the
4 testimony of Mr. Mandic was in this respect and will whether we are
5 talking about impeach. Before we start discussing whether it would be
6 appropriate, yes or no.
7 Now, Mr. Tieger, the ten minutes are over.
8 We'll have a break until 20 minutes past 4.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 3.57 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 4.32 p.m.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I had asked you earlier about the sources of
14 information you had at the time to -- about what was happening in
15 Sarajevo, what -- where actions by Serb forces were taking place, what
16 territories were being taken, citizens were being arrested or detained and
17 so on, and one of those sources of information, Mr. Krajisnik, was
18 Mr. Mandic himself, correct?
19 A. I did have a conversation with Mr. Mandic, and he told me, in
20 connection with Kula, about the event. He explains here. He was not a
21 permanent source of information, nor was there any need for him to be.
22 Q. You're referring to the conversation on -- I take it on June 26th,
23 1992, during which Mr. Mandic informed you about 400 Muslims who were
24 detained and also informed you about the allegations by Mr. Vukovic that
25 this was part of an ethnic cleansing campaign by Bosnian Serbs?
1 A. Yes. That conversation was here, and it refers to him, if that's
2 what was given here.
3 Q. There was another conversation you had with Mr. Mandic on the 25th
4 of June, just the day before. That's found at tab 184. Perhaps we could
5 look at that now.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that's P292, KID 31469.
7 Q. So once again, Mr. Krajisnik, we see you speaking to Mr. Mandic,
8 as you can see, beginning on the first page --
9 A. Just excuse me, it's 185 and then 165. I can't find it. Excuse
10 me. This is not in the correct order. It's the last one. Yes. I see
12 Q. Good. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, as we see at the beginning of the
13 conversation, toward the bottom of the first page, after asking him what's
14 new, and he says, Mr. President, how are things? And you say, I just said
15 that you are a real hero, all the others are just useless.
16 Mandic: You're right on that one and for the rest we will see.
17 And you say: Useless, I must tell you. There are just few Serbs
18 with such name and that reminds me of Vojvoda Momcilo, and Mandic laughs.
19 But as the conversation moves on, on page 2 of the English, well,
20 first, you -- before I move on, at the bottom of page 1, you say listen,
21 Momo. And he says, Yes, tell me. And you advise him as you indicated
22 previously that Milo Savic's brother has been arrested --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Tieger, can you give us references, please?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, you would now be at the top of 0955.
25 Q. And then you say, and now listen to this. And then there is a
1 brief interruption when you're addressing someone in the room, calling
2 Milos. And then Mandic says: Mr. President.
3 You respond: Yes.
4 He says: The first part has been ociscen. It was done today.
5 MR. TIEGER: And then this was the subject that the next portion
6 of the intercept, Your Honour, Your Honours may recall, was the subject of
7 some courtroom translation because three alternatives were given. I
8 didn't move to have that revised precisely but I can read the portion from
9 the transcript, then you say, a phrase, "Je li otislo," which is -- could
10 be translated as "has it gone," "has it been dispatched," "has it been
11 taken care of."
12 And then Mandic says: Yes, it's been ociscen.
13 You say: Huh?
14 He says: The first part has been ociscen.
15 And you ask: Which part?
16 And he said: That one, the one that was uncertain.
17 MR. TIEGER: The translation, Your Honour, is uncertain. I
18 understand that word can mean either undefined or disputed. I don't know
19 if it makes a difference there but I bring that to the Court's attention
20 since I have that information.
21 Mr. Krajisnik says: I don't know which one. Oh, oh, the one up
23 Mandic: Yes.
24 Mr. Krajisnik: On the top, is it?
25 Mandic: Yes, yes.
1 Krajisnik: No kidding.
2 Mandic: Yes, and the men, they've already been transferred there.
3 Krajisnik: Is that right?
4 Mandic: Yes, they are working.
5 Krajisnik: Oh, good, excellent. I have to tell you, this is for
6 your ears only. This, that I am giving you compliments just to know that
7 the bill for the commercials is on its way to you.
8 And then if we turn to page 3 of the English, and page 0956 of the
9 B/C/S. Your Honours, that's located towards the bottom of the page.
10 And what, tell me, is -- is in that part? Yesterday, when we were
11 looking at that portion, that was not clear. Is that it?
12 And that was you speaking, Mr. Krajisnik. And then Mr. Mandic
13 says, Oh, yes, that part closer to me.
14 A. I'm not getting the interpretation. Just a moment, please. I
15 don't -- I'm not getting the interpretation. I don't know what you're
16 reading here.
17 Q. I think I'm now at the top of page 0957 in the B/C/S,
18 Mr. Krajisnik. I'll read it again?
19 A. Yes, yes. Yes, I see it now. There is no need for you to repeat.
20 Q. Okay. After Mr. Mandic says: Oh, yes, that part closer to me.
21 You say: Okay, good.
22 Mandic says: That has been done.
23 Krajisnik: And tell me, that stronghold, has it been put
25 Mandic: Yes, yes.
1 Krajisnik: I must tell you that you will be decorated. When the
2 circumstances are right, you'll get a medal.
3 And Mandic says: It's the people that did it.
4 And then you say, oh, yes, laughing, Mandic continues, these,
5 these specialists of mine, and you say, there are not many like that.
6 Mr. Krajisnik, we've heard before Mr. Mandic relating himself his
7 involvement in cleaning up, detaining people, asking Serbian TV to film
8 that liberation. This is an example here, on this date, is it not, of
9 Mr. Mandic informing you about the success of Bosnian Serb efforts to take
10 what they regarded as Serbian territories in Sarajevo and the consequences
11 to the Muslims who lived in those territories?
12 A. First of all, I took the initiative for this conversation and it
13 has to do with a particular problem, Milos Savic. Everything else was
14 something that he spoke of his own accord and I was just guessing what he
15 was referring to. I didn't call him for this purpose, nor was it a topic
16 of conversation. It was just to get Mr. Milos Savic's family released.
17 He was the secretary of the assembly.
18 Q. No. You may not have been calling him for that purpose,
19 Mr. Krajisnik, but Mr. Mandic is happy to pick up on the ongoing
20 discussions that you two were having. As you said to him at page 3 of the
21 English, yesterday when we were looking at that portion, that was not
22 clear. Is that it? He's keeping you abreast of what he's been informing
23 you about throughout.
24 A. No. That's not correct. This is his incidental information about
25 something I forgot five minutes later. I was only trying to help
1 Mr. Milos Savic to get his family released. That was all. I could have
2 learned from 50 others whether a part of Sarajevo had been taken or not.
3 It's a small area. There was no need for him to inform me about that. I
4 was just joking with him in order to arrive at the main topic of
5 conversation. Mr. Mandic did not provide information about some kind of
6 fighting or anything. He just mentioned this in passing, about an area
7 that was contested, and he did it on his own initiative. People kept
8 crossing over to the Muslim and Serb sides throughout the war.
9 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you certainly seem intent in this
10 conversation on making sure that Mr. Mandic knows that his efforts are
11 appreciated. "I must tell you that you will be decorated. When the
12 circumstances are right, you will get a medal."
13 A. I was joking. I didn't have the right to decorate anyone. It's
14 the president of the republic who had that right. I was just joking,
15 saying I'll send you a bill for the commercials. The whole conversation
16 was actually full of jokes until we get to Milos Savic. He -- this man
17 participated in releasing people when I asked him to. This whole
18 conversation is jocular in tone.
19 Q. Who were the specialists of Mr. Mandic, who he wants to give
20 credit to, not just himself?
21 A. If you recall, he said he was a Deputy Minister of the Interior.
22 He was possibly referring to the specials, the special purpose policemen
23 from the MUP. I assume. He said that he had been appointed by Stanisic.
24 I didn't know that, although that couldn't have been the case because he
25 would have had to be appointed by the government, the cabinet.
1 Q. I wanted to turn to one more item, Mr. Krajisnik, in connection
2 with your efforts in Sarajevo. Can we turn to tab 179, please? This is
3 an excerpt from the 20th session of the RS Assembly, Your Honours, held on
4 the 14th and 15th of September 1992. And this particular portion reflects
5 the remarks of Mr. Trifko Radic, whose name has come up previously. And
6 if we turn to page 46 of the English and page 04226242 of the B/C/S. In
7 the English, Your Honours, it's located -- it's the last sentence of that
8 first long paragraph, last two sentences.
9 And in the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, it's the same, both reflected at
10 approximately the top, well, the, at about two-thirds down on the page.
11 And after explaining at some length events in his municipality of
12 Ilijas and more generally areas of Sarajevo, Mr. Radic states, "The
13 Ustasha attacks us on all fronts every day. We have no help. I went to
14 see Mr. Krajisnik and General Mladic and if they hadn't come we would have
15 fallen a long time ago. If Ilijas falls, so will Rajlovac, Vogosca and
17 That's correct, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik, that when Mr. Radic
18 needed military reinforcement of some sort, needed help, he went to see
19 you and went to see General Mladic?
20 A. I visited Ilijas once, on the 28th of June. He says, if you
21 hadn't come. Mr. Radic was a deputy. He came to see me, but this was not
22 within my competence. I could only help him to put him in touch with
23 somebody else, with Mladic or someone, but there was no assistance I could
24 actually give him. I could only assist him as a deputy, but I couldn't
25 order the movements of any military units. I only visited this place,
1 Ilijas, once and that was on the 28th of June, 1992. Mr. Trifko Radic
2 complained more than once saying they needed air support, they needed this
3 and that, because they were under huge pressure, enormous pressure, from
4 Muslim units in Central Bosnia and that's true. Very tight circle.
5 Q. And this particular occasion, when he went to see you and
6 General Mladic for help in a situation that would have resulted in Ilijas
7 falling but for that assistance, when was that?
8 A. He says, if you hadn't come, we would have fallen. I didn't go
9 there. Maybe he was referring to Mladic or somebody else. I don't know
10 who. But he was referring to both of us in the plural, as a president of
11 the municipality, I could help him by putting him in touch with a MUP
12 minister, with General Mladic, or someone else, although he could have
13 done that on his own as well. But there was no other assistance
14 whatsoever that I could give him. When he says if Rajlovac would have
15 fallen if we hadn't helped, he was referring to my municipality.
16 Q. And what kind of assistance was provided to Mr. Radic and his
18 A. I don't know. I don't know what kind of assistance he received.
19 I'm telling you what kind of assistance he could have received from me.
20 All I could do was put him in contact with somebody else. It was Mladic
21 who could send the army there. The Minister of Police could send the
22 police. I could do neither.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you don't remember a situation when Mr. Radic came
24 to see you, when Ilijas and Rajlovac and Vogosca were jeopardised?
25 A. They were in jeopardy throughout the war and throughout the war he
1 came to see me as a deputy. He came very often. I don't know what he
2 thought but I don't remember any specific instance. He came often because
3 he was a deputy from that area. We would sit down and discuss things,
4 talk. He had problems with the local army, with the local soldiers. He
5 was having problems all the time, throughout the war.
6 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, on these many occasions when Mr. Radic came
7 to see you about the problems he was having, what did you do? What steps
8 did you take on behalf of Mr. Radic that caused him to come back to you
9 repeatedly for such assistance?
10 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I have been clear. As I say, throughout the war,
11 he came to see me on many occasions, full stop. I didn't say that he came
12 for assistance every time. He was a deputy. We were in frequent contact.
13 In this particular instance, I don't know precisely what happened, but I
14 can only assume what it was that I could have done, and now he mentioned
15 something else at the end. I know that once he called me on the phone, he
16 was in a panic, he was saying that they needed air support and so on and
17 so forth, and I would say to him, "Hang on, wait a minute. Apply to the
18 army." People when we are desperately looking for assistance, they call
19 anyone, whether the person they are calling is the right person or the
20 wrong person for that.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I am going to move on to another subject.
22 A. I can put this away, can I?
23 Q. Yes.
24 During the course of your examination-in-chief, you were asked
25 questions about the strategic goals or strategic objectives, and on the
1 16th of May, you were asked about who, when and by what process were the
2 strategic goals formulated. That questioning began at page 11, line 21.
3 MR. TIEGER: Actually, I'm afraid that may reflect the time,
4 Your Honour, rather than a particular page number but if it becomes
5 significant we can certainly retrieve it for the Court.
6 Q. And you said, repeatedly during the course of your testimony, that
7 the strategic goals were an effort by the Bosnian Serb leaders to simply
8 put down what you had said to Mr. Cutileiro. As you said on the 16th of
9 May, let's put it down into some kind of exposition so that those who
10 listen will know what we are fighting for, and then you said, when I use
11 the word fight, I'm referring to what happened at all the previous
13 A. Yes. That's what I said. And that's what I think now, too.
14 Q. So did I understand you correctly to suggest that the strategic
15 objectives were not intended or understood to be implemented at any time
16 through the use of military activity?
17 A. Those who drafted the strategic goals, and I participated in this,
18 had as our aim to write a brief and succinct document so that the whole
19 assembly would know what we were advocating at the peace negotiations
20 because they kept complaining that they were not well-informed. That was
21 the main goal. And the purpose at that assembly was to continue
22 negotiations based on that platform. That was the aim of the 16th session
23 of the assembly, and those who participated in the drawing up of the
24 strategic goals.
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the strategic objectives, in fact, represented the
1 goals formulated by the Bosnian Serb leadership which were intended to be
2 achieved through efforts that would be implemented on the ground, through
3 war, coupled with whatever diplomatic gains could be made in light of the
4 factual situation, isn't that right? And that's what it was intended for
5 and that's how it was understood by both the political representatives and
6 the military.
7 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I'm really sorry but I have to give you "no"
8 answers all the time. I'm talking about those of us who were suggesting
9 those strategic objectives and the purpose of those objectives was to
10 continue negotiations and find a solution for the crisis in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. To put in clear language, what we were working for,
12 to send that out and to have negotiations continue regardless of combat
13 activities, all the way until a peaceful solution is found. I know that
14 because I was involved. Only through political means.
15 Q. And you never saw any indication, never suggested in any way to
16 the deputies, or to the representatives of the military, that the
17 strategic objectives would be achieved through military efforts, at least
18 in part?
19 A. In the course of deliberations, there was talk like that as well
20 but I'm telling you what the objective was, and the ultimate conclusion
21 was not to accept those strategic objectives but, instead, to demand a
22 continuation of the negotiations. That was the goal. Nothing else. And
23 that was achieved.
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I just want to make sure we are not playing any
25 kind of clever technical word games. I am not suggesting to you that the
1 formulation of the strategic objectives meant that your negotiating
2 efforts would stop. What I am suggesting to you is that you knew full
3 well, you and the other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, and
4 intended, that the effort to achieve those goals would be pursued not only
5 through whatever gains you could make in negotiation but through military
7 A. It was not so. And I'll tell you why. Those objectives were
8 agreed with Mr. Cutileiro. They were our demands, to have our own
9 constituent unit, to try to achieve contiguous territories through
10 exchange. It was not only about an outlet to the sea and to divide
11 Sarajevo. Those were the only objectives we worked for throughout the
12 war. We had no other objective except to have our own constituent unit.
13 If we had no negotiations, and if the war was going on, of course, during
14 the war you no longer have control. But that was our political goal, even
15 before any war started, from the 18th of March. And I gave you that map,
16 from my sources, and there is also the Cutileiro map. There are two
17 sources for those strategic objectives.
18 Q. Let me be clear. Are you saying that was a political goal that
19 was formulated by the Bosnian Serb leadership and, when the war started,
20 those became the objectives of the military effort? Or are you saying
21 that the strategic objectives were entirely unlinked, unconnected, to the
22 military effort by the Bosnian Serbs?
23 A. Mr. Prosecutor, our strategic objectives had the following basis,
24 namely to reach them through political agreement. If war had been imposed
25 on us, and there is no political understanding, then there is no
1 agreement. We did not achieve those goals. We didn't achieve the
2 Sarajevo objective, the outlet to the sea. The objective itself does not
3 mean anything, if there is no political agreement. We wished to achieve
4 those strategic objectives through political means. And, of course, if we
5 had been able to achieve more through negotiations, even more favourable
6 conditions, and if the other side agreed, we would not have refused.
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can we turn, then, to the session at which the
8 strategic goals were enunciated to the Bosnian Serb representatives at the
9 16th session of the RS Assembly on May 12th, 1992? Someone will have to
10 provide you with that binder, Mr. Krajisnik.
11 A. Thank you.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the very beginning of that session,
13 Dr. Karadzic speaks at length, describes the state of affairs, and then,
14 beginning at page 13 of the English and page 7 of your version in B/C/S,
15 Mr. Krajisnik, begins to discuss or to enunciate -- to articulate and
16 explain the strategic goals, beginning at the second paragraph, the
17 Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency, the government, the
18 council for national security which we have set up have formulated the
19 strategic priorities, that is to say the strategic goals for the Serbian
20 people. The first such goal is separation from the other two national
21 communities, separation of states, separation from those who are our
22 enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this century,
23 to attack us and would continue with such practices if we were to stay
24 together in the same state.
25 And then on that page, and the next page in English, and I believe
1 it's the same in your version, he continues to list and explain to some
2 extent all six of the strategic goals. And then you open the -- after
3 Dr. Karadzic's remarks, you open the floor to the representatives, and
4 Dr. Beli from Brcko speaks, and that's at page 10 to 11 of your version,
5 Mr. Krajisnik, and page 16, Your Honours, of the English. And Dr. Beli
6 says, I would like -- I would evenly like to make a few remarks on the
7 priority tasks set by our president. Although I'm not going to
8 deconstruct each delegate's remarks in detail, it's correct that Dr. Beli
9 was not part of the negotiating team and when he refers to priority tasks,
10 he's not referring to negotiations, is he?
11 A. No. He's talking about the contribution of Mr. Karadzic. He was
12 not on the negotiating team.
13 Q. He explains that one of the physical priorities, as he understands
14 it, is establishing communication between Semberija and the Bosnian
15 Krajina. That's strategic goal number 2, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?
16 A. Yes, correct.
17 Q. And since Brcko is practically in the centre of all these events,
18 I must inform you that the operations to establish this communication have
19 been completed to a degree in the military aspect. He then goes on to
20 explain that the completion of that objective, at least in so far as Brcko
21 is concerned, remains uncompleted, and he states, about seven lines down
22 from there, "While the cooperation has been good so far, or rather is good
23 as the circumstances allowed, however, for definitive clearing of the area
24 it will be necessary to have many more forces there." And then a few
25 lines down, I would like to ask that we do not leave this place without
1 and above all the military strategists, I see Mr. Mandic is here, without
2 having such problem areas as Brcko that precisely defined in military
3 terms so that we know where to turn for help. He believes, he says that
4 Semberija and Majevica can do a lot and says in these times of war we must
5 conduct a general mobilisation of the Serbian people so I would ask
6 President Karadzic and President Krajisnik, because they can communicate
7 with the Serbian people through the media, to promote this more. And I
8 must say that the Serbian people, especially in parts like Brcko where we
9 are 20 per cent, and as you have been saying, Mr. President, the Serbs are
10 not a conquering people and do not get involved easily in these conquests
11 that are currently necessary.
12 Those remarks by Dr. Beli, and we'll turn to other remarks, are a
13 reflection of his understanding and the understanding of everyone else
14 present, that the strategic goals were to be implemented militarily?
15 A. No. He says what the current situation was, and they don't
16 believe in negotiations. You're right. He doesn't believe in
17 negotiations. He looks instead at what the strategic goals are. Then
18 unaware of our talks with Croats and other things, although Karadzic
19 mentioned it at this session, concerning the exchange of territories. If
20 you remember, that was said at this session. But he's thinking about
21 Brcko. He knows that until that moment he had been waging war for a month
22 and a half, and he's priority is it resolve that. He says Serbs are not a
23 conquering people and he doesn't believe in negotiations because he knows
24 that negotiations had been going on for a long time, Muslims were just
25 keeping us tied down in negotiations to gain time, and in the meantime,
1 war began.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Beli begins his remarks by making it completely
3 clear he is addressing himself to the tasks set by the president just a
4 moment before in enunciating the strategic objectives.
5 A. Yes, yes. He says first of all, Mr. Karadzic said clearly what
6 the strategic priorities should be and he picks up from what Mr. Karadzic
7 said and goes on to explain what the situation in Brcko was on this road
8 that should have been the corridor between Semberija, Majevica and
9 Krajina. He and he has his own view about that. Implicitly he doesn't
10 believe in negotiations and he thinks that's his opinion, that that would
11 have to be resolved some other way. He listened to this account of
12 priorities and he translated it in his mind as was convenient to him.
13 And by the way, there must be a mistake here. There must be a
14 reference to Mladic, not Mandic, because Mladic was at that session and
15 Mandic wasn't, although it says Mandic there.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps one, you said that he thought
17 that the matter would have to be resolved some other way. He listened to
18 this account of priorities, and he translated it in his mind as was
19 convenient to him. That's very vague language. Was it convenient to him
20 to use military means also to resolve the matter, the matter that is to
21 establish the corridor? Do you think that was on his mind or do you say
22 no, what he says is not an expression of how to militarily support or
23 achieve or assist in achieving what was the first priority he mentions?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In his mind, he thought that that
25 problem had to be resolved, and if I may be allowed to interpret him, he
1 thought it could not be achieved by political means but that instead
2 military means would be necessary. That's what he thought. Whereas
3 political -- well, whereas what Mr. Karadzic stated were political
4 priorities to be achieved by political means. And he's concerned only
5 about the resolution of his own problem.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, the question, and the basics of these
7 question, was whether other people would have interpreted or would have
8 looked at these strategic objectives in military rather than in political
9 terms, and it takes us a long while but finally, I now do understand that
10 you say although this is not what Karadzic meant, Mr. Beli, for his
11 preoccupation with -- with the Brcko situation, and because he didn't
12 believe in negotiations, may have given it a military, operational meaning
13 despite that that's not what Mr. Karadzic had in mind.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Beli interpreted it exactly as
15 you put it. And there were others who had the same interpretation, but
16 the basic thread was different. It was political solution. They had been
17 at war for a month and a half, and there was no solution. There were no
18 negotiations going on at the time.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think as a matter of fact that you might have
20 misunderstood that, that Mr. Tieger is -- among other things is exploring
21 how the strategic objectives were understood by those who attended that
22 meeting and those who listened to it. Mr. Tieger, or am I wrong in
24 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's then put the next question and perhaps
1 it could come a bit quicker to an answer next time.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Beli was not the -- or Dr. Beli was certainly not the only
5 deputy at that session or other person at that session to who understood
6 precisely that, that the strategic goals were concrete tasks to be
7 implemented militarily.
8 A. Even Mr. Beli thought that these strategic goals should be
9 achieved by military means. He understood Karadzic, as always, as to what
10 the priorities were but he believed, he believed that what Karadzic was
11 stating, he was stating probably because -- probably because Muslims
12 rejected it, his conclusion was that negotiations would give us nothing.
13 And that we had no choice but to go to war, and I'm saying, concerning
14 Beli and other people, there were individuals who thought differently.
15 But nobody was opting for war, nobody was committed to war. Karadzic
16 didn't say that that was a war option, and Beli didn't understand Karadzic
17 to be promoting a war option. He just thought that there would be no
18 choice but to go to war.
19 MR. JOSSE: Sorry to interrupt but I've been sitting here puzzling
20 about the first sentence of that answer.
21 JUDGE ORIE: I can imagine. Could we please ask Mr. Krajisnik to
22 repeat that?
23 You started your answer when Mr. Tieger asked you whether Mr. Beli
24 was not the only one who understood the strategic objectives as Dr. Beli
25 did. You started by explaining I think again what Mr. Beli thought.
1 Could you please repeat what you said there? Before you continued saying
2 he understood Karadzic as -- you said -- you started by saying even Mr.
3 Beli thought that --
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note, Your Honour, that there
5 is just one word missing at the beginning of that paragraph, not. Not
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not a single deputy, not even
8 Mr. Beli understood Mr. Karadzic to be saying that those were war
9 strategic priorities to be achieved by military means. Not one deputy.
10 Not even Mr. Beli.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Nevertheless, this language suggests that he
12 translated it immediately in military terms and not primarily in
13 negotiating political terms: You said none of the deputies, not even Mr.
14 Beli did not, they all understood Mr. Karadzic well that these were just
15 political -- these were objectives to achieve -- to be achieved by
16 political means only and not even if politics would fail to be successful,
17 to be implemented by the use of military means. Is that a correct
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot understand you,
20 Your Honour. Forgive me, please. But may I just repeat my answer once
21 again? If it's unclear.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I understood your answer but I'm seeking
23 confirmation that you said not even Dr. Beli but also none of the other
24 deputies misunderstood the -- what Mr. Karadzic meant by the strategic
25 objectives, that is that they should be achieved only by political means
1 and that even if politics would fail to achieve them, that they should not
2 be achieved also or instead by military means.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no need for that last bit.
4 I'll put it clearly. At this stage, Karadzic said, these are our
5 strategic goals. We are going to the conference to work politically. He
6 didn't say anything about what happens if we don't find a political
7 solution, whether we go to war or not, because that was not the subject of
8 discussion. There are hundreds of indications, exchanges of territories,
9 Cutileiro gave us this and so on.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I would tend to agree with you, Mr. Krajisnik, there
11 would be many ways of achieving these goals. But I think Mr. Tieger is
12 putting to you that Dr. Beli at least have chosen to speak about these
13 strategic goals in terms that are understood by Mr. Tieger very much in a
14 military sense rather than a political sense. And that's what he's
15 putting to you, but I do understand that you disagree with that.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Mr. Tieger said that Mr. Beli
17 understood Karadzic to mean the war option. That's not true. Whether he
18 thought that the political option would fail, that the military option
19 would have to be used, is another matter. He may have thought that. But
20 everybody understood Karadzic to mean political strategic objectives and
21 that we are going to that conference. That's my answer.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Tieger, perhaps you continue.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. A number of areas I want to turn to but let me just address first
25 your contention that not one of the deputies, not even Dr. Beli,
1 understood that the strategic goals were tasks to be implemented
2 militarily. If we could turn to the remarks of Mr. Novakovic at page 25
3 through 26 of the English and page 18 of the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik.
4 Mr. TIEGER: Those
5 are found at the bottom of the page, Your Honour. Now, Mr. Novakovic
6 understand that is work has been done in the course of negotiations and
7 refers to that, Mr. President, fellow deputies, I believe that the Serbian
8 officers, once they hear how militant and able these Serbian
9 deputies are, will want the entire BH, the former one, as it used to be.
10 I think it was good that we talked today about the work done last time in
11 Lisbon, the work that was done with the maps. Not because the Serbs like
12 to draw maps, although it is true they do, but because our strategic goals
13 or rather concrete tasks for all the deputies here, and all the peoples
14 tribunes, military leaders and others on the ground should be derived from
15 such an explanation.
16 And then he goes on, as for the maps and so on, the area from
17 which they come, in other words, the region of and Majevica, since what is
18 Serbian there was liberated long ago, and the people are already gradually
19 getting used to it.
20 Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Krajisnik, was from Bijeljina, was he not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And that's a reference to what he calls the liberation of
23 Bijeljina, isn't it?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And the Court has heard evidence about the nature of that
1 liberation. Mr. Novakovic says, referring to -- he refers to our
2 strategic goals or, rather, concrete tasks for the deputies, the people's
3 tribunes and the military leaders. Now, Mr. Novakovic is another deputy
4 who understood full well that the strategic objectives were to be
5 implemented militarily.
6 A. No, he understood it differently. You see, before that, he says
7 that the strategic goals will emerge from the Lisbon maps. You can see it
8 for yourself, Mr. Prosecutor.
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
10 A. We spoke about the Lisbon paper. That's what it says here. I
11 thought we understood each other.
12 Q. What are the concrete tasks that the military leaders are to
13 engage in to achieve those strategic goals?
14 A. To hold the lines, to hold the lines that had existed up to that
15 point and to negotiate. That's what the army was supposed to do because
16 the Muslims were establishing an army in order to take Serb territories.
17 And to liberate all of Bosnia, as they said. And that is in Mladic's
18 address to the army. That was the army's task, to negotiate so as not to
19 lose those territories and so that people wouldn't get killed.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I will turn -- well, let's turn next to some
21 remarks at the 17th session before we go back to the 16th. I want to turn
22 to page 69 through 70 of the English, page 72 of the B/C/S, the remarks of
23 Mr. Kupresanin. Now, this is the session immediately after the 16th
24 session, at which the strategic goals were enunciated. And Mr. Kupresanin
25 says, "This is the Serb Assembly here."
1 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honours you'll find that at page, excuse me
2 if I'm not making it clear, page 70 of the English.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the interpreters, it's the 15th
4 line from the bottom.
5 JUDGE ORIE: But it might be that we don't have the 17th session
6 in front of us. Okay. We found it. Thank you.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Begins at the very bottom of page 70, Your Honours. "This is the
9 Serb Assembly here. It makes decisions. And when I return to Krajina I
10 want to tell the soldiers, gentlemen, these are our ultimate goals. At
11 the last session, in Banja Luka, we said that the northern border of the
12 Serb Republic of BH was the right bank of the Sava River. We have come to
13 the realisation there is a part of Brod left, Bijelo Brdo and Orasje are
14 left. We ordered the army to realise that goal.
15 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, it appears that Mr. Kupresanin too, one of the
16 most powerful leaders in the Bosnian Krajina, understands full well that
17 the strategic objectives enunciated at the 16th session were to be pursued
18 militarily. And perhaps ultimately consolidated during the course of
19 negotiations but meanwhile, achieve them on the ground.
20 A. But, you see, it says here that the border is on the Sava, and you
21 know very well that that was not the case, only a corridor. There is a
22 lot of rhetoric here. It's the first assembly after Banja Luka.
23 Everything he says here is upside down. You cannot take this as the norm.
24 There is Tuzla here, Bihac. They are no where to be found in the
25 strategic goals. He was speaking in a belligerent manner. He was
1 referring to the assembly but these things were not said at the assembly.
2 You see here, Bihac, all sorts of things. And let me just remind you
3 there were two conferences before that date. It was from this session
4 that we went to the London Conference, from this session. And it was at
5 this session that all the deputies and members of the Presidency took an
6 oath and then it's well known who the members of the Presidency were, and
7 it was from this conference that we went to the second conference in
8 London on the 12th of May.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It was from this
10 session that we went.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Well, we could turn to other comments by deputies and we will turn
13 back to the 16th session, Mr. Krajisnik, but first let me turn you to your
14 own remarks on the 18th session. That's found, those remarks begin at the
15 last paragraph of page 11 of the English and continue on to page 12, and
16 for you, Mr. Krajisnik, that would be found at page 17, and let me begin
17 shortly before the end of your remarks when you're addressing the Serb
18 Krajina and begin concerning the Serb Krajina, I think that there is no
19 one in this room who doesn't want us to unite with them. We are one state
20 but at the moment there is United Nations who could stop us if we do.
21 There is no Serb who doesn't want to live in a united and unique state.
22 It is politically impossible now but we must achieve it. I will be very
23 happy if we reunite with Serbia and Krajina and also to form some
24 relations with Muslim and Croat BiH. Therefore I would like to ask you to
25 be rational and consider the situation very seriously. We have our own
1 plan and we shall realise it by political, military and other means,
2 depending on the situation.
3 Now, Mr. Krajisnik --
4 A. Where do you find this, we have our own plan? Please. I've been
5 reading everything you said but you -- I can't find. This you probably
6 skipped something. If you skip those lines up there, then --
7 Q. On page 02149618 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik, I've been reading
8 from the last paragraph.
9 A. Yes. I have found it, but you skipped three lines. That's why I
10 was unable to follow. Please go ahead.
11 Q. I'm sorry, well, the thrust of my question is this, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 Just as prior -- we examined some of the assembly sessions prior to the
13 war, when efforts were being made simultaneously to advance the de facto
14 situation on the ground to improve the negotiating position of the Bosnian
15 Serbs, and here too we see a reflection of the manner in which the
16 strategic objectives were to be pursued, militarily and politically. And
17 you're making that very clear to the deputies.
18 A. When I speaking about the Serb Krajina, please read everything.
19 They want to unite the Serb Krajina with Republika Srpska. I'm telling
20 them we can't do this. All the Serbs want to give together but the
21 environment is not in favour of that. United Nations would not allow it.
22 And at the end, there is a sentence because we are in a war, there is only
23 one sentence but there cannot be replace everything I said before. I said
24 quite clearly we cannot do this. But we were at war so of course I had to
25 mention war but I didn't think we had to do this by means of war. I said
1 military but I would not be respecting the Vance Plan, the Owen plan.
2 It's all in here. And it's not the factual situation that's important. I
3 showed you in 1993 exactly how much territory we agreed to concede. You
4 have a map. We had to preserve the situation and negotiate. We couldn't
5 let go.
6 Q. You had to preserve the situation? Did the -- did the situation
7 at the time of the enunciation of the strategic objectives include the
8 control and expected retention of all that territory in Eastern Bosnia
9 along the Drina?
10 A. That's not correct. In the strategic goals, we said we are
11 stopping right now, on our own initiative, we are stopping the war, we are
12 asking the international community to have a conference and we will
13 continue by political means. We didn't have any of the two corridors,
14 either of the two corridors or Sarajevo or access to the sea or anything
15 but we agreed to engage in negotiations with a mediation of the European
16 Community. So what kind of strategic goals did we have? Not a single one
17 had been achieved. And yet we agreed to that very moment to stop and to
18 go and negotiate. You cannot finish the job by military means. You had
19 people there who would all get killed, all of Bosnia was a battlefield.
20 So what were we to do? Not to hold the line and have the people behind
21 the line killed? Well, that's what happened. People were killed behind
22 the lines, on all three sides. On the 16th, if you look at the 16th
23 session, not a single strategic goal had been achieved and yet we agreed
24 to engage in negotiations right away.
25 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I was looking at the clock.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger, we'll have a break until five
2 minutes past 6.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 6.11 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I'd like to turn next to tab
7 212. That bundle may need to be distributed, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, you know that everyone is always crying
9 for the index to it.
10 MR. TIEGER: I am reminded, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: It needs a number, as far as I can see, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: I believe that's correct, Your Honour.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1234, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, P1234 contains an excerpt from the 40th session of
17 the RS national assembly held on 1 and 11 May 1994. Another session that
18 you chaired, and if we turn to page 50 of the English, and page 02152526
19 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik, in B/C/S.
20 MR. TIEGER: It's at the very top of the page, Your Honour, in
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. TIEGER: These are the remarks of Mr. Mijatovic?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although that's not apparent from the --
25 MR. TIEGER: I can see that myself.
1 JUDGE ORIE: From the document.
2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, which tab is it?
3 MR. TIEGER: Tab 212, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I take it Mr. Josse will verify whether these are the
5 words of Mr. Mijatovic. If we do not hear from him it will be
7 MR. TIEGER: I believe that's visible in the B/C/S.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just have a look. Yes, at least it seems that
9 Mr. Mirko Mijatovic is speaking on the second half of page 44 in the
11 MR. JOSSE: I'm certainly prepared to take my learned friend's
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. And Mr. Mijatovic states, "Your excellency, presidents and
16 respected colleagues, we determined and defined the goals of the combat at
17 the first assembly session in Banja Luka. I think that we made most of it
18 right at that time."
19 Mr. Krajisnik, this is another reflection of the understanding of
20 the strategic goals among the political leadership of Republika Srpska;
21 isn't that correct, that they were goals of the combat?
22 A. There was a political struggle and there was a military struggle,
23 but Mr. Mirko Mijatovic was the president of the legislative commission
24 which deals with the legal ordering of the state, and he says that he has
25 to redefine his goals. He mentions negotiations here. I've read some of
1 this. I haven't had time to look at it all, but he's talking about
2 negotiations and 64 per cent of the territories.
3 Q. Yes. As you note, it's yet another reflection of the demands of
4 the Bosnian Serbs for 64 per cent of the territories. And I'm sure there
5 are other portions of Mr. Mijatovic's remarks of similar interest but I
6 was referring your attention, Mr. Krajisnik, to Mr. Mijatovic's
7 understanding of the strategic goals as goals of combat. That's how it
8 was understood by the deputies and other political and military
9 representatives throughout Republika Srpska. Isn't that correct?
10 A. The assembly could only enact political goals, not military goals.
11 It is the military commander who can set military goals. So we set the
12 political goals and he says here we have 64 per cent of the territories,
13 negotiators and so on. There is no assembly anywhere at any time that has
14 been able to adopt military goals or is authorised to adopt military
16 Q. At the top of the chain of command of most nations, and as we've
17 seen already in Republika Srpska, was the Supreme Commander, the civilian
18 authority, correct? And that --
19 A. Yes. The Supreme Commander. That's normal. That's the president
20 of the state, as in any state. But his competence, his military
21 competence, as part -- is part of his office as president of the state,
22 but that's not the assembly.
23 Q. And the political leadership, which has beneath it, subordinate to
24 it, the military authorities, as well as civilian authorities, sets the
25 political objectives of the state. That's right, isn't it?
1 A. Not the political leadership, but the Supreme Commander. He is
2 the one who determines military goals. The assembly, the cabinet, and I
3 don't know who else, can set political goals, but the president of the
4 republic is also the Supreme Commander, and that's the same in every
5 country, as far as I know. But you can't have ten people in command of
6 the army, only one, even if it's a collective body.
7 Q. And those political goals are to be implemented by the political
8 and military authorities of the state, sometimes only by the political
9 authorities, sometimes only by the military authorities, and sometimes in
11 A. I assure you, I know, I know, I'm not guessing, I participated in
12 the creation of the strategic goals, they are our political option at
13 negotiations. There was no other idea behind them. We wanted to gain
14 through negotiations regardless of the situation on the ground. Everybody
15 did his job. I know this because I participated in it. When we discussed
16 it, it was a platform for negotiations. Each plan we had in future was
17 based on those strategic goals.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber is not further assisted by
19 state theory and these kind of matters. Of course, I didn't know whether
20 you want to further pursue the matter.
21 MR. TIEGER: No, I --
22 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear enough that there is not -- that you do
23 not take exactly the same position as the witness does in this -- in this
24 matter. Please proceed.
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what political gains, what gains in negotiation,
2 had been made by November 1992, for example? Or December 1992?
3 A. All of this. All of this could have been achieved if we had not
4 gone back from the initial agreement. We could have had three constituent
5 units, exchanges of territory, part of Sarajevo, access to the sea.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I understood the question to be: What
7 had been gained, not by what you thought that could have been gained but
8 what you gained in negotiations by November or December 1992.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood what could have been
10 achieved or what was achieved.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Was achieved was the question but correct me if I'm
12 wrong, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
14 Q. Not what could have been achieved. What gains or successes had
15 been achieved by November or December of 1992, politically or through
17 A. By political means?
18 Q. Right.
19 A. The negotiations were on going, nothing had been finished. In
20 1992, there were some negotiations going on but they were not serious. We
21 kept insisting on negotiations.
22 Q. If I understand that correctly, in 1992, there could have been a
23 solution, that's the -- that's the achievement to which you referred in
24 the first answer but it didn't happen, as you've explained, and the
25 Bosnian Serbs kept insisting on negotiations but nothing serious had
1 happened, nothing was happening, at least at that point or at least no
2 successes had been realised?
3 A. I don't remember, in 1992 there were several conferences. There
4 was this conference in London or two conferences in London, one in
5 Lisbon. And there were constant shifts. We kept discussing. There were
6 maps, issued were raised and so on.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, please focus on the question.
8 Mr. Tieger is asking whether any noticeable results were obtained during
9 these negotiations. Not on how they developed, what happened, but whether
10 any noticeable results were achieved. If so, please mention them. If
11 not, please tell us.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I simply said I don't
13 know, but there had been conferences. One can see all that. That's it.
14 That's what I said.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not that I don't know. I can't
17 recall right now. If I were to go through the documents, I might discover
18 what had been achieved. I might find it.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. All right. Let me -- let's take a look at tab 209, which is a
21 brief video clip.
22 [Videotape played]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Seems to be no sound, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Waiting to see if that problem can be resolved,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 [Videotape played]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I have no.
4 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] The best message would be if our Serb
5 people were to be patient in all this, if they were to pray to God for God
6 to remove this misfortune from us, the one we are experiencing right now.
7 This was also the announcement of our guest for this evening, president of
8 this Bosnian Serb Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 Mr. Krajisnik good evening.
10 Good evening.
11 The Serbian delegation has given a new proposal to the Geneva
12 conference. The basis of that proposal is the Lisbon paper but it looks
13 as if Lord Owen is giving his opinion in advance regarding the new
14 proposal by the Serbian delegation. How do you comment the statement, and
15 is there any chance that the Serbian proposal be adopted at the Geneva
17 Momcilo Krajisnik: Well the intentions of the international
18 community and the United Nations who are now mediating are clear to us,
19 and there is no doubt that they want in fact to preserve
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which they've recognised by force and against all
21 principles. But we at the assembly session, which was held in Prijedor,
22 gave our opinion. The Serbian people gave its opinion through the
23 assembly that we shall not even participate in such a conference if we are
24 to have a solution imposed on us which does not satisfy primarily the
25 Serbian people or other people who wish to create their own national
1 states on the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'm
2 referring primarily about the Croatian national community in Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. That was the basis for our proposal, which puts all three
4 national communities on an equal footing to form three states on the
5 territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they be connected
6 on a volunteer parity basis with a decision-making system based on the
7 principle of consensus. I hope that Mr. Owen is an experienced
8 politician, as well as Mr. Vance, and I believe that they will understand
9 reality, the reality which is that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be put
10 together any more. In fact it doesn't exist. There are three separate
11 parts, or better said, two parts, and one part that doesn't know what it
12 wants. That is the Muslim part, in fact, one part of the territory of the
13 former Bosnia and Herzegovina which is under Muslim authority. And they
14 will have to understand that it is very hard to tame a people who knows
15 what it wants.
16 "So counting on the experience of politicians such as Mr. Owen and
17 Mr. Vance, I believe that all this now is just a preparation for trying
18 something that they already know, I hope, they can't accomplish."
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I had intended to play that plus a different
21 portion and perhaps I'll have an opportunity later to play that other
22 portion. But it seems fair to say that at least at that stage of the --
23 of events, the political objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership had not
24 advanced appreciably?
25 A. Well, that was our position, that we had sent out to the
1 conference in Lisbon. So on that basis we were sending our proposal to
2 the conference that had given up on those positions, and I was wondering
3 why they had given up on three constituent units and Republika Srpska. So
4 the conference was ongoing and every side was giving its own proposals.
5 Q. Now, you had talked about the formulation of the strategic goals
6 as purely political goals by the members of the -- by yourself and other
7 members of the Bosnian Serb leadership. I'd like to turn to the remarks
8 of General Mladic at the 16th session?
9 MR. JOSSE: Just before that's done, allow me, if I may, to be
10 extremely pedantic. Your Honour, tab 209, which is P851, I think only the
11 transcript was exhibited as part of the Prosecution case. Not the actual
12 video itself. I don't know whether that matters but I thought I would
13 make that observation.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If that is the case, I don't remember. I take it
15 that there is no further problem with it, as far as the Defence is
16 concerned, so that if now seen that the words written down were spoken as
18 MR. JOSSE: Of course. There is no difficulty with it.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the completeness of the records, we have
20 to --
21 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour might recall not that long ago we asked
22 that the record be changed from video to transcript because we were aware
23 that the video hadn't ever actually been played during the case, during
24 the course of Mr. Thompson's evidence.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So therefore, what -- perhaps the most -- the
1 easiest solution is that we would make the transcript P851A and make the
2 video, and I take it, then, Mr. Tieger, that you're going to give us the
3 CD or the DVD on which it appears, would then get P851 and then 851A and
4 A.1 for translation, transcript and translation. This matter having been
5 resolved, let's proceed.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if we could turn first to page 35 of the English
8 and page 26 of your version.
9 A. You mean the 16th session?
10 Q. Yes. And toward the beginning of his remarks, lengthy remarks, in
11 the middle of the page at 35 --
12 A. Excuse me, is it 26 in Serbian?
13 Q. Yes. It's also indicated as 00847741, and it's just above the top
14 of the page -- just above the middle portion of the page, Mr. Krajisnik.
15 And General Mladic states, "Please let us not set before ourselves goals
16 that will bring us down. Let us set before ourselves the goals we can
17 achieve. Many of you have helped me. I already said this a few days ago.
18 I keep on repeating certain things. I said this in Nevesinje before the
19 top leadership of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
20 before an even more select political leadership in Belgrade."
21 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you were part of that top leadership of the
22 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with whom Mr. Mladic met in
23 connection with the formulation of these goals, correct?
24 A. No. He met with Mr. Ostojic in Nevesinje. I remember that.
25 Whereas I was in Nevesinje later with Mr. Karadzic. But I just can't find
1 this passage. If it's on page 26, I don't see any reference to Nevesinje.
2 Q. Well, it's difficult to count the lines but perhaps the best way
3 is to look about 20 lines down and you'll see a reference to 29 June and
4 then if you go about ten lines below that --
5 A. Yes, yes, I found it, sorry. I went to Nevesinje after the
6 assembly session and after the meeting in Graz with Mr. Koljevic and Mr.
7 Karadzic. Mladic wasn't there. He said that he had been to visit his
8 home village with Mr. Ostojic and he went to Nevesinje. I don't know if
9 anyone else was there.
10 Q. Which members of the political leadership met with General Mladic
11 before the may 12th session and before his formal ascension to the top
12 position in the VRS?
13 A. I don't know. I don't remember that I met with him. I don't
14 remember. And I didn't speak with him about any strategy or any goals, if
15 I did meet with him. The time line is not very clear in my head because
16 he was commander of the 2nd Military District before his appointment,
17 after General Kukanjac, and he remained in that position briefly, only 15
18 days or so.
19 Q. Apart from Mr. Ostojic, what members of the top leadership of the
20 Serbian Republic, or what members of an even more select group of the
21 political leadership in Belgrade, did General Mladic meet with a few days
22 before the May 12th session, if you know?
23 A. I -- I don't know. I met with him at that round table with
24 Serbian Krajina but I don't know anything about this.
25 Q. Was it Mr. Ostojic who discussed with General Mladic the strategic
1 goals that were enunciated on 12 May?
2 A. No. I know that Mr. Ostojic went by helicopter in his home
3 village. I know that from a telephone conversation. And he mentions it
4 here, and they went to Nevesinje but I didn't know about them going to
5 Nevesinje but it's written somewhere that he met with Serbs and Muslims in
6 his own village, but I don't know with whom he met in Nevesinje. When I
7 was in Nevesinje, there was General Perisic. I remember that. So Mladic
8 wasn't there.
9 Q. Let's turn to page 36 of the English and page 27 of your version
10 in B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik. And, Your Honours, that will be found at about
11 the -- at the second paragraph in that page, about six lines down, where
12 General Mladic states, "To achieve a goal, you need forces. I have read,
13 mulled over for a long time, and discussed within the most select circle
14 of comrades whom we convened the strategic goals that are of substance,
15 which does not mean that they could not be better, richer or maybe more in
16 keeping with our current strength and the present moment."
17 I ask you again, Mr. Krajisnik, to think back and indicate to the
18 Chamber who the most select circle of comrades to whom General Mladic is
19 referring in that passage, with whom he discussed the strategic goals.
20 A. I suppose that that is the group that came together with him from
21 Knin and was in the Main Staff. I suppose he means military men.
22 Q. And General Mladic then goes on to discuss those goals.
23 Continuing farther down the page, at about the 14th line from the
24 bottom, "If we have taken something in this war that was not ours, we need
25 to keep hold of it so that in political negotiations, we can get those
1 things that were ours and that we cannot get in other -- in any other way.
2 In other words, we need -- in other words, define the territories
4 Mr. Krajisnik, it's clear, isn't it, that General Mladic wasn't
5 going to have any role in the negotiating process. He understands that
6 his role in this process with relation to the strategic goals is to do
7 what he does as a soldier and get territories so that they can either be
8 kept or traded for those territories which the Bosnian Serb forces were
9 otherwise unable to obtain.
10 A. I think he's talking from a soldier's point of view, and, please,
11 it's written verbatim what he says. Let me read: "If war has to be
12 waged, it will have been imposed, despite our wishes. Nobody is asking us
13 whether we want to wage war or not. We can present our views, declare
14 them, do what we like. We said we didn't want to wage war back in
15 Yugoslavia but they made us." And he says, "Whatever is not ours will
16 have to be returned, if after 150 years." He's speaking seriously, as a
17 soldier, saying basically, "I have to know what the objectives are, what
18 the objectives are that I have to work for as a soldier. The territories
19 that will have to be defended." He want to have the territory defined
20 basically. It's impossible to say this is for Serbian territory and go on
21 and defend it.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, that's clearly not what he's saying because he
23 says, if we have taken something in this war. He's not talking about
24 staying -- standing pat in the territories as you've described. He's
25 talking about, in that passage I just read to you, "If we have taken
1 something in this war that is not ours, we need to keep hold of it so that
2 in political negotiations we can get those things that were ours."
3 A. Correct, but please look at that other sentence which says the
4 international community would never agree to recognise them as ours, if it
5 wasn't ours. We can hold something for five or ten or 150 years. Our
6 grandchildren would still have to go back to the places we reached and
7 were not ours. Those who think that we can keep whatever our tank and our
8 soldier can reach, those times are long gone. That's past perfect. He
9 was still new when he was saying this.
10 Q. Just look a little further at your suggestion that the strategic
11 goals were only about remaining in place and were only political. At the
12 very bottom of the page on -- at page 36 in the English, and on page 27 of
13 the B/C/S, General Mladic states, "The way I see it unfortunately is more
14 realistic and I can tell you that we have only made our first move in the
15 war, not of our own accord. In Bosnia-Herzegovina it is only starting
16 here and there. People and peoples are not pawns, nor are they keys in
17 one's pocket that can be shifted from here to there. It is something
18 easily said but difficult to achieve."
19 Now, there, Mr. Krajisnik, General Mladic is cautioning the
20 deputies that the task which he's been assigned will be a difficult one to
21 achieve and not as easy as some think, right?
22 A. He's responding to Mr. Trifko Radic at this point. Trifko Radic
23 said in a militant tone something like we have expelled the Muslims and
24 he's saying people are not pawns to be easily moved. And he says
25 somewhere towards the beginning, That would be genocide. How would we
1 face the international community then? And then he even mentions the
2 numbers of Muslims and Serbs in Krajina. I really didn't understand his
3 tone to be war mongering at that time, although he did talk a lot at that
4 time, and that was the beginning. You'll find a contribution by Trifko
5 Radic to which this is a response.
6 Q. Well, General Mladic says, not only that people are not pawns to
7 be easily moved, as you said, but he said, "That's difficult to achieve."
8 That, Mr. Krajisnik, is a reflection of General Mladic's understanding
9 that that was part of the task ahead of him and he was asking the deputies
10 to define the territories in such a way that he wouldn't have more to do
11 than was reasonable to ask of him, more people to shift from here to
13 A. Please, I should like to emphasise, when you mentioned the
14 political leadership and the government as defining territories.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Krajisnik tell us exactly what he's
16 saying or reading?
17 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, the interpreters have the text in
19 front of them, and when you referred to what General Mladic said, the
20 interpreters would like to know where you read that exactly so that they
21 can follow you.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I'm really sorry.
23 JUDGE ORIE: No problem.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's above the number 220.000, four
25 lines up. It says the following: That's a quotation. Next, I would like
1 to point out.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have found it. Thank you.
3 MR. JOSSE: Could Mr. Krajisnik then repeat the last answer that
4 he gave of substance? Because it was not interpreted for the reasons we
5 now know.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, I think you started that answer
7 by saying, Well, General Mladic says, not only that the people are not
8 pawns. Could you please again give us that answer in full?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here is what I said. "Next" if the
10 interpreters have found the passage. "Next I would like to emphasise,
11 when the political leadership and the government and the assembly define
12 territories, we need to choose clearly which path to follow, which
13 objective to be guided by, for now and for the future. And in the past as
14 well. It was always thus twice. Generally speaking we choose the war
15 option and peace. What we gain and what we lose by choosing each."
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik please turn to page 28 of the B/C/S and page 38 of
18 the English. It's 14 lines down from the top, Your Honours, in English --
19 and it's the top of -- it's just below the beginning of the second half of
20 the page, Mr. Krajisnik, for you. And I'll read it slowly so you can find
21 it. General Mladic states, "And please let us not only put our minds into
22 what we are doing but let us at also think thoroughly about it and let us
23 be cautious about when to keep mum. No. The thing we are doing needs to
24 be guarded as our deepest secret and what our representatives appearing in
25 the media at political talks and negotiations are going to say, and they
1 do need to present our goals in a way that will sound appealing to the
2 ears of those we want to win over to our side without being detrimental to
3 our Serbian people. Our people must know how to read between the lines."
4 What was the deepest secret that had to be guarded, Mr. Krajisnik?
5 It surely wasn't that you were engaged in negotiations.
6 A. Well, if he had acted this way, he wouldn't have given orders on
7 the telephone that Sarajevo needs to be shelled. This is a pamphlet.
8 That was no secret. There was no secret. He was just telling deputies --
9 he misty identified everything. Everything that happened in assembly
10 sessions was public. This was placed in the public domain very soon
11 afterwards. There was no secret. Throughout the war, I cannot remember
12 one single secret. Every last village flew what was going on in politics.
13 Our policy were negotiations. This is his manoeuvring or I don't
14 know what, to persuade the deputies. If he wanted secrets to be kept he
15 should have used secure communications when he issued orders to shoot to
16 fire at Pofalici. There was no secret. They just pretended to have some
18 Q. Finally, Mr. Krajisnik, let me ask you to turn to tab 210.
19 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, this is P65, I presume we need a little
20 bit more information for you. We will try to obtain it.
21 Q. First looking at page 14 of the English, and page 12 at the bottom
22 and moving on to page 13 of your version, in B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, it's
23 Dr. Karadzic speaking and he says, "The strategic goals adopted by this
24 assembly have been or will be achieved to the fullest extent, just to
25 remind those who do not know it. This assembly reached strategic goals of
1 Serb people which have become in a certain way our tasks, our obligations
2 to realise them, but those were the goals we aimed at and the goals we aim
3 at now to achieve whenever it would be possible." And then he goes on to
4 describe again the strategic goals and, in addition, I would ask you to
5 turn next to page 66 of the English of that session, and in your version,
6 in B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, that's page 65. And this is General Mladic
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, it will be found at the bottom third of
9 the page in English. It's the beginning of his remarks.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm just looking at the B/C/S. I don't know
11 whether there is any page 65 for Mr. Krajisnik. My last page is 29 in
12 B/C/S, at least the page numbering at the top of the page, but perhaps you
13 have a different -- that's last three digits of the ERN number is 647. If
14 you have more, then --
15 Mr. Krajisnik do you have --
16 MR. TIEGER: I don't --
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have page 65, with the
18 contribution by Mr. Mladic.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll just read the translation. Please
20 proceed, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. And General Mladic states, "First, people and the army, with the
23 help from the rest of us according to our possibilities, have carried out
24 most of tasks and strategic goals set to them. We have created Republika
25 Srpska." And he continues on the next page in English, page 67, and page
1 66 of the B/C/S, again, at approximately the bottom one-third of the page,
2 appearing for recognition purposes, Your Honours, after the words Lukavac
3 93 in parentheses at the left. It's at about the bottom third of the
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I found that.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. And then after discussing the negotiations, he states about three
8 sentences later, "I have to say to our delegation, which I really
9 appreciate, together with our president, Mr. President, you have started
10 from the most favourable starting position in Geneva. You had the
11 military result in your hands. You and the people and the army and the
12 forces of MUP have created it."
13 Mr. Krajisnik, there, General Mladic is explaining in explicit and
14 completely clear terms that the army and the people carried out the
15 strategic goals and produced a situation on the ground which provided
16 their negotiators with the best starting position. Isn't that right?
17 A. That's not the way it is. He put it here very nicely when he
18 said, speaking about strategic goals, "Second, politics start and end
19 wars. War ends with a peace accord." He put that very nicely here. As
20 for the starting position, Mladic wasn't the one who provided the starting
21 position. He spoke as a soldier. But that was not one of the arguments
22 of the Serbian side. What is at stake here is the Vance Owen plan whereby
23 we lose Republika Srpska. That's what the discussion is about, not
24 something that we were going to hold on to. He is accusing us, basically.
25 We got Republika Srpska already but if we accept the plan we
1 will lose it. That's his point.
2 Q. Politics start and end wars, General Mladic said, but in between,
3 the army, by pursuing, implementing and achieving large portions of the
4 strategic goals, put the negotiators in the best starting position to
5 cement those gains. Isn't that complete lie clear, Mr. Krajisnik?
6 A. No, no. Right, he said it. You had a good starting position but
7 that was not a military position. Those were lines drawn during the
8 negotiations. Completely regardless of any war we had an agreement,
9 completely, independently of any war. All through the war, the
10 negotiations were unsuccessful. We didn't start the negotiations with
11 military positions. We started negotiations without any war. And it's
12 not true that our military position was one of our assets because we had
13 even created Republika Srpska before the war. Of course, only on paper,
14 in terms of declaration. And we wanted to fix it through negotiations and
15 we got it through the Lisbon agreement.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm looking at the clock.
17 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, just one housekeeping matter. That
18 document was P64 A tab 39, P65, tab 221.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
20 Mr. Krajisnik, before we adjourn for the day, I'd like to remind
21 you or give again my instructions to you that you should not speak with
22 anyone about the testimony already given or still to be given.
23 For the Prosecution, as guidance, the Chamber expects the
24 Prosecution to finish its cross-examination not later than next Thursday.
25 Of course we do not know exactly what might happen on Wednesday,
1 as far as the treatment of the dentist is concerned but that's what you
2 should be preparing for.
3 Then we adjourn until Monday, the 12th of June, 9.00 in the
4 morning, in Courtroom III, and I wish everyone a good weekend.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.07 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Monday, the 12th day of June,
7 2006, at 9.00 a.m.