1 Tuesday, 13 June 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. Mr. Registrar, would you please call
6 the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Mr. Krajisnik, I do understand that we received another CD with
11 documents, an index more or less, a short description has been provided.
12 May I take it, Mr. Josse, that you take care that the index at least is
13 translated with full priority so that everyone knows what's on the CD.
14 MR. JOSSE: We are having it summarised at the moment. Would that
15 suffice, Your Honour? To have the full translation will not be easy.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, most important is that we know what is on the
17 CD approximately. Could be that it's material that is already in
18 evidence. From what I saw today, there might be well quite some matters
19 which are already in evidence, so that we at least can identify what has
20 been presented to us.
21 MR. JOSSE: Well, that's useful guidance.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, I'm not insisting on a literal translation
23 because of course Mr. Krajisnik has summarised in his way and then most
24 important is that we, without having full knowledge and full access to the
25 text, that we at least know what is on the CD.
1 MR. JOSSE: As I just said, that's useful guidance, Your Honour,
2 and Mr. Jonovic is already carrying out that task and will do so in
3 conjunction with his other court duties.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you
5 that you're still bound by the solemn declaration, although it's a long
6 time ago, but by the solemn declaration that you've given at the beginning
7 of your testimony. And Mr. Tieger are you ready to proceed?
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, thank you.
9 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Krajisnik.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. Shortly before we adjourned yesterday, we had begun to address
15 some of the specific strategic objectives and we were focused, immediately
16 before the recess, the adjournment, on strategic objective number 3, as
17 articulated by Dr. Karadzic at the 16th session of the RS Assembly, "The
18 third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina valley, that
19 is the elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds. We are on
20 both sides of the Drina and our strategic interest and our living space
21 are up there."
22 Now, we, Mr. Krajisnik --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps, Mr. Tieger, but I'm also looking at you,
24 Mr. Krajisnik, often reference is made to the strategic objectives. Could
25 we do it in a summary way to say the Neretva River or the Una river
1 objective, and then I take it we all know what we are talking about, or
2 access to the sea so we don't have to explain who said what and what the
3 exact wording is. We are always referring to the heading as it was
4 published in the Official Gazette. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. We briefly compared the Drina River objective to the map with the
7 red line, which you explained during the course of your
8 examination-in-chief, and discussed briefly Dr. Karadzic's words.
9 Now, the map that you produced during the course of your
10 examination-in-chief, which we looked at yesterday and which is found at
11 tab 228, is not the only map that we had an opportunity to see and -- or
12 that you had an opportunity to see and discuss during the course of your
13 examination-in-chief. We also saw you in front of an ethnic map of Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina during the course of an interview that was on -- produced
15 on television, and you were explaining at that time the territories
16 possessed by the Bosnian Serbs.
17 Now, we can take another look at that video, if necessary,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, and we probably will during the course of the remaining
19 examination, but as I recall, that --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber would like to see it again,
21 if you could --
22 MR. TIEGER: Excellent, Your Honour. It's at 213.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Not at this very moment, if you're not prepared for
24 it then, perhaps, but the Chamber would like to see it again.
25 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I think it's worth a minute or two to
1 set it up.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if the Court is ready?
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 [Videotape played]
6 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are standing in front of the
7 ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- the former Bosnia and Herzegovina,
8 with marked borders of the territory that is presently held by the Bosnian
9 Serb army. I can only say that what was being said, the propaganda that
10 we are holding territories ethnically populated by the other national
11 communities, that is not true, which can be seen on the ethnic map of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we can cover with a transparent sheet on
13 which the territories are exactly marked, the territories held by our
14 army, that those are in fact areas that belong to our people. A map, a
15 similar one to this, as far as I'm informed, was offered in Geneva, and it
16 was made clear that the Serbs want the borders of our future republic to
17 be ... that is the Neretva River valley, and this is mostly territory of
18 Republika Srpska. With the proviso that we allow for the possibility of
19 certain enclaves on our territory that may be populated with the -- with
20 other ethnic communities. Sarajevo is a separate problem. At the moment,
21 it is marked as ... the area of city proper is marked as Muslim territory,
22 but, in our relations, we will work for a demilitarisation and division
23 between the two ethnic communities, primarily Serb and Muslim, and maybe a
24 municipality for ... I mean a municipality populated by the Croatian
25 community. The territory of Republika Srpska represents, in fact, the
1 border along the Una River, the Sava River, with a smaller area that is
2 not yet held by our forces, I mean, it's not liberated yet. That is
3 Orasje, those are ... that is the border, this is the territory of
4 Semberija, the territory of the Ozren mountain and the territory of
5 Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. We presented, as our territory and our
6 strategic goal to the Croatian community in Graz, that our border should
7 be between our two ethnic communities, that would be the Neretva River.
8 In any case, this continuity of our territory, it is ... it is in one
9 piece, if I may say so, and we will do our best that there is one
10 constituent unit of Republika Srpska, and allow the possibility of more
11 constituent units for Croatian and Muslim people. Simply, that is not a
12 condition. What is a condition is that our republic be an integral one
13 and not divided into several parts."
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm looking again at D192A, the map with the red
16 squiggly line that you provided, and indicated represented the --
17 represented strategic objective number 3, the Drina River objective.
18 MR. JOSSE: That's tab 228, for Mr. Krajisnik's benefit.
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, thank you.
20 Q. The territories taken by Bosnian Serb forces and pointed out by
21 you in Eastern Bosnia in the video we have just seen bear a much closer
22 relationship to Dr. Karadzic's articulation of strategic objective number
23 3 at the 16th session than does the red squiggly line depicted in D192A.
24 In fact, Mr. Krajisnik, it is the -- it is correct to say that what
25 Dr. Karadzic expressed at the 16th Assembly, that the strategic goal was
1 that the Drina no longer be -- or the Drina would not be a border between
2 two Serbian worlds or two Serbian states, was the strategic objective and
3 not the red squiggly line in D192A; isn't that right?
4 A. No. That's not right. And I explained why it isn't right.
5 Q. Well, part of your explanation, Mr. Krajisnik, was that although
6 Dr. Karadzic expressed himself in the way we have looked at repeatedly, he
7 didn't really agree with himself about that. So I'd like to look to other
8 expressions by Dr. Karadzic and others of strategic objective number 3.
9 So could we first turn to tab 210, please.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, if the Chamber wants to consider this map
11 used during this television programme, it would have always to play that
12 portion. Is there a possibility - I mean, nothing changes in the map -
13 for very practical purposes to have a still to be made from that portion
14 of the video so that you can look at it without using your technical
16 MR. TIEGER: Unless someone tells me to the contrary, Your Honour,
17 I'm confident that can be done.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know, Mr. Josse --
19 MR. JOSSE: Couldn't possibly object.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And I take it it doesn't have to be a separate
21 exhibit. I mean, it's just a still taken from the video, yes.
22 MR. JOSSE: Absolutely, Your Honour. No problem at all.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then the Chamber would highly appreciate if you would
24 produce that.
25 MR. TIEGER: We'll see to it, Your Honour.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, tab 210 contains excerpts from the 34th Assembly
2 session that is the 34th Republika Srpska Assembly session held on the
3 27th and 29th of August, 1993, and the 9th and 10th of September, 1993,
4 and the 29th September and 1st of October of the same year. It's P65,
5 Your Honour, but I need, clearly, more specific information for the Court
6 on that, but -- and we will provide that.
7 In the early part of the session, Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Karadzic is
8 reminding the deputies and other persons assembled about the strategic
9 goals, and if you would turn to the -- the Court would turn to page 14 of
10 the English at the bottom, and Mr. Krajisnik, you would turn to page 12 of
11 the B/C/S, that is 02150520, where Dr. Karadzic begins: "Strategic goals
12 adopted by this Assembly have been or will be achieved to the fullest
13 extent, just to remind those who do not know it. This Assembly reached
14 strategic goals of Serb people which have become in a certain way our
15 tasks, our obligation to realise them, but those were the goals we aimed
16 at and the goals we aim at now to achieve whenever it would be possible."
17 He then goes on to discuss the individual goals, and on page 15 of
18 the English, and I believe still on the same page you began on in B/C/S,
19 he again articulates the third goal by saying, "The third goal is to let
20 the river of Drina be never more a border between Serb people."
21 Mr. Krajisnik, it appears, therefore, that when Dr. Karadzic
22 expressed the strategic goal relating to the Drina on May 12th, 1992, at
23 the 16th session, he expressed exactly what he meant and exactly what the
24 objective was, as he explained again at the 34th session. It wasn't a
25 mistake, it wasn't something he disagreed with, it was in fact the goal.
1 Isn't that correct?
2 A. Well, that's exactly what I've been saying. A border is not only
3 a physical border but also a psychological border, where there are no
4 passports and such. When there is a border, you have to produce a
5 passport. Well, you have that in several documents I've provided. This
6 is Bosnia. This is about Bosnia. Bosnia cannot be without borders. In
7 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina has its internationally recognised borders,
8 and you can't say there won't be a border between Serbia and Bosnia.
9 There will be no psychological border, though. There will be no
11 There is constant repeated reference to negotiations. Look here.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we have addressed that before and retreating into
13 the language of negotiations doesn't address the issue that we've been
14 discussing, and that is that the strategic objectives articulated at the
15 16th session were intended to be pursued both militarily and through
16 negotiations to finalise them. So citing language of negotiations doesn't
17 suggest that there was in any way an elimination of or failure to pursue
18 the military option of achieving results on the ground.
19 A. First of all, that's not correct. You have a document that I
20 produced today concerning the session of the Presidency of the 9th of
21 June, 1992, with military men and politicians in attendance, and the last
22 but one item on the agenda was to publish the strategic objectives and a
23 map of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to send them to
24 the European Community. Even then it was understood that it's a political
25 objective. Only political. The military men were present.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, the one doesn't exclude the other,
2 does it? I mean, if military men are there and do not disagree with
3 sending certain plans to the negotiating table, does that mean in your
4 view, is that correct, that then it's not -- in military terms they are
5 silent, they say, okay, put it to the negotiations, and then it's off the
6 table for military purposes, without any explicit word?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the 9th of June is
8 just a month after the strategic objectives were endorsed, and on the
9 agenda of that meeting had the task to publish strategic objectives and
10 send them to the European Community. Why would they be sending military
11 objectives? I'm telling you what was said and what was understood on the
12 9th of June.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, okay, I do understand if you say we send
14 something to the negotiation table, then it's out of the mind of any
15 soldier, of any military man, that as a support or if the negotiations
16 fail, that it's not -- it's not within the realm of the military any more.
17 If that's your testimony, then it's clear. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: All right.
19 Q. Were other strategic objectives psychological in nature? That is,
20 when Dr. Karadzic referred to the second goal or fourth goal, did he
21 intend that to mean that the Bosnian Serbs would only -- that those were
22 intended to be implemented psychologically rather than physically, that
23 they weren't related to territories? Or was the third goal the only
24 psychological goal?
25 A. No, no. Please, this second objective, the president said the
1 objective was a corridor. With regard to the corridor I also provided
2 material here. It was a government session of the 19th of June, where it
3 was said that the issue of the corridor should be resolved, it has nothing
4 to do with the strategic objective you have in this material of today. On
5 the 12th of May, it was specified exactly: Through exchange of
6 territories with Croats, we plan to resolve this politically. Look at the
7 transcript of that session, and you'll see. And the fourth objective is
8 what - Sarajevo. Find the 17th of March, or rather, the 19th of March in
9 1992. Karadzic said exactly what kind of objective Sarajevo was. I also
10 produced some material, namely the ethnic -- Serb ethnic parts of
11 Sarajevo. It's all documented.
12 Q. We will deal with Sarajevo and we will deal with the documentation
13 shortly, but --
14 A. Well, you said it was the fourth goal, didn't you? You mentioned
16 Q. That's the fifth goal. In any event, we will be talking about
18 A. I'm sorry, I confused the objectives.
19 Q. That's fine. I asked you that in particular because of course
20 Dr. Karadzic says, at the 34th session which we are looking at now, and
21 said at the 16th session, the second goal was to have connected
22 territories. And about the fourth goal, he said the fourth goal is that
23 the valley of the river of Neretva belong to East Herzegovina and/or
24 Republika Srpska due to the historical and ethnic right, geographical and
25 economic right. Those would appear to relate to the possession, the
1 physical possession, of those territories rather than to any relationship
2 psychological or otherwise to them. There is no dispute about that, is
3 there, that at least the second and fourth goals related to territory?
4 A. Both of them relate to territories.
5 Q. Then let's turn to tab 232, please. It's Dr. Karadzic again
6 talking about the strategic goals.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this will need a number, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1237, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Now, P1237 is a recording of Dr. Karadzic on the 23rd of August,
12 1995, by Banja Luka Television. And again, Dr. Karadzic is discussing the
13 strategic goals, and he states: "It is our vital interest that the Una
14 and the Sava become our borders --" I'm sorry, Your Honours, that's
15 precisely in the middle of the page where it indicates "Begin Karadzic
16 recording." That's the second paragraph in the first page.
17 "It is our vital interest that the Una and the Sava become our
18 borders, that the Drina be ours, for it is ours. It has been ours for
19 centuries." And he continues that we get -- "that we get a part of
20 Sarajevo for all of Sarajevo used to belong to the Serbs. To get a part
21 of the Neretva valley and to gain access to the sea. These are the
22 strategic goals that our Assembly adopted already in 1992. They were
23 revealed later on. It was no longer a secret. These are our goals and
24 our nation is fighting to realise them, to realise such a state and it has
25 realised such a state. The international community must recognise that.
1 Of course, not all of them are realised as long as there is fighting,
2 until an international treaty is signed. Not an agreement between the
3 warring sides but an international treaty which is the highest level, the
4 highest legal and political intergovernmental act guaranteed by the world
6 Now, when Dr. Karadzic says, "The Drina is ours, and it has been
7 ours for centuries --"
8 A. I beg your pardon but what date is this? When was this statement
9 made? Do you have the date perhaps?
10 Q. August 23rd, 1995.
11 A. Thank you. I do apologise for having interrupted.
12 Q. It's not a problem, Mr. Krajisnik. When Dr. Karadzic says, "The
13 Drina is ours, it has been ours for centuries," and he says it's one of
14 the six strategic goals adopted by the Assembly in 1992, he's referring to
15 the territory along the Drina, he's referring to that Eastern Bosnia
16 territory, he's not referring to the fact that the Drina will belong to
17 the Muslims but that the Serbs will be seeking some kind of visas or
18 passports to enable them to pass through to Serbia. That's the truth of
19 it, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?
20 A. That is the truth, what you said, but it's not an answer to your
21 question, and I can explain it. That's why I asked you what year we were
22 talking about.
23 Q. Please explain.
24 A. This is the contact plan, the time we are talking about a plan,
25 and it's a big problem, what territory we are going to take, whether in
1 the east or in the west of Republika Srpska, because we have to have 49
2 per cent, and Mr. Karadzic is speaking about the importance of the Drina,
3 that we should have certain territories along the Drina River. Now,
4 everything that Mr. Karadzic says here he's saying so that the
5 international community -- he's saying that the international community
6 must verify our plans, not that we take control of the Drina. So this is
7 related to the contact group's plan. I know that for certain, because the
8 ethnic regions, our ethnic regions in the west, remained with the Muslims
9 - Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar, and so on - whereas we had in our possession in
10 the eastern part along the Drina, important territories, so that's why Mr.
11 Karadzic said that in figurative terms, the Drina is ours, having in mind
12 the contact plan.
13 Now, as far as this goal is concerned, it's exactly as I stated,
14 why we had planned it that way, not to have Drina the border between these
15 two worlds, and that is something that Mr. Izetbegovic confirmed, and he
16 said this, that there shouldn't be any passports or anything like that.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Izetbegovic did not stand in front of a map
18 showing that the Bosnian Serb forces possessed the entirety of Eastern
19 Bosnia and suggest in any way that that was consistent with anything he
20 had said about borders and passports, and you know that. The strategic
21 objective has nothing to do with that comment by Mr. Izetbegovic.
22 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I have explained here what I was explaining on the
23 map, that the interruption, the break, in the statement, as I emphasised,
24 is where a sentence was left out, that we are yielding to the Muslim side
25 a narrow part of Sarajevo where there are more Serbs than in the whole of
1 the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I said that and I remember that
2 full well. So that was the break in this, what's it called, this
3 recording, and I emphasised where that gap or break was, and I said, in
4 the eastern part, where the majority of the population was Muslim, small,
5 little areas, small towns. And I would have said quite the opposite if I
6 were to say this is now Serb. And I think the map was a 1993 map or
7 whenever. Perhaps it was 1992. Not quite sure.
8 Q. Let's turn to tab 231, Mr. Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, would you mind if I ask one specific
10 question in relation to what you pointed at at the map. Mr. Krajisnik,
11 you said, "There was smaller area that's not yet held by our forces, I
12 mean, it's not liberated yet. That is Orasje." Could you point exactly?
13 Perhaps I could provide with you D192A.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Orasje is Croatian, there is no
15 problem there. And that wasn't the correct statement on my part. Orasje
16 was Croatian, along the Sava River. And you're quite right, we didn't
17 have the right to Orasje.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you said it still has to be liberated.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I did.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I wasn't right there. I wasn't
22 right on that score.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please point at the map exactly where that
24 is so that I've got a better idea.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Orasje is this bit here.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And it's inhabited by an absolute
3 Croatian majority.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see that. That's clear. And just for the
5 record, you pointed at the first area at the northern border, which is at
6 approximately one fourth coming from the east, which is not blue but of a
7 different colour, small --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And it says Croatian territory, yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to look at a couple of comments made in the
12 Assembly at different times concerning Podrinje or the Drina area. If you
13 could look first at the comments of Mr. Dukic at the 25th session of the
14 National Assembly held on 19 and 20 January, 1993, found at tab 231.
15 MR. TIEGER: In particular the comment will be found in
16 approximately the middle of the page, page 42, Your Honours, and at page
17 02149979 in the B/C/S, at the bottom of the first paragraph.
18 And, Your Honour, I believe this will need a number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1238, Your Honours.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Here, in January of 1993, Mr. Dukic, the former president of the
22 SDS executive board, and someone whom you've mentioned during the course
23 of your examination, Mr. Krajisnik, is complaining about the Vance-Owen
24 Plan and what it offers the Serbs. And after highlighting certain aspects
25 of the territory, including its economic implications, he states:
1 "... according to the Vance map, Birac as a whole has been painted green.
2 It is clear to everyone that there can be no Serbian state, nor a
3 community of Serbian states, nor life or prospects for the Serbian people
4 without Podrinje, from Foca to Bijeljina. Even Karadjordje knew that.
5 Regrettably, we too have failed to settle the issue of this Podrinje over
6 which world empires, ideologies and religions have clashed and are still
7 clashing. Nowhere are the Serbs suffering more or are the prospects for
8 their future poorer than in the Podrinje of today."
9 Now, again, as was the case with the comment by Dr. Karadzic we
10 looked at a few moments ago, Mr. Dukic refers to the Serbs' history in the
11 Podrinje, and he says flatly that it's clear to everyone that the
12 establishment of the Serbian state and its intended linkage with Serbia
13 will require Bosnian Serb possession of that entire area, which is
14 consistent with Dr. Karadzic's articulation of strategic objective number
15 3 at the 16th session and thereafter.
16 A. First of all, Karadzic didn't say that, and you're not right,
17 unfortunately, Mr. Prosecutor, in what you say. This is quite a different
18 set of problems, and I can explain what Dr. Dukic said here.
19 Q. So true -- correct or incorrect, that Mr. Dukic is saying that
20 it's clear to everyone there could be no Serbian state without that entire
21 swath of territory along Eastern Bosnia belonging to the Bosnian Serbs.
22 You can explain why he said that, but he's saying that, isn't he?
23 A. This -- what he said is, it is clear to everyone there is no Serb
24 state, nor a community of Serb states, or life or any prospects for the
25 Serb people without Podrinje from Foca to Bijeljina. That's what he said.
1 He was looking at it from an economic standpoint because he was an
2 economist himself, and he was discussing mines and the general wealth of
3 the country and of course the territory as well, and on that point you're
4 right, because he was referring to the historical genocide that was
5 executed during World War II, but this is the economic principle that he
6 was referring to and using here.
7 Q. So in addition to the historical genocide committed against the
8 Serbs during World War II, Mr. Dukic was invoking an economic rationale
9 for the necessity of Republika Srpska possessing that entire territory of
10 Eastern Bosnia; is that correct?
11 A. Not the entire area, not the entire territory no.
12 Q. There would be some enclaves, as you've said repeatedly, is that
14 A. No, no. When he's talking about economic indices, he's talking
15 about the enclaves in which you have economic areas; mines, thermoelectric
16 power stations, or rather, hydroelectric power stations, and so on and so
17 forth. He's not talking about forests and fields, but when he says
18 territory, he means in that territory, in that area or region. And you
19 have that on the 6th of May, for instance, 1993. His entire presentation
20 to the session, everything he said and everything he thought, that same
22 Q. Whatever the rationale, Mr. Krajisnik, invoked by various people,
23 the significance of the Drina for Republika Srpska and the Serbian people
24 was considered enormous, and the territories sought by Republika Srpska
25 pursuant to strategic objective number 3 included those-- that entire
1 area, some of which might be ceded to the Muslims in the form of small
3 A. First of all, that's not true. A quarter of the Drina River is
4 the border. A quarter. I explained that last time. The rest is the
5 border beyond the Drina. So the psychological border on the Drina is the
6 problem. Passports, you can't go to Serbia, you can't have links with it.
7 And I showed that. It's from Visegrad to Zvornik. That's all. All the
8 rest is away from the Drina River border on which the Serbs have territory
9 on both sides of the river.
10 Q. I'd like to turn once again to the comments of -- first let me
11 turn to Mr. -- Let me turn to the comments of Dr. Karadzic at the 33rd
12 session, please. That's in July of 1993.
13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'll move forward. We'll determine
14 whether it needs a number or not.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Registrar, perhaps you would try to find
16 out. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to turn your attention to Dr. Karadzic's
19 remarks at 02150376, the bottom half of that page in your version and,
20 Your Honours, at page 53, where Dr. Karadzic begins.
21 THE INTERPRETER: May we have a tab reference, please? Thank you.
22 MR. TIEGER: It's an extra that should have been provided to the
23 booth. I don't know if -- you do have it, and it's an extra. It says on
24 its cover, "Minutes and tape recording of the 33rd session of the RS
25 National Assembly."
1 JUDGE ORIE: Not on our cover but -- we have no cover page with
2 it, but its last four digits English is 0497. B/C/S last four digits
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found it, thank you.
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, it does need a number.
6 JUDGE ORIE: It doesn't?
7 MR. TIEGER: It does.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1239, Your Honours.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You said that this was July, 1993,
10 the Assembly; is that right?
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. 33rd session, held on the 20th and 21st of July, 1993. At the
13 beginning of his remarks, Dr. Karadzic is talking about the UN as an
14 important factor, indicating that we have to crawl slowly and wisely
15 between Scylla and Charybdis, trying not to cause resistance because it
16 does not matter to us. But then he continues on to the next page in
17 English, same page in B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, stating: "They have not
18 recognised borders of Republika Srpska yet. Gorazde is ours. We might
19 make some concessions in the area of Sarajevo itself so that Gorazde could
20 remain ours. The significance of the Drina for Republika Srpska and
21 Serbian people is enormous. Finally, one of the strategic objectives is
22 that the Drina is not a border. We decided about it here at this
24 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, Gorazde was a predominantly Muslim
25 municipality, correct? One of the many predominantly Muslim --
1 A. Yes, yes. It was a predominantly Muslim municipality, Gorazde
2 was, yes.
3 Q. And Dr. Karadzic is saying there that in view of the significance
4 of that area for Republika Srpska and the Serbian people, in view of the
5 fact that one of the strategic objectives is that the Drina is not a
6 border, that Gorazde, then held by or effectively controlled by, the
7 Bosnian Serbs, should remain "ours." That's a reflection of the fact that
8 the -- that strategic objective number 3 --
9 A. That's not correct. The subject was to send Gorazde -- to send UN
10 observers to Gorazde, and the deputies were against this, and that is why
11 Karadzic says how important the Drina is to us. And we wanted to send UN
12 observers. That's what we were aiming for. So that was the reason he's
13 referring to Gorazde. Not the strategic goal. He said that it was
14 important to us, that the Drina was important to us, but just a little way
15 before that, you'll find that explanation, because it was a protected area
16 and the UN observers were supposed to be in Gorazde.
17 Q. What -- well, let's turn to tab 235.
18 MR. TIEGER: This needs a number, Your Honour.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1240, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, I do understand that the
21 observers, at least, the UN was a -- was an element of this discussion.
22 Gorazde at that time was militarily controlled by whom?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Muslims. And to the end of the
24 war it was controlled by Muslims.
25 JUDGE ORIE: At this period of time in July, 1993, it was still
1 held by the Muslims?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. The Muslims, and it was
3 a protected area, and the UN observers were supposed to be in Gorazde, and
4 the deputies were opposed to that, so that's why Karadzic was saying this.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Nevertheless, he wants Gorazde to, as he said,
6 it is yours, and he says that by making some other concessions, that
7 Gorazde could remain yours. That seems not to be just related to sending
8 military observers but it seems to relate to what the final outcome would
9 be, that is that an area, as you said, controlled by the Muslims at that
10 time, would finally become Serb, although it is a Muslim-majority area or
11 territory. I mean, that's not limited to sending observers, is it?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. It says we'll
13 have to give concessions in Sarajevo. I know that there was a discussion
14 going on whereby parts of Serb Sarajevo should be exchanged for Gorazde.
15 That was a discussion in the negotiations, but that was never realised.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, in the first lines he expresses after he
17 has said that one should try to keep Gorazde as yours, he immediately
18 follows then by saying how important the Drina is and that it is one of
19 the strategic objectives that the Drina is not a border. So he seems to
20 pronounce that in almost one breath, the efforts to keep Gorazde and the
21 significance of the Drina River.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, the subject of
23 discussion is the sending of observers, and now he's saying --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying -- yes, please proceed.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In order to protect -- or rather,
1 the protected area to be protected from the observers, that is to say who
2 is attacking whom, Mr. Karadzic says that we are interested in Gorazde too
3 but we'll have to make that concession, and it says part of Sarajevo, but
4 all this is linked to sending the observers. It has nothing to do with
5 strategic goals or objectives. He takes this as a justification in order
6 to send the observers there.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Karadzic is mentioning strategic objectives and
8 if you say it has got nothing to do with that, that's not easy to
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. No. He does mention that
11 the Drina is a strategic goal to justify why the observers are going to
12 Gorazde so that he could put that through the Assembly, and he says you
13 can't have the Assembly as being an executive organ. You can't decide
14 whether the observers will go or not, he says to the Assembly.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, he says it immediately following a line which
16 says that, through making concessions, Gorazde could remain Serb, not
17 textually. The link is there not for sending observers, but textually the
18 link is there between -- to Gorazde to remain or by concessions. Clearly
19 refers to negotiations and making concessions. But then Gorazde to remain
20 Serbian and not Gorazde to be observed by UN military. But I'm just
21 trying to fully understand how you interpret these words of Mr. Karadzic.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you have here further up in
24 the text, Mr. President, you have a passage about the observers. On that
25 same page, it refers to observers.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I didn't miss that the discussion starts with
2 observers but what I'm trying to find out is it seems that although it's
3 still about -- it starts with observers, but the passage certainly does
4 not end focusing on observers but ends on a subject which may be related,
5 but certainly is not focusing on sending of observers --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, correct.
7 JUDGE ORIE: -- but how to keep Gorazde as a result of concessions
8 to be made in respect of Sarajevo, and a reference close to that line, to
9 the objective -- strategic objectives. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. You are absolutely right.
11 That's what it is precisely.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. We saw this morning, or saw documentation this morning, of
14 Dr. Karadzic referring to the Drina as "ours." Dr. Karadzic's concern at
15 the 33rd with respect to Gorazde is at least in part the concern that
16 Gorazde might connect with another enclave of the Muslims or in some
17 manner prevent the Drina from being "ours" and prevent the objective of
18 the Drina not being a border between Serbs.
19 A. I can explain what the issue was, if that's your question.
20 Q. No, my -- Dr. Karadzic is concerned about Gorazde and its enormous
21 significance, that is the enormous significance of the Drina, because he
22 doesn't want Gorazde in any way to prevent the Drina from being Serb, or
23 Bosnian Serb, and he doesn't want Gorazde to undercut the goal of the
24 third strategic objective, to ensure that that area is not a border
25 between Serbs.
1 A. Well, that's not true. He wouldn't be sending UN observers, he
2 wouldn't be wanting to send UN observers, if that were true. He is, on
3 the contrary, justifying the sending of observers, the idea of sending
4 observers, with that story.
5 Q. Well, let's look, then, at your remarks at the 34th session.
6 JUDGE ORIE: May I again ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, the lines prior
7 to that say, "If we can carry ten kilograms today instead of 100, which
8 they would load on us tomorrow, then we should rather take ten kilograms
9 ourselves and proceed, because if we wait, they will load us with 100
10 kilograms tomorrow." Which seems to be an expression, but please correct
11 me if I'm wrong, that one should develop a strategy in which you take
12 today what you can take or you can bear and then what the future will
13 bring us, then, is still to be expected. So therefore if you say why
14 would he have sent observers to Gorazde at this time? One would be
15 inclined to interpret this in the context of what is today -- could
16 develop in whatever way tomorrow, and therefore not to give a too
17 significant meaning to the step taken at that very moment. One might be
18 inclined to interpret it that way, but if you'd like to comment on that --
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I'm going to say now is the
20 real interpretation. Karadzic said it's better for us to accept
21 observers, 20 of them, than a whole UN army, because the assemblymen were
22 afraid that the latter would be arming the Muslims who would be attacking
23 Serbs, and that they would get weapons by airlift. He said, it's better
24 to accept observers than a whole battalion of troops. Because the UN
25 plays an important role. That's what he said. And UNPAs were in fact
1 armed. That is true. Although that was late.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in connection with Dr. Karadzic's remarks about the
5 Drina being "ours," and the concern that Muslim-held territories would be
6 in conflict with the goal of the third strategic objective, to prevent the
7 Drina from being a border, I asked you to turn to tab 210, which reflects
8 remarks at the 34th Assembly session. I had indicated to the Court
9 earlier that was P65, and I had a better number for that.
10 A. 234?
11 Q. No, the 34th session at tab 210, Mr. Krajisnik. And if the Court
12 could turn to page 129, and Mr. Krajisnik, you could turn to 02150643.
13 And, Your Honours this is P64A tab 37, P65, tab 221.
14 And there, Mr. Krajisnik, you state: "Third strategic goal was
15 Drina. I think that we should task our negotiating team not to allow
16 Muslim side request that Zepa gets connected with Gorazde an enclave to be
17 accepted, because in that case, Drina would not be ours. They would have
18 their own republic and we would enable it in that way. And we would
19 fulfil at least 80 to 90 per cent of this plan that Drina is not actually
20 a border between Serbs."
21 Now, again, Mr. Krajisnik, you're talking about -- you're talking
22 to the Assembly members in the context of negotiations, again you're
23 talking about the possibility of accepting more than your ultimate
24 objectives, but you are also there reminding the deputies of what those
25 objectives are, in particular the third objective, which encompassed
1 ensuring that the Drina was "ours" and that it would not actually be a
2 border between Serbs. The same thing that Dr. Karadzic was talking about;
3 isn't that right?
4 A. No, that's not right. You see here what exactly I said. When we
5 were adopting it, it was the second corridor, and this is later, I don't
6 know when, in 1993, when we had a plan on our agenda. It was already the
7 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.
8 And the problem was Brcko. Right it was the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan
9 that gave us three enclaves in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Correct. This is the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan that came after the Vance
11 Plan, and I'm saying that the second --
12 THE INTERPRETER: It is unclear what Mr. Krajisnik said, the
13 interpreters apologise. It was the second something was the corridor.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, the interpreters could not hear the
15 last part of your sentence. You said, "... and I'm saying that the second
16 --" and then they couldn't follow you any more.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here, on page that ends with 634,
18 Momcilo Krajisnik says, "Another strategic goal was a corridor. We called
19 it corridor then because the objectives that we have now attained were
20 still remote, whereas this plan discussed here was October, 1993, the
21 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, and I can give you a map to see.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the reference to second strategic goal
23 is found on page 128, at approximately the 10th line down from where
24 Mr. Krajisnik begins.
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in the context of talking about the
1 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan to the deputies, you remind them of the third
2 strategic goal and, once again, articulate what it's about in order to
3 assist them in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of that plan.
4 Isn't that right?
5 A. The third or the second? You've been reading to me from the
7 Q. No. I read to you originally the --
8 A. Sorry, sorry. Yes. Correct. This is the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan,
9 wherein they linked up with the road cutting our territory in two, and I
10 said that shouldn't be done but that instead enclaves should remain. All
11 of it is about the plan.
12 Q. Let's look quickly at remarks by Mr. Mijatovic at the 53rd
13 Assembly session.
14 A. And may I produce tomorrow the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan that would
15 explain this? Precisely from that moment.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That's -- I leave it to the parties whether there is
17 any -- let's not --
18 MR. JOSSE: Well, it's opened it up, in my submission. That's the
19 answer of the witness, and it's opened it up to go into that in some
20 detail now.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. JOSSE: His answer is very clear to the robust suggestion my
23 learned friend put to him.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Well, as a matter of fact, I'll reread who exactly
25 opened it up, whether it was opened up by the question or by the answer.
1 Yes. Please proceed.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: For the time being.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Tab 235, Mr. Krajisnik. These are the remarks of Mr. Mijatovic at
6 the 53rd session of the RS National Assembly on 28 August, 1995.
7 JUDGE ORIE: It needs a number, Mr. Tieger.
8 THE REGISTRAR: We assigned it --
9 MR. TIEGER: P1240.
10 JUDGE ORIE: P1240.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. And at page 51 of the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, at the -- that is
13 02154350, approximately 12 lines from the bottom, and at page 41 of the
14 English, Your Honours, just below the middle of the page, the -- for
15 reference purposes, the Court looks down at the right-hand column, about
16 -- a short portion below the middle, you'll see a reference to "a clean
17 Drina." I'm going to read from that sentence. Mr. Mijatovic states,
18 Mr. Krajisnik: "There are --"
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just trying to find it. You said 53rd session.
20 I'm in tab 235; is that correct?
21 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then you referred to the B/C/S page 51. My start
23 with 87 and then 88. I do not see any 51 there. I can find 41, but --
24 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, 41 in the English, Your Honour, correct.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And B/C/S?
1 MR. TIEGER: 51, or 02154350.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I see. It's split up into -- yes, that always
3 confuses me a bit. If you start with the English and then have some
4 B/C/S, then comes some English.
5 MR. TIEGER: I have the same problem.
6 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear, thank you.
7 MR. TIEGER: We will see a short, first full paragraph that says,
8 "For those reasons ..." the next paragraph beginning, "The fact is that
9 they have ..." and then if the Court goes down 15 lines, there is very
10 left -- there is, for purposes of identification, you'll see RS down that
11 -- at the -- one of the far left, and then the sentence after that
12 states: "There are two or three goals of RS that this Assembly defined at
13 its first session in Banja Luka, that is access to the sea, the Neretva
14 River valley, a clean Drina, participation of the Herzegovina Corps in the
15 possible division of Sarajevo, et cetera."
16 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Mijatovic's reference to "a clean Drina"
17 is again a reference to strategic objective number 3, and its goal of
18 ensuring that Eastern Bosnia would be in the possession of the Bosnian
19 Serbs in order to ensure that that territory remained "ours" and that it
20 was not a border between two Serb states or two Serb worlds. Isn't that
22 A. No, no. This was not a goal. You know that. It's how he
23 interprets it in 1995 when a specific plan was topical, in order to get as
24 many territories in the eastern part of Republika Srpska as possible.
25 This is the plan of the contact group. He's actually calling on those
1 strategic goals in order to get the map to be as good as possible.
2 Mistakenly, of course. There are many other mistakes he made.
3 Q. He is calling on the strategic goals, and he's explaining what
4 they mean, and he's saying, essentially, what I put to you at the
5 beginning of my questions about strategic objective number 3, that it
6 meant that the Drina area was not to be a border between two Serb worlds
7 but the backbone of two Serb worlds. Isn't that right? Isn't that what
8 strategic objective number 3 was about?
9 A. No. That's not the objective. I told you, one-fourth of the
10 Drina forms a border between Bosnia and Serbia. So the rest of the border
11 is not the Drina. Other features formed the border. In Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina the border is only two-thirds of the river. Only from Zvornik
13 to Bijeljina. Look at the map and you'll see. And that was held by the
14 Serbs. That's what Serbs used as crossing, not other parts.
15 But what is meant is the psychological border. Serbs were on both
16 sides of the river in Bijeljina so you could cross over without a
17 passport. That's what he meant. And he's making here an interpretation
18 of the contact group plan and trying to achieve as good positions as
19 possible. He himself is from Bijeljina, from Eastern Bosnia.
20 Q. Before the break let's turn to your own remarks on November 1st,
21 1995, in -- article in Srpska Oslobodjenje. I think that's an extra, Your
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, that would receive number? Would that
24 be P1241, Mr. Registrar?
25 THE REGISTRAR: Indeed, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And that's an Oslobodjenje article, 1st of November,
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Now, P1241, in front of you now, Mr. Krajisnik, should be at least
5 somewhat familiar to you. It's an article in Srpska Oslobodjenje from
6 November, 1995. And if you'll look to page 5, it has two pictures of you
7 there, and at the bottom of the left -- the second to the left column, and
8 beginning at the very top of the right-hand column, you'll see the remarks
9 to which I'm going to direct your attention. So it would be immediately
10 opposite the bottom picture of you. And it begins, "I will remind you of
11 something." You see that, Mr. Krajisnik?
12 And in the English, Your Honours -- the English. You got the
13 translation before you.
14 "I will remind you of something. At the beginning of the war, we
15 adopted six strategic goals. The first was to separate ourselves from
16 Muslims --"
17 A. [No interpretation].
18 MR. TIEGER: I'm not getting translation.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You said -- I'm sorry, I can't find
20 it. Because it's my interview, I really want to find this passage. You
21 said it was opposite or above the photo?
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if you look in my direction, you see that page, the
24 large page with the two photos?
25 A. Yes. That's the end, and you said above.
1 Q. If you'll look to that portion opposite the picture at the bottom,
2 in that small -- in the left-hand column, beneath the header. "I will
3 remind you of something. At the beginning of the war we adopted six
4 strategic goals."
5 A. Yes, I see it.
6 Q. And continuing: "The first was to separate ourselves from Muslims
7 and Croats. We did not say that we would create a state, even though we
8 will have started with the creation of a state at a later stage. Then we
9 asked for a corridor to link the western and eastern part, and we will
10 continue to insist on this. The third thing was that the Drina must not
11 be the border but the backbone of the Serbian people except for Gorazde."
12 And then you continued discussing the fourth, fifth, and six
13 goals, and conclude, "All the strategic objectives that our soldiers and
14 our people died for, all these strategic goals are within our reach."
15 That's a reflection in your own words, Mr. Krajisnik, of the fact
16 that the third strategic objective was intended to ensure that the Drina
17 would not be a border, as you said, but the backbone, between those two
18 Serbian worlds, just as Dr. Karadzic said on May 12th, 1992.
19 A. Maybe I did repeat the term "backbone." I did. But I assure you,
20 it says here precisely "except Gorazde." A moment ago you were trying to
21 persuade me that we wanted to take Gorazde. Here it says the contrary.
22 This is about Dayton. There was a map, and that map is still in
23 existence. We had already agreed the aims with Mr. Holbrooke that
24 Republika Srpska would be in one piece, and I'm talking about the
25 objectives that we have to attain at Dayton. This is before Dayton. And,
1 of course, I was putting it roughly, without specifying. But I'm assuring
2 you that it's not what you think it is. I was referring to a border that
3 we could just go through. Why would I otherwise say backbone if there is
4 no border between Bosnia and Serbia. Look at the beginning, we had
5 already given up on a state. I read it here in the beginning. We made a
6 sacrifice and abandoned the idea of Yugoslavia, a state. You cannot have
7 a backbone if there are two states. I'll read you -- I'll read to you
8 another quotation from this same article.
9 Q. Well, I think the imagery of backbone is pretty clear,
10 Mr. Krajisnik, especially in this context. A backbone is that portion
11 that supports and is between what roughly amounts to a single entity, and
12 that's what you meant there.
13 A. Well, no. Please, if it's highlighted here, we made a great
14 sacrifice. We abandoned the idea of our own state and accepted a Bosnian
15 union in order to get an entrance ticket for a common delegation. That's
16 what I said in that article. Here it is, at the top of the article. Even
17 cultural linkage, educational linkage with Serbia would be special ties.
18 We even accepted Bosnia as a state. If I read this whole article, I
19 guarantee that I didn't say any different from what I testified here. I
20 know exactly what my approach was.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, could we perhaps move to your next
22 question. This is what Mr. Krajisnik has explained to us --
23 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- quite a couple of times, that what the Drina not
25 being a border meant to him, and just to further analyse newspapers,
1 articles of which we do not even know whether these are exactly the words
2 of Mr. Krajisnik, and apart from the explanations given already, it
3 doesn't assist the Chamber very much. Please --
4 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, before Mr. Krajisnik referred to other
5 parts of this article --
6 JUDGE ORIE: He wants to draw our attention.
7 MR. JOSSE: I was going to inquire whether the Prosecution
8 intended to have the rest of it translated. I was concerned about
9 context, and I emphasise that was before the witness said what he has just
10 said. Having said that, if the Chamber is saying this article doesn't
11 really assist them in their deliberations, then I'm certainly not going to
12 pursue the point.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I still would have to discuss with my
14 colleagues whether it would have the minimal weight as I at this moment
15 might have in mind.
16 MR. JOSSE: Well, if the Chamber are prepared to give that
17 indication, it would certainly help the Defence. I don't know what my
18 learned friend's position is.
19 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --
20 JUDGE ORIE: I seem not to be the only one in this Chamber.
21 MR. JOSSE: I'm not asking it to be translated.
22 MR. TIEGER: I leave to the Court, of course, its assessment of
23 weight. I want to point out, however, that this is an official -- Srpska
24 Oslobodjenje had the official imprimatur of RS, was praised by
25 Mr. Krajisnik himself, so to that extent, it's not just another newspaper
1 article. Now the content is another story, and I leave that to the Court,
2 but I don't want the Court to be misled about the nature of the
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It doesn't change our mind, as far as
5 requesting a translation of the whole of the newspaper article and, of
6 course, Mr. Josse, it's up to you if there are other portions which you
7 would like to draw our attention to, of course, you're fully free to do
9 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed. No. Let's not proceed. Let's have
11 a break. We will adjourn until five minutes past 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.11 a.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, earlier this morning, we talked about borders
17 between Bosnia and Serbia. I think that was about 9.30 of your testimony.
18 Republika Srpska, and Serbia and so on.
19 When we looked at the video showing you at the ethnic map,
20 indicating the territories held by the Bosnian Serbs, it clearly appeared
21 that there would be no border of any non-Serb entity between Republika
22 Srpska and Serbia at that time, or at least, based on the territories that
23 you were indicating. What was the border in Eastern Bosnia as of late
24 1992, according to Republika Srpska authorities?
25 A. That map is a proposal put forth to the international community.
1 We wanted the enclaves that were Muslim in the eastern part to be
2 exchanged for certain Serb territories. So that's a proposal. That was
3 the proposal that was sent to the European Community, or rather, to the
4 negotiators. In fact, in 1992, there was Srebrenica, Gorazde - I don't
5 know what else - Zepa, and so on.
6 Q. And the Assembly declared what the border of Republika Srpska was
7 in Eastern Bosnia and other portions of what was determined to be or
8 sought --
9 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask one thing? Mr. Krajisnik, you say
10 that the map, so that's a proposal, that was the proposal that we sent to
11 the European Community. In your comment, you start saying, "We are
12 standing in front of the ethnic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the former
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We've marked borders of the territory that is
14 presently held by the Bosnian Serb army." I'm trying to reconcile the map
15 as being a proposal and a map characterised in this television clip as
16 presenting the territory presently held by the Bosnian Serb army. Could
17 you please clarify.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are two maps. One is on the
19 foil and the other one is underneath. And we sent a similar map to the
20 European Community. I think that that is contained in that interview.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But where we find the borders, from what I
22 remember, the underlying map is the ethnic map. And the borders, when you
23 speak these words, you see the borders. And I mean, an ethnic map of
24 course - at least that's my understanding - could not reflect territory
25 held by, because then every ethnic bit or piece --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, you're right.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I took it that the map with the line on it was the
3 map reflecting the territory presently held by the Bosnian Serb army.
4 That's how I understood that comment. Now, if you say a proposal, a
5 proposal similarly, I would say, could not be just reflecting the ethnic
6 composition, because then you would have this very complicated picture.
7 So even your answer has not reconciled where you now said that the map was
8 a proposal - that's the map with the lines, because proposals are about
9 lines and not about ethnic composition, I would think - whereas in the
10 television clip you said it's the territory presently held. Unless, of
11 course, the proposals would completely be in accordance with the territory
12 you held at that time, but that was not my understanding until now. Could
13 you please clarify.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor asked me about 1992,
15 and I said that in 1992, Srebrenica was in Muslim hands. Zepa, Gorazde as
16 well. All of that is on the Drina.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just have a look. Yes. The question said, if
18 we are looking at the video showing you at the ethnic map, that it clearly
19 appeared that there would be no border, et cetera, et cetera. The
20 question then was what was the border in Eastern Bosnia as of late 1992
21 according to the Republika Srpska authorities? And then you said, that
22 map is a proposal. You were not asked about whether the map was a
23 proposal or reflected reality, but I nevertheless would like to know, is
24 this map now giving a proposal or is the map reflecting the territory
25 actually held by the Republika Srpska armed forces?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether this is
2 contained in the stenographic notes, but my understanding was that I was
3 asked where the Muslim border was on the border. I understood this to
4 mean where are the areas that are border areas on the Drina. Now I'll
5 explain the map, yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. I'd like to have an answer to my question
7 but I do agree with you that the question was not clear because whether in
8 the eastern -- in Eastern Bosnia, when we are talking about borders, it
9 could be borders between Serbian held territory within Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina and the border with Muslim-held territory, where it could also
11 refer to borders between Serbian-held parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
12 Serbia proper. So therefore the question, I would agree with you, was not
13 entirely clear, at least it was not to me, but I nevertheless would like
14 to have an answer to my question whether the map you're standing in front
15 of with the flip-over on it, the lines on it, does that reflect a proposal
16 or does it reflect the Serbian held territory?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From this point of view, I cannot
18 say what map it was, because in 1992, if it was in 1992, I could not say
19 that we were holding Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa when we were not holding
20 that. Well, we couldn't have. We certainly couldn't have. Up until the
21 end of the war, that was in Muslim hands. That's why I'm perplexed too
22 when it says that it's held by our armed forces because we did not hold
23 that, and that's a well known fact. But at the same time, I said this is
24 the map that we gave to the international community, so that is how I
25 tried to explain this to myself.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And any other respect, I do understand, and you
2 gave some comment on enclaves, especially in the Drina area. You did not
3 comment on any other matters, such as, well, for example, Prijedor being
4 under Muslim control --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I didn't, no.
6 JUDGE ORIE: No. Okay. That's -- let's move on. And perhaps
7 about the borders, Mr. Tieger, could you clearly --
8 MR. TIEGER: I'll make it as clear as possible, Your Honour.
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, didn't the Bosnian Serb Assembly declare that the
10 indisputable border of Republika Srpska was the -- in the east, that is
11 the eastern border, was the border with the Federal Republic of
12 Yugoslavia, and didn't that happen in 1992?
13 A. Well, all right. The border is on the Drina, from Bijeljina to
14 Zvornik, yes, that's Serb territory. If that's it, then yes, that's it.
15 You know what? Along the border with Yugoslavia, on the Drina, there are
16 few Muslim territories. Well, maybe this is not very clear. Perhaps I
17 should try to explain it a bit better. I'm trying to guess what you're
18 looking for.
19 Q. I'm simply asking you about an issue that was raised before, and
20 that is where Republika Srpska determined the boundaries of its territory
21 to be, and so my question is, and I think you answered it but you can
22 clarify if not, that at the 17th Assembly session --
23 A. No, no, no. I did not answer, no.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. Please, let me tell you something. The 17th session was two
1 months after the 12th of May. We never determined the borders of
2 Republika Srpska. We always said that they would be agreed upon at the
3 peace negotiations. If there were some discussions and explanations, they
4 weren't conclusions. So that's a different matter. And those were
5 objections made to us, that we didn't have any borders.
6 Q. Well, perhaps we can clarify this by turning to the transcript of
7 the 17th session itself, at page 103 and 104 of the English.
8 A. Could you please get one for me, too?
9 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik, once -- you don't have that.
10 A. Just a moment. Let me just get it. I'm so sorry. Please go
12 Q. If you would turn, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 02149599, those are the
13 concluding remarks that you made at that session, beginning at the bottom
14 of 9599, and Your Honours, at the bottom of page 103. You stated:
15 "Before we close, since we have finished with the agenda, last night we
16 discussed the borders. I move that the Assembly adopt the text because we
17 discussed it last night, only the borders. And that we adopt the text
18 today for the sake of the minutes. Aiming to end the hostilities and
19 protect the civilians as well as to enable the functioning of the rule of
20 law, the Assembly of Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina at its 17th
21 session held on 25 July, 1992, brought unanimously a decision on
22 establishing disputable and indisputable borders of its territory in the
23 following ways: The indisputable borders are, the western border is the
24 Una River, the northern border is the Sava River, the eastern border is
25 the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the southern border is
1 just one part of the border with Croatia, the south-west border is partly
2 the border with Croatia and partly with the Republic of Serb Krajina."
3 And then you go on to identify the disputable borders, indicate at
4 the bottom that those borders shall be subject to corrections and
5 verifications in accordance with international agreements and indicate
6 below that the Assembly has adopted the statement unanimously.
7 So it is correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that the declared border of
8 Republika Srpska as of July, 1992, was the border with the Federal
9 Republic of Yugoslavia.
10 A. Well, yes. From Zvornik to Bijeljina. Certainly. That's where
11 our border was with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. You see, from
12 Visegrad onwards, there is Rudo, Cajnice, so on, all of that is our
13 territory, but we are not talking about the entire border. Not all of the
14 Drina River is the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina but only a small part of it.
16 Q. Republika Srpska was struggling to establish itself and control
17 territory that would be recognised by the international community and to
18 identify the borders of that entity but everybody knew where the borders
19 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were, and that --
20 A. Well, no, I'm sorry.
21 Q. And that territory coincides with exactly what is depicted in the
22 ethnic map where you are pointing out the territories controlled by the
23 Bosnian Serbs.
24 A. This is the month of July, and that map was much later. The map
25 came later, because I have that black ribbon after August, 1992. On that
1 map I'm wearing the black ribbon because my wife had died, so that's not
2 it. This is where we established the disputed and undisputed territories,
3 we did not establish the borders of Republika Srpska. We just established
4 what was disputed and what was not disputed, because after this session we
5 embarked on negotiations, and now what was it that we were supposed to
6 advocate at these negotiations? From this session, we went to the London
8 Q. In the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina what's the difference
9 between the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs as indicated on that
10 map and the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
11 A. Are you asking me about this Assembly or the map? If you're
12 asking about the map, I'll explain the map. If you're asking me about the
13 session, I'll explain the session but, please, do not link up the two.
14 They are totally unrelated. I cannot explain this which came later. I
15 already said that. But this is different. Over there, Neretva is the
16 border, and here Neretva is not in dispute, so there are hundreds of
17 things that are different. On the map, the Neretva is the border, whereas
18 here, that territory is in dispute.
19 Q. I wasn't asking about the Neretva. I was asking about the area in
20 Eastern Bosnia, Podrinje, the Drina, the area that we have been discussing
21 in connection with strategic objective number 3. In July, the Assembly
22 declared that that border would be the border with the Federal Republic of
23 Yugoslavia. When we look at the map, it seems to encompass the
24 territories held by the Bosnian Serb appear to encompass that entire
25 territory along that border. Is that right or wrong?
1 A. I mean, please, as for this particular point, from the
2 southernmost part of eastern Republika Srpska, all the way up to Gorazde,
3 the border is not on the Drina. And that is Serb territory. And then you
4 skip over to Zvornik, and then from Zvornik to Bijeljina the border is on
5 the Drina and that is Serb territory and that's where the Federal Republic
6 of Yugoslavia is. Only between Visegrad and Zvornik is there Muslim
7 territory. Gorazde is not the border with the Federal Republic of
8 Yugoslavia. It's only behind Gorazde. So that's where we have the border
9 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in certain sections.
10 Q. Well, maybe I'm -- can I ask you to turn to tab 229 very quickly.
11 A. Yes, yes, you can see it here.
12 Q. Well, let me ask you a quick question. The green represents the
13 territory of what -- what was Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least at the
14 beginning of 1992, correct?
15 A. I didn't quite understand. The green, you mean?
16 Q. This is Bosnia-Herzegovina, right?
17 A. Oh, yes, yes, yes, Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes, yes. We can put it on
18 the map, or rather, we can put this map here, and then I can explain what
19 I was trying to say.
20 Q. If it's necessary I'll be happy to do that. To the right is
21 Serbia and Montenegro as we see labelled on the map.
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. Part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
24 A. Yes, yes.
25 Q. So the difference between the green and the white is the border of
1 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is it not?
2 A. Correct. And, please, can I just explain what I was trying to
3 say? Can we just put the map here on the ELMO? I'll explain what we
4 wanted. All of this is the border, up to here, objective 3, all of that
5 is the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, if you want to point at something, it
7 should be done on the ELMO.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please --
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, yes, please, I would like to ask
11 for that.
12 This is the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, all
13 the way up to here, this part here. And up here, this is Serb territory,
14 from this part here -- no, sorry, from this part here. Now, this is the
15 Drina. That belongs to the Muslim part. And we have a border with the
16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; all of this. So it's not this part here
17 but this part down here as well. Herzegovina, that's ours.
18 I actually wrote that down here, over here. That's the part --
19 well, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde is here, Mr. President, right here.
20 It's not on the border. Rudo is behind it.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, one additional question.
22 You said, on from Zvornik, up to Bijeljina, that's Serb territory. Now
23 you have explained to us in quite some detail that we should look at
24 territories not just by majority in a municipality, but to look more
25 detailed at certain parts which would, although in a majority A
1 municipality --
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- would nevertheless be a majority B community or
4 village or town. Now, if I look at the map you presented to us, that is
5 D192A, which is the more detailed map with even the red marking you made
6 on that, I see that there are at least some of the border areas, although
7 in a Serb majority municipality, seem not to be really Serb territories in
8 the sense that there may have been, at the border there, majorities --
9 other ethnic majorities. So you already explained to us and emphasised
10 very much that we should not just look at the majority beyond
11 municipality, but what you seem to do here, yourself, is to claim that it
12 was all Serb territory, although we find here villages or at least areas,
13 territories, which are not on your own map depicted as of Serb majority.
14 So I'm just wondering what approach we then should take. Now you say this
15 is Serb territory, and on your own map it's not depicted as such, unless
16 you look at it municipality by municipality, not in further detail, but
17 you emphasised that we had to look at it in further detail and not just
18 municipality by municipality. Could you please clarify that on what basis
19 you now say that especially the border area that's all Serb territory.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we please just have the map
21 that you're talking about placed here? And then I can explain. I'll
22 explain here in a minute.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Tab 228, the first -- the first map in 228. Tab 228
24 is missing?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Somebody stole my map,
1 Mr. President. That is really -- and I'm so enamoured of this map.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it is with us, Mr. Krajisnik.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If it's with you, then that is a
4 cause for special concern.
5 Now, Mr. President, this is the border. All of this is the border
6 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Now, I was saying that we have a
7 border here, Herzegovina and Montenegro, right here. Then here there is
8 also part of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over
9 here also the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over here
10 is the border. And here as well. Of course, there are enclaves too. I'm
11 not denying the fact that these enclaves were Muslim. We were saying that
12 we have a border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And we do, of
13 course. Not the whole border. Nobody said it was the whole border. Over
14 here, this part was always in dispute. This is the Drina here. From here
15 onwards, the Drina.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but I was mainly focusing on what you said about
17 from Zvornik to Bijeljina, so further up north, you said this is Serb
18 territory, and do I now understand that you say it's Serb territory
19 although there were Muslim enclaves even at the border?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. Well, yes, you're right,
21 yes. I mean Semberija is really majority -- well, that's what I meant.
22 But here, all of this is Muslim, yes, absolutely. And I don't think it's
23 any different.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And then, in your view, was it justified then to take
25 to take military control over those what you called enclaves or those
1 smaller territories at the border which were of Muslim majority?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it wasn't. Well, like the
3 other side too. But that absolutely did happen during the war but it was
4 not right. Had we had a peaceful settlement, then, of course, it goes
5 without saying that everybody would have had what belonged to them. So it
6 wasn't right. But, please, in my interview, I also say we have to get our
7 ethnic territories back, and you know which ones, the interview that I
8 gave before going to Dayton.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you say if there is a Muslim majority which
10 would have been in the smaller areas where a peaceful solution would most
11 likely have led to giving each ethnicity what belonged to it, that under
12 those war circumstances, it was not right to take military control over
13 those smaller areas which were Muslim majority areas.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, everybody took it over.
15 You're completely right. Just a minute. You see, the Sava River, it's
16 all the border. Here we have a border with Croatia, down there. Here,
17 the Una is the border. That was explained in terms of undisputed
18 territories. The Neretva River valley is in dispute.
19 JUDGE ORIE: My question was --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We explained that when we set off
21 for the negotiations.
22 JUDGE ORIE: My question was exclusively on the Zvornik-Bijeljina
23 area. Thank you for your answer. Mr. Tieger.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, one of the issues in connection with strategic
2 objective number 3 was the concern about Muslims establishing a line that
3 would lead through Sandzak, Kosovo, and the Albania part of Macedonia
4 through into Bosnia-Herzegovina territory. That is into the territory of
5 what you called former Bosnia-Herzegovina, correct? That's one of the
6 things that Dr. Karadzic articulated at the 16th session.
7 A. There was a certain number of deputies, right, you're right, who
8 were talking about the green thoroughfare. If we place the map, you'll
9 see from Sandzak through Kosovo, in the minds of Muslims, all this was
10 Muslim ethnic area, down to Macedonia. That's what certain people said.
11 Because, before the Berlin Congress, Sandzak used to be part of the
12 Ottoman empire, together with Bosnia.
13 I looked also at the map of the Muslim delegation. I'm saying I
14 saw at the negotiations the map of the Muslim delegation, where they
15 annexed Sandzak to Bosnia, in one version, because Sandzak has a majority
16 Muslim population, and that was put on the table a couple of times. And
17 if you had a map in front of you of Serbia, you would see that there is a
18 belt that indeed makes a connection. Whether it's just identified or not,
19 I don't know, but it had been presented.
20 Q. Well, first of all you said that a certain number of deputies were
21 talking about the green thoroughfare or green transversal. In fact, just
22 as Dr. Karadzic was enunciating the strategic objectives, he expressed
23 that concern to the deputies, correct? You find that on page 12, if you
24 need to, and -- but if you remember it, we can -- I can move on to my next
25 question. Dr. Karadzic said, at page 12 of the English and page 7722 of
1 the B/C/S --
2 A. The same session, you say?
3 Q. Of the 16th session.
4 A. Yes, yes. I agree.
5 Q. Okay. And that was one of the things that made the Drina and
6 securing control of the Drina area so important, the interest in cutting
7 that off, that green transversal off.
8 A. Only the strategic objectives as read are strategic objectives.
9 The rest of the rationale were meant in order to sell the strategic
10 objectives to the deputies so that we are able to go to attend
11 negotiations. And all the deputies knew about the problem of the green
12 transversal and Karadzic took avail of that in order to ensure the
13 continuation of the peace conference. That has nothing to do with the
14 strategic objectives that we presented to the European Community.
15 Q. Well, it wasn't just discussed with the deputies, Mr. Krajisnik,
16 it was also discussed by members of the Bosnian Serb political leadership,
17 including yourself, with military leaders; isn't that right?
18 A. I don't remember that, but there was frequent discussion about
19 that Muslim objective because we were aware of it, and it was frequently
20 discussed because we knew why they wanted to have that, because they
21 wanted to link up Gorazde with Novi Pazar up there.
22 Q. If we could turn quickly to the 20th session, page 14 and 15 of
23 the English, Your Honours; and, Mr. Krajisnik, page 14 and 15 of the
24 B/C/S. Your Honours, you'll find that at the last paragraph beginning on
25 page 14. Mr. Krajisnik, you'll find it in the same place in the B/C/S,
1 approximately the middle of the last paragraph. You'll see the names
2 "Krajisnik, Koljevic and I" in the middle of that. They might serve as
4 A. I need time to find it. It takes me a while every time. If it's
5 on page 15, I need time to find it. Oh, you say 14. I found it. It's on
6 page 14. Please go ahead.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the 20th Assembly session?
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Page 14 and 15. There could be a -- I think our ends
10 at page 12.
11 MR. TIEGER: Are you looking in the tabs or the actual session,
12 Your Honour?
13 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the Assembly session number 20, 14th
14 and 15th September, 1992, held in Bijeljina, where it ends as was -- as
15 far as we are concerned, page 12.
16 MR. JOSSE: No problem in our -- the binder that was provided to
17 the Defence.
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we can provide the -- well, excuse me.
19 MR. JOSSE: I think Your Honour has different binders, so my
20 comment doesn't help at all.
21 MR. TIEGER: The same binders, to the best of my knowledge, were
22 distributed to the Defence and the Chamber, and it's the same binder we
23 are using, but for the time being, Your Honour, if I could just provide
24 the Court with a full copy of the 20th from --
25 JUDGE ORIE: If you give me -- yes, we have -- yes.
1 MR. JOSSE: If it would help, mine can be put on the ELMO.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if that could be done, that would certainly
3 help. And the exhibit number would be, Mr. --
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I --
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the --
7 JUDGE ORIE: We have a -- it might be a difference that the one is
8 [Microphone not activated] The difficulty might be that the one is a
9 relatively short and the other a relatively long record. The one saying
10 minutes of the National Assembly same date, same year, whereas the other
11 says verbatim record of the 20th, so it seems that there are two versions,
12 one minutes and one verbatim record.
13 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. I believe at one time we were only in
14 possession of the minutes. That may have been early in the case. At some
15 point I recall that the Court asked for all the Assembly material from
16 1991, 1992; at that point we ensured that the Court had all of the
17 sessions, including any small portions of sessions that were available,
18 for example, the 21st session we only had one small portion from, as I
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. We can proceed. We have got it. It's
21 on the ELMO. Could you still give me the exhibit number, which allows me
22 to browse myself instead of being dependent on others?
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar told me it's P65 tab 200.
25 MR. TIEGER: I'm only waiting to ensure that that is the full
1 session that we are looking at on paper.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No. It's the short session. Okay. Let's proceed
3 and we'll find perhaps another full text copy.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I -- excuse me.
6 [Prosecution counsel confer]
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Looking at page 14 of the English and again at the portion you
9 found at page 14 in the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik, it states in part, "Messrs.
10 Krajisnik, Koljevic and I --" and I should note this is Dr. Karadzic
11 speaking. So again, starting again: "Messrs. Krajisnik, Koljevic and I
12 were in Visegrad yesterday and then we went to Rudo. The military
13 leadership of the Cajnice Brigade was in Rudo and we discussed the
14 situation. Since easing pressure on Gorazde meant more tension in those
15 municipalities, we will again have to increase pressure on Gorazde to ease
16 pressure from those municipalities. Consultations with commanders will be
17 held here tomorrow and we believe that we will adopt some very important
18 decisions with them. Namely, the Drina is of great strategic importance.
19 It is of vital strategic importance. If the green transversal is cut off
20 at the Drina, Muslim Bosnia will lose in importance. In that case Europe
21 will definitely walk away from Alija."
22 And then it continues on to page 15, talking, continuing on about
23 whether Europe will give up on Alija and what he hopes to achieve. "In
24 that sense, tomorrow we will agree to go back to Gorazde and I think that
25 the Assembly will support the idea to secure the Drina and all Serbian
1 municipalities and homes on the Drina. This way we will link up with the
2 East Bosnia Corps."
3 So first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, that's a reflection of discussions
4 not only with deputies but with military commanders by the members of the
5 Bosnian Serb leadership, about the green transversal and its significance.
6 A. Well, you see here that Mr. Karadzic will talk, and of course I
7 also attended the conference in Bijeljina. I said I attended two
8 conferences with the army; one at Pale, one in Bijeljina. Of course, they
9 were telling us their strategy. Here it says that we eased the pressure
10 on Gorazde and they then increased the pressure on Rudo and Cajnice. I
11 can tell you why we went to Rudo and how.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm focussing on the significance in the minds of
13 the Bosnian Serb leaders of the area of the Drina including the concern
14 about the green transversal. Looking at the map you showed us in tab 228,
15 that is D192A, that red squiggly line you drew wouldn't have any
16 appreciable deterring impact on Muslim efforts to establish a connection
17 between Sandzak and Muslim territory, would it? In other words, it
18 wouldn't address the green transversal concern.
19 A. No. I don't know how they would have dealt with it, but I'm
20 saying they wanted to link up Bosnia with Sandzak, up to Sarajevo. How
21 they wanted to do that, only they know, but that was the plan that we were
22 aware of. Whether it was a serious one or not, I don't know.
23 Q. And the question is simple: That red squiggly line in D192A
24 wouldn't have stopped whatever plan the Bosnian Serb leadership thought
25 the Muslims had, but controlling the territory along the Drina, having a
1 border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, would prevent that,
2 wouldn't it?
3 A. No. No, Mr. Prosecutor. I showed you where the border lay, but
4 in the area of Gorazde, Visegrad, Rudo, Cajnice, that was the area that
5 the Muslims wanted to link up with Sandzak, only that, and where else
6 towards Sarajevo, I don't know. But that was their objective, as we found
7 in some discussions with them, because they thought Sandzak belonged to
8 Bosnia. And, of course, they would have taken part of our territory;
9 Rudo, Cajnice, and maybe Mount Romanija.
10 Q. I want to move on to another subject, Mr. Krajisnik, and that is
11 the -- where we might find the relationship between the articulation of
12 political objectives and the implementation of military plans. First of
13 all, on page 14 of the 16th Assembly session - in the English, it's the
14 second paragraph, and 7723 of your version - we find Dr. Karadzic
15 explaining the sixth strategic goal and saying: "The sixth strategic goal
16 is the access of the Serbian Republic --"
17 A. Just a minute, please. Let me find it. That's page 8. Yes.
18 Please go ahead.
19 Q. He says that: "The sixth strategic goal is the access of the
20 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the sea. It is not unimportant.
21 It is very important, but some things are more important than others, or
22 more feasible than others."
23 So that's an expression, is it not, of the fact that at least at
24 the time of its articulation, strategic objective number 6, although
25 deemed important, was still a lower priority than the other strategic
2 A. They had to be prioritised, so that it ended up in sixth place,
3 but that doesn't mean it was much less important than Sarajevo and Drina,
4 say. But it's much less important than the first objective. That is, to
5 have Republika Srpska and a corridor through the Sava River valley. But
6 you cannot put all the objectives in one place. You cannot lump them all
7 together. And this particular objective was discussed in Graz before
8 this, in the presence of a Croat representative.
9 Q. Okay. And if we turn to tab 210, at page 130 of the English and
10 page 02150645 of the B/C/S, again, that's the 34th session of the RS
11 National Assembly. We've turned to this before. And there, at about a
12 dozen lines from the bottom of the page in English, Mr. Krajisnik, you
13 say: "That is our sixth strategic goal. I have to remind you when we
14 were accepting this goals. We added this goal as 'Come on, son, but it's
15 not the time yet.'"
16 And I take it that's another expression of what you just described
17 to us earlier, that the goals had to be prioritised and the -- this
18 particular goal, although important, took its place at the bottom of the
20 A. It's certainly much less important than the second objective, but
21 it was -- it depended on Croatia. It didn't depend on Muslims and Croats
22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It depended on agreement with Croatia. That's
23 not something we were able to resolve with Muslims and Croats in Bosnia.
24 Q. And that particular place in the Bosnian Serb leadership
25 priorities would be consistent with the first directive which you
1 discussed yesterday, found at tab 197. That's General Mladic's order of
2 June 6, 1992. That's P1154, Your Honour.
3 And Mr. Krajisnik, if we just look quickly at --
4 A. Just a minute.
5 Q. Sure, I'm sorry.
6 A. You're so quick. It's very difficult to follow you.
7 Q. Please take your time. I want you to --
8 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, Mr. Tieger, we are now spending
9 four or five minutes on whether it was a bit less or much less important
10 or priorities. Of course, I take it that we are heading for something but
11 until now, it escapes my mind what actually the issue is.
12 MR. TIEGER: I hope it will become apparent in a moment, Your
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I take it.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Just looking quickly at that, Mr. Krajisnik, we see the tasks of
17 the various corps, including at the bottom of page 4 of the English, and
18 at page 03629107 of your version, the tasks of the Herzegovina Corps. I
19 want you to look quickly at that to see and confirm that it doesn't
20 include any instructions related to access to the sea or obtaining
21 territory that would provide such access. That's correct, isn't it?
22 A. No, no access to the sea. If it's only the Herzegovina part.
23 Q. Okay. Well, I haven't seen in that directive any instructions to
24 any other corps that would direct it towards the sea or toward territory
25 that would provide access to the sea. You're more than welcome to look it
1 over, but that's my reading of that document.
2 Now, in the 17th session --
3 A. I take your word for it.
4 Q. In the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly --
5 A. I found it.
6 Q. At page 32 through 33, and page 02149526 of your version --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That begins the middle of the page, Your Honours, where
9 Dr. Koljevic states: "The Presidency has concluded that we propose to the
10 Assembly one of our statements on the borders, which I will read to you
11 now and which you can amend, or adopt, or reject."
12 He continues on to the bottom of that paragraph: "That is why we
13 thought that we should describe the borders generally enough and that
14 where and how it is possible should be made concrete in the field."
15 Then he begins to describe them, and in the beginning, the last
16 paragraph on page 33, states: "The western border is the Una and Neretva.
17 The northern outside border is the Sava. The eastern outside border is
18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The southern outside border is part
19 of the Croatian border, we say part of it because there are possibilities,
20 that is, we will claim rights to an exit to the sea."
21 And then, if we continue on to your comments at page 48 through 49
22 of the English, and page 49 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik, toward the
23 beginning of your comments --
24 A. Just a minute, please.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... those pages.
1 A. Please go ahead.
2 Q. Okay. You state --
3 A. I found it. Please go ahead.
4 Q. You state at the beginning there: "You may not have understood
5 but Mr. Koljevic said that the borders were made by the people. ... The
6 people created the borders and we have to agree here today on territories
7 that are not under our control right now but to which we claim rights.
8 One of these rights is, and this is one of our strategic goals, the
9 natural right of the Serb people of Bosnia-Herzegovina for an exit to the
10 sea. We should embrace this standpoint because this Assembly has already
11 given one such strategic goal."
12 And I'm just going to turn you quickly to two more comments, at
13 page 65 through 66 of the English, and page 66 through 67 of your version,
14 beginning at the bottom of --
15 A. I have 67 -- oh, yes, I have it now.
16 Q. At the bottom of page 65, it's the third or fourth to last
17 sentence, about six lines up, Mr. Mijatovic saying: "I think that the
18 Assembly of the Serb people in Banja Luka precisely defined the goals and
19 we should not and must not give them up, especially not the goal number 6,
20 and that is the exit to the sea."
21 And finally, let me turn you to one more speaker at page 84 of the
22 English and page 86 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. And that's found at
23 the very bottom of the page. The previous speaker was Mr. Ostojic, but
24 there seemed to be indicated in the text another speaker whose name was
25 not captured as it was taken down, and he says, "My proposition --" again
1 that's found at the very bottom of the page at page 84. "My proposition
2 is that we give the army a task to come to the borders towards the
3 Tudjman's Croatia --"
4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [No interpretation].
5 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour, my apology.
6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I don't think that the pages
8 MR. TIEGER: Well, in this -- in the version I'm looking at, Your
9 Honours, Dr. Karadzic begins to speak at the bottom half of page 85. I
10 might be able to orient myself if --
11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Begins to speak at page 84.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's the minus one problem.
13 MR. TIEGER: Seems to be. So in that case, Your Honour, we would
14 presumably be looking at page 83.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. TIEGER: It's a portion which begins, "Gentlemen, I don't
17 think we can put --"
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It should be minus one.
19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Excuse me for interrupting you.
20 MR. TIEGER: Not at all, Your Honour, I'm very sorry that we
21 weren't --
22 JUDGE ORIE: It's the cover page problem.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. At the bottom of that page, that speaker says, again: "My
25 proposition is that we give the army a task to come to the borders towards
1 Tudjman's Croatia, that is to say, we should tell them ..."
2 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I directed your attention to all of those
3 portions because it appears to reflect an increased interest in and indeed
4 determination to see that strategic objective number 6, access to the sea,
5 begins to receive some attention.
6 A. This is a discussion that has to do with going to the conference,
7 and it's people from Herzegovina who are talking. They are interested in
8 having access to the sea. And what he says about getting to the border
9 with Croatia, well, Croatia took part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, above
10 Dubrovnik, and these parts were exclusively Serb. Look it up. You'll
11 find it. It's a narrow belt.
12 Q. So is it just a coincidence, then, Mr. Krajisnik, that a very
13 short time later, at the beginning of August, in directive number 3 - and
14 you can find that at tab 219 - General Mladic directed the Herzegovina
15 Corps to advance to the left bank of the River Neretva from Konjic to
16 Capljina and, if possible, to the administrative border with Croatia?
17 And Your Honours, that can be found at page 5 of the English and
18 page 5 of the B/C/S. That's P727, tab 15. Have you found that,
19 Mr. Krajisnik?
20 A. Well, what I see on page 5 is that it's the Herzegovina Corps, or,
21 rather, prevent any penetration from the area of Western Herzegovina and
22 Croatia in the area of the corps.
23 Q. Under "zadatak," task --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The Herzegovina Corps is directed to stop further enemy advances
1 in the corps zone toward Trebinje and Trnovo, advance to the left bank of
2 the river Neretva from Konjic to Capljina and, if possible, to the
3 administrative border with Croatia. That directive was issued a little
4 more than a week after the 17th session and the discussions which we saw
5 reflected in the text we just reviewed.
6 A. This has nothing to do with the 17th session. You see here that
7 at the 17th session they say we were at the Neretva and we left it.
8 That's page 85. This has nothing to do with it. And to be fair, Capljina
9 and Metkovic were never Serb. That's what it says at the 17th session.
10 Q. So is it your testimony, Mr. Krajisnik, that the issuance of this
11 task to the Herzegovina Corps shortly after the 17th session and the
12 expressions concerning the sixth strategic objective and access to the sea
13 at that session had no relation and were simply coincidental?
14 A. It's not even a coincidence. It has nothing to do with anything.
15 Access to the sea is something that we agreed upon three times with the
16 Croat side, and I'm going to give you all the maps when we agreed on this,
17 how to gain access to the sea through political means only. It has
18 nothing to do with military resources.
19 Another thing: The Yugoslav People's Army did have territory near
20 Dubrovnik. That is to say, when they withdrew, we did not take that
21 territory but it was Croat. We didn't have to take it. We could have
22 just taken it over from them. So this has nothing to do with anything.
23 He gave a directive, just like any other commander. And none of this was
24 carried through.
25 Q. It has nothing to do with anything. It has nothing to do with the
1 military resources, access to the sea was through political means only is
2 what I understand you to have just said, Mr. Krajisnik.
3 A. Exactly. Exactly. And we agreed upon that three times.
4 Q. Please turn to tab 222.
5 A. No, whether somebody did something else, that's a different
6 matter, but I do know what we were saying.
7 Q. That's directive number 4, which is P727, tab 18, and
8 Mr. Krajisnik, if you'll turn to --
9 A. I'm sorry, just a moment, please. Is that 222?
10 Q. That's correct.
11 A. This is some kind of information? I don't have 222. I have 223
12 and I have 221 as well.
13 Q. I think tab 222 is something you took with you yesterday.
14 MR. JOSSE: I think that's the problem. Mr. Krajisnik's documents
15 are being filleted for good reason.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, so what I take I don't give
17 back. That's the problem. The 23rd of November, 1992? Is that what
18 you're saying?
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Yes. Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, strictly
21 confidential number 02/5, et cetera, 19 November, 1992.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well the date of the 23rd of November also
23 appears, so that is apparently the same document.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if you'll turn to your page 00876276.
1 A. Yes, I found it.
2 Q. There, General Mladic indicates -- that's the top of page 3, Your
3 Honours, the first full paragraph. General Mladic indicating that the
4 following tasks from directive number 3 have not been carried out: One,
5 the towns of Gorazde, Gradacac, Maglaj, Bugojno, Olovo and Orasje have not
6 been liberated. Two, the Posavina corridor has not been substantially
7 widened. Three, the enemy groups in the wider area of Gorazde, Zepa,
8 Srebrenica and Cerska have not been totally routed. And four, the
9 Herzegovina Corps has failed to reach the left bank of the Neretva River
10 and secure access to the sea.
11 Now, two things, Mr. Krajisnik. First, General Mladic is making
12 clear that the portion of directive number 3 that we read a moment before
13 was intended to secure access to the sea. Correct?
14 A. Oh, no. He could have written whatever he wanted to but that had
15 nothing to do with access to the sea. He could have written anything he
16 wanted to write, because we were reaching agreement on a completely
17 different area in terms of access to the sea. The area of Prevlaka. I
18 have no idea what this means here, what he wrote here. What does that
19 mean, get to the Neretva River? That's not access to the sea.
20 Q. Well, I'm not going to debate military strategy with you,
21 Mr. Krajisnik, but this perhaps can be addressed quickly by simply looking
22 at tab 230, which doesn't contain a detailed map but perhaps one
23 sufficiently detailed. That's P401, for this purpose.
24 JUDGE ORIE: I've got on tab 230.
25 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Your Honour, tab 229.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, 229. Yes.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And that, the map at 229 is P68, tab 16, where we see the Neretva
4 pictured, the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the Adriatic Sea.
5 And it's clear there, is it not, Mr. Krajisnik, that if the Bosnian Serb
6 forces secure all the territory up to the Neretva, they will have that
7 little finger of access to the sea, correct?
8 A. Well, all of this was held by the Yugoslav People's Army. Had we
9 wanted that, we would have taken over the territory that they had been
10 holding. So this is not true. All of this area up to Dubrovnik was held
11 before that by the Yugoslav People's Army. The army of Republika Srpska
12 could have simply taken it over and that would have resolved the problem.
13 This is totally wrong. You have the map where I referred to the access to
14 the sea. This really has nothing to do with anything. Believe me. This
15 is a map that is wrong. This map drawn by Mr. Treanor. And Mr. Cosic
16 handed over Prevlaka to Mr. Owen and Mr. Vance. So they were not
17 expelled, they handed it over, and the Croatian army came there, and
18 Mr. Cosic did that as president of Yugoslavia. So why would Mladic have
19 to recapture this?
20 JUDGE ORIE: These latter events, when did they take place,
21 Mr. Krajisnik? The handing over and --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's all in Owen's book. I can look
23 it up. I can find it. When Cosic handed over -- I think it was 1992. I
24 think. After the shelling of Dubrovnik, that it was handed over after
25 that. I can look it up. I can find it. Mr. President, an agreement was
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is shelling of Dubrovnik, is that 1992?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it's 1992. I don't know. I
4 can look it up. I can show it to you tomorrow. I can put it to you
5 tomorrow, when this agreement was signed and when Prevlaka was handed
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't know that but I know there was a public
8 document in this Tribunal so that's my knowledge of the case law which
9 situates the shelling of Dubrovnik on the 8th of December, 1991, if I'm
10 well informed.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll bring it.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know when this was,
15 but the JNA was there and they handed it over.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. TIEGER: I'm looking at the time, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll have a break, 20 minutes, until ten
19 minutes to 1.00.
20 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, we checked it. It's December, 1991.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. JOSSE: Sorry to interrupt. When Your Honour wants to deal
25 with the document that Mr. Jonovic has translated, if at all.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could we have a look at it?
2 MR. JOSSE: Of course. Copies have been provided for all
4 JUDGE ORIE: To be quite honest, I see many, many, many of the
5 Presidency sessions which are all in evidence, unless there is anything --
6 MR. JOSSE: I think -- precisely, precisely.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I can imagine that you either use those comments in
8 preparing for re-examination or that you use it for final briefs or -- but
9 I don't think -- first of all, there is no need to have these documents
10 translated again. And let me just see, if you'd perhaps try to find out
11 whether all of these documents are in evidence, I could say by heart that
12 if it's not the full 100 per cent, then at least 90 per cent is already in
13 evidence and the parties can use it perhaps for further preparation of
14 whatever questions they would like to put. But no further translation
15 seems to be needed. Comments as such do not directly, I would say, regard
16 the Chamber. It would be kind of a silent additional testimony.
17 MR. JOSSE: So, in other words the document itself is not going to
18 become evidence.
19 JUDGE ORIE: No. Unless the parties would take a different
20 position and offer it in evidence. Of course, the parties can do whatever
21 they want to do with it.
22 MR. JOSSE: I'm content with that, Your Honour. We'll consider
23 the position.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger?
25 MR. TIEGER: At the moment I certainly don't see any basis for
1 admission, but I'm happy to discuss it with the Defence.
2 JUDGE ORIE: It seems that -- okay. Then, I'm going to return
3 this to Mr. Registrar, who was kind enough to provide it to us. But the
4 Chamber would very much like the parties to check whether all of these
5 documents are either in evidence or are disclosed, so that we don't
6 have --
7 MR. TIEGER: My immediate response is the same as the Court's.
8 They looked quite familiar.
9 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, it was already on the basis of
10 this morning's B/C/S version that I got that impression. Then the short
11 version of the -- which one was it? The speech by Dr. Karadzic that was
12 presented this morning. I think it was when we had the short and the long
13 version. No. There seems to be an except already in evidence in P892,
14 tab 60, but that's also an incomplete and only partial portion of that --
15 of those minutes.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the simplest thing may be at this point,
17 but I can consult with the Registry and of course leave it with the Court,
18 would be to simply give the complete version of the session a number and
19 have it, I guess it can't supersede the others, but at least it will be in
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That seems to be a sensible solution.
22 Mr. Josse any objection?
23 MR. JOSSE: No.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then we can proceed this way.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Could we distribute P65, tab 184. Those are the
3 minutes of the 21st session of the Presidency for the Serbian Republic of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina on August 2nd, 1992.
5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, as you can see, this session was attended by
6 Dr. Karadzic, Mrs. Plavsic, Dr. Koljevic, you, and General Mladic and
7 Colonel Tolimir, apology by Dr. Djeric.
8 And I just want to confirm, Mr. Krajisnik, that on August 2nd,
9 1992, approximately a week after the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb
10 Assembly and a day before General Mladic issued directive number 3, that
11 there was a briefing of the Bosnian Serb leadership as reflected in item
12 2, which states: "On the basis of the condition and assessment of the
13 political situation presented --" and Your Honours, again that's item 2 at
14 page 2 -- "Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic briefed those present on the
15 assessment of the military situation in Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina,
16 describing the situation in each combat sector, the necessary tasks, and
17 the connection between ensuring material potentials and financial
18 resources and the necessity of adopting a decision on general
19 mobilisation. Due to security considerations and the detailed nature of
20 the information, the conclusions and alternatives adopted were not put on
22 That's correct, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik, that's a reflection of a
23 detailed briefing by General Mladic the day before the issuance of
24 directive 3?
25 A. No. He did not really conduct a briefing. He came to ask for
1 funds, and that's the main reason why soldiers came to meetings. And it
2 was the London Conference that was on the agenda and then he talked about
3 his demands as well. Invariably, he attended sessions only in order to
4 submit his bills, to say what kind of support he needed. The directive,
5 no way. I never attended a session where any directive would be on the
7 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau was a question for you.
8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, [Microphone not
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm less interested in the fact
12 that a directive was issued. If I look at item 2, I can see that you talk
13 about describing the situation in each combat sector. Could we just look
14 at this, please? When you talk about describing the situation in each
15 combat sector, [In English] "General Mladic briefed those people present
16 on the military situation, describing the situation in each combat
17 sector." [Interpretation] So my question runs as follows: Do you agree
18 that you were directly informed by General Mladic of the situation -- of
19 the military situation in each sector where there was fighting on that
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, no. He's talking about sectors
22 in order to say that mobilisation should be carried out, and that he needs
23 resources. That is what his task was invariably. He never talked about
24 any kind of combat. Things like that were never on the agenda. A lack of
25 manpower and --
1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, I'm sorry, but
2 this is signed by President Karadzic, [In English] "Describing the
3 situation in each combat sector." [Interpretation] Do we need to
4 understand that all and everything was put in these minutes? [In English]
5 "Describing the situation in each combat sector." [Interpretation] To
6 me, this seems pretty clear.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, please, I don't know
8 what this sounds like in English and what is written there in English but
9 I'll just try to explain what it was because I know what happened at the
10 session. On the basis of the presented political situation, Mr. Mladic
11 spoke about the military situation and he said here, explained the
12 situation, every one of the combat sectors, in view of the indispensable
13 tasks and in terms of providing material potentials and resources and the
14 indispensability of reaching an order on mobilisation. That was always a
15 problem. So that he would have an army to lead.
16 I know that it looks as if -- well, I don't know what it was that
17 he could have explained at that meeting except that he needed soldiers,
18 that he needed mobilisation, that he needed assistance from
19 municipalities, that he needed ammunition, that he needed food, and so on
20 and so forth. And that was always on the agenda when the military were
22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm sorry, but -- I'm sorry
23 if I labour the point but when an officer comes to ask for resources and
24 that these resources meet his requirements, he first of all has to
25 describe the situation in question, doesn't he? We have lost so many
1 cannons, we have lost so many men, we have recruited a greater number of
2 soldiers. So my question runs as follows: Before you, did General
3 Mladic, on that day, assess the situation and describe the military
4 situation? [In English] "Describing the situation in each combat sector."
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. The military situation,
6 or rather, the situation that the military was in, what they lacked. I
7 assure you that he never explained any combat activities to us at
8 meetings. He explained what he needed. He needed soldiers, he needed
9 uniforms. He always talked about money. And Karadzic said, well, tell us
10 how many -- how much you need in terms of potatoes, in terms of this and
11 that, and those are the kind of meetings I know. I have no idea about any
12 directive, whatever. I cannot deny that perhaps he said we would like
13 this or that, but this is no combat report. It has to do with the needs
14 of the military, and I know what the answer was, the one that he always
15 got. I mean, really, I can --
16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.
17 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... on the basis of
18 what he asked? I should be clear. I asked what conclusions did you reach
19 on the basis of what he asked?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I cannot recall now but I can
21 tell you what there was in the treasury. They were telling don't say how
22 many personnel we have, what our equipment is. It is military secret. To
23 us they always said everything was a military secret. Believe me, they
24 never came to us and said, "We need this and this in order to take that
25 and that territory." I never heard any such thing. For instance, I heard
1 for the first time today, in a -- I read for the first time today in a
2 document that a corridor needed to be seized. That's all we discussed
3 there. I have no other way to convince you except to just put it to you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It doesn't sound very much as detailed
5 information which is said in these minutes, "due to the security
6 considerations and the detailed nature of the information." What you
7 describe is rather general, say, well, you never heard such a thing like
8 "we need this and this in order to take that and that territory." I
9 don't know what you then did hear, but that sounds as if you would receive
10 only very superficial information whereas the minutes say otherwise. I'm
11 just asking for your comment.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Mladic was always very
13 loquacious, and whenever he explained and talked about a problem, he would
14 go into great detail. He would say in Mount Vlasic I would need so many
15 men, so many uniforms of that and that size, I need canvas sheets,
16 tarpaulin; that's what I heard. Whether he had any talks about directives
17 and such like apart from that, I don't know. I don't recall a single
18 meeting where he would say, for instance, we need to take territory and
19 I'm going to issue a directive. I mean, of this kind.
20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to ask you another
21 question, Mr. Krajisnik, if I may. When you were in this type of
22 situation, you had with you General Mladic and Colonel Tolimir. And this
23 took place at a time when you were concerned and worried about what was
24 happening in your country. And you were worried about the fate of your
25 people. So does this mean that you didn't take advantage of the situation
1 in order to ask these superior officers to describe the situation to you
2 in a very detailed way, and in all the regions and municipalities where
3 you thought that there might be fightings? I'm sorry to say this,
4 Mr. Krajisnik, and I might be wrong, but I have the feeling that you did
5 not really want to know what was happening in such troubled times. You
6 had in front of you the people who could give you information. So why
7 didn't you ask them to describe the situation [In English] in each sector
8 combat [Interpretation] in each sector combat -- in each combat sector?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I knew about all the situation
10 in Republika Srpska; where the demarcation line was, I knew all that.
11 That's not in dispute. This is after the conference in London, and we
12 were conducting briefings about the conference and he probably came to say
13 that, like there is not much success in -- at the conference, so I need
14 this and this in military equipment and resources. I didn't have much
15 time to go into the details like whether -- but I knew the main things,
16 whether Banja Luka was in Muslim or Serb hands, or Travnik. But as for
17 their intentions to issue directives, I never asked about that because it
18 wasn't in my province. I would get information whenever territory was
19 lost or gained. I was interested in every single village. But that was
20 the limit of my interest and competence. I don't know what else I could
21 have gotten out of them. Newspapers wrote about that. The line of
22 demarcation was clearly known to everybody.
23 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Of course, Mr. Krajisnik, I
24 understand what you're telling us. But earlier on, I thought that you
25 were telling us that you remembered that meeting, and I'm asking you a
1 question. What I would like to know is whether you managed to strike a
2 dialogue with these superior officers in order to be updated about what
3 was going on or what was about to happen; how did they assess the
4 situation from the military point of view, for instance.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was talking about this
6 meeting, Your Honour, after the London Conference. I cannot recall
7 precisely. I'm just talking in general terms what Mladic asked for
8 whenever he would come, about informing us that he was going to take a
9 territory versus asking for material resources. He always told us that
10 uniforms, food, salaries and everything else was lacking. So in this
11 case, the conference fell through, we have to bring the army up to the
12 required levels, and we need this, this, this and that. That's what he
13 could have said. I didn't need to be informed which territory was ours
14 and which was in other hands. To me as a person, that was enough. But
15 look at the directives on the other hand. All of them were issued and
16 none were carried out. It all depended on developments in the field.
17 There was not much planning in advance. It would just happen that you
18 would lose a territory or gain a territory. There was no plan. I'm
19 telling you what I know.
20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Do we have to therefore understand that the minutes
22 are wrong, because what you say is that what also appears in these
23 minutes, that material potentials and financial resources and the
24 necessity of adopting a decision on general mobilisation, that that was
25 discussed, but the minutes say that there was more discussed. Is that
1 then wrong? Because it says describing the situation in each combat
2 sector and the necessary tasks, and then it mentions only what you said
3 was usually discussed and must have been discussed during this meeting as
4 well. So the first two items is therefore the minutes are wrong? Because
5 everything you tell us is described here but there is more.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, probably there is more. I
7 can't recall. There certainly is something but I would have to guess now.
8 I was trying to recall what I knew about such meetings.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not inviting you to guess.
10 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to talk to you quite briefly about the fifth
13 strategic objective, the division of Sarajevo, about which this Court has
14 heard a great deal of evidence. You were asked about that during the
15 course of your examination-in-chief and, among other things, on the 11th
16 of May, you said, at page 21 -- 25 excuse me, that "Let anybody show me a
17 proposal where I said I wanted a division of Sarajevo. That's all wrong
18 -- or this is all wrong. It was supposed to be a single city."
19 Now, I'm not going to take you through the evidence that was
20 adduced during the course of the case through witnesses, but I want to ask
21 you a you a few questions about that. First of all, I recall that in
22 P1012 the interview that you conducted with the BBC, "The Death of
23 Yugoslavia" interview, you addressed a number of items. You may recall we
24 -- that was discussed during the course of questioning concerning your
25 meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic. That's found, Your Honours, at page -- at
1 tab 185. I'm directing my attention to page 4 of the English. I don't
2 see the translation here. This was adduced at least once and I think more
3 than once during the course of the Prosecution and Defence case, so if I
4 may, I'll read it slowly so it can be translated accurately.
5 Unless your bundle is different, Mr. Krajisnik, I don't think
6 you're going to find a translation of this short segment.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I've got the translation. I have two
8 languages in front of me. So if there is any section to be read, it's
9 1012.1, English, and 1012 -- not in my bundle but on my screen. So if --
10 and since I do understand the Defence now also has the material -- perhaps
11 not today, because it's Mr. Stewart is not there.
12 MR. TIEGER: Just going to read two sentences, Your Honour or
13 three, I guess it is.
14 Q. And in that recorded interview, Mr. Krajisnik, you said, among
15 other things: "We always had at the back of our minds the division of
16 Sarajevo, so the Serbs to have their part and the Muslims theirs. This is
17 no secret. We consider that Sarajevo should be split into two cities,
19 That account, Mr. Krajisnik, is a more accurate reflection of the
20 objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership with regard to Sarajevo, that it
21 wouldn't remain one city, that it would be split, divided, between Muslims
22 and Serbs with perhaps a municipality or a small portion to Croats; isn't
23 that right?
24 A. Well, conditionally, if you say that division is a transformation
25 of Sarajevo wherein you have Serb municipalities, Muslim municipalities,
1 and one Croat municipality, with an umbrella body over them, then yes.
2 But it's not a real division of the city. You cannot divide a city, if we
3 have one state. The division -- "division" as a word does not refer to a
4 physical division. It means administrative division. I personally heard
5 these words.
6 Q. Well, I'm sure a variety of words were spoken at a number of
7 different times, but in concrete terms, perhaps we can turn to tab 196.
8 You mentioned, I think more than once, Ambassador Zimmerman's book and
9 introduced a portion of that book, so we've gone back to that.
10 MR. TIEGER: This will need a number, Your Honour.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1242, Your Honours.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. P1242 is an excerpt from -- another excerpt from "Origins of a
14 Catastrophe" by Warren Zimmerman, and if we turn to page 0328-2314 of the
15 English, and Mr. Krajisnik, that's what is marked as page 2 but it's the
16 first page in your translation --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm a bit confused by your reference to
18 tab 196, and then the introduction of this -- oh, no, tab 196 was left
19 open, yes. I see that. Yes. Thank you.
20 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, just to confirm that Your Honours have --
21 JUDGE ORIE: "Origins of a Catastrophe."
22 MR. TIEGER: Yes. And if Your Honours can turn to the page which
23 is 202 in the book and 0328-2314 of the ERN, at the very bottom.
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I already indicated the place to you. I presume
25 you had it. It's the paragraph beginning: "Koljevic chimed in ..."
1 Ambassador Zimmerman says: "Koljevic chimed in to say that if I hadn't
2 overlooked the sequence of events I would have seen that the Bosnian Serbs
3 were consistently for negotiation. I replied, the --" and it's quoted in
4 the book -- "the Bosnian Serb strategy is clear to all. Create new facts
5 by establishing the borders of a Serbian Republic by force, then get those
6 facts ratified by negotiation."
7 Moving away from the text for a moment, Mr. Krajisnik, I wanted to
8 turn your attention to the portion on Sarajevo. At the middle of the page
9 -- that is the second full paragraph of page 203 in English, Your
10 Honours; and for you, Mr. Krajisnik, it's the last page, page 3 of 3,
11 beginning -- it says page 3 of 3 but the first page is that cover page,
12 beginning at that second paragraph, and the book states as follows:
13 "'Where will your capital be?' I asked. 'Why, Sarajevo, of course.' 'But
14 how can a city that is nearly 50 per cent Muslim and only 30 per cent Serb
15 be the capital for the Serbs alone?' Karadzic had a ready answer:
16 'Sarajevo was built with Serbian money so we have a right to divide the
17 city into Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian sections so that no ethnic groups
18 will have to live or work together.' 'Just how do you plan to divide it?'
19 I asked. 'By walls,' he said, matter-of-factly. 'Of course, people will
20 be able to pass from one part of the city to another as long as they have
21 permission and go through the check-points.' .
22 I thought of Sarajevo with its tradition of civility and openness
23 to all ethnic groups. Then I thought of Berlin where the wall that had
24 symbolised all the hatreds and divisions of the Cold War had been torn
25 down just a few years before.
1 'Do you mean,' I asked, 'that Sarajevo will be like Berlin before
2 the wall was destroyed?' 'Yes,' he answered, 'our vision of Sarajevo is
3 like Berlin when the wall was still standing.'"
4 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, although that constitutes a transformation of
5 Sarajevo, we can see that in concrete terms, Sarajevo would no longer be
6 effectively one city but two.
7 A. That is pure invention, fabrication. Please, tell me, when did
8 this meeting take place? I assure you, we have a statement published in
9 the newspaper where Karadzic stated exactly how the city was to be
10 transformed, made on the 18th of March, 1992. This is pure fabrication.
11 It was completely made up. With all due respect for the authority in
12 question, it's pure invention. I'm sorry I have to put it so crudely but
13 I really do. I'll bring you the statement by Karadzic of the 19th of
14 March, 1992.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you seem to be indicating a "transformation" of
16 Sarajevo that would leave it essentially the same city it had been and
17 without any intention whatsoever to turn it into two cities or two border
18 cities, but the fact is that Ambassador Zimmerman had it quite right and
19 that you were stating the reality in "The Death of Yugoslavia" interview
20 when you said the Bosnian Serb intention was to divide Sarajevo and turn
21 it into two cities; isn't that right?
22 A. Well, yes. Two cities within one. As there were two entities in
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia is one single country, there are two
24 entities. But the city is not divided. The essence of the word is
25 different, I know, but it was meant to be one city with two entities in
1 it, because we also have our right to Sarajevo. Please, Mr. Zimmerman was
2 together with Karadzic and Koljevic in Belgrade in February or March, 1992
3 - I don't know if you can find the date - and you have that statement
4 published in a newspaper when Karadzic explained how he saw it. This is
5 being imputed to the Serbs, that they wanted walls in Sarajevo.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, the reference is made to May the 14th
7 on page 201 in the English version. I take it that that's then May, 1992.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. That cannot be. Mr. Zimmerman
9 was there in February, 1992.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but he describes a meeting - that's at least
11 what I read - and I'm just trying to find whether the -- yes. If you
12 would please look at the B/C/S version, the bottom of the -- page 2 out of
13 3, there must be a reference somewhere after Mr. Koljevic is introduced, a
14 reference to the 14th of May. No, perhaps it's earlier. Mr. Tieger, is
15 everything translated?
16 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, I don't know if 14 of May is
17 translated. You're correct, of course, it appears in the English.
18 JUDGE ORIE: It starts with early May and then it continues
19 describing a meeting with Koljevic and Karadzic on the 14th of May.
20 That's at least how I read it. And -- but I'm a bit puzzled by what has
21 been translated and what --
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may, there is no --
23 JUDGE ORIE: I see the reference, although of course you didn't
24 read that, which is a point of reference for me, the reference to a Nazi
25 leader on -- in the English on the top of page 2 of 3, which appears five
1 lines from the bottom on page 2 of 3, and I have some difficulties in
2 accepting that what is above there is the full translation of the two
3 previous pages.
4 MR. TIEGER: It appears -- I agree with Your Honour it appears not
5 to be the full translation of the pages that appear here.
6 JUDGE ORIE: If we take the date -- I, at least, took the date
7 from a part which seems to be --
8 MR. TIEGER: May I just offer this suggestion.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. TIEGER: I don't think there is any question, and I invite the
11 scrutiny of the document, that the conversation which was the -- which I
12 -- a portion of which I read to Mr. Krajisnik, is part of the visit that
13 is described in the paragraph that begins, "Koljevic was in my office a
14 few days later, May 14, this time with Karadzic," and it continues on with
15 that section. We will certainly be happy to get the remainder of that
17 JUDGE ORIE: That would be good, because Mr. Krajisnik -- at
18 least, in his answer gave the impression that he had a different time
19 frame in his mind, and then of course he's entitled to check on the basis
20 of the context whether the time frame which is specifically described here
21 is the correct one, yes.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That's the only meeting I
23 know. I don't know about any other meeting. But excuse me, if it was at
24 Koljevic's office, does that mean that Zimmerman went to Pale?
25 JUDGE ORIE: It doesn't say that it was in Koljevic's office, I
1 think, but -- I think it's situated in the office of Mr. Zimmerman. But I
2 have not had an opportunity -- yes, the meeting is described as a meeting
3 in the office of Mr. Zimmerman.
4 MR. JOSSE: Clearly it would be useful for Mr. Krajisnik to see
5 that Mr. Zimmerman describes Koljevic and Karadzic as madmen, and his
6 general comment.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Tieger, you're invited to provide the
8 context so Mr. Krajisnik can read it as well.
9 Then one second, please.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's from Zimmerman's book? I'll
11 have a look tonight.
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, in terms of the translation, I may have
13 been wrong but it may be that Mr. Krajisnik, who produced a portion of the
14 book himself, may have a translation.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then --
16 MR. TIEGER: I would invite the Court to ask Mr. Krajisnik to
17 confirm that.
18 JUDGE ORIE: If you have the book and if you have a translation,
19 Mr. Krajisnik, then of course it's not a CLSS translation but nevertheless
20 the parties would be in a position to look at it and see whether it's --
21 it could be different editions, it could be that in the translation some
22 language has been changed which is what now and then happens when a book
23 is translated and reviewed.
24 MR. JOSSE: Could I endorse Mr. Tieger's remark? Could I invite
25 Your Honour to ask the witness?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, if you have the book, and if you
2 could bring it, and perhaps already read the relevant passages overnight,
3 then that would be highly appreciated.
4 MR. JOSSE: I think what my learned friend wants to know is
5 whether Mr. Krajisnik has a translated version of the book.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I took it since I do not -- I was not even
7 thinking about Mr. Krajisnik reading from an English book, so therefore, I
8 took it that he was referring to a B/C/S version of that book. Yes.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I have the book and I'll
10 be happy to do that, to assist the Prosecution as much as I can.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 Then for tomorrow, Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, the strength you
13 need for the dentist, that's common human experience, I would say. We --
14 of course we do not know exactly at what time you're ready for the
15 dentist. The Chamber has in mind to start between 10.30 and 11.00,
16 depending on the arrival of Mr. Krajisnik, that's one, and also on
17 performance of the matters the Chamber -- the members of the Chamber have
18 in mind for themselves which are not completely schedulable, up to half an
19 hour. So if everyone would remain standby to start on from 10.30, and we
20 do not intend to start any later than 11.00. Of course, then you'll be
22 We will adjourn, not sine die but sine tempore until tomorrow,
23 same courtroom.
24 THE WITNESS: And, Mr. Krajisnik, no speaking --
25 JUDGE ORIE: You slowly learn a bit, Mr. Krajisnik. We should
1 learn a bit more B/C/S. We adjourn.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of June,
4 2006, sine tempore.