Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 26029

1 Tuesday, 20 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

7 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

9 Before we go into private session for a few matters, perhaps the

10 first thing in relation to scheduling is that I was informed,

11 Mr. Krajisnik, that you have a dentist appointment this Thursday - is that

12 correct? - between 8.00 and 9.00?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I said that it should

14 be this week, but I don't know.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm informed that it would be this Thursday,

16 and so therefore Thursday is already a bit deviant from our usual days,

17 but that would then sit -- start at a late start. I take it, I hope, at

18 9.30 we could start, then we will most likely finish at approximately

19 11.00 and have a longer break, and then have a session until 3.00 or 3.30.

20 So that's the first scheduling issue.

21 Then I would like to turn into private session.

22 [Private session]

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 26030

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 Pages 26030-26032 redacted. Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 26033

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 [Open session]

12 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session now, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

14 Mr. Krajisnik, today again we received a short list of material

15 from you. We have dealt with it in the same way that it's given to the

16 parties. They can use it and introduce it into evidence if they think

17 that it would assist them. At the same time, at the end of your testimony

18 any documentation which is not adopted, so to say, by the parties, you

19 will have an opportunity to explain on the basis of the then-translated

20 inventories, as you know the inventories were the first ones to be

21 translated, to apply for admission into evidence of specific documents and

22 explain to the Chamber why you consider them of importance for the

23 Chamber.

24 Then at the very end of your testimony, we'll also go through the

25 list of exhibits that have been introduced through you as a witness.

Page 26034

1 We'll then hear -- we'll review the material. We'll hear objections to

2 the evidence which was introduced. Mr. Registrar is invited to prepare

3 that list so that the parties could prepare properly and that we do not

4 spend too much time on that evidence and the admission of that evidence

5 and that I can make short reference to the numbers on the list.

6 Then a very practical matter. I do understand that when I gave,

7 on behalf of the Chamber, the deadline for objections in relation to the

8 photographic material, Mr. Krajisnik, the deadline was addressed to you,

9 that the transcript now reads that it was one week after the 21st of June,

10 whereas from what I understood that's not what I said. You have up until

11 tomorrow to come up with any objections in relation to that photographic

12 material. And I already instructed you what kind of objections the

13 Chamber would expect.

14 Then another very practical matter is the following. It's quite

15 some time ago that there was an objection by the Defence to the admission

16 into evidence of the notebook of Mr. Karadzic. And at that time it was

17 uncertain on what other portions of that same notebook would be raised

18 during the examination of witnesses by the OTP. Therefore, we delayed at

19 that time a decision on whether the whole of the notebook would be

20 admitted or whether the Chamber would follow the objection by the Defence,

21 that is only to admit those portions that were specifically dealt with

22 during the examination of the witness.

23 We are now further on in the case. I do not remember that the

24 notebook of Mr. Karadzic returned since that date, so the OTP is invited

25 to reconsider its position as far as admission of the totality or just

Page 26035

1 part of the notebook of Mr. Karadzic is concerned, to express itself on

2 the matter so that we can hear from the Defence what their position is.

3 Then finally, and that is a procedurally bit complicated matter.

4 A letter has been sent by Mr. Karadzic to the Defence. That letter has

5 been translated. I take it that the parties received the translation.

6 The letter was introduced by Mr. Krajisnik as a witness. It is not clear

7 to the Chamber whether any of the parties would adopt that letter to -- in

8 the sense that they would tender it into evidence or whether they would

9 not. If they do not, then it still is a document which was in the hands

10 of a witness who presented it to the Chamber, and the Chamber would - so

11 therefore, if it's not adopted by any of the parties - would like to hear

12 whether there are any objections to admit this letter as a -- as an

13 exhibit brought by a witness during his examination as a witness. And

14 there I do understand that the position of the Defence is a bit

15 complicated because you are in a position to express a position as Defence

16 counsel of the accused in relation to a document which has been brought to

17 the attention of the Chamber by a witness who happens to

18 be the accused as well.

19 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I'm happy to say that we can at

20 least make it simpler in this respect. Two points: We don't adopt it,

21 but we don't object.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's clear.

23 Any position already from the Defence -- from the Prosecution?

24 MR. TIEGER: No, but we'll get one back to the Court very quickly,

25 Your Honour. Thank you.

Page 26036

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And of course an admission into evidence is

2 apart from weight to be given, how to evaluate the material, the level of

3 relevance, that's of course a matter which is apart from admission as

4 such.

5 Having dealt with these practical matters --

6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

7 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that CLSS would like to check the

8 translation of a document which the Defence expected to receive today, and

9 that would then be early tomorrow and same would be true for the OTP.

10 Yes.

11 Then having dealt with these practical and procedural matters,

12 Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that --

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau reminds me that there was a tiny

15 thing, Mr. Stewart, you would like to raise.

16 MR. STEWART: That's very gracious of him to remember that and to

17 note it. Yes, I did.

18 Yes, it was this -- Your Honour, it was only looking ahead in the

19 light of that timetable. We -- of course we have Your Honours' questions

20 now, Your Honours in the plural, is there -- may we have a -- is there

21 some indication -- do Your Honours have in mind a point at which

22 Your Honours will have completed your questions and there will be the

23 opportunity for the parties? Because I have it in mind also the apparent

24 slight uncertainty about the position in relation to next Monday.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Well --

Page 26037

1 MR. STEWART: May I simply say -- Your Honour would appreciate,

2 the Trial Chamber and the parties don't always see a hundred per cent eye

3 to eye about the scale of the demands on the case, but at the very least

4 this is going to be a pretty demanding period for both parties. The more

5 we can know about where we're going -- and I rather feel that Mr. Harmon

6 is sharing my submission on this, Your Honour - the better for all

7 concerned. He apparently clearly does.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we go into private session for a moment.

9 MR. STEWART: Certainly, Your Honour, if that's more helpful.

10 [Private session]

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 26038

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 Pages 26038-26039 redacted. Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 26040

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 [Open session]

20 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE ORIE: [Microphone not activated]

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I would like to remind you that you

24 are still bound by the solemn declaration that you gave at the beginning

25 of your testimony.

Page 26041

1 And before I give an opportunity to Judge Hanoteau to continue to

2 put questions to you, I have one simple question on the documents you

3 provided to us today. There's one handwritten document on which I clearly

4 see the name of Mr. Silajdzic appear. Could you briefly tell us what the

5 document approximately is.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I gave evidence yesterday in

7 response to a question to a question by Judge Hanoteau concerning a girl

8 that I brought to the airport, and that is what the document is about. I

9 didn't want to mention either his or her name, especially not her name. I

10 typed it out on the second page, the exact same thing that I provided in

11 manuscript.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then can -- who was Mr. Silajdzic exactly?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Silajdzic was a member of the

14 negotiating team on the Muslim side. He was the foreign minister of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina and also Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that.

17 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 Questioned by the Court: [Continued]

20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, yesterday when

21 adjourned we had mentioned the presence of Mr. Davidovic on the territory

22 of your country, and I asked whether at one point in time you felt that

23 around you things were hidden from you. And you answered that you hadn't

24 felt that and that you couldn't even imagine that people were hiding

25 information from you. So in your answer I thought I understood that you

Page 26042

1 were reducing that to the presence of Mr. Davidovic on the territory, but

2 my question was a bit broader. I wanted to know whether you felt that the

3 information was hidden from you on the weapons that were equipping the

4 Serbs, on the problem of the role paramilitaries were playing. You know

5 that in this Tribunal you know we've heard a lot of evidence on this, and

6 often you told us: Well, I didn't know, I didn't know.

7 So here's my question: Have you ever felt that around you people

8 were hiding information from you, but deliberately because people didn't

9 want you to know about this?

10 A. Thank you for asking that question again because I don't think

11 I've managed to give a complete and good answer. When I responded to your

12 question I said that I didn't have the impression that people in my

13 immediate as I recall with whom I cooperated, Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic,

14 Mrs. Plavsic, people from the authorities with whom I had contact, were

15 keeping things from me at those consultative meetings. However, each of

16 us was busy doing his or her own job in an autonomous way, just like the

17 government is not aware of what I was doing, I was not aware what the

18 government was doing. It's similar with members of the Presidency. There

19 are many decisions of the Presidency - I'm not saying that they are

20 criminal - but that I was not aware of until seeing them here because it

21 was up to the authority concerned to issue such decisions.

22 As for paramilitary units, it was said here that the SDS, the Serb

23 Democratic Party, was involved in the distribution of weapons. That point

24 was made here several times. I really had nothing to do with that line of

25 party work, and I was not really informed whether somebody was shipping

Page 26043

1 weapons by trailer from some other area of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As for

2 paramilitary units, I assure you that it was the firm position of the army

3 and also of the people with whom I had those consultative meetings that

4 that was an evil and that they had to be placed under the control of the

5 army, because otherwise there would be no control. Because the army was

6 badly organised as it was. It consisted basically of armed citizens. And

7 it was my sincere belief that everybody concerned was committed to

8 fighting against paramilitary units.

9 As for Pale and the leadership in Pale, I would be hard-put to say

10 whether somebody was concealing a group of, let's say, 20 men that I

11 didn't know about. But it's very hard to say because we were short of

12 man-power and municipalities wanted to fill those empty trenches, and

13 maybe on their own initiative they sought help elsewhere. However, that

14 was forbidden, and if that was done it could only have been done by the

15 lower level, on their own initiative, without the consent or the knowledge

16 of the government.

17 As for the government and the Presidency, I don't think they were

18 keeping things from me; they were just doing their job, although there

19 were a lot of things that came within their province that I didn't know

20 about until now. For instance, that law that we discussed earlier. It

21 was drafted, it was given to the president of the Presidency to sign, and

22 that was the procedure that completely bypassed me because it was not my

23 job.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And along the same line of

25 thought, Mr. Krajisnik, let's go back to the report that was drafted by

Page 26044

1 the Sarajevo MUP and that dealt with a police action that arrested a

2 vehicle that was loaded with automatic weapons, with a lot of ammunition.

3 It was a vehicle where a Mr. Kostic Dusan was, a person who was a member

4 of the SDS Main Board, Mr. -- and he was an MP, Mr. Kostic Dusan. So you

5 said that you never heard about this report that had been drafted by the

6 Sarajevo MUP. So here's my comment, and there's a question after it.

7 When a police department, police service, is in this delicate

8 situation like we have right here - there is the police that is in front

9 of an MP, and I mean they're very close to an offence here. So you could

10 think that the people in charge at the police department - you know, for

11 the ministry - would immediately alert the person in charge of the

12 institution that this person belongs to. So I would like to get an

13 explanation from you. I'd like you to tell us how you could imagine that

14 the minister of the home interior, learning this and being so surprised,

15 didn't report to you, you as president of the Assembly. I mean, you were

16 the boss of the MPs, after all, if I could say so, the "boss." Do you

17 think that this -- the minister of interior wanted to hide the reality

18 from you? And that was what I was talking about earlier, the deliberate

19 will to hide things from you. Or do you think there were other intents

20 behind all this? How do you feel about all this? Because the reality is

21 there, it exists.

22 A. Yes, Your Honour, at that time the MUP was a joint institution of

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina and a Muslim man was at its head. Now, from this

24 distance, with hindsight, I can give you my opinion but that's probably

25 not what you're interested in. You're probably interested in what I

Page 26045

1 thought then. There was this story that the MUP was arming Muslims, that a

2 reserve police force was being established, etc. There were a lot of

3 irregularities and Parliament was never officially informed, instead there was

4 backroom talk, you know when... before the session, why it never...

5 What was the MUP Minister supposed to do? He should have presented it to the

6 Government, the Government presents to the Assembly the official information,

7 files a criminal report and it goes to the Public Prosecutorís Office and that

8 Office takes its own course. According to our Constitution, the Speaker of the

9 Assembly has no authority over the conduct of MPs, the Assembly does.

10 The Assembly itself does have that control. They can strip an MP

11 of his immunity and deprive him of other sorts of protection. However, it

12 was a time when there was no real authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

13 these illegal factions, they tolerated each other, knowing that the other

14 one was also distributing weapons. I have no other explanation for why no

15 measures were undertaken at the time to... there is a way for doing things,

16 no need to reinvent the wheel... Regardless of whether it was an MP, or anyone

17 else, things take their course as they should...and whoever ambushed the convoy

18 and everything else. So he did not have to report to me personally. He should have

19 informed the Government, the Government in turn should have informed the Assembly;

20 he could have reported it to me but he didnít have to, he was under no obligation

21 to do so or to say we demand that immunity be stripped or that the issue be

22 debated. So, that was the established route, unfortunately we kept blaming one

23 another and so you could never tell what was truth and what was rumour.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to ask you another

25 question, Mr. Krajisnik, regarding another topic. At the Assembly session

Page 26046

1 held on the 25th of February, 2005 [as interpreted], you stated the

2 following, and I will quote you in English. You stated:

3 [In English] "We have two options: One to fight by political

4 means, to make the most out of the present time as a first phase; or to

5 break off the talks and go for what we have done over the centuries, win

6 our own territories by force."

7 [Interpretation] A little further down you stated:

8 [In English] "-- remain in a single Serbia, with Serbia and

9 Montenegro," and so on. "If we don't want to do this by certain methods,

10 let us put a stop to it. You know what our provision has always been, to

11 wage war."

12 [Interpretation] You recall, Mr. Krajisnik, saying this, do you?

13 A. Yes, I do. I don't recall which session it was, but I remember my

14 words.

15 JUDGE ORIE: It certainly would not have been in 2005, as the

16 transcript reads, but please --

17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Sorry, it was the 25th of

18 February, 1992.

19 Mr. Krajisnik, my question was the following. In the statement

20 you are not saying that the use of force will be applied only if you are

21 attacked, but you are considering using force as of the moment where the

22 political negotiations do not work out. You say in your statement: If

23 the negotiations are not fruitful, we are going to wage a war. What did

24 you mean by that, exactly, or is this what you meant? You are not

25 alluding to an imminent aggression which would justify the use of

Page 26047

1 offensive or the use of force. We feel, when we re-read your statement,

2 that in case of the negotiations -- in case they don't work out, you will

3 take this initiative to wage a war. Should I understand you like this or

4 maybe did I perhaps misunderstand you?

5 A. Well, I will tell you what my thinking was and what things were in

6 reality, and it's up to you to judge that. What was on the agenda was an

7 agreement - you can look it up at that Assembly session - an agreement

8 from the conference that was to be discussed by the MPs. MPs had a

9 thousand objections. They were bothered by this and that, whereas the

10 Muslims had already declared their referendum and going for independence.

11 So you had many MPs saying: What's the use of talking to them anyway?

12 Because they are going for their referendum and they are going to vote for

13 an independent Bosnia without any transformation. So the point was to

14 persuade these people who were bitter about being led up the garden path

15 for a whole year, as they were saying, and to persuade them that we should

16 continue with negotiations. So I said we had -- we have two options: To

17 find a solution through negotiations. And then sarcastically I say: We

18 have option number two. Just as we waged war for years, losing lives,

19 getting killed, we can do that now, without having exhausted the

20 possibilities of option one.

21 And you will see from the transcript of that session that it was

22 with great difficulty that we forced the Assembly to approve the continued

23 negotiations, because they were up in arms saying: The Muslims are going

24 for independence irrespective of the constitution, irrespective of

25 anything. And I wanted to tell you this: I understood the role of the

Page 26048

1 Speaker of the Assembly in the following way. I thought that it was my

2 obligation to make sure that the conclusions and decisions were correct,

3 legal, and regular. And whatever contributions, whatever speeches by MPs

4 that were maybe immoderate and whatever it took to continue the

5 deliberations was a small price to pay for ultimately reaching a decision.

6 And I analysed the decisions taken by that Assembly, and I did not find a

7 single one that I would like now to dissociate myself from. Not a single

8 decision was illegal. For instance, if an MP rose and said: Let's vote

9 for option two, war, I never put such a decision up for a vote. I never

10 allowed a single decision to be taken under the influence of somebody's

11 passions. I only cared for the result, and that was the most important

12 thing for me. Because Serbs had gone through many wars. Each of those

13 wars halved their population. There could have been without wars 30

14 million Serbs instead of today's 7 or 8 million. The point of my speech

15 was not advocating war; on the contrary. If you analyse it, you will see

16 that it was all a commitment to peace and negotiations.

17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Changing topic to ask you the

18 following question.

19 Mr. Stewart quoted Mr. Karadzic and he quoted certain things. He

20 said, pertaining to the power, how to take power, so he is quoting and is

21 criticising little Napoleons who are trying to hurt or who are doing

22 things that will inevitably do the Serbian people wrong. When asked to

23 give your opinion on that quote from Karadzic you answered:

24 [In English] "People of the regional level got to be in charge of

25 the region SDS policies and grabbed power, elevated themselves, and

Page 26049

1 decided they were independent of the party."

2 [Interpretation] And later on you added.

3 [In English] " -- Mr. Karadzic put some people on the regional

4 level in charge of coordinating regional boards of the SDS so these people

5 acquired a certain power and, to put it crudely, they abused it."

6 [Interpretation] You did not want to give names, you did not want

7 to mention people whom you thought said that. You said it would be just

8 guesswork, you did not want it to go into detail. You thought that we

9 would definitely understand, but what did you mean when you said: These

10 people in fact had abused power, had -- when you said that these small

11 Napoleons, these people who abused power, what did you mean exactly, who

12 did you have in mind exactly?

13 A. Well, that was precisely this example when Mr. Karadzic used those

14 words, he was criticising one of the presidents, one of the regional

15 coordinators for SDS from Banja Luka. He is a wonderful man, but he is

16 very stubborn, not disciplined at all. And the policy of the SDS,

17 meanwhile, and our policy was to observe the Vance Plan in Croatia and to

18 work for the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to

19 Cutileiro principles. We couldn't split Croatia and split Bosnia and tear

20 them apart because that would be a blow to international agreements.

21 However, bowing to the great wish of the Krajina people from the Serbian

22 Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina, those people wanted to proclaim Krajinas

23 a state. We were aware that the Krajina people wanted it; however, we had

24 to tell them: No. No because of this reason and that reason. That

25 particular man was heading this initiative and making such statements, and

Page 26050

1 then people from the international community rightfully said: You are not

2 observing international agreements and how can we trust you in our

3 negotiations if you are obviously trying to split up Bosnia and Croatia?

4 That man in that job was under obligation to tell the Krajina people what

5 they didn't necessarily like to hear, namely that they had certainly

6 obligations, they couldn't just do as they pleased. And whatever action

7 they took would have certain consequences.

8 Another thing. Economic power lay with municipalities because

9 they had a certain income and revenues. They financed the army, the

10 refugees, and the fact is that political power is always coupled with

11 economic power. And in wartime when all ties are severed, it's difficult

12 to synchronise things. If you do not have any carrots to offer, those

13 people on that level will do as they please.

14 I'm not saying that everybody was like that. Those people like

15 him were exceptions. Most people behaved quite decently. But those few

16 exceptions were enough to create trouble. That is the example that I

17 remember when I hear those words of Mr. Karadzic.

18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, I would like to

19 quote you again. It is something that you said on the 18th of March,

20 1992. It is something you uttered during the 18th Assembly Session. You

21 stated the following.

22 [In English] "I think the problem is that they want BH to be

23 internationally recognised at any cost. They want it to be a state. In

24 this respect it would be good if we could do one thing for strategic

25 reasons, if we could start implementing that we have agreed upon the

Page 26051

1 ethnic division on the ground, that we start determining the territory,

2 and once the territory is determined it remains to be established in

3 additional negotiations whose authorities are to function and in what

4 way."

5 [Interpretation] And you concluded by saying.

6 [In English] "I can't say whether we'll be fair in political

7 terms. There is no much fairness in politics after all, and if it doesn't

8 turn out to be fair, the Serbian will be blamed."

9 [Interpretation] You may recall your words. You may recall what

10 you said at that time.

11 A. I do remember.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] When you said: "We could start

13 implementing that which we had agreed upon, the ethnic division on the

14 ground, we have to start determining the territory," by that did you mean

15 that it -- does this involve a taking of a territory according to an

16 ethnic line or an ethnic division that was already decided upon earlier?

17 Is that what you meant?

18 A. Your Honour, the Cutileiro principles were on the agenda and I

19 state quite clearly -- well, perhaps what is written there is ambiguous.

20 Let us carry out what we have agreed on. I meant the principles, namely

21 that we should know what our ethnic areas are. There was a map there, and

22 what the ethnic areas were. Through negotiations we will try to get as

23 much as possible, at any rate I wanted to get even more territory because

24 this was say 44 per cent or whatever.

25 As for government and whose government would function where, it

Page 26052

1 depended on whether it would be the constituent unit or

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was said it would be the Bosnia and Herzegovina

3 government and the government of the constituent unit. I know that this

4 sounds equivocal, but if you analyse that Assembly people invariably

5 wanted to go back to the option of Yugoslavia. So that was a turning

6 point for us to say: Well, this is Bosnia -- well, I couldn't put it in

7 those words. But let us carry through what we've agreed upon and then

8 let's try to achieve as much as possible through talks. It took a lot of

9 time for people to move from one concept to another, namely from remaining

10 in Yugoslavia together with all the other Serbs to a Bosnia where they

11 would have their own constituent unit. You will see in the debate that

12 people said: What is this constituent unit? They will do this, they will

13 do that to us. A plan that was similar on the 11th of March went down the

14 drain, and then it was adopted through a major effort. That was my

15 objective. Of course my objective was not war if we were talking about

16 the Cutileiro principles. For me what was important was that we know that

17 we have in Krajina, Herzegovina, Semberija, what we have agreed upon,

18 these are our areas, but everybody would want his village to be in the

19 constituent unit or his own region, and then you say: Wait a second,

20 we'll negotiate -- oh, I'm sorry, I got carried away. I'm moving very

21 fast.

22 When the MPs were debating things, it was only maps that were a

23 problem, territories were the only problem. Everybody was just trying to

24 see on which side his own home area would be. Would it be green or blue

25 or red? And we say: Let us carry through what we've agreed upon, and

Page 26053

1 then we'll go on talking and we'll see what kind of government there will

2 be on the whole and what kind of government there will be in the

3 constituent unit. That was the only point of my discussion.

4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So there, Mr. Krajisnik, I will

5 tell you a bit what is puzzling me in the statement is that when -- what

6 you said in conclusion: "I cannot say whether this will be fair in

7 political terms," this seems to mean that what I'm saying here is try to

8 determine these territories. I know that it's not very, very pretty, but

9 that's what politics are. So that comment that you add at the end in fact

10 makes the beginning of your statement completely ambiguous. Do you see

11 yourself that one could understand your words that way or how should we

12 understand it, sir?

13 A. I fully understand that this can be understood in different ways.

14 We always had a club meeting before the Assembly, and the atmosphere there

15 was always more relaxed. I know that we were saying: Look at this. We

16 are 33 per cent and the Cutileiro Plan gives us 44 per cent. We wanted to

17 sell that plan, so to speak. And when we said we will go on striving for

18 territories, well perhaps it's not going to be fair for us to get, I don't

19 know, 50 per cent. What I was trying to tell them was that what will be

20 achieved in addition to all of this is perhaps not all that fair because

21 our percentage of the population is less. Well, I have to say that in

22 order to sell the plan so that the people would adopt it.

23 You know, sometimes you say something that you yourself know is

24 not correct, that is to say you have 64 per cent of the territory. And

25 then you say: Wait a second. You look at the arguments of the Muslims

Page 26054

1 and they say: Wait a second, there is only 33 per cent of you and you're

2 getting 44 per cent of the territory. That's what I'm saying. So if

3 through negotiations we get a bit more and that's unfair, that's politics.

4 I wanted them to realise that they should be satisfied with what we are

5 getting now as a point of departure, so to speak, rather than have

6 megalomaniac aspirations. Somebody would like to take, I don't know,

7 two-thirds of Bosnia, or whatever. It depends on how people viewed the

8 division of Bosnia. I'm so sorry. You can see that at club meetings the

9 atmosphere was far more relaxed than at the session, but then some things

10 only continued at the session itself.

11 I always wanted a fair settlement, always. And when we talked to

12 the other two sides as well I always said that I didn't want something to

13 work to the advantage of the Serb people and to the disadvantage of the

14 other two peoples. The Serbs really had a lot of territory, truth to tell

15 all of that are unproductive areas that were not exactly built-up. But

16 that is a fact. And we got these unproductive parts. We did not get the

17 developed parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, I would like you

19 to elaborate on one last point. If I understood correctly you were

20 elected by the Main Board of the SDS on the 12th of July, 1991. Is that

21 correct?

22 A. The Assembly of the Serb Democratic Party; yes, the 12th of July,

23 1991.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And at that time you were a

25 member of the SDS for how long?

Page 26055

1 A. I was a member of the SDS from the very outset, that is to say

2 from the 12th of July, 1990. I was a member.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Very well. So I am not mistaken

4 in saying that you were not part of the Executive Board of the SDS. Is

5 that right?

6 A. No. I was not in the Main Board or the Executive Board until the

7 12th of July.

8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, I see. So the Main Board

9 was comprised of 45 members, if I understood you correctly. Is that

10 exact? Is that true?

11 A. I think so, yes.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And the Executive Board was

13 comprised of how many members?

14 A. Well, I think it was six, seven, eight, or nine, that's a smaller

15 body, as a government is in the republic. It's sort of an executive body.

16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Could you please give me an idea

17 of the -- the number of meetings of the Main Board, what was the frequency

18 of your meetings, how often did you meet, as of the 12th of July, 1991?

19 As of the moment when you began to participate. Those meetings took place

20 at what frequency? How often would you meet?

21 A. It was here that I established how many session had been held. In

22 actual fact I think there were two or three sessions before the war broke

23 out. I think that there were several joint sessions of the members of the

24 Main Board and the Club of Deputies when an important problem was supposed

25 to be resolved. According to the records or minutes, I think there is one

Page 26056

1 or two sessions of the Main Board. There is also this telephone

2 conversation between Mr. Dukic and myself towards the end of the year when

3 he says that the Main Board had not met for almost a year. Indeed, the

4 Main Board was not operating. It was this joint Assembly that was

5 focussed upon in perhaps these joint meetings. So the work of the Main

6 Board was not really felt. Operative work carried by the Executive Board

7 of the Serb Democratic Party was in the forefront.

8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Is that what you meant when you

9 talked about the SDS Political Council, that council?

10 A. No, no, Your Honour. There was a separate body consisting of

11 prominent individuals, members of the academy, and so on. It was an

12 advisory body. I was not a member of the Political Council, but I am

13 aware of it.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I see. So this Executive Board,

15 if I understood you correctly, met two or three times before the beginning

16 of the war. Is that correct? And after that, there were no meetings and

17 the club -- the Deputies' Club was the instance where one would discuss

18 politics. Is that correct?

19 A. No, no. The Executive Board met frequently, that executive body

20 that I was not a member of. The Main Board had only two or three

21 sessions. So what was the policy? Unfortunately only one question. The

22 policy was discussing the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At these joint

23 meetings that is what was discussed, if that was the subject involved.

24 Other matters, personnel movements and so on, were resolved by the

25 executive body. I did not attend any meetings of the Executive Board, due

Page 26057

1 to my own commitments.

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Okay. Now I'd like to know how

3 this Deputies' Club operated. You know, it's mentioned often, so how did

4 it work? This Deputies' Club existed within the Assembly of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, right?

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So was it a Deputies' Club with

8 only SDS members?

9 A. Yes, and two MPs of the SPO, that's the party of Vuk Draskovic.

10 In Bosnia-Herzegovina that's the way it was, yes. Later on there were

11 independent MPs as well in the Serb Assembly.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Okay. But at the level of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina - we'll stay there for now - this Deputies' Club

14 brought together the deputies that were SDS and two others that were of

15 another party. But at the time, what was the role played by this

16 Deputies' Club? Did they have a legal existence? Was it something that

17 was provided for in the constitution? And then secondly, what role did it

18 play? But only for Bosnia-Herzegovina right now.

19 A. Yes, yes. According to the rules of procedure of the Assembly of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, every political party that had its deputies in the

21 Assembly, if it had at least two deputies it had the right to establish

22 its own club. There were three political parties -- or rather, two

23 political parties that had two members respectively. They had their own

24 rooms, they had their own secretary that the Assembly gave them. The

25 club -- or rather, all clubs met when they would get materials for

Page 26058

1 Assembly meetings. Then before the Assembly meeting they would meet and

2 prepare for the session that was to be held the following day. This

3 material would be elaborated on in preparation for the following day.

4 There were also ad hoc meetings of the club during breaks if there was a

5 problem, and then the clubs would withdraw and discuss a particular

6 matter. The president of the club had an office of his own. There was

7 the secretary of the club, too, and there was an official representative

8 of the Assembly there from the administration who helped him in his work.

9 This was an official body. Every political party in the Assembly had

10 that.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Okay. But at the time of the

12 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was chairing the Deputies' Club, the

13 SDS Deputies' Club, who was chairing it?

14 A. We had a president and a deputy president of the club. The

15 president of the club was Professor Vojislav Maksimovic and the deputy

16 president was Trifko Radic, MP. They chaired the meetings of the

17 Deputies' Club, they gave the floor to others, they took part in the

18 discussion themselves, and so on.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] But you were president of the

20 Assembly and you also sat at the Deputies' Club, right.

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So when Republika Srpska was

23 created there was a new Assembly, and there again was there also a

24 Deputies' Club?

25 A. Yes, yes. The same two people were the president and the deputy

Page 26059

1 president, and all of us were the Deputies' Club, including the

2 independent MPs. At first they were together with us and later on they

3 had a separate club of their own, that is to say towards the end. Pretty

4 late, that is.

5 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] In this Assembly of Republika

6 Srpska, if I understood things well, there were no new elections to elect

7 the MPs of Republika Srpska. It's the SDS MPs -- well, it's the Serbian

8 deputies of the Bosnian Assembly who became the MPs of the Assembly of

9 Republika Srpska. Is that the way it worked?

10 A. Yes, yes. Serbs who were deputies in the Assembly of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only from the SDS but also from other parties,

12 they became the Serb Assembly, only those MPs.

13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And in this Assembly of Republika

14 Srpska, were there several Deputies' Club or just one Deputies' Club?

15 A. At first there was just one, one club. We were all a club. And

16 later on -- well, maybe in 1994 and 1995, I can't say exactly, the MPs

17 from other parties established their own club.

18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And in this Assembly of Republika

19 Srpska, this Deputies' Club, did it meet every day? Could you tell me

20 exactly how often the Deputies' Club met?

21 A. It only met when an Assembly session was supposed to be held. The

22 club did not meet apart from Assembly sessions.

23 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] But you did not chair this

24 Deputies' Club, right? Mr. Maksimovic was still chairing this Deputies'

25 Club?

Page 26060

1 A. Yes, yes, Maksimovic and Radic again, the two of them were still

2 president and deputy.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So if I understood you well, Mr.

4 Krajisnik, during those meetings of the Deputies' Club in Republika

5 Srpska, there were also people who were not members -- MPs who attended,

6 right? I didn't think that I made a mistake, but I think I understood

7 that Mr. Karadzic sometimes attended, members of the government,

8 ministers, even General Mladic attended?

9 A. You're right. You're quite right.

10 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So I'm afraid -- I'm sorry to say

11 that you're mixing this hodgepodge, you know, it's a bit strange. I mean,

12 a Deputies' Club would be a place normally where people would be thinking,

13 you know? Where MPs would be thinking about the decisions that they're

14 about to make in a session. But why is there such a mix-up? You know,

15 because here is a body where you're supposed to be thinking and drafting,

16 but you also have people who are in government who are attending. I mean,

17 I don't have anything against military, of course, but you also have

18 people from military come and attend. So how can you explain this?

19 A. No. I think that the military were there only if there would be a

20 session and then a break. If club meetings were held before the session,

21 I do not recall that the members of the military were ever present. If

22 they would come to a session and then if the club would meet -- well, I

23 don't even remember that they were at the club meetings.

24 As for the others that you're referring to, well, very often the

25 government had to perhaps explain a particular government, a government

Page 26061

1 representative would do that. Very often somebody from the Presidency

2 would have to say what something was about. The club was certainly very

3 autonomous, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska, because

4 deputies thought that their role was very important and they didn't allow

5 anyone to dictate anything to them, Karadzic or Plavsic or anybody else.

6 They were even more relaxed at club meetings. So it was far more

7 difficult to streamline views than at formal sessions. But there were

8 guests who helped the club, that's right, and even a record was kept. I

9 think even minutes were kept in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yes. But I think in

10 the Serb Assembly, too, there were minutes.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] What was the proportion of SDS

12 MPs in Republika Srpska who were also member of the Deputies' Club? Were

13 all MPs attending or were only part of them, you know, the one that are

14 more involved that were part of it?

15 A. No, no. All MPs were in the Deputies' Club. Every member of

16 parliament was a member of the club. It wasn't that there was anybody

17 apart, I mean in Bosnia-Herzegovina and here in the Serb Assembly. There

18 wasn't anybody who was outside the club.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, thank you, Mr. Krajisnik,

20 for answering my questions.

21 A. Thank you, too.

22 JUDGE ORIE: It's quarter to 4.00. We'll have a break of half an

23 hour to quarter past 4.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

Page 26062

1 JUDGE ORIE: I take it the parties received the report we earlier

2 spoke about.

3 Then Judge Canivell will continue with questions.

4 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, I would like to

5 ask you a few questions. I know the history of your country. I would

6 like to know what was the -- questions about yourself. I don't really

7 want to know exactly what happened to you, you know, yourself, but I would

8 like to know in a broader sense what exactly happened to you. I would

9 like to know more things about your country, because you know your country

10 went through complicated times in terms of politics and that the Balkan

11 peninsula had been occupied by the Ottoman Empire at one time. Around the

12 end of the 19th century Bosnia-Herzegovina turned from being under the

13 Ottoman Empire to being under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But after

14 World War I, that's what I'm really interested in. What was the situation

15 of the Muslims in your country after World War I? I mean, after World War

16 I, Muslims were a group in a country -- you know, that they used to be

17 members of the country that occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ottoman

18 Empire, ages ago, and then after World War I the occupying power was an

19 ally to the Central Empires. So after World War I these Muslims who used

20 to be -- who used to belong to the occupying power, the Turks before, and

21 now they were -- they had been defeated in 1918, and I guess that they had

22 to live through difficult times because they became a minority in a

23 state -- in this Yugoslav state -- I mean, even -- they were not even

24 recognised in the name of the country being Muslims and this being the

25 Yugoslav state, the state of the southern Slavs. So these Muslims -- I

Page 26063

1 mean, how exactly did they feel in this new country that had been created

2 after 1918?

3 A. Well, the former Yugoslavia one, second, or the third one that

4 began in 1918 is full of history. And to your question, Your Honour, I

5 would say this: When the southern Slavs united, they were considered as

6 Slavs who adopted Islam. There were some people who were left behind

7 after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire but they were considered as

8 Slavs and I don't know what rights they enjoyed then because at that time

9 the prevailing distinction was between Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims,

10 rather than Croats, Serbs, and Muslims.

11 The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was organised in the so-called

12 Banovinas. I'll give you an example. In Zabrdje, where I was born, the

13 vice-ban, like the vice-president, was a Muslim, Hadzi Omerovic. He had

14 his country house. Back then, and later, the Muslims had an identity

15 problem. It would take being in their shoes to give you a really

16 objective answer as to how they felt, but it must not be easy to be in a

17 position where two leading nations, the Serbs and the Croats, are there

18 with you in the middle. Whether they had adopted Islam by force or of

19 their own will, whether they were Slavs or not, it was a problem. This

20 balance and this reciprocity was the same in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,

21 just as before this war. People tried to show tolerance and understanding

22 before the war, but it took very little when the war began for a rift to

23 occur. I don't know how objective I can be, but I can understand that

24 it's difficult when you can't find your own identity.

25 After the Second World War, by the way, Muslims were again not

Page 26064

1 recognised as a nation. They were like undecided, so they were either

2 Serbs or Croats. And they had this persistent ambition to realise their

3 own identity, until in the 1950s, 1950-something, I don't know which year,

4 the former president, Tito, recognised Muslims as a nation. In this

5 latest war that is relevant to this trial, they said: We are not Muslims,

6 we are Bosniaks. So this constant quest for identity reoccurred as a

7 problem. At one point they told themselves: This is our chance to get

8 Bosnia as our state, like Serbs have their own state and Croats have their

9 own state, because they had never had their state before. And because

10 this ambition went unrealised for so long, this desire was stronger than

11 anything conscious.

12 Every unfulfilled ambition can lead to such excess. Imagine a

13 small nation of only 2 million, they thought it was a great thing to be,

14 although it should have been great for the Turks. When they are

15 called "Turks," they understand that to be a derogatory term, the

16 equivalent of the term "Chetnik" for Serbs, although it shouldn't be

17 derogatory; on the contrary, because Turks are a great nation and a big

18 nation. So whenever there is an upheaval, those historical antagonism and

19 animosities come to the surface and lead to war. Bosnia used to be called

20 miniature Yugoslavia. And at a time when Yugoslavia was being torn apart,

21 it was difficult for Bosnia to stay together. It's difficult to me to

22 speak in their name. I can say that I understand them, although I believe

23 they were wrong in going against the constitution of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina and that is one of the main reasons for this war.

25 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes. You're telling me that in

Page 26065

1 a derogatory way these be called Turks, so this confirms the possibility

2 that in all that time between the two world wars and after the Second

3 World War, socially, despite, you know, the fact that what you told us --

4 you know, for example, in your family people would welcome Muslims and

5 have dinner with them, and so normally it wasn't the case. It seems in

6 the normal state of things it was always different, always these people

7 who felt that they weren't Muslim Turks but they had become Muslims, maybe

8 because it was easier for them to be under the Turkish domination at one

9 point in time. But all this determined the way they -- the -- determined

10 the fact that they felt that the others had contempt towards this ethnic

11 group, towards the Muslims. They felt, you know, that the others only had

12 contempt for them because for centuries it had a different religion, and

13 especially after the small Serbia, after World War I, transformed itself

14 into a major Yugoslavia.

15 So socially, how were Muslims seen by the others? Was it

16 normal -- for example, when a Serb or a Croat would marry a Muslim -- of

17 course you told us about a few cases yesterday, you know, where things

18 went well, but was that seen as normal? Obviously you told us, you know,

19 that you had good Muslims friends, but wasn't it the opposite that was

20 more of a general rule?

21 A. Right. As far as marriage is concerned, there were marriages

22 between Serbs and Muslims, Croats and Muslims, but they were in a

23 minority, a definite minority. Marriages were usually within one ethnic

24 group, although there were mixed marriages, of course. However, they were

25 a definite minority, as I said. As for your suggestion that they were

Page 26066

1 held in contempt, in Bosnia-Herzegovina where I lived, Muslims were

2 predominant and played a predominant role from the liberation until this

3 latest war.

4 The Muslims from Bosnia have absolutely nothing to do with the

5 Muslims that we see on television in the east. They were a peaceful

6 people, fair, decent, and if you had any business to do, they were much

7 easier and more pleasant to deal with than anyone else. Now, after this

8 war, it's incredible the radicalism that appeared among the Muslims, and

9 it's interpreted as if somebody robbed them of a state, somebody cheated

10 them. And on account of that, people who used to be incredibly tolerant

11 are now sowing hatred.

12 As for what you said, it was not official and it was not public,

13 but that point when people adopted Islam was held in disapproval by Croats

14 and Serbs and it was held against them. But in normal, everyday life,

15 since the 1970s when the Muslims became a majority - maybe they became a

16 majority even earlier, I don't know - they had one area which they

17 basically held as their dominion, that is craft and trades. Of course, a

18 certain number of Muslims went on to university, but mainly they were in

19 crafts and trades. Nowadays all that has changed. There are many artists

20 and highly schooled people among the Muslims, and it is this latest war

21 that turned Muslims into a nation. And nowadays they really feel like a

22 nation. They have matured. If this war has brought anything good to

23 them, it is that they feel finally as a nation. They can tell themselves:

24 We are no longer former Serbs or former Croats, we are finally a nation.

25 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Thank you for saying this.

Page 26067

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the Judge please adjust his microphone.

2 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] I need to -- I'm sorry. I wasn't

3 close enough to the microphone.

4 A. We are both at a disadvantage. I can't see you either.

5 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] So on the one hand there was

6 resistance to this -- the resistance of this Muslim community was only in

7 Bosnia, right? But not in the rest of former Yugoslavia?

8 A. Well, there were Muslims living in Serbia, in an area that Serbs

9 called Raska and Muslims call the same area Sandzak. It is closer to

10 Kosovo. But Bosniaks are now called in Muslims in Serbia, in Croatia, and

11 in Bosnia, although earlier, while they were still Muslims, they were only

12 in Bosnia. Nowadays they identify themselves as Bosniaks.

13 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Thank you for reminding me.

14 Another question now that I find it hard to understand. At the

15 end of World War II it seems that there was some kind of a genocide

16 carried out against the Serbs, and I think I understood that this was done

17 by Ustashi. So were they Muslim Ustashas? I am a bit confused here

18 because I thought there were only Ustashas. Muslims were aside and --

19 were they involved in this or not?

20 A. There were Muslims among the Ustashas. Croats called them Croats

21 of Muslim faith, and there was even a notorious Muslim division called the

22 Handzar Division. They wore their caps that are part of their national

23 costume, but they were Ustashas on the Croat side. There were, however,

24 some Muslims among the partisans but also among the Chetniks, although

25 very few because the Chetniks were derived from the old Yugoslav army.

Page 26068

1 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes. But the situation that

2 existed at the end of World War II, can't you say that it cropped up again

3 at -- during the war, you know, that we're interested in, because there

4 was more of a divide between the -- with the Croat -- with the Muslims.

5 Or is it because the Muslims were more numerous in Bosnia than the Croats?

6 How should I try and understand this?

7 A. Croats and Muslims, from the very beginning of multi-party

8 political life formed a coalition. Although they were sharing power with

9 the SDS, they immediately sided together and left the SDS on the other

10 side. And when the war began, they were already together. At a certain

11 point, I don't know whether it was at the end of 1992 or in 1993, they

12 started infighting over some territories or over some crimes, and a war

13 began between Muslims and Croats. At the end of the war, however, the

14 Federation was formed, comprised of Muslims and Croats, but it is not a

15 marriage based on love. There is antagonism against -- among Croats and

16 Muslims, just among Croats and Serbs, and Serbs and Muslims. The Croats

17 now believe that they are disenfranchised.

18 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] There was the independence of

19 Croatia, and chronologically that happened before the independence of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you think that that was a reason -- that was a --

21 sort of triggered what happened in Bosnia later on? Because apparently

22 they were supposed to respect the borders, you know, that were already

23 there after the -- between the six republics that had been set up after

24 World War II. So did you think that this complicated -- this was a

25 reason -- this was one of the reasons for the complications that occurred

Page 26069

1 later on, the fact that they wanted to make a state with the -- using the

2 territories that used to be Bosnia-Herzegovina before and the -- because

3 they couldn't -- the Serbs wanted to be with the -- maybe with the other

4 Serbs that were in other former Yugoslavian states, but because of the

5 borders the way they were they couldn't do it anymore.

6 A. Of course I always take it into account that I may not be entirely

7 objective, but it's up to you to judge that.

8 I believe that Muslims were instigated by Croats to go forward

9 with the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it were, and I believe

10 that the war was imported from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 Croatia found it a relief because it had a war with the Serbs in Krajina,

12 and they wanted to take some territories in the west and in the north,

13 like Posavina. During negotiations I talked to Croat representatives. It

14 was their opinion that it was important for them in those areas where they

15 had authority and control, whereas the other things would be left for some

16 later stage. I'm absolutely certain that if the Serbs and Croats in

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina could have their way, they would both join Serbia

18 and Croatia respectively, whereas the Muslims would either have liked to

19 have all of Bosnia or would liked to have the most prosperous part of

20 Bosnia for their state. This is my perspective from here in The Hague and

21 of course the wisdom of hindsight when I look back on some conversations

22 that I had with them.

23 Both Serbs and Croats are all the nations who had lived there for

24 centuries, and they remember what happened 300, 500 years back. And in

25 the Second World War, the Serbs suffered a lot, including from genocide,

Page 26070

1 and especially in the regions that we have referred to a lot during this

2 trial. The Ustashas massacred people in Mount Kozara area, the Jasenovac

3 concentration camp, et cetera. Of course Muslims also remember being

4 victimised in Eastern Bosnia by the Chetniks. So everybody has their own

5 history and everybody looks back to it.

6 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] That's for a general aspect.

7 Now, if we go into more details, you said in your testimony that there was

8 a referendum in November 1991. I think I've understood -- I'm not sure I

9 understood. This was done along with the constitution; is that what

10 happened? Or is it the Serbs who decided to call for a referendum in

11 order to know who was in favour, who was against the situation as it was

12 at the moment?

13 A. That was not in accordance with the constitution of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In actual fact, when there was this rift in the

15 Assembly on the 14th of October, the SDS was advocating the following

16 view: That the Muslims and the Croats did not have the right to declare

17 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on their own and that the SDS is

18 the legitimate representative of the Serb people. And they said what it

19 was that the Serbs wanted. They wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain

20 within Yugoslavia. Then objections were voiced in terms of the SDS not

21 having legitimacy because there were Serbs in other political parties,

22 too.

23 It was then that the Assembly of the Serb People was established,

24 and they called a plebiscite in order to see what the will of the Serb

25 people was. Others voted, too, and then it was said: Well, now you have

Page 26071

1 information about what the Serb people think. It wasn't compulsory, this

2 plebiscite, but it was there to show whether that policy pursued by the

3 SDS had a certain legitimacy.

4 Actually, there is this one particular provision, the so-called

5 self-determination of peoples. It is a provision, but it was not really

6 elaborated upon in the constitution that you had the right to resort to,

7 say, a plebiscite and to carry this through in that way, because this was

8 actually never done in socialism, and this constitution dated back to the

9 days of socialism.

10 Well, perhaps it was legitimate, but it was not legal.

11 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand the difference.

12 But it was a referendum called by the SDS, and the only ones who could

13 take part in it were the ethnic Serbs. The others weren't even allowed to

14 take part in the vote, the Muslims and the Croats were not allowed to take

15 part in the vote. Okay.

16 Then there's another question which might be interesting --

17 A. Your Honour, everybody could take part in it, but there were a

18 certain type of ballots for Serbs who were in favour of Yugoslavia; a

19 second type for Croats; a third type for Muslims, so that others could

20 state their views, too, in terms of Bosnia remaining in Yugoslavia.

21 However, the absolute majority of voters who took part in it were Serbs.

22 And Yugoslavs as well.

23 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] So Muslims and Croats didn't vote

24 in that referendum, or did they vote? I don't think any Muslims or Croats

25 participated in the vote?

Page 26072

1 A. Very few non-Serbs voted in the referendum or people who did not

2 declare themselves as Yugoslavs. It was just a very small percentage of

3 Croats and Muslims who voted in the referendum.

4 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] So you told us in your testimony

5 that when -- on the May 12th -- in the Assembly that you chaired on May

6 12th, 1992, you voted on the six strategic goals and on your future and

7 what -- as you said, that was important in order to have something to

8 negotiate on, to negotiate on with the other -- with the international

9 community and with the other ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I'd

10 like to ask you the following question: But wasn't that going to

11 stimulate what was going to happen? Wasn't it going to trigger what was

12 going to happen? A war. The fact, you know, that these six strategic

13 goals could be achieved in another way then through negotiation --

14 actually, through war?

15 A. Your Honour, we had been in a war for a month already. These

16 goals were presented when we presented our requests to Mr. Cutileiro,

17 namely that we wanted to have a constituent unit of our own, that we

18 wanted it to be linked up, and so on and so forth. That is to say that

19 these were objections voiced by the MPs, they were saying that they often

20 did not know what it was that we advocated in the negotiations. Then what

21 was stated was what we actually wanted. There is even a book

22 called: "What do the Serbs want?" And it was published. This is

23 actually a platform on the basis of which we had already worked with

24 Cutileiro. So these six strategic goals were adopted, but at the same

25 session we adopted the conclusions, stating that we wanted the conference

Page 26073

1 to continue and that we wanted it to go on until a political solution is

2 reached. You can read that from the session of the 12th of May, because

3 we knew if we do not verify something in a political way it doesn't matter

4 how you actually fair in war -- I mean, war brings you nothing, it brings

5 you only victims.

6 That was our objective on the 12th of May, and we did not vote

7 about the strategic objectives; we voted about the entire information

8 presented, not about the goals specifically. Within this information,

9 they were incorporated, too. It's a different matter altogether that

10 later on they were published as a document; I explained that in 1993 --

11 well, I don't know. Perhaps they were adopted on purpose or by mistake.

12 It wasn't on my part at any rate, but they were published, yes.

13 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes. I am -- then you continue

14 to try and find solutions, negotiated solutions, you know, to find -- even

15 though, as you say, the war had already broken out a month before that

16 statement where you announced the six strategic objectives. But

17 afterwards -- well, you especially were negotiating, you knew that at the

18 same time these objectives had influence -- had an influence on the war

19 that was going on, didn't you?

20 A. Well, it can be taken that way, but believe me, ewe never knew

21 what you could achieve while the war was still on. The fortunes of war

22 changed to such an extent and ultimately -- well, I don't know. Apart

23 from one particular objective, I don't think that any one of these

24 objectives were attained. You simply have no idea what tomorrow will

25 bring because the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina is the front. So every

Page 26074

1 municipality had a plan of its own. If they could take a village of their

2 own or whatever else, quite simply, there was this confederacy, if I can

3 put it that way, a confederacy of goals. Everybody had a goal of their

4 own, a local goal of their own. This was a platform for negotiations, and

5 now what could you achieve if there is a war on? That depended on the

6 fortunes of war. You would gain a few, lose a few. War is, well,

7 something that is either imposed or not imposed; you either want it or you

8 don't want it. I mean, nobody wants a war, but once a war starts it is

9 hard to stop it.

10 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Fine. Then you also told us that

11 you were in favour -- you were in favour of -- you thought that the

12 changes in population had to be done deliberately. I mean, you wanted

13 only those to leave -- those who left their territories to be people who

14 wanted to leave their territories. That's what you said many times. So

15 you only wanted, you know, movements of population to be done through the

16 will of the people, but at the same time you seem to think that that was

17 an acceptable way of doing things, but you knew that there was a war going

18 on also. So didn't the fact that there was a war going on sort of force

19 people to leave on both sides? So people -- you say that people were

20 leaving of their free will, but it wasn't that free. They were leaving

21 because there was a war. Maybe for other reasons, but they were leaving

22 because of the war. Isn't that obvious for you that that's why people

23 were leaving?

24 A. Well, when there is a war going on, the most important thing is to

25 stay alive. The easiest thing in a war is to lose one's life; it's easier

Page 26075

1 than anything else. When I talked about Serbs who were leaving Central

2 Bosnia, when they were leaving their homes and when they were happy, I

3 understood them.

4 During the course of the negotiations, during those four years, 20

5 times or perhaps even more than that I thought: We've achieved peace.

6 Practically at every conference you would think: Yes, this has brought

7 the war to an end. You're absolutely right. People flee from war,

8 especially those who are a minority. They want to save their lives, and

9 they hope that the war would end quickly. That's what happened in the

10 Second World War, people fled from certain areas, the war was over, and

11 then everybody went back home where they had lived. This turned out to be

12 quite different. I was happy when, say, these Serbs -- when I saw that

13 they got out alive. Believe me, those who stayed on in territories where

14 they were a minority fared much worse than those who had left; I'm talking

15 about Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, I don't know, other areas as well. When

16 you are a minority for a long time, there are various elements that get

17 out of control and therefore your life is in jeopardy and it is hard to

18 stay alive.

19 I have the example of a Croat doctor in Pale who came to ask me

20 for help. And I said: Yes, tell me. And he said: Well, I have this

21 friend. And that is when I called this Malko Koroman, I remember, and he

22 said: I'll find these criminals. This was a doctor, a paediatrician, who

23 had treated many, many Serb children, and a criminal threatened him.

24 Thank goodness he stayed alive. He survived and he wanted to be a witness

25 here, in fact, but he died a month or two ago. What I'm trying to say is

Page 26076

1 that in every environment there are people who could jeopardise your life.

2 If people were moving out under force, that was all -- that was not right.

3 If people left of their own accord, then it's different. I'm a refugee

4 myself, and I know what it's like to leave your home.

5 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] You also said during your

6 testimony that you did not know of serious offences made to human rights

7 and serious breaches of human rights that occurred, despite, I imagine-

8 that what I'm asking - that you often left your country, you attended

9 international meetings. So during these international meetings wasn't --

10 didn't you -- weren't you able to say: What's going on? What's happening

11 out -- you know, what's happening in terms of human rights? During these

12 negotiations, first with Lord Carrington and Cutileiro and then later on

13 with Vance Owen, didn't the people who were there never -- didn't it ever

14 occur to them to ask: What's going on? Do you know what's going on? Can

15 you -- what can you do to stop what's happening in the country? Didn't

16 that ever occur?

17 A. I explained that here. There were complaints made by the

18 representatives of the international community that there was ethnic

19 cleansing, that there were persecutions, and other things, too, camps, and

20 so on. I told you, there were people who were in charge of things, like

21 the MUP and people from the Presidency, and they were in contact with

22 certain structures. I would always receive information. We discussed

23 that at this consultative meeting. Information -- the information that we

24 got was that this was propaganda, that things were actually the other way

25 around. And when a commission was established, when they went to the area

Page 26077

1 and communications were very poor, then some things were actually

2 discovered. And this seemed to be only a small part of the problem, for

3 instance that there were prisons but not that there were murders. And

4 measures were taken, very strict measures. I don't want to commit a sin.

5 This was not my area of responsibility, but the government, the

6 Presidency, I felt that everybody wanted to have the rule of law

7 established and to have perpetrators punished. Nobody supported that, but

8 it is incredible the extent to which crimes were being concealed. I told

9 you about Sarajevo, a diameter of 2 kilometres, and the authorities did

10 not know what was going on there, in that area. A crime could happen in

11 the building next door, you wouldn't know during the course of a war.

12 Quite simply, people who committed crimes hid that and you did not have

13 sufficient information, you could not investigate that, the judiciary was

14 not functioning properly, and it was only later on that you would find out

15 what had happened.

16 So I know that whenever accusations were made, there was always a

17 discussion and measures were always taken. I do not remember a single

18 meeting where this was on the agenda and when measures were not taken

19 later on, to establish the truth, to punish the persons who were guilty --

20 I mean, I simply do not remember a meeting where somebody said it doesn't

21 matter, never mind what happened.

22 And in addition to that I'll tell you something else. I had my

23 own family problems. While my wife was alive, I had that problem; and

24 then I had three children. They were in Pale and I spent most of my time

25 in Pale. I didn't travel that much, except that I attended Assembly

Page 26078

1 meetings. So I could not tour the entire area, so I could not

2 establish -- I mean, that I myself could establish what the truth was.

3 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes, but you say that there are

4 many crimes that were hidden, maybe so. But there were other situations

5 that were shown to the entire world on the media, especially with the --

6 you know, this -- on TV. So when you left the country, when you went to

7 London, to Brussels, you told us that in July you went to London, in July

8 of 1992. I think there was another meeting at the end of August, also in

9 London, and another one in Geneva later on. Didn't that strike you, just

10 in passing in front of a TV, to see that on the screen, people coming to

11 ask -- asking: What's happening? What's going on? Didn't it occur to

12 you that you could ask what was happening?

13 A. First of all, I was highly interested in what was going on. At

14 these meetings that we attended, everything that was presented -- say this

15 meeting in London, conclusions were reached, decisions were reached to

16 disband all prisons and to have all persons exchanged. Then somebody was

17 supposed to carry this through and some things were indeed carried out. I

18 know that, for example, if there were such accusations made, then those

19 who were in charge, say Karadzic, Koljevic, would present certain views on

20 that, and indeed they had the same kind of information that I did. I

21 cannot say anything that wouldn't be right, and they probably got this

22 information from people they had consulted previously.

23 Regrettably, in the media, in foreign media, there were some

24 things that we knew were not true. For example, they would show a

25 graveyard full of crosses and then they would say - I heard that - this is

Page 26079

1 the graveyard of Muslims that were killed by the Serbs. We know that

2 Muslims do not have crosses on their tombstones. So for somebody out

3 there, that may seem to be true. But then you feel that there is no

4 objectivity in information. So I heard about that, and then you get the

5 impression that everything is rigged and that everything is false. You

6 saw Mrs. Plavsic's open letter. She said: It is not correct. There are

7 Muslims that -- there are also Muslim organised camps and so on and so

8 forth, and it is not civilians who are in prisons and so on and so forth.

9 I mean, I'm just saying that the situation was the same on other sides,

10 too. Quite simply, there was chaos all over the place and where authority

11 was brought down to the lowest possible level and very often was in the

12 hands of highly responsible people. We started from scratch, basically,

13 when we started building some kind of a legal system. I'm not trying to

14 justify people who were in charge of this, but that's just the way it was.

15 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes, but for example there was a

16 moment where Mr. Karadzic -- I don't remember if he learned it through the

17 Times or some minister of -- explaining that there were Arab attacks and

18 he said: Well, this is all fabrication. But did he have intelligence or

19 something? Because when you say, okay, somebody's been killed. You say:

20 No, it's not true. And you can deny it. But the opposite is difficult,

21 saying that this has not occurred. So how did he make that statement so

22 quickly? Did he investigate, you know? I mean, you were always with him,

23 so did you know what happened when he made that statement?

24 A. I'm not aware of that statement -- well, maybe my conclusions are

25 wrong. I'm not Mr. Karadzic's lawyer; I'm defending myself. As far as I

Page 26080

1 knew, information could come from the MUP, from the military, and perhaps

2 for -- from people who were in the field. But I hadn't heard of anybody

3 confirming such reports. If Karadzic received the same information, then

4 perhaps he reacted on the basis of that, and then later on you established

5 that there was something wrong and that some chief of police had

6 misinformed you or something. Well, he informed his minister and the

7 minister misinformed you. I mean, I'm talking about the persons who were

8 actually in charge of such things.

9 There is one thing, Your Honour, I myself, I personally, could not

10 punish anyone, could not promote anyone, I could not give anyone a

11 decoration, I could not give anyone a commendation. Had I received some

12 information - I've already given you an example - I would certainly want

13 for my own sake, as a human being, to see this through. Not because it

14 was my duty. I wouldn't want anything to remain unresolved because that

15 would give my people and the policy that I take part in a bad name. But

16 had I known of any such thing, I would have reacted and I always reacted

17 in order to have things investigated to the very end if there were

18 indications. However, I do not want to commit a sin. I should say that

19 others reacted, too.

20 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes, and finally, you said in

21 your testimony that when you were meeting in the Presidency of Republika

22 Srpska you were always there as a guest, you always attended those

23 meetings as a guest. So I think you were there in almost all the meetings

24 except for one, all the meetings of this Presidency from January all the

25 way to December. So I would like to know what it meant to be a guest at

Page 26081

1 those meetings. What did you do exactly? What was the role that you

2 played in those meetings as a guest?

3 A. I did not think that these were meetings of the Presidency. I

4 first saw these records here, in The Hague. I knew that there were

5 certain reminders. I thought that these were consultative meetings. Very

6 often we had consultative meetings. We'd discuss various problems,

7 various respective problems. As for these consultative meetings, I'm

8 the "guilty party," and Mr. Djeric, too, because we simply wanted to

9 consult about certain matters. Because I used to work in a company where

10 we would have senior staff meetings, we'd discuss a problem, and then

11 everybody would go and do his own job. We would discuss various problems

12 there. There were many decisions that were reached, say of the

13 Presidency, that were not reached at these meetings; they were reached

14 autonomously. For example, all orders issued by Mr. Karadzic were issued

15 apart from these meetings. Then there were laws and other things that

16 were not part of the agenda of these meetings. After all, that is his

17 right -- or rather, the right of the Presidency.

18 Now, whether they had any separate meetings -- well, I think that

19 was very seldom. These were sort of ad hoc meetings. They were not

20 particularly official meetings. At these meetings that were called

21 Presidency meetings, there was this discussion, debate, about all sorts of

22 things. And, quite simply, if somebody had a particular task or a

23 particular problem, we'd discuss it and then everybody'd go and do his own

24 work. I did not take over anything from the Presidency. I never did

25 anything that was not part of my own job. I would not allow myself to be

Page 26082

1 part of an illegal body. If they want me to become a member of a

2 particular body, have the Assembly vote on it. And if the Assembly votes

3 and says that I'm a member of the Presidency, then all right. But, I

4 mean, I would not do it any other way. We were all there, we consulted on

5 problems and our jobs. I remember most of the items that were on the

6 agenda, and then after that we all went out and did our own work. I

7 didn't know what the government did. They didn't know what I did. Others

8 didn't know either, then everybody went off and did their own work. Very

9 often these meetings were brief.

10 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Yes, but how can you explain that

11 in the minutes of what happened over there the mention is decisions made

12 on problems, you know, appointment of this person, appointment of

13 commissioners to Crisis Staffs or to war staffs? And at one point in time

14 also if I remember on June 27th, 1992, at the meeting of the Presidency

15 and in the minutes that we got, it was -- General Mladic was ordered to

16 stop bombing Sarajevo, not just that, it wasn't a consultation, you know,

17 it was a decision, it was an order, that was given to General Mladic. And

18 after that order given to General Mladic, bombing actually stopped, right

19 there. So how -- it looks like these meetings were decision-making

20 meetings. They weren't just consultative meetings, at least from what we

21 saw, it definitely looks like they were decision-making meetings.

22 A. If that refers to a meeting that was not attended by Karadzic but

23 was attended by Koljevic, Plavsic, Djeric, and I, and when we said that

24 firing at Dobrinja should stop -- I mean Sarajevo, and that the Supreme

25 Command should be told to issue orders to the Main Staff to that effect.

Page 26083

1 It's probably the case that somebody who was in contact with the

2 UNPROFOR received complaints about Sarajevo being shelled -- or maybe

3 somebody said the conference can't go on because the Serbs are attacking

4 the city, and Koljevic presented that at the meeting. And it was

5 concluded that regardless of the crime that it constituted, it did us

6 political damage and that indeed the Presidency should issue orders to

7 stop that, regardless of whether the military had any excuse for that or

8 not. The recording secretary wrote that, not because the order was issued

9 then and there, the orders were issued in due course by whoever was in

10 charge. But the Presidency did note that such an order should be issued

11 because it was doing us political damage. The military justification was

12 maybe there, but it was doing us political damage because the conference

13 could not go on.

14 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] So you mean that in these

15 meetings decisions were never made, except by those who were in the

16 Presidency, Koljevic and you didn't mention Mrs. Plavsic. But there was a

17 meeting in November 1992 where the three members of the Presidency were

18 present. So how were the decisions made then when there were only one

19 person who was able to make the decision --

20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter made a mistake.

21 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] At that meeting the only person

22 available to make the decision was one of the members of the Presidency;

23 the two others were only consultative.

24 A. Well, that speaks volumes. A certain problem would be discussed,

25 and if the problem fell into the jurisdiction of the Presidency, the

Page 26084

1 Presidency would decide. If it fell within the province of the Assembly,

2 the Assembly would deal with it. The same goes for the government. And

3 the implementation would be up to the competent body, whether it would be

4 by an order, whether it would be placed on the agenda. The initiative

5 would come from the competent body. It would be placed on the agenda to

6 hear the opinion of others, but the implementation was always in the hands

7 of the body in charge. I, for instance, could not issue orders to the

8 army to stop the shelling. It could be done by the president of the

9 Presidency, as the supreme commander, just like they could not preside

10 over an Assembly session. The same is true of the government.

11 I, for instance, did not attend a single cabinet meeting. I don't

12 know what was decided there because finally it was -- I mean, in 1992 it

13 was their province. But it was quite normal for them to attend Assembly

14 sessions when I presided and members of the Presidency attended, too,

15 although because they not have the right of vote at Assembly sessions.

16 Only MPs had the right to vote. But we were anxious to hear their opinion

17 when they rose to spoke to tell us their opinion. Of course, the MPs

18 appreciated that.

19 JUDGE CANIVELL: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.

20 A. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I'll not start right away with my

22 questions because we'll first have a break. But I have one follow-up

23 question for you. One of your last answers to Judge Canivell's question

24 you responded in the following way. You said: If that refers to a

25 meeting that was not attended by Mr. Karadzic, but -- and then you

Page 26085

1 mentioned those who were present.

2 "And when we said that firing at Dobrinja should stop, I mean

3 Sarajevo, and that the Supreme Command should be told to issue orders to

4 the Main Staff to that effect, it is probably the case that somebody," and

5 then you continued. I think correctly you said "and when we said,"

6 because if we read what it says, it says: "The Main Staff of the Army of

7 the Serbian Republic of BH is ordered to cease all infantry and military

8 operations in the suburb of Dobrinja immediately."

9 Do we immediately that at least the text, the language, does not

10 say that you are asking the Supreme Command to issue orders to the Main

11 Staff, but that, at least in this text, there was a direct order to the

12 Main Staff to act immediately. That's what it says, isn't it?

13 A. No, no. Maybe on page 2, I think. You have it in some record

14 that the Main Staff should report to the Supreme Command or seek

15 information. If I had that record I could answer this. It's difficult to

16 say something like this off the cuff.

17 JUDGE ORIE: If someone would have the B/C/S version of the 12th

18 Presidency Session of the 27th of June, then we could -- it's P65, tab

19 171, I take it. Yes.

20 Yes, could it be given to Mr. Krajisnik.

21 Mr. Krajisnik, I have in front of me the minutes of the 12th

22 Session, and I was referring to paragraph 3, first full sentence, which

23 reads in English, but if it's not well translated then we have to verify

24 that: "The Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic of BH is

25 ordered to cease all artillery and infantry operations in the suburb of

Page 26086

1 Dobrinja immediately."

2 A. Yes, yes. It says: "The Main Staff is ordered." But it's not an

3 order. This is up to somebody to implement after this because there was

4 no representative of the Main Staff. Somebody had to write out an order,

5 somebody in the Presidency, and to send them that order. And it must be

6 linked with this last item where the Main Staff is instructed to establish

7 contact with the UNPROFOR and start implementing -- no, sorry, the

8 previous one. "Fire is to be opened only in necessary defence" -- that's

9 what I meant. "Fire is to be opened only for necessary defence, but only

10 with prior notification to the Supreme Command and the UNPROFOR is the

11 mediator in the airport operation."

12 This is what I mean. This is just a memo because Karadzic was not

13 there. It's probably the case that somebody said: The Main Staff should

14 be ordered immediately to stop this, and the recording secretary wrote it

15 down. But this is not the way you write orders. Somebody should --

16 somebody over there should have written it and sent it to the Main Staff.

17 If the representative of the Main Staff was there, then you could say that

18 he heard this, but normally an order is not written this way. It had to

19 be an order in writing.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, it also could be read, I'm just

21 putting this to you, that an order was given to cease all artillery and

22 infantry operations immediately, that -- as the second line says, that the

23 armed forces should move from offensive to defensive positions, which at

24 least suggests that they were in offensive positions. And that, for the

25 future, fire should be opened only for necessary defence, after having

Page 26087

1 consulted with the Presidency, the Supreme Command, and UNPROFOR. So

2 apart from whether the Presidency and the Supreme Command both played a

3 role there. But you could also read it as making a clear distinction

4 between orders that took immediate effect and orders that would need

5 further consultation, that is to respond to open fire only for necessary

6 defence.

7 A. Yes, but this is not an order. On the basis of this paper,

8 somebody was to write out an order, the competent body was to write an

9 order and approve this. It's true that two members of the Presidency were

10 present, but this was to serve only as a basis for further enactments.

11 That's why it was a consultative meeting. Yes, we could have noted

12 whatever we saw fit, but somebody else was to write an order. This is not

13 enough. This is not something received by the -- or receivable by the

14 Main Staff or the Supreme Command. The Main Staff did not receive this.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, that's not what the text says. Do we

16 agree on that?

17 A. Yes, we agree, we agree completely. It's written just as you

18 said, but after this somebody was to write an order to implement this.

19 The Main Staff did not receive this.

20 JUDGE ORIE: The second portion of your reasoning is that you

21 say: "This was to serve only as a basis for further enactments." Then

22 you said: "That's why it was a consultative meeting."

23 Here your assumption or your testimony that it was a consultative

24 meeting explains why something was still to be done. That also means that

25 if it was not a consultative meeting, that that reasoning is not valid

Page 26088

1 anymore.

2 A. No. You see, this is a consultative meeting, not an advisory

3 meeting. People consult each other.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Where does it say so? Could you please tell me, this

5 is decision A, decision B, order A, order B. Where does it say -- I mean,

6 you have repeatedly told us that, and one of the things which is very

7 important is that you gave your interpretation of the text on the basis of

8 what you say what is your knowledge, but of course the Judges have their

9 own responsibility in interpreting texts and to see whether the text

10 support your testimony in this respect. So therefore I'm inviting you to

11 give us those portions of the text that clearly indicate that these were

12 consultative meetings rather than decision -- rather than meetings where

13 decisions were taken, because the text so often says: Decision this,

14 order that. So if you would assist us in -- help us in finding textual

15 support for your interpretation of these texts and your recollection of

16 what happened during those meetings, then it would highly -- be highly

17 appreciated.

18 A. You see, Mr. President, you see this paper was signed by

19 Mr. Karadzic; it means that it was typed out later. Because we, when we

20 hold the meeting, somebody takes notes, and afterwards writes it all out.

21 Especially when Karadzic was not present, he wrote it out the next day or

22 even later. When I say that it was a consultative meeting, it's not

23 written anywhere that it was a consultative meeting. It says: "A meeting

24 of the Presidency in immediate threat of war," not in a state of war --

25 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not saying --

Page 26089

1 A. And the attendees discussed things --

2 JUDGE ORIE: You're now mixing up a few things. I think I never

3 put it to you that it said that it was during a state of war. I'm just

4 asking you to point at those portions in the text which would support your

5 testimony that these were consultative meetings, and I just heard you say

6 that the text doesn't say so.

7 A. It's not written in the text, but look where it says: To hold a

8 patron saint's day, for one of them to go to Ilijas, for a delegation of

9 the government to go -- it's not even specified who should be on the

10 delegation. There were lots of such conclusions. This thing should be

11 done and that thing should be done, et cetera. Things should be done is

12 the wording.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Now you say it's not even said who would be in the

14 delegation. I see under 1 that for St. Vitus day, the patron saint for

15 the army of the Serbian Republic, the following appointees go, under A:

16 For Han Pijesak, Biljana Plavsic, Dr. Branko Djeric, and Bogdan Subotic.

17 B: For Ilijas Dr. Nikola Koljevic and Momcilo Krajisnik. C: For Res

18 [phoen] Velobar Ostojic and Ljubomir Zukovic. Your testimony just was

19 that it wasn't even said who would be the delegates. Could you explain to

20 me -- and you took this example, how could I read it in such a way that

21 the delegates were not even, as you said -- let me just check that. "It's

22 not even specified who should be on the delegation."

23 I see for all three delegations, I see persons clearly mentioned

24 to be on that delegations.

25 A. Well, what I meant is this: The government is instructed to

Page 26090

1 appoint a delegation to tour military units and hospitals. Here, the

2 government is urged to appoint units to visit military units and hospital.

3 We were there and we were talking about who should go to some sort of

4 celebration. It was not a decision; it was simply an understanding

5 between us.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that the decision is laid in the hands of the

7 government.

8 We'll first have a break. We'll resume at five minutes past 6.00.

9 --- Recess taken at 5.39 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I've got a few questions for you as

12 well. First of all, you explained many, many times that it was

13 unconstitutional what the -- the Muslims and the Croats did in the way

14 they sought independence for BiH. Could you tell us what would have been

15 the constitutional way to do it, step by step. What would have been

16 needed in accordance with the constitution to gain independence?

17 A. Independence could have taken place only by way of changing the

18 constitution.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And how would you change the constitution?

20 A. Well, the constitution would be changed in the following way. The

21 constitutional commission would, well, provide a draft and then there

22 would be a public debate and then a proposal would be presented, and this

23 would go to the Assembly. And two-thirds from both chambers, that is to

24 say the Chamber of Nations and the Chamber of Citizens, two -- there would

25 have to be a two-third majority that would vote in favour of the new

Page 26091

1 constitution that would provide for the independence of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is what Slovenia and Croatia had done; before

3 that, they had had a referendum to see what the public thought and felt.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So do I understand well that so a minority

5 could have blocked independence if it was at least one-third of the vote?

6 Is that correct understanding?

7 A. Yes. A change of the constitution, yes. But there was an

8 instrument perhaps; that's very important. In fact, national questions,

9 questions that were of vital interest, could not be, well, voted on until

10 this would be considered by the council for the national and ethnic

11 equality of peoples, and it would be that council that would have to pass

12 a two-thirds decision. And once there is such a decision, then the

13 proposal will be presented to the Assembly, and then two-thirds of the MPs

14 will have to support that decision made by the council. Something similar

15 is in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina now with regard to these questions --

16 well, there's actually a council of peoples rather than this original

17 council.

18 JUDGE ORIE: And this council for national equality, there in that

19 council, a minority could have blocked a way to independence. Is that a

20 correct understanding?

21 A. Only in terms of vital national interests, that is to say a

22 minority could do that -- well, they could not discuss any issue, laws, or

23 whatever. But as for vital interests, a minority could block a majority.

24 This exists to this day -- or rather, it was introduced after Dayton.

25 What was insisted upon was consensus and accommodation of views rather

Page 26092

1 than out-voting.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Do you consider that a question of independence could

3 be resolved by a consensus, where the parties were so much opposing each

4 other?

5 A. I believe that we absolutely could have done it that way, and I

6 can even explain how.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

8 A. Well, we had two extremes. Say the Serbs wanted Yugoslavia and

9 the Muslims wanted an independent, unitary state. The Croats were sort of

10 in between. Agreement was reached, either under pressure or by way of a

11 reality. You recognise Bosnia and you give up on Yugoslavia and agree

12 that Bosnia will be a complex national community like Switzerland,

13 Belgium, and so on. So those are the principles involved, and on the

14 basis of that there could have been an independent Bosnia without any war.

15 People were delighted when these principles were agreed upon. People did

16 not want war. And I think that this is a great pity, historically

17 speaking.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Now, things went otherwise. A constitutional

19 solution was not found. Now, looking at the new situation in the

20 Republika Srpska - and I'm first concentrating on the central level - how

21 were the minorities represented on the central level, be it government, be

22 it Assembly, be it Presidency, in Republika Srpska?

23 A. You mean once the war started?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Once the Republika Srpska was established and that

25 the war started soon after that.

Page 26093

1 A. Yes, yes. Republika Srpska was established on the 9th of January,

2 1992. That is to say two or three months before the war. It was

3 established on paper - on paper - that is to say it was almost a fiction.

4 On the 25th of January, so that is to say just a bit after that, there was

5 an Assembly meeting of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the referendum, and I

6 asked the MPs through my own authority to go to this joint Assembly. And

7 we discussed this for two days, to see how the Serbs could take part in

8 the referendum, too, and indeed we found a solution. The government

9 agreed on regionalisation. There is a recording of that and there is a

10 transcript, too. That would have satisfied the Serbs. So we all would

11 have taken part in the referendum, Bosnia would have been independent, but

12 we would have had these units, these constituent units. Of course that is

13 what was supposed to be done. And you even have this decision, that is to

14 say the deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Cengic, who was also vice-president of

15 the SDA. He went to the rostrum together with Karadzic and he said:

16 We've reached agreement. And everybody was so pleased. However, after

17 that, Mr. Izetbegovic went back on that and said: We give up on this.

18 That was the last session of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was

19 held. So agreement was reached at 3.00 at night. I had this session

20 going on for two days, and we kept discussing and trying to reach

21 agreement, and that was the last chance to avoid everything. And then

22 there was Cutileiro and so on and so forth.

23 JUDGE ORIE: But My question was how the minorities were

24 represented.

25 A. Well, I said that on the 9th of January Republika Srpska existed

Page 26094

1 only on paper. It did not actually start functioning at all until the war

2 started. So the Muslims and Croats did not even take part in this state

3 that existed only on paper. No territory, no nothing, you just have this

4 proclamation.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Now things moved on. At a certain moment there was a

6 territory, there was -- there was an Assembly. What steps were taken then

7 to have the Muslims and the Croats represented in the newly established

8 organs of Republika Srpska?

9 A. I have an example, say of an attempt. Mr. Kupresanin asked an MP,

10 a Muslim, to enter the Assembly. He came to Banja Luka, and he had had

11 contact with Karadzic over the telephone. You have a recording here, and

12 he said: Please, join the Assembly because you're from Banja Luka and

13 you're from that old Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apparently he agreed

14 to that, but later on he refused. MPs from the HDZ and the SDA did not

15 want to take part in this "artificial" Assembly. During the war, whether

16 we like it or not, it was exclusively Serb. I'm talking about the

17 authorities at the level of Republika Srpska. That's what you asked me

18 about. But say at municipal level, Mr. President -- well, and this is a

19 smaller part. For example, in Banja Luka the vice-president was a Croat

20 and then there was some Muslims, but only at first. Later on, quite

21 simply, there weren't any, like on the other side, too.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now in some municipalities where the Muslims

23 were a majority, for example in Prijedor, what -- what happened there as

24 far as the rights of Muslims and Croats were concerned?

25 A. Well, you saw Mr. Srdic's statement here, that they did all of

Page 26095

1 that on their own, that we did not have any contact with Prijedor until

2 the end of June because there was no communication. So what was done?

3 They got into a fight. Without a war, the Serb side took the

4 municipality, and then the fight broke out, that is to say the war broke

5 out. I don't think that the Assembly operated at all. They had a Crisis

6 Staff or a Presidency. I learned that later.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, you've told us that Serb Assemblies had to

8 be formed in the municipalities. They were mainly, as you told us -- were

9 an instrument to express the views of Serbs on vital issues, vital to

10 them, not for any decision-making. Could you tell us: What happened

11 later with these Serb Assemblies? Did they ever in a later stage -- not

12 necessarily before the year 1992. Did they function? Did they finally

13 play a role as an Assembly or ...

14 A. You mean during the war? I did not quite understand,

15 Mr. President.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, you said it was -- these Assemblies,

17 these Serb Assemblies, were formed. Of course we know about Crisis

18 Staffs, we know about war commissions or War Presidencies, but what

19 exactly happened with these Serb Assemblies? Did they ever function as an

20 Assembly at a later stage?

21 A. At a later stage in most municipalities, yes. Practically in all

22 by the end of 1992, the organs of government, if I can put it that way,

23 started to function, the executive councils, the Executive Boards of

24 municipalities that consisted of Serbs, of course for the most part,

25 during the war. So there weren't any commissions or commissioners, so

Page 26096

1 they did start functioning, yes.

2 JUDGE ORIE: And did at these later stages -- was an opportunity

3 given to be represented in those representative bodies as an Assembly to

4 Muslims and Croats who had remained on the territory of those

5 municipalities?

6 A. I cannot -- well, it would be dishonest of me to try to give a

7 quality answer now. I can give you my opinion, though. I know that we

8 would have been glad had the Muslims from those areas been in the

9 municipalities, and then we would have said: Well, we have mixed

10 municipalities and Assemblies, just like the Muslims did in Sarajevo with

11 just a couple of Serbs. But that simply didn't happen. Even those who

12 were in the Assembly left. So there was an absolute majority of Serbs,

13 although I know the policy was it would be a welcome thing if we were only

14 to look at politics -- of course we'd be happy if we had members of the

15 Municipal Assembly who were not Serbs. But the same goes for the other

16 side. But never mind about the other side; I'm talking about the Serb

17 side now.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Wasn't this a constitutionally guaranteed right

19 to be represented on the local level?

20 A. You are absolutely right. We had the most democratic of

21 constitutions. But there was a war and, quite simply, this was a utopia.

22 You could not carry it through. Well, after the war, yes, but not during

23 the war.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the right to be represented in directly

25 elected representative bodies was a dead letter at that moment. Is that a

Page 26097

1 correct understanding?

2 A. Well, first of all, there were no elections during the course of

3 the war. There were only old Assemblymen from 1990. They were not in

4 parliament. For the most part, they didn't want to be there. They left

5 that parliament where Republika Srpska was, if I could put it that way.

6 However, they certainly would have been received had they been willing to

7 join the parliament, the municipal parliament, I mean. The republican

8 parliament, too, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Was any, apart from that telephone call you just

10 referred to by Mr. Kupresanin, was any initiative taken to -- to make the

11 rights of Muslims and Croats any more than a -- as you just confirmed

12 this, of a dead letter.

13 A. Well, more was done to protect people along the lines of the

14 Geneva Conventions and so on and so forth. Really, as far as political

15 life is concerned there were Crisis Staffs or Presidencies or commissions.

16 So in that period when the Assemblies started to operate, that was already

17 the second half of 1992, perhaps even the fourth quarter of 1992. So -

18 how should I put this? - one could not talk about a productive product,

19 that you were involving Muslims in municipal government, although the door

20 was always open. People were, quite simply, leaving. Serbs were leaving

21 and, of course, Muslims and Croats, too.

22 JUDGE ORIE: You say: "More was done to protect people along the

23 lines of the Geneva Conventions and so on and so forth."

24 Is my recollection correct that war crimes against Serbs were

25 investigated?

Page 26098

1 A. No, Mr. President, not investigated at all, although a commission

2 had been established. They should have been investigated, just like a

3 commission was established on the Muslim side for all, and as a matter of

4 fact papers were being collected and war was being waged. I don't know

5 whether the Serbs investigated anything against the Serbs -- I mean --

6 well, the central commission. I'm talking about the central commission,

7 but I don't know about what was done at municipal level. I do not recall

8 now.

9 JUDGE ORIE: You said a commission had been established to

10 investigate although they didn't do it, to investigate war crimes

11 committed against Serbs. Was a similar -- were similar initiatives taken

12 in -- to investigate violations of the Geneva Conventions against

13 non-Serbs?

14 A. There was a standing order several times that if there were any

15 indications that things should be looked into and that the perpetrators

16 should be punished. I'm sure that this exists on paper, too, these

17 orders. Now, how that was actually carried out in practice, that I don't

18 know. That is a different matter.

19 This was an enormous burden, and also that was not one's goal, to

20 violate the Geneva Conventions.

21 JUDGE ORIE: What was exactly the enormous burden?

22 A. Well, if you have negotiations, and if somebody keeps accusing you

23 of something all the time. I'm talking apart from crimes. I mean, that's

24 not permissible, of course. Of course you do your best to investigate

25 that and to get that out of the way because, to put it mildly, this is not

Page 26099

1 in your political interests, it's not politically useful. How can that be

2 useful if somebody is killing, raping, looting, whatever? It is not in

3 the interests of normal politicians, especially if you want to resolve a

4 problem by political means. Why would you be under pressure all the time?

5 I don't know. Especially if this is being done by criminals who are

6 robbing Serbs and who are committing crimes against the Serbs, too? Why

7 would you protect criminals? You would not have a single reason to

8 protect criminals.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You were asked by Judge Canivell earlier on how

10 seriously you took the media reports on -- blaming the Serbs for

11 misbehaviour. And then you answered that by saying: Well, they would

12 come with a graveyard with crosses on it saying: Well, these are all the

13 Muslims that died. And of course Muslims have no crosses on their

14 graveyards, so it is -- that was more or less the answer you gave. Did

15 you also see information -- information which was not obviously and

16 immediately recognisable as total nonsense?

17 A. I mentioned an example of a lack of confidence in the

18 international media, so I referred to that.

19 This is what the measures were: We took a statement. The

20 minister of information took all the journalists who had written against

21 us before that. He took them out on a trip to show that this was not true

22 and he had a press conference in that same place, Prijedor. And his

23 impressions when he got back were quite different. Now, was he deceived?

24 How did this turn out to be so different? Well, journalists from all

25 media went there and he said: Write about everything that you've seen.

Page 26100

1 There's no censorship. What could I do? I could only believe or not

2 believe him. If I would not believe him, then I would have to go to check

3 things out and I would probably get the same information, although that

4 was not my job, it was his job.

5 Mr. Bozanic went, too, and that woman who was here, who was a

6 witness here, she took journalists, too. That is what could be done, to

7 see whether journalists were right in terms of what they were writing

8 about or was the situation different. That what I can -- well, I don't

9 know. What could I do? Would I have to turn into a traveller to follow

10 in the trails of a delegation to see whether everything was correct?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Now, among the adjudicated facts we have information

12 about serious malnutrition in some places of detention. Did you ever see

13 the television broadcast at that time, whether you saw it directly on

14 television or on any picture, of people that were visibly malnourished?

15 A. Mr. President, if you're referring to the example from Prijedor, I

16 ask you, please, there is this film here, I gave it to my Defence, where

17 the journalist states that all of that was stage-managed. Could the

18 Defence please find that cassette that I provided? So the journalist

19 himself says: This is how they stage-managed all of it. So then you

20 really have this dilemma as to what was correct out of all of this or not.

21 Please, I gave the Defence this cassette where the man says how all of

22 that was stage-managed.

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it did occur to me to suggest when

24 Your Honour put the question, a need to be a bit more specific. I decided

25 to wait to see whether Mr. Krajisnik, well, picked up in a way that meant

Page 26101

1 that there wasn't any problem or uncertainty about what we're talking

2 about, but it's apparent that there might be. So I would invite

3 Your Honour to be a bit more specific than just refer to the telephone

4 broadcast.

5 JUDGE ORIE: It's there -- well, I would say it has become a

6 notorious picture of -- I've forgotten the name. I think it is in

7 evidence, the man who is behind the barbed wire.

8 MR. STEWART: I can picture it myself. Yes, indeed, Your Honour.

9 But Mr. Krajisnik responded by asking a question for confirmation of what

10 was being talked about.

11 JUDGE ORIE: I think we're talking about the same, but let's get

12 it confirmed. That's -- I've forgotten under what number it is in

13 evidence, but the one who is standing behind barbed wire. That -- it

14 seems that Mr. Krajisnik has the same. Yes.

15 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, apart from to what extent that is staged, was

16 the state of malnutrition staged as well in view of -- I mean, I was

17 talking not primarily about who was behind the barbed wire and who was,

18 but I'm mainly talking about the visible malnutrition of the person on the

19 picture, was that staged as well?

20 A. I didn't see that footage then. It was published later, and then

21 I got curious and wanted to know what it was about. I don't know why the

22 man looked like that. If he was thin, then obviously he didn't eat

23 enough. But really, at that time I didn't know anything about it.

24 Instead, I got a film in which it is explained that the man was not behind

25 the wire fence, he was outside the wire fence. I don't know what's true,

Page 26102

1 whether he was in prison and lost weight there or not, I don't know. But

2 I really did watch that film that was broadcast on television several

3 times later. But I didn't see it at the time, nor do I know why the man

4 appeared like that. It would be a good idea to show that film that I have

5 produced on a cassette. I don't know what's true.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm not primarily interested in to what extent

7 all the other parts were staged; I'm primarily interested in a state of

8 malnutrition.

9 But let's move to another subject, Mr. Krajisnik.

10 A. Excuse me, Your Honour. Ten people around him look quite well

11 fed, and he is really thin, that's true. All the other people around him,

12 who are apparently in the same prison, look quite normal. So you have to

13 wonder why he is only one who is so thin. You will -- you can have a look

14 at that photo, and if you pay attention to the people standing next to him

15 they are all- how shall I say? - normal.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to move to the next subject which is, to

17 some extent, related to what we earlier discussed. That is the

18 functioning of the judiciary. To what extent were you involved in the

19 setting up or establishing the judiciary?

20 A. The minister of justice had a great difficulty assembling

21 personnel and filling in vacancies because there were few lawyers who were

22 qualified to be judges and that was discussed at cabinet meetings. And

23 then they would bring nominations to the Presidency to sign, and then

24 these nominations were forwarded to the Assembly. So you have a whole

25 set of appointments prior to the 11th of August signed by Karadzic that

Page 26103

1 were published in the Official Gazette directly, only for some

2 modifications to be later made by the Assembly because the MPs objected to

3 certain people. Karadzic signed appointments for a large number of Croats

4 and Muslims. And this met with resistance at the Assembly, so that

5 eventually some of those people were revoked from those positions,

6 including some Montenegrins even, because people at the local level

7 objected to some people being judges there. Even Karadzic said it was

8 very detrimental, very damaging, and Mr. Koljevic said the same. They

9 said something along the lines: How are we supposed to build a democratic

10 state if we act like this? You can read about this in one of the

11 transcripts. I, however, did not decide on a single appointment. This

12 was the proper procedure for appointments.

13 JUDGE ORIE: What happened to those who belonged to the judiciary

14 that was functioning before the war?

15 A. I really don't know. They must have remained, most of them, even

16 if some left. But I know that a -- they had a shortage of personnel

17 because there were not enough lawyers, not enough qualified judges. And

18 it was an even bigger problem when the Assembly refused to approve certain

19 appointments and there was no replacement available or when a judge left

20 of his own accord.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Did you raise your voice when the Assembly refused to

22 approve certain appointments?

23 A. Well, we did have a consultative meeting about these appointments

24 and we were quite satisfied, because you cannot come across as a

25 democratic state in the eyes of the international community if your own

Page 26104

1 people are against judges simply because they belong to a different ethnic

2 community. But the atmosphere was such that the MPs were convinced that

3 it was up to them to decide. So when it came to a vote, they got their

4 way. What I could do and what I did do as the speaker, I tried to

5 organise discussions in such a way as to protect these nominations because

6 it was politically wise and also fair in the humane sense. It was very

7 politically unhelpful, to say the least.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Could you point us to any of the stenographic notes

9 or the minutes of the Assembly meetings where we can find confirmation of

10 how you organised discussions in such a way as to protect these

11 nominations?

12 A. Well, on the 11th of August there was a proposal for the MPs just

13 to confirm an appointment signed by Mr. Karadzic, including a large number

14 of Croats and Muslims. Prior to that, of course, I was in favour of

15 approving these nominations. And there were deliberations and debate, and

16 Karadzic himself defended his own proposal, Koljevic and others. You can

17 find it in the record. As soon as it was placed on the agenda of the

18 Assembly meeting, I took my position in favour of that proposal. 11th or

19 12th of August, one of those two days.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'll check that overnight and see whether I can

21 find that in the ...

22 A. I could bring it tomorrow, if you like, and we could see exactly

23 who was appointed.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At earlier occasions, were you aware of --

25 because I asked you before about -- about the fate of the judges that were

Page 26105

1 functioning before the war. Was that ever discussed? You said: I don't

2 know where they went, and you spoke then about new appointments.

3 A. Well, many of them were judges before. I really don't know what

4 posts they occupied before, but they must have passed the bar exam. I

5 don't know who served where, but I know about the Supreme Court.

6 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be a misunderstanding. I asked you

7 whether it was ever discussed what happened with the judges who served

8 before the war and may not have served anymore when the war had started.

9 A. No. That was within the province of the minister, and I didn't

10 get involved in that. I didn't find out why they did not occupy that

11 post. Nobody actually wanted to be a judge during the war because anybody

12 could take justice in their own hands at that time. They could barge into

13 your courtroom and tell you what to do. That was within the province of

14 the ministers I said. He is the one who formed the entire ministry.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I earlier asked you whether you raised your voice in

16 view of new nominations. Did you raise your voice when on the 25th of

17 July, 1992, Mr. Lukic, who was the Vlasenica deputy to the Bosnian Serb

18 Assembly, asked why we expelled all Muslim judges from Vlasenica,

19 Bratunac, and Zvornik. Did you then comment on this matter?

20 A. I don't know who Lukic from Vlasenica is. Maybe Dukic?

21 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, I may have -- Rajko, yes, Rajko Lukic must be

22 Rajko Dukic, yes. On the first name I --

23 A. No, Mr. President. On the 25th of July I know that we were under

24 great pressure to go as soon as possible to the London Conference. I even

25 seem to recall that I didn't share all of that session, that Mr. Milanovic

Page 26106

1 took over because we had to leave to make it to the London Conference.

2 And that was our priority at that time. In that month, we went to London

3 twice. I don't remember what happened there, and I do not trust myself to

4 remember that now. There were all sorts of proposals and all sorts of

5 speeches. What I cared about were the conclusions. Everybody else had

6 the right to say whatever they pleased, and even if I objected it didn't

7 matter one bit. All I could do was try to use my influence to arrive at a

8 good decision at the end. If I objected, it could only lead discussion up

9 a wrong path.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. To go to more specific issue, also about the

11 functioning of the judiciary, we heard the evidence of Mr. Mandic, who

12 said he was very much in favour of the -- of the merging, I would say, of

13 the military judicial organs with the -- with the civilian judicial

14 organs. Do you remember that testimony?

15 A. I do.

16 JUDGE ORIE: And he told us that he discussed the matter with you.

17 Is that also what your recollection tells you?

18 A. I have shown here that I put it before the Assembly, the military

19 were against, and they took it off the agenda. However, it wasn't he who

20 talked -- he talked with the government and then he talked to me.

21 However, when the proposal from the government came, it was put before the

22 Assembly. He understood that that was needed; however, the Main Staff was

23 against and they managed to take it off the agenda. They did not accept

24 the joinder. Health services were supposed to be joined, but the MPs

25 rejected even that.

Page 26107

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You said: They managed to get it off the

2 agenda. On the basis of what exactly did they manage to get it off the

3 agenda? I mean what was the competence of the military to remove items

4 from the agenda of the Assembly?

5 A. No, the military did not have that right, but the so-called party

6 concerned, the proponent was in this case the military prosecutor and they

7 are under the Main Staff. And they come to the session to defend their

8 position; the government defends its own position. They took opposite

9 views, and after discussion the solomonious solution was found --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Who proposed that?

11 A. Well, we arrived at it through debate. It was decided that was

12 the best thing to do. I can't tell you now who decided that, but that

13 solution was found to avoid making a decision then and there because the

14 Main Staff was absolutely against and the government was backing a

15 different proposal. Of course, it was possible to put it up for a vote,

16 in which case one party would be out-voted and that would not have been a

17 good thing.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I do understand that the government and the Main

19 Staff had a different position. Who decided to postpone the matter? I

20 mean, within whose competence was it to postpone the matter?

21 A. Well, the Assembly could agree with that or not. But the party's

22 views have to be harmonised. Everybody has to substantiate their

23 argument. We didn't want to play arbiters. We wanted them to bridge the

24 gap between their positions. We didn't want to root for any of the

25 parties.

Page 26108

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, the "we" is not always clear to me,

2 who "we" exactly was. Was the postponement to delay any further

3 decision-making, was that put to a vote? If not, who then decided?

4 A. Well, Mr. President, if for instance you have a speaker chairing

5 the Assembly session and one party is making a proposal, whereas another

6 party is opposed. A debate follows. And if you are then placed in a

7 situation to put something up for a vote without any hearing of arguments,

8 then the only solution --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, let me stop you at this moment. Let

10 me then perhaps ask it directly, because it seems that -- did you decide

11 that it would be postponed on the agenda? I mean, was it within the

12 competence of you -- your --

13 A. No, I have no such power, but I could only approve the

14 postponement. Of course I couldn't do it on my own, but I could

15 propose -- I could suggest that it should be postponed, yes. And however,

16 if the Assembly did not agree with that, my proposal would not pass.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Was there a vote on it or was it just silent

18 decided -- you say: Let's postpone it and then without any further --

19 A. I would never have put it on the agenda in the first place had I

20 been against. Why would I have put it on the agenda then and then

21 postponed it?

22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just trying to find out who took that decision to

23 postpone the matter. I now understand that it was you and you said -- let

24 me just --

25 A. I didn't take the decision.

Page 26109

1 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand. You say: Of course, I couldn't do

2 it on my own, but I could propose -- I could suggest that it should be

3 postponed. And that's what you did, that it should be postponed?

4 A. That's probably what I did.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 A. After a long debate in which various interests clashed.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Did Mr. Mandic earlier or later address the

8 same matter to the Presidency?

9 A. I don't remember it. It was discussed by the government, by the

10 Assembly, but we couldn't arrive at an agreed position. But it was not

11 the problem that the prosecutor's office was separate from the judiciary.

12 They could well work as separate institutions. Why not?

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Mandic also testified that he specifically

14 informed you about all matters in his knowledge, including irregularities

15 and inhumane treatment in detention facilities. Could you confirm this

16 or ...

17 A. No, that's not what he said. Later he said only as regards

18 Sarajevo. But when Mr. Stewart was questioning me, I only informed him

19 about Kula, because he wasn't aware of anything going on around Sarajevo.

20 I know exactly what he said. And I know that he didn't know much more

21 because otherwise he wouldn't have sent out that commission to

22 investigate. You can find it in the transcript. You'll see that what I'm

23 saying is right.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm looking at the clock, Mr. Krajisnik. Even

25 for me I have to obey the laws of the clock. I have violated them too

Page 26110

1 often. We'll adjourn for the day and we'll continue tomorrow at a quarter

2 past 2.00 in this same courtroom.

3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

4 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 21st day of

5 June, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25