1 Tuesday, 29 August 2006

2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.

7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

9 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11 Before we start, the Chamber is aware that the Prosecution very

12 much wanted to use its time as effectively as possible, and therefore to

13 start in time. It was due to the Martic delay that we have a late start,

14 and I have to even ask you for a couple of minutes more and then,

15 Mr. Harmon, all the time today is yours. I need that time to deliver a

16 decision on the Defence motion for exclusion of appendices A to D of the

17 final brief.

18 On the 25th of August, 2006, the Defence filed a motion seeking

19 exclusion of appendices A to D of the Prosecution's final trial brief on

20 the basis that they contain factual argument and, as such, do not comply

21 with paragraph (C)6 of the Practice Direction of the length of briefs and

22 motions of 16 September 2005. The Defence argues that the appendices are

23 argumentative because they contain summaries of the evidence given in the

24 course of the trial and are referenced only to the evidence which supports

25 the Prosecution's case. Such evidence, according to the Defence, does not

1 purport to be objective and for that reason alone cannot be said to be

2 "non-argumentative," as required by the Practice Direction.

3 The Defence also argues that the Prosecution's claim that the

4 appendices contain "references" is correct only insofar as that term

5 applies to the footnotes, but not to the substance of the text itself.

6 The Defence therefore asks that the Prosecution not be allowed to rely on

7 the appendices; that it be prevented from making any reference to them

8 during the closing arguments; that the appendices be removed from the

9 record; and that the Trial Chamber give an assurance that no use

10 whatsoever is made or will be made of the appendices by the Chamber.

11 On 28 August 2006, the Prosecution filed a response opposing the

12 motion. The Prosecution argues that appendices A to D fall within the

13 wide discretion afforded to the parties by the Practice Direction, as they

14 contain references to relevant transcript pages and exhibits accompanied

15 by "brief non-argumentative contextual information."

16 The Prosecution also claims that there is no requirement in the

17 Practice Direction that a party present material which is relevant to the

18 other side's case. The Prosecution concludes that the fact that an

19 appendix may support the case of the submitting party does not transform

20 that appendix into argumentative material within the meaning of the

21 Practice Direction.

22 The Chamber observes that paragraph (C)6 of the Practice Direction

23 allows for the use of appendices to present "references, source materials,

24 items from the record, exhibits, and other relevant non-argumentative

25 material." Accordingly, it allows the parties considerable discretion as

1 to what to include in the appendices for their final briefs. This

2 discretion is not unfettered, however, and two criteria must be met:

3 First, the material presented in appendices must be relevant; second, it

4 must not contain factual or legal arguments.

5 The use of appendices in final briefs is essentially an exercise

6 in utility. It is meant to enable the parties to assist the Chamber as

7 much as possible in determining a case, while giving them some relief from

8 the word limit. The Chamber's approach to the issue must, therefore, be

9 pragmatic. A final brief is expected to present one side of the case

10 only. Therefore, it would be illogical to insist that the presenting

11 party is only allowed to file an appendix to that final brief if it lists

12 the other party's evidence as well. The fact that the Prosecution may

13 have used its appendices to list evidence that gives support to its case

14 alone does not make them argumentative and is, therefore, not in breach of

15 paragraph (C)6 of the Practice Direction.

16 In addition, in cases such as this one where the Chamber is faced

17 with schedules of alleged crimes, any attempt to associate the scheduled

18 allegations to the evidence received will necessarily involve some

19 interpretation. The Practice Direction should be understood as

20 necessitating that this interpretation be kept to a minimum and that the

21 references to source material are as objective as possible. The

22 unavoidable presence of a degree of interpretation is certainly less

23 problematic in a case such as the present case where the very accused is

24 alleged to be far removed hierarchically from the perpetrators of the

25 crimes on the ground. The Defence does seem to accept that appendices may

1 be used for the purpose of footnoting scheduled allegations to the

2 material in evidence.

3 One could, of course, conceive of appendices consisting only of

4 page references to the original documentation. However, such a document

5 would defeat the ultimate purpose behind the use of the appendices.

6 Accordingly, good reasons should exist for the Chamber to accept the

7 impracticality of such an appendix.

8 The Chamber notes that it's not the first time that a Prosecution

9 final brief is presented with appendices consisting of summaries of

10 evidence. For example, in Prosecutor versus Brdjanin, the Prosecution

11 attached a 70-page annex to its final brief, containing a chronology of

12 events. This chronology included descriptions of alleged crimes, as well

13 as the supporting Prosecution evidence and exhibits. A similar and even

14 longer appendix was submitted in Prosecutor versus Kvocka and others and

15 was accepted by the Trial Chamber.

16 The Chamber has reviewed limited portions of the Prosecution's

17 appendices in order to assess the extent to which, if any, the text

18 contained therein does more than reflect objectively the content of the

19 underlying source material. The Chamber found the text in the appendices

20 to be reflective, as much as that is reasonably possible, of the

21 referenced passages of the source material. Furthermore, the Chamber

22 notes that without the text such as this, which essentially provides a

23 link between the references and the schedules, the appendices would

24 produce only confusion, leaving in doubt the content of the references

25 themselves.

1 Accordingly, the Defence's motion is denied. To the extent that

2 the text included in the appendices A to D contains elements of

3 interpretation of the evidence, the interpretative aspect will be ignored

4 by the Chamber which will, as always, make its own assessment of the

5 evidence cited in the footnotes.

6 This concludes the Chamber's decision.

7 Mr. Harmon, the remainder of the day is for the final argument by

8 the Prosecution. Please proceed.

9 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

10 Good afternoon, Your Honours, counsel. We have come to the

11 conclusion of a very, very long trial, and before Prosecution begins its

12 final submissions, I'd like to publicly acknowledge people who played an

13 important role in the course of this trial. I'd like to start first of

14 all with my colleagues, the lawyers who participated with me, both lawyers

15 from the work in the court-room before Your Honours and who worked behind

16 the scenes in preparing evidence and legal filings in this case. Of

17 course, we couldn't do it without the support of the trial support

18 personnel who assisted us greatly in terms of copying, photocopying

19 exhibits, who in the court-room managed the exhibits, who presented them.

20 The legal assistants who translated -- I should say the language

21 assistants who translated volumes of documents for us. Investigators and

22 analysts. All of them I would like to publicly acknowledge a great debt

23 of gratitude for their efforts.

24 I'd also like to thank Mr. Stewart, Mr. Josse, and members of his

25 team, both past and present, for their courtesy and their professionalism

1 toward the Prosecution which ensured that this trial would move in an

2 orderly fashion.

3 I must say that a great debt of gratitude is due to the people in

4 the language booths, because without them we couldn't proceed, and of

5 course, we lawyers make their lives miserable. We speak too fast,

6 occasionally we go beyond the time we're permitted. The interpreters have

7 to interpret in very, very difficult circumstances. They have interpret

8 victims of crimes whose stories are truly unbearable, and they do the job

9 magnificently.

10 As I stand in this court-room, and I have for many years, this is

11 quite a modern court-room, full of computers and wires and the like, and

12 the technical booth also needs to be acknowledged because they have

13 assisted both parties in the court throughout these proceedings. And for

14 those of us particularly who are technologically challenged, it's been a

15 pleasure working with them and we're indebted.

16 Of course, the members of the registry and the court reporters who

17 have managed efficiently the exhibits we have presented, both sides, the

18 legal filings, production of the transcripts, we're grateful for them --

19 to them as well.

20 Of course we had numerous witnesses. I think we had 124 viva voce

21 witnesses. A great number of those witnesses, Your Honours, have been

22 assisted by the Victims and Witnesses Unit. They always do their job

23 professionally. We're grateful to them for doing their job in such a

24 competent and professional manner because it gives the witnesses comfort,

25 it gives the witnesses a certain equilibrium before they come into this

1 court-room. That's very important.

2 Of course we thank security as well for their professionalism

3 throughout these proceedings.

4 And finally, I would like to thank Your Honours for the courteous

5 manner in which Your Honours have conducted these proceedings. So thank

6 you.

7 And now we will -- I will describe how we intend to proceed with

8 the arguments. The submissions this afternoon will be made by myself,

9 Mr. Tieger, and Mr. Gaynor. We're going to divide these submissions.

10 There will be occasions when we have to go into private session in order

11 to refer to the testimonies of persons who were protected.

12 Without further ado, Your Honour, I'm going to yield the floor to

13 my colleague Mr. Tieger. Thank you.

14 MR. TIEGER: Good afternoon, Your Honours, counsel.

15 Your Honours, in the face of the increasing likelihood that the

16 international community would recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as

17 independent, the Bosnian Serb leadership embarked on a plan to ethnically

18 divide Bosnia by force and create a homogenous Serbian state. In the

19 ethnically intermingled leopard skin that was Bosnia, the objective of a

20 pure Serbian state would have been impossible to achieve without the

21 forcible elimination of non-Serbs even if the territorial aims of the

22 Bosnian Serb leadership had been modest. Their aims, however, were

23 otherwise. The Bosnian Serb leadership sought great portions of Bosnia,

24 including areas where Muslims and Croats were the majority. By the end of

25 1992, most of those people were gone, cleansed from their homes by Bosnian

1 Serb forces.

2 This case, Your Honours, has been about one of the principal

3 persons responsible for this. Over the course of the case, we have seen

4 and heard witnesses and documents that revealed his position at the apex

5 of the Bosnian Serb political structures and forces through which the

6 objective to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Croats was eliminated

7 [sic].

8 We'd like to begin by having Mr. Harmon and I address certain

9 factual issues in the case that appear to be in dispute. And I'd like to

10 begin with the issues surrounding the objective of the joint criminal

11 enterprise or the common plan.

12 Now, as I just mentioned, the Bosnian Serb leadership opposed an

13 independent Bosnia and sought a separate Serb state on large portions of

14 Bosnia, from which hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats, viewed as

15 historical enemies who threatened Serbs, were to be forcibly removed. The

16 leadership assembled the organs and forces necessary to achieve that end,

17 including Crisis Staffs, parallel governmental authorities, and armed

18 forces, and with the recognition of Bosnia at hand, began the forcible

19 ethnic separation of Bosnia and the creation of ethnically pure areas.

20 The Defence asserts that Muslims and Croats were responsible for

21 increasing tensions and were the ones who threatened force to achieve

22 their goals and that Bosnian Serb actions were merely reactive and

23 defensive. They assert that Mr. Krajisnik and other Serb leaders desired

24 peace, that the Bosnian Serb leadership intended only to "retain"

25 territory and did not contemplate involuntary movement of Muslims and

1 Croats. They assert that population movements that occurred thereafter

2 were an inevitable by-product of the war, and that forced movements were

3 not the result of efforts by the Bosnian Serb leadership or done with the

4 knowledge of Mr. Krajisnik.

5 Your Honours, there is of course no dispute that the Muslims and

6 Croats sought the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Bosnian

7 Serbs opposed it. To contend, however, that Muslims intended to achieve

8 this by a military campaign and that Serb arming and other steps in

9 preparation were a defensive reaction to that intended force is to turn

10 the world on its head. The threat posed by the Muslims and Croats was the

11 political victory of independence. The Defence argument represents the

12 same attempt to blur the lines between political action and physical

13 violence reflected in comments by the Bosnian Serb leadership. See, for

14 example, references by Dr. Karadzic to "constitutional" violence, or his

15 observation that "Violence against the Serb people is called democracy."

16 That's at the 4th Session.

17 The reality was, as Goran Zekic said to the Assembly at the 8th

18 Session on February 25th, 1992, when he was comparing the situation at

19 that time to World War II and the Serb refusal to be -- before World War

20 II to be subjected to subjugation, "Now no one is threatening us with

21 weapons but we have already agreed to a certain degree of subjugation."

22 This is not to say, Your Honours, that there was no arming by Muslims or

23 Croats, but instead that the Bosnian Serbs prepared themselves not to

24 defend against Muslim physical aggression but to implement their

25 objectives by force after the loss of the political battle.

1 As for desiring peace, Bosnian Serb leaders, Mr. Krajisnik in

2 particular, were not prepared to accept the political defeat represented

3 by an independent Bosnia. In his remarks that were taped at the 28

4 February Deputies Club, after telling deputies that the Muslims wanted an

5 Islamic state, Mr. Krajisnik told the deputies that would not happen.

6 Instead, he and other leaders would come to them and say, he assured them:

7 "Gentlemen, get your woolen socks ready, we are going to defend

8 ourselves." Similar references by Mr. Krajisnik are found in the brief,

9 with references to going for "what we have done for centuries - win our

10 own territories by force," or "you know what our profession has always

11 been, to wage war." That's at the 8th Assembly, Your Honour.

12 Mr. Krajisnik asks the Court to ignore the plain meaning of these

13 words, asserting, instead, that he was trying to dissuade the deputies by

14 reminding them of the tragic consequences of war. This assertion is

15 wholly misleading. A recurring theme throughout the Assemblies is the

16 Serbs were always victorious in war but somehow lost the peace. And as

17 we've seen, this time Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic did their utmost to

18 ensure that the gains of war would not be lost.

19 The Defence assertion that Bosnian Serb leaders intended merely to

20 "retain" territory echoes Mr. Krajisnik's testimony that the Bosnian

21 Serbs sought only areas in which they were already a majority, as

22 reflected by the maps presented by Serbs, he asserted, during the

23 Cutileiro discussions.

24 That was false. First, Mr. Krajisnik himself conceded during

25 testimony that "it was impossible to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina in

1 clearly divided ethnic territories, areas where one ethnic community would

2 be a clear majority."

3 Put another way, in the context of Serb territorial aspirations,

4 it was impossible to ethnically divide Bosnia except by force, as

5 Ambassador Okun and other international witnesses have explained. Indeed,

6 the negotiations that Mr. Krajisnik talked about so fulsomely did not

7 identify the extent of Bosnian Serb territorial ambitions. On the 18th of

8 March at the Assembly, when a deputy complained that Prijedor was not

9 included as Serb territory on the map he was shown, Mr. Krajisnik quickly

10 reassured him: "Please, let us not take the maps seriously." Recall

11 also, Your Honours, that Mr. Krajisnik falsely asserted that a map of

12 territorial division was part of the 18 March agreement in principle,

13 stemming from the Cutileiro discussions, despite the fact that the

14 agreement explicitly attached only a map depicting the existing

15 municipalities and the existing demographic breakdown in those

16 municipalities.

17 The negotiations were simply part of a process for the Bosnian

18 Serbs. While the ultimate goals must remain secret, Dr. Karadzic told

19 deputies at that same session, when the attention of the world is no

20 longer on them, everything will be possible, even changing the borders.

21 Meanwhile, their goal, he said, was to make the internal borders as wide

22 as possible. And once negotiations had broken down and the conflict was

23 under way, this incremental approach was no longer advantageous and

24 Bosnian Serb territorial aspirations could be, and were, directly

25 pursued.

1 The Drina region, for example, to ensure that there was no border

2 between the Bosnian Serb state and Serbia and which would be, in

3 Mr. Krajisnik's own words in the Srpsko Oslobodjenje interview, the

4 backbone of the Serbian people. Also the corridor connecting Krajina to

5 Semberija, the territory to the Una, and the rest of the territorial

6 ambitions reflected in the strategic objectives.

7 These, Your Honours, were not territories retained but, in the

8 repeated words of Bosnian Serb political and military leaders "liberated"

9 or "conquered." As Dr. Karadzic said at the 17th Assembly in July 1992:

10 "We have liberated almost everything that is ours." Or as Mr. Krajisnik

11 said at the 36th Assembly: "At the beginning of the war Serbs marshalled

12 their forces for the 'liberation of Serbian ethnic spaces.'"

13 Your Honours, contrary to the map that was shown by Mr. Krajisnik

14 during his testimony, with the Serbs seeking only this modest area

15 reflected by the red line which weaves its way carefully through

16 predominantly Muslim-populated areas, let me show you a map which reveals

17 the extent of Serb conquest. That's a map we've seen in court through the

18 course of Mr. Krajisnik speaking on a video.

19 This map, Your Honour, reflects the territories that had been

20 conquered or liberated by Serbian forces. Let me show you another map

21 before I go on to Mr. Krajisnik's remarks at that time. That's a map of

22 the -- this is a better picture of that map, and let me show you quickly a

23 map of the municipalities involved. Especially look at the Eastern Bosnia

24 region. These are some of the municipalities, Your Honour, that are

25 involved, and you can see the demographic breakdown in those

1 municipalities, including the ones in Bratunac, Srebrenica, Visegrad,

2 Rogatica, Zvornik, Vlasenica, and so on. And yet when Mr. Krajisnik

3 explained the video map to the Serbian public on television, he said: "I

4 can only say that what was being said, that we are possessing the

5 territories ethnically populated by the other national communities, that

6 is not true."

7 And his remarks were technically correct because the Muslims were

8 no longer there. As Dr. Karadzic explained at the 53rd Session with

9 regard to those same municipalities: "There are towns that we've grabbed

10 for ourselves and there were only 30 per cent of us ..." And he went on:

11 "Don't let this get around, but remember how many of us there were in

12 Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how many in

13 Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera. Due to strategic

14 importance, they had to become ours, and no one is practically questioning

15 it any more."

16 As Dr. Karadzic explained to the deputies on the 28th of February,

17 this was fundamentally an ethnic conflict of the sort that necessitates

18 re-settlement, and then he stated: "Muslims cannot live with others. We

19 must be clear on that."

20 As Defence Witness Kasagic acknowledged, that meant that the

21 Muslim population had to be reduced to a certain percentage, recalling the

22 figure of 5 per cent. And after Dr. Karadzic had told the deputies that

23 Muslims couldn't live with others, Mr. Krajisnik then told them: "I tell

24 you, everything we do in this parliament, everything I do personally, I do

25 exclusively for pure areas."

1 These pure areas, Your Honours, were not created by some

2 theoretical inevitability of wartime population movements; they were the

3 result of military efforts by the Bosnian Serb forces. Thus, when

4 Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic went to negotiations to demand that these

5 newly Serb territories be kept by Republika Srpska, Mladic could say

6 proudly to the Assembly, as he did: "I have to say to our delegation,

7 which I really appreciate together with our president, Mr. President, you

8 have started from the most favourable starting position in Geneva. You

9 had the military result in your hands."

10 Your Honours, let me next turn, if I may, to the issue of

11 leadership. The ethnic division of Bosnia by force required concerted

12 action. The Bosnian Serb leadership, as detailed in the brief, assembled

13 the bodies and forces necessary to accomplish that: Assemblies, Crisis

14 Staffs, Council of Ministers, police, government, Presidency, NSC, army,

15 et cetera. These organs were part of a hierarchical structure which

16 implemented the policy of forcible ethnic separation. At the top of this

17 leadership structure throughout, in positions of formal authority which

18 mirrored their de facto power, were Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic.

19 Now, in the early phases of this case, the Defence disputed that

20 Mr. Krajisnik was a leader. That position yielded to mounting evidence of

21 Mr. Krajisnik's involvement at the highest levels of everything that went

22 on within the Bosnian Serb leadership structure. Now the Defence

23 acknowledges that Mr. Krajisnik was a leader but asserts that he was not a

24 controlling figure because the expanded Presidency did not exist, the

25 National Security Council was not a legal body, and that his other

1 positions were of insufficient significance to render him criminally

2 liable.

3 Let me turn first to the expanded or War Presidency. There has

4 never been a dispute that a formal declaration of war was not declared.

5 That fact, however, does not control the determination that this body was

6 a source of de jure control. As the Defence brief itself acknowledges, de

7 jure control refers to power derived from appointed positions. It is not,

8 Your Honours, concerned with whether there was a technical legal

9 deficiency in that position. And there is abundant evidence that the War

10 Presidency or expanded Presidency existed. First, the records of the

11 expanded Presidency themselves demonstrate its existence and

12 Mr. Krajisnik's membership in it. He is referred to repeatedly as member,

13 he signed Presidency documents, chaired a session, and was allocated

14 Presidency responsibilities. The Presidency decision on the formation of

15 war commissions of June 10th, 1992, makes three explicit references to

16 "the War Presidency of the Republic."

17 Your Honours, if I may, I'd like to move into private session

18 briefly.

19 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session. I find P, yes, on my

20 screen, that -- yes.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed.

24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the Defence argues -- Your Honours,

25 there will be nothing depicted visually that would compromise ...

1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm informed that the sound could go through the

3 glass, so therefore the public gallery is -- should be emptied before we

4 continue.

5 [Private session]

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. I take it the public gallery is open

10 again.

11 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

12 MR. TIEGER: The Defence also asserts, Your Honours, that the

13 unreliability of the minutes is reflected in the listing of Trbojevic as a

14 member of the Presidency in the minutes of the 27th Session. That

15 assertion, however, is grounded on an incorrect translation, which was

16 corrected in court during Mr. Treanor's testimony, and the correct

17 translation distinguishes Trbojevic from the other members of the

18 Presidency, including Mr. Krajisnik.

19 More importantly, Your Honours, the Defence brief ignores the

20 contemporaneous references to the existence of the war or expanded

21 Presidency, including references by top officials Maksimovic, Djokanovic,

22 Subotic, Trbojevic, implicit references by both Dr. Karadzic and

23 Krajisnik, the lengthy debate at the Assembly about the "existence" of the

24 expanded Presidency, and ignores the expanded Presidency's own inquiry

25 into whether RS should "stick with" that body, as well as the testimony of

1 Trbojevic and Djokanovic and the testimony of former Presidency members,

2 Djeric and Plavsic.

3 The Defence contends that Djeric did not say that the War

4 Presidency existed or that he was a member and testified that it did not

5 actually function. In fact, Mr. Djeric said explicitly that Mr. Krajisnik

6 "was a member of the Presidency by virtue of his office as Speaker of the

7 Parliament, so that is how he was a member of that body, just like I was

8 there as Prime Minister."

9 And Djeric also made clear what he meant by his comment that the

10 Presidency didn't function. First, he noted that he thought Plavsic or

11 Koljevic should have chaired the meetings; and second, he testified that

12 Mr. Krajisnik never disagreed with Dr. Karadzic and in most cases Koljevic

13 would take "their side, the side of those two." Therefore, in most cases

14 "there was no need for a vote."

15 Mrs. Plavsic had essentially the same complaint about the way the

16 expanded Presidency functioned: "I said many times that the Presidency,

17 which did not function properly, was only a waste of money and that two

18 persons, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, decided everything."

19 The Defence assertion that Mrs. Plavsic did not provide any useful

20 evidence concerning the existence of the expanded Presidency or the nature

21 of the meetings is quite erroneous. Beyond the excerpt from her statement

22 just cited, in her statement she directed the Court to sections of her

23 book that she considered relevant to Mr. Krajisnik. In court she

24 testified that, "I wrote there that the name of the book is very binding,

25 as far as I'm concerned. That's why I called the book 'I Testify.' And I

1 said it as if I had given an oath that I would speak the truth, only the

2 truth, so help me God. And that's what also kept, like a thread,

3 appearing throughout this book and also the second book."

4 And here is what she wrote: "Who was the expanded Presidency?

5 Members of the Presidency elected to the Assembly on 12 May 1992, the

6 Assembly president, and the Prime Minister."

7 And she explained that the expanded Presidency existed until

8 December, when it gave way to a single president; Mr. Karadzic.

9 This body, Your Honours, was the supreme commander of the army and

10 empowered to issue orders to the police and exercise control over

11 municipal authorities. Quickly explained, Article 174 of the law on the

12 army provides that the president is the supreme commander; amendments to

13 Article 5 of the constitutional law for the implementation of the

14 constitution on the 12th of May and the 1st of June vested those duties in

15 the Presidency and then the expanded Presidency, as explained in detail in

16 P64, paragraphs 260 through 264. As Main Staff member Gvero stated at the

17 19th Assembly: "Shortly the basic elements are: There is the Supreme

18 Command of the army, and that is the president of the republic as the

19 supreme commander. In our situation, this will be the Presidency. All

20 the elements of defence and the army are subordinated to this institution.

21 We, in the army, are following this and are trying to fully observe it.

22 There was no significant act that was passed without this in mind."

23 Your Honours, the National Security Council, the NSC, and the

24 three-member collective Presidency preceded the five-member War

25 Presidency. The NSC, was chaired by Dr. Karadzic and took the important

1 executive decisions in that period, which were then formalised through the

2 acting presidents, one of whom, Mrs. Plavsic, was in Sarajevo, or the

3 Assembly. Now, similar to its technical attack on the so-called legality

4 of the War Presidency, the Defence claims that the NSC was not a legal

5 body. This is an assertion that ignores the evidence of its establishment

6 by the Assembly, the formal records of its existence and its decisions,

7 the testimony of witnesses who did not suggest that it was illegal or did

8 not exist, and Mr. Krajisnik's own acknowledgement that it functioned,

9 referring to the introduction of the state of imminent threat of war, he

10 acknowledged, "The discussion here -" referring to the minutes of the NSC

11 meeting - "indicate that it was the council that proposed that."

12 Now, quickly, Your Honour, before moving on, I wanted to address

13 question 9 the Court posed to the parties regarding the body known as the

14 -- well, there's a question about the Supreme Defence Council. I don't

15 believe there's any dispute among the parties that there was no body in RS

16 by that name, but instead only a body that was titled "Supreme Command."

17 That body was formed after the debate about whether or not the expanded

18 Presidency should continue in late November, and thereafter Dr. Karadzic

19 became the single president and the Supreme Command was formed.

20 Mrs. Plavsic's use of the term "Supreme Defence Council," based on an

21 examination of the transcript, appears to reflect simple confusion between

22 the Supreme Command in Republika Srpska and a similar body called the

23 Supreme Defence Council in Serbia and Montenegro. And you can see that

24 confusion beginning in her transcript references when she tries to recall

25 the name of the body and says it's like the body in Serbia and Montenegro.

1 As far as her reference to a meeting of that body in June, that's either a

2 simple misrecollection of date or a reflection of some meeting, an ad hoc

3 meeting of similar persons who comprised the membership of the Supreme

4 Command at a later time.

5 Your Honours, I'd like to move past the discussion of the formal

6 bodies and note this: Beyond Mr. Krajisnik's membership on these formal

7 bodies, it is more important to recall that these structures were both a

8 reflection of his power as well as the source of it. As Trbojevic

9 testified, suggested the establishment of the expanded Presidency did not

10 change the division of power, but rather formalised it. The evidence from

11 witness after witness revealed the duumvirate of the Bosnian Serb

12 leadership. Dr. Karadzic, who was openly heralded as the undisputed

13 leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Mr. Krajisnik, his trusted, organised,

14 meticulous, complement and a formidable power in his own right. As we

15 heard, people were considered either Radovan's man or Momo's man. When

16 asked which he was, Mandic told us that he was "close to Momcilo

17 Krajisnik." And later he explained the nature of that subordinate

18 relationship by saying: "You know how subordination and superiority in

19 the government functions." And he provided us with an example referring

20 to a Muslim whom Mr. Krajisnik wanted released from detention. Mandic

21 told us: "I carried out this order. I acted as a soldier carrying out

22 his order. If I found the man there, I would ask the army to release him

23 or if -- or the police who were holding them. I would tell them that

24 Mr. Krajisnik had ordered me to bring this man to Vrbanja and that he be

25 released to go back to Sarajevo. And I would personally escort this

1 person and then inform Mr. Krajisnik that I had carried out his

2 instruction."

3 Trbojevic knew that he could not become Deputy Prime Minister

4 without the approval of both Karadzic and Krajisnik, and it was "crystal

5 clear" to Prstojevic that Karadzic and Krajisnik could remove any

6 municipal official.

7 The many intercepted telephone calls reveal that relationship and

8 reveal a pair taking decisions, formulating policy, selecting personnel,

9 calling others to meetings, praising each other, disparaging others in a

10 manner reflecting their mutually superior rank. Dr. Karadzic and

11 Mr. Krajisnik were a very effective team. In addition to their positions

12 together on the top executive bodies, Mr. Krajisnik was the powerful

13 president of the Assembly. From witnesses such as Trbojevic, Mandic,

14 Neskovic, and Radic, we heard about Mr. Krajisnik's power over deputies

15 and their derivative power in the municipalities. As one of the deputies

16 noted at the February 28th Deputies' Club in comparing Mr. Krajisnik's

17 mastery of the Assembly to a regional Assembly president: "The president

18 of the Assembly -" that's Mr. Krajisnik - "has shown that he has to

19 control the Assembly." Excuse me: "... has shown that he has to control

20 the Assembly. Mr. Kupresanin, likewise, has to control the situation in

21 Banja Luka." And thus, when a crisis hit, the president of the ARK

22 Assembly, Kupresanin, urged "the president of the party and the president

23 of the Assembly to come to Banja Luka and I am sure that nothing bad will

24 happen."

25 And that was at the 8th Assembly.

1 Beyond its formal functions, the Assembly was a neurocentre.

2 Deputies were expected to disseminate policy to their municipalities,

3 where they sat on Crisis Staffs, and to report back on what was happening

4 in the field, and Mr. Krajisnik's office, as we heard, was constantly

5 filled with deputies and municipal representatives.

6 Thus, with their hands on the levers of power, Mr. Krajisnik and

7 Dr. Karadzic directed the effort to forcibly create an ethnically separate

8 entity.

9 Your Honours, one of the other issues, factual issues, in dispute

10 based on the reading of the briefs concerns detention facilities. Now,

11 detention facilities, the Prosecution has shown, were part of an extensive

12 system. An extensive system of detention and exchange which was

13 instituted and implemented under the direction of the Bosnian Serb

14 leadership. Many thousands of non-Serb civilians were rounded up, held in

15 brutal and inhumane conditions, and either killed or sent outside RS

16 territory.

17 The Defence asserts that evidence of Krajisnik's power -- or

18 knowledge of detention facilities is "very patchy" and places great

19 reliance on what it terms "the clear and succinct answers given by

20 Mr. Krajisnik," which are also termed "clear and forthright."

21 And during the course of his testimony Mr. Krajisnik said that he

22 didn't know anything about camps until July or August 1992, when strict

23 instructions were given to investigate. He suggested that the camps were

24 secret and not known to the MUP, and he claimed that he would never

25 countenance the detention of civilians, as reflected, among other things,

1 by his assertions that he was never at a meeting where measures were not

2 taken in response to information about possible misconduct.

3 Your Honours, one of the pervasive aspects of the pattern that we

4 saw in this case, beginning with the imposition of increasingly

5 restrictive measures on non-Serbs and loss of rights, and ending with

6 massacres, was the establishment of detention facilities where civilians

7 were held in inhumane conditions and where brutality varied only in

8 degree. Like the forcible displacement of Muslims and Croats, the

9 existence of such facilities in municipality after municipality was

10 sufficient by itself to demonstrate a pattern too uniform to be ad hoc,

11 but instead one that must be the product of a guiding hand above the

12 municipalities. That inescapable conclusion is only buttressed by the

13 fact that camps were set up and run by the army, police, and Crisis

14 Staffs, all with their chains of communication and command up to the

15 Presidency and, more particularly, to Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. The

16 detention of civilians was systemic. Officials at all levels knew about

17 the camps and a republic exchange system was established from the earliest

18 stage to monitor and control the possible release of civilians.

19 On the 24th of April, 1992, the NSC decided that the exchange of

20 prisoners would be handled by the Ministry of Justice after internal

21 affairs organs did their work. Now, these were civilian prisoners as well

22 as so-called military prisoners, as we know from --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Tieger, please slow down. Thank you very

24 much.

25 MR. TIEGER: -- the Dr. Djeric, 28 April -- [B/C/S on English

1 channel].

2 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be a problem in switches.

3 Please continue, Mr. Tieger -- no, please proceed and do not

4 continue this speed of speech.

5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, two weeks after the NSC decision that

6 the exchange of prisoners would be handled by the Ministry of Justice

7 after the police finished their work, the Ministry of Justice established

8 a central commission for exchange of prisoners, a body which extended to

9 the municipalities and regions and to the corps level of the army, and

10 which prohibited the release of detainees without its order. That

11 commission began functioning almost immediately. You will recall the 400

12 battered Muslims from Bratunac who, as Mr. Tupajic told us, were only a

13 small part of the forcible expulsion of Muslims from Eastern Bosnia, who

14 were on a list signed off by Markovic, the MUP member of the exchange

15 commission. You will also recall that Prime Minister Dr. Djeric

16 coordinated the effort, arranging for trucks from Crisis Staffs to

17 transport those detainees.

18 Mrs. Plavsic explained to General Wilson that the detention of

19 people of military age was a pre-emptive action so that they would not

20 participate in fighting. And that is borne out by the 6 June order of the

21 exchange commission, the testimony of Mandic, and the accused himself, who

22 testified that "the general opinion that prevailed was this, that the

23 entire population and all the people, all the -- were actually the army,

24 all ethnic groups with the army."

25 Your Honours, let me show you an order from VRS Major Andric in

1 Eastern Bosnia that also reflects precisely that, that the moving out is

2 to be arranged, and men fit for military service are to be placed in camps

3 for exchange. In Western Bosnia, as well, thousands of Muslims were

4 rounded up by the army and police and camps were established in Omarska

5 and Trnopolje and other places, pursuant to a decision by the Crisis

6 Staff.

7 As Bosnian Serb conquests increased, however, conquests of Muslim

8 areas, the camps filled and overcrowding became a security problem. On

9 the 12th of June, 1992, General Mladic ordered the establishment of camps

10 at the corps level in response. Batkovic was one of those camps.

11 Manjaca, which was another corps-level camp, was already in operation by

12 that time, receiving Muslims and Croats from the Crisis Staffs.

13 Now, it was already in late May that the international community

14 was concerned and expressed concern about the detention of Muslim and

15 Croat civilians. On the 24th of May, concerned about the threat of

16 air-strikes by the international community, Dr. Djeric wrote a letter to

17 the United States Secretary of State denying the existence of camps.

18 Ambassador Okun also testified about the international community's concern

19 about camps and about knowledge of camps by June.

20 On June 10th, 1992, the expanded Presidency, with Mr. Krajisnik,

21 as always, present, after reviewing foreign press reports, decided that

22 Djeric would have the government provide a report on detainees, and that

23 day Djeric tasked the Ministry of Justice, which was in charge of the

24 exchange commission, to make a report about prisoners, paying special

25 attention to "treatment of civilian population."

1 Now, that report was received five days later on June 15th, as we

2 have seen more than once in this court. It generated a great deal of

3 concern to a government already concerned about its public image. The

4 issue of prisoners exchange, it wrote, is "extremely important, complex,

5 and delicate." And if insufficient attention is paid, it can cause a

6 number of negative consequences to the republic. A working group

7 consisting of the very highest ranking members of government: The Prime

8 Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the minister of justice, the minister

9 of interior, the minister of defence, the minister of health, was formed

10 to propose systemic solutions.

11 But the oppressive system continued to operate. Recall the

12 damning ICRC report about Manjaca, which was received by Dr. Karadzic and

13 sent on to Dr. Djeric. Or the 17 July report of the minister of the

14 interior to Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Djeric in which Stanisic reported that

15 "the army, Crisis Staffs, and War Presidencies have requested that the

16 army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible," noting

17 that they were held in poor and dangerous conditions and requesting only

18 clarification on who had jurisdiction over them. In addition, as we heard

19 about Susica, efforts were made to hide prisoners.

20 However, in the same way that Mr. Krajisnik and the Bosnian Serbs

21 blame the Muslim political drive for independence for forcing them to

22 conquer and cleanse the parts of Bosnia to which they felt entitled, the

23 Bosnian Serbs blame the terrible conditions in camps on Muslims, asserting

24 that their refusal to engage in exchanges of population were responsible.

25 Incredibly, on 7 August, 1992, after the discovery of Omarska, Dr. Djeric

1 issued a press release explaining that conditions in Omarska were bad

2 because the other side doesn't want to exchange. Mr. Krajisnik, in fact,

3 suggested the same in court, asserting that the fact that Muslims failed

4 to implement a proposed all-for-all exchanges was a big mistake and many

5 remained in prison where they were subjected to abuse and grave

6 consequences.

7 It is true, Your Honours, that both the Muslim authorities and the

8 international community saw the exchange process precisely for what it

9 was, a way to ethnically cleanse RS territory of Muslims. We heard that

10 from Ambassador Okun and from other international witnesses - you will

11 also recall the Mazowiecki report - and we also saw that from the 20th

12 June, 1992, session of the Bosnian government, in which it was said, "If

13 we don't accept the ultimatum, these people could be really hurt. If we

14 accept it, we are legalising ethnic division, that is, the alteration of

15 the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of ethnically clean

16 territories like some precondition for the creation of some kind of

17 Serbian state in BH."

18 Indeed, Mr. Mandic told Mr. Krajisnik directly on 26 June 1992

19 that Filip Vukovic, who had a Serb name and was the head of the Muslim

20 exchange commission, had made just that charge. Mr. Krajisnik's response

21 was simply to call the man a "traitor." Mr. Krajisnik asserted in

22 testimony that he did so because Mandic told him that the charge was

23 false, but when asked to identify the portion of the conversation where

24 Mandic denied that it was true, Mr. Krajisnik could only point to Mandic

25 saying about Vukovic: "Fuck his mother." There was only one proper

1 solution: The immediate release back to their homes, the solution that

2 was expressly set out in Vukovic's facsimile and it was ignored.

3 As for Mr. Krajisnik's repeated assertions that he and the rest of

4 the Bosnian Serb leadership acted vigorously to "take measures urgently to

5 punish perpetrators," because "if you wouldn't be interested in this kind

6 of thing, then you would be committing a crime." They are belied, Your

7 Honours, by the sham investigations in the wake of the Omarska outcry on

8 the 5th of August, 1992. The Assembly never discussed the issue of

9 prisoners, despite requests by deputies to do so. Mr. Krajisnik was asked

10 by His Honour Judge Hanoteau whether he could have taken an initiate as

11 president of the Assembly concerning the prisoners. Mr. Krajisnik told

12 the Court that it was for the government to complete its investigation and

13 submit a report to the Assembly. But the report's pretextual nature is

14 clear. Even Mr. Krajisnik had to acknowledge the patent inadequacy of the

15 August report on Eastern Bosnia camps. And in the end Mr. Krajisnik

16 admitted he simply never read them.

17 Your Honours, I'd also like to address one additional issue,

18 factual issue, in dispute, and that is the issue of the Variant A and B

19 document. I will be turning the floor over to Mr. Harmon. He will be

20 talking, among other things, Crisis Staffs which flow from that document.

21 We heard a great deal of testimony about that. As the Prosecution

22 asserted at the beginning of the case and as it established, having

23 decided to achieve a Serbian entity by force, the Bosnian Serb leadership

24 began to put into place the necessary bodies and forces. Variant A and B,

25 which is dated 19 December, 1991, as we all know, and which was

1 disseminated immediately after, was an important clandestine outline to

2 establish the municipal structures, particularly Crisis Staffs, and

3 prepare for the take-over of power.

4 The Defence minimises the significance of the instructions,

5 asserting that there is little evidence of it being adopted or

6 implemented. Well, Your Honours, although the Defence may attempt to

7 minimise its significance, we can find a more accurate reflection of the

8 significance in the remarks of Dr. Karadzic, as he said at the 46th

9 Session: "Please, remember how we used to work before the war?

10 Everything was as clear as day in the municipalities where we were a

11 majority and in those where we were in minority. Do you remember the

12 instruction A and instruction B? We had Crisis Staffs and it was clear

13 they were the authority. They could make mistakes, but they were still

14 the authority."

15 And he reminisced again at the 50th Assembly: "At the moment the

16 war began in the municipalities where we were in the majority, we had

17 municipal power, held it firmly, controlled everything. In the

18 municipalities where we were in the minority, we set up secret government,

19 municipal boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents of Executive Boards.

20 You will remember the A and B variants."

21 Dr. Karadzic knew full well the role that Variant A and B had

22 played in the run-up to the forcible take-over. As for the Defence

23 assertion that there is little evidence of it being adopted or

24 implemented, that completely ignores the evidence in this case. To the

25 contrary, we have seen and heard evidence of Variant A and B being adopted

1 in the following 23 places, 23: Banja Luka, Bihac, Bijeljina, Bratunac,

2 Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Centar

3 Sarajevo, Donji Vakuf, Foca, Gorazde, Ilidza, Kljuc, Livno, Novo Sarajevo,

4 Prijedor, Rogatica, Sarajevo City, Sokolac, Trnovo, Tuzla, and Zvornik.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Tieger, may I try to clarify

6 one matter. May I take you to page 27, line 10 and 11. I thought as a

7 matter of fact that you were referring also to Mr. Krajisnik and not only

8 to Mr. Djeric who issued a press release. And the line abuse and

9 consequences was used by Mr. Krajisnik, although not literally, and he

10 says - how should I put it? - on the 15th of May during his

11 examination-in-chief, and a question was put to him on the 14th of June in

12 cross-examination. Were you just referring in these lines to the press

13 release of Mr. Djeric or did you include in any way Mr. Krajisnik, which I

14 thought I heard but might be wrong, but I don't -- I do not see it

15 reflected in the transcript.

16 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour, let me clarify, and I appreciate the

17 opportunity. Dr. Djeric issued the press release --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 MR. TIEGER: -- on the 7th of August. I indicated that

20 Mr. Krajisnik suggested essentially the same rationale in his testimony in

21 court.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

23 MR. TIEGER: That is that the failure to engage in exchange was

24 the cause of the continued detention of civilians.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 Could you please look at page 27, lines 8 to 11, and see whether

2 it reflects what you said, or otherwise we could check it during the

3 break.

4 MR. TIEGER: It does not, Your Honour, and I appreciate you

5 recalling my attention to that.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And perhaps we could --

7 MR. TIEGER: Again, for clarification, the point was that on

8 August 7th Dr. Djeric issued a press release explaining that conditions at

9 Omarska were bad because the otherwise didn't want to exchange. I then

10 went on to say that Mr. Krajisnik suggested essentially the same thing in

11 court.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what I heard. We'll check the

13 correctness of the transcript in this respect.

14 Please proceed.

15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I just recited the number of

16 municipalities for which we have evidence of the adoption of Variant A and

17 B, receipt and adoption of A and B, and Dr. Karadzic's emphasis on its

18 significance. From the beginning, Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik

19 shepherded its implementation. They discussed it immediately after its

20 dissemination, pondering who would implement it. The council of ministers

21 or Mr. Cizmovic, who was the regional coordinator, and to whom Karadzic

22 spoke that same day, agreeing both that Cizmovic would visit the

23 municipalities and on the importance of the "realisation" of "those

24 papers." By the 16th of January, Cizmovic had reported back to Karadzic

25 on his visits to various municipalities and the extent of their

1 preparation to "implement the first level of instructions."

2 Cizmovic, who considered his position to be the third highest in

3 Republika Srpska, reported to Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik about his

4 work. At the 26th of January Assembly session, the 6th Session, which was

5 called as an extraordinary session after further Muslim moves toward

6 independence, Cizmovic observed that the Bosnian Serbs therefore had to

7 solve or to deal with that pending issue through the establishment of

8 their state, and he asserted "tasks set out in the instructions of 19

9 December 1991 should be carried out."

10 A little more than two weeks later, at a meeting of SDS and Main

11 Board and Executive Board and municipal leaders, Karadzic activated the

12 second level of A and B in order to "intensify the functioning of the

13 government at any cost and on every single millimetre of our territory."

14 At the Assembly session of the next day it was proposed that

15 Cizmovic tour all municipalities to determine whether they were prepared

16 to be operational and "exercise power over the territory that is ours."

17 Karadzic proposed that a checklist and reminder be prepared for the

18 municipalities and suggested therefore that "we should meet later in

19 Mr. Krajisnik's conference's room."

20 And by March 18th, 1992, the Assembly session at which

21 Mr. Krajisnik told the deputies that it would be good to start

22 implementing the ethnic division on the ground, Karadzic reminded deputies

23 that the foundations were nearly in place and "it is up to you to decide

24 when we will reveal our next move. It will all be happening in a flash

25 and the set-up of the de facto situation based on our documents."

1 Your Honour, at this point, I'd like to yield the floor to

2 Mr. Harmon who will address further factual issues in dispute.

3 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, another issue of fact that's in dispute

4 is whether Mr. Krajisnik had knowledge of the crimes that are described in

5 the indictment as being committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His position

6 is set out in paragraph 206 of the Defence brief, where it's asserted

7 that: "Mr. Krajisnik has always emphatically denied any knowledge of the

8 crimes charged. In the fog of war the truth can be hard to discern and he

9 was entitled to be skeptical of any reports received, to question and to

10 seek verification as to its truth."

11 Now, what type of crimes are we talking about in 1992 about which

12 he claims he had no knowledge? Expulsions, deportations, killings,

13 detentions of civilians, camps with dreadfully poor conditions,

14 destruction of sacred sites, looting, destruction of non-Serb villages,

15 homes. I dare say, if Mr. Krajisnik is believed, that he may have been

16 the only person living in Bosnia who was unaware of what was happening in

17 his country.

18 In response to one of Judge Canivell's questions, he asserted that

19 he got information but that the media was reporting things that he knew

20 were not true; that he had the impression that everything was rigged and

21 that everything was false. Now, the Defence asserts the Prosecution must

22 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Krajisnik did receive actual and

23 verified reports indicating that crimes were being or were about to be

24 committed. And I want to focus the Court's attention on some of the

25 evidence that demonstrates that in 1992 Mr. Krajisnik received verified

1 reports of the types of crimes that are described in the indictment.

2 I'll focus first, if I can, Your Honour, on the internal Bosnian

3 Serb sources of information. The first event that happened in Bosnia was

4 Bijeljina, and that was a dramatic event that gripped the nation. A

5 presidential commission which included Mrs. Plavsic was sent to Bijeljina.

6 And as Mr. Kljuic testified, Mr. Krajisnik received police reports about

7 what had happened there. I think Mr. Kljuic's words were: He knew more

8 than us.

9 On May the 9th, 1992, the village of Glogova was razed to the

10 ground. The decision to destroy the village and ethnically cleanse it was

11 sanctioned by authorities at the republican level - Assemblyman Zekic -

12 and by Serbian state authorities from the security service. It was the

13 Crisis Staff who formulated and took a formal decision to attack the

14 village, expel its population, burn the village to the ground, and to

15 continue those types of actions against other villages in the Bratunac

16 municipality. The following day, members of the -- what we allege were

17 members of the joint criminal enterprise participated in that attack,

18 members of the Crisis Staff, the JNA, the Territorial Defence, the police,

19 and volunteers from Serbia. They leveled the village, they killed 65 of

20 Muslim inhabitants from that village, and they expelled the survivors and

21 burned the village.

22 Two days later, on or about the 11th of May, 1992, Mr. Deronjic

23 was summoned to a meeting in Pale where he and other Crisis Staff members

24 convened in the presence of General Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and Velibor

25 Ostojic. Those were the people who were directing the meeting. And they

1 sat at a podium in front of maps. Mr. Deronjic described to the Serbian

2 leaders, the Bosnian Serbian leaders, what exactly he had done and how

3 those offensive operations were continuing and going to continue in

4 Bratunac. He received applause from the other municipal persons,

5 municipal Crisis Staff presidents, and Mr. Ostojic commented: "Now the

6 municipality can be painted blue."

7 Two days later Mr. Krajisnik, at the 16th Assembly Session, said:

8 "I like Ostojic's blue maps." It's our submission, Your Honour, that

9 Mr. Ostojic and Mr. Karadzic informed Mr. Krajisnik about the events in

10 Glogova.

11 Furthermore, between the 14th and the 17th of May, 400 men

12 ethnically cleansed from Bratunac arrived in Pale. You heard the evidence

13 of Sulejman Crncalo, who was a Muslim from Pale. He testified that he was

14 with the president of the Serbian municipality of Pale, a man by the name

15 of Starcevic, and together they observed the 400 men, many of whom had

16 visible signs of beatings. Mr. Krajisnik himself testified that he

17 learned that Deronjic had sent the Muslims to Pale, and he also testified

18 that he met with Mr. Starcevic and discussed the 400 Muslims.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I'm going to just interrupt you on the

20 last line. On footnote 1056 you say this information is the testimony of

21 Mr. Deronjic, but exactly the same information in footnote 1137 you say

22 it's the testimony of Mr. Krajisnik, which is a bit confusing.

23 MR. HARMON: Well, I don't have the brief --

24 JUDGE ORIE: I don't to --

25 MR. HARMON: I'll clarify that, yes, Your Honour. What I say,

1 Your Honour, is that the information about what happened to the people in

2 Glogova was reported in a meeting in Pale that Mr. Deronjic had been

3 directed to attend. There he made -- there he related precisely what had

4 happened to the Muslims -- the Muslim community in Bratunac. As I say --

5 if there's some confusion in the footnotes, I'll take a look at them and

6 I'll address that after the first break. It may be an error, Your Honour.

7 But let me return to the types of notice that Mr. Krajisnik had.

8 You heard the testimony of Mr. Divcic, who said that the arrival of the

9 400 Muslims was the talk of the town. There's no doubt that Mr. Krajisnik

10 was informed about the 400 Muslims who had been ethnically cleansed from

11 Bratunac and about whom Mr. Deronjic had reported only a few days earlier.

12 Mr. Krajisnik also was informed directly that the village of Misoca, a

13 Muslim settlement, had been cleansed. That's found in an intercept that's

14 identified in the evidence. The village of Ahatovici, where there was a

15 massacre. Mr. Krajisnik was informed by his brother about the events

16 relating to a massacre at Ahatovici. I'll be going later into private

17 session to discuss Mr. Krajisnik's knowledge about a massive bombardment

18 that occurred in Sarajevo. I won't do so now, I'm merely foreshadowing

19 that as another point of reference for the types of evidence that showed

20 Mr. Krajisnik was fully aware of what was happening in Bosnia.

21 Also, Your Honour, if we examine the evidence of Mr. Dragan

22 Djokanovic, who was a war commissioner. He testified that on the 16th and

23 17th of June he informed Mr. Krajisnik and members of the Presidency that

24 serious crimes had been perpetrated in Zvornik. On the 17th of July, as

25 well, the same day the minister of the interior, Mico Stanisic, addressed

1 a report to the president of the Presidency in which he informed: "The

2 army, Crisis Staffs, and War Presidency have requested that the army round

3 up or capture as many Muslim civilians ..." And it described the

4 conditions in the camps as being quite poor and not observing

5 international norms.

6 Mrs. Plavsic testified about the notorious criminal Batko. She

7 said she brought his conduct to the attention of Mr. Krajisnik,

8 Mr. Mandic, and others, and they were indifferent. Mr. Kasagic confirmed

9 that he had learned of the forcible expulsion of Muslims and Croats at

10 Assembly sessions and that all Assembly members were aware of that.

11 Mr. Karadzic was repeatedly informed about crimes committed in

12 Bosnia, and given his close relationship with Mr. Krajisnik, it's

13 unimaginable that the subject of such crimes was not discussed in their

14 daily intercourse.

15 Finally, Mr. Krajisnik had the opportunity to travel through

16 Bosnia, and he could see first-hand the results of the ethnic cleansing

17 that had occurred in 1992.

18 Now, if we also look, Your Honour, at external sources of

19 information, let me recall the testimony of a witness from an

20 international organisation who gave direct and specific information to

21 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Koljevic, and Mr. Karadzic about ethnic cleansing in

22 Zvornik. Mr. Okun testified that frequent and repeated complaints were

23 made at international negotiations to Krajisnik and others about the types

24 of crimes that are at issue here and that those crimes were not denied.

25 The ICRC made reports directly to Mr. Krajisnik and others. The media to

1 which Mr. Krajisnik had access, we heard that from Mr. Ostojic, contained

2 reports of these crimes. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Prime Minister of

3 Poland, prepared four reports for the United Nations in which he described

4 the crimes committed by all parties. He described ethnic cleansing. He

5 described the features and particular characteristics of ethnic cleansing

6 and what it meant in real terms.

7 It's interesting to note that Mr. Krajisnik, as we know from the

8 evidence, said that Mr. Mazowiecki was bribed, his reports were not

9 credible and honest. And yet Mr. Mazowiecki's reports, in many respects,

10 contain the same identification that Mr. Stanisic's report contained, the

11 report of the 17th of July, that civilians were being rounded up, that

12 they were in camp, that the conditions were in contravention of legal

13 standards.

14 The bottom line, Your Honour, is that Mr. Krajisnik's assertion

15 that he did not -- that it was hard to be -- that it was difficult, I

16 should say, to discern what is true is, in fact, correct if your eyes are

17 closed and your ears are closed and you're at the heart of a criminal

18 enterprise. But it's our submission, Your Honour, that Mr. Krajisnik did

19 receive reports, credible verified reports about ethnic cleansing, and

20 when he testified that he did not, he was untruthful.

21 Now, I'd like to turn to the issue of Crisis Staffs because that's

22 another issue that's raised in the Defence brief. In paragraph 408 of the

23 Defence brief, the Defence asserts that there is extreme patchiness in

24 respect of when Crisis Staffs existed, and even sometimes whether they

25 existed, how long they existed, their membership and authority, their

1 actions, their independence or autonomy, and their involvement in criminal

2 acts on the ground. I want to address these issues. But, by my

3 calculation, Your Honour, the Trial Chamber has received evidence of

4 Crisis Staffs in virtually all of the indictment municipalities, as well

5 as evidence about War Presidencies in another four municipalities.

6 Your Honour, could I find out when we're going to take the break?

7 I'm prepared to continue. I just don't know --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we are now, I think, one hour and 25 minutes

9 approximately, so we usually have the first break after one and a half

10 hours. So you can continue.

11 MR. HARMON: I'll take my five minutes, Your Honour. Thank you.

12 In its brief the Defence makes a number of assertions. First of

13 all, it asserts that Crisis Staffs were casual, spontaneous bodies; that

14 these bodies were created at people in the municipality's own initiative.

15 And, according to Mr. Krajisnik, establishing a Crisis Staff was just like

16 saying good morning.

17 The second issue that is addressed in the brief is that, bearing

18 in mind the casual nature of the Crisis Staffs, it's simply irrational to

19 believe that Krajisnik had knowledge about and was informed what the

20 Crisis Staffs were doing.

21 The third issue is that there is nothing to demonstrate any

22 significant contact or control by Mr. Krajisnik relating to municipal

23 Crisis Staffs.

24 And four, the fourth issue, is that there was extreme patchiness

25 in the evidence about the Crisis Staff's involvement in criminal acts on

1 the ground.

2 Let me take the first issue, the first issue being that Crisis

3 Staffs were casual and spontaneous bodies. Crisis Staffs may have been

4 casual, ad hoc bodies under the communist system, but the Crisis Staffs

5 that concern us in this trial and that we've been talking about for over

6 two years were deliberately established by the Bosnian Serb leadership

7 through Variant A and B as preparations for the take-over of power.

8 Our evidence shows that Crisis Staffs declared themselves to be

9 the sole municipal authority on the ground, taking all the prerogatives of

10 the Municipal Assembly. We know from Mr. Djeric's instructions on the

11 work of Crisis Staffs that were promulgated on the 26th of April, Crisis

12 Staffs were explicitly stated to take over all the prerogatives and

13 functions of Municipal Assemblies when they are not able to convene.

14 Likewise, the Presidency decision on the formation of War Presidencies

15 from the 31st of May stated that War Presidencies were to carry out all

16 functions of the Assembly and executive organs as well as the work of

17 state organs.

18 Now, we have presented through the course of this trial countless

19 examples of Crisis Staffs replacing Municipal Assemblies and asserting

20 themselves to be the municipal authority. I direct Your Honours'

21 attention to paragraph 40 of the report prepared by Ms. Hanson, but I'll

22 give you some examples.

23 Bosanski Samac, on the 30th of May, the Crisis Staff claimed the

24 prerogatives of the Municipal Assembly. In Bratunac, the Crisis Staff

25 took over from the Municipal Assembly. In Brcko, the War Assembly assumed

1 all authorities of the Municipal Assembly. In Hadzici, "the Crisis Staff

2 took over the complete authorities of the Municipal Assembly and its

3 organs and services." In Ilidza, a 10th of May decision, 1992, the

4 decision of the Crisis Staff "is to be regarded as a decision of the

5 Serbian Assembly of the municipality of Ilidza." In Ilijas, the Crisis

6 Staff assumed all the responsibilities of the government.

7 I could go on, Your Honour. There are many more examples that are

8 found in Ms. Hanson's report.

9 I think this would be an appropriate time to break, Your Honour.

10 I'm about to address the second issue raised by the Defence in its brief.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

12 Since we had a late start, not due to ourselves, and since the

13 Prosecution specifically asked to get all the time, we'll have a break

14 until 20 minutes past 4.00 sharp.

15 --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.

18 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, to begin, first of all, I've looked at

19 the footnote 1056 and the name Krajisnik should be inserted in lieu of

20 Deronjic.

21 I had finished the issue of whether these were spontaneous bodies.

22 It's our submission, Your Honour, that Crisis Staffs were planned and

23 well-designed parts of the system created by the Serbs to ensure Bosnian

24 Serb hegemony in the territories that they coveted.

25 Now, the next point made in the Defence brief deals with the -- in

1 fact, the Defence says it's irrational to believe that Krajisnik had

2 knowledge about and was informed what the municipal Crisis Staffs were

3 doing. We've presented considerable evidence to the contrary.

4 First, the Crisis Staff reported to bodies which Mr. Krajisnik was

5 a member, and Mr. Krajisnik had personal contacts with Crisis Staff

6 presidents and knowledge of their actions. I just want to give you some

7 examples; more are mentioned in the Hanson report.

8 But on the 1st of April, 1992, the Bijeljina municipal Crisis

9 Staff reported to the SDS Main Board on the situation as of 2000 hours,

10 and this is precisely the period when Bijeljina was being taken over by

11 the Bosnian Serb forces under the leadership of the Crisis Staff. That

12 same day Mr. Krajisnik called the Bijeljina Crisis Staff and he talked to

13 President Micic and he also talked to Mauzer, the paramilitary leader. On

14 the 28th of April, 1992, the National Security Council minutes reflect

15 that the National Security Council accepted a report on the work of the

16 Crisis Staffs.

17 Second, Mr. Krajisnik had information about the Crisis Staffs

18 through the Presidency. Mr. Djeric's instructions instructed Crisis

19 Staffs -- Mr. Djeric's instructions -- testimony, I'm sorry, was "those

20 were the heads or, rather, chiefs of various Crisis Staffs of various

21 entities of various municipalities, individually and so on and so forth."

22 He went on to say: "I mean they had this party line primarily and they

23 set store by that, and quite simply they would sideline the government and

24 go directly to the Presidency."

25 Radomir Neskovic, who was the president of the Novo Sarajevo

1 Crisis Staff, described an occasion in June of 1992 when he and other

2 Crisis Staff presidents were summoned to the Bistrik Hotel in Pale in

3 order to report on their work. And Mr. Neskovic submitted a written

4 report on their work to the president of the Presidency. Mr. Krajisnik

5 also had knowledge of the work of the Crisis Staffs through the Assembly.

6 Dragan Djukanovic testified to a case -- to this point. He said:

7 "Most deputies in the People's Assembly were in their constituencies also

8 members of Crisis Staffs and commissions. A large number of them were

9 republican commissioners in the second half of 1992."

10 When you examine the minutes of the Assembly, you'll notice that

11 many of the people who were deputies and also involved in Crisis Staff

12 work who -- representatives of Crisis Staff discussed what was happening

13 in their municipalities. I refer to Trifko Radic from Ilijas, Miroslav

14 Vjestica from Bosanska Krupa, and Milenko Vojinovic from Brcko.

15 Mr. Krajisnik also had information about what was happening in Crisis

16 Staffs and their activities through his personal contacts. On the 3rd of

17 April, 1992, there's an intercept between Mr. Krajisnik and Jovan Tintor,

18 the SDS Crisis Staff head from Vogosca. In that intercept, Mr. Krajisnik

19 refers to Mr. Tintor as his kum. And Mr. Tintor says: "Please, it's my

20 duty to inform you what's going on."

21 In response to a question by Judge Hanoteau, Mr. Prstojevic, who

22 was the president of the Ilidza Crisis Staff, testified: "As a native of

23 Sarajevo, he, Krajisnik, had special concern for the Serbs of Sarajevo,

24 and we could go to Mr. Krajisnik at any time. His door was always open to

25 us. We could be received for an interview, we could call him on the

1 telephone, and we could ask for help. We could ask him for his advice,

2 and the president was able to either praise or criticise our work."

3 On the 12th of May, 1992, Assembly session, Trifko Radic, who was

4 the Crisis Staff president from Ilijas said that he released a prisoner:

5 "On the intervention of the president of the Assembly," an example of

6 Krajisnik's power over the Crisis Staff president.

7 At the 20th Session, Mr. Radic said: "The Ustasha attack us on

8 all fronts every day. We have no help. I went to see Mr. Krajisnik and

9 General Mladic, and if they hadn't come, we would have fallen a long time

10 ago."

11 Finally Mr. Milan Tupajic, who was the president of the Crisis

12 Staff from Sokolac, testified about his meetings with Mr. Krajisnik. He

13 said: "I remember several working meetings with Mr. Krajisnik during

14 which I was present. There was some more official meetings and there was

15 also some chance encounters when they came to the municipality."

16 Mr. Krajisnik also had knowledge and control, especially to the

17 republican war commissioners. War Presidencies and war commissioners were

18 established to replace Crisis Staffs and to tighten central control over

19 municipal authorities by means of the republican war commissioner. They

20 came into existence in April of 1992.

21 Milan Tupajic, who I just referred to, said that war commissioners

22 were a way for the members to gain insight into the developments in

23 municipalities in order that they could inform the president of the

24 Assembly and the president of the republic. He said that war

25 commissioners were members of The National Assembly. "A certain number of

1 member MPs were indeed appointed as war commissioners which in the last

2 analysis is only logical, since they came from the base."

3 Now, I earlier mentioned Mr. Dragan Djukanovic, who was a war

4 commissioner and who reported directly to the Presidency. Mr. Djukanovic

5 reported in -- about crimes that he had observed in Zvornik. "When I went

6 back to Pale I informed Karadzic and Krajisnik of all the observations

7 that I had made on my visits to the municipalities and all the events that

8 I had learned. I performed my mandate to establish governments. I

9 conveyed general information about the situation in the places I had

10 visited to the War Presidency, informing them that many bad things had

11 happened."

12 Mr. Poplasen, a Defence witness, testified that the -- that he

13 reported orally and in writing to the Presidency members, and one exhibit,

14 a copy of a document dated the 24th of June, 1992, from war commissioner

15 Poplasen addressed to the Serb Republic of BiH wartime Presidency reported

16 that a prison in Vogosca was illegal. Mr. Krajisnik was a member of the

17 Presidency and responsible for the work of war commissioners. Referring

18 to their work of the 22nd Session, he said that their work was: "Very

19 efficient and good. I know that every deputy from the Assembly who went,

20 Mirko Mijatovic, Jovo Mijatovic, Cancar, Marko Simic, Branko Simic, Vojo

21 Maksimovic, they all provided great service because they tried to resolve

22 all problems when they arrived together with the people."

23 The brief also notes that there's nothing to demonstrate any

24 significant control by Krajisnik relating to municipal Crisis Staffs.

25 There is no document in evidence reflecting that Krajisnik issued a direct

1 order to the Crisis Staff. Crisis Staffs were part of the state system

2 created to seize and to hold power. They operated under the authority and

3 at the direction of state organs of which Krajisnik was a member. They

4 were not rogue bodies implementing policies on their own.

5 The evidence that we have presented shows that Crisis Staffs

6 received and implemented orders from the republic level. Mr. Pasic, from

7 Bosanski Novi, in response to a question I posed, said: "You asked me

8 whether the Crisis Staff acted in accordance with these decisions of the

9 Republika Srpska Assembly and other bodies and authorities. I have

10 already mentioned in my testimony that the Crisis Staff had no choice and

11 could not have undertaken anything else."

12 We've also -- other documents have come into evidence; they're

13 referred to in Ms. Hanson's report. Evidence has been adduced at these

14 proceedings that Crisis Staff presidents reported directly to the

15 Presidency and to Mr. Krajisnik and largely bypassed the government. I've

16 mentioned two examples already; the example of Mr. Prstojevic and the

17 testimony of former Prime Minister Djeric. And I've also mentioned the

18 testimony of Mr. Neskovic, who was summoned to the Bistrik Hotel in Pale

19 in order to report on the work of Presidency -- the work of Crisis Staffs.

20 Lastly, let me address the assertion that there was extreme

21 patchiness in the evidence about the Crisis Staffs involvement in criminal

22 acts on the ground. To make it perfectly clear, it is our submission,

23 Your Honour, that Crisis Staffs were not benign organisations; they were

24 essential. In the persecutory campaign, they ordered and enforced

25 discriminatory measures against Muslims and Croats, they implemented the

1 forcible removal of non-Serbs and the systematic seizure of property of

2 those persons who were forced out of those municipalities.

3 I'm going to direct your attention briefly to some of that

4 evidence that deals with their involvement in criminal acts on the ground.

5 The 23rd July 1992 War Presidency decision from Celinac severely

6 restricted the movement of Muslims who resided in the community. They

7 couldn't linger on the streets, they couldn't sell or exchange property,

8 they couldn't drive cars, they couldn't hunt, fish, or swim in rivers.

9 I've described the attack on Glogova that was the result of a Crisis Staff

10 decision.

11 In late May of 1992, the Crisis Staff in Prijedor decided to

12 establish detention centres at Trnopolje, Keraterm, and Omarska. At the

13 end of May 1992, the Sanski Most Crisis Staff ordered the establishment of

14 detention facilities at the sports hall Betonirka in Krings. In that same

15 municipality, the Crisis Staff listed the type of persons who were

16 undesirable in the municipality of Sanski Most: Politicians,

17 nationalists, extremists, and people unwelcome in Sanski Most, and indeed

18 sent many of those people to Manjaca where some perished en route and some

19 perished in the camp.

20 The Bosanski Petrovac Crisis Staff set up a prison in Kozila so

21 that it could in its own words "arrest all military-capable people who

22 could possibly harm the Serbs."

23 In Bosanska Krupa, the War Presidency in its own words "suggested

24 two options to the Muslims: Either to organise their own evacuation from

25 the area or to have that effected by military means."

1 And lastly, I refer Your Honours to the two documents, one of

2 which is in 1993, Mr. Prstojevic from the Ilidza war commission forbade

3 the return of all Muslims and Croats to his municipality. And the 7 June,

4 1992, decision of seven municipal Crisis Staff presidents who demanded

5 that Muslims and Croats should move out of "our municipalities until a

6 level is reached where Serbian authority can be maintained and

7 implemented. And if the leadership of the autonomous region of Krajina

8 and Banja Luka fails to solve this issue, our seven municipalities will

9 take all Muslims and Croats under military escort from our municipality to

10 the centre of Banja Luka." Those seven municipalities were Bihac,

11 Bosanski Petrovac, Srpksa Krupa, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and

12 Kljuc.

13 Now, Your Honours, let me turn to another issue in dispute; the

14 strategic objectives. Mr. Tieger has addressed some of this. As we know,

15 the strategic objectives were formally announced at the 16th Session. We

16 know from that -- transcripts from that session, that strategic objective

17 number 1, which was the establishment of state borders separating the

18 Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities was the most

19 important objective, according to Mr. Krajisnik, who said to both the

20 assembled deputies and General Mladic and the assembled military persons:

21 "The first goal is the most important one. And in relation to all other

22 goals, all other goals are subsets of the first one."

23 Now, these strategic objectives constituted the core political and

24 military objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Many witnesses who

25 testified here noted the blinding reality that ethnic separation could not

1 be achieved in Bosnia without the use of force. Now, Mr. Krajisnik

2 testified that those objectives that were enunciated at the 16th Session

3 were: "Political objectives only and were not intended to form part of

4 the military planning that was to implement the programme of war being

5 pursued by the army." In his testimony he insisted there was no link

6 between the military objectives described in the army report and the

7 strategic objectives enunciated at the 16th Session.

8 Mr. Krajisnik, according to the evidence we have presented, had

9 numerous contacts with General Mladic, members of his staff; Presidency

10 session minutes reflect that. Our brief reflects those contacts at

11 paragraphs 398 to 401. When Mr. Krajisnik was asked if he ever asked the

12 military: What are your objectives? What are you trying to achieve? His

13 answer was: I don't remember having asked such a question. That's an

14 incredible answer, given the fact that the Serbs were fighting for their

15 own survival against what they had publicly announced were the genocidal

16 elements in the other ethnic groups and that they were fighting for their

17 age-old dreams of establishing a Serb state. Can Your Honours imagine any

18 wartime leader of any country not asking his or her military chiefs: What

19 are your objectives? What are you trying to achieve?

20 It's clear from looking at the 16th Assembly Session transcripts

21 that the people who were present, the Assemblymen, understood these to be

22 military objectives. Mr. Beli, and I quote: "These are the war goals

23 that people must know they are to do at any moment."

24 Mr. Milosevic: "Since I heard the proposer say it was our second

25 strategic goal, please allow me in that case we must jointly work on

1 furthering that interest in a military sense, too."

2 Mr. Radic: "As the president said, let us set our goals and

3 tasks, see exactly what is ours and how much we should occupy and then

4 divide up." He went on to say: "Please work on this and please give us

5 our goals so that we know what we are going to take."

6 Mr. Ostojic testified in respect of the strategic objectives:

7 "We have the idea and the realisation of this map of ours, and I do

8 believe I was the first to start drawing the map, but they are an idea on

9 which the diplomacy has to work. They are -- they, the borders, will be

10 drawn and established only when we make them a fact. I believe that peace

11 with Alija can only be achieved by war."

12 And lastly, Mr. Mijatovic said -- he asked "to give the floor to

13 the experts in the military field so that they can tell us their vision

14 and their overview, and I hope that we will all see much more clearly what

15 the duties are facing us, what it is that we have to do to fulfil the six

16 strategic goals we recently put before the Serbian people and the Serbian

17 Republic of BH."

18 Now, the evidence that these strategic goals were understood by

19 the military are contained in our brief at pages 117 to 122. The army

20 report makes it crystal clear. It says: "The strategic objectives were

21 military -- the strategic objectives are -- of our war which were promptly

22 defined and set before the Main Staff of the Army of the RS, the commands

23 and units as a general guideline upon which we planned the actual

24 operations and concerted battles."

25 The evidence we presented show that the strategic objectives were

1 immediately disseminated by the military. Two days later they were

2 discussed at a meeting of municipality presidents. Five days later

3 Subotic said that all conscripts had to be informed -- briefed of the

4 goals. And five days later as well the commander for morale of the 1 KK

5 said, specifically addressing strategic objective number 1: "The Serbian

6 people must struggle for the complete separation from Muslim and Croat

7 peoples to form their own state."

8 Three weeks later directive 1 was issued by General Mladic and it

9 called for operations to be conducted in order to realise the corridor.

10 In fact, Your Honour, within six weeks of the directive -- of the

11 strategic objectives being announced, the corridor operation was

12 successful and the second strategic goal had been realised.

13 The fourth directive that was issued in November of 1992 called

14 for the removal of the Muslim population, and embedded throughout the army

15 report are references, some of which mirror uncannily the exact words of

16 the strategic objectives themselves. One reference in the army report

17 says: "The strategic objective of our war would be realised, one that

18 could be defined as 'establishing contact with Serbia on the river Drina,

19 or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier.'"

20 At the 34th Assembly Session Mladic described the relationship

21 between military objectives and the political objectives of the war. He

22 said: "Politics start and end the war." He went on to say that:

23 "People and the army have carried out most of the tasks and the strategic

24 goals set to them. We have created Republika Srpska."

25 Finally I direct your attention to the testimony of General

1 Wilson, who testified that military objectives and political objectives

2 were indistinguishable. He said: "Operations of the Bosnian Serb army

3 appeared to be directed at achieving the political aims that were quite

4 clearly stated, that is setting up a separate Serb territory. It is no

5 accident that the military operations seem to mirror requirements of the

6 political ambitions."

7 Lastly, Your Honour, let me turn my attention to an item that is

8 addressed specifically in the Defence brief; the departure of the Muslims

9 from Pale. In respect of this particular issue that seems to be in

10 contention, Mr. Krajisnik testified that the Muslims left Pale

11 municipality voluntarily, that he and Mr. Koljevic did not know of their

12 departure from the Pale municipality until after they left. He learned of

13 their departure sometime after 25 July 1992, and no one wanted the Muslims

14 to leave.

15 The Defence has invited the Chamber to pay the closest possible

16 scrutiny to Defence Exhibits 197 through 216. We have done so and I'm

17 going to direct Your Honours' attention to the contents of some of those

18 documents. The first issue I'd like to address is: Was the departure of

19 the Muslims from the Pale municipality voluntary? You heard the testimony

20 of Sulejman Crncalo - he was a Muslim from Pale - and he described for

21 Your Honours what life was like in Pale for the Muslims. He described

22 intimidation of the Muslim community, random arrests, detentions, and

23 beatings, calls for the Muslims to surrender their arms, Serb policemen

24 coming to his community and telling Muslims it was better for them to

25 leave. He described the meeting with Nikola Koljevic in May of 1992, who

1 informed Mr. Crncalo and other members of his delegation of Muslims from

2 Pale that "the Serbs don't want to go on living with you." He said Malko

3 Koroman, the police chief from Pale, said that he couldn't protect the

4 Muslim community of Pale, a statement that Mr. Crncalo took to be a

5 threat. He went on to describe the restricted movement of Muslims because

6 of check-points. They had to leave their property and leave with only the

7 goods they could personally carry. He said Muslim telephone lines had

8 been cut, paramilitaries had arrived and searched Muslim homes and

9 intimidated the Muslim residents. Muslims were dismissed from working at

10 the Famos factory. He described killings in the community. He described

11 the arrival of 400 ethnically cleansed and beaten Muslims from the

12 Bratunac area. And he concluded his testimony on this point by saying:

13 "None of us wanted to leave our homes and our property and go out into

14 the world like a beggar, but we had to." He said that he left the Pale

15 municipality: "To save my life and the lives of my family members."

16 The evidence of Omar -- Mr. Asim Omerovic, who was a 92 bis

17 witness, described the attack on his village, described his own arrest,

18 the fact that he was beaten and the beatings of others.

19 So when you consider the testimonies of the witnesses you have

20 heard on behalf of the Prosecution, consider, Your Honours, the events

21 also that were occurring at the same time in other parts of Bosnia in

22 municipalities that were occupied by the Bosnian Serbs.

23 Now, if we examine the Defence documents, they support the

24 testimony and the events described by Messrs. Crncalo and Omerovic. If

25 Your Honours examine D197, minutes of a Pale Crisis Staff from the 9th of

1 April, 1992, it shows that the delegation of Muslims went to the Crisis

2 Staff and they presented proposals. Those proposals asked: "That events

3 from other parts of SRBH not be reflected and reciprocally applied to the

4 Muslim population in the territory of Pale municipality."

5 He went on to say: "Families who do not feel safe be allowed to

6 leave without hindrance due to reasons such as abuse, unlawful arrests of

7 only Muslims, break-ins into apartments, disarming of Muslim police

8 officers, seizing personal weapons with permits and similar."

9 It's our submission, Your Honour, that the Muslims of the Pale

10 municipality did not leave their homes in that community voluntarily.

11 Now, Mr. Krajisnik testified that he had no knowledge that the

12 Muslims from the Pale municipality had left. He only learned about that

13 sometime after the 25th of July. Now, Pale's a small community; it's not

14 New York City. It's not Tokyo. The 1991 census figures show that there

15 were 16.355 people in the municipality, 7.384 lived in the town. We know

16 for a fact that the town swelled with Serbian refugees. Mr. Divcic told

17 us it swelled to 30.000. Nevertheless, it was a very small town.

18 Mr. Krajisnik was clearly put on notice in May or June that

19 Muslims and Croats wanted to leave his community. He testified that he

20 had been visited by a Muslim and a Croat who informed him of that fact.

21 On the 6th of July, 1992, if you examine Defence Exhibit 209, it reflects

22 that a large percentage of the Muslims who had remained in Pale over a

23 period of four days were placed on buses and escorted out of the

24 municipality by Pale police officers. Specifically, it reflects that on

25 the 30th of June, 88 Muslims left in two buses; on the 1st of July, 220

1 Muslims left on four buses; on the 2nd of July, 324 Muslims left on five

2 buses; on the 3rd of July, 410 Muslims left on seven buses. That's a

3 total of 1.042 Muslims out of this -- the small Muslim community that

4 remained in the municipality. I'd also ask Your Honours to examine

5 Defence Exhibit 208, a 6th July decision for an eight-bus convoy to escort

6 420 Muslims and Croats out of the municipality. That means in this small

7 town of Pale, a significant percentage of the Muslim population left in

8 organised convoys that surely Mr. Krajisnik must have been aware of and

9 could not have failed to see. If the arrival of 400 Muslims from Bratunac

10 was "the talk of the town" according to Mr. Divcic, the departure of a

11 significant number of the remaining Muslims in that community must have

12 been the talk of the town and must, Your Honours, have reached

13 Mr. Krajisnik's ears.

14 In addition, Your Honour, there was a -- on the 19th of June in

15 Pale, there was a regulatory scheme set up to ensure the exchange of

16 property. That regulatory scheme was similar in nature to what happened

17 elsewhere in Bosnia. Mr. Krajisnik, in our submission, must have been

18 aware of that, in his talks with Pale Crisis Staff representatives.

19 Finally, Your Honours, if you look at Defence Exhibit 211, it's a

20 document from the Pale municipality Crisis Committee dated the 7th of July

21 that is addressed personally to Biljana Plavsic and informs Mrs. Plavsic

22 that Muslims started moving out forcefully and wilfully at their own

23 private initiate and discretion, and it goes on.

24 Mrs. Plavsic surely would have shared that information with

25 Mr. Krajisnik.

1 Finally, Mr. Krajisnik asserts that no one waned the Pale Muslims

2 to leave. I've already mentioned, Your Honour, a conversation that took

3 place between Mr. Crncalo and Mr. Koljevic and the conversation that took

4 place between Mr. Koroman, the police chief, and the large, organised

5 convoys that escorted these people out.

6 It is, of course, our submission, Your Honour, that the Muslim

7 people who resided in Pale were forced out. It is also our submission,

8 Your Honour, that their departure is consistent with the implementation of

9 strategic objective number one, the strategic objective that Mr. Krajisnik

10 said was the most important objective.

11 Your Honour, I have concluded this part of the submissions. May I

12 have just a moment.

13 [Prosecution counsel confer]

14 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'm going to yield the floor to

15 Mr. Gaynor, who will make the next set of submissions.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gaynor.

17 MR. GAYNOR: Good afternoon, Your Honours.

18 I'll be making submissions in response to ten legal issues which

19 arise in the Defence final brief, and I'll then be making some short

20 submissions on 7(3) responsibility. During the course of this, I'll be

21 referring to several cases, and for later reference the citations to those

22 cases are on a sheet which I've provided to Your Honours and to the

23 Defence.

24 The first of the ten issue issues is Rule 90(H)(ii). The Defence

25 submits at paragraphs 62 to 69 of its brief that the Trial Chamber must

1 not use important assertions as to acts and declarations of Mr. Krajisnik

2 that were made by Prosecution witnesses and were not put to Mr. Krajisnik

3 by the Prosecution in cross-examination. It relies on Rule 90(H)(ii),

4 which provides: "In the cross-examination of a witness who is able to

5 give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining party, counsel

6 shall put to that witness the nature of the case of the party for whom

7 that counsel appears which is in contradiction of the evidence given by

8 the witness."

9 The Defence submission does not cite to any jurisprudence in

10 support of its position. Tribunal jurisprudence on Rule 90(H)(ii) and a

11 national jurisprudence on a related principle known as the rule in Browne

12 against Dunn, which was an English case cited in the early 1890s, do not

13 support the Defence's assertion.

14 Tribunal jurisprudence stresses that Rule 90(H) must be applied

15 with a certain flexibility, depending on the general conduct of the trial.

16 There is no absolute rule requiring a cross-examining party to put every

17 detail of its version of the events to a witness or to put the witness on

18 notice of every detail of the witness's evidence that the cross-examining

19 party does not accept. In the application of the rule, a measure of

20 flexibility will be allowed according to the circumstances, and based on

21 the general conduct of the trial. Rule 90(H)(ii) is to be applied in a

22 way to ensure the orderly progress of the trial and the transparent

23 presentation of evidence.

24 These principles appear in a Brdjanin and Talic decision of the

25 22nd of March, 2002, which examined the rationale behind Rule 90(H)(ii).

1 That decision was upheld on appeal on 6 June 2002. The principles in

2 those decisions were applied with approved by the Oric Trial Chamber in a

3 decision of 17 January 2006.

4 From the Tribunal's jurisprudence it is clear that Rule 90(H)(ii)

5 is intended to secure three broad objectives: First, the rule protects

6 against the possibility of a party ambushing a witness by not giving the

7 witness an opportunity to state his position in respect of evidence which

8 the cross-examining party later calls which contradicts the evidence of

9 the witness.

10 Second, the rule gives the Trial Chamber an opportunity to observe

11 the witness's demeanour while he is confronted with contradictory evidence

12 and while he comments on that evidence.

13 Third - and this is a very practical consideration - the rule

14 exists in order to avoid the need to bring a witness back to the Tribunal

15 in order to deal with a new aspect of the cross-examining party's case

16 which emerges from evidence later led by that party and which was not put

17 to the witness when he or she first testified.

18 Domestic jurisprudence accepts that this rule - it's the rule in

19 Browne and Dunn - is not a strict rule at all and was not intended to be

20 by the court in Browne and Dunn itself but is rather a principle that

21 applies to a greater or lesser extent depending on the particular facts of

22 the case and the conduct of the trial. In particular, ambush of a witness

23 is avoided where the witness is put on objectively sufficient notice that

24 his credibility is in issue. Where the witness is the accused, there is

25 jurisprudence to the effect that the Rule does not apply.

1 I will very briefly draw Your Honours' attention to four domestic

2 decisions on the rule in Browne and Dunn.

3 First in Verney, a case concerning the application of the rule to

4 the Defence, the Ontario Court of Appeal said that the rule: "Is not an

5 absolute rule and counsel must not feel obliged to slog through a

6 witness's evidence in chief, putting him on notice of every detail the

7 Defence does not accept."

8 The Court added that: "Counsel must be free to use his own

9 judgement about how to cross-examine a hostile witness. Having the

10 witness repeat in cross-examination everything he said in chief is rarely

11 the tactic of choice."

12 Second, in a 1983 Australian decision, Allied Pastoral Holdings

13 against the Federal Commissioner of Taxation, recently cited with approval

14 by the English Court of Appeal case in Markem Corporation against Zipher

15 Limited, Judge David Hunt - the same Judge David Hunt who later acted here

16 - noted that Browne against Dunn itself recognised that there was no

17 obligation to raise a matter in cross-examination in circumstances where

18 it was perfectly clear that the witness had full notice beforehand that

19 there was an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he

20 was telling.

21 Another Australian case, Raben Footwear against Polygram, said

22 that the rule in Browne and Dunn: "may be satisfied where the witness is

23 on notice that the version given is disputed, and such notice may come

24 from pleadings, the opponent's evidence or opening, or from the general

25 manner in which the case is conducted."

1 The fourth and final case is the Crown against W. (M. L.). There

2 the Ontario Court of Appeal found that when the witness was the accused,

3 this was not a Browne and Dunn situation. The Court said: "There was no

4 ambush of the appellant. He knew the case against him full well when he

5 went into the witness box. There was no evidence called by the Crown in

6 reply. It is a matter of judgement on the part of Crown counsel as to

7 what areas he wishes to cross-examine on."

8 Similarly, in this case, there was no ambush of any kind. The

9 accused was well aware of the Prosecution's case against him when he began

10 his testimony, and he was given an opportunity to answer that case, and he

11 took that opportunity over the course of 40 days of testimony. Before the

12 accused began to give evidence, he had received the indictment, the

13 supporting material, a great deal of pre-trial disclosure, and the

14 Prosecution's pre-trial brief. He had heard the Prosecution's opening

15 statement, the oral evidence of 93 Prosecution witnesses, he had received

16 written evidence of many more, and also received over 3.800 Prosecution

17 exhibits during the course of the trial. He had also listened to the

18 Prosecution's cross-examination of 24 Defence witnesses.

19 In addition, he met with his counsel frequently throughout the

20 trial and, in particular, prior to the beginning of his testimony. The

21 accused was therefore on full notice of the Prosecution's case against

22 him. In fact, almost his entire evidence in chief was a response to that

23 case. Therefore, there can be no concern about the accused being put on

24 notice as to the essence of the Prosecution's case against him and being

25 given the opportunity to respond to that case.

1 It is also relevant that there was no rebuttal case for the

2 Prosecution. So there was no practical issue about re-calling the accused

3 to respond to further Prosecution evidence.

4 In respect of assessing credibility, the Chamber had ample

5 opportunity to observe the accused and to draw its own conclusions about

6 the accused's credibility during the 40 days of his evidence.

7 For these reasons, all the concerns underlying Rule 90(H)(ii) were

8 addressed. Prosecution complied with Rule 90(H)(ii) in accordance with

9 the spirit and the aim of the rule and the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

10 We submit that there is, therefore, no merit in the Defence submissions

11 concerning Rule 90(H)(ii).

12 The second point, the mens rea for planning, ordering, and

13 instigating in the Defence brief is incorrect. The submissions set out at

14 paragraphs 92 to 96 of the Defence brief in relation to those three forms

15 of liability do not refer to and are not consistent with the definitions

16 of the actus reus and the mens rea for planning, ordering, and instigating

17 set out at paragraphs 25 to 32 of the Kordic appeal judgement. The

18 threshold set out at those paragraphs is lower than the test set out in

19 the Defence brief.

20 The next point is that joint criminal enterprise liability can

21 apply to a massive criminal campaign. The Defence appears to argue, at

22 paragraphs 107 and 130 to 134 of its brief, that JCE liability cannot

23 apply in a large-scale case. This issue has already been considered and

24 dismissed -- this argument has been dismissed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber.

25 In the Karemera decision of 12th April 2006, the Appeals Chamber found

1 that there is no geographical limitation on JCE liability. Liability can

2 apply to a JCE of vast scope.

3 Further support is found in paragraph 25 of the Rwamakuba decision

4 of the ICTR Appeals Chamber of the 22nd October, 2004, where the Appeals

5 Chamber noted that post-World War II jurisprudence, in particular the

6 Justice case, shows that liability for participation in a criminal plan is

7 as wide as the plan itself, even if the plan amounts to a nation-wide

8 government-organised system of cruelty and injustice.

9 Fourth point: The application of JCE 3, liability to genocide,

10 was recognised under customary international law in 1992 and was

11 sufficiently accessible to the accused at the time of the offences. The

12 Defence, at paragraphs 245 to 253 and 259 of its brief, argues that the

13 application of JCE 3 to genocide would offend the nullum crimen principle.

14 In particular, the Defence argues that the Rwamakuba decision of 22nd

15 October 2004 did not expressly address the question of whether JCE

16 liability was recognised in customary law prior to 1992.

17 Now, the Appeals Chamber in Rwamakuba found that the customary

18 international law recognised the application of JCE liability to the crime

19 of genocide before 1992. The Chamber did not exclude JCE 3 from its

20 finding. Further, the Chamber expressly declared correct a statement to

21 the effect that JCE liability applied to genocide in the Tadic appeal

22 judgement, which concerns all three forms of JCE liability. In addition,

23 the Rwamakuba decision refers several times to the ICTY Appeals Chamber's

24 19 March 2004 decision in Brdjanin that JCE 3 and genocide are compatible.

25 Therefore, our submission is that the Karemera decision of the

1 12th of April, 2006, when read in conjunction with the Rwamakuba decision,

2 confirm that the application of JCE 3 to genocide was recognised in

3 customary law in 1992. I refer Your Honours expressly to footnote 41 of

4 the decision of the 12th of April, 2006.

5 Now, the Defence argues at paragraph 256 of its brief that JCE 3

6 for genocide was not sufficiently foreseeable to the accused in 1992. The

7 Appeals Chamber, in its 21st of May, 2003, decision in Milutinovic ruled

8 that JCE liability - and it did not exclude JCE 3 liability - was

9 sufficiently foreseeable. Its decision was in the context of a Kosovo

10 case, but it relied in part on the -- on Article 26 of the 1977 Criminal

11 Code of the SFRY.

12 The next point is that JCE does not require an agreement between

13 the accused and those physically carrying out the crimes. The Defence

14 brief, at paragraphs 148 to 150, argues that for JCE liability to attach,

15 the Chamber must be satisfied that the Prosecution has proved that there

16 was an understanding or agreement to commit a particular crime between the

17 accused and the relevant physical perpetrators. The Defence argues that

18 the fact that both may have espoused a strategic plan is not equivalent to

19 an arrangement between them to commit a concrete crime, and they rely on

20 the Brdjanin judgement. We submit that the requirement referred to by the

21 Defence does not exist and the Brdjanin judgement is erroneous in this

22 regard.

23 Two different issues have to be distinguished: First, does the

24 physical perpetrator need to be a member of the JCE? Second, do the

25 members of the JCE have to have an agreement, and what is its content?

1 In respect of the first issue, we submit that it is not necessary

2 that the physical perpetrators be JCE members. It is possible to have a

3 JCE made up of members at the leadership level who use the physical

4 perpetrators as their instruments or tools. The Prosecution's position,

5 which is set out in Prosecution's appeal brief in Brdjanin, that the

6 physical perpetrators do not need to be among the members of the JCE has

7 been implicitly confirmed in paragraphs 63 to 98 of the Stakic appeal

8 judgement and is supported by Judge Bonomy's separate opinion in

9 Milutinovic of the 22nd of March, 2006.

10 With regard to the second issue, the question whether, if the

11 physical perpetrators are among the members of the JCE there needs to be a

12 direct agreement between the physical perpetrators and the accused, is

13 also currently under appeal in Brdjanin. The only support cited in the

14 Brdjanin judgement for the existence of this requirement is an

15 interlocutory decision in Brdjanin of the 26th of June, 2001, which itself

16 cites no authority. Neither Tribunal jurisprudence nor customary

17 international law support this narrow interpretation of JCE liability.

18 The Prosecution's position on appeal in Brdjanin is that it is

19 sufficient if the members of the JCE espouse the same plan, design, or

20 purpose. As I mentioned earlier, it has been recognised by the ICTR

21 Appeals Chamber that a JCE can be nation-wide. If this is the case, it

22 clearly cannot be a requirement for responsibility of the members of the

23 JCE that they all have entered into something akin to a one-to-one

24 understanding or agreement with each other.

25 The application of JCE liability by the Appeals Chamber in Stakic

1 and by Trial Chamber -- the Trial Chamber in Krstic, and by the Chambers

2 in plea agreement cases such as Obrenovic and Plavsic, shows that a direct

3 agreement between the accused and the physical perpetrators is not

4 required. Significantly, a number of post-Brdjanin Appeals Chamber

5 interlocutory decisions and judgements concerning JCE have not referred to

6 such a requirement.

7 Therefore, in the present case, in accordance with the approach

8 taken in the Stakic appeal judgement, this Trial Chamber is not required

9 to find that the physical perpetrators were members of the JCE. And if it

10 does find that the physical perpetrators were members of the JCE, it does

11 not have to find that there was an understanding or agreement to commit a

12 particular crime between the accused and the relevant physical

13 perpetrators in addition to proof of the existence of the common plan,

14 design, or purpose espoused by the members of the JCE.

15 Sixth point - and it's a short one - JCE liability does not

16 require that the accused make a substantial contribution --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gaynor, before you continue.

18 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.

19 JUDGE ORIE: You referred to the position of the Prosecution which

20 was set out in the Brdjanin appeals brief.

21 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: And that required a lot of paragraphs I think you

23 referred to. Is that the position the OTP takes in general or just in

24 Brdjanin or would it fully apply here? How do we have to understand that?

25 MR. GAYNOR: Your Honours, you can understand that as being the

1 Prosecution position in this case also.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. GAYNOR: It's our policy -- position. The --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Legal analysis, I take it.

5 MR. GAYNOR: Yes. The analysis we've made in the Brdjanin is also

6 applied by the Prosecution in this case.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, that's -- that's clear, then. That's on

8 the judicial database, I take it?

9 MR. GAYNOR: Yes, Your Honour. I can provide you with the date.

10 Your Honours, the Prosecution's brief on appeal in the Brdjanin case is

11 the 28th of January, 2005, and I refer Your Honours in particular to pages

12 5 to 20 of that brief.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

14 Please proceed.

15 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.

16 Your Honours, the sixth point is that JCE liability does not

17 require that the accused make a substantial contribution. The Defence

18 brief states at paragraph 143 that for JCE liability to attach, "the

19 accused must have carried out acts that substantially assisted or

20 significantly effected the furtherance of the goals of the enterprise."

21 The brief cites to the Kvocka trial judgement but fails to refer to the

22 Kvocka appeal judgement, which held at paragraph 97 that there is no

23 specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial

24 contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.

25 The next point - also short - the Defence brief, at paragraphs 152

1 to 154, makes submissions concerning aiding and abetting a joint criminal

2 enterprise. I direct Your Honours to the Kvocka appeal judgement at

3 paragraph 91 where the Appeals Chamber held that it is inaccurate to refer

4 to aiding and abetting a joint criminal enterprise, but rather the aider

5 and abettor assists the principal perpetrator or perpetrators in

6 committing the crime.

7 The eighth point is that superior responsibility for genocide does

8 not require proof of special intent. The Defence final brief, at

9 paragraphs 260, 266 to 270, submits that for a conviction for genocide

10 under Article 7(3), the Prosecution must establish that the accused

11 possessed the requisite dolus specialis. The only support for this view

12 is the Stakic Rule 98 bis decision. As the Defence brief appears to

13 accept, there is a considerable quantity of jurisprudence against the

14 Defence on this point.

15 In the Brdjanin decision on interlocutory appeal on the 19th of

16 March, 2004, the Appeals Chamber referred to command responsibility

17 liability as an example of a form of liability which does not require

18 proof of intent to commit a crime on the part of the accused in order for

19 a criminal liability to attach. I refer Your Honours to the Brdjanin

20 trial judgement, paragraphs 717 to 721, the Blagojevic trial judgement,

21 paragraphs 686, the Milosevic 98 bis decision at paragraph 300. All of

22 those Trial Chambers took the view that specific intent on the part of the

23 accused is not necessary for finding of genocide under Article 7(3).

24 [Prosecution counsel confer]

25 MR. GAYNOR: The next point concerns the expanded Presidency.

1 Mr. Tieger has made submissions about the expanded or War Presidency

2 already. To his submissions, and I refer to the Defence brief at

3 paragraph 198, I simply wish to add that as a matter of law it is not in

4 fact necessary to prove that the accused held any de jure authority to

5 secure a conviction under Article 7(3). A finding of de jure authority

6 does establish a rebuttable presumption of effective control, but the

7 controlling test for liability to attach is whether the accused in fact

8 held effective control in the sense of a material ability to prevent or

9 punish conduct however that control is exercised and regardless of the

10 formality of his appointment or the titles which he held.

11 And I refer the Court to the discussion in the Celebici appeal

12 judgement paragraph 197.

13 The tenth legal point is the accused's intent to commit crimes in

14 each indictment municipality. The Defence submits that the Prosecution

15 must prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Krajisnik intended the

16 commission of crimes in each of the indictment municipalities and suggests

17 that this analysis must take place with respect to each and every specific

18 offence or event charged and it is not sufficient to infer it from the

19 existence of some general or overarching purpose. That's at paragraph 138

20 of their brief. The Defence cites no authority for this proposition. The

21 Kvocka appeals judgement at paragraph 276 demonstrates that a participant

22 in the JCE does not need to know of each crime committed in order to be

23 criminally liable, where a series of charged acts forms part of an attack

24 of a discriminatory nature, this context can be a sufficient basis to

25 infer the discriminatory intent in relation to each particular act. In

1 respect of that proposition the support is the Blagojevic trial judgement

2 at paragraph 584 and the Tadic trial judgement at paragraph 652.

3 Rather than carrying out a site-by-site compartmentalised

4 analysis, we submit that the Chamber must consider the evidence in this

5 case as a whole in determining whether the accused intended to commit the

6 crimes in each indictment municipality. That means considering as a whole

7 the evidence concerning, for example, disarming the non-Serb population,

8 arming and training the Serb population, establishing Crisis Staffs,

9 establishing Serb-only police and TO forces, dismissal of non-Serbs from

10 employment, coordinated take-overs of power at the municipal level by

11 Crisis Staffs and Serb forces, shelling and burning houses and other

12 civilian targets, detention, mass killings, and expulsions of great

13 numbers of Muslims and Croats, including through the provision of

14 organised transportation out of the indictment municipalities --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down. Thank you very

16 much.

17 MR. GAYNOR: -- and the systematic elimination of Muslim and Croat

18 sacred sites.

19 The Chamber must consider that evidence in conjunction with the

20 related evidence of neutral international observers; MUP, VRS, Crisis

21 Staff documentation; victim and insider evidence; statements of the

22 Bosnian Serb leadership; as well as evidence identifying the territories

23 targeted for inclusion in the Serb state as evidence from which to infer a

24 centrally directed, massive and systematic attack on the Muslim and Croat

25 populations in all of the indictment municipalities.

1 In the Stakic trial judgement, the Trial Chamber, quite rightly,

2 noted that where the accused is hierarchically distant from the physical

3 perpetrators: "To require proof of the discriminatory intent of both the

4 accused and the acting individuals in relation to all the single acts

5 committed would lead to an unjustifiable protection of superiors and would

6 run counter to the meaning, spirit, and purpose of the Statute of this

7 International Tribunal."

8 Your Honours, that ends the purely legal submissions for the

9 moment. I will now make submissions on 7(3) liability of this accused.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that means factual submissions or -- because you

11 said that ends the legal submissions.

12 MR. GAYNOR: Yes. These are not -- I know Your Honours have given

13 us some legal questions on 7(3), which I propose to address at a later

14 date. These are just a quick overview of our factual position --

15 JUDGE ORIE: So we first start with the facts. Please proceed.

16 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.

17 Krajisnik and Karadzic were at the apex of the Bosnian Serb

18 structure of power. Together with others, they designed, developed, and

19 promoted the common purpose and oversaw and directed the establishment of

20 bodies and organs to secure its implementation. They intended that crimes

21 be committed during the brutal campaign to secure the objective of pure

22 territories. As the architects and implementers of that campaign, they

23 had no incentive to devote resources to preventing crimes committed in

24 pursuit of that campaign, nor to punish the perpetrators of those crimes.

25 Our position is that the Bosnian Serb leadership, with Karadzic

1 and Krajisnik at its apex, had the material ability to prevent and punish

2 the commission of crimes by the VRS, including paramilitary forces

3 incorporated in the VRS, from its creation on the 12th of May, 1992, until

4 at least 30th December, 1992; and over the Serb TO, the RS MUP, including

5 paramilitary forces incorporated in the TO and the MUP, and Serb Crisis

6 Staffs from the 1st of April, 1992, until at least the 30th of December,

7 1992.

8 Instead of preventing or punishing, the Bosnian Serb authorities

9 deliberately created a culture of impunity for brutal crimes against

10 non-Serbs, while continuing to arrest and prosecute Serbs committing

11 ordinary crimes, including relatively minor crimes against fellow Serbs.

12 The Serb Republic continued to insist on a facade of legality and forced

13 thousands of non-Serbs fleeing the claimed territory to sign documents

14 purporting to lawfully transfer title to their property to the Serb

15 Republic. But when it came to enforcing the law in respect of brutal

16 crimes against Muslims and Croats, the Serb authorities did next to

17 nothing.

18 In respect of the MUP, the existence of a culture of impunity and

19 the deliberate non-prosecution of MUP members for crimes against

20 non-Serbs, including mass killings conducted in circumstances of shocking

21 brutality, is evident from the lack of any real effort to prosecute those

22 responsible for crimes such as the brutal Koricanje Stijene massacre

23 discussed at the Presidency session at which the accused was present on

24 the 1st of September, 1992, and the other crimes referred to at paragraph

25 317 of our brief.

1 In respect of the VRS, the existence of a culture of impunity for

2 crimes against non-Serbs was evident from a great body of evidence,

3 including the evidence referred to at paragraphs 406 and 407 of our brief.

4 The VRS took steps to prevent individual looting by Serb soldiers for

5 their personal profit, but took no meaningful action to punish soldiers

6 who participated in mass killings of Croats and Muslims. As the Banja

7 Luka military court log and the Banja Luka military prosecutor's log,

8 which are in evidence, illustrate, prosecutions initiated against soldiers

9 for crimes against non-Serbs were allowed to lapse. Those few soldiers

10 who were taken into custody for brutal massacres were quietly released

11 back into their units. Soldiers felt immune, and indeed were immune, from

12 prosecutions for crimes committed against non-Serbs.

13 The same applied to paramilitaries. As we said at paragraph 336

14 of the brief, Yellow Wasps were arrested in Zvornik. They were arrested

15 for stealing cars, but the authorities were aware that those Yellow Wasps

16 were involved killings of Muslims in Celopek. None of the Yellow Wasps

17 were prosecuted for killing Muslims, but instead, several were offered

18 positions in the RS MUP intelligence services.

19 Even when the brutality of conditions within several Serb

20 detention facilities became front-page news around the world in August

21 1992, the leadership took no effective action against the perpetrators of

22 crimes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Gaynor, we usually say to witnesses: Wait until

24 the text stops moving. I'm not asking you to always keep an eye on the

25 screen, but your speed of speech is still a bit high.

1 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 On the 6th of August, the Presidency issued a decision that a

3 commission for investigation of war crimes against Serbs should start its

4 work. The minutes of the meeting also record that the Presidency directed

5 the MUP to investigate; however, both the MUP inquiry and government

6 commissions of inquiry which were also set up were a mere sham, as we

7 submit in paragraphs 454 to 456 of our brief.

8 The Trial Chamber, on several occasions, invited Defence witnesses

9 to submit evidence of proper investigations and prosecutions of crimes

10 against Serbs. No meaningful evidence was submitted, to our knowledge.

11 It is also relevant that during the entire Defence case, the Defence did

12 not submit any convincing evidence of any meaningful effort to prosecute.

13 The burden of proof remains on the Prosecution to prove liability under

14 Article 7(3), but in our submission the Court may, in assessing whether

15 that burden has been met, also take into account in the exercise of its

16 discretion the nature of its responses to its invitations for evidence of

17 meaningful prosecution.

18 There can be no doubt that the Presidency, including

19 Mr. Krajisnik, had the power to take steps to protect Muslim and Croat

20 populations. To name just one area, it had the power to order the release

21 of the thousands of Muslims and Croats detained in conditions of great

22 brutality. Following the international outrage which resulted from news

23 of conditions in many of the camps, the Presidency, on the 6th of

24 September, did exercise its power to release and ordered the release of a

25 token number of prisoners from Manjaca.

1 As well as failing to take action to protect Muslims and Croats,

2 when implored to do so by neutral international humanitarian

3 organisations, the accused took steps to keep the issue of prisoners off

4 the agenda at the Serb Assembly. At the 10th of August, 1992, Assembly

5 session, the accused deftly and effectively removed the prisoners issue

6 from the Assembly's agenda. He was also fully involved in the Bosnian

7 Serb leadership's decision, illustrated by the 8th August Presidency

8 minutes, to solve the prisoner issue by insisting in international

9 negotiations on a system of all-for-all exchanges.

10 In short, the accused took next to no action to prevent the

11 commission of crimes or to hold to account those responsible. In his

12 testimony he took the position that if he had known about the crimes, he

13 would have intervened or asked for a debate or demanded that those

14 responsible take steps or speak out within the Presidency, but he also

15 took the position that he would have been powerless even if he did speak

16 out.

17 The accused's position that even if he did disapprove of crimes,

18 he could do nothing, is simply not credible. He was a member of the inner

19 core of the Bosnian Serb leadership, which had effective control over MUP,

20 VRS, TO, paramilitary forces operating under the direction of those

21 bodies, and Crisis Staffs. Rather than seeking to prevent or punish

22 crimes, the accused actively participated in the preparation for and the

23 implementation of the campaign for ethnic separation. He continued to

24 work hard as that campaign grew to tragic proportions with such

25 devastating consequences for thousands of Muslims and Croats.

1 Now, I'll hand back to my colleagues.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Gaynor.

3 To both of them; are they speaking simultaneously? Mr. Tieger or

4 Mr. Harmon.

5 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I would like to address the issue of

6 credibility generally and specifically in this case. Your Honours have

7 heard the testimonies of 124 witnesses and have reviewed the testimonies

8 of 97 statements admitted under 92 bis without cross-examination. You and

9 the Judges must determine the truthfulness and the accuracy of each

10 witness's statement and each witness's testimony, and in that regard, Your

11 Honours, in making those separate assessments as to whether a witness who

12 took the oath of solemn declaration before this Court told the truth or

13 did not tell the truth, we, as experienced advocates and you as

14 experienced Judges, know that there's no particular formula to apply in

15 evaluating whether a witness has told the truth. Instead, you must apply

16 your varied experiences in life in making judgements as to whether a

17 witness told the truth or didn't tell the truth. If, however, Your

18 Honours find that any witness has intentionally lied after taking the oath

19 and lied about a material fact, you can disregard that witness's testimony

20 in its entirety, or you can accept as much of it as you find may have been

21 truthfully given.

22 Now, in its brief the Defence has directed your attention to

23 various categories of witnesses called by the Prosecution and has made

24 certain observations about those categories. I'd like to respond to that,

25 and I will do so now. The first category that the Defence identified is

1 witnesses called by the Prosecution, they were convicts, and he identified

2 them by name, omitting, of course, that the Trial Chamber also called a

3 convict, Biljana Plavsic. The Defence made a very serious and provocative

4 allegation when it asserted that the Prosecution does not call witnesses

5 as some sort of fact-finding exercise or search for the truth. And I

6 state now publicly that we categorically and emphatically reject that

7 assertion. We also categorically reject the assertion in the Defence

8 brief that no Prosecutor could call criminals such as these individuals

9 unless they felt that they simply had no other option and in relying on

10 their evidence, the Office of the Prosecutor were really scraping the

11 barrel. While these characterisations are unnecessary and untrue, I want

12 to deal with reality.

13 Mr. Krajisnik was part of a criminal enterprise. The persons who

14 were close to him and who were also engaged in the enterprise and were

15 convicted of crimes related to the enterprise are ideally the persons who

16 are likely to know information and have evidence that's vital to the

17 search for the truth.

18 It's also important to bear in mind that the "convicts" called by

19 the Office of the Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber did not testify about

20 events in isolation. Considerable testimonial evidence corroborated the

21 particulars of their testimony. In addition, witnesses who testified

22 before this Court corroborated their evidence. In assessing whether a

23 witness's criminal conviction has affected the truthfulness of the

24 witness's testimony, I'm quite confident that you will measure his or her

25 testimony in light of all the evidence that's been presented during this

1 case and will find their evidence to be reliable.

2 Second, the Defence brief draws attention to the category of

3 suspects. I want to be clear from the outset. With the exception of Mr.

4 Mandic, who is facing criminal proceedings in Bosnia, none of the persons

5 identified as suspects by the Defence, to my knowledge, has been declared

6 so by the Bosnian authorities. The Defence invites you to engage in

7 speculation. The reality is that many of these "suspects" are persons who

8 were close to Mr. Krajisnik personally and/or professionally during the

9 period of the indictment. As such, they are persons who had considerable

10 insight into Mr. Krajisnik's conduct and into the organs of government of

11 which he and they were members.

12 Again, Your Honours, examine carefully who they were and examine

13 if these persons were persons who had an opportunity to see or to hear the

14 events about which they testified, if their evidence is plausible and

15 likely to be true in light of the other evidence you received, and whether

16 they had any hostility or bias towards Mr. Krajisnik.

17 The expert category highlighted the testimony of Messrs. Treanor,

18 Nielsen, Ms. Hanson and Mr. Browne. It's undisputed that three of them

19 are employed by the Office of the Prosecutor, and Mr. Brown was employed

20 by the Office of the Prosecutor at the time he prepared his report.

21 You're urged by the Defence to examine that element and conclude or at

22 least examine their conclusions with caution because it's asserted they

23 are not independent.

24 Those experts who testified and who presented reports to Your

25 Honours, we don't ask you to rely on their bald assertions in those

1 reports. Those reports were supported by documentation that was

2 voluminous in some cases. We invite you to scrutinise their evidence,

3 their conclusions, the materials upon which they base their conclusions

4 when you make a judgement as to their reliability.

5 Again, also compare their conclusions and their findings with the

6 other evidence that you've heard in this case, both Defence witnesses,

7 Prosecution witnesses, and Trial Chamber witnesses.

8 When we turn to the fourth category, internationals, you're urged

9 to scrutinise international witnesses who testified here. The

10 international witnesses who testified here were Mr. Charles Kirudja,

11 General John Wilson, former Ambassador Okun, two witnesses from

12 international organisations who testified with protective measures and one

13 who gave written evidence pursuant to 94 bis. You're urged to treat their

14 evidence with care. According to the Defence brief, many of the

15 international witnesses "had developed a built-in antipathy toward Serbs

16 and developed a rather biased disposition and were not objectively

17 reliable."

18 We reject those assertions. The international witnesses who came

19 and gave evidence before you were not parties to this conflict, but were

20 persons who represented neutral international organisations and who had

21 unique access to Bosnian Serb military and political leaders, including

22 Mr. Krajisnik, and were fully aware of the situation in the field in

23 Bosnia. In some cases, their contemporaneous reports are before you. In

24 many instances those reports reflect the critical view of the crimes that

25 were taking place and the events that they observed while they were in the

1 field, but having a critical view doesn't make them objectively unreliable

2 as witnesses.

3 Again, Your Honours, apply your common sense and the standards

4 that you normally would apply as Judges to the testimonies of these

5 neutral third parties, whose evidence you heard.

6 [Prosecution counsel confer]

7 MR. HARMON: Finally, let me turn to a witness whose evidence was

8 specifically identified, Mr. Davidovic. The Defence states in its brief

9 that it was noteworthy that Mr. Davidovic became a witness "relatively

10 late in the case," and was called because "the Prosecution felt that their

11 case was lacking." The Defence claimed in trial and claims again in its

12 brief that Mr. Davidovic is a liar, that he knew and sanctioned torture,

13 and that the Prosecution in calling him were scraping the barrel.

14 Let me first address what the Defence fails to mention in its

15 brief as to the reason why Mr. Davidovic became a witness late in the

16 proceedings. These facts were contained in the Prosecution's motion of 8

17 April 2005 and were summarised in the Trial Chamber's decision on that

18 motion at page 12.461 of the transcript.

19 Mr. Davidovic declined to be interviewed by the Office of the

20 Prosecutor in the absence of a waiver from his government. Despite

21 repeated requests and reminders by the Office of the Prosecutor, the FRY

22 government delayed for nearly two years issuing a required waiver. And

23 when they were finally issued in October of 2004, the Prosecutor

24 interviewed Mr. Davidovic. Those interviews concluded in March of 2005.

25 We then added Mr. Davidovic to our witness list in early April of 2005.

1 The Defence attacks on Mr. Davidovic have been relentless. In the

2 brief they called him a liar. In trial proceedings they called him a

3 liar. The Defence in no way were curtailed from bringing evidence aimed

4 at influencing the Trial Chamber's perception of his credibility. They

5 brought no evidence before this Chamber. At trial they called him a

6 criminal, asserting there were criminal proceedings pending against him.

7 They accused him from taking property from Muslims during the war, attacks

8 that were not true and later withdrawn by the Defence. I want to address

9 those issues further. Those issues have already been addressed by the

10 Chamber.

11 Finally, the Defence invites the Trial Chamber to find that

12 Davidovic must have "known and sanctioned the torture that his men doled

13 out on their captives." This invitation is based in part on the testimony

14 of KRAJ 682, which the Trial Chamber noted was based on "speculation

15 conclusions rather than clear observation of facts." I direct Your

16 Honours' attention to 17.016 and 017.

17 I further note, Your Honour, that the Defence produced no evidence

18 revealing a demonstrated animus of Mr. Davidovic toward Mr. Krajisnik. At

19 trial they asserted that because he didn't have a single word of praise

20 for Mr. Krajisnik he was biased, nothing more. That's found at 14.358.

21 Likewise, they suggested that he lied about Krajisnik to cover up his own

22 misconduct. That's found at 15.229. That criminal conduct, allegations

23 of which, were later withdrawn.

24 What's important, however, having said that, is that Mr.

25 Davidovic's evidence should be analysed like any other witness in this

1 case. You should apply the same standards. Despite the vociferous

2 attacks on him, we invite you to apply those standards to Mr. Davidovic's

3 testimony like you would any other witness.

4 Now, Your Honours, having addressed those points, I would like to

5 turn to the credibility of Mr. Krajisnik, and I've addressed Mr.

6 Krajisnik's credibility in part in my previous submissions. I'll cite

7 some but not all of the points where it is our belief Mr. Krajisnik was

8 not truthful.

9 In assessing his credibility, I'd urge you to examine particular

10 -- the plain meaning of his words that he uttered in 1992, 1993, 1994,

11 1995, in Assembly sessions, in interviews, in speeches, and compare them

12 with the contorted meanings he attached to his words during the course of

13 his evidence. Consider also whether, in light of other evidence you've

14 heard in the course of this trial, his evidence is plausible or likely to

15 be true.

16 Let's start with the issue of Mr. Krajisnik's testimony relating

17 to his lack of knowledge about Bosnian Serbs being armed before the

18 conflict. We spent considerable time on that topic. Mr. Krajisnik

19 testified: "I do not know in which way and how they were arming

20 themselves." In response to a question by Judge Hanoteau, Mr. Krajisnik

21 answered: "But I emphasise that I did not have any information at the

22 time that the Serb side was arming itself."

23 He's testified again later: "As for the things I heard

24 second-hand, stories circulated that people were receiving weapons, and I

25 heard some stories like that, like rumours, but nothing specific." He

1 said that arming was a secret. Perhaps people spoke about it only

2 tete-a-tete.

3 He wants you to believe, Your Honours, that he was ignorant about

4 the fact that the Serbs were being armed prior to the conflict. Here was

5 a leader who was specifically concerned that his people were at risk of

6 genocide, that they found themselves in a minority in an Independent State

7 of Bosnia and he knew nothing about any means by which they would protect

8 themselves if necessary.

9 He testified that he and Karadzic met with the top echelons of the

10 JNA in Sarajevo and in Belgrade before the war. Given the fact that the

11 Bosnian Serb leadership's concerns about possible genocide against the

12 Serb people, is it logical that he was unaware that the JNA, parties with

13 whom he'd met in Belgrade and Sarajevo, were not supplying arms to the

14 Bosnian Serbs? We submit it is not. Our evidence shows that he was fully

15 aware of the arming programme that was taking place.

16 Both General Gvero at the 34th Session and other members of the

17 Assembly testified or stated in those meetings that the Serbian Democratic

18 Party, and I quote General Gvero: "The Serbian Democratic Party and the

19 established state institutions also have the most credit for the initial

20 arming of the Serb people ..."

21 P51, a report -- a top-secret report prepared by General Kukanjac,

22 referred to many, many times in the course of this trial, indicates that:

23 "The JNA distributed 51.900 pieces of armament and the SDS 17.298

24 pieces." That same report mentions that General Kukanjac would be meeting

25 with Bosnian Serb leaders, who he identified, including Mr. Krajisnik.

1 Now, it's our submission that the arming of the Serbs was widespread and

2 notorious.

3 If you look at Sarajevo municipality alone, a subject of keen

4 interest of Mr. Krajisnik, and you look at the Kukanjac report, you can

5 see that 15.100 weapons were distributed in the Sarajevo municipalities,

6 and in Mr. Krajisnik's municipality 2.400 weapons were distributed. The

7 persons who were engaged in the arming efforts, you've heard evidence who

8 some of them were: Radovan Karadzic, Goran Zekic, Danilo Veselinovic, SDS

9 Main Board member Jovan Tintor, Mr. Krajisnik's kum, Rajko Djukic,

10 president of the SDS Executive Board, General Kukanjac, who was the

11 commander of the 2nd Military District.

12 Mr. Krajisnik -- let's focus on one person who should have caught

13 the attention of Mr. Krajisnik, that's Dusan Kosic, who was a prominent

14 member of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, who was arrested for smuggling arms

15 on the 24th of May, 1991. He smuggled ten crates -- or eight crates of

16 automatic weapons. Lots of ammunition. This was a notorious event. It

17 made the headlines in Oslobodjenje. Mr. Karadzic publicly spoke about it

18 at a press conference. Mr. Krajisnik's evidence on that? A member of

19 parliament who had asked for immunity, he said he didn't know anything

20 about it. Simply not credible, Your Honour.

21 Furthermore, there are intercepts, two intercepts, that deal with

22 Mr. Krajisnik being directly informed of weapons. Mr. Djukic talked to

23 him about buying 1.000 weapons, Mr. Karadzic talked to him about the Serbs

24 not having enough weapons.

25 So it's our submission, Your Honour, that Mr. Krajisnik was not

1 truthful when he said he did not know about the Serbs being armed.

2 Let's focus briefly on the shelling of Sarajevo. Mr. Krajisnik --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, we need another break.

4 MR. HARMON: Okay.

5 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether this would be an appropriate

6 moment before --

7 MR. HARMON: This is fine, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You are aware that we have a break of 20 minutes,

9 that means that we'll resume at 6.20 sharp, and the Prosecution has

10 another 40 minutes.

11 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, at the beginning of our presentation we

12 lost, I think, 15 minutes by virtue of -- I'll have to check, but there

13 was a decision that was read that -- we'd finely tuned our timing on this.

14 I was wondering whether or not those minutes would be returned to the

15 Prosecution or not during the break; we can otherwise adjust.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but not -- I'll see how much time I took for

17 reading. That's always a dilemma because if I read too quickly, I'm

18 making the same mistake as many do in this court-room; if I read too

19 slowly, then the interpreters are suffering in a different way, and that

20 is that you ask for more time after 7.00. I'll consider the matter.

21 I also noted, Mr. Harmon, that when points were discussed where

22 the briefs clearly indicate that the parties take a different view, that

23 sometimes also reference was made to matters I remember having read

24 clearly already in the brief. A shorter reference would certainly have

25 served. So if you would keep that in mind and discuss with your

1 colleagues how you'll manage to finish by 7.00. Then I'll have a look at

2 how much time it took me to read.

3 We'll adjourn until 20 minutes past 6.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 5.59 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 6.21 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed. It took me eight minutes

7 and five seconds to read the decision.

8 MR. HARMON: And in respect of those eight minutes and five

9 seconds, Your Honour, is there any decision reached on --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's see. I think if you don't speak too

11 quickly and if you behave well, I certainly would think that the

12 interpreters would assist you in five minutes or something like that.

13 MR. HARMON: All right. Thank you very much, Your Honour. I'll

14 begin.

15 The next issue I'd like to address is on the issue of

16 Mr. Krajisnik's credibility, deals with the shelling of Sarajevo. In that

17 context Mr. Krajisnik testified: "Let me repeat, and I think this is

18 important: Whether somebody shelled or will shell Sarajevo or not was

19 something the army decided." He also said he did not "remember that there

20 was any major shelling of Sarajevo ever."

21 Your Honours, recall the testimony of General John Wilson who was

22 the head of the UNMOs for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo. He described a massive

23 shelling on the 14th of May, 1992. In his own words, he said Sarajevo

24 suffered a horrific artillery bombardment. On the order of 5 to 10.000

25 rounds of artillery were fired on the city that day. He said it was

1 indiscriminate, disproportionate. He'd never seen such a weight of fire

2 used, particularly against civilian targets. It seemed to him there was

3 no value, military value in the targets selected. As a result of that,

4 Your Honour, UNPROFOR moved its headquarters, moved to Belgrade. That a

5 major shelling incident resulted in the displacement of one of the most

6 significant international organisations operating in Bosnia is surely

7 something that did not escape the attention of Mr. Krajisnik. I direct

8 Your Honours' attention also to the minutes of the fourth expanded meeting

9 of the War Presidency of 9 June, 1992, with Mr. Krajisnik in attendance at

10 that Presidency session --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Let me interrupt you. I was under the impression

12 that we would start in private session. I had not ordered that. I do not

13 see that confirmed on my screen; therefore ...

14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

15 MR. HARMON: I can speak publicly on these matters, Your Honour.

16 I'm going to go into private session in just a minute.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I was directing Your Honours' attention

19 to the minutes of the fourth expanded meeting of the War Presidency on the

20 9th of June, with Mr. Krajisnik in attendance, and after having been

21 briefed by General Mladic and his other generals who were present, there

22 was a conclusion reached at that session: "The heavy artillery fire on

23 the town be halted."

24 And if you look at another event, also ultimately reflected in the

25 Presidency session minutes, the minutes relate that after the Presidency

1 had received or became aware of the Secretary-General statement that had

2 been issued to the Security Council, complaining about the artillery

3 attack on areas -- heavy artillery attack on areas of Dobrinja that

4 threatened the airport negotiations, the following day at the 12th Session

5 of the Presidency, which Mr. Krajisnik attended and Mr. Karadzic did not,

6 they reflect that: "The Main Staff is ordered to cease all artillery and

7 infantry operations in the suburb of Dobrinja immediately." This is

8 undisputed evidence that Mr. Krajisnik's testimony that the shelling of

9 Sarajevo was something that the army decided was not the case. The

10 shelling of Sarajevo was a political decision implemented by the military

11 that could be turned on and off depending on the circumstances.

12 Now if we could go into private session for just a minute.

13 JUDGE ORIE: We turn into private session.

14 [Private session]

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 [Open session]

15 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, based on the evidence that I have

16 reviewed and other evidence that's been presented to this Court, it is our

17 submission, Your Honour, that the shelling of Sarajevo wasn't decided

18 exclusively by the military. Mr. Krajisnik was fully aware of massive

19 shellings that were taking place on Sarajevo.

20 A last issue I want to address briefly is the issue of the

21 separation of the police, because this is another issue where

22 Mr. Krajisnik squarely puts his credibility at issue. The -- on the 31st

23 of March Mr. Mandic sent a dispatch that resulted in the separation of

24 the police. It created a crisis. Mr. Krajisnik's evidence on that was

25 that he was in Brussels at the time and he and Karadzic were stunned to

1 receive news that this dispatch had been sent out. And according to Mr.

2 Krajisnik, he said it was unauthorised, it was an irresponsible act that

3 took them by surprise, they were stunned, and that he -- he had no time to

4 do anything to rectify or negate and manage this irresponsible and

5 unauthorised act. He wanted to distance himself from what Mr. Mandic

6 did. Recall that Mr. Mandic -- Mr. Krajisnik took a very legalistic

7 approach as to whether or not that dispatch was legally authorised. He

8 avoided the core issue. The core issue was that he and Mr. Karadzic

9 agreed with what Mr. Mandic had done. This is demonstrated in fact by the

10 failure - his failure, Mr. Karadzic's failure - to immediately repudiate

11 the act of Mr. Mandic or to take any ameliorative steps such as simply

12 sending a dispatch to all the police stations affected and saying:

13 Disregard it. How simple is that? Mr. Krajisnik's assertion that there

14 was not enough time is simply beggar's belief. How long would it have

15 taken for him to issue a memorandum, forward it through the normal

16 channels? An hour? Six hours? A day? Nothing happened. But Mico

17 Stanisic, the minister of the interior, found time three days later to

18 send a dispatch to the police station saying Mandic's dispatch was

19 operative.

20 Now, finally, what also supports the fact that Mr. Krajisnik was

21 not truthful are his actions that he took vis-a-vis Mr. Zepinic, who was

22 the highest ranking police official in the Bosnian government. Remember,

23 Mr. Zepinic -- Dr. Zepinic was meeting with members -- with Delimustafic,

24 his superior and members of the special police unit in an attempt to keep

25 them an integrated unit when he was summoned to the office of Mr.

1 Krajisnik, summoned by Mr. Krajisnik personally. When Dr. Zepinic arrived

2 in the office of Mr. Krajisnik, present were Mr. Mandic, Mr. Karadzic, Mr.

3 Koljevic, Djeric, Mr. Buha, and others, and he was vigorously attacked

4 because he had been meeting with the special police unit and not

5 supporting the division of the special police. According to Mr. Mandic,

6 the division of the special police was the final act in the division of

7 the MUP. Dr. Zepinic offered to submit his resignation to Mr. Krajisnik;

8 that was accepted.

9 It doesn't sound like the actions of someone who didn't have time

10 to do anything; it sounds, in our submission, like the actions of someone

11 who firmly supported Mr. Mandic's efforts to divide the police. And it's

12 our submission that Mr. Krajisnik did have time to take affirmative steps

13 to repudiate the dispatch. Mr. Krajisnik supported the division of the

14 police at the time Mr. Mandic sent the dispatch, and his testimony about

15 not having time to do so was false and was an attempt to mislead this

16 Trial Chamber on this issue. Thank you very much, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

18 MR. HARMON: I yield the floor to Mr. Tieger.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, I'd like to

22 begin by offering a quick follow-up to Mr. Harmon's remarks about

23 credibility, and in particular Mr. Harmon dealt with the categorisation of

24 witnesses by the Defence while asserting in their brief that their

25 witnesses came to "tell it like it is." I think it became apparent during

1 the course of testimony that numbers of Defences witnesses came with their

2 own issues, sometimes nationalism, sometimes over-identification with the

3 accused. The point is not to reject them as a category, but to do what

4 Mr. Harmon suggested the jurisprudence calls for; to examine them in light

5 of all the evidence and all the factors.

6 I'll mention a few examples quickly and then I'll move on.

7 Witnesses such as Mr. Bjelica who admitted that he had previously stated:

8 We wanted to have a complete break from the Muslims. We did not want to

9 live with them, and we don't want to be buried near them. Witnesses like

10 Mr. Milancic, who was confronted with his call at the 24th Assembly to

11 take internationals as hostages, and then told the Court: Well, it seemed

12 like a good idea at the time, basically. Witnesses like Mr. Milancic who

13 also tried to persuade the Court that the Srbac had taken vigorous action

14 to prosecute Serbs who committed crimes against Muslims, pointing to a

15 particular example of a killing of a prominent Muslim. As it turned out,

16 Your Honours will recall, that Serb was released after killing the

17 prominent Muslim, went on to shoot four additional Muslims, four of whom

18 -- two of whom were killed, and was not imprisoned until an incident in

19 which he lightly wounded a Serb child.

20 Or witnesses like Mr. Micic, who testified he'd never heard of the

21 strategic objectives before coming to The Hague but was confronted with

22 his presence at Assembly sessions when the strategic objectives were

23 extensively discussed by Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, and in addition

24 by a video which showed him discussing the strategic objectives with

25 Mr. Maksimovic, indeed a video where the question was posed whether there

1 was any other way to implement the strategic objectives other than war.

2 On the other hand, there are witnesses like Mr. Kasagic, who

3 talked about the need to reduce the Muslim population to 5 per cent, or

4 Mr. Micic, who talked about his brother who was on the Bijeljina Crisis

5 Staff, working together on that Crisis Staff with Mauzer. Or Mr. Vasic,

6 who testified that the second strategic goal was a military goal. He

7 said: "It was a military objective and in that sense a strategic

8 objective of the Bosnian Serb forces to establish contiguous territory and

9 prevent any border from separating the Serbian people."

10 All of this, Your Honour, again, is not to suggest that Defence

11 witnesses should be rejected as a category, but it just underscores what

12 Mr. Harmon was saying, the need for the Court - and I'm sure the Court

13 will do so - to evaluate their testimony in light of all the factors

14 including all the evidence and accept or reject any parts of their

15 testimony the Court considers credible.

16 Your Honour, I'd like to turn next to the issue of genocide. In

17 this case, as the Court is well aware, we consider a systematic campaign

18 of chilling proportions and consequences that was bent on achieving the

19 goal of Serb territory by the removal of Muslims and Croats at all costs.

20 This campaign sought the acquisition of territories that were populated by

21 those considered dangerous and undesirable and was fueled by the memory of

22 historic tragedies and a sense of victimisation. The Court knows what

23 happened, how Muslims and Croats were moved from the protections of law,

24 subjected to forces determined to secure their disappearance, and the fate

25 of many, many of whom were killed and many subjected to conditions likely

1 to cause death. The Court must now answer the question whether these

2 circumstances fall within the scope of genocide.

3 The Defence notes in its brief that genocide has been called the

4 crime of crimes, and therefore it urges it has a stigmatising effect and

5 should not be diluted. It must be emphasised, however, that for that very

6 reason the Court must not unduly restrict the application of genocide and

7 therefore refrain from stigmatising conduct that properly falls within the

8 Statute and has no place in a civilised world to which we must strive --

9 to which an increasingly armed planet must strive.

10 Genocide, of course, Your Honour is a legal conclusion that rests

11 on a combination of a prohibited act and intent; therefore, a vast killing

12 campaign resulting in untold deaths may not constitute genocide, and on

13 the other hand a far smaller number of deaths may do so. Fundamental

14 inquiry is often intent. That inquiry, however, must not be confused with

15 motive. While there may be a --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Tieger, please.

17 MR. TIEGER: -- as was the case --

18 JUDGE ORIE: You are asked to slow down.

19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. Sorry.

20 There may be, of course, a convergence of intent in motive, as was

21 the case in the genocide of World War II; however, any number of motives

22 may prompt an accused to engage in a prohibited act that falls within the

23 Statute with an intent to destroy a protected group. It's no defence to

24 say that genocidal intent is lacking because the accused's motive in

25 destroying the group was, for example, acquisitory.

1 Now, in this case, Your Honour, territory was to be acquired to

2 the establishment of a criminal enterprise intended to permanently remove

3 Bosnian Muslims and Croats by whatever means possible. In a moment I'll

4 direct the Court to assertions that were made that if Bosnia declared

5 independence it would lead to the annihilation of Bosnian Muslims and

6 Croats. But let me first say this: It is evident that prohibited acts

7 under Article 4(2) in this case were committed. So the issue is whether

8 Mr. Krajisnik and, in this case, others had the intent to destroy a

9 protected group. The determination of that intent may rest upon the

10 circumstances surrounding the relevant acts, may also be gleaned from more

11 direct evidence. Genocidal intent may be inferred from, among other

12 things, the discriminatory intent of the accused, acts or utterances of

13 the accused or his associates, and so on. Indeed, inference of genocidal

14 intent may be drawn even where the individuals to whom the intent is

15 attributable are not precisely identified, as in the Krstic case. But the

16 most direct insight into intent may be provided by what perpetrators or

17 those closest to them say, and I turn now to some of that evidence.

18 You'll recall, of course, Dr. Karadzic's speech at the October

19 14th or October 15th session of the Assembly, when he referred to the

20 possible extinction of the Muslims. Now, that has been interpreted by

21 some in this case as referring to political rather than biological

22 extinction, but a closer review of the evidence available to us makes

23 clear that Dr. Karadzic referred to an intended physical destruction, and

24 we cite the Court quickly to a number of intercepts with which I believe

25 the Court is familiar.

1 First, the intercept with Mr. Djogo two days before the speech,

2 and I just direct the Court's attention to a few of the salient comments

3 in that intercept.

4 Djogo: "What's he thinking, to start a war in Sarajevo? Is he

5 crazy?" He says again.

6 Dr. Karadzic says: "They should be thrashed if they start a war.

7 They'll disappear."

8 Djogo: "There will be rivers of blood."

9 Karadzic: "They will disappear, that people will disappear from

10 the face of the earth if they start now."

11 Karadzic continued in that conversation with remarks such as the

12 fact that 300.000 Muslims in Sarajevo would die and the Muslims in Bosnia

13 would disappear at the hands of the Serb forces. He said that Muslims

14 would be up to their necks in blood and the Muslim people would disappear,

15 the poor Muslims would disappear. And he also said, "Europe will be told

16 to go fuck itself, not to come back until the job is finished."

17 Now, the next day Dr. Karadzic reiterated the view that Muslims

18 would be annihilated in a conversation with Mandic. In just a couple of

19 days, he said, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be 500.000 dead. In

20 one month Muslims will be annihilated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He spoke

21 to his brother the day after the Assembly session of the 14th and 15th,

22 and he said: There will be war until their obliteration. None of their

23 leaders would stay alive.

24 Now, Your Honours, these remarks cannot be minimised as public

25 rhetoric for political purposes because they were made outside of the

1 public context. And indeed, Mr. Krajisnik had advised Dr. Karadzic in a

2 conversation of September 4th, in which they agreed that Muslims would

3 disappear and be annihilated, to simply say publicly that both Serbs and

4 Muslims would suffer that fate. But the intercepts to which I just

5 referred the Court are stunningly clear and unguarded expressions by

6 Karadzic of the nature of the campaign that would be launched if Muslims

7 pursued their intentions for independence.

8 And indeed that's precisely how Dr. Karadzic's words were

9 understood by other Bosnian Serbs in leadership positions. At the 4th

10 Assembly Session regional leader Vukic said, to applause: "The EC

11 recognition of Bosnia as an independent state would result in 'another

12 Serbian uprising and there will be massive bloodshed in which some nations

13 that have been subsequently created -'" and that means the Muslims, as we

14 heard in this court -- "'will disappear altogether.'"

15 And indeed, once the campaign began, these expressions continued.

16 At the 17th Assembly in July, 1992, Dr. Karadzic said: "This conflict was

17 roused in order to eliminate the Muslims. They think they are being

18 nationally established, but in fact they are vanishing."

19 Similarly, Dr. Kalinic, at the 16th Session, said, "Knowing who

20 our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until

21 they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which of course

22 implies eliminating and liquidating their key people."

23 Now, Your Honours, evidence of intent is found not only in the

24 direct statements of elimination but other expressions of intent to

25 eliminate a protected group may also provide such evidence. In that

1 connection the Court can look to many comments with which the Court has

2 been previously made aware, such as Dr. Karadzic's remarks that Muslims

3 cannot live with others. We must be clear on that. Or: They'll

4 overwhelm you with their birth-rate and their tricks. Or Mr. Krajisnik's

5 call for pure territories, or Kupresanin explaining at the 24th Assembly

6 that the war had been necessary because now Bosnia would be a

7 predominantly Serb republic, and noting that Serbia should do the same to

8 prevent Albanians and Muslims from taking over in Serbia.

9 As the Appeals Chamber recognised in Krstic, there are a number of

10 means apart from killing to secure the disappearance of a group. In

11 certain circumstances, forcible transfer, if committed with the specific

12 intent, can be one of the means to secure the physical disappearance of a

13 protected group.

14 And as mentioned, Your Honour, evidence must be considered in

15 context. And I ask the Court to keep one additional aspect of context in

16 mind. A recurring theme among the Bosnian Serbs was the very theme of

17 genocide: The assertion that Muslims and Croats were threatening them

18 with the same genocide they had suffered in World War II. And for those

19 living in the past and captive to this mind-set, the destruction of the

20 Muslims represented an anticipatory quid pro quo. As Ambassador Okun

21 warned Karadzic: If you keep talking about genocide, you will commit a

22 pre-emptive genocide.

23 Your Honour, the genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serb leadership

24 can be inferred from other aspects of evidence as well: Scale and pattern

25 of the attacks, their intensity, the substantial number of Muslims killed,

1 the detention of Muslims and Croats, their brutal treatment in those

2 facilities and elsewhere, and the targeting of persons essential to the

3 survival of the Muslims and Croats as a group are all factors that must be

4 considered by the Court.

5 The Court has received a great deal of evidence of killings of

6 Muslims and Croat civilians and infliction of bodily harm in 1992 on a

7 massive scale and also received considerable evidence on atrocious

8 conditions in detention facilities. In addition, I ask the Court to keep

9 in mind the considerable evidence about the forcible displacement and

10 systematic transfer off the territory claimed by the Serbs, and the Court

11 must assess this evidence in conjunction with the statements of the

12 Bosnian Serb leadership anticipating the disappearance of the Muslims.

13 With all those factors in mind, Your Honour, the Prosecution submits that

14 the Court's conclusion must be that the Bosnian Serb leadership, including

15 Mr. Krajisnik, intended that the Muslims and Croats should physically

16 disappear from the targeted territory and intended that the campaign which

17 they led include a massive campaign of killings, bodily and mental harm,

18 and detention in life-threatening conditions with the intention of

19 securing the physical disappearance of Muslims and Croats. And the charge

20 of genocide against Mr. Krajisnik, Your Honour, has therefore been

21 established.

22 Your Honour, in my remaining time I'd like to address two issues,

23 and that is the issue of sentencing and the issue of victim impact. I'll

24 need only a very few words about victim impact. No one should attempt to

25 capture the tragedy of the hundreds of thousands of victims in this case.

1 Indeed, the scale of the impact of the victims in this case is most

2 accurately reflected by the impossibility of attempting to fully assess

3 it. We ask the Court not to think of a hundred victims or a thousand

4 victims or hundreds of thousands of victims, for there was really one

5 victim at a time over and over and over, each with his or her own tragedy

6 and his or her own pain. Therefore, in assessing the impact in this case,

7 Your Honours, each victim must be considered.

8 Finally, Your Honour, I turn to the issue of sentencing, and what

9 in the Prosecution's view and submission is appropriate for the crimes

10 committed by Mr. Krajisnik. In making our determination on the

11 appropriate sentence, we have considered various factors in aggravation

12 and mitigation. I'd like to comment on those quickly.

13 In respect of aggravating factors, it is our submission that there

14 are three factors that aggravate the sentence. The first is abuse of

15 authority. Mr. Krajisnik was an intelligent man, an educated man, a man

16 who professed in this court to have the trust of Serbs and non-Serbs alike

17 before the war. Yet, he used his positions of power not to protect

18 Muslims and Croats from the harms that befell them, but instead to

19 implement the campaign of -- massive campaign of persecution and

20 destruction against the populations. It is our submission, therefore,

21 that Mr. Krajisnik abused his position of authority and the trust of the

22 civilian population and his sentence should be aggravated as a result.

23 The second factor, Your Honour, is that Mr. Krajisnik's victims

24 were vulnerable. The vast majority of those victims, of course, were

25 non-Serb civilians, young and old alike, violently uprooted from their

1 homes and settlements, abused, put into camps or cast out into the unknown

2 with little or no means of survival at their disposal at that time.

3 Bosnia was impoverished, the lives of its people were impoverished then

4 and now. Mr. Krajisnik's sentence, we submit, should be aggravated

5 because of the vulnerability of those victims.

6 And I'd like to turn quickly to the third aggravating factor, the

7 types of conduct for which Mr. Krajisnik is responsible: Killings,

8 forcible expulsions, deportations, unlawful detentions, destruction of

9 non-Serb homes, wholesale and systematic destruction of sacred sites,

10 genocide, and the fact that the commission of these crimes was protracted.

11 From the end of March 1992 until December 1992, the scale, Your Honour,

12 and scope of those crimes and the length of time over which they were

13 committed warrants an aggravating factor in sentencing.

14 The Prosecution has also identified two factors in mitigation.

15 The first factor recognised by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal is that

16 an accused with no prior convictions carries a factor that may be

17 considered by the Court. Our position is that the weight of this factor,

18 in light of the magnitude of the crimes committed, should be very little

19 in this case in assessing an appropriate sentence for the conduct. The

20 second factor is comportment in detention; another factor that the

21 Prosecution submits is a technical basis for mitigation but has little

22 relevance in light of the scale of crimes in this case. We accept that

23 Mr. Krajisnik has conducted himself properly in detention, but again, in

24 light of the massive nature of the crimes committed by the accused, it is

25 our submission that this sentence should have little weight in mitigating

1 the sentence.

2 Accordingly, Your Honour, it's our submission as follows: Each

3 count of the indictment individually, if found to be true, merits the

4 highest possible sentence, regardless of the mode of liability.

5 Therefore, based on the crimes committed by Mr. Krajisnik, the aggravated

6 factors associated with them, the absence of substantial mitigating

7 factors, it is our submission that Mr. Krajisnik should be sentenced to

8 prison for life.

9 That concludes my submissions, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. I take it that it concludes

11 the submissions of the Prosecution as well.

12 MR. TIEGER: That is correct.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 Mr. Stewart, you have informed the Chamber about what you'd wish

15 the Chamber to have available tomorrow in order to be better able to

16 follow. Hanson report. Just the report, or annexes to it as well?

17 MR. STEWART: Well, I wasn't going to ask Your Honours to have

18 everything that goes with the Hanson report. That would rather be a tall

19 order. Your Honour, may I make it clear that the particular items which

20 I've asked the Court to bring were -- because they are large items.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

22 MR. STEWART: If I referred to reports, I do only mean the report.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, they won't be the only items I refer

25 to, but the other ones will be small items and I will take care of that

1 and ensure they are put before the Court in a convenient way, but they are

2 physically large items.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Then Treanor report and also the report only, as far

4 as --

5 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ORIE: And you referred to the army report as we find it in

7 the glossary in the OTP. For the army report, I find two sources, the

8 first one being Exhibit P64A, tab 6, which, at least what I've got under

9 64A.6 is as a matter of fact not a report on the army, but it is P529 tab

10 255 seems to be an analysis --

11 MR. STEWART: That's it, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: No, but there are two sources, one rather misleading,

13 it seems, in the --

14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, to be frank, Your Honour, I

15 thought the Trial Chamber would take its pick of the one that produced

16 the documents, so --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 MR. STEWART: -- it seems it has done just that, yes, but that's

19 the document, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

21 MR. STEWART: Yes, the reference -- I've got a copy of it on which

22 it says at the front P64A, binder 26, tab 779. If that offers anybody an

23 alternative source, well --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I take it that P529, tab 25 -- that is only one

25 document and that is what you call the -- and what the Prosecution calls

1 the army report.

2 MR. STEWART: Yes, that's the --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then for further exhibits you would like to

4 refer to, I have to make a confession, not on all computers in this

5 court-room easily accessible for everyone are all the exhibits. Although

6 I would have 99 per cent, for example, one of the things that would not be

7 in my computer is, surprisingly, the Treanor report itself, but I will get

8 that. But at least on one of the computers here it would be easy to

9 produce most of the evidence, so there's no need to have it copied again.

10 If you would not be surprised if the other Judges would look from the left

11 and to the right on my screen as well.

12 MR. STEWART: Well, after two and a half years, no, I wouldn't be

13 surprised. No, Your Honour is correct. But, Your Honour, I will take

14 care of the logistics of what probably will only be two- or three-page

15 exhibits.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but the Chamber is also a bit concerned about

17 the quantity of paper that's used in this courtroom. If you can do

18 without, that would be -- if we have it on our screen, then it certainly

19 is worth trying.

20 Then if there's nothing else for tomorrow --

21 MR. STEWART: Nothing else from the Defence, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: -- then we conclude for the day. We'll start

23 tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this same courtroom, and the schedule tells us

24 that tomorrow the whole of the day is for the Defence to -- to present its

25 final argument in the first round.

1 We stand adjourned.

2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of

4 August, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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