1. 1 Tuesday, 4 April 2000

    2 [Open session]

    3 [The witness entered court]

    4 --- Upon commencing at 9.45 a.m.

    5 [The accused entered court]

    6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good

    7 morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning counsel for

    8 the Prosecution, for the Defence. General Krstic, good

    9 morning. I hope the interpreters can hear me. Yes, it

    10 seems so. Good morning to your sound engineers. We

    11 shall resume the Krstic case. We have the same

    12 witness, and Mrs. Malagic will continue her testimony

    13 today.

    14 Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. Have you had a

    15 good night's rest?

    16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

    17 Yes, I did.

    18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

    19 You will now continue to answer questions that

    20 Mr. Cayley will be asking of you.

    21 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good

    22 morning, Your Honours; good morning, counsel.


    24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

    25 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Cont'd]

  2. 1 Q. Mrs. Malagic, first of all, I would remind

    2 you that you are still under a solemn oath, the same

    3 oath that you were under yesterday.

    4 Secondly, if I can just refresh your memory

    5 as to the point in time that we arrived at during your

    6 testimony. If you recall, you were telling the Judges

    7 about your journey from Potocari to Kladanj, and you

    8 had arrived at a point in time on the road between

    9 Bratunac and Konjevic Polje, where you saw a large

    10 group of men in a meadow near Sandici. Can you

    11 continue with your account of events from that point in

    12 time to when you arrived in Kladanj?

    13 A. Yes. When we passed by that meadow, where

    14 they were there and I already knew that they were our

    15 men who had been captured by Serb soldiers, the bus did

    16 not stop again. We proceeded to Nova Kasaba, then via

    17 Milici, Vlasenica. In Vlasenica, the bus stopped

    18 because it had a failure, at least that is what the

    19 driver said, a tyre evidently. So they changed the

    20 tyre. And a Serb soldier came onto the bus but did not

    21 talk. He simply brought three apples and gave them to

    22 children who were sitting in the front seats and left

    23 the bus. And then the driver was back and we went on.

    24 When we arrived at a place, I believe it's

    25 called Tisca, I'm not quite sure, the buses stopped

  3. 1 there and the driver told us we could get off the bus

    2 and proceed on foot. We got off there. There were

    3 again Serb soldiers by the buses to meet us, and as

    4 there were no more men on the bus, that I was in, there

    5 were only women and children, and they simply pointed

    6 which direction that we should proceed. And at some

    7 point our folk will be waiting for us, as they put it.

    8 So we proceeded and as people said if there

    9 happened to be men on the bus or young girls, then they

    10 were separated by Serb soldiers, but I did not see

    11 that. And we continued in a column, I don't know how

    12 many kilometres that was, until we reached the

    13 demarcation line, as we were explained.

    14 We were first met by UNPROFOR soldiers. I

    15 believe it was a Pakistani, but I can't remember. And

    16 that was right at the entrance to Kladanj. They met us

    17 there with some food, with hot drinks, of course if

    18 people were up to eating at all. There were also some

    19 Red Cross vehicles for people who had fallen ill and

    20 were too weak to proceed by themselves.

    21 After an hour or so, I'm not quite sure

    22 because we had no watches, buses arrived and they took

    23 us on further towards Dubrave.

    24 At nightfall, with my son Adnan Malagic,

    25 other people I arrived at Dubrave. There we were met,

  4. 1 or rather me specifically, my husband's sister, who had

    2 been in Zivinice since earlier days. I did not spend

    3 the night there. They took me up there and took me

    4 over to Zivinice, and that's where I spent that night.

    5 The next morning we registered at a school

    6 and I stayed there until we were put up in houses that

    7 were built by UNPROFOR.

    8 And that was the end of that unfortunate

    9 journey, I shall call it. As for my testimony, I

    10 should like to finish it by saying something which is

    11 very important for me, and I believe for this Court

    12 too. With the fall of Srebrenica, rather when it was

    13 taken by Serb soldiers, when the Serb soldiers took

    14 that so-called protected area by the United Nations,

    15 from the face of the earth were wiped off three

    16 generations of men in the cruellest way possible. I can

    17 corroborate it by a fresh example from my family.

    18 My father-in-law, Omer Malagic, born in 1926,

    19 his three sons, one of whom was my husband, Salko

    20 Malagic, born in 1948. His two brothers, Osman

    21 Malagic, born in 1953; Dzafer Malagic born in 1957.

    22 His three grandsons, that is, my two sons Elvir Malagic

    23 born in 1973; Admir Malagic born in 1979; and my

    24 brother-in-law's son, Samir Malagic's son, born in

    25 1975.

  5. 1 There are hundreds of such families in

    2 Srebrenica and throughout eastern Bosnia, and to my

    3 mind this testifies to the scale of the genocide

    4 committed by Serb soldiers, commanded by the then

    5 General Ratko Mladic, Stanislav Krstic, and others. I

    6 can't remember all their names.

    7 Thank you very much for giving me the

    8 opportunity to say what I had -- to say all this before

    9 this august Tribunal. Thank you for hearing what I had

    10 to say.

    11 Q. Mrs. Malagic, I don't want to dwell in your

    12 grief over your loss, but there are a couple of final

    13 exhibits that I'd like to show you and for you to

    14 confirm some matters in those exhibits.

    15 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could first of

    16 all be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 80. If the usher

    17 could turn to the page on that list, which is

    18 highlighted in yellow, there is a name highlighted.

    19 Q. Mrs. Malagic, I just want to return to a

    20 point in time near the beginning of your testimony,

    21 when you stated that the last that you saw of your son

    22 Elvir was on a truck, a UN truck, travelling between

    23 Srebrenica and Potocari. Can you look at that list in

    24 front of you and identify the name that's been

    25 highlighted on that list?

  6. 1 A. You mean my son's name only? Elvir Malagic,

    2 do you ...

    3 Q. If you could, please.

    4 A. I don't understand.

    5 Q. Is your son's name listed on that long list

    6 of names? Do you see your son's name there?

    7 A. I do. I do. Elvir Malagic, 1970. This is

    8 an error. He was born in 1973, in Voljavica,

    9 Bratunac. Yes, this is my son. I saw him on the

    10 truck, as I told you. He raised his hand to greet me

    11 and other relatives who were in the UNPROFOR compound

    12 at that time.

    13 After the fall of Srebrenica, I heard,

    14 they've confirmed that he was there, and the UNPROFOR

    15 soldiers, as I was told, were the ones who made this

    16 list. This list turned up in Tuzla once, and I saw

    17 it. When we went to the UNPROFOR base, somebody met us

    18 there, I don't know who it was, a soldier, I don't know

    19 what rank he was, a military, and he said that he did

    20 not quite understand, that his superior was not there

    21 and that he could not understand how did that list turn

    22 up in public and who had made it and left it there.

    23 MR. CAYLEY: Finally, if the witness could be

    24 shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.

    25 Q. Mrs. Malagic, you earlier said in your

  7. 1 testimony that your husband Salko and your son Admir

    2 went to the woods with the other men at the time of the

    3 fall of Srebrenica. How old was Admir at this time?

    4 A. He was 15 and five months.

    5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could place

    6 the photograph.

    7 Q. Could you just very quickly, Mrs. Malagic,

    8 identify the man in this photograph.

    9 A. Yes. This is my husband, Salko Malagic.

    10 Q. Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much, indeed,

    11 for your patience. The Defence will have a few

    12 questions for you, and also the Judges.

    13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

    14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    15 Mr. Cayley.

    16 Mrs. Malagic, now you will be answering

    17 questions that Mr. Petrusic will ask you. He's the

    18 Defence counsel for General Krstic.

    19 Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.

    20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Good morning,

    21 Your Honours; good morning, my learned friends.

    22 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:

    23 Q. Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. I will ask only

    24 one question, and it has to do with the final questions

    25 by Mr. Cayley.

  8. 1 Mrs. Malagic, was it your conclusion, when

    2 you said that it was all General Mladic's and General

    3 Krstic's fault?

    4 A. In my view, these military who committed the

    5 genocide, who in a couple of days' time saw -- shot

    6 dead, and in all sorts of ways to do away with the

    7 thousands of men, must have done it at the orders of

    8 their Generals. One man could not do it. But I do

    9 believe that they could have issued such orders.

    10 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I have no

    11 further questions, Mr. President.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,

    13 any additional questions?

    14 MR. CAYLEY: No, Mr. President.

    15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Judge Fouad

    16 Riad.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    18 Mr. President.

    19 Questioned by the Court:

    20 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. We

    21 are very aware and compassionate with your great grief

    22 and we admire your courage. I would like just to see

    23 things a little bit more clearly, and I have one

    24 general question or two and two specific questions.

    25 You gave us a nutshell of the generations

  9. 1 which were exterminated. You started by your

    2 father-in-law, Omer, who must be an elderly man; then

    3 your husband and his brother, Salko and Osman; then

    4 your sons, Admir and Elvir. But we didn't reach Adnan,

    5 who was 11. So to start, was Admir and Elvir in the

    6 fighting brigades? Were they more or less militarily

    7 involved in anything, or were they taken just because

    8 they represented the youth, the Muslim youth?

    9 A. My children, and there were thousands of them

    10 like that in Srebrenica, in 1992, in April 1992, for

    11 instance, Admir Malagic was in the sixth grade only, he

    12 was barely 12 at the time, and when Srebrenica fell he

    13 was 15 years old only, and thereby, under any rule,

    14 under any norm, any regulation, he simply could not be

    15 a soldier. And my other son and the youngest one were

    16 not soldiers.

    17 As in 1993, early 1993, when UNPROFOR entered

    18 the protected area of Srebrenica, or rather when

    19 Srebrenica was already proclaimed a safe haven, then as

    20 everybody there knew it, they pursued

    21 demilitarisation. And those who were combatants, who

    22 had some weapons, handed them over to UNPROFOR

    23 soldiers. So that all those lads did not have any

    24 weapons, they were bare-handed, barefoot. They had no

    25 clothes. And I do not think they were soldiers. They

  10. 1 had nothing to defend themselves with. They believed

    2 that they would be protected; they believed that

    3 UNPROFOR would shield them and that perhaps we would be

    4 taken to a place, to a destination where, if nothing

    5 else, then life would be guaranteed to us.

    6 And Adnan Malagic, my youngest son, I did not

    7 mention him, well, because he crossed over with me, but

    8 thank you for remembering him in the end. The traumas

    9 he suffered, believe me, there are still effects of all

    10 those traumas today.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Of course. But are you

    12 convinced that all of them have disappeared, or just up

    13 to now you are in search of them?

    14 A. We mothers, wives, sisters, we're still

    15 looking for our missing, and we hope. But deep down,

    16 after all these years, I think we fear that they are no

    17 longer among the living.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: In fact, you mentioned that when

    19 you saw men taken by Serb soldiers into the

    20 interrogation house, you said they never came back.

    21 You are just deducing that from the events, or there

    22 are certain proofs that nobody came back?

    23 A. Yes, I have proof too. I did not go into

    24 those houses, even though there were women who were

    25 with me there, whose -- and it was their children and

  11. 1 they were taken away, and these women simply could not

    2 let them -- could not let it go, who pursued the truth

    3 and went around neighbouring houses and they spoke to

    4 people and talked to those who saw men beheaded, heads

    5 separated from bodies. They saw blood in those

    6 houses. On the road to the village of Budak, they saw

    7 very many men with their throats slit.

    8 One of my closest neighbours told me, when we

    9 met in Tuzla, how a Serb soldier and two others had

    10 taken them towards Budak and told them to wait for a

    11 moment. But then other Serb soldiers came up, and he

    12 knew one of them and they greeted one another, and that

    13 Serb soldier asked him why he was waiting there, and he

    14 said he was waiting for those Serb soldiers who brought

    15 him there with other neighbours. However, he pointed

    16 at those Serb soldiers who were aligned by that house,

    17 and he said, the Serb soldiers said, "No, these are all

    18 butchers. They are waiting to butcher you all, so get

    19 away." And then he, the Serb soldier whom I did not

    20 know and I did not see them, they took them to the

    21 trucks and that man reached Tuzla and lives there

    22 today.

    23 And there are many such stories. Whether

    24 they will all appear before this Court to tell what

    25 they saw with their own eyes, I don't know. But I did

  12. 1 not go into those houses because I simply couldn't do

    2 that. But from such stories, I realise that only the

    3 worst things happened there.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: So this applies to all

    5 generations of men, in your assessment.

    6 A. Yes.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: What about women?

    8 A. According to unofficial sources, it is

    9 thought, but I am not sure about the figure, that about

    10 1.000 women did not arrive from Potocari, mostly young

    11 women, and that about 650 children, below the age of

    12 12, were also missing, those who were with their

    13 mothers in Potocari. This is an unofficial record, but

    14 there are some women who saw children who were slain,

    15 amongst the -- in a maize field, because maize had

    16 been sewn there beyond the Zinc Factory. In the

    17 morning, that maize field was all surrounded, and there

    18 were military who did not allow anyone to enter the

    19 field. I did not see that, but these are figures,

    20 testimonies of women who did not see their children.

    21 There were women at Potocari who suffered, neighbours

    22 broke down and who said that the children were snatched

    23 from their arms and slain before them.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: My last question is concerning

    25 the buses. You said something rather interesting. You

  13. 1 said you saw many buses with headquarters in Serbia.

    2 So these buses came from Serbia, not from Bosnia?

    3 Thank you very much.

    4 A. Yes. Yes, the headquarters of these

    5 companies was in Serbia, even before the war. Strela,

    6 Sabac, Raketa, Titovo Uzice, Lasta from Belgrade, and a

    7 number of others, those who maintained regular

    8 transportation to Srebrenica; for instance, Raketa from

    9 Titova; Uzice, had a regular line with Srebrenica, so

    10 on and so forth.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. My question: Did

    12 they come specially for this purpose, or were they

    13 serving before the war? Were they on line all the

    14 time, or did you discover that they were coming for the

    15 purposes of transporting the refugees or the

    16 condemned? Do you understand my question? Were they

    17 new to the area?

    18 A. I do. I do understand. Yes, those buses, I

    19 know they came specially for the purpose, for us, to

    20 take us away. There was a long, long column of buses,

    21 and this to me is a fact, because during the war, while

    22 we were in Srebrenica, not a single bus, or rather not

    23 a single vehicle save the UNPROFOR vehicle appeared in

    24 Srebrenica. There was absolutely no traffic. Nothing

    25 worked. There was absolutely nothing, I already said

  14. 1 that. I do not think that a civilised world knows a

    2 life like that. We never saw those buses until the

    3 fall of Srebrenica, that is for those three years, and

    4 then they were all aligned in columns, only to

    5 transport us from there towards Kladanj.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: Mrs. Malagic, thank you so

    7 much. I'm sorry to ask you questions which might stir

    8 up such bad memories, but you're a lady of great

    9 courage. Thank you.

    10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your

    11 Honour, and I should like to thank all of those who

    12 make it possible for us to come here, and if nothing

    13 else, say what happened, to find some relief in saying

    14 what happened to us, to try to show you what happened

    15 when Srebrenica fell, and simply to wish that may

    16 Srebrenica never happen again anywhere. Thank you.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    18 Judge Riad.

    19 Mrs. Malagic, I believe that Judge Wald also

    20 has some questions for you.

    21 Judge Wald.

    22 JUDGE WALD: Mrs. Malagic, I just have one

    23 question. Your son that was on the UN transport, going

    24 from Srebrenica to Potocari, and you didn't see him

    25 again. When you got to Potocari, did you make

  15. 1 inquiries, did you -- I'm sure you looked around

    2 yourself to see if you could locate him, and you

    3 weren't able to. Is that right?

    4 A. I looked for him in Potocari, although there

    5 were so many people that it was very difficult. But,

    6 yes, I made some inquiries among people I knew. But

    7 across that barricade, as I called it, or rather the

    8 UNPROFOR compound, we simply couldn't enter because

    9 UNPROFOR soldiers wouldn't let us in. So that when I

    10 arrived in Potocari, I did not see him again because

    11 those who were in the compound could not come out, and

    12 we could not get in. We had no access until we were

    13 made to board buses.

    14 JUDGE WALD: So it is your belief or

    15 assumption that your 15-year-old son was put on the

    16 buses with the men in Potocari; is that right?

    17 A. Well, I suppose so. I suppose so, according

    18 to others who were there. They were also separated and

    19 taken away from Potocari by separate buses.

    20 JUDGE WALD: Thank you for coming,

    21 Mrs. Malagic.

    22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

    23 Mrs. Malagic, I do not have any questions for you. My

    24 colleagues and counsel for the Prosecution and Defence

    25 asked all the questions that I needed answers to. But

  16. 1 is there something that you would like to say and have

    2 not had the opportunity of answering? If there is

    3 anything else you wish to add, you may do so now,

    4 Mrs. Malagic.

    5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply want

    6 to thank you once again.

    7 Yesterday afternoon, when I returned from

    8 here, I went out to walk around your city, that is what

    9 I wanted to tell you. I couldn't really see much, but

    10 what I really liked, what caught me eye, was a monument

    11 that we visited and that was a monument to women, that

    12 is, women awaiting sailors who never come back. And

    13 the monument to those wives touched me profoundly. I

    14 should like to find this statue and take it to Bosnia

    15 with me. Perhaps it could be likened to mothers and

    16 wives of Srebrenica who have been waiting and hoping

    17 for all those years, except that we followed different

    18 roads. We could turn to our empty forests. We saw our

    19 sons and our husbands off to those woods and never

    20 found out anything about them again, whether they are

    21 alive or dead, where are their bones lying. Many

    22 mothers have died hoping against hope, and it is quite

    23 possible that all the other mothers would end up like

    24 that because their numbers are dwindling every day.

    25 Thank you once again.

  17. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We share

    2 your grief, Mrs. Malagic, and the grief of all other

    3 people, and I hope that in your misfortune you

    4 nevertheless have a feeling for -- to manage to

    5 overcome this suffering, and independently of who are

    6 the responsible for this, they are no doubt a disgrace

    7 to humanity.

    8 But, Mrs. Malagic, I hope you will be able to

    9 find hope again and that you will continue along with

    10 this sensibility that you gave evidence of today.

    11 Thank you very much and a safe journey home.

    12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very

    13 much.

    14 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation]

    15 Mr. President, there are two exhibits. We need to know

    16 what will happen to them.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

    18 Mrs. Malagic, will you please wait for a moment while

    19 he resolve this.

    20 Mr. Cayley.

    21 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.

    22 In respect of Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, that will be

    23 admitted into evidence by another witness, but I would

    24 like to make application for admission into evidence of

    25 the photograph, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.

  18. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.

    2 Mr. Petrusic, any objections?

    3 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No,

    4 Mr. President.

    5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

    6 Exhibit 81 is admitted, and we are still waiting for

    7 the Exhibit 80, is it, to be tendered yet. Very well.

    8 This exhibit is admitted.

    9 Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much once

    10 again.

    11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

    12 [The witness withdrew]

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I see that

    14 Mr. Cayley is going to take the floor.

    15 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. We do have

    16 another witness. It's Major Franken, who was the

    17 second in command of the Dutch Battalion. We do need

    18 to bring in a Dutch interpreter, who will be assisting

    19 him but not actually -- a Dutch/English interpreter who

    20 will be assisting him, not actually translating for

    21 him. So I don't know whether you want to take a

    22 five-minute break or whether the interpreter can walk

    23 straight into the courtroom. However you wish.

    24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Are there

    25 any protective measures?

  19. 1 MR. CAYLEY: No.

    2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No. So we

    3 will be sitting in open session.

    4 I should perhaps take this opportunity,

    5 Mr. Cayley, and ask you something concerning the

    6 decision that is still pending; namely, the

    7 lack-of-contact decision. So perhaps we should have a

    8 break now, and then later on proceed with the witness.

    9 Who is going to speak about this decision, or

    10 actually the application? I actually made a mistake, I

    11 told you I would not be here today. Actually, I will

    12 be absent tomorrow, and today the Chamber, because it

    13 is sitting in full composition, can make the ruling. I

    14 don't know whether Mr. Harmon wishes to take the floor

    15 about this application, and then after we could perhaps

    16 have a break.

    17 MR. HARMON: Yes. I will be glad to inform

    18 the Chamber of the Prosecutor's position in respect of

    19 the defendant's motion.

    20 The counsel for the Defence and I had an

    21 opportunity to discuss the suggestion by the Chamber

    22 after the break. We have concluded that the position

    23 of the Prosecutor is one that we would like to put

    24 forward jointly, that is, no contact after the witness

    25 is sworn -- I should say after the direct examination

  20. 1 is concluded, and we both agree that we would not

    2 pursue the issue, we would not like to see the issue of

    3 the Prosecutor having contact with the Defence

    4 witnesses as a condition to the contact being

    5 permitted, and vice versa, that the Defence would have

    6 contact when the Prosecutor has contact with witnesses

    7 brought by the Prosecution.

    8 So our view is, if you will, the original

    9 position, and I think both counsel and I would tender

    10 that to the Chamber as the positions upon which we have

    11 agreed.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

    13 Mr. Visnjic.

    14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

    15 I can just confirm what my learned colleague,

    16 Mr. Harmon, has just stated. But if I may add,

    17 yesterday we heard reasons, we heard arguments of the

    18 Prosecution regarding your proposal. I should only

    19 like to put forward arguments of the Defence. We

    20 believe that your proposal is the best solution, and if

    21 today were the first day of the trial, I think that

    22 this suggestion, this proposal, would be the best way

    23 to proceed. However, for the reason that I mentioned

    24 yesterday, having to do with the number of witnesses

    25 that have already been heard, I think that the

  21. 1 Prosecutor and the Defence have managed to find a

    2 solution which is, at this moment, satisfactory to both

    3 parties and acceptable to both.

    4 So again, as I say, in principle, I do

    5 believe that your suggestion is the best solution.

    6 However, bearing in mind our current position, I think

    7 this solution, as it has been put forth by the

    8 Prosecution, is in the interests of both parties.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you

    10 very much, Mr. Visnjic.

    11 Having heard your views and arguments, we

    12 shall make a ruling later on. I hope that it will be

    13 possible for us to find a convenient moment today, this

    14 morning, but perhaps after the break we should proceed

    15 with the witness, with the testimony right away, and I

    16 hope that later on we will have an opportunity to

    17 announce our ruling.

    18 And now I think we should have a 20-minute

    19 break. Mr. Dubuisson, after we have come back, I hope

    20 that the witness will already be in the courtroom.

    21 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

    23 [The witness entered court]

    24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We're going

    25 to resume the hearing.

  22. 1 Can you hear me, sir?

    2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.

    3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Will you

    4 please read the solemn declaration that the usher will

    5 give you.

    6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    7 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    8 truth.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Please be

    10 seated. Let me just remind the interpreter that we

    11 consider this as a continuation of his previous work,

    12 and he's also still under an oath.

    13 Thank you, sir, for coming to testify before

    14 the Tribunal. First of all you're going to answer

    15 questions put to you by Mr. Cayley.

    16 Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.

    17 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.


    19 Examined by Mr. Cayley:

    20 Q. Major Franken, we are speaking the same

    21 language in the courtroom. There are interpreters

    22 between us. So I will go slowly and set a pace which

    23 allows for good translation, but if you could try and

    24 take a pause between my asking a question and you

    25 answering it, it also gives you a moment to think about

  23. 1 a response.

    2 A. Okay. I will try.

    3 Q. Your name is Robert Alexander Franken; is

    4 that correct?

    5 A. That's correct.

    6 Q. And you are Dutch by nationality.

    7 A. That's correct as well.

    8 Q. And you were born on the 24th of August,

    9 1950.

    10 A. That's correct, sir.

    11 Q. And you are a Major in the Dutch army; is

    12 that correct?

    13 A. That's correct again.

    14 Q. I think you are an infantry officer by

    15 specialisation and career in the Dutch army; is that

    16 correct?

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. Am I right in saying that you joined the

    19 Royal Dutch army in 1970.

    20 A. That's correct.

    21 Q. And I think you've held many positions over

    22 30 years, including commander of a mechanised infantry

    23 company, operations officer in an armoured brigade, a

    24 tactics instructor at the infantry school, chief of

    25 training at an infantry training unit, staff officer

  24. 1 concerned with logistics and intelligence at battalion

    2 and brigade level. Have you done all of those jobs

    3 within the Dutch army?

    4 A. That's correct, sir.

    5 Q. I think you are also trained as an airborne

    6 officer, and those wings on your chest, I think,

    7 indicate that; is that correct?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. At the time of the events with which this

    10 Court is concerned, you were the 2 IC, the second in

    11 command, or the deputy commanding officer of the 1st

    12 Netherlands UN Infantry Battalion in Srebrenica.

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. And I think you yourself were based in

    15 Srebrenica from January of 1995 until July of 1995.

    16 A. Yes, in the area of Srebrenica, actually in

    17 Potocari.

    18 Q. Could you explain to the Judges the mission

    19 of the Dutch Battalion within the Srebrenica enclave?

    20 A. Yes, I can. We were -- our mission was to

    21 deter any attack on the safe area of Srebrenica by

    22 presence, to demilitarise the area of the enclave, and

    23 to support NGOs and other humanitarian organisations in

    24 their task, in a humanitarian way.

    25 Q. Now, you confirmed to me a moment ago that

  25. 1 you were the deputy commanding officer of the

    2 battalion. Can you explain to the Judges your

    3 responsibilities as the deputy commanding officer or

    4 second in command of the battalion?

    5 A. Yes. In fact, I was in charge of all

    6 internal affairs of the battalion and a big part of the

    7 operational affairs. Next to my duty as a DCO, I was

    8 the SFOR of the battalion and my mission was to take

    9 care of all logistics. So I had a double function,

    10 more or less. It's usual in a Dutch battalion that a

    11 commander sets a couple of directives within which his

    12 staff operates, and that's what I did.

    13 Q. You've used a couple of acronyms. SFOR, can

    14 you explain to the Judges what is meant by SFOR?

    15 A. That's the staff officer responsible for the

    16 logistics, all logistics. That means food, fuel,

    17 ammunition, medical care, et cetera.

    18 Q. When you use the acronym "DCO," this means

    19 deputy commanding officer.

    20 A. Sorry for that, but it's a military habit to

    21 talk in abbreviations.

    22 Q. Who was the commanding officer of the Dutch

    23 Battalion?

    24 A. That was Colonel Karremans.

    25 Q. As the deputy commanding officer, where were

  26. 1 you based for most of the time?

    2 A. HQ in Potocari.

    3 Q. When you say in the headquarters, were you

    4 based in the operations room?

    5 A. Yes. I was not always present in the

    6 operations room, but actually the operations room

    7 always directly reported to me, and when there were

    8 events I went to the operations room and my place was

    9 in that room.

    10 Q. Now, the operations room was, I think, the

    11 nerve centre of the battalion; is that correct?

    12 A. That's correct, sir.

    13 Q. And there were reports flowing into that

    14 operations room from the various locations of Dutch

    15 soldiers around the enclave; is that correct?

    16 A. That's correct.

    17 Q. Now, the reports that were written, did you

    18 read many of them, all of them, the reports that were

    19 received?

    20 A. No, not all of them. The duty officer

    21 reported the most essential ones to me, and then I

    22 heard the story and if I wanted, once in a while, I

    23 read them. But it was a hell of a lot of information,

    24 so the crew of the duty room selected that, analysed

    25 it, and gave me the analysis of the information.

  27. 1 Q. You mentioned a moment ago, and I just want

    2 to clarify it for the record, you said, and I'll

    3 paraphrase what you said, the commanding officer set

    4 the mission of the battalion and you essentially, as

    5 the deputy commander, ensured with the other officers

    6 that that was implemented; is that correct?

    7 A. That's correct.

    8 Q. You were the most senior officer amongst all

    9 of the other officers, as the deputy commander.

    10 A. That's correct as well, sir.

    11 Q. Did you act for Colonel Karremans in his

    12 absence?

    13 A. Yes, that was one of my tasks.

    14 Q. Now, you mentioned a moment ago that the

    15 mission of the UN Battalion in Srebrenica was the

    16 demilitarisation of the enclave. Can you explain to

    17 the Judges whether, to your knowledge, the enclave was

    18 ever demilitarised successfully by the Dutch Battalion?

    19 A. No, it was not, sir. We had a minor amount

    20 of small arms in the so-called weapon collection point,

    21 but the mass of small arms was still in the enclave.

    22 The problem was that we tried, the battalions who were

    23 there before us and we as well tried to demilitarise

    24 the enclave, but there were a couple of problems in

    25 that; one of which was that we were not allowed to

  28. 1 enter private houses. When we saw somebody with a gun,

    2 with a weapon, we followed him, we tried to catch him,

    3 but the very moment he went into a house, we had to

    4 stop and call in the local police to see whether the

    5 weapon was still in the house. We tried that a couple

    6 of times, but the result always was that the so-called

    7 CIVPO, the civilian police, came out and said that

    8 there were no weapons.

    9 On three or four occasions, we succeeded to

    10 catch somebody in the open field and we took his

    11 weapon. The procedure then was that he got a receipt,

    12 and the weapon was brought to the weapon collection

    13 point.

    14 Q. What other weapons, apart from light weapons,

    15 were in the weapons collection point?

    16 A. There was a T-55. A T-55 is a main battle

    17 tank. As far as we knew, there was no ammunition for

    18 that tank. Some artillery pieces and some self-made

    19 artillery pieces, for instance, a rocket pod, something

    20 that's normally under an aeroplane or helicopter, an

    21 armed helicopter, and they mounted that on two wheels

    22 and probably tried or used it as an artillery piece.

    23 Q. Just to make the record absolutely clear.

    24 You were concerned with disarming Muslims within the

    25 enclave.

  29. 1 A. That's correct.

    2 Q. Now, Major Franken, had you been a Muslim

    3 within the Srebrenica enclave, would you have handed in

    4 your weapon?

    5 A. Seeing the fact that as the enclave started

    6 or was organised, they were surrounded by pretty

    7 heavily armed Serbs. There was a minor unit -- in

    8 fact, a minor unit of the UN around, being a battalion,

    9 which is for that area and that kind of terrain a very

    10 small unit to do anything, seeing the fact that that

    11 unit did not have the order to defend the enclave but

    12 to deter, I would not have delivered my weapon, sir.

    13 Q. So you would have kept your weapon had you

    14 been a Muslim within the enclave in Srebrenica?

    15 A. Yes, that's correct.

    16 Q. Now, the Bosnian Muslim soldiers or

    17 individuals who had weapons within the enclave, what

    18 was the military structure to which they belonged; do

    19 you know?

    20 A. Yes, we knew. Initially it was called the

    21 8th Operational Group, but later on it was called the

    22 28th Division. It had a division structure, so it was

    23 a division with four brigades and lower levels, as far

    24 as we could see. There was below brigade was the

    25 company level, led by non-trained commanders, but that

  30. 1 was on paper. Actually, there was not a real structure

    2 and there was not, let's say, any discipline in that

    3 unit. We found that out on several occasions, where

    4 all arrangements made with divisional headquarters, or

    5 the divisional leaders, were not followed by local

    6 commanders. In the end phase, a couple of times we had

    7 to ask the Chief of Staff of the division to go to a

    8 Muslim position, to get them to reason, to get them

    9 that far so that we could move with our APCs to another

    10 position, because they, in most of the cases, wouldn't

    11 let us, although the division said that we had freedom

    12 of movement to move our forces around as we wished.

    13 Q. Now, you mentioned that there was a

    14 divisional headquarters. Did you ever visit the

    15 divisional headquarters?

    16 A. I've been at the gate of it, at the door of

    17 it.

    18 Q. Could you describe that divisional

    19 headquarters to the Judges?

    20 A. Yes. It's more or less a conference room

    21 with no maps inside. There were no communications

    22 inside. Just a room with some desks, that was about

    23 it, and in it were, at that moment and later on we

    24 found out that the division staff was not more than

    25 about ten guys.

  31. 1 Q. Now, you're a professional army officer,

    2 you've been in the army for 30 years. Did it look like

    3 a divisional headquarters to you?

    4 A. No, absolutely not, because normally, you can

    5 imagine that a divisional headquarters is about around

    6 100 officers and NCOs and different specialisations who

    7 have their maps, their gear, more or less. There is a

    8 concentration of communication means, et cetera. So it

    9 didn't look at all like a divisional headquarters, as I

    10 know it.

    11 Q. Now, you mentioned in your evidence that at

    12 one time you had to call for the intervention of the

    13 Chief of Staff --

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 Q. -- of the 28th Division, in essentially

    16 coercing the brigades within that division to obey

    17 commands given by the divisional headquarters. I want

    18 you to turn your mind to another discussion that you

    19 had with the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, when

    20 you discussed with him the prospect of the enclave

    21 being attacked. Can you tell the Judges about that

    22 conversation?

    23 A. Yes. It was a hypothetical conversation,

    24 where the question was asked by the Chief of Staff of

    25 the 28th Division what the UN or what DutchBat would do

  32. 1 when the enclave was attacked. I said that we would be

    2 defending our positions because we were only allowed to

    3 do self-defence, and I mean by "positions," our

    4 observation posts. And during that conversation, we

    5 came to the idea that when it would happen, it would be

    6 possible that Muslim forces covered the areas between

    7 the observation posts, which I remarked with, "I

    8 understand what you mean, but then it would be that way

    9 that they would stay out of sight of the observation

    10 posts and it would look like a ring around the

    11 enclave." That's the general idea of that

    12 conversation, sir.

    13 Q. Did that defence ever actually materialise in

    14 reality?

    15 A. No. Well, locally it did, but in the overall

    16 situation, it did not. Essential for something like

    17 that is that when your neighbour is going away, that

    18 means when the Muslim forces would withdraw, they

    19 inform you, but they never did. So that's one of the

    20 reasons our OPs found themselves back in the midst of

    21 Serb forces.

    22 Q. Now, you've just mentioned Serb forces, and

    23 I'd now like you to turn your mind to the Bosnian Serb

    24 army.

    25 Do you recall, prior to the fall of the

  33. 1 enclave, the officers within the VRS with whom you were

    2 dealing?

    3 A. Yes. It was, as far as I know, the official

    4 liaison, Colonel Vukovic, he came from Skelani Brigade,

    5 and there was a Major Nikolic who belonged to the

    6 Bratunac Brigade. The position of Major Nikolic is a

    7 bit unclear because when he was asked he gave a

    8 different job every time. He said he was just a

    9 liaison of the Bratunac Brigade on one occasion, and on

    10 the other occasion he said he was the second in command

    11 of the Bratunac Brigade. Then again he said he was the

    12 commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and then he said,

    13 "I'm the ops officer of the Bratunac Brigade." So we

    14 couldn't place him really on a job, but obviously he

    15 belonged to the Bratunac Brigade.

    16 Colonel Vukovic never gave away what his real

    17 function was. He always said he was the official

    18 liaison of the Serb armed forces to DutchBat.

    19 Q. Now, you mentioned at the beginning of your

    20 testimony that the mission of the UN within the enclave

    21 was to deter Serb attacks and to demilitarise Bosnian

    22 Muslim forces within the enclave, and you've stated in

    23 your evidence that you never successfully demilitarised

    24 the enclave.

    25 Now, did the Bosnian Serbs ever make

  34. 1 representations to you about this failure to

    2 demilitarise the enclave?

    3 A. In general, they did often, but I remember

    4 two special occasions where they complained to us that

    5 Muslim forces did kill Serb soldiers, and that was on

    6 occasion in the area of about four or five kilometres

    7 south of Zeleni Jadar, that is between the enclave

    8 Sabar and the enclave of Srebrenica, where Serb

    9 soldiers went into an ambush allegedly led by Bosnian

    10 soldiers.

    11 The second occasion was a report of our OP

    12 Mike, observation post Mike, I should say, where they

    13 reported battle noises, we called it, by night and

    14 during the morning and they saw burning houses in the

    15 area directly north of OP Mike, being Serb territory.

    16 Q. Let's go back to the first incident, which

    17 was in May of 1995, and if you could look at the map

    18 next to you and if you could point out to the Judges

    19 with a pointer the area in respect of which this

    20 complaint was made.

    21 A. It's out of the map, sir.

    22 Q. It's off the map.

    23 A. It's further down south than the map shows.

    24 Q. Could you indicate with the pointer the

    25 direction it is in.

  35. 1 A. Indicate here?

    2 Q. No, just on the map.

    3 A. Yes. It would have been around here

    4 [indicates], this area.

    5 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the

    6 witness is indicating south of Zeleni Jadar, on

    7 Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E.

    8 Q. Now, who complained about this ambush?

    9 A. Major Nikolic did, sir.

    10 Q. Did anybody in DutchBat see any evidence of

    11 this ambush taking place?

    12 A. No, we did not. You must consider the

    13 terrain is hilly, so in a horizontal site, it is one

    14 kilometre away, but there is a hill in between it, and

    15 anything can happen at the other side and you won't see

    16 or hear it.

    17 Q. Now, in respect of the second complaint, who

    18 did you hear that complaint from?

    19 A. Again, Major Nikolic, sir.

    20 Q. You've indicated, in fact, that members of

    21 DutchBat actually observed that alleged incident taking

    22 place; is that correct?

    23 A. The consequences of it, burning houses. Yes,

    24 correct.

    25 Q. Do you recall any other complaints during

  36. 1 your time period, from the Bosnian Serbs?

    2 A. No. As I said before, it was repeatedly a

    3 complaint that we didn't disarm the Bosnian soldiers

    4 but never related to a certain event, as far as I

    5 know.

    6 Q. Now, the other way around. Do you recall

    7 whether there were ever any complaints made by Bosnian

    8 Muslims in respect of Serb action against the enclave?

    9 A. Yes. Not in the way that they complained

    10 about Serb raids, as we called actions like this, but

    11 they complained that the Serbs were crawling forward

    12 into the area of the Srebrenica enclave. The problem

    13 with that was that there were three boundaries of the

    14 enclave: there was a UN boundary; the Serbs had their

    15 own boundary which was about two kilometres within the

    16 boundary of the UN; and, of course, the Bosniaks and

    17 Muslims, had their own boundary which was about two or

    18 three kilometres outside the UN boundary. So it was

    19 very hard to bring over a complaint from one party to

    20 another, because at the very moment you came, you got

    21 territory within the enclave, the only issue we had was

    22 the UN boundary, which was not fully acknowledged by

    23 both parties.

    24 There was one occasion south of OP Romeo

    25 where it was clear that the Serbs crossed the UN

  37. 1 boundary, and we managed to get them back to their own

    2 side of the confrontation line.

    3 Q. And I think -- you don't need to get up, but

    4 on the map behind you, OP Romeo is the point that I

    5 think is marked -- it's on the right-hand side of the

    6 boundary marker of the enclave.

    7 A. It's this one [indicates]. And the Serbs

    8 directly south, alongside the road, going down to the

    9 city of Srebrenica, they took positions there and they

    10 were clearly out of their area and within the area of

    11 the UN enclave. I say "UN enclave," I mean the area

    12 marked by the UN boundary.

    13 Q. Do you recall when that took place?

    14 A. It should have been somewhere around April, I

    15 suppose, sir.

    16 Q. April of 1995.

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. Let's move ahead in time to the 11th of July,

    19 1995.

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. I think you find yourself in the operations

    22 room of the battalion in Potocari. Do you recall the

    23 reports that you started to receive at that time?

    24 A. Yes. In fact, it started, the confrontation

    25 with the Serbs started from the night before. We got

  38. 1 reports of pretty massive shelling of the city. We got

    2 reports from B Company, who found out that the 28th

    3 Division has disappeared from his flanks. And the

    4 problem was that in the morning, the Bosnian civilians

    5 overran the compound of B Company, so the HQ of the

    6 company, in fact. And the commander of B Company tried

    7 to organise it again by sending a patrol out and trying

    8 to get the people in the direction of Potocari.

    9 That's, in fact, when the second time, the move of the

    10 civilians in the direction of Potocari started.

    11 In that phase, we had contact with Serb

    12 forces, not being -- yeah, well, some infantry, but

    13 mainly tanks. That's about the situation in the

    14 morning of the 11th, sir.

    15 The situation on our own side was as well

    16 that we were expecting and we thought we would get some

    17 air support in order to equalise our combat, our lack

    18 of combat power, I should say. That's generally

    19 describing the situation on the morning of 11th.

    20 Q. And when you say "equalise," equalise with

    21 whom?

    22 A. With the Serb forces confronting us.

    23 Q. You said at the beginning of the answer to my

    24 question, that you heard reports of pretty massive

    25 shelling of the city, and you also said that at that

  39. 1 time, to your knowledge, the 28th Division had

    2 vanished, had disappeared.

    3 A. That's correct.

    4 Q. Why was there shelling of the city taking

    5 place?

    6 A. It's strange you ask me that question, but

    7 there was not any military objective other than the

    8 so-called telegraph, post and telegraph building, where

    9 a part of the HQ of the 28th Division was, but that was

    10 not in the city, that was in the northern part of the

    11 city. The city itself did not give any military

    12 objective in that stage, other than, of course, the UN

    13 forces. But then again it was at random shooting at

    14 the city.

    15 Q. From your recollection, what was the calibre

    16 of the artillery and mortars? And if you can remember

    17 to pause between question and answer. I'll try and go

    18 more slowly myself.

    19 A. Mainly it was a bigger -- calibres of around

    20 .100 millimetres. I did deduce that from the

    21 explosions we heard and we saw. So it was heavy

    22 artillery.

    23 Q. Any other weapons being used, Major Franken,

    24 apart from heavy artillery?

    25 A. Tanks were used, not only on the positions of

  40. 1 our own forces but also used to shoot into the area of

    2 the city.

    3 Q. From your recollection, thinking back now to

    4 July of 1995, do you have any recollection of the

    5 number of shells that fell on the city on that day?

    6 A. Yes, I remember that I ordered B Company to

    7 stop reporting every single explosion, and it was --

    8 when we reached the figure of about 200.

    9 Q. Now, you stated in an earlier response that

    10 there was no military objective by this stage that

    11 would require this level of firing, and I'll ask you

    12 the question again: In your opinion, what was the

    13 reason for this very heavy shelling?

    14 A. There could have been two reasons, but was

    15 the same effect: killing people or trying to raise a

    16 panic by killing people. And I mean by "people," I

    17 mean civilians, women and children.

    18 Q. You've stated in your evidence that civilians

    19 essentially overran the compound of B Company, based in

    20 Srebrenica. Do you recall what orders you gave to B

    21 Company after you received the reports about the heavy

    22 shelling of the town?

    23 A. The commander of B Company came himself with

    24 the suggestion that he was not in control of his own

    25 compound anymore, as you can imagine, because the

  41. 1 shelling was on the very location of the compound

    2 itself as well. So I agreed on him going aboard his

    3 APC and command his company from there, and try to get

    4 the refugees in the direction of Potocari. We prepared

    5 the arrival of the refugees before because there was,

    6 as I told you before, a move of refugees in that

    7 direction. So Major Otter, a Dutch officer being the

    8 compound commander, was ordered by me to prepare that

    9 and to guide the refugees through a safe route, into

    10 the direct area of our HQ. I say "safe route" because

    11 the whole road and our own compound was the very site

    12 of the Serb artillery and tanks.

    13 Q. When you say that -- you said the final

    14 sentence, "I say safe route because the whole road was

    15 the very site of the Serb artillery and tanks," can you

    16 explain what you mean by that?

    17 A. Well, I was convinced of the fact that as

    18 soon as the Serbs would see that mass of refugees

    19 approaching, they would open fire. They did that

    20 before in the city. And on one occasion we were warned

    21 that they would not allow us to have refugees on our

    22 camp.

    23 Q. Now, after you issued the orders to Major

    24 Otter, can you recall what took place?

    25 A. Yes. Well, the next report, or the essential

  42. 1 report that I got from B Company was that there was

    2 Serb infantry in the high grounds west and east of the

    3 city, so they, what we call, out-flanked us. As I said

    4 before, the 28th Muslim Division was gone, so we had no

    5 neighbours on our left and right side.

    6 At that point, there was no use in keeping on

    7 defending the city of Srebrenica, it was being left by

    8 the refugees, and I, in fact, changed the intent of the

    9 mission not to defend Srebrenica but try to protect the

    10 refugees by withdrawing at the end of the refugee

    11 column, in the direction of Potocari, and Captain

    12 Groen, who was the company leader of that company, got

    13 orders from me to take positions in the south on part

    14 of Potocari, facing the Serb advance from the city of

    15 Srebrenica.

    16 Q. Sir, am I right in saying, from your

    17 testimony, that B Company essentially withdrew on the

    18 tail of the refugees, as they moved towards Potocari.

    19 A. That's correct. I wanted absolutely to

    20 prevent Serb infantry free access to those masses of

    21 refugees.

    22 Q. What did you, at the time, believe would

    23 happen if the Serb infantry got in amongst the

    24 refugees?

    25 A. Seeing the experience with the shelling of

  43. 1 Srebrenica and the history on the Serb side, not

    2 directly in the area of Srebrenica, I suggested that,

    3 or I expected them to start killing, or things like

    4 that.

    5 Q. Now, you also stated earlier in your

    6 testimony that B Company was to withdraw and take up

    7 new positions to the south of Potocari; is that

    8 correct?

    9 A. That is correct.

    10 Q. And by doing that, what did you hope to

    11 achieve?

    12 A. To gain time, first, and secondly bring those

    13 people together on a smaller area where we would at

    14 least be able to try to control it. If you are in an

    15 area like Srebrenica, the village or city of Srebrenica

    16 and Potocari, you need a hell of a lot of troops to

    17 control it. With the means we had and the number of

    18 troops we had, it was absolutely impossible. So the

    19 only thing I could do was concentrate.

    20 Q. You stated earlier in your evidence that one

    21 of the missions of the battalion was to deter Serb

    22 attacks on the enclave. At this point in time, did

    23 you, with the commanding officer, consider making a

    24 stand at Potocari?

    25 A. We shortly did, but if you do not consider

  44. 1 the fact that I had about 150 combat-trained soldiers

    2 over there, you do not consider the fact that I had

    3 about 16 per cent of ammunition that I should have had,

    4 and even for anti-tank and mortar ammunition, those

    5 percentages were much lower, and seeing the fact that I

    6 was in the midst of 30.000 civilians, our positions

    7 where we had to defend them were about 20 or 15 metres

    8 away from that mass of civilians, mainly women and

    9 children, starting to fight was no option.

    10 Q. Very briefly and to theorise, in your

    11 opinion, Major Franken, what would have happened if the

    12 Dutch army would have mounted a Defence in Potocari?

    13 A. We would have had a massacre, and I mean a

    14 massacre between women and children, who were mainly

    15 the mass of refugees. The Serbs already proved that

    16 they didn't respect anything about civilians or

    17 non-combatants. They fired at them with artillery in

    18 Srebrenica; they fired on them with artillery on the

    19 way down to Potocari and further on. By means of -- by

    20 communication means of one of our OP crews, we used a

    21 radio of one of the APCs, after we had one air support,

    22 close air support mission in the afternoon of the 11th,

    23 the message came down from the Serbs that if we didn't

    24 stop opposing them, specially if we didn't stop with

    25 air support, they would fire on our compound and on the

  45. 1 refugees in Potocari, and they said they would kill our

    2 POWs. By that the time we had about 50 POWs, crews of

    3 our OPs -- sorry, observation posts who were captured

    4 by the Serbs. And I believe that he would start firing

    5 on that crowd, absolutely.

    6 Q. Two questions to clarify matters. When the

    7 Serbs made this threat, were they in a position to

    8 carry it out?

    9 A. Yeah, they were. As far as we counted, there

    10 were about 35 pieces of artillery, with heavy calibre

    11 confronting us, a couple of multiple-launch rocket

    12 systems, tanks. So he didn't have to fight with us, he

    13 could withdraw and shoot us to pieces without us being

    14 able to do anything. I didn't have heavy equipment; I

    15 didn't have artillery; I didn't have any means to

    16 oppose their artillery, seeing the fact that I didn't

    17 get defensive air support.

    18 Q. You spoke very briefly about POWs that were

    19 taken from your observation posts. Who are you

    20 speaking of?

    21 A. Crews of a couple of OPs. We had the --

    22 yeah, well, all the OPs in the south were already taken

    23 by the Serbs, and one exception was OP Delta,

    24 observation post Delta, and the other observation posts

    25 all were either captured by the Serbs or were ordered

  46. 1 by me to stay there in their position until they were

    2 contacted by the Serbs. The reason for that was the

    3 experience we had with the withdrawal of OP Foxtrot and

    4 the killing of one of our soldiers at a roadblock

    5 within the enclave.

    6 Q. So these POWs were UN Dutch soldiers.

    7 A. Dutch soldiers, that's correct.

    8 Q. When the Serbs threatened to kill these

    9 people, did you take that threat very seriously?

    10 A. I didn't believe at that moment that they

    11 would put them against the wall and shoot them, but I

    12 was convinced of the fact that they would use them as a

    13 shield against whatever, air support or things like

    14 that. They did that before.

    15 Q. Major Franken, let's move now to the next

    16 day, to the 12th of July, and if you can tell the

    17 Judges the first significant event that you recall from

    18 that day.

    19 A. Yes. NCO, the commanding officer,

    20 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans was ordered by Mladic at

    21 10.00 in Bratunac for another meeting, and at the very

    22 same time, it appeared to be the start of an infantry

    23 tank attack from the area OP Papa, so directly north of

    24 our HQ --

    25 Q. Could I interrupt you. Could you just

  47. 1 indicate to the Judges on the map that is there.

    2 A. So this area [indicates], alongside this

    3 road, our HQ was here [indicates], marked as "UN base,"

    4 and the attack came from the area Yellow Bridge, as we

    5 call it. So the surroundings of OP Papa, observation

    6 post Papa, I should say.

    7 MR. CAYLEY: I think the witness has

    8 adequately explained his movements with the pointer and

    9 that's on Prosecutor Exhibit 1E.

    10 Q. So you observed an infantry tank attack, or

    11 an infantry attack supported by armour --

    12 A. That's correct.

    13 Q. -- coming from OP Papa. Can you describe to

    14 the Judges, in your opinion, as a military man, how

    15 well-organised that attack was at the time?

    16 A. Very well organised. It looked like a kind

    17 of demonstration, in fact. They were -- well, I

    18 wouldn't perform an attack like that in that way, but

    19 it looked very disciplined. They were -- the intervals

    20 between the attacking soldiers were correct, they were

    21 correctly dressed. It was obvious that there was a

    22 coordination between the tank and the infantry next to

    23 them. So that looked like a regular attack, performed

    24 by trained and regular troops.

    25 Q. Now, you said in response to one of my

  48. 1 earlier questions that Colonel Karremans was at a

    2 meeting. Was he present when this attack took place,

    3 or was he absent from the UN compound in Potocari?

    4 A. He was absent, sir. He was in Bratunac with,

    5 as far as I know, General Mladic.

    6 Q. Do you see any significance in that absence?

    7 A. Well, probably they tried to intimidate the

    8 battalion again. There's no logic behind it, as far as

    9 I know.

    10 Q. When did Karremans return from the meeting in

    11 Bratunac?

    12 A. Would have been around half past eleven,

    13 12.00.

    14 Q. When he returned, did you speak with him?

    15 A. Yes, of course. He debriefed me about what

    16 was discussed over there. He gave the demands Mladic

    17 made concerning what was called the evacuation of the

    18 population, and, well, he didn't finish debriefing and

    19 the first buses and trucks appeared.

    20 Q. When you say "the first buses and trucks

    21 appeared," can you explain what you mean by that to the

    22 Judges?

    23 A. Colonel told me that the UN supposedly agreed

    24 upon the execution of the evacuation by Serb forces and

    25 that -- so the BSA, the VRS army, would perform that

  49. 1 action. The time he mentioned was as of 1600 hours, as

    2 I recall well, but the very moment he told me that we

    3 got a report that there were a hell of a lot of buses

    4 and trucks appearing from the direction of Bratunac,

    5 over the road going to the Potocari area.

    6 Q. Now, you've said in response to my question

    7 that the evacuation was to be carried out by Serb

    8 forces. Who in the Serb forces was to carry out the

    9 evacuation?

    10 A. At that moment I did not know any name, but

    11 later on I understood that we were ordered by the UN to

    12 support or to facilitate that evacuation, and I was

    13 ordered by Colonel Karremans to see for Acamovic, he

    14 was somewhere outside the gate, to coordinate logistics

    15 support as far as it was applicable. And then I met

    16 that Colonel and he said that he was in charge, he said

    17 he was a G-4, so a logistics officer, and he said that

    18 he came from Pale.

    19 Q. Can you recall anything of the conversation

    20 that you had with Colonel Acamovic?

    21 A. Yes. Well, he demanded transport and he

    22 demanded fuel. Well, as is probably known, we didn't

    23 have any fuel, and I didn't grant him transport as

    24 well. I thought it was a very bad idea to have UN cars

    25 with Serb drivers on it, riding around.

  50. 1 Q. Now, you're an officer of significant

    2 experience, and now as your memory serves you, at the

    3 time at what level, at what operational level, did you

    4 think that Acamovic was working at when you were

    5 speaking to him?

    6 A. If you see the problems that the Serb forces

    7 were confronted with, being what we call a mopping up

    8 operation within the enclave, they had to counter the

    9 outbreak of the 28th Division in the general northern

    10 direction, and we're talking about 10.000 men going

    11 out, of which 50 per cent are probably armed. The

    12 organisation of the evacuation, the transport, securing

    13 the routes, arrangements to be made at the crossing

    14 point of Kladanj, I think there were four up to six

    15 brigades at least involved, so we're talking about

    16 corps level at least.

    17 Q. Major Franken, you said in your evidence that

    18 at the time you thought it was a very bad idea to have

    19 UN cars with Serb drivers riding around. What decision

    20 did you, in fact, make in respect of UN transport and

    21 the refugees?

    22 A. Well, we were confronted with the fact that

    23 they started the evacuation without any coordination

    24 with us. So the first thing I did was ordered two

    25 officers, being Major Boering, our liaison officer, and

  51. 1 our personnel officer, Captain Voerman, to take a jeep

    2 and to go with the first convoy wherever they went and

    3 whatever would happen, stay with them. Then we rapidly

    4 organised an escort. We gathered all the small

    5 vehicles we had, jeeps, I mean, and manned them with an

    6 NCO, or an officer and a soldier, and every time a

    7 couple of buses left we tried to escort them, and

    8 "escort" means, in fact, ride along with them.

    9 Q. Can you explain to the Judges what actually

    10 happened after you ordered this to take place?

    11 A. It looked like in the beginning that we

    12 succeeded in executing that escort, but pretty soon it

    13 proved that it went wrong, that the escort vehicles

    14 were either stopped by more or less regular forces,

    15 with the excuse that "We are responsible for your

    16 security. It's not secure over here, so you can't ride

    17 on." The buses could. And otherwise they were robbed

    18 or hijacked by militia-like types. So the amount of

    19 small vehicles I had with the battalion decreases

    20 pretty rapidly.

    21 Q. When you say "stopped by more or less regular

    22 forces," which forces are you referring to?

    23 A. Well, you could say Rambo-types, wearing half

    24 uniforms, not looking like a military unit but a bunch

    25 of robbers.

  52. 1 Q. On which side of the conflict did these

    2 forces belong to?

    3 A. On the Serb side, obviously.

    4 Q. Now, how many vehicles did you lose to this

    5 activity, that you can recall?

    6 A. In total we lost about 33 vehicles, but I

    7 think concerning the convoys, it would be about 15, 16

    8 jeeps, I suppose. But the figures are somewhere in the

    9 documents, the exact figures, but that's what I recall

    10 now.

    11 Q. Why do you think they were taking the jeeps?

    12 Why were they stopping the Dutch escorts from

    13 accompanying the buses?

    14 A. Because they didn't want anybody to be

    15 around; that's obvious. Otherwise they can't think of

    16 any reason to stop them, because we were not a threat,

    17 we were not a military potential. One jeep with two

    18 guys in it is nonsense. And so obviously they didn't

    19 want us to witness whatever would happen.

    20 Q. Now, when you'd lost 16 jeeps, did you think

    21 that there was any kind of significance or planning

    22 that somebody had actually decided that this was to

    23 happen?

    24 A. It was obvious that the word was out to

    25 frustrate the convoy escort, and the regular forces, as

  53. 1 far as we could judge, used the excuse of being

    2 responsible for the safety of our personnel. And the

    3 other ones didn't use any excuse; they just took the

    4 men's gear, their weapons, and their cars.

    5 Q. Did you make any complaints?

    6 A. Yes, I did. I did complain several times to

    7 a Colonel Jankovic, who in the meantime appeared to be

    8 the central figure on the Serb side, and he said he

    9 would look after it, but he also said that he did not

    10 have all militia, et cetera, under control. So they

    11 would look after it, and if I gave the exact figures,

    12 et cetera, et cetera, and locations where they were

    13 stolen, they would take care of it, but they never

    14 did.

    15 Q. When you got this response from him, what did

    16 you think?

    17 A. "Nice response," but probably that nothing

    18 would happen. And it proved out that nothing would

    19 happen -- I'm sorry, nothing did happen.

    20 Q. Now, you stated the number of vehicles in

    21 total that you lost. Do you, in summary, recall

    22 anything else that was lost by the battalion to Bosnian

    23 Serb forces?

    24 A. Yes. We lost the APCs of the observation --

    25 APCs, armoured personnel carriers, which were posted at

  54. 1 the observation post taken by the Serbs, and we lost

    2 about three APCs by a hit, or near-hit, of tanks.

    3 Q. Do you recall any other losses of the

    4 battalion in terms of equipment?

    5 A. Yes, of course. We lost a hell of a lot of

    6 small arms. Of course, all the POWs lost their small

    7 arms. There was outposts I had around the perimeter of

    8 Potocari were robbed by militia. Weapons were taken,

    9 flak jackets were taken. Initially we sent out the

    10 escort with weapons, but they lost their weapons pretty

    11 quickly, so in the end I sent them out without a

    12 weapon. So I suppose that about 150 -- the amount of

    13 150 small arms were lost by the battalion.

    14 Q. Let's return to the subject of Potocari. Can

    15 you recall the state of the refugees at this time?

    16 A. Yes. Partially in great fear, the major part

    17 resigned, not responding, not reacting; just being

    18 there.

    19 Q. Now, at this time you were in the battalion

    20 operations room, and I think also making rounds outside

    21 the compound and inside the compound.

    22 A. That's correct. I did that at least twice a

    23 day, to keep in contact with reality, so to say.

    24 Q. You mentioned earlier a company attack by VRS

    25 soldiers mounted on the compound. Do you recall when

  55. 1 the Serb soldiers actually arrived outside the UN

    2 compound in Potocari?

    3 A. Personnel in that attack force should have

    4 been around, let's say, 11.00, they stopped at the

    5 red/white tape that we drew around the factories and

    6 locations where we had the -- where the refugees were

    7 concentrated, and pretty quickly next to that, what I

    8 called second and third echelon militia-like types

    9 appeared.

    10 Q. What did these second and third echelon types

    11 do when they got to your compound?

    12 A. In the beginning they were -- sorry. In the

    13 beginning they were pretty well controlled by the

    14 regular troops who were part of that attacking force.

    15 There was a group of about between 15 and 20 soldiers

    16 in different uniforms who wanted to enter the compound

    17 and started opening -- well, by force opening the fence

    18 around the compound. I stopped them and they said they

    19 wanted to enter. It was a unit -- or a unit -- it was

    20 a group of Serbs partially in blue uniforms and with

    21 dogs.

    22 Q. Major Franken, just to ask you, if you could

    23 try --

    24 A. Slow down.

    25 Q. -- and slow down. I realise you're used to

  56. 1 giving orders at a rapid pace, but if you could try and

    2 slow down a bit, then it makes the interpreters' task

    3 easier and they get a more accurate translation of what

    4 you're saying, they're able to do that.

    5 A. Okay. I'll try.

    6 Q. You said in your evidence that a group of 15

    7 to 20 soldiers arrived, you stopped them, and they said

    8 they wanted to enter, and then you were describing the

    9 unit. Could you carry on with the description and then

    10 explain what happened? And pause.

    11 A. I will. They made clear to my men who were

    12 posted over there that they wanted to enter the

    13 compound. It was reported to me, so I left the OPs

    14 room and went to the very spot that was on the western

    15 side of our compound, near the road. They made it

    16 clear that they wanted to enter. I said no, asked for

    17 somebody who spoke English. One of the soldiers spoke

    18 more or less English, and I asked what they wanted.

    19 They wanted to control the compound, whether there were

    20 BiH soldiers or military units within our compound.

    21 Seeing the fact that I couldn't start a fight

    22 over there, with the same reasons I had before, I said,

    23 "Okay. You can come in, but accompanied by me, and

    24 only two or three of your men. So give me the

    25 commander and we'll make a round." After some

  57. 1 discussion within their ranks, they agreed upon that

    2 and I took them along. They had a quick round over the

    3 compound and then left through the same hole in the

    4 fence as they came in.

    5 Q. Can you describe the uniforms that these

    6 individuals were wearing, if you recall?

    7 A. As far as I remember, they were the standard

    8 camouflage uniforms. A couple of them looked like,

    9 well, what we call the Rambo uniform, so part of it

    10 green, part of it camouflage jackets. And there were

    11 five or six of them in blue uniforms, dark blue

    12 uniforms, and those were the guys with the dogs.

    13 Q. Do you recall what kind of dog they had with

    14 them?

    15 A. Mainly German Shepherds.

    16 Q. How did the people, the Bosnian Muslims that

    17 were inside the compound, react when these individuals

    18 entered?

    19 A. They only got the Muslims inside, within the

    20 big hall where they were, the big -- what do you call

    21 it? -- hall, the big hall? I brought them to a corner

    22 and I didn't grant them to go inside. I said, "I don't

    23 want a panic over here." People who saw them, of

    24 course, were in fear. They saw, as I gathered, about

    25 10 or 12 UN soldiers around them, and then I went away

  58. 1 as quick as possible, and they hadn't been there longer

    2 than about, I think, 30 or 45 seconds.

    3 Q. Now, Major Franken, the refugees that were

    4 present inside the compound and outside the compound,

    5 were they mainly women and children, or men, women and

    6 children? Can you remember the approximate proportion

    7 of the refugees?

    8 A. The main part were women and children. We,

    9 for the occasion of a list -- probably we will speak of

    10 that -- next to it there were about 300, 350 men within

    11 the compound, and we estimated that there were 500 to

    12 600 men outside the compound. The rest were women and

    13 children.

    14 Q. The 500 or 600 men outside the compound, by

    15 this time were you aware, in the operations room, from

    16 the walk-abouts that you'd had, what was taking place

    17 with the men?

    18 A. Yes. One of the demands or rules Mladic gave

    19 us was -- or his intents, he told us that he intended

    20 to separate the men between 16 and 60 years to check

    21 whether they were war criminals or soldiers. So it was

    22 obvious that they were going to separate the men from

    23 the women. And as it is, in the procedure, there's

    24 nothing wrong, because it's a normal procedure when you

    25 have a great amount of prisoners, is to separate them.

  59. 1 But I had my thoughts -- no, I had my fears about what

    2 was going to happen to the men afterwards.

    3 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Registrar, we could have

    4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 at the ready.

    5 Q. Major Franken, can you tell the Judges, from

    6 your recollection, what actually happened to the men?

    7 A. They were separated and they were

    8 interrogated in a house about 300, 400 metres outside

    9 of our main gate. In an increasing amount, I got

    10 reports that the interrogation was done with physical

    11 violence, and I sent down first the UNMOs, United

    12 Nations Military Observers, who were -- we had a party

    13 of UNMOs within the enclave -- to check whether the

    14 amount of men that went into the house was the same

    15 that came out.

    16 When they were came out, they were brought

    17 into a blue bus, and that bus went with the other buses

    18 outside the enclave. We tried to escort specifically

    19 that bus, but we failed in that, because we were

    20 stopped by Serb forces, or a column of 20 buses going

    21 through a village or a city like Bratunac, if you have

    22 one or two jeeps with them, you can't control it, and

    23 you only can see outside the city that a couple of

    24 buses are gone. So we didn't manage to escort the blue

    25 bus. Even when we rode next to it, we were stopped by

  60. 1 OP Papa, or somewhere in Bratunac we were stopped by

    2 Serb forces, and then the bus vanished.

    3 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown

    4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17, and if it could be placed on

    5 the ELMO.

    6 Q. Major Franken, do you recall this building?

    7 A. That is the White House, what I was

    8 talking -- that I was talking about. It's this one

    9 [indicates]. Sorry. This is the White House.

    10 MR. HARMON: The witness is indicating on

    11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 that the photograph

    12 represents the White House.

    13 Q. What happens at the White House? This is for

    14 the purposes of making the transcript absolutely

    15 clear.

    16 A. Sorry. I misunderstood your question. Say

    17 it again, please.

    18 Q. Could you explain to the Judges what you saw

    19 taking place at the White House?

    20 A. Yes. Well, men were brought there. They had

    21 to leave their gear, their personal belongings outside,

    22 and then were interrogated. A couple of my officers

    23 went down there. I sent down there the UNMOs. The

    24 reports then were that they were not friendly, but

    25 nothing serious happened. But going into the 12th, it

  61. 1 got more serious, it got more violent. In the end we

    2 were not able to send down a patrol. Every time I got

    3 a report, I tried to send down a patrol to the White

    4 House. But by the end of the 12th, it was obvious we

    5 were not in control anymore, because our patrols were

    6 stopped by armed Serbs and outnumbered our forces

    7 without, so we couldn't approach the White House

    8 anymore.

    9 Q. From your memory at the time, why did they

    10 want to stop the Dutch patrols moving around the White

    11 House, Major Franken?

    12 A. I suppose for the same reason as they stopped

    13 our escorts: They didn't want witnesses.

    14 Q. Now, you said earlier in your testimony that

    15 it's normal procedure to separate individuals when you

    16 have a large number of individuals. Is it normal

    17 procedure, as far as you're aware, in international

    18 law, under military law, to use violence when you

    19 interrogate people?

    20 A. No, absolutely not. It is forbidden, and in

    21 fact there's an international law that says that a POW,

    22 or somebody in that group who looks like a POW, is only

    23 entitled to give his name, his rank, and his

    24 registration number, and that's it, and you're not

    25 allowed to force him to say more, in any way.

  62. 1 Q. Why did you conclude that there was violence

    2 taking place in the White House?

    3 A. Reports from my post that there was -- they

    4 saw a man outside being beaten up: "We heard noises,

    5 we heard yelling," et cetera.

    6 Q. Those types of noises were heard coming from

    7 the White House?

    8 A. Cries.

    9 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you wish to

    10 break at this point?

    11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,

    12 Mr. Cayley. I think this is a convenient time, so that

    13 the witness can have some rest as well.

    14 A 20-minute break.

    15 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.

    16 --- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,

    18 you may continue. We have two hours of work left. We

    19 will divide the remaining time in two parts, with a

    20 break in between, halfway through, so you will know

    21 when to ask for a break.

    22 You may continue now, Mr. Cayley.

    23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

    24 Q. Major Franken, if I could first of all remind

    25 you again to take a pause between my question and your

  63. 1 answer, and if you could speak slowly. It's very, very

    2 clear, in English, what you're saying, it's just it's a

    3 little bit too rapid to give the fullest translation

    4 that the interpreters want to give.

    5 You said earlier in your testimony that

    6 Colonel Karremans had been to Bratunac on the morning

    7 of the 12th of July, to meet with General Mladic. Do

    8 you recall that?

    9 A. That is correct.

    10 Q. Do you recall with whom Colonel Karremans

    11 went to that meeting with?

    12 A. Yes, with two of our liaison officers, Major

    13 Boering and Warrant Officer Rave.

    14 Q. Did anybody else accompany Colonel Karremans

    15 on that trip; do you recall?

    16 A. As far as I know, not, sir.

    17 Q. Were there any representatives of the Muslim

    18 refugees?

    19 A. Yes. That is correct. The representatives

    20 of the Muslim community were present, three people were

    21 there.

    22 Q. Do you recall the names of any of those

    23 people?

    24 A. There was Mister, as I know him, Mandzic, the

    25 father of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs. I

  64. 1 don't know his name. I don't recall his name, I should

    2 say. And a lady, whose name I can't recollect, but

    3 I've still got a picture with her.

    4 Q. Now, it's the second person that you

    5 mentioned that I want you to concentrate on, and you

    6 said, I think in your evidence, that he was the father

    7 of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs.

    8 After Colonel Karremans returned, did you

    9 have any contact with that man?

    10 A. Yes. I had contact with him on the evening

    11 of the 12th. He asked to speak to me.

    12 Q. Can you tell the Judges the content of that

    13 conversation that you had?

    14 A. Yes. He asked me to stop the evacuation,

    15 because he feared everybody would be killed by the

    16 Serbs. I answered that I feared, in fact, for the men

    17 as well but that, in fact, he asked me to make the

    18 choice between thousands of women and children and the

    19 men. And then he answered that he understood what I

    20 meant, and he agreed and went away.

    21 Q. If we can explore this a little bit more.

    22 You said that you feared for the men as well but that

    23 you had to make a choice at the time.

    24 A. That is correct.

    25 Q. And I think I'm correct in paraphrasing your

  65. 1 evidence if I say that you had to choose between

    2 thousands of women and children and the men that were

    3 at the White House.

    4 A. That is correct, sir.

    5 Q. If you had stopped the evacuation of women

    6 and children, what did you think, at the time, would

    7 happen?

    8 A. There were, in fact, two possibilities which

    9 I estimated as being realistic. One of them was the

    10 worst case, that Mladic would start firing upon them or

    11 try to bring down the role of DutchBat to zero, so we

    12 didn't have any influence at all more; secondly, he

    13 could freeze the situation. Our logistics situation

    14 was devastating. We did not have food and, more

    15 important, we did not have water for 30.000 men,

    16 people. There were no medical supplies. We didn't

    17 have the necessary -- What do you call that? --

    18 hygienic insulations, so we couldn't have sustained

    19 that situation longer than about two or three days.

    20 Q. Now, you said in your evidence that you were

    21 concerned that Mladic would start firing upon "them."

    22 Who do you mean by "them"?

    23 A. I mean the refugees outside the camp, sir.

    24 Q. Now, you say that after you had this

    25 conversation with this gentleman, the father of one of

  66. 1 the interpreters of the UNMOs, that he understood what

    2 you meant.

    3 A. Yes. He understood obviously the problem we

    4 had, the decision I had to make, and he supported the

    5 decision we took. That's the impression I got of his

    6 answer.

    7 Q. Do you recall that man's name at this point?

    8 A. Ibrahim. Sorry. I can't recall exactly.

    9 Q. I'll lead you.

    10 A. He was one of the three representatives of

    11 the civil population.

    12 Q. Was his surname, his last name, Nuhanovic?

    13 A. That's correct, sir.

    14 Q. So Mr. Ibrahim Nuhanovic.

    15 A. That is correct.

    16 Q. Now, you just stated in your evidence that

    17 you discussed with him the problems with the men in the

    18 White House. Did you take a decision at this time in

    19 respect of those men who were in the compound?

    20 A. Yes, I did. I tried to give them some

    21 protection in a way Amnesty International uses.

    22 Anonymous victims don't -- are not really -- it is not

    23 possible to protect or to do something about anonymous

    24 victims, so I suggested to the committee to register

    25 all the men between the age 16 to 60, because that was

  67. 1 the age group Mladic told us he would check, register

    2 them, make a list of it, and make the list public, as

    3 we did, at least as we intended.

    4 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown

    5 Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, please.

    6 Q. Major Franken, could you look through that

    7 document -- I've shown it to you before -- and could

    8 you tell the Judges the nature of that document?

    9 A. Yes. It is a list of the major part of the

    10 males in the -- between the refugees within our

    11 compound, we registered their name, their first name,

    12 year of birth, and place of birth, to give them an

    13 identity. I counted them and signed them, and

    14 afterwards I see I did some bad counting, but anyway,

    15 that's the nature of that list.

    16 Q. In fact, I think it says that there are 239

    17 in total, but I've counted them and I make it 251. But

    18 be that as it may, you say in your evidence that you

    19 arranged this in order to give these men protection.

    20 At the time, what did you believe they needed

    21 protection from?

    22 A. It was obvious that the men were not arriving

    23 in the Kladanj area, on the evening of the 12th. We

    24 checked that, at least at HQ. I asked there whether

    25 there were men between the masses of refugees coming

  68. 1 across at the Kladanj crossing point. So at least they

    2 were kept in a kind of concentration camps. In the

    3 worst case, they were killed. And I tried by this list

    4 to make them known to the world and perhaps give them

    5 some protection by giving the Serbs the problem that

    6 there were known people. They could be checked. We

    7 knew who they were, who they are. That was the general

    8 idea with this list, sir.

    9 Q. Did you tell anybody about this list, apart

    10 from the Muslims who you were dealing with inside the

    11 compound?

    12 A. I told the Serbs that I had the list, that I

    13 registered the men, and I sent it by fax to the HQ of

    14 Sector North-east, which was our direct higher echelon,

    15 a UN HQ -- sorry, a UN headquarters. And I faxed it to

    16 what we call the Crisis Staff here in The Hague, so

    17 that is a Dutch headquarters, with the request to make

    18 it known.

    19 Q. And to your knowledge, was this list

    20 published in any way?

    21 A. No. It disappeared in some drawers or in any

    22 bureaucratic swamp or whatever.

    23 Q. Were all of the men inside the compound on

    24 this list?

    25 A. No. As reported to me by the committee,

  69. 1 about 70, 7-0, 70 of them did not want to give their

    2 name.

    3 Q. You stated earlier in your testimony that

    4 there were, I think you said, between 600 and 900 men

    5 outside the compound. Did you consider them at all

    6 while you were making this list?

    7 A. Yes. The idea was to register them as well,

    8 but at the very moment that our committee and

    9 interpreters who we needed to speak to the men came

    10 outside of the compound, they were intimidated by the

    11 Serbs, and the lady, being a member of the committee,

    12 was intimidated in such a harsh way that she got a

    13 nervous breakdown and was to be brought to the

    14 hospital, and was further in the period she stayed

    15 there as a patient. So after that, our -- well, the

    16 people didn't have the guts to go out. They didn't

    17 have the courage to go out anymore. So that failed.

    18 The registration of the men outside the compound

    19 failed.

    20 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown

    21 Prosecutor's 28/13.1, and if you could also get ready

    22 Prosecutor's 62 and 5/3.

    23 Q. Major Franken, do you recognise this man?

    24 A. This is the man known to me as Colonel

    25 Jankovic.

  70. 1 MR. CAYLEY: Just for the purposes of the

    2 record, this is Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/13.1, and the

    3 witness has identified the individual as Colonel

    4 Jankovic.

    5 Q. Did you have occasion to speak with Jankovic?

    6 A. On several times --

    7 Q. At about this time, on the 13th of July.

    8 A. Yes. I spoke to him and -- that's correct,

    9 yes. I had a contact with him.

    10 Q. Do you recall what you spoke with him about?

    11 A. All the details, the arrangement, and I

    12 thought that this was the occasion where I informed him

    13 of the existence of the list, that I informed him that

    14 we had registered all men in the convoys.

    15 Q. Now, you said earlier that you thought that

    16 the procedure, that the treatment of the men that they

    17 be separated was normal, and I think in that respect

    18 you were thinking of prisoners of war. Did Jankovic

    19 say to you anything about prisoners of war at that

    20 time?

    21 A. I asked him, on several occasions, what --

    22 where the men went. First he answered that there was

    23 no problem, they went to a POW camp and would be

    24 treated correctly, and he told me that ICRC was

    25 monitoring the operation. The information we got from

  71. 1 the UN as well. That's, in fact, his answer when I

    2 asked him about the men. At least twice I protested

    3 about the treatment the men got at the White House, and

    4 he said he'll go in for it and arrange it, but nothing

    5 happened.

    6 Q. Did he ever indicate to you the number of

    7 prisoners of war that were under VRS protection?

    8 A. Yes. We came to the -- and how exactly I do

    9 not know, but we came to speak about the outbreak of

    10 the 28th Division, and he told me that they already had

    11 6.000 POWs.

    12 Q. Do you recall on what date you had that

    13 conversation with him?

    14 A. It must have been on the 14th, sir, but I

    15 don't exactly recall when, because I had quite a lot of

    16 meetings with Colonel Jankovic.

    17 Q. When you say "the 14th," you mean the 14th of

    18 July, 1995.

    19 A. Yes. Yes.

    20 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown

    21 Prosecutor's Exhibit 62.

    22 Q. This is an exhibit that I've previously shown

    23 to you. Do you recognise this image?

    24 A. Yes. The building you see is the so-called

    25 White House. The road in front of is the road from our

  72. 1 main gate to -- the road that goes from right to

    2 left -- is the road from -- sorry. The road on this

    3 side [indicates], OP Papa Bratunac, going in that

    4 direction, the direction of Srebrenica,

    5 Potocari-Srebrenica. This is the so-called White

    6 House, and this I have seen [indicates]. It was the

    7 burning of the personal belongings left behind,

    8 probably by the men who were separated and went to the

    9 White House. I was reported that they were setting

    10 fire to their belongings, and that's what I saw.

    11 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record,

    12 the witness pointed to the building that can be -- the

    13 outline of the building which can be seen in the centre

    14 of the photograph and indicates that that was the White

    15 House and that the objects burning on the left-hand

    16 side of the photograph were the belongings -- the

    17 personal belongings of men who had been separated and

    18 went to the White House.

    19 Q. You saw that and that was reported to you as

    20 well in the operations room.

    21 A. That's correct.

    22 Q. At about this time, Major Franken, do you

    23 recall any reports that you received from soldiers

    24 within the battalion about events that had happened

    25 outside the compound during the 12th and 13th of July?

  73. 1 A. Yes. On one occasion, it was reported to me

    2 that they found nine dead men, dead bodies, in an area

    3 directly south of the White House, near a brook, and

    4 they were obviously executed, because the positions of

    5 the bodies gave no occasion whatsoever that it would

    6 have been as a consequence of combat.

    7 And the second report I got was through

    8 Colonel Karremans, that a soldier of C Company, being

    9 at a post in the area of the Zinc Factory, that's one

    10 of the -- there was a zinc industry, and one of the

    11 buildings we used for the refugees to take shelter, and

    12 he reported that he saw an actual execution of one

    13 Muslim man by two Serb soldiers.

    14 Q. Major Franken, if we can just return briefly

    15 to the first incident, and if that exhibit can be

    16 removed and Exhibit 5/3 placed on the ELMO. Who

    17 reported to you, Major Franken, in respect of the nine

    18 bodies by the brook?

    19 A. It was Lieutenant, now Colonel Koster.

    20 Q. If you recall, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3,

    21 the area where he stated to you that those bodies were

    22 found.

    23 A. Yes, I can. It was in this area, sir

    24 [indicates].

    25 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the

  74. 1 witness is --

    2 Q. Could you point the pointer back there again,

    3 please?

    4 A. Sure.

    5 MR. CAYLEY: The witness is indicating a

    6 clump of trees to the bottom -- to the middle

    7 right-hand side of the picture and about seven or eight

    8 centimetres to the right of two houses which are

    9 prominently situated in the centre of the photograph,

    10 just next to the road that runs through Potocari.

    11 Q. Thank you, Major Franken.

    12 The second report that you heard about in

    13 respect of an individual -- let's see your exact words

    14 from the transcript -- that I think a soldier had seen

    15 somebody executed at the Zinc Factory. Did you take

    16 that report seriously at the time?

    17 A. Yes, I did.

    18 Q. Why?

    19 A. Well, I can't imagine somebody reporting

    20 something grave like that just for fun, out of

    21 imagination, and the situation was so grave that it was

    22 an absolute reality, or a possibility that it could

    23 have happened, and there was no reason for me to doubt

    24 the words of that soldier.

    25 Q. Did you know that soldier?

  75. 1 A. I don't know him by name now. He didn't

    2 report it directly to me so I didn't speak to the

    3 soldier. I got the report in a briefing from Colonel

    4 Karremans.

    5 Q. If we could now move ahead in time to the

    6 17th of July of 1995, and I want you to cast your mind

    7 back to a delegation who arrived at the compound. And

    8 if you can tell the Judges who came on that day and

    9 what they did within the UN compound.

    10 A. Yes. The meeting was arranged concerning the

    11 transfer of 59 patients and wounded of MSF, Medecins

    12 Sans Frontiers, who were still in the compound, and a

    13 number of wounded still in the Bratunac Serb hospital.

    14 It was arranged that ICRC would take them over from me

    15 and bring them to a safe area, and I don't mean a safe

    16 area in Srebrenica, I mean a safe territory.

    17 On that occasion, a Serb delegation came.

    18 The leader was Colonel Jankovic; there was one civilian

    19 who appeared to be, later on, the mayor, the new mayor

    20 of Srebrenica; Major Nikolic was there with a

    21 bodyguard; not by name known, a Colonel of the Serb

    22 forces; and a Lieutenant-Colonel, being a lawyer, as he

    23 indicated himself. And on my side there was later on

    24 Mr. Mandzic, one of the three members of the civilian

    25 committee, my G-5, a warrant officer Rave, and later on

  76. 1 the ICRC delegation. That's the, as far as I remember,

    2 the complete crew in that room at that moment.

    3 Q. Who were these patients, these wounded people

    4 that you refer to?

    5 A. Initially those were patients and wounded

    6 evacuated from the civil hospital in Srebrenica, and we

    7 tried before to bring out all the wounded during the

    8 evacuation that failed at the crossing point in

    9 Kladanj, for several reasons. When they returned, they

    10 were not brought into the -- no, wrong. The Serbs did

    11 not allow us to bring them back to the compound

    12 partially, but took a couple of them to the hospital in

    13 Bratunac. We left the Dutch doctor to watch over them

    14 there, and there were still 59 wounded and patients

    15 within the compound, and we're talking about those 59

    16 wounded and patients of the MSF and the patients still

    17 in the hospital in Bratunac.

    18 Q. These people were local Bosnian Muslims from

    19 Srebrenica.

    20 A. Yes, that's correct.

    21 Q. Now, this meeting took place in order to

    22 facilitate their evacuation, and can you explain to the

    23 Judges what you had to do in order to facilitate that

    24 evacuation?

    25 A. Yes, it was made clear to me that the Serbs

  77. 1 wanted a declaration in which the representative of the

    2 civilian committee declared that everything went

    3 according to the rules during the evacuation. At the

    4 very moment it was presented to me, the declaration

    5 was, it's called the Serbo-Croatic [sic] language. So

    6 I said -- they asked me to sign it as a witness. I

    7 said that I wanted to have it translated because I was

    8 not going to sign any declaration in Serbo-Croat,

    9 seeing the fact that I don't speak or can't read the

    10 language, and I had my own interpreters translate it

    11 into English.

    12 Meanwhile, it was made clear to me that the

    13 transport and the operation and the transport of the

    14 wounded on our compound and the wounded in the Bratunac

    15 hospital would be favourably influenced by that

    16 declaration, to say, facilitate it, accelerate it, the

    17 procedure, et cetera. So I had it --

    18 Q. Major Franken, if I can interrupt you at this

    19 point --

    20 A. Sure.

    21 Q. -- and just show you Prosecutor's Exhibit

    22 86.

    23 Major Franken, do you recognise this

    24 document?

    25 A. Yes. This is a document, a list with names

  78. 1 and birth years, et cetera, made by the MSF, as being

    2 part of the standard procedure for getting a clearance

    3 for a movement through VRS territory.

    4 Q. And the 59 individuals listed on this list,

    5 who are these people?

    6 A. These are the same 59 people that I spoke of,

    7 the 59 patients of MSF, in their custody, on the

    8 compound.

    9 Q. Were all of these people evacuated from the

    10 UN compound?

    11 A. In the end, yes. The problem was ICRC did

    12 not have enough capacity on the spot to transport the

    13 people, so they asked me to provide transport for seven

    14 men and I granted that. I sent that truck with those

    15 seven men down to Bratunac. I had it accompanied by an

    16 UNMO Major De Haan. In Bratunac, he transferred them

    17 to the ICRC again.

    18 Q. Did you subsequently hear reports in respect

    19 of those seven men?

    20 A. Yes. It proved out that ICRC was not taking

    21 them with them, for reasons not known to me. They

    22 stayed in Bratunac. ICRC would monitor them, so

    23 overlook them. I spoke to you before about the doctor

    24 still in the Bratunac hospital, and he was called away

    25 for lunch or whatever, and when he came back, the seven

  79. 1 men had disappeared. When he asked for them, he was

    2 told that he better not ask if he wanted to return

    3 safely to the compound.

    4 Q. The doctor, who was he?

    5 A. Colonel Schouten. He was one of our

    6 surgeons.

    7 Q. He was a Dutch army surgeon?

    8 A. Correct.

    9 Q. Do you have any idea to this day where those

    10 seven men went to?

    11 A. I fear they have -- well, at least they

    12 disappeared. Whether they are still in some kind of a

    13 camp, but probably they're dead.

    14 Q. And these were all wounded individuals.

    15 A. That's correct.

    16 Q. Indeed, if you look at the list in front of

    17 you, and you and I have reviewed this, and it's a

    18 combination of male and female, which is indicated by

    19 the "M" and "F," there are some elderly people, elderly

    20 males on this list, are there not, Major Franken?

    21 A. There are, absolutely. There is 1910, 1913,

    22 1914, et cetera.

    23 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be

    24 shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 47A and 47B.

    25 Q. Major Franken, you were -- you began to speak

  80. 1 of a declaration which you witnessed, and if you could

    2 place the document that you signed on the ELMO in front

    3 of you, and I think you also have an English

    4 translation that is also in front of you. 47A is the

    5 official English translation; 47B is the field

    6 translation which you were referring to in your

    7 evidence, which you requested before you signed it,

    8 because you didn't understand the Serbo-Croat

    9 language.

    10 Just to confirm, Major Franken, for the

    11 purposes of the transcript, is this the document that

    12 you witnessed?

    13 A. That is correct. This is that document.

    14 Q. I'd like to refer you to the -- what I would

    15 call the operative paragraphs of this declaration. It

    16 states the following was agreed, and I want to ask you

    17 about each of these particular statements.

    18 The agreement states that: "The civilian

    19 population can remain in the enclave or evacuate,

    20 dependent upon the wish of each individual."

    21 Major Franken, is that a real statement?

    22 A. I understand that General Mladic made that

    23 statement, but hardly any realistic statement because

    24 the fate of those who wanted to stay, even if they

    25 could, was, let's say, uncertain. And in the end,

  81. 1 there was not a choice. Mladic ordered the population

    2 to go to Kladanj, period.

    3 Q. If we could now move to the next section.

    4 "In the event that we wish to evacuate, it is possible

    5 for us to choose the direction of our movement and have

    6 decided that the entire population is to evacuate to

    7 the territory of the County of Kladanj."

    8 Major Franken, is this true?

    9 A. No, it is not. You can't say that the

    10 committee or Mr. Mandzic did decide anything. It was

    11 dictated by Mladic that the evacuation would take place

    12 to the crossing point at the Kladanj county. There's

    13 not a choice, it was dictated.

    14 Q. And the final paragraph: "It has been agreed

    15 that the evacuation is to be carried out by the Army

    16 and Police of the Republic of Srpska, supervised and

    17 escorted by UNPROFOR."

    18 A. That's about the same story. As far as I

    19 know, Mladic demanded that it had to be carried out

    20 like this, and there has been, as far as I know, any

    21 contact between UN level. What level, I don't know.

    22 And they -- by consequence they ordered us to assist or

    23 to facilitate the evacuation. But it's not a choice

    24 that it was done by the army and police of the

    25 Republika Srpska, it was one of the demands of Mladic,

  82. 1 and obviously the UN was not able to counter that

    2 demand.

    3 Q. It then states: "After the agreement had

    4 been reached, I assert that the evacuation was carried

    5 out by the Serb side correctly and the clauses of the

    6 agreement had been adhered to."

    7 What do you say to that, Major Franken?

    8 A. Well, it's not correct, and if you take the

    9 last sentence, I added there that it would have been

    10 that way, as far as convoys actually escorted by UN

    11 forces are concerned, and none of them actually were

    12 escorted in the military sense of the word by UN

    13 forces. So that made for me this declaration

    14 absolutely worthless. Perhaps to make clear what I

    15 mean, with an actual escort, if you have a party of ten

    16 buses going over a road, in covered terrain with a lot

    17 of crews, you almost have to put a UN vehicle between

    18 each bus to really escort them, to have constantly a

    19 view of what's happening on that convoy. As you know,

    20 we were not able to do that. Our escort was, when it

    21 succeeded a few times, was just one jeep, riding

    22 alone.

    23 Q. Now, you stated in response to my question

    24 that you added in a sentence, and I think you're

    25 talking about the phrase in the very last paragraph,

  83. 1 where it states: "As far as convoys actually escorted

    2 by UN forces are concerned."

    3 How did the Bosnian Serbs react when you

    4 added that phrase?

    5 A. There were two reactions: The

    6 Lieutenant Colonel who said he was a lawyer got mad and

    7 started a pretty frantic discussion with his

    8 colleagues, and Colonel Jankovic, well, reacted as,

    9 "Let it be." Those were the two reactions that I

    10 could see.

    11 Q. Now, you've stated in your evidence that you

    12 regard this declaration as absolutely worthless.

    13 A. That is correct.

    14 Q. Why did you sign it?

    15 A. Well, as I told you, the message came to me

    16 that in order to be sure that those 59 wounded and

    17 patients and the civilians, and the patients wounded in

    18 Bratunac, could get away with the Red Cross, the

    19 signing of this declaration would be in favour of the

    20 procedure and accelerate the procedure. And in my

    21 opinion, making the declaration worthless, I could sign

    22 that with the effect that it at least favoured the

    23 routine with the wounded. That was my idea; that was

    24 my motivation to sign it.

    25 Q. We can leave that subject now, and I just

  84. 1 have two areas that I want to briefly cover with you.

    2 I want you to think about the 12th and the

    3 13th of July again, generally. The military operation

    4 that you saw taking place. You mentioned General

    5 Mladic a moment ago. Were you aware that he was at the

    6 compound at Potocari on either of those dates, on the

    7 12th and 13th of July?

    8 A. He was not at the compound itself, he was at

    9 the area outside, so the Potocari parameter where the

    10 refugees were. Yes, that was reported to me.

    11 Q. In your opinion, why was General Mladic

    12 outside the compound?

    13 A. Seeing the presence of Serb cameras, et

    14 cetera, it was some kind of public relations or what we

    15 call media operations trick.

    16 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier in your evidence

    17 that you assessed that this was a corps operation

    18 taking place.

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. When you look back now, why do you assess

    21 that Mladic was present, since he was the chief of the

    22 Main Staff, the Commander in Chief of the army?

    23 A. Well, propaganda or public relations issues,

    24 being the big hero of the Serb forces, showing off,

    25 because where he appeared, there were cameras, as far

  85. 1 as we know. But was he really in the lead there, I

    2 doubt that.

    3 Q. When you say "in the lead," what do you mean

    4 by that?

    5 A. Actually commanding the troops on the spot,

    6 because that would be highly unusual in a military

    7 way. It's a high commander who passes all levels in

    8 between and then interfering with details, he's making

    9 a mess of an operation within a couple of hours.

    10 Q. Who, in your opinion, would have been in

    11 control of the operation that you're referring to?

    12 A. Without naming a person, but it should have

    13 been the commander of the corps level who was involved

    14 in the operation, the commander and staff of that

    15 corps. That would be a military norm.

    16 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown

    17 Prosecutor's Exhibit 45.

    18 Q. Major Franken, I've shown you this photograph

    19 previously. Do you recognise this man?

    20 A. Yes, I recognise this man by face.

    21 Q. Do you know where you've seen him previously?

    22 A. Yes. I must -- not an exact probability.

    23 Let's say it this way: Somewhere around the 12th,

    24 13th, or 14th of July, and the most probable occasion

    25 is when I met the first time with Colonel Ademovic

  86. 1 [Realtime transcript read in error "Erdemovic"] outside

    2 the compound, because there was a circle of officers

    3 discussing things, and I'm sure that I saw this man

    4 there.

    5 Q. Major Franken, could you stand up and look

    6 around the courtroom and see if you recognise anybody.

    7 A. Yes. That's the man [indicates].

    8 Q. Can you describe what the gentleman is

    9 wearing?

    10 A. He was in a camouflage uniform.

    11 Q. At the time that you saw him. Can you

    12 describe what he's wearing now?

    13 A. Sorry. A dark suit, a dotted tie, and a

    14 light blue shirt.

    15 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show,

    16 Mr. President, that the witness has identified the

    17 accused.

    18 Mr. President, I have no further questions

    19 for the witness. I can now offer him for

    20 cross-examination.

    21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    22 Mr. Cayley.

    23 I think that perhaps it will be better to now

    24 make a break, rather than do it during the

    25 cross-examination. Therefore, we shall now make a

  87. 1 15-minute break.

    2 --- Recess taken at 1.11 p.m.

    3 --- On resuming at 1.30 p.m.

    4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Now, Major

    5 Franken, you will answer questions -- excuse me. I do

    6 see Mr. Cayley.

    7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to

    8 interrupt you, but it was pointed out to me in the

    9 break, and it's now just disappeared off the

    10 transcript, that at line 1, of page 85, the name of an

    11 individual was stated as "Erdemovic," and in fact what

    12 the witness said at the time was "Ademovic." You can't

    13 see it on the screen because it's scrolled over, but

    14 just I thought I would point it out to the Court, and I

    15 think it can also be corrected in the transcript when

    16 the court reporter actually listens to the recording

    17 later.


    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

    20 Thank you very much, Mr. Cayley. Yes. The transcript

    21 will be corrected.

    22 As I was saying, Major, you will now answer

    23 questions which Mr. Visnjic, I think, yes, Mr. Visnjic,

    24 the Defence counsel for General Krstic, will ask you.

    25 Yes, Mr. Visnjic, you have the floor.

  88. 1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    2 Mr. President.

    3 Cross-examined by Mr. Visnjic:

    4 Q. Major Franken, I should like us to go back to

    5 the beginning of your stay in the protected area of

    6 Srebrenica, that is, the first months of your duty

    7 there. According to our information, you tried to

    8 normalise relations between the parties to the conflict

    9 on several occasions, and one of such attempts was to

    10 establish trade between the parties. Could you tell

    11 the Chamber something more about that?

    12 A. Yes, I could, although I was not personally

    13 involved in that action. It came to me that from the

    14 Serb side there was a proposal to open trade to the

    15 enclave, on conditions like those already used in the

    16 area of Gorazde. I know that there were a couple of

    17 meetings concerning that proposal, which tried to

    18 arrange details for that trade. That is correct.

    19 Q. Did it ever come to fruition? Was this

    20 agreement, this understanding, put through?

    21 A. No. In the end, it was not. There never was

    22 any formal trade between the Serbs and the Muslims

    23 within the enclave, in our period.

    24 Q. Would you know, why was this proposal on the

    25 Serb side rejected?

  89. 1 A. The only thing I know is that it was

    2 rejected, rejected by the leaders of the 28th Division,

    3 then still called 8-0G. The formal reason was that

    4 they didn't want to trade with the Serbs. That is what

    5 came to my ...

    6 Q. Major Franken, in your view, would have this

    7 trade perhaps made the life of the civilian population

    8 easier? I mean, food supplies and whatever other

    9 necessities.

    10 A. If the trade would have concerned food

    11 supplies or medical supplies, it indeed would

    12 have enlightened the faith of the population.

    13 Q. And in the end this was to be the trade in

    14 food, medicines, and similar things, according to the

    15 proposal, rather than trading weapons.

    16 A. Yes. But the same goal could have been

    17 achieved by allowing UN convoys to enter the enclave,

    18 which the Serbs did not.

    19 Q. Major Franken, was there, in the Srebrenica

    20 enclave, a kind of a black market, trade in foodstuffs

    21 and other necessities for the civilian population?

    22 A. There was a market where things were traded,

    23 like cigarettes and things like that. That's correct.

    24 Q. And was food also sold on that black market,

    25 in addition to cigarettes, I mean food and other basic

  90. 1 necessities?

    2 A. Yes, in small amounts, it was.

    3 Q. And from the information that you gathered,

    4 in one way or the other, would you know who was in

    5 control of that black market?

    6 A. Probably as we found out, there was some

    7 leadership of the enclave involved in the black

    8 market. We knew of the existence of a pony express, as

    9 we called it, between the enclave of Zepa and the

    10 enclave Srebrenica.

    11 Q. Could we infer then that they wouldn't be

    12 very happy if normal trade, normal commerce, were

    13 established between the Serb and the Muslim side?

    14 A. Yeah, probably, I suppose. But don't ask me

    15 that question, ask them.

    16 Q. My next question relates to the situation

    17 regarding the taking of the OP Echo. Could you tell

    18 the Chamber when did that happen, and explain the

    19 situation which preceded -- which preceded the taking

    20 of the OP Echo.

    21 A. Yes. As far as I recollect, the attack on OP

    22 Echo was on the 6th or the 8th of June, June with "N,"

    23 November. I got a report early in the morning, there

    24 was movement in the factory, in front of OP Echo, Serb

    25 infantry was recognised. And then there was a voice by

  91. 1 an amplifier, whatever you call a thing like that, who

    2 said that we had to leave OP Echo and there was a

    3 deadline, I suppose. As I recollect, the deadline was

    4 one hour or something like that.

    5 Q. Near that OP was a furniture factory or a

    6 timber processing plant. Were there any problems

    7 before between the Muslim and the Serb side regarding

    8 the use of that factory?

    9 A. Yes. Muslims frequently tried to get in to

    10 fetch wood or furniture, what was in that factory.

    11 They said that the factory used to be a Muslim

    12 factory. The Serbs always protested to the fact that

    13 the Muslims entered the factory. In fact, we tried to

    14 avoid that, that there was always trespassing into that

    15 factory.

    16 By patrolling in the area, and actually we

    17 had a request to Serb forces to grant us material to

    18 close it down, so I mean barbed wire, et cetera, et

    19 cetera. As you probably know, the Serb forces actually

    20 controlled the contents and the amount and the quantity

    21 of the convoys coming into the enclave. So I

    22 personally said to Colonel Vukovic, if you want us --

    23 if you want to take out that possible source of

    24 conflict, then let us bring in equipment so we can

    25 close down that factory for both the Serb and Muslim

  92. 1 side. I never got that convoy granted.

    2 Q. Who owned the factory at that time, or rather

    3 could you tell us in whose territory was the factory?

    4 A. The factory, a small part was on the Muslim

    5 side of the UN enclave and a major part was on the Serb

    6 side of the UN boundary of the enclave. So the

    7 boundary, UN boundary, went across that factory. In

    8 fact, we proposed to the Serbs to shift OP Echo further

    9 down southwards, on the very edge of the UN boundary,

    10 but they did not grant us that. They didn't want

    11 that.

    12 Q. And in consequence, after the attack on the

    13 OP Echo, this boundary shifted, or rather the OP Echo

    14 moved into the depths of the territory, towards the

    15 town of Srebrenica.

    16 A. The boundary did not shift, but we were

    17 forced to leave the boundary. The UN boundary was

    18 still in its place, but we were not allowed to

    19 overwatch it. We could not overwatch it after the

    20 attack.

    21 Q. In your view, why was the OP Echo taken?

    22 What was the reason behind?

    23 A. As we analysed it, the Serb forces wanted

    24 free use of the road [Realtime transcript read in error

    25 "word"] to Zeleni Jadar in the general western

  93. 1 direction going across or passing the mining areas

    2 south of the enclave. Sorry, I see here in the script

    3 that I'm wrongly translated. I said, the free use of

    4 the road in the direction of -- west of Zeleni Jadar,

    5 in the western direction, going. I mean this one

    6 [indicates]. By having the area of the factory, the

    7 small parts but essential parts of that road within the

    8 Muslim territory were controlled by the Serb forces,

    9 and that's what we thought as the deeper reason after

    10 the attack of Echo, or behind the attack of Echo.

    11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] For the record,

    12 the witness indicated the road leading from Zeleni

    13 Jadar to Milici, from Zeleni Jadar to the west and on

    14 to Milici.

    15 Q. And the enclave was attacked about a month

    16 later.

    17 A. No. In fact, the enclave was attacked at the

    18 very moment the Serb forces attacked OP Echo.

    19 Q. Yes. But was that attack directly related to

    20 events which took place a month later?

    21 A. Yes. We analysed it as being a test case,

    22 test case in the sense of will the UN react with air

    23 support as they -- because one of the criteria for air

    24 support was a direct attack on the UN force or a UN

    25 establishment. That did not occur. There was no

  94. 1 counterattack by Muslim forces, and there was not a

    2 real counterattack by UN forces. So we analysed it as

    3 being a test case for the following attack on the

    4 enclave in July.

    5 Q. You said that there were three boundaries, or

    6 rather three lines of conflict, three lines of

    7 confrontation. Could we then say that conflicts prior

    8 to July mostly took place along the boundaries of the

    9 enclave and were due to the fact that both sides

    10 refused to recognise the boundary as conceived, as

    11 defined, by the other side?

    12 A. Well, of course we can say anything, but it's

    13 not applicable because after the Serb forces attacked

    14 Srebrenica, there was no option that the boundary of

    15 the UN enclave was in the city of Srebrenica. So if

    16 you state that the conflicts -- sorry. I have to

    17 correct that. You said that the conflicts prior to

    18 July. I misread that. Sorry.

    19 Q. Yes.

    20 A. I suppose so, yes, that's correct.

    21 Q. Major Franken, did you have the information

    22 that Muslim forces came out of the enclave and entered

    23 the Serb territory?

    24 A. Yes. As I stated before, I had two actual

    25 reports of incidents. That was the incident south of

  95. 1 Zeleni Jadar, being an ambush where Serb soldiers were

    2 killed, and an action of Muslim soldiers north of our

    3 observation post Mike, as I stated before.

    4 Q. Within the agreement on demilitarisation, was

    5 it envisaged that your forces should go out of the

    6 enclave and either prevent or constrain Muslim forces,

    7 prevent them from leaving the enclave, or having some

    8 control over happenings outside the enclave?

    9 A. No, it was not emphasised that we went out of

    10 the enclave.

    11 Q. You told us during your examination-in-chief

    12 about some of the difficulties that you encountered as

    13 you tried to demilitarise the enclave. In your view,

    14 what was the -- how many troops were needed in order to

    15 demilitarise the enclave successfully? Did you feel

    16 that you were too short of men and equipment to

    17 completely demilitarise the enclave?

    18 A. I've already stated that one of the reasons

    19 that we were not able to demilitarise was a juridical

    20 problem as not being allowed to enter houses; that's

    21 one problem we had. The second problem was that if we

    22 wanted to do that quickly with the consent of entering

    23 houses, we would have needed two or three battalions,

    24 and I mean battalions of the size that we were.

    25 Q. In your previous statement, you described the

  96. 1 type of weapons that used to belong to Muslim forces

    2 and that were controlled by your battalion. Could you

    3 tell us, to your knowledge, which armaments did the

    4 28th Division have, which was not under your control?

    5 A. Mainly light armament, and I mean assault

    6 rifles of the type Kalashnikov, probably a number of

    7 machine-guns and light mortars.

    8 Q. How did the Muslim forces come by, obtain

    9 their weaponry?

    10 A. We do not know. You can make all kinds of

    11 assumptions. We assumed that they came down with the

    12 so-called pony express from Zepa, and there were

    13 reports of helicopter landings. I should say "supposed

    14 helicopter landings".

    15 Q. Could you tell us, in your view, how strong

    16 was the 28th Division?

    17 A. Combat power is not only a case of amount of

    18 weapons, but in our esteem, they had about 4.000, 4.500

    19 [Realtime transcript read in error "5.000"] men

    20 weaponed, armed with Kalashnikov or equivalents. No,

    21 that's wrong. I said 4.000 to 4.500.

    22 Q. Apart from some observation posts, Muslims

    23 soldiers also dug trenches and fortified their

    24 positions. Was it in line with the technical joint

    25 defence that you mentioned during your

  97. 1 examination-in-chief?

    2 A. I did not mention a tactical coordinated

    3 defence, I mentioned a hypothetical discussion about

    4 what would happen and what if. They dug trenches, that

    5 is correct, but they did it, indeed, apart from the

    6 observation posts, and the observation posts were not

    7 an integrated part of those trenches.

    8 Q. During your examination-in-chief, you mention

    9 an incident in which a Dutch soldier was killed.

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Could you tell us something more about the

    12 incident? And how did he die?

    13 A. Yes. It concerns the crew who was in the

    14 position on OP Foxtrot, one of our observation posts in

    15 the south-eastern part of the enclave. After being

    16 shelled for a couple of days, and a Serb attack

    17 withdrawal -- local withdrawal of the BiH forces, OP

    18 Foxtrot found itself amidst Serb infantry. They were

    19 allowed to withdraw to Srebrenica, and on the road back

    20 to Srebrenica they encountered a Muslim roadblock. The

    21 commander of the APC didn't trust the situation because

    22 the men on the roadblock were very excited, they had

    23 weapons, and he ordered them to go, as we call it,

    24 under armour, so close all the hatches, and then

    25 proceed. Obviously the gunner didn't succeed in

  98. 1 closing his hatch as fast as necessary, and he was shot

    2 by one of the men at the roadblock.

    3 He came to the compound alive but died pretty

    4 shortly after.

    5 Q. And the barricade was put up by Muslim

    6 soldiers.

    7 A. That is correct.

    8 Q. In your testimony in chief, you said that

    9 your troops stayed at some OPs, observation posts,

    10 until the arrival of the Serb troops. Could you tell

    11 us something about the instruction or the order that

    12 you received, directive, issued to that effect to your

    13 troops?

    14 A. I did not receive an order, I gave the

    15 order. Seeing the fact that we had problems with local

    16 BiH commanders performing their own war, not following

    17 the directives of their own division, I gave an order

    18 that they were to withdraw only in consent with the

    19 local BiH commander. The reason for that was the

    20 killing of soldier Renssen. If they could not

    21 coordinate the withdrawal of their OP, then they had to

    22 stay in place and wait for things to happen, and in

    23 fact that meant wait until Serb forces made contact.

    24 Q. Does that mean that you feared that the

    25 Muslim forces might also treat the UN forces as hostile

  99. 1 forces?

    2 A. Not in general, but we were not sure where

    3 [Realtime transcript read in error "whether"] they

    4 would or would not.

    5 That's wrong. It's not "whether they would

    6 or would not," "where they would." So locally there

    7 were BiH commanders who allowed us to move with our

    8 APCs; on other spots, there were BiH commanders locally

    9 who did not want us to stay and not move. So where the

    10 consent was not achieved, our troops had orders to stay

    11 in place.

    12 Q. And do you know the reason why, at some

    13 point, the men of the 28th Division withdrew from the

    14 defence lines and left, abandoned the defence of

    15 Srebrenica?

    16 A. No. I can only guess.

    17 Q. What is your opinion?

    18 A. Well, later on we heard that the 28th

    19 Division broke -- tried to break out in the direction

    20 of Tuzla, that could have been one of the reasons; and

    21 an order from their higher echelon to maintain the mass

    22 of the 28th Division and not sacrificing them in the

    23 defence of the enclave. But again it's all

    24 speculation, what I'm doing now.

    25 Q. I should like to move on to the 11th of July,

  100. 1 that is, the period between the 8th and the 11th of

    2 July, while the enclave was exposed to an attack coming

    3 from the southern direction.

    4 Could you indicate on the map what were the

    5 main lines of attack of the Serbian army?

    6 A. Yes. And then I have to give that out of

    7 what was reported to me because we didn't have an

    8 overview over the complete enclave. We had an overview

    9 inside, around the area of Srebrenica.

    10 The main axis of attack was, in fact, the

    11 road Zeleni Jadar in a northern direction.

    12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the other microphone be

    13 switched on as well, please.

    14 THE WITNESS: I need a microphone. This

    15 one? Okay. I'll try it in this way.

    16 A. The main axis of attack was the road between

    17 Zeleni Jadar and Srebrenica, so directly from the

    18 south, advancing in a northern direction. Later on

    19 there was an attack from the northern, but then

    20 Srebrenica already fell.

    21 And we know of another axis of attack from

    22 the region of Zeleni Jadar, in a western direction, in

    23 this area [indicates], alongside the Jadar River, the

    24 valley of the Jadar River. But we didn't have -- we

    25 only could monitor that till our OPs were taken out.

  101. 1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

    2 Q. You testified that as your troops were

    3 withdrawing from Srebrenica, the B Company was

    4 following the refugees, trying to protect them from

    5 possible contact with the Serb troops.

    6 In accordance with what you have just stated,

    7 the B Company was actually between the refugees moving

    8 towards Potocari and the Serb forces coming --

    9 advancing from south, towards north. Could you tell

    10 us, did any contact occur between the B Company and the

    11 Serbian army troops, and where exactly did the Serb

    12 troops stop?

    13 A. There was contact between B Company and Serb

    14 troops. A position at the west of Srebrenica was under

    15 fire of Serb tanks. On the -- already on the 10th --

    16 on the evening of the 10th, an infantry came down to

    17 the city; we answered that with fire and they

    18 withdrew. And there was fire contact in the sense of

    19 artillery fire and tank fire.

    20 Q. So where did the Serb forces coming from the

    21 south stop?

    22 A. [Indicates]. They tried to come down the

    23 slope from this area [indicates], down to the city, and

    24 as we opened fire, they withdrew. And there was

    25 fighting in the area of OP Hotel, which was an OP, an

  102. 1 observation post, directly east of the city, about 600,

    2 700 metres in front of that OP. There was fighting

    3 between BiH forces and Serb forces.

    4 Q. On the 11th of July, your forces withdrew to

    5 the Potocari base; is that correct?

    6 A. That is correct.

    7 Q. Did the Serb forces, which were attacking the

    8 town, also move in the direction of Potocari?

    9 A. Not directly in front of us, but they did on

    10 our flanks. That was, as I stated before, the reason

    11 that I ordered the company to withdraw.

    12 Q. Could you tell us where, on the 11th of July,

    13 did the Serb forces stop?

    14 A. I don't know the exact coordinate where they

    15 were seen last, but it's in this area [indicates]. I'm

    16 pointing to a location on higher grounds, parallel to

    17 the northern part of the city. It was the last report

    18 I got that Serb infantry was present. And we lost

    19 contact with Serb forces halfway down the road between

    20 Srebrenica and Potocari.

    21 Q. If I understand you correctly, Serb forces

    22 stopped at Srebrenica, or perhaps halfway towards

    23 Potocari, and that was your last contact with them.

    24 I'm referring to the Serb forces which were advancing

    25 from the south, towards the north of the enclave.

  103. 1 A. I couldn't state that they stopped. The only

    2 thing that I can say is that we lost contact with them,

    3 and the last report was on the location I gave you.

    4 Whether they entered Srebrenica, I do not know. We

    5 couldn't see that because following withdrawing with

    6 the tail of the column of refugees, we in front had not

    7 more than 100, 150 metres line of fire because of the

    8 buildings, et cetera, et cetera. So whether in that

    9 moment there were Serb soldiers in the very town of

    10 Srebrenica and in the area west and east, out of our

    11 sight, I could not state that.

    12 Q. Thank you. You testified during your

    13 examination-in-chief about contacts with the United

    14 Nations headquarters. I assume it was Colonel

    15 Karremans who maintained those contacts in general.

    16 And you also talked about their position about the

    17 evacuation. Could you tell us something more about

    18 that?

    19 A. That's correct. It was Colonel Karremans who

    20 had those contacts, so all the information I have is

    21 from hearsay, by briefings from his side. I know that

    22 in the morning of the -- the evening of the 11th or on

    23 the morning of the 12th, we got the order again to --

    24 or again to defend the position Potocari. Colonel

    25 Karremans informed the UN that it was impossible; I

  104. 1 described the situation to you before, being in

    2 positions 20, 30 metres from a massive amount of

    3 civilians.

    4 I got through Colonel Karremans the message

    5 that the UN ordered us to facilitate the evacuation, as

    6 it was called at that time. That's about all I can

    7 state about that.

    8 Q. During the examination-in-chief, you gave us

    9 an estimate of males who were in your base in Potocari

    10 and the number of men outside the base, outside the

    11 compound.

    12 As regards the first figure, I understand,

    13 more or less, how you managed to establish it, that it

    14 was thanks to the list and the registration that took

    15 place. But could you tell me how you managed to assess

    16 the number of men outside the compound?

    17 A. Yes. We -- it was assessed by the local

    18 guard commanders, officers of DutchBat who were in

    19 command outside the compound, and asked for it, gave me

    20 that number. I've been down there myself. It was

    21 extremely difficult to make an estimation of that

    22 amount because it was one big crowd, and then it is

    23 difficult to esteem what exactly are males, et cetera.

    24 But we took that figure for -- reliable for granted

    25 [sic].

  105. 1 Q. According to your estimate, how many refugees

    2 were there inside the base and around the base?

    3 A. Well, we had about 5.000 refugees inside the

    4 base, and there were about 25.000, up to 30.000

    5 [Realtime transcript read in error "2.500, up to

    6 3.000"] refugees outside the base.

    7 Q. At the end of your testimony, you described

    8 how you saw General Krstic in the vicinity of the base,

    9 accompanied by a number of other high-ranking

    10 officers. Could you remember the time of the day when

    11 it took place?

    12 A. I said that it was at the meeting, at the

    13 first meeting I had with Colonel Acamovic, and it would

    14 have been on the 12th, afternoon, around 1400, 1500

    15 hours. But again it's four and a half years ago, so

    16 the esteem in time [sic], it was in that afternoon.

    17 Q. My next question is probably equally

    18 difficult for you. Could you tell us approximately how

    19 long the General stayed in the area?

    20 A. No, I can't. I know that I was in that area

    21 for about ten minutes. I did not know that it was a

    22 general and General Krstic. I recognised the face. I

    23 was not introduced to him or anything like that. So I

    24 can't tell you, when I went away, whether this person

    25 stayed or went away as well. I don't know.

  106. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

    2 Mr. Visnjic, I apologise for interrupting you, but as

    3 far as I can see on the record, on page 103, as regards

    4 the number of refugees, I heard the French

    5 interpretation which was 25.000 to 30.000 refugees, and

    6 here I can see "2.500, up to 3.000."

    7 Could the witness once again tell us the

    8 number of refugees that were outside the base.

    9 A. Yes, I can, Your Honour. "2.500" is the

    10 wrong figure. The correct figure is 25.000, up till

    11 30.000.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,

    13 then. In this way, we can correct the transcript.

    14 Sorry I had to interrupt you, but I wanted to

    15 intervene while it was still on the screen. Thank

    16 you.

    17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

    18 Q. Let me go back once again to the time you saw

    19 General Krstic in a group of some other high-ranking

    20 officers. Did you notice, did you observe, that he was

    21 giving orders at the time or was he involved in any

    22 other such activity?

    23 A. There was a discussion going on. I can't say

    24 because I don't even have the slightest understanding

    25 of Serbo-Croatic. But whether they were discussing any

  107. 1 other issue, I don't know. But it was not a line-up,

    2 like issuing orders in a very formal way.

    3 Q. Thank you very much, Major Franken.

    4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

    5 this concludes my cross-examination.

    6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you

    7 very much, Mr. Visnjic, for your questions.

    8 Mr. Cayley, do you have any additional

    9 questions?

    10 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. No, I

    11 have nothing to ask the witness in re-examination.

    12 Thank you.

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    14 Mr. Cayley.

    15 Judge Fouad Riad.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Thank you,

    17 Mr. President.

    18 Questioned by the Court:

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Major Franken, or

    20 as you say in this country, "Goedemiddag."

    21 A. Thank you.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Of course, you are an officer of

    23 a high grade, especially when you were deputy commander

    24 with the UN, and in this quality, perhaps you can give

    25 us some kind of global assessment of the events you

  108. 1 lived at that time. My questions are very limited to

    2 three or four.

    3 The first, perhaps not in any order, the

    4 first concerning the evacuation. You heard Colonel

    5 Karremans saying, I don't remember the words exactly,

    6 that the UN had agreed that this evacuation would be

    7 undertaken by the Serb forces. Is that right?

    8 A. That's correct. That's what Colonel

    9 Karremans told me as well, sir.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Yes. I put this in connection

    11 with other affirmations which you said. You said

    12 you -- considering the history, that is, you were

    13 saying that, considering the history of the Serb side,

    14 not directly in the area of Srebrenica but on the

    15 whole, "I expected the Serb forces to start killing

    16 civilians indiscriminately." In other words, that

    17 would be delivering the Srebrenican people to their

    18 butchers, if I put your statement with the decision to

    19 let the Serbs evacuate them.

    20 A. That is correct, sir. I had those fears.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: And then what did you call

    22 "evacuation"? Does it mean that all the people of

    23 Srebrenica were meant to leave, to be taken away?

    24 A. That is correct as well, sir.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Then that is another word called

  109. 1 "deportation."

    2 A. That is correct, but in the stage I made --

    3 in that time frame, the word still was "evacuation" for

    4 me, so I used that word as well.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: So it was a planned

    6 deportation.

    7 A. Yes.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: Which the UN authorised.

    9 A. That's, in fact, correct, sir.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: And which it was given to be

    11 performed by the Serbs.

    12 A. That's what I was briefed by Colonel

    13 Karremans. That is correct, sir.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: Now, you also spoke about the

    15 demilitarisation, and the demilitarisation amounted to

    16 the fact of taking away all the weapons of the

    17 civilians of Srebrenica, of the enclave, but not of the

    18 Serbs surrounding the enclave.

    19 A. Yes, that is correct.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: The Serbs surrounding the

    21 enclave were heavily armed.

    22 A. Yes, sir.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: And it was supposed to be a

    24 deterrent to any future, let's say, war between them.

    25 A. Yes. Our initial mission was to deter any

  110. 1 offensive operation into the enclave, sir.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: So by demilitarising one party

    3 completely and leaving the other party stronger and

    4 stronger, this is a deterrent?

    5 A. We had problems with our mission as well,

    6 sir.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: Then we speak of your mission.

    8 Your mission also was unable to protect them.

    9 A. That's correct, sir.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: So they are disarmed completely,

    11 with your mission unable to protect them, with the

    12 Serbs highly militarised, and according to your

    13 statement, which I will not repeat, they would kill

    14 civilians.

    15 A. That is correct, sir.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Now, the list of men which you

    17 spoke about, who were between 16 and 60, of course your

    18 view was to make it public.

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: But it disappeared.

    21 A. In the sector north-east, the HQ initially

    22 said that they didn't receive it. But from looking

    23 afterwards, they discovered that they did receive them

    24 but they didn't do anything with it. And the Dutch HQ,

    25 a staff officer received it, didn't understand the

  111. 1 meaning of it, allegedly called the battalion in the

    2 Potocari area and had a staff officer saying to them

    3 that he also didn't know what it was all about, and

    4 they put it in a drawer, sir.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: But it was also put in the hands

    6 of the Serbs.

    7 A. No, the list was not given to the Serbs. I

    8 told the Serbs that I had registered all the men in the

    9 compound.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: You're sure it did not fall into

    11 their hands.

    12 A. No, absolutely not, sir. Moreover, I brought

    13 the list with me, out of the enclave, in my underpants

    14 to be sure that it would not go in the hands of the

    15 Serbs.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. Thank you

    17 for coming.

    18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you

    20 very much, Judge Riad.

    21 Judge Wald.

    22 JUDGE WALD: Major Franken, you testified

    23 early on that when it became apparent that the UN had

    24 neither the ability nor maybe the will to defend

    25 Srebrenica that you gave an order to guide the refugees

  112. 1 on to Potocari.

    2 At that point did you or any of your

    3 superiors, to your knowledge, have any kind of a plan

    4 of what would happen when those 25.000 to 30.000 to

    5 35.000 people got into Potocari on a very hot day,

    6 without -- I mean, suppose the Serbs had never come

    7 forward in any meeting with General Mladic to say,

    8 "We'll evacuate them." I mean, what was going to

    9 happen to them when they got there?

    10 A. Seeing the amount of supplies and the water,

    11 as the most important issue in this weather for little

    12 children, et cetera, there would have been a

    13 humanitarian disaster if there was not any resupply.

    14 That was one of the reasons that I gave Mr. Ibrahim --

    15 the father of one of the interpreters. Sorry, I lost

    16 his name again -- for our decision or for the

    17 impossibility to stop the evacuation at a later phase.

    18 If the Serbs wouldn't have done anything and

    19 just would have left us there with those 30.000 people,

    20 where children were born, people were dying, without us

    21 having the logistics supplies, medical, eat, food,

    22 water, et cetera, yeah, it's almost cynical to say the

    23 problem would have solved itself.

    24 JUDGE WALD: So to your knowledge there was

    25 no plans afoot at the UN to try to mobilise

  113. 1 humanitarian organisations or anything to do anything

    2 once they got up to Potocari.

    3 A. No, seeing the fact that we got orders to

    4 defend the Potocari parameter, even if necessary with

    5 defensive air support, and two hours later we got the

    6 order to facilitate the deportation, it was obvious

    7 there was no plan on the UN side.

    8 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Later on you talked about

    9 a conversation you had in which you talked to the

    10 father of the UN interpreter, and you two seemed both

    11 to recognise that there might be some kind of very

    12 tragic trade-off between what was going to happen to

    13 the men in Potocari and being able to get the women and

    14 children away on buses.

    15 What kind of assurance, or why were you even

    16 convinced that the women and children on the buses

    17 would be okay?

    18 A. Because I got that confirmed from the UN

    19 side, from the Kladanj area, where reports came in

    20 through the HQ, headquarters, of sector north-east,

    21 that massively women and children were crossing the

    22 border and coming in. So I assumed that they were

    23 relatively safe.

    24 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question is: As

    25 far as the list of the 219 or 250 men that you compiled

  114. 1 inside the compound, were you or anyone else, to your

    2 knowledge, ever able to find out later on whether any

    3 of those men survived, came out on the other side?

    4 A. My hope was that -- well, I was not able to

    5 check that because I went back to Holland, and that was

    6 it. But I hoped the UN or ICRC, or whatever

    7 organisation, would take it up and check whether they

    8 were still alive. But to my knowledge, nobody did.

    9 JUDGE WALD: So you don't know.

    10 A. No.

    11 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you, Major

    12 Franken.

    13 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. You said that nobody

    14 did survive, or you don't know?

    15 A. No. Nobody did pick up that list to check

    16 whether they did survive, sir. That's what I meant.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you

    19 very much, Judge Wald.

    20 Major Franken, I too have a couple of

    21 questions for you.

    22 At one point, in response to a question put

    23 to you by the Prosecutor, you said that somebody had

    24 said that no refugees would be allowed in the UN base.

    25 A. Somebody is -- it was a demand of General

  115. 1 Mladic, he demanded that no refugees were to be let

    2 into our base. He said that and threatened with

    3 artillery if it happened.

    4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] When did he

    5 say that, on what date, more or less?

    6 A. It was in the afternoon of the 11th, when the

    7 movement of the refugees already took place, and it was

    8 the same message in reaction to the close air support

    9 strikes over the city of Srebrenica, where he used one

    10 of our APCs and communications and had that message

    11 brought to us by one of our own sergeants in English,

    12 but he had to read the text, sir.

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My second

    14 question for you is the following: You told us that

    15 Colonel Karremans had informed you about what had been

    16 discussed at the meeting in Bratunac, and you said that

    17 he hadn't finished reporting what had been said at the

    18 meeting -- that before he had actually finished, trucks

    19 and buses started arriving in the base.

    20 The wording that appears in the declaration

    21 that you signed, on the 17th of July, is "negotiate and

    22 attack." The purpose of the meeting was a

    23 negotiation. However, Karremans didn't provide an

    24 answer at all, and buses and trucks had already started

    25 arriving. How do you explain that?

  116. 1 A. Well, the meeting didn't have the character

    2 of a negotiation. It was Mladic who dictated exactly

    3 what he wanted. I heard that afterwards. And they

    4 already planned, obviously, the evacuation and had

    5 their own time schedule. What they talked to us, told

    6 us, was not evident, was not relevant or not

    7 interesting.

    8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] What you

    9 have just said, can it be related to the incidents that

    10 took place at the OP Echo or not?

    11 A. Just to understand your question well, sir.

    12 Do you mean that there was a bigger plan where Echo was

    13 the trial and the whole situation was, in fact,

    14 planned? Yes, that is to my conviction, sir. I'm

    15 absolutely -- no, I'm not sure, but I'm convinced of

    16 that.

    17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Because

    18 when you were speaking about the incident that took

    19 place at the OP Echo, you said that the incidents were

    20 some kind of a test in terms of preparations. Did you

    21 mean to say a test or preparation for the upcoming

    22 attack? Can we interpret it that way?

    23 A. No, sir. I did not foresee an attack within

    24 four weeks on the enclave. I just analysed it as being

    25 a test case. One of the reasons I did so was that

  117. 1 normally when you do an advance or an attack on key

    2 terrain, and OP Echo was key terrain, you keep up your

    3 momentum, you go on, as long as you don't get

    4 opponents. And after the attack on OP Echo, in fact

    5 the road to Srebrenica was open. I ordered B Company

    6 to go down there like hell with a couple of APCs to

    7 block the Serb forces off, but as you can see on the

    8 map, on that occasion, show our uniform were

    9 established and we could go down south, almost to the

    10 factory before we came to Serb forces. That's one of

    11 the reasons that I said it was not Srebrenica now, it

    12 must be a test case. But not foreseeing an attack on

    13 the enclave then.

    14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And my last

    15 question, Major Franken: You compiled a list of men

    16 who were within the compound. I should like to know if

    17 you compiled that list before or after having seen the

    18 belongings of the men who had entered the white

    19 building being set on fire? Do you understand this?

    20 Did you do it before or after their belongings were

    21 burnt?

    22 A. It was before, sir. The trigger for me was

    23 the -- sorry -- increasing violence in the

    24 interrogation of the men. So I already stated that I

    25 had the feeling in the late afternoon of the 12th that

  118. 1 we were not in control in any way anymore, and that

    2 triggered me for this solution.

    3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I see.

    4 Well, thank you very much, Major Franken. Thank you

    5 very much for coming here to testify. We understand

    6 and we share your feeling of powerlessness, of

    7 impotence, but perhaps -- and I do understand that your

    8 feelings, as a professional and as a human being, were

    9 deeply offended by what happened. But nevertheless we

    10 wish to thank you for coming here to testify about

    11 these painful events. We hope that you will regain

    12 your peace and serenity in your country here.

    13 Mr. Cayley, I believe that we have to settle

    14 the exhibits now. We have to see what to do with

    15 them.

    16 Perhaps Mr. Dubuisson could give us the

    17 numbers of these exhibits.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] This was the

    19 decision which concerns 80 and 86.

    20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.

    21 Mr. Cayley, 80, Exhibit 80 was already used, and you

    22 said that you would await another witness. I do not

    23 know whether this is the moment now, or do you still

    24 wish to wait?

    25 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you're quite

  119. 1 right. Exhibit 80 is the list which the previous

    2 witness referred to and which this witness provided

    3 evidential foundation for, so I would apply for that to

    4 be admitted into evidence. And Exhibit 86 is the list

    5 of the wounded in the compound, which again this

    6 witness recognised, and I would ask for that to be

    7 admitted into evidence, please.

    8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

    9 Mr. Visnjic, any objections?

    10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No,

    11 Mr. President.

    12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

    13 Thank you very much. Therefore, 80 and 86 are

    14 admitted.

    15 Could we abuse the interpreters for another

    16 three minutes, please? Very well. The question is,

    17 indeed, whether I am or am not abusing it, but I shall

    18 nevertheless do it.

    19 We have to deliver the decision that we

    20 discussed earlier, and I have to do it now. I'd also

    21 like to seize this opportunity to say that on Friday,

    22 on Friday, we shall begin the hearing at 10.00 because

    23 the Chamber will have another business to attend to,

    24 and therefore we shall then sit as of 10.00, so that

    25 you can sleep a little longer. Yes, you can sleep a

  120. 1 little longer.

    2 There is yet another matter, and that is that

    3 tomorrow, as I have announced, that is, a day where I

    4 shall not be able to attend, I will not be here

    5 tomorrow, and Judge Riad, being the older of the two

    6 Judges, the senior of the two Judges, will be

    7 presiding.

    8 Before we take the decision, I should like to

    9 set free Major Franken. Thank you very much for coming

    10 once again. Thank you very much.

    11 Usher, will you please help Major Franken.

    12 [The witness withdrew]

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Right. The

    14 decision of the Chamber regarding the contact of

    15 parties with witnesses is as follows:

    16 A few days ago, the Defence raised a question

    17 of communication between the parties and the

    18 witnesses. According to them, the parties should no longer

    19 communicate with witnesses once the witnesses have

    20 taken the oath. The Defence did not quote a specific

    21 reason but stated that it was merely for the sake of

    22 making clear the relations of the parties to the

    23 witnesses.

    24 The Chamber was informed by the parties that they had met

    25 and agreed the contact would not be prohibited between a witness

  121. 1 and the party representing it, except after the

    2 examination-in-chief of the witness. The parties

    3 confirmed the understanding during court session

    4 but after a suggestion of the Chamber

    5 they changed their positions slightly.

    6 The Chamber believes that it should specify certain

    7 points. It notes first of all that no provision of

    8 the Statute or of the Rules regulates the matter.

    9 However, it believes that the procedure followed,

    10 before this Tribunal, does not make part of

    11 any specific legal system under Rule 99a of the Rules,

    12 and that its application is to ensure the best

    13 presentation by the parties of their evidence so

    14 that the Chamber can arrive at the truth of the case

    15 submitted to it in conformity with the solemn

    16 declaration as envisaged by Rule 90b of the rules.

    17 Moreover, the Rule 98, states

    18 that the Chamber may summon witnesses whose testimony

    19 is put in evidence with a view to establishing the truth.

    20 Witnesses who appear before the Chamber, which ever

    21 party calls them - be it

    22 the Prosecution or the Defence,

    23 are no longer witnesses of one of the parties,

    24 but they are witnesses of justice. A party which

    25 calls a witness has all the possibilities of

  122. 1 communicating with the witness before the witness takes

    2 the oath and explain the procedure, specifically all

    3 that refers to this decision.

    4 However, from the moment the witness

    5 has made the solemn declaration, this evidence may no longer

    6 have any particular link

    7 to either of the parties who may even

    8 unwittingly or subconsciously interfere with the

    9 spontaneity and the truth of the testimony as required

    10 by the spirit of the Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal.

    11 The Chamber, knows with how much care,

    12 vigilance, and neutrality, the Victims

    13 and Witnesses Unit takes care of the health, security and

    14 the well-being of witnesses. Therefore there is no need

    15 for the parties to have even for logistical reasons --

    16 contact with any witness -- from

    17 the beginning to the end of his

    18 testimony.

    19 In view of the above , the Chamber

    20 decides in accordance with the Rules 54, 99(G) and

    21 90(G) of the Rules, that all contact between a witness

    22 and the parties shall be prohibited

    23 as of the moment when this witness takes the solemn

    24 declaration and up to the end of his appearance before the

    25 Chamber, -- Unless under exceptional circumstances one party

  123. 1 deems it necessary to contact a witness, this party

    2 shall then inform the Chamber prior to the contact and clearly

    3 state the reason and objective of its application. If

    4 the Chamber accepts this application, then the Chamber

    5 will also specify the conditions under which this

    6 contact may take place.

    7 This is the decision of the Chamber. We

    8 discussed it at great length and we came to this

    9 decision, which in our opinion strikes a balance between

    10 different requests and needs. And so this is the

    11 decision of the Chamber.

    12 I should like to thank the interpreters and

    13 all the personnel who were so kind as to stay a little

    14 longer so that we could give you this ruling.

    15 Therefore, tomorrow at 9.30, the Chamber will

    16 be here with Judge Riad and Judge Wald, to continue the

    17 hearing of this case.

    18 Thank you very much. Have a nice afternoon.

    19 Thank you.

    20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    21 2.45 p.m., to be reconvened on

    22 Wednesday, the 5th day of April, 2000,

    23 the 9.30 a.m.