1 Tuesday, 27
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.36 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and
7 gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth, to the interpreters, to
8 the legal assistants and court reporters. Good morning, Madam Registrar.
9 Good morning, Mr. Harmon and Mr. Cayley. Good morning, Mr. Petrusic and
10 Mr. Visnjic. Good morning, General Krstic.
11 Good morning, Witness. Can you hear me?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You are now going to read the
14 solemn declaration handed to you by the usher, please.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 WITNESS: WITNESS CC
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Please be seated.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I hope you're comfortable.
22 Approach the microphone, please. Thank you.
23 The usher is going to show you a piece of paper. Please tell us
24 if your name is written on it. Give us a yes or no answer if it is or is
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you. You will now be
3 answering questions put to you by Mr. Cayley who is the gentleman standing
4 up to your right.
5 Mr. Cayley, your witness.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
7 Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic. Thank you.
8 Examined by Mr. Cayley:
9 Q. Witness, during your evidence, in order to ensure that your
10 identity is not revealed to the outside world, I will be referring to you
11 as "Witness CC." I'm going to ask you some preliminary questions to which
12 you can simply answer yes or no.
13 Your nationality is Bosnian; is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You are a Muslim by faith; is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You did not serve in the JNA, the army of the former Yugoslavia,
18 because you were, I think, too young for military service; is that right?
19 A. Because I had enrolled in the faculty of veterinary studies which
20 meant that I could defer my military service.
21 Q. Did you ever serve in the JNA?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Am I right in saying that you joined the Bosnian army in October
24 of 1992?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, I know you had a number of duties in the army but we won't go
2 into that; the Defence may have some questions for you about that. But am
3 I right in saying that in March of 1995 you went to the listening post at
5 A. Yes, that was in March.
6 Q. You underwent some training for a period of 15 days. What did
7 that training involve?
8 A. At that training we learnt about the various devices and equipment
9 that was used by the JNA at the time, the range of that equipment, how the
10 mobile surveillance centres worked, interference centres, jamming centres,
11 and so on. That means that we learnt about interception devices and
13 Q. The equipment and devices that you're speaking of were, in
14 essence, radio or communications equipment; that was the equipment that
15 you were trained upon.
16 A. Yes. After that training, we had to do a test; that is to say, we
17 had our final examinations. But I don't think we actually did those
18 examinations because of some of the operations that were going on at the
20 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could get Prosecutor's Exhibit 138
21 for me and place it in front of the witness.
22 Q. Now, Witness, you were in a unit at Okresanica known as a PEB.
23 Was this the PEB of the 21st Division of the Bosnian army?
24 A. Yes, it was.
25 Q. What does "PEB" stand for?
1 A. It means anti-electronic warfare.
2 Q. Am I right in saying that the 2nd Corps of the Bosnian army and,
3 indeed, the State Security Service of the Bosnian government had listening
4 posts at the same location, at Okresanica?
5 A. Yes, as far as I remember, that is correct. It did, yes.
6 Q. So there were, in fact, three separate units at Okresanica who
7 were involved in monitoring activities.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Could you just point on Prosecutor's Exhibit 138 to the location
10 Okresanica. Witness, if you look at the top of the map, it is, in fact,
12 A. Up here, yes. Here it is.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has identified
14 the green circle marked "Okresanica" as the location of his place of work
15 at the interception centre of the 21st Division.
16 A. It is on Mount Majevica. This is the mountain, Mount Majevica.
17 Q. Witness, there is another location on that map marked Konjuh. Are
18 you aware that there was also a listening post at Konjuh?
19 A. Yes, I knew that.
20 Q. Now, at Okresanica, which army were you principally listening to?
21 A. The army of Republika Srpska.
22 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that in July of 1995, you were working at
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, very, very briefly, because the Judges have now heard this on
1 numerous occasions, can you explain to Their Honours the process that you
2 as an operator went through in intercepting and recording military
3 transmissions of the army of Republika Srpska?
4 A. You mean our method of work, is that what you want to know about?
5 Q. Exactly, Witness.
6 A. Well, we had three work posts or three devices, sets of equipment,
7 that we worked with. When we were on the job, after arriving at our post,
8 we would consult the operator who was working, who was on duty. We'd ask
9 him what he'd been listening in to; we would take a look at his notebook,
10 what he had recorded and what he had made a note of; and the operator
11 would tell me what I should pay attention to in particular, if there was
12 something very important, what I should monitor.
13 Then I would sit down at my work post. I would put my headsets
14 on. The equipment would scan the frequencies and it did this non-stop,
15 all the time, and if I would intercept a conversation, the -- actually,
16 the device which intercepted the conversation would stop of its own. But
17 on occasion, it would not stop automatically. Then we would stop it and
18 go back to that particular frequency. We would then switch on the
19 recording device which we called an Uher tape recorder and record the
20 conversation. So we'd press a button on the Uher so that we could go back
21 to the conversation that had been taped. We would then introduce it into
22 the notebook, transcribe it.
23 After transcribing the conversations, we would hand them over to
24 the unit commander who would then introduce the information into a
25 computer and then would, I think, send it further on to the division.
1 That would briefly be our method of work.
2 Q. Witness, how did you identify the participants within any
3 particular conversation that you were listening to?
4 A. In my case, if the participant introduced himself, there were
5 cases where the participant in the conversation would introduce
6 themselves, and then we knew this, and we would take down their names or
7 nicknames and even the ranks that they held. And if it was a lieutenant,
8 we would put "L" or "P" for Pukovnik. If we did not know who the
9 participants were, we would put an "X" or a "Y".
10 Q. Did you ever come to be so experienced that you recognised voices
11 without the actual participant identifying him or herself on the radionet?
12 A. Yes, yes, I did have experience of that kind. I could recognise
13 certain voices, yes.
14 Q. If there was any part of the conversation which you couldn't
15 clearly hear, what procedure did you adopt if you couldn't transcribe what
16 was being heard on the tape recorder?
17 A. There were parts of conversations or words that were not
18 sufficiently audible. I would then rewind several times and try to
19 discern the words or parts of sentences, but if I failed, I would call the
20 commander and the others who were working there, and we'd go -- wind the
21 tape back 20 or 30 times, sometimes, and listen to it together to try and
22 decipher what the words were that were inaudible. If that failed, then I
23 would place three dots for that segment.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this witness has very few intercepts
25 to actually introduce into evidence, but what I will do now for the sake
1 of Your Honours and for the court is to identify the linkage between the
2 notebook and the individual intercept.
3 The first exhibit, Mr. Usher, is 356, and that is linked to
4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 297 or tab 19; and the second two intercepts are
5 Exhibits 357 and 358, and they are linked to Prosecutor's Exhibit 295 or
6 tab 17.
7 Now, Mr. Usher, you can hand those exhibits out, but first of all
8 I would like you to hand to the witness Prosecutor's Exhibit 297, which is
9 tab 19.
10 Q. Now, Witness, you've previously looked at this book in my office.
11 Do you recognise this book?
12 A. I recognise it.
13 Q. Is this a 21st Division notebook?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. How did you recognise this notebook?
16 A. I recognised it by the lines and this number, and the RRU800 that
17 it says here. And that's open and closed, that's how we did it, the
18 lines, the squares.
19 Q. And indeed, I think this notebook contains your handwriting, does
20 it not?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be shown Prosecutor's
23 Exhibit 356, and it's 356/1C please, Mr. Usher.
24 Q. Now, Witness, don't read this conversation out, nor should it be
25 placed on the ELMO because it identifies you. Is this an intercept that
1 you took down, 356/1C?
2 A. Yes, it is my conversation.
3 Q. And indeed, without stating it, that in fact is your signature, is
4 it not, that can be seen?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Now, if we could go to, back to Prosecutor's Exhibit
7 297, and in fact, Mr. Usher, if you could go to page 236, those are the
8 last three digits of the evidence registration number.
9 Q. Do you see the same intercept within the notebook, Prosecutor's
10 Exhibit 297, that you've just identified?
11 A. Yes, I do. I see it.
12 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the court record, the witness has
13 confirmed that Prosecutor's Exhibit 356 is an extract from Prosecutor's
14 Exhibit 297, at page 236.
15 Q. Now, Witness, if you go back to the page before, so back to page
16 235, what is the date at the top of that page?
17 A. The 13th of July, 1995, Thursday.
18 Q. There is only one other intercept prior to your intercept at eight
19 minutes past eight. Your intercept was taken down at 1602, at two minutes
20 past four in the afternoon. Would you agree with me that your intercept
21 was taken down on the 13th of July, 1995?
22 A. Yes. The 13th of July, 1995, that is also my conversation.
23 Q. Thank you, Witness. This is a very brief intercept which I will
24 read into the record. It starts at the top with the frequency:
25 "836.000 (Channel 19) 1602 hrs, Participants: X - Y
1 X: This is mostly it. I called 394. I've got an extension down
2 in Kasaba.
3 Y: Uh-huh.
4 X: Where Malinic's unit is. They said that there are over 1,500
5 gathered at the stadium.
6 Y: What?
7 X: There are 1,500 at the stadium in Kasaba, fuck it. The duty
8 officer down there said that we probably won't let anything
9 get by. There are more ... that hasn't finished ...
11 And then it's signed. I won't read the signature into the record
12 because it identifies the witness.
13 MR. CAYLEY: If the Witness could be given Prosecutor's Exhibit
15 Q. Witness, could you examine that notebook in front of you very
16 briefly and state whether or not you recognise it.
17 A. I do.
18 Q. Is this a 21st Division notebook?
19 A. Yes.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has confirmed
21 that Prosecutor's Exhibit 295 is identified as a 21st Division notebook.
22 If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 357/1B.
23 I apologise, Mr. President, the French translation is missing so
24 we owe that to the Court.
25 Q. Witness, is this a conversation that you took down?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And you recognise your handwriting.
3 A. I recognise it.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could turn, in Prosecutor's
5 Exhibit 295, to page 639.
6 Q. Witness, do you see this same conversation in the notebook that's
7 in front of you, to the left of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record, the witness has
10 confirmed that the extracted conversation, Exhibit 358, is contained
11 within Prosecutor's Exhibit 295, at page 639, 640. I will not read this
12 particular conversation into the record.
13 If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 358.
14 Q. Do you recognise this conversation, Prosecutor's Exhibit 358?
15 A. I recognise it, yes.
16 Q. This is a conversation which you took down.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If you could look at the notebook to the left of you and simply
19 turn one page, do you see the conversation that you've just identified in
20 the notebook?
21 A. Yes, I can see it. Yes.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has confirmed
23 that Prosecutor's Exhibit 358 is an extract from Prosecutor's Exhibit 295,
24 at page 642.
25 Q. Now, let's date these two conversations together, Witness, because
1 one follows the other.
2 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could turn back to page 638 of
3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 295.
4 Q. Do you see a date on that page, Witness?
5 A. Yes, the 15th of July, 1995, Saturday.
6 Q. Could you turn the page. Do you see the first intercept which you
7 identified, Prosecutor's Exhibit 357, on the next page?
8 A. I see it.
9 Q. On the next page, at 0955, on page 642, do you see Prosecutor's
10 Exhibit 358?
11 A. Yes, I see it.
12 Q. So would it be correct to say that both of these intercepts were
13 taken down on the 15th of July of 1995?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Let's keep turning the pages from 642 to 643. Do you see any
16 dates on 643, 644? In fact, there are no dates on that page, Witness.
17 A. No. No, I can't see that.
18 Q. On 645, 646, there are no dates.
19 A. No, I don't see that.
20 Q. 647, 648?
21 A. No, there aren't any.
22 Q. 649, 650?
23 A. No, none.
24 Q. And then on 651, 652, what date do you see?
25 A. The 16th of July, 1995, Sunday.
1 Q. Thank you, Witness.
2 One last question for you, Witness. When you were working at
3 Okresanica, did you ever think that you would be coming to this court to
4 testify about your work?
5 A. Let me just say that everything we did, we did for the
6 requirements of our army, principally. We did this with the highest
7 responsibility, to the best of our ability, because any serious error
8 would be detrimental to our fighters and our army. I could never even
9 dream -- not in my wildest dreams did I ever think I would be sitting here
10 when I was recording and intercepting the conversations and doing the
12 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I have no further questions for the
13 witness so I can offer him for cross-examination.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
15 Mr. Cayley.
16 Witness CC, you are now going to answer questions which
17 Mr. Visnjic is going to put to you.
18 Mr. Visnjic, you have the floor.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Cross-examined by Mr. Visnjic:
21 Q. Witness CC, while answering questions put to you by the Prosecutor
22 in the course of the examination-in-chief, you said that you completed
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. How long did the training last?
1 A. Fifteen days.
2 Q. During that training course, were you trained in the procedure for
3 preserving documentation on interception?
4 A. No.
5 Q. In the course of the training, were you familiarised with any
6 rules which govern these activities in anti-aircraft warfare?
7 A. As far as I can remember, no.
8 Q. Later on while you were working, were you informed on rules?
9 A. Yes, there were rules, of course. There were shifts. We knew
10 exactly what had to be done, how many people worked. We worked around the
11 clock. We had to have a serious attitude towards our work. Where the
12 conversations are intercepted, how they are intercepted, whom they are
13 forwarded to. And what happened afterwards with those conversations, I
14 don't know. So those were the rules that applied in the army of
16 Q. How were you informed about those rules?
17 A. As much as I needed to do the job, to that extent.
18 Q. Just a moment, please. Because of the interpretation, we should
19 make pauses in between the questions and answers.
20 The rules that you just described, were they in writing?
21 A. The shifts were written out on the doors so you knew who worked
22 when and for how many hours. That was hung up on the door, and this was
23 written out by the department Commander, or rather the squad Commander.
24 So I knew exactly when I would be on duty and for how long.
25 Q. Did you have written instructions as to the way you should
1 intercept messages, to whom you should give them, and so on?
2 A. No. No, we knew that. This was told to us orally.
3 Q. But who told you?
4 A. The squad Commander.
5 Q. Did the squad Commander inform you about the plan on electronic
7 A. Which frequencies were to be monitored, he would tell us. If
8 something was important, then he would tell us precisely which frequency
9 we should monitor, but he told us this orally.
10 Q. Did you have an order for electronic surveillance?
11 A. I don't know.
12 Q. Did you know whom you should listen to?
13 A. Yes, we knew that.
14 Q. In the event you were to capture another conversation, for
15 example, by the HVO or the international forces, what was the procedure?
16 A. As far as I can remember, as far as I'm concerned, I never heard
17 conversations by the HVO or the international forces.
18 Q. How long were your shifts at Okresanica?
19 A. Seven days at Okresanica, seven and seven at home.
20 Q. When there was a change in shift, was there a formal handover of
22 A. Yes, there was a handover of duty.
23 Q. Was this done in writing?
24 A. No, orally.
25 Q. Did each of you while using communications equipment have their
1 own equipment?
2 A. We divided up in the division so that everyone had his own
3 equipment. So, for instance, I spent 90 per cent of my time working on a
4 Kenwood. So mostly we trained on a particular type of equipment so it was
5 easier for each one of us to use it later on.
6 Q. Does that mean that you had had your own complete set that you
8 A. Yes. Not all the time, but most of the time I would sit at this
9 Kenwood. I had a tape recorder, a notebook attached to each device, a
10 rotator for the antenna. There was a tape recorder, a rotator, and
11 notebook. Pens, of course.
12 Q. When you mentioned notebooks, did each device have its own
14 A. Yes, each device had its own notebook.
15 Q. I think that I read or heard that you had three sets of equipment?
16 A. Yes, three.
17 Q. Does that mean that notebooks were used simultaneously for three
18 different devices?
19 A. So each operator sitting at a particular device would write down
20 in his notebook.
21 Q. Tell me, do you know where the notebooks came from, how you were
22 supplied with notebooks?
23 A. No, I don't know.
24 Q. There appears to be a problem with the interpretation, yes.
25 A. I can hear.
1 THE INTERPRETER: There's a constant hum.
2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Was each one of you responsible, in a sense, for a certain
5 A. Yes, yes. The notebook had to be there on the table, and while
6 working, you couldn't move it anywhere else. You couldn't move it away
7 from the table. While you were working, you had the notebook there in
8 front of you, and you were responsible for it.
9 Q. Did you write up anything for these notebooks?
10 A. The commander would write on the notebook when it was issued and
11 the day it was completed. I can't remember exactly. I think some
12 notebooks had stamps. I'm not sure about that, whether all of them had
13 stamps or some of them. I think there was even a stamp, that it was
15 Q. Do you remember where this stamp appeared?
16 A. No, I can't remember at all. It seems to me there was one, but I
17 can't remember where.
18 Q. Do you perhaps remember in the case of these two notebooks?
19 A. I do not remember.
20 Q. Upon completing your work, what happened with the notebooks?
21 A. The squad commander would take them, and I don't know. I think he
22 sent them to the division, probably. There was a contact between -- from
23 division to division.
24 Q. Tell me, how did you transcribe the conversations in the
1 A. First we'd note the frequency, the time of the conversation, and
2 the participants in the conversation. If they introduced themselves, as I
3 said, we'd put the first letter of the name or nickname or rank.
4 Q. When you say that you took down the time, did you transcribe the
5 conversation immediately after intercepting it?
6 A. I would first write down some conversations on a piece of paper,
7 and then write it out nicely in the notebook, but first on an ordinary
8 piece of paper.
9 Q. But you wrote them into the notebook in the order in which you
10 heard them?
11 A. Yes. But when copying them into the notebook, I didn't follow the
12 same order.
13 Q. Does that mean that the conversations written in the notebook are
14 not in time sequence?
15 A. There are cases. For example, it says 9.15, and for the next
16 conversation, 8.15. So that is the explanation. Sometimes I took down
17 the conversations according to my own judgement as to which one was more
18 important, and in consultation with the commander, of course.
19 Q. Did you ask the commander in what order you should write down the
20 conversations in the notebook?
21 A. No, no, only in terms of the importance of the conversation. I
22 asked him, do I have to write them down in order; and I remember him
23 telling me clearly that it wasn't so important to write them down in
24 order. Whether one would be at 8.15 and the next one at 9.15, that wasn't
25 important, but the important thing was that the conversation was recorded
1 on such and such a day, and that we indicate the time in the notebook.
2 Q. When you wrote out the conversations in the notebook, did you
3 write down every word that you heard on tape?
4 A. I wrote down every word I heard starting from "hello" until the
5 last word, except, of course, those that couldn't be heard.
6 Q. And you considered it to be very important that every single word
7 should be noted in the notebook; is that what you are saying?
8 A. Yes, that was, for us, the approach. We considered every word to
9 be important.
10 Q. Did you take care to follow the word order?
11 A. Yes, of course. We did our very best to be faithful to the
12 original word order. That's what we had to do.
13 Q. Tell me, what was the procedure with the tapes once they were
14 filled out?
15 A. I can't tell you. We sometimes turned the tape around and used it
16 again, the same tapes, when we were out of tapes.
17 Q. When a conversation was written out on a piece of paper, do you
18 know how it was sent on to the command?
19 A. No, I don't know that. I can't tell you that.
20 Q. Did you perhaps say earlier on that the conversation was forwarded
21 by telephone?
22 A. I know that there were some urgent messages. I did say that there
23 was this inductor telephone, and then the commander would call up directly
24 the command of the 21st Division and report to them orally what we had
25 captured if something was really extremely urgent and it needed immediate
2 Q. What was the regular procedure?
3 A. I really don't know. I can't tell you, and what happened
5 Q. In your shift there were several soldiers. How many?
6 A. About nine, mostly nine soldiers. But of course, the number
7 varied occasionally, but mostly we were nine. I remember that.
8 Q. How long was your duty working on the device? How long did it
10 A. Four hours, sometimes eight.
11 Q. How many operators were working simultaneously in the same room?
12 A. Three operators.
13 Q. Who sent the reports to the command?
14 A. The squad leader, the squad commander, and the platoon commander.
15 He was there, too. I don't know which one of the two of them, but one of
16 the two of them.
17 Q. When handing over your duty during your working day, did you write
18 down anything about the condition of the equipment or things like that?
19 A. No, we did this orally. When I would come on duty, I would review
20 the conversations that were intercepted by my colleague, and then I would
21 ask him whether there were any interferences, and then he would tell me if
22 he had something to tell me regarding things I had to devote particular
23 attention to. This was done orally.
24 Q. Were all the soldiers in your group equally trained for this job?
25 A. No, they were not. Some were less, some were better. For
1 instance, I was less well-trained than people who had been working on the
2 job for five years, ever since 1992, even before. There were people who
3 were radio hams for 20 years.
4 Q. When you say less well-trained, you mean regarding intercepting
5 the signal?
6 A. No, no, regarding certain technical things, knowledge about
7 physics and things like that. But as regards interception, we were more
8 or less the same. I was no poorer than they in capturing conversations,
9 noting them down, and recording them. I knew what I was doing just as
10 well as they.
11 Q. So if we're talking only about the process of interception and
12 transcription, in that respect you were all more or less equally trained;
13 is that what you said?
14 A. Yes, more or less. As regards those particular activities, I can
15 say that we worked more or less equally well, not perhaps time wise. Some
16 needed more time; one was slower in writing than someone else. But we did
17 the job more or less equally well.
18 Q. In answer to questions by my learned friend Mr. Cayley as to
19 whether you can identify a certain conversation, did you actually
20 recognise your handwriting?
21 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely so, I recognised my handwriting.
22 Q. Do you remember the contents of those conversations?
23 A. I remember one.
24 Q. Among those that have been referred to specifically?
25 A. Yes, among those that were referred to specifically.
13 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French
14 and English transcripts.
1 Q. Do you remember the details, or globally?
2 A. I have a very rough impression of it, yes. In general terms I
3 remember it.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further
5 questions for this witness.
6 Witness CC, thank you.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
8 Mr. Visnjic.
9 Mr. Cayley, any additional questions?
10 MR. CAYLEY: Very few, Mr. President.
11 One thing I did want to note for the record is that I have the two
12 original notebooks here which my learned friend Mr. Visnjic has had the
13 opportunity to review outside the courtroom, and indeed he can look at
14 these again if he wishes. I have just one point of clarification with the
16 Re-examined by Mr. Cayley:
17 Q. Witness, you worked for the PEB unit that was attached or
18 reporting to the 21st Division; is that correct?
19 A. I can't hear the interpretation.
20 Q. You worked for the PEB unit that was reporting to the 21st
21 Division; is that correct?
22 A. Yes. Yes, the 21st Division.
23 Q. You stated in your examination-in-chief that there were two other
24 units, one of which was a unit that was reporting directly to the 2nd
25 Corps of the Bosnian army.
1 A. Yes. Yes.
2 Q. Were you at all familiar with the procedures that were being used
3 in the 2nd Corps PEB, or were you only aware of the procedures that were
4 being used in your own unit, the 21st Division PEB?
5 A. I knew only about the procedure that we used in the 21st
6 Division. I had no contact at all with the 2nd Corps, and I can say that
7 these boys from the 2nd Corps, I didn't know any one of them, actually,
8 until I arrived there. I knew one who came from the same place as I, that
9 he was from Srebrenik, but I didn't know he was working there, because I
10 went to see them only once. I just peeped in. I had no insight into what
11 they were doing and how.
12 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Witness.
13 Mr. President, just for the reference of the Court, I previously
14 made a comment about this, but Your Honours may wish to review
15 Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 334, and 358 together. I anticipate there will
16 be argument about the detail that emerges from those three exhibits at
17 some stage, but you may wish to review those three documents together.
18 Thank you, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much,
20 Mr. Cayley.
21 Judge Fouad Riad, any questions?
22 Madam Judge Wald?
23 Questioned by the Court:
24 JUDGE WALD: I just have one. You didn't put down every day, did
25 you? I mean, the date, July 15th, July 16th, did you do that every day,
1 or maybe some days you didn't do it? Which?
2 A. We did that every day. Every day the date had to be written
3 down. All conversations intercepted on that day were noted down in the
4 notebook under that date.
5 JUDGE WALD: And that's true of Exhibit 295, notebook 2, the
6 notebook that you were asked to identify the exhibits from?
7 A. Yes. Yes, it is.
8 JUDGE WALD: All right. That's all I have.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness CC, you said that you
10 believed that there were stamps on the notebooks but you can't remember
11 exactly. When you spoke about these stamps, does it remind you of some
12 official records or something like that?
13 What I'm saying is when you saw the notebook for the first time,
14 when it was absolutely empty, was anything written on it already or not
15 before you started writing into it?
16 A. No. No, the notebooks were completely empty. Completely.
17 Nothing could be written in them. It was not allowed.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question. You said that
19 the order of transcribing messages was not important, it was the hour and
20 the date that was important. This brings me back to the question of my
21 eminent colleague Judge Wald. What about the hour? Was the hour always
22 important; the time, in other words?
23 A. Yes, the time was always important.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And the date? What about the
1 A. The time and the date, yes.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Why do you think when you were
3 doing your work that the time and the date was important? Why did you
4 think it was important?
5 A. Well, simply the date had to be known, when the conversations were
6 recorded, so as to avoid any confusion there might be down there in the
7 centre. Wherever they processed these messages, in the division or the
8 corps, they had to know when each conversation was intercepted. And also
9 if the conversation is linked to any operations, they had to know when
10 those operations took place.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Did it happen that the date or
12 the hour was not written down? I'm not thinking of you, I'm thinking of
13 all of you. Could it happen that you forgot to write these things down?
14 A. Probably it's possible. It's possible. It can happen that
15 somebody may forget to write it down.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, Witness. We have no
17 further questions for you.
18 JUDGE WALD: I'm sorry. Maybe if the witness can't, the
19 Prosecution might be able to help me on this. I can't find any notation
20 of July 17th in Exhibit 295. Where have I missed it? I find the 16th and
21 I find the 18th but I can't find the 17th. That's tab 17; the 18th is on
23 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, to be completely frank with you, I have
24 actually been through these and I think the 17th of July is missing.
25 JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to make sure that I hadn't omitted
2 MR. CAYLEY: You're referring to Prosecutor's Exhibit 295? Yes,
3 it is missing, that date.
4 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, Witness, we have some
6 matters to regulate regarding tendering of exhibits.
7 Mr. Cayley, you have something to say, I think, regarding exhibits
8 and tendering those that you used in your examination-in-chief.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Subject to the Court's existing ruling, I would ask for admission
11 into evidence of Exhibits 295 and 297. In respect of the other three
12 exhibits, I would ask for admission of 356, 357, and 358 into evidence;
13 357 and 356 should be under seal because they identify the witness.
14 Excuse me one moment, Mr. President.
15 [Prosecution counsel confer]
16 MR. CAYLEY: My learned friend Mr. Harmon has reminded me that the
17 notebooks themselves, 295 and 297, should be under seal because they again
18 identify the witness.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, are we still going
20 to wait for your position?
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, our position is
22 almost formed, but because of these three latest exhibits, perhaps we
23 could state our position after the break.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, Madam Registrar, you will
25 take note of these exhibits so we may determine what to do with them
2 Is there anything else, Mr. Cayley?
3 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Harmon would like to
4 address the Court, so if I could move out of his way.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 Mr. Harmon.
7 MR. HARMON: Mr. President and Your Honours, good morning, and
8 good morning to my colleagues.
9 We have one additional exhibit, Prosecutor's Exhibit 348; two
10 binders, 348/1 and 348/2. My colleagues have received these exhibits
11 before I am seeking their introduction into evidence.
12 These exhibits contain copies of various excerpts from notebooks
13 and include typewritten, transcribed intercepted conversations as well.
14 Some of these have been referred to in the next witness' testimony.
15 To orient Your Honours to this exhibit, if Your Honours don't
16 already have a copy of it, perhaps it could be distributed and I can
17 orient you through it so it will be easy to use in the future should it be
19 I can tell Your Honours, while we're waiting for the distribution,
20 that we're asking that these two exhibits be admitted for the time being
21 under seal. We will come back to the Court and ask that portions of these
22 be removed from the seal.
23 If I may orient Your Honours, then, I'll use the first of the two
24 binders, 348/1, to orient you. At the beginning there is a table of
25 contents and there are four tabs in the exhibit, and it is
1 self-explanatory as to what each of those tabs represent.
2 Under tab 1 there is a brief index and a summary of the
3 intercepted communication that is contained within the notebook; tab 2
4 contains an index of names; tab 3 -- I'm sorry, tab 2 contains an index of
5 code names; tab 3 contains an index of names that are referred to in the
6 intercepts; and tab 4 contains maps with locations that are mentioned in
7 the intercepts. Thereafter, there are a series of tabs in date order
8 containing intercepts, and the same is repeated in the second volume.
9 JUDGE WALD: Mr. Harmon, excuse me. Mine say "Exhibit 364" and
10 the transcript says "348" or "248." Which is it?
11 MR. HARMON: I apologise. I've been given a binder that says 348
12 so it should be --
13 JUDGE WALD: My binder says "364." Just so we know, we can
14 determine what the number is.
15 MR. HARMON: We treat the Judges better than we treat the
17 JUDGE WALD: So it's 364?
18 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
19 JUDGE WALD: Okay. All right.
20 MR. HARMON: That's all, Your Honours. Thank you.
21 JUDGE WALD: I have one further question.
22 Just so I understand, these transcripts or these excerpts that are
23 contained in these two binders, some of which may come in or be referred
24 to by the next witnesses or a subsequent witness' testimony, these are not
25 the same as any of the ones we've been dealing with in the last week. I
1 just want to make sure I've got that straight. Is that right?
2 MR. HARMON: Some of them are.
3 JUDGE WALD: But some of them aren't, they aren't --
4 MR. HARMON: Some of them are not.
5 JUDGE WALD: So if we keep these two binders during the subsequent
6 witness' testimony, we can take back and put away the earlier intercepts,
7 or will we need reference to the earlier intercepts again? Just because
8 it's getting very crowded up here on the bench.
9 MR. HARMON: It is, it is. And we will stage manage to the best
10 we can, Your Honours. The sets that you're going to receive through the
11 next witness --
12 JUDGE WALD: Okay.
13 MR. HARMON: -- there are voluminous sets of binders, and we will
14 indicate to Your Honours which are going to be used on which day in order
15 to make more space up there.
16 JUDGE WALD: But we can put away the ones we've dealt with this
17 week or not?
18 MR. HARMON: Yes.
19 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, what is your
21 position, the position of the Defence, with respect to these exhibits?
22 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The Defence has received the
23 folders several days ago, binders, from the Prosecution, but with respect
24 to our comments with regard to the contents, we will do so after the
25 break, if we may, because we feel that we should take them all together
1 because they are intercepted conversations which are already contained in
2 the exhibits presented already.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Witness, we thank
4 you for coming to the International Tribunal. We wish you bon voyage back
5 to your country and every success in your work, but please stay seated for
6 a few more minutes.
7 We're going to have a break now, a 20-minute recess.
8 --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon.
12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we seek admission of all of the
13 documents that we have previously tendered in the last seven days, and I
14 await hearing the position of the Defence, and then I will respond.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Petrusic, let's hear
17 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, in
18 accordance with the ruling of the Chamber of the 19th of June, the Defence
19 would like to state its position regarding exhibits tendered since then to
20 the present.
21 The Defence will make a general objection regarding all the
22 exhibits together, and that general objection will apply at the same time
23 to each exhibit individually. The reasons for our objection to those
24 exhibits are as follows: If the notebooks were kept by members of the
25 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and according to the testimony of the
1 witnesses heard they were, or were kept either for the 2nd Corps or for
2 the 21st Division, then those notebooks had to be kept on the basis of
3 unified rules, namely, each notebook issued by the command. For whose
4 needs the witnesses heard here were working, each of those notebooks had
5 to be registered and approved by the stamp of the appropriate command, and
6 the witness we heard today told us, according to his memory, that he saw
7 that stamp. Furthermore, those notebooks had to be paginated, had to have
8 the pages numbered; and at the end of the notebook, a date had to be noted
9 when the notebook was completed and signed by the person responsible for
10 it, as well as the date when it was archived.
11 Only in that case could we speak of a valid system of keeping
12 records or documents. Without any procedure having been established,
13 these notebooks could be considered to be private notebooks kept by
14 individuals who filled them in, regardless of whether they belonged to the
15 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the Ministry of the Interior or its State
16 Security Service.
17 Furthermore, if on the basis of the handwriting in the notebooks a
18 text is typed out, then that text, that typewritten text has to be
19 absolutely identical with the handwritten text in the notebook. In the
20 submission of the Defence, the typewritten text would also have to respect
21 a certain format, and that means that the unit has to be indicated which
22 is issuing such a document; then the time has to be indicated when the
23 document was issued or compiled; and as in this case, we are dealing with
24 interception of radio relay communications, the frequency also has to be
25 indicated, and the route of the frequency on which the conversation in
1 question was intercepted. Also, the participants in the conversation have
2 to be indicated and to whom the telegram is addressed. For a document to
3 be valid in form, but in the opinion of the Defence this is not a matter
4 purely of form but also of substance, the document should also have a
5 stamp of registration.
6 Also, bearing in mind that these exhibits do not contain these
7 specified elements, then such notebooks should be considered private
8 notebooks, or possibly raised to the level of an internal document that
9 are used by Witness BB in his statement to the investigator of the
10 Tribunal in May, 1999.
11 In all the notebooks, in the majority of cases, the date is
12 missing in the heading of the noted conversation. The question that
13 arises is, is the method of determining the date a reliable one in the way
14 done by the Prosecutor or explained by the witnesses in their testimony?
15 There are numerous examples in these exhibits confirming this. By
16 way of an example, if the date 13th of July, 1995, is indicated, attached
17 to a particular conversation, and then comes the 16th of July or a later
18 date, by leafing through the notebook and watching the time when various
19 conversations were conducted is a rather unreliable method because one may
20 ask: What if within those two indicated dates, in between those indicated
21 dates, there were no conversations on a particular day, or no
22 conversations were noted down?
23 It should also be noted that the persons operating the computer
24 had the duty to retype a written message and forward it to a higher
25 command, so those individuals were not authorised to make any changes in
1 the contents of the written text. Exhibits 328C and 329B show that
2 changes were made in the text. The differences that occur are also
3 visible in Exhibits 334/2B and 334/1C.
4 There are also cases when a conversation was intercepted by three
5 operators; however, in all three versions there are differences, at least
6 as far as the version in the B/C/S language is concerned. As for versions
7 in English, the Defence objects to the translation.
8 In the case of individual conversations, certain words appear
9 which in another text, taken down by a different operator, those words are
10 missing or were left out, or parts of sentences were left out or
11 individual words. An example of this can be found in Exhibits 328, 329,
12 334, 358.
13 Similarly, there are differences between the handwritten and the
14 typewritten text. One might concede that these were due to punctuation
15 differences only, but if there are words that are different -- or in some
16 cases we have words and names which are not to be found in the handwritten
17 version. This also applies to Exhibits 334/2B and to 334/1C.
18 Also, when it comes to the identification of the participants in
19 the conversation, it is the submission of the Defence that in these
20 exhibits, they were identified in an extremely unreliable manner. If the
21 participants in the conversation introduced themselves, then that is
22 without dispute; however, there are exhibits, such as 303/C, 304/C, 305/B,
23 307/C, 312, 320/C, in which the participants did not introduce themselves
24 in any way whatsoever but were still identified by the operators.
25 We find the position unacceptable that the participants could be
1 recognised by the witnesses heard in court on the basis of the tone or
2 strength or modulation of voice. The Defence will agree that it is
3 possible to identify participants in that way, but such an identification
4 can be done, in the submission of the Defence, only by experts, persons
5 who have special expertise regarding distinctive characteristics of voice,
6 when asked to make an expert opinion. So a reliable manner of identifying
7 the voice of a participant would be one that I have just described. And
8 one of the witnesses, in his statement to the Prosecution, stated that a
9 tape was played for him during his interview with the investigators.
10 Mr. President, the Defence has, since these exhibits were produced
11 to it, in accordance with its daily obligations, invested an extra effort
12 to analyse these exhibits, though I must concede that an analysis of the
13 exhibits themselves is not the subject of this objection. But I cannot
14 avoid mentioning Exhibits 328, 334, and 358, and if we take any given
15 version of those exhibits -- it is a conversation between Krstic and
16 Beara -- if we take any version of that conversation, we see that every
17 subsequent version does not follow the same chronology of syllables,
18 words, and sentences as in the case of the previous operator.
19 I have already mentioned that objections have been made regarding
20 the translation, and we are awaiting an official response from the
21 Registry regarding that.
22 Bearing all this in mind, the Defence, depending on the
23 proceedings that lie ahead and the court sittings that have been planned,
24 will have to request an expert analysis regarding the authenticity of
25 these exhibits, the originals of which are in the possession of the
1 Prosecution. At this stage, and this may not be important for this
2 objection of the Defence, but the Defence would like to give notice to the
3 Chamber that in view of the contents of this objection, that we will be
4 forced to take such steps.
5 Mr. President, those would be the substantive objections of the
6 Defence which apply collectively to all the exhibits, as I said at the
7 beginning, all of them together, and each of the exhibits individually.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
9 Mr. Petrusic.
10 Mr. Harmon, please.
11 MR. HARMON: Mr. President and Your Honours, we are seeking
12 admission of all of the exhibits that we have tendered that relate to
13 these intercepts.
14 First, the appropriate Rule of Evidence that applies in this case
15 is found in Rule 89(C). "A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which
16 it deems to have probative value." Now, Your Honours, in respect of this
17 evidence, from the content of what Your Honours have heard, the
18 Prosecutors would submit that intercepted communications and conversations
19 between General Krstic and members of his staff and other army members of
20 the VRS, in the time frame from, I believe, the first conversation is
21 approximately the 9th or 10th of July and past, are relevant to the issues
22 that Your Honours will be deciding.
23 Secondly, I think the Court must determine whether the documents
24 that they have seen, the notebooks, the excerpts from the conversations
25 themselves, are reliable.
1 What makes these documents reliable? In the first place, Your
2 Honour, in respect of each of the notebooks, these documents have been
3 authenticated by witnesses who were present either at Okresanica, Konjuh,
4 or the location where the 21st Division was intercepting communications.
5 Each of the original notebooks has been examined by the witnesses from
6 those particular units, as well as the transcribed conversations from the
7 State Security Service. Each has been identified as being true versions
8 of those documents.
9 In respect of the notebooks, the platoon commanders from Konjuh
10 and from Okresanica have identified the notebooks by examining them,
11 identified their own handwriting in them and identifying the handwriting
12 of their colleagues in them. In respect of the notebooks from the 21st
13 Division, we heard a witness today. He's examined those notebooks, the
14 originals, and he has authenticated those notebooks. There was a witness
15 from the State Security Service who has identified the transcripts and has
16 done so on the basis of the header that is located at the top of the
17 document, and either codes which identify the person who intercepted the
18 communication or transmitted the communication, or by names that are
19 located at the bottom of those.
20 So in terms of the authentication of these documents, you've had
21 witnesses, and the Defence has had the opportunity to cross-examine those
22 witnesses, and whether these documents that we have submitted to Your
23 Honours are authenticate.
24 Now we turn to the issue of whether these documents are reliable
25 and can be depended on for what they contain. I think in your analysis,
1 Your Honours, you first of all must examine, what was the purpose of the
2 creation of these documents at the time they were created. Now, these
3 documents weren't created to come to the International Criminal Tribunal
4 for the former Yugoslavia when they were created in 1995. They were
5 created because they were important to military operations that were being
6 conducted in the course of a war. These intercepts, these conversations,
7 were of a military nature. They were the type that -- the type of
8 information in them was the type of information on which the military
9 relied. It was information that could potentially save lives. It was the
10 type of information that could change the tactical situation on the
11 ground, and it was the type of information that was being intercepted that
12 could well, in some cases, even change the course of a war. There was,
13 indeed, a strong motivation on the part of each of these intercept
14 operators to be accurate because indeed, lives depended on it. The course
15 of the war depended on it. These weren't communications that were, as I
16 say, intercepted for future use in a criminal proceeding against General
18 The next thing I think Your Honours must examine in determining
19 whether these conversations are reliable, let's take a look at the people
20 who intercepted these conversations, and Your Honours have heard from some
21 of these people, not all of them. These were people who were assigned a
22 specific duty by the army or by the State Security Service, and they had a
23 duty and an obligation to fulfil their task. Their task was to intercept
24 and accurately record the substance of conversations that they had heard.
25 Virtually all of these people had experience in the use of radios. Many
1 of them had been ham radio operators since their early years. Virtually
2 all of these intercept operators, Your Honours, you have heard, started in
3 this process of listening to, capturing, and recording communications
4 since the time the war started in 1992. They had been at it for a
5 considerable period of time by the time the conversations that are at
6 issue in this case, in July of 1995, had been intercepted. They were,
7 indeed, experienced at their jobs.
8 The next thing I think Your Honours should take a look at is, what
9 were the procedures that were used in the course of capturing this
10 information that would suggest that it is reliable. First, they were
11 virtually identical procedures that were used within the three units,
12 within the four -- within the three units. One, the conversation would be
13 listened to. When there was a transmission, immediately the person
14 intercepting the communication would depress a button on the tape
15 recorder, and it would be captured to the extent that it could be
16 recorded. Thereafter, and I say thereafter, there was a handwritten
17 notation, virtually contemporaneous, with the time the conversation was
18 captured on tape.
19 If there was a dispute, if the intercept operator had a question
20 about what was heard, Your Honours have heard testimony that the intercept
21 operator may solicit his colleagues to come and listen to the
22 conversation, and they would attempt to listen over -- indeed the witness
23 today said I think as many as 20 or 30 times they would listen to
24 conversation. Why did they do that? They did that because lives hung in
25 the balance on what was contained in these conversations. It had to be
1 reliable. Now, I think not only did it have to be reliable, but the army
2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of a terrible war depended on this
3 information. The army relied on this information itself.
4 So when you take a look at the procedures and the purposes, I
5 think it's clear that this information, created at the time it was
6 gathered, used for purposes of essentially understanding enemy movements,
7 potentially saving lives, suggests that this is reliable information.
8 I think Your Honours should also take a look at the integrity of
9 these documents themselves. Your Honours have taken a look at the
10 documents, have inspected them. They're available for Your Honours'
11 inspection. We have presented copies, but we have the originals
12 themselves. And you'll see in some cases there are multiple conversations
13 that are captured -- the same conversation, I should say, that are
14 captured from multiple locations. Let's take the example that my
15 colleague Mr. Petrusic described, Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 354, and 358.
16 Prosecutor's Exhibit 328 is a conversation between Colonel Beara
17 and General Krstic. It's both sides of the conversation, and it was
18 captured from Konjuh. 334 is only one side of the conversation, and it
19 was captured from Okresanica. Prosecutor's Exhibit 358 is a partial,
20 two-sided conversation captured by the 21st Division at Okresanica. Three
21 different locations capturing portions of the same conversation at or
22 about the same time on the same frequency.
23 Now, they're different times you'll notice in those exhibits. I
24 don't recall, I think one says 9.57, one says 10.00, but bear in mind
25 there are portions of this conversation that may be missing in one version
1 or the other. But when Your Honours inspect how these conversations are
2 integrated from different locations, that, the Prosecutor submits,
3 suggests reliability as well.
4 So, Your Honours, we believe these documents are relevant,
5 reliable, and trustworthy, and should be admitted.
6 Now, I would like to address specifically some of the points that
7 were made by my colleague, Mr. Petrusic. Mr. Petrusic has stated that the
8 typewritten version must be absolutely identical to the handwritten
9 version in the notebook. The testimony before Your Honours was that the
10 intercept operators never unilaterally changed anything from the
11 notebook. However, there were differences noted between the typed version
12 and the notebook version. And I believe it was Witness BB, who was a
13 transmitter of information and somebody who encrypted and transmitted this
14 information, explained to Your Honours why there may be differences. And
15 he explained to Your Honours that if there was a doubt in reviewing the
16 notebook, bearing in mind he was somebody who also intercepted for many
17 years, he would ask his colleagues to go back and listen to the tapes, and
18 any changes would be typed into the computer and not necessarily noted in
19 the notebook.
20 My colleague also says and objects to the English translations of
21 these documents. Well, we certainly join in any objection if there are
22 errors in the English translations; they should be corrected. We have no
23 objection with that whatsoever. We submit to Your Honours the versions
24 that we get from the Language Services Section and presume that they are
25 accurately translated, but if there are significant differences, they
1 should be retranslated and resubmitted to Your Honours.
2 Now, my colleague also said that the identity of the participants
3 is unreliable in some of these conversations. I merely remind Your
4 Honours of the testimony of the procedures that were used. The
5 conversation, the radio transmission, would be heard by the intercept
6 operator. He would note -- he would depress the button as quickly as he
7 could. In many cases, parts of the conversation from the time it was
8 initially heard to the moment the button was depressed are not and did not
9 appear on the tape, but the intercept operator would note on a piece of
10 scratch paper who it was, the identities of the parties, and would include
11 that, not in a verbatim portion of the intercept because only the tape
12 itself that had been -- the conversation that had been taped was
13 transcribed, but had the intercept operator heard the identities during
14 the time period before the button was depressed, he would note that. The
15 Prosecutor's Office submits, again, that's reliable for the reasons I've
16 previously stated.
17 Now, counsel also says that the voice identification can only be
18 done by experts. The Prosecutor's Office respectfully disagrees with that
19 submission. In our own common experiences, I think I'm not necessarily an
20 expert, but over the years I'm fully capable of understanding and
21 identifying voices. These were people whose job it was seven days a week,
22 every day for many years, rotating in and out of their shifts, to listen
23 to the same channels, and after a while, we would submit that voice
24 identification is indeed likely and proper.
25 Lastly, my colleague submits to Your Honours that they may require
13 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French
14 and English transcripts.
1 a proper analysis of these exhibits. Certainly these exhibits are at
2 their disposal. Any expert they want, we will make these exhibits
3 available to them for their analysis should there be any problem. That
4 can be raised insofar as their evidence is concerned and should not affect
5 the admissibility of these exhibits.
6 We would submit, Your Honours, that while in some conversations
7 and multiple conversations there may be some minor differences, the
8 substance of these conversations that have been captured from different
9 locations is the same. We would submit, in Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 334,
10 and 358, a close analysis by Your Honours, as we have done, will reveal
11 distinct similarities between those conversations.
12 Therefore, Mr. President and Your Honours, we would move into
13 evidence all of the exhibits that we have tendered throughout the course
14 of the last seven days that relate to intercepts. Thank you.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
16 Mr. Harmon.
17 Mr. Petrusic, do you have any additional observations to make?
18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you said that the substance of the
20 conversations were the same. Now, just for the sake of knowledge, when
21 several people hear the same thing, don't you think also the words should
22 be the same?
23 MR. HARMON: I think if people hear the same thing under optimum
24 conditions, they should be the same; however, as I understand this
25 testimony to be, there could be different interferences and conditions as
1 to what is being heard depending on your location, the orientation of the
2 antenna, and the like. That may well account for the differences in some
3 words or the inability to hear clearly some words.
4 I would agree with Your Honour that those of us in this room who
5 are hearing me speak should hear the same words. But the conditions in
6 this war from the different positions differed, and that may well account
7 for the differences that are found in the text.
8 I would invite the Court to look at the substance of these
9 conversations and consider the substance of these conversations in the
10 context of everything else in the reliability analysis of all of these
11 documents. None of these witnesses who were recording these conversations
12 had any reason whatsoever to make a mistake; they had no reason whatsoever
13 to be false in what they believed they were hearing.
14 JUDGE RIAD: As far as the discrepancy between the handwritten and
15 the typewritten text, if worse comes to worst, are the audio cassettes
17 MR. HARMON: Of a limited number of conversations, yes.
18 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
19 JUDGE WALD: I have one question which you may be able to help me
20 with. It's probably more a legal question than it is factual as to
21 anything we've heard.
22 In assessing the reliability or the authenticity of these
23 documents, why is it irrelevant, as I assume you must consider it since
24 you didn't put any evidence in this way, why is so-called chain of custody
25 irrelevant? In other words, these people were looking at these notebooks
1 sometimes, I guess -- they may have seen them in your office, but prior to
2 that, they hadn't seen them in five years or so, and none of them appeared
3 to be very clear about where those notebooks were in the meantime. Why
4 don't we have to think about that with relationship to authenticity or
6 MR. HARMON: It can be considered by Your Honours.
7 JUDGE WALD: But we don't have anything to consider. We don't
8 know. None of the witnesses seem to know.
9 MR. HARMON: The witnesses testify that these were sent back to
10 their high command.
11 JUDGE WALD: To the high command, yes.
12 MR. HARMON: That's correct. The Court can consider it, of
13 course, in --
14 JUDGE WALD: You are here presumably to tell me why we don't have
15 to worry about not knowing.
16 MR. HARMON: Well, I think, first of all, Your Honours, these
17 witnesses have identified the specific notebooks themselves.
18 JUDGE WALD: I understand that. They said, "I know this
19 notebook. That's my handwriting. I was there back in 1995 writing that
21 MR. HARMON: Right.
22 JUDGE WALD: But somebody thinking about it really, at least the
23 question goes through your mind, well, you know, where were they in the
24 last five years?
25 MR. HARMON: I understand. The answer to your question is we did
1 not present that evidence to Your Honours; we are in a position to present
2 that evidence to Your Honours. We believe the evidence that we have
3 presented is sufficient for their admission into evidence. Should the
4 Court have a question or desire that kind of evidence, we're perfectly
5 happy to call that evidence.
6 You can see, in terms of the type of evidence this is, that we
7 could be here for months putting in every intercept operator, and
8 therefore we elected to present the evidence in the manner that we did
9 because we believed that we could establish, one, its admissibility, and
10 we could establish its reliability as well.
11 JUDGE WALD: Okay.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Harmon, I have a
13 question for you.
14 Perhaps you examined the entirety of the notebooks. Have you got
15 an idea whether there is an order in all this of registration? If we look
16 at the registration number, at the Commander's number, perhaps there's a
17 sort of order. Some witnesses said yes, there is; others said no, there
18 isn't. Some say that the books were virgin, were empty; others say that
19 there was something. But they all have registration numbers. Now, are
20 you able to establish by examining their entirety whether there is any
21 sequence as to date, and any qualifications of those registration
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 MR. HARMON: I personally don't know the answer to your question,
25 Mr. President.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is it possible to have a memo
2 for the Chamber and for the Defence with respect to this question, because
3 I think that it could be important.
4 MR. HARMON: Yes, we can do that.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber will
6 make a ruling.
7 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The Chamber is rendering its
10 Having heard the arguments of the parties and taking into account
11 the spirit of the Statute, specifically the fairness of the proceedings,
12 the right of the accused to examine and have examined the witnesses
13 against him; and taking into account the general principles of criminal
14 law, that is, that the essential objective is to establish the truth, and
15 in order to attain that objective, it is important to have an overall view
16 of the evidence; and more specifically, taking into account Rule 89(C),
17 that is, the relevance of the documents and that they have been identified
18 by the authors to clarify the evidence; and taking also into account
19 Rule 85, the Chamber rules to accept the submission of the Prosecutor and
20 to admit into evidence the totality of the exhibits which are the object
21 of this motion.
22 That is the ruling of the Chamber.
23 So now, Mr. Harmon?
24 MR. HARMON: I'm now going to turn over the floor to my colleague,
25 Mr. McCloskey, who will examine the next witness.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you have the
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President, I heard the French, but
4 I didn't have my earphones on so I didn't hear what you just said.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I just gave you the floor,
6 Mr. McCloskey. That's all.
7 [In English] I'm giving you the floor.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 We have, as you probably remember, Mr. Butler from the United
10 States Army who is our military intelligence analyst that will be
11 testifying on some 200, 240 exhibits which are voluminous but, we think,
12 very important for the case.
13 We also have outside a representative of the United States
14 government, Ms. Jessica Holmes, and I think if we invite them both in now,
15 we can get started.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Let us invite them in,
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I take advantage of the occasion
20 to bid welcome to madam Jessica Holmes and Mr. Richard Butler. Can you
21 hear me well?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You're going to read the solemn
24 declaration that the usher is giving to you, please.
25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
1 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You may be seated. I think that
4 you are very familiar with our procedures, so there is no need for me to
5 explain to you what is going to take place. As you know, you will be
6 answering questions put to you by Mr. McCloskey.
7 Mr. McCloskey, your witness.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. McCloskey, my
10 colleague Judge Wald has asked me whether it is an open or closed
11 session. This is an open session, isn't it?
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, this is wide open, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You may
14 begin. Please begin.
15 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:
16 Q. Can you tell us your name and spell your last name for the record
18 A. My name is Richard Butler, last name B-u-t-l-e-r.
19 Q. And what is your nationality?
20 A. I am a US citizen. I am a military intelligence analyst with the
21 United States Army.
22 Q. And can you provide a brief outline of your career advancement in
23 the army?
24 A. I joined the army in 1981. I was an enlisted analyst from that
25 period until 1984. At that point in time, I became a non-commissioned
1 officer; I was promoted. From 1984 to 1988 I served as that. In 1988 in
2 December I was appointed as a Warrant Officer in the United States Army
3 Intelligence Corps, and I've been a Warrant Officer since then.
4 Q. And can you explain to us what a Warrant Officer is, and how it is
5 different, if it is, from what one would do as a regular officer,
6 lieutenant, major, and up?
7 A. A Warrant Officer, as the career track is designed, is to allow
8 individuals to specialise in specific segments of a career field, in my
9 case, within the intelligence career field. By a warrant to do that and
10 as a Warrant Officer, I'm able to focus my entire career on intelligence
11 and intelligence and analytical-related matters, rather than having a much
12 broader aspect that other army officers are expected to have.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. McCloskey, excuse me for
14 interrupting you. You know you speak the same language, and we have
15 interpreters, and I think it is impossible to have interpreters with
16 instantaneous memory. There's also a delay. So we have to bear that in
17 mind, and I ask you to pay attention, both you and the witness, to make a
18 pause between the beginning of your question and the answer. Perhaps one
19 day we will have interpreters with instantaneous memories, but for the
20 moment, they don't exist.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I appreciate that, and we've
22 been trying to tell each other that, and we always seem to go a little
23 fast, so we'll try and slow it down.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I will remind you by making a
25 sign without interrupting you with words.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
2 Q. Can you describe your current position as an intelligence analyst?
3 A. In April of 1997 I was seconded to the Officer of the Prosecutor
4 by the United States government, and I have been performing military
5 intelligence analysis-related functions for the Office of the Prosecutor
6 since April of 1997.
7 Q. You've described yourself as an all-source intelligence analyst.
8 Can you tell us what that is and what kind of materials you generally
10 A. Well, within the spectrum of intelligence and analysis there are
11 broad categories. Human-related intelligence, which for the most part is
12 the review of statements; it is the review of refugee comments; it is the
13 review of POW interrogations, those types of information that come based
14 from human sources.
15 The next discipline is signals intelligence which is the analysis
16 of information which comes from signals or communications-related
17 intelligence and many aspects. The analysis of intercepted enemy
18 communications, for that matter, how that's done.
19 The next one is the basic category of imaginary intelligence which
20 is the review of all forms of imaginary, aerial imaginary, ground-based
21 imaginary, those types of things to allow intelligence information to be
22 derived from them.
23 The next category is a relatively newish category, it's called
24 open-source intelligence, which is now looking at open-source
25 press-related information and finding and examining and getting
1 intelligence-related information from that material as well.
2 So there's -- the overarching purpose of my function as an
3 all-source intelligence analyst, I'm professionally acquainted with all of
4 those major disciplines and how to take the information that comes out of
5 there and put it into the required product.
6 Q. Which one of those categories would the documents such as orders,
7 internal military memoranda, military documents come under?
8 A. In that case that comes under the broad category of human-based
9 intelligence. The exploitation of captured materials, maps, graphics,
10 orders, the deriving of intelligence from those, those are considered part
11 of the human-based intelligence part.
12 Q. And what's the foundation of how you analyse all this, practically
14 A. Essentially, it's going through a very detailed and in-depth drill
15 of reviewing all the material, extracting all of the relevant portions,
16 putting it together and, you know, coming up with a detailed analysis of
17 the overall situation. It is a very in-depth process.
18 Q. Can you describe your relevant professional education you've had
19 as part of your army career?
20 A. Initially when I joined the army in 1981, the first level was the
21 basic intelligence analyst's course; as I became a non-commissioned
22 officer, the non-commissioned officer professional course; being appointed
23 a Warrant Officer required additional professional education, both a
24 basic course and I had to pass a technical certification course before I
25 could accept my warrant. And now as a senior Warrant Officer, my last
1 professional series of education was the Warrant Officer advanced course.
2 And all of these tracts of curriculum are specifically designed for
3 military intelligence analysis.
4 Q. How about a college degree?
5 A. I have a Bachelor's degree from the University of Maryland which I
6 earned while I was on active duty, and I've currently enrolled as a
7 Master's candidate in international relations, although it's been a while
8 since I've been able to work on it, obviously.
9 Q. Can you describe for us the three kinds of areas that this subject
10 has been broken down into in your context of intelligence evaluation?
11 A. Military intelligence as a major discipline looks at three broad
12 analytical areas. The first area is what we would call the strategic
13 analysis area, and in that aspect primarily we're looking as military
14 analysts at the strategic ability of nations or states to raise armies to
15 make war. There are a lot of technical factors along the lines of force
16 projection, military industry, mobilisation, those type of broad, basic
17 strategic assets and outlooks.
18 The next level that we look at is the operational level, and what
19 that operational level is, that's that middle level between the
20 component army, the military army function, and how it interacts with the
21 military assets of a corps and the relationships between the two.
22 Essentially, how one takes the strategic vision of what the strategic and
23 the political level want out of a military, and how you then translate
24 that into the executable functions which armies and corps do on the
1 The last aspect is the tactical aspects which essentially is the
2 analysis and the work that goes behind examining how those corps elements
3 at the operation level then take what they want to accomplish, and how
4 that works down at the lowest levels from corps to division, in this case
5 with the VRS to brigades to regiment and down to battalion.
6 So while there are three distinct disciplines, they're all very
7 well related to each other, and you have to be comfortable operating in
8 each one in order to get the full programme.
9 Q. In your analysis of the product for this case, have you had an
10 opportunity to review all three of those levels or review the material
11 with reference to all three of those levels?
12 A. Yes, I have. At the strategic level, a lot of that review came
13 about looking at the laws of the Republika Srpska that regulate how the
14 army is formed and how it operates. For the operational level, a lot of
15 that revolved reviewing and examining the former JNA rules and regulations
16 pertaining to corps operations and pertaining to the staff processes and
17 procedures which make those operations happen. And at the tactical level,
18 a lot of it revolved around actually reviewing documents and materials and
19 orders and directives from relevant brigade units.
20 And again, not only did we do that in many senses with the
21 documents, we've been able to interview people as well who have been able
22 to give us insights on how those three areas functioned within the system.
23 Q. So finally, can you give us a brief rundown of your actual field,
24 military field experience, from a broad perspective, obviously?
25 A. Very broadly, my first operational job was in Europe, Germany,
1 doing strategic analysis of the former Warsaw Pact and spent four or five
2 years doing that.
3 From there I went to an armoured cavalry regiment where you might
4 imagine the focus was strictly tactical, working on how to deal with
5 looking at opposing forces at the division and below level.
6 From that aspect I went to look at more along the lines of the
7 operational level of war where I spent two years reviewing Soviet army
8 operations in Afghanistan, and we looked at those operations and tried to
9 determine what lessons we could learn from those, so there was a very
10 detailed analysis.
11 From that position I went back to Germany, and we reviewed again
12 at that level operational and tactical aspects of the Warsaw Pact. Being
13 assigned to an infantry division, that was the focus we were doing.
14 From there back to the United States -- well, actually, before
15 that, from there I went -- I deployed into Iraq as part of the Gulf War
16 and again, that was tactical and operational level of war type analysis,
17 learning how the Iraqi army worked, and again, how we could defeat it on
18 the battlefield.
19 From there back into the United States, I stayed with a Middle
20 Eastern focus and worked at all three levels at that point, the strategic,
21 operational, and tactical level, looking at Iraq and other countries of
22 Southwest Asia.
23 JUDGE RIAD: Perhaps it may be useful to correct in the
24 transcript, "the Warsaw Pact," it is written differently. It's "war so
25 pact." It is the city, Warsaw.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honour. Yes, we have enough wars
2 in this case as it is.
3 We have Mr. Butler's CV as Exhibit 400 for any further reference,
4 and counsel has had that for a long time.
5 Q. Now, you mentioned briefly when you came to work for the OTP. Can
6 you tell us how it was that a US Army warrant officer could work for the
7 United Nations? What kind of arrangement did you have?
8 A. Initially I was seconded over when that programme still existed
9 within the UN. The UN had requested a professional military analyst to
10 help deal with some of the very technical aspects of these military
11 cases. In 1997 they didn't have a lot of that. I continued in the
12 seconded status until December 1998 when that programme ended.
13 Based on the apprehension of General Krstic in November, the
14 Office of the Prosecutor requested from the US government that I continue
15 to remain available to serve the Office of the Prosecutor in an analytical
16 aspect. The US government agreed to do so. From that period, while
17 specifically now I'm still a member of and work for the US government, I
18 am effectively on loan to the Office of the Prosecutor and will be for the
19 duration of this case.
20 Q. When did you first begin working providing intelligence analysis
21 to the Srebrenica investigative team?
22 A. Arriving here in April of 1997, within two weeks I was starting to
23 already work for primarily Eastern Bosnia, and very shortly after that,
24 within a month I was totally focused on dealing with the aspects of the
25 Srebrenica case. That has been my primary function since then.
1 Q. Can you describe for us the particular tasks and objectives you
2 were assigned by the investigative team? And please mention your two
3 principal areas of study which you have referred to as the command study
4 and the narrative study.
5 A. Well, sitting back and looking at the overall Srebrenica
6 investigation, we always refer to it in many aspects as a three-legged
7 investigation or stool. The primary leg is the actual criminal events and
8 the crime scenes, and the investigative team, as Mr. Ruez is noted,
9 handles that particular aspect.
10 What I was asked to do from a military analytical aspect is to
11 develop the other two legs; one of them being the command and control
12 component, defining what a corps command was, how a corps command
13 operated; more importantly, the roles and responsibilities and authorities
14 of a corps Commander in that aspect. That work is reflected in my first
15 product which is the command responsibility report, which essentially
16 takes in abstract a VRS corps command circa 1995 and lays out the
17 authorities and responsibilities as they are understood and outlined under
18 VRS army laws and under the VRS regulations in effect.
19 The second component of my work dealt with the actual linkage, if
20 we could make such linkage, between the military units of the Drina Corps
21 and the actual crime scenes. That, of course, was the harder portion of
22 the work. It's a much more lengthier product. But that product -- the
23 Srebrenica military narrative is the manifestation of all of that work,
24 the actual linkage of Drina Corps units to the crime scenes.
25 Q. You mentioned that as part of your command study you reviewed JNA,
1 basically former Yugoslav-type documents, regulations and rules, and
2 applied it to the VRS. How were you able to do that? Why would that be
3 valid, if it is?
4 A. One of the first things that we did when trying to examine the
5 regulatory background under which the VRS worked and operated was looked
6 at the former regulations of the JNA. They essentially provide the
7 foundation for that. Most of the professional officers of the
8 VRS were obviously former JNA officers.
9 As we went through and developed that and as we started acquiring
10 more and more military documents from the VRS from various sources, it
11 became quite clear that, in fact, the JNA operating methodologies had been
12 almost completely adopted by the VRS. And then the final component of
13 that was in the interview of many VRS officers, we'd put these regulations
14 to them and they told us flatly that, yes, they did use these JNA
15 operating instructions; they were in the middle of the war and this was
16 all that they had to use.
17 So for almost all aspects, the former operating regulations and
18 instructions of the former JNA are fully applicable to the VRS.
19 Q. For your narrative report, we've touched on it briefly, but can
20 you tell the Court what kind of materials you reviewed for the narrative
22 A. A lot of material clearly went into the work on the narrative.
23 The primary document basis, other than the JNA regulations which built out
24 of the core report, were documents we obtained from the VRS pursuant to
25 search warrants.
1 In the period of early 1998, I believe, the Office of the
2 Prosecutor conducted search warrants and we seized the military records of
3 the VRS 1st Corps, which was formerly the 1st Krajina Corps. We seized
4 the records of the 513th Motorised Brigade, which was formerly the Zvornik
5 Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps -- I'm sorry, the 503rd Motorised.
6 Then we also seized the records of the 513th Infantry Brigade, which was
7 formally the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps. So
8 between the three seizures, we're looking at almost 30.000-plus documents
9 from the RS which were relevant to the entire war period. That was the
10 regulatory base from the documents.
11 We also looked at in great detail the intercepts provided by the
12 Bosnian Muslim II Corps which were intercepting the VRS telecommunications
13 network in Eastern Bosnia during that period as well. That also plays a
14 piece in the analysis and also plays a piece in the result of the
16 Q. So to simplify matters, much of your materials were from what was
17 then called the Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Was the Drina Corps searched?
20 A. There was not a search conducted on the headquarters of the Drina
21 Corps. Primarily we could never get an accurate location of where their
22 archives were. Historically based, what happened after Dayton was within
23 six months, the Drina Corps headquarters was essentially disbanded and
24 their units were resubordinated to other VRS formations as part of a
25 general demobilisation.
1 Within about eight months, they reformed the Drina Corps, or what
2 they called it as the 5th Corps, and one of the problems is that we've not
3 been able to track the Drina Corps archives so we were never able to
4 effectively get a location of where to seize those.
5 Q. Now, you had access to the information generated by the
6 investigation; is that right?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. For the purposes of your narrative report for trial, have you
9 cited any witness statements that were not from witnesses that testified
10 in court?
11 A. For the purposes of the narrative, the only three instances I used
12 witness statements as opposed to actual witness testimony, two revolved
13 around the fact that they were witnesses who had not yet testified because
14 I got stuck in a production schedule and they hadn't gone yet, and they've
15 since testified. There was only one witness that I used who has not
16 testified who was a survivor of the Orahovac execution site. I needed
17 some information from his report and he was not called because you had
18 heard other survivors from Orahovac.
19 Q. So your reference to his statement in your report adds no new
20 material to what the Court has already heard.
21 A. No, sir, it does not.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, I don't know if you may want to make
23 a break here. It's a good place to break.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you are
1 We usually have three 20-minute breaks, but as we've only had one
2 break, let's have two together so that we can have a block of work. Let's
3 have a 40-minute break now; that is to say, we'll resume at 1.08,
5 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.11 p.m.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let us resume the hearing. I
8 should like to ask Mr. Richard Butler, if possible, to speak a little
9 slower, please.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: And Mr. President, if I could just go over some of
13 the paperwork issues before I get into the questioning again.
14 As you've heard, Mr. Butler has a narrative report and a command
15 report, and all the footnotes for both those reports have been put in
16 several binders. The narrative has eight, and the command has five, and
17 those are just the footnote sources, so that's like a library for this
18 material. I don't believe it needs to be overly accessible in the
19 courtroom because, in addition, we've chosen some 240 exhibits that we
20 have in some seven to eight binders, and we hope to get two to three of
21 those a day. It's very difficult to estimate, but those would be the
22 binders of exhibits, those two to three that we hope to get to during a
23 day that would be most important for the Court to have in front of you.
24 There's obviously a lot of duplication in the library source material, but
25 that's why we've given the separate binders for, for his testimonial
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. I hope
3 you're not going to bring in the libraries of universities here.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, we don't -- we'll not read too many intercepts
5 if we can help it also, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Please continue,
7 having said that. Thank you very much.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would like to just note for the record, we
9 have Exhibit 400-1 which is a declaration of Jan Kruszewski identifying
10 where all the material from the command report came from, and Exhibit 401
11 is the command responsibility report in various languages. And 401/3 is
12 Mr. Kruszewski's list of all the items and where they came from, and we
13 would like 403-3 to be under seal temporarily because we need to redact
14 some information from that.
15 We have the supporting material for the command report which is
16 402 which we can give to the Court in any way you would like it at any
17 time. The military narrative is 403A, and it comes in the various
18 languages. Exhibit 404 is the supporting material to the narrative.
19 And with that, I believe we're ready to get started with
20 Mr. Butler again.
21 Q. Mr. Butler, I want to start with the command report, and if you
22 could briefly summarise for us the structure of the RS government as it
23 relates to military command and control issues, very simply if you could.
24 And if we could start with Exhibit 405 on the ELMO that will help
25 illustrate that structure.
13 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French
14 and English transcripts.
1 A. In simple terms, as designed under the RS law in the army, the
2 chain of command starts at the top with the president of the Republika
3 Srpska. He exercises that command through the Commander of the Main Staff
4 of the army of the Republika Srpska, General Mladic, and from that point
5 the command is exercised through the six primary ground forces corps as
6 well as other units directly attached to or assigned to the Main Staff.
7 Q. All right. Let's go to Exhibit 406, and I want you to
8 specifically look to Article 369 and tell us about that section.
9 A. Article 369 is highlighted, and is the specific portion of the RS
10 law of the army that defines that the president of the Republika Srpska is
11 the only person who is responsible for the promotion and appointments and
12 transfers of individuals in the rank of General.
13 Q. So where does that fit in just briefly in the facts of the case as
14 you'll be discussing them later on?
15 A. As we get into the facts of the case, one of the key events that
16 occurs during the commission of the crimes and beyond is that there is a
17 corps change of command: the outgoing commander, General Zivanovic, the
18 incoming commander, General Krstic. What this designates is or where this
19 becomes important is the recognition is that in that change of command,
20 those command changes can only be made legally under their system by the
21 president of the republic.
22 Q. Okay. Now, in going to another subject in your command report,
23 the concept of command and control, a term you've already used, if we
24 could go to Exhibit 407 -- but prior to looking at this exhibit, can you,
25 can you tell us a bit about what this concept is of command and control
1 that is discussed under section 1 of chapter 3 of the Rule on Corps of
2 Ground Forces Provisional?
3 A. Again, taking the JNA base documents and regulations pertaining to
4 that, this is just a broad outline of the base function of command and
5 control within the army and how it encompasses all aspects of military
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would just note for the Court's attention, in
8 paragraph 63, "Command and control are conscious and organised activities
9 of the Commander of the corps and the bodies of command and," I would add
10 for emphasis, "aimed at engaging and unifying the actions and activities
11 of all units and commands, et cetera.
12 Q. Now let's go to the next exhibit, 408A. First of all, tell us
13 what the provisional service regulations of the army of the Serbian
14 Republic are.
15 A. In May, June, July, and, in this case, in August of 1992, as the
16 army of Republika Srpska was formed and now operating as an independent
17 entity, the army felt a need to publish a set of regulations pertaining to
18 the daily activities, roles and responsibilities, of all the individuals
19 who were members of the army. These provisional service regulations
20 pertain to the daily activities and the daily rules and regulations of the
22 Q. So unlike the last documents we looked at, these are actually now
23 Bosnian Serb documents.
24 A. That is correct, sir.
25 Q. I want you to look specifically at section 2, "Relations in the
1 Army." It talks about giving orders. Can you again just
2 briefly synopsise what this piece is about orders?
3 A. Essentially, looking at the three relevant paragraphs, paragraphs
4 16, 17, and 18, paragraph 16 discusses the prospects of when its officer
5 assumes command, along the very general aspect that the senior officer
6 will take command; paragraph 17 deals with the specific issue of members
7 of the army responsible for carrying out orders, particularly in a timely
8 manner without demur and with a full accuracy; paragraph 18 discusses the
9 aspects of the issuing of orders.
10 Q. So going back to paragraph 16, I want to ask you about the second
11 paragraph. "If the unit or institution is suddenly left without a
12 commanding officer, command shall be assumed by his deputy or the highest
13 ranking officer." Will that become relevant in the facts of the case as
14 you have analysed them later on?
15 A. That becomes relevant in so much as, as the Drina Corps Chief of
16 Staff during the period, General Krstic is also the Drina Corps Deputy
17 Commander. Behind General Zivanovic, General Krstic is the senior most
18 ranking officer in the corps.
19 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 409, the Rule of Ground Forces Provisional,
20 again. Now we're getting into the definition of the command roles of a
21 Commander. Can you briefly give us your understanding of the Commander's
22 roles and duties in the VRS?
23 A. Well, again, as defined under this JNA regulation, the Commander's
24 duties, very essentially, are to -- he is legally empowered with the
25 authorities and the responsibilities to command and direct the activities
1 of his, in this case, corps. He's responsible for all of the actions that
2 occur; the planning process, the execution, and the monitoring. Under
3 this system, he is the individual held responsible for all the results.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would call the Court's attention specifically to
5 paragraph 65, and one line in that: "He is responsible for harmonising
6 the activities of his command, subordinated commands and headquarters ..."
7 et cetera.
8 Q. This document goes on to say in paragraph 66, it starts talking
9 about the Chief of Staff position. Can you tell us about the Chief of
11 A. The Chief of Staff in the corps organisation is the primary person
12 who is responsible for planning, organising, and managing the aspects of
13 the corps staff, that organ which essentially, on behalf of the Commander,
14 directs the activities of the entire corps. Again, as it notes here, the
15 Chief of Staff functions also as the corps Deputy Commander.
16 Q. I note that in paragraph 66, in the middle of the paragraph, it
17 says, "He is the only one who, in keeping with the Commander's decision,
18 has the right to give assignments to subordinates." What does that mean?
19 A. Generally, that provision means that while the Chief of Staff, as
20 the Deputy Commander, is empowered to make the decisions for the brigades,
21 he generally has to do so within the frame of reference of the overall
22 guidance of the Commander. So while the Commander in many aspects will
23 make the larger decisions as to the major movements or the major actions
24 of the corps, it's the responsibility of the Chief of Staff to give the
25 series of implementing orders or more specified instructions based on the
1 general guidance and the direction that the Commander wants to go.
2 Q. What role would you expect, based on this definition, the Chief of
3 Staff to take in the planning of military operations?
4 A. The Chief of Staff in the planning of military operations is
5 normally the most knowledgable person about the conduct of the entire
6 operation. It's his responsibility to coordinate all of the planning
7 aspects from all of the various organs of the staff, to include the
8 operations organ, the intelligence organ, the security organs, the rear
9 services organs. Ultimately, all of those planning aspects are managed and
10 coordinated by him.
11 Q. Let's go now to Exhibit 410, which is a JNA document entitled
12 "Regulations on the Responsibilities of the Land Army Corps Command in
13 Peacetime." Can you tell us what this time and what applicability a
14 peacetime document might have for us?
15 A. Under the former JNA system, which again in many aspects was
16 adopted by the VRS, and even under the laws, they envisioned regulations
17 and command of military units operating under three distinct periods: a
18 period of peacetime, a period of immediate threat of war, and a period of
19 a state of war. Those are legal distinctions that the Republika Srpska
20 specifically used to define the legal powers and legal authorisations of
21 various government agencies to include the army.
22 These regulations reflect the peacetime status which was, of
23 course, the normal status, and in the case of the Republika Srpska,
24 despite a conflict going on, it was a declared state of peace for most of
25 the period from 1992 to 1995.
1 Q. Would the definitions in this document be applicable to the
2 wartime situation in RS?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Now if we could turn to what is page 6, entitled "Commander," we
5 get into another detailed definition of the command which I don't want to
6 go over, but I do want to point out, as we can see from the ELMO, the
7 highlighted areas. I notice that the Commander is in charge of, and it
8 lists a number of things and I've highlighted here, "Monitoring and
9 directing the work," et cetera, "Monitoring and studying," et cetera,
10 "Monitoring and assessing." The first three points are monitoring for a
11 Commander. Can you explain the significance and importance of a
12 Commander's duty to monitor the situation, as described?
13 A. In the sense of monitoring, generally, under the definitions given
14 by these JNA regulations, it's not enough for a Commander to issue an
15 order. He has to take the steps -- and a lot of that, again, is the work
16 of the staff -- to ensure that those orders are implemented. That's part
17 of the programme when giving an order: getting feedback as to whether that
18 order was complied with; if it was not complied with, why?
19 Q. Now let's turn the page, and let's go over to page 8, to "Chief of
21 Again, without getting into a detailed discussion of this, I noted
22 that under this definition, planning plays a significant role: formulating
23 and updating the development plan, compiling and updating the readiness
24 plan, compiling orders for combat training, planning and executing, the
25 organisation planning. Planning is everywhere. Again, as you've stated,
1 planning is an important part of the Chief of Staff's job; is that
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Also on the next page, number 10, what's that? It begins:
5 "Managing intelligence support of security organs for intelligence
6 work ..."
7 A. Again, it demonstrates that not only is he responsible as the
8 Chief of Staff for managing the operations aspect, he is also responsible
9 for oversight and managing the activities of the Security Branch. That
10 feeds directly back in to him. A lot of that, again, is part of the
11 coordination role. He is the ultimate coordinator of all of those
12 activities and he is the person who is going to make sure that all aspects
13 of that is in sync.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, to correct the record, and it's
15 probably my fault, there is a reference to page 10 as what we referred to,
16 when in fact it was paragraph 10 on page 9.
17 Q. Mr. Butler, you've mentioned intelligence and security. Can you
18 just briefly describe those two different functions in a corps command so
19 that we can get a feel for where they fit in to the command network.
20 A. In the VRS Corps command structure, intelligence and security are
21 broken down into two. While related, they're still distinct disciplines.
22 The Chief of Intelligence works and falls directly under the operations
23 staff and branch as part of the operative bodies of the corps. The
24 security branch falls under a separate branch, it's considered to be a
25 specialised services branch, and that falls under the control and
1 management of the Assistant Commander for Security.
2 Q. Okay. Now I'd like to go into another area of the rules and
3 regarding the law that governs the duties of commanders to prevent war
4 crimes and punish people involved in war crimes. Has the RS enacted any
5 legislation or any rules or orders related to those subjects?
6 A. The Republika Srpska from May of 1992 on did in fact through a
7 series of presidential decrees, laws, and other forms of regulations
8 fairly adequately delineate out the roles and responsibilities of senior
9 military commanders to prevent those types of things from occurring.
10 Q. And if we can go to Exhibit 411, Mr. Butler, if you could tell us
11 what this is.
12 A. This document is a 13 May, 1992, decree from the -- or order from
13 the president of the -- presidency of the Republika Srpska, or at that
14 time the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, pertaining to the
15 application of rules of international law of war on the army of the
16 Serbian republic.
17 Q. All right. And I will briefly read out the most relevant part,
18 and that would begin with section 2:
19 "Commanders of all units, as well as each member of the army or
20 other armed formation who takes part in combat activities, are responsible
21 for the application of the rules of the international law of war.
22 "It is the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate
23 proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the rules
24 of the international law of war."
25 Would a corps commander, in your view, be such an officer?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. Let's go to the next exhibit, 412. That's entitled "The
3 Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War and the Armed
4 Forces of the SFRY." Okay, we're back to a document from the former
5 Yugoslavia. How does this have relevance to the Republika Srpska and the
6 VRS in particular?
7 A. As part of, again, adopting the former operating regulations of
8 the JNA and SFRY, these essentially were adopted and totally used by the
9 army as their operating, regulating guidelines on combat operations
10 pertaining to, to the -- to preventing violations of laws of war. We've
11 been told this by several key officials within the Republika Srpska
12 government that this was, in fact, the applicable document.
13 Q. All right. And, without reading it, I would call the Court to the
14 attention of paragraph 20, "Personal responsibility for violations of laws
15 of war," which describes that each officer is personally responsible; and
16 going on to page 15, we have highlighted the second paragraph, "The
17 perpetrators of such criminal acts may also answer before an international
18 court if such a court has been established."
19 In your view, would that include The Hague, where we are today?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Again, I would call the Court's attention to paragraph 21, "The
22 responsibility for the actions of subordinates," and 22, which I would
23 like to take a moment to read out.
24 "Responsibility for violations of the laws of war committed on
25 orders. A member of the armed forces shall be liable to criminal
1 punishment also for violations of the laws of war committed by following
2 orders resulting in the commission of a war crime or other grave criminal
3 offence --"
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could we ask Mr. McCloskey to slow down, please.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I'm sorry.
6 Q. "-- if he knew that the orders were intended to bring about a
7 violation of the laws of war which constitutes a criminal offence."
8 In your view, would this apply to General Krstic if he received an
9 illegal order from General Mladic?
10 A. Yes, it would.
11 Q. Now, if we could go to OTP Exhibit 413. Mr. Butler, if you could
12 tell us what this opening letter from General Mladic is, and then go
13 through the document and tell us what the rest of it is.
14 A. As I noted earlier, the process of the VRS in early and mid-1992
15 as it was establishing itself as an independent army, what this letter
16 represents and the document behind it is the guidance and the policies
17 that came out of the Main Staff pertaining to the roles and
18 responsibilities of the army commanders for enforcing the former laws of
19 the SFRY and the military regulations of the JNA and their applicability
20 into the VRS.
21 This document specifically deals with three aspects of military
22 law, the first aspect being crimes against the army, the second aspect
23 being crimes related to failure to respond to mobilisation, and the final
24 aspect dealing with crimes against violations of international law.
25 Q. I'm going to ask both of us to slow down. We'll get the hang of
1 it; otherwise, we won't be here. But by tomorrow, I'm sure we'll have
2 rhythms worked out.
3 Now, Mr. Butler, this is a document, 413, by the -- entitled
4 "Guidelines For Determining Criteria for Criminal Prosecution," from the
5 military prosecutor's office of the Main Staff. And I note that on the
6 first page entitled "Guidelines Determining Criteria For Criminal
7 Prosecution," it lists the three areas that it's most -- this particular
8 document is most concerned with, the first being failure to respond to
9 military callup; the second being which willfully absenting one's self
10 from one's post; and the third, what is relevant for us, criminal offences
11 against humanity and international law pursuant to chapter 16 of the
12 Criminal Code.
13 And again, if you could just go over to the next two pages, it's
14 under paragraph 3 entitled "Criminal Offences Against Humanity," but we've
15 highlighted the next page. If you could just give us a synopsis of this
16 and your understanding of it.
17 A. In short, what this series of paragraphs does is establishes a
18 positive preventive duty for senior officers and commanders of the army to
19 proactively deal with the issue of war crimes. First, proactively to take
20 the positive steps to prevent them, and second if they should occur, to
21 take the steps to deal with them. It obligates them further that if they
22 do not take these types of steps, that they themselves become answerable
23 for those same criminal offences.
24 Q. Was this an application at the time, in July of 1995, when General
25 Krstic was the Commander of the Drina Corps?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Would General Krstic have been aware of these rules and these
3 laws, in your opinion?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. How do you know that?
6 A. One of the further, in the scheme of the corps, assistant
7 commanders, one of the assistant commanders is in fact designated the
8 Assistant Commander for Legal, Religious, and Moral Affairs. As part of
9 that there is a subbranch within his staff which is the corps legal
10 officer. That would have been the repository for all of these legal
11 documentations and rules regulating these types of things.
12 Q. All right. Let's go now to Exhibit 414, and can you tell us what
13 this is?
14 A. This document is the 1993 law on military courts, and this is
15 Republika Srpska law.
16 Q. All right. And Article 65, what's the gist of Article 65?
17 A. The essence of Article 65 again reflects around the
18 responsibilities for every superior officer to take the positive steps to
19 prevent the individuals who may have committed crimes from fleeing the
20 scene. It establishes the responsibility of the Commander to take those
21 actions for dealing with criminal offences.
22 Q. And this now is, in fact, a law at this time?
23 A. That is correct, sir.
24 Q. Let's go to OTP Exhibit 415. Is this another Republika Srpska
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. And what's the gist of Article 1 as we have outlined it?
3 A. In the sense of this article, it's an individual responsibility
4 for anyone, be that military or civilian, who possesses any information
5 pertaining to or evidence of crimes against humanity or international law,
6 to report that to the relevant authorities.
7 Q. All right. And now let's go to 416. Can you tell us what this
8 law is in reference to, as it is relevant to ours? And I would
9 particularly point you and the Court to Article 8 and 9.
10 A. As I noted earlier, again under the three states in which the army
11 legally functions, peacetime, imminent threat of war, and state of war,
12 this article pertains to essentially the expanded legal powers of military
13 officers, particularly corps commanders, during a state of war.
14 In looking at Article 8 and Article 9, these articles set the
15 provision up for the corps Commander, or subordinate brigade commanders
16 with the approval of the corps Commander, for convening what are known as
17 emergency military courts or court marshals where they can, in effect, try
18 their own soldiers for various violations of law.
19 Q. But these special powers don't arise unless there's a particular
20 kind of state of war in existence; is that right?
21 A. These powers to come into effect requires a declared state of war.
22 Q. All right. And on that note, let's go to the next exhibit, 417,
23 and can you tell us what this is?
24 A. This is dated 14 July, 1995, and this is a decision on the
25 proclamation of a state of war in the Srebrenica-Skelani municipality
1 signed by the president of the republic.
2 Q. So on July 14th, the powers that you referred to in the early
3 exhibit would have been in effect in the Drina Corps?
4 A. For the most part within those elements in the Srebrenica-Skelani
5 municipality, yes, sir. What further occurs related to this is by 29
6 July, two weeks later, a state of war is declared for the entire Republika
7 Srpska, and in that effect, from 29 July onwards, those powers would have
8 referred to the entire Drina Corps.
9 Q. Before leaving this subject, what is your understanding of what --
10 let me give you a hypothetical. If General Mladic ordered General Krstic
11 to commit a war crime, what would, in your view, General Krstic's
12 responsibilities and powers be to do regarding General Mladic, his
14 A. First, within a sense, his individual legal responsibilities of
15 not following the order. Because as the regulations are very explicit,
16 there is no obligation to follow an order that is criminal at face value.
17 In the sense that General Mladic is a superior, General Krstic in
18 and of himself, probably doesn't have the authority to go out and
19 immediately arrest General Mladic; however, he has the positive
20 responsibility to, again, refer that to the superior officer who can deal
21 with that issue. In this case, it would have been the notification of the
22 president of the Republika Srpska.
23 Q. All right. Let's now go to the rules as they are related to the
24 security organs, going to Exhibit 418. In particular, I want to give you
25 a hypothetical involving a corps like the Drina Corps. Can you just
1 briefly describe where the security organ fits into the Drina Corps and
2 the responsibilities of the security officer or the Chief of Security.
3 A. First, dealing with the responsibilities of the Chief of Security,
4 who is also known as the Assistant Commander for Security, his primary
5 function is the security aspect of the corps, mostly in a
6 counterintelligence aspect. His other primary function is to provide, on
7 behalf of the Commander, management and oversight responsibilities for all
8 issues dealing with the military police.
9 Takeing that to the next step pertaining to where the Chief of
10 Staff fits in, again, in coordinating the actions of the Assistant
11 Commander for Security, and again coordinating the actions of the military
12 police battalion, the Chief of Staff is involved in that process to make
13 sure that their activities are fully integrated to not only the corps plan
14 but also the intent of the Commander.
15 Q. So for the corps Chief of Security, who is his boss?
16 A. His boss in the hierarchy is -- when the Chief of Staff is wearing
17 his chief-of-staff hat, so to speak, in that function, his boss goes to
18 the Commander. When the Chief of Staff is functioning as the corps Deputy
19 Commander, it goes through him to the Commander.
20 Q. Calling your attention to paragraph 18, "The security organs of
21 the superior command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces
22 provide specialist administrative services for security organs in
23 subordinate commands, units, institutions, and staffs of the armed forces
24 and provide assistance to these organs and organise, direct, coordinate,
25 and supervise their work."
1 Now, in the hypothetical I gave you, who would be the superior
2 command from the corps that also has a security organ?
3 A. In this instance, the superior command to that would be the main
4 security administration of the Main Staff of the army of Republika
6 Q. How does the Main Staff security organ fit in the chain of command
7 to a corps Chief of Security?
8 A. It doesn't fit into the chain of command per se in the functions
9 that the Chief of the Main Security Administration can order the lower
10 Chief of Security Administration to perform functions or tasks of major
11 significance. That Commander, that corps security officer -- corps
12 Assistant Commander for Security works for the corps Commander. It is not
13 an alternative chain of command.
14 Where this chain falls in is what's referred to in the regulations
15 as a technical or management chain; whereas the superior branch organ
16 provides technical advice, technical assistance, in some cases, resources,
17 guidance, and direction for the more technical aspects of security
18 operations. So it's not a command chain, per se; it is very much an
19 advisory and management chain.
20 Q. If we could go to Exhibit 419, back to the JNA Rule Corps of
21 Ground Forces, it speaks briefly on the subject of security at page 23,
22 paragraph 73. How does 73 add to the analysis?
23 A. Again, with respect to the analysis, it again shows that at the
24 corps level, counterintelligence is a primary function, and it again
25 reiterates that the Chief of Security is responsible for managing the
1 corps military police in accordance with the guidance and direction of the
2 Commander; in this case, proposing uses for the military police for the
3 Commander's approval.
4 Q. I'd now like to go to another area of the law, and Exhibit 420.
5 This is a law entitled "The Law on the Implementation of the Law of
6 Internal Affairs During an Imminent Threat of War or a State of War." If
7 you could turn the page to page 12 where we have skipped to the law
8 related to the use of police units in combat operations, under subheading
9 4, can you tell us about what the essence of this law is?
10 A. In short, what this law does is it regulates the command
11 relationship between the Ministry of the Interior police units and the
12 army when those police units are performing functions subordinate to the
13 army. It specifies that when they're conducting operations with the army,
14 that they are, in fact, subordinated to the army for the duration of those
16 The one other additional aspect of this article that is noted of
17 significance is the fact that the Ministry of the Interior police are only
18 obligated to perform those functions which have been previously agreed to
19 between the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, or are
20 designated by the President before they go under army control. So while
21 the Ministry of the Interior units are under army control for many of the
22 aspects, there are, in fact, limitations on what the army commander can do
23 relative to the people and relative to their mission.
24 Q. So would you expect the police units, the MUP police units working
25 together with the army on the same operation without the agreement, as
1 noted in this particular law?
2 A. Unless the functions were agreed to, they wouldn't be working in
3 that function at all.
4 Q. This has particular application to combat operations; is that
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. I'd also like to point you to Article 14 and ask you about this
8 particular sentence: "Police units assigned to combat operations by an
9 order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces shall be
10 resubordinated to the Commander of the unit in whose zone of
11 responsibility they are performing combat tasks."
12 What does that mean, " ... the Commander of the unit in whose zone
13 of responsibility they are performing combat tasks"?
14 A. In a broad sense, when you look at the historical pattern of MUP
15 operations with the army, generally, the Ministry of the Interior police
16 forces will be resubordinated first to the corps as the general oversight
17 asset. For practical, logistical, and battlefield coordination issues,
18 they would further be resubordinated down to the applicable brigade in
19 whose zone they were conducting operations.
20 Part of this, again, is a practical aspect of coordination; the
21 other part of it is a practical aspect of supply, logistics, food, those
22 things which are better taken care of by the brigade Commander. But in
23 both aspects, it's a clean, physical resubordination to the corps and then
24 to the subordinate brigade.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I would like to now take us to another
1 area. If you could briefly summarise General Krstic's career up to the
2 start of the assault on the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, and we have
3 two exhibits that you can refer to when you feel it appropriate, the next
4 one being 421.
5 A. General Krstic or, at the time in November 1992, Colonel Krstic
6 was first the Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, which in
7 November 1992, when the Drina Corps was formed, that brigade went from the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps control to the Drina Corps control, physical
9 resubordination of that unit. He was affiliated -- he was, in fact, the
10 Commander of that brigade for two years until August of 1994, when he was
11 appointed to become the Chief of Staff of the VRS Drina Corps.
12 If I can bring up, I believe, Exhibit 422 -- sorry, 421, this is
13 the order from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence pertaining to the
14 appointment of General Radislav Krstic, or then Colonel Krstic, as the
15 Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander.
16 As is generally designated within the JNA organisational
17 documents, the position of Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of a corps
18 is a function that is normally filled by a senior Colonel, somebody
19 awaiting promotion to General. What this document is, in May of 1995, is
20 a request by the corps Commander, General-Major Zivanovic, to the Main
21 Staff for the early promotion of Colonel Krstic to the rank of
22 General-Major; again, noting he holds the position of Chief of Staff and
23 Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps.
24 We don't have his order which pertains to the actual appointment,
25 but we see the public announcement of his promotion to the rank of
1 General-Major in June of 1995.
2 Q. What's the significance of General Zivanovic, in Exhibit 422,
3 recommending an early promotion?
4 A. In a practical sense, there's no reason to assume that he couldn't
5 do the job as well as a senior Colonel as he was as a General-Major, and
6 it's reasonable to believe that General Zivanovic felt strongly enough
7 that he should be promoted before his normal term because of the job that
8 he was performing and because of his capabilities to do that.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, we are now at the stage where I'd
10 like Mr. Butler to just briefly go over some of the personalities involved
11 in the next few days, and it would be helpful if we had the chart of the
12 Drina Corps that is right outside in the next room. We hadn't brought it
13 in before because it blocks the audience, but if we could take a moment to
14 bring that chart in now, that would, I think, help.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Could Mr. Usher assist,
17 So the interpreters and the court reporters can make up for the
18 delay now.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: I apologise, Mr. President. We've had a lot of
20 exhibits out there but we don't have the right one. It is Exhibit 28 in
21 the small version so perhaps we can use that.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We can use the ELMO, can't we?
23 It is easier. In that way, the public can see and are not prevented from
24 seeing what we are seeing. Yes.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: That should be Exhibit 28.
13 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French
14 and English transcripts.
1 THE WITNESS: If we could zoom out a little bit.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
3 Q. Mr. Butler, if you could take your highlighter, actually, and
4 let's first point out General Krstic, if you could just highlight his
5 position as the Commander.
6 A. [Marks]
7 Q. I think we'll be discussing quite a bit of General Krstic. Let's
8 go down to General Zivanovic and just briefly describe where he fits into
10 A. In the case of General-Major Zivanovic -- he, again, is off to the
11 side on this particular chart -- he is the Drina Corps Commander up to the
12 period of 13 July 1995. When the corps was formed in 1992, he was
13 appointed the Commander of corps and was since then.
14 His position is relevant, and we will see him through parts of the
15 operation, the actual capture of Srebrenica. We will see his physical
16 presence at the first meeting between the Dutch and between General
17 Mladic. After that we don't see physical presence of him except for one
18 instance in Potocari on the 12th. We'll continue to hear from him in the
19 form of intercepts from the Bosnian Muslim army on the 13th and on the
20 14th. After the 15th, or on the morning of the 15th, essentially he will
21 tell us he's no longer making any decisions or authorised to do so, and he
22 essentially disappears from all of our information holdings after the
23 morning of the 15th. [Marks].
24 Q. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic?
25 A. Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic is the Assistant Commander or
1 Chief of Security for the VRS Drina Corps. We see his involvement as
2 early as the meetings on 12 -- on 11 July, the meetings with the Dutch,
3 with the VRS, and with Muslim representatives. We see him again on the
4 12th in Potocari, and we see his active involvement with the aspects of
5 the movement of prisoners into the main execution areas in the zone of the
6 Zvornik Brigade. We particularly see his activities on the 16th of July,
7 1995, at the time that the killings are occurring at the Branjevo Military
9 Q. And Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric?
10 A. Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric is the Chief of Intelligence for the
11 VRS Drina Corps. We see him, his activities, again related to the
12 meetings between the Dutch, the UN, and Muslim representatives on the 11th
13 and 12th of July. We see his involvement with the refugee population in
14 Potocari on 12 July.
15 Q. He's notable because of his balding hair and very large moustache
16 on the videos; is that right?
17 A. That is correct, sir.
18 Q. And who is Major Pavle Golic?
19 A. Major Golic is an intelligence officer of the Drina Corps. We see
20 his involvement, particularly first in the series on the 14th, and later
21 on the 16th at the command of the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica
22 where he's active passing information relating to Colonel Popovic and
23 relating to the procuring of fuel and other requirements during the
24 Branjevo Farm killings.
25 Q. Colonel Lazar Acimovic?
1 A. Colonel Acimovic is the Assistant Commander for Rear Services or
2 Logistics Services of the Drina Corps. We see his function primarily on
3 the 12th and the 13th where both him and members of his staff become very
4 involved in the process of moving the Muslim population from Potocari to
5 Muslim territory outside of Kladanj. He's very involved in those process,
6 and those same buses later are used as part of the movement of Muslim
7 males who have been held in facilities in and around Bratunac to the main
8 execution sites up in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.
9 Q. Colonel Slobodan Cerovic?
10 A. Colonel Cerovic is the Assistant Commander for Legal, Religious,
11 and Moral Affairs of the VRS Drina Corps. We see his presence and we note
12 him at the command post of the Drina Corps with multiple discussions
13 pertaining to the handling of prisoners, and further in several
14 discussions where he notes that General Krstic has been apprised of
15 various reports that are coming out of brigade commanders, specifically
16 the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade.
17 Q. Colonel Ignjat Milanovic?
18 A. Colonel Milanovic is by position the Chief of Anti-Aircraft
19 Defence of the Drina Corps. He's a former Deputy Commander and Chief of
20 Staff of the Bratunac Brigade in early 1992, 1993. We see his primary
21 role during this period on the 13th, we see him involved in discussions
22 pertaining to trying to acquire bulldozers or backhoes, probably related
23 to executions in and around the Srpska Valley or Jadar River area.
24 We further see him again on the 15th of July when, on behalf of
25 the corps Commander, he conducts a very detailed tour of the area from
1 Bratunac through Konjevic Polje through Milici, looking at the military
2 situation there and recommending to the Commander of the Drina Corps steps
3 that should be taken in order to improve the command and control and the
4 military operations relative to the remainder of the Muslim column.
5 Q. Okay. Now that's most, but perhaps not all, of the Drina Corps
6 people that we'll be hearing about. Now let's go to the Drina Corps
7 units, starting with the Bratunac Brigade and Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic.
8 A. He is the Commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
9 subordinate to the Drina Corps. His personnel are involved in the
10 activities that happen in Potocari on the 11th and -- I'm sorry, on the
11 12th and the 13th. We further see his units involved in some of the
12 combat operations against the column on the 14th; and some of his units, a
13 small element, which deploys toward Zepa. But he remains for the most
14 part in the physical vicinity of his command post in Bratunac until about
15 the 17th or the 18th of July.
16 Q. Now, Major Momir Nikolic?
17 A. Major Momir Nikolic is the Assistant Commander for Intelligence
18 and Security Affairs of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. By
19 organisational function in a light infantry brigade, the roles of security
20 and intelligence are combined. They're not separated out, so he holds
21 both positions.
22 We see his involvement on the outside of the initial meetings on
23 the 11th and 12th with the members of the Dutch, the Muslim population,
24 and the VRS. We also see his involvement with issues dealing -- we see
25 him physically in Potocari and his involvement with issues dealing with
1 Muslim males coming out of the Potocari around the Bratunac area on the
2 12th and the 13th. He's also, he's also further noted in issues dealing
3 with the wounded Muslims who are being held in the military hospital in
4 Bratunac. And I don't have him on this list here, the Drina Corps staff
6 Q. Could you tell us that last statement again? I don't think it got
7 translated into French.
8 A. I apologise. He's also involved with the issues pertaining to
9 wounded Muslims who are being held and treated at the Bratunac military --
10 or at the Bratunac medical facility.
11 Q. That being Momir Nikolic?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Okay. Let's go to the Zvornik Brigade now, and tell us about the
14 Commander, Lieutenant Commander Vinko Pandurevic, but just briefly because
15 the details will come.
16 A. In the case of Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, we see him
17 commanding elements of the Zvornik Brigade which deploy for the actual
18 military operation against Srebrenica. On the evening of the 13th, we see
19 those elements deploy for operations in Zepa. Because of the military
20 operations which occur later from the Muslim column which are attacking
21 primarily the units of his brigade in Zvornik, we see him on the morning
22 of the 15th with those units return back to the Zvornik Brigade area.
23 Once he arrives back in the Zvornik, we see him active in not only the
24 defence, but he also sends a series of reports to the command of the Drina
25 Corps pertaining to issues of Muslims being held in schools in his zone of
2 Q. And Major Dragan Obrenovic?
3 A. He is the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Commander of the Zvornik
4 Brigade, and during the absence of Colonel Pandurevic, he is in effect
5 running the day-to-day operations of the Zvornik Brigade. We will see his
6 involvement tracking the movement of the column as it moves from Bratunac
7 north into his zone, in Zvornik zone. He becomes involved in issues of
8 the column and also involved in issues of the handling and holding of
9 prisoners in the schools in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade on the 14th,
10 particularly those that are held at the school at Orahovac.
11 Q. And Lieutenant Miomir Jasikovac?
12 A. Lieutenant Jasikovac is the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade
13 military police company. We see first his involvement, the military
14 police, on various ambush sites on the evening of the 12th, on the evening
15 of the 13th, as the Zvornik Brigade is now mustering all of their
16 remaining reserve units, the military police being one of those that can
17 be used, as the column is coming north.
18 On the 14th -- or on the evening of the 13th, we see elements of
19 the military police pulled out of those ambush positions and redeployed at
20 the school at Orahovac where the Muslim prisoners are arriving.
21 Q. Okay. And were you able to mark the exhibit for Pandurevic and
23 A. My apologies. They're both on the exhibit.
24 Q. And if you could move that exhibit up a bit. There we go. Major
25 Dragan Jokic?
1 A. Major Dragan Jokic by position is the Chief of Engineering
2 Services of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. On the 14th of July he's also
3 performing the function as the Zvornik Brigade duty officer, in effect,
4 the representative of the Commander at the operations centre.
5 On the 14th, we see his involvement in a series of discussions
6 pertaining to, one, the movement of the column north into their zone as he
7 advises the Drina Corps and other people what the status is. We further
8 see his involvement in the discussion with Colonel Ljubo Beara who is the
9 Chief of the Main Security Administration.
10 Q. Could you provide more detail about the position of duty officer
11 and how it relates to the functions of any command, both brigade, corps,
12 main staff?
13 A. In a sense, the duty officer is the individual who functions on
14 behalf of the Commander in the operations centre. It's generally
15 recognised that one of the functions of command in going out and
16 inspecting the troops or being with the troops, that the Commander himself
17 is not physically going to be in the garrison or headquarters 24 hours a
18 day, yet that is where the information comes in.
19 Particularly in the case of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Obrenovic
20 is out with the soldiers at various ambush locations ensuring they're set
21 up properly, ensuring the resources are used. Major Jokic as the duty
22 officer, his duty position is in the operations centre where it is his
23 function as orders and directives and information comes in from higher or
24 from other units, it is his job to collate that information and then pass
25 it to the Commander, in this case the Deputy Commander, Obrenovic, later,
1 when Colonel Pandurevic returns, to Colonel Pandurevic. But he
2 essentially is the focal point of information in the operations centre,
3 and that functionality goes from the brigade. There's a similar
4 functionality at corps, so it is a fairly seamless thing.
5 Q. Captain Dragan Jeftic?
6 A. Captain Dragan Jeftic is the Commander of the Engineer Company of
7 the Zvornik Brigade. We see backhoes and bucket loaders under command of
8 the engineer company active in burial operations in Orahovac, at the
9 Petkovci dam, and at the Branjevo Military Farm, and at the site of Kozluk
10 on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and in one case the 18th of July. So it is
11 his unit his responsible for burying those who have been killed at those
13 Q. Drago Nikolic?
14 A. Lieutenant Drago Nikolic is the Zvornik Brigade Assistant
15 Commander for Security. In this case, because Zvornik is an infantry
16 brigade and not a light infantry brigade, the functions of intelligence
17 and security have been separated. He is the one -- the Assistant
18 Commander for Security.
19 We see him chronologically on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, primarily
20 at the back end of the operation, where his people, again the military
21 police, are rounding up Muslim stragglers from the column. And in many
22 cases, these people are known to be captured, their names are taken down,
23 some of them are interrogated, and they're later missing.
24 Q. And you meant July? You meant July when you said those dates?
25 A. I'm sorry, July 1995.
1 Q. And Captain Milorad Trbic?
2 A. Captain Milorad Trbic is an intelligence and security officer with
3 the Zvornik Brigade. He, in effect, assists both of the other officers in
4 the performance of their duties. We see him first performing the duty
5 officer function on the 16th of July, 1995, and he's involved in a series
6 of conversations pertaining to the involvement of Colonel Popovic as
7 members of the Drina Corps command and staff are trying to locate him.
8 We further see his involvement several months later as part of the
9 reburial process where, when fuel and resources are allocated to the Drina
10 Corps to perform this reburial process, he is the officer put in charge of
11 the Zvornik Brigade for monitoring the fuel usage to make sure that none
12 of it is illegally or improperly siphoned off from that role.
13 Q. Okay. And the last soldier for today, I would think, Sergeant
14 Gojko Simic.
15 A. Sergeant Gojko Simic is the Commander of the Fire Support or Heavy
16 Weapons Platoon or the 4th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Infantry
17 Brigade. He is identified by one of the survivors of the Orahovac
18 killings as one of the individuals -- or as the individual of the group
19 that's doing the executions. He's in charge of that group.
20 This is on the 14th. Gojko Simic is killed two days later on the
21 16th of July in combat operations defending the 4th Battalion command post
22 which was then later run over by the Muslim column on its way towards
23 Bosnian Muslim held territory.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, that does give us a start on the
25 next few days, but this would probably be a good time to stop.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. That is a
2 good time to interrupt and adjourn for today. We will meet again tomorrow
3 at 9.30 to continue.
4 You had something to say, Mr. McCloskey? Go on.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, I forgot to mention, I have
6 spoken to Defence counsel, and there is a matter that Defence counsel and
7 the Prosecution need to discuss with the Court very briefly in an informal
8 setting somewhere, either directly after or perhaps prior to tomorrow
9 morning. It shouldn't take very long. There's something we just need to
10 discuss briefly.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If I understood you correctly,
13 Mr. McCloskey, it would be an informal meeting with the Chamber. Perhaps
14 in my office?
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: That would be excellent.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Would 5.00 be convenient for
17 you? I'm going to ask Mr. Petrusic the same question.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, that's perfect.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, and for you?
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Fine. I will have the pleasure
22 of receiving you in my chambers with my colleagues at 5.00 today. We can
23 save on hearing time by doing that. It is better to do that in that way,
25 Very well, I'll see you at 5.00.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.33 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of June,
3 2000, at 9.30 a.m.
13 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French
14 and English transcripts.