1 Friday, 21 July 2000
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and
7 gentlemen; good morning, to the technical booth, the interpreters; good
8 morning, legal officers, the registrar, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Cayley,
9 Mr. McCloskey; good morning, Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic, and
10 General Krstic.
11 Good morning, Mr. Butler. We're going to continue with your
12 testimony, and it is Mr. Petrusic's turn to continue.
13 Your witness, Mr. Petrusic.
14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours; good
15 morning, my learned friends from the Prosecution; good morning,
16 Mr. Butler. The Defence wishes a good morning to all others present here
17 in the courtroom.
18 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic: [Continued]
20 Q. Mr. Butler, do you have any evidence that the forward command post
21 of the Drina Corps was located in the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade
22 on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of July, 1995?
23 A. I believe there is one specific reference in one of the previous
24 exhibits tendered, and again the specific exhibit number escapes me, where
25 the specific identification "IKM Drina Corps" and "Bratunac" are used in
1 the same context.
2 Q. Was Pribicevac a forward command post during the operation?
3 A. As established, the location of Pribicevac was first a command
4 post for the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Infantry Brigade, Light
5 Infantry Brigade. It was also a command post for a group or Tactical
6 Group that oversaw or monitored the operations of Srebrenica for two years
7 prior. It later became the forward command post of the entire Bratunac
8 Light Infantry Brigade as part of the operations for Krivaja-95, and into
9 that same command post function, a good number of Drina Corps officers
10 fell in, so it became a forward command post for the Drina Corps as well.
11 Q. The command post or the forward command post?
12 A. In this regard, we would be talking about the forward command post
13 at Pribicevac, sir.
14 Q. Do you have any evidence to show who represented the Corps
15 Commander at the command post in Vlasenica on the 14th of July, 1995?
16 A. Working under the premise that General Major Krstic was the Corps
17 Commander on that day and that he may well have been in Zepa, with the
18 understanding that at that time Colonel Svetozar Andric, who was assuming
19 the position as Chief of Staff at the time, was also reportedly in Zepa,
20 the next logical individual who would have assumed that function would
21 have been the Chief of Operations for the Drina Corps.
22 Now, my understanding in this regard is that the Chief of
23 Operations of the Drina Corps was also in and around the Zepa area as
24 well. So specifically, while I can't give you the name of an individual,
25 the other individuals in question would have been other officers of the
1 Drina Corps staff. The most probable one, and there would have been two
2 that come to mind rather quickly, one would be Colonel Cerovic, the
3 Assistant Commander for Morale, Legal, and Religious Affairs of the Drina
4 Corps, and Colonel Popovic, the Assistant Commander for Security.
5 Q. Regarding the change of the Corps Commander, were the brigade
6 commanders or the brigades informed of that change? Because as you say,
7 this change took place on the 13th. Were they informed on that same day
8 of this change?
9 A. As the previous -- as at least one previous exhibit has
10 demonstrated, the response by the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to a
11 Drina Corps order that we do not possess, in reading that response, I
12 conclude that that case specifically, the Bratunac Brigade, was informed
13 of a change of command, and my presumption is that based on that document,
14 that the other brigades would have been informed as well. However, that
15 again -- that information would have been available to them by the late
16 evening of the 13th or the early morning of the 14th hours, so I can't
17 specifically say the brigade commanders would have been aware of that
18 change of command on 13 July.
19 Q. In the written documents of the other brigades, the Zvornik, the
20 Milici, the Vlasenica, and Birca Brigades, as well as the Rogatica
21 Brigade, among those documents is there any evidence to show that the
22 Commanders were informed of the change at the head of the corps?
23 A. As I previously indicated, of the units that you've listed, the
24 written documents that I have reflect only Bratunac Brigade and Zvornik
25 Brigade. I do not possess the material documents for the other units that
1 you've listed. So I cannot answer that. I can only say that in the case
2 of the Bratunac Brigade, I have a piece of information that indicates that
3 there was a change of command notification.
4 Q. In that piece of information from the Bratunac Brigade, is a date
5 indicated when the change took place?
6 A. No, sir. The specific phrase, and again it comes out rather
7 awkward in English, is "hitherto," which, being American and not English,
8 I had to ask -- do some research on what exactly that meant, "hitherto"
9 reflecting from that point and prior. So my conclusion is that that
10 change of command or that date is reflective of their notification on the
12 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I should like to ask the usher for
13 his assistance to find Exhibit 556, please.
14 Q. In its questions, the Defence will proceed from the assumption
15 that this piece of information is an authentic document, although that has
16 been disputed because this is an intercepted telephone conversation
17 conducted on the 14th of July, 1995, at 20.38 between Major Jokic and
18 Major General Zivanovic who is at Zlatar. In the third line of this
19 conversation, General Zivanovic says to Major Jokic, "Take this as an
21 Mr. Butler, somebody who has been replaced and relieved of his
22 duty as commander, can he issue orders to an immediate subordinate?
23 A. In reviewing the intercepts within the context and with
24 specifically this intercept, because this issue and this specific
25 intercept flies counter to the theory that we've examined, one of the
1 things that I have done in looking at this is trying to come to grips with
2 under what circumstances and why that phrase specifically is there.
3 One of the possible reasons that I would have, and in many regards
4 this is supported by the other information pertaining to the lack of
5 communications with General Krstic and, in fact, in many case supported by
6 statements that have come out of the interview, that there was also a
7 discussion between Colonel Obrenovic, or Major Obrenovic at the time, and
8 General Krstic related to the same topical area.
9 So in this regards, and as I believe I've noted in direct, the top
10 line, the frequency, was not active, again potentially implying a
11 communications difficulty. But in putting this all together, what I
12 believe we have in this case is General Zivanovic still as a superior
13 officer in the VRS, in fact giving an order to the duty officer Major
14 Jokic and indicating to him that he should take this as an order, the
15 presumption being that he, General Zivanovic, is authorised, particularly
16 in this case, to give that order.
17 Moving back off that, the question then becomes by what
18 authorisation General Zivanovic is giving this order.
19 Q. In this same conversation a few lines down, General Zivanovic
20 indicates in tactical terms, I would say, what Major Jokic needs to do --
21 or rather, the unit of the Zvornik Brigade, when he says, "Then it means
22 good weapons, good reconnaissance and taking good action against all of
23 that." And then towards the very end of the conversation he says again,
24 "Therefore blockade, blockade. The units will be there by dawn."
25 Mr. Butler, is he, that is General Zivanovic, indicating how units
1 should be deployed in the sense of a command?
2 A. In this specific intercept, what I believe he's doing -- he's not
3 specifically indicating how units would be deployed as a command. What
4 he's doing is indicating in broad terms the type of broad actions that he
5 wants the duty officer to pass to Obrenovic what he should be doing during
6 the course of the evening, for the first part; and for the second part,
7 indicating that block it, do the best that you can, and be aware that
8 reinforcement and other units will be there by dawn, dawn in this case
9 being the morning of the 15th. And as we know from the further
10 information, the units of the Zvornik Brigade withdrawing from Zepa arrive
11 the morning of the 15th back in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.
12 Q. The time of this conversation is the 14th of July, 1995, at 2020
13 hours. That is what the Defence wishes to note.
14 The next exhibit is 558. The date is the 14th of July, 1995, and
15 the conversation at 2056 hours between a major and General Zivanovic - X.
16 Mr. Butler, in the seventh line of this intercept, the Major
17 addresses the General and says, "How can I find out --" he's addressing
18 "X" and asking him, "How can I find out where General Zivanovic is as
19 I've been waiting here for him on his orders since 1700 hours."
20 Does that mean that someone is continuing to act on General
21 Zivanovic's orders and to carry out his orders, or rather, that Major
22 General Zivanovic is still issuing orders to his -- to subordinate
24 A. Well, clearly your first explanation is probably the most
25 technically accurate one considering the identification of "M," the major,
1 is unidentified. So not knowing how "M" the major is, it's difficult to
2 make the next leap, but clearly that individual is waiting for General
3 Zivanovic on his orders.
4 Q. So in this case too, we have an order which was passed on to
5 somebody from General Zivanovic.
6 A. I'm not sure it qualifies as an order. It's a statement that a
7 Major has been waiting for General Zivanovic at a location on his order.
8 I don't know if that qualifies as a passing on of an order in a formal
10 Q. But in this intercept, in this case, reference is made to an order
11 among the participants.
12 A. The reference made to the order is the individual Major was told
13 by General Zivanovic to be here waiting for him. In the scheme of orders
14 and instructions in commands, in my mind, looking at that, it's less a
15 formalised, "I'm giving you a series of formal instructions," rather than
16 a general is a superior officer telling a major, unidentified, "Be there
17 at this time and wait for me." It's tough to tell what the context is,
18 but I wouldn't read too much into it on one line, sir.
19 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may the Defence be
20 allowed to read the entire intercept? It is not long.
22 "X: Just a moment, to Colonel Vukovic.
23 M: How it's going?
24 X: We're fine, how about you?
25 M: How can I find out where General Zivanovic is? I've been
1 waiting here for him on his orders since 1700 hours.
2 X: He's here.
3 M: What?
4 X: He's here.
5 M: There?
6 X: Yes.
7 M: Put me through to him.
8 X: I'll try to now.
9 Z: Good evening, Vuko.
10 M: Things are all right, good, here. I did everything in the
11 spirit of what I received last night. And this morning /?he/
12 called me Natasku? /word unknown/ and I came here this morning
13 at around 10 o'cock and I /as written/.
14 Z: Major!
15 M: Yes, yes, I understand you.
16 Z: I have just come from the checkpoint ...
17 M: Could you repeat that, please?
18 Z: I said that paper which was sent - there is one - from
19 Blagojevic, about me.
20 M: Okay.
21 Z: Read my conclusions.
22 M: I understand.
23 Z: Because (from here on drowned out by previously recorded
25 M: Yes, sir. I understand, completely, and then we'll focus on
1 the one down there. (drowned out by previously recorded
3 M: I understand. I'm going to my post up there.
4 Z: Listen. Where are your boys there?
5 M: Well, my boys are now in the western part, working there as of
6 today. Everything's in place. Sweet as a nut.
7 Z: Excellent.
8 M: I did that today.
9 Z: ... (mumbles something briefly)
10 M: Yes, sir.
11 Z: Take care.
12 M: Take care."
13 Q. From this entire conversation, Mr. Butler, it is clear that the
14 Major, as a participant, and Zivanovic as the other participant, are
15 discussing a certain military situation, and in a part of that
16 conversation, Ivanovic is cautioning the Major and telling him to read the
17 conclusions. Is that correct?
18 A. That's a correct phrase, sir, read my conclusions, yes.
19 Q. Is it also correct that the Major is telling General Zivanovic
20 where his forces are distributed?
21 A. That is correct, sir.
22 Q. And does General Zivanovic express his approval of that
23 distribution of forces when he says "excellent"?
24 A. That is correct, sir.
25 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the usher for his
1 assistance, and Exhibit number 532, please.
2 Q. This is an order of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska
3 issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Gvero. The date is unclear, illegible,
4 but it is July 1995.
5 In view of the format of this order and the units to which it is
6 addressed, the question is: The units to whom this order was issued, are
7 obliged to inform the Main Staff on the execution of this order?
8 A. With this specific order and coupling that with the follow-on
9 order for the Drina Corps, which essentially repeats this and
10 redistributes it to the brigades, I would not interpret it as the brigades
11 are responsible for informing the Main Staff specifically. The order, as
12 written, indicates -- I believe the phrase that they use is -- okay. In
13 this case they do not use the phrase, so let me -- in this specific one
14 they talk about the Republika Srpska Main Staff. So in this case, I don't
15 believe they use the generic phrase "superior command."
16 Again looking at this, I read there along the lines of the Drina
17 Corps, as the primary command, having to inform the Main Staff through
18 interim reports. I do not read this, and I do not believe it is intended
19 that the subordinate brigades are to inform the Main Staff directly
20 through the use of interim reports.
21 Q. It is undisputed that the Main Staff has issued an order to
22 lower-level units, in this case, brigades, is it not?
23 A. In this case the Main Staff has issued an order to the Drina Corps
24 commands, the IKMs, and several of the Drina Corps brigades.
25 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] With the assistance of the usher,
1 can I have Exhibit 649, please.
2 Q. An order of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, dated
3 the 17th of July, 1995, signed by the Commander, Colonel-General Ratko
5 The appointment of commanders of the mentioned orders, and that is
6 Lieutenant-Colonel Kesarevic, does that imply that Lieutenant-Colonel
7 Kesarevic is obliged, after carrying out activities envisaged by this
8 order, to inform the Main Staff through regular and interim reports to the
9 Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska or to -- that is, to its
11 A. In this particular instance, the document specifies that the
12 deadline for the completion of the task by a designated date and an order
13 for further engagement towards Cerska shall be imposed, meaning that
14 Colonel Kesarevic -- I hope I pronounced that correctly -- should propose
15 a future operations plan to me, again in this case it would be
16 General Mladic, by July 19, 1995.
17 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Exhibit number 364/2, please,
18 Mr. Usher. The tab 17th of July, tab 14/2.
19 Q. Mr. Butler, the Defence will once again ask the following
20 questions under the presumption of authenticity of this document. This is
21 an intercepted conversation. It was -- it took place on the 17th of July
22 at 2030 hours. Participants are Krstic and "X."
23 In this conversation, Krstic asks "X," "With whose approval did
24 you send soldiers down there?" and "X" answers, "On orders from the Main
25 Staff." Does that mean that the Main Staff having issued the order, in
1 this case to "X," the Commander of this unit, bypassed the chain of
2 command through the Corps Commander or the Deputy Corps Commander?
3 A. I just want to make sure I read the whole thing before I give you
4 my answer. I don't want to answer it out of context, here.
5 My answer to that, and I just wanted to confirm this because I've
6 gone over this one before as part of my analysis, is that it only -- your
7 conclusion makes sense if you're willing to assume that "X" and the unit
8 of "X" are under the command of the Drina Corps. That presumption is not
9 indicative in the order, for example. "X" could be the commander of a
10 Main Staff unit or another unit which General Krstic may have thought he
11 had some right to command or had some string on their resources.
12 So without knowing again who "X" is and what the function and
13 purpose of "X" is prior, I can't presume that "X" is in fact a subordinate
14 of General Krstic.
15 Q. Mr. Butler, "X" mentions Potocari, and that's the area of
16 responsibility of the Drina Corps.
17 A. "X" says he was up in Potocari; he had to check it out. All "X"
18 is doing is giving a physical location on the ground where he was at a
19 point in time.
20 Q. Mr. Butler, "X" says, "I have just come recently from my area of
21 responsibility just to make your acquaintance," and he talks about
22 Potocari. So is Potocari in the area of responsibility of the Drina
23 Corps? Just yes or no, please.
24 A. The answer is yes, Potocari is in the zone of the Drina Corps.
25 Q. Mr. Butler, are there cases and is it possible for a superior
1 command, in this case the Main Staff, to take over the command over
2 subordinate units, Drina Corps that is, in the whole area of
3 responsibility of the Drina Corps or in a limited area thereof?
4 A. If I understand what you're asking, sir, what you're asking is, is
5 a series of two theoreticals. Theoretical number one, is it possible for
6 a Superior Command to take over, and if I read the transcript correctly,
7 over the command over subordinate units, the whole area of responsibility
8 in one sense; and then the next one is the theoretical, is it possible for
9 them to take over command of a limited small unit.
10 Going back to the 7 [sic] July 1995 order, the previous exhibit,
11 649, I believe that's an excellent example of how the Main Staff can take
12 over limited command of select assets, some including the Drina Corps, for
13 a specific period. Going back to your first one, whether or not it's
14 possible for them to come in and essentially take over whole commands,
15 brigade-size formations, if you will, I don't see practical applications
16 of that, and I don't see evidence that supports that in my research,
17 unless we're physically talking about the resubordination of brigades from
18 one command to another command for battlefield reasons on the ground. One
19 would think that with the work load of the Main Staff over -- having to
20 oversee the activities of six corps, that that would be a bit much for
22 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there seems to be a
23 mistake in the transcript. Instead of the 7th of July, it should read
24 17th of July since Mr. Butler in his response referred to document -- to
25 Exhibit 649.
1 Q. Mr. Butler, in your expert opinion, and please correct me if I'm
2 wrong, you stated that General Mladic supervised the operation and the
3 events related and everything, in fact, related to the Krivaja-95
4 operation. If it is indeed the case, did General Mladic have an
5 obligation to let the meeting in Potocari on the 11th and on the 12th of
6 July, the last one being in the morning hours, to let his Corps Commander
7 lead the meeting or perhaps his deputy?
8 A. General Mladic is clearly the Commander of the Main Staff and, in
9 effect, the senior ranking and Commander of the army who answers only to
10 the President of the republic.
11 Understanding the context of this meeting, the fact that General
12 Mladic, whether he wanted to designate or not delegate the details of it
13 to his Chief of Staff or to a Corps Commander or to anyone else, is his
14 decision. And clearly when one looks at the style of General Mladic,
15 certainly as envisioned by -- or certainly as demonstrated by the video
16 evidence that has been seen to date relative to Srebrenica, he very much
17 is hands-on and involved with certainly the public aspects of these
18 events, and these meetings certainly qualify as public aspects.
19 Q. Can we count these meetings that fall under the heading of
20 "command of subordinate officers"?
21 A. Could you be more specific, sir? I'm not sure what regard
22 "command of subordinate officers." I mean, clearly he's giving
23 instructions to his officers, he's giving instructions to the Dutch UN
24 representatives that are present, and he's giving instructions to the
25 Muslim civilian representatives who are present. So it's an exercise of
1 General Mladic giving instructions to everybody concerned.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
3 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in the last part of
4 our cross-examinations, we would like to go over into closed session.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So let's go into private
6 session, please, for a few minutes.
7 [Closed session]
13 page 5449 redacted – closed session
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So we are in open session now.
22 Thank you very much. You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
23 Re-examined by Mr. McCloskey:
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Since we left at the meetings, let me just briefly ask you, the
1 meetings on the 11th and the 12th had -- General Krstic was there,
2 General Mladic was there, other high-ranking officers of the corps were
3 there. Can we -- can you assume that there were other meetings related to
4 military matters, aside from the meetings that we see on the video,
5 between the VRS officers?
6 A. It's -- my understanding is that there would be other meetings,
7 yes, sir.
8 Q. From a military sense, when could you expect the VRS command
9 structure that was present in the area of Potocari and Bratunac on the
10 10th, 11th, and 12th, when could you expect for them to have knowledge
11 that there were a fair number of Muslim men gathered and a large group of
12 individuals in Potocari?
13 A. If we look back at the military situation and where the units were
14 laid out, and as previously noted, the VRS positions were in the hills,
15 not only along the route and -- or along surrounding Srebrenica town and
16 later on the 11th in the town but certainly in a position to overlook the
17 road from Srebrenica to Potocari and then Potocari itself, the presumption
18 is that they would have been able to observe the movement of the civilian
19 population from Srebrenica to Potocari on the late afternoon, early
20 evening hours of the 11th. And certainly either during the evening hours
21 of the 11th or certainly by first light on the 12th, been in a position to
22 physically observe the composition of the large number of people at
23 Potocari. Certainly they may not have been able to pull out numbers and
24 everything else, but as the witness statements and Dutch testimony
25 indicates, the sheer number of people around that area, it should not have
1 been difficult for reconnaissance units or individuals conducting personal
2 reconnaissance to get a broad idea as to general numbers or general
3 percentage of men, women, and children as part of the larger crowds.
4 So fixing a date of time, it could have occurred as early as the
5 evening hours of 11 July, sir, 1995.
6 Q. Now, given that the transcripts of those meetings, what we know of
7 them, obviously they're not complete transcripts, show that on the 11th,
8 General Mladic is interested in the Muslim soldiers. When is the first
9 time that we see from the transcripts that General Mladic actually makes
10 reference to males between the ages of 16 and 60, if you recall?
11 A. If I recall correctly, at the third meeting that occurs at
12 1000 hours on 12 July 1995, General Mladic makes that statement.
13 Q. And again, if you can recall, when approximately did Muslim people
14 in Potocari start to get put on buses?
15 A. In reading and in reviewing the testimony of the Dutch and other
16 survivors, by the mid-afternoon, almost -- and I can't really qualify it
17 in a period of time when the first buses leave for Kladanj, there are also
18 a series of buses that depart that are filled with men that are going to
19 Bratunac. So again, that process occurred in the mid-afternoon hours of
20 12 July, and we see the men being put on buses and taken to Bratunac at
21 approximately the same time.
22 Q. So given that time frame that you've discussed, from the evening
23 of July 11th when the VRS could have first found out about men in Potocari
24 and the afternoon of July 12th when men had their IDs taken and were put
25 on buses, who was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps at that time and
1 present at those locations?
2 A. That would have been General Major Krstic, sir.
3 Q. And as the Chief of Staff, as you've described earlier, would one
4 of his principal responsibilities be the planning and organising of
5 military operations?
6 A. That is his primary job function.
7 Q. When did the VRS first become aware of large numbers of Muslim men
8 from the column and that they would have the opportunity to -- sorry. Let
9 me start over and phrase that a little better.
10 When was it -- did it become clear to the VRS that they were able
11 to capture or they would be able to capture large numbers of Muslim men
12 from the column?
13 A. The intercepts, as we have them, indicate that by approximately
14 0300 hours on the morning of 12 July, the Muslim [sic] lower commanders on
15 the ground or along the road were becoming aware of the existence of a
16 column. That column formed during the day and continued to move through
17 12 July. The presumption would be that sometime certainly by the
18 afternoon of 12 July or early evening hours at the latest, they would have
19 been capturing Muslim men from the column. As to when an exact awareness
20 of when that would have been, I can't answer that specifically, sir.
21 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Butler. You said at the beginning of
22 your answer "the Muslim lower commanders on the ground."
23 A. I apologise, sir. That should be the VRS lower commanders.
24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY:
1 Q. And before the evening hours of July 13th, were many, many
2 hundreds of Muslims in fact captured along the Bratunac-Milici road and
3 shipped off to various places that you've discussed before, Bratunac,
4 Kravica warehouse, those places?
5 A. Yes, sir. That is correct.
6 Q. And again at that time period, General Krstic was the Chief of
7 Staff of the Drina Corps and would have been involved primarily in
8 planning -- well, excuse me, not primarily but certainly would have been
9 involved in planning operations if he was doing his job as defined by the
11 A. That is correct, sir.
12 Q. Now, counsel brought up, in the cross-examination, a conclusion
13 you made in your report regarding the leadership role of General Krstic in
14 the attack of Srebrenica. Now, I've asked you to assemble some of the
15 documents that are actually in support of that theory of yours. Could you
16 just take us through them very briefly. I know you've already spoken of
17 them, so I don't think we need to spend much time, but I do -- I would
18 like it if you would remind the Court of what -- the real meaning of that
19 paragraph. What backed up that paragraph in your report?
20 A. In that regard, that series of documents which are now exhibits
21 which demonstrate the situation that certainly General Zivanovic, the
22 Corps Commander, is not physically present and that General Krstic, the
23 Chief of Staff, is present at the forward command post and running that
25 I would refer to Exhibit 431, and again, I won't discuss it in
1 detail, which indicates discussion between the two of them, and this date
2 is 8 July.
3 I would reference Exhibit 432, which is a 9 July report to the
4 Drina Corps IKM, again, directed personally for General Krstic at that
6 I would note Exhibit 433, which is the excerpt of the Bratunac
7 Brigade daily combat report for 10 July 1995, noting for the first time
8 the physical presence of General Mladic and General-Major Zivanovic, as
9 well as the presence of General-Major Krstic in the zone of the 1st
10 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and of course, the forward command post at
11 Pribicevac falls in that zone.
12 Exhibit 435 intercepted radio telephone communication between
13 General Krstic and Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic who is the Chief of
14 Transportation Services for the Drina Corps with regard to the assembly of
16 Exhibit 508, again, a discussion by the duty officer at Badem, 1st
17 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and a subscriber at Zlatar, the Drina
18 Corps, and while we don't know who the correspondents are other than the
19 broad duty officer identification is "X," that duty officer indicates the
20 physical presence of General Krstic "here." The presumption here is that
21 the duty officer is in the operations centre at the Bratunac Light
22 Infantry Brigade at this time.
23 Exhibit 539, another "X" and "Y" intercept, last line noting the
24 request of fuel being forwarded to Krstic, and noting that so far 50 buses
25 have been obtained.
1 Exhibit 364, again, a conversation between General Krstic and a
2 certain Ognjenovic, whom I believe to be Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic, a
3 member of the Drina Corps operations staff at this time; and then further,
4 a conversation between him and Krsmanovic again, and as previously noted,
5 Colonel Krsmanovic, the Chief of Transportation. And looking at both
6 parts of the conversation, it's clear that the specific area that we're
7 talking about is in the area of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade within
8 the tactical situation, and the second part pertaining to movement of
10 Exhibit 440, again, a synopsis of a conversation between the two
11 correspondents, Krstic wants the buses to start moving immediately.
12 Exhibit 446, another discussion, and again the principle players
13 here, General Krstic, Colonel Kosoric, the Chief of Intelligence of the
14 Drina Corps, a notation up front noting that Krsmanovic, the Chief of
15 Transportation, set off towards Krstic's location 15 minutes ago, and
16 Sobot, in this case another officer of the rear services branch of the
17 Drina Corps.
18 Q. Could you note the times as you're going through these so we can
19 see the time, how they're related in time sequence?
20 A. My apologies. This one is 1305, and I believe the date inclusive
21 that we've been discussing is all 12 July, sir.
22 1345 hours, and this is Exhibit 509, and the back end of the
23 conversation, again, an acknowledgment, "I can put you up there to General
24 Krstic. He's in charge of this attack." Again, an awareness on the part
25 of the subscriber "O," a duty officer, and as we've discussed earlier in
1 my testimony as to the roles and functions of the duty officer, the
2 individual who, on behalf of the Commander, is the focal point of the
3 gathering of all of the information that's coming in. So presumably the
4 duty officer is in a position to be aware of the events that are occurring
5 and the context in which they're occurring.
6 Exhibit 510, and I'll just go to the relevant part here, time is
7 1440, the back end of the conversation in a series of conversations, and
8 the way we've already discussed the exhibit, but again, Krstic coming on
9 the line asking to be put through to Colonel Krsmanovic. The last line,
10 "Come on, put me through to him again, Zlatar," an implication -- or an
11 inference that he's calling to the Zlatar switch, and he's angry at them
12 because he dropped off the line.
13 Exhibit 529, this one 13 July 1995, time of 2040, conversation
14 between Krstic, General Krstic, and Borovcanin who, as discussed earlier,
15 is Lieutenant Colonel Ljubisa Borovcanin, who is in charge of the MUP
16 Special Police Unit that is operating along the road, Bratunac-Konjevic
17 Polje, with the Drina Corps.
18 Exhibit -- I believe that covers the series of exhibits. I don't
19 want to go too fast. I believe that covers the series of exhibits. The
20 last one, 483, the base exhibit pertaining to the Zepa operations order.
21 Q. And that's signed as Chief of Staff, General Krstic as Chief of
22 Staff on the 13th; is that correct?
23 A. That is correct, sir. That is signed by General Krstic as the
24 Chief of Staff.
25 Q. All right. And then I think the last two exhibits are just
1 General Mladic's and President Karadzic's statements regarding the
2 leadership role of General Krstic; is that right?
3 A. That is correct. Exhibit 99, as we've discussed previously, and
4 Exhibit 482, also discussed previously.
5 Q. General Mladic's statements were very specific regarding the
6 Srebrenica and Zepa attacks. He describes the leadership of General
7 Krstic as Chief of Staff or Corps Commander; is that right?
8 A. That is correct, sir.
9 Q. All right, thank you. And just to clarify the record, one -- I
10 think Mr. Butler identified an Exhibit as 539, and Ms. Keith tells me it
11 should be 359. At this point we may be getting a little dyslexic, all of
12 us, so we'll ...
13 Now, Mr. Butler, 14 July, that was the day the records indicate
14 the attack on Zepa?
15 A. That is -- according to the operations plan and the other
16 information we have, the beginning of the attack on Zepa occurred early
17 morning hours of 14 July, yes, sir.
18 Q. And do you have any intercepts that have General Krstic on them on
19 14 July?
20 A. As previously noted, we have no intercepts of General Krstic on 14
21 July 1995 that reflect that.
22 Q. However, there are indications in the investigation and in the
23 records that Major Obrenovic had discussions with General Krstic on the
24 14th of July regarding the situation up in Zvornik; is that right?
25 A. That is correct, sir.
1 Q. And how about the 15th, 16th, 17th, are there intercepts with
2 General Krstic on those dates?
3 A. There are I believe at least one, perhaps two on the 15th, and
4 numerous ones on the 16th and 17th, sir.
5 Q. And are those generally consistent with a Corps Commander checking
6 in or monitoring the situation in his zone of responsibility?
7 A. Yes, they are, sir.
8 Q. Now, I want to briefly go back to an exhibit the Defence
9 discussed, the Main Staff order signed by General Gvero on 13 July,
10 Exhibit 532/A, and there was a suggestion that or a question to you
11 whether or not this order would have required the brigades to report back
12 to the Main Staff. You made reference to a Drina Corps order that was
13 directly related to that Main Staff order, and I have that now, and if I
14 could ask you to take a look at it. It's Exhibit 462/A, and is that
15 specific as to the reporting responsibilities of the brigades?
16 A. This order, and as I've discussed previously, is almost a verbatim
17 copy of the General Gvero order. If you go to the final paragraph 8 on
18 page 3 of the English translation, it notes, "Through interim reports,
19 ensure all units are kept informed of the current situation in areas of
20 responsibility so that the Command of the Drina Corps may be able to take
21 measures in good time."
22 I believe this very clearly articulates that the reports are to go
23 to the Command of the Drina Corps so they can take measures in good time.
24 Q. Now, if we could get the exhibit that shows the quote from the 15
25 July interim combat report, I think it may be 29 right there.
1 I don't think we'll use the exhibit. Mr. Butler, you have read
2 this enough times. Could you tell us -- again I'll make reference to the
3 part -- sorry, it's 610, but that's all right, I'll just make reference to
5 The part I'm referring to of the interim combat report is the part
6 where Colonel Pandurevic says something to the effect that, "The
7 additional burden for us are the large number of Muslims located in
8 schools throughout the area of the responsibility of the brigade, as well
9 as obligations of security and restoration of terrain. The Command cannot
10 take care of these problems any longer as it has neither the material nor
11 the resources. If no one takes care of this responsibility, I will be
12 forced to let them go."
13 Now, we've gone through your interpretation of that somewhat
14 cryptic communication regarding dealing with the Muslim prisoners
15 throughout the schools. Would this be difficult to understand by itself
16 if the receiver of it did not understand the context by which it was being
18 A. I would say that that's a, that's a fair assumption. If you did
19 not understand the context of what was going on, this would be pretty
20 meaningless to you.
21 Q. And when was this sent to the Corps Command of the Drina Corps?
22 A. The actual report, the outgoing time stamp reflects, I believe,
23 either 18 or 2000 hours on 15 July 1995.
24 Q. Is there any information in the record that would indicate whether
25 or not the Corps Commander, General Krstic, did in fact have knowledge of
1 the murder operation that was going on in the Zvornik Brigade on 15 July
2 and prior to?
3 A. I would in that event refer back to the series of exhibits which
4 reflect the conversation which occurred between General-Major Krstic and
5 Colonel Beara with regards to the "packages" and having no effective way
6 to deal with them.
7 As I've noted as that conversation as well, certainly from reading
8 that conversation, because it's noted by one of the subscribers, and I
9 don't know whether it's Colonel Beara or General Krstic off the top of my
10 head, that the "line is open and we shouldn't discuss it in that manner,"
11 they're clearly attempting to talk around the meat of the subject. Again,
12 another clear indication that in trying to talk around what the real part
13 of the subject is, both correspondents are fully aware of what the context
14 of the conversation is about.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: And for one or two last questions, Your Honour,
16 could we go into closed session?
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, let us go into private
18 session, please.
19 [Closed session]
16 [Open session]
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We are in open session now. I
18 think this is a good time to have a break.
19 Yes, Madam Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: I see on the transcript it says "private session,"
21 but Mr. McCloskey said "closed session." Just for clarification for the
22 court reporters, because they always ask me, do you want it private,
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm not sure of the difference, but I want it as
25 closed as we can get it.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Then closed.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Okay. Thank you.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. We're going to have
5 a half-hour break now, and after that, we'll come back for the questions
6 of the Judges.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.55 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.27 a.m.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, I think you have
10 something to communicate to the Chamber.
11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. In the break
12 that we just had, General Krstic had certain health problems linked to his
13 amputated leg, and as soon as that was noted, the doctor on duty found
14 that an urgent medical treatment was required to deal with the injury, so
15 that General Krstic is now being treated. However, we have conferred with
16 him, and he agrees that we continue with the proceedings in his absence,
17 and he has given a written statement to that effect, which has been
18 provided to the registrar.
19 The statement is in the Serbian language, but if I may translate
20 it, it says that General Krstic agrees that we continue the hearings in
21 his absence.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, we have no objection to
24 proceeding in the absence of General Krstic, in light of the fact that he
25 has filed a written waiver.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The statement is indeed in
2 B/C/S, but we trust Mr. Petrusic because, unfortunately, we do not
3 understand the B/C/S.
4 What will be the number of this document, Madam Registrar?
5 THE REGISTRAR: 714.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So the General's statement will
7 be marked and admitted into evidence as 714, Exhibit 714.
8 Fine. So we can resume our proceedings, and it is now the turn of
9 us Judges to put questions to the witness, Mr. Richard Butler, and I give
10 the floor, therefore, to Judge Fouad Riad.
11 Excuse me. I beg your pardon. Mr. Harmon.
12 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honours, but I see that
13 Exhibit 714 is in the series of the Prosecutor's exhibits, and I don't
14 think this should be a Prosecutor's exhibit. I draw that to the Court's
16 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry. My mistake. I'll get the proper number.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon,
18 for drawing our attention to this. I myself was surprised that the
19 Defence had produced all those documents prior to this one, 713,
21 So what will be the number now, Madam Registrar? Or we can deal
22 with the matter at the end of the session.
23 So let me give the floor now to Judge Fouad Riad.
24 Questioned by the Court:
25 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Good morning, sir.
2 A. Good morning.
3 JUDGE RIAD: I've been listening carefully to your very
4 comprehensive testimony. I've learned a lot from it. I would invite you
5 to shed some more light, to help me understand as somebody who is not
6 military. Some of my questions I don't think need closed session, but if
7 there is any suspicion, we can immediately close the session.
8 You mentioned a statement -- I think you mentioned a statement by
9 President Karadzic at the time, stating that General Krstic -- he was not
10 a General perhaps at that time -- "Krstic planned the operation in front
11 of me and I approved that task for Srebrenica, which he did exceptionally
12 well." I quoted you as much as I can. Then you said, "I corroborate that
14 Now, what do you corroborate in that statement? In other words,
15 what is the planning of the operation? What does this entail or include,
16 military or civilian, the fighting, or the execution? Could you tell it
17 to me without being too sophisticated militarily?
18 A. In doing my analysis and looking at the outside material, the
19 open-source press, in which case this would fall under, what I indicate
20 when I corroborate it is that it in fact is a corroboration by
21 President Karadzic of, at a minimum, the military planning aspects of the
23 Now, as to whether he physically planned it in front of him or an
24 awareness of the president of the planning process, I don't know, but --
25 and again, keeping with the more limited or more conservative views that I
1 have pertaining to what qualifies as criminal and what qualifies as
2 military, and if I'm not sure I will default to the military one, I would
3 only note that my judgement is that that particular statement corroborates
4 the military planning aspect. I wouldn't take it further than that
5 without additional information, which I don't have.
6 JUDGE RIAD: Would the military aspect include the transportation
7 of the men to the camps, for instance, and keeping them in the camps as
8 one step?
9 A. A military -- certainly that is a military function, sir. Where
10 the problem that I would have is trying to, again, get in the head of
11 President Karadzic and try to determine whether or not he is only
12 referring to the Krivaja-95 operations plan, which it would be a natural
13 assumption to make that as the president of the Supreme Command, he would
14 see that plan and certainly be briefed on it; or whether it's taking it to
15 the next step, which is the planning and execution process of moving the
16 men up to execution sites and things of that nature. So I'm unable to
17 make a determination based on that individual piece of information as to
18 what part of the planning process President Karadzic is referring to.
19 JUDGE RIAD: So the Krivaja plan did not include transportation or
20 anything except fighting?
21 A. The Krivaja plan as written does -- only indicates that prisoners
22 will be assembled and dealt with as part of the normal function of a corps
23 military operation. The Krivaja plan as written does not go into the next
24 series of steps as part of criminal act, sir.
25 JUDGE RIAD: As written, but who is supposed to execute it?
1 A. In this regard, and as I've discussed as part of the testimony, as
2 the military portion of the operation and then the criminal portion of the
3 operation which is conducted by the military takes off, General Krstic as
4 the Chief of Staff would be the person who would by position and,
5 certainly as the facts suggest, by knowledge be an integral part of that
6 process, sir.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Now, there was also a mention that Mr. Karadzic
8 would -- considered General Krstic a very prominent general, and even he
9 could compete with Mladic.
10 Do you think that still General Mladic would be able to pass over
11 Krstic and, let us say, dominate the situation and do the whole thing, or
12 would this be contrary to your findings?
13 A. One of the things that needs to be understood about that
14 particular excerpt is, and one of the reasons why I don't put that much
15 validity in except a very limited manner, is the fact that that excerpt
16 was part of a larger speech by General -- or by President Karadzic on 4
17 August 1995 where he, in effect, removed General Mladic from the chief --
18 as the Chief and Commander of the army, the Commander of the Main Staff,
19 and tried to move him sideways, so to speak, and appoint himself the
20 Commander of the army and move General Mladic into a position as his
21 advisor, in effect, taking him out of a position of codified command and
22 removing him to an advisory position.
23 Understanding that that's the context of the entire thrust of the
24 conversation, it's not unreasonable to assume that he's going to certainly
25 try and downplay the role of General Mladic and up-play the role of
1 General Krstic. In fact, if you go back and look at the 4 August 1995
2 daily combat report for the Bratunac Brigade, that daily combat report
3 reflects that on 4 August in the afternoon or during the day, President
4 Karadzic in fact did travel to Srebrenica and meet with and do a
5 walk-through tour with General Krstic. Knowing several hours later that
6 President Karadzic in fact tried to remove General Mladic as the Commander
7 of the Main Staff, certainly you could infer that part of the conversation
8 that they were having on that day would have been a discussion relative to
9 whether or not General Krstic would publicly support the president of the
10 republic in that move.
11 JUDGE RIAD: Now, would this -- where would the, what can I say,
12 the withdrawal of General Zivanovic fit in this case? Why did Zivanovic,
13 why was he removed in that period, if you know about it, and replaced by
15 A. That, sir, is the million-dollar question, and I really don't have
16 a solid answer. We understand from both public statements, and we also
17 understand from the interview that he gave to a correspondent a year after
18 the events occurred, that he was suffering health problems. And if you
19 would refer back to the video exhibit where it shows the walk-through on
20 11 July 1995 in company with General Mladic and General Krstic, one of the
21 statements attributed to General Zivanovic, and if I believe the quote is
22 correct, he says, "My blood pressure must now be 600 over 300." Again, I
23 don't have a background in medicine, but clearly the implication is that,
24 you know, perhaps high blood pressure.
25 We have in the statements of Drazan Erdemovic, he makes a specific
1 reference to information that he understands relative to information he
2 gained as part of that walk-through, his impression that General Zivanovic
3 was leaving as part of a planned event, that it was not a spontaneous act,
4 meaning that Mr. Erdemovic felt that his view was this is not a
5 spontaneous removal, that General Zivanovic seemed to indicate that he
6 knew his time was coming to an end.
7 JUDGE RIAD: You added yourself that, I don't find the quotation
8 exactly, but it was a very -- it was not the most propitious period for a
9 transition of command.
10 A. If one looks at the operations in a strictly military sense, that
11 Krivaja-95 as an operation militarily alone ends at a fixed point in time
12 and then subsequent to that Stupcanica-95, the operation for the takedown
13 of the Zepa enclave occurs in sequence afterwards, you could make the
14 argument that it would be a logical time to replace the Commander,
15 particularly if it was understood that the Commander is going to be
16 replaced by the Chief of Staff, and you would have absolutely no loss in
17 the knowledge base and the visions of what the operations were supposed to
19 Overlaying the context of the military events as they occurred,
20 which shows that it wasn't a clean break and, in fact, the unexpected
21 breakthrough by the 28th Infantry Division or the unexpected movement of
22 the column out clouds that issue. You don't get a clean break. And when
23 you look at it from that aspect, it wouldn't seem to be a good time to do
25 The only other inference that I can make that adds another fact to
1 that but doesn't, unfortunately, clear it up, is the fact that
2 General Zivanovic, after the fact, goes to great pains to make it known,
3 on a public level, that he was out of there as early as midnight on the
4 11th of July. He didn't want to be associated with anything after the
5 midnight of the 11th of July.
6 So again, a series of facts, and I'm not exactly sure what that
7 means with respect to the intent to replace one General with another
8 General. So that sense it remains ambiguous for me.
9 JUDGE RIAD: But the bottom line would be that in the eyes of the
10 president, the Supreme Commander, Krstic was the man fit for the job.
11 A. Presumably he may not have appointed him unless he felt that he
12 did, sir, yes.
13 JUDGE RIAD: And with the support of the president?
14 A. Again, as the president is the only person who can formally
15 appoint him as the commander, yes, sir.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Now, in the light of this, how much do you think he
17 could be unrelated to the events? For instance, you mentioned the
18 civilian authorities of Srebrenica. Could there be some kind of
19 distribution of roles and Krstic would be just the military man and the
20 civilian authorities would be handling, let us say, the rest, the transfer
21 of prisoners, the executions, and so on? Is that, militarily speaking, a
22 very logical plan, division of roles and power?
23 A. While in the abstract it might appear to be a logical break-up of
24 responsibilities, the fact basis completely supports the fact that the
25 military was the primary agency responsible for doing all of this, to
1 include the fact that the military was, through the Ministry of Defence,
2 requisitioning civilian assets and civilian resources in order to
3 accomplish this mission. Given the state of military affairs and
4 everything else, I don't believe it would have been realistic to believe
5 that the military could only fight the battle. The civilian leadership
6 could handle just the civilian aspects of moving Muslim civilians, the two
7 would not get mixed up somewhere, and again the fact that the civilian
8 leadership, the local civilian leadership didn't have the resources to
9 accomplish that mission anyway.
10 So certainly the military had primacy in this role, and I don't
11 believe that the civilian leadership would have thought that they could
12 not have done that.
13 JUDGE RIAD: Now, when you speak about the military function, does
14 it -- do you speak in the light or bearing in mind the chain of command as
15 the regular army or just the military people with weapons, doing what they
17 A. Certainly in this context and what I hope I've demonstrated
18 through the fact base that has been presented, is that one of the
19 fundamental tenets of this entire series of events is the underlying
20 organisation and structure involved. Certainly in isolation, one can make
21 the argument that an individual Muslim civilian in Potocari being killed
22 or maybe a group of five or ten being killed can be an isolated event or
23 along the road an isolated event, but when you string them altogether,
24 particularly tracking the implied organisational process that takes the
25 civilians from Potocari, the female and the children and the elderly from
1 Potocari and deposits them at Kladanj under military control, and then you
2 take the implied organisational things that have to have happened to first
3 collect the Muslim men in Bratunac, bring the additional Muslim men who
4 were captured from the column to holding sites at Bratunac, organise their
5 movement into the zone of another brigade, the Zvornik Infantry Brigade,
6 and then the systematic executions in series and how the specialised
7 equipment needed to bury the dead moves from site to site, when you look
8 at that in its entire context and then overlay on top of that how a corps
9 command and staff would have controlled that given their roles,
10 responsibilities, and functions, then the individual facts that all lock
11 that into place through the series, and because of that whole series of
12 events and how I look at that, understanding the military structure and
13 how it would have worked by a military, it would be impossible to conclude
14 that these are a series of random widespread individual events of which
15 that there was no or extremely limited control over, sir.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Now, in light of this orderly chain of command, you
17 mentioned that General Krstic gave orders that women and children should
18 not be molested, shall not be hurt, and he was obeyed, except one who was
19 abused. I noted that down.
20 Did he only concentrate on women and children and mention nothing
21 according -- you don't say the people should not be -- the civilians
22 should not be touched or he said women and children? And what do you
23 infer from that?
24 A. He makes two specific comments. The one, the first comment you
25 refer to was from an intercepted communication where he's discussing the
1 issue with a subordinate Drina Corps officer. The second is a public
2 statement that he makes in Potocari compound on 12 July 1995, where he
3 notes that the operation is continuing under the Drina Corps to liberate
4 the entire Srebrenica area, municipality presumably, and that he also
5 makes a statement -- and I can't remember it completely so I won't quote
6 it, so I won't misquote it -- but he also makes a statement relative to
7 the treatment of the civilian population, something along the lines, I
8 guess, of they'll be moved to wherever they want to go. So in that sense,
9 he makes those two statements.
10 JUDGE RIAD: The statement concerning the women and children you
11 said was obeyed, except one exception. Was the other one -- had he given
12 the same orders concerning men? Would it have been obeyed?
13 A. My understanding is -- I don't have any evidence that he gave the
14 same order concerning men, and to be honest, sir, again you're asking me
15 to get into General Krstic's head on that one. I don't know whether if he
16 gave that order it would be obeyed, sir. It's real speculation on my
17 part, sir.
18 JUDGE RIAD: No, I'm sorry. It's a twofold question. You said
19 first he didn't give the order, I gather from the answer.
20 A. That's my understanding.
21 JUDGE RIAD: But the other thing: According to the chain of
22 command, would he have been obeyed?
23 A. If he gave that order according to the chain of command, certainly
24 all the troops under his command would have obeyed that order or should
25 have obeyed that order.
1 JUDGE RIAD: You gave the options of a commander who disapproves
2 of a situation, and you said -- you gave several things. You said he can
3 protest, he can withdraw. Do you think, under the circumstances in this
4 very specific situation, was it possible for a commander to withdraw or to
5 show his disapproval? I don't know if that was the case of Zivanovic, but
6 could General Krstic have done that with impunity, with impunity?
7 A. Well, as you've indicated, sir, I don't know that that wasn't the
8 case with General Zivanovic.
9 JUDGE RIAD: What about others? Was there any other who
10 disapproved of what was happening?
11 A. Let me answer your question in two parts, sir. The first part is
12 that I do not have any information, throughout the entirety of my analysis
13 of the VRS, that at any given point in time a senior officer, battalion,
14 brigade, certainly a corps commander, was at any point in time ever
15 prevented from or operating under a climate of fear pertaining to what he
16 approved of or did not approve of actions.
17 I would remind the Court that in November 1994, General Galic, for
18 again circumstances not clear, left as the Commander of the
19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. So in that respect, I don't have any evidence
20 base which would suggest that officers who disobeyed or not disobeyed but
21 disapproved of the conduct of the overall course of the war or of the
22 orders they were following felt a compelling need to follow them for
23 individual fear. I mean, this was not the Nazi SS.
24 JUDGE RIAD: Just as a footnote. You said about Zivanovic, you
25 said he made it clear that by the 11th of July, midnight, he was not
1 involved. Wasn't that a way of disassociating himself?
2 A. Sir, again, I wouldn't want to speculate too far into that. All I
3 know is we have the one fact, the one public statement that he's made to
4 that regards.
5 We certainly are able, through the fact base, to demonstrate that
6 he was in fact there on the 12th, and he was in fact there on the 13th,
7 and he continued to be in the area on the 14th. So that is an inference.
8 But based on those two, I wouldn't go that much further, personally, in
9 trying to theorise the circumstances that General Zivanovic did that
11 JUDGE RIAD: You're not putting him in the same category of the
12 other General, Galic, I think?
13 A. I was just using General Galic as an example of the fact that
14 corps commanders did change through the war, and I only used General
15 Galic. I know there were other corps commanders as well, but that they
16 did change throughout the war. And while we don't understand the reasons
17 why all of these corps commanders changed, there's nothing in the
18 information or the evidence base that I have that would suggest that these
19 senior VRS officers were operating under a climate of fear.
20 JUDGE RIAD: My last question, you mentioned that Colonel
21 Pandurevic mentioned that he would not consider the -- he would not
22 consider operation Krivaja as finished until it has -- until all the
23 issues are dealt with in the zone of Zvornik Brigade, until all the issues
24 are dealt with?
25 A. That is correct, sir.
1 JUDGE RIAD: And you left this a little bit in suspense. What
2 does he mean by "all the issues"?
3 A. Based on the content of that specific comment and based on the
4 events that were occurring, there were only two issues occurring in the
5 zone of the Zvornik Brigade at that time: one, the combat operations
6 against the column, and the other, the mass executions that were occurring
7 at the previously identified sites.
8 As to which one is he specifically referring to, I don't know that
9 I could take that next step, sir.
10 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. I have perhaps a question that
11 requires a closed session, but I'll keep it. Thank you. Thank you very
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Judge Fouad
15 Madam Judge Wald, please.
16 JUDGE WALD: I asked many questions as your testimony, perhaps too
17 many from your point of view, as your testimony has proceeded; but let me
18 tell you in advance I've got about a dozen questions so that you may, if
19 you care to pace your answers --
20 A. I have a blank pad, ma'am.
21 JUDGE WALD: So that we have lots of time for Judge Rodrigues'
22 questions as well.
23 Several of them are, in the beginning, based upon your analysis of
24 the roles of Chief of Staff in the VRS based, as you explained, partly on
25 earlier JNA regulations, partly on what you saw as evidence of the way
1 they were implemented or adjusted during this period.
2 My first question is, would you say that the Commander could under
3 the existing regulations and practices and might be likely to delegate
4 more responsibility for implementations of his broader orders to the Chief
5 of Staff than to the lower line officers? In other words, might a
6 Commander be more likely to give broader discretion in the implementation
7 of his overall orders to a Chief of Staff than to his lower line officers?
8 A. The way the system is designed, ma'am, that's exactly what is
9 supposed to happen, the Chief of Staff taking the broader guidance, and
10 then it becomes his function as the head of the staff to take the broad
11 guidance and turn that into executable orders or specified taskings for
12 the subordinate commands and commanders. That's how the system is
13 designed, ma'am.
14 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My next question is, in the specific situation
15 we had here, if an order to the Assistant Corps Commander who was the
16 chief of security, the assistant commander for security for a corps, if
17 that person received an order from the Main Staff head of security that
18 was at conflict with either an order of his own Corps Commander or corps
19 policy, existing corps policy, which one do you believe under the
20 regulations he would be obliged to obey? He might try to accommodate
21 them, I understand that, and go to the Corps Commander and explain his
22 dilemma, but if push came to shove, which one does he owe primary
23 obedience to?
24 A. My readings of the JNA Corps Command Regulations and the JNA
25 Security Regulations, both being adopted by the VRS, those are -- that's
1 very specific. It notes that the security, the assistant commander for
2 security and the security organ work for, are answerable to, and under the
3 command of the Corps Commander -- or the Commander of that echelon. If
4 we're referring to the assistant commander for security of a corps, he is
5 under the command of and responsible to primarily the Corps Commander.
6 JUDGE WALD: So if he should receive a proposed order or directive
7 from the Main Staff, chief of security, with whom he does have
8 communication lines, as you explained, that ran counter to his own
9 commander's orders or to what he believed to be command corps policy, then
10 he would have a duty, certainly, as I understand it, to go talk to his
11 corps commander about it and attempt to resolve the dilemma, unless it was
12 an investigation of personal malfeasance as you said. Is that right?
13 A. That is correct, ma'am.
14 JUDGE WALD: Now you talked some about the duty of investigating
15 war crimes that a Commander had under the existing regulations here which,
16 as I understand it, would include the duty to make inquiries or
17 investigations, if there were enough evidence or suspect evidence to
18 suggest that these might be being committed. Would a Chief of Staff have
19 that same duty, that same level of duty? Or if a Chief of Staff had some
20 evidence that came before him to suggest that there might be war crimes
21 going or crimes against the international norms of war going on, would his
22 duty be to go talk to the Commander or to initiate some kind of
23 investigation on his own?
24 A. Let me answer that in two parts, ma'am.
25 JUDGE WALD: Sure.
1 A. The first part is as codified in the SFRY regulations, and as I
2 previously discussed, I won't go into detail. There are three broad
3 categories of liability under those regulations: the individual liability,
4 the superior, and, of course, the under orders.
5 JUDGE WALD: Right.
6 A. The Chief of Staff by position within the entire corps structure
7 does not just qualify as any officer. He is, by position, the second
8 senior ranking officer in the entire corps. If he finds out about it, in
9 the sense where he finds out about this, on his own authority as the Chief
10 of Staff and the Deputy Commander, he would certainly have the authority
11 to phone down to the brigade or to whatever level and order the operation
12 to cease.
13 JUDGE WALD: Or to at least find out --
14 A. Yes, ma'am.
15 JUDGE WALD: -- what was going on?
16 A. Even if he were to operate under the presumption that the corps
17 commander was doing this without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff, as
18 the Chief of Staff finds out about this, and again in a theoretical sense,
19 gives the order to stop, the brigade commander is going to accept that
20 order at face value, operating under the assumption that the Chief of
21 Staff was authorised to give it anyway.
22 So even in a theoretical sense where there was a gigantic
23 conspiracy to cut him out of the loop, once he found out, he certainly had
24 within his own discretion the powers to at least take some form of action
25 against it.
1 JUDGE WALD: Okay. You said at one point I think that there was
2 no specific evidence that the shelling of Srebrenica when -- during the
3 takeover targeted the civilian population as such. When you used the word
4 "targeted" in both your question and answer, did you mean simply that
5 there was no evidence that the shelling, the shells, were aimed directly
6 at people, or did you also include the motion that perhaps the shells
7 might be used to, in a word, terrorise or scare people into certain modes
8 of action, even though they weren't aimed at, you know, physically
9 injuring those people?
10 A. In that regard, the comment that I made, and I did qualify it in
11 my testimony, was that I have no specific evidence --
12 JUDGE WALD: Right, right.
13 A. -- from the VRS and the documents.
14 JUDGE WALD: I understand.
15 A. Now, clearly Dutch witnesses have testified that they believe that
16 the civilians were, in fact, being shelled.
17 When I talk about the issue of targeting, and again looking at it
18 from a very narrow military sense --
19 JUDGE WALD: I understand.
20 A. -- what I'm looking for is evidence or information that the shell
21 was aimed at or the round was aimed at a specific location or with that
22 specific intent. Now, I understand that that is a very narrow view.
23 JUDGE WALD: So in other words, your answer was not ruling out,
24 that's all I wanted to -- the notion that you might also use shelling as a
25 strategic way of getting civilian population to move on, as it were?
1 A. Yes, ma'am. And as I believe some of the Dutch have testified,
2 their impression was that as the civilian column was moving up the road,
3 the shell pattern that they observed --
4 JUDGE WALD: Right.
5 A. -- certainly inferred that to them, that they were being herded in
6 a direction.
7 JUDGE WALD: Tell me if you're able to answer this question based
8 upon the information base that you have: Would you say in the almost
9 complete evacuation of the Muslim population from Srebrenica, that the
10 dominant factors -- or how would you rate the factors of, one, the actions
11 of the VRS in taking over the town militarily; two, the decision by the
12 military and perhaps civilian leaders of the BiH at a certain point that
13 they thought it was best for them to move on to Potocari; and three, just
14 the spontaneous reactions of the population itself?
15 A. With regards to the sequence of events between the military
16 operation at Srebrenica and the BiH activities, clearly as indicated by
17 one of the exhibits I believe the Defence raised, by the 9th of July, the
18 BiH military and civilian leadership in Srebrenica realised that, one, the
19 UN forces were not going to be able to prevent the VRS from taking the
20 town; and two, that they militarily themselves could not do that and were
21 awaiting guidance.
22 Certainly as Colonel Karremans discusses the next day or that
23 evening in his discussions, he discusses the issue of the fact that NATO,
24 to his understanding, will conduct airstrikes sometime on the 11th. That
25 evening of the 10th, for whatever reason, the BiH military and civilian
1 leadership does not believe that or does not believe that that's going to
2 be enough to effect that, and that's where you get the first series of
3 events from the BiH side, the population movement. The civilians going
4 into town and then clustering at the UN enclave or at the UN base, and
5 then the military population and the military-age men, population to
6 attempt to break out to what is known as free territory.
7 After that, with regards to the BiH and their governmental policy
8 or whatever, I did not analyse that because relative to the limited goals
9 of what I was asked to do, that didn't become relevant after that.
10 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My next question deals with the column. We
11 had a couple of discussions about how the VRS was entitled under military
12 law to treat a mixed military-civilian column as a military target of some
13 sort. We also had in your report, testimony, that actually the number of
14 armed men, at least, it seemed to me the greatest estimate, the highest
15 estimate was about a third of the column, and then there were estimates
16 that were lower than that, that maybe a thousand of these men out of the
17 several thousand that were in the column were armed.
18 Do we know whether or not the armed men were at the head of the
19 column for the breakthrough primarily. Or whether they were scattered at
20 random, as it were, throughout the column? Predicate to that, the second
21 part of the question would be, is it indeed, if they were concentrated at
22 the beginning, if, of the armed column -- of the column, then is it
23 legitimate for the enemy to treat the whole column as a military target if
24 large portions of it are clearly purely civilian? That's kind of a
25 complicated question; do the best you can.
1 A. Yes, ma'am. With regard to my view, and what I'll qualify is, is
2 my view now is going to represent my understanding of what I think the VRS
3 was aware of at certain points in time.
4 Certainly the understanding on the 12th and the 13th during those
5 early days reflects an awareness that there was significant military
6 assets pushed into the front of the column. Also, and as the witness
7 testimony indicates, there were armed soldiers throughout the length, but
8 certainly the bulk of that --
9 JUDGE WALD: Was at the front.
10 A. -- was at the front of the column. As that column then transited
11 through the zone of the Zvornik Brigade the 14th, 15th, and 16th, clearly
12 intelligence reports that the VRS is receiving from their sources qualify
13 the column in a series of one, two, or three groups, either an advanced
14 group, a reconnaissance group, and the main body, and they note that the
15 bulk of the fighters are in the beginning of the column.
16 As a matter of record that we've discussed as part of the evidence
17 base, on the 14th of July, Dusko Vukotic, an intelligence officer assigned
18 to the Zvornik infantry brigade, makes a report to the command of the
19 Drina Corps, the intelligence command of the Drina Corps, recommending
20 that some thought should be given, considering the strength of this part
21 of the front of the column, that they be allowed through, and then the
22 remainder of the column can be successfully engaged.
23 And as you look at the series of events that occur afterwards,
24 that is what was reflected on the ground, a temporary truce to allow the
25 bulk of the column that was armed through, a closing of the lines, and
1 then a series of continual sweep operations through the remainder of the
2 zone against the bulk of the column which, by the 15th -- by the 17th and
3 the 18th, surely there must have been an understanding that they were
4 either poorly armed or not armed at all.
5 JUDGE WALD: But there was nothing militarily illegitimate about
6 that. Even if you only have a scattering of arms in a predominantly
7 civilian column, it's still okay to treat it as a military target?
8 A. The best that I can do on that is to again refer back to the fact
9 that under their reading of that specific portion of the regulation on a
10 mixed civilian military target, that at a broad level, it's acceptable.
11 However, there is a qualification that military commanders, in doing so,
12 are required to take due regard to the military benefits of the military
13 operations and how they would impact either the civilian population or, in
14 this case, whether or not the casualties that the civilians would occur in
15 a pocket of people justifies the military necessity. And in that regard,
16 judgements on that would be legally speculative and probably above my
17 purview, ma'am.
18 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Let me ask you this: You gave us your
19 elaboration both in your report and in your oral testimony about why you
20 think it would be permissible, perhaps even necessary, to infer from the
21 facts that General Krstic actually became operationally the Commander a
22 day or two days -- a day before President Karadzic's appointment, and two
23 days, I think, before it was to be effective, and you made out that case,
24 which we don't have to go into.
25 On the other hand, if I understand your answers correctly, and
1 this is why, to several of the questions dealing with the possibility that
2 the Defence raised that the Commander-in-Chief of the whole force,
3 General Mladic, might have taken charge of a particular operation or a
4 particular part of the Drina Corps responsibility; namely, while Krstic is
5 fighting the war in Zepa, the theory might have been that Mladic says,
6 "You just take care of Zepa, and I'll take care of the operations in
7 Bratunac Zvornik Brigade." You raised several reasons, I think, why you
8 thought that was not probably a plausible scenario, because there was no
9 formal reallocation of the authority and the commanders while he remained
10 the formal Commander, retain the responsibility, even if other operations
11 were going on in his domain.
12 I'm wondering if you might explain a little bit more why you think
13 that, in fact, one couldn't imply the same kind of
14 well-operationally-it-was-done approach towards a possible scenario. I
15 understand if you say there isn't enough evidence that that happened, but
16 could it have happened in an informal fashion, Mladic saying, "The Main
17 Staff is going to handle this, and you just take care of Zepa"?
18 A. There are two parts to that question. I'd like to answer one, and
19 I think I can answer it in open, and the other one I would request going
20 into a closed session on.
21 JUDGE WALD: All right. You can save the closed session maybe
22 till the end and we'll do everything in one closed, so just answer the
23 open-session part.
24 A. Let me just write down the -- with regards to the second part, the
25 issue pertaining to Mladic and the Main Staff going to handle that aspect
1 and allowing just the Drina Corps element to handle Zepa, one, from a
2 practical aspect, again remembering the workload, that the entire country
3 is at war and there are six VRS corps all conducting combat operations
4 just not one in isolation, certainly in July of 1995, the issues
5 pertaining to the ultimate military operations with regard to the entry of
6 the Croatian army proper into the war -- we call that Operation Storm --
7 in late July, early August, took a lot of assets and resources and time
8 and energy from the Main Staff to a point where General Mladic's deputy,
9 Colonel -- or General Lieutenant Colonel Milovanovic, was for the most
10 part operating out of a Main Staff forward headquarters in Banja Luka, to
11 deal primarily with a lot of the important issues that came out of there.
12 Sarajevo military operations were occurring at the same time, as well as
13 operations in other areas.
14 So from a workload-intensive look only, to ask the Main Staff to
15 take not only their burden but essentially take on the entire burden of a
16 corps headquarters, it would certainly almost double their workload.
17 JUDGE WALD: But my question is -- I understand that. That's your
18 reason why. On the facts it's not likely to have happened, but the fact
19 is we do have evidence on the public record that General Mladic was
20 sighted on several of those places where some of these holding actions and
21 even where some of the executions were taking place.
22 So we know that he was down there, we know that some of his Main
23 Staff was down there, and I guess my basic question is: Could he have,
24 under existing military regulations or military law have said, "I'm going
25 to take charge of this. I'll use your Drina Corps assets down that. I'll
1 use some of your Drina Corps people and equipment and everything else, but
2 you take care of Zepa, and I'm going to take charge. I'm down there, I'll
3 be on the site, et cetera."
4 A. In the larger sense, as the Commander of the army of Republika
5 Srpska, he does that anyway. On the other aspects, certainly we have him
6 on the ground on the 12th and the 13th of July. We have him in Belgrade
7 on the evening of the 14th and all day on the 15th, according to
8 General Elliot's affidavit. So at a point in time, his physical presence
9 disappears. Now, that certainly doesn't imply that his ability to command
10 and control disappears.
11 He -- certainly there are Main Staff officers in the zone of the
12 Drina Corps, but it would again come back to the observations of the size
13 and scale and scope of the operation. Certainly it would be at the
14 direction of General Mladic. The question then becomes: How did he
15 choose to execute that? And again, General Mladic, being an experienced
16 commander and staff officer, it would be difficult for me to believe that
17 for the purposes, that he would essentially remove one or two or five of
18 the most critical officers of the corps and isolate them completely, and
19 then of his own violation or volition try to handle it himself. I mean,
20 in essence, to do that, he is degrading his own abilities to successfully
21 conduct that.
22 JUDGE WALD: Okay. I have just about four, I think, rapid
23 questions. One, we heard one theory raised in some of the Defence
24 questions that the references to the word, which I don't -- couldn't
25 pronounce correctly, for burial, in a couple of the excepts, might have
1 referred, or at least this was the inference I drew from the question,
2 might have referred to the normal kind of cleaning up of a battleground
3 after you've had a battle, and I'm wondering whether or not you thought
4 that was logical given the description of the kinds of equipment we saw
5 moving around and being requisitioned for whatever it was being
6 requisitioned for.
7 A. In that regard, perhaps the best way to do it is keeping in mind
8 the time sequence of the events as they occurred. The phrase itself
9 obviously refers to the burial of bodies. It doesn't qualify how the
10 bodies got there. What I tried to do as part of my analysis is to go to
11 the effort of quantifying where the combat from the column was physically
12 and where it occurred in time, and then demonstrate that based on the
13 times that we see the engineer equipment operating, that there cannot be a
14 physical linkage between the two.
15 I mean, in the sense of Colonel Pandurevic as a Commander --
16 JUDGE WALD: Yes, I understand.
17 A. -- I would find it very difficult for him to be concerned about
18 the burial of bodies on a battlefield, from a battlefield context, before
19 the battle has really gotten underway.
20 JUDGE WALD: Okay. I've just got four questions now. If the Main
21 Staff was running an operation of any sort in the Corps Commander's
22 territory without there having been a formal recertification or
23 reallocation of authority, would it be the normal military procedure for
24 the Commander, for the Corps Commander, to be told about both that
25 operation and some degree of detail?
1 In other words, just hypothesise that the Main Staff said, "We'll
2 take care of the treatment of the prisoners as they move into Bratunac,"
3 and just hypothesise that. Would it be the normal military procedure that
4 the Corps Commander would be told that and also told at least the outlines
5 of the plan for their treatment?
6 A. Absolutely, ma'am. The fundamental issue within a military
7 structure, particularly a ground army, is that everybody has to know what
8 everybody's doing. I mean, certainly not the individual soldier on the
9 ground, but the staff, because it is their job to, one, coordinate the
10 activities, and to further deconflict [sic] the activities. Because,
11 again, in a live-fire environment, if everybody is not clear where
12 soldiers are on the ground, you will end up killing your own people.
13 We've done that in various wars in the US Army. It's not an exact
14 science, and a lot of the work of the staff resolves around that.
15 The second piece is again from a military aspect and as
16 demonstrated by what occurred in the Zvornik Brigade, at the same time
17 these events are occurring, you've got significant military activity, and
18 you have a conflict in the resources required to either fight the column
19 or to bury the bodies and conduct the executions. And again, with Colonel
20 Pandurevic noting that there is a conflict here, he needs guidance, he
21 needs reinforcements, it's an unexpected situation, and the manifestation
22 of this command and staff activity to get Colonel Pandurevic the tools he
23 needs to both fight the column and continue on the execution process. I
24 mean, that's why the system works the way it does, and that's why it's --
25 particularly within the JNA and former VRS, orders that are issued at one
1 level are normally reviewed by the next superior level just so everyone up
2 the chain is aware of what is occurring, in detail, why it's occurring, in
3 detail, what resources will be needed so the decisions can be made to
4 execute the plans knowing everything that goes behind the plan.
5 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Exhibit 619, which I believe is -- the Defence
6 counsel brought up again, which is an order from the Main Staff to the
7 Drina command and the recipients, several of the brigade commanders which
8 you -- brigade commands which you discussed, but I noticed, in looking at
9 the heading on that, when it said, "Drina command, from the Main Staff,"
10 it says, "for information," and then it says, "Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac
11 Brigade." Is there any -- I mean, it says "Drina Corps command," then
12 "for information." It's unclear to me, reading the English translation,
13 if the "for information" is for the Drina command, if the "for
14 information" is for the following -- the individual brigade commands. Do
15 you have any impression on that? Or is it completely random?
16 A. I tried to discuss this a little in direct. It is a bit confusing
17 because of the language issue.
18 JUDGE WALD: Right. Yes.
19 A. Now, in that particular exhibit, unless I'm mistaken, if you go to
20 the B/C/S version, behind it you will see where the comma is.
21 JUDGE WALD: Oh, okay.
22 A. Or "for information," and then units listed behind it.
23 JUDGE WALD: From which you would infer what?
24 A. That the order was directed to the higher command.
25 JUDGE WALD: And the information was down below.
1 A. And in some of our discussions with other VRS officers, they
2 indicate that generally while it is a rare practice that occurs, it is a
3 practice that does occur and it is indicative of the fact that the higher
4 command wants to make sure that everybody is on the same sheet of paper
5 and it wants to do so in a timely manner.
6 JUDGE WALD: Now my last question, but it's a little bit
7 complicated. At various times, people, and we don't -- I mean, have
8 suggested that may have been a plan from the very beginning about the
9 treatment of the prisoners, namely, the women and children would go on
10 through to Kladanj and the men would not. But the time line, and maybe
11 you can go over this for me briefly -- and there's also been evidence very
12 early on, maybe it was even the 12th but it may have been the 13th, you
13 suggested that people down the line had to be going around finding these
14 holding stations like these schools and the various places so they would
15 be ready when the prisoners arrived. On the other hand, we know that
16 the -- in Potocari, the maximum number of men that anybody has suggested
17 there were 900 or 1.000, something like that, from the Potocari group,
18 whereas the bulk of the people that eventually were held in these stations
19 and executed came out of the column. It's my understanding.
20 So I'm trying to get it straight as to whether or not you think,
21 based on the evidence you have, when they were going around finding these
22 holdings stations and that sort of thing, they were doing it just on the
23 basis of the Potocari, because you point out it was the day or so before
24 they caught on what was happening to the column and the capturing began,
25 all of which comes to my final question.
1 If, if there was any kind of plan, was it a static plan or do we
2 have a situation where there may have been originally a plan for a certain
3 number of people, and when a new event like the column came into being,
4 that plan was constantly being adjusted as it went along, that they didn't
5 necessarily know on the first day if there was a plan, what was going to
6 happen on the third or the fourth day to the people from the columns, that
7 those decisions were being made on the spot?
8 A. The best way that -- or possibly the way that I use, I won't say
9 "best," to try and come to grips with that on a time line of looking back
10 at what a plan might have been, and again keeping in mind that it takes
11 them a few days for the column to --
12 JUDGE WALD: Right.
13 A. -- get established in their mind where it's going and what it's
14 doing, is again when an awareness of -- that there would have been men in
15 Potocari evening of the 11th, the morning of the 12th. Certainly the
16 evening of the 11th the decision was made to start busing them out.
17 JUDGE WALD: Right.
18 A. The presumption is that sometime during the evening, the early
19 morning hours of the 12th, somebody in Bratunac started designating and
20 identifying sites to hold individuals who would start arriving by the
21 12th, by the afternoon of the 12th, the earliest ones. Excuse me.
22 General Mladic makes the statement pertaining to a formal vetting
23 process in his mind for war criminals. The separation at Potocari there,
24 the fact that there's a list, the fact that Dutch witnesses say that in
25 the white house there were photographs out where some people were vetting
1 these individuals, and then again the witnesses describing a widespread
2 practice of the burning and the taking and the confiscation of
3 identification material, which would support that process.
4 The fact that the brutalisation that occurs to these people in the
5 holding facilities in Bratunac infers that they were not given
6 instructions that these people were to either be protected or held, and on
7 another extreme could lead one to interfere that the individuals carrying
8 these out could do so secure in the knowledge that they weren't going to
9 be held accountable for their individual actions, even in the case where
10 you have deaths occurring in the tens, and if one looks at the casualties
11 that occur, the deaths that occur in the hangar, perhaps even in the
12 hundreds, that there is no liability. The troops are doing this at the
13 lowest level with impunity, either -- somehow operating under an
14 assumption that nothing's going to happen to them, despite the presence of
15 their lower-level commanders in and around the area. The -- that piece
16 begins to manifest itself as early as the 12th.
17 Now, again, going under the understanding that perhaps
18 General Mladic and the Drina Corps don't -- they know there are men in
19 Potocari, they don't know how many men, but again they're expecting to
20 find them in the Badara Triangle. So there is no way to say that it
21 wouldn't have been part of that plan at any point in time. And in fact,
22 how flexible it was was the fact that even though they were picked up in a
23 separate location, they were still brought in and held, one, in some of
24 these facilities, those same facilities; and, two, when the facilities
25 were filled up, they were held in bus and trucks outside of those
1 facilities. So certainly the facilities were not filled by the afternoon
2 of the 13th from just by Potocari people, some of these were being filled
3 by people from the column.
4 So again, inferring back, those were the designated sites
5 regardless of where the men were picked up.
6 The great unknown is what they would have estimated the size of
7 the column or the size or the sheer number of men that they were picking
8 up. The other part of the unknown is: At what point in time the Supreme
9 Commanders in that case, in this case General Mladic, came to a decision,
10 either on his own or with the president, or certainly came to the decision
11 that, "We can't -- either we're not going to hold them. We're going to
12 kill them. And we can't kill them here. We have to move them to remote
14 Because looking at the overall context of events -- I mean,
15 certainly from the perspective of the army and the perspective of the
16 political and civilian leadership of VRS, considering the broad scale of
17 events as they're occurring, it is hard to envision a better bargaining
18 chip in dealing with the political authorities of certainly the BiH
19 government and of the International Community than having 10.000 to 15.000
20 Muslim men in the middle of Potocari in a legitimate prisoner of war
21 facility under the control or under the supervision of certainly the
22 UN troops that were there and the ICRC at a point in time. That is the
23 ultimate bargaining chip, to be able to get significant political leverage
24 from people, one would think, and this chip was thrown away for another
25 reason. And again, I don't know what that reason could be.
1 So going back in the series of time as to when the plan expanded
2 from hold them into these facilities and kill them while they're in these
3 facilities to remove them to a more remote zone, the best that I can infer
4 on that is the Zvornik Brigade or elements of the Zvornik brigade became
5 aware of that plan sometime on the 13th, and the reflection of that is how
6 it was manifested or manifested in the travels of those vehicles looking
7 for potential sites.
8 Again, as the Defence raised, most of these sites were in remote
9 locations, with the exception of the Pilica Dom. And again going back to
10 the sheer number of people, the Orahovac facility filled up, the Petkovci
11 facility filled up, the Pilica facility filled up, possibly the school at
12 Rosevic filled up. The people are still -- again, as a military
13 operation, it's not just a tap that turns on and off. Buses are still
14 moving up the road and they've got to put them somewhere. They put them
15 in Pilica Dom.
16 But just to finish the last part of the question as to where the
17 intent was, it can't be forgotten that the first of the large-scale
18 executions doesn't occur in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade, it occurs in
19 the Cerska Valley belonging to, I believe, the Milici Brigade, as early as
20 noon on 13 July. And when you look at the external components of that, it
21 was organised insomuch as there were buses carrying the men. They had a
22 military escort, and behind those buses or as part of those buses there
23 was earth-moving equipment. It wasn't a holding site they were going to
24 up the valley to in Cerska. It was not a convenient place to hold them.
25 This is where they were going to be executed.
1 And again, the reflections of conversations in some of the
2 intercepts where Drina Corps staff officers, as early as the afternoon of
3 13 July, are looking for engineer equipment. So in my mind, that is the
4 first manifestation of a major move, that it's not ones and twos, it's
5 tens [sic] any more, it's a systematic process.
6 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
8 Judge Wald.
9 I see that it is 20 to 1. I, too, have a large number of
10 questions for you, so if we begin with my questions, we will be under
11 pressure because we will need a closed session, so perhaps it would be
12 better to have a break, at least for me to prepare my questions. I have
13 asked the registrar to prepare the exhibits which I intend to use, and to
14 facilitate your answers. My questions will be very simple, but maybe your
15 answers will not, so I'm going to ask Madam Registrar to put before
16 Mr. Butler the exhibits.
17 So we're going to have a break. I think 20 minutes will suffice
18 because after that we don't have much more to do. 20-minute break.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.43 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Butler, I am going to ask
22 you a certain number of questions, 14 in all; some have subquestions to
23 them. I proceed from the principle that all my questions require answers
24 from you after you have reviewed and read all these documents. Some are
25 hypothetical, but they are always based on the information you acquired
1 having read and reviewed all these documents, and they also rely on your
2 expertise and your military experience and knowledge.
3 I am starting from Exhibit 409 which perhaps you have in front of
4 you, and the question is the following: The Corps Commander, can he
5 decide without telling his assistant commander, that is, the Chief of
6 Staff, about it?
7 A. There may very well -- depending on the order, there may be
8 instances where that is theoretically possible. A very simplistic order
9 may be an individual type of an order. But within the realistic scheme of
10 how a military command and staff works, trying to do that on a broader
11 scale and trying to keep the Chief of Staff specifically out of the loop
12 very quickly runs the risk of military confusion, particularly if it's an
13 order that would require the work of subordinates on the staff to have to
14 accomplish, and yet somehow not be able to do that, deal with the Chief of
15 Staff and then deal directly through the Commander.
16 I mean, one of the last issues on the command is the fact that the
17 one resource a Commander can't fix on the battlefield and can't somehow
18 modify or alter is time. He's got a lot of missions and a lot of jobs and
19 a lot of hard decisions, and he has "X" amount of time. And one of the
20 reasons why he has the Chief of Staff and the staff is so he can give a
21 simple order or broad guidance and not himself have to spend the hours
22 necessary taking that broader guidance and turning it into specific
23 executable tasks.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Do you have any indications of
25 the presence of Arkan's Tigers in Potocari?
1 A. Sir, I understand from one or two witness statements that an
2 individual is identified either as a member of the Arkan group or is seen
3 wearing an Arkan Tiger uniform or distinctive patch; but from my review of
4 the document base in question, I have no information which would support
5 that statement.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But if we take into
7 consideration Exhibits 423 and 424, those exhibits refer to regular units,
8 if I can call them that; and in connection with that you said that at a
9 given moment, paramilitary units were integrated into the regular
10 structure or were disbanded. How can we interpret their presence in the
11 context of military principles?
12 A. With that regard, I believe I qualified that "that moment in time"
13 was in mid to late 1992. The physical presence of a single individual is
14 not something that in isolation, that I would say qualifies the presence
15 of that individual to the fact that a paramilitary unit is fully there.
16 What I'm looking for as part of my analysis to come to grips with
17 that issue is information or evidence which would suggest that either
18 multiple sightings which we could use or which I would use to refer
19 multiple individuals, or some evidence within the documents or within
20 other statements that I could use as an additional piece of evidence
21 coming from another source to confirm or deny that. And at the end of the
22 day, what I've come up with is I have this specific statement, and I just
23 have no other information which would allow me to confirm or deny their
24 physical presence. I can't say that they were there; I cannot say that
25 they weren't there. I cannot confirm it, though.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 425 mentions repeatedly
2 UNPROFOR and the International Community and international public opinion.
3 Do you have any idea as to, and I have two subquestions, the role that
4 these factors played in the decisions taken by the responsible officials
5 of the army of Republika Srpska, and what was the understanding of those
6 factors or perception of those factors by the VRS?
7 A. With respect to Srebrenica in 1995 in that regards, certainly the
8 army, as well as the civilian leadership of the country Republika Srpska,
9 was very aware and had to take those into consideration. The
10 manifestation of that in my mind, of how they took those considerations
11 into effect, first would be the Krivaja-95 OP plan itself which does not
12 specify the taking of the town of Srebrenica as an objective; the 5 July
13 1995 air defence order published by the Drina Corps, a reflection that
14 because of the upcoming operations, NATO aircraft would potentially be
15 involved, understanding that they would expect some reaction out of the UN
16 as a result of the increased military operations; the fact that when you
17 look at the scope of the operations, and I have to give them very good
18 credit on this, it was very much done, at least from my view, not in a way
19 that would immediately cause a trigger to be tripped in the International
20 Community or with the UN. It was a very slow, cautious approach, moving
21 forward, taking an OP, moving forward again, taking an OP, working very
22 hard not to cause UN casualties as reflected in some cases by the way they
23 did this. In other cases, you know, firing at the UN, always a pattern or
24 a lack of pattern that the UN and the International Community could grasp
25 onto as the ultimate intent. And clearly, the lack of response or the
1 lack of perceived response was a factor in the 9 July 1995 order in the
2 name of President Karadzic to expand the goal of the operation. So again,
3 throughout the course of the operation, the actual military part, they
4 were very cognizant of the International Community and the UN.
5 That same type of recognition is also reflected in many ways by
6 the way the prisoners were handled afterwards: The conscious effort to
7 move the men out of the eyesight of the Dutch who were there; the plan, as
8 it was perceived from the results of the observations of the Dutch, that
9 their vehicles were being taken away, and that their ability to monitor
10 the events in the name of the UN and the International Community was being
11 systematically degraded; the fact that even in Bratunac, the understanding
12 that there was still too much of the International Community there between
13 relevant UN forces that were in Bratunac at the Hotel Fontana, between the
14 ICRC and other international organisations, and even an awareness that's
15 reflected in the conversation between Miroslav Dzuronic, the civilian
16 commissioner for refugees, and the office of the president which, as I
17 reviewed now -- I wasn't sure yesterday -- took place on 13 July with the
18 instructions of "get them out of there." And in essence, they're moved to
19 the isolated locations which would not reasonably be expected to be under
20 anyone's view.
21 And certainly as the army operation that everyone could watch was
22 moving from Srebrenica to the UN operation in Zepa, certainly the
23 International Community and the UN's view was focussed on that, as well as
24 being focussed on having to deal with the thousands and tens of thousands
25 of Muslim civilians, women and children, coming out of Kladanj. So at a
1 higher level than just a military level, certainly an awareness that
2 everything that they did would somehow have to be conducted with regards
3 to what the UN and what the International Community could see and would
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 428 refers to the
6 separation and reduction of the enclaves as the objectives of the military
7 operations as a first step, at the same time, the creation of conditions
8 for the elimination of those enclaves. Would you agree with that?
9 A. That is correct, sir.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Those objectives, were they
11 separate or were they simultaneous in time?
12 A. They were -- well, from a military sequence, separated by time one
13 after the other. In a planning sequence, they were certainly looked at as
14 a unified plan, and we see the manifestation of that in some of the 9 and
15 10 July -- matter of fact, I believe there's 10 July Drina Corps order
16 that is either an exhibit or part of my supporting material which reflects
17 the fact that as a result of what is occurring at Srebrenica, we're now in
18 a position to start taking advantage of that and start setting the
19 conditions for the military operation at Zepa.
20 So while the military events fall in sequence because you need the
21 same forces and they can't be in two places at once, the planning intent
22 was certainly together.
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If one assesses the results, do
24 the results coincide with the objectives, or is there a discrepancy
25 between the two, and if so, what is the discrepancy between the objectives
1 and the results achieved?
2 A. I believe from a military sense, the results exceeded the planned
3 objectives but met the modified objective insomuch as the fact that the
4 initial intent and goals was, first, the physical reduction of the
5 enclave, and to create the conditions where presumably the United Nations
6 and the International Community would evacuate the enclave. In effect,
7 try to replay what happened in 1993 prior to the establishment of the
9 In that regard where I think they were surprised was from a
10 military sense, they were surprised by their success, and a lot of the
11 events that you see relative to the frenzy of activity trying to get the
12 buses and the resources to move the population is a reflection of the fact
13 that it didn't occur to them until almost the 11th, the evening of the
14 11th, that they would need to do that.
15 I mean, looking at a corps staff and any military staff, part of
16 that process is to be able to anticipate events so you can plan for them
17 before you need whatever you need. And in this regard, you don't see
18 that. There was no prior planning for that aspect. So from a military
19 sense, they did achieve that at the low end. At the larger end, they
20 achieved the goals of what they wanted, which was the elimination of
21 Srebrenica and Zepa as enclaves, and in a larger sense, now they did not
22 have those two enclaves to deal with in the area of the wider area of the
23 Predendija [phoen] Valley.
24 Now, going to the next step of whether that included Gorazde and
25 whether they thought they could get away with that as well is a bit
1 speculative based on the information that I have, sir.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is it true that in the original
3 plan, the evacuation of the population was included, was envisaged?
4 A. Are we referring to the original OP plan Krivaja-95? I don't read
5 it as such. The specific line that I believe you're referring to would be
6 part of the procedures that would be relative -- and, again, I don't want
7 to put words in your mouth, sir, but I believe this is the passage that
8 you would be referring to, the issue of dealing with prisoners in a war in
9 a civilian population behaving in every way.
10 When I look at that, I don't take that to mean that they are
11 already thinking through the process of removing thousands of numbers of
12 individuals. I believe we're referring here to something of a much
13 smaller scale. The fact that they can anticipate that they're going to
14 take a number of prisoners, certainly at the beginning of the operation in
15 maybe ones and maybe tens, that they're going to come across members of
16 the civilian population, and as previous testimony has indicated, there
17 was, in fact, a rather large civilian project out there, I believe it's
18 called the Swedish Shelter Project, in that area, so it would not be
19 unreasonable at all to expect that their combat troops would be dealing
20 with prisoners of war and civilians in that aspect of the combat. But I
21 wouldn't take this any further than that, sir.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But if we come to the 11th or
23 the 12th of July, specifically to the meetings held in the Fontana Hotel,
24 I don't know whether it would be naive to say that there was an intention
25 on the part of those responsible to evacuate the population. But what we
1 know today is that persons were executed.
2 I don't know whether we can see there a change of orientation.
3 And if so, what could have been the reasons that led to the executions
4 when, after all, they were always talking about evacuation?
5 A. I would say, based on the events and probably the best trigger of
6 the event in my mind that would illustrate that intent would be at the
7 first meeting and then further at the second meeting. At the first
8 meeting, General Mladic articulates he wants to see the Muslim military
9 commanders; second meeting, the same.
10 He doesn't know that the 28th Division is trying to escape.
11 Again, their understanding is that that division is in the Bandera
12 Triangle to the south-west of Srebrenica and may be preparing to fight or
13 may be preparing to make an escape towards Zepa. He doesn't know that
14 they're going out as a column or that there is an intent.
15 It's almost clear, at least in my mind, that on the evening of
16 11th July, General Mladic, by that first meeting, second meeting, he's
17 looking to set the conditions for a set peace surrender of the
18 28th Division to him.
19 Somewhere after that second meeting and through the events that
20 are occurring late in the evening of the 11th and the morning of the 12th,
21 as his tactical units on the ground along those roads start indicating
22 that there's a column moving, there is an awareness that, one, the
23 28th Infantry Division is not where the VRS thought it was; and, two, that
24 the 28th Infantry Division is not going to surrender but is, in effect,
25 trying to organise a mass escape and return to the lines of the BiH.
1 If I had to say what is the event where the light turned on or the
2 light turned off, I would say that recognition by General Mladic that that
3 event that he expected, that he was going to gain custody of those people,
4 again perhaps for a potential bargaining chip or for whatever reasons, was
5 not going as he had anticipated.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibits 437 and 445 speak about
7 the mobilisation of buses and also of drivers. You may have already
8 answered this question, but I would like to insist upon it. This
9 mobilisation, was it part of the initial plan or of the modified or
10 adjusted plan, following what you have just said?
11 A. Again, given the fact that the VRS, in general, and certainly the
12 corps tried to be as organised as possible and predict major events like
13 this, certainly where large numbers of resources are going to be used, all
14 of the activity pertaining to buses and pertaining to the resources to
15 move the population appear, in my view, to be reactive to the situation
16 that's occurring. They're not in anticipation of an event. We don't see,
17 prior to the early morning hours of 12 July, any thought process
18 whatsoever on the side of the army or even the side of the civilian
19 government that they would have to do this.
20 When you look at that and other statements that are taken in the
21 context of the events, it almost appears that until the late evening hours
22 of the 11th, the early morning hours of the 12th, they had always
23 perceived that the UN would do this and not them, and that it would be the
24 UN that would gather the assets, it would be the UN that would actually
25 use all the resources, particularly the large number of buses and the
1 large amount of fuel that would do this, that would have to come out of
2 the very limited coffers of the VRS.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So we come to Exhibit 459. The
4 treatment given to civilians mentioned in the postscript, is it possible
5 to make a distinction between the envisaged treatment and the other
6 treatment that was, in fact, given?
7 A. I think the key qualifier in this specific paragraph is the
8 recognition of how it will be necessary to present the operation in
9 Srebrenica to the media. They're qualifying the public face and the
10 private face.
11 I don't think, at this point in time -- I mean, again, they're
12 qualifying it. We have to advance the perception that here's the
13 treatment of the civilians and even here's the treatment of surrendered
14 soldiers. This is the public scene. So this is, in my mind, not an
15 awareness of a duality of how they're going to treat the individuals but
16 an awareness of the fact that "what we do and what we sell publicly has to
17 be different."
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could it be said that they were
19 playing with public opinion in a sense, that in a way they were lying?
20 A. Sir, I believe that the fact basis supports that they were
21 manipulating the public opinion or attempting to. The fact that we have
22 the 12 July order that specifies that access to foreign media, foreign
23 information sources is going to be restricted along those closed highways
24 and that only media under the accompaniment of the army -- and again, the
25 media coverage by Zoran Petrovic, typical of that -- would be allowed to
1 put the best public face on. I mean, certainly we know there were at
2 least three media outlets taping events there. We know that Zoran
3 Petrovic; we know that Colonel Milovanovic, who was the RS press
4 information officer, it's his footage, is my understanding, where we have
5 the video footage of the meetings; and there was another film camera down
6 there as well showing Mladic on the 12th in Potocari.
7 So certainly within this aspect, they are attempting to present
8 the best possible public light to the events both as they're occurring and
9 after the fact.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] To go back to the Zoran Petrovic
11 interview, has this question something to do with the statement, that is
12 Exhibit 499, according to which, and I'm going to quote it in English [In
13 English] [Previous translation continues] ... "peripheral phenomenon in
15 Is there a relationship between the two? This statement is found
16 on page 2, paragraph 5, "Refugees are a peripheral phenomenon in war."
17 A. I think, and again not reflecting the views of the author on this
18 one, I think he's accurately recounting the fact that military combat,
19 military conflict, does not occur in isolation with the civilian
20 population. I mean, in fact, with regret, most of the combat seems to
21 occur there. Very rarely do you get the situation where you have the
22 luxury of a wide open desert with very little civilian population issues
23 to deal with.
24 Civilians or noncombatants always attempt to flee. I mean, it's a
25 phenomenon, it's a known one, it's a rational choice, and military forces
1 have been having to deal with the aspects of civilian populations and what
2 that means in their military operations before, during, and afterwards for
3 as long as I've been reading military history. It is a phenomenon of
4 war. It's a recognised phenomenon of war. It doesn't occur in
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 433 refers, among other
7 things, to the presence of General Mladic. I think we have already
8 discussed this at some length, but maybe this is from a slightly different
10 Is it normal for the Major General, the chief of the command, to
11 be present in these conditions? And if not, what are the reasons that you
12 would give for his presence there?
13 A. Certainly given the perception that we're on the eve of a major
14 Serbian VRS victory, I would certainly expect General Mladic to be there.
15 As I've noted in my previous testimony, particularly with relation to the
16 video footage of the walkthrough of Srebrenica with General Krstic and
17 General Zivanovic, one of the fundamental tenets of leadership and command
18 is to be seen doing that.
19 General Mladic is the commander of the army of Republika Srpska.
20 That's not an esoteric position that is done in isolation. As a commander
21 at any level -- and I believe this is a pretty universal military
22 concept -- the commander has to be out with the troops and to be seen
23 being with the troops, sharing the hardships, sharing the rewards. He has
24 to be seen commanding and being seen leading.
25 If you look at the video footage of General Mladic through the
1 war, he makes very sure that there are video cameras around making sure he
2 is seen doing all of those things.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Have you come across any pieces
4 of information which could lead you to have some views regarding the
5 relationship, even personal relationship, between General Mladic and the
6 Drina Corps, and more specifically, with General Zivanovic?
7 A. The professional association with General Mladic and
8 General Zivanovic, and where I believe it crosses over to a personal
9 level, goes back as far as I can track it with the material I have before
10 the war, at least the war in Bosnia, where General Mladic was the
11 commander of the JNA 9th Corps in Knin, and where General Zivanovic was
12 one of his brigade commanders, the Commander of the 180th Motorised
13 Brigade, I believe.
14 When the war begins, General Mladic, of course, becomes the
15 Commander of the Main Staff of the newly-formed army of Republika Srpska.
16 And one of his deputies -- and if my information is correct, the Main
17 Staff Chief of Artillery during the early period of 1992 was then
18 Colonel Zivanovic. Again, a continued professional relationship.
19 The fact that in November 1992, when the Drina Corps is formed,
20 General Zivanovic is appointed to be the Commander of that corps. One
21 would presume that while it would be President Karadzic who appoints the
22 Corps Commander because it's a general position, that he would have done
23 so with the endorsement and on the recommendation of General Mladic.
24 Their continued professional association over the three years of the
25 course of conflict, and because of the evidence base, I can't really
1 qualify that in too much depth, until General Zivanovic leaves. And
2 perhaps the last piece is the actions or the activities of
3 General Zivanovic after he leaves. I mean, upon his retirement, he is, in
4 fact, promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel-General as he retires.
5 So I can certainly catalogue a long professional relationship in a
6 superior/subordinate relationship, a very close one, between
7 General Mladic and General Zivanovic.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I now come to a subject which
9 was already addressed by my distinguished colleague Judge Riad.
10 It has to do with the question why General Zivanovic was replaced
11 by General Krstic. You have already touched upon that question, but I
12 would like to come back to it with this question: Is it possible to think
13 that General Zivanovic was perhaps not in agreement with the plan or the
14 attitude of General Mladic in that operation?
15 A. Sir, that is a definite possibility and one of the two or three
16 theories that we hold.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 446, I think that in the
18 analysis that you have made of this exhibit I'm talking about Exhibit
19 number 446 --
20 A. I do not have that in front of me, sir. I have 464 not 446. Oh,
21 here it is on the bottom, sir. I've got it.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you. So this exhibit,
23 according to your analysis, refers to the first convoy of women and
24 children that left Potocari. Would you agree with that?
25 A. The time frame of 1305 and 12 July supports that, yes, sir.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] At that point, that is, the 12th
2 of July at 1305 hours, was it possible for General Krstic to be informed
3 of the execution or of a plan of executions, and if yes, why and how can
4 we make that conclusion that he was aware of it?
5 A. If we -- or in my case, if I make the assumption that that plan
6 occurred sometime between the second meeting on 11 July and the third
7 meeting on 12 July, the physical presence of General Krstic at both those
8 meetings and in the Bratunac area during the period leads me to believe if
9 there was a plan of that nature, he would have known about that.
10 Now, looking at this specific intercept pertaining to the buses,
11 one would make the inference that part of that would be the knowledge that
12 the women, the women -- and maybe the best way to do it would be to say
13 those people who didn't qualify as military combatants or potential
14 military combatants were not part of that plan. One of the unique things
15 that I can use that helps me to support that theory is witness testimony
16 that was brought before the Court earlier where on 13 July in the Sandici
17 meadow, there was an awareness that they were looking to exclude out of
18 the groups of people individuals who were not between the ages of 16 and
19 60. And that was an awareness by the soldiers at the lowest level.
20 So in that regards, the intent that there's a plan, that there's
21 the intent that there was some form of thought process who will be
22 excluded from that group manifests itself in both this intercept and in
23 that other piece of information.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But Mr. Butler, if Mladic knew
25 about this -- and we have information, but now I ask you the questions. I
1 will present this to you conditionally as a question. So if Mladic did
2 know about the executions, would it be normal to think that Krstic knew
3 about it, too?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The first question, did Mladic
7 A. The physical presence, as noted by a lot of the witnesses, and the
8 physical -- and the descriptions and the statements by them, as well as
9 the footage of him in Potocari on 12 July, and certainly his presence on
10 13 July on the Bratunac road up to Konjevic Polje to Nova Kasaba, and the
11 bodies that are on the road during that period, and in one specific
12 instance, that there was one individual killed at Sandici that I believe
13 is closely associated with his presence, strongly infers that; but I can't
14 based on that alone say that from those events, that Mladic knew. I mean,
15 that's a mental state judgement that I can't make, sir.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 459, please. I will
17 quote in English, [In English] "... has stayed in the hospital of Bratunac
18 at the request of the hospital staff to make sure that the patients are
19 properly treated. I intend to send him away tomorrow under the pretext
20 that his help is not necessary."
21 [Interpretation] Taking into account the fact that there seem to
22 be two entities making decisions and two criteria for the decision making,
23 what are your comments? And perhaps I can ask another question. Do you
24 have any indications about the fate of the 57 wounded, the 18 persons that
25 were relocated later, and some five or six people who died in the hospital
1 in Bratunac? Who were dying, not the persons who actually died, but who
2 were dying.
3 A. It's easier to answer the second question first. My understanding
4 from the investigation and dealing with them particularly with regards to
5 this issue, is that they have in fact looked at this closely, and all of
6 the information that we have to date from both the VRS documents as well
7 as from the International Community, the Red Cross and those agencies that
8 actually did monitor the transfer, indicates that for the most part that
9 this group of individuals was in fact properly treated, was in fact
10 evacuated under proper medical supervision, and many of those were in fact
11 taken to the detention centre at Bajkovici; to include, if you look at a
12 related document to this, the fact that Captain 1st Class Nikolic
13 indicates that 23 were transferred on this date under Drina Corps military
14 police guidance, and one person was given to the municipal police as a
15 confessed war criminal. And even he comes out after the war from the camp
16 at Bajkovici. So with this regard, my understanding is that the
17 investigation, while certainly continuing in this regard, has not yet
18 determined anything to date that would warrant further action.
19 In answer to your second question, again, you've reflected on the
20 fact that Colonel Radislav Jankovic, the intelligence officer or
21 unintelligence [sic] officer of the Main Staff, is making an intention or
22 informing both the Drina Corps and the Main Staff of his intention to send
23 the doctor away under the pretence that he's no longer needed, again, part
24 of that larger campaign to remove international eyes from the area.
25 Now, certainly in this specific case, either by design or just
1 because there were too many eyes, and I won't speculate as to what the
2 situation was, these people were treated properly. So with that regard,
3 it does seem to be contradictory.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But one could think that this
5 person that -- had intention to get rid of the doctor or to no longer use
6 his services, that he asked the hospital staff whether they needed the
7 doctor, that they would have said that they still needed him?
8 A. The interesting parallel, and again if you note it, is that the
9 doctor's -- he stayed on at the hospital at the request of the hospital
10 staff, so presumably some medical authority wants him to stay for whatever
11 reason; and yet, yes, Colonel Jankovic as the intelligence officer is
12 making a pretext to send him away, overriding that medical advice or that
13 medical desire, yes, sir.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibits 463 and 464. In your
15 opinion, these two exhibits are co-related; they need each other. Between
16 the two terms, one that's used in 463 which is "search," and 464, which is
17 "search" -- there seems to be a problem with translation and
18 terminology. Do we need to look up this word in the dictionary. There
19 seems to be the same term used in both documents and the original.
20 A. I believe that in this case, I mean, the phrase "search and sweep
21 operation" are used interchangeably. And looking at particularly when you
22 break down the Bratunac Brigade order, what the actual order is directing
23 is a rather coordinated sweep operation, the goal being to, as the
24 military unit passes over the terrain in a somewhat linear fashion, that
25 everything behind that unit is in fact secured. It has no -- they do not
1 leave behind any enemy forces; they do not bypass anybody. It becomes a
2 secure area.
3 So I think in that respect, we are -- we remain functionally
4 talking about the same type of operation.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 556, we have already
6 visited this exhibit today, [In English] "Take this as an order," 14
8 [Interpretation] My question, perhaps it is repetitious, but it is
9 from a slightly different angle, could this mean that General Zivanovic
10 could have legitimate doubts that his interlocutor does not -- is not
11 aware of the conditions in which the order is given, that it is an order?
12 What I was saying was, that the person he's speaking to does not
13 see it as him being in a position to give orders?
14 A. Sir, that is in fact how I do interpret it, and if -- when at a
15 point in time we go into closed session, I will provide additional
16 information which in fact supports why I interpret it that way.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 564. We have here the
18 dialogue, and I'm referring to page 2, between Malinic who says, [In
19 English] "We should do something to eliminate it," "it" meaning a group.
20 Nastic answers, "yes." And after Malinic, "Can we do that?"
21 [Interpretation] My question, the word "eliminate," does it have a
22 special meaning in military terminology? And let me go on with my other
23 questions. Is it possible to imagine that there was no plan or that there
24 was a plan that some people were aware of and others were not? And
25 finally, can we see that in this document? Were there any surprises or
1 improvisations? I think you already answered that part of my question.
2 A. With regards to the first question, certainly in the case of Major
3 Malinic, the Commander of the Military Police Battalion, 65th Protection
4 Regiment, and Major Nastic, the Commander of the Milici Brigade, as senior
5 officials within the structure, the military structure that existed, one
6 in the Drina Corps and one subordinate to the Main Staff, these would,
7 these would be people who would be aware of what was going on if -- as
8 part of the plan. Their assets would be involved in it. They'd have to
9 be aware.
10 The second piece is, and again as you indicate, sir, there is a
11 lot of ad hoc or very rapidly changing military situations or other
12 situations that are presenting themselves, which they have either not
13 fully anticipated or having to react to on a -- in a rapid basis. So in
14 that regard again, yes, this particular intercept reflects that.
15 Going to the last piece based on this, and again Judge Wald, I
16 believe, brought this issue up earlier, what to infer from it, again
17 defaulting back to my statements where that as a military analyst that
18 unless it was clear in my mind what I would infer from it, I would always
19 default back to a potential military meaning. And since I do understand
20 at the period that there was column activity that could have qualified as
21 legitimate, I can make that. However, I certainly can't deny that there
22 is an entirely different way to read this which would lay out criminal
23 intent or certainly criminal knowledge.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So that brings me to
25 Exhibit 712. One can read that: [In English] "General Krstic, this
1 morning, praised the way we have completed our task so far."
2 [Interpretation] Do you have any idea which those tasks were? And
3 another subquestion: What was the date from which they should be included
4 or inserted?
5 A. The first part of your question, and in reading this, one has to
6 keep in mind that as the first part notes, "defining task related to
7 coming duties especially at Trnovo," they still were conducting combat
9 Further during this period in time, the Bratunac Brigade or large
10 elements of the Bratunac Brigade were operating under the command of the
11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in Trnovo, that ability to do that, being the fact
12 that the Srebrenica safe area no longer existed. So again, a reflection
13 of a manifestation of that goal. Now we're able to use this brigade in
14 another corps zone. So in this regard, there are potentially a lot of
15 very difficult military operations that occur which, in fact,
16 General Krstic could be praising.
17 At the same time during the period that this is occurring, as the
18 investigation has revealed, we have the process where primary mass burial
19 sites at Glogova, I believe, are being removed and are being reinstalled
20 or moved to the secondary grave sites along the Zeleni Jadar road. And
21 again the comment by Major Nikolic or Captain First Class Nikolic at the
22 back of that is what I take as indicative of that, but I can't necessarily
23 say that the task that General Krstic is praising is or is not related to
24 the second task.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You mentioned an interview given
1 by General Zivanovic, in which he said that he left the Drina Corps
2 command on the 11th of July. Do you recall the date of that interview?
3 A. If memory serves me correctly, that interview was taken in
4 November of 1996. It in fact shows up as a footnote in Mr. David Rhodes'
5 book pertaining to Srebrenica, which is how I found out about it. The
6 interview is not relatively public knowledge because for whatever reason,
7 it was not published by the editors. However, the author has in fact
8 provided the investigation with the completed notes of that interview.
9 But I believe the time is November 1996.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Exhibit 609. We have revisited
11 that exhibit today, and it has to do with a statement by Vinko
12 Pandurevic. [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... "under his
13 responsibility, we will be forced to let them go."
14 [Interpretation] In saying that, is Pandurevic acknowledging that
15 the plans or the plan was not well-adjusted or that there was no plan at
16 all? You have already answered this question in general terms, but more
17 specifically, could it be that Pandurevic either did not know about the
18 plan or that the plan he knew was not adjusted to his needs?
19 A. Going back to the first part of your question, would I look at
20 this and is this a potential indication of whether or not Colonel
21 Pandurevic knew, and again as I've indicated, the fact that the way he's
22 talking about that is indicative of the fact that he knows there is a
23 plan, and certainly, as a brigade commander coming into his zone again
24 from the Zepa area and very quickly becoming briefed on the situation, he
25 knows how extensive the plan is, he knows what resources are being used,
1 and he also knows that the military situation with the column will require
2 maybe some of those resources to be pulled to another location.
3 So again, I interpret this as reflective of the fact that he
4 understands that there's a plan, and further, he understands that the new
5 military situation that is presenting itself with the column will require
6 reinforcements or modifications to that plan. And when you wrap that in
7 again with the 15 July 1995 intercept conversation between Colonel Beara
8 and General Krstic, Colonel Beara makes it very clear that all of a
9 sudden, because of the situation, people who are supposed to be there or
10 people who he had been counting on earlier are no longer available to
11 execute his portion of that plan presumably to execute Muslim men, and he
12 is rapidly querying the Corps Commander about the availability of
13 additional resources to even qualify the point that, "I will only need
14 them for the day. You can have them back tonight."
15 Clearly again, when you take it in context with the events, a lot
16 of people are suddenly coming to the realisation that plans and resources
17 now have to radically shift to deal with the military situation as it's
18 now presenting itself with the column.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My last question for the
20 moment: If we have this column and the evacuation and all the problems
21 related to the column, do you have any information on the conversations
22 between the VRS and the BiH, and do you have any analyses of those
24 A. The intercepts that we have, the BiH intercepts of the VRS
25 communications, reflect the fact that on the ground, that Muslim military
1 commanders or certainly at least one individual who represents himself as
2 a commander, is attempting to make contact with the VRS. We see that
3 reflected in one particular exhibit that I believe was tendered pertaining
4 to a synopsis of a conversation where the individual Semso Muhanovic --
5 and I'm sure I pronounced his name incorrectly -- is looking for
7 That individual, Semso, has been in the area of Tuzla for several
8 years as a military commander. Certainly he knows who his opposite number
9 is, and he knows who to contact relative to this, and he does so contact
10 him over a frequency that he knows the VRS is listening to or monitoring,
11 maybe one of their own even. So he does that.
12 Again, a reflection of the 14 July suggestion from Dusko Vukotic,
13 the intelligence officer of the Zvornik Brigade, noting that, "Perhaps we
14 should make contact with them," clearly indicating that contact between
15 the BiH and the VRS, from a military perspective for these things, is
16 certainly not unheard of and may in fact be a channel that occurs
17 relatively frequently, although I can't say that.
18 We certainly know that when we look at the 16 July 1995 daily
19 combat report -- I'm sorry, the interim combat report, that in that
20 report, Colonel Pandurevic notes that because of the military situation
21 and because of what he perceives to be a lack of support, that he, on his
22 own volition, has met with or at least verbally communicated with the
23 Muslim military commanders on the ground there and arranged for a
24 temporary truce to occur. So certainly we have the intent or the idea at
25 the beginning. We have contacts from the Muslim side attempting to make
1 that happen. And even backing off that, we have, on the 9th of July, we
2 have the request from the civilian and military leadership in Srebrenica
3 that the BiH governmental level should initiate contacts with the VRS to
4 see if something like this can be arranged. So certainly intent on both
5 sides, and we see the manifestations of that intent reflected in reality
6 on the 15th and 16th of July, which then leads for at least a portion of
7 the column to leave the territory of VRS and go to BiH territory.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] It seems to me, Mr. Butler -- I
9 don't know where I came across that -- that the difference in the
10 negotiations was that on the Muslim side, the condition was for the
11 military and civilian to pass through. The position of the VRS, however,
12 was no, the civilians can pass but not the military men. Can you confirm
13 that? Am I right or not?
14 A. The evidence as tendered reflects the fact that the Muslim
15 position was that they wanted the entire column out, and the fact that
16 Colonel Pandurevic had indicated that his position was the civilians could
17 go out but that the military would remain in the custody of the VRS. And
18 because of the circumstances that followed, what ended up happening, as
19 reflected by Colonel Pandurevic, was that the compromise, whether it was
20 planned or not, the compromise solution that he reported was that, "I
21 couldn't control it either way, but at least I can say that those Muslim
22 military who went out went out unarmed."
23 So the two positions are reflected and then the end result being
24 as Colonel Pandurevic discusses.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So can we conclude that when
1 Pandurevic says, "Let them go," he's referring to the whole column?
2 A. In this regard and because I read this in conjunction with the
3 above paragraph, I would say no, only because I do not believe that at
4 this point in time, in time sequence, that the enormity of the situation
5 that is reflected in the 16 July 1995 interim combat report has occurred
6 on the 15th of July.
7 On the 15th of July, in the morning, we have the Muslim side
8 trying to initiate contact. There is no reflection that contact is
9 returned or that any discussions are made during the day of the 15th. So
10 because of that and because of the way I read this, I wouldn't come to the
11 conclusion that if no one takes responsibility, I will be forced to let
12 them go. I would not take that comment as relating to the column at all,
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, can we now go
15 into closed session, please?
16 [Closed session]
13 page 5523 redacted – closed session
13 page 5524 redacted – closed session
13 page 5525 redacted – closed session
13 page 5526 redacted – closed session
13 page 5527 redacted – closed session
13 page 5528 redacted – closed session
13 page 5529 redacted – closed session
8 [Open session]
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So that Judge Fouad Riad can put
10 his questions, bearing in mind that it is now 2.40.
11 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Is it all right?
12 [In English] I just want a clarification about some of your
13 answers to my colleagues. You mentioned concerning the replacement by
14 General Krstic to General Zivanovic, that perhaps Zivanovic was not in
15 agreement with the plan or with Mladic's attitude in that operation. And
16 I think that was an answer to Judge Rodrigues, and you said this was one
17 of the two or three theories that you held.
18 Previously I asked you about that and you didn't give me your
19 theories, so what are the other one or two theories?
20 A. The first theory is as you've stated, that he did not agree with
21 the operation and chose to depart. The second theory is that because of
22 preexisting health conditions, that that was a planned move between
23 operation Krivaja-95 as planned and operation Stupcanica-95 as planned,
24 and in fact that was a manifestation of what did occur. So again, I can't
25 prove either of those two theories.
1 The third theory, and again, entering the realm of speculation, is
2 the fact that we know from our information that certainly by late
3 July 1995, the relationship between President Karadzic as a civilian head
4 of the government and General Mladic was extremely rocky, reflected by the
5 fact that on 4 August he tried to fire General Mladic or at least remove
6 him from his position as the Commander of the Main Staff.
7 Knowing that General Zivanovic was in fact -- had a long
8 association with General Mladic, as I outlined to Judge Rodrigues, the
9 theory offers itself up that President Karadzic may have removed, on his
10 own volition, General Zivanovic as a check in the growing balance of power
11 between him and General Mladic.
12 And again, in this case, those are three theories, and I'm not in
13 a position with evidence to support either one of those theories.
14 JUDGE RIAD: And the events could not put more weight on one of
15 the theories?
16 A. It would be probably unfair for me to infer that General Zivanovic
17 after the fact should have been expected to publicly stand up and decry
18 what happened if he disagreed with it. He lives in Serbia, as our last
19 knowledge of him is. Those are still his people, and at a point in time
20 particularly in 1995, late 1995, when the Serbian people and the army of
21 the Republika Srpska is under attack from the Croatians, from the
22 Bosnian-Muslims, and from NATO in that regard, and maintaining unity at
23 all costs would be a plausible goal, in that regard it would be unfair for
24 me to expect General Zivanovic to stand up at that time and say things.
25 JUDGE RIAD: The other answer you gave, also to Judge Rodrigues I
1 think, was the following: I think you said that a lot of the action of
2 the Drina Corps were reactive acts. You used the word "reactive," which
3 means that they were not planned.
4 I just put this together with one of your statements, a very clear
5 one. It was on the 30th of June, you said that, "The individual pieces
6 infer that there was a plan or a knowledge of a plan by the individuals
7 who were part of the process." And you mentioned the guarding of the
8 prisoners, the arrangement of the transportation, and the execution
10 So do you think all this was reactive now in -- put it now in
11 perspective? How do you reconcile this?
12 A. Essentially, it's a long-term and a short-term argument. Within
13 the scope of the short-term problem of trying to assemble the buses, it
14 was reactive. There did not appear to be a plan several days out that
15 they would need these buses.
16 Now, again, somebody put together a plan rapidly and did that, but
17 it doesn't -- again, it doesn't -- to me, looking at the material, it
18 doesn't infer that somebody thought this out more than two days in
19 advance. The same way with the identification of sites in Bratunac for
20 Muslim males and sites in Zvornik for Muslim males, again, reactive in a
21 sense of the planning didn't look to occur long term. They weren't
22 looking three or four days out, which is what one would expect from a
23 corps staff, that they're looking four, five, six days in the future,
24 reactive insomuch as we have a situation that is occurring now or will be
25 occurring within a very rapid period of time, and we have to do something
2 JUDGE RIAD: Would that apply to the executions of such a big, a
3 big number?
4 A. If going back to when the first series of executions occurred that
5 could infer being planned, and in this case we'll use the Cerska Valley
6 executions of the early afternoon of 13 July, and --
7 JUDGE RIAD: That was planned in advance?
8 A. The inference that I make is that somewhere between that and the
9 period of 11 and 12 July, the plan must have been hatched. Again, in my
10 mind, that reflects short-term planning. It does not reflect a long-term
11 plan of execution. Not execution in a criminal sense in this one, just
12 one how executes a plan.
13 I wouldn't take the events that are occurring on the 12th, 13th,
14 14th, 15th of July and beyond and take that back, and to say that on
15 2 July 1995 or 4 July 1995, when Krivaja-1995, the plan, was hatched, that
16 that was in any way part of it.
17 JUDGE RIAD: Putting this in perspective with an answer you gave
18 to Judge Wald, you expressed some kind of a transition mark. You said
19 that there was some kind -- the fact that they had something like 10.000
20 Muslims in prison was a leverage to the BiH and to the international
21 community, and it seemed rather strange that they would not use this
22 leverage and apparently execute the people, and you wondered if they had a
23 higher plan in that sort. What could be the higher plan which would
24 override the leverage, this very strong leverage?
25 A. In that regard, what I was noting was that one would believe that
1 rather than executing the Muslim men, that if they were to come into
2 possession of them and hold them in Potocari, that within the political
3 spectrum, that would give them an enormous bargaining chip or political
4 leverage over the situation.
5 And again in answer to Judge Wald's question, and there I entered
6 the realm of speculation knowingly, one has to wonder why something like
7 that was not accomplished, and the manifestations of the executions as we
8 saw them took place. There had to have been some trigger to do that, one
9 would think.
10 JUDGE RIAD: You say "trigger" or "higher purpose" or "plan."
11 A. When I use the phrase "trigger," I use some event or some decision
12 that had to have been made by somebody somewhere that, "No. We're not
13 going to hold these individuals as prisoners. We're going to in fact
14 continue or begin a long series of process of executions."
15 So somewhere apparently somebody made a conscientious decision one
16 way or another which way it was going to be, and I don't have the evidence
17 base and I don't have, as a result of my reading it, I can't put my finger
18 on when, where, and under what circumstances that individual decision was
19 made. The best that I can do is offer the windows of when this could have
20 occurred, to the Court, based on the known facts that I have in my
22 JUDGE RIAD: So just to finish. I'm closing down. Could you
23 consider this was reactive or as a strategy, a policy of a higher status,
24 owing to the number of executions and, as you said, the coordination and
25 so on?
1 A. Certainly this operation as we saw it, reflected the plans,
2 policies, and intent of the army of Republika Srpska with General Mladic
3 as its head and the Drina Corps as the major component in East Bosnia that
4 was accomplishing that. I cannot take it to the next step and say that
5 that intent and that directive was at the guidance of President Karadzic
6 based on the military documents and information that I've evaluated. So I
7 can't make that link with the material that I have available to me.
8 The inference is that the army could not have gotten away with
9 doing this, one, without certainly the knowledge of the president of the
10 republic, who had his own independent intelligence and security-gathering
11 apparatus. And we know from the 18 July 1995 report from Captain First
12 Class Momir Nikolic, that certainly that apparatus was present there in
13 one regard, because they gave an opinion to Captain Nikolic as to what
14 they believed the status of multi-national workers and more importantly
15 the status of Muslims who were working for the UN and for MSF were under
16 that regard.
17 So clearly, President Karadzic had his intelligence collection
18 information and assets out there and was listening. Certainly the
19 Minister of the Interior and his forces were throughout that whole area.
20 So again, I can't say that President Karadzic knew while it was
21 occurring, but I can say that all of the tools and all of the mechanisms
22 which the president of the republic should have had to keep him informed
24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Mr. Butler.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In normal conditions, having
1 come to almost 3.00, we've worked very hard, and I apologise to the
2 interpreters, because we had two breaks and one that was a shorter one,
3 but I think that the interpreters can understand the work we are doing
4 here, and they are also a part of the working team, and we have a spirit
5 of solidarity amongst us. I risk being accused and even being criticised,
6 but I'm saying this to try and make up for this.
7 I think now that we have some documents to tender, and I would
8 like to ask whether we can tender the documents without the presence of
9 the witness. Then we can do it on Monday, or maybe the witness can come
10 just for that purpose.
11 Mr. Harmon.
12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I'm prepared to defer until Monday the
13 regulation of these documents. I intend to meet with counsel after
14 today's session. We perhaps can present to the Court a more expedited
15 presentation. Thank you.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Do you need the presence --
17 maybe I should ask Mr. McCloskey, but it's more or less the same thing.
18 Do you need the witness for the tendering of documents,
19 Mr. McCloskey?
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't believe we need his presence, but he's
21 still working on various investigations. So he's close by if necessary.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think there is a Defence
23 document to be tendered, Madam Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it's document D24, and that's
25 General Krstic's waiver to be presented today.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I understood that there was no
2 objection on the part of the Prosecution, so that the Defence Exhibit is
3 admitted into evidence.
4 So I think we really have come to the end of our work. All of us
5 have supported a great deal, a great deal of strain, as well as the
6 witness, and we do thank Mr. Butler very warmly for his understanding.
7 You have produced a great deal of information to us, the Prosecution, the
8 Defence, and the Judges, and we thank you very much.
9 I apologise once again to everyone, but I wholeheartedly wish you
10 a well-deserved, good weekend. These things do happen on Fridays, so you
11 will an opportunity to recover.
12 So, Mr. Butler, thank you once again for coming, and have a good
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.55 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 24th day of July,
17 2000, at 9.30 a.m.