1 Tuesday, 25 July 2000
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.36 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and
7 gentlemen; good morning to our technicians, interpreters; good morning to
8 our legal assistants, court reporters, representatives of the Registry;
9 good morning to the representatives of the Prosecution: Mr. Harmon,
10 Mr. Cayley, Mr. McCloskey; good morning to the Defence counsel:
11 Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic; good morning, General Krstic.
12 Good morning, General Dannatt. We have come back to continue with
13 your testimony. I hope that you have had a good rest and that you are
14 ready to continue.
15 However, before we continue with the witness, I should like to
16 hear from the Prosecutor, perhaps Mr. Harmon, and to ask him to review his
17 position regarding the documents. We would like to know what are the
18 documents that you really wish to tender under seal and what are the
19 remaining documents. So perhaps with the assistance of Madam Registrar it
20 would be convenient to rethink the issue and then we will make the ruling
21 later on.
22 Now, without much further ado, we will continue with the testimony
23 of General Dannatt.
24 Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. President, Your
1 Honours, Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic.
2 A small point arises, Your Honour. The witness would very much
3 like to finish with his evidence today. Certain urgent matters have
4 arisen for him in the UK requiring his attention. Whilst he has
5 emphasised to me that he is entirely at the disposal of the Court and also
6 bearing in mind that the cross-examination of the Defence cannot be
7 limited in any way, would it be possible for us to continue until 3.00
8 today to finish the General's evidence?
9 JUDGE RIAD: Would 3.00 be enough, Mr. Cayley?
10 MR. CAYLEY: I will do my best to finish my examination-in-chief
11 in the first session, and Mr. Visnjic has indicated to me that the Defence
12 possibly have two hours of cross-examination. The witness is prepared to
13 stay until tomorrow, Your Honour, but if we could finish today, that would
14 be helpful.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I should like to ask the
17 registrar if it is possible to work until 3.30 if it is necessary. In
18 principle, we will go until 3.00; however, if it is necessary, I should
19 like to continue until half past three. I think that we always have a
20 representative of the interpreters here. I don't know if there's going to
21 be a problem with that. We will have a break for lunch.
22 Madam Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: I will talk to the necessary persons dealing with
24 the transcripts and security and see if it's a problem.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And then after the break -- yes,
2 Mr. Cayley, we will then work until 3.00. If it is necessary to
3 prolong the day, we will work until 3.30 so as not to have the witness
4 come back tomorrow. I hope you will not waste your time. Please proceed
5 with the examination, Mr. Cayley.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. I realise much of this is
7 dependent on my speed so I will go as efficiently as I can, and I thank
8 the Court for allowing us to continue beyond our normal time.
9 WITNESS: FRANCIS RICHARD DANNATT [Resumed]
10 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Continued]
11 Q. General, I wish to briefly return to Prosecutor's Exhibit 459,
12 which is a report from Colonel Jankovic of the Main Staff to the
13 Intelligence Department of the Drina Corps, so an officer from a superior
14 headquarters reporting to a subordinate headquarters.
15 Can you explain to the Judges what, if anything, this document
16 demonstrates to you? I've placed Exhibit 398 next to you so that that can
17 assist you.
18 A. Your Honours, good morning.
19 Just in answer to that question, I would like to refer back, if I
20 may, to an answer I gave yesterday when I introduced this particular
21 diagram which showed the relationship between a subordinate command's
22 intelligence and security functional area and the Higher Command's
23 intelligence and security functional area, and indicated that orders were
24 followed up the solid line, as it were, from the division to the corps and
25 the corps to the division. That was the way that orders were passed. But
1 it was perfectly legitimate in armies generally for there to be an
2 informal functional chain, not of command but of exchange of information
3 and advice from the subordinate to the superior and vice versa.
4 Therefore, this particular exhibit, which is the one that
5 Mr. Cayley has just referred to, from Colonel Jankovic of the Main Staff,
6 the Security Branch, to the Drina Corps Intelligence Department is an
7 illustration of that process actually taking place between the security or
8 intelligence function at the division level having an exchange of
9 information with the Intelligence and Security Branch, functional branch,
10 at the corps level. This is an illustration of what I was talking about
12 I also notice and just draw your attention to the last part here.
13 There's a postscript that says: "I think that if we want to take over the
14 enclaves of Zepa and Gorazde ..." and it goes on. I would just draw
15 attention to the words "I think that if ..." Well, if Colonel Jankovic, a
16 Colonel on the Corps Staff, was actually giving orders to someone in the
17 subordinate formation's Intelligence Department, I wouldn't have expected
18 to see words like, "I think that if we want to ..." He would say
19 something much more direct like, "You are to ..."
20 I think this illustrates the linkage between the divisional
21 Intelligence and Security Staff and the Corps Intelligence and Security
22 Staff was one of advice and information as opposed to one of ordering. I
23 believe that is the import behind this, and of course the substance of the
24 message here is informing that the operation to take over the former
25 enclave of Srebrenica had been completed, as I mentioned yesterday.
1 Q. General, in explaining this document you were using the
2 nomenclature of NATO; you were referring to "corps" and "division." Just
3 to clarify, Colonel Jankovic was on the Main Staff, which you equate with
4 the corps, and he was actually sending information to the Drina Corps,
5 which you've equated, with your language, to a division; is that correct?
6 A. That's exactly so. I was using this diagram here, and in this
7 situation, we have the Drina Corps in this box effectively and the Main
8 Staff in this box, but the principle that I was describing is exactly the
10 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness can be provided with Prosecutor's
11 Exhibit 483.
12 Q. General, this is a document that's been provided to you by the
13 Prosecutor. It's the combat order for operations in Zepa. You've read
14 this document. What comments do you have for the Judges on this
15 particular document? The document is dated the 13th of July, 1995.
16 A. Your Honours, this document is quite clearly the operation order
17 produced by the Drina Corps Command for the operation to attack and
18 capture the enclave of Zepa.
19 Having reviewed it, it's a very good piece of Operational Staff
20 work. It sets out very clearly the situation pertaining at the time; it
21 sets out the mission, the intention to move towards and to attack Zepa; it
22 details the subordinate units, brigades principally, of the Drina Corps
23 that are to take part in this operation; and it gives a certain amount of
24 coordinating instruction to make that attack happen. As I say, it is a
25 very clear and well-organised and produced piece of Operational Staff
1 work, which, frankly, is the sort of thing I would expect from competent
2 and well-trained staff officers. And I notice that it's signed by
3 General Krstic on the 13th of July, and he signed it as Chief of Staff.
4 And having reviewed his military education and background, I'm not at all
5 surprised that I see a piece of quality staff work of this nature.
6 However, of particular interest to me is that while this
7 particular operation was directed towards Zepa, and I'm also aware and we
8 discussed yesterday that not only was there follow-up action going on
9 around Srebrenica but that there was the business of moving the large
10 number of civilians from Potocari back to behind Muslim lines, and there
11 was also the issue of the Muslim military column of 28th Division, so
12 there was a lot going in the Drina Corps area.
13 But I notice in this document, at the end, that the Drina Corps
14 forward command post mentioned here was to move to Krivace, which was in
15 the section of Zepa, and it should start work at 1800 hours on the 13th of
16 July, and that communications should be ready for the attack at 0600 hours
17 on the 14th of July. So what that says to me is that the planning for
18 this operation on Zepa would probably have gone on in the main Drina Corps
19 command post. It would have been activity coordinated by the Chief of
20 Staff. The Intelligence Staff, the Operation Staff, the Logistics Staff,
21 would all have had a hand in putting together this operation. The order
22 would have been drawn together by the Chief of Staff who then signed it,
23 and the Commander who was going to command the operation would have moved
24 or intended to move to the forward command post, as I said, at Krivace,
25 but that communications would be in place by 0600 on the 14th of July.
1 What that says to me is that although the commander is going to
2 command this operation from the forward command post at Krivace, a
3 communications back to the main command post would have been established,
4 and, therefore, that commander would have been in touch and aware of all
5 the other activities going on within his corps area of responsibility, and
6 I just mentioned a number those major activities which I'm aware were also
7 going on at the same time, as well as the developing plans for the attack
8 on Zepa.
9 Q. General, one point from paragraph 10. It states that: "The Drina
10 Corps forward command post will be in Krivace and shall start work at 1800
11 hours on the 13th of July, 1995."
12 Would it be right to assume that it would be the Corps Commander,
13 the Corps Commander of the Drina Corps, who would have been at that
14 command post after its establishment on the 13th of July, 1995?
15 A. Yes. I would expect that to be the case. I think yesterday, in
16 my earlier evidence, I talked about in a division such as mine or a corps
17 such as the Drina Corps, that there are a number of headquarters. There
18 is the main headquarters where the majority of the staff are and where the
19 Chief of Staff usually is, where planning is conducted, and where
20 operations, in the main, are controlled from. But that at certain times a
21 forward command post or a tactical command post can be established,
22 usually to which the commander, the overall commander, deploys in order to
23 command the immediate operation.
24 So what I see here is, from the Main Headquarters at another
25 location, this forward command post, I would call it a tactical command
1 post, is established close to the new operation for the Corps Commander to
2 coordinate the attack from there.
3 Another point which has just caught my eye on the screen is,
4 again, as I referred yesterday, daily records describing the situation at
5 1700 hours to be submitted at 1800 hours were required. So, again, we've
6 got this business that I would expect in a properly organised military
7 formation, of reminding everyone that daily combat records from the
8 brigades were required in order to keep the headquarters fully informed of
9 all the situations throughout the corps area.
10 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be provided with
11 Exhibit 463.
12 Q. I want to move on, General, with the interception and the mopping
13 up of the mixed the military-civilian column that left Srebrenica. You're
14 aware of this event.
15 First of all, Exhibit 463, which is an order signed by
16 General Krstic, what type of order is this? This document is dated the
17 13th of July, 1995.
18 A. This document is an order, and it's an order instituting another
19 operation, effectively a security operation, a search operation, in what I
20 would describe as the rear area, away from the main combat zone perhaps,
21 of the corps. In this order, General Krstic, now signing a notice as
22 Commander of the corps, I'm reminded of the previous operation, of the
23 previous order we were looking at a moment ago, signed on the same date by
24 General Krstic as Chief of Staff. So that tells me that something has
25 changed on that day, but, nevertheless, this operation is a separate
1 operation ordered by General Krstic to identify, capture, and round up a
2 number of people who have escaped from the former Srebrenica enclave.
3 And the way, I think in general terms, I would characterise this
4 operation is as a rear operation. If I could just generalise, in
5 principle, for a moment. Military operations, on the whole, are
6 categorised either formally or informally as deep, close, or rear
7 operations. Deep operations are those things which are done to prepare
8 the ground, to change the circumstances ahead of time to give a better
9 prospect of your close operation, when you're actually applying your
10 combat power, for that to happen successfully.
11 For example, going back to issues we were discussing yesterday,
12 the preliminary bombardment of Srebrenica and the fear that that
13 engendered amongst the people. I would see that as a deep operation
14 activity, trying to change the terms for future combat. Then when the
15 Drina Corps units attacked Srebrenica, that was the close operation.
16 What we see here is a rear operation, essentially a security
17 operation being conducted to ensure the security and protection of the
18 remaining Drina Corps troops, to make sure that civilians in the area were
19 protected from military people still roaming in that rear area. So I see
20 this as a rear operation.
21 And deep, close, and rear operations are sometimes conducted in
22 sequence. Sometimes they are conducted at the same time. What these two
23 documents, this one and the previous one we looked at, indicate to me,
24 that at this time, the Drina Corps was concerned with a deep and close
25 operation focus towards accident, and we have this rear operation focused
1 to the area generally around part of Srebrenica towards Zvornik and the
2 other places are mentioned here in this order.
3 So a lot, as I've said before, was going on in the Drina Corps
4 area, but for a properly organised corps and headquarters such as I
5 believe the Drina Corps to have been, under good command, a number things
6 going on does not present a problem. They're capable of looking in
7 several directions, doing several things at the same time, all coordinated
8 by the main headquarters, as I said, where the Chief of Staff would be
9 presiding and keeping the commander, now probably at the forward command
10 post, in the picture about everything that was going on in his corps
12 JUDGE WALD: Can I just ask one question?
13 MR. CAYLEY: Please, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE WALD: Does the terrain that's referred to in
15 paragraphs 1 and 2 of this order, that's going to be the object of the
16 mop-up or the search, does that roughly encompass the area or any of the
17 area that the column was going to be marching down or is that more the
18 kind of normal mop-up you would have expected after the fall of Srebrenica
19 when they thought ---or at least there's some evidence that they thought
20 that the 28th Brigade was still down by the Bandera Triangle, et cetera?
21 A. Your Honour, in general terms, the bits of geography referred to
22 here are a little south of where the 28th Division column, we now know,
23 was going north, although, they may not have known that or realised that
24 at the time. Hence, I've made several references to there was a lot going
25 on in the Drina Corps area at the time. It was actually quite a
1 challenging moment for a commander and his staff, I would judge.
2 JUDGE WALD: But this particular -- if you read this, you read it
3 with reference to what you would have thought was a normal mop-up
4 operation after Srebrenica, extrinsic of the fact that you had a whole new
5 conceivable breakthrough.
6 The last question is: Would it have been normal procedure for
7 these people to wear special identifying material? Paragraph 5: "Shall
8 wear a white band on their right shoulder."
9 A. That's quite an intriguing point. I think it's quite a sensible
10 and clever point. I think by this stage of the war, not everyone had a
11 regular uniform. I think there was probably a genuine possibility of
12 mistake and muddle because, after all, in search-type operation, you've
13 got people over a large area, some of whom are on your side, some are on
14 the other side, and I think to have ordered some particular distinctive
15 identification mark was a sensible precaution.
16 MR. CAYLEY:
17 Q. General, now I'd like you to address from universal principles the
18 operation to search the area and to intercept this column and to indicate
19 on the chart in front of you the Staff Branches that you believe would
20 have been involved in controlling this kind of operation.
21 A. If you'd allow me to move to the ...
22 Your Honours, rather as I indicated yesterday, an operation such
23 as we're talking about now, which is the operation to identify, to find,
24 the 28th Division column and then to reduce it, would require a
25 coordination from a number of parts of the Corps. Not shown on here
1 necessarily are the units. What we have here is the Staff and here we
2 have subordinate units. In fact, they are shown here on the bottom,
3 subordinate units. A number of brigades would have been told that they
4 had some responsibility to take part in this action. So we've got a
5 number of brigades being told that it is likely that in their area,
6 particularly the Zvornik Brigade, it is likely that in their area this
7 column will be passing.
8 But because no one at that stage knows exactly where it is, I
9 would see the Intelligence Section having a major role to play in this
10 operation to try and find the enemy. I would see the Operations Section
11 here having a major role to play to coordinate the activities of the
12 various brigades and make sure that there was sufficient men available.
13 I referred yesterday to the importance of the use of reserves, and
14 I think in a situation like this where you don't know where the enemy is,
15 the first corps function in any operation is to find the enemy. Once
16 you've found him, then the next corps function is to fix him, in other
17 words, to remove the enemy's freedom to manoeuvre, and then you've got to
18 put together another force whereby you can strike him. So in general
19 principles, operations are conducted to find, to fix, and to strike an
20 enemy, and that requires a force to do each of those three key functions.
21 Hence, the Intelligence part would have a large part of the coordination
22 as, indeed, the Operations Section would as well in coordinating the
23 activity of these various subordinates.
24 Of course, if this operation goes on for any length of time, we're
25 then looking support from the Rear Services area. The Transportation
1 Service would have been required to move prisoners that were rounded up
2 and captured. There is a responsibility on the Quartermaster Service to
3 make sure that food was available for the potentially large numbers of
4 prisoners. Indeed, Medical Services here would have been required to
5 ensure that at least basic first-aid was provided under the terms of the
6 Geneva Convention to prisoners that had been captured.
7 Of course, I've talked about just now this operation being a rear
8 operation, a security operation, a force protection operation, and
9 therefore the Department for Security, Colonel Popovic, I think, would
10 have had a fairly key interest in this to make sure that the security of
11 the Drina Corps was maintained.
12 So the deduction that I would make, within the general principle
13 of an operation to find the enemy, then to fix him, to remove his ability
14 to manoeuvre against you, and then to produce a force to strike would have
15 required a coordination from a large number of the elements of the Drina
16 Corps Staff and subordinate units. Not surprisingly, I can't conceive
17 that being done other than with considerable coordination from the Corps
18 Headquarters, the Chief of Staff, and of course incumbent on that is that
19 the Commander, whoever he was and wherever he was, would be kept very
20 firmly in command.
21 Also, I've seen a particular series of situation reports,
22 particularly from the Zvornik Brigade who became very concerned about this
23 operation when it looked as if the column might actually be going to make
24 an attack on Zvornik, when the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade
25 particularly appealed to the Corps Commander and said, "You must take me
1 away and some of my men from the attack on Zepa. We need to get back to
2 the Zvornik area because we've got a serious problem going on." So that
3 shows to me that coordination within the Corps was absolutely vital and
4 that the Commander and the Chief of Staff were absolutely essential to the
5 decision-making process of how to deal with that 28th Division column,
6 which, as I've said several times, I think would have presented a major
7 headache in the Drina Corps area at the time.
8 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with Exhibit 464.
9 Q. Now, General, this is an order from the Bratunac Brigade of the
10 14th of July, 1995. Rather than having you do it because the document
11 speaks for itself, this is an order, Your Honours, that directly
12 references Exhibit 463, the order from General Krstic. It, indeed, refers
13 to the order of General Krstic of the 13th of July, 1995.
14 General, what conclusion - perhaps it speaks for itself - can you
15 draw from the fact that Colonel Blagojevic is essentially issuing an order
16 directly in response to General Krstic's order to his own subordinate
17 battalions to conduct this search of the terrain?
18 A. Your Honour, that's exactly the deduction I draw from this
19 document. In the opening three lines here, the Brigade Commander of the
20 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade makes reference to the fact that he has
21 received an order from the Drina Corps, dated the 13th of July, and he is
22 now issuing his own orders to his own battalions. "The 1st Infantry
23 Battalion will search ..." and he's giving them all various details. "The
24 2nd Infantry Battalion will search ..." and so it goes on. "The 3rd
25 Infantry Battalion will search ..."
1 What this simply shows to me is a properly functioning chain of
2 operational command. The Drina Corps issued an operation; it was received
3 by one of the brigades, in this case, the Bratunac Brigade. The Commander
4 has analysed that order; he's thought about it, he's made his own plan,
5 and he's now issuing orders to his own battalions in order to comply with
6 that order originally issued by the Drina Corps. This is showing to me a
7 joined up and properly functioning command and control and operational
8 planning process.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit
11 Q. Now, General, the previous document was an order from Colonel
12 Blagojevic, and here is a daily combat report actually issued on the 13th
13 of July of 1995 to the Drina Corps Command. This document discusses a
14 search that is taking place. What can you say about this particular
16 A. Well, again, there are a number of comments that I would make
17 about this.
18 First of all, it's issued by the Command of the Bratunac Light
19 Infantry Brigade; it's being sent to the Command of the Drina Corps. It
20 calls itself, interestingly, a daily combat report and the content of it
21 gives an update of operational activity going on in the Bratunac Light
22 Infantry Brigade area. And it's following the format that I've seen in
23 several of these orders.
24 Interestingly, although the first three paragraphs give detail of
25 what is going on, and that detail, I think, is not necessarily relevant,
1 we then go on to paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 and they're in very standard
2 format. Paragraph 4: "There were no unexpected events." Paragraph 5
3 always seems to be a statement on morale within his unit, where all is
4 good. Then paragraph 6 says that the logistics support is functioning
5 well, and paragraph 7 reports casualties: "We've had no losses or
6 wounded." We see that format in many of these daily combat reports, and
7 it's a very efficient way of doing business.
8 What catches my eye slightly is that -- yes, it's signed by the --
9 issued by the Brigade Commander, or in his name, signed by one of his
10 staff officers and that's perfectly normal. But it's not at 1700 to be
11 there at 1800, it's issued at 1545; it's probably by way of an interim
12 combat report. But it's following the standard format of all the
13 reports. Again, that indicates to me that the reporting system was
14 functioning well within the Drina Corps, and there was a good flow of
15 useful information finding its way from the lower levels, from the
16 brigades, up to the Drina Corps Headquarters.
17 JUDGE WALD: Excuse me. Doesn't paragraph 1 up there: "The last
18 large enemy group has been successfully encircled in the area of Konjevic
19 Polje/Kasaba ..." doesn't that indicate to us that that was sort of the
20 beginning of -- that was certainly one of the first incidents, massive
21 incidents, that we're engaged with here?
22 A. Your Honour, that's --
23 JUDGE WALD: There's a little bit of tension in the thing between
24 "no unexpected events" and "a large group." And then the second line in
25 the second one: "The Brigade Command is working on a company to be sent
1 to the area of the school to carry out the assignment ..." Anyway ...
2 A. You're absolutely right. It's often a feature of military
3 situation reports that people tend to say things are going perhaps a
4 little bit better than they really are. So when in paragraph 4 he said,
5 "There are no unexpected events," most commanders want to show that they
6 have got the whole thing thoroughly under control and that they're not
7 being surprised by anything.
8 So that doesn't, in itself, surprise me, although your point is
9 right that the large enemy group around the Konjevic Polje/Kasaba area, we
10 now know was one of the first of the groups from the 28th Division. But I
11 would suspect that at this stage they were still trying to piece the
12 jigsaw together and their picture was not that clear.
13 JUDGE WALD: Okay.
14 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with two exhibits
15 together, 540 and 597.
16 Q. Now, General, we're moving to the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. 540
17 is a daily combat report of the 13th of July and 597 is a daily combat
18 report of the 15th of July. Do these documents also show that the
19 brigades were reporting to the Corps that they were engaged in combat with
20 the Muslim column that was moving up towards and out of their area?
21 A. Yes. This report from the Zvornik Brigade is more complex. It's
22 got more detail in it. I've already alluded to the fact that the Zvornik
23 Brigade was pretty much in the eye of the storm as far as all this is
24 concerned, and it's giving fairly detailed reporting here of various
25 engagements that elements of the brigade had had with, quite clearly, the
1 column of the 28th Division. But I think the general point, I don't think
2 the detail of what is going on here is that relevant, but the general
3 point is that I see a clear combat report from one of the subordinate
4 brigades to the Drina Corps Headquarters drawing attention to what was
5 going on in the area and making a fairly accurate and full report about
6 it, again showing that the command and control process within the Corps
7 was very much functioning in an effective and efficient way.
8 Q. Indeed, there's no necessity to put 597 onto the ELMO, I will
9 simply summarise what it says. Essentially it records the fact that
10 Bosnian army forces were launching a heavy artillery attack into the area,
11 and then it goes on to say that the Zvornik Brigade units were involved in
12 cutting off and destroying Muslim forces retreating from Srebrenica in the
13 direction of Tuzla.
14 Again, does this demonstrate that the Corps was receiving regular
15 information about what was happening within its subordinate brigades?
16 A. Very much so. All these reports of a similar type make exactly
17 that point, that good information, useful information, as far as the Corps
18 Headquarters was concerned, was being passed to them by their subordinate
19 brigades and would have given the Corps Headquarters a very clear picture
20 of what was going on.
21 I've made reference a couple of times to the fact that the Zvornik
22 Brigade was very much in the thick of all this, and it doesn't surprise me
23 at all that subsequently the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade asks for
24 reinforcements because he was clearly under, really, quite a lot of
25 pressure in his area at this time.
1 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit
2 609, please. And if you could have ready 404/7, tab 430.
3 Q. General, the one particular paragraph that I'm interested in on
4 this combat report, and it's dated the 15th of July from the Zvornik
5 Brigade to the Command of the Drina Corps, is, and I'll read it: "An
6 additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners distributed
7 throughout schools in the brigade area as well as obligations of security
8 and restoration of the terrain."
9 Now, purely from general principles, and I don't want you to
10 interpret what this means, but if you were a commander of a corps, would
11 this not indicate to you, if you were receiving this report, that there
12 were large numbers of prisoners in your area of responsibility?
13 A. That's exactly the meaning from the words that I see here, "An
14 additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners distributed
15 throughout schools in the brigade area ..." This doesn't tell me where
16 those prisoners have come from, but noting again it's the Zvornik Brigade,
17 I can fully understand why the Commander later on in this situation
18 report, this combat report, asks for reserves.
19 He's actually fighting the 28th Division column himself and taking
20 prisoners, and it seems to be slightly to his surprise that a large number
21 of prisoners are also being lodged in his brigade area. I think I can
22 understand his alarm, that if his manpower is already stretched in his
23 combat operations, to have a large number of prisoners he's got to guard
24 as well, if they were to break out from where they were held would provide
25 a real threat to his security. I can understand him being concerned.
1 I also see he says: "All brigade forces are fully engaged and we
2 have no reserves." This is quite a cry for help from the Commander of the
3 Zvornik Brigade, who is particularly concerned about that large number of
5 I think those are the comments I'd offer on that.
6 Q. General, you've mentioned already -- you've actually already come
7 on to it, but if you could shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 404/7, tab 30, when
8 you mentioned reinforcements, and this is a document from the Krajina
9 Corps Command dispatching an Infantry Company within that corps to the
10 Zvornik area. What comments do you have about this document?
11 A. Well, this document is, as you say -- and I just draw Your
12 Honours' attention to the fact that it comes from the Krajina Corps, from
13 a different corps, and it's signed by the Corps Commander, General Talic,
14 at the bottom.
15 It's clearly been in response, I would guess -- no, I don't guess,
16 I notice it here on the screen -- pursuant to the document by the Main
17 Staff. There's been a plea, if you like, from the Drina Corps to the Main
18 Staff for reinforcements, and the Main Staff have ordered the 1st Krajina
19 Corps to send a reserve formation across to the Drina Corps area to
20 assist. And in response to that order from the Main Staff, General Talic
21 from the Krajina Corps is ordering the commander of one of his subordinate
22 brigades, the 16th Krajina Motorised Brigade, to prepare and dispatch an
23 Infantry Company to the Zvornik area where it will be assigned to the
24 Commander of the 1st Light Infantry Brigade.
25 So this again shows to me that not only was the Drina Corps
1 command chain working properly downwards, but it was also working upwards
2 to the Main Staff to whom they sent a request for the reserves. The Main
3 Staff had looked around the overall availability within the VRS at that
4 time and looked to see that the Krajina Corps probably could afford to
5 send some reserves and ordered them to do so, and they were now being --
6 and they were now being sent across.
7 Paragraph 2 shows that the company is to be dispatched on the 16th
8 of July by 2.00, by 1400 hours. It gives its direction of march and tells
9 where it should go, to Zvornik, and to be there by the 16th of July by
10 2000 hours at the latest.
11 So this underlines to me a fully functioning command and control
12 system, and I expect, on a practical note, that the Commander of the
13 Zvornik Brigade would be delighted to see the arrival of this company
14 group from 1st Krajina Corps.
15 It's only an aside issue, but the way that General Talic has
16 written this order, that he wants this company that he's sending to be a
17 well-organised, well-supported, and smart and efficient company in order
18 to make sure that the Krajina Corps is shown off to be in a good light by
19 those who receive it in the Drina Corps.
20 This is all good military stuff and the sort of thing I would
21 expect to see, and it shows the command and control system in the VRS
22 working, and working well.
23 Q. General, I just want to quote from your report at paragraph 58,
24 page 18, and this concludes the questioning I wish to have in this area.
25 "It is very clear to me that the whole operation was coordinated
1 at corps level and that Major General Krstic, as Chief of Staff and later
2 Corps Commander, would have been closely involved in the planning and
3 execution of these operations."
4 Can you comment any further on that statement that you make in
5 your report? And this is specifically referring to the interception and
6 mopping up of the column.
7 A. Your Honour, I think it's probably already fairly clear from what
8 I've said so far that with a number of major activities going on in the
9 Drina Corps area, and when I spoke from the chart just now, I indicated
10 the number of areas of the staff that would have been involved and the
11 number of subordinate brigades that would have been involved in these
12 operations, and there are several focuses or several areas of operation,
13 the attack on Zepa; clearing up around Srebrenica; dealing with the
14 column, particularly in the Zvornik area. There was a lot going on in the
15 Drina Corps area.
16 The issue of reserves underlines manpower was short. Request for
17 manpower had been made to the Main Staff, and as I've just described, had
18 been provided by the Krajina Corps. There is no way that this activity
19 could have been conducted unless it had been coordinated and thoroughly
20 organised and expedited other than through the Corps Headquarters. And
21 this is the whole business and stuff of the Chief of Staff, to shift these
22 various reports coming in, to understand them, and to make recommendations
23 to his Commander about how operations should be developed.
24 So to me, it is quite clear that in this fairly complex situation
25 for the Drina Corps, there is no alternative other than the fact that the
1 Corps Headquarters was fully informed as to the situation in these various
2 areas, was taking decisions as far as these various areas were concerned,
3 and that the whole activity in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility was
4 a cohesive one being orchestrated quite properly and in the normal
5 military manner by the Corps Headquarters, orchestrated by the Chief of
6 Staff, keeping his Commander fully informed in the normal way. And it is
7 what I would expect as a military commander, and it seems to me to be an
8 efficient way of doing business, being properly delivered by the Drina
9 Corps, and I recognise it as being a coherent and an effective piece of
10 military activity going on.
11 JUDGE WALD: Let me just ask you a puzzling question on that.
12 Everything you've said has led to the conclusion, I think, that the
13 Prosecutor's question indicated a coherent command system which people
14 knew what their roles were and followed them, and yet you have as an
15 overlay to this what happened. In other words, some place you had a
16 massive violation of not only internal but, I suppose, international rules
17 and everything. How can that happen in a coherent command system in which
18 people have roles, they have communications going back and forth,
19 everything seems fine in terms of the three operations going on
20 simultaneously, but yet at the end of the line something completely out of
21 range of normal military activity happens? I don't know if that's an
22 answerable question but it keeps arising.
23 A. Well, Your Honour, I've not been specifically asked about the
24 detail about that, but I will offer a comment.
25 JUDGE WALD: Just as a general proposition.
1 A. I talked about three activities going on, the attack on Zepa, the
2 mopping up of the 28th Division column, and the movement of the civilian
3 women and children. But of course there was this fourth activity going
4 on, and implicitly I've referred to it in one of the exhibits we looked at
5 a moment or two ago about the large number of prisoners in the Zvornik
6 Brigade area. Where did they come from? Who were they? From other
7 information I've seen, it seems absolutely clear to me that these are a
8 number of the men who had been separated at Potocari and had been taken to
9 schools in the Zvornik Brigade area, schools that I have visited.
10 So what we have got here is an undercurrent chain of reporting.
11 And because what was going on, as you've alluded to, ma'am, it contravenes
12 and a lot of people knew this was contravening established norms and
13 standards set down in the Geneva Conventions. It is not specifically
14 mentioned in detail in these combat reports, because I think people wanted
15 to keep that pretty quiet, but implicitly there are indications of what
16 was going on. And I'm afraid my general point I have to extend and say
17 that in the same way that the three legitimate operations were being
18 properly coordinated, I can see no reason at all why that fourth operation
19 was not being similarly and properly coordinated. That's a sort of dark
20 implication I would have to draw from this.
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, was it possible to
22 plan, to organise, and to execute all of these operations without the
23 knowledge and without the participation of General Krstic?
24 A. No. I have to say that, because I go back, Your Honour, to one of
25 my earlier points of yesterday, that command is a personal thing, and the
1 commander must take and does take personal responsibility for all that
2 goes on in his zone of responsibility.
3 I know there is an issue that the Court has considered previously
4 as to whether -- on what date General Krstic ceased being the Chief of
5 Staff and on what date he became the Corps Commander, and I don't wish to
6 address that. But I have made the point that those two appointments of
7 Commander and Chief of Staff are unique in that they both have a
8 responsibility to know what is going on. The Chief of Staff must gather
9 all the information about all that is going on within the corps zone of
10 responsibility in order that he can make the balancing decisions that I've
11 just been referring to, balancing of the requirements of the three or four
12 operations going on, and particularly when there are difficult issues.
13 The minor ones he can take himself as Chief of Staff, minor
14 decisions, but he must consult his commander to take major decision. I
15 would expect, for example, the decision to ask the Main Staff for
16 reinforcements from the Krajina Corps, I would be -- it's the sort of
17 decision I, as a commander, would want to be consulted on before I went to
18 the level above me to say, "I need reinforcements." So there are a number
19 of things where the Chief of Staff undoubtedly would have to consult the
21 And again it's a point I was making before and it's an absolutely
22 critical one, that even if the Commander, whoever he was, had gone off to
23 the forward command post at Zepa on the 13th, we've already seen that
24 communications were is established by 6.00 on the 14th between the forward
25 command post and the main command post so that information could still
1 flow to the Commander. He may well have been focusing on the Zepa
2 operation, but he can't distance himself and ignore what else is going
3 on. It's too busy in his corps area to be able to say, "I'm just looking
4 in that direction. You get on with the rest of it." It's a total
5 responsibility, and the Commander and the Chief of Staff can't walk away
6 from that.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question. We are here
8 talking about the 10th, 11th, 12th, 16th of July. You are a General with
9 a great deal of experience. How is it possible to explain the
10 substitution of General Zivanovic by General Krstic if such a substitution
11 occurred, or replacement?
12 A. Your Honour, it's a very good question. It seems hard to explain
13 why you do not know why General Zivanovic was removed. There are a number
14 of theories, and I don't know, so I won't comment on why General Zivanovic
15 was removed.
16 Undoubtedly, he was removed at some point and, undoubtedly, at
17 some point General Krstic became the Commander. It will be most unusual
18 to remove a Commander in the middle of an operation and most unusual to
19 remove him in middle of a battle other than if he became a casualty.
20 However, the operation to capture Srebrenica was undoubtedly completed
21 11th, 12th, in that sort of time frame, and the operation to move to and
22 to try to capture Zepa was going to start 13th or 14th. Therefore, if I
23 was going to change a Corps Commander, I would do it between those two
24 principal operations. And given that General Krstic, as Chief of Staff,
25 would have been principally responsible for the planning of the operation
1 on Zepa, he was then very well-informed, very well-briefed, and very
2 well-positioned to then become the Commander in order to command that
4 So to me, just looking at the practicality of it, once a decision
5 had been made to remove General Zivanovic, the logical military time to
6 put a new Commander in place would have been 13th, 14th, in order that the
7 new Commander was there at the command post to lead the attack on Zepa.
8 That is my military logical deduction. And I'm aware about funny dates
9 and so on, but that's my military deductions in this.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We are talking about the good
11 organisation, good communications, a military organisation that was
12 functioning very well and that was well planned. So one could think that
13 the evacuation of the population from Srebrenica was well planned and well
14 thought out, so that they may reach territory controlled by the Muslim
15 army. Why did the executions then occur? Do you have any idea, from the
16 military standpoint, why such a plan occurred?
17 A. If one applied a normal logic, Your Honour, it is difficult to see
18 why executions on the scale that are -- that undoubtedly took place
19 happened. I think one can only explain it by trying to dig into the
20 unusual and rather bizarre logic that surrounds many events in the
21 Balkans. I think we are deep into issues of ethnic tension and
22 long-seated hatred which goes back over many centuries, and which had
23 undoubtedly been found by the three or four years of the civil war.
24 I think what I detect in here was a long-standing intention, and
25 we see it from the political direction that I commented on yesterday, to
1 capture Srebrenica and completely remove the Muslim population so that it
2 could become a Serb town. But I think we see a late decision, having
3 separated the men, then to kill them. And -- well, that has to be an evil
4 decision, but I think it was a late decision. I think it was a decision
5 based out of, sort of, vengeance, going back to deep-seated ethnic
6 tensions. There is some pretty inflammatory language which one has seen
7 being used on the video footage and in some of the transcripts, and I
8 think that decision, which was a late decision, is not a military
9 decision. It's one based on deep-seated history and hate, I think.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Can one say that this decision
11 was outside the military officials, that it had escaped the attention of
12 the military officials?
13 A. I don't think I can comment, Your Honour, on who took that
14 decision. But once that decision had been taken, we're talking about
15 operation, a black operation, if you like, a dark operation, which was
16 conducted over a relatively short period of time. It was an operation of
17 some magnitude which required considerable coordination of transport
18 facilities to move people to holding areas, which themselves had to be
19 identified and found; it involved identifying people who were able and
20 willing to take part in the killing; it required other people with
21 machinery to dig holes, to dig graves; it required other people to provide
22 fuel for that equipment and fuel was in very short supply. So what I see
23 is a dark operation going on, but one that was also a complex operation.
24 That could not have been done other than by utilising the command
25 and control structure which I've already shown that on the other
1 operations was working perfectly effectively, and indeed from other bits
2 of evidence I have been shown or I have asked to see, I see clear
3 indications that fuel was being requested by the Drina Corps staff, that
4 Engineer Units were being moved, and that the machinery of the Corps
5 facilities were being engaged to conduct this dark operation.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE RIAD: General Dannatt, before we go to another point, I
8 would like to understand more clearly some of your very basic statements,
9 whether in the report or right now.
10 You spoke several times of the combat records. You spoke of the
11 chain of command which worked properly upwards and downwards and the
12 coordination which was extremely well done and vital, and you gave the
13 example of the Zvornik Brigade and so on. All this covered the military
14 aspect, apparently.
15 Just for my knowledge, would you, as a General, be completely
16 involved in the military aspect and be seriously involved and capable and
17 leave the non-military thing as being irrelevant or even
18 counter-productive and not be bothered with it? I mean, just the fact
19 that you want to win the battles, let the soldiers go on killing, raping,
20 whatever they do, what they do in wars, and if I exert more pressure on
21 them, it might defeat my own purpose.
22 So all this organisation, coordination which is the daily combat
23 reports, which are called combat reports, are only concerned with the
24 military aspect and let other things take their own course. Would you
25 think that this applies to this very special situation in Srebrenica?
1 A. Your Honour, no, I don't think it does apply. I think the very
2 nature of the VRS Corps, which, unlike my own division, the VRS Corps have
3 zones of responsibility and that seems to give fairly comprehensive and
4 total sort of responsibilities to the Corps, to the Commander, and to the
5 Staff. And because these Corps are essentially local, they are quite
6 well-integrated with the civilian authorities, and therefore although the
7 prime focus of any military man in any military undertaking is to win the
8 current battle that is going on, this whole background of other activities
9 that are going on - the column, the civilians being moved, and so on -
10 they all have to be seen in the overall context of the military
12 Because after all, we see the Drina Corps having to assemble a
13 force to attack Zepa; that's going to require transport to move soldiers
14 to the line of departure to start the attack on Zepa. But at the same
15 time, we see 25.000 to 30.000 civilians being moved away from Potocari;
16 that is going to require transport. Now, I don't think there was a
17 limitless amount of transport. Somebody has to weigh up the requirements
18 of the military operation and the civilian deportation operation and make
19 a judgement and apply a priority: On this day, at this time, those 50
20 buses are to take part in the Zepa operation; on this day, at a later
21 time, those 50 buses can be made available for the deportation operation.
22 So while a military man is always going to be most interested on
23 the combat operation, particularly in these circumstances, he's got to be
24 aware of everything that is going on and balance up the priorities,
25 balance up the availability of undoubtedly scarce resources, and fuel was
1 very much a scarce resource, and make judgements.
2 So I can't accept that it's possible for a military person just to
3 focus on the combat bit and forget the rest. It's a complete spectrum of
4 activities and events that will undoubtedly have to capture the
5 Headquarters' and the Commander's attention.
6 JUDGE RIAD: You just said that you can't accept -- of course, I
7 know you are a great professor of military tactics and so on, and you gave
8 us this distinction between the Befehlstaktik which was applied in the
9 JNA. Is your direction based on this idea that the JNA was a
10 Befehlstaktik, where everything should be in the hands of the
11 institutionalised commander, or is it on your direct observation?
12 A. I think it's both, sir. The principle comes from central command
13 and control and central, principally, top-down direction that undoubtedly
14 is the doctrinal basis which I've observed from my theoretical studies.
15 But from my own knowledge of operating in the Balkans and from the
16 knowledge that I've gained in studying this operation, it's my deduction
17 from the facts that I see that this was the process that was going on.
18 I don't mean to labour the point about combat reports coming up
19 and orders coming down, but this shows a very clear chain of information
20 and chain of direction in place and being effectively used.
21 JUDGE RIAD: Just another question before we go to another point.
22 In your answer to the President, you seemed to indicate that the
23 executions were decided at a late stage, the massacres and so on. I just
24 saw in your report a statement where you said: "I have read the directive
25 to the Drina Corps ..." and then you go on and say: "The document
1 demonstrates that the siege of Srebrenica is being planned. Combat
2 operations are to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with
3 no hope of further survival for the inhabitants of Srebrenica." So do you
4 think that was also decided at a late stage or it was a plan intentionally
6 A. Your Honour, I think the intention from the extract which you've
7 just quoted was to create such a situation in Srebrenica that not only
8 would the town more easily be captured in a military sense, but that the
9 people who had such a sense of fear and no hope of further life, that they
10 would want to leave Srebrenica and go and live somewhere else so that it
11 could become a Serb town.
12 Now, I do not know and I'm offering purely a speculation. It
13 could have been that a decision had been taken at an earlier stage to
14 massacre a lot of the people. I do not know. It would seem to me that
15 the intention was, by one means or another, to remove the people in a
16 deportation sense so that it could become a Serb town and that the option
17 remains open that the decision to separate the men and to kill them
18 perhaps was taken at a later stage. But I will offer this as a
19 speculative point on my part, and I probably should not make too strong a
20 comment on it.
21 JUDGE RIAD: Well, you added, just in the same line: "There is a
22 strong implication that where there is no territory, there is no life."
23 You're saying they wanted Srebrenica without the people, and where there
24 is no territory, there is no life. You were almost aware of the fact that
25 there is no other territory for these people.
1 A. That is right, Your Honour. I mean, the people would have to go
2 elsewhere to a Muslim area, and that is indeed what we saw, the
3 deportation/transportation of the people. I think that was always the
4 intention, that at the end of this operation, at the end of this period of
5 time, that there would not be a Muslim population in Srebrenica, that
6 there would be a Serb population in Srebrenica.
7 JUDGE RIAD: You say: "... no life." "Where there is no
8 territory, there is no life."
9 A. One can interpret that, really, either way. It could be "life" as
10 in everyone having been killed or "no life" as in a community existence, a
11 Muslim community continuing. No life, no living, no community existence,
12 and that's, indeed, what we saw.
13 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, General. Thank you.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, perhaps we can go on
15 until 11.00.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Between the three of you,
17 you've actually covered much of the rest of my examination-in-chief. But
18 I do have some other points to raise with the witness. In fact, there is
19 one area that requires closed session but I'll do that after the break. I
20 actually want to completely move to another area which I think will be of
21 interest to the Court, and it is in respect of the intercepted radio
23 If Prosecutor's Exhibit 684 could be made ready for the witness.
24 Q. General, you're aware - you've seen some of them; you haven't seen
25 all of them - that a large number of intercepted radio communications were
1 acquired by the Office of the Prosecutor. These documents, the ones that
2 I've shown you, show military traffic between a large number of different
3 individuals both within the Drina Corps and the subordinate brigades and,
4 indeed, the Main Staff, all these different units speaking to each other.
5 MR. CAYLEY: If that exhibit could be placed next to the witness.
6 This is simply one example.
7 Q. General, is this document discussing information of an operative
9 A. Your Honour, this would appear to be a transcript of part of a
10 conversation, and I see in the top line that there's reference to "They,"
11 the Muslims, "had close to 10.000 men of military age in Srebrenica," and
12 "Have they reduced them by half?" is the other half of the conversation.
13 "Yes, it must be close to half. 4.000 to 5.000 have certainly kicked the
14 bucket," "kicked the bucket" being a euphemistic expression for having
15 been killed.
16 So there is information being discussed by these two people here
17 about a large number of people of military age, 10.000, and about half of
18 them, by one means or another, would appear to have been killed.
19 Q. General, I don't wish to go through this whole document, but it
20 does contain, other than this piece of information, a lot of information
21 that appears to be of an operative nature of the activities of individuals
22 within the Drina Corps, of NATO activities, and, really, it's a general
23 question I have: Would individuals, in your opinion, speak about these
24 kinds of matters, which one would believe to be confidential, on a line,
25 on a military communication line that they knew could be intercepted and
1 listened to by others?
2 A. Military communications, Your Honour, ideally are conducted by
3 secure means, that you can, therefore, have a private conversation from
4 one person to another. Those secure communication means sometimes break
5 down; sometimes the distances over which they've got to communicate make
6 them inoperative, and, therefore, often people revert to what they know is
7 an insecure means of communication. These days, increasingly mobile
8 telephones are used or, indeed, the normal civilian infrastructure
9 telephone network, a land line telephone network.
10 Also, it's a feature of part of Bosnia and the Balkans that the
11 land line telephone system often has a radio link, in part, and we know
12 that some of the Serb-to-Serb communications were actually having to go
13 through Muslim-held territory, and everyone would have known that.
14 Therefore, people talking to one another, if they couldn't use a
15 secure means of speech, may still have felt the need to talk and,
16 therefore, would have talked knowing they were going to be doing so on an
17 insecure means. Therefore, the way the military people try and get round
18 this is to talk in, what we refer to as, veiled speech. You think you're
19 hiding the meaning, but, in fact, when you actually analyse what is being
20 said, it is pretty obvious.
21 Now, an expression such as I've just referred to, "kick the
22 bucket," that is not a very clever expression for people having been
23 killed. But in other of the transcripts that I have seen, there is quite
24 a lot of reference to people saying, "Don't say that. You know this is an
25 open line," and I've seen another -- I've seen several where there are
1 clear attempts being made to use veiled speech to hide what is being said
2 knowing that others are listening.
3 I'm afraid all armies do it. They shouldn't do it. But when you
4 feel you do need to communicate and the insecure option is the only one
5 available to you, then people go down that track, and it usually leads to
6 a breach of operational security.
7 Q. Now, General, I don't want you to make any comment on the
8 reliability of all these documents, but based on what you've just said, do
9 you believe it's quite possible that the Bosnian Muslim forces intercepted
10 and, indeed, recorded a large number of conversations between VRS units
11 within the Drina Corps area?
12 A. Undoubtedly. In the Balkans, everyone is listening to everybody
13 else's communications.
14 For example, the British Battalion at about this time in Gorazde,
15 one of the other enclaves, knew that all its communications were being
16 overheard, and because they are a Welsh battalion, they decided as a
17 matter of policy to speak in Welsh, a language that no one can understand
18 apart from themselves. It is a fact that everyone was overhearing
19 everybody else, and therefore it doesn't surprise me in the slightest that
20 there were these intercepts going on.
21 I have to say that I think the quality of the intercepts are
22 remarkably high. I have seen three different independent reports from
23 three different interceptors of certain conversations, and the accuracy of
24 what they've reported, I think, do indicate that they are accurate
25 intercepts and informative as a result.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question, please.
2 General, as a General, you certainly have a great deal of
3 experience and contacts with communications people, people doing their
4 job. Is it possible for someone who is involved in a cause, to help its
5 army to develop on the ground and in order to do that they need
6 information, is it possible to envisage that somebody will trick others
7 with misinformation or with something that he didn't actually hear, or
8 vice versa? My question is: This information which was transmitted, do
9 you think that it was really intercepted, or was it made up, perhaps?
10 A. Your Honour, your general point is a very fair one, and of course
11 misinformation is very much something that people practice.
12 The total amount of information and the total number of messages
13 that are received have all got to be evaluated, and it's very much the
14 responsibility of the Intelligence and Security Staff to analyse the
15 massive information that comes in and to try and decide what is genuine
16 and what has, perhaps, been artificially fed in. It's easy to feed in a
17 piece of misinformation; it's quite difficult to feed it in in a
18 consistent and coherent fashion that doesn't reveal the fact, after a
19 period of time, that it's coming from an unauthorised source.
20 With regard to the specifics here, as I've just commented, I'm
21 amazed by the vast amount of intercept information that there is, that it
22 comes from several different sources, several different people listening
23 to the same number of conversations and producing what, to me, are pretty
24 faithful and accurate reports of those conversations.
25 So while I concede in principle it is possible for disinformation
1 to be introduced, I believe that it's possible to spot disinformation from
2 real information. In this case, the amount of good information is of such
3 a high quality and consistency that I think that a fair degree of
4 reliability, a high reliability can be placed on most of these
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, you have reviewed and
7 read these intercepts of conversations on the one hand; on the other, you
8 have seen orders and possibly conversations relating to those orders, and,
9 as you have said, you have seen intercepts of the same sort of information
10 but intercepted by different people. When you see this consistency of
11 information, information captured by different people, is that information
12 consistent or not? That is my first question.
13 The second: Intercepts and what you read among the documents,
14 orders, combat reports, and so on, is there a consistency there too?
15 A. My short answer, Your Honour, is that there is a high degree of
16 consistency. Now, inevitably there are some things that it's quite
17 difficult to see exactly where they fit in, if it's only a part
18 conversation or it's not entirely clear who was talking to whom. At what
19 time is usually clear because that's actually fixed at a moment in time.
20 But the remarkable thing is that given an order being passed --
21 let's say the order for the search operation issued on the 13th of July;
22 I've seen transcripts of intercepts that relate to that kind of
23 activity -- so there is a meshing in of one set of information with
24 another set of information but, to a very high degree of consistency, does
25 fit the various parts of the jigsaw together.
1 When I was asked to help the Court by the Office of the
2 Prosecutor, I had a general knowledge of what had gone on in Srebrenica
3 overlayed on my own previous experience in the Balkans, but I have been
4 amazed by the amount of information that is available on matters relating
5 to this case and the degree with which pieces fit together. My own
6 judgement is that it does give a high degree of reliability to many of the
7 things that are before the Court.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley --
9 MR. CAYLEY: It's four minutes past eleven.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] -- have you finished with this
11 point? Is it a good moment for a break?
12 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I actually want to go into closed
13 session for the next part of the witness' evidence, so it's probably a
14 good moment to take a break.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. We are going to have
16 a half-hour break now.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.04 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m.
19 [Closed session]
13 page 5670-5682 redacted – closed session
17 [Open session]
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The registrar tells me that we
19 are in public session. So you may continue, please.
20 MR. CAYLEY:
21 Q. General, I want to briefly and finally return to general
22 principles of command and the particular concept that you spoke about
23 early on in your testimony, that of command being a personal matter and of
24 responsibility for everything that goes on within one's command.
25 General, if a senior officer receives from his superior an order
1 which is illegal, what should the subordinate officer do in those
2 circumstances, in your view?
3 A. Your Honour, in those circumstances, a subordinate officer
4 obviously is in a difficult position, and he has a difficult choice to
5 make between one or two courses of action. One course of action is to
6 immediately remonstrate, to raise the issue with the superior officer who
7 has given him the order that he believes is illegal, probably done
8 privately, General to General, and to point out to him that the order he
9 has given him is an illegal order and invite him to reconsider whether
10 that is what he really wants to do.
11 If that fails, then the junior officer, really, I think, has three
12 choices: One is to comply with it on the basis that an order given by his
13 superior is an order to be carried out even if he believes it's illegal
14 and he doesn't like it; that's one end of the response spectrum. The
15 other end of the response spectrum is, consistent with his view that it's
16 an illegal order, to refuse to comply with it and in so doing to offer his
17 resignation from his position as a subordinate general or a subordinate
18 officer, remain true to his own conscience and resign his command and take
19 whatever consequences there are.
20 Or there is a central option, I suppose, that could be followed of
21 knowing that what you've been asked to do is wrong, you carry it through
22 on a minimalist basis. That, of course, is the worst, really, of all
23 options because it's indicating that you know what you're doing is wrong.
24 You're abdicating your responsibility, I think, to your subordinates and
25 certainly abandon any pretense on being the moral high ground. So I think
1 if confronted with an illegal order, there are those three responses that
2 can be taken.
3 In moral understanding and in international law, the only
4 appropriate and reasonable course of action to follow is to refuse to
5 follow the order which you've been given, and probably part and parcel of
6 that is offer your resignation, if you haven't already been sacked by the
7 superior, and take your chances within the structure that you find
9 JUDGE RIAD: Just to complete your spectrum. You said being
10 sacked. Is there something worse? Under the circumstances, in this very
11 specific situation, was there something worse than being sacked?
12 A. No, sir. By "sacked," I mean dismissed. Of course, it's up to an
13 army to decide what it will do with a general who refuses to obey orders.
14 There are many examples in history whereby a general who refuses to obey
15 orders is then shot. That, I think, is the far end of the spectrum.
16 JUDGE RIAD: But in your experience, in this situation, was this a
17 normal occurrence?
18 A. I don't believe I have come across an incident in the Balkans
19 whereby a general who refused to follow orders has been shot. That's a
20 sort of negative answer to that. I think there are cases of people being
21 removed or dismissed from their position, which is quite common in
22 military matters.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry. You said: "I believe [sic] I have come
25 across an incident in the Balkans whereby a general who refused to follow
1 orders has been shot." Or has not been shot?
2 A. Not been shot.
3 JUDGE RIAD: Not.
4 A. Not.
5 JUDGE RIAD: Because they did not put "not." He has been shot.
6 They have shot him here.
7 A. I will clarify. I have not come across an incident myself in
8 which a general who refused to follow orders has been shot. It may have
9 happened; I've not come across it.
10 JUDGE RIAD: Correct it on the transcript. Thank you.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I've finished my examination-in-chief
12 so I can offer the witness for cross-examination. Thank you.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
14 Mr. Cayley.
15 General Dannatt, you are now going to answer questions which
16 Defence counsel will be putting to you. I see it is Mr. Petrusic who is
17 going to cross-examine on behalf of the Defence.
18 Mr. Petrusic, your witness.
19 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] First of all, may I say good
20 afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours, my learned friends across the
22 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:
23 Q. Good afternoon, General.
24 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] At the very beginning of this
25 cross-examination, the Defence will start with Exhibits 425 and 426,
1 please. Could I ask the usher for his assistance.
2 General, I'm referring to Directive 7 and Directive 7/1.
3 Could we have the other exhibit too, please, 426, provided to the
5 A. I have got both.
6 Q. General, looking at these two exhibits, these two directives and
7 their contents, in terms of the objectives set to the Drina Corps, they
8 are not identical.
9 In Directive 7, issued by the then President of the Republic and
10 the Supreme Commander, Radovan Karadzic, there is the sentence that says:
11 "... through daily planned and well-thought-out combat activities create
12 a situation of total insecurity and no prospect for the continued survival
13 and life of the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
14 In Directive 7/1, issued by the Main Staff of the army of
15 Republika Srpska - allow me to describe this as an objective - that
16 objective laid down by President Karadzic is missing.
17 My question is whether Directive 7, issued by the President of the
18 Republic, is the basis for Directive 7/1, issued by the military
19 leadership of Republika Srpska, that is, by the Main Staff?
20 A. Your Honour, I understand that question quite clearly, but I've
21 been furnished with, I think, only the covering letter of 7/1 and I
22 haven't got the substance of the order here. So before I can answer that
23 question, I'm missing the second document in substance. Exhibit 426 is
24 simply a four-line covering letter, and I haven't got the main document.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Madam Registrar, is it possible to do this.
1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, let me provide the
2 witness with those documents. We have copies. The usher's assistance,
4 A. If you don't mind, I'll just take a moment to look at this because
5 I want to make sure I've got the right document.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Take as much time as you need.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
8 A. Your Honour, the reason I paused to take some time to look at this
9 is because the obvious thing to do is to simply compare the piece in the
10 first order relating to the Drina Corps with the piece in the second order
11 just relating to the Drina Corps. If I just make that one direct
12 comparison, in the second order, I don't see any reference to operations
13 around Srebrenica which perhaps you would have expected to have been done
14 given that in the order signed by President Karadzic it refers to
16 When I look at the orders in the second document, signed by
17 General Mladic, first looking at the Drina Corps specifically, there was
18 no reference at this stage to Srebrenica. However, I've looked at the
19 general statement in the second order which comes first, which describes
20 the overall conduct of the army's operations, and in that I see reference
21 to operations to be conducted in the area of Srebrenica.
22 The terminology about the survival or life of the inhabitants is
23 not read across, but in the general statement of what the army is to do,
24 it does indicate that operations should be mounted against Srebrenica.
25 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So, General, only the military operation, the military operation
2 known later on in the plans as Krivaja 95.
3 A. Yes. The normal military process is that when an order is written
4 at a higher level, in this case we have at the highest level, an order
5 written by the President, it's then passed down to the next level. In
6 this case, the next level is the Main Staff of the army. They all receive
7 the order from above; they all read it; they all analyse it. I call it a
8 process which we term as mission analysis. You look closely at what it is
9 you are required to do. You then conduct your own estimate of the
10 situation, analyse the situation, think through all the various factors,
11 and then make your own plan and express your own plan in your own
12 operation order.
13 What I see here is a high-level order received at the Main Staff
14 level, analysed, thought about, a decision made, and then an operation
15 order issued; and of course going down, that operation order, 7/1, is then
16 issued to the subordinate corps, and we would see a similar order being
17 thought about and then being produced at the Drina Corps level. So what
18 I'm looking at is two parts of the process that started with the President
19 and found it's way down to lower levels.
20 Q. If I understand the process correctly, the directive first reached
21 the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska which then analysed that
22 directive, and the directive of President Karadzic was used as a basis;
23 then a new number was given to that directive based on President
24 Karadzic's directive, and then the Main Staff issues to the Drina Corps
25 this analysed directive for further analysis or, rather, for the
1 preparation of operational plans for the implementation of the Operation
2 Krivaja 95; am I right, General?
3 A. That is correct, sir.
4 Q. General, if that is so, and you have just confirmed it, then the
5 aim that President Karadzic spelled out in his directive to create
6 unbearable conditions for life in Srebrenica and Zepa does not reach the
7 Drina Corps and operational plans are not prepared at that level
9 A. If one is analysing the words, Your Honour, that are written down
10 here, you're quite correct. I don't see a read across of the fairly
11 colourful language used in the order signed by Mr. Karadzic. But as I've
12 already said, what I do see in the Main Staff order is a reference to the
13 fact that attacks will be developed towards the enclaves, including
15 As a military person, I would be very wary of including in my own
16 operation orders the kind of language and the kind of intent that is
17 actually written down in Mr. Karadzic's piece of paper. I perhaps would
18 have an eye to the future. I would have an eye to what is proper, in
19 military terms, and what is perhaps less proper, and I may well have
20 carried the intent from the words written down at the political level,
21 which is what effectively Mr. Karadzic has done. But I think I would be
22 very wary of carrying that kind of language over into my military
23 document. Although I, analysing Mr. Karadzic's order, would have
24 understood what he had in mind, and I perhaps would have chosen not
25 necessarily to have included that in the written part of my order.
1 So I can see the point that the lawyer here is making, but I can
2 understand why I don't see the same language being passed down from one
3 document to another.
4 Q. General, in the operational documents that you had occasion to
5 review in the course of your preparations for this testimony, the terms
6 and concepts used by officers of the Drina Corps with reference to the
7 attack on Srebrenica, were they proper in military terms? To be specific,
8 regarding the order, the preparatory order for active combat activities,
9 dated the 2nd of July, 1997, Exhibit 428, is it quite correct for the
10 commander to say in his order, when he determines the objective of those
11 operations on page 2, " ... by surprise attack to isolate the enclaves of
12 Srebrenica and Zepa, improve the tactical position of forces deep into the
13 zone, and create conditions for the elimination of those enclaves?" From
14 the point of view of military terminology and military orders, is that a
15 proper wording of a document of this kind?
16 A. Within the, Your Honour, overall military construct that I
17 described earlier of deep, close, and rear operations, and deep operations
18 being those things being done to give you a better chance of successfully
19 carrying out your close operation, your close combat operation, then the
20 language that I see here is consistent with that. In other words, by
21 surprise, by artillery fire and shelling, that you would so reduce the
22 will of the defenders to continue to defend. I see references in here,
23 the task of carrying out offensive activities with three forces deep in
24 the Drina Corps zone. These kind of deep activities are designed to be
25 unsettling and to reduce the will of the defenders to continue to defend
1 the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, and that is the kind of language and
2 kind of construct that I would expect.
3 Now, that has a military derivation from the kind of language that
4 the Karadzic signed piece of paper had, but interpreted into a more
5 military fashion, and I, therefore, see a consistent thread from the
6 political direction given by Mr. Karadzic, which is not there so obviously
7 in the Main Staff order that I was taking some time to look at a moment or
8 two ago. But the intention of that, I see carried across here in the
9 Drina Corps operation to conduct those deep activities, those unsettling
10 activities that are more likely to facilitate the successful outcome of
11 the close operation, the actual attack on Srebrenica, so that it can be
12 done quickly, decisively, and with minimal casualties to the attacking
13 Serb forces. That is all pretty consistent, in my view.
14 JUDGE WALD: General, let me ask you a question. In one of the
15 earlier documents we saw the objective defined as keeping the enclaves
16 within their original boundaries, preventing the free flow of various
17 activities going on in between, all of which sort of are consistent with
18 the status quo or what people thought the status quo should be. If you
19 get an avowed objective to create conditions for the elimination of
20 enclaves which have been set up for safe areas under an UN directive
21 originally, do you run into a tension between correct military and lawful
22 orders or objectives?
23 A. Yes, Your Honour. I can see what you're getting at, which I think
24 is why the Karadzic directive is -- although the terminology is quite
25 colourful, I think its worded something quite carefully because it doesn't
1 actually specify that there will and deliberate attack to capture
2 Srebrenica. It talks about creating the environment whereby life is
3 unsustainable there, which would effectively have the same result.
4 Going on beyond that, what I understand is that perhaps the
5 overriding concern at the planning stage of this operation was not
6 necessarily so much as the elimination and the capture of Srebrenica and
7 Zepa, but to prevent the joining up by Muslim forces of Srebrenica and
8 Zepa and, therefore, making an existing problem, in Serb eyes, worse. So
9 I think part of the planning intention was to make sure they were kept
10 apart. The stated hope of reducing them so the population left was, I
11 believe, very much there. I think only subsequently, when the success of
12 that was being evident, was the decision made to actually press home an
13 attack and actually deliver the defeat of Srebrenica and, therefore, its
14 subsequent evacuation by Muslims and availability to become a Serb town.
15 I think throughout this, the Serb political level and higher
16 military level had to keep an eye very much on international reaction
17 here, and if they pushed too hard, they were always going to run the risk
18 of an international backlash. As you, ma'am, quite rightly point out,
19 these enclaves were subject to United Nations Security Council resolutions
20 declaring them as safe areas, and if the Serbs pushed too hard against
21 them, it is quite likely they might have triggered United Nations or NATO
22 airstrikes against them. And I think to push slowly and gently and not
23 inflame international opinion, that was probably the right way to go, and
24 that is, as events turned out, exactly what they did.
25 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. General, according to your knowledge and according to the
2 information and the documents that were available to you during this
3 research, was the 28th Muslim Division concentrated in the protected area
4 of Srebrenica?
5 A. My understanding, Your Honour is that the 28th Muslim Division was
6 within the general enclave, geographic enclave of Srebrenica, not just in
7 the town but in the rather larger area knocked out by the enclave. That
8 was the location of 28th Division. Whatever, I have to say, 28th Division
9 was. I don't think it's got quite as I would term it, joined-up a
10 structure as the Drina Corps had.
11 Q. Speaking of the members of the 28th Muslim Brigade, if they were
12 the ones who were attacking or making incursions into the rear of the
13 Serbian territory, Serbian-held territory, if they were attacking both the
14 military and the civilian population, in that case, was the attack on the
15 28th Muslim Brigade a legitimate military objective, a legitimate military
17 A. Your Honour, could I just clarify that question? That you mean
18 that the attack on the 28th Muslim Division, once it had broken out of
19 Srebrenica and while it was trying to regain Muslim lines in the direction
20 of Tuzla?
21 Q. Was the attack on the territory which was held on the 28th Muslim
22 Division, that is, at the beginning of July 1995 and on the 6th of July,
23 1995, when the attack on the VRS actually began, at that moment, at that
24 period of time, under the assumption that there had been attacks from the
25 protected area and from the territory held by the 28th Muslim Division,
1 was that division, at that time, a legitimate military target?
2 A. Thank you for clarifying that. I understand the question.
3 Within the enclave of Srebrenica there were Muslim forces which we
4 know to be named 28th Muslim Division. Of course, under the terms of the
5 United Nations Security Council Resolution that had declared Srebrenica to
6 be a safe area, part and parcel of that Resolution was that military
7 forces within Srebrenica should have been disarmed and not existed.
8 Now, I think that's a separate issue which I don't want to comment
9 on too much, which was the extent to which those Muslim forces had been
10 disarmed by United Nations forces in Srebrenica. But I think we all know
11 that there were a number of Muslim military men who were still bearing
12 arms in there.
13 The extent to which, therefore, the attack on Srebrenica was a
14 legitimate military act, according to general Geneva Convention norms, is
15 my answer is yes, it is not unreasonable for the Serbs to have attacked
16 the enclave of Srebrenica in which there were known to be Muslim military
18 That is a separate issue, in very general terms, to the more
19 specific issue as to whether it was right for Serb forces to have attacked
20 Srebrenica, which was itself an United Nations Security Council resolved
21 safe area. That is a separate issue. And by terms of that United Nations
22 Security Council Resolution, that attack was an illegitimate attack. It
23 was against the Resolution of the Security Council. So I have two answers
24 to that question for whatever value that adds to these matters before the
1 Q. General Dannatt, in the division which is under your command, is
2 there a principle of handover of control, of duty between two commanders,
3 that is, between the outgoing commander and the incoming commander? Do
4 you have that as an established principle in your division?
5 A. When I hand over command of my division, I walk out of the door
6 and get into my car and I drive away. The next day, my successor arrives
7 and assumes command. There is not a process of time by which he and I
8 work together and I hand over my responsibilities. That is the function
9 of the staff.
10 It's a bit like a monarchy, I suppose. The king is dead, long
11 live the king. I finish my time in command, I go away, the next man
12 arrives, he assumes command. It's the function of the staff to make sure
13 that the incoming commander is brought up to speed with current issues.
14 In terms of handover of command, there is not a period of time when we
16 When I have in-staff positions, that is a different matter. One
17 spends up to a week with the staff officer who is relieving you, going
18 through the issues of substance to make sure that nothing falls between
19 the gap. But the handover of command is what we would call a cliff-edge
20 affair. I go; the new man arrives. It could be the same day; it could be
21 a day or two later. But we do not have a practice in my army, at either
22 battalion, brigade, or division level, and I've handed over command in all
23 these different areas, where I spent time with my successor. I go away,
24 the new man comes.
25 Q. So that happens at the level of the division and as regards the
1 office of the commander of the division. Are you familiar with the
2 regulations of the VRS to that effect, that is, is that procedure provided
3 for in the same manner as in your army, that is, at the level of the
4 commanders of the corps?
5 A. In my study of the VRS regulations, I can't bring to mind a
6 regulation that stipulates whether there should be a formal
7 handover-takeover period between commanders at the corps level. I can't
8 recall seeing anything to that effect. So I can only comment, I'm afraid,
9 on what my own practice is, and not offer -- I'm afraid I cannot help the
10 Court whether there is a regulation that specifies a handover-takeover
11 period within the VRS.
12 Actually, it's not the sort of normal thing in command terms
13 because command is a personal thing. What my predecessor has done and
14 what my successor will do are two different personal things, and I just
15 refer back to the general principle that command is a personal thing.
16 It's the staff that must keep the continuity of detail going. The tone,
17 the trend, the principle is set by the commander, and to have a sort of
18 clean end to your command and the clean start to the next chap is the most
19 effective way of that delivering that personal command.
20 Q. General Dannatt, while studying or, rather, while preparing
21 yourself for your analysis, for your testimony, did you ever come across
22 documents issued by the Drina Corps to certain units, such as brigades,
23 after the 13th of July, 1995?
24 A. Yes, sir, I'm sure I have. I'm just trying to think. The 13th of
25 July is obviously the date of Krivaja 95, the attack on Zepa; the 13th of
1 July is also the date of the search operation which we spoke about
2 earlier. I'm just trying to recall an operation order after that date.
3 But amongst the many documents I've looked at, I'm sure I have seen one
4 later but I can't immediately bring one to mind.
5 Q. The documents or, rather, the regular combat reports coming from
6 the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades, were they addressed to the forward
7 command post at Krivaca or to the command post or, rather, the
8 headquarters of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica?
9 A. Your Honour, I --
10 Q. Excuse me, General. Just a second. Let me try to be more
11 precise. I am referring to the 14th and the 15th of July.
12 A. Yes, Your Honour, I understand the question. I understood it
13 originally as being, had I seen orders coming down from the Drina Corps. I
14 understand the question to be, have I seen combat reports coming up from
15 the subordinate brigades to the Drina Corps, and the answer is yes, I have
16 seen those.
17 I'm now trying to remember whether they were addressed to the
18 forward command post or the main Corps Command. If I say I can't
19 remember, in my own view, I don't think it really matters. I've already
20 commented on the fact that the forward command post had communications
21 established to the main command post from 6.00 on the 14th of July, and
22 therefore, if the reports had gone to the forward command post or the main
23 command post, the information was equally available at both those
25 Now, the usual way for a routine situation report to be passed is
1 to go to the main headquarters. That is where, as I've already indicated
2 on several occasions, the majority of the staff are, where the Chief of
3 Staff probably is most usually, and that is where the information is
4 collated. Important information is then passed across to the tactical
5 command post, the forward command post.
6 But to my mind, whether it's gone to one or the other isn't really
7 an issue for me. The fact of the matter is both headquarters are in touch
8 with each other, and information of any significance would be passed
9 routinely from the main headquarters to the tactical headquarters for the
10 information of the commander. After all, there is no point in having
11 information if decision-makers don't know about it.
12 Q. I will follow up on what you have just said. General, on the 14th
13 and the 15th of July, at the Vlasenica command post, there is evidence
14 about the presence of General Zivanovic at that command post. Was that of
15 any relevance?
16 A. Your Honour, we touched earlier on, I think it was this morning or
17 was it yesterday, on the departure of General Zivanovic. When he actually
18 disappeared is quite difficult to pin down. I see no evidence in any of
19 the orders, reports, or intercepts of any reference to General Zivanovic
20 after the 15th. In fact, from the 16th onwards he seems to have sort of
21 dropped into a hole; he doesn't seem to appear at all.
22 The only period of confusion in my own mind is the 13th, 14th,
23 15th as to whether General Zivanovic was still the Corps Commander up
24 until the end of the 15th or whether, indeed, General Krstic had become
25 the Corps Commander as early as the 13th. I think I've indicated that, to
1 me, logically General Krstic would have become Corps Commander in time to
2 properly conduct the Zepa operation which started late 13th, early 14th.
3 It may well be that to do that, certainly for part of the time he was at
4 the forward command post which had moved to Krivaca.
5 Whether General Zivanovic was still, shall I say, hanging around
6 the main command post in Vlasenica, I'm not sure. I've seen a couple of
7 intercepts to indicate that he was there. I've seen one that said, "I'm
8 packing my bags." I think that was on the 14th or the 15th. So it was
9 quite clear that he was leaving. I've seen another one that says -- I
10 think it was on the 15th, someone had asked him a question and he said,
11 "Actually, I can't help you anymore," indicating that he had given up
12 executive authority. So there is a little bit of doubt as to what General
13 Zivanovic's function was on the 14th and 15th, but certainly from the 16th
14 onwards, he appears to be irrelevant to the whole thing.
15 Q. Likewise, General Dannatt, since you've mentioned the
16 conversations, we have an example of a conversation in which a lower-level
17 officer was waiting for General Zivanovic upon his order, and also we have
18 General Zivanovic addressing this lower-level officer, telling him, "You
19 have to understand this as an order."
20 So my question in relation to that would be: Was there, of any
21 relevance -- was the presence of General Zivanovic at the command post on
22 the 14th and the 15th of July of any influence as regards the situation,
23 bearing in mind the various combat reports that are coming from
24 subordinate units at that time?
25 A. Your Honour, I say again, I think General Zivanovic's position on
1 the 14th and 15th is unclear. Whether he was or believed he was still the
2 Corps Commander, I don't know. But what undoubtedly is a fact is that he
3 was still a General on the 14th and the 15th and he had been the Corps
4 Commander prior to that.
5 So, undoubtedly, whether he still was or was not the Corps
6 Commander, he still had some authority because he was a General and he
7 carried over some authority in some respect because he had been the Corps
8 Commander. Therefore, I'm not entirely surprised that he's still giving
9 some direction.
10 The Defence lawyer made reference to the fact of one communication
11 where General Zivanovic says, "You are to take this as an order." Well,
12 from those words, I would deduce that if he was still the Commander, he
13 would have said, "You are to do this. You are to do that." Perhaps
14 because he's no longer the Commander, he has to say, "You are to take this
15 as an order." In other words, he realises that he is actually no longer
16 in a position to give orders, but because he's a General and carries the
17 authority of his rank, he is saying to some subordinate, "You are to take
18 this as an order," "as if I was still the Commander."
19 I hope I've made a distinction there that's clear.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If I may ask a question.
21 General Dannatt, if he had not been the Commander but only a
22 General, would it still have been possible for him to say, "Take this as
23 an order"?
24 A. Your Honour, it's quite possible that he could have done that
25 because he was a General and therefore more senior by rank to most other
1 people who were around.
2 What I have to say, as a military person, I find this whole
3 business quite extraordinary, that there is doubt as to who was and who
4 wasn't the Corps Commander in a combat situation. In driving a car, you
5 can only have one person behind the wheel at any one time. Now, either
6 General Krstic was the Corps Commander or General Zivanovic was the Corps
7 Commander, and when I stand back from muddle of dates, and we've got the
8 20th and 21st being talked about, when I stand back from it, I come back
9 to the answer and the analysis that I gave earlier: that the logical time
10 for there to have been a de facto, in effect, change of command was
11 between the end of the Srebrenica operation and the start of the Zepa
12 operation; therefore, the 13th would seem to be the time that General
13 Krstic effectively became the Corps Commander because that was the start
14 of the new operation.
15 I know that the order from Mr. Karadzic came later; I know that
16 there was a handover of duty, a sort of party on the 20th and 21st. Well,
17 it doesn't surprise me that that came later because organising people to
18 come to a ceremony takes a little time. But the effective handover, to
19 me, logically, was on the 13th.
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, the then President, Mr. Karadzic, was the only person who
22 had the authority to appoint the Corps Commander. Are you familiar with
23 that regulation?
24 A. Yes, I've read that regulation, Your Honour.
25 Q. So in an organised army, as you have described the VRS -- strike
2 In your division, speaking of your army, is it possible for a
3 commander to be appointed by someone else except for the person who is
4 empowered by law to appoint him as a commander?
5 A. In practice, Your Honour, yes, this can happen. I will give you
6 an example from my time as a Battalion Commander.
7 My adjutant, my Chief of Staff --
8 Q. General, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I'm speaking about the
9 level of a corps or, rather, a division, and the appointment of a division
10 commander in your army.
11 A. Right. Your Honour, I'll give you a different example in that
13 At divisional level, in my divisional headquarters currently,
14 there is the Chief of Staff of one of my brigades. It's integral to the
15 divisional headquarters. This officer was not performing satisfactorily,
16 and ten days ago I removed him from his post as Chief of Staff of the
17 Reconnaissance Brigade. I did that because it was the right thing to do.
18 However, the official posting authority is another officer called
19 the Military Secretary who issues the written orders for the removal of
20 someone and the replacement of someone else. That subsequently had to
21 happen and took a number of days afterwards for the action that I had
22 taken to be authorised and approved and for a replacement to be posted
24 I took the action to remove the officer that I felt needed to be
25 removed on my own authority, and I sought formal authority subsequently.
1 Sometimes you have to do things slightly outside the regulations, trusting
2 your own judgement. I did that ten days ago. I believe probably General
3 Mladic did it on the 13th of July, feeling that General Zivanovic was not
4 the correct officer to lead the attack on Zepa, that General Krstic was,
5 and he subsequently sought authority from Mr. Karadzic to approve it. It
6 was a risk, I guess, that General Mladic took.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, General Dannatt. In the example you gave
8 about you taking a decision and then being corroborated, suppose it was
9 rejected. Weren't you running a risk?
10 A. Yes, Your Honour, I was.
11 JUDGE RIAD: So that was not -- I mean, you took it at your own
13 A. I used my judgement and exercised my own personal decision-making
14 process, believing that what I was doing was right.
15 JUDGE RIAD: It was strictly on an official basis -- not you, but
16 I mean it would not have happened.
17 A. If I had gone by the book, I would not have acted in that way.
18 But I think it's true to say, if you do everything absolutely by the book,
19 you don't necessarily always make the best decisions.
20 JUDGE RIAD: As far as General Krstic was concerned, was he the
21 choice of Mladic or of Karadzic?
22 A. I would have said, but I do not know, Your Honour, that he was the
23 choice of General Mladic, the military Commander who knew General Krstic
24 well; that he wanted him to command the attack on Zepa and --
25 JUDGE RIAD: Because we had a speech by Karadzic praising very
1 much General Krstic and saying that he could almost be as good as Mladic.
2 A. I think that's very fair.
3 JUDGE RIAD: That's a speech we have.
4 A. Yes, and I have seen that, Your Honour. I believe that in
5 professional military terms, I believe that General Krstic had a fine
6 reputation and was, indeed, praised by Mr. Karadzic. Therefore, that does
7 not surprise me.
8 JUDGE RIAD: So that does not lead to a conflict between him and
10 A. No. Maybe we're misunderstanding each other, sir. I said that I
11 believe it was General Mladic's decision on the ground, if you like, to
12 appoint General Krstic on the 13th of July to be the Commander of the
13 Drina Corps so that he was there in the Command appointment before the
14 attack on Zepa properly began, and it was subsequently approved by
15 Mr. Karadzic. But as you, Your Honour, point out, Mr. Karadzic, quite
16 clearly, had a high opinion of General Krstic from the speech that you've
17 just referred to, and therefore, General Mladic would probably have known
18 that he was not running much of a risk by himself appointing General
19 Krstic, knowing that Mr. Karadzic would, in all probability, subsequently
20 approve that appointment.
21 JUDGE RIAD: With the result that Mladic and Krstic were almost on
22 the same wavelength.
23 A. I suspect at that time, sir, they were.
24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, before the break - I
1 apologise, Mr. Petrusic, I have to interrupt with a question - if General
2 Zivanovic was not in a good health condition, for example, would you say
3 the same thing, or would that change or affect your opinion in any way?
4 A. Your Honour, if General Zivanovic was not in good health, then the
5 automatic thing to have happened would have been for General Krstic to
6 have become the Corps Commander, because as the previous Chief of Staff,
7 by regulation, he was the Deputy Commander. So if the former Commander is
8 no longer available through ill-health, then, by regulation, General
9 Krstic would automatically have become the Commander.
10 As I said before, I do not know why General Zivanovic was removed,
11 whether it was health or whatever.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but in that case, we could
13 have General Krstic replace General Zivanovic and then afterwards there
14 would be a formal appointment; am I correct in understanding you?
15 A. Yes. If, let's say, General Zivanovic had been unwell for a
16 period of time, then quite naturally General Krstic would have exercised
17 the function of Corps Commander until General Zivanovic had got better.
18 That would have not required an order from Mr. Karadzic. The regulations
19 provided for General Krstic to be in the Command appointment.
20 However, General Zivanovic did not come back so, therefore, I
21 deduce that he was not replaced as a result of ill-health; he was replaced
22 for some other reason. And my earlier comments, I think, are the comments
23 that apply.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, would this be a
25 convenient time for a break?
1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, then. We will have a
3 45-minute break, and I still hope that we won't have to work until 3.30.
4 A 45-minute break.
5 --- Recess taken at 1.08 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.55 p.m.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, you may now
8 continue, but please bear in mind that we have to make some effort and try
9 to finish by 3.00, and only if it is necessary we will work until half
10 past three, in which case, we will have a short break for the benefit of
11 General Krstic. If we have to make a break, it will be a 15-minute break
13 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I do hope that we
14 will be able to finish by that time and that we won't have to have a
15 break, but this also depends on the General and his answers.
16 Q. General Dannatt, let us briefly deal with the following issue. We
17 spoke about President Karadzic and General Mladic at some length, and I
18 should like to know whether you know what kind of relations they had as
19 regards the issue of commanding; that is, what is the relationship between
20 him as the Commander in Commander of Staff or the Supreme Commander and
21 the Commander of the Main Staff? What were the relations at the time?
22 Were they, so to speak, adequate?
23 A. Your Honour, as much as I'd like to help the Court, I really don't
24 think I can offer a useful comment on that particular topic. I'm sorry.
25 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the fact that at the beginning of
1 August 1995, President Karadzic attempted to replace General Mladic?
2 A. That was, I think, a matter that was quite widely reported, and
3 I'm aware of that in general terms.
4 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Can I just ask you a speculative question
5 in this line? Could General Mladic have been able to interfere and stop
6 the nomination of General Krstic had he wanted it?
7 A. Your Honour, you asked me to speculate. My answer is a
8 speculation. I believe that had General Mladic not been content, had not
9 been approving of the appointment of General Krstic as Corps Commander, I
10 think he certainly would have said so to Mr. Karadzic, and indeed I think
11 it's also quite possible that Mr. Karadzic may well have discussed with
12 General Mladic his intention to appoint General Krstic as Corps
14 Raising the issue to one of generality, certainly within my
15 country, within my army, the most senior appointments are recommended by
16 the senior military for approval by the political heads and there is some
17 discussion that goes on. So both the Chief of the General Staff, the
18 Chief of the Defence Staff and the Secretary of State for Defence in my
19 country both have to agree that a particular person would have a position
20 of appointment of such seniority as a corps commander. That's a general
22 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
23 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, on the assumption that Mladic appointed Krstic as a Corps
25 Commander on the 13th of July, that is, are we speaking on the basis of an
1 assumption that Mladic appointed Krstic as a Corps Commander on that
2 date? Is it your assumption that this was done by Mladic?
3 A. Your Honour, it's my military opinion that logically, the sensible
4 time to have changed the command of the corps would have been between the
5 Srebrenica operation and the Zepa operation, and, therefore, the date of
6 the 13th of July would seem to be the most sensible. And my speculation
7 is that this was a military decision, and that General Mladic probably
8 made that decision and then sought, subsequently, approval from
9 Mr. Karadzic. That is my military view, with some speculation added to
11 Q. Do you think that the chief of staff of a corps can take over the
12 command duty over the corps only in the absence of the commander or in
13 cases of his unavailability or in case that he is prevented from
14 fulfilling that duty for any reason?
15 A. Yes, Your Honour. The regulations are quite clear that the
16 general officer who holds the appointment of chief of staff is also the
17 deputy commander, and he would exercise the command function in the
18 absence for whatever reason, injury, illness, leave, of the appointed
19 commander. Yes, that is a normal -- that is what the regulations provide
21 Q. General, apart from an order for active combat operations in
22 respect of Srebrenica, do we have any other well thought out plan for the
23 implementation for the Directive 7/1?
24 I think that the Exhibit in question, 426, has been widely used.
25 I don't think it is necessary for putting it on the ELMO once again.
1 So except for that particular order, do we have anything else, any
2 other specific document concerning the Directive 7/1?
3 A. I'm just reflecting for a moment to see what I can remember.
4 Your Honour, I believe part of the answer to the question is that
5 the overall directive, which came from Mr. Karadzic, that then produced
6 the Directive 7/1, which was the order for the attack on Srebrenica, it
7 was same Karadzic-level produced document that provided the background for
8 the subsequent operation order for the attack on Zepa, Krivaja 95. So I
9 think the Karadzic-level document provided the higher-level instruction
10 for both of those.
11 So the answer to the question is yes, there is a second operation
12 order, and that's the Krivaja 95 operation order.
13 Q. I see in the transcript "Zepa" in relation to the Krivaja 95
14 plan. I believe it's a mistake because the Krivaja 95 plan actually
15 concerns Srebrenica.
16 A. Yes. I'm referring to the two separate operation orders, the one
17 for the attack on Srebrenica and the one for the attack on Zepa
18 subsequently, the one issued on the 13th of July, which was signed by
19 General Krstic as Chief of Staff.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Petrusic -- Mr. President, Excuse me. I don't
21 want to interrupt my learned friend because we want to move quickly. But
22 I do believe that if Defence counsel is making reference to documents, the
23 purpose of the cross-examination is not to conduct a memory test on the
24 General as to what he can remember. It would be better if he actually
25 puts the documents in front of him because that would, I think, probably
1 speed things up and make it easier for the General to remember rather than
2 him having to remember the thousands of documents' specific content. It's
3 just an observation I make. It's not an objection as such.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. I think you're right,
5 Mr. Cayley. But I believe that Mr. Petrusic was trying to obtain the same
6 result without the actual use of documents. But in any case, it is much
7 better to have the General see the document so that he can remember
8 things. I think it is an easier way to proceed.
9 There is always a risk, when we want to act in a speedy manner.
10 So, Mr. Petrusic, it perhaps would be better if you ask the
11 registrar to have the document be shown to the witness.
12 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe that the
13 witness has answered my question, so we don't believe there is any need to
14 go back to the document and have it placed before the witness.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Petrusic. You
16 may continue.
17 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, in your analysis, you stated that you were not surprised
19 by the presence of Mladic and Gvero, that is, the Commander of the Main
20 Staff and his assistant, and that as regards the structure of a military
21 command, it is a usual practice for the higher command to follow carefully
22 the main effort, the main events.
23 In relation to that and bearing in mind your experience in Bosnia
24 and Herzegovina, how do you interpret the fact that the superior officers
25 were actively following duties of their subordinate officers but that they
1 did not have enough scope, enough room for action and decision-making
2 process without necessarily involving even higher military levels? How do
3 you interpret that within the framework of the actual developments of the
4 actual situation in the area of Srebrenica after the 11th of July?
5 A. I'm just making sure, Your Honour, that I follow the exact line of
6 the question.
7 I think, Your Honour, I rather disagree with the premise of the
8 question. What I have said hitherto is that the presence of
9 General Mladic and some of his assistants, some of his staff in the area
10 of the Drina Corps, I don't find surprising because that's where the main
11 effort for the VRS at that time was. Because General Mladic was there, I
12 would expect him, quite properly and quite normally, to have endeavoured
13 to influence events. After all, he was superior by appointment and rank
14 to, we'll say, General Krstic, to the Corps Commander at the time, and,
15 therefore, could well have given additional orders and sometimes
16 additional advice. There is a difference between the two. "You are to do
17 this," "I suggest you do that," but it's all done following the structure
18 of Mladic to Krstic and using the organ of the Drina Corps to carry out
19 those commands.
20 The bit of the question that I don't follow is the implication
21 that's between General Mladic on the Main Staff level and General Krstic
22 and his Drina Corps level, there was a requirement to go apparently higher
23 to seek authority for a number of these sort of things. I don't see any
24 evidence that that happened. I think that from my understanding of events
25 that took place leading up to the capture of Srebrenica and that which
1 followed after the fall of Srebrenica, they were issues that were decided
2 by the Generals on the ground at the time.
3 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. "Between the Generals"? I thought there
4 was one General.
5 A. Your Honour, I'm trying to address the issue of the fact that
6 General Mladic was also present in the area of Srebrenica at the time and
7 the fact that he undoubtedly would have had conversations; he may have
8 given orders to General Krstic. So I use the term "Generals," plural;
9 General Mladic and General Krstic.
10 JUDGE RIAD: And how would that interfere with the responsibility?
11 A. It wouldn't at all.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Then who would be responsible in that case?
13 A. The normal passage of formal orders is as we've been describing
14 over the last couple of days, of issuing a formal operation order from one
15 level to another. But it's perfectly proper for the Superior Commander,
16 in this case, General Mladic, to give additional orders or additional
17 instructions to General Krstic as Corps Commander, face to face, in a
18 spoken way, at the time, telling him to do this or to do that. Then one
19 would expect General Krstic then to issue instructions to his own people
20 within his Corps to carry out those instructions.
21 This is the way that I would normally understand the senior
22 commander being present to influence the conduct of operations in a given
23 area, the key area of the main effort.
24 JUDGE RIAD: But there was no sign of General Mladic giving direct
25 orders to the subordinates of General Krstic.
1 A. No, sir. I think we've looked at that several times previously,
2 and I can see no evidence of General Mladic giving direct orders to
3 constituent parts of the Drina Corps and, therefore, bypassing the normal
4 Corps command and control structure. I don't see any evidence of that.
5 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
6 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, if we are talking on the basis of the assumption that
8 oral orders are also being issued, as you yourself have just mentioned, by
9 General Mladic in this case, in the period of the 11th, the 12th, and the
10 13th of July, when General Krstic was the Chief of Staff, would it be
11 natural or logical for General Mladic to issue such orders to the Corps
12 Commander and not to the Chief of Staff of the Corps?
13 A. Your Honour, the normal and correct way of doing business would be
14 for General Mladic, if he felt it appropriate to issue some additional or
15 fresh orders, to do it to the Corps Commander, that is, the strict chain
16 of command.
17 I think, however, having made quite a lot of, over the last couple
18 of days, the unique position of the Corps Chief of Staff as the principal
19 staff officer, also a general officer, that it would not be wrong for
20 General Mladic to issue orders to the Corps Chief of Staff, in the clear
21 expectation that the Chief of Staff would immediately inform his Corps
22 Commander that he had been given those fresh orders.
23 It's quite usual, in my experience, for orders to be given and
24 received by a commander to a subordinate chief of staff in the expectation
25 that there is an immediate discussion between the chief of staff and his
1 appropriate commander.
2 Strictly, orders would go commander to commander. But given the
3 particular nature of the Chief of Staff position, and he was a General, I
4 don't find it particularly unusual - and we are talking in terms of
5 hypothesis here - that General Mladic might have given some orders to
6 General Krstic who could well have been still the Chief of Staff at that
8 Q. As regards the regulations which were applicable within the VRS;
9 namely, the regulations which had been adopted from the former JNA, in
10 accordance with those regulations, does the corps commander issue orders
11 to his assistants?
12 A. Could I just clarify, Your Honour, what Defence counsel means by
13 "assistants"? Does he mean assistant commander as per that diagram or
14 does he mean subordinates as in brigade commanders?
15 Q. The corps commander has his assistants for morale, religious
16 issues, for logistics and for security, so I'm referring to those
18 A. Yes, thank you for clarifying that. It would be perfectly normal
19 for the corps commander to issue instructions to his assistants
20 responsible for those functional areas.
21 Q. A corps commander also issues orders to his subordinate units such
22 as brigades or, rather, to the commanders of those brigades.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. General, during the time that you spent working on this case, did
25 you ever learn that the first documents relating to the transport, the
1 evacuation or, if I can use the term from the indictment, the deportation
2 of the population from Potocari, are such documents related to the date of
3 the 12th of July?
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, I'm sorry to
5 interrupt you, but I think it would be useful to see the documents.
6 Otherwise, we will be testing the General's memory which I trust is very
7 good; however, it should not be tested here.
8 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, of course. If
9 you can just give me a moment.
10 I will withdraw this question for the time being. But I should
11 like the assistance of the usher to put Exhibit 459 on the ELMO, please.
12 Q. General, this information comes from Colonel Jankovic, and it was
13 issued from the forward command post in Bratunac on the 13th of July,
15 General, could you please tell us - you have already spoken about
16 the subject this morning - why Colonel Jankovic, who is an intelligence
17 officer of the Main Staff, is transmitting this to the Intelligence Sector
18 of the Main Staff and to the Command of the Drina Corps and its
19 Intelligence Department? Why is he transmitting this piece of information
20 to these two addressees?
21 A. Your Honour, I assume that he is doing that because he has been in
22 the area of operations covered by this report, probably in the company of
23 General Mladic, and he will have seen things going on, he will have seen
24 events going on, and felt it appropriate to pass on that information, in
25 the same nature of the dialogue between one intelligence officer to
1 another, to the Command of the Drina Corps so that it's accurately and
2 properly recorded.
3 After all, we're dealing with an army conscious of regulation,
4 conscious of keeping good records, and by making a report like this, as
5 one intelligence officer to another intelligence officer, it was a way of
6 ensuring that the information was properly recorded and found its way into
7 the framework and network of information-gathering that the Drina Corps,
8 which had the geographic responsibility for that part of Republika
9 Srpska -- was properly documented and recorded.
10 I can see what Defence counsel is alluding to here, but I don't
11 see anything particularly unusual about it. It's exactly the same example
12 we discussed this morning of not the command relationship but the
13 information relationship between one headquarters and another.
14 Q. Assistant Commander for Security in the Corps, is he in charge of
15 controlling the Security Organs in a professional way?
16 A. Your Honour, he is responsible for coordinating all the people
17 that work in the security and intelligence area in the same way that the
18 other branch heads in the functional areas are responsible for their
19 functional areas. But they are part of the Corps Headquarters structure
20 and, therefore, are answerable to the Chief of Staff, and then on upwards
21 to the Corps Commander.
22 Q. From your research, do you think that this is the only
23 responsibility, the only duty? As regards the hierarchical structure, is
24 it going upwards to the Corps Commander, or, bearing in mind the nature of
25 the work that they do, do they also have a responsibility in respect of
1 the Intelligence and Security Organ of a higher command; in this case, it
2 would be the Security Organ of the Main Staff?
3 A. In general terms, the responsibility within the security and
4 intelligence area is the same as the responsibilities for any functional
5 area. I can imagine, perhaps, some circumstances where there was some
6 information of a very sensitive nature that was kept within the
7 intelligence community, but that is usually for the purpose of the
8 protection of the source of that information and is never intended to be
9 denied to the commander.
10 Indeed, in my own experience, on operations when I've fulfilled
11 the post of Commander British Forces, I have had intelligence officers who
12 have come to brief me personally on relatively sensitive bits of
13 information that aren't more generally known within the staff, and this is
14 to invariably make sure that the source, where this information has come
15 from, has remained privileged and protected and can continue to be used.
16 But in general terms, the intelligence function operates in the
17 same way as the operations or the transport or the logistics function.
18 Q. Again, the Intelligence Service, did it have its special rules and
19 regulations of service?
20 A. As far as I'm aware, it has, within the overall regulations, some
21 detailed provisions and requirements in the same way that all the
22 functional areas have some detailed regulations and requirements laying
23 down how they should do their business.
24 Q. Let me now go back to the question involving Exhibit number 437.
25 General, if there was a plan to conduct a deportation, such a document or
1 a document similar to that document, would it have to be transmitted prior
2 to that date?
3 A. I just want to look at the transcript of your question to make
4 sure I understand it correctly.
5 Q. For the record, would such a document have been issued prior to
6 the 12th of July, 1995?
7 A. I think, Your Honour, if I understand the question correctly,
8 we're trying to examine as to whether the deportation was a previously
9 planned event or whether it was the result of a late decision.
10 I think it's quite difficult for me to speculate on that. All I
11 can say, from various reports and documents that I have seen, is that
12 undoubtedly there was an urgent request placed for buses and trucks to
13 remove people. I can't remember whether I have seen any such requests
14 that date before the 12th of July, but certainty the Exhibit 437, which we
15 were discussing a moment ago, is dated the 12th of July, and that is one
16 of many documents related to the requisitioning and gathering together of
18 But I think I've already expressed the view that although there
19 was intention to apply pressure to Srebrenica and the long-held aspiration
20 to capture it, it was something of a surprise, I think, to the Serb
21 military authorities to find that the United Nations, the International
22 Community were not responding to the beginnings of their attack on
23 Srebrenica. So, therefore, it was a relatively late decision to press
24 home the attack and actually capture the town and, therefore, start the
25 process that led to the deportation of the people. If that presumption is
1 correct, it is, therefore, no surprise to me that the gathering together
2 of transport was something that was done in rather a hurry and in rather a
3 short time frame.
4 So what I'm really saying is, I don't believe the intention to
5 gather together transport and the intention to deport the people was a
6 decision taken a long time in advance. It was consequent upon other
7 things happening.
8 Q. General Dannatt, would the use of transport means be part of the
9 functions of the Rear, the Logistics Services and the Transportation
11 A. Your Honour, the transport is one of the branches of the
12 Department for Rear Services shown on the left-hand side of that diagram
13 under the Department for Rear Services. Yes, it's one of the functions of
14 that part of the Corps Headquarters.
15 Q. To the very end, General Dannatt, it is not my intention to test
16 your memory. I simply do not have at my disposal those exhibits. But
17 while preparing for your testimony, did you note, in the area of Zepa and
18 within the framework of another operation that was conducted from the
19 13th and 14th of July, did you note the presence of Intelligence Organs,
20 Intelligence and Security Organs in that area if you had access to any
21 such materials in the course of your study?
22 A. I'm afraid, Your Honour, I can't help you with that question. I
23 understand the question, but I've got no information to give you by way of
24 an answer.
25 Q. General Dannatt, thank you very much.
1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,
2 Mr. President. That ends my cross-examination.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
4 Mr. Petrusic.
5 Mr. Cayley, any additional questions?
6 MR. CAYLEY: Very quickly, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Please proceed.
8 Re-examined by Mr. Cayley:
9 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with Exhibit 425,
11 Q. General, if could I refresh your memory to the beginning of your
12 cross-examination when you were examined on whether or not the substance
13 of Directive 7/1, and rather, I think you called it inflammatory or
14 flowery language contained in the document was contained in subsequent
15 orders down through subordinate units. If I could direct you to page 14
16 of Exhibit 425, paragraph 6.1, and it is the third paragraph from the
17 bottom of that page, and I will essentially summarise what the directive
18 is, and essentially the document states that: "UNPROFOR and humanitarian
19 organisations are to be restricted so that, in essence, logistical supply
20 is strangled to the enclave both for UNPROFOR and resources to the Muslim
21 population, essentially making them dependent upon the goodwill of the
23 Now, the one simple question I have for you, General, is: Are you
24 aware whether or not that actually happened on the ground at Srebrenica?
25 Are you aware whether or not logistics were interfered with by the VRS and
1 supplies were limited coming into the enclave?
2 A. Yes, Your Honour, I'm very much aware. The Dutch Battalion that
3 was the UNPROFOR garrison experienced considerable, almost extreme
4 difficulties in bringing supplies in. It got to the point where they
5 didn't have sufficient fuel for their vehicles and had to start foot
6 patrols. Their food was considerably reduced and, in fact, as a result of
7 roadblocks and checkpoints that were placed on their access into Potocari
8 and into Srebrenica, the effect described by this paragraph here was very
9 much the effect that happened on the ground. And as you would imagine, if
10 it was happening to the Dutch Battalion garrison of UNPROFOR, it was
11 happening even more so to the Muslim population. And I think there was
12 the same -- I know there was the same denial of UNHCR relief convoys into
14 So the intent to make life very difficult for the UNPROFOR
15 garrison and for the Muslim population was very much carried out on the
16 ground. There is no doubt about that.
17 Q. So you've been very clear, General, but in essence, this directive
18 from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska was,
19 in fact, carried out on the ground in Srebrenica by units far down the
20 chain of command?
21 A. There's no doubt about it because it would have been elements of
22 the Drina Corps, more than one brigade that were manning the confrontation
23 lines around Srebrenica, and the approach routes from the Muslim-held
24 territory where the support bases for UNPROFOR were located. They would
25 have all responded to this instruction and in an orchestrated fashion have
1 inhibited the resupply process going to the UNPROFOR garrison and to the
2 Muslim people. Indeed it was happening in Zepa and Gorazde as well.
3 Q. Thank you very much, General.
4 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President and Your Honours, I have no further
5 questions for the witness.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
7 Mr. Cayley. Judge Fouad Riad, do you have some more questions?
8 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
9 Questioned by the Court:
10 JUDGE RIAD: General Dannatt, I would still like to have some
11 precisions, although I have understood you very clearly. You spoke about
12 of the daily combat reports, and I can just quote one part of your
13 report. You say: "I have seen evidence of daily combat reports that are
14 clearly in a layed-down format which provides a full account of all
16 Did this daily combat report give an account of the massacres?
17 A. No, Your Honour. I have not seen direct reports of what you would
18 describe as massacres. As I said in an earlier answer, there were -- and
19 I wouldn't expect to do so either, because I think most people would have
20 realised that to commit to paper, in a formal daily report matters like
21 that, was laying themselves open to subsequent investigation as indeed the
22 business of this court is all about.
23 But one does see in some places references to things that one
24 knows afterwards were indirect references, whether it's to prisoners, and
25 I'm thinking now of the Zvornik Brigade's report complaining, if you like,
1 of the large number of prisoners being held in schools and other reports
2 relating subsequently to engineer equipment being moved and fuel being
3 requested or being made available.
4 So I see no direct reference to what you've described, sir, as
5 massacres, but I have seen several examples of indirect references that we
6 now know refer in part to that process.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Now, to go further, if these daily combat reports
8 were submitted to the Higher Command, so the Higher Command was not
9 informed about the executions if they are not mentioned in the combat
10 reports. Just to follow the echelon. How would you know about it?
11 A. In a direct sense, Your Honour, I agree with you and -- I would
12 agree with that point, sir.
13 JUDGE RIAD: But still it will -- he'll remain responsible?
14 A. Certainly remains responsible, but there are two parts to this
15 information exchange process, Your Honour. There are upward reporting of
16 what is going on, but then of course there is the downward ordering of
17 what should be done. The mere fact that in the daily written combat
18 report we don't see reports of that aspect of activity being reported up
19 does not necessarily mean, on the one hand, it wasn't happening, and on
20 the other hand, that it hadn't been ordered from above. I think a
21 sensible subordinate commander would not have included such material in
22 his daily combat reports.
23 JUDGE RIAD: And a sensible commander would not order it in
24 written documents also, vice versa?
25 A. If he has an eye to the future and what might happen, I think that
1 would also be the case, that you wouldn't issue written detailed orders
2 ordering what we would regard as a crime and orders instructing something
3 to happen that is known to be against the Geneva Convention and against
4 common humanity. Those are the sort of things that are dealt with by
5 spoken word. I certainly wouldn't write it down.
6 JUDGE RIAD: And in a well-disciplined army, this should still be
7 done within the chain of command?
8 A. Instructions to do things should still follow the chain of
9 command, as I've just tried to clarify, but I wouldn't expect to see that
10 sort of thing written down. However, the sort of things that we're
11 talking about are not the sort of activities that I would expect a
12 civilised, disciplined army to actually do.
13 There is no doubt that these dreadful things happened. They
14 happened extensively and over a short period of time, and, therefore, I
15 have to make the dreadful deduction, if you like, that for this widespread
16 activity to happen over a short period of time, it had to be facilitated
17 by a disciplined, joined-up organisation to make such activity happen so
18 quickly, and there was no other framework to enable this to happen other
19 than the framework of the Drina Corps.
20 JUDGE RIAD: Now, you spoke of a civilised army. In one of
21 your -- apparently when you were describing the plan Krivaja 95, you said
22 it has a fairly barbaric logic. So that's not very much in harmony with
23 what you said about a civilised army.
24 A. I think the term, Your Honour, that I've used mostly as been
25 "disciplined," as disciplined as in following a chain of command,
1 downward instructions, upward reporting. I don't think I've used the term
2 "civilised" very often, and if I have --
3 JUDGE RIAD: Right now you did, five minutes ago. I'm not blaming
4 you, I'm just telling you.
5 A. Well, I'm probably trying to clarify that there is a distinction,
6 a sharp distinction, in my mind between "disciplined" and "organised" on
7 the one hand and "civilised" on the other.
8 JUDGE RIAD: So why do you say it was a fairly barbaric plan, the
9 plan Krivaja?
10 A. The intention to shell, the intention to make life unsupportable,
11 the intention to make life unbearable for principally civilians has a
12 barbaric logic, and I think that comes into the uncivilised category.
13 JUDGE RIAD: It carried already the intention of harming people.
14 A. Going right back to the original document that we looked at
15 earlier, going back to the Karadzic-signed document which talks about
16 there being no hope for life and making survival difficult, if there's a
17 barbaric logic to that, and that implicitly -- that implies harm and
18 casualty and fear being created amongst not only military people but
19 amongst civilian people, that is not certainly civilised behaviour
21 JUDGE RIAD: You were discussing transportation and wondering why
22 there were no written documents concerning it. Would you put this under
23 the category of unwritten exchange of orders and documents?
24 A. To clarify, Your Honour, I said that I could not recall any
25 written documents relating to transportation before about the 12th of
1 July. I have seen written documents requisitioning transport, organising
2 transport, for the purpose of what we know now is deportation subsequent
3 to the 12th. So I have seen elements of that written down, and I've also
4 seen transcripts relating to that.
5 Indeed, one of the documents I was shown, I think it was number
6 437, a few minutes ago was such a written order requesting 30 buses to go
7 from one place to another. So I have seen written-down evidence of the
8 gathering of buses for the obvious purpose of transportation of people.
9 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Judge Fouad
12 Madam Judge Wald.
13 JUDGE WALD: General Dannatt, I have three questions. The first
14 is a bit complex but be reassured the second two are very simple.
15 A. All right.
16 JUDGE WALD: I wonder if you would consider for a moment a
17 slightly different scenario, hypothetical, for the moment, obviously, than
18 the one discussed at length which was whether or not General Mladic might
19 have gone in and taken direct command of certain units of the Drina Corps
20 and exercised that command. We also discussed at a later point whether or
21 not, and you agreed, a logical time for General Krstic to take over as
22 Commander would be at the end of the Srebrenica military campaign, the
23 beginning of the Zepa military campaign. And occasionally, a good
24 commander-in-chief jumps the box a bit and faces the consequences.
25 Joining those two thoughts together, I would just like your
1 comment on the possibility of a scenario which went like this: General
2 Mladic - wanting General Krstic to go and lead the Zepa campaign, knowing
3 that he was slated to become the Commander, if you went by the Karadzic
4 letter, effective July 15th, which was a few days henceforth - decided to
5 jump the box, as it were, let him become Commander for the Zepa operation
6 but continue General Zivanovic in his present Commander status for the
7 mop-up operation down the line, in which case there wouldn't be a need to
8 go over generally; they could work, as you put in your report, glove in
9 hand. And General Zivanovic whom, for the moment hypothesise, might have
10 been more sympathetic to the style of General Mladic, and together they
11 could regulate the lower part while General Krstic went on the upper
12 part? Is such a scenario feasible, or is it highly unlikely?
13 A. I think, Your Honour, it has to come into the highly unlikely
15 JUDGE WALD: Okay. You tell us why.
16 A. And I'll tell you why. There can only be one commander in a
17 military establishment at any one time. I think I alluded to one person
18 behind the steering wheel of a car. It would flout all the norms of
19 military conduct to have two commanders at any one time, and I think
20 that's a generalisation but I think it's a pretty strong generalisation.
21 Secondly, General Zivanovic has completely disappeared off --
22 JUDGE WALD: Not until the 15th.
23 A. Yes, ma'am, that's correct. We see no further transcripts or
24 documents relating to General Zivanovic after the 15th, I would agree, but
25 that mop-up operation was ongoing for some time; the search in the woods
1 went on for several days. So I think that would defy that part of the
3 JUDGE WALD: But some of the heaviest of the massacres had already
4 finished by the 15th.
5 A. We're talking of two or three things here, I think, if I can just
6 clarify. We're mopping up the column, the 28th Division column; we are
7 dealing with the search operation - I was going to come to that - that was
8 ordered on the 13th; and we're also dealing with what I've referred to
9 previously as "the dark operation," to massacre a lot of people. I would
10 agree, in the main, the killing was largely over on the 15th but it did
11 run to an extent on the 16th --
12 JUDGE WALD: Yes.
13 A. -- the burial aspect went on beyond, and of course the digging up
14 and reburial was well beyond. So even if General Zivanovic had been the
15 driving force behind that to start with, he very quickly stopped being so
16 in that hypothesis and someone else, very early on, took it over.
17 I would just come back to the other point which is the search
18 operation, which was definitely not being ordered in the Zepa operation
19 which was ordered on the 13th of July, and an order that was signed by
20 General Krstic.
21 So for all those reasons, I can understand how one could arrive at
22 that hypothesis, but I would put it into the highly unlikely category for
23 the three or four reasons that I have just given.
24 JUDGE WALD: Okay. The two shorter questions.
25 If you, as the commander of a corps or a division, suddenly found
1 yourself in a combat situation which you hadn't anticipated - what I'm
2 talking about is they might not have found out about the column marching
3 towards Tuzla until the morning of the 12th, et cetera - but you then
4 realise that you have on your hands some kind of a potential military
5 operation; if you also anticipated that that might well result in taking a
6 sizable number of prisoners of war in it and you wanted to handle them
7 according to international law, et cetera, what kind of preparations, even
8 if they were last-minute, would you expect the authorities to have to take
9 if they were really going to treat people who were captured as prisoners
10 of war?
11 A. If they're going to do it properly, then first of all a body of
12 troops, a unit of some sort, has got to be appointed to act as a guard
13 force for that. I mean, it might be that you would choose a military
14 police unit or it might be that you select an infantry battalion to be a
15 guard force to prevent those people from escaping.
16 You would have to identify places that you were going to hold
17 those people. That might be buildings that you would be required to
18 identify which were large enough, warehouses or factories or anything like
19 that, to put people in, in other words, provide accommodation for them, or
20 alternatively you would have to build pens very rapidly with wire
21 stockades and so on in which to put them.
22 You would then, knowing that you were dealing with large numbers,
23 have to make some arrangements for the provision of food and water for the
24 sustainment of those people and, on the presumption that these people were
25 being taken prisoner after a period of combat, then provide medical
1 services to at least give basic medical treatment; according to the Geneva
2 Convention, at least as good as that which you would provide for our own
3 people to sustain those prisoners.
4 So there are quite a lot of activities that you would have to put
5 in place, and that would require a degree of planning.
6 JUDGE WALD: Would it require that those holding places have
7 enough food, medical care for a period of time? You mentioned that all
8 during this war, the Bosnian war, there were these kinds of exchanges that
9 went on between the BiH army and the Bosnian Serbs, exchanges of
10 prisoners, so I assume this would not be an entirely new situation. But
11 would you have to assume that you might have to hold those prisoners for a
12 period of time before such an exchange was -- in other words, it couldn't
13 be done overnight.
14 A. I think that's absolutely right. Exchanges take a little while to
15 organise. One's got to get in touch either directly with the other side
16 or, as was often done, through the International Committee of the Red
17 Cross, who acted as the intermediary in order to facilitate exchanges.
18 That would certainly have taken a period of days; it may have taken a
19 period of weeks.
20 Of course, this is going beyond a little bit, but if they had
21 taken 4.000 or 5.000 prisoners at this stage in the war, exchange was one
22 option, but continuing to detain them for a longer period of time might
23 have been a better option rather than put 4.000 or 5.000 potentially back
24 in uniform as rearmed soldiers to fight against them once more.
25 JUDGE WALD: My last question. You said, I think I quote you
1 accurately, that it was your opinion, or at least your speculation that
2 the decision to execute the prisoners was probably made late. I think you
3 used the word "late."
4 Can you tell us, knowing everything you know about the situation
5 here, how late in this course of events could that decision have been
6 made? I mean, in other words, did it have to be made before the buses
7 left Potocari? Could it have been made after the buses left Potocari and
8 the time the first groups of prisoners began to be assembled from the
9 column? Given what we know here, how late in the game could that decision
10 have been made?
11 A. Well, the people, as I understand it, Your Honour, who were
12 massacred came from two sources.
13 JUDGE WALD: Right.
14 A. Some were prisoners captured from the column --
15 JUDGE WALD: The majority, yes.
16 A. -- and some were men from Potocari who were separated out from the
18 JUDGE WALD: That's right.
19 A. I guess that the decision to kill probably stemmed from the
20 Potocari separation exercise and then carried on as a response to a number
21 of those who were captured as the column was rounded up. So after all
22 that, that took place over a number of days, and it was quite some time
23 before the last elements of the column had been rounded up.
24 So I believe that the decision to kill the men was a decision
25 taken in the Potocari environment and then, to an extent, it was rolled
1 across to a number of the prisoners.
2 JUDGE WALD: Although, weren't some of the first executions of the
3 column people done on the 13th whereas the Potocari people were bused and
4 held around Bratunac before some of them were then dispersed to camps and
5 killed? That doesn't mean your answer can't be correct that the decision
6 was made but ...
7 A. I think, actually, some of the killings of prisoners from the
8 column may well have come into the spontaneous category. I think that we
9 may well have had a little revenge-taking going on there, and that may
10 have been a less-disciplined aspect of the whole thing.
11 I think the more sinister aspect of this is the major decision
12 that was taken to separate men from women and children and then to execute
13 the men, and that originally stems from the large group of people rounded
14 up in Potocari. I agree with your difference over the dates there.
15 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, I also have a few
18 My first question is the following: You said that it was normal
19 for General Mladic to be present in the field of operations and that he
20 could give instructions or orders of an additional nature. I think that
21 you saw the video recording of the meetings held in the Fontana Hotel.
22 The fact that we saw Mladic alone conducting the negotiations - Krstic did
23 not speak; the other officers did not speak - how do you view that
24 situation? It would have been normal for Krstic or Zivanovic to be able
25 to speak and not for Mladic. He was there just to support them.
1 A. Your Honour, two or three comments there, if I may. I presume
2 that in advance of those meetings that were filmed and we've seen on the
3 video, that the Serb Generals would have had a meeting beforehand and
4 decided what they were going to do. I believe they would also have
5 decided who was going to be leading the negotiations, who was going to be
6 doing the talking.
7 Secondly, General Mladic was the senior of the Generals amongst
8 his own Main Staff people, General Zivanovic and General Krstic;
9 therefore, it's not surprising that he takes the leading role. Although
10 I've not met General Mladic, by reputation and by what one's read and seen
11 of him, he's that kind of large, dominant character that I would not
12 expected to have sat quietly in a corner and allowed someone else to
13 conduct the discussions. So it doesn't surprise me at all that he's
14 taking the leading part in those discussions. I think that's a human
15 aspect, and his large blustering, I call it, bullying character, I think,
16 probably would mean that he was likely to be the main spokesman.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question. I don't know
18 for the moment whether it is an order coming from the Main Staff to the
19 Drina Corps and all the other brigades - you will remember there was
20 something very urgent - or whether it was the Drina Corps repeating an
21 order for the subordinate units. There is a point where it is noted "For
22 Information," and then in brackets it says: [In English] "To be handed
23 directly to the Commander or Chief of Staff."
24 [Interpretation] This phrase in brackets, can that serve to
25 confirm what you have told us, that in certain circumstances the Commander
1 or his Assistant Commander or Chief of Staff were more or less the same
3 A. If your question is on that particular phrase, then I believe it
4 does confirm exactly that; that there is this unique and special
5 relationship between the Commander and the Chief of Staff. It doesn't
6 take anything away from the Commander as the boss, as the number 1. But
7 the Chief of Staff has a very special relationship to him, and people
8 recognise that you can tell something to the Chief of Staff and you're
9 effectively telling it to the Commander, so they are bracketed together in
10 that regard.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question. We have seen
12 that for the purpose of communication and information, there were direct
13 relations between the Assistants for Security in the Main Staff and in the
14 Drina Corps. Have you come across documents containing orders; that is to
15 say, is it necessary to make a distinction between information and orders?
16 A. Your Honour, when you say have I come across documents, do you
17 mean regulations or just --
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Orders. Have you seen any
19 documents containing orders that were passed directly between two
20 Assistants for Security?
21 A. I don't believe I have, sir, no. I'm just trying to think whether
22 I have. I think I have seen, as I mentioned before, communications
23 between the two facilitating a passage of information. I don't think I
24 can recall seeing an order.
25 If I could just remind you, Your Honour, of one comment I made
1 about the Jankovic piece of paper - I'm afraid I can't remember the
2 exhibit number - but there was a postscript, and I think I said yesterday,
3 "You should take it as an order." Therefore, what that is saying to me
4 is that it's not an order but take it as an order, recognising that
5 there's no legitimate means for one Security Branch to order another but
6 that you should take it as an order, meaning it's not an order but I think
7 you should do it.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, just to summarise and
9 maybe to finish off this question, there's another point. Seeing
10 communications between the Assistant for Security from the Main Staff and
11 the Assistant for Security in the Drina Corps, one can agree that
12 information is circulating; that is to say, is it necessary to make a
13 distinction between orders which may or may not be passed on directly, or
14 information which can always be passed on from one to the other?
15 A. I think, Your Honour, the point that I want to make and I want to
16 stay with is that it's perfectly legitimate, and I have seen several
17 examples of information being passed from the Security Staff at one level
18 to the Security Staff at another. I have seen no orders being passed from
19 one level to another.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My one last question, General.
21 You said that you haven't seen documents relating to the buses prior to
22 the 12th of July. My question is: Have you seen documents, prior to the
23 12th of July, which make mention of the evacuation? Perhaps all the
24 documents would need to be reviewed. I'm sorry.
25 A. I'm pausing because I'm thinking.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, General. Let me
2 retrace my steps a little because buses are one thing and to talk more
3 generally of a plan for the evacuation of the population is another.
4 Maybe we have a defined objective, and then we have to consider the means
5 to achieve it. So I don't know if by making such a distinction that could
6 assist you in refreshing your memory.
7 A. Your Honour, I've certainly made reference to the fact that one
8 has seen the general stated intention going right back to the Karadzic
9 order that to remove the Muslim population as a long-term aim from
10 Srebrenica was in mind. That is one thing. I don't think I can recall
11 seeing a particular written order prior to the 12th of July. And those
12 orders largely pertain to the gathering together of buses and so on for
13 the purpose of moving the people.
14 So I think I can safely say that my understanding is that there
15 always was an intention to remove the Muslim people from Srebrenica when
16 at some point in the future the opportunity presented itself.
17 I think that opportunity presented itself after the town had been
18 captured, in a military sense, and that's when one begins to see written
19 orders and transcripts of conversations and so on, gathering together
20 buses for that purpose. And I think the 12th of July is about the cut-off
21 date or about the start date for that.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, General, I think we have
23 come to the end of your testimony. We have made every effort to release
24 you today.
25 I should also like to take advantage of the opportunity to thank
1 all the staff members for their availability and readiness to continue
2 late which, after all, was not necessary.
3 But I wish to thank you too very much, General, for coming and
4 answering questions from the Prosecution and the Defence and the Judges,
5 and we wish you every success in your future work.
6 I will now ask the usher to accompany General Dannatt out.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 [The witness withdrew]
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I was going to raise the
10 question of documents. Perhaps I should also take a few minutes to
11 address some questions. We have come against a concrete difficulty, and
12 that is that Mr. McCloskey has asked for the admission into evidence of
13 the list of documents contained in Exhibit 394, specifically that exhibit
14 was tendered and requested to be admitted under seal because the list
15 contains documents under seal. So that brought about this specific
16 difficulty as to finding out which of the specific documents which need to
17 be admitted under seal and which are the documents that can be admitted
19 So I don't know whether the Prosecutor is ready to answer this
20 question or perhaps we can deal with it at some other time, because it was
21 not clear for me, during the discussion, whether the Defence took a
22 position only regarding the documents under seal. As you remember, the
23 Defence had an objection regarding the admission of certain documents, but
24 in my understanding, it did not state an opinion regarding the request of
25 admitting certain documents under seal.
1 Those are the questions that we still have to deal with before
3 Mr. Harmon, please. Then I'll give the floor to the Defence.
4 MR. HARMON: Good afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours,
6 The situation in respect of the exhibits, many are under seal,
7 many are not under seal, we have duplicate documents finding themselves in
8 both situations, it's, frankly, very confusing. In order to resolve this
9 issue, my proposal to the Trial Chamber is that Ms. Keith has been working
10 on a comprehensive list of documents and exhibits and is prepared tomorrow
11 to present to the registrar the list of documents for which we are seeking
12 a removal from the protection of the seal and the identity of documents
13 which we believe should remain under seal, and we're prepared to submit
14 that to the registrar and let that be regulated by the registrar in
15 conjunction with my colleague, Ms. Keith.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon, are you ready to
17 discuss the totality of those documents with the Defence, those under
18 seal, those not under seal?
19 MR. HARMON: We have engaged in those discussions throughout this
20 litigation. We will be meeting this afternoon -- I hope either this
21 afternoon or tomorrow to have the list available to show to my colleagues
22 from the Defence, and we will reach an agreement that is acceptable to
23 both parties.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, please, regarding
25 this matter.
1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon is quite right in saying
2 that we tried to come to an agreement regarding these exhibits, and the
3 methodology that he proposed was accepted by the Defence. So we are
4 waiting for that list, be it today or tomorrow, and then we can agree or
5 come to an agreement as far as that is possible regarding the exhibits to
6 which we have no objection.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well then. We're going to
8 wait then before we decide because for us, it was an insurmountable
9 obstacle and we had to encourage your cooperation.
10 I see Mr. Cayley on his feet. Do you have a witness?
11 MR. CAYLEY: I wouldn't dare announce that at this stage,
12 Mr. President.
13 There are some exhibits to be regulated for General Dannatt.
14 Prosecutor's Exhibit 395, 396, 397, 398, and General Dannatt's report
15 which has been marked as Exhibit 385A, which is the English version, and
16 "B" which is the B/C/S version. So if there are no objections from my
17 learned friend Mr. Petrusic, I would ask for those to be admitted into
18 evidence. If I can assist the Defence, they were the biographical
19 documents that were presented at the beginning and then the document
20 showing the relationship between Security Organs within a corps and
21 Divisional Command.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Petrusic.
23 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] We have no objection,
24 Mr. President.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Fine then. The documents have
1 been admitted into evidence. That is the decision of the Chamber.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Harmon has asked me to notify the Court that
3 tomorrow there will be two witnesses who will be essentially giving the
4 Court evidence of the impact of these crimes on the community in
5 Srebrenica, and they will be led by Mr. Harmon's legal officer, Magda
6 Karagiannakas, and so she will be leading the evidence tomorrow.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much,
8 once again, to you all for your availability. So we meet again here
9 tomorrow at 9.30. Have a good evening and success in your work.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.27 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day of
12 July, 2000 at 9.30 a.m.