1 Thursday, 7 December 2000
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.25 a.m.
5 [Accused not present]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, will you please
7 have the accused brought in. As far as I can see, he's not in the
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. I received yesterday after the hearing a
10 waiver, so I have it here.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, for the record,
12 could you please tell us what's happening with General Krstic, why he
13 cannot be present today.
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, General Krstic is
15 having certain health problems. The Chamber has already been informed of
16 the nature of his health problems, and today he has a checkup at hospital.
17 So for these reasons, for reasons of health, he waived his right to be
18 here and provided the registry with the relevant document. He agreed that
19 the proceedings continue in his absence, but I hope that he will be able
20 to join us tomorrow.
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, thank you,
22 Mr. Visnjic.
23 Let me just bid you good morning, to the technicians, the
24 interpreters, to the counsel.
25 Good morning to Professor Radinovic. Professor Radinovic, you
1 will continue to testify under oath.
2 I will give the floor to Mr. Visnjic to continue with the
4 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examined by Mr. Visnjic: [Continued]
7 Q. [Interpretation] General Radinovic, yesterday we spoke about a
8 certain level of independence in the chain of command of the Security
9 Service. Could you tell the Chamber whether during your research you have
10 ever come across a report which would have been sent by the security organ
11 to the Commander of the unit that it belongs to; not to its superior
12 command, but to the Commander of the unit in which composition it has
13 found itself and which report would deal with the problem of the prisoners
14 of war.
15 A. No, no. I haven't come across a single document issued by the
16 security organ during my preparations for this testimony, any document
17 which would contain a report or information to the Superior Commander,
18 either of the relevant brigade or the Drina Corps, about the assignment
19 which the security organ was carrying out.
20 Not only did I not find anything about their obligations within
21 the chain of command of the Drina Corps, I also haven't come across any
22 report issued by the security organ and sent upwards through the chain of
24 Q. Would it have been conceivable for the Drina Corps officers and
25 the Commander of the support units not to know about possible crimes
1 committed by their members?
2 A. Yes, that is conceivable for reasons contained in my answer to
3 your previous question. That is to say, it was perfectly possible for the
4 members of the military police of the brigades of the Drina Corps under
5 the leadership of the assistant Commander for security in those brigades,
6 that they were carrying out assignments which were outside the control of
7 the Brigade Commander.
8 Second reason for that could have been the fact that the Brigade
9 Commanders and the command system of the Drina Corps as well were not
10 informed, were not familiar with the conduct of the security organs; and
11 that the Commanders and commanding officers, it would have been possible
12 for them to think that their members were carrying out legal duties which
13 did not involve cases of murder and burial.
14 If I may add one further sentence, please, to support my claim.
15 It was possible for this chain of command which was independent and which
16 was not under the control of the usual, the normal command system of the
17 Drina Corps, to use the resources of the brigades for certain activities
18 involving the treatment of the prisoners of war. And it was possible for
19 the Commanders to think that it was a legal activity and that murders,
20 killings, and burials were not part of such activity.
21 Q. In your opinion, what was the responsibility of General Krstic for
22 parts of that chain of command of the security elements in the period of
23 time when crimes were committed, where mass killings were perpetrated in
24 the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade, that is, up until the
25 18th or the 20th of July?
1 A. At that time, General Krstic was at his post of the Chief of Staff
2 of the Drina Corps and the Commander of the Operational Group for
3 planning, preparation, and execution of the Zepa operation. As such, he
4 did not have the security organ of the corps in his control. They were
5 not subordinate to him. And as a chief of staff, he did not have
6 authority to exert control over that chain of command and control.
7 Therefore, General Krstic cannot be held responsible for the acts and
8 deeds of that particular chain of command because that fell out of his
9 competence in his capacity of Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and the
10 Commander of the Operational Group for Zepa.
11 Of course, this answer is truthful if similar things did not occur
12 in the area of Zepa.
13 Q. General Radinovic, in view of the military doctrine, is the
14 procedure of bringing in the prisoners of war in the area of
15 responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade in the period from the 13th until
16 the 11th of July -- until the 18th of July, is that understandable? Is
17 that acceptable in the sense of the military doctrine?
18 A. It is completely contrary to the military doctrine for several
19 reasons. Prisoners of war, in accordance with the principles of the
20 military doctrine, are not held for a lengthy period of time in combat
21 zones but are sent to collection centres that are provided for that
22 purpose beforehand. The VRS had such a centre at the time. It was in
23 Bijeljina at Batkovic.
24 In view of the fact that in the orders of the Main Staff issued to
25 the Drina Corps and in view of the fact that the Drina Corps was ordered
1 to send the prisoners of war to the higher levels of command, it was
2 unnecessary for the prisoners of war to be relocated, to be pulled out
3 from the combat area and to be accommodated in a properly and adequately
4 controlled collection centre. So that is one reason, and it has to do
5 with the adopted norms and standards.
6 The second reason is of a doctrinary nature. It is completely
7 understandable. It cannot be conceived why the prisoners of war, at the
8 time of the most intense fighting in the area of responsibility of the
9 Zvornik Brigade, were collected, were gathered in the area of
10 responsibility of that brigade.
11 Another doctrinary reason is the reason why those prisoners of war
12 were put up in the area of the Zvornik Brigade when that area of
13 responsibility in the overall area of responsibility of the Drina Corps is
14 the most restricted one. There's less than 15 or 20 kilometres between
15 the line of contact and the Drina River.
16 So that portion of the area of responsibility was -- it was
17 possible to cut that area of responsibility in two in cases of major
18 attack from the direction of Tuzla. So militarily speaking, that would
19 have caused a problem in respect of the prisoners of war. Those
20 collection centres could have been deblocked, and I really don't know why
21 such a situation occurred because what happened is completely contrary to
22 the military doctrine.
23 The only reason, the only explanation that could possibly be
24 considered as rational was the fact that that particular area contained
25 the highest number of facilities which could be used for the accommodation
1 of prisoners of war and where it was possible, for a certain limited
2 period of time, to control the prisoner of war with a relatively
3 restricted number of resources.
4 There are such possibilities outside this area, outside the area
5 of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. There are several villages, but
6 there are not enough adequate facilities for that. However, once again I
7 have to say that all military reasons were contrary to that, that it was
8 done contrary to military principles, military doctrinary principles.
9 Q. According to the testimonies that we have heard in this case, most
10 of the executions were conducted in the area of deployment of certain
11 battalions of the Zvornik Brigade.
12 How can you comment on that proximity as regards a potential
13 responsibility of the Commanders and their ability to learn about such
14 executions and to do something about them?
15 A. At the time of these events, as far as I could learn from the
16 material and the documents that I had access to while I was preparing for
17 this testimony, combat activities were going on in the area of
18 responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade, and such combat activities were of
19 a rather high intensity; that is, on the 14th, the 15th, the 16th, and the
20 17th of July, the area saw a rather high-intensity fighting.
21 According to certain operational reports of the Commander of the
22 Zvornik Brigade sent to the Commander of the Drina Corps, I came across
23 information indicating that the intensity of combat activities from the
24 area of Tuzla, from the area of responsibility of the 2nd Corps of the BiH
25 army, was very high.
1 Why am I saying this? It was possible for the shots -- it was
2 possible for the Commanders of those battalions not to identify the shots
3 coming from the executions as something unexpected. That could not have
4 been the reason for them being upset or concerned about it and induced to
5 ask reasons for such shooting, because shots are not uncommon and the
6 noise from firing is not uncommon in area of high combat activities. It's
7 not a justification; it's a mere fact.
8 The second fact which goes to the issue of the command
9 responsibility of the Battalion Commanders, in view of the principles of
10 the military doctrine which was in force in the VRS and which had been
11 adopted from the JNA, battalions in defensive action, as were the
12 battalions of the Zvornik Brigade, are not assigned a particular area of
13 responsibility as is the case with the brigades. A battalion is only
14 assigned to deploy in a region of defence, as it is called, and such
15 regions have two positions: the front position and the rear position. And
16 it also includes firing positions of the firing group of the battalion.
17 And they have their command post, the battalion command post, but it is a
18 very restricted area, very restricted terrain. It's merely a spot in such
19 an area.
20 The difference between a brigade and a battalion is the fact that
21 every battalion is assigned a region of defence which contains two
22 separate parts, two lines, two lines of facilities which they have to take
23 possession of, and is not assigned a particular area of responsibility
24 which it is supposed to control and have responsibility for. So that is
25 the specific difference between battalions and brigades.
1 Second, battalions of the Zvornik Brigade and the battalions of
2 the Drina Corps and the VRS in general, as is the case with all of the
3 three armies in the BiH, are not very strong. They do not have a high
4 number of troops, unlike Western battalions which have -- which can have
5 between 800 and 1.000 troops. The number of troops in these battalions
6 was 2 to 300, so they were not able to take control of the features as
7 part of their defence which would secure them such a portion of the
8 terrain which is described by the military doctrine. And the military
9 doctrine which was applicable in the VRS provided for the battalion to
10 take possession of the territory which is 3 kilometres wide and 1.5 to 2
11 kilometres long. So it was very difficult for these, these type of
12 battalions to cover such a large area.
13 Q. General Radinovic, yesterday you explained to the Trial Chamber
14 the existence of several individual systems of command in the zone of the
15 Drina Corps. Was it realistic to expect that the Drina Corps, or rather,
16 that the system of command of the Drina Corps could function successfully
17 and control all the events that were taking place and activities that were
18 taking place in their zone of responsibility in July 1995? Was that
20 A. First of all in answer to your question, let me say what this
21 should have been like in principle; what the principle of the matter
22 should have been.
23 The command of the Drina Corps had to ensure an insight into the
24 situation as it existed and prevailed in the zone of responsibility. It
25 had to do so according to doctrinary principles. It would have had to
1 have done so. In the zone of responsibility, nothing could take place
2 which the command system of the Drina Corps was not in control of. So
3 that is the principle as it stands.
4 Now, from that principle, which is a normal requirement and would
5 be normal to expect, going down to practice itself and the actual
6 situation on the ground as it is and was, is a subject for analysis. We
7 can debate the point.
8 Yesterday I spoke about several systems of leadership in that zone
9 which functioned simultaneously and upon which the command system of the
10 Drina Corps did not -- it was not possible for it to establish control
11 over it either de facto or in normative terms. So at the same time, we
12 saw the functioning of systems, the simultaneous functioning of systems
13 over which the Drina Corps, by nature of the position in military
14 hierarchy, did not wield any influence on nor could it wield any influence
15 on. Therefore, on the command system of Superior Command, it was not able
16 to exert any influence.
17 The second point I would like to stress here is that in the zone
18 of possibility of the Drina Corps we saw the units and compositions active
19 which belonged to those various and different command systems upon which
20 the Drina Corps could not exert any influence, and they were, as we saw
21 yesterday, the units under the immediate direct command of the Main Staff
22 of the army of Republika Srpska and the units which were under the direct
23 command of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Republika
24 Srpska. So the Drina Corps exerted -- did not exert -- not only did it
25 not -- was it not able to establish control over these units nor could it
1 have done because by virtue of the documents and orders it was not
2 organised to do so nor was it duty-bound to do so. This was not
4 The command system of the Drina Corps vis-a-vis those systems
5 which were not under its control and which it could not control were
6 duty-bound that having learnt of what had happened to have undertaken the
7 steps which are provided for and prescribed for in the rules of service
8 for the VRS and relate to the execution of orders. That means the duty
9 and obligation of each and every person to undertake proceedings that all
10 illegal acts which took place in the zone of responsibility must be --
11 that the long arm of the law must come to persecute them.
12 The next reason which could have led to something that was natural
13 to expect, that is to say that the Drina Corps could control the situation
14 in its zone of responsibility, the next factor that did not allow it to do
15 so was the confusion that resulted from the simultaneous complicated
16 conditions and factors that prevailed on the ground; namely, the danger of
17 seeing a breakthrough into the zone of responsibility along the
18 Tuzla-Zvornik axis at the time, that is to say, between the 15th to the
19 17th, and prior to that as well, from the 14th onwards. That serious
20 crisis came to a head in the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik
22 The second fact which influenced this general confusion was the
23 problem of preventing the withdrawal of the 28th Division to break through
24 the zone of responsibility.
25 And third, the third reason which led to this operational
1 operative confusion in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps was
2 that a large portion of the resources of the corps was deployed and used
3 at the Zepa operation, and that was an operation which was being launched
4 in a completely separate portion of the zone of responsibility of the
5 Drina Corps.
6 This, therefore, led the fact that the command system focused --
7 of the Drina Corps focused on solving these operational problems which
8 came to a head at that time and were very serious. In other words, the
9 military system of command was focused on operational problems, that is to
10 say, it tried to deal with the crises that took place in combat and in the
11 activities at Zepa, whereas the other problems which are the subject of
12 these legal proceedings was left to the other systems, the systems that
13 existed in parallel form. And the Drina Corps had no influence exerted,
14 no influence, or had any influence on those parallel systems.
15 JUDGE WALD: Excuse me. I have one question that I must ask you,
16 General, if I may.
17 Having heard your explanation here, which I understand in
18 theoretical terms, I'm driven back, though, to one question. You yourself
19 discussed at an earlier point the intercept which came back from Colonel
20 Pandurevic of the Zvornik Brigade when he went back from Zepa down during
21 the crisis. He was called back and then he sent an intercept and he
22 talked about the problems of detention of 3.000 people being in some form
23 of detention, 7.000 people coming in from the column, and he used the
24 term, if I remember correctly, "I need" -- in effect, "I need more
25 resources or I will have to let them go," which sounded very much the tone
1 of the intercept was that he considered himself still as the head of the
2 brigade to be dealing with the situation or to have to deal with the
3 situation of the prisoners of war rather than what you postulated as a
4 whole independent control system for the prisoners that he had no control
6 I'm just wondering if you could, in your theory, put those two
7 things together.
8 A. In response -- that is to say, the first sentence of my response
9 was that the Drina Corps had to establish control over the zone of
10 responsibility, would have had to. That was its duty and obligation and
11 that is incontestable, without a doubt.
12 The report, the intercept that you talk about, I think was dated
13 the 18th of July; that is to say that there are two reports. One was on
14 the 18th of July, the second on the 15th of July. So as soon as the
15 report came from Zepa, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade in the interim
16 combat report stated that an additional problem was the prisoners. The
17 prisoners were an additional problem for him, whom somebody had brought
18 into his zone of responsibility; whereas the appeal which speaks about the
19 3.000 prisoners of war and 7.000 others in the woods, I think that refers
20 to the 18th of July, that the date there was the 18th of July, but I'm not
21 quite sure. I think that is so.
22 And that is, for me, completely incontestable, that is to say that
23 the command of the Zvornik Brigade when sending out those reports did not
24 know that -- of the liquidation of the prisoners of war in his zone of
25 responsibility because it was quite obvious that at the time that he was
1 reporting on this, these prisoners of war, according to the documentation
2 that I had at my disposal for preparing for this testimony, that fact
3 about the prisoners was not in Zvornik.
4 So it is evident that the Commander did not know about that fact,
5 and if he did not know about that fact, that is an indication for me that
6 he did not control that system. Why didn't he control the system? He
7 didn't control the system because the problem of prisoners of war, by
8 virtue of its very nature and the internal function of command, is
9 something that the Security Service deals with, as can be concluded from
10 the orders of the Commanders at all levels of command. And that problem
11 on the division of work in the Zvornik Brigade belonged to the assistant
12 Commander for security and the platoon of the military police. And it is
13 quite certain that his assistant for security and the police probably knew
14 about that at the time when this execution took place and the burials took
15 place, but neither his security officer nor his police had to have -- at
16 the beginning of this treatment of the prisoners knew that at the end of
17 the chain, they would be executed.
18 So I'm trying to explain how this could have happened, how this
19 could have come about, of course without any apriori attempt to justify
20 anything that happened in that chain. What I'm trying is for my angle of
21 vision as a witness, as an expert witness, I am trying to see how that
22 could have happened and how that could have been allowed to happen. I'm
23 trying to make that clear to myself.
24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further
25 questions, but I do have a correction to make in the transcript for this
1 last response by General Radinovic, and it is in line 7. General
2 Radinovic mentioned just a report, not an intercept. He said "report,"
3 not "intercept," so the report is -- the "intercept" is wrong.
4 And in line 10, General Radinovic did not talk about Zepa, so that
5 word "Zepa" is not properly -- is not appropriate.
6 And in line 3.000, he mentioned -- in line 13 he mentioned 3.000
7 prisoners. There was the figure "3" which had nothing to do with that.
8 The figure was 3.000 prisoners. Those are my remarks with regard to the
9 LiveNote, Mr. President, and my corrections.
10 I have no further questions.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Visnjic.
12 I think that this would be an opportune moment to take a break,
13 perhaps, before we start with the cross-examination. Mr. Cayley, is that
15 MR. CAYLEY: As you wish, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let us take a 20-minute break,
17 after which we will start the cross-examination by the Prosecution.
18 --- Recess taken at 10.00 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 10.20 a.m.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Professor Radinovic, you will
21 now be answering questions put to you by the Prosecutor, and in this case
22 it is Mr. Cayley who will be asking you the questions.
23 Mr. Cayley, your witness. Please proceed.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours, my learned
1 Cross-examined by Mr. Cayley:
2 Q. General, my name is Cayley. I'm from the Office of the
3 Prosecutor, and I will be asking you questions on your evidence. And let
4 me say to you from the outset --
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you can intervene if there is anything
6 here that I say which is out of order.
7 Q. -- you've given your evidence in-chief, and it's been in a very
8 long narrative form where you've been very expansive in what you have
9 said. My questions should elicit from you fairly short responses. Not
10 every question can be answered by yes and no, and I understand that, and
11 of course you will be given every opportunity by the Judges to make sure
12 that you can give a full response; but we have got a lot of material to
13 get through in a limited period of time, so if you could tailor your
14 response to my question, that would be very helpful.
15 Is that clear, General?
16 A. I shall answer in keeping with the knowledge I have of the facts
17 related to the case and in keeping with my temperament, of course, because
18 there is a component part of my psychological makeup. So anything that is
19 not forbidden to me by the Trial Chamber I shall do, but I will, of
20 course, try to adhere to your requests, yes.
21 Q. Thank you, General.
22 Do you have your report to hand?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If you could turn to page 10 of your report, and it is in fact
25 page 11 in the English version.
1 MR. CAYLEY: This document has not yet been given an exhibit
2 number, although I do think my learned friend is probably offering it into
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Apparently, Mr. Visnjic, I'm sorry, it's been given a
6 Prosecutor's exhibit number, 755.
7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that seems to be a
8 rather strange marking in view of the fact that it is a Defence exhibit.
9 But I would just like to indicate that the General has his report before
10 him, but that this time his report is in a different version, that is to
11 say, the pages will not coincide. So perhaps the registry can provide him
12 with the same version of his report so as to overcome that technical
13 difficulty. So may we just wait a few moments for the General to get the
14 same copy.
15 MR. CAYLEY: In -- excuse me, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I apologise, but there seems to
17 be a conflict here. Now, the Prosecution and the Defence seems to want
18 this document for themselves. Now, how do we stand there? Because it has
19 already been marked for identification but not admitted yet, so I think
20 the Defence ought to be given preference here because it is, after all, a
21 report by their expert witness.
22 Mr. Cayley.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you're absolutely right. Mr. Harmon
24 has thousands of very efficient people working for him upstairs who put
25 numbers on everything the moment they see a document, so it should have a
1 Defence exhibit number on it. It's not our report. I think it was done
2 in haste because the Defence hadn't actually offered it into evidence,
3 so ...
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed. One must be
5 careful, otherwise, Mr. Harmon risks getting a number too himself.
6 Now the Defence is going to tender that document into evidence.
7 Is that correct, Mr. Visnjic?
8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Mr. President, and I
9 can provide a number for purposes of the record. It would be Defence
10 Exhibit D160.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, is that right?
12 Is that the proper number for that document?
13 THE REGISTRAR: I have two blank spaces, D159 -- yes, one space,
14 D159, but you may already have an exhibit labelled D159, do you, that you
15 did not submit yet?
16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we leave it at number D160 and
17 then we'll fill in D159 as we go along in due course?
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. So this document
19 will be document D160, 1-6-0, for purposes of identification. So when we
20 refer to the document, we can refer to it in that fashion.
21 Mr. Cayley, without further ado, I think we can proceed.
22 General Radinovic has the proper version before him, the pages coincide
23 with your own copy, so I think we can proceed, Mr. Cayley. Your witness.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. General, if you could turn to page 10 of your report, which I
1 think deals with the sources that you used for your report. Can you find
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that as far as your primary sources are
5 concerned, you were given access by the Defence to all of the Prosecution
6 and Defence exhibits which are in evidence; is that right?
7 A. I think it is, but I can't say for sure. I can't give you a
8 precise answer, but I think so, yes.
9 Q. Mr. Visnjic may be able to clarify this later, but we'll carry on
10 with the cross-examination for the moment.
11 You did have access to radio intercepts of VRS forces, did you
12 not? And in fact, you refer to them in your list of primary sources.
13 A. No. I had access, but I did not use them as my primary source
14 because for the type of expertise that I engage in, intercepts cannot be
15 considered to be primary sources because we must know the strategic
16 context in which they occurred, who the people speaking were, what
17 functions they had, who they were talking to and so on and so forth.
18 Q. General, excuse me.
19 A. I apologise, but may I finish what I was saying?
20 Q. General, we will actually get on to discuss the quality of the
21 intercepts later on in your examination in chief and you will be able to
22 say everything you want to say about intercepts. For the moment, all I
23 want to do is to specifically identify what you used and what you didn't
24 use in compiling this report.
25 Can you read out from the paragraph that has listed primary
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 sources. Could you read out the final sentence after the semicolon which
2 reads "Tribunal documents given with the indictment"? Could you read that
3 please, General?
4 A. Yes. "Tribunal documents given with the indictment, intercepted
5 conversations, tables and diagrams, maps and so on."
6 Q. That sentence is contained within which is the paragraph headed up
7 "Primary sources," is it not?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So you did use intercept as a primary source in your report?
10 A. In the extent to which I considered them to be relevant.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, in respect of secondary sources, you included
12 there "thematic studies relating to the problem of operation Srebrenica
13 and the events after its termination."
14 Now, I think you used, did you not, Radovan Karadzic's book that
15 was written by Dejan Lukic called "My Defence", did you not? Did you
16 refer to that book in your report?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I'm not going to put this into evidence, but this is in fact the
19 book. How heavily did you rely on this particular book?
20 A. Not much.
21 Q. Did you read the chapters on Srebrenica? There are two chapters,
22 aren't there, I think, which concern Srebrenica and what happened and the
23 aftermath of Srebrenica? Did you read these two chapters?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, I'm not going to read all of that book, but I'm just going to
1 read on the back of this book what it says. Mr. Karadzic says, on the
2 back of this particular publication, which I think Mr. Lukic has quoted:
3 "My plea at The Hague would be an accusation rather than a defence. It
4 is Lords, Secretaries-General, presidents, and ministers of sorts who
5 should turn up there and come out into open."
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, yes.
7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I did not hear the
8 question put by Mr. Cayley. I don't understand whether the expert witness
9 is asked to comment on the stand taken by President Karadzic, or whether
10 it was just -- whether he had read that portion of the book. If he said
11 that he was acquainted with the book, then it is certain that he read that
12 part; but if he is being asked to comment on what Radovan Karadzic says in
13 that book in that portion, I don't know whether that comes within the
14 domain of his expertise.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I don't think that Mr. Cayley
16 has asked his question yet. Shall we wait and see what the actual
17 question is, Mr. Visnjic?
18 Please proceed, Mr. Cayley.
19 MR. CAYLEY:
20 Q. General, what do you think Mr. Karadzic meant when he said that?
21 A. I am not here to interpret Karadzic. He could have thought what
22 he liked. So that -- I did not pay specific attention to that part of his
23 text, but if you want me to tell you what I think about it, then may I
24 have a copy and I shall read through it and then be able to tell you
1 Q. This, unfortunately, is an English version, General. I assume you
2 read it in the Serbian version which I don't have to hand, but if we do
3 refer to this book later on, I will indeed give you a copy in your own
4 language if we refer to the two chapters which you have referred to in
5 your report, which you have relied on to some extent in your report.
6 A. I apologise for having to add the following. It's not an answer
7 to the question, but let me just say that when you -- if you wish to ask
8 me about things like that, you must give me the possibility of reading
9 through the portion again. I have read many books, and I can't be
10 expected to remember sections of individual books. But I have nothing
11 against giving my judgement and saying what I think about what you're
12 asking me, but I would have had to have read through the section first.
13 So please provide me with that possibility if you want me to answer.
14 Q. General, have no fear, any documents that we look at in detail,
15 you will have copies placed in front of you.
16 What other books did you rely on for your report, other than the
17 Karadzic book? Just give a list.
18 A. In my testimony and in answer to questions from the Defence, I
19 think I spoke about that in greater detail, and I think it exists in the
20 transcript. I studied a number of books by Muslim authors. I think that
21 one of them was Nesib Mandzic, that that was his name. Then there was
22 Masic, Sefer Halilovic. That is as my memory serves me. Those three
23 quite certainly, but I couldn't give you the names of the others at
24 present. So of the Muslim authors, I read those three books. I also read
25 the book that you have just mentioned by Dejan Lukic.
1 Q. And in terms of actors in these events who were from the
2 International Community, did you read the book by Carl Bildt?
3 A. Yes. "A Mission of Peace," I have read it, and I think I quoted
4 it in my report. And from the whole series of books, that was the last
5 one I read so that my recollections of that book are freshest in my mind,
6 although I did have problems in accepting everything that he sets out and
7 in recalling it all because it's not a very well-ordered book, if you
8 don't mind my saying that. It is not the kind of text that I'm accustomed
9 to read; that is to say, it hasn't got a firm structure where you can see
10 the thesis, the arguments, and the conclusions. So it was a little
11 difficult for me to follow because it was more the type of publication
12 that is more lax. It is not very rigid in its demands and strict in its
13 demands, but I do think that I remember the basic points and thesis put
14 forward in the book, yes.
15 Q. Now, just literally in the form of a shopping list - you don't
16 need to give your opinion on every book - which other books did you read,
17 if you can recall, published by members of the International Community who
18 were involved in these events? Were there any others?
19 A. I read the report by the Secretary-General, by Michael Rose.
20 Q. The report of the Secretary-General, you mean the report by Kofi
21 Annan; and I think when you're referring to Michael Rose, you're referring
22 to --
23 A. 1999.
24 Q. And when you're referring to Michael Rose, you're referring to
25 General Sir Michael Rose who is the Commander of UNPROFOR forces who wrote
1 a book on Bosnia. You read that book as well?
2 A. Yes. I read that book, that is to say, excerpts of it. The
3 excerpts were published in our newspapers and journals, so that is why I
4 did not quote it in my report as a source. It would be difficult for me
5 to refer back to the book at this point.
6 Q. Now, General, I want you to think about the VRS orders that you
7 looked at. Now, you would agree with me that neither you nor I have had
8 sight of every single Bosnian Serb army order that was issued in respect
9 of the events with which this Court is concerned.
10 A. Well, I have managed to look through what I had at my disposal for
11 these legal proceedings, what I received from the Defence as documents,
12 the ones that are considered to be relevant for this case.
13 Q. But you would agree with me that there are -- that the sum total
14 of what the Defence and the Prosecution have in their possession are not
15 all of the written orders that were, in fact, issued in respect of the
16 events with which the Court is concerned?
17 A. You're asking me questions which I cannot answer. For me to be
18 able to answer your question, I would have to know how many documents were
19 actually in existence, and then to subtract from that number the number of
20 documents I had at my disposal, and then I would know whether I had
21 omitted to study some of the documents. I can only assume that they
22 exist, but I cannot give you a clear-cut answer.
23 Q. General, I'm not asking you to give me the numbers of the missing
24 documents. Let me just state to you that the Office of the Prosecutor has
25 been seeking a large number of orders, written orders, that are relevant
1 to these proceedings for some considerable time, and those proceedings are
2 ongoing. And I will just refer to one particular request which was
3 requested to Branko Milosevic who is the liaison officer for Republika
4 Srpska in Banja Luka.
5 I won't read the letter, but in that letter, at the end of
6 November of this year we request orders in respect of the Drina Corps, the
7 Drina Corps Chief of Security, the Drina Corps Chief of Logistics, the
8 Milici Brigade, the Vlasenica Brigade, the 5th Engineering Battalion, and
9 we give dates of all of the orders and reports that we want that are
10 relevant to these proceedings.
11 The response from the Defence Ministry of Republika Srpska, on the
12 15th of February, 2000, was simply an explanation that many of these
13 documents have disappeared or were, in fact, destroyed when the government
15 Are you aware that many of the documents that are relevant to
16 these proceedings have, in fact, disappeared? Were you aware of that
18 A. No, I was not aware of that. I did not know that the relevant
19 documents had disappeared nor that they had been destroyed. If they were
20 destroyed and if they did disappear, then I can understand that. I can
21 understand that because it is -- it is the kind of thing that happens
22 during the kind of war that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I don't
23 know of a single civil war where things like that don't happen. Documents
24 are not registered in the way they should be, war diaries, archives are
25 not kept, and documents are not stored in the professional way. That is
1 understandable to me.
2 Now, the scope of those documents that were destroyed, how many of
3 them and how relevant they were, I really don't know. I really can't
4 say. But I do believe that I did have relevant documents at my disposal
5 on the basis of which it is possible, with relative measure of certainty,
6 to reconstruct what had taken place in the events that we are discussing
7 at this trial. And, of course, it is up to the person deciding to
9 Q. Now, General, you'd agree with me that there will have been oral
10 orders issued during these events which neither you nor I are aware of?
11 A. Yes. It is the right of the command system to issue oral
12 commands, especially in current events, ongoing events. But I, as a
13 military expert, can assume that such things happened but I cannot base my
14 testimony on that.
15 Q. Now, General, the first 15 or so pages of your report are
16 concerned with historical events going back to, I think, the sixteenth
17 century and the Ottoman Empire, and I'm not going to ask you any questions
18 about that at all. Let us move straight to the twentieth century.
19 Now, my understanding is that the essence of your testimony
20 concerning the Serbs of Bosnia is that they wished to preserve Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and when it
22 became clear that that was impossible, they wanted to create a Serb
23 political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
24 A. Not quite correct. If you wish for me to respond precisely to
25 this question, you must give me the opportunity to formulate my answer.
1 So I cannot answer by yes or no.
2 Q. I don't expect yes or no, but briefly, briefly, because this is
3 not the heart of the case. But if you can briefly, in about the same
4 amount of time as my question, answer that, that would be perfect?
5 A. Well, I'm not as skilful as you are in order to reply so briefly,
6 but the first fact that should be kept in mind is that for the creation of
7 Yugoslavia in 1918 and for the creation of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Serbs
8 or the Serbian people, which at that time numbered between 6 million and
9 7 million, spent or lost 3 million people. Three million Serbs were
10 killed. And the political programme was the formation of a common state
11 of southern Slavs and that programme was drafted a long time ago.
12 The second fact that I would like you to keep in mind is that the
13 people who had such major sacrifices for the creation of such a state
14 spent vast national energy in order to preserve it because that state
15 enabled them all to live in the same state. This was the first time in
16 history that all Serbs lived in one state in Yugoslavia, and they were
17 really willing to defend it.
18 Q. I'm talking about 1990. I'm talking about this civil war, the war
19 that this court is dealing with. I'm not talking about the history that
20 preceded it. If you can't answer the question without giving a historical
21 analysis going back to the beginning of the century, we'll move ahead.
22 Now, I --
23 A. You didn't allow me to answer your question. Serbs in Bosnia did
24 want to preserve that state and for Bosnia-Herzegovina as their state to
25 be within Yugoslavia. So the political programme was that.
1 So thanks to the supremacy of the political forces in Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina this concept was not accepted, but they opted for the complete
3 separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. So the breaking up
4 again of the Serbian people into sections which would remain in Serbia and
5 sections which would remain within other republics of that once common
6 state, then the political programme of the political leaders of the
7 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina was for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be
8 reconstituted as a community of all three peoples which would all be equal
9 and constitutive parts of the state.
10 So the programme which was closest to this idea was the so-called
11 Cutiliero Plan. He is a Portuguese diplomat who proposed that Bosnia be a
12 confederation based on a cantonal principle, and the leaders of the
13 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted that concept. Under
14 whose incitement or how this happened, the already-accepted plan was
15 rejected by leaders of the Muslim community. So they rejected Cutiliero's
17 So according to my view and according to what I know, this served
18 as an introduction for the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later on
19 there were other factors that attributed to this, but politically
20 speaking, this was one of the basic causes for this conflict.
21 So I'm really speaking about this subject in quite an analytical
23 Q. Now, General, I think on the 6th of March, 1992,
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum and voted to be a sovereign state; is
25 that correct?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. No, not Bosnia and Herzegovina but members of the Muslim and
2 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian people did not
3 participate in this referendum. In the prior constitution of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina they were a constitutive people of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
5 and the referendum without the participation of one of the constitutional
6 peoples is not a legitimate one.
7 Q. Now, General, I'm right in saying that on the 7th of March the
8 United States of America and the European Community, the then European
9 Community, now the European Union, recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
10 sovereign state. This is a matter of public record, General.
11 A. No, it's not a generally accepted fact. This was on April 7th,
12 not March.
13 Q. I'm sorry if I misspoke. You're quite right. But it occurred on
14 the 7th of April, 1992, the event that I've just stated?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Now, if the witness could be shown Prosecutor's
17 Exhibit 746.
18 Q. Now, General, this is a document which is signed by the president
19 of the Serbian National Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 12th of May,
20 1992, and it sets out the strategic objectives of the Serbian people in
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
22 There is one paragraph that I'm interested in and the only one
23 that I wish to discuss with you. It sets out on this document the aims of
24 the Serbian people, but paragraph 3 says to: "Establish a corridor in the
25 Drina river valley, that is, eliminate the Drina as a border separating
1 Serbian States."
2 Now, that area, General, if I'm right, incorporates the Podrinje
3 region which you said was for the Serbs the "to be or not to be" part of a
4 Serb area within Bosnia; is that right? To use your words. I think you
5 quoted Shakespeare, Hamlet.
6 A. No, I didn't quote, I used that metaphor.
7 Q. But am I right in saying that the Podrinje area is within this
8 area referred to in paragraph 3 of this decision?
9 A. Well, this is not Podrinje, this is Drina. This is a historical
10 concept since King Theodosious divided the kingdom to his sons and the
11 kingdom was divided into the eastern and western part.
12 Unfortunately for the Serbian people, it divides the Serbian
13 ethnic space into two parts, the western and the eastern part. And in
14 this decision, in this document that you have pointed me to, the political
15 leaders of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that it
16 is a legitimate aim for this pointer not to pass through the very centre
17 of their territory but for this border to be moved. These are quite
18 desirable political objectives. Many objectives perhaps cannot be carried
19 out, but if you wish, this for me something that is quite normal.
20 Podrinje is along this border.
21 Q. So in your evidence when you said that without Central Bosnia the
22 Serbs could not form a political entity , that area, Podrinje, includes
23 Bratunac, Konjevic Polje, Nova Kasaba, Srebrenica?
24 A. In the translation of your question I heard "Central Bosnia." I
25 think probably there is a mistake in the translation.
1 Q. Central Podrinje.
2 A. Yes, yes. In my response to the question by the Defence, I spoke
3 about the strategic significance of that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 for all three sides in the conflict, and I said, and I am replying to you
5 now, that none of the three warring sides had such a major interest in
6 Central Podrinje as the Serbian side did, because without Podrinje, you
7 cannot have a political entity of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I
8 think this is the answer to your question.
9 Q. General, let's move straight to the summer of 1992, and I want to
10 ask you if you are aware of certain events that were taking place.
11 MR. CAYLEY: And if, Mr. Usher, Prosecutor's Exhibit 485 could be
12 placed on the board next to the General. Let's not waste the time. Can
13 you just lean it up against the board?
14 Q. Now, General, at about the same time as the declaration that we've
15 just looked at by Mr. Krajisnik about creating a corridor in the Drina
16 River valley, certain events were taking place in Cerska.
17 MR. CAYLEY: If Prosecutor's Exhibit 37 could be made available.
18 Q. This is a document unfortunately which is in English, but I'm
19 going to quote some sections to you from it - not all of it, very
20 briefly - and I just want to know whether or not you were aware that
21 these events were taking place.
22 This report, General, is a report by an individual by the name of
23 Tadeusz Mazowiecki who was appointed by the United Nations in 1993 to
24 produce a report on human rights, alleged human rights abuses in Eastern
25 Bosnia. It is a document which I'm sure was made available to you. Even
1 if you didn't read it, it's a document the Defence had.
2 Now, this particular report describes events in the town of --
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, excuse me.
4 Mr. Visnjic, one has to bear something in mind. If you have an objection
5 as regards the transcript, that's fine. If you have an objection to the
6 question of the Prosecutor, you have to let him finish his question.
7 Proceed with your objection for this time, but let me remind you
8 once again that only when you have pertinent objections can we hear.
9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have an objection for
10 the use of this document. Defence received this document in the English
11 version. It was never translated, so that --
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, I'm sorry, but it
13 is the witness who can tell us that. The Prosecutor has said, "You have
14 perhaps seen the document. It is in the English language." The witness
15 can say yes or no. He can tell us whether he has had the document,
16 whether he has had it in English and was unable to read it. You have to
17 leave the witness the opportunity to respond to the question. I think
18 that the witness is also aware of the problem and that he will let us know
19 about it.
20 MR. CAYLEY:
21 Q. General, this is a document which is in English. Have you seen
22 this document that's in front of you? Can you --
23 A. No.
24 Q. I realise you're at a disadvantage because you cannot read it, and
25 I won't spend very long with this particular document. It refers strictly
1 to events that were taking place that were reported on by Mr. Mazowiecki
2 to the UN, and all I want you to do is to cast your memory back to 1992
3 and 1993 and recall for the Judges whether or not you can remember these
4 particular events taking place. Let me read the report, and the report is
5 titled "Ethnic Cleansing of the Eastern Enclaves."
6 "The first wave of ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina was carried out by Serb forces in April and May of 1992."
8 MR. CAYLEY: This is at the bottom of page 3, Mr. Usher, and then
9 it goes over the page.
10 Q. "Only three pockets or enclaves remained under government control
11 in the east. For most of this period the enclaves consisted of Cerska,
12 Konjevic Polje, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa." There is then a
13 description in the main body of the report about the siege of the Cerska
14 area, the Cerska Valley which can be seen on the map. I won't read it,
15 but essentially a large number of civilians were surrounded by Serbian
16 forces and subjected to shelling and siege-like conditions for many
18 Were you aware of these events in Cerska in the summer of 1992,
20 A. Yes, I knew from the media. I knew that from the media, not from
21 documents; but since I know that the media tend to exaggerate, I had
22 sufficient reason not to wholly believe in the facts that were published
23 by the media. But certainly in the war which started in Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina, and since I know what civil wars look like, that type of
25 activity and that type of consequences are quite expected.
1 Q. Now, in your own evidence, General, you then refer to a government
2 offensive, a Bosnian government offensive from December of 1992 to January
3 of 1993, and you discussed in that the fall of the village of Kravica and
4 the killing of a number of Serbs. And indeed, that particular event is
5 also referred to in this report, although unfortunately due to lack of
6 cooperation of the Serbian authorities, Mr. Mazowiecki was only able to
7 essentially write these in the forms of allegations, but those events are
8 referred to.
9 Now, moving on, you then stated in your evidence, and do you
10 recall this, that there was a Drina Corps offensive following on from the
11 Bosnian government offensive in March of 1993 to retake ground taken by
12 the Muslims. Do you remember saying that in your evidence?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, General, you have had opportunity --
15 MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. Usher, this is Prosecutor's Exhibit number
16 30, which is the Secretary-General's report.
17 Q. You have had an opportunity to read this report, haven't you?
18 A. In 1999, yes, the report of the Secretary-General.
19 Q. That's correct. And you've read that in your own language?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Do we have a copy of that in the Serbian language? I
22 will read out the section concerned, if the relevant paragraph can be
23 placed on the ELMO. This is paragraph 37. If the Defence has a copy to
24 assist the witness, they can let the General have it so that he can follow
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, unfortunately we do not
3 have a copy in the Serbian language, and it was never tendered into
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] At any rate, I think that we
6 have a translation service here, that is, the interpreters; and Mr. Cayley
7 can read the relevant portion, and the General will receive the
8 interpretation from the booth, and we will be able to follow it on the
10 Please continue, Mr. Cayley.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, it's page 13 of the report, paragraph 37.
12 Q. General, it's a very short section within the report, and it
13 refers to the following: "Bosniak forces attacked out of the enclave
14 against the Serb inhabited village of Kravica on 7 January 1993. Serb
15 sources claimed that over 40 Serb civilians were killed in the attack."
16 That's what you referred to in your evidence, isn't it, General?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The next sentence, "Soon after the attack on Kravica, Serb forces
19 began to prepare a counter-offensive." And here we're talking about the
20 Drina Corps, aren't we, General?
21 A. I assume so, yes.
22 Q. "By March 1993, Serb forces were advancing rapidly, killing and
23 burning as they did so." Would you agree with that characterisation,
24 General, that the Secretary-General of the United Nations gives to the
25 Serb counter-attack?
1 A. A fact is missing from this report of the Secretary-General and
2 that is the fact that Kravica, Kravica is the last village in Central
3 Podrinje which was inhabited by Serbs. And since then, from January 7th,
4 and it's very symbolic and it's obvious because it's the Orthodox
6 Q. I'm going to interrupt you. You've already agreed with me about
7 the attack on Kravica by Muslim forces and the allegations that Serbs were
8 killed. What I'm asking you about, General, is the characterisation of
9 the -- listen to me.
10 A. That's the last Serbian village.
11 Q. This report, the second sentence, concerns the characterisation of
12 the Serb counter-attack against the Muslims. Do you agree or disagree
13 with that particular characterisation of that, whether the Drina Corps, in
14 your words, "... advanced rapidly, killing and burning as they did so"?
15 Do you agree or disagree?
16 A. I do not agree that the Drina Corps advanced killing and burning.
17 The Drina Corps, which carried out a counter-attack in Central Podrinje,
18 was on the road along which the road was advancing, and the army was from
19 that area, which was completely ethnically cleansed by the Muslims until
20 the Orthodox Christmas of 1993. On that road, they found unburied corpses
21 of their family members, of their household members, so the remains, the
22 bodies, of their dearest ones.
23 So, sir, unfortunately, previously all Serbian settlements had
24 been ethnically cleansed and destroyed in Central Podrinje, and Kravica
25 was only the sad epilogue of that previous cleansing. Before that, the
1 cleansing was carried out in other areas which were under the control of
2 Muslims and Croats.
3 Q. Now, General, to end this particular discussion, this report
4 indicates that by March of 1993, the entire Muslim populations of Cerska,
5 Konjevic Polje, Vlasenica, Sadic, and Kamenica, were either all in the
6 Srebrenica enclave or had fled to Tuzla, and that the population of
7 Srebrenica had expanded from 7.000 to 60.000 people, including the
8 surrounding villages. Are you aware of those facts? Did you hear about
9 those facts during 1993?
10 A. I think that the information about such a number of citizen -- or
11 such a number of the population in Srebrenica is not correct. I don't
12 think that the town can accept that many people, but this is not really
13 that important, the figure itself. But I agree with you that the
14 concentration of population was much -- much exceeded the resources of the
15 town in order to enable normal living.
16 Q. Now, General, let's move forward rapidly to April of 1993 and a
17 matter that you've discussed which was the protected area, the safe area,
18 Resolution 819. And you also stated in your evidence that there was a
19 military agreement between Mr. Mladic, General Mladic, and the then
20 Commander of the Bosnian government forces. Do you recall referring to
21 that agreement?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And I think you stated in your evidence that the Muslims
24 essentially totally failed to respect that agreement over the next two
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And I think you also said that the Bosnian Serb army fully
3 respected that agreement. Do you recall saying that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Let's just read through, and again, my apologies because it is in
7 MR. CAYLEY: We're now back on Prosecutor's Exhibit 37, and it
8 might be a good idea to actually place this on the ELMO.
9 Q. And I will summarise the seven points of that agreement between
10 the Serbs and the Muslims. The first part of the agreement, General --
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have a principled
13 objection and I will not ask this question again, but I would like to make
14 the following objection: When you are using a document which is not
15 accessible to the witness in his language, I think that it is unnecessary
16 to quote from such a document. Mr. Cayley can summarise the question and
17 cite his source. But if he reads this and quotes from the document to the
18 witness, I think we will lose a lot of time, and I'm not sure whether the
19 witness can provide a good answer to the question since the whole document
20 is not accessible to him. So this is a general objection to such
22 So if the witness has a translation of the document, it is
23 possible to quote. But if not, then I think that the way I suggested
24 would be appropriate and we would save much time and get on much faster.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, how do you respond
1 to this objection.
2 MR. CAYLEY: I agree, Mr. President. In this particular instance,
3 that is exactly what I'll do. There may be documents which are not in the
4 language of the witness which I will read. I mean, I'm reading it so that
5 he can actually understand in his own language and so that I'm not
6 mischaracterising what is actually contained in the document. That is the
7 only risk. Indeed Your Honours have this document available to you to
8 read. I mean, it's a huge document that's 20-odd pages of typed script.
9 I'm not reading all of it. So I will do that in this instance. I'll
10 summarise the agreement.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Cayley, you may
13 MR. CAYLEY:
14 Q. Page 9, at the bottom of the page. These are just, General, the
15 elements of the military agreement that took place between the Muslims and
16 the Serbs in respect to the safe area following on from Resolution 819,
17 and if you could simply say yes or no in respect of the particular points
18 of agreement, that would be helpful.
19 Now, the first point of agreement was a total ceasefire between
20 the parties, is that right, in the Srebrenica area?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. The next requirement was the deployment of a company of UN
23 Protection Force soldiers?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The next requirement was the opening of an air corridor for the
1 evacuation of the seriously wounded and ill to Tuzla?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The next requirement was the demilitarisation of the enclave and
4 the requirement that the Muslims hand over their weapons?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. The next requirement was freedom of movement for both sides?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. The next requirement was freedom of movement for the International
9 Community and the access of humanitarian aid into the city of Srebrenica?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the final requirement was that prisoners be exchanged between
12 the two parties.
13 Now, General, are you aware that in -- I think it was April, 25th
14 of April, 1993, the Secretary-General sent in a special representative to
15 Srebrenica to make a report on what he found in the area. Mr. Diego
16 Arria, who was the permanent representative of Venezuela, and he stated
17 and I summarise that the Serbs were not complying with the military
18 agreement because they had not withdrawn from points where they could
19 attack, harass, or terrorise the town.
20 Are you aware of the fact that the Serbs did not withdraw in
21 accordance with the military agreement, the Bosnian Serb forces? Are you
22 aware of that, General?
23 A. You should be familiar with the ways a particular area can be
24 demilitarised in order to understand why Serbs didn't withdraw. In 1992,
25 I took part in the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan in the Krajina
1 region, and I was in charge of the disengagement of forces.
2 The first omission of the agreement that you have just quoted was
3 the fact that it did not contain at the time it was reached a defined
4 boundary of the safe area. So the agreement did not contain a specific
5 and articulated plan of demilitarisation. A demilitarisation plan should
6 contain a full dysfunctioning process of putting out of function the
7 Muslim forces in the enclave so that their military resources and
8 equipment can be pulled out. In that way, the military situation would
9 have been defused and the enclave would no longer be exposed to any
11 Since that was not specifically regulated in the agreement, that
12 particular element had to be done subsequently and that was the reason --
13 that was why there were so many violations of the agreement which
14 eventually led to the operation Srebrenica 95.
15 Q. General, are you aware that the Serbs systematically prevented
16 humanitarian aid from 1993 through to June of 1995, they systematically
17 prevented humanitarian aid from getting into the enclave of Srebrenica?
18 And before you answer this question, the Judges have heard
19 evidence both from the commanding officer of the Dutch Battalion who said
20 that that's -- that is exactly what happened, and they have also seen UNMO
21 reports which indicate that that happened.
22 Are you aware of that fact?
23 A. You probably haven't heard the fact that the concept of
24 humanitarian convoys was jeopardised because certain prohibited equipment
25 was being brought into Srebrenica.
1 I absolutely do not support the idea of holding up the convoys and
2 preventing the aid to reach the civilian settlements. However, you must
3 understand the reality of the situation, because on a number of occasions
4 it was discovered that the convoys were carrying military equipment,
5 weapons, ammunition, and other types of materiel.
6 Q. Colonel Karremans, General, in his evidence to the Court, refers
7 to the fact that the Serbs, by April 1995, were not allowing food into the
8 enclave, they were not allowing spare parts for his vehicles, for Dutch
9 vehicles, they were not allowing Dutch personnel back into the enclave,
10 and I won't read out all of his evidence, but he describes the effect of
11 no food on a starving population.
12 Are you aware, General, that this was taking place? Are you aware
13 of these events?
14 A. I have heard such testimonies. Whether that was indeed the case,
15 I don't know. What I want to say is that I don't have any confirmation of
16 the testimony of Colonel Karremans. However, let me assure you that the
17 activities of the Dutch Battalion in respect of the control of the regime
18 of the safe area and the conduct of all of the participants was inadequate
19 and that there was enough reasons for the Serbian side not to abide
20 strictly by the agreement but to control all entries to the safe area
21 because such entries were detrimental to the overall regime of the safe
22 area. And that attitude of the Serb side, that is that they were
23 preventing entry of the humanitarian convoys into the area, was actually a
24 consequence of the situation, and Colonel Karremans, who was at the head
25 of the Dutch Battalion, was responsible for the violations of such a
2 Q. So by saying, General, that the Serbs did not strictly abide by
3 the agreement, it's incorrect, isn't it, to say that the VRS fully
4 respected the military agreement?
5 A. Before this Chamber and on the basis of the document which was
6 issued by the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the VRS, I showed what
7 his order was in that respect.
8 Q. General, that is a very, very straightforward question. It links
9 onto exactly what you've just said. You've just stated to this Court that
10 the Serbs did not strictly comply with the military agreement that had
11 been reached in respect of Resolution 819. On that basis, is it correct
12 or incorrect that the VRS fully respected the agreement?
13 A. I discussed the attitude of the parties towards the agreement
14 itself, and I told this Chamber that at the very beginning, the VRS took
15 up a perfectly correct position, that is, that they were respecting, fully
16 respecting the agreement from the beginning. On the other hand, the
17 Muslim side violated the agreement at the very beginning, at the day it
18 was supposed to enter into force, by not demilitarising the zone and by
19 not handing over the weapons as was provided for in the agreement. In
20 that way, both the system of the United Nations and the Muslim side --
21 Q. General, you're not answering my question.
22 A. -- violated the agreement.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I may. Can I put the question to
24 the witness?
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General Radinovic, if you have
1 to start from the beginning for every single answer that you wish to give
2 to the Prosecutor, this will take us nowhere. It will be far better for
3 all of us for you to answer your questions briefly and clearly.
4 But let me take advantage of this opportunity to ask you a
5 question. At any point in time did the Serb authorities notify the United
6 Nations of the violations of the agreement that you have just mentioned?
7 A. My assumption is that they did. I know that it was publicly
8 discussed. It was discussed at the meetings in which I took part that the
9 violations were commonplace, that the agreement is not being ordered, from
10 the demilitarised area Sabotage Units were being infiltrated into the rear
11 of the Serb side and that that side suffered losses.
12 I don't know how the command of the VRS could have complied
13 strictly with the agreement in terms of complete freedom of movement in
14 view of the fact that the regime inside of the zone itself was not
15 respected. But the reality was, actually, that the safe area was
16 militarily active. And I should like to stress the necessity of bearing
17 that particular fact in mind when discussing these issues.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In order to assess the general
19 situation, one needs to proceed step-by-step. We will have enough time to
20 do that, but let me now ask you once again to try and provide direct
21 answers to the questions put to you by the Prosecutor.
22 Mr. Cayley, please continue.
23 MR. CAYLEY:
24 Q. Now, General, just to briefly finish on this issue,
25 Colonel Karremans, in his evidence, stated - and I think I may have said
1 this to you already - that his personnel were prevented from returning to
2 the enclave by Serb forces. Equipment, ammunition was all prevented from
3 getting into the enclave and by Serb forces.
4 Now, you would agree with me that that would completely vitiate
5 requirement (B) of the military agreement, the deployment of a company of
6 UNPROFOR soldiers. Those soldiers would have no effect whatsoever in the
7 pocket if basically their military capacity was strangled by the Serbs,
8 would it?
9 A. No, I cannot agree with your statement because they were able to
10 conduct activities despite the restrictions that you are talking about,
11 inside the zone.
12 Q. Now, General, I'm not going to read the evidence out because the
13 Judges have heard it, but there has been extensive evidence in this case
14 of the prevention of the entry of humanitarian aid into the Srebrenica
15 enclave, and it is clear from that evidence that the VRS were behind the
16 prevention of that transit. You would agree with me that if that is
17 correct, then it completely vitiates part (F) of the agreement that
18 humanitarian aid was to continue to be allowed into the city as planned?
19 A. Once again, I have to answer you bearing in mind the international
20 standards that you are familiar with. There is a very specific
21 requirement that the signatory parties to the demilitarisation agreement
22 that if one signatory party vitiates, violates the agreement, the other
23 one is no longer obliged to comply with it. So if the Muslim side was
24 militarily active, then a number of other elements of the agreement have
25 to be reconsidered because the agreement itself is brought into question.
1 It is no longer a valid agreement.
2 The reason for that was also the conduct and the behaviour of the
3 United Nations forces, which didn't do much to prevent such violations and
4 it was their obligation.
5 Q. And I think you'll agree with me, General, that part (D) of the
6 agreement was never fulfilled in that the enclave was never properly
8 A. No. It was never fully demilitarised.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if you wish to take a break at this
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right,
12 Mr. Cayley. This is indeed a convenient time for a break. But maybe it's
13 still a bit too early for our usual lunch break, so let us have a
14 20-minute break at this point. 20 minutes.
15 --- Recess taken at 11.34 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.58 a.m.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, please continue
18 until ten minutes past one, more or less.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. General, we'll work for an hour and ten minutes and then we can
21 both get some lunch.
22 General, I want you now to direct your mind to 1995, so we leave
23 behind us the events of 1992 and 1993, and I want you to now think
24 specifically about Operation Krivaja 95. Now, you said in your evidence
25 that the reason -- one of the reasons for Krivaja 95 was the fact that in
1 June of 1995, there were Muslim infiltrations into Serb units,
2 specifically the Podrinje Brigade, and 40 soldiers were killed. So,
3 infiltrations out of the enclave behind VRS front lines killing Serbian
4 soldiers. Do you recall that evidence?
5 A. Yes, but not only there. Also at many other places in the areas
6 of responsibility of the units which were deployed immediately around
7 Srebrenica. I only gave you the most drastic example, but there are quite
8 a few of such examples in my findings.
9 Q. Now, I think you also said in your evidence in respect of these
10 infiltration manoeuvres that there is not a single example in the entire
11 war of the VRS making use of the infiltration manoeuvre. Do you recall
12 stating that?
13 A. I don't remember my exact words, but I will tell you what I think
14 is the truth about that. The VRS did not apply that type of manoeuvre
15 which is often used in these types of wars, whereby it showed that its
16 tactics was that of a defence. I know that there was -- but I know that
17 there was one infiltration manoeuvre in Srebrenica, but it had no military
18 effect whatsoever. I believe that it took place sometime in June 1995.
19 Q. General, I'll read out exactly what you said, and it can be found
20 at paragraph -- at page number 7822 in the LiveNote transcript so you can
21 refresh your memory. "There is not a single example in the course of the
22 entire war where the army of Republika Srpska made use of this manoeuvre
23 of infiltration, that is to say, infiltrating troops into the rear of the
24 enemy." Now, that's what you said, General.
25 Now, these kinds of infiltration manoeuvres in the -- let me, let
1 me ask you a question. I don't need you to confirm or otherwise. That's
2 in the transcript, what you said.
3 These kinds of manoeuvres involve essentially going to the rear of
4 the enemy, blowing up munition warehouses, artillery storages, killing
5 enemy soldiers. Is that an infiltration manoeuvre, the kind of
6 infiltration manoeuvre that the Muslims were carrying out?
7 A. No. When speaking about infiltration manoeuvre in terms of
8 tactical considerations and tactical doctrine, then that was not the kind
9 of infiltration manoeuvre that is in the question. That is the type of
10 activities into the rear of the enemy.
11 When I spoke about the VRS and the fact that they did not make use
12 of infiltration manoeuvre, I was referring to the infiltration of the
13 combat units which would be active from the rear of the enemy and
14 cooperate with the units in the field. That is the kind of manoeuvre I
15 was speaking about. In the doctrine of tactics, it is called
16 "infiltration manoeuvre," and not the other one.
17 But all armies make use of that manoeuvre. The Serb forces did
18 not infiltrate into the rear of the enemy; they simply held the
19 positions. That was their tactics, whereby they showed that they didn't
20 care about taking over the territory which they didn't consider to be
21 theirs in ethnical terms.
22 Maybe I didn't express myself well enough. I wasn't referring to
23 the infiltration of the terrorist group, I just said that the VRS did not
24 make use of the manoeuvre infiltration into the rear of the enemy, and
25 that it did not attempt to take possession of new territories by
1 cooperating with other units in that manner.
2 Q. I'm not entirely clear now what your point is, so I'll ask you a
3 simple question. Did the Bosnian Serb army ever infiltrate into the rear
4 of Bosnian government forces in order to blow up ammunition storage
5 points, kill enemy soldiers, that sort of thing? Did the Bosnian Serb
6 army ever do that?
7 A. I didn't testify about that. That was not the kind of a problem
8 that I studied in my research. I just spoke --
9 Q. Answer that simple question, and I'll state is to you again. It's
10 very clear, as clear as the statement that you made to the courtroom the
11 day before yesterday. Did the Bosnian Serb army ever infiltrate into the
12 rear of Bosnian government forces in order to blow up ammunition storage
13 points, kill enemy soldiers, and that sort of thing? Did the Bosnian Serb
14 army ever do that, General?
15 A. I don't know that. I'm not familiar with that fact because I
16 didn't conduct any research in that respect, so I cannot provide you with
17 any answers. And I did not testify about that, and my testimony did not
18 include the kind of activities that you speak about.
19 I testified about the characteristics of the tactics and the
20 tactical doctrine of the VRS. They did not make use of the infiltration
21 manoeuvre in the sense that they would have infiltrated their units,
22 platoons, battalions into the rear of the enemy from where they would
23 attack the units which were along the contact line. That kind of
24 manoeuvre was not used by the VRS, and that is what I spoke about in my
1 Whether there were cases of infiltration of groups into the rear
2 of the Muslim forces, the groups which would conduct sabotage activities
3 and terrorist activities, I don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised that
4 there were such cases because every -- all armies do that. I wouldn't be
5 surprised to know if -- that the VRS did the same.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Could we have Defence Exhibit 149, please.
7 Q. General, what was the function of the 10th Sabotage Detachment
8 which was, in fact, a unit of the Main Staff? Can you, first of all,
9 point it out for us on the diagram that is in front of you? If you could
10 use the pointer.
11 A. That's not the right exhibit.
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... matter. It's the Main Staff
14 A. This refers to the Drina Corps.
15 MR. CAYLEY: It doesn't matter, Madam Registrar, we'll carry on.
16 Q. You're aware that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was a unit of the
17 Main Staff?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What was their function within the VRS? What was the function of
20 that unit?
21 A. That unit is a so-called detachment. It can be of a company --
22 that can be a company or a platoon as the nature of their composition.
23 That one was a platoon, which is a rather small unit bearing in mind the
24 general strength of detachments.
25 According to the doctrine that was used by the JNA there were such
1 formations, such temporary formations, but they were usually companies,
2 very often stronger than battalions. This detachment had two platoons --
3 Q. Don't worry about the size of the unit. I didn't ask you what was
4 the size of the unit. I asked you what is the function. What was the
5 function of the 10th Sabotage Detachment?
6 A. If we look at the name of the unit itself then we can conclude
7 from that name what it was supposed to do. Sabotage or diversionary units
8 are used for sabotage activities into the rear of the enemy including
9 command posts, artillery positions, fire groups, and special
10 reconnaissance assignments.
11 All armies in the world engage in reconnaissance assignments, and
12 one such reconnaissance assignment is to capture members of the enemy army
13 in order to collect intelligence data. That is a common type of behaviour
14 of all armies in the world and that is precisely the role of sabotage
16 Q. And all armies in the world, General, engage in infiltration,
17 don't they? And the 10th Sabotage Detachment was an infiltration unit.
18 It was an infiltration unit of the VRS, wasn't it?
19 A. Well, probably, yes. Yes, for the assignments that I spoke about
20 previously, that is to say, for undertaking activities in the rear, the
21 enemy rear, attacking the elements of command and fire support.
22 Q. Well, General, I'm not going to read out the evidence to you, but
23 a member of the 10th Sabotage Detachment testified before these Honourable
24 Judges and he said exactly that, that the 10th Sabotage Detachment was an
25 infiltration unit used to go behind enemy lines and attack the enemy.
1 MR. CAYLEY: That is at page 3077, and, Your Honours, that's
2 Mr. Erdemovic testifying to that fact.
3 Q. Now, General, based on the fact that you agree with me that the
4 10th Sabotage Detachment undertook activities in the rear, the enemy rear,
5 attacking elements of the command and fire support, your statement that
6 you said that there is not a single example in the course of the entire
7 war where the army of Republika Srpska made use of this manoeuvre of
8 infiltration, that is completely incorrect, isn't it, General?
9 A. You are interpreting my statement erroneously, Mr. Prosecutor.
10 That is not what I said. What I said was, and let me repeat, when I
11 expounded on the characteristics of the military doctrine of the VRS, I
12 said and I repeat once again that that army did not use infiltration of
13 its forces into the rear of the enemy as a manoeuvre of tactical units on
14 a tactical scale, which means that its battalions and brigades were not
15 infiltrated into the enemy rear in order to have an opposite front and
16 move towards the line of demarcation and work with the forces on the
17 front. That is tactical manoeuvres. But what you're talking about, the
18 kind of infiltration that you are talking about, you are talking about
19 infiltration for the purposes of diversion, sabotage and reconnaissance
20 work, and there is no army in the world which in the tactical and even
21 operative scale does not use that type of activity.
22 That was probably used by the army of Republika Srpska as well.
23 But as I say, I did not speak about that form of activity. I spoke about
24 tactical manoeuvres of turning the front round, upside -- reversing it and
25 joining up with the forces attacking from the front. So that is the kind
1 of manoeuvre that I meant, which is not the same thing as you are talking
3 Q. I think, General, what you said yesterday is in the transcript.
4 It's there for everybody to see. I've read it out for the purposes of
5 your cross-examination. I think we can now actually move on.
6 MR. CAYLEY: If Prosecutor's Exhibit 425 could be made available,
7 please, for the witness.
8 Q. Now, General, this is a document that we've already discussed. Do
9 you have the Cyrillic version in front of you?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And I think you said, in respect of this document and again just
12 so there's no misunderstanding between us about what you've previously
13 said - I think this is at transcript page 7872 - you state that a
14 directive is essentially a list of desirable objectives rather than a
15 strict order. That is how you characterised a directive. Is that
17 A. Just directives of this type. There are two types of directives.
18 One are prospecting for desirable activity, that is, a forecast for
19 forthcoming activity. Then there are directives which strictly prescribe
20 the operation to be carried out. So these are not executionary directives
21 but directives which serve to plan, forecast, and stipulate what can be
22 expected in the course of the year depending on the period in question.
23 But of course there are directives which are very precise and ones which
24 are very short. Three sentences, for example. And that has to be
25 executed. For example, I know that in 1943, the Supreme Command of the
1 liberation forces of Yugoslavia issued a directive and it was three words,
2 "Prozor must fall," and Prozor did fall. So those directives are
4 So there are other directives which are directives of principle,
5 of forecasting, which must be operisationalised in the operative staff and
6 command to determine what the realistic or what is realistic and feasible
7 under prevailing conditions.
8 Q. Was this directive an order, or not?
9 A. It was not an order.
10 Q. So this document has no binding effect; it's not a decision of any
12 A. That is not a decision. It is not a decision for concrete
13 operations. It is just a concept, a conceptual document for the
14 activities in the ensuing year.
15 Q. If you can just turn to -- I'm not sure which page it is of your
16 version of events. It's paragraph 4. Can you read out the first three
17 words of paragraph 4? Could you read out the first three words of
18 paragraph 4?
19 A. "Decisive defence in the zone of responsibility of the
20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps."
21 Q. I think you're reading actually from the wrong paragraph.
22 Paragraph 4.
23 A. Which page?
24 Q. Paragraph 3 says, "The tasks of the Republika Srpska army." Can
25 you read the title out for paragraph 4?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. "I hereby decide." Is that what you mean? Is that how the
2 paragraph begins? Paragraph 4, "I hereby decide:"
3 Q. So when Mr. Karadzic wrote "hereby decide," what you're saying he
4 really meant is, "I hereby would like, or hereby would wish that something
5 actually takes place." He wasn't actually making any kind of decision at
7 A. For you to understand me, you will have to listen to what I say in
8 explanation of this paragraph.
9 Combat documents and documents for command have a certain
10 structure that they follow. In each and every document of command,
11 orders, directives, and so on, there is a fourth point which sets out the
12 conceptual part, the concept, and that is the basic concept from which
13 documents are further elaborated, and plans as well. And just as in the
14 order for the active functioning of the Drina Corps, in paragraph 4 we
15 have the Commander's concept, here too we have the concept of the person
16 issuing the directive, which in this case is the president of Republika
18 The president of Republika Srpska availed himself of the structure
19 and dealt with the issues that the directive as an act of command
20 contains. Therefore, within the frameworks of that fourth point or fourth
21 paragraph, he provides a concept. It is the conceptualisation. It is not
22 an absolute order by him that it should be executed. So after this
23 conceptual form we have the elaboration of more concrete forms later on,
24 and then the decision is binding. This decision is still not mandatory,
25 still not binding, and what testifies to that is that the majority of
1 these operations were never, in fact, executed.
2 Q. General, you're a military man. You commanded a battalion. When
3 you commanded your battalion and you made a decision and you expressed
4 that decision to your subordinates, did you expect that decision to be
5 carried out?
6 A. My decision-making was for a day and an hour, not for a year. And
7 strategic bodies give assignments of principle. They -- directive
8 decision making in our terminology means setting out the principles of
9 planning, that is to say, planning in principle of the desirable and
10 possible goals and assignments. And it is up to a concrete analysis of
11 whether that is feasible, and once that question is settled, planning is
13 Quite obviously, this particular directive was, in fact, a
14 document of principle which was not compiled as mandatory. Nor was it
15 understood by the Main Staff of the VRS as such, particularly not the
16 cause to which these were intended, that they should prepare and execute
18 In this form, the directives were not binding, not mandatory,
19 because for each individual operation, concrete directives were compiled.
20 So this is the concept. This sets out the concept of what should be done
21 but not what must be done on a mandatory basis.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, I apologise for
23 interrupting at this point, but may I say the following.
24 That is, General, the example you quoted, "Prozor must fall," and
25 afterwards you added, "Prozor did fall," what was that, "Prozor must
2 A. It was the directive issued by the supreme command of the national
3 liberation army of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, in 1943.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. That means that that
5 authority in a way expressed his will, yes or no?
6 A. Yes.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Was it necessary at that level
8 that that particular person had to say Prozor should fall in such and such
9 a way, at what time, what was the date, and so on and so forth with all
10 the specifications? At that level, was that necessary?
11 A. Then, yes.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No. What I asked you was, would
13 that same authority, that same individual who said Prozor must fall,
14 should he have had to state the specific time, the way, the manner in
15 which it should fall, the date and so on; or the people who executed this
16 order had to take care of those specific features?
17 A. Well, it was as you stated, but quite obviously this is not that
18 type of directive. What we have here is not that type of directive,
19 Mr. President, and I endeavoured to indicate the difference between the
20 different types of directives that exist. There are directives which are
21 very concrete and binding, mandatory, and which must be executed; and
22 there are other directives which are directives of principle, plans in
23 principle, and they are not understood as having mandatory power.
24 From this type of directive we go down to the nitty-gritty of
25 working out the particulars, the operations or which parts of this plan
1 should be realised, put into practice.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, very well. But can we say
3 that the leaders decide by directives, by means of directives?
4 A. Yes.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, thank you.
6 Mr. Cayley, please continue.
7 JUDGE RIAD: I'm still rather confused about the directives, and I
8 asked General Radinovic yesterday about them.
9 It seems still to me that they are more rhetorical than anything
10 else, and we can see them. I mean, I can't imagine a head of state saying
11 I'm going -- I don't know, we have to take that or to take that as we see
12 that happening around us.
13 But how can, how can a General execute this rhetorical order, at
14 what stand? Take even the example, you said, "Prozor must fall." It
15 fell, you said it fell afterwards, but it didn't fall by enchantment, it
16 fell according to a certain plan, clarification, and so on.
17 So the directive is very as -- what can I say, as a policy does
18 not -- it does not surpass the wishful thinking or the preparation of
19 minds. You can see it happening in many parts of the world, a president
20 just conditioning the people.
21 So what is exactly the role of directives here in our field, and
22 the responsibility for it? You don't need to answer me, but I'm still
23 wondering. Thank you.
24 A. I'll answer with pleasure. The illustration that I gave to stress
25 the difference between certain types of directives, the operation on
1 Prozor in 1943 was not executed only on the basis of that sentence,
2 "Prozor must fall," but on the basis of that concept by the Supreme
3 Commander, the Main Staff plan, the operation for the liberation of
4 Prozor, and, I might say, in great detail, and so also on the basis of
5 these directives which are the subject of this consideration.
6 For the operation to be implemented, a concrete order is necessary
7 for a concrete time and a concrete area and a concrete unit. And in my
8 testimony, I showed -- I demonstrated that many operations which were
9 planned here and listed here were not implemented at all, were never put
10 into practice. There are no documents to show that anybody was -- held
11 anybody responsible for the operations in this document, that is to say
12 that this type of document was not understood as having to be realised.
13 There is another step after this first step, and that is a
14 concrete order. It would have to have been followed by a concrete order
15 to the units who were supposed to execute them.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, for the moment. Thank you.
17 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Judge Riad.
18 Q. General, you also gave evidence, I think the day before yesterday,
19 in respect to the directive, and you stated that the directive did not
20 have a binding nature because there was no obligation on those who
21 received the directive to make reports upwards, back to the initiator of
22 the document. Do you recall saying that or do you want me to read out to
23 you what you said?
24 A. I know what I said. I do know what I said. With respect to this
25 directive, I said that as these were documents of principle and not
1 documents which are mandatory to the units to plan an operation, and
2 because there was no call to accountability because -- for the fact that
3 these operations were not indeed carried out and because there were no
4 operative reports that the operations were carried out or not carried out,
5 then for an appraisal of the mandatory character of the directive it was
6 clear that written in this form, in this shape, and according to that
7 programme were not implemented. They were realised on the basis a
8 concretisation, a concrete document based on this document of principle.
9 Q. You're having difficulty in understanding me, my questions.
10 They're obviously not clear enough for you. So what I'll do is I'll read
11 out your testimony to you and you can either say, "Yes," or "No, I said
12 the following."
13 You stated yesterday: "Those who whom the directive is sent are
14 not obliged to report on the execution of the tasks contained in the
15 directive," and that is at page 7872. Do you recall saying that?
16 A. Yes, because those assignments were not carried out, and that
17 shows precisely that the doctrine was not binding.
18 Q. Was there or was there not a reporting requirement for subordinate
19 units who received this directive?
20 A. That is the doctrinary principle, that an assignment which is
21 carried out or which is assigned -- a task which is assigned must be
22 carried out. That is provided for in the rules of service.
23 Q. You misunderstood me General. You misunderstood my question. Did
24 those units who received this directive have an obligation to report to
25 the Supreme Command? Did they have an obligation to report on this order
1 as in any normal military structure where an order is given?
2 A. They did not have this obligation because this was not sent as a
3 directive for the execution of an operation. As I said, it was a
4 directive of principle on the assignments that could be executed in the
5 course of the year not which must be executed.
6 Q. Could you turn, General, to the final page of this document?
7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could put the final page of this
8 English version of the document on the ELMO.
9 Q. Now I'm looking at paragraph 7, and I will read it so that there
10 is no misunderstanding between us, General. Paragraph 7 lays out the
11 command and control of the Supreme Command in Pale and then in the third
12 paragraph it states: "Submit reports as follows:
13 "a) regular reports by 1900 hours with situation as at 1700
15 "b) interim reports as the need arises and in the case of surpise
16 action or incursions by the enemy.
17 "c) reports on readiness for offensive operations.
18 "d) summary reports every third day during active combat
20 So the fact is, General, is in fact the subordinate units or the
21 subordinate unit who received this directive did have an obligation to
22 respond to the Supreme Command as with any normal military order, didn't
24 A. But the answer --
25 Q. General, answer the question. Did the units that received this
1 directive have an obligation to respond? Did they have an obligation to
2 respond to the Supreme Command?
3 A. To this directive, no, but to the directives that they were to
4 receive and which relate to them particularly for the execution of
5 concrete operations. In this directive, as you know, Krivaja 95, it
6 relates to the Hercegovina Corps and the valley of the river Neretva and
7 not to Krivaja 95, which was performed in the Srebrenica region.
8 Therefore, it is not natural that the Hercegovina Corps report on the
9 Krivaja operation, although it has been mentioned here. But it did not
10 perform that operation.
11 So point 7, paragraph 7, is a point which must exist in each act
12 of command, and the person issuing the act knows that it is a component
13 part of that item -- that a component part of that item 7 is that reports
14 be submitted and the deadlines for that be stipulated but for operations
15 which are carried out, not for operations which are not carried out.
16 Q. There is a reporting obligation, isn't there, in this directive,
18 A. For what is carried out, but not as an answer to this directive
19 but to the directives which stipulate the execution of concrete operations
20 in a concrete space of time and a concrete area.
21 Q. Let's move on, General. And again, I can quote your testimony
22 back to you if there is any disagreement about what you said or didn't
23 say. Do you recall yesterday stating that: "There is no operative link
24 between directive 7 and 7/1," which is the Main Staff document.
25 MR. CAYLEY: That is Exhibit 426 [sic], Mr. Usher. If that can be
1 made available to the witness.
2 Q. "There is no link between those two documents, 7 and 7/1, and the
3 operation Krivaja 95." Do you recall stating that?
4 A. Yes. I meant Krivaja 95, which was carried out by the Drina
6 Q. Now, let's go to page 10 of the English version. I think it's
7 page 8 in your version. Can you go to the final sentence of the first
8 paragraph, and the paragraph is headed up "Drina Corps." Do you see the
9 paragraph "Drina Corps"?
10 MR. CAYLEY: It's page 10, Mr. Usher, of the English version.
11 Q. Do you see that, General, where it says "Drina Corps"?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can you read the sentence which begins "By planned and
14 well-thought-out combat operations"?
15 A. I have the text here, "Drina Corps." If we have the same
16 text: "By extremely persistent and active defence in the north-western
17 part of the war front and around the enclaves, prevent enemy breakthroughs
18 along --"
19 Q. General, I'll read it out. It's the final sentence of the first
20 paragraph, and actually, I can see it quite clearly in the Cyrillic
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, I'm sorry to
23 interrupt you. What document are you referring to, 426?
24 MR. CAYLEY: 425. I'm sorry if I --
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Because we read on the record
1 426. There is a problem here because we cannot follow it on the ELMO.
2 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So it's 425.
4 MR. CAYLEY: Actually, that was my fault. I actually -- I do want
5 that document. I want that document ready but --
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher, it's page 10 of the
8 MR. CAYLEY:
9 Q. Page 10 in the English, and I believe it's page 8 in the Serbian
11 General, I'll read out -- it's the final two sentences, actually,
12 of the first paragraph. Actually, the final sentence of the first
13 paragraph moving into the second paragraph: "By planned and
14 well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total
15 insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of
16 Srebrenica and Zepa."
17 The next sentence: "In case UNPROFOR leaves, UNPROFOR forces
18 leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the Drina Corps Command shall plan an operation
19 named Jadar with the task of breaking up and destroying the Muslim forces
20 in these enclaves and definitively liberating the Drina valley region."
21 Now, in respect of the first sentence that I read out, "By planned
22 and well-thought-out combat operations," that is a directive to eliminate
23 the enclave of Srebrenica, isn't it, General?
24 A. I said that there is disagreement between the directive of the
25 Main Staff, which is directly superior to the Corps Commanders, and the
1 directives which was issued by the president of the republic as the
2 Superior Commander of the Main Staff. So the first level of
3 responsibility in commanding the VRS is the Supreme Commander, and we
4 showed this on the illustration, on the chart.
5 Q. General, I'm sorry to interrupt you but again you must have
6 misunderstood my question. What I'm asking you is would any sensible
7 military officer interpret that sentence to mean the elimination of the
8 enclave at Srebrenica?
9 A. This directive is not an execution directive. I showed that and
10 I'm telling you this today. Directive 7 is not an execution directive
11 after that. It should be followed by directives from the Main Staff.
12 Then there is directive 7 -- then there are directives which should follow
13 up directive 7, develop it. So the Main Staff --
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic.
15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think Mr. Cayley read
16 to the witness two sentences and now he's asking him, as I see -- well,
17 the question is: "Would any officer interpret that sentence to mean the
18 elimination of the enclave at Srebrenica." I don't know whether he meant
19 both sentences or just one. So perhaps this could clarify -- this could
20 be clarified for the witness.
21 MR. CAYLEY: I referred him to the first sentence actually.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General, I think that the
23 Prosecutor's question was quite clear. I'm going to quote it in English.
24 [In English] "What I'm asking you is would any sensible military officer
25 interpret that sentence to mean the elimination of the enclave at
1 Srebrenica?" So put you in the place of this military officer and
2 interpret this, even if you are going to make an operational directive or
3 order. Do you understand the question?
4 A. I have understood the question, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So please give us direct
7 A. First officer which received -- who received this directive is the
8 Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, and for that very reason, because
9 he would interpret that sentence in the way that Mr. Cayley is asking and
10 that you are asking, Your Honour, he knew its meaning, and in his
11 directive which he issued, and that is directive 7/1, there is no such
12 sentence. This sentence doesn't appear. Thereby he expresses his
13 disagreement with that sentence, and that sentence was left out of
14 directive 7/1, which was closer, actually, to the corps system, to the
15 system of the corps which was supposed to carry out the directive.
16 So this sentence is not contained in directive 7/1. So this
17 directive does have this sentence, and the other one does not contain that
18 sentence for the very reason that the sense, the meaning, of that sentence
19 was understood by that officer, and it was left out of the text of
20 directive 7/1.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. So General, you would agree with General Dannatt's assessment of
23 this order when he stated in respect of this particular portion of the
24 directive that we're discussing, he said, "Well I think what is intended
25 here is that Srebrenica and Zepa should be captured, and I would assume
1 that the reference to `no hope of further survival or life for the
2 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa' meant that not only were those towns
3 to be captured, but that the existing population should be removed from
4 those places."
5 Now, based on what you've just said to the president, you agree
6 with that assessment of this particular portion of the directive?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, if we could move on to Prosecutor's Exhibit 426. Now,
9 General, you have stated to the Judges already that there is no mention of
10 directive 7 in this order, that is, Exhibit 426, the directive of the Main
11 Staff. Do you confirm that testimony?
12 A. That directive 7 is not mentioned. To tell you the truth, I don't
13 recall saying that, that it is not mentioned, but that it cannot in the
14 sense of directive for the execution of actions --
15 Q. General, before it disappears off the transcript, let me repeat
16 your answer.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
18 Q. Let me repeat your answer to the president. "Thereby he expresses
19 his disagreement with that sentence and that sentence was left out of
20 directive 7/1." That is what you have just said to the Court.
21 A. Yes. Yes, yes, I said that. So that there is no sentence that
22 you quoted.
23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think Mr. Cayley's
24 question was not interpreted correctly to the witness, so perhaps that is
25 the cause of the misunderstanding.
1 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, Mr. Visnjic, yes, if that is the case.
2 Q. Let's confirm, General. You state, stated in your evidence that
3 there is no mention of directive 7 in the Main Staff document directive
4 7/1; is that correct?
5 A. No, no. I didn't say that. I said that that sentence from
6 directive 7 that you quoted is not mentioned. It is not contained in
7 directive 7/1.
8 Q. But you would agree with me that directive 7 is incorporated by
9 reference in directive 7/1, isn't it, General?
10 A. Of course, because it is a document that has a more general --
11 higher level of generality, so it is in a way a plan of task, so it is
13 Q. Let's turn to page 4 in the English version. In fact, page 2 in
14 the English version, which is --
15 MR. CAYLEY: If you could move that into the centre of the screen,
16 Mr. Usher. Could you move it down a bit.
17 Q. Now, General, paragraph 2 outlines the tasks of the VRS, and it
18 states, "On the basis of directive number 7, the VRS has the task," and
19 then it outlines all of the tasks that have to be fulfilled. Now, you
20 would agree with me that that is an incorporation of directive 7 by
21 reference into this document, isn't it?
22 A. Well, relying on it or mentioning it, yes, but in the strict
23 adherence to each formulation, no, and that this is -- the fact that this
24 is true is proved by the fact that the sentence on the elimination of
25 enclaves from directive 7 was eliminated in this directive.
1 Q. Now if you could go to page 4, and it's paragraph 4.
2 Now, General, this is a document signed by Colonel-General Ratko
3 Mladic, the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, and in paragraph 4 he
4 states "I have decided." Do you see that?
5 A. Yes, yes.
6 Q. And then if you go down to the bottom of your page, the last
7 paragraph, "Other forces of the VRS shall contribute to the conduct of
8 operations Sadejstvo 95 with the goal of operative strategic camouflage
9 and correcting the operative tactical position," and this is the important
10 part, General, "by carrying out planned combat, battles and operations in
11 accordance with directive number 7 and active combat operations towards
12 Bugojno, Travnik, Kladanj, Olovo and Vares and around the Srebrenica, Zepa
13 and Gorazde enclaves in the Bihac pocket."
14 So it's correct, isn't it, General, that General Mladic was
15 directly referencing directive 7 in respect of the Srebrenica enclave; he
16 was incorporating by direct reference the language of Mr. Karadzic in
17 directive 7?
18 A. No, sir, it was not incorporated by reference because in this
19 paragraph that you read from, General Mladic's directive, elimination of
20 the enclaves is not mentioned, but active -- activities or action around
21 the enclaves is mentioned. So action or elimination is not the same
22 linguistically, semantically, and particularly not from the aspect of
23 consequences of such acts.
24 Q. But you would agree with me, General, that when General Mladic
25 wrote this order in respect of combat operations towards Srebrenica, he
1 had directive 7 in his mind; otherwise, he wouldn't have written it down
2 here, would he?
3 A. Of course, I agree with that. He did have it in mind, but he
4 corrected its aspirations, particularly having in mind the consequences
5 which would ensue if he had accepted that sentence which is contained in
6 directive 7.
7 Q. Now, General, in your evidence yesterday you stated that the fact
8 that there was no mention of directive number 7, Karadzic document, in
9 directive 7/1 indicated a certain duality of command.
10 Now, you would agree with me that I've now shown you two direct
11 references to that document, that your theory of duality based on the fact
12 that 7 was not mentioned in 7/1 is completely false?
13 A. No, no, I do not agree with what you say. I think that this
14 directive shows that this duality, rivalry exists, and this duality will
15 result in a major clash between the political leadership of Republika
16 Srpska and the Main Staff of VRS in 1995.
17 Q. General, General Mladic is saying in this document on two
18 occasions, "on the basis of directive number 7"; "in accordance with
19 directive number 7." If he is acting on the basis of "in accordance" with
20 something, he is following those orders, isn't he?
21 A. Yes, but he's correcting them so as not to speculate. I showed
22 you in a direct example that he has significantly corrected the directive
23 of the president of the republic by not accepting to eliminate the
24 enclaves, only to carry out activities around the enclaves.
25 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, General, but the directive 7 was public.
1 It was known also by the other officers or generals. So would they in
2 applying directive 7/1, would they also take into consideration directive
3 7 the way you would take into consideration the law when you apply, for
4 instance, a regulation?
5 A. Yes, but the directive is a state secret; it's not a public
6 document. It only goes or is transmitted along a strict command system to
7 only a certain number of senior officers. In directive 7/1, it is very
8 clear -- it is clearly shown that the Main Staff of the VRS, in the face
9 of its Commander who signed directive 7/1, does not accept the expression
10 nor the intention of the sentence contained in directive 7 but
11 significantly modifies it, thus indicating that there was a dual
12 competence or authority in the military system, because -- as has been
13 shown, this was good because directive 7/1 is more in compliance with
14 international norms and the agreement on the demilitarisation and the safe
15 zones than directive 7.
16 So as a military expert, this was an indication to me which showed
17 that there were differences, and that the system of the functioning of the
18 VRS did not proceed along strictly hierarchical principles which would be
19 natural in any army in the world. It is one weakness of that system
20 which, in certain stages and periods, deviated from this which disrupted
21 relations and also the efficacy of that system. So this is something
22 which we can see that is evident when you compare directive 7 and
23 directive 7/1.
24 So it's not natural to expect the Main Staff of the VRS to
25 completely ignore a directive of the Supreme Commander. Of course, this
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 is not natural. So he refers to that directive in order to give some
2 legal basis for the things that he is doing in his own directive, but it's
3 obvious that he significantly changes it.
4 JUDGE RIAD: Before I -- thank you. But once you refer to it,
5 isn't it a fact that you are adopting it in the eyes of those who will
6 execute later? They know that there is -- that 7/1 has got its source in
7 directive 7, and they are legitimately entitled to apply them, to apply
8 both. Is that logical if you were applying it, not analysing it as a
10 A. Only -- no, Your Honour. The logic of military activity is to
11 execute the orders of the immediate superiors because this order would be
12 derived from the secondary superior officer, because usually orders are
13 carried out from the immediately preceding level. And here it is obvious
14 that the Main Staff did not adhere to everything or did not carry out
15 everything that the president of the republic, i.e., the Supreme
16 Commander, asked them to do; and I think this is a good thing, rather than
17 apply or execute this order literally because of the consequences of such
18 an act.
19 JUDGE RIAD: But would they be responsible or accountable if they
20 applied also the supreme order or this gives them green light to apply
22 A. Well, the green light is given. I don't think that the green
23 light has been given because the Commander of the Main Staff has excluded
24 that from his own document, meaning that this is not something that he is
25 ordering, this task to be carried out.
1 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, General.
2 MR. CAYLEY:
3 Q. General, when the Srebrenica enclave was eliminated in July of
4 1995, who was the Commander of the Main Staff?
5 A. The Commander of the Main Staff was General Ratko Mladic.
6 MR. CAYLEY: I can carry on if you wish, Mr. President. Yes.
7 If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 427, please.
8 Q. General, this is the preparatory order for operation Krivaja 95.
9 You can see it's signed by -- this edition, version, is not signed but it
10 is a document that is from General Zivanovic.
11 Could you read out, please, from paragraph 2 up to and including
12 the words "Main Staff." You can stop at the words "Main Staff."
13 A. You mean paragraph 2?
14 Q. Paragraph 2, General. The paragraph that's numbered 2.
15 A. "The Drina Corps Command," "The Command of the Drina Corps"? Is
16 that the one that you have in mind?
17 MR. CAYLEY: What document does the witness have in front of him,
19 MR. USHER: 427, yes.
20 MR. CAYLEY:
21 Q. Paragraph 2 of that document, General, if you could read that.
22 A. "In the past three months, the enemy started and is still
23 conducting --"
24 Q. It's numbered 2, General. I can see what you're doing. It's the
25 secdon -- I'll read it out for you if it's a problem. Paragraph 2 reads:
1 "Based on directives OP numbers 7 and 7/1 of Republika Srpska army Main
2 Staff," and then the order carries on and gives more detail.
3 This preparatory order, General, was based, was it not, on
4 directive 7 from the Supreme Staff and directive 7/1 from the Main Staff?
5 A. Throughout my testimony that is what I was talking about and that
6 is what I said on several occasions. The operation Krivaja 95 was planned
7 on the basis of what you have just read, including also the phrase "and
8 the current situation." And the situation in the month of July was such
9 that the Commander of the corps had to plan and execute such an operation,
10 and I testify and I abide by what I have said.
11 I really cannot answer the question as to what exactly constituted
12 the basis for the planning of the operation because in both directive 7
13 and directive 7/1, Krivaja refers to a completely different area. It
14 refers to the area of the Neretva River valley which is a different part
15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it concerns the Herzegovinian Corps and not
16 the Drina Corps, and it was on the basis of that that I concluded that the
17 operation indeed was not planned or executed based on directives number 7
18 and 7/1 but on the basis of the current situation. And there must have
19 been a different act of command, a different document whereby the
20 operation would be launched.
21 In my research, I didn't come across such a document, but I am
22 certain that it existed because the operation could not be planned and
23 conducted on the basis of what it says here, directives 7 and 7/1, because
24 the location in question in directives number 7 and 7/1 is completely
25 different and it pertains to a different area. So there cannot be any
1 link on the basis of which you can say that these two directives
2 constituted the basis for the planning of the Krivaja 95 operation.
3 Q. Do you accept now that when you said that there was no operative
4 link between 7 and 7/1 and these orders in respect of Krivaja 95 that that
5 position is erroneous based on what the documents themselves say?
6 A. I'm sorry, I don't quite understand your question.
7 Q. Do you accept now that what you said previously about the linkage
8 between document 7 and 7/1 and the Krivaja 95 orders is incorrect?
9 Let me read back to you just to remind the Court what you said
10 yesterday. "I can find no link between directives 7 and 7/1 and the order
11 for Krivaja 95." Do you stand by that statement?
12 A. Yes. Yes, I still stand by that statement.
13 Q. Let's move on to the final document, General, which is 428.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, perhaps we can do it
15 after the break. We shall now have a 50-minute break and come back at
17 --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 2.04 p.m.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, please continue.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, everybody.
21 Q. Good afternoon, General.
22 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's 428,
23 please, Prosecutor's Exhibit 428.
24 Q. General, let's -- I'll just remind you where we were before the
25 break, when you had confirmed to me that you could find no linkage between
1 document 7 and 7/1 and the Krivaja 95 order, and you confirmed that that
2 was the case.
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If page three of the English version can be placed on
5 the ELMO.
6 Q. And General, if you would go to paragraph 2 of this document.
7 MR. CAYLEY: For the reference of the Court, this is the final
8 order for Krivaja 95 dated the 2nd of July.
9 Q. Do you have paragraph 2 to hand, General?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Could you read paragraph 2, please.
12 A. "The command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations directive
13 number 7 and 7/1 of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, and on
14 the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility, has the
15 task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep in the
16 Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order to split apart the
17 enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas."
18 Q. And then, General, if you could go to paragraph 4 just below there
19 where it states, I think, about five or six lines down, "Objective: By
20 surprise attack." Could you read that out to the Court.
21 A. Yes, I could. "Objective of the option: By a surprise attack to
22 separate and reduce in size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to improve
23 the tactical position of the forces in the depth of the area, and to
24 create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves."
25 Q. So General, would you agree with me that the principal purposes of
1 the Operation Krivaja 95 was, one, to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and
2 Srebrenica; two, to reduce them to their urban areas; three, to create
3 conditions for the elimination of the enclaves?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Now, if the witness could be given Prosecutor's
6 Exhibit 425, page 10 of the English version, page 8 of the Serb version.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Cayley. Was there anywhere some kind
8 of explanation of the word "elimination" of the enclaves?
9 MR. CAYLEY: There's no elaboration, Your Honour. I'll simply
10 read it to you: "... and to create conditions for the elimination of the
12 JUDGE RIAD: You can't raze them out of the planet, so what does
13 the meaning of elimination is -- what is the meaning of "elimination,"
14 just ...
15 MR. CAYLEY: I'll ask the witness for you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Yes, thank you.
17 MR. CAYLEY:
18 Q. Now, General, I'm going to read to you from Mr. Karadzic's
19 document, which is directive number 7, the first document that we started
20 with today, and he states halfway down that paragraph --
21 MR. CAYLEY: Have you not found it yet, Mr. Usher? Sorry, it's
22 page 10 of the English version.
23 Q. General, do you have it in front of you? It's page 8.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. I'm reading halfway down the paragraph titled "Drina Corps."
1 "Using operational and tactical camouflage measures while in the
2 direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, complete physical
3 separation of Srebrenica and Zepa should be carried out as soon as
4 possible preventing even communication between individuals in the two
5 enclaves. Secondly, by planned and well-thought-out combat operations
6 create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further
7 survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
8 Now, General, if we go back to General Zivanovic's order,
9 paragraph 2, you agree with me that he was stating that one of the
10 objectives of Krivaja 95 was to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and
11 Srebrenica, and you would agree with me that that is exactly what Radovan
12 Karadzic is directing in directive 7, isn't it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And the other condition that General Zivanovic was laying down in
15 his order was to create conditions for the elimination of the enclave, and
16 I think you would agree with me that creating an unbearable situation of
17 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
18 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa is, in fact, creating conditions for
19 the elimination of the enclave, isn't it, General?
20 A. No. No, that is not so, looking at it from the military point of
21 view. Speaking in military terms, creating conditions for the elimination
22 of the enclaves implies taking possession of the key features around the
23 enclave and, if necessary, for the separation of the enclaves to be
24 carried out. However, in the order issued by General Zivanovic, there is
25 no such instruction for the elimination of the enclave. There is no such
1 order. Had that been the objective, he would have ordered it. He would
2 have ordered the elimination of the enclaves, which he didn't.
3 Q. General, can you answer Judge Riad's question? What does
4 "eliminate" mean?
5 A. In the order issued by the Drina Corps Commander, such a phrase
6 cannot be found but the phrase to create conditions for the elimination of
7 the enclave. Again, in military terms, it would mean to have the forces
8 actually enter the enclave and take possession of all the key facilities,
9 which would mean that the VRS would thereby establish control over the
10 enclave; that is, the enclave would no longer exist as such. It would not
11 exist as a term. It would no longer be the base of the army, and it could
12 no longer be controlled by the Muslim army.
13 Such an objective was not set out in the order. That task was not
14 defined. It would have been -- the combat disposition would have been
15 completely different had that been the objective, and that was not the
16 objective of the operation.
17 Q. But that is exactly what the VRS did and completed, by your
18 testimony, by July the 10th, 1995, isn't it?
19 A. Yes, but prior to that, both the population and the military had
20 left the enclave and the area would already be completely empty.
21 JUDGE RIAD: May I just ask, General, because I understand that an
22 army would say taking possession of the enclave, but eliminating a part of
23 a country, does that include also its people?
24 A. No.
25 JUDGE RIAD: Just --
1 A. Elimination of the enclave implies eliminating those conditions
2 and those factors which set out that area as a different area -- distinct
3 area within the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps.
4 In that region, in that part of the enclave, there were both
5 military and civilian authorities that were in place which were not
6 controlled by the VRS. The elimination of the enclave would imply that a
7 military and political control had to be established over that area. It
8 does not imply the forcible removal of the population or the destruction
9 of property.
10 JUDGE RIAD: Well, just to follow up this reasoning, the enclave
11 is eliminated not because it is the wrong place geographically, it is
12 distinct you say. It is a distinct area. It is distinct because of its
13 people. That's the only distinction.
14 A. And also because of the authorities and because of the military
15 which was there. But here in this case primarily because of the military,
16 because of the soldiers.
17 JUDGE RIAD: So just eliminate the soldiers and not the people.
18 That's the order "elimination," in your opinion?
19 A. No. No. The elimination of the enclave, militarily speaking,
20 does not imply expelling the population or any violence against the
21 population. It implies a military victory over the forces which control
22 the area, the enclave.
23 JUDGE RIAD: When it is accompanied by this making it impossible
24 or difficult for them to stay, doesn't this throw a new light and show
25 that this elimination includes the people too?
1 A. Yes. But I testified to the effect that that sentence cannot be
2 found in 7/1. The command of the Main Staff left it out, and in that
3 sense, the Drina Corps did not have that obligation.
4 JUDGE RIAD: Even as a background?
5 A. I don't understand your question, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE RIAD: It doesn't matter, thank you.
7 MR. CAYLEY:
8 Q. General, do you have your report to hand?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Could you please turn to page 28 of your report.
11 A. I have this other version. I think it will be easier for me if
12 you just tell me what it is that you want to ask.
13 Q. I'd like you to read -- is that the -- that's the original
14 language. Page 28, please, General, paragraph 3.1. Could you read the
15 first sentence, in fact the first two sentences of paragraph 3.1 on page
17 A. "In the Drina Corps Operation Srebrenica was code named Krivaja
18 95. It was based on the directives of the president of Republika Srpska
19 and the Commander of the army Main Staff." Do you want me to continue?
20 Q. No. And you stand by that statement in your report?
21 A. Yes, I do stand by it; however, with the caveat that I expressed
22 during my testimony, that is, that it was essentially based on the
23 analysis of the situation in the month of June and the activities of the
24 Muslim forces in the rear of the VRS.
25 Q. General, you'd agree with me in the next sentence of your report
1 you actually state that the assessment of the situation in Middle Podrinje
2 is contained in those directives. The assessment which you're referring
3 to is based on the directives themselves, isn't it?
4 A. Yes, on the assessment, but also on the assessments that they made
6 Q. Let me read, General, to the Court so it's in the record what you
7 actually do say in that paragraph. "In these directives," and this is
8 paragraph 3.1 on page 28, "In these directives it was assessed that the
9 situation in Middle Podrinje could become complicated if the status quo
10 persisted; that is, if the area between the enclaves of Srebrenica and
11 Zepa stayed under Muslim control, and the forces of the 28th Infantry
12 Division from both enclaves remained active. On the basis of this
13 assessment of the situation, Drina Corps Commander was ordered to prevent
14 at all costs the penetration of the forces of the Muslim 2nd Corps along
15 the routes leading from Tuzla and Kladanj towards the area of Srebrenica
16 and to urgently separate the two enclaves and occupy the area between them
17 with his forces, that is, to separate the enclaves and reduce them to the
18 borders of the safe areas as established by the agreement signed in April
19 and May of 1993."
20 And you stand by that statement?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Let me just read to you the few lines of the next paragraph.
23 "Recognising," this is paragraph 3.2, "Recognising the Muslim intentions
24 after having successfully broken the Muslim offensive in the direction of
25 Tuzla and Kladanj on June 24, 1995, and neutralised nine sabotage
1 terrorist groups infiltrated in the wider region of Han Pijesak and
2 Vlasenica on June 26, 1995, and in accordance with the assignments given
3 in directives number 7 and 7/1 on July 2nd, 1995, the Drina Corps started
4 immediate preparations for the execution of the operation," and then you
5 go on to explain the Srebrenica, the Krivaja 95, operation.
6 Do you stand by that, General?
7 A. Yes, of course I do, because mention is made here of sabotage and
8 terrorist groups which were nine in total at the end of June, and that was
9 the reason for the planning of the operation, the immediate reason.
10 Q. General, do you recall yesterday, changing subject slightly, that
11 you said that for the Drina Corps Commander to have a mandate to issue
12 orders to MUP forces, he would have to have had authority from the Main
13 Staff. Do you recall saying that?
14 A. In principle, that is applicable to all units which are not part
15 of his formation, including MUP units.
16 Q. And I think you clarified it by saying that there would have to be
17 some indication that the Drina Corps had been given the capacity to order
18 an MUP unit for a particular task and for a particular time; is that
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you state -- you stated in your evidence that you've seen
22 absolutely no evidence at all to indicate that the Drina Corps had such
24 A. We are talking about the MUP unit --
25 Q. Correct.
1 A. -- which was effective on the road from Konjevic Polje to
2 Bratunac; is that it?
3 Q. That's correct, General. Have you seen any evidence to suggest
4 that the Drina Corps had been given this kind of authority?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Now, General, could you just have a look at paragraph 3.8 of your
7 report. It's on page 30 in your version.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, it's page 31. I'm sorry, page 30 in the
9 English version.
10 Q. Did you find it, General? I think it's around 30 or 31 - your
11 pagination is different to mine - and it deals with all the assignments of
12 the units.
13 A. Yes. For the units, it's on page 29 in my version, if it is
14 paragraph 3.8 that you are referring to.
15 Q. Could you go to the final paragraph where it refers to --
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting,
17 Mr. Cayley, but the document that we have on the ELMO is not that report.
18 I think you're thinking about -- that you're talking about paragraph 3.8,
19 and is it page 30, Mr. Usher?
20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, it's very confusing, because the
21 problem is there are two different English versions with two different
22 numbering systems and then there's a Serbian version also with a different
23 numbering system and that's where the confusion arises. In fact, the
24 section that's on the ELMO is correct. I'll keep a close eye on it to
25 make sure that we have the right page.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Okay. Very well.
2 MR. CAYLEY: If you'd raise it, Mr. Usher. That's perfect.
3 Q. General, can you read the last paragraph of that section which
4 begins "The Skelani," and you can stop after the word "reserve."
5 A. "The Skelani Independent Battalion, in the role of Corps'
7 Q. Now, General, can you explain on what basis you made that
8 statement? And I assume that you made that statement -- you're saying
9 that the Skelani Battalion was allocated as the reserve for Krivaja 96,
10 for the operation Krivaja 95? Can you explain how you came to that
11 conclusion? It's not. What is it the reserve for, General?
12 A. The Skelani Battalion was part of the organic composition of the
13 Drina Corps. It was not attached to it but was within the composition of
14 the Drina Corps, and the Corps Commander decided not to engage that
15 battalion in the first echelon but to leave it in reserve, to leave it in
16 reserve with the assignment of possible action which could ensue with the
17 development of events if the need arose. If there was a lag in the
18 advance of its units -- of his units, then the Corps Commander could use
19 this to improve the operative situation along the axis where the need
20 was -- where this was required. That is the role of a reserve force.
21 Q. General, how do you come to the conclusion that the Skelani
22 Battalion was allocated by the Drina Corps Commander as the reserve
24 A. By studying the documents that I had at my disposal and by
25 reconstructing the combat disposition. Therefore, it was my duty to set
1 forth how the actions at Srebrenica followed on from each other within the
2 Krivaja 95 operation, which implied that I had to identify the first
3 echelon for active combat activities and the second echelon or a possible
4 reserve depending on which forces were utilised. I concluded, on the
5 basis of my studies and research, on the basis of the analysis of the
6 relevant documents, that the Skelani Battalion was a reserve force.
7 Q. Can you identify for the Judges which documents you relied on to
8 come to the conclusion that the Skelani Battalion was the reserve force?
9 A. On the basis of a number of documents, documents which I had at my
10 disposal. And I also had studies of an internal nature which were used in
11 the high military schools and academies, and on the basis of my own
12 personal contacts with the participants in the operation. So it was on
13 the basis of all that material that I deduced that the Skelani Battalion
14 was a reserve force.
15 Q. Did you see in any documents that you were provided by the Defence
16 the Skelani Battalion named as the Reserve Battalion during operation
17 Krivaja 95?
18 A. I'm not quite sure at this point whether I saw that in the
19 documents provided to me by the Defence, but quite certainly I did find
21 Q. General, do you have Prosecutor's Exhibit 428 before you?
22 MR. CAYLEY: Does the General have 428? Or if he hasn't, could he
23 be given it, please.
24 Q. General, do you have the version in your own language of
25 Krivaja 95 before you?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Do you have it in front of you now, General?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You see the first paragraph in this --
5 MR. CAYLEY: And, Your Honours, so there's no confusion, this is
6 the operative order for Krivaja 95 that we're referring to signed by
7 General Zivanovic.
8 Q. It's addressed to the commands of various units within the Drina
9 Corps. Is the Skelani Battalion referred to at all in that address
11 A. It is not referred to, to whom it is sent, and I came to the
12 conclusion that the Skelani Battalion was in reserve and that it got into
13 that position on the basis of the studies which I had at my disposal in
14 the centre of high military schools. There is a graduate study that was
15 done there and the topic of it was the Srebrenica operation at the war
16 school, and it expressly states that the Skelani Battalion was a reserve
18 Q. Did you --
19 A. If need be, if that is absolutely necessary, I could find the
20 document and you can check that out. I didn't quote it because it wasn't
21 a public source.
22 Q. General, let's go to page 3 of this combat order, to the bottom of
23 the page, and you'll see there that the order, like all normal combat
24 orders, refers to the reserve force. Can you read to the Judges what this
25 order says about reserve forces?
1 A. "Reserve forces, three to four forces of the MUP and one company
2 from the Vlasenica, Vlasenica Brigade."
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I do apologise, but there seems
4 to be some confusion. Could the usher place on the ELMO the document that
5 you are reading so that three parties can follow. So that the
6 interpreters can follow, number one; so that the Judges can follow, number
7 two; and the public in the public gallery, number 3.
8 And I would like to appeal to the technical booth that when we
9 analyse and read a document, could they focus on the text so that the
10 public gallery can see it on the screen.
11 So those are three very good reasons, Mr. Cayley, to state the
12 page and paragraph of the document so that the usher can place it on the
13 ELMO, please. Thank you.
14 MR. CAYLEY: My apologies, Mr. President. It's page 5. Perfect.
15 And I'll read it so that there's no uncertainty. "Reserve forces
16 of a size of two or three companies of the Ministry of the Interior and
17 one company from the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. Task: to be in
18 readiness to launch an attack in order to strengthen the force and enhance
19 the success along the battalion's axes of attack; to repel an enemy
20 counter-attack; to secure our hold on the features on the lines reached;
21 to prevent an enemy withdrawal; to secure the flanks and the rear of the
22 attacking forces, and other tasks."
23 Q. So you would agree with me, General, that these two or three
24 companies of the Ministry of the Interior and the one company of the 1st
25 Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade were in fact the reserve forces for
1 Operation Krivaja 95?
2 A. The companies that are mentioned of the MUP are the forces of the
3 local police which absolutely have no combat potential of a company. And
4 in studying the documents for this operation, I doubted, to tell you the
5 truth, whether it was forces that could carry out this operation, and I
6 sought out what was in the reserve. And studying the material, I came to
7 the conclusion that it must have been the Skelani battalion and not these
8 companies because they were local police forces which did not have the
9 combat strength to act as a reserve in the sense of this document here.
10 And that is why my statement in my expert report is different from
11 this order, for the simple reason that the local police forces were not
12 intended to carry out these assignments. And any other police forces, for
13 them to be able to be deployed, the Brigade Commander must have
14 authorisation to issue them assignments, and the doctrinary principle
15 which must not be infringed upon with regard to the use of forces attached
16 is that they must not be split up but must be deployed as a whole.
17 So you cannot divide up an attached unit. That is a doctrinary
18 principle, and this principle must not be infringed upon according to our
20 Q. General, let me interrupt you.
21 A. And being fully aware of that particular principle, I --
22 Q. Let me interrupt you at that point, General. Would you agree with
23 me that the reserve forces are being given a combat assignment by the
24 Corps Commander on the basis of this order?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. So you're suggesting to the Judges that General Zivanovic, in full
2 knowledge of the capacities of the local police, was giving a combat
3 instruction to a unit that he knew had no ability to carry out any kind of
4 combat operation at all, on your theory of these units being the local
5 police force?
6 A. I know full well that those police forces haven't got the power
7 and strength to carry out that assignment. What General Zivanovic ordered
8 at that time, I don't know; I know what he wrote. And I do know that the
9 forces that he determined as a reserve were not sufficient to carry out an
10 operation -- an assignment of that kind.
11 And so I sought out fresh elements which are not contained in the
12 order itself, because in this order, the Skelani Battalion is lost. It's
13 not there, and therefore I assume that it was the Skelani Battalion which
14 was the reserve force. And this was borne out by a graduate report by an
15 officer of the Republika Srpska army and his graduate thesis, and he
16 expressly states that the Skelani Battalion was the reserve force in this
17 operation. And, as I said a moment ago, I can send that in as an
18 additional document for you to see for yourselves.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley, I apologise, I have
20 to interrupt again.
21 General, are you saying at this point that the Skelani Battalion
22 was able to accomplish the tasks that these two or three companies were to
23 have done according to the order, pursuant to the order? Is that what
24 you're telling us?
25 A. What I want to say is -- I want to say two things. First of all,
1 that these MUP companies were not capable of carrying out that assignment,
2 and second --
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If I understood correctly -- but
4 perhaps I didn't understand you. What I understood was that you were
5 saying that these forces could not have been the reserve forces, but you
6 conclude that the Skelani Battalion was the reserve force; is that
7 correct? Am I right in understanding that?
8 A. Yes, that the Skelani Battalion was the reserve force.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The answer is yes or no, right.
10 So what I understood is correct. Now I'm asking you the following: Did
11 you know what the dimensions and characteristics were of the Skelani
13 A. Yes, I did know.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Did you know that the Skelani
15 Battalion was composed of elderly persons, predominately? Did you have
16 that piece of information?
17 A. Yes, but it was a combat unit. The Skelani Battalion was a combat
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But at all events, the
20 information that I have now is that the Skelani Battalion was composed
21 predominately of elderly persons and that it was a provisional battalion;
22 and after the assignment, there was talk of its dissolution.
23 Now, with all these characteristic features of that battalion,
24 could it carry out the task of these two or three companies, even if they
25 were MUP companies, that is to say, police companies?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. The MUP companies were not units for combat activities within the
2 combat disposition of military units. They were there to secure the
3 territory, to control the territory, and to implement additional
4 assignments with the frameworks of the combat disposition of the units,
5 and that the Commanders of the units had to unite them when they were in
6 their zone. And assignments are not given, combat assignments are not
7 given to MUP companies. They're not capacitated for those aassignments,
8 nor are they equipped for them, because they are the classical type of
9 police force.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, General. You have
11 answered my question. Now please continue responding to the questions put
12 to you by Mr. Cayley.
13 Mr. Cayley, please proceed.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. If you could -- do you still have page 3 in front of you, General?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you go to the top of page 3, paragraph 2.
18 MR. CAYLEY: And if the usher could move the page down. Actually,
19 it's page 4, I'm sorry.
20 Q. General, could you read paragraph 2 on page 3? It's the fifth
21 line down.
22 A. "The 2nd Battalion to be formed from the part of the forces of the
23 1st Birac and 2nd Romanija Brigade were a company from the Skelani
24 Independent Infantry Battalion." Do you want me to continue reading.
25 Q. You'd agree with me, General, that in fact the Skelani Battalion
1 was not the reserve force, and in fact, it was a component of the 2nd
2 Battalion allocated for combat operations during Krivaja 95, from what
3 you've just read, your own words?
4 A. No, sir. In military terminology, when sections are taken away
5 from some units and attached to another, the unit retains its name. So
6 the Skelani Battalion was still called the Skelani battalion, regardless
7 of the fact that one company was attached by the Commander to another
8 battalion for active -- for action. It has not disappeared; it is just
9 weakened by that one company which has been taken.
10 Q. But bearing in mind, General, that the people who drafted these
11 documents were professional, sensible people - in fact, General Krstic
12 himself was involved in the planning of this operation - don't you think
13 that if part of the Skelani Battalion, that was not in the 2nd Battalion,
14 had been allocated for the reserve forces, he would have actually
15 expressed that in this document?
16 A. It needn't be. The 2nd Battalion remains. No, that is to say
17 that the Skelani Battalion retains its title, its name, regardless of
18 having been weakened in this fashion. This need not be stated, but the
19 person taking over command responsibility, to be able to take over that
20 responsibility, must be told.
21 Q. So one company from the Skelani Battalion does actually receive an
22 express written order, and the other part, which is part of the reserve
23 forces, doesn't receive any written order at all from the Corps
24 Commander. Is that your evidence?
25 A. No, that is not my evidence. I have tried to answer this in
1 response to your previous question.
2 The reserve of the forces named here by the Corps Commander on
3 page 3 in his order for active combat action, according to me, is not
4 sufficient and is not capable for that type of action. It is not a combat
5 unit. It is a police unit which is not intended for that action. That
6 told me that I ought to seek out the actual forces which were the reserve
7 force of the corps for this operation because the Corps Commander would
8 not carry out any operation without a reserve force, and a reserve force
9 can be two battalions, one battalion, a weakened battalion, but it cannot
10 be without a reserve force for carrying out assignments which can be
11 needed within the course of an operation.
12 In seeking this out, I tried to reconstruct the operative system
13 of the corps and arrived at the fact that the Skelani Battalion was the
14 reserve force without that one company, minus that one company which was
15 attached to someone else.
16 So that is not unusual. It is nothing unusual.
17 Q. General, it's --
18 A. In the use of units.
19 Q. General, it's ...
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Previous B/S/C translation continues] ...
21 interpretation at this point.
22 MR. CAYLEY: We're not getting the -- I think it's all right now.
23 Q. General, it's unusual, isn't it, that the Skelani Battalion got no
24 notification that there was no reserve force during this operation?
25 A. I personally feel that it was stated but by mistake it wasn't
1 written down here, because I can only assume that the officer that wrote
2 his graduate thesis at the high school, high military school in the
3 Yugoslavia army, that he was well-informed. I don't know what post he
4 held, but quite simply, I think it is rather a mistake or an omission in
5 the text than -- because it was quite certain that the battalion was a
6 reserve force.
7 Q. General, what part of the MUP was actually capable of combat
9 A. Not a single part of MUP is meant to conduct combat actions
10 because --
11 Q. General, have you heard of the Special Brigade of the MUP?
12 A. Yes, I have.
13 Q. And what is their task?
14 A. Their task is to carry out special police assignments, special
15 police assignments. The doctrine of police tasks is not in my area of
16 expertise so I didn't really study that, but I do know that police forces
17 are not used --
18 Q. General. General, does the Special Brigade of the MUP have a
19 combat capacity?
20 A. A Special Brigade of the MUP did have combat capacity but it is
21 not a unit which is meant for and which is used for combat assignments.
22 Q. And you're in agreement with me that General Zivanovic, in this
23 order, is giving a combat assignment to a MUP unit, isn't he?
24 A. Which MUP unit are you referring to?
25 Q. The MUP unit that's referred to in this order, General.
1 A. Yes. These are some local MUP forces. They are not used in
2 combat activities.
3 Q. General, you're not answering my question so I'll put it to you
4 again. You're in agreement with me, aren't you, that General Zivanovic,
5 in this order, is giving a combat assignment to the Ministry of the
7 A. General Zivanovic, the local police forces, which were on the
8 territory, could have -- General Zivanovic could have considered them
9 forces which would be able to perform some of the tasks in respect of the
10 combat control of the territory. So they could guard facilities, they
11 could carry out patrols, and so on. So in that sense, they could be
12 reserve forces but not as combat forces because these are not formations
13 which are intended for these purposes. He himself knows that they are not
14 able to carry that out, and I'm sure that General Zivanovic would not
15 issue such an assignment to units of the local forces, to any police
16 forces because police forces are not meant to carry out combat
17 operations. They are intended for police assignments.
18 Q. But you would agree with me that the task issued to the reserve
19 forces here is in fact a combat assignment? And before you answer,
20 General, let me read it to you so there is no misunderstanding. "To be in
21 readiness to launch an attack." That's a combat assignment, isn't it,
23 A. Yes, it is a combat assignment. It's a task of the reserve which
24 is carried out by reserves by definition. But these MUP forces cannot
25 carry out such an assignment, and I'm quite sure that he did not mean the
1 MUP forces but he meant the forces of the Skelani Battalion. And these
2 companies of the local police were ready or in readiness to carry out
3 police assignments in the area of responsibility.
4 Q. General, a defence witness has stated to the Judges that
5 General Zivanovic was not present at the forward command post in
6 Pribicevac until at least the 10th of July of 1995. Now, we know that
7 General Krstic was present at the forward command post from on or about
8 the 6th of July of 1995.
9 Now, based on your theory that in the absence of the Corps
10 Commander the Chief of Staff is the deputy Commander, would you agree with
11 me that General Krstic was, in fact, in command of operation Krivaja 1995
12 from the 6th to the 10th of July?
13 A. I do not agree with you because I have no reliable indicators
14 where General Zivanovic was. But regardless of that, regardless of the
15 fact where General Zivanovic was at that time, the Corps Commander who
16 carried out the operation Krivaja 95 was General Zivanovic. There is no
17 document based on which that Commander is excluded. And he, according to
18 his own personal assessment, could have been in any part of the area of
19 responsibility including the forward command post but also in the
20 north-west of the area of responsibility, in the region of activity of the
21 1st Zvornik Brigade, i.e., the Bircani Brigade which was holding the front
22 towards Tuzla. So this would be in the competency and within the rights
23 of the Corps Commander to find himself or to be at any moment at the place
24 he felt was a priority place at that point in time. When the Commander is
25 not there, automatically the command duty is assumed by his deputy, i.e.,
1 the Chief of Staff.
2 If General Zivanovic was not there at that time of course Krstic
3 was carrying out the command, but this does not rule out the command
4 competencies of the Commander. So Krstic was the Chief of Staff, and in
5 that role he always substitutes for the Commander when the Commander is
6 not there.
7 Q. Who was in command of Krivaja 95 from the 6th of July to the 10th
8 of July, 1995? Just give me a name, General. Just give me name. Who was
9 in command?
10 A. The Corps Commander.
11 Q. General Zivanovic.
12 A. The Commander of the Corps was in command of the forces in the
13 Zepa [as interpreted] operation.
14 Q. And that was General Zivanovic.
15 A. Yes. He had the command responsibility towards --
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic.
17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I either think that we
18 have a lapse or a mistake in the transcript because we're talking about
19 operation Srebrenica and not operation Zepa, as it states in page 95, line
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And in line 4 as well, I think.
22 We will have to check the record, Mr. Cayley. Thank you.
23 MR. CAYLEY: It's in the response of the witness, Your Honour. He
24 says the Commander of the Corps was in command of the forces in the Zepa
1 Q. You meant the Srebrenica operation, didn't you, General?
2 A. No. No. You said from the 6th to the 10th. That is not Zepa.
3 We're talking about the Srebrenica operation, from the 6th to the 10th.
4 Q. That's fine, General. You've corrected it.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you wish to go on any further
6 or ...
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No. No, Mr. Cayley. I think
8 that we should adjourn at this point. It is 3.00. We will continue
9 tomorrow at 9.20.
10 The Chamber has other commitments to fulfil, so we have to call it
11 a day at this point. Have a good afternoon, and I will see you again
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day
15 of December, 2000 at 9.20 a.m.