1 Wednesday, 29th September, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case IT-95-16-T,
7 the Prosecutor versus Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan
8 Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic,
9 Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic.
10 JUDGE CASSESE: Mr. Blaxill.
11 MR. BLAXILL: Good morning, Mr. President;
12 good morning, Your Honours; fellow counsellors; good
13 morning, Brigadier. Before I recommence with my
14 examination-in-chief, we have this morning supplied to
15 the Chamber some translations of extracts of the report
16 document. I went through the document with a language
17 assistant yesterday afternoon. It was a very hurried
18 exercise, but we tried to identify points that were
19 perhaps amplifying what was in the original statement
20 and have those specifically translated whilst the
21 translators work on the full document to provide it to
22 Your Honours at the earliest opportunity.
23 As I say, my learned friends for the Defence
24 have the full document in their own language anyway.
25 Thank you, sir.
1JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you.
2 WITNESS: ASIM DZAMBASOVIC [RESUMED]
3 Examined by Mr. Blaxill:
4 Q. Brigadier, good morning, sir.
5 A. Good morning.
6 Q. Yesterday we had shown you a few documents in
7 relation to the questioning regarding general matters
8 of military strategy, military conduct, and the actions
9 and obligations of commanders. I would like you to
10 look, indeed, at the documents attached to your
11 statement again, sir, and, in fact, pick document
12 number AD1.
13 MR. BLAXILL: Just for the record, Your
14 Honours, I understand this is not a controversial
15 document in terms of ever being before any Chamber
16 before. It is a fresh document. That is obviously
17 conceded, but I think that's its status.
18 Q. Sir, would you look at that document, and
19 could you tell me what that conveys to you as regards a
20 military communication? What is it, and from what
21 level of person does it pass, and to what level of
22 person does it go to?
23 A. Good morning, everybody, to begin with.
24 AD1 is the example of a report. The commander of a
25 company sends his report to the commander of the
1military police, and this document is correct in all
2 its aspects.
3 The only thing that is not correct,
4 militarily speaking, is that one step had been
5 skipped. He should have sent it to the battalion
6 commander, and then the battalion commander should then
7 send it on to the commander of the military police. So
8 one rung had been skipped. We do not have a battalion
9 commander here.
10 Q. Brigadier, does the document, on the face of
11 it, indicate what company issued that report?
12 A. Yes. In my analysis, I also quoted a
13 example; what reports, orders, and everything else
14 should look like and what they should contain.
15 Reports and orders do not have to include all
16 the basic points, but they must comply with the
17 principal point; that is, the name of the unit or the
18 institution issuing the report, the reference number,
19 the filing number, date, and the addressee. These are
20 the principal elements. Then, of course, the signature
21 of the person who has written the report, and the
22 seal. These are the most important elements of both
23 orders and reports. Of course, the contents may vary
24 and may include the elements which are expected to be
25 included in every report and every order.
1Q. And so just looking at the document, does
2 that tell you, on the face of the document, from whom
3 it was sent? Who sent it?
4 A. It was sent by a company commander, and it is
5 addressed to the military police command. That is
6 quite clear.
7 Q. Which company is that? Does it say, on the
8 face of it, which company he is the commander of?
9 A. It is correct here. The 1st Active Company
10 of the military police, 4th Battalion. So the heading
11 says that it is a unit which is called 1st Active
12 Company, part of the 4th Battalion of the military
13 police.
14 Q. Again, sir, as to the identity of that
15 company commander -- clearly you'd not previously seen
16 this document -- I appreciate that fact; you don't know
17 its contents -- but what appears to be the name of the
18 company commander on that report?
19 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Pavkovic?
20 MR. PAVKOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
21 We object to this. It is not true that the witness did
22 not see this report. The witness did see this report.
23 That is my yesterday's objection to the documents
24 presented to this witness earlier without having been
25 authenticated in this court as authentic documents.
1Now questions take all this information about the
2 company person, who might have written this, and so on
3 and so forth.
4 So do I not really think that what my learned
5 friend said is correct, that the witness did not see
6 this. Yes, he did see these documents, and he supplied
7 his answer in an earlier document.
8 JUDGE CASSESE: It's not an objection to your
9 question, but the way you phrased your question.
10 Counsel Pavkovic is correct in saying that the witness
11 did see the report.
12 MR. BLAXILL: What I was trying to get to, in
13 a simple way -- and I think I made a mess of it, Your
14 Honour -- is simply that this man is not the author of
15 the document, and I'm trying to express that he,
16 obviously, is not able to speak as to the truth of its
17 contents or indeed the fact of it being signed by
18 whoever it purports. I'm just dealing with the face of
19 the document: "As an expert looking at it, does it
20 look like a military document, and what do you see
21 there?" and it bears no more weight than that, but I
22 suggest it is admissible and appropriate.
23 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes, it is.
24 MR. BLAXILL: Thank you.
25 Q. So, yes, Brigadier, again I would just ask
1you to confirm. You see a signature block on that
2 document. I'm just asking you to say that on the face
3 of it, of that document that you saw, who appears to be
4 the signatory?
5 A. The commander of that company. I do not know
6 that individual, but what it says is "company
7 commander," and then typed "Vladimir Santic." Of
8 course, I cannot claim this is his signature. That is
9 only what it says here.
10 Q. Thank you, Brigadier. I would like you to
11 turn now to documents AD2, 3, and 4.
12 MR. BLAXILL: These are contentious documents
13 in some measure, Your Honours. I'm wondering whether,
14 out of an abundance of caution -- although hopefully my
15 questions will not create a problem -- that we would
16 have private session for about five minutes, just to be
17 absolutely sure.
18 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes.
19 [Private session]
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12182 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12183 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1 (redacted)
2 (redacted)
3 (redacted)
4 (redacted)
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 [Open session]
11 MR. BLAXILL:
12 Q. Then next, if you please, Brigadier, would
13 you be so kind as to look at your documents AD5 and 6.
14 Now, looking at document AD5, Brigadier,
15 could you please again -- please do not necessarily
16 refer to any names in it; that's not relevant to us --
17 but can you tell us what the nature of document AD5 is?
18 A. Document AD5 is basically an order, a short
19 one, because the preamble says: Pursuant to the order
20 of the commander of the 4th military police battalion
21 number such-and-such of 2nd April, I order or
22 designate. So it is a form, a type of a short order.
23 Q. Would an order of that nature -- firstly, may
24 I ask you -- sorry, sir. Does that order appear to be
25 drawn up in a proper military fashion, according to
1your knowledge of these things?
2 A. Well, I have said it. In principle, there is
3 a pattern for orders, for decisions, for reports and
4 what they should contain, in principle, all these
5 orders and reports and decisions. But I also mentioned
6 yesterday, if you remember, that an order may be in one
7 sentence only if circumstances so require. So it may
8 depend on the situation. What is important is that
9 they contain all these elements: who it is addressed
10 to, who it is sent by, and the date and the number.
11 And, of course, the contents may vary depending on the
12 circumstances, on the conditions, so that there may be
13 only one item, there may be various items, but, I mean,
14 whatever is necessary for the task to be then carried
15 out. But in this specific case, I believe this
16 suffices if it only means that certain soldiers are
17 assigned as assistants.
18 So it is a list of soldiers, and that
19 suffices for the task for the order to be carried out
20 properly.
21 Q. This order assigning these various people,
22 again, can you say from which company or battalion that
23 is coming, and who is to be the signatory?
24 A. This order, too, comes from the 1st Active
25 Company of the military police in Vitez, and it is
1signed by a commander. Or, rather, the order was
2 written here, the principle of the chain of command was
3 complied with, so it is the commander of the 4th
4 Military Police Battalion.
5 Q. And who is the signatory to this?
6 A. The signatory is the company commander.
7 Q. And the name you see on that document, the
8 signatory?
9 A. Vladimir Santic is what is typed here, and
10 the signature itself, Santic, whether that is his
11 signature, that is something that I cannot say. But in
12 typed letters it is Vladimir Santic.
13 Q. Document AD6, sir. Again, would you just
14 tell us what is that document? Is that an order or
15 some other form of document? And what does it instruct
16 people to do, or what does it report upon?
17 A. This is a typical order, or a short order,
18 and it was written pursuant to the order issued by the
19 commander of the 4th Military Police Battalion, so that
20 this chain of command principle was complied with in
21 this case too.
22 Here this designates -- there is units of the
23 1st Company which are sent out to carry out a specific
24 mission.
25 In the second -- the second item, then,
1specifies that the AT Platoon will be ensuring the
2 safety of persons and premises according to the
3 instructions of the commander of the company, and I
4 can't really read this properly.
5 So the second item, it says that: AT Platoon
6 members shall provide the safety for the personnel and
7 the facilities under the instructions of the commander
8 of the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion. So the AT
9 Platoon is to provide security for persons on the basis
10 of the instructions of the commander of the 2nd
11 Company. So the AT Platoon of the 1st Company was, in
12 this particular case, assigned to the commander of the
13 2nd Company to then provide the security for individual
14 persons under his instructions.
15 And the important thing here, in the fifth
16 item, after the order has been complied with, men
17 should be transferred to the seat of the unit in an
18 organised manner. This is a logical order, both as
19 regards the addressee and the signature; that is, the
20 commander of the 4th Battalion, and there is -- then
21 the commander of the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion,
22 the commander of the AT platoon, and one for the
23 files.
24 So the specific thing is the commander of
25 2nd Company is here charged with providing the security
1according to the instructions of the commander of the
2 2nd Company. So this is a type of an attachment of the
3 AT Platoon to the commander of the 2nd Company.
4 Q. Sir, using the expression "attachment," do
5 you see from this whether it is a long-term duty or a
6 short-term duty, the attachment of these people?
7 A. Here we have the date and the day when the
8 AT Platoon is placed at the disposal of the 2nd Company
9 commander of the 2nd Company of the military police.
10 I do not see really for how long they are
11 assigned to him, and I can't see that. Perhaps it does
12 say somewhere, but I don't remember seeing it, how long
13 they are assigned to that particular mission. Perhaps
14 there is somewhere else, but it doesn't say here
15 clearly. There is no time frame. One doesn't know for
16 how long this AT Platoon will be at the disposal of the
17 2nd Company commander.
18 All we see here is that after the mission has
19 been accomplished, the men of the platoon should be
20 transferred to the headquarters of the unit, but how
21 long the task is to take, it doesn't say here.
22 Q. Well, finally, in respect to those documents,
23 again, Brigadier, can you say from which company
24 those -- or within which those orders were made and who
25 made those orders? Who was the signatory?
1A. The order was drawn up by the 1st Active
2 Company of the 4th Battalion of the military police,
3 and the order was signed by the company commander.
4 Q. Thank you very much. Can you say the name
5 that appears on the piece of paper just appears to be
6 the commander?
7 A. "Company commander," and then it is typed
8 "Vladimir Santic."
9 Q. Thank you, sir. Brigadier, have you, in the
10 course of your military duties in around the time, made
11 any study of the events that occurred in Ahmici, in the
12 Lasva Valley, on the 16th of April, 1993?
13 A. On the 16th of April, 1993, more specifically
14 I was the head of the staff of the 1st Corps in
15 Sarajevo, and my -- and that particular area of
16 responsibility was not part of my terms of reference;
17 that is, it was not an area of responsibility of the
18 1st Corps.
19 But since -- as of August 1993, the general
20 headquarters of the then-army of the Republic of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is the present commander
22 Army of the Federation, at that time I was the head of
23 the planning administration; that is, the operative
24 administration.
25 At that administration we received all the
1reports, both from our unit -- that is, units directly
2 subordinate to us of the army of the Republic of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and the reports which were --
4 which presented some interest to us from the military
5 point of view, and we were receiving them from other
6 units, from all the other areas of responsibility, so
7 that I can say that I was conversant with the situation
8 because of that.
9 And with my HVO colleagues, I always
10 discussed those matters, because we both attended
11 various meetings; and during the negotiations, while
12 the conflict was under way, we often attended various
13 training meetings, drills, courses, et cetera, et
14 cetera, and soldiers just naturally always discussed
15 such areas as Ahmici and other areas which are of
16 interest to us.
17 So for that reason, I do know the situation
18 in that area and throughout the Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 theatre of war, because I had all the information in
20 one place, both in relation to the army of the
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO and the BH army, so that
22 I can really say that I'm conversant with the
23 situation -- that I was conversant with the situation
24 as much as it was possible at the time.
25 Q. So, Brigadier, could you offer, from your
1knowledge of what you say you believe happened in
2 Ahmici -- would you, firstly, indicate what forces you
3 think were involved?
4 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Pavkovic?
5 MR. PAVKOVIC: Your Honours, I wish to
6 apologise for having to speak -- to take the floor once
7 again. This witness was called in to testify as an
8 expert witness. The witness has no experience or
9 direct knowledge of what happened in Ahmici.
10 Now, this information the witness is
11 referring to, the experience and everything else, to my
12 mind, it goes beyond an expert testimony, and I object
13 to this. I do not think that the examination should go
14 on in this direction.
15 MR. BLAXILL: I'll explain the purpose of the
16 next few questions. It's virtually the last element of
17 my examination-in-chief.
18 As I understand the role of the expert, it
19 would be a position, Your Honours, that we would -- an
20 expert receives information and, upon the information,
21 is then able to form, one hopes, with the expertise
22 they profess, an opinion to offer.
23 Now, clearly, I feel it appropriate, if I'm
24 going to ask matters which are generally about the
25 organisational requirements and the level of
1coordination and so forth required in an operation such
2 as the 16th of April, it would be appropriate,
3 obviously, to see what perception the expert has,
4 because then Your Honours will know the factual basis
5 upon which he bases his opinion. If his facts are
6 wrong, then you know what weight to give his opinion.
7 If his facts are right, then, likewise, you'll know the
8 foundation upon which he makes those opinions.
9 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
10 JUDGE CASSESE: We uphold the objection of
11 Counsel Pavkovic. I think Counsel Pavkovic is right.
12 He's going to guess. He can't guess, the witness. So
13 I wonder whether you could move on.
14 MR. BLAXILL: Yes. Just give me a moment;
15 I'll cull my questioning.
16 Q. Very well. Just now to deal with one final
17 theoretical matter, Brigadier, not related to any
18 specific actual event, but if, if a company was to be
19 deployed in the field in a combat operation and
20 involves three or four platoons and maybe other units
21 of an army, what kind of level of planning and
22 coordination is required of the commanders,
23 particularly at company level? Please, you can be as
24 brief as possible, because the general principles
25 you've already covered.
1A. What can a company commander do if he gets a
2 concrete task and if he has three or four platoons or
3 squads available? Well, yesterday I explained a few
4 elements.
5 Specifically, a company commander calls in
6 his commanders; that is to say, platoon commanders. He
7 familiarises them with the task that lies ahead, he
8 points out which are the really important elements for
9 carrying out this task, and then, if the conditions are
10 right, he goes out to the ground to specifically
11 outline the tasks he gave on the ground.
12 I already explained that this can be done
13 from one location if the specific situation permits
14 this and all the commanders can be present. However,
15 if this is a wider area, then he can use his own
16 judgement, his own assessment, to see which unit should
17 be used where, and then he can show each and every
18 commander what he should do.
19 So these are the tactics that are usually
20 applied. We always point out, in military theory and
21 practice, that the best thing is to issue tasks on the
22 ground, because maps, written documents, in general,
23 have their shortcomings when compared to a concrete
24 situation that can be directly seen.
25 Therefore, the best thing is to issue
1assignments on the ground. In military practice, it is
2 very well known that this is the best way of issuing
3 orders and having them carried out.
4 In this connection, it is important to
5 coordinate activities with regard to all elements, in
6 terms of logistics; communications; carrying out the
7 task itself, whether it will be carried out in one
8 stage, in two stages, in several stages; et cetera.
9 That is to say that a commander is kept very busy. He
10 has many activities related to carrying out such a
11 task.
12 Finally, when all of that is coordinated,
13 when every one of his subordinates gets a specific
14 assignment, then the company commander is engaged,
15 together with his team, in elaborating certain combat
16 documents.
17 Combat documents are made so that everyone
18 would know, for several reasons, what each and every
19 unit does, what kind of activity it is engaged in.
20 This is done for the sake of history, for the sake of
21 archives. So it is envisaged, for each and every
22 combat action, to have these combat documents made.
23 Usually, at company level, a decision is made
24 as to how a specific assignment will be carried out. A
25 schematic is made, and then one can see how each and
1every unit will be deployed, the depth and the breadth
2 of every task can seen on the map. Then one can see
3 whether this unit can carry out that particular
4 assignment independently or whether it seeks artillery
5 support or the support of some other unit.
6 In most cases concerning specific tasks, not
7 a single unit has, within its own organic composition,
8 all the elements that would make it possible for it to
9 carry out such a task. Then a commander can ask his
10 superior to have an entire artillery, engineering, et
11 cetera, unit attached to him, or part of such a unit,
12 in order to carry out a specific task.
13 In this connection, the commander carries out
14 all these activities I mentioned, and then, if at all
15 possible, he goes to check out, in practice, how his
16 order or decision is carried out on the ground; that
17 is, before combat operations begin.
18 But I pointed out yesterday that when combat
19 operations begin, the company commander should be at
20 such a location that makes it possible for him to have
21 the best conditions possible for monitoring the
22 situation so that he can change, correct, if necessary,
23 alter his decisions, depending on the situation on the
24 ground, what the new elements may be that he was
25 unfamiliar with and what the problems are that he could
1not have forecast before that.
2 When doing that, he does this in certain time
3 intervals and then provides reports to his superior
4 officers on everything he's done.
5 MR. BLAXILL: That concludes my questions.
6 Thank you very much, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. Counsel
8 Pavkovic?
9 MR. BLAXILL: Sorry to pre-empt my friend for
10 a second. I would like to, in fact, formally to
11 tender, in due course, the statement and the report
12 prepared. I advise Your Honours in advance of that.
13 Obviously, the full report with translation will be in
14 your hands -- we have part of the translation submitted
15 this morning -- just lest I forget at a later point in
16 time.
17 JUDGE CASSESE: Any objection, Counsel
18 Pavkovic?
19 MR. PAVKOVIC: If I understood the Prosecutor
20 correctly, he is going to offer a statement; that is to
21 say, he is going to tender the statement that I spoke
22 about yesterday and the report I spoke about
23 yesterday.
24 Did I understand you correctly? Oh, I did.
25 Well, I have certain objection with regard to
1the first document, and I think it should not be
2 included because the expert had documents made
3 available to him by the Prosecutor, and they would not
4 have been accessible to this expert had the Prosecutor
5 not disclosed this to him.
6 However, I do not have any objections with
7 regard to the second document that was mentioned
8 yesterday.
9 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
10 JUDGE CASSESE: Our ruling is that both
11 documents should be admitted into evidence, both the
12 statement with the annexes and the document which will
13 be circulated in English, in extenso, maybe tomorrow.
14 MR. BLAXILL: Yes. We hope to have that
15 ready tomorrow, Your Honours.
16 My only other observation at this point would
17 be an abundance of caution, now, after Your Honours'
18 observations of yesterday, and that is, perhaps should
19 that document, because of the annexures, be filed as
20 confidential or something. Just particularly I'm
21 thinking AD2 to 4, where I think that is particularly
22 relevant, if that's the case.
23 JUDGE CASSESE: So they will be
24 confidential. Thank you.
25 Counsel Pavkovic?
1MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I will be the
2 first to examine the witness, and then after that it
3 will be Ranko Radovic, Luka Susak, and Petar
4 Puliselic.
5 THE REGISTRAR: The statement of the witness
6 will be 310, Prosecution evidence; and the report 311,
7 also Prosecution evidence.
8 Cross-examined by Mr. Pavkovic:
9 Q. Good day, Witness. My name is Petar
10 Pavkovic, Attorney at Law. Yesterday and today you
11 expressed a very fair assessment of military doctrine,
12 the chain of command, and other doctrinary matters, and
13 I thank you for having helped me to put my questions
14 today perhaps in a better way, thanks to your
15 testimony. However, I would like you to clarify
16 certain matters to me a bit.
17 First of all, you're a Brigadier, from what
18 I've been able to see, but you are a Brigadier-General
19 in terms of the formation post that you hold. Is my
20 understanding correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you have any wartime experience? In this
23 last war, I mean, this last war that was waged in the
24 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 A. Well, I mentioned the initial period; that is
1to say, April 1992. I was in the republican -- rather,
2 I received instructions from the territory of defence
3 headquarters in Sarajevo to help the establishment of
4 the Territorial Defence in Konjic, because this was the
5 very inception of the Territorial Defence in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, generally speaking, and it was also the
7 very inception of this new army.
8 My first task or, rather, my first experience
9 was in the area of Visoko, when, in the month of June,
10 we tried -- that's the way I have to put it -- to
11 deblockade a certain area that led to Sarajevo via
12 Visoko and Vares, and then I was commander of the
13 tactical group of Visoko, of Vares. That's what it was
14 called.
15 Q. You are talking about June; is that right?
16 Which year?
17 A. That was 1992. And then in August 1992, I
18 was head of the staff in the temporary command of South
19 92. That is also an operation which was planned for
20 the purposes of deblockading Sarajevo, because the
21 general purpose was always this deblockade. I don't
22 want anybody to be confused by this. And how realistic
23 this was is another matter. But this was this other
24 operation where I was chief of staff from the broader
25 area of Igman. That's where the deblockade of Sarajevo
1was supposed to be carried out.
2 And then as chief of staff of the 1st
3 Sarajevo Corps, I had a series of wartime experience in
4 the units of the 1st Corps. So that is where I was
5 directly engaged in the operations; that is to say, I
6 was directly engaged as an officer according to the
7 post I held.
8 Later, as chief of administration for
9 operations and planning, I was not in a position to be
10 directly engaged in these operations, to directly
11 participate, because this was not the post I held. But
12 often I went to Vlasic, Igman, Treskavica, Kupres.
13 Also the areas of Prenj, Bjelasnica, et cetera; that is
14 to say, those areas that were accessible at the time,
15 and those units as well. Because that was my duty,
16 after all.
17 This element of control was necessary, in
18 terms of our planned activities. So I was actually
19 checking up on these planned activities that we had
20 envisaged.
21 Q. Thank you very much. You took part in this
22 as a member of the TO or, rather, the Army of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Who were you fighting against?
1A. At that time, in 1992 -- that is to say,
2 until the conflict with the HVO broke out -- we had one
3 enemy only, and that was the Army of Republika Srpska.
4 Q. Let's be more concise. Did you take part in
5 the fighting against the HVO?
6 A. No. No. Not directly. Not directly. I was
7 not directly in such a position. I was in such a
8 position only in terms of taking up on certain planned
9 activities. When I came to Kakanj, where our general
10 staff had been transferred at the time -- you are
11 probably familiar with that -- that was January 1994,
12 and in that period I carried out planned activities in
13 the territory of Central Bosnia and in other
14 territories that were accessible.
15 Q. So one may infer that in a certain way, in
16 accordance with the position you held in the chain of
17 command in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did take
18 part in operations in respect of the HVO?
19 A. You can't put it that way. I pointed this
20 out at the very outset. My direct participation was
21 when I was commander or, rather, chief of staff. And
22 when I became, in 1993, the chief of administration for
23 operative planning, I did not have anything directly to
24 do with combat activity; that is to say, I wrote and
25 drew things. So perhaps this makes it clearer to you.
1That is to say that we, from the general
2 staff, from the highest level of command, we issued
3 appropriate orders and commands. It was only normal.
4 And that was my function in that respect, not direct
5 participation in a unit that was engaged in fighting.
6 We have to make a distinction between the two; that is
7 to say, not only I, but the function of the general
8 staff as a general staff is such.
9 So the general staff of the Army of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was called at the time, did
11 not directly participate in any such thing at all.
12 That was the function of all other staffs, not only the
13 army staff.
14 Q. If we treat only the rank-and-file soldiers
15 as direct participants, then of course you did not take
16 part in any combat activities. But you will agree with
17 me that military planning, the issuing of orders, is
18 also part of overall combat activity that is carried
19 out vis-a-vis the other side. And the lower units, as
20 you explained to us yesterday, did not carry out their
21 own tasks, but the tasks given to them by higher levels
22 of command. So, in accordance with the principles of
23 command that you explained to us yesterday, you
24 nevertheless, in a way which is compliant with your
25 role, did take part in the operations that took place
1in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Croatian Defence
2 Council units?
3 Please, could you briefly give me a "yes" or
4 a "no" answer, but we really have to move on.
5 A. The function of a staff and the function of a
6 commander are very, very different functions. Only a
7 commander -- and that's the way it is everywhere -- has
8 the right to command; that is to say, the commander,
9 who is a person -- or rather, a person who is called a
10 commander has the right to issue commands. And he is
11 responsible. He is the only one who is responsible for
12 everything that happens. Rasim Delic, at that time
13 commander of the general staff, was responsible for the
14 entire army. The commander of the corps was
15 responsible for the entire corps, but not people from
16 the staff too. That is to say that I cannot sign an
17 order, I cannot have responsibility as chief of
18 administration. It is only the commander that signs a
19 command.
20 Q. Witness, witness --
21 MR. VRDOLYAK: I'm sorry, there is a mistake
22 in the transcript. Instead of "headquarters," it says
23 "staff." It should be the function of the
24 headquarters.
25 JUDGE CASSESE: All right. We'll get it
1straight.
2 May I ask the witness to be concise and
3 specific, not to indulge in generalities. Thank you.
4 MR. PAVKOVIC:
5 Q. Mr. Witness, perhaps you misunderstood me.
6 It is not my intention to establish your responsibility
7 or something. I just wanted to see where your position
8 was, and I am satisfied with the answer you've given so
9 far. So let us move a step forward.
10 MR. VRDOLYAK: I'm sorry, again there is a
11 mistake here. Instead of "staff," it should say
12 "headquarters." The word "staff" can mean both staff
13 and headquarters.
14 THE INTERPRETER: It's either a building or
15 people, says the interpreter.
16 JUDGE CASSESE: There is the explanation from
17 the interpreters. Yes.
18 MR. PAVKOVIC:
19 Q. Yesterday you explained to us the chain of
20 command, you explained subordination to us, you
21 explained the unity of command. You spoke of the chain
22 of command and you said that lower units or, rather,
23 the commanders of lower-level units, had a certain
24 degree of freedom and initiative, but that this freedom
25 of theirs has to move within the fundamental ideas of
1the commander. So if an attack order was issued from a
2 higher level, it can never be understood as a defence
3 order, if one strictly respects hierarchy.
4 A. Would you like me to answer?
5 Q. Please say whether I understood you well and
6 whether I said this correctly.
7 A. You did understand me correctly, but it's not
8 only lower-level unit commanders. Every subordinate
9 officer has initiative within those boundaries that you
10 have referred to; that is to say, to formulate certain
11 ideas that do not deviate from the general objective.
12 However, if he does this, he has to inform his superior
13 officer that he assessed the situation, that he has
14 more information, and that he believes that the order
15 can be carried out in a different way. But basically
16 that's it.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with me, when we
18 speak about combat activities, that combat activities
19 are a series of activities that can be divided,
20 essentially, into attack activities and defence
21 activities?
22 A. According to strategy, there is a strategic
23 offensive -- that's the expert word for it -- and
24 strategic defence. And within strategic defence there
25 are all forms of attack and attack activities; and
1within defence, strategic defence, all forms of
2 defensive activities.
3 Q. Do you agree with me that within defence
4 activities or defence, strategically speaking, certain
5 activities can have the characteristics of offensive
6 activities? What is active defence, in your opinion?
7 A. That is also one of the principles. And
8 there is a term "active defence." That means that part
9 of a unit is used exclusively for defence, and another
10 part of the unit is used for offensive activities, for
11 various attacks, ambushes, et cetera.
12 When we say that within strategic defence --
13 if we look at the highest level, what is the
14 determining factor, whether this is an attack or a
15 defence, or offensive or defensive, it is the number of
16 units engaged.
17 If the predominant number of units in that
18 zone are engaged in defence activities, then it is
19 defence, but if the predominant number of units in that
20 zone is engaged in attack in that zone, and according
21 to that task, then it is offensive. But in the context
22 of offensive and defensive activities, there can be
23 both kinds, and the determining factor is whether a
24 larger number is involved in defence or attack. And if
25 most are engaged in attack, then it's a typical attack,
1and if a larger number of units are in defence, then
2 it's typical defence.
3 Q. And that I can also see from relevant
4 documents for an attack and for a defence, because
5 those who are assessing the strength of a particular
6 unit will also decide whether it will go into an attack
7 or a defence, or whether they will be engaged in some
8 other form of operations. So that documents also allow
9 us to see what kind of operations are addressed there,
10 unless they have personal experience in this.
11 A. Yes. If a corps commander is organising the
12 defence by the whole unit, then the whole unit are only
13 -- all the units or only parts of the corps may go
14 into it. So within the general task, within the
15 overall task, the strength or either the number of the
16 -- of units of men and equipment will determine
17 whether something will be a defence action or an
18 offensive action.
19 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you spoke about the
20 command, leadership in the Yugoslav People's Army, with
21 which you spent a major part of your career, and you
22 tried to draw a comparison or, rather, to juxtapose the
23 principles of leadership and command in there and in
24 the armies which came about in Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 entities. And you asserted that these principles were
1embraced, more or less successfully, in all the three
2 armies; that is, the Army of the Republika Srpska, HVO
3 and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You also indicated
4 certain differences between them and you told us why
5 did these differences exist.
6 Could you tell us now if these principles
7 which were adopted not only by the former JNA and quite
8 a number of the armies we went over, was it all that
9 simple to adopt them and put them through in the newly
10 established armies, in view of the shortage of, shall I
11 say, properly qualified officer cadres and other
12 personnel?
13 A. Listen. I mean, the principles are such as
14 you have just said, and that applies to all the armies
15 in the world; all of them are governed by these
16 principles. And, yes, we did embrace that. I mean,
17 all the three armies. But it was easiest for the Army
18 of the Republika Srpska because the available
19 equipment, armament, literature, war plans and
20 everything else went to one people. So it was easiest
21 for the Army of the Republika Srpska to accept it or
22 take it over and reorganise.
23 And then -- because in Croatia, what
24 happened, it was the next -- easier for the HVO,
25 because they were receiving some assistance from
1Croatia, as was only natural. And it was least easy
2 for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it had the
3 least equipment and other material and everything else,
4 which of course affects this.
5 The question of the qualified personnel,
6 qualified commanding personnel, is of crucial
7 importance. And that applied to all three armies
8 regarding the organisation and formation of all armies,
9 especially at the initial stage in 1992.
10 It was difficult to apply the system of
11 leadership and command, but it was applied because it
12 cannot be any other way. In spite of the differences,
13 it was difficult to apply in those cases where the
14 commanders, for some reason, a justified reason, were
15 designated. And the commander may be a civilian as
16 well, if somebody appointed him to that particular
17 duty.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, if we look at the theory,
19 then the HVO rules at that time, if we juxtapose them
20 to JNA rules, also upheld the same standards, but in
21 practice these principles could not be upheld at the
22 same level, because on the one hand we had an army
23 which was developing its structure, which had been
24 developing its structure for 40 years, and the latter
25 had been in existence for only one year.
1A. Yes, that's quite true. But we were all
2 faced with problems of that kind, that we appointed
3 commanders by their full name, even if they were not
4 professional officers or soldiers until that time.
5 But in all these organisations and formations
6 that we had, there were also career soldiers,
7 professional soldiers, who lent a hand to these
8 people. And schools and courses began shortly
9 afterwards through the HVO, the Army of BH and
10 elsewhere; that is, courses to train such people. That
11 was the process and that was quite a natural
12 operation.
13 So that is true; it is quite true that it was
14 difficult to apply in practice the leadership and
15 command system as it is postulated by theory. But our
16 rules also say, and I can see that it was everywhere,
17 that ignorance does not relieve your responsibility.
18 That is the certain rules. It does not relieve you of
19 responsibility, regardless of what he is talking
20 about. In our practice, we often said that. Somebody
21 says, "I'm not a lawyer. I didn't know this or that."
22 Q. Excuse me. Witness, I must ask you, and I
23 will try to cut my questions short, and I should also
24 like you -- to ask you to be concise. I do not wish to
25 interrupt you, but, still, could you please take care?
1Yesterday you spoke about your personal
2 experience as regards the military police. You are an
3 infantryman, aren't you?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What do you know about the military police,
6 in theory?
7 A. In practice, our unit often included the
8 military police unit.
9 Q. Were you a commander?
10 A. No. I was the commander of the brigade
11 staff, but within my personnel we also had a military
12 police unit.
13 Q. Yesterday you said, and I quote:
14 "The military police reluctantly conducts
15 defence operations."
16 You presented that as your personal
17 experience.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So was the military police or any other
20 unit -- does the military police or any other unit do
21 what it likes or what it is ordered to do?
22 A. Well, they do what they're ordered to do, but
23 they're special units: reconnaissance, military
24 police, subversive, and so on and so forth.
25 In principle they were treated as units which
1could do -- which was beyond some other units. In that
2 sense they were some special units, and, therefore,
3 they did what --
4 Q. But, otherwise, they are also subjected and
5 bound to comply with the orders they're issued?
6 A. Yes, of course.
7 Q. And is it within the terms of reference of
8 the military police in wartime -- and in peacetime as
9 well, but in wartime perhaps more -- providing security
10 of the command post? Is that an important task of the
11 military police; that is, are they there to provide the
12 security for documents, for the records, and the
13 commander? Briefly.
14 A. Yes, it is one of its duties.
15 Q. I went through the rules that you submitted,
16 and I could see it says, on page 33 of the document:
17 "Military police in wartime carries out the
18 tasks as follows: (A) ..."
19 First it says:
20 "Directly provide the security the command
21 post, the commander of the military unit, and
22 institution in -- at its seat or when -- or on the
23 move, and military couriers who carry military
24 documents of the highest confidentiality."
25 Is that it?
1A. Yes, of course, but I did not really list all
2 the tasks, but I think I say somewhere -- and all the
3 other orders issued it. That, I think, go for all the
4 armies in the world.
5 Q. But regardless of its other activities, this
6 is also one of the very important tasks of the military
7 police, which cannot --
8 A. Yes. Yes, it is one of the regular tasks of
9 the military police.
10 Q. Witness, you enclosed with your expert
11 opinion an example of an order for -- of an attack
12 order, and I believe you have it with you, a fragment
13 of it.
14 A. Yes. Yes, a fragment.
15 Q. So could you please help me to briefly go
16 through these general principles of an attack order?
17 Witness, tell me -- it is page 216 of your document?
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 Q. Here you give us a fragment and you begin
20 with item 4 of such an attack order.
21 Now, according to these definitions -- that
22 is, which forces, which directions, which objectives --
23 and we recognise that this is an attack order, even if
24 we did not have a heading which said that.
25 A. Absolutely.
1Q. So it is quite true what it says here, that
2 it is an attack on main forces and so on and so forth?
3 A. Yes. I tried to show what a specific combat
4 order would look like.
5 Q. Then item 5. Item 5, you also say what this
6 particular mission of the 1st Company looks like.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Then item 6 for the 2nd Company; and item 7,
9 3rd company.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And we see the objective of the attack,
12 because we have directions of their movement?
13 A. Yes. It is a complete pattern, model of what
14 an order should look like.
15 Q. Now, my question is: Why didn't you also
16 show us a defence order?
17 A. Well, because it is identical. This thing is
18 quite identical.
19 Q. But what is the difference?
20 A. Well, the only difference is that it says
21 "defence" instead of "attack." So here he says -- and
22 the defence order here says the area of attack, and it
23 will say area of attack, and it will say the area of
24 defence. So that would be the only distinction. And
25 just as the combat operations, the role and place of
1the commander, they're always the same, regardless of
2 whether it's attack or defence.
3 Q. So could you briefly explain what would a
4 defence order look like?
5 A. Well, if you have them here, I can go through
6 all these items -- there's seven -- if you like. So
7 instead of "armoured unit in the area of attack," it
8 will say the same unit in the area of defence, the
9 depth, the width of the front, and the mission.
10 Q. And what does it mean when an order says
11 preparedness at such-and-such hour on a particular
12 date?
13 A. It means, in all cases, in all instances,
14 that a unit must be prepared for that task at a given
15 time, but it may happen that this particular mission
16 begins later. But that is a set time by which I, as a
17 commander, must prepare my unit so that it can set off
18 to carry out its mission. But whether we shall set off
19 to conduct that mission, that may be changed by my
20 superior, and, say, instead of 6.00, it will start at
21 7.00, or for some reason, objective reasons, it will
22 start earlier. But that, of course, you transmit that
23 change down the chain of command.
24 Q. So in other words, all the combat -- all the
25 things have to be completed and the unit must be fully
1combat-prepared and waiting for the sign to go into an
2 operation.
3 A. Yes. That is what is done by professional
4 soldiers, and they know that. Sometimes they do not
5 even write down the preparedness, and that is not a
6 mistake, but that is basically what preparedness
7 means.
8 MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I should only
9 briefly like to go through documents we were shown
10 yesterday. So could you please -- could we go into
11 private session, please, for a short while?
12 [Private session]
13 (redacted)
14 (redacted)
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 (redacted)
18 (redacted)
19 (redacted)
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12217 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12218 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12219 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 page 12220 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1(redacted)
2 (redacted)
3 (redacted)
4 (redacted)
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 [Open session]
12 MR. PAVKOVIC:
13 Q. Today, Witness, when asked by the
14 Prosecution, you analysed documents in Annex A and
15 marked as AD1 to AD6, and you said that you were
16 reading there the signature of the commander, and you
17 mentioned his name. You do not know if that is the
18 signature of the person indicated here as the commander
19 of that company?
20 A. Quite true. I have never seen that person.
21 I've never seen his signature.
22 Q. You said that these documents AD2, AD3, and
23 AD4, that these were not combat orders?
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are sorry;
25 they could not hear the witness's answer.
1JUDGE CASSESE: Could you please answer this
2 question?
3 A. Yes, yes. Perhaps you did not hear it. I
4 apologise. The first three documents -- these first
5 documents are not combat orders; they are orders
6 relative to disciplinary responsibility.
7 MR. PAVKOVIC:
8 Q. And the document AD5, even if it says that it
9 is minutes, you established -- you asserted that it was
10 an order?
11 A. Quite right. It cannot be minutes of
12 anything. So this is an example. As soon as you
13 see -- as soon as you see the words "odredjujem" or
14 "odlucujem," it means, "I thereby determine, or order,
15 or I decide." As soon as you have these three words,
16 "I command, I order, I decide," then it is an order.
17 Q. That is from your point of view?
18 A. No. That is from the point of view of
19 everybody.
20 Q. You mean from the point of view of the
21 doctrine?
22 A. Yes. Once again, every soldier will do
23 that.
24 Q. Yes, but other people --
25 A. Yes, with that, of course, a reservation. I
1mean -- but a soldier would know that.
2 Q. Yes, but a person who is not a professional
3 soldier may do that out of sheer ignorance?
4 A. I already told you -- I mean, it may -- it
5 may happen so, and even in mathematics, sometimes the
6 solution is not correct but it gives you the best
7 result. But what it says here, this is an order,
8 because it says "designate here," and this was in how
9 many -- with the order of the commander of the
10 4th Battalion. So he could not do anything else.
11 So this is an order really, because it does
12 say here, "Pursuant to the order of the commander."
13 You told me to carry out this particular task, and then
14 I contact the immediate executors and tell them to do
15 that.
16 Q. Right. But it, nevertheless, says here that
17 it is nothing but a list.
18 A. The list is only a preamble, but we see where
19 these soldiers are going to. So this list is -- the
20 list could have been an annex to the document. The
21 list could have been an annex to the order; that is,
22 the order could have come down to only the sentence.
23 "The soldiers are going to reinforce Travnik," and
24 that could have been the order, the whole of the order,
25 and then attached to it could have been the list of
1these people here.
2 Q. I have only one question more. Will you
3 please look at the document under A6, and that is the
4 document of the 8th of April, 1993.
5 Could you please confirm it for us that this
6 document does not show how long will this unit be
7 attached to the commander of the 2nd Company?
8 A. I believe I did confirm that I could not see
9 that period of time. One sees when it is to be -- when
10 it is being attached to the commander of the
11 2nd Company, but I could not read anywhere for how long
12 it would be attached to it. It does not appear here.
13 Q. Will you tell us, please, when was this order
14 issued?
15 A. On the 8th of April, 1993. And on the 8th of
16 April. So it should have been before 12.00. Before
17 12.00, sometime in the morning hours, so that this
18 company -- so that this unit could carry out this task;
19 that is, the unit must be prepared to carry out its
20 task on this day when the order is issued.
21 Q. Thank you very much.
22 MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I have no
23 further questions for this witness.
24 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Pavkovic.
25 So we now take the usual 30-minute break, and then we
1resume with Counsel Radovic, Susak, and Puliselic.
2 We'll adjourn now.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE CASSESE: We will resume with Counsel
6 Radovic. May I ask Counsel Radovic, Counsel Susak and
7 Counsel Puliselic to try to be as brief as possible,
8 because we would like to start with the next witness,
9 if possible. And then at the end of this testimony we
10 will do some planning for the future, and you will see
11 why we are keen to move on quickly.
12 Counsel Radovic.
13 MR. RADOVIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Cross-examined by Mr. Radovic:
15 Q. My name is Ranko Radovic. I am one of the
16 Defence counsel of the accused Zoran Kupreskic, as the
17 first defendant. I will first start with the documents
18 that the Prosecutor showed you, and I would like to ask
19 you to have a look at AD8. We are talking about the
20 order issued on the 15th of April at 10.00.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Have you found it?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In the upper left-hand corner it says where
25 this order came from. So could you please give us the
1place that this order came from?
2 A. The command headquarters of the operative
3 zone of Central Bosnia forward, the command post -- oh,
4 forward command post. Yes, forward command post.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 A. Forward command post, Vitez.
7 Q. Tell me, operative zone, that's in the HVO.
8 Which formation was that? Was it like a corps?
9 A. It was a formation similar to a corps; a
10 division, a corps, approximately that rank, that
11 level.
12 Q. But it was below the level of operative --
13 what was below the level of operative zone?
14 A. It was battalions and brigades.
15 Q. Please look at the right-hand side -- in the
16 upper right-hand corner, "defence military secret."
17 A. "Strictly confidential."
18 Q. What does it mean when it says "defence
19 military secret, strictly confidential" on a document?
20 A. That means that that document is handed over
21 only to persons who are in charge. That is to say that
22 only persons who are in charge within the chain of
23 command are supposed to familiarise themselves with
24 it.
25 Q. Could you please explain this. It starts
1from the command of the operative zone or a corps, and
2 then who would be the person in charge who would get
3 this order?
4 A. Well, it says here who it was addressed to.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please stop
6 overlapping the witness, says the interpreter.
7 A. It is customary that it is sent from the
8 operative zone to the brigade, and from the brigade to
9 the battalion; that is, within the operative brigade.
10 But it can also go independently to an independent
11 battalion.
12 Q. Very well. To which level of command would
13 this first order go?
14 A. This first order should go to the first
15 level. That is the principle. That should be received
16 by the commander of the brigade and commander of the
17 independent battalion.
18 Q. What about this first order? Would the
19 brigade commander give it further to battalions, or
20 not, or can you not give a definite answer to this?
21 A. In principle, in principle, this order in
22 this form would not go further from brigade commander.
23 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. President, mea culpa. I
24 did not ask for a private session and I started with
25 this document.
1JUDGE CASSESE: I was aware of that, but I
2 thought that you would not mention specifics of this
3 document.
4 MR. RADOVIC: I repent.
5 JUDGE CASSESE: All right. So you wish us to
6 go into private session?
7 MR. RADOVIC: Yes.
8 [Private session]
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 (redacted)
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 (redacted)
18 (redacted)
19 (redacted)
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 (redacted)
24 (redacted)
25 (redacted)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 pages 12229-12242 redacted – private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1(redacted)
2 [Open session]
3 MR. RADOVIC:
4 Q. You said that you worked for the general
5 headquarters and that you were always kept abreast of
6 all the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if I understood
7 you properly.
8 A. Yes. It was as of September 1993 -- or,
9 rather, 16th of August, 1993.
10 Q. But right at the beginning of the war, would
11 you know what was the position of Croat units or, say,
12 HVO, in the Vitez area? Or perhaps a direct question:
13 Were these units encircled, surrounded at some point?
14 A. By whom?
15 Q. Encircled by Muslim armed forces.
16 A. In early 1992, in the beginning of 1992,
17 there was no need to analyse whether they were
18 surrounded by anyone.
19 Q. No. But let's just talk about the end of
20 1992.
21 A. We can only talk about the time of the
22 conflict.
23 Q. Right. Tell us.
24 A. Well, on the ground and in the maps, some
25 units of both were partly surrounded; that is, a part
1of Vitez, a part of Busovaca, a part of Kiseljak. But
2 likewise, both of them -- or, rather, they were
3 alternatively semi-encircled or encircled. Now, I
4 would have to show you --
5 Q. Right, right. But a British officer said
6 that in Old Vitez, Muslim forces were surrounded;
7 around them was the HVO, and the HVO was also
8 surrounded, so that it all looked like that shooting
9 target?
10 A. Yes. And there were very many cases of that,
11 in Zepce, in --
12 Q. Right. But what I'm interested in is Vitez.
13 Is that correct? Was that British officer correct?
14 A. Well, they were all semi-surrounded.
15 Q. But tell us, the concentration of HVO troops,
16 apart from Vitez, was there one at Kiseljak?
17 A. The HVOs, you mean?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. Yes, there was.
20 Q. And will you now, please, look at this large
21 map and show us Vitez and Kiseljak and their location?
22 A. Kiseljak is right here [indicates].
23 Q. It doesn't seem to be --
24 A. No, this is the larger -- this is an aerial
25 photograph and enlargement, so perhaps it's not here.
1Q. All right. All right. Never mind, then.
2 Excuse me.
3 So these two places where we had
4 concentrations of HVO forces, was there a road
5 communication between them?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then this road which linked the two
8 groupings of HVO forces, if I can put that way, was of
9 strategic importance for the HVO?
10 A. Well, it depends how you look at it. Yes, it
11 was of strategic importance, and no, it wasn't. But
12 yes, rather.
13 Q. On the basis of the military tactics or,
14 rather, strategy, is the separation of enemy forces and
15 then the destruction of individual groups, thus the
16 separating?
17 A. Yes. So you see how my Bilic [phoen]
18 training, education is still very active. Well, I
19 spent there ten years, and you learn the tactics quite
20 well.
21 Q. Right. But let us move on to another
22 question. You did give us an answer to that, but I
23 should like to really lay stress on it, because we saw
24 a film, and your answer -- your response to it will be
25 different than the author's.
1At the time of the SFRY and the JNA, a
2 reservist took his weapons back home with him.
3 THE INTERPRETER: The witness nods.
4 MR. RADOVIC:
5 Q. Are you quite sure about that?
6 A. I'm sure about it, and I was with the JNA
7 until 1992.
8 Q. I'm asking you this because one of the
9 witnesses for the Prosecution, who made a film and told
10 us that people with weapons were issued with those
11 weapons as reservists and went back with them home?
12 A. Now -- but you have to distinguish --
13 Q. I'm referring to the JNA period.
14 A. Yes. The Serbs were issued them, that is
15 true. I was the head of the brigade staff, and I know
16 that that is true. So I know that this -- I know this
17 to be the truth. But it wasn't the case before 1990.
18 Q. And the Muslims, the reservists, did they
19 ever -- were they ever issued with weapons?
20 A. No. No, never, and we agree on this point.
21 Q. Croats were issued with those weapons after
22 the war in Croatia?
23 A. No. That is another matter.
24 Q. I'm asking whether Muslims reservists were
25 issued that.
1A. No.
2 Q. Right. So only the Serbs went back home with
3 their weapons and the others did not?
4 A. I did write something about this, which were
5 the strategic activities at the territorial-defence
6 level, and I wrote it down, who was issued with what
7 weapons.
8 Q. Yes, I heard, that, but we heard it from a
9 witness, and he was supposed to be an objective witness
10 and yet he presented us with an unobjective fact.
11 Now, as regards the military tactic. Is surprise one
12 of the permissible methods of warfare?
13 A. Yes, it is. That is one of the principles.
14 The higher degree of surprise, the effect, the results
15 are better. That is natural in combat operations. And
16 everybody tried to do that. Who managed to catch the
17 enemy by surprise, he achieved results.
18 Q. And that is probably part of the history of
19 warfare, isn't it, because the history of warfare, you
20 also learn about successful surprise tactics that are
21 taught. For instance, the attack of Normandy was one
22 of such cases. And you must have learned?
23 A. Yes, those examples of catching the enemy
24 unawares. Something which is a possible example of
25 tactics.
1Q. In your analysis you also dealt on the system
2 of recruitment, of reserve system and the mobilisation
3 system. Could you please tell us: After the military
4 service, after the regular military service, one became
5 a reservist. Now, at the moment when one becomes a
6 reservist, as of that moment that person is a civilian
7 or a military?
8 A. That person is a civilian doing his whatever,
9 regular civilian job.
10 Q. Until?
11 A. Until he is called to join his unit.
12 Q. So we agree on that point too. And now, as
13 regards the mobilisation. Very briefly, tell us the
14 types of mobilisation, but very briefly, and then I
15 will give you an example and ask you whether
16 mobilisation is possible in that way.
17 A. Well, right. There is the secret and public
18 mobilisation, so that was the classification, and that
19 is according to one classification. And there is also
20 regular or surprise mobilisation, in part or in whole.
21 I said yesterday how people are called up may vary.
22 Q. Right. We don't have to go into that. I
23 will give you an example, and that example is from the
24 Bosnia conflict. That is not in a stable -- not from a
25 stable state, which has existed for years; it is
1summons in an unstable situation for an army which is
2 in the making yet. And is it possible for the military
3 police, if I -- if I seem to be leading, do, please,
4 interrupt me, but perhaps this is the simplest way and
5 we can waste least time. Is it possible that two or
6 three military policemen come to somebody's home, just
7 pick people up and take them to the front line?
8 A. Yes, that is a possible solution if a soldier
9 were -- received a summons and failed to respond. So
10 if I got this summons and, however, did not respond,
11 did not report to my unit, and the military police is
12 bound, or whatever is the authority, to come and take
13 me to the -- to my unit.
14 Q. But you are referring to the regular state of
15 affairs. But if there was no summons in writing, can
16 then the military police come and pick up people?
17 A. Well, that can happen also, but the scope of
18 it and how often it happened, I really don't know. But
19 in practice that is of course possible, simply because
20 in the beginning there was a lot of arbitrariness
21 about.
22 Q. So we agree on all the points that we talk
23 about. Very well.
24 Now, I should like the usher to show the
25 witness P135.
1I have the text in Croatian -- rather, in
2 Bosniak. You see, do you have the Croatian or, rather,
3 the Bosniak text in front you? Well, no, it is
4 Croatian, because of what the document is. It is the
5 Croatian Defence Council.
6 So this is the replenishment of the Vitez
7 Brigade. That is what it is about. What I should like
8 to know is what conclusions would you draw from item 3,
9 3, which reads: "Between the 16th of April to the 28th
10 of April they were mobilised --" I shall begin at the
11 beginning. "Between the 16th of April until the 28th
12 of April, '93, they mobilised 498 conscripts as a whole
13 and they were actively included in HVO units in
14 addition to the regular personnel of the Vitez
15 Brigade."
16 And now we shall do a full stop here and
17 interpret this sentence. Do you agree that this text
18 seems to indicate that there was a regular crew, if I
19 may call it that, of Vitez Brigade, without people
20 mobilised, and when the war broke out, that this
21 brigade was replenished with reservists? Is that what
22 transpires from this sentence?
23 A. I could interpret it in two ways. I have
24 nothing against it. I am giving you my
25 interpretation. Well, one way is that the structure of
1the brigade, in terms of organisation, was below the
2 number of soldiers who were at that point with a
3 brigade. That is, that there were more soldiers in the
4 brigade than would be warranted by its structure.
5 And another interpretation is -- now, what
6 this term was supposed to mean, one would really have
7 to look into that.
8 Q. As it says here -- you have the next passage,
9 which perhaps may expand on this. The next sentence
10 says: "The largest number of military conscripts
11 mobilised after the first day of the conflict were
12 immediately included in the first line of defence.
13 They are used as replacements on the lines after the
14 first assault; that is, they are gradually included as
15 replacements for the soldiers from the mobile
16 personnel."
17 Now, could you tell me, does it transpire,
18 clearly from this text, which was -- which part of the
19 army participated in the first strike?
20 A. It was the members, the brigade numbers.
21 Q. No, but it doesn't say brigade here. It says
22 "replacement for soldiers from the mobile personnel."
23 So is that active? In the former JNA, were they all
24 soldiers under contract, or who were they?
25 A. Well, now, I cannot really say whether those
1were soldiers under contract, as it says here, because
2 we did not have any professional men in the former JNA,
3 except for that particular category -- a few soldiers
4 are under contract -- and towards the end I believe it
5 was first implemented in practice sometime in 1990 or
6 end of 1990. But now we do not have that particular
7 category of persons and the brigade could not be
8 replenished with those men at that time.
9 I simply think that this was a brigade in the
10 making on the basis of a particular structure or
11 pattern, and it had its subordinate units, which were
12 replenished. But there was a mobilisation; additional
13 mobilisation was carried out because of the situation
14 on the ground.
15 Q. Yeah, right. So we agree. And now, will you
16 please tell me -- I mean, these are your conjectures,
17 as a matter of fact, because you did not really keep
18 abreast of that --
19 A. No, I didn't. Really, I do know some things,
20 but --
21 Q. And now let us move onto the Territorial
22 Defence. When was the system of -- when was the chain
23 of command established in the Territorial Defence?
24 Could you give us the time frame?
25 A. I don't understand you. What do you mean
1from below up?
2 Q. What was the Territorial Defence -- that is,
3 the commanding and the commanded, did they exist in the
4 Territorial Defence? Was there a chain of command
5 established in the Territorial Defence?
6 A. Well, as soon as a wartime unit is mobilised
7 -- and TO units were mostly wartime units, so some of
8 the TO units only had their offices. That is a part of
9 the command which existed in peacetime already, and all
10 the rest were reservists; that is, either reserve
11 soldiers and reserve officers or NCOs. Until the unit
12 -- until such time as when the unit was mobilised,
13 that it fully formed the reserve officer, the reserve
14 had no commanding authority. And after a unit was
15 formed, then there was -- then all this disappeared
16 between an active reserve soldier or an active reserve
17 officer and an active officer or an active duty
18 soldier.
19 Q. So TO units which then grew into the BH army,
20 were they formed on the basis of the territorial
21 principle; that is, all the inhabitants of a village in
22 one unit?
23 A. Why, yes. Those units were also formed on
24 the basis of the territorial principle.
25 Q. So, right. We know what the territorial
1principle is. I only wanted this to be confirmed. And
2 those units which were formed on the basis of the
3 territorial principle -- that is, one village, one
4 unit, never mind which -- those soldiers or militia men
5 or home guards were put up in special building
6 facilities; that is, barracks with training grounds and
7 whatnot, or did everybody go back home every time?
8 A. Well, specifically, I did have an opportunity
9 to see that. And with the HVO in Konjic or Fojnica and
10 other places, Mr. Something, I don't know what his name
11 was, they were using the schools, and as a rule those
12 units would be put up in those schools. Or perhaps
13 some business premises, such as warehouses, those units
14 would be there.
15 But until then, the largest part of the units
16 were at home, that is, at home. But by mid '93 they
17 began to set up branches -- began to set up something
18 else. Well, barracks. Not always proper, true
19 barracks such as in Kiseljak. But there were no
20 barracks. They were at home. As a rule, in schools,
21 or warehouses or in barracks.
22 Q. But they were also at home, weren't they?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, what I should like to know next is you
25 said the BH army had considerable trouble with
1supplies. And this trouble -- did these supplies also
2 cover uniforms?
3 A. Yes, all the material, resources.
4 Q. But I am interested in uniforms, because
5 uniforms are very important in this regard. I should
6 repeat my question. Was there a shortage of uniforms?
7 A. Yes, sir, there was a shortage of uniforms
8 too.
9 Q. Were there such instances when BH army
10 members would wear civilian clothes on front line
11 towards the Serbs?
12 A. In the beginning, yes.
13 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. President, thank you very
14 much for your patience. I have no further questions.
15 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Susak.
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Susak:
17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
18 Mr. Dzambasovic?
19 A. Dzambasovic.
20 Q. All right, Dzambasovic. I am the Defence
21 counsel for Drago Josipovic. Since we were in the same
22 military formation while doing our military service at
23 Tomoglavac, I think we are going to understand each
24 other better. You talked about attack in your
25 expertise, and you say an attack can be carried out
1from a circular or semi-circular base. Could you
2 please tell me what that means?
3 A. There are different forms of attack. Frontal
4 attack means that an attack is carried frontally. Then
5 an attack from the flanks, that is the attack comes
6 from either the right or the left flank, and it can be
7 either the east or the west in relation to a particular
8 facility. So that's on the flanks. Then also an
9 attack can come from the rear -- well, depending on the
10 situation. If the positions of your unit are such that
11 you can from -- you can carry out an attack from
12 several different points, then that is better.
13 So then if you create an overall picture, you
14 see whether it's a circular or semi-circular base. So
15 you've encircled someone and then from that
16 encirclement you carry out, you launch an attack.
17 Q. And now in relation to this I am going to put
18 another question to you. Can defence be organised or
19 carried out from a circular or semi-circular basis?
20 A. Yes. If you are encircled and then the
21 combat operation that should follow is a breakthrough
22 through that encirclement.
23 Q. When a circular or semi-circular space is
24 used for an attack or a defence, can diversionary units
25 be brought in as well?
1A. If the conditions are right, this can be done
2 in any situation.
3 Q. Well, now we've reached the following point:
4 How is a semi-circular line established of attack or of
5 defence?
6 A. If I could get a piece of paper, I could draw
7 it for you and then everybody could see it. Could I
8 please get a piece of paper? I could draw a diagram
9 for you.
10 What you see on your monitors now is the
11 following: If this is the enemy in the green square,
12 that would be a semi-circular base attack,
13 approximately. If we were now to add the following,
14 that an attack could be carried out from this side too,
15 or from some other side too, then that is an attack
16 from a circular base.
17 Q. Mr. Witness, could you please look at the
18 diagram you drew for us once again.
19 A. Very well.
20 Q. Wait a minute. I have a question for you. I
21 can't see the diagram yet. Fine. Look at this arrow
22 that is closer to you. Yes, that's the south. What
23 does this line mean -- no, not south; the arrow down
24 there closer to you. What does this line that you drew
25 denote?
1A. That means the direction.
2 Q. And this is the unit. And this semi-circular
3 line, is that a semi-circular or a circular line?
4 A. That is the deployment of units on the
5 ground, and it may differ.
6 Q. All right. Now, I am going to give you an
7 example and you are going to help me understand this.
8 There is a conflict in a village, and this conflict
9 moved one kilometre to the north, for example. And
10 where it originally broke out, this conflict, there
11 were houses, houses that were scattered around, only a
12 few Muslim and Croat houses. Where the Muslim and
13 Croat houses were, those that were scattered about,
14 they are adjacent to a territory where there was no
15 war, no conflict, and then the conflict extends
16 further. How do you interpret this, that not a single
17 Muslim was killed, not a single Croat was killed, and
18 there were even some officers of Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 there; they all remained alive and they were
20 military-aged men? How do you explain this: that in
21 one corner of the village these houses remained intact
22 and that there was no conflict? Is it because of the
23 distance involved? Or if we look at the scattered
24 houses and then on the other part of the -- in the
25 other part of the village where there are many more
1houses, there is a clearing between the two. So what
2 is your opinion? How did this happen or why did this
3 happen?
4 A. It is very difficult to answer. Everything
5 you said can be true, and, on the other hand, it need
6 not be true. This can be outside the zone of
7 responsibility. That is one possibility. Then it may
8 be that it was not important, in terms of the
9 assignment, because it is not a significant target. It
10 may be that somebody reached an agreement and said, "We
11 are not going to do anything. Let us go," et cetera,
12 et cetera. So there are several possibilities and
13 every one of them can either be true or untrue.
14 Q. But I am laying special emphasis on the fact
15 that nobody got killed, nobody got hurt, nobody was
16 shot on that day from any ethnic group, no houses were
17 torched, nothing happened there.
18 A. If this was within the zone of
19 responsibility, it is strange, but if it is outside the
20 zone of responsibility, it's natural. But now I really
21 don't know.
22 Q. Could you interpret it as follows: that
23 there was less interest involved, less importance, that
24 there should be no conflict there?
25 A. Whatever you say in this case can be either
1true or untrue.
2 Q. Very well. Now, I am going to move on to
3 another question.
4 As for civilian defence, since the rules were
5 taken over from the former JNA, you said here that
6 civilian protection, civilian defence, was organised in
7 headquarters, units and special representatives. Who
8 was the special representative?
9 A. A special representative was in the local
10 community, this lowest social political community. He
11 was in charge of these particular matters; that is to
12 say, if there was a natural disaster, an earthquake, et
13 cetera, he should mobilise people; that is, that
14 individual who was called in different ways and
15 different places. But this was the lowest level of
16 setting up this civilian protection.
17 Q. So you are saying that that's the lowest
18 level of civilian protection?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What are the tasks of the representative for
21 civilian protection?
22 A. So we are talking about the lowest level;
23 that is to say, two or three villages. So if, from his
24 superior, he receives an order to engage a civilian
25 defence unit, to act as follows: that is to say, to
1give call-up papers to civilian protection unit members
2 and to set up a unit within this area of civilian
3 protection, and then he should act in accordance with
4 the tasks that he received. So that will be his
5 authority, because that is this lowest level. But then
6 it went further on upwards, towards the municipality,
7 et cetera. There were different levels.
8 Q. Just one more question. This representative
9 refers to the civilian authorities in the
10 municipality. For example, does he refer to the
11 defence department of Vitez, for example? I mean, in
12 view of the organisation.
13 A. No, he is not attached to the defence
14 department of Vitez, this representative of the
15 civilian defence. However, civilian defence units
16 carried out tasks for defence purposes, those that were
17 not of a combat nature.
18 Q. Very well. Could you please tell me now: In
19 war, or immediately after war, what are the obligations
20 of civilian defence? In the immediate aftermath of a
21 war or, for example, during a war, is one of the tasks
22 to take care of the situation on the ground?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you please tell us something more about
25 that?
1A. Civilian defence units are used for the
2 consolidation of the front line and the terrain. This
3 is an expert notion that is used, an expert term. That
4 is to say, to prevent the outbreak of contagious
5 diseases. And as for the front line, it means taking
6 care of the wounded, of the dead, of persons and
7 animals and buildings. That is to say that if a
8 building was destroyed --
9 Q. So one of the tasks is to take care of all
10 the dead bodies that are in that area?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Do you agree with that?
13 A. Yes, yes. That's part of their task, yes.
14 Q. Very well. Can this be considered to be
15 humane work, since the war had stopped much earlier?
16 If it's no longer a battleground, can this be
17 considered to be a very humane effort? For example,
18 taking care of dead bodies, removing dead bodies, all
19 the things that you mentioned, can this be considered
20 to be a humane effort?
21 A. Well, it's certainly a humane effort if none
22 of this has been taken care of. If there are
23 authorities that are in charge of that, then it's a
24 different matter altogether.
25 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, let's move on.
1I'm going to ask you something about war, if there is a
2 conflict, and if one side in a war loses.
3 The side that lost the war, does it surrender
4 its weapons or not, or can an agreement be reached in
5 this respect, how arms would be surrendered?
6 A. Perhaps I did not fully understand you, but
7 I'll try to tell you the following: When combat
8 operations cease, or when a war ends, we believe that
9 one side was defeated, for example. Now, whether it's
10 going to surrender its weapons or not, that depends on
11 international agreements if international factors are
12 involved.
13 So, for example, there is this latest example
14 of Kosovo. KFOR gave a deadline for the Kosovo army to
15 disarm, so that is one way of doing it, how one acts
16 after combat activities cease.
17 If international factors are not involved in
18 the process of peace or of building the peace, then it
19 depends on the internal situation; that is to say, how
20 the military and political leadership is going to act.
21 That's what it depends on, whether somebody is going to
22 hand over their weapons or not.
23 Q. So it depends on the decisions that will be
24 reached by the two conflicting parties; is that right?
25 A. Yes, that's right.
1Q. Very well. Now, my last question would be:
2 Do you know anything about exchanges, either of
3 population, either of one ethnic group or another, at
4 what level this was carried out? Was this done at the
5 level of the military authorities or civilian
6 authorities? And could you tell us at which levels
7 these things were done, the exchange of prisoners of
8 war, civilians, et cetera?
9 A. Well, that was organised from the top; that
10 is to say, from the level of the state. There were
11 official authorities that were involved in such
12 matters. In practice, in the practice that prevailed,
13 I don't know whether it went to the municipal level or
14 whether specifically -- I don't want to make a
15 mistake. I don't know whether it was the municipal
16 level or lower than that, but there were exchanges that
17 were carried out within units too.
18 For example, you and I reach an agreement,
19 and we do something that we agreed upon. So --
20 Q. And could agreements be reached at the level
21 of municipalities?
22 A. Well, yes, I think so. I don't know any
23 specific examples now, but I think they did it.
24 Q. All right. So, for example, the
25 municipalities of Vitez and Zenica, do you know
1anything about this?
2 A. Well, I cannot give you a specific example.
3 I don't know about this. I know that in Blaskic, for
4 example, that somebody from Travnik was in charge of
5 this exchange, but as for this particular case that you
6 mentioned, I cannot give you an answer, because I'm not
7 familiar with it.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dzambasovic.
9 MR. SUSAK: Thank you. I have no further
10 questions.
11 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Puliselic?
12 MR. PULISELIC: Mr. President, I have no
13 further questions because they have been exhausted.
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you.
16 Counsel Slokovic-Glumac?
17 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Thank you,
18 Mr. President. I only wanted to draw your attention to
19 this map which was already tendered. This is a map
20 that was admitted as D9/2, and, therefore, I think it
21 will be unnecessary for us to call in any other experts
22 with this regard. And it's going to be very brief.
23 Since this is the only copy that is here in
24 the courtroom right now, I would like to ask the usher
25 to show the witness this map. And we got this map from
1the Office of the Prosecutor right now. That is to say
2 that the map that was tendered is not in here right now
3 because it's being photocopied.
4 Cross-examined by Ms. Slokovic-Glumac:
5 Q. Mr. Witness, please, could you have a look at
6 this? This is the deployment of forces.
7 MR. BLAXILL: Excuse my interruption for just
8 a moment. Excuse my interruption. I have been advised
9 that this may well have been a document that was
10 introduced or tendered in the course of perhaps closed
11 testimony of a protected witness. In view of, you
12 know, our endeavours to ensure confidentiality in that
13 regard, I'd perhaps just remind my learned friend, and
14 perhaps we could make sure it's handled appropriately
15 now. Sorry to interrupt you.
16 JUDGE CASSESE: All right.
17 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: It was admitted in open
18 session in the Aleksovski case, and now I cannot
19 remember whether it was in open or closed session in
20 this case, but at any rate, we can move into closed
21 session in this part.
22 JUDGE CASSESE: Private session. Private
23 session, yes.
24 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Thank you very much.
25 [Private session]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 pages 12267-12272 redacted private session
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1 (redacted)
2 (redacted)
3 (redacted)
4 (redacted)
5 (redacted)
6 (redacted)
7 (redacted)
8 (redacted)
9 (redacted)
10 (redacted)
11 (redacted)
12 (redacted)
13 (redacted)
14 (redacted)
15 (redacted)
16 (redacted)
17 (redacted)
18 (redacted)
19 (redacted)
20 (redacted)
21 (redacted)
22 (redacted)
23 [Open session]
24 MR. BLAXILL:
25 Q. Just a test. Can you hear me now, Brigadier,
1or can you hear the translation?
2 A. Yes, it's fine now.
3 Q. Yes, sir. In answer to my learned friend
4 Mr. Radovic you made a remark about the issue of
5 weapons to Croats after the war in Croatia. I would
6 ask you just three questions on that.
7 One, is on what knowledge you base that
8 comment; two, if you know how extensive was that arming
9 of obviously non-active Croat persons; and thirdly, do
10 you know when that happened?
11 A. Right. Thank you. When the war broke out
12 and ended in Croatia, on the basis of the agreement
13 concluded by the republics, a part of the armaments was
14 left behind in the barracks in the Republic of Croatia;
15 that is, part of equipment and armament and Varistine
16 [phoen] and all the other barracks where the conditions
17 were all right. And those armaments and equipment were
18 used to equip the Croatian army and the HVO - that's no
19 secret -- and also the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that
20 is, all three of them.
21 The weapons, now, how they came by it, I -- I
22 never dealt with logistics in my life, in my
23 professional career, so I don't know. Some were
24 purchased, some papers were seen, and all of the
25 manners -- how did the logistics people manage? I
1don't know.
2 So that was the beginning and the end of the
3 war in Croatia, and so far then, the Croatian army or,
4 rather, the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, before
5 the Bosniak Muslims and later on the Muslims, also used
6 some of these armaments and equipment from Croatia.
7 Q. And I think just the last item I asked you
8 is: Do you recall, in terms of the date, when that
9 happened? Can you say in months or weeks as to when
10 that happened?
11 A. I know specifically when I was in Konjic,
12 from -- HVO command being Dinko Zebic, Ivica Azinovic
13 who cooperated with me. We cooperated closely. They
14 were issuing some papers to individuals who were
15 involved in the purchase or procurement of these
16 weapons. But how they did it in the territorial
17 Republic of Croatia, I really don't know, but I know it
18 was April/May 1992. At that time armaments were
19 arriving from the Republic of Croatia.
20 How, in that way specifically, I really never
21 learned that, but, you know that -- it was a regular
22 occurrence and that was no secret.
23 Q. Brigadier, thank you very much.
24 MR. BLAXILL: And I'm obliged to you, Your
25 Honours.
1JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Mr. Blaxill. We
2 don't have any questions for the witness.
3 Brigadier Dzambasovic, thank you so much for
4 testifying as an expert witness. You may now be
5 released.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you too.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE CASSESE: Before we move on to our next
9 witness, I would like to tell you how we intend to plan
10 for our future sittings. We very much hope that by
11 Thursday of next week we may finish with the evidence,
12 both the rebuttal witnesses and any rejoinder
13 witnesses, as you know. Then closing arguments will be
14 held in November, the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th of
15 November.
16 You also know that we have already set
17 deadlines for the submissions of written briefs. You
18 may submit either, say, an outline of your closing
19 arguments with references to relevant parts of
20 transcripts or, if you wish, you may submit a
21 fully-fledged written brief on both legal and factual
22 issues.
23 As for the oral arguments, we thought that we
24 would allocate 3 hours and 45 minutes to the
25 Prosecution -- this would be Monday, the 8th of
1November -- an hour and a half to each Defence counsel,
2 except for the Defence counsel of Dragan Papic.
3 There's only Count 1, and he would be allocated one
4 hour. So 1 hour and 30 minutes for all the Defence
5 counsel, for a total of 8 hours and 30 minutes.
6 Of course, Defence Counsel Slokovic-Glumac
7 and Radovic, they can decide how to share the 3 hours.
8 You have together 3 hours. It's for you to decide
9 whether each of you will use an hour and a half or
10 otherwise.
11 But that means that for that purpose, we
12 would have to sit on the 9th and the 10th of November
13 from 8.30 in the morning to 1.30. From 8.30 to 1.30.
14 Only in this way could we have 8 hours and 30 minutes
15 available for Defence counsel. I hope these
16 arrangements are suitable.
17 What about the Prosecution? So you would
18 have three -- all of Monday morning, for a total of 3
19 hours and 45 minutes, because we exclude the breaks,
20 two breaks, one 30-minute break and one 15-minute
21 break.
22 MR. TERRIER: I have no comments, Your
23 Honour.
24 JUDGE CASSESE: And Defence counsel? I see
25 you don't have any objection.
1Of course, it is a maximum. If you speak for
2 less than an hour and a half, it's even better. More
3 so because there's no point in repeating what you may
4 have already put on paper in your written briefs.
5 So we plan, therefore, to finish on the 10th
6 of November by 1.30, and then we will start
7 deliberations. We very much hope to deliver our
8 judgement in January.
9 If you are not too tired, we could now move
10 on and call the next witness. Do you want a 10-minute
11 break? Would you prefer a 10-minute break? No break.
12 Let's go on. Depending on the interpreters because, of
13 course -- I hope the interpreters --
14 MR. TERRIER: It might be good to have a
15 break. It's extremely hot in this courtroom.
16 JUDGE CASSESE: We have already complained
17 twice against the warmth, but the technicians don't
18 seem to pay any attention to our requests. So let's
19 have a 10-minute break. So we resume at quarter to one
20 and go on until 1.30.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.
23 THE REGISTRAR: The expert witness's
24 testimony will be D41/4.
25 MR. TERRIER: Mr. President, the following
1witness asked for protective measures, which would be a
2 closed session and the granting of a pseudonym, and the
3 defence has no objection.
4 JUDGE CASSESE: All right, then, the blinds
5 should be drawn.
6 MR. TERRIER: Mr. President, could I take
7 advantage of the time needed to bring the witness in to
8 present the Prosecution's position about the documents
9 that Mrs. Slokovic-Glumac suggested on Monday? I am
10 talking about documents which -- affidavits which
11 reveal the personality of the accused, Kupreskic, and
12 which were given the number D29/1. The Prosecution has
13 no objections at all to those documents being submitted
14 as evidence.
15 But, as regards those documents which were
16 numbered D31/1, I would make the following comment: In
17 the documents, we find in the first place there are
18 documents which relate to incidents that -- incidents
19 of the witness Sakib Ahmic's particular life, and in
20 particular incidents which occurred in '71 and in '79.
21 The Prosecution has no objection to those documents
22 which relate to the professional life of the witness
23 Sakib Ahmic be tendered as evidence for the Tribunal.
24 But the other evidence relate to divorce
25 proceedings which took place in 1985 and which was
1granted in 1986 by a judgement for which we do not have
2 a translation.
3 As regards those documents which deal with
4 the divorce proceedings, I refer to the -- to Rule 75
5 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, protect the
6 privacy of a witness, and the documents which relate
7 to the divorce proceedings have absolutely no
8 relationship --
9 JUDGE CASSESE: We agree with you.
10 MR. TERRIER: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Mr. President, may I
12 just say something? This document was not included in
13 our proposals because it is a private document, but
14 it's not the only reason. The witness, on several
15 occasions, in response to the questions related to the
16 divorce, it is obvious that there were problems between
17 him and his wife, and that alcohol was the problem and
18 that there were beatings, et cetera. So, in response
19 to direct questions, this is related to medical
20 documents that were submitted, whether this witness
21 knew why he was beaten up and why he spent 17 days in
22 hospital. He said that he did not know. But it is
23 obvious from these records that he was beaten up by his
24 sons.
25 It is not that we want to go into the private
1life of the witness, but in response to the direct
2 questions put by the defence, he gave false answers.
3 So that is the only reason why we are questioning his
4 credibility.
5 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes. Thank you. Counsel
6 Susak?
7 MR. SUSAK: Mr. President, I would like the
8 sketch that the previous witness made to be admitted
9 into evidence. That is the sketch relating to attack
10 and defence.
11 JUDGE CASSESE: It has already been admitted
12 into evidence. There's even a number.
13 THE REGISTRAR: The document was tendered.
14 It's D41/4.
15 JUDGE CASSESE: We consider that those
16 documents relating to the proceedings of Mr. Sakib
17 Ahmic are not relevant, so they will not be admitted
18 into evidence. The other ones will be admitted into
19 evidence.
20 I see your point, Counsel Slokovic-Glumac;
21 however, we feel that it's -- they are not relevant.
22 So we can move on to -- so closed session and the
23 witness.
24 [Closed session]
25 (redacted)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 pages 12282-12298 redacted – closed session
14
15
16
17
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
19 at 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on
20 Thursday, the 30th day of September,
21 1999 at 9.00 a.m.
22
23
24
25