1 Friday, 14 January 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Perhaps we should have the witness.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE PARKER: If I could remind you of the affirmation that you
10 made at the commencement of your evidence which still applies.
11 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir.
12 WITNESS: JOHN CROSLAND [Resumed]
13 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Continued]
14 Q. Mr. Crosland if I could have you turn to tab 33 but initially I
15 have some questions following on from what we were discussing yesterday.
16 Mr. Crosland, you recall yesterday that you were explaining to
17 Their Honours the geographical area of command, what you believe to be the
18 geographical area of command of the headquarters at Malisevo; do you
19 recall that?
20 A. I do so, yes.
21 Q. In military concerns what is a geographical area controlled by
22 headquarters called?
23 A. An operational area usually.
24 Q. In your travels around Kosovo, did you come across any other
25 operational areas of control?
1 A. Your Honour, within the -- when we were looking at the whole
2 problem, we discussed amongst various other people connected with looking
3 for these problems and we drew up rough maps of what we thought were the
4 operational areas, some of which were confirmed by other intelligence
5 sources which we were privy to.
6 Q. And these were the operational areas of control of the KLA in
8 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
9 Q. Can you give us one other example of the area other than the area
10 of Malisevo, of an operational area of control within Kosovo?
11 A. The area around Riznik was under the command the Ramus Haradinaj.
12 Q. Is the map there?
13 A. It's not, sir, no.
14 Q. It's at tab 1.
15 A. The areas, Your Honour, I was talking about is the base here just
16 beyond Riznik, and it was thought that this area under Ramus Haradinaj
17 probably went as far as --
18 Q. Could you wait a moment, Mr. Crosland, because the map is not on
19 the ELMO. Could we have the map up, please. Thank you.
20 Could you point it out again. I apologise.
21 A. The area we're dealing with, Your Honours, is based on Riznik or
22 close to Riznik and it was suggested or thought that perhaps this area of
23 operations would stretch as far as Pec including Decani and down to the
24 area of Djakovica.
25 Q. And who is the commander of that area?
1 A. The commander of that area was Ramus Haradinaj, who I met on
2 several occasions.
3 Q. Mr. Crosland, what is an order of battle?
4 A. Your Honours, it's the technical term that military use for the
5 organisation which attempts to show the strength, the numbers of men, the
6 numbers of vehicles, the numbers of weapons, and the ability that
7 particular unit could carry out.
8 Q. Did you -- were you ever able to create an OrBat for the KLA in
10 A. An OrBat was created by outside intelligence agencies which I was
11 a little bit skeptical about personally, but this is the fashionable way
12 of looking at intelligence. And it rather produces, in my opinion, a
13 slightly heavier picture than what actually may be on the ground. I went
14 by what we could see on the ground, the various headquarters that I
15 visited as I indicated yesterday, and we went along in parallel.
16 Q. Can you just indicate to Their Honours again the KLA headquarters
17 that you did visit during your travels around Kosovo?
18 A. Certainly, Your Honours. First of all, the one Ramus Haradinaj is
19 just in the area of Riznik. There was one in the area which is called
20 Jablanica, in this area here. There was another one at Vocnjak. There
21 was one in the Drenica area, in the area here, which is a small village
22 which is not marked. There was a further headquarters east of Kosovska
23 Mitrovica Bajgori. There were further later in the day towards the major
24 town of Podujevo and the villages just in this area here, possibly
25 subservient to Bajgori.
1 In Lapusnik on the main Pristina-Pec road. As we discussed
2 yesterday, the major headquarters or what was perceived to be the major
3 headquarters at Malisevo with a radio station close to the area Crni Lug
4 in the mountains. Another one at Sedlare, and finally down at Crnoljevo
5 on the road from Stimlje, on to Suva Reka, and on to Prizren. There was
6 probably one in the area of Budakovo.
7 Q. And that's all the headquarters that you can remember?
8 A. Yes. I think that's correct, sir, yes.
9 Q. Now, where was the KLA receiving its supplies from for operations
10 in Kosovo?
11 A. As I indicated yesterday, Your Honours, most of the supplies were
12 coming through the corridor from the camps based in Tropolja and
13 Bajram Curi through the Albanian border, but roughly between the area here
14 and Vrbenica at the south. That was the initial area. And subsequently
15 later in the year supplies were starting to come through from the southern
16 borders of -- boundary -- bordering Kosovo and Macedonia.
17 Q. You stated yesterday that you were aware of camps in Albania, in
18 Bajram Curi, in Kukes and Tropolja. What was taking place in those camps
19 as far as you know?
20 A. The information we received was there was basic military training
21 going on and the forward stationing of resupply of ammunition and clothing
22 and weaponry, which would then be ferried in over the mountains or even
23 smuggled in through Vrbenica, the major international boundary on the
25 Q. Just to be clear: Training and resupply of which armed force?
1 A. Of the KLA.
2 Q. We can go to the next telegram. I think this was a telegram that
3 was written by you. It's by Landsman; it's by the Deputy Head of Mission.
4 This is a tour that took place on the 9th of July into Kosovo. Were you
5 on this tour?
6 A. This is with the Kosovo Verification Mission, yes.
7 Q. Were you with them?
8 A. No. I -- I -- with the Ambassador and Mr. Slinn, we briefed them
9 at our embassy. We led them into Kosovo, and the British contingent went
10 to Prizren. And then they did their own thing after they had been given a
11 geographical brief by myself and taken around various areas.
12 Q. Can you tell us anything about this report or not?
13 A. This report on page 2, the UCK controlled the area around
14 Dobro Vodo which is on the main Pec-Pristina road just to the north of the
15 road here.
16 Q. Could you mark that with the highlighter.
17 A. [Marks]. Dobro Vodo had been a long-term collection point for
18 people who had been forced out of their houses. The tour then appears to
19 have gone down towards Djakovica, down this major road here, past
20 Rakovina, which is highlighted, and again there was just the usual
21 destroyed and deserted villages in these areas.
22 Q. And who had destroyed those villages?
23 A. They had been destroyed by the Serbian security forces.
24 Q. Anything else in this report?
25 A. The record says the UCK was seen in the area of Rudnik, to the
1 north here, on the northern route, which again is quite possible out of
2 the Drenica area. Again very isolated areas up here. And again most of
3 the villages around -- on this road from Mitrovica along to Pec, close to
4 Istok, all the villages there had also suffered major damage.
5 Q. By Serbian forces.
6 A. Again by Serbian forces, yes. Further down the page, the UCK at
7 Crnoljevo, which we looked at in detail yesterday. It's on the road from
8 Stimlje down to Suva Reka, and again as I indicated that was another UCK
10 And over the page -- it's called page 5. It's obviously page 3, I
11 think. Wanton damage, and it just reinforces what I've been saying about
12 the amount of damage that was now commonplace throughout Kosovo.
13 Q. And that damage I think was in the Decani-Pec area, wasn't it,
14 that's referring to, on page 5?
15 A. That's correct, yes.
16 Q. The report states that MUP and JSA forces randomly shooting up
17 homes, houses, businesses and pilfering the contents. VJ also involved in
18 further damage to Crnoljevo. Did you witness Serbian force shooting up
19 houses and pilfering the contents of houses?
20 A. Yes, I did, sir. I took a video of this which was then given to
21 General Ojdanic in late July when the Vojska Jugoslavije made the
22 statement that their regular forces, their regular army forces, were not
23 involved in Kosovo, and this video was then produced for the General Staff
24 to prove that this was incorrect. And they were shown using -- or tanks
25 firing their main armament, artillery, and we heard multi-rocket launchers
1 as well, which were fired into the Junik area.
2 Q. Do you have any other further comments on that report?
3 A. I would respectfully draw Your Honours' attention to the last
4 paragraph "Abnormal force," and that is exactly what we've been saying
5 all along is that huge damage had been done. And if I remember rightly,
6 by October a brief I wrote said that over a quarter million people had
7 been disenfranchised from their homes, some had gone to Albania, some had
8 gone to Montenegro, but it was a picture of heavy damage throughout the
9 area of Kosovo itself. Mainly inflicted by the Serbian security forces.
10 There was also some damage done by the KLA as well but not on the same
11 level of destruction.
12 Q. Over the page to the next report which is dated the 30th of July,
13 1998. What I intend to with these is, to save the interpreters, I'll just
14 read the summaries, and you can make any further comments within the
15 report itself.
16 So this is a situation report of the 28th and 29th of July, 1998.
17 Summary: "Tour taken by UCK north of Orahovac to Malisevo. Released and
18 allowed to travel north to Pec-Lapusnik-Pristina road. Met assault force
19 of SAJ, PJP and VJ lined up for attack on Malisevo. Further combat group
20 include JSO, PJP, and VJ at Cijevo. Ongoing operations in Dulje, Ilaca.
21 Firing all day. Junik under artillery-tank and MOR fire from 1300
22 onwards. Unanswered questions CLN where is Civpop from Orahovac.
23 Malisevo approximately 30.000. No mention of casualties - possible mass
24 grave in Orahovac. How do Serb authorities explain wanton damage to towns
25 and villages?"
1 Now, first question: Were you on this, sir, particular tour?
2 A. Yes, sir. I carried out this tour, and it was a return tour from
3 Orahovac going north into the area of Malisevo which we'd been -- we'd
4 been detained in as we discussed yesterday. This time they were obviously
5 aware that a heavy force of Serbian assault forces which you described
6 were on the Lapusnik and just at the Kijevo crossing point ready to come
7 and assault Malisevo, and that assault took place once we got out of the
8 area, but by which time most people had left Malisevo and just massive
9 damage was done to the approach -- on the approach roads to Malisevo. All
10 the villages was destroyed, and some of the area around Malisevo was
11 destroyed although not the area around the headquarters which was left.
12 It was subsequent to this I then took the troika group back down to
13 Malisevo to show them where the UCK had been. And that produced a whole
14 mass of refugees that then left Malisevo and went down into what we call
15 the Pagarushe valley area which is just this area here north of Suva Reka
16 which contain at one stage about 40 to 50.000 refugees.
17 Q. Any further comments, Mr. Crosland, on that report?
18 A. Sorry, Your Honour. The area around Blace was, as I described
19 yesterday, a Vojska Jugoslavije emplacement from which their artillery was
20 able to support the operations around the whole of this area and from
21 which heavy artillery fire was seen and videoed throughout the months of
22 July, August, and September.
23 Q. I think we can go to the next report. This is a report from the
24 Pec military department to the Pristina military district command. STG,
25 derogatory for Albanian terrorist group activities against MUP Ministry of
1 Interior members:
2 "STGs from the village of Junik are offering strong resistance to
3 MUP forces. Part of the village of Junik has been mopped up - the
4 mopping-up operation continues. VJ Yugoslav army forces are helping MUP
5 forces in this and three tanks from the Pec garrison have been engaged.
6 We have no information on the outcome of the fighting."
7 Paragraph 2: "STG activities against VJ members and facilities,
8 conscripts and the civilian population:
9 "VJ forces operating with MUP forces around the villages of
10 Iglarevo and Junik continue mopping up the area around the villages of
11 Iglarevo and Kijevo, as well as Junik itself, where strong STG forces are
12 still offering fierce resistance."
13 Now, simply upon the -- regarding the events referred to in this
14 report, were you aware of these events at the end of July in the Junik
16 A. Yes, Your Honours. And as I had mentioned just recently, we'd
17 already made the point to Vojska Jugoslavije General Staff that the VJ was
18 involved in operations, and here you've got confirmation from themselves
19 that they were actually involved, although outwardly they were saying they
20 were not. And that's in the fighting around Junik which, as we described
21 yesterday, had been going on for the past three months and is still going
22 on at the end of July.
23 The second point I would like is I was present at the village of
24 Iglarevo which I'll mark on the map for you here, which is just beyond
25 Dobro Vodo area, and we were present when the security forces -- Serbian
1 security forces moved into this village and literally kicked the doors
2 down, burnt the houses and abducted the villagers who were still in these
3 houses. These were a farming community who had remained there in order to
4 try to farm their areas but were engaged by the Serbian security forces as
5 a supposed threat to their operations along the main Pristina, Klina, and
6 Pec road. And there was a systematic destroying of all villages along
7 these roads for that reason, that they offered hiding places for the KLA
8 to attack from.
9 Q. Go to the next report. This is the command of the 15th Armoured
10 Brigade. Can you tell the Judges where the 15th Armoured Brigade was
12 A. Your Honour, the 15th Armoured Brigade was based in Pristina, on
13 the outskirts of Pristina. We visited this on several occasions before
14 these operations took place. And again I think just reinforces the fact
15 that they were involved, as it says in various paragraphs, with the MUP
16 forces and is further evidence that there was collusion between the
17 Vojska Jugoslavije and the MUP formations.
18 Q. And in paragraph 4 previous operations by MUP and VJ units were
19 carried out with the approval and knowledge of Joint Command. Is that the
20 paragraph you're referring to?
21 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
22 Q. Just in terms of paragraph 1, and I won't read out all of the
23 villages, but it is referring to operations around Komorane, Lapusnik, and
24 Kijevo between 25 July and 6 August, 1998. Were you aware of those
25 operations taking place during those dates?
1 A. Yes, we were, Your Honours. I mean, the area we're dealing with
2 extends from Lapusnik here in the north, down to Malisevo, and along to
3 Blace, and Dulje. And this was the central area which is high ground in
4 this area here and was of tactical and strategic importance to the Serbs.
5 And they systematically cleared this whole area, and all the villages
6 along here were more or less flattened by Serbian security forces during
7 this time.
8 Q. Go to the report of the 27th of August, 1998. And again I'll read
9 the summary at the beginning.
10 "25 August 1998 ongoing MUP/VJ operations in Stimlje, Dulje,
11 Blace and south from Komorane, towards Sedlare. Heavy artillery and
12 direct fire heard. No access allowed south to Malisevo. UCK appear to be
13 backfilling into old areas.
14 "26 August 1998 gained access through Junik under MUP control and
15 toured south through cordon sanitaire Ponosevac to Djakovica. This area
16 under VJ control but relaxed. Tour took HMA and guest to Josanica and
17 viewed examples of damage to homesteads. Token UCK VCP stopped tour at
18 Brocnja to make impression of UCK-controlled area. Wanton damage and
19 fresh burning of houses continues. Forecast MUP/VJ continue aggressive
20 operations. Damage and humanitarian problem continues to escalate."
21 Now, Mr. Crosland, apart from the mention of Junik again, this is
22 actually referring to the same area that we were referring to with the
23 last tab, isn't it?
24 A. That's correct, Your Honours. And it's really the start of the
25 Serbian security forces attempting to reassert their control over the area
1 which up until then, as we discussed yesterday, three of the four main
2 routes had been blocked by the KLA, and we're now starting to see, if you
3 will, the counter-offensive by the Serbian security forces to clear these
4 areas and attempt to regain control. The area we described is still in
5 the area of Lapusnik, Malisevo, Blace. The operations around Junik are
6 still continuing.
7 And then we then took our ambassador up to Josanica and Vocnjak
8 which is where the KLA had headquarters. And I was to show him that the
9 KLA were organised in a looser way but did have headquarters in the area.
10 Q. You do mention again fresh burning of houses. Do you recall where
11 that was?
12 A. Your Honours, this was, as I've said many times, a daily
13 occurrence, and every time we toured around the area the area would be
14 covered in smoke from burning fields, houses, petrol stations, grain
15 stores. Whatever part of the infrastructure the Serbs could get hold of
16 they would then try and destroy in order to ethnically cleanse the area of
17 the Kosovo Albanians.
18 Q. Go to the next report dated the 10th of September of 1998. And
19 again I'll read the summary: "Potential gravesite two kilometres
20 south-east of Riznik, 8 to 12 bodies seen. Serbs claim 40, because 40
21 other people are missing. Chinese rounds found in the area which would
22 indicate UCK responsibility. Autopsy to follow."
23 Paragraph 2: "IDP concentration between 5 and 15.000 people seen
24 moving south, possibly going to re-inhabit wrecked villages of Suva Reka.
25 Komorane to Sedlare, all villages heavily destroyed. Civilian population
1 returning slowly. Tour spoke to people who indicated that only 25 had
2 returned and they were short of food and materials to rebuild."
3 Mr. Crosland, could you please point out for us again the village
4 of Riznik?
5 A. Certainly, Your Honours. We were contacted by the Serbian
6 security forces - we were based in Djakovica at the time - and we were
7 taken under MUP escort up to Prilep and then we turned right into Riznik
8 and then we drove into the area about where I'm pointing now. Another
9 five kilometres north of Riznik.
10 Q. And what did you find when you got there?
11 A. Well, on the way there, there was ongoing operations of tanks,
12 armoured personnel vehicles, the cutting edge of the JSO, the SAJ were
13 clearing for the second or third time at least the villages of Riznik and
14 Prilep which were heavily damage. Prilep was more or less flattened to
15 about a foot level. These operations were still going on. Hayricks were
16 being burnt, and general destruction of the infrastructure was continuing
17 as we drove past.
18 We then arrived at what was called a potential gravesite, and
19 there were six to eight bodies lying in a monsoon-type drain of about
20 three to five metres deep. I in fact picked up these rounds which had
21 Chinese origin. Potentially this would indicate the KLA had committed
22 this particular crime. However, we were not able to properly identify who
23 these unfortunate people were. I estimated they'd been possibly in the
24 drain between a week and a month, but it's very difficult to know when
25 people are lying in water.
1 As a follow-up to this I took our ambassador and Lord Ashdown to
2 this site, and also the deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Milutinovic, came
3 down and later -- at a later date. So it is -- unless it was a very
4 clever ruse by the Serbian security authorities to muddle this up, it does
5 look that possibly this was a KLA atrocity, and the comment was that there
6 were still 40 other Serbs or more missing, and they were being held we had
7 indications in the area of Jablanica, in this area here.
8 Q. Just to be clear: What was the ethnicity of the murdered
9 individuals in Lapusnik?
10 A. As I said, Your Honours, it would be impossible to tell because we
11 couldn't go down into the water to look at these unfortunates and so they
12 could have been anyone. But the evidence would tend to favour that
13 perhaps for once the Serbs were telling the truth.
14 Q. If you could go -- unless you have any other comments on that, I
15 think that covers --
16 A. I just respectfully draw Your Honours' attention to paragraph 7.
17 This was a report from the Kosovo Verification Mission about the outlined
18 figures of 171.000, and this gives you some idea of the destruction that
19 had gone on and the mass movement of population that was now starting to
20 take place. A lot of these, as I said earlier, between 40 and 50.000,
21 were in the Pagarushe valley area to the north-west of this area of
22 Suva Reka, where I'm pointing now.
23 Q. Here you're referring to displaced persons.
24 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
25 Q. Go over the page to the report of the 6th of November of 1998.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Again I'll just read the summary: "Mutual request to discuss rapidly
2 deteriorating security situation in Kosovo, also activities of UCK/KLA,
3 re-engagement of MUP, lack of control, cross-border in Albania, visit by
4 General Perisic units in Kosovo, 4 to 6 November 1998, DA suggested change
5 of tactics is necessary."
6 What is this referring to, this summary?
7 A. Your Honours, this refers to a meeting that I was requested by
8 Colonel General Dimitrijevic who was head of counter-intelligence to
9 myself to discuss what was going on in Kosovo, because whilst as I
10 mentioned earlier in the end of August, September the Kosovo -- the
11 Serbian security forces had April period to have seized and made what I
12 would call a tactical strike against the KLA who were at that time
13 disorganised and perhaps on the back foot, there were already worrying
14 indications that stronger resupply to the KLA was coming in from Albania.
15 And whilst the Serbs may have had a tactical advantage, they certainly
16 didn't have the strategic capability of finishing off the KLA. And this
17 is really what General Dimitrijevic is referring to. Because as I
18 mentioned many occasions yesterday -- in yesterday's session, no one side
19 really retained control for more than a passing couple of days or so
20 before the other side then took control back again, and these rings went
21 round and round in ever-decreasing circles.
22 General Perisic, who is chief of the General Staff, went on a
23 morale-raising visit to the VJ troops in Kosovo, who at this stage had
24 thought they'd had the KLA on the back foot, but this was, as we might see
25 later on, to change when the resupply started to come back in, and then
1 NATO pressure was applied to the state of Yugoslavia.
2 Q. You mentioned Dimitrijevic the destruction of the infrastructure
3 and the housing in Kosovo that you had seen taking place?
4 A. Yes, I did, Your Honours. And in paragraph 5 he does admit that
5 the VJ had overstepped the mark in the summer offensive, but this had been
6 because the VJ had to step in order to salvage the inefficiency of the
7 MUP. Well, I think that's a moot point as we've discussed. The
8 destruction was -- been going on mainly by the MUP in this particular
9 case, but the direct and indirect fire the artillery and tank fire was
10 coming from Vojska Jugoslavije formations.
11 Again, I would respectfully draw your attention to paragraph 6
12 that there was in General Dimitrijevic's opinion continued lack of
13 responsibility by Albania to in any way police or control their border.
14 And this is one of the old tales of woe that came from the
15 Vojska Jugoslavije, and with a huge amount of reason, as we've discussed
17 Q. Let's move on to the next DipTel, which is dated the 6th of
18 November of 1998. Paragraph 4, which I'll read: "Serb and Albanian
19 sources present different pictures of a series of small-scale incidents.
20 The overall impression is that the UCK are assuming control of roads in
21 several areas but that both sides are trying at this stage to avoid major
22 provocations. Shots apparently from the UCK were heard in the Cicavica
23 mountain area of Drenica, the scene of the final major conflict of the
24 summer. In a separate incident, armed Albanians stopped a bus on the
25 Pristina to Kosovska Mitrovica road. They questioned two Serbs; one
1 soldier, the other a policeman. The soldier was subsequently released,
2 but the policeman's whereabouts are unknown. Meanwhile, the two Tanjug
3 journalists remain in the custody of the UCK. The Belgrade media, both
4 state controlled and independent, continues to give prominence to their
6 Now, where at this time in Kosovo were the KLA beginning to assume
7 control of roads?
8 A. Your Honours, I would respectfully draw your attention to
9 paragraph 6, and this was the time that Mr. Holbrooke and I'm right in
10 saying that NATO had issued an ActOrd on the state of Yugoslavia.
11 Therefore, the state of Yugoslavia was under intense pressure to withdraw
12 its forces which they did, the three battle groups, and I and one other
13 person was present when these formations withdrew.
14 The advice that I gave to higher authority, both at London and in
15 "Shape" was that if the Vojska Jugoslavije withdrew from these positions,
16 the KLA would backfill into them unless we replaced them with some kind of
18 To be fair to the Serbs, they did withdraw as ordered back to
19 their barracks in -- back to Prizren, back to Urosevac, and back into
20 Pristina. And true to form, the KLA backfilled into some of the positions
21 as we've heard, and shots were fired from the Cicavica mountains, which
22 are the mountains overlooking the valley that runs from Pristina to
23 Kosovska Mitrovica.
24 Q. So when it's referring to the UCK human control of roads, that's
25 what it's referring to, what you've just stated?
1 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
2 Q. Now, it also referred to incidents where armed Albanians stopped a
3 bus on the Pristina to Kosovska Mitrovica road and the questioning of two
4 Serbs, a soldier and a police officer, and the disappearance of the
5 policeman. Do you recall that event?
6 A. Yes, I do, Your Honour. And the Serbs were quite naturally very
7 irate that in what they considered to be their heartland just north of
8 Pristina between Pristina and Mitrovica they had interference. On the
9 western side here --
10 Q. Can you pull the map across so that --
11 A. Is that all right?
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, Your Honour, if I might. I appreciate
13 that in Mr. Cayley's opening he indicated that he wished to deal with
14 matters in an entire context; however, we have for some period of time
15 been dealing with a date or dates that are outside of the indictment
16 period, and I would for purposes of the record object on the grounds of
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
19 At the moment, the Chamber would not interfere, Mr. Cayley, but
20 you will appreciate that there is some validity in the point that's just
21 been made, and we would invite you to consider carefully that area which
22 has some relevance to the issues in this trial and that which goes beyond
23 that and is merely a very general background picture.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Could I answer the objection?
25 JUDGE PARKER: You've no need, because I've said we're not going
1 to interfere.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Because I believe there is, and I did state in my
3 opening and I can talk to Mr. Guy-Smith about it after the session, I did
4 state it was necessary actually for the purposes of the legal test laid
5 down in Tadic. But I realise you don't want me to get into that argument,
6 but I think it's perfectly reasonable to adduce this evidence.
7 Nevertheless, Your Honour, I will proceed, and I think you will find
8 there's two other reports after this, so I think Mr. Guy-Smith will be
9 satisfied that I haven't gone beyond the boundaries which I should. Thank
11 JUDGE PARKER: I must say that the little that is to follow
12 encouraged the Chamber's view just expressed.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Where were we? Sorry.
14 A. We were discussing the area about Cicavica which I have hopefully
16 Q. Yes. The -- the arrest of the -- the arrest of these individuals
17 from a bus between Pristina and Kosovska Mitrovica. You recall that
19 A. I do indeed, Your Honours. And as I mentioned before, the area
20 we're dealing with is right on the heartland north of Pristina towards
21 Mitrovica along -- on the western side where there were a number of
22 Serbian villages and where the KLA came down from the Cicavica mountains
23 and managed to abduct one person.
24 Q. Do you recall the two journalists who were taken into custody by
25 the KLA?
1 A. I don't, Your Honours. By now there were hundreds of journalists
2 in Kosovo who were all attempting to get a story. Some stuck to some of
3 the advice that was given to them that it was a dangerous place to travel
4 around in, others did not. So I'm not -- I'm afraid I can't recall this
5 particular incident.
6 Q. If we go to the next report, the 16th of November, 1998. And it's
7 purely paragraph 5 that I'm interested in. "One soldier was killed and
8 three seriously injured on 13 November following an UCK ambush on a VJ
9 convoy near Dulje on the Pristina to Prizren road. The VJ Pristina Corps
10 informed DA (who was travelling from Prizren at the time of the incident)
11 as well as representatives of KDOM/KVM and asked DA to see the injured men
12 and the body. On 15 November, also near Dulje, US KDOM reported that a
13 passing VJ column opened fire aiming above their vehicles. Bullivant (KVM
14 spokesman) stated that KVM had sought an explanation from the VJ. In a
15 statement, the VJ denied that the incident had taken place. Separately,
16 VJ sources suggested that the alleged firing was in fact the sound of a
17 vehicle backfiring. I understand that KDOM are now more relaxed about
18 this incident, though Pellnas (head of KVM liaison office in Belgrade)
19 told me this morning that he thought that the VJ had been aiming at the
20 convoy and he expected Walker to raise the issue at his meeting with
21 Milosevic later today."
22 I've read it for completeness, but what interests me in this
23 report is the attack on a VJ convoy near Dulje. Can you indicate where
24 Dulje is on the map?
25 A. Yes, Your Honour. It's on the favourite road we discussed in
1 detail yesterday between Stimlje, Dulje and back to Prizren. I was in
2 Prizren during the day and was travelling back relatively late at night
3 when we were caught up by the Vojska Jugoslavije roughly in this area and
4 asked to turn to Prizren because this incident had taken place where VJ
5 had been killed and other soldiers wounded.
6 I asked the commander there who I knew reasonably well if I could
7 help, and we went to the hospital and viewed the dead soldier and then
8 gave medical help and medicines to their doctor in order to treat the -- I
9 think it was five soldiers who had been lightly wounded in this particular
10 attack. I made a statement, and it was that statement, a joint statement
11 was signed by both the commander at Prizren and myself explaining this
12 particular incident.
13 As regards the KVM, you will see in paragraph, if I may
14 respectfully pass you to paragraph 10, a comment by Seselj indicating that
15 the Serbs did not necessarily trust KVM. I cannot confirm or deny that
16 this event took place, but as I indicated yesterday, the area of Dulje to
17 Crnoljevo and to Stimlje was an extremely dangerous and demanding area,
18 and it may well be that this incident happened post the strike on the
19 Vojska Jugoslavije where they had lost soldiers and one could understand
20 their anger at that.
21 Q. Sorry, which incident are you referring to now?
22 A. The incident, sir, in paragraph 5 that talks about the US KDOM
23 having been attacked by the -- or opened fire on by the VJ.
24 Q. And the final report, if you could go behind tab 42, and I'll read
25 this: "On 20 November, two Serbian policemen both from north-eastern
1 Serbia were killed and four wounded in Prilep near Decani where their car
2 was hit by an anti-tank device. This was followed by automatic rifle
3 fire. There are reports of heavy-handed police responses in the area over
4 the weekend, including beatings and raids on the few remaining houses left
5 intact in Prilep. UCK announced on 22nd November that they had arrested a
6 Serbian policeman and a civilian suspected of looting Albanian villages.
7 They are being held by UCK police organs. Police figures published on
8 23 November cite 163 UCK attacks between 13 October and 20 November,
9 resulting in the deaths of 14 policemen and the wounding of a further 21.
10 Two VJ soldiers have been killed and two VJ soldiers and one civilian were
11 reported wounded in the same period."
12 Can you point to Prilep, please?
13 A. Yes, Your Honour. Prilep is this small -- small town on the road
14 between -- between Pec, Decani. Prilep is here and then down to
15 Djakovica. It was, in effect, the quasi-front line along which fighting
16 took place throughout the months that we have described. And Prilep was a
17 MUP defensive position that was regularly attacked on -- on a regular
18 basis primarily from the KLA who were based, as I indicated to you
19 earlier, just east of the village of Riznik, and so both these villages
20 received acute attention. And I stated just earlier Prilep was now down
21 to about 25 centimetres high.
22 Q. Now, their vehicle was hit by an anti-tank device. What would
23 that do?
24 A. Very close to this time, I can't exactly remember the date, but I
25 visited the KLA headquarters here at Riznik, close by Riznik, which is
1 Ramus Haradinaj's area, and they were very keen to show us off a new range
2 of automatic weapons, sniper rifles, and Panzerfaust, which were anti-tank
3 weapons, sniper rifles which had just arrived on the latest resupply from
4 Albania through the -- the old corridor I mentioned many times down Decani
5 down to Tropolja. They also had on this visit obviously received a lot
6 more clothing because they were in much more regular combat clothing and
7 all wearing a similar natured dress, indicating, as I say, the resupply
8 had got through. And if I may respectfully remind you, we're now dealing
9 with, in paragraph 3 the time when Mr. Holbrooke was in Yugoslavia
10 attempting to draw this particular conflict together. So the Serbs were
11 very much under pressure, and the KLA and Albanian authorities were
12 exploiting this pressure that the Serbs were under.
13 Q. The figures quoted of 163 UCK attacks, can you make any comment on
14 that, during that time period from the 13th of October to the 20th of
16 A. Yes, Your Honours. This number would not be disproportionate, but
17 it would include major events like the anti-tank -- killing of the
18 policeman with the anti-tank weapon to very minor offences. So stated as
19 163, there may well have been a hundred serious cases and perhaps 63 not
20 so serious cases, but that's the nature when you start playing with
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. Just some final questions for you to clarify
23 what we were talking about in Malisevo. Did you ever meet a KLA commander
24 quality Fatmir Limaj?
25 A. If the code name was Celiku, then yes. But the problem in these
1 early days, Your Honours, was that although you asked for names, you were
2 given various code names or synonyms as and when. So I can't specifically
3 say that he was the person I met because they were still acting then under
4 in -- in a very tight way for their own security.
5 Q. And the individual that you met in Malisevo, did he speak to you
6 at all about his area of command and the troops that were under his
7 control at that time?
8 A. Not in so many words, no. But as I attempted to indicate, we
9 discussed various towns -- or these villages around the area and he
10 obviously knew of them, and one could draw from that, I think, a
11 reasonable conclusion that these areas were within his tactical
12 operational area. But as I said, Your Honours, it's very difficult to
13 draw together a significant military OrBat with a formation that is
14 running around the countryside attempt -- being chased by a significantly
15 numerically superior force, and therefore they had learnt their lesson in
16 the very first days in the Drenica --
17 Q. Whose they - sorry - just for the record.
18 A. Sorry, the Kosovo Liberation Army, that if they stood and fought
19 in an area that was geographically advantageous to the Serbian forces who
20 were mobile and had weapons able to fire long distances, then they were
21 liable to suffer very severe casualties. So, yes, there was an
22 organisation, there was a command structure, and there were headquarters
23 scattered throughout the province of Kosovo as I hopefully have indicated
24 to Your Honours.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honours. I don't have any further
1 questions for the witness and I can offer him for cross-examination.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Mr. Mansfield.
3 Cross-examined by Mr. Mansfield:
4 Q. Mr. Crosland, I represent somebody called Fatmir Limaj. Today
5 appears to be the very first time that there has been any indication from
6 you, is this right, about the possibility of meeting somebody by that
7 name? Is that right?
8 A. I think so. It's the first time I've been specifically asked that
9 particular question.
10 Q. Is it? The first time you've been asked that question?
11 A. As far as I'm aware, sir, yes.
12 Q. So how did you know, therefore, that it might relate to the name
14 A. Because in one of my reports written during the time when I was in
15 Kosovo, this connection came up by other intelligence agencies to which I
16 was privy.
17 Q. Well, where is that report?
18 A. Sir, I don't know. These reports are not my property. They are
19 property of the Ministry of Defence.
20 Q. When did you write the report and under what title was it?
21 A. As I'm attempting to explain to you, sir, the report was one -- I
22 wrote about 85 reports, plus sending verbal reports on secure means back
23 to London. Those reports are the property of the Ministry of Defence, and
24 I have now retired from the Ministry of Defence.
25 Q. Yes, I do appreciate the difficulty. See, I want to ask you, we
1 don't have that report, as far as I'm aware, did you indicate in that
2 report or reports that you had met somebody called Fatmir Limaj?
3 A. I, sir, did not know that particular name, no.
4 Q. So if I can be clear: There is no report anywhere in existence,
5 let alone the ones produced here, suggesting that you'd ever met anyone
6 called Fatmir Limaj; is that right?
7 A. That particular name, sir, was not familiar to me until other
8 agencies said that these two might be linked together, and that is clear
9 as I can make it, sir.
10 Q. What other agencies?
11 A. These are other intelligence agencies which I dealt with.
12 Q. What other intelligence agencies did you deal with?
13 A. Agencies linked to the Ministry of Defence, sir.
14 Q. Yes. Which ones?
15 A. I don't think I'm entitled to tell you that.
16 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, for reasons that are linked very much
17 to an alleged incident in this case that's relevant to the period on the
18 indictment, I do ask that we know at least the names of the agencies.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, this is --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Cayley.
21 MR. CAYLEY: -- as Mr. Mansfield knows, a very sensitive area, and
22 I would ask for an adjournment so I can speak to the Ministry of Defence
23 legal advisor on this issue.
24 JUDGE PARKER: How long?
25 MR. CAYLEY: Five minutes, please.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We will adjourn temporarily.
2 --- Break taken at 10.05 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 10.23 a.m.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Cayley.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, perhaps it might be appropriate -- I
6 don't want to waste any time -- any more time than is necessary on of
7 this. We'll make a mountain out of a molehill, but if I could address you
8 in private session, and perhaps it would be appropriate out of earshot of
9 the witness.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. I'm afraid I must ask you if you would
11 leave the court, and I can indicate that there will be a break after these
12 submissions, the first morning break, so you can expect, I'd think,
13 something toward half an hour before you will come back.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Cayley. Private session.
17 [Private session]
11 Pages 1985-1990 redacted. Private session.
8 We will now adjourn and resume just before the hour.
9 --- Break taken at 10.37 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
11 [Open session]
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Cayley.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, just two very minor matters following on
15 from the discussion before the adjournment. If the -- if Your Honour
16 would be so good as to explain to the witness - because obviously we can't
17 speak to him - that legal advice has been taken on the issue and secondly
18 whether it be possible to do that line of questioning, if Mr. Mansfield is
19 agreeable, in private session for that short period. I think that would
20 safeguard a lot of concerns that have been expressed by the legal advisor
21 from the MOD to me.
22 JUDGE PARKER: I understand from Mr. Mansfield's nod that he sees
23 no difficulty with that.
24 JUDGE PARKER: If I could indicate that the issue raised before
25 you left the courtroom has been for the moment resolved. Your concern was
1 whether you were permitted to disclose the information sought in the
2 question, and no objection is being taken by your ministry we are advised
3 by the Prosecutor to you disclosing the identity of the intelligence
4 services from which you drew that information.
5 I think that will be sufficient for the moment, so, Mr. Mansfield,
6 if you would like to continue.
7 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes, I would ask the questions now but it's
8 necessary to go into private session.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Good. We'll move into private session for a
11 [Private session]
7 [Open session]
8 MR. MANSFIELD:
9 Q. You've indicated that in relation to the visit to Malisevo where
10 you may have met a commander, that you did make a written report about
11 that, and you think it's one that has already been referred to. That's
12 what you've just said.
13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
14 Q. Yes. Would you kindly let us know which report it is that
15 contains the details about your visit to Malisevo and meeting the
17 A. I assume it's one of these in here, sir. As I indicated to you
18 earlier, I made reports. I made about 85 visits, I think, to Kosovo
19 during this particular period. Some reports were written. Other reports
20 were sent directly on satellite phone as the incidents unfolded. I
21 thought -- and forgive me if I'm wrong, but I thought we debated this
22 issue in the previous session under Mr. Cayley. Exactly which report I'm
23 not familiar with because I haven't seen them for nearly seven years.
24 Q. Mr. Crosland, that's fully understood. These were happenings some
25 years ago now. But before you gave evidence, were you given time to
1 familiarise yourself with the documentation that you do have?
2 A. I saw this documentation early yesterday morning, yes, sir.
3 Q. All right. Please understand I'm not intending this to be a
4 memory test, but you're welcome -- and I'm cut it short. You're welcome
5 to go through it if I have this wrong, but amongst the documents that
6 we've been provided with and which you have gone through in detail, there
7 is no document that narrates in any way or describes the visit to the
8 Malisevo headquarters where you may have met someone by the name of
9 Celiku. Do you follow?
10 A. I follow your line of question, sir, yes. I would say -- suggest
11 that tab 34 -- in fact, there were two visits to Malisevo, one where I was
12 detained for an hour and a half to two hours where this gentleman may have
13 been this person we're talking about. That is tab 34.
14 Q. Could you just indicate the passage in there that you say covers
16 A. Well, the summary paragraph, sir. And then detail 1 which goes
17 Orahovac, Malisevo.
18 Q. If you read it carefully, sorry to just interpose for a moment,
19 this one that we're looking at at tab 34 is dated the 30th of July; is
20 that right?
21 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
22 Q. And it's describing what has happened in relation to the 28th and
23 29th, is it not?
24 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
25 Q. It's not actually dealing with, unless there's a mistake, the 1st
1 of July, is it?
2 A. No. As I indicated to you, sir, this is the second visit, and I
3 haven't found the other report yet or the other mention of it yet.
4 Q. Yes. I want to be precise about it. I'm sorry to be careful
5 about this.
6 You're welcome to go back through the documents again if you wish,
7 but there is no document, no report, sitrep, DipTel, however you describe
8 it, indicating a visit to Malisevo on the 1st of July where you met or may
9 have met a commander called Celiku. Do you follow?
10 A. I follow what you're saying, sir, yes.
11 Q. And the reason I ask the question is why is there no such report
12 if this occurred in the way you describe?
13 A. Sir, you'll have to ask my counsel that because I'm only replying
14 to questions that I've been asked to answer. I'm the guinea pig in the
15 middle here, I'm afraid, without being frivolous about it.
16 Q. I understand that because you may not remember, but you would have
17 made a report about the visit on the 1st, if it was the 1st?
18 A. I made a report -- I know I made a report because it was a very
19 significant meeting.
20 Q. Exactly.
21 A. Because it was the first time that we had actually been or anyone
22 had been, as far as I know, to this headquarters, which was a major
23 headquarters, and I made very specific comments, one of which, Give me 50
24 good men and we'll sort this business out tonight.
25 Q. Right.
1 A. Where that report is, sir, I do not know. It's not in my -- in my
3 Q. Well, as I've said, I'm certainly not trying to test your memory
4 about what now you remember writing. I do make the request through you
5 that if you did make a report, which you think you must have done because
6 it was a significant occasion, that that report is provided to us,
7 whichever agency of the ones you've described presently has it. So I
8 think -- I see that's been acknowledged. I'll move on for the moment.
9 On the basis that there must have been a report, it would be
10 presumably facile of me to ask you now to remember anything else about
11 what you wrote in the report other than the question that you just
12 mentioned about, Give us 50 good men and we'll sort it out today, or
13 tonight or something?
14 A. I reported in detail about what I saw in Orahovac up to Malisevo
15 under UCK escort. The numbers I described to you earlier were 150 to 200
17 Q. Right.
18 A. Men and women.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. There were a certain number of foreigners from the region in this
21 area, both of Dutch nationality, and possibly British, even French, and
22 there was one gentleman from the Middle East.
23 Q. That's what you remember writing, is it?
24 A. I remember writing that, sir, yes.
25 Q. Yes. It does not include, therefore, writing that you may have
1 met a commander named Celiku?
2 A. I can't recall that, sir, in detail, no.
3 Q. No.
4 A. I'm under oath as you realise.
5 Q. I appreciate that. I'm going about this carefully. There are
6 reasons to do it carefully.
7 Can I just step back a moment? I'm still dealing with this day.
8 The date of this occasion was put to you by Mr. Cayley. I'm not objecting
9 to the fact that it happened, but do you know when it was that you went?
10 A. Yes. It was the 1st of July, sir.
11 Q. And you know that because?
12 A. My new warrant officer had just joined the team, and it was a very
13 specific day in his memory as well. Because it was quite a challenging
14 event. As I indicated, they were possibly going to detain us or carry out
15 even more dire threats.
16 Q. Well, I'll come to that in a moment. Who was the warrant officer?
17 A. He was my British warrant officer who was attached to the embassy
18 in Belgrade.
19 Q. Yes. Do you remember his name?
20 A. Yes. Warrant officer Rob Johnson.
21 Q. Rob Johnson?
22 A. I was also with a Dutch warrant officer as well.
23 Q. Now, as the date sticks clearly in your mind, I wonder if you
24 could -- I'm not going to take time asking you to look it up if you'd
25 accept it from me, that when you were asked about these matters in more
1 detail in 2004, last year, you made a statement. Do you recall?
2 A. I think I made about three or four statements, so --
3 Q. Yes. This is the third one.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. The one you made last year in July. See it if you wish, but in
6 that statement I give you the paragraph number so it can be checked, in
7 paragraph 13, you indicated that you couldn't be sure of the date. It was
8 June or July. Had it just slipped your mind last year, then?
9 A. I think quite possibly, yes, because I was not involved in any
10 shape or form. I have since, you know, with this -- with this present
11 session, I have been updated and have remembered.
12 Q. Who updated you?
13 A. My counsel.
14 Q. Were you shown any documents with dates on them?
15 A. Yes. These documents here, yes.
16 Q. Then we know there isn't a document or a report dated the 1st of
17 July or referring to the 1st of July that you wrote at the time, do you
18 follow, that we have?
19 A. There is a document. But it's not in this bundle of documents.
20 Q. When did you last see that document?
21 A. Probably when I wrote it.
22 Q. When you wrote it. So you haven't been shown it just before you
23 gave evidence or anything like that?
24 A. I don't have access to these documents. These are all Ministry of
25 Defence documents.
1 Q. Now, again, assuming for the moment that it was the 1st of July
2 that you went, if you're going to visit what you regarded as possibly a
3 major headquarters of the KLA, you would want to give them advance notice
4 that you're coming, wouldn't you?
5 A. I don't see why we should do that at all.
6 Q. Because you might got shot out of the water, if you know the
7 expression, if they don't know who you are and you suddenly appear. It's
8 a risk. You're a military -- you know, personnel with rights to go
9 anywhere you please.
10 A. We -- we --
11 Q. But it would be a matter of sense, would it not, to give advance
13 A. Sir, we came under fire on many occasions from both sides,
14 probably all three sides. That was one of the risks that I had to take as
15 the commander of this particular patrol.
16 Q. But you would want to reduce the risks, wouldn't you?
17 A. As far as I know, there was no open communications and certainly
18 no communications available to me to either contact the KLA at any time
19 during my --
20 Q. When did you decide you wanted to go there?
21 A. When?
22 Q. Yes, when.
23 A. When we were staying in Djakovica. I'd been planning that this
24 was an area that we should look at. There was a rule within my vehicle
25 that if anyone felt unhappy about going into an area which was known to be
1 a dangerous area, that they could object. Neither of the other two people
3 Q. It wasn't an accidental patrol along a road in which you were
4 suddenly, as it were, taken into custody. This was a deliberate decision
5 to go to Malisevo because you wanted to have a look; is that right?
6 A. Exactly that. That was part --
7 Q. Exactly.
8 A. -- Part of my job was to try and attempt to find out what was
9 happening on both sides of this particular conflict and --
10 Q. And all that happened - would this be fair - is that having
11 decided to go there along the route that you described yesterday, once you
12 got near to Malisevo, unsurprisingly you were escorted by members of the
14 A. No, that's not correct, sir.
15 Q. What then?
16 A. When we left Orahovac and went -- passed through the
17 Vojska Jugoslavije position on the north edge of the town, around the next
18 corner we came straight into a KLA checkpoint.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. Across the road which had been blocked.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. We were then escorted by these gentlemen there to Malisevo.
23 Q. That is what I was putting to you, that unsurprisingly you were
24 escorted into a KLA stronghold.
25 A. Well, I achieved what I wanted to do. Whether they achieved what
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 they wanted is another matter.
2 Q. I appreciate your point of view, but what I'm suggesting to you
3 here is that this isn't as though you've been captured on the road to
4 Malisevo. You've come to a roadblock, and you presumably indicated you
5 wanted to go to the headquarters, have you, when you get to the roadblock?
6 A. We don't know that particular time whether the headquarters is
7 there or not.
8 Q. Do you indicate when you get to the roadblock who you are?
9 A. Of course I do, yes.
10 Q. Do you indicate to the people what you want to do?
11 A. There is not that much discussion. Because it's all done at
12 gunpoint in a very defensive manner by the people concerned who were
13 naturally very jumpy at a blue Discovery which the MUP had tried to use in
14 approaching one of their former checkpoints, and afterwards they told me
15 they very nearly opened fire on us irrespective until they realised who I
16 was. So then I produced my licna karta and my identity card to prove my
18 Q. Having been escorted into the building which you later determined
19 was a headquarters, in fact would it be fair to say that the people in the
20 building in fact treated you in a proper and professional manner?
21 A. In the building they did, yes.
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. As I indicated, I think.
24 Q. You did in --
25 A. My -- my --
1 Q. In your statement?
2 A. In my statement, yes.
3 Q. Those are your words.
4 A. Correct, sir.
5 Q. And when you made that statement, so that it's clear to the
6 Tribunal, those words come out of your first statement of the three, which
7 is in May 1999, paragraph 18. You may see it if you wish, but you do not
8 say in that paragraph or make any suggestion that anybody talked about
9 abducting or kidnapping you, do you?
10 A. I have to take your word for it, sir.
11 Q. Would you like to see it to make it easier?
12 A. I'm perfectly -- accept your word on it.
13 Q. All right. Can you explain why if in fact a serious threat of
14 abducting you was being discussed you didn't mention it in that
15 description of your attendance on the 1st of July?
16 A. I think in all fairness there was a lot going on. There was
17 certainly -- I don't speak Albanian. I speak reasonable German and
18 Serbian. There was discussions in probably Albanian, and there was
19 certainly as I indicated this gentleman from the Middle East who was
20 extremely unfriendly to the three of us concerned. And having been around
21 these type of people for quite some time, one was extremely wary of what
22 they may or may not be thinking.
23 Q. I appreciate.
24 A. And as the people in the headquarters were, as I made clear to
25 you, treated us with due respect. Outside people had questioned the
1 validity of our licna kartas, our identity cards and our ability to travel
2 into this area which they claimed was under Albanian control, and I think
3 I've explained this to the Court beforehand.
4 Q. Did you put in the report at the time anything about a discussion,
5 did you report that there'd been a discussion about abducting you? Did
6 you report that back?
7 A. I can't remember at the moment, but we -- the vehicle was
8 thoroughly searched.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. And some equipment was left behind, and we came back the following
11 morning to collect it.
12 Q. Yes. I'm going to suggest to you that it's not surprising given
13 the history that your vehicle would be searched and you would be asked
14 questions. It's not surprising, is it, given the circumstances occurring
15 in Kosovo at the time?
16 A. No, nothing was surprising in Kosovo, no.
17 Q. No. Right. Now, I want to deal with the person, the commander.
18 You say you met a commander -- or, rather, you saw a commander. Now, the
19 question you were asked yesterday - and I have the transcript so perhaps
20 you'd just accept it from me for the moment - was this: "Do you have any
21 recollection of what he was called, the commander?" Do you remember that
22 was the question?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. And I don't know whether you now remember the answer, but may I
25 just read what you said yesterday in answer to that question. "The name
1 Celiku has come up. I'm not completely convinced if that was him or not,
2 and it would be difficult for me to say under oath whether that was the
3 exact name or not. I don't know."
4 Now, that was your answer. Now, you've indicated earlier today
5 that you don't know or you can't recall whether in fact you mentioned the
6 name Celiku in your contemporaneous report. Would it be fair to say that
7 you're not in a position to indicate that if you met a commander or saw
8 one there that that person was Celiku, are you?
9 A. That's a reasonably fair assessment as I've already indicated to
11 Q. All right. Thank you. Let alone whether that person is Fatmir
12 Limaj. You certainly can't take the further step, can you?
13 A. No. I indicated that to you this morning.
14 Q. I want to ask a straightforward question on the back of those
15 answers. Have you ever been asked to identify him from photographs, the
16 person who you met?
17 A. That's a very difficult question to answer, sir, because there may
18 well have been some photographs at that time. I don't -- I cannot
19 honestly recall. Because, I mean, this was --
20 Q. All right. I'll make it more specific to make it more
21 straightforward. Have you for the purposes of this these proceedings ever
22 been shown any photographs? In other words, has somebody, an
23 investigator, come along to you and said, "Look, you met a commander. Do
24 you think you recognise him, and have a look at these."
25 A. I think I may have been shown some photographs.
1 Q. Right.
2 A. On one of the occasions, but I cannot recall precisely which.
3 Q. Well, we have your statements, and none of them indicate that if
4 you saw photographs you were able to pick anybody out. Do you follow?
5 A. That may well be a fair comment, yes.
6 Q. It may be a fair comment. All right.
7 Q. Once again, if in fact that process has been adopted in this
8 case -- it hasn't. Right. I can't take it further.
9 Now, the person who you met who you thought was a commander, you
10 indicated today that that person -- you were asked the question whether
11 you'd spoken to that person. Now, I would like to be clear insofar as you
12 can be. Did you speak to him or not?
13 A. I think, if I remember correctly, he remained in the background,
14 but as I said earlier, as a controlling influence when sometimes the
15 questions became a bit heated.
16 Q. Well, the reason I ask is that the answer you gave today was that
17 not in so many words, but you indicated there was a discussion about towns
18 and that he knew the area and so on. Are you saying that that was a
19 discussion you had?
20 A. Yes. We spoke of many things about the area in general, as far as
21 I remember.
22 Q. Well, I'd like you to be careful. I appreciate the lapse of time
23 here, because again when you were describing this person and your contact
24 with him in the statement in July last year you said this. It's just one
25 sentence I want to read to you in paragraph 13: "I do not recall Celiku
1 speaking directly to me or any other members of my party."
2 Now, if he didn't speak to you, whoever he was, or your party, he
3 wouldn't have discussed towns or areas with you, would he?
4 A. He may not have done, but the person conducting the interview did.
5 Q. The person conducting the interview where, for the statement or at
6 the --
7 A. No. At the -- at the scene of the incidents in Malisevo.
8 Q. In Malisevo. So the person in Malisevo conducting the interview
9 was -- are you saying that person was the commander?
10 A. It's very difficult for me to recall exactly who was who, as we've
11 been indicating all along.
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. These people -- I can't remember, maybe four or five people in the
14 room plus myself and the Dutch warrant officer.
15 Q. Well, I appreciate that as well. And the reason for these
16 questions is a further point. In fact, I want to suggest to you, given
17 your answers, that in fact what you thought was the operational area of
18 control for that particular focal point at Malisevo was not what you were
19 told but only what you thought as a military individual was likely to be
20 that area. Would that be fair?
21 A. At some stage the Ministry of Defence produced a guesstimate of
22 what they thought the areas were.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. Now, as I've indicated to you, sir, I put my thoughts together as
25 someone who travelled throughout that area, working on the lines of a
1 person who has been involved with training guerilla forces and training in
2 defence. Now, as I indicated earlier to the Court, whether that was a
3 correct assumption or not I cannot judge.
4 Q. You cannot judge. It may be difficult it place it, but when was
5 the Ministry of Defence guesstimate produced?
6 A. I can't with any exactitude say, sir. It was sometime in the
7 middle of the year if I'm right in saying.
8 Q. Yes. It might be for the purposes of this case that when you're
9 talking about the operational area as to when you formed those conclusions
10 in relation to the guesstimate provided. So that's why I asked for the
11 date, roughly speaking. So you seem to believe that the guesstimate was
12 available to you about the middle of the year.
13 A. That's possibly a correct time line, sir.
14 Q. Right.
15 A. I mean, as I indicated earlier, I and others had our own ideas,
16 some of which were reasonably similar to the Ministry of Defence. Some
17 were perhaps different. Now, I didn't have access to some of the other
18 agencies that presumably the Ministry of Defence did have access to.
19 Q. Yes. I follow that. And the basis for this particular line of
20 questions is this: That yesterday when you were asked about the area
21 under control, your answer was very specific. You said, "I suspect their
22 control," and then you described. And in fact, you said it more than
23 once. "I suspect, as I said," and so on.
24 So what you were making clear yesterday was, if I may put it this
25 way, was that this was an assessment by you based on your experience in
1 the region.
2 A. That's correct. And I drew some of the lines saying Lapusnik on
3 the north that the road may well have been the boundary. The reason for
4 that is the countryside around there is actually very difficult to cross
5 unless you're in a vehicle and therefore potentially a good place to have
6 a boundary. Now, whether that was true or not, as I indicated yesterday,
7 I could not confirm that.
8 Q. Right. Now, I want to come to an important assessment you did
9 make, and I think you've mentioned it on more than one occasion, not only
10 in statements but also in your evidence in the Milosevic trial, and that
11 is that the strength, if you like, of the KLA at that time was such that
12 with 50 trained soldiers on the other side, they could have been
13 nullified. Was that your view?
14 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
15 Q. Yes. Effectively, therefore, what you were saying, in your own
16 assessment, was that the apparent efficacy of the KLA and control has been
17 or was -- sorry, was exaggerated in the minds of others, when in fact on
18 the ground it was fairly thin. I'm putting it in colloquial language. Is
19 that fair?
20 A. I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, no.
21 Q. No. Right. I give an example. You described the three -- the
22 three roads and how they were blocked and so on. I think at one point you
23 say in one of your narratives of this that just because they were able to
24 interrupt the passage of transport on those three roads by no means meant
25 that they controlled the areas of territory between the three roads,
1 although people assumed that.
2 A. Yes. This is -- as I said yesterday, sir, where I disagreed when
3 people said they controlled 35 or 65 per cent, this was what was being put
4 forward, but I would caveat it with the fact that, as I've said all the
5 way along, there was a lack of proper use of military force by the Serbian
6 authorities. That -- why that is, I cannot answer.
7 Q. No. I appreciate that's a different question. Yes, understood.
8 But it wasn't just a question of control. They didn't have
9 extensive armory. Now, I'll make it clear the period I'm talking about.
10 I'm dealing with the period between January 1998 and July 1998, and
11 obviously in particular the period where you are visiting Kosovo on a
12 regular, daily basis.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So it's probably March or the spring onwards; is that right?
15 A. I visited throughout 1998 and 1999, yeah.
16 Q. Throughout 1998. And I include -- that's the period, January to
18 A. I understand.
19 Q. In that period they did not have extensive weaponry, did they?
20 A. No, as I indicated yesterday.
21 Q. No. It's a bit of a checklist. I'm sorry to go through it.
22 Didn't have extensive weaponry, didn't have overall control, but lasted
23 for more than 48 hours in any one area?
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. That's correct. They didn't have enough uniforms to go around, so
1 it was rather a motley collection?
2 A. Yes, I follow your question. This is common in any fledgling
4 Q. Fledgling organisation, I appreciate that. And this is
5 summarising what you've been saying for reasons linked to the case.
6 And when one then, as it were, switches attention for a moment to
7 the other side, the policy adopted by the Yugoslav authorities, and in
8 particular Milosevic and those beholden to him particularly, was a policy
9 which can be described either as ethnic cleansing or blitzkrieg, scorched
10 earth, all these terms. That was the policy that was being pursued
11 throughout 1998, wasn't it?
12 A. That is true, sir, and that I'm afraid is true of the Balkans
13 since 1991.
14 Q. Yes. And your point both to Milosevic and others was that this
15 was military nonsense, besides also being grossly inhumane?
16 A. That's exactly correct, sir, yeah. Non-effective.
17 Q. And if you would bear with me for a moment, because you've
18 described it before but I just want it to be clear. What the policy
19 actually involved was, as you witnessed it, and the products of it on more
20 than one occasion was that Serbian troops, and in particular obviously the
21 ones you've specified, it would be MUP and so on, would -- and with the
22 assistance of the VJ as it got into 1998, would approach a village with
23 superior armory and, first of all, warning shots would be fired; is that
25 A. That's are my words, yeah.
1 Q. Yes. And after that, and the intention obviously that the
2 villagers should remove themselves as fast as possible, there would then
3 be what you have described as a very destructive phase of bombardment by
4 the armory that had been assembled?
5 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
6 Q. And some of the armory, without going into the technicalities,
7 that had been assembled wasn't intended for this purpose at all, was it?
8 A. Not under the Geneva Convention, no.
9 Q. It was an armory to deal with aircraft and so on?
10 A. That's correct, sir.
11 Q. Once the bombardment had been completed, then ground troops would
12 approach the village, torching and burning the houses? I'm sorry, I have
13 to ask you to say yes. I know it's bit of a --
14 A. Sorry. Correct.
15 Q. -- description in another Tribunal. The houses, also the
16 livestock and the stores of winter foods such as haystacks. All that
17 would go?
18 A. That's correct, sir.
19 Q. And plainly any crops or materials related to farming would all
21 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
22 Q. And that that burning process might last several weeks. In other
23 words, the burning would go on.
24 A. That's correct. It was continuous, as I made clear earlier, sir.
25 Q. Yes. And in the wake of that, if there's anything left to take,
1 then the troops would loot any premises still standing.
2 A. That's also correct, sir.
3 Q. Now, this led, as you've indicated, to a diaspora or displacement,
4 and I think they unfortunately have an acronym IDPs, led to a large
5 numbers of displaced persons having to live elsewhere in the -- in the
6 rough, in the forests, in the mountain valleys, and so on.
7 A. That is also correct, sir, yes.
8 Q. And the figures have been difficult to estimate, and you mentioned
9 one this morning by the commission of verification, namely 171.000, but
10 we're dealing with almost certainly hundreds of thousands of people
11 displaced by this process?
12 A. I agree it may well be up to a quarter of a million.
13 Q. Quarter of a million. Now, this process, as you've accepted,
14 being carried out throughout 1998, where people are losing their homes, it
15 would not surprise you, would it, if people in those circumstances thought
16 it necessary to arm themselves against such an onslaught? That wouldn't
17 be surprising, would it?
18 A. No, not at all.
19 Q. And in fact --
20 A. As I've indicated, the hearts and minds were being totally lost by
21 the Serbian security forces on many occasions.
22 Q. It's -- I appreciate what you're saying about hearts and minds.
23 It's not only hearts and minds. It's a question, then, of survival and
24 self-defence, is it not?
25 A. Yes, that is correct, sir. It was happening on, as I indicated to
1 the Court earlier, in a lesser scale by retaliation from the KLA probably
2 quite rightly after, as you've indicated, after very major activities by
3 the Serb security forces all over Kosovo. And I think -- I hope I've
4 given justification or ample justification to both sides of this
5 particularly nasty situation.
6 Q. So if there were an insurgent or fledgling army growing up to
7 protect citizens insofar as they could be protected, again that is an
8 entirely natural response, isn't it?
9 A. It's a natural response, sir, but on the other hand, there is also
10 the legality of whether they should be doing it. And there's the legality
11 of what the Serbs have been doing as well.
12 Q. Different question. Because I think yesterday, although it was in
13 a slightly different context, and to be fair to you I'll put it in the
14 context, you said at one moment in time, although relating to Serbs
15 defending their farms, that you you'd do the same in those circumstances.
16 Do you remember saying that yesterday?
17 A. Yes, I do, yes.
18 Q. Yes. Now, how well did you get to know the KLA headquarters that
19 you say you visited? Did you visit them on more than one occasion or
20 several or...
21 A. I used to visit or I attempted to visit. Sometimes it was
22 impossible because the Serb security forces would block the way. I would
23 attempt to visit them most -- I think I got to visit most of them two or
24 three times each probably.
25 Q. Right.
1 A. Some of them slightly more.
2 Q. Now, the reason for this is, and I want to ask you in particular
3 about one that you've mentioned today and you've mentioned in your
4 statements before. That is Lapusnik.
5 A. Uh-huh.
6 Q. You visited there?
7 A. Yes, I did, yes.
8 Q. Right. Could you please help us as to when you visited Lapusnik?
9 A. I think we went into Lapusnik shortly after the KLA blocked the
10 main road to attempt to find out what was going on. So that would have
11 been early on in the conflict.
12 Q. Yes. Can I just pause. I don't want to distract you from your
13 answer. It's just that -- when you say early on in the conflict, what --
14 A. I mean, the problem --
15 Q. -- March?
16 A. Maybe March, sir. The problem is Lapusnik itself changed hands on
17 a regular basis.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. Now, this is where, as I indicated yesterday, the situation was
20 extremely fluid. On one occasion you'd find the KLA there; the next time
21 you might well find that the MUP had moved closer or were apparently
22 threatening it, so the KLA would have moved out. So it was not -- it was
23 not a stable situation per se. And Lapusnik itself, if I remember
24 rightly, is an elongated village along the main Pec-Pristina road and with
25 some houses to the south of it as well, so possibly 20 to 30 houses
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 perhaps, perhaps a few more.
2 Q. Did you go to -- did you go to the village itself?
3 A. Yes. I drove through the village on many occasions, yes.
4 Q. Did you stop?
5 A. Yes, as I indicated, yes.
6 Q. Yes. Sorry, but there are reasons for this. So the two or three
7 occasions, is this fair, stretch between March to July? Is that -- I'm so
8 sorry. Many -- I'm so sorry, my fault. The many occasions stretch
9 between March and July, do they?
10 A. Yes, that's probably reasonably correct. Because after July the
11 Serbs went on to the offensives as we discussed in the earlier session.
12 Q. Yes. The question I ask you is on any of those occasions that you
13 went there, did anybody there or thereabouts suggest to you that in that
14 very village the KLA had a prison camp?
15 A. The reason I'm pausing is because I think both -- if I remember
16 rightly, they were indications that both sides had used it as a prison
17 camp, in parentheses, but I don't recall seeing this particular -- this
18 house, no.
19 Q. Well, to be more precise then again about this, that when it was
20 in the hands of the Serb authorities, MUP or whoever had moved in, the VJ
21 or so on later, none of them came up to you and said, We want you to come
22 and look at this prison camp and what has been going on here.
23 A. No, they didn't, no, because they were about to assault Malisevo
24 on this particular occasion.
25 Q. Yes. This was at the end of the July?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. They had been there before that.
3 A. Yes, they probably had. But they weren't particularly welcoming,
5 Q. No. But you were there with particular attachment to the Serb
6 government, are you not, because that was --
7 A. Yes. You're correct, sir. I was accredited to the
8 Vojska Jugoslavije, but in these circumstances we were not every time that
10 Q. No. But the one thing that the Serbs on the whole would be
11 anxious to point out is any -- and I'm understating it, any indiscretions
12 that either were alleged or thought to have been committed by the KLA,
13 wouldn't they?
14 A. That was part of their policy, yes.
15 Q. So nobody said on any occasion, Come and look at what has been
16 going on here, or indicated a prison camp, and you certainly didn't go to
17 this particular set of premises where it is alleged there was one. You
18 haven't been there?
19 A. No, I haven't, sir.
20 Q. All right. Now, beyond going to the village and meeting people
21 and so on, you have, as you've described, and I'm not going to repeat it
22 in public session, a network of intelligence available to you.
23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
24 Q. There's that network. And in addition to that network there's the
25 obvious one. You have close liaison with the VJ intelligence authorities,
1 don't you?
2 A. I was privileged to be briefed by them, yes.
3 Q. Was there ever any occasion in this period of time - particularly
4 I'm dealing with January through to July 1998 - that any of that
5 intelligence, particularly coming from the Serbs, suggested that there was
6 a prison camp indulging in totally improper activities at Lapusnik?
7 A. As I think I've indicated to you already, sir, there might have
8 been a hint, but I can't truthfully recall that, no.
9 Q. You can't recall it?
10 A. I don't think I've written it down anywhere, no. So I'm not --
11 Q. Well, we don't have a document from you in which that is
12 suggested, and obviously if there is a document that you have written
13 rather like the one on the 1st of July in which it is suggested, no doubt
14 it could be provided. So there may have been a hint but you can't
15 remember. So it's not a topic I can pursue with you because you don't
16 have any details; is that right?
17 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
18 Q. All right. And just to finish this particular topic off, the
19 occasion at the end of the July when you went there just prior to the
20 assault on Malisevo, you in fact met a JSO commander on that day, didn't
21 you, in Lapusnik?
22 A. Yes. On the afternoon, once we had been released from Malisevo.
23 I met a person who was called Legija.
24 Q. Legija. L-e-g-i-j-a I think is how it's apparently spelled.
25 A. That's correct, sir.
1 Q. Now, putting some of this together, that is the matters to do with
2 what was happening on the ground with the Serbs and what was happening on
3 the ground with the KLA, does this combine to explain why in your very
4 first statement you said this about the KLA using a word you just used,
5 indication, I'll just read the sentence to you: "The first indication --
6 the first indication that the KLA was a force was in October 1998, when I
7 discussed it with General Dimitrijevic, the chief of counter-intelligence,
8 KOS." Do you remember writing that sentence?
9 A. I remember writing that sentence, yes.
10 Q. And the paragraph - sorry if I have not suggested it - is
11 paragraph number 4 in the statement -- the first statement you made, the
12 26th of May.
13 Do you stand by that description that you gave then?
14 A. Well, the use of the word "force" is a very generic term.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Now, if, as I think you're indicating, up till the KLA was not a
17 force to be reckoned with. I think I've indicated that in this extremely
18 muddled and fluid situation, the KLA made their mark in various ways by
19 attacking, albeit with small arms and things, the Serbian security forces.
20 Therefore, one could say that they had -- they had been a force to be
21 reckoned with. Now, "reckoned with" is perhaps too strong a term, but
22 they certainly gave a good account of themselves all the way through in a
23 limited way.
24 Q. Yes. In fact --
25 A. I wouldn't -- excuse me for interrupting. I wouldn't suggest that
1 a force at this particular time, and as I said this in the earlier session
2 from what -- I think it was October to November onwards, there was a
3 definitive increase in both appearance being more regular, in automatic
4 weapons, and the anti-tank weapon that we talked about this morning.
5 Q. A qualitative change?
6 A. Correct, sir, yes.
7 Q. Of course, force can be used with that meaning. In other words,
8 the first time they were a force to be reckoned with, but of course force
9 also has a military connotation, doesn't it?
10 A. That's correct, yes.
11 Q. What is the military connotation?
12 A. As I've indicated already, that they would be a force, both
13 numerically and tactically, capable of carrying out operations.
14 Q. Right.
15 A. Insofar as they did, they were able to do that as we've gone
16 through on the previous session.
17 Q. Well, you were asked in a later statement to amplify what you
18 meant by the use of the word "force." I'll just read you what you said.
19 It's in line with some of what you've just said. I'll just read it. It's
20 paragraph 8 of your third paragraph. I'm not asking anybody to look at
21 it. I'll read it out at as it stands. It's the statement that you made
22 last year. I'll read the whole paragraph do you. It's quite short. "In
23 my first statement, when referring to the fighting between the security
24 forces and the KLA, I stated that the first indication that the KLA were a
25 force was in October 1998. That is not to say that prior to October 1998
1 the KLA did not fight 'the security forces' nor that they did not have
2 the capability to launch a successful -- to launch successful small-scale
3 attacks on the security forces." And then you indicate there are frequent
4 fights between them particularly in the border area and so on.
5 Do you remember saying that in the statement last year?
6 A. Yes, I do, sir, yes.
7 Q. Now, I want to just develop one dimension of this one stage
8 further, if you wouldn't mind. And there are reasons, please bear with
9 me, for asking you these questions. You served in the north of Ireland,
10 didn't you?
11 A. I have done, yes.
12 Q. Now, please understand I'm not going to ask you any sensitive
13 questions about intelligence or your role or anything else. Do you
15 A. I accept that I. I won't answer it.
16 Q. I'm not going to ask you that, so I don't want you to sit there
17 worrying that we're on -- if that's what you would do, worrying that
18 you're on the brink of having to be asked difficult questions. But you
19 are from -- from you experience in Northern Ireland, you are familiar,
20 would this be fair, with the activities of the IRA and the PIRA?
21 A. Yes, yes.
22 Q. May I just know how long you were stationed there, that is in
23 north of Ireland, just roughly?
24 A. I saw service from the beginning in 1969 until late '70s.
25 Q. Late '70s. So just to do a quick resume, that goes through the
1 period of internment, it goes through the period of Bloody Sunday, it goes
2 through the period where after that there are what's called the period of
3 troubles, some people call it the troubles, in Northern Ireland. That
4 whole period you're there?
5 A. Off and on, yes.
6 Q. Off and on, yes. I'm not asking whether you're there every day
7 and so on. These are the questions -- in that context of course the IRA
8 and the PIRA were -- both obviously had the word army in their title, they
9 both had forms of uniform. Sorry if you could say yes or no to that.
10 A. They operated both in and out of uniform as we -- as we -- as all
11 of us know, yes.
12 Q. Yes. And I don't know whether you are in a position to say now,
13 but presumably then somebody had estimated the size of these two wings of
14 the same movement. Can you help on that?
15 A. As I indicated when we talked about the KLA, there were various
16 ideas as to what constituted the organisation of the IRA, the PIRA, the
17 UVF, et cetera, et cetera.
18 Q. Yes. I'm just concentrating on one example; there are others
19 plainly. But in relation to IRA, PIRA, are you now in a position to
20 recollect what estimates of numbers involved were then?
21 A. No, I'm not, no.
22 Q. You're not?
23 A. No.
24 Q. But it certainly ran into hundreds, didn't it?
25 A. Possibly, yes.
1 Q. Yes. Four hundred, 500 even?
2 A. I wouldn't like to hazard a guess, because in those days there
3 wasn't the cooperation that there has been in latter years like with IRA,
4 the southern Ireland.
5 Q. All right?
6 A. So we are looking into a crystal ball which is --
7 Q. They had access then in the -- well, late '60s, certainly in the
8 '70s they had access to all kinds of weaponry, didn't they?
9 A. There were various container loads that came across from various
10 other countries, yes.
11 Q. Yes. Came across the border?
12 A. Possibly, yes.
13 Q. Yes. And it would include rifles, automatic guns, pistols, that
14 kind of thing, wouldn't it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. All the way through to explosives and rather high explosives at
17 that, wouldn't it?
18 A. It did include those, yes.
19 Q. Yes. They had, both of them, that's the IRA and the PIRA both had
20 a form of hierarchy, didn't they?
21 A. As you're indicating, yes.
22 Q. Yes. And a command structure, didn't they?
23 A. Of sorts, yes.
24 Q. Of sorts. And they had elements of control over various areas of
25 territory in the north of Ireland, areas near the border, areas in the
1 middle of a cities like Derry and so forth, didn't they?
2 A. There were areas that were classed as no-go areas, yes.
3 Q. No-go areas. And on the other side, the British army who'd been
4 sent there in 1969 when you first go, how many troops roughly speaking -
5 I'm sure it's not giving away a secret now - how many troops why stationed
6 in north of Ireland during the time that you were there on and off? Can
7 you help us?
8 A. I think probably about 12.000 in total.
9 Q. Twelve thousand, right. And needless to say, they would have
10 access to APCs and so forth, would they not?
11 A. Yes. They had access to APCs but not to free-fire zones that was
12 committed in Kosovo --
13 Q. No, no.
14 A. -- if that's what you're indicating.
15 Q. No, no, I'm not. I just want to get clear what the machinery
16 was. And in fact in order to clear certain areas they did have to have
17 recourse to bulldozing tanks, didn't they?
18 A. No, that's not correct.
19 Q. Not correct.
20 A. They did not have tanks or -- if I remember correctly we had
21 motorised equipment as opposed to tract, and we certainty did not have any
22 form of tanks in Northern Ireland.
23 Q. Well, I was careful about bulldozing. It's what happened in
24 Motorman. Do you know about Motorman?
25 A. I was not there in Motorman.
1 Q. No. Do you know what was used to clear? So the largest British
2 army --
3 A. I was not there, so I was not --
4 Q. You can't help?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Were you aware even that it was the largest British army exercise
7 since the war, that one in 1972?
8 A. That is one of the terms that is used to describe it, yes.
9 Q. Yes. So that just to complete this part of matters, when you left
10 Northern Ireland, your final year there of commitment, were -- was the, as
11 it were, undeclared war still being waged?
12 A. Yeah, very much so.
13 Q. Very much so. Yes.
14 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you. I have no other questions.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Mansfield. Any -- Mr. Topolski.
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Topolski:
17 Q. Mr. Crosland, I represent the third defendant, Musliu. Can I
18 begin by attempting to understand precisely the role of the defence
19 attache. Would I be right in suggesting that the role is to first of all
20 advise Her Majesty's ambassador on military matters?
21 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.
22 Q. To liaise with the host nation armed forces?
23 A. That's correct, sir.
24 Q. And to liaise with other nations' defence attaches?
25 A. That is also correct.
1 Q. I think for the period of your service in Belgrade, you were, were
2 you not, the secretary/president of the Defence Attaches Association?
3 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
4 Q. Your service ended, did it not, Mr. Crosland, I think on the 23rd
5 of March, 1999?
6 A. That is when we left Belgrade.
7 Q. Because on the 24th of March, 1999, the bombing campaign started?
8 A. That is correct, sir.
9 Q. Could I just indicate to you -- and in light of Mr. Mansfield's
10 questions I was able to put a line through a number of questions I was
11 going to ask you, so my attempt is not to replicate, still less
12 duplicate. I want to focus on the spring and summer of 1998 with you if I
14 As military attache -- defence attache, I'm sorry, the description
15 used of you by Lord Ashdown in his statement to this Tribunal in Milosevic
16 was someone who was highly informed and appraised. I have no doubt you
17 would agree with that?
18 A. That's a very flattering comment, but thank you.
19 Q. Well, you can thank Lord Ashdown next time you see him.
20 Can I deal first of all with the Serb forces and their conduct,
21 and I wonder if I could invite you to agree to a series of propositions in
22 the light of the cross-examination thus far. Militarily speaking,
23 Mr. Crosland, they enjoyed, did they not, massive superiority in every
24 respect over the forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army?
25 A. Yes, I think I've indicated that to the Court.
1 Q. They were, for the period of time that we are concerned with and
2 indeed the period of time for which you were Her Majesty's attache,
3 engaged, I suggest, in a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian
4 population of Kosovo. Would you agree with that?
5 A. Yes, I even used the word ethnic cleansing for which people were
6 somewhat excited about.
7 Q. You did. I'm trying not to get excited. I invite you to agree
8 with the expression, if you're proceed to, widespread and systematic
9 attack on the civilian population. Do you agree?
10 A. I'm happy with that phrase.
11 Q. You're happy with that. You were with Lord Ashdown, were you not,
12 when he visited Kosovo?
13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
14 Q. And to be exact, I think you were with him maybe more than once,
15 but you were certainly with him, were you not, in September of 1998 when
16 he toured the western part of Kosovo with Mr. Slinn and Mr. Donnelly?
17 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
18 Q. Was this the same or a different occasion on which you have
19 described graphically to us earlier today the discovery of bodies in a
21 A. Yes. I took Lord Ashdown and my ambassador to that spot as I
22 indicated earlier to the Court.
23 Q. Yes. Again, in an attempt not to replicate or duplicate but to
24 put a slightly different form of words to it, I wonder if you might agree
25 with this regarding the conduct of the Yugoslav military and the Yugoslav
1 police in Kosovo, that they systematically, deliberately, and without
2 justification destroyed, damaged and burnt civilian property and murdered
3 and abused large numbers of civilians. Do you agree with that?
4 A. Sir, I have to take issue with "without justification." There was
5 justification, because the KLA did attack and kill and take away various
6 numbers of Serbs as I've indicated. So there is some justification for
7 some of these. As I've also indicated, I continually pointed out to the
8 Serbian authorities that these very heavy-handed and clumsy actions were
9 doing nothing but harming both their military ability in the area and,
10 more importantly, their political stand in the wider world.
11 Q. There can never be justification for rape and murder of women and
12 children, can there, Mr. Crosland?
13 A. Not at all, no.
14 Q. Can I ask you something Mr. Mansfield didn't touch upon, he knows
15 I don't say that critically, another aspect. It's intelligence and
16 counter-intelligence. Could you look at tab 13 of the documentation that
17 you were taken through by Mr. Cayley, please. We are early on in the
18 story, the 28th of April, Mr. Crosland, and the summary of this DipTel
19 speaks for itself. I just want to look at paragraph 4 with you, if I may.
20 This is a briefing, I think, is it not, involving Colonel General
21 Dimitrijevic. Is that right?
22 A. That's right, yes.
23 Q. And this is as it were the report of the Colonel General speaking,
24 and it's the last sentence which I'm putting under the head of
25 intelligence I want to ask you about. "He added that the FRY security
1 service had identified a training camp. They had the names of some 2 to
2 2.500 men who had been trained at the camp."
3 First question, Mr. Crosland. Were you ever shown a list of the
4 names yourself?
5 A. No. I was not shown a list of the names, no.
6 Q. Is this claim that has a legitimacy as far as you're concerned?
7 That is to say, the ability of the FRY security service to gather such a
8 large number of names.
9 A. I was not actually at this particular incident as the paragraph
10 makes clear.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I had had other conversations with General Dimitrijevic who had
13 indicated to me that they had a reasonable handle, in military
14 terminology, on the activities going on on the other side of the border.
15 Q. Would your assessment be that they also had a reasonable handle on
16 military activities going on against them within the borders? That is to
17 say, what was your take on the abilities of the FRY security services to
18 gather reliable information in your time there.
19 A. Electronic warfare capability was very reasonable.
20 Q. Very reasonable.
21 A. Yes. And leading on from that you'll say, well, why didn't they
22 use it -- did they not use it in a much better way. And that is a
23 question that I have asked many people, including Mr. Milosevic, when I
24 was in front of him last year.
25 Q. I know, I've read it.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. So I don't know the answer to that.
2 Q. But they were capable and sophisticated intelligence-gathering
3 people, FRY, on your assessment of them. Would that be fair? What they
4 did with it is another matter, Mr. Crosland. I'm only concerned with
5 their capability.
6 A. Without downgrading the Albanian capability, I think at that
7 particular time their electronic and wireless ability was probably not as
8 sophisticated and, therefore, the Serbs with their more sophisticated sets
9 did have the upper hand.
10 Q. Yes. I want to deal with another aspect under the general head of
11 intelligence and counter-intelligence, if I may please. Were you aware or
12 did you become aware of the use by -- I'll use the term generally the Serb
13 forces, you understand what I mean, Mr. Crosland, shorthand. Did you
14 become aware of the use of infiltrators into the ranks of the KLA?
15 A. I think General Dimitrijevic did mention that on one occasion,
16 yes. I can't specifically recall it, no.
17 Q. Right.
18 A. But it is an obvious line of --
19 Q. It is obvious, isn't it.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you for pre-empting me. What about something rather more
22 than simple infiltration? That is to say, agent provocateur. You, of
23 course, appreciate the slight difference. What about the use of them?
24 A. I was never privy to that type of information, sir.
25 Q. Right. I won't waste your time. What I think you were privy to
1 is because you saw it was the arming of apparent civilians by the Serbs,
2 were you not?
3 A. Yes. I've mention that to the Court on several occasions.
4 Q. You used the word "thugs" yesterday on one occasion.
5 A. Yes, perhaps I can expand on that. The various towns that were in
6 that particular report mainly from Montenegro, the border towns close to
7 that, Novi Pazar, Cetinje, Podgorica, et cetera, et cetera, this is one of
8 the ways that elements of sometimes special police in civilian clothes, at
9 other times paramilitaries, if we use that phrase, would move around.
10 Q. Yes. When -- I don't ask you to turn it up. We'll remember it,
11 I'm sure, from yesterday. Behind tab 7 is a detailed attempt at a Serbian
12 security force analysis as of March 1998, and under the heading
13 of "Outline of forces," show of overwhelming force, regarding the outer
14 ring, there's talk of a capability of deploying up to 10.000 MUP for urban
15 deployment, crowd control, assisted by imported thugs. Where were the
16 thugs being imported from, Mr. Crosland? Were you aware?
17 A. Those were the gentlemen I'm was talking about just now.
18 Q. Right. Were you aware of the functioning of the office of state
20 A. Yes, I was, yes.
21 Q. You were asked a particular name, I think, in your final of three
22 statements to this Tribunal, a David Gajic, and you indicated you did not
23 know that gentleman. I wonder if I may put another name to you, Dragan
24 Jasevic. Did you know him?
25 A. The name is not...
1 Q. Familiar?
2 A. Dragan is a very common name.
3 Q. But Jasevic may not be. He was the head of the office of state
4 security responsible, if I'm rightly remember, for political delinquency?
5 A. I take your word for it.
6 Q. Pardon?
7 A. No.
8 Q. No dealings?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Would you have had any dealings --
11 A. I was not accredited to -- as I indicated first off, I was
12 accredited purely to the Vojska Jugoslavije.
13 Q. In a report that we in fact don't have in our bundles but it is a
14 report in fact dated the 3rd -- I'm sorry, the report is dated the 5th of
15 June. If anyone wants to cross-reference it in the Exhibits, it's
16 R0428576 and onward. You haven't got did in front of you, Mr. Crosland,
17 and I don't think you're going to need it. It's an analysis in June of
18 1998, as I say. It speaks about being in the area around Komorane, which
19 was being still very tense, and it relates to - and you may remember this
20 if you were there - a journey back to Pristina when people visited the
21 civil military air field. There were 15 MiG jets in two rows on the air
22 field, which had been flying training combat air patrol missions over
23 Pristina during dusk and early evening. Now, do you remember this? Were
24 you there?
25 A. I can recall in the early part of the -- this conflict that the
1 Vojska Jugoslavije air force did -- did fly some training missions around
3 Q. Did they have the use of helicopters?
4 A. The Vojska Jugoslavije had a few number of helicopters. I came
5 across, I think, one up towards Mitrovica. There were reports that
6 helicopters had been used to assault various villages.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. I could never -- excuse me, I lost the word. Verify. Thank you.
9 Verify or confirm these reports because by the time you started to talk to
10 people who had been under bombardment of whatever kind, the stories would
11 grow larger as fishermen do with fish.
12 Q. It's the last line of this report that I want to ask you about.
13 The author says that this overflying combat air patrols, although
14 training, is not new to Kosovo. It is more likely to be a rather unsubtle
15 piece of psych ops. Psychological operation, is that what that's for?
16 A. That's a reasonable assessment, yes.
17 Q. Would you help us, please. What other kind of psych ops were the
18 Serbian forces carrying out in the period of time we are interested in,
19 Mr. Crosland, if you're aware of any?
20 A. I suspect they used the communication networks to try and
21 broadcast to the Albanian population which would be a perfectly reasonable
22 tool to use.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. And by their actions alone, you could understand that they
25 would -- we were putting a psychological fear --
1 Q. Oh, yes.
2 A. -- into the inhabitants of Kosovo.
3 Q. Certainly.
4 A. I think I commented on this to the General Staff as a derogatory
5 way of use of force.
6 Q. Can I turn then to -- away from intelligence to just one or two
7 questions about the KLA.
8 I don't know if the Court's going to have another break. Your
9 Honour was looking at me in a meaningful way. I don't know whether that
10 was meaning to indicate a break.
11 JUDGE PARKER: We would break now if you think that would be more
13 MR. TOPOLSKI: Your Honour, I'm entirely in the Court's hands.
14 Mr. Crosland may welcome a break. Perhaps the interpreters might. I can
15 indicate that I'm certainly I'm going to finish before the end of the
16 session today given the -- I hope the lack of duplication.
17 JUDGE PARKER: We will have a break now, resuming at ten minutes
18 to. There's a reason for a slightly longer than usual break.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.54 p.m.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Topolski.
22 MR. TOPOLSKI:
23 Q. Mr. Crosland, it's my fault, not yours. Could both you and I
24 remember to pause after my question --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. TOPOLSKI:
2 Q. -- and your answer to assist the translation.
3 MR. TOPOLSKI: Your Honour, I'm told there is no Albanian
4 translation. There is now.
5 Q. We were on the KLA, Mr. Crosland. Could I ask you this, please:
6 Were you aware of armed Albanians engaged in fighting who were not
7 members of the KLA but any other organisation?
8 A. Sir, as I indicated in Malisevo there were other nationalities
9 who made their nationalities avail to be me. As far as I know, that's
10 the only the time I saw people outside the Albanian population.
11 Q. And to be clear, my question was specifically regarding
12 Albanians. You were not aware of any other military or quasi-military
13 organisation that was engaged in fighting at the time other than the KLA?
14 A. That's correct. I was not aware of anyone, no.
15 Q. I'd like to take you, if I may, to a passage in your second
16 statement, Mr. Crosland, and I wanted to assist you whether Mr. Crosland
17 could be given a copy of it, please. I know Mr. Hasan has copies
18 available. I hope I'm not stealing Mr. Cayley's.
19 Mr. Crosland, would you be good enough, please, to identify this
20 as one of your three statements to the Tribunal? You will see the date
21 towards the bottom of the first page. 7th December, 2000.
22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
23 Q. Could I ask you, please, to go to the third of 11 pages.
24 Paragraph 9, first of all.
25 "Based on my dealings with the KLA and knowledge of many of their
1 operations, I do not think that its General Staff have particularly
2 effective control over the organisation. The more committed and fervent
3 KLA zone commanders conducted operations in their areas without any
4 apparent sense of commitment to a higher command." And then a name:
5 "Ramus Haradinaj," "Remi and Drini were particularly strong and
6 independently-minded KLA regional commanders."
7 For the future -- is that a characterisation of the totality of
8 your dealings with the KLA?
9 A. I think that is a comment which as you read out I would agree
10 with, yeah, at that particular time, yes.
11 Q. May I can take you to the last two sentences or three of the same
12 paragraph on the next page and I want you to if you can confirm that this
13 is indeed the position. "I am unaware of the existence of any written
14 KLA doctrine or of the ability of the organisation to impose discipline,
15 especially that related to criminal acts and their prevention, nor am I
16 aware of whether or not KLA commanders ever ordered criminal attacks."
17 Do you stand by that?
18 A. I think that is -- that is the comment I made at the time and --
19 yes. I think that's a true comment, yeah.
20 Q. Can I move on, then, to Lapusnik itself. Mr. Crosland, would it
21 be any use pressing you on how many occasions between March and July you
22 were in or around that village?
23 A. I can only say there were many occasions.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. Sometimes we were allowed in, sometimes we were not.
1 Q. When you were allowed in, may I ask you this, were you introduced
2 to or did you meet any KLA soldiers there?
3 A. I met some soldiers there, yes, who appeared to be on patrol in
4 that area.
5 Q. It's a grand way of putting it, I suppose, but I'm sure you'll
6 get the effect of my question. Were you shown deployment of KLA forces
7 in the village?
8 A. No. There were some very obvious slit trenches that were local
9 defensive positions.
10 Q. And were they located at various positions around the village?
11 A. As far as I can remember, and up on the surrounding ridges
12 adjacent to that particular village, yes.
13 Q. On subsequent occasions of your visits, did you meet the same or
14 different KLA soldiers?
15 A. I -- I think it would be very difficult to say truthfully yes or
16 no, to be honest.
17 Q. You can, of course, meet people and never know their names or
18 anything else other than their appearance. I mean, do you have any
19 recollection now, and I know it's difficult these years later, meeting
20 the same person more than once?
21 A. Not particularly in this location, no.
22 Q. Were you aware and can you help Their Honours with the deployment
23 of Serb forces around Lapusnik at any stage?
24 A. Yes, Your Honours. The major position was at Komorane. It was
25 a -- mainly a MUP position with various other elements in there as well.
1 Q. Did it have the capacity to shell the village, the Serb forces,
2 from outside of it when you saw their deployment?
3 A. I don't recall -- yes. Later on there was a VJ position there
4 which had artillery, yes, to the south, to the south-east, I think it
5 was, on a hill.
6 Q. Mr. Crosland, I recognised difficulty, but can you help us at all
7 as to when that might have been, at least what month that was?
8 A. I think it may be from July or September, that period of time, I
10 Q. What we're given to understand is that Lapusnik, as the KLA no
11 doubt would have put it fell to the Serb forces certainly on the 28th of
12 July, and you were there, were you not, in that area on that very day
13 witnessing what was undoubtedly the amassing of Serb forces. That's
14 right, isn't it?
15 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
16 Q. You've answered very clearly, if I may say so, Mr. Mansfield's
17 questions regarding a camp or whatever in the Lapusnik itself. The
18 reference to a prison camp at Glogovac, you'll recollect that,
19 Mr. Mr. Crosland. It's just to remind you, if you want to look it up
20 again, behind tab 20 of your exhibits --
21 A. Thank you.
22 Q. -- is the relevant telegram, where in paragraph 8, halfway
23 through under "Security," it says there is talk of a KLA camp in
24 Glogovac, impossible to substantiate.
25 Did you ever go to a place that could be described as a prison
2 A. There is in Glogovac an industrial area that may -- could have
3 been used as a prison camp. We had discussions later on that the Serbian
4 security forces were using it as a prison camp.
5 When I attempted to go into that area, quite naturally I was not
6 allowed access for whatever reason.
7 Q. I don't ask you to turn it up because I don't want to trouble you
8 with too many documents, but at paragraph 21 of your second witness
9 statement, in fact I think actually the statement you have in front of
10 you, at 21 you say, if you're referring to the same place, Glogovac
11 factory was used by the MUP and was obviously a place where suspicious
12 activities took place, but I was never allowed into it."
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Now that I've shown you that, do you wreck next that's putting it
15 slightly higher, isn't it, obviously a place where suspicious activity
16 took place?
17 A. Well, as I indicated to the Court, the security forces were
18 extremely jumpy about me coming anywhere near it, so one can draw
19 conclusions from that.
20 Q. Would it be fair to leave this subject of Lapusnik/camp in this
21 way, Mr. Crosland, that until this case and your involvement in it as a
22 witness, you were not personally aware of the allegation of the existence
23 of the camp in Lapusnik? Would that be fair?
24 A. That's a fair comment, sir, yes.
25 Q. May I ask you, then, as a final heading, and I hope it can be
1 fairly brief one, some general questions, tapping into your experiences
2 there. First of all, this: We have heard very early on in this trial
3 from a diplomat, a Mr. Kickert to be exact, of what he described as a
4 tension between the KLA and the political party the LDK. Were you
5 conscious of such tensions in Kosovo at the relevant time?
6 A. There was political comment by those following the political side
7 that there appeared to be some tension between those two elements. As you
8 are well aware, my job was to follow the military part, but it is integral
9 that there is a military and political wing of a fledgling party.
10 Q. Certainly. Can I ask you about the subject of imprisonment itself
11 and invite you to consider this, Mr. Crosland: Given the situation as you
12 regularly saw it, given the nature of the insurgency, given the nature of
13 the Serb response, those three givens, activities by the insurgents
14 whereby individuals are stopped, questioned, arrested, detained,
15 imprisoned would all be of themselves typical of such a military
16 situation, would they not?
17 A. They were typical of this particular military situation, yes. I
18 wouldn't say every military situation.
19 Q. Of course not. But Mr. Mansfield was asking you quite a bit about
20 the north of Ireland. There it occurred, did it not?
21 A. Yes, it did. I would take great exception if people are inferring
22 that Northern Ireland and the actions of the British army were in anyway
23 linked to the actions of the KLA and the Serbian forces in Kosovo.
24 Q. Well --
25 A. I'd take very strong objection to that.
1 Q. Mr. Crosland, as it happens, nothing was further from my mind.
2 A. I'm very glad to hear it.
3 Q. I think finally this: You'll recollect, no doubt, giving evidence
4 in the trial of Milosevic. Mr. Crosland, you recollect --
5 A. I'm sorry, yes. Beg your pardon.
6 Q. I wonder if I might read to you - and we have distributed copies
7 of it, it's only a paragraph - from page 8013 of the transcript of that
9 A. Thank you.
10 Q. At the bottom of 8013 is a question from Mr. Milosevic himself, I
11 think. It is: "Is it uncontested that the objectives of the attack or
12 the targets were members of the Ministry of Interior, members of the
13 military, civilians as well, Serbs, and Albanians, Muslims and members of
14 other ethnic communities?" This is a general question regarding 1998.
15 Mr. Milosevic goes on: "They were killed, they were kidnapped, they were
16 robbed. Do you know about that? Did you know about that?"
17 May I just read out your reply and ask you if it is something you
18 stand by today, Mr. Crosland: "Yes, Mr. Milosevic, I knew about that.
19 You must bear that in context with what your security forces were doing,
20 something like 2 to 3 to 400 villages I saw burnt to the ground. It's not
21 unnatural that people took revenge. I'm afraid reconciliation in the
22 Balkans is not a word that's very much known about "osveta." More
23 "osveta" and less -- a bit more "pomirenje" and less "osveta" would be a
24 better thing all around. More reconciliation and less revenge."
25 Do you stand by that, Mr. Crosland?
1 A. Yes, I stand by that, and I think I've indicated that throughout
2 my current tour in the court.
3 I would also, if I may, just go back to the previous point. When
4 I went back into Kosovo after the conflict, I went to the prison at Istok,
5 Dubrava, it's in the western part of Kosovo, up here to the north-east of
6 Pec, and it was myself and one or two others who uncovered a whole mass of
7 evidence that indicated orders for execution of various Albanian people.
8 So I would hope that both things are taken in context, that one was trying
9 to report firmly and fairly on what was a pretty nasty incident all round.
10 So I would just like that to be added, please.
11 Q. It has been -- it has been recorded, Mr. Crosland, and for my part
12 I thank you for your patience and all the assistance you've given. I'm
13 very grateful.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Topolski.
15 Mr. Guy-Smith.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: No questions.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Mr. Cayley.
18 MR. CAYLEY: Very few, Your Honour.
19 Re-examined by Mr. Cayley:
20 Q. Mr. Crosland, you'll be pleased to hear that you will actually be
21 going home today rather than having to come back on Monday because I have
22 very little. The Judges may have some questions for you.
23 You made a comment in response to a question by Mr. Topolski a
24 moment ago, and I'll read out your response that you said that you would
25 take great exception if the actions of the British army were in any way
1 linked to the actions of the KLA and Serbia in Kosovo. How were the
2 actions of the KLA and the Serbs in Kosovo different from the actions of
3 the British army in Northern Ireland?
4 A. I wouldn't even put the two in the same sentence, frankly.
5 Q. Could you expand on why -- how operations were conducted? What
6 was the distinction between the manner in which operations were conducted?
7 I know it's obvious to you, but if you could explain to the Court the
8 distinctions between the operations of the KLA and the Serbs in Kosovo and
9 the operations of the British army in Northern Ireland?
10 A. I don't think there's any -- any connection whatsoever. The
11 operations from the British army in Northern Ireland were carried out
12 under a mandate that was legally applied to. Yes, there were mistakes
13 made, as we all understand and appreciate. But to -- in any shape or
14 form, to put these two operations together, I would not countenance any
15 conversation on them, full stop.
16 Q. How were operations carried out by the KLA and Serbs in Kosovo?
17 A. As we've just had talked about with the Defence counsel, there was
18 a great deal of room for retaliation because of the very heavy-handed
19 nature of the Serbian operations. This does not immediately allow people
20 to carry out counter-operations. But within the Balkans, this is the way
21 people carry out their dealings. It's rather brutal, and I think we're
22 all aware of that. And one tried, as I've said here, to report on -- on
23 both sides accurately, fairly, and firmly, and to point out to the
24 relevant people, and in my case to Vojska Jugoslavije, that certain
25 actions that they were carrying out would do nothing to sort out this
1 mess, which is still, as we know, ongoing.
2 Q. You responded earlier on actually to a question from Mr. Mansfield
3 and it was about your characterisation of the KLA as a force, and you made
4 the comment, and I copied it down. "The KLA made their mark in various
5 ways. They gave a good account of themselves all the way through." What
6 did you mean by that?
7 A. For a potentially lightly armed force, and certainly in the early
8 part of 1998, as I've said already to the Court, they learned their lesson
9 not to stand and fight but to use what we call the shoot-and-scoot
10 tactics. And these they carried out with reasonable success as the
11 Serbian casualties are quite clear.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland.
13 MR. CAYLEY: I don't have any other questions, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Cayley.
15 I am pleased to be able to indicate that that concludes your
16 evidence and you're free to return to your other activities. We would
17 like to thank you for the assistance that you've given the Chamber.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE PARKER: If there is no matter, it would seem a practical
20 course to adjourn now for the weekend.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.
22 JUDGE PARKER: We will therefore adjourn. It has been pointed
23 out, Mr. Cayley -- if you wouldn't mind just waiting there for a moment.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. CAYLEY: My apologies, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Have they been tendered?
2 MR. CAYLEY: No. I apologise. Mr. Younis did remind me.
3 Could I, for simplicity, admit it as one exhibit because the map
4 is actually at tab 1. So it would be tabs 1 to 42 inclusive, the
5 Prosecutor's exhibit. I don't know what the next number is.
6 THE REGISTRAR: You don't want the number individually assigned to
7 each tab or just one number?
8 JUDGE PARKER: One exhibit number to the whole folder.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you very much. So that will be P92 for the
10 full binder, including tab 1 to tab 42.
11 MR. CAYLEY: And if it could be placed under seal, Your Honour,
13 JUDGE PARKER: Exhibit P92 will be admitted, being a binder of
14 documents, and they will be under seal.
15 That being so, we will now adjourn until 2.15 on Monday. Oh, 4.00
16 on Monday, as another Trial Chamber has to use this court to deliver a
17 decision at 2.15. So we are delayed, I am afraid, until 4.00.
18 Until Monday.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.20 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Monday, the 17th day of
21 January, 2005, at 4.00 p.m.