1 Thursday, 10 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon.
6 Mr. Whiting.
7 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I believe Mr. Mansfield had some
8 points to raise, so I defer to him.
9 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes, I'm most obliged. Your Honour, I would like
10 to take one brief moment, if I might, as a matter of courtesy to you and
11 the Tribunal to make an explanation and an apology, rather than for it be
12 left without explanation, for those occasions when I'm unable to be here.
13 I'm afraid there have been rather too many of those, I accept.
14 The problem I'm afraid has been an ongoing one since 2003. I was
15 engaged and am engaged in a major, long-running criminal case in London
16 at the Old Bailey. The hearings began in 2003; however, without
17 belabouring about how things became completely bogged down and derailed.
18 The trial didn't begin when it was supposed to and it's now it's running
19 about four or five months overdue over which I have no control
20 whatsoever. I really apologise to you that occasionally I'm not able to
21 be here; I have to be there. I'm not even in a position -- and I dare
22 not, as you've discovered in these proceedings -- to make a prediction
23 that it will end at the end of this month. It was supposed to have ended
24 by the end of last year, but it still hasn't and there is evidence
25 ongoing. I'm doing the best I can, and I'm sorry if that has not been
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mansfield, we are grateful for your
3 explanation. We had not taken it as discourtesy. You had indicated that
4 there were or was - I don't remember which - one or more conflicting
5 interests which you were working your way through, and we fully
6 understood that is the position. And fortunately you have left Mr. Khan
7 to very ably keep the reins on behalf of your client, so we have been
8 well assisted.
9 MR. MANSFIELD: I thank you.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Whiting.
11 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think we're ready to proceed with
12 the next witness.
13 [The witness entered court]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. Would you be good enough to read
15 the affirmation on the card that is given to you now.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, sir. I solemnly declare that
17 I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Please sit down, sir.
19 Yes, Mr. Whiting.
20 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 WITNESS: JAKUP KRASNIQI
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Examined by Mr. Whiting:
24 Q. Good afternoon, sir.
25 A. Good afternoon.
1 Q. Can you understand me clearly and hear me clearly?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. I realise I'm on the wrong channel.
4 Sir, could you please state your name.
5 A. Yes. My name is Jakup Krasniqi.
6 Q. Sir, I see that you have some papers that you have brought with
7 you in front of you. Am I right about that?
8 A. Yes. I have the right to possess some documents and I have
9 brought with me some documents and materials that I think relate to this
11 Q. And I just want to ask you, just so we have a record, what it is
12 that you have in front of you so that we're all clear about that.
13 A. I have the statement I issued in Pristina to you and some
14 statements issued by the General Staff of the KLA and a notebook.
15 Q. What I'm going to ask you, sir, is if you would, before you refer
16 to any of those documents, if you would please let us know that you would
17 like to refer to one of those documents. Do you understand what I'm
19 In other words, if you could put the documents to one side for
20 now and I'll ask you questions, and if you have any difficulty answering
21 any of my questions or any of the other questions that are put to you
22 during your testimony, then perhaps you could ask to refer to one of
23 those documents. Do you understand?
24 A. Yes, I understand. I may put them aside for the moment, and when
25 I need them I will bring them out.
1 Q. Thank you for your understanding.
2 Now, sir, could you tell me your date of birth.
3 A. January the 1st, 1951.
4 Q. And where were you born?
5 A. I was born in Fatos village, formerly Negrovce.
6 Q. And what municipality is that in?
7 A. It is a rural municipality 30 kilometres west of Pristina.
8 Q. How many years of education have you had?
9 A. Apart from the primary school, I finished the high school
10 pedagogical school or faculty, and post-university studies in Pristina.
11 Q. After you finished your education, your schooling, your
12 education, did you start working?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And can you tell us what you did at that time?
15 A. I used to do two jobs. I worked in the educational system. I
16 worked in a primary and in a high school. I was a member of clandestine
17 organisations which we called illegal or secret organisations against the
18 occupier, the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
19 Q. I'm going to ask you about each of those jobs, but let me start
20 with your work in the educational system. Were you a teacher in the
21 primary and high school?
22 A. I was also a teacher in the primary school and in the high
24 Q. And how many years did you do that? How many years were you a
1 A. I wasn't lucky to work very long as a teacher. I worked during
2 the studies and a little after the studies, because in April 1981, I was
3 imprisoned by the former Belgrade regime.
4 Q. Okay. Can you tell us where you were imprisoned.
5 A. I was imprisoned in Pristina of course, and I did a sentence of
6 ten years and four months from April the 5th, 1981, until 23rd July,
8 Q. What was the reason that was given for imposing that sentence?
9 A. In 1980/1981 in Kosova a movement was organised, a clandestine
10 and a student movement, which was transformed into a popular movement.
11 The demand of this movement was for Kosova to become a republic in the
12 Yugoslav federation.
13 Q. I understand. Is that -- was it because of your participation in
14 that movement that you were imprisoned?
15 A. Yes. I said I was member of its organisation, but I also
16 participated in all the demonstrations that were staged in Pristina in
17 the spring of 1981.
18 Q. And if you remember, Mr. Krasniqi, what was the actual charge
19 that the Serbs said was the reason for your imprisonment?
20 A. The reason -- the indictment was, under the Yugoslav law,
21 activity -- counter-revolutionary and hostile activity. It was
22 interpreted under two articles, 214 and 226.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, you told us that in addition to teaching you
24 had joined some clandestine organises and I think you've already provided
25 a little bit of information about that. But can you tell us specifically
1 when did you join these organisations? What year?
2 A. I was -- joined one organisation and this happened in 1973.
3 Might be early 1974 probably.
4 Q. What was the name of that organisation?
5 A. That organisation was called Marxist-Leninist Organisation.
6 Q. Were you a member of that organisation from the time you joined
7 until the time you were imprisoned in 1981?
8 A. Yes, I was.
9 Q. When you were released from prison in 1991, ten years later, what
10 did you do?
11 A. After I was released, I engaged in political activities. At that
12 time in Kosova there was a democratic alternative movement in place and I
13 was a member of the Democratic League for the Drenoc local branch.
14 Q. Have you lived in Kosovo your entire life or have you lived for
15 periods of time outside of Kosovo?
16 A. With the exception of the time I was in prison, and this was
17 outside Kosova, I have lived mainly in Kosova. During the war in the
18 last month after my return from Rambouillet and Paris conferences, I was
19 for some months in Albania.
20 Q. And the last question on this topic: You said you were
21 imprisoned outside of Kosovo. Where was that? Someplace in Serbia?
22 A. I was in several prisons but most of my term I did in Zrenjanin
23 and Novi Sad, in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
24 Q. I'm going to move on to another topic, but before I do that I
25 want to ask you some questions about your appearance here today. Did you
1 receive a subpoena from the Court to appear here today?
2 A. Yes, I did receive a subpoena, and I want to declare here in the
3 presence of Their Honours that initially I stated that I am not willing
4 to testify against Fatmir Limaj and his comrades. This was one reason.
5 The other reason was that even today I believe that the Kosova Liberation
6 Army during its short existence and life didn't commit crimes for which
7 it's being accused, and I don't see any reasons for its members to be put
8 here in The Hague Tribunal. I didn't want to issue statements. My
9 statements have been always public, transparent in the eyes of the Kosova
10 and international public, and I didn't have more to add to them. The
11 duty of a spokesperson in every army in every country are known.
12 And another reason is that to this day I believe that the
13 indictment against the three accused has been built on politically
14 motivated evidence given by the people who have been in the service of
15 the violence of the occupiers in Kosova. I am a witness that they have
16 been processed in advance. Before they were given to the investigators
17 of the Tribunal, they have been processed by the Serb intelligence
19 These were the reasons for my hesitation to appear here in the
20 court and to issue statements to the prosecutors. That's why I refused
21 to come of my own free will, even though I have a lot to say, especially
22 about the political struggle of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
23 And before the Tribunal today I'm going to tell the truth
24 regarding the KLA, its just and liberation struggle which was in fact
25 waged by the people of Kosova; the KLA just led the struggle.
1 Q. Just to be clear, Mr. Krasniqi, all I ask of you is that you
2 answer my questions and tell the truth. Do you understand that?
3 A. Even now I said the truth.
4 Q. I understand. And it is -- so -- just so I understand your
5 answer there, it's in compliance with the subpoena that you are here
6 today. Is that right?
7 A. I already stated my reasons for my hesitation, but still I am
9 Q. I understand. Now, sir, on April 27th of 2004, did you attend an
10 interview with the Office of the Prosecutor in Pristina pursuant to a
11 summons from the Prosecutor?
12 A. Yes. And at that time I have told you and there is a document
13 here, point 4, that I intend to be a witness for the Defence lawyers of
14 Mr. Fatmir Limaj, and for these reasons I refuse to be a witness for the
15 Prosecution. This is what I told you then.
16 Q. I understand. And what you've just referred to when you said
17 "point 4" is the report of the interview that you had with the Office of
18 the Prosecutor on April 27th, 2004. Is that right? Just so the record
19 is clear.
20 A. Yes, that's right.
21 Q. And in that interview on April 27th, 2004, were you truthful?
22 A. Yes, I was truthful in regard to what I was asked.
23 Q. And after the interview, did you later learn that the recording
24 equipment at the interview had malfunctioned and that there was no tape
25 of the interview? Did you learn that?
1 A. Yes, I learned that later.
2 Q. And on the 21st of June, 2004 - I understand if you don't
3 remember the exact date but you can -- I believe it was on that date -
4 were you given a report of the questions and answers at the interview in
5 the Albanian language? And did you have an opportunity to review that
6 report and then on the following day initial and sign the report?
7 A. Yes, but the report was not built or written on the basis of a
8 recorded tape, but it was written on the basis of the notes taken by your
9 staff during that time. This is what I was told.
10 Q. That's -- thank you for that clarification; that's correct. My
11 next question is: When you -- I understand that it was a -- not a
12 verbatim report of what had occurred at the interview, it was a summary
13 of what had occurred at the interview. But when you initialled each page
14 and signed it, were you agreeing to the accuracy of the summary of what
15 had occurred at the interview?
16 A. In general it was what I said.
17 Q. Okay. Sir, when did you join the KLA?
18 A. We have to divide that -- the existence of the KLA in two parts.
19 It has -- it's composed of the political leadership, which of course has
20 the operational aspect or side. From the beginning, from the inception
21 of the KLA, together with the other comrades that formed this KLA, I was
22 there. We were organised in the political bodies which then did not have
23 the name KLA even before 1991. It was -- to be precise, in 1991 it
24 celebrated its 30th anniversary when Adem Jashari and the armed political
25 formation in Prekaz put up the first armed resistance against the Serb
1 police and military forces.
2 Then with its political formation, Adem Jashari was for some days
3 at my family, then he stayed with some other families in my village. And
4 this is how we began to link up with the armed wing and in 1993 I may say
5 that the KLA was formed as such, which at a later time in 1994 through
6 its communiques would become known to the public.
7 Q. Thank you. I'm going to ask you some more -- some further
8 questions about what you just told, but I realise I neglected to ask you
9 an important question. That is: How are you presently employed?
10 A. Yes. Presently I am the general secretary of the Democratic
11 Party in Kosova and the chairman of the parliamentary group of this party
12 in the Kosova parliament.
13 Q. The Democratic Party in Kosovo, is that known by its initials,
14 the PDK?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And just so I understand your answer, you are a member of
17 parliament and you are in fact the chairman of the parliamentary group of
18 your party in the parliament. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes, this is what I said.
20 Q. And were you until recently a member of the government, a
21 minister in the government?
22 A. Yes. In the first legislature, I was Minister of Public Works in
23 the Kosova government, provisional government.
24 Q. And that was from what year to what year?
25 A. This was from March the 4th, 2002, until 1 December 2004.
1 Q. And was it because there was a change in the government that you
2 are no longer in that position?
3 A. Yes, yes. There are -- naturally there are changes in the
4 government and my party is in opposition.
5 Q. Now, I want to go back to the answer you gave a few moments ago
6 about the beginning -- about your beginning involvement in the KLA and
7 just make sure I understand what you were telling us. Do I understand
8 that in 1991 you joined -- the political organisation that you joined was
9 in some senses a precursor to the KLA. Is that what you were telling us?
10 A. It's not exactly so.
11 Q. Well, please explain.
12 A. I said earlier that on July 23rd, 1991, I was released from jail
13 after ten years and three, four months. I was a member then and in
14 Kosova there existed a greater party, a democratic party -- Democratic
15 League. Since most of the citizens had subscribed to that movement and
16 party, even though people referred to it more as a movement, would be
17 most seriously committed to the realisation of the aspirations of the
18 Kosova citizens, so that they, too, enjoy freedom and democracy - meaning
19 I was a member of the Democratic League then. But during this time an
20 armed action was undertaken. These actions were naturally the -- were
21 organised in -- underground.
22 So this was the beginning of the armed resistance, which I
23 described also as part of my struggle in a political plain to implement
24 the aspirations of Kosova citizens, freedom and democracy; to help them
25 build their independent state; to ensure the freedom of all its citizens.
1 Q. And when would you say that you joined the armed struggle? When
2 was that? What year was that?
3 A. I already said that we may say that 1993 marks, in a way, the
4 unification of the political wing and the armed wing. And from this
5 unification, I would say -- this unification resulted in the emergence of
6 the KLA, which in 1994 through a communique made public that due to the
7 severe Serb repression and violence, maltreatment, and constant
8 persecution of Albanians, due to violence, savage violence exercised by
9 the occupier in Kosova, which had been doing that even earlier in the
10 Milosevic time, it stepped up this violence, becoming unbearable for the
11 population. Under such circumstances, they formed the political and
12 military formation which was now known by the name of Kosova Liberation
14 Q. And when that occurred in 1993/1994, did you think of yourself as
15 being in the -- I understand that these two wings merged, the political
16 wing and the armed wing. After 1993 and 1994, were you in the political
17 wing or in the armed wing? Or were you in both?
18 A. I was more in the political wing because I was in Kosova and
19 during all that time I was there I was also a member of the Presidency of
20 the Democratic League in Drenoc. I was also a member, a deputy, because
21 in 1992 in Kosova we held free elections. And during those elections, I
22 was elected as the deputy for Drenoc in the Kosova parliament, a
23 parliament which due to the repression and the violence and the obstacles
24 put to it by the Belgrade regime never managed to appropriately
25 constitute itself and function as a proper parliament.
1 At the same time -- this was my legal activity but there was also
2 the underground activity. Because at that time to fight for democracy
3 was forbidden under the laws of the Yugoslav federation, which now
4 actually had -- then become the laws of Serbia, which kept only the name
5 as the Yugoslav federation.
6 So to work for our country, it was necessary for us to engage in
7 illegal, clandestine organisations. I don't know which word would suit
8 better your vocabulary, but it boils down to the same thing. They were
9 secret organisations because we did not have other possibilities to act.
10 That's why my being in the KLA initially illegally and then my legal
11 presence in the LDK was a must. I never accepted being debased by the
12 Belgrade regime or the debasement that this regime made of most of the
13 citizens in Kosova.
14 Q. Sir, can you briefly tell us what the illegal or clandestine
15 activities comprised of. What was that? You've told us what the
16 political activity was; what was the illegal, clandestine activity at
17 this time, 1993/1994?
18 A. The illegal activity aimed at expanding the resistance wing in
19 Kosova on a national level. They aimed at preparing the citizens of
20 Kosova to -- for the liberation war. They aimed that the violence and
21 Serb terror be halted. They aimed that the Kosovar citizens regained
22 their dignity and honour, their freedom, independence and democracy.
23 That was the aim of this organisation and all the other organisations in
24 Kosova following the Second World War.
25 Q. You've described what the aims or goals of the illegal and
1 clandestine activity were. Now -- briefly, what was the means? What
2 means did you use to attempt to achieve those goals?
3 A. In 1991 the citizens of Kosova had exhausted all the political
4 means of war. So the only means left to them was to engage -- to create
5 armed formations for them to realise their freedom and democracy against
6 those who were engaged in violence and terror.
7 Q. And, sir, in 1993 and 1994 did you yourself participate or engage
8 in armed formations?
9 A. No, I didn't take part personally in such formations.
10 Q. Did there come a time when you did?
11 A. I have always been the -- a member of the political wing in the
12 Kosova Liberation Army.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, before I move on to later dates, at this
14 time in 1991 did the LDK exist in Kosovo?
15 A. Yes. It was formed in around December 1990/1991, meaning that it
17 Q. And were you yourself a member of the LDK in addition to being a
18 member of the Democratic League?
19 A. But the LDK and the Democratic League are one and the same thing.
20 Q. Thank you. Did there come a time when you broke from the LDK,
21 when you stopped being a member of the LDK?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And can you tell me what year that was.
24 A. This happened in 1998 when I saw that the path followed or chosen
25 to be followed by the LDK was a path that didn't lead anywhere. Over
1 400.000 people had left Kosova while terror or cleansing was being
2 pursued in Kosova. The people were being maltreated from all sides.
3 Every main street -- In all the roads of Kosova you could see police
4 roadblocks and checkpoints where all the citizens of Kosova without
5 exception were being maltreated with the purpose of -- for these citizens
6 not to feel at home in Kosova but to flee it and that Belgrade regime
7 could re-colonise Kosova.
8 Q. Sir, we will talk certainly more about these issues later, but I
9 just at this point want to ask you this: What month in 1998 did you
10 break from the LDK for the reasons you've just described? What month was
12 A. I became displeased with the KLA -- sorry, with the LDK at the
13 end of 1997 and beginning of 1998, especially following the event of 28
14 February 1998 and that of 5, 6, and 8 March 1998. That was the moment
15 when I broke away from the policy followed by the policy of silence and
16 doing nothing of the LDK. And it was then that I passed on to the Kosova
17 Liberation Army quite openly. I broke away from them really on the 3rd
18 and 4th of March, 1994, on the occasion of the burial ceremony of the 14
19 victims of the Serb terror. It was at that time that I gave a political
20 speech there which marked my open, official breaking away with that
21 party, with which its policy had become an obstacle for the Kosova people
22 to realise their freedom and democracy and independence.
23 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I think we had a little problem with the
24 translation so I'm going to ask you this question. You said you broke
25 with them on the 3 and 4th of March, and I believe you intended to say to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 say March 1998. Is that correct?
2 A. 1998, yes. It's 1998.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, we've heard some testimony about this and I
4 think everybody in the courtroom is familiar with what occurred on these
5 dates, the 28th of February and the 5th and 6th of March. But just so
6 the record is clear and your testimony is complete, could you briefly
7 tell us what it was that occurred on those dates.
8 A. It is 5, 6, 7, and 8 March.
9 Q. Thank you. And what is it that occurred on those dates, the 28th
10 of February and those dates in March in 1998?
11 A. Yes. At that time I was still the chairman of the Drenoc LDK
12 branch legally or officially. And I followed closely on a daily basis
13 the political developments that occurred in Drenoc commune --
14 municipality, which is one of the two municipalities of Drenica. On that
15 day large military and police Serb forces attacked several villages of
16 Drenica, of the north-eastern part of Drenica. And at that time we
17 couldn't know -- it was not possible for us to know what was the goal of
18 these force -- of such large presence of forces in that area in those
19 villages, Likoshan, Granacell and Qirez.
20 Q. I think you've given a partial answer to my next question but I
21 want to give you an opportunity to address it more completely, though
22 briefly, if you could. And that is: What was it about those events that
23 occurred at the end of February and beginning of March 1998 that caused
24 you to be disenchanted with the policies of the LDK? Can you explain
25 that for us, please.
1 A. This happened mainly because of the terror and genocide that were
2 being committed by the Belgrade regime in Kosova. It was at this time
3 that two events, painful events not only for the Albanians and for
4 Kosova, happened. This happened in Likoshan and Qirez where the Serb
5 military police and paramilitaries in a day killed 14 people 11 of whom
6 were unarmed, people who the police and the army found in their homes.
7 Among the victims was also a pregnant woman.
8 And to further clarify this point I want to say that if [as
9 interpreted] on the 28th of November, 1997, in Llausha, we buried a
10 teacher killed by the Serb army which was attended by 20.000 people. In
11 the burial of these victims on the 28th February and the 1st of March,
12 1998, and on -- 3 and 4 March, 1998, in Likoshan which was attended by
13 over 200.000 people, this shows how much the discontent -- how great was
14 the discontent of the population of Kosova at the policy followed by the
15 Belgrade regime. So at the funeral of the teacher in Drenica, as I said,
16 was attended by 20.000 people. The funeral at Likoshan and Qirez were
17 attended by over 200.000 people, in a word --
18 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, if I can direct you a little bit in your answer. I
19 understand what you've told us about the events on these dates. If you
20 could just tell us: What was it that then -- what was it about these
21 events that caused you to be disenchanted with the LDK? Because I
22 believe that's what was your testimony. But what was about these events
23 that caused that? Why did you become disenchanted with the LDK when
24 these events happened?
25 A. I already said that the LDK didn't represent anymore the
1 interests and the voice of the Kosova citizens. So it was necessary for
2 somebody else to become the torch-bearer of the interests of the Kosova
3 citizens. Someone had to stop the Serb genocide in Kosova and this is
4 what the people expected the KLA to do.
5 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you to be patient with my questions because
6 I know you know this information very well and some of my questions may
7 seem obvious, but we need to have clarity about these issues. So can you
8 explain for us what was the difference of the approach of the LDK and the
10 A. I believe that the differences, for the Trial Chamber and all of
11 you, are known. The LDK was not engaged in a movement to do away with
12 the Serb violence in Kosova. In one way or another it had become a
13 stooge of this regime, to -- to deprive the rights of the Albanian
14 people to live in peace and freedom and independence and democracy.
15 Q. And when you say that the LDK had become a stooge of the regime,
16 I assume you're talking of the Serb regime. Did -- are you saying that
17 the LDK generally adopted a passive approach to resistance?
18 A. Both. The LDK was engaged in a very passive resistance and
19 didn't move things. It was a movement that hoped that someone from the
20 sky would bring freedom and democracy. It was, in my opinion, a vain
21 expectation. We had been waiting for that for 50 years, hoping that
22 Yugoslavia would understand that we needed our rights for almost 90 years
23 it has ruled in Kosova. It has been unable of building a public,
24 democratic administration that was accepted to its citizens. So it was
25 in vain to wait any longer for a regime -- from a regime that had
1 destroyed the entire Yugoslavia when it was led by a dictator that the
2 Tribunal knows very well. I don't want to mention even his name here.
3 Q. And --
4 A. And the fight against that regime had become inevitable.
5 Q. And so just so I'm sure I understand your testimony, the KLA
6 proposed that as an alternative, armed active resistance to the Serb
7 regime? Am I understanding your testimony correctly?
8 A. Yes. But maybe we have to go back a little bit in time. You
9 know that in 1995 there was a conference held in Dayton regarding the
10 Yugoslav federation. And in that conference where Croatia, Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina took part, which had been fighting against Milosevic people,
12 Kosova was not invited even though Kosova was also engaged in a passive
13 resistance. And the voice of this resistance was not heard. In Dayton,
14 either -- then the LDK chairman used to say that we didn't take part in
15 Dayton, but we are going to take part in London, Paris, and Moscow and in
16 similar conferences, which was not the case. So only those who created
17 new realities in their own respective countries participated in Dayton.
18 So for the KLA it was clear that a new reality had to be created
19 in Kosova for the international community to take into consideration the
20 just demands for freedom, democracy, and an independence of the Kosova
21 citizens. This is why, following Dayton, the KLA enhanced its
22 organisation in both wings, the military and the political ones.
23 Q. When the Kosovo question was not addressed at Dayton, did more
24 people in Kosovo begin to look for an alternative to the LDK and start to
25 turn to the KLA? Do you understand my question? Is that ...
1 A. Yes. All the developments in 1996 and also in 1997/1998 go to
2 prove that the citizens of Kosova were deflecting from the passive
3 resistance. They were tired from violence, repression. And there were
4 only two ways left to them, either to fight in Kosova or to flee Kosova.
5 Q. And you've referred to the LDK chairman who said after Dayton
6 that the Kosova question would be addressed elsewhere in London, Paris,
7 or Moscow. Was that LDK chairman, was that Mr. Rugova, Ibrahim Rugova?
8 A. Yes, he was the chairman, but I want to be precise in one issue.
9 Our organisation in war was not meant to oppose LDK or Kosova, it was
10 meant to fight the Serb occupier, which -- and the repression which
11 reached its height during the time of the Milosevic regime.
12 Q. Now, did there come a time that you became a member of the
13 General Staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. When was that, please?
16 A. It might have been end of 1996 and beginning of 1997.
17 Q. Can you tell us who else was on the General Staff of the KLA at
18 that time?
19 A. Yes. If you want this issue to go down in history, I can give
20 names, of course, because these people have names and last names. I have
21 to say one thing before the Trial Chamber. The organisation was a
22 clandestine one. It was an underground form of organisation and at that
23 time not everyone -- I didn't know everyone, as the others didn't know
24 me, not all of them did, because of the position I held at that time in
1 Q. Can you tell us the names of the other people on the General
2 Staff as you knew them?
3 A. Yes. The General Staff during that time was spread out in three
4 parts. One part operated in Kosova, underground. Another part -- it was
5 a minority probably, this lived in Albania outside Kosova. And another
6 part lived and worked in the western countries; in Switzerland, Germany,
7 the United States, in France, in the Scandinavian countries. We were, as
8 I said, spread out.
9 Q. Okay. And the part that was in Kosova underground was obviously
10 the part you were in. And can you tell us who else was in that part?
11 A. Yes. It is known now that commander of the KLA at that time was
12 Adem Jashari. Sokol Bashota was there, Rexhep Selimi, while several
13 others, as I said, were abroad as in Albania and different countries in
14 the west.
15 Q. Did you know the names, either as pseudonym or as true name of
16 any of the others who were abroad?
17 A. At that time I didn't know them and I think that neither them [as
18 interpreted] knew my position.
19 Q. Can you tell us how it came about that you joined the General
20 Staff. How did that happen?
21 A. I already said that from the beginning, from December 1991, I had
22 contacts with the commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which at that
23 time of course was not Kosovo Liberation Army but it was in the form of
24 that two wings, the political wing and the military wing. Then in 1993
25 in March or April 1993, there was a meeting between several
1 representatives of the political wing with the informations of the Adem
2 Jashari in his house in the village of Prekaz, Skenderaj municipality
3 and here we divided the duties between us. Some were engaged in the
4 operations level and some on the political level. I was amongst those
5 engaged on the political level. I was in the directorate of the
6 political wing of the KLA where Hashim Thaqi was the chairman. Adem
7 Jashari and his formations were part of the operations.
8 Q. And just to be clear in December -- you said you had contacts
9 with the commander of what would become the Kosovo Liberation Army in
10 December of 1991. Are you speaking about Adem Jashari?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And now you've explained how it is that you joined the KLA, we'll
13 call it, in March/April 1993 and you became engaged in the political
14 activities. When you -- how did it come about that you joined the
15 General Staff at the end of 1996 or beginning of 1997? How did that
16 happen? Were you asked? Was there some other procedure?
17 A. We should understand here that the beginnings of the KLA
18 organisation were not of a formation which could freely exercise their
19 duties. It was an organisation that had to exercise its activity
20 secretly because the Belgrade regime had installed many police and army
21 forces in Kosova, uniformed ones. This regime also had at its disposal
22 many forces within the secret service, so it wasn't easy at all to
23 organise oneself into illegal operations and operate. These were
24 difficult times and conditions, and it wasn't preferred at that time to
25 deal with documents and papers in writing because this at that time was a
2 It was a sort of idealism for these people who were organising
3 and a determination to operate. So if you're now looking for procedures
4 of armies operating in legal conditions with budgetary and infrastructure
5 regulations, we can freely say that this did not happen in Kosovo and it
6 wasn't possible to happen in such administrative forms and shapes as it
7 is in countries where people live freely.
8 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I'm sorry -- I just -- I'm sorry to interrupt you,
9 but I want to focus a little bit here. I understand your explanation
10 that the -- that there were no written documents and that things operated
11 secretly. But my question just was: How was you became a member of the
12 General Staff? Because you told us you became a member of the General
13 Staff at the end of 1996, beginning of 1997. And I just was asking, how
14 did that happen?
15 A. I would like to explain this one more time that my contacts with
16 both the wings, both the military and army wing -- sorry, military and
17 political wing existed from 1991. As for the political part, I explained
18 earlier that I was in the political activity since 1973 and spent over
19 ten years in prison because of that activity. Politically I was
20 organised even early before the KLA came into service --
21 Q. I --
22 A. Sorry, I would like to explain this to the Trial Chamber. In
23 1993 --
24 Q. I'll give you an opportunity to explain it, I will. I just think
25 you've perhaps misunderstood my question or I've put it poorly. My
1 question was really: Did somebody ask you -- not what your experience
2 was that led up to becoming a member of the General Staff, it just was --
3 it actually was more simple than that. Did somebody ask you to become a
4 member of the General Staff? Were you elected? Did you ask, yourself,
5 to become a member of the General Staff? What happened at the time?
6 What happened at the end of 1996, beginning of 1997 that caused you to
7 become a member of the General Staff?
8 A. In 1996 and 1997 we mentioned the Dayton conference, the
9 political circumstances changed, not only Kosovo but in the entire
10 territory of the former Yugoslav federation. Changes occurred in Kosovo
11 as well. I was not earlier appointed member of the General Staff because
12 I was already in Kosovo. And as I said, this activity was mostly taking
13 part abroad and on individual basis.
14 In 1996, the need for expansion of the activity of the KLA in
15 Kosovo emerged. Of course this consulting did not occur only between us;
16 we had our representatives abroad and we all agreed to increase the
17 military and political activity in Kosova. In such circumstances we
18 discussed with comrades with whom I constantly maintained contact from
19 1993 and earlier, and as I said I had to engage more in Kosovo because I
20 was there in the military and political expansion of the KLA in Kosovo.
21 Q. Okay. Let me --
22 A. And in the end of 1996, beginning of 1997 --
23 Q. Yes, I'll let -- let me pose this question to you: Who -- you
24 said you were appointed to be a member of the General Staff. Who
25 appointed you?
1 A. The commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Adem Jashari.
2 Q. Thank you. And you mentioned Hashim Thaqi. Was he also a member
3 of the General Staff at this time? And we're talking end of 1996,
4 beginning of 1997.
5 A. He was.
6 Q. And at this time, at the end of 1996, beginning of 1997, did the
7 General Staff meet on a regular basis or how would you communicate with
8 other members of the General Staff?
9 A. We would meet quite rarely, due to security reasons. We would
10 consult through electronic means, by electronic means, because majority
11 of comrades were outside of Kosova.
12 Q. And you say you met rarely. How -- can you give us an idea how
13 often? Was it once a week? Once a month? Less frequently than that?
14 A. This depended on the political development. Sometimes we would
15 not meet for months and sometimes we would meet often, very often, due to
16 the circumstances. In other words, there wasn't a regular pattern when
17 we would meet. I would stress again that this was depending on the
18 political developments in Kosova.
19 Q. And when you say you communicated at times through electronic
20 means, including with people -- members outside of Kosovo, what do you
21 mean exactly by electronic means? Can you explain that? Is that by
22 telephone or some other ...
23 A. By phone, by fax, and other forms as well.
24 Q. I understand. Now, did you -- I'm going to move us forward in
25 time to the spring of 1998. At that time were you still a member of the
1 General Staff? And just to be more precise, the spring of 1998, we'll
2 say May of 1998.
3 A. I was even before May 1998.
4 Q. I understand. But in May of 1998 you were still a member of the
5 General Staff. Is that correct?
6 A. In May 1998, in June, and continuously.
7 Q. Thank you. And at that time, in May or June of 1998, can you
8 tell us who else was a member of the General Staff?
9 A. Yes. Again, during this time not all members of the General
10 Staff were in Kosova. Now, after the March events the general commander
11 of the KLA in Kosova was Azem Sula. Deputy commander was Sokol Bashota.
12 General inspector was Rexhep Selimi. And other members of this staff at
13 this time were myself, Llahib Rrahimi [as interpreted]. Xhavid Zeka was
14 not there. Xhavid Haliti was not inside, but he was a member of the
15 General Staff. Hashim Thaqi and Kadri Veseli.
16 Q. Where was Xhavid Haliti? You say he was not inside. Where was
18 A. Xhavid Haliti, yes. He was within this staff but he lived in
19 Albania. He did not live in Kosova.
20 Q. Now, on the 11th of June, 1998, were you appointed to a
21 particular position in the General Staff?
22 A. Yes. I then assumed the position of the spokesperson to convey
23 the policy of the Kosova Liberation Army to the public opinion within
24 Kosova and abroad.
25 Q. Now, with the assistance of the usher I'm going to put before you
1 a document.
2 MR. WHITING: And I actually ask that a binder be placed before
3 the witness. Your Honours and the parties have been provided with this
4 binder. I'm going to ask the usher, please, to assist the witness and
5 turn to tab 2. And for the record tab 2 is Prosecution Exhibit P49,
6 while the rest of us will turn to tab 1, which is Prosecution Exhibit
7 P48. And in tab 2 if the witness could be shown -- it's ERN U008-1630.
8 And in the English, tab 1, it's U003-8575. And it's also on the
9 Sanction, should be on the computer as well.
10 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I'm putting before you a page from the newspaper
11 Pristina Bujku, it's from the 12th of June, 1998, and it's page 5. I
12 want to draw your attention to the top right of the page. I'm sure
13 you've found it there. And the rest of us have a translation of that
14 article. Now, I see that you've pulled out a piece of paper there.
15 A. This is the same thing, just enlarged here where I sit.
16 Q. Oh, okay. I actually -- I understand because the copy that you
17 have is actually quite small and I've asked Mr. Younis to have prepared
18 and I should have put it in front of you. I have a large version of it
19 because in fact this is from a newspaper. That should be easier. Why
20 don't -- we'll refer to that.
21 MR. WHITING: And if the usher could again find the page, it's
22 1630, U008-1630. And just for the record, this paper that we've put
23 before the witness is the same exhibit, just larger. P49. And this
24 should be easier.
25 Q. Now, again, I draw your attention to the article at the top right
1 -- and specifically to the end where it says: "The UCK General Staff has
2 decided to appoint Professor Jakup Krasniqi as its spokesman. Professor
3 Jakup Krasniqi was born on 1 January 1951 in the village of Negroc in
4 Drenice, where he still lives."
5 And it's signed the General Staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army,
6 Pristina, 11 June 1998.
7 And sir, was that in fact your announcement of your appointment
8 to be spokesman in fact issued by the General Staff of the KLA?
9 A. It is.
10 Q. And can you tell us what your responsibilities were in this
11 position. I think you've already given a little bit of an answer to this
12 question, but what were your duties as spokesman of the KLA as you
13 understood them?
14 A. I mentioned earlier what was the duty of the KLA spokesperson. I
15 believe that many here know very well the duties of a spokesperson. My
16 duty was communication with the media so that the KLA before the media in
17 Kosova and those of the western countries and the United States that were
18 largely present in Kosova at that time, my duty was to present before the
19 public opinion the political programme of the Kosova Liberation Army.
20 Q. And how long did you stay in that position?
21 A. I held this position until the formation of the provisional
22 government of Kosovo after the Rambouillet conference. And in the early
23 beginnings of the provisional government I was still a spokesperson until
24 June 1999.
25 Q. And the Rambouillet conference was in what month and year?
1 A. It consisted of two parts. The first part occurred in
2 Rambouillet in February 1999 and the second part in Paris in March 1999.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, perhaps this is a convenient time.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.
6 We will now have a break. You've been giving evidence for nearly
7 an hour and a half, so a break will assist you. It's also necessary for
8 technical reasons, as the tapes have to be changed over. We will resume
9 sitting at 5 minutes past 4.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Whiting.
13 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Sir, when you became a member of the General Staff at the end of
15 1996 or beginning of 1997, I believe that you referred to communiques
16 from the General Staff at that time.
17 A. I mentioned the communiques even earlier. As of 1994 we started
18 to issue some communiques to inform the public.
19 Q. Were the communiques issued by the General Staff of the KLA?
20 A. Most of them were issued by the General Staff. They have
21 informed the public of the activities of the KLA.
22 Q. You say "most of them were issued by the General Staff." Did --
23 were any issued by any other body or person?
24 A. Yes. The war was under -- waged underground. Sometimes
25 communication was not -- did not function properly. So it happened that
1 some communiques were released without the knowledge of the General
2 Staff. It was -- it might have been issued by some operational zones of
3 the KLA.
4 Q. Do you remember any specific instances where that happened?
5 A. Yes. It was not very frequent, but there were some instances
6 when it happened. During the war when some commanders of some zones
7 might have issued communiques on behalf of the zone, but also on behalf
8 of the KLA. But not on behalf of the General Staff.
9 Q. And when that happened, when a commander of a zone issued a
10 communique, would it say that it was -- would it say that it was on
11 behalf of the zone or the KLA?
12 A. Yes. It said on behalf of the KLA and the zone.
13 Q. But if I understand your answer correctly it would not say in
14 those cases that it was on behalf of the General Staff. Is that what
15 you're telling us?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, if we could focus on the communiques that were issued on
18 behalf of the General Staff of the KLA; how were those communicated to
19 the public?
20 A. In general initially, because it changed with the passage of
21 time, prior to 1998 in most cases they were faxed or by telephone. But
22 most of them were communicated via fax.
23 Q. And they would be faxed to whom?
24 A. They were faxed mainly to the print media in Albanian, but also
25 to a broader public.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. After -- you said prior to 1998 they were faxed or in some
2 instances communicated by telephone. After 1998 how were they
4 A. After or in 1998 they were issued, again via telephone, and
5 international radio stations broadcasting in Albanian. They were sent to
6 radio stations broadcasting in Albanian in Kosova as well. They were
7 sent to the media, whereas from January 1999 when the KLA and the General
8 Staff established the free Kosova and the Kosova Press news agency, all
9 the communiques, all information regarding KLA and what happened on the
10 ground were dispatched through the agency, Kosova Press, via Internet.
11 Q. And in 1998 you say they were sent to the media. Were they --
12 did that include the print media, Albanian newspapers?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And what newspapers in Albanian, that were published in Albanian,
15 would publish these communiques? And now I'm speaking about 1997 and
17 A. Bujku, Koha Ditore, and a newspaper that appeared now and again
18 in Switzerland called Zoriko Sor [phoen] and the Bota e Re, New World,
19 which was a bi-monthly or a bi-weekly newspaper of Pristina students.
20 Q. Now, the communiques that were published in these newspapers that
21 you have just identified that were from the General Staff or said that
22 they were from the General Staff, were they in your -- in fact from the
23 General Staff during 1997 and 1998?
24 A. To my knowledge with some exception which I don't know of, they
25 were communiques issued by -- on behalf of the General Staff.
1 Q. So as far as you know every time a communique was published in
2 one of those newspapers that stated it was a communique from the General
3 Staff of the KLA, it was in fact from the General Staff of the KLA.
4 A. I cannot say that 100 per cent of them were, but in 90 per cent
5 of the cases they were communiques issued by the General Staff of the
7 Q. Now, in your first answer I understood you to say that there
8 might be an exception that you were not aware of. But now I have
9 understood perhaps you have said something slightly different. Are you
10 aware in 1997 or 1998 of any instance where a communique was published in
11 one of those newspapers in Albanian that you identified and it was not in
12 fact a communique from the General Staff of the KLA?
13 A. Some time, as you know, has passed, but as I said a bulk of them
14 -- I can't rule out that one of them or two may not have been issued
15 directly by the General Staff, but it might have reported on an event
16 without passing through the General Staff. But they are very few I would
17 say, almost insignificant number.
18 Q. And as you sit here today, can you think of any particular
19 instance where that occurred?
20 A. I don't recall any such. Also because of the fact that we didn't
21 have time to deal with such communiques that didn't pass through the
22 General Staff.
23 Q. Well, I'm going to show you some of the communiques and we can
24 talk about each one. I'd ask you, please, with the assistance of the
25 usher and using the large format, if you could look at communique number
1 35. And it's the ERN on the Albanian version is U008-1607 and the
2 English it's U008-8554. And it will also appear on the Sanction. It's
3 communique 35 in the 8th of August, 1997, published in Koha Ditore on
4 page 3. And I draw your attention to the top left of the page; I believe
5 that's where it appears on the Albanian version. Do you see that
6 communique number 35?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Was that communique issued by the General Staff?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to the beginning paragraph of
11 the communique, and I'll just read it out. It says:
12 "In a communique for the media bearing number 33, the
13 organisation calling itself 'The Kosova Liberation Army' claims
14 responsibility for recent armed incidents in Kosova, in which two Serbian
15 policemen and two Albanian civilians were injured. This communique
16 states: 'By a decision of the UCK Central Staff made on 3 and 4 August,
17 our guerrilla units carried out three armed operations against the
18 occupiers and the their collaborators.' The organisation also claims
19 responsibility for what we called 'the assassinations of Ali Qullapeku
20 from Terstenik and Ramiz Leku from Baince near Gllogovc [Glogovac]."
21 Do you see that in the communique?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, with respect to the three armed operations that were
24 referred to that were carried out against the occupiers and their
25 collaborators, did that in fact happen? Were there three armed
1 operations that were carried out?
2 A. Yes. As I said earlier, the General Staff had two wings, the
3 political and the operational one. And the communiques were issued
4 mainly by the operational wing, whereas the political statements were
5 issued by the political leaders of the KLA.
6 Q. And was there communication between the political wing and the
7 operational wing of the Kosovo Liberation Army?
8 A. Yes. Certainly there was.
9 Q. And the communique also refers to two assassinations of two
10 individuals. Were these two people assassinated because they were
11 suspected of being collaborators?
12 A. You must have read several statements and communiques of the KLA
13 and must have seen that the people -- the persons who were the stooges of
14 the Serb regime, who served this violent regime, were drawn attention to
15 some Albanians, who unfortunately were in that position. This was not a
16 common picture of the Albanian population, but the savage regimes,
17 barbarous regimes, at other times in other -- Other European countries
18 have had their collaborators, as is the case with the Second World War,
19 when some French intellectuals and other people joined the
20 collaborationist groups. This happened also in Norway and other
21 countries in Europe. This happened also in Kosova. These people were
22 maybe out of fear and the pressure of the regime obliged to serve this
23 regime. The Kosova Liberation Army has -- constantly has drawn the
24 attention -- has warned such people to withdraw from that activity and
25 not undermine the liberation war. In those cases when the such persons
1 have done great damage to the Albanian people, we have -- as a result of
2 their activity, we have lost many people during the war and many people
3 have been killed in ambushes laid to them. As a result of the activity
4 of such people in those cases the operational wing of the KLA has killed
5 such people because of the service they have rendered to the violent Serb
6 apparatus in Kosova.
7 Q. And to your knowledge is that what happened to the two people
8 referenced in this communique, communique 35?
9 A. Yes. As the communique said, it must have certainly happened.
10 Q. And did it happen because they were suspected of being
11 collaborators? Is that what you're telling us?
12 A. Not because they were suspected, but because they served the
13 occupiers. And even the children of the villages were aware of that in
14 the places where they lived and worked.
15 Q. Do you know how it was determined that they were collaborators?
16 How was that decision made? How was it determined?
17 A. The decision -- how the decision was made, I don't know; but if
18 they were not in the service of the enemies, if they didn't do any damage
19 to the KLA, such a thing would not have happened.
20 Q. I appreciate your confidence, but my question is: Do you have
21 any information about what the procedure was? Was there any procedure
22 were determining whether these people were collaborators? Was there a
23 trial? Was there a proceeding or do you not know?
24 A. Such persons were not tried in courts because we did not have the
25 conditions for that. But they were executed or killed while they were
1 serving the enemy, as the case has been with the killing of the Serb
2 police and army members.
3 Q. I think I understand your answer. I'm going to move on to
4 another communique.
5 MR. WHITING: I'm going to require the assistance of the usher.
6 This is -- in Albanian -- in the Albanian version it's U008-1608. In the
7 English it's U003-8557 to 8558. It's communique number 40 published on
8 the 5th of December, 1997, in Bujku, on page 10. And I believe on the
9 Albanian version it's in the top right of the page.
10 Q. I'm just going to give you a moment to look at that.
11 Is this a communique that was issued by the General Staff?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to the first paragraph where
14 it states: "By a decision of the Central Staff, armed units of the UCK
15 continued their liberation operations during November," November, I
16 assume, 1997.
17 "On the evening of 11 November, a hand-grenade attack was carried
18 out against the house of Tomcic, the Serbian-imposed chairman of the
19 commune of Podujeve, in the village of Tashec," and I apologise for my
20 pronunciation, "near Kursumlija, in Operational Zone No. 5.
21 "Our armed units also conducted other liberation operations
22 between 25 and 28 November in Operational Zone No. 1."
23 Do you see that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Were -- did those things that are described in fact occur? Those
1 attacks and operations that are referenced, did those actually occur?
2 A. Everything that is said here has really happened.
3 Q. And there's a reference to Operational Zone Number 5 and
4 Operational Zone Number 1. Where -- first of all, what is operational
5 zone number 1?
6 A. The Operational Zone Number 1 was in Drenoc.
7 Q. And Operational Zone Number 5?
8 A. It was the Llap zone.
9 Q. Was operational zone 1, did that ever, to your knowledge, did
10 that ever refer to the whole of Kosovo? Or was it always -- did it
11 always refer just to the Drenica zone?
12 A. Drenica zone -- in Kosova there were seven zones, one of them was
13 the Drenica zone.
14 Q. But at some time was -- were the seven zones in Kosovo referred
15 to as sub-zones and Kosovo itself referred to as Operational Zone Number
16 1? Did -- was there ever a time when that occurred?
17 A. Yes, it may have been possible, but the military activity of the
18 KLA was organised in Kosovo.
19 Q. And just to draw your attention back to this communique when it
20 refers to Operational Zone Number 1, it -- is it the zone -- the Drenica
21 zone or is it referencing in that case all of Kosovo?
22 A. It means the Drenica zone here.
23 Q. Thank you. I want to draw your attention now to a sentence which
24 is part-way down -- I would say it's about halfway down and I'll read it
25 out and perhaps you'll be able to find it.
1 "On the evening of 28th November, Dalip Dugolli, a collaborator
2 and one of Milosevic's most trusted men, was killed in the village of
3 Petreshice near Shtime [Stimlje]."
4 Do you see that?
5 A. I don't find it.
6 Q. Take your time. I know it's a little -- it's difficult. And
7 I'll read it again.
8 "On the evening of 28th November, Dalip Dugolli," do you see that
9 name, "a collaborator and one of Milosevic's most trusted men, was killed
10 in the village of Petreshice near Shtime [Stimlje]."
11 A. Yes, yes, I see it now.
12 Q. Did that happen? Did that in fact happen?
13 A. Yes. The operational zones in -- given the conditions that
14 prevailed in Kosova, they could act independently on the basis of their
15 own discretion when they had information that some individual who had
16 caused the country damage. They might have undertaken such acts and have
17 notified the General Staff. After that the General Staff has notified
18 the public through the communique.
19 Q. And with respect to this case - and I'll put to you the same
20 question which I put to you before regarding the previous communique - do
21 you have any information how it was determined that this individual was
22 in fact a collaborator?
23 A. I'm telling you again that such acts were undertaken in the
24 conditions of illegality. And the operational units were separated from
25 each other. But they could make their own decisions. When a person was
1 harmful to the KLA, when such a person is giving information on the
2 movements of the KLA to the Belgrade regime, in these instances the unit
3 had all the power of discretion to conduct such acts without any --
4 without taking the extra approval or supplementary approval for such
6 Q. I understand your answer, but I'm just going to ask you again and
7 I'm going to ask your patience with my questions: Do you know if any
8 procedure was followed to determine whether this person was in fact
9 giving information on the movements of the KLA to the Belgrade regime?
10 You've said that trials were not held. But was there any other
11 procedure, any proceeding, that was held? If you know.
12 A. With exception of what I already stated, I don't have anything
13 else to say.
14 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you about another communique and it's -- in
15 the Albanian it's at U008-1610.
16 MR. WHITING: And -- I'm sorry. In the English it's at 8560,
17 U003-8560. It's communique number 42 from the 28th of February, 1998,
18 published in Bujku on page 1. And it appears on the Sanction. And I
19 believe it's in the top middle on the Albanian version.
20 Q. Was that communique issued from the General Staff?
21 A. Yes. On the basis of information from the grass roots.
22 Q. And I want to draw your attention to the first sentence of that
23 communique after the introduction and -- where it says:
24 "On the decision of the UCK Central Staff, our armed units
25 undertook a series of attacks against the forces of the Serbian police
1 and their collaborators during January and February."
2 And I'll ask you the same question: Did that in fact occur? Did
3 those attacks occur in January and February?
4 A. The attacks have occurred, as the communique says.
5 Q. And then about halfway down there's a sentence which says: "On
6 13 February, 1998, Mustafe Kurti, a collaborator ... was liquidated."
7 Do you see that sentence?
8 A. Yes, I see not only that sentence but the entire communique
9 issued at that time, and I think that -- you are well-advised to use the
10 whole communique and not take out separate sentences. I am telling again
11 that the KLA has fought against the entire Serb violent operators that
12 has perpetrated genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosova.
13 Q. I understand.
14 A. This apparatus -- please -- couldn't function in Kosova only
15 through its police and soldiers. This apparatus extended its tentacles
16 to all the pores of public administration. They ruled in Kosova also
17 with the help of the collaborators, the people who served the police and
18 the soldiers -- the Serb police and soldiers. That's why I am saying
19 that you are well-advised to look at the communique in all its entirety
20 and not take out names. That is difficult for me to argue.
21 Q. Well, I can assure you that the entire communique is in evidence
22 and will be considered by the Court. I'm just asking you specific
23 questions about specific parts of the communique.
24 A. I answered that all those who were in the service of the
25 Milosevic regime and who committed many evils against the Albanian people
1 deserve the same fate that the entire Milosevic regime deserved and had.
2 Q. And can you tell me, Mr. Krasniqi, what in your mind is a
3 collaborator? And I know it may seem like a strange question to you, but
4 what is a -- you said "all the people" -- "those who were in the service
5 of the Milosevic regime and committed many evils against the Albanian
7 Can you define for us what a collaborator is?
8 A. My belief is that the Honourable Trial Chamber knows very well
9 what a collaborationism is and what collaborators are; this is not a
10 phenomenon typical of Albanians, this is a well-known phenomenon. Back
11 in ancient times if we go into history, this phenomenon has manifested
12 itself, especially during the Second World War and it has manifested
13 itself among all the peoples who have been occupied. Unfortunately, my
14 people had the same destiny. And such people, collaborators, who were
15 numerous, they have received little punishment for what they were. They
16 were in the service in the violent Serb regime. Such people did not
17 deserve a better fate for serving the most criminal regime that has been
18 known by the peoples of Europe after Second World War.
19 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I appreciate your answer that the -- collaboration
20 is not unique to this war. But I want you to please try to answer my
21 question, which is: In your mind, and focusing in particular in the war
22 you were involved in, what in your mind was a collaborator? What would
23 -- what are the sorts of things that somebody could do that would make
24 them a collaborator?
25 A. I'll give you a concrete example which illustrates my point. On
1 the April the 10th, 1998, in Slatine, 20 kilometres away from Pristina,
2 there is a person was kidnapped. A doctor, humanist doctor, Hafir Shala
3 was kidnapped by the Serb forces. This person has assisted the citizens
4 of Drenoc through humanitarian aid and associations. He has administered
5 his services also to the injured soldiers of the KLA. Because of the
6 people who collaborated with the Milosevic regime, this person was
7 kidnapped and his family knows nothing about his fate. We have many
8 instances like this in Kosova when other persons like Xhavid Haziri, for
9 example, another activist of the Council for the Protection of Human
10 Rights and Freedoms, it was I think in July, August, he too was kidnapped
11 in Pristina by the Serb secret police because he was spied upon by the
12 collaborators who existed in the war zones when the KLA operated. And I
13 can give you -- such examples are rife.
14 Q. With respect to that last example, is that July/August of 1998?
15 A. In July, August, and there were also in June, April, even
16 earlier, even before the war. There were many collaborators. Even the
17 case of Likoshan on 28th February, 1998, this came about as a result of
18 the clash between the KLA members and the Serb police, because of the
19 service that the collaborators had done to the Serb police in Drenoc.
20 There are many cases that I know of when collaborators must let the Serb
21 police and soldiers to commit crimes and genocide in Kosova.
22 Q. You --
23 A. Without this category of bad people, the Belgrade regime wouldn't
24 have been able of living such a long life.
25 Q. And you've given now some examples, some specific examples. And
1 I believe earlier you stated that in some instances you believed that
2 collaborators were providing information about the movements of the KLA.
3 A. I will repeat it again and I kindly request the Chamber that the
4 interest on the part of the Prosecution to deal only with these isolated
5 events is very dangerous for the political process in Kosova and does not
6 serve justice and the goal of this Tribunal.
7 Q. Sir, as I told you, the entire communique and other entire
8 communiques are in evidence and considerable evidence about the context
9 of these events has been heard. But for the moment I must focus on these
10 specific questions.
11 With respect to -- still on the subject of collaborators, in some
12 instances were there Albanians who did business, had business, with Serbs
13 who were as a result considered to be collaborators because of their
14 support for the Serb regime? Do you understand my question?
15 A. I understand it very well. Honoured Chamber and Honoured
16 Presiding Judge, the Kosovo Liberation Army which in its second political
17 statement clearly shows its aims and objectives, there were many
18 collaborators in Kosova. And perhaps those that were mentioned here
19 concretely served and damaged the operational units of the Kosovo
20 Liberation Army. However, the KLA did not have as its plan the killing
21 of the citizens of Kosova. But being poor, you actually are experienced
22 with different things. Many people at that time, even today, are in
23 connection with the Serb secret service. However, we did not wage the
24 war against those who collaborated with the Milosevic regime. Our war
25 was mainly directed against the Serb policemen and soldiers. And there
1 when the operational units were at danger, then the killing of those who
2 presented an obstacle took part as well. But the war was mainly directed
3 against those who exercised violence and those who forced people to use
4 their own humanity and honour.
5 In the Political Statement No. 2, which is the KLA programme as
6 presented to the public opinion, it says that "The KLA has a defending
7 and liberating character. Its aim was not war but peace and freedom of
8 its own people. And the KLA will fight on behalf of its people and will
9 self-sacrifice in the name of people. The KLA condemns terrorism and all
10 forms of violence used against civilians. The KLA recognises and abides
11 by the national acts of the United Nations and the Conventions on war,"
12 and it goes on.
13 I said -- I focused only on these two points to see or to tell
14 you that the goal of our war was not to attack the collaborators of the
15 enemy who are numerous in Kosova in the economic and the political sphere
16 as well as a cultural and in the security spheres -- the security for
17 Serbia but not for the citizens of Kosova. Therefore, I think that the
18 practice used to try to deck out the Kosova Liberation Army as an army
19 that fought against Albanians and not the Belgrade regime does not serve
20 the truth and has nothing to do with the truth. I do believe that even
21 though the KLA from a guerrilla army was transformed into a popular,
22 voluntary army and at a later phase into an organised army, it did not
23 have as its aim, as its goal, the killing of the people but to win
24 politically over the Serb police and army. Therefore, its victory is
25 also a political victory. Also thanks to the support it had among the
1 international community.
2 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I just want to assure you that certainly nobody on
3 this side of the courtroom, and I'm certain it's true for the other side
4 of the courtroom, is suggesting that the aim of the KLA was primarily to
5 attack Albanians. But we must continue to focus on some of these
6 specific issues. Now, you read out there from a document, and I believe
7 it was Political Statement No. 2. Can you tell us what the date of that
9 A. 29th April, 1998.
10 Q. I wonder since you read out from that document -- first of all,
11 was that published, that political statement?
12 A. It was published, yes.
13 Q. Are you able to see where it was published?
14 A. I don't have the name of the newspaper, but this communique was
15 published both in Bujku and in Koha Ditore.
16 Q. And was it issued by the General Staff?
17 A. It was issued by the General Staff.
18 Q. I'm wondering if you could provide it to the usher and if we
19 could have it. The version you have, is it in Albanian or in English?
20 A. It's in Albanian.
21 Q. And do you by any chance have an English version? Probably not.
22 A. No, sorry I don't have it.
23 Q. That is something that I think we can take care of. I'm
24 wondering if you could provide it to the usher. It could be provided to
25 the parties and translated and perhaps exhibited, since you have read
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 from that.
2 A. However, I need a copy of this document because I still have some
3 parts to read out from that.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Could I suggest, Mr. Whiting, that it be copied
5 and the copy there returned to the witness.
6 MR. WHITING: I think that's an excellent suggestion, Your
7 Honour, and perhaps since the witness may want to refer to it in his
8 testimony he could hold on to it for now. We'll copy it at the break.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
10 MR. TOPOLSKI: Your Honour, I wonder if I could just rise to make
11 a suggestion because it's obvious I think to the Chamber that neither
12 side has this document, which is plainly important, the second communique
13 from the KLA. One wonders whether the witness has others that neither
14 side have seen, and I wonder whether some thought may be given at some
15 stage while the witness is still with us as to making inquiries of him as
16 to what else he has with him, as he plainly has other papers. I
17 apprehend this witness may be with us beyond today, and therefore in
18 light of the court's sitting, beyond the weekend. So there is time for
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Topolski.
21 Mr. Whiting, I think you were going down that road as the
22 opportunity presented, but you're invited to specifically inquire about
23 it and see what can be done.
24 MR. WHITING: I think that's an excellent -- it's another
25 excellent suggestion. However, I would note for the record that it's not
1 the second communique, it's the Second Political Statement, and there's a
2 distinction between the two.
3 MR. TOPOLSKI: Yes.
4 MR. WHITING: But maybe we can inquire about this further.
5 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, you obviously in addition to your statement to the
6 ICTY, you've brought other documents including the one that you've just
7 described. Can you tell us what other documents you have?
8 A. Mainly they are political statements of the period between April
9 and September. I have one document which was sent to the international
10 community. It's of the General Staff of the KLA sent to the relevant
11 institutions of the European -- of the international community. This
12 document shows clearly what was the policy that the General Staff of the
13 KLA followed.
14 Q. And, Mr. Krasniqi, at the next break would have any objection to
15 those documents being copied so that they can be translated and put into
16 evidence if necessary in this proceeding?
17 A. It was because of this reason that I brought them here, these
18 documents, to the Tribunal.
19 JUDGE PARKER: The Tribunal would be grateful if they could be
20 copied during the break, Mr. Krasniqi. You will understand that we have
21 to learn about the philosophy and the workings of the KLA, and these
22 documents would be of considerable use to the Judges if they have
23 relevance to this case. So if we can leave it that Mr. Whiting's staff
24 will take them and copy them during the break and then give you back your
25 originals, we'd be very grateful.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Honoured Presiding Judge.
2 Amongst my documents there is another document, a speech that I held on
3 the occasion of the funeral of the victims of Likoshan and Qirez. And I
4 believe this document can also serve this Tribunal and I find it also
5 necessary for the work of this Tribunal.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 Yes, Mr. Whiting.
8 MR. WHITING: Thank you --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
10 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. And thank you, Mr. Krasniqi. We'll collect those documents and
12 copy them at the next break.
13 MR. WHITING: But for now we'll move on and I'm going to draw
14 your attention to communique number 43. In the Albanian it's at
15 U008-1611. In the English it's at 8561, also on the Sanction. It's
16 communique number 43 from the 4th of March, 1998, published in Bujku on
17 page 11. And I believe on the Albanian version it's on the top left of
18 the page.
19 Do you see that communique, Mr. Krasniqi?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was it issued by the General Staff?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I'm going to draw your attention just to the end, to the phrase
24 at the end: "Death to enemies and traitors!"
25 Is "traitors" a reference to collaborators?
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. WHITING: If we could turn now to communique number 45 from
3 the 11th of March, 1998, published in Bujku on page 11. On the Albanian
4 it's at 1612; on the English it's 8566. It's also on the Sanction. And
5 I think it's at the bottom right of the page in Albanian.
6 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, was that communique issued by the General Staff?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I want to draw your attention to the first few paragraphs of the
9 communique, and I'm just going to read them out.
10 "In the last few days since 7 March, our armed forces have
11 clashed on a broad front with formations of the occupying Serbian
12 military and police forces and Chetnik volunteers.
13 "Military confrontations stretch across a wide front, extending
14 from Gllogoc [Glogovac] in the direction of Skenderaj [Srbica] in the
15 north, towards Kline, towards Mitrovice in the east, and in the villages
16 along the Cicavice ridge," again forgive me for my pronunciations, "from
17 Gllogoc in the protection of Pristina, including many villages in the
18 Drenoc region.
19 "The UCK's military formations also engaged occupations forces in
20 the Llap region, in the area between Decan, Gjakove [Djakovica], and
21 Kline, and between Malisheve and Rahovec [Orahovac], crossing from the
22 Lumihat region. There were also engagements on a line stretching from
23 Decan to Peje [Pec]."
24 These various operations that are described which occurred
25 apparently between the 7th of March and the 11th of March, when the
1 communique was published, did those in fact occur, to your knowledge?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. May I draw your attention to communique number 47.
4 MR. WHITING: It's -- in the Albanian it's at 1614; in the
5 English it's at 8573. It's communique number 47 from the 13th of May,
6 1998, published in Koha Ditore on page 6. And I think it's on the top
7 left on the Albanian page, and in English it's on the Sanction.
8 Again, I would remind the Court and the other parties that if you
9 press "Computer Evidence" it comes in most clearly.
10 Q. Was that communique issued by the General Staff?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, at the beginning of the communique it says that: "On the
13 orders of the UCK General Staff, successive operations against the
14 invasion troops were carried out in Operational Zone No. 1, that is, in
15 the operational subzones of Drenice [Drenica], Erenik, Dukagjin
16 [Dugadzini], Pashtrik [Pastrik], and Llap [Lap]. In the course of bitter
17 fighting on the front, the invading forces suffered major human and
18 material losses. Throughout this period, operations were also carried
19 out against Albanian collaborationists, who, despite earlier warnings,
20 did not abandon their antinational courses of action."
21 Did the things described in that passage that I just read out in
22 fact occur?
23 A. There's nothing that I can add to this communique except for
24 minor printing errors in the beginning. This is a time after the
25 Likoshan massacre, after the KLA epic of Prekaz. 14 persons were killed
1 in Likoshan, one KLA soldier and two villagers who resisted, themselves,
2 and 11 civilians who were unarmed and who were in their houses. This is
3 a time when the Jashari family, 22 members of this family, were killed.
4 And altogether about 60 persons in the Jashari neighbourhood, most of
5 them civilians, elderly persons, children, and women, unarmed.
6 And of course in this time to a certain extent, this was a deed
7 of those who served the Serb apparatus. And this is a time when
8 mobilisation begins within the ranks of the KLA. It is also a time when
9 except for those who were already organised within the ranks of the KLA,
10 we see also a solidarisation with the population and the army. It is a
11 time when villagers voluntarily take up weapons and defend their
12 dwellings. It is a time of a general mobilisation of the people and the
13 massivisation [as interpreted] of the people is so great and their will
14 to join the KLA is so great that the guerrilla army now becomes a popular
16 This extension -- expansion took place on a horizontal level. We
17 have a period when the engagement of the commanding and leadership
18 structures of the KLA are directed in systematisation of the population
19 in the ranks of the KLA. In this time there are actions that are carried
20 out without the knowledge of the General Staff because of the hatred and
21 the dissatisfaction of the population to fight the enemy.
22 I would like also to point out, you Honoured Judges, is that
23 except for the will and the solidarisation of the Kosovo citizens to join
24 the KLA, there was something else that was a moving force for them to
25 abandon their homes and take up weapons. On both occasions, mainly those
1 who suffered were the unarmed; those who were in their homes. What I
2 would like to say is that a part of the Kosova citizens joined the KLA
3 out of fear as well because a citizen was not feeling safe and secure in
4 a market, in home, on the road. So the only support that the population
5 found was in the KLA. It wasn't easy --
6 Q. Okay --
7 A. -- for an army with a political organisation of 300 or 400
8 persons to control and to organise itself after the events in April 1998.
9 So I think we have to look at all the forms, at all the ways, the
10 reasons, that urged these people to leave their homes, leave their
11 families, give up their jobs, to defend their lives, even sometimes their
12 personal lives.
13 Q. You said that sometimes actions were taken without the knowledge
14 -- were carried out without the knowledge of the General Staff. When
15 that happened, was the General Staff informed of these actions after they
16 had taken place?
17 A. The General Staff through these communiques and statements wanted
18 to enhance the confidence of the citizens in its leading body.
19 Q. And if I -- okay. But let me just put the question again which
20 is: After -- you said that actions were taken at times without the
21 knowledge of the General Staff. Was the General Staff to your knowledge
22 informed about these actions after they occurred and then the public was
23 told about them in the communiques? Is that what happened?
24 A. The communiques aimed at informing the public of the military
25 actions undertaken at given periods of time in Kosova.
1 Q. And just to bring you back, please, to the communique that we
2 started off looking at, which is communique number 47, and specifically
3 to that first paragraph which references operations in various subzones
4 and -- as well as operations carried out against Albanian
5 collaborationists. My question is: Did those operations in fact occur?
6 A. Since they have been given to the media and to the public, of
7 course they must have happened.
8 Q. I want to draw your attention now to a sentence which is
9 approximately halfway through and I'll just read it out and perhaps
10 you'll be able to find it.
11 "In a lightning action by our military formations, an operation
12 against the enemy's punitive expeditions on the main road in the
13 operational subzone of Pashtrik was successfully carried out."
14 Are you able to find that sentence?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you know what this refers to, what battle this refers to or
17 what main road is being -- is referred to here?
18 A. This does not refer to a specific battle, and this to me is not
19 known. What I want to say here is that this was a propaganda material.
20 It's not something that might be used as evidence and less so as an
21 evidence in a court like the Tribunal, The Hague Tribunal is.
22 Q. Well, maybe you can tell us what you mean by that. What do you
23 mean by it's propaganda material?
24 A. I respect the Honourable Judges. I respect all those who serve
25 this process and wish it to be based on relevant facts. I want once
1 again to say here that for me it doesn't make sense for this Tribunal to
2 take such statements and communiques issued by the General Staff of the
3 KLA as material evidence to prove the guilt of someone. I'm repeating it
4 that these were public materials, documents, used for propaganda
5 purposes. The aim of these documents was to increase the respect and
6 authority of the KLA in the eyes of the citizens. It was a material that
7 spoke also about the war we engaged in, to enhance the organisation of
8 this military organisation for the people to believe in it, to join it;
9 and I think we successfully carried out this, our purpose. In other
10 words, for me it doesn't make sense for such propaganda materials to be
11 used as evidence by the Prosecution to condemn someone for something that
12 in one way or another was and is known to the public in general. What
13 were the organisational means, the operational means; what were the means
14 the KLA had to operate in such circumstances of the time that these
15 communiques and statements speak of.
16 Q. Well, Mr. Krasniqi, if there's a particular passage that I ask
17 you about in any of these communiques that you believe is propaganda,
18 then please tell me and we can inquire about that and have additional
19 evidence about that. But let me ask you another question at this moment.
20 Were you aware of a battle on -- around the Pristina-Peja highway around
21 Lapusnik around the 9th of May, 1998? Were you aware of that battle?
22 A. Of course I was, because my village is situated very close to
24 Q. And the sentence that I read a moment ago: "In a lightning
25 action by our military formations, an operation against the enemy's
1 punitive expeditions on the main road in the operational subzone of
2 Pashtrik was successfully carried out."
3 Is that a reference to the battle in May of 1998 or do you know?
4 A. I do know what this is about. I also know that Lapusnik and the
5 fighting waged there do not belong to Pastrik zone. They were -- they
6 occurred in the Drenoc operational zone.
7 Q. It -- can you tell us to the best of your knowledge -- well, let
8 me take this one step at a time. This sentence then that I read, is it
9 or is it not a reference to the 9th of May battle at Lapusnik?
10 A. It cannot be related to Lapusnik. I'm repeating that the
11 distance between Lapusnik and the surrounding zones -- villages were
12 under the command of the Drenoc, not Pastrik operational zone.
13 Q. So I'll ask you some more questions about that in a moment. But
14 what then is this sentence a reference to? Or do you not know?
15 A. I'd like to give you an idea or a picture of -- to the Honourable
16 Judges that the Pastrik zone comprised municipalities of Malisevo,
17 Rahovec, Prizren, Shale, and Ferand [as interpreted], former Suhareke,
18 whereas the territory we are talking about in Lapusnik it was and is part
19 of Drenoc municipality, which fell under the Drenoc Operational Zone.
20 Q. I understand your testimony on that point, but my question is:
21 Going back to Communique No. 47 and this sentence, and if you don't know,
22 just tell me that you don't know. But there's a sentence that reads:
23 "In a lightning action by our military formations, an operation
24 against the enemy's punitive expeditions on the main road in the
25 operational subzone of Pashtrik was successfully carried out."
1 What is that a reference to?
2 A. I already indicated that the Pastrik zone comprises a very vast
3 area. So some action might have taken place in the area of Rahovec
4 municipality in Ferand, Prizren, and in the other part of Malisheve
5 municipality because that was a vast area and the operational units might
6 have carried out some actions in one of these municipalities.
7 Q. And the reference to the main road in that sentence, do you know
8 what main road that is referring to?
9 A. Yes. There is the Prishtine-Peja road which passes through
10 Carraleve valley and Ferand, but not in Komorane, Lapusnik, Kline and
11 Peja. We have to deal with two roads. It does not specify which of the
12 two roads it is. And after all, it is hard for me now and even then to
13 follow every action that occurred in every part and road of Kosova. We
14 had other duties to attend to at that time.
15 Q. And you would agree with me that the -- Lapusnik is in Gllogoc
16 municipality, and I've probably mispronounced that. Is that the
17 municipality that Lapusnik is in?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And what operational subzone was that municipality in at the time
20 in May of 1998 if you know? Was it in one --
21 A. This I know. It was part of the Drenica Operational Zone, number
23 Q. And was the entire municipality in your view in that -- in the
24 Drenica operational subzone?
25 A. Drenica, Skenderaj municipalities, and the larger part of Klina
1 municipality and part of Kastriot Obiliq municipality were.
2 Q. But my question was: Was the entire municipality of Gllogoc in
3 the Drenica zone? Or was that municipality divided --
4 A. The entire municipality was.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time, Mr. Whiting?
6 MR. WHITING: It is, Your Honour, thank you.
7 JUDGE PARKER: You've had another hour and a half now, Mr.
8 Krasniqi. We'll break now and resume at 5 minutes to 6.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 5.33 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Whiting.
12 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, first I want to return to you with the assistance
14 of the usher the documents that you provided. Thank you for those
15 documents. We've made a copy of the documents.
16 MR. WHITING: And for the record, I've provided a copy of the
17 documents to the Defence. And during the long weekend we will endeavour
18 to copy them -- I mean translate them. I provided only one copy to the
19 Defence, but I have an extra one here.
20 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I just had one last question about that Communique
21 No. 47 that we were talking about before the break. And do you have that
22 in front of you, number 47? It's --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, there in that first paragraph where there's a reference to
25 operational zone number 1 and then there's reference to various
1 operational subzones, in that paragraph is Operational Zone Number 1
2 referring to the whole of Kosovo or to something else?
3 A. It refers to the entire Kosova.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. WHITING: I'm going to move on to another document, and it is
6 Communique No. 49. It's at -- in English it's at 8577. It will be on
7 the Sanction. In Albanian it is at 1615 and it's on the bottom right of
8 the page in Albanian and it's communique number 49 from the 13th of July,
9 1998, published in Koha Ditore on page 2.
10 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, was that communique issued by the General Staff?
11 A. Yes. The Information Directorate of the KLA issued it.
12 Q. And can you explain for us what the Information Directorate of
13 the KLA was.
14 A. It was a directorate responsible for informing the public.
15 Q. As spokesman were you in charge of the Information Directorate?
16 A. No. I was not in charge of it. I think it's a mistake here
17 because informative -- information might be misinterpreted for
18 informative, it's referring to the Albanian. In the English -- it's
19 probably a mistake, probably, in Albanian or misinformation in the way
20 it's written because the meaning is information, public information,
22 Q. Well, let me put another to you, maybe we can clarify it. Was
23 this communique -- did the General Staff approve of this communique? And
24 I would draw your attention to the end of the communique where it reads:
25 "Thus ends Communique No. 49 of the UCK General Staff."
1 Was this communique approved by the General Staff?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to I think it's the third
4 sentence of the document and I'll just read it out.
5 "Measures have also been taken against certain diehard
6 collaborators, who are still working against our national interests.
7 Operations are under way to reinforce and extend the positions under the
8 control of our forces in the subzones of Pashtrik, Llap, Drenice,
9 Karadak, and Dukagjin within Operational Zone No. 1.
10 "Our formations have successfully carried out large-scale
11 operations in the subzone of Pashtrik."
12 Do you see that in the communique?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And is that true? Did those things happen?
15 A. I'm repeating that this is a propaganda material. If you try to
16 use this material for other ends, I think there is no point in arguing
17 it. We were in a war. We were engaged in a very unequal war. We
18 couldn't tell our people, Come and join us, because we are not organised.
19 Q. Well, we're going to come to some communiques that talk about the
20 organisation of the KLA in a moment, and perhaps that's what you're
21 referring to when you talk about propaganda. But here this refers not to
22 the organisation but to other things. And you have already told us that
23 on -- that at times collaborators were in fact killed. So here my
24 question is -- the sentence where it says: "Measures have also been
25 taken against certain diehard collaborators who are still working against
1 our national interests," is that true? Had measures -- were measures
2 still being taken against collaborators?
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me -- excuse me --
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think --
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, sir.
6 JUDGE PARKER: If you could pause a moment, please.
7 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think Mr. Whiting has misstated what the
9 statement is. The statement does not contain the words "measures are
10 still being taken," the statement is "measures have also been taken."
11 JUDGE PARKER: Ah yes, that was not his quotation. That was his
12 following question.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: I understand. My concern is --
14 JUDGE PARKER: It followed on earlier questions of earlier times.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: I understand. My concern is there may have been
16 some confusion with regard to what was being said since he was dealing
17 with the specific statement within the context of this particular
19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith, I don't think
20 this witness is going to be at all confused in that way.
21 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I'll put the question to you again. I'll draw your
23 attention to this sentence where it says: "Measures have also been taken
24 against certain diehard collaborators who are still working against our
25 national interests."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 At this time when this communique was issued on the 13th or --
2 published on the 13th of July, 1998, was it true that measures were being
3 taken against collaborators?
4 A. Distinguished Judges, I think that I have already exhausted this
5 question. I have answered this question and I think that a repetition of
6 the same submissions does not -- will not get another answer from what I
7 have already stated.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Krasniqi, the questions aren't trying to get
9 another answer from you, but trying to learn whether there has been any
10 change in the position as these different communiques are issued. They
11 span now some months, and that's the purpose, as I would understand it,
12 of the question. So it's not that anything that you've said about this
13 conduct and its justification has been overlooked or is not going to be
14 noticed, but the question is asking: Here is something now published in
15 July. Is this still happening? So if you wouldn't mind with your
16 patience putting up with some repetition as certain matters are made
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. I am here to explain
19 what happened more from a political point of view rather than from an
20 operational point of view. However, I want to say that this communique
21 issued by the Information Directorate has to do with more what has
22 happened in the past prior to 13 July 1998.
23 MR. WHITING:
24 Q. I understand that. Is -- however, with respect to -- and if you
25 don't know, then please simply tell me you don't know. But with respect
1 to this sentence that "Measures have also been taken against certain
2 diehard collaborators who are still working against our national
3 interests," do you know if that was in fact true up to that date that up
4 to the 13th of July, 1998, measures were still being taken against
6 A. I'm saying that we have taken measures against the entire violent
7 operators of the Milosevic regime at that time in Kosovo.
8 Q. And when you say "the entire violent operators of the Milosevic
9 regime," does that include collaborators?
10 A. They were part of the same regime, tools of the same mechanism.
11 Q. Now, the next sentence says that -- it talks about -- what
12 appears to talk about military operations that were taken -- or let's say
13 armed operations that were taken by the -- undertaken by the KLA before
14 the 13th of July, 1998, specifically within the subzones of Pastrik,
15 Llap, Drenice, Karadak, and Dukagjin. And there's specific reference to
16 the large-scale operations undertaken in the subzone of Pastrik. Do you
17 know if those operations that are referred to in fact occurred?
18 A. Such communiques have to be taken in the context of the
19 propaganda and the specific battles waged in all wars, as the case was in
20 Kosovo war. But until the mid-July, I have to say that not many
21 operational actions were undertaken. They start to be undertaken
22 especially from the second half of July to continue during the entire
23 month of August and September. This was otherwise the well -- notorious
24 offensive waged by the Serb police and army against the Albanian villages
25 during which 70 to 100 per cent of 415 settlements have been razed to the
2 Q. I understand your answer with regard to the increase in activity,
3 military activity, that occurred after the -- beginning in the second
4 half of July. But my question is: Before this communique was published,
5 before the 13th of July, were there operations within these zones, as
6 described in the communique? Whether big operations or small operations,
7 did they in fact occur, to your knowledge? If you know.
8 A. They happened, but not to the dimensions that the communique
10 Q. I understand. Now, we're going to move on to -- and we're going
11 to move on to Communique Number 51, and this is actually at tab 6. This
12 -- it's at tab 6 of the binder.
13 MR. WHITING: And for the record it is -- the English is a
14 two-page document entitled "Spokesman: UCK is Institutionalized,
15 'Structured' Army," dated 26th August, 1998, from the Tirana television
16 network," and it's followed by a two-page translation into Albanian. And
17 the English is on the Sanction or let's say part -- the second page of
18 the English.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, if you could just take a moment to read this.
20 For this one I don't have a newspaper version of it because it purports
21 to be from the -- transmitted on the television. I see you're looking
22 through the documents that you brought. I myself have not found a
23 newspaper version of it in your document, but feel free to look yourself.
24 A. I have a statement here published in Bujku on 28th July, 1998.
25 And this must be it, I think.
1 Q. On 28 July, 1998?
2 A. On 28 July, 1998.
3 Q. Is this -- this article that you have from Bujku from the 28th of
4 July, 1998, is it Communique Number 51?
5 A. No. This is a political statement.
6 Q. Okay. So -- and it's -- is it numbered, the one in Bujku? Does
7 it have a number? It's Political Statement Number --
8 A. Number 5.
9 Q. Okay. The document that I've put before you is -- purports to be
10 Communique Number 51, and it's dated the 26th of August, 1998. So it
11 appears to be something different from the Bujku document which you are
12 referring to. If you could just look at the document that I've put
13 before you. Do you remember that communique, Communique 51, at the end
14 of August 1998? And take your time to read it.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was that issued by the General Staff?
17 A. It was the time of the August offensive, and fighting was severe
18 in all the zones, the most so [as interpreted] in Drenica and Pastrik,
19 but also in Dukagjin zones. And we consulted on telephone about the
20 situation created. We were informed of the -- from the war zones of what
21 happened and we issued communique of the General Staff that is here.
22 Q. And I'm going to draw your attention to the last sentence of the
23 communique where it reads: "The UCK is an institutionalised, organised,
24 and structured army, continuously becoming more professional and more
25 prepared to fight until victory."
1 A. Yes. Again, I am referring to what I've said several times. The
2 entire Kosova at that time was engulfed in war and flames as a result of
3 the Serb police and army and paramilitaries led by a command with a sole
4 aim, an aim that was planned from 80 -- 40 [as interpreted]. It was the
5 time when the penetration -- the Serb army had penetrated almost in all
6 the zones controlled by the KLA. At this time I and the General Staff
7 couldn't say that the KLA was disbanded, was not organised. There are
8 some things that really must be looked at carefully, they are -- I'm
9 emphasising it, propaganda, material -- not materials to be used as
10 evidence, nowhere, even as lower-instance courts, let alone at such
11 higher court. These are propaganda materials showing that despite the
12 losses inflicted on it, it's not 415 as it says in the transcript, 450
13 places were razed to the ground and the international community has seen
14 it through television programmes broadcast on BBC and other television
15 stations which relate news on the burning of the villages in Kosova by
16 the Serb police and army. In a word, as I said, it's propaganda
17 material. After this period, we did, however, manage to go further in
18 our national liberation war and to reinforce ourselves.
19 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this document be given a
20 number, please.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be Prosecution Exhibit P138.
23 MR. WHITING:
24 Q. I'm going to show you another communique, it's communique number
25 53. And for this we go back to tab 1 in English and tab 2 in the
1 Albanian. In the English it's 8606; in the Albanian it's 1616.
2 MR. WHITING: And I'd ask the usher to assist the witness in
3 finding that in the large format. Usher -- I'm sorry. If you could
4 assist the witness in finding ERN number 1616 in that large format. And
5 on the Albanian page I believe it's at the bottom right. It's published
6 in Koha Ditore on the 19th of September, 1998, on page 2. Was this
7 Communique Number 53 issued by the General Staff?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And I'm going to draw your attention to a phrase that is -- it's
10 about the fifth -- fourth or fifth sentence. It says: "Punitive
11 measures of various kinds are also being undertaken against
12 collaborationist elements that continue to serve the occupying power."
13 And I'm going to put the question again which, again I apologise, may
14 seem repetitive but is important for our understanding. At this time on
15 the 19th of September, 1998, when this communique was issued, were there
16 still measures being taken against collaborators with the Serb regime?
17 A. I'm repeating that this is a propaganda material, and of course
18 measures were taken against all those who have done harm to the political
19 and military actions of the KLA.
20 Q. And that would include collaborators?
21 A. Yes, of course.
22 Q. Now, in addition to communiques, did you also as spokesman of the
23 KLA give various interviews to the media during this time period in 1998?
24 A. Yes, I did, certainly. That was part of my duties and
1 Q. I'm going to draw your attention to the document at tab 4 of the
3 MR. WHITING: And I'll need the assistance of the usher.
4 And I have -- Usher, I have a large format of that document as
5 well. And for the record the Albanian version is U008-6944 to 6945. The
6 English version does not have an ERN. It's a two-page document entitled
7 "Kosova Liberation Army's TV Statement, Pristina" published in Bujku on
8 the 16th of June, 1998.
9 Q. And I would draw your attention, Mr. Krasniqi, on the Albanian
10 document to -- it appears to be the lower left. And I think this may
11 actually be -- you may actually have a document of this document in the
12 records you brought.
13 A. Yes, I do have it.
14 Q. Is this -- is that an article, a report, of the first declaration
15 that you made from Klecka as UCK spokesman on the 15th of June, 1998?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And is it an accurate report of what you said on that day in that
18 first declaration that you made?
19 A. Honoured Judges, on the 11th, respectively on the 12th of June,
20 1998, the General Staff appointed me spokesperson of the KLA to
21 communicate with the media in Albanian and at the same time we had -- we
22 were flooded by different media from the world, from Europe and the
23 United States, and up to this time the leaders of the KLA were not known
24 for the public opinion and not known for the soldiers due to the
25 circumstances that I am emphasised earlier, due to the risk and --
1 existing risk from the secret service of Serbia who had also infiltrated
2 the soldiers and the public. This was the duty and the task of the Serb
3 secret police.
4 However, the public opinion was not directly informed about the
5 personalities that were leading the KLA. In these circumstances, the
6 General Staff appointed me spokesperson of the Kosovo Liberation Army and
7 I accepted this duty wilfully and aware of all the risks that could
8 befall me and my family because all my family members were in the
9 village. I accepted this duty as a person who was already engaged
10 politically against the Belgrade regime. And after informing the public
11 with declaration number 3 from my appointment as a spokesperson on the
12 13th of June, I gave my first public statement for the Albanian
13 television -- in fact, for that part of the Pristina television that was
14 not able to operate in Pristina but was operating in the frames of the
15 Albanian television in Tirana. This is the declaration, the statement,
16 that I gave in order to inform the Albanians. And in several items I
17 represented -- I presented a part of the programme of the KLA. I
18 consider and I assess that this statement is not a fact, a factive [as
19 interpreted] material that would verify the entire leadership of the KLA.
20 I mentioned earlier that there were circumstances at that time which did
21 not enable us to have control over all those people who were ready to
22 enter war. Out of fear of the regime -- of course I have spoken in the
23 best word about the highest possible level of the organisation of the
24 KLA, but bear in mind that a guerrilla army which was not capable of
25 being not more than three people sometimes, something which went on until
1 the December -- November of 1997 when it was expanded not to a large
2 degree in 1998 because we lacked weapons, we lacked financial means, but
3 we never lacked the readiness to fight the Milosevic regime. We never
4 lacked the readiness, willingness to fight the Serb occupiers despite the
5 risky possibilities.
6 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I've hesitated to interrupt you, but you will have
7 opportunities to explain all of these documents. But my question is: Is
8 this document that you have in front of you, the article from Bujku on
9 the 16th of June, 1998, is that an accurate report of what you said in
10 that first statement that you made?
11 A. Since I have it with me, I wish to read a sentence from it. "The
12 General Staff of the KLA calls on all the co-nationals, wherever they
13 are, all the freedom fighters to all the experts and professionals of
14 military warfare to respond to the voice of the homeland."
15 This was in fact a call for joining, but it was not an order for
16 people to join, and the KLA has never issued orders to people to join
17 it --
18 Q. I understand --
19 A. -- because it didn't have the possibility to do that. It just
20 called it to join it.
21 Q. I understand that, Mr. Krasniqi. And we can see where that says
22 that in the document. And that actually brings me to another question
23 which is: When you -- after you became spokesman of the KLA and you gave
24 interviews or made statements to the media, were you speaking on behalf
25 of the General Staff in those statements or were you speaking on behalf
1 of yourself?
2 A. I was officially -- I was not officially known to the public as
3 spokesperson to convey the policy of the General Staff of the KLA. I was
4 not -- no longer an individual. I represented and publicised the policy
5 of the General Staff and the KLA at that time.
6 Q. Okay. There was a little -- I apologise. There was a little
7 problem with the translation --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's mistake. It was "I was
9 officially known," not "not officially."
10 MR. WHITING: Thank you to the interpreter. I don't need the ask
11 the clarifying question then.
12 Q. Please, if we could go back to this document, the article in
13 Bujku on the 16th of June, 1998. You've read now a sentence about
14 calling on people to join the KLA. Is the rest of the text an accurate
15 account of what you said in your first statement as spokesman of the KLA?
16 And if you could just focus on that question, please, and give me an
18 A. Everything I have said here on 16th of June goes to me. I do not
19 claim that I do not -- did not give this statement. I'm not denying it.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, I want to draw your attention to one sentence in
21 the article. You've already read a sentence. This is a different
22 sentence where it says: "The UCK General Staff is of the opinion that
23 during the present phase, political pluralism is a luxury."
24 Do you see that sentence? It's just before the sentence that you
25 read to us?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can you explain what that means?
3 A. Yes. At that time in Kosova there were many political parties
4 and none of them with the exception I think even though late of the
5 Parliamentary Party of Kosova, had ceased its political activity; while
6 the others, none of them gave up their political activity. And they had
7 become a hurdle to the extension or the growth of the KLA and the
8 assistance given to it. They were fanatically abiding by such -- by some
9 positions which to us were meaningless. At every wartime, even
10 well-organised states usually outlaw -- sorry, disband institutions and
11 concentrate responsibilities on one single body that in many cases
12 substitutes other organisations. Even it disbands parliament. That's
13 why our demand was that even when Kosova was in flames, when the
14 Milosevic regime was committing massacres against civilians, we thought
15 it was more than luxury to be organised in parties and to conduct policy
16 -- politics under the tutelage of Serb regime.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this be given a number,
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be Prosecution Exhibit P139.
22 MR. WHITING: If we could turn now to the document at tab 5. And
23 if the witness could be provided with tab 5. This is, for the record,
24 the English is a three of page document which is entitled "UCK Spokesman:
25 Goal is Unification of All Albanians," from the -- from Der Speigel --
1 from July 6th, 1998, pages 1 to 3. And following it is the three-page
3 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, do you remember giving an interview to Der Speigel
4 at the beginning of July 1998?
5 A. I don't remember the exact date, but I do remember very well that
6 I gave Der Speigel an interview. I gave that interview.
7 Q. And the report of the interview that appeared in the newspaper in
8 Der Speigel, was it an accurate account of the interview that you had
9 given to the newspaper?
10 A. The entire interview, with minor exceptions, is correct.
11 Q. And the minor exceptions, did they pertain to something in
13 A. They pertained -- they had a political character. And at that
14 time I didn't think but the way the well-known journalist of Der Speigel
15 wrote about the war and political developments in Kosovo, after the
16 developments in June 1998, I was convinced that she was in a way ordered
17 by the regime, the Serb regime, and that the aim was to give another
18 direction of the policy and the war of the KLA. In that interview I said
19 that the Kosovo Liberation Army was fighting for the unification of the
20 occupied territories and not the way she put it, for greater Albania or
21 something like that. This was the contestation.
22 Q. And aside from that point whether the goal of the KLA was to
23 unify the occupied territories or to create a greater Albania, aside from
24 that point, was the article that appeared in Der Speigel accurate?
25 A. It was correct.
1 Q. And the point that you have just referenced about the goal of the
2 KLA, did that cause some controversy after the publication of the article
3 in Der Speigel?
4 A. As I said, on a political plan it did because the aim of the KLA
5 was allegedly to destabilise the entire region of the Balkans. Our war
6 was very transparent. Our requirements might have been minor or greater,
7 but after the consulting we had with the Albanian movement in general as
8 well as with analysts and politicians of the Western world, we
9 concentrated the entire operational activity of the KLA in Kosova.
10 Q. Now, with respect to this article I want to draw your attention
11 to a question at the -- it's perhaps the -- it's the fourth question.
12 And the newspaper puts a question to you about Rugova. And your answer
13 as translated is:
14 "The policy of the LDK, which is headed by Rugova, has produced
15 only failures over the past 10 years. The Albanians have lost their
16 trust in this policy. Rugova has made too many mistakes."
17 Now, you've addressed this issue at length already, but I wanted
18 to ask you: Did you in fact say that in the interview?
19 A. I did tell you during the interview in Pristina that this is what
20 I thought at that time and that my opinion has not changed.
21 Q. And then that -- the tenth question. And just to assist you in
22 finding it in your version, it has to do about the UCK central command.
23 And your answer is, and I hope you'll be able to find it in your version
25 "The UCK has only one Main Staff and one supreme commander. The
1 military decisions are made here in Kosovo. At the moment, I am the only
2 one permitted to speak on behalf of the UCK."
3 And this topic also has been addressed by you, but I'll just ask
4 you this: Did you say that during the interview?
5 A. Yes, I did say that. And if needed, we will explain why I said
7 Q. Please do, briefly.
8 A. I said this due to the fact that my obligation was to communicate
9 with the public opinion. The fact was that at that time in Kosova it was
10 not known who the person you were communicating with was, and for the --
11 everybody to give their own opinions, political opinions, and of course
12 at the time this was damaging for the war and caused confusion within the
13 ranks of the KLA and could form confusion within the diplomatic circles
14 of those who were interested in a just war in Kosova. Due to all these
15 risks and many other risks, although we were not prepared and we did know
16 all the precaution measures, the consequences that could be felt from the
17 Serb regime and the collaborators, we did take the risk in order to
18 defend the political aims of the KLA.
19 We did this because we wanted the public, the home and
20 international public, to know the true stand of the KLA and of the
21 struggle led by it.
22 Q. Thank you, sir. Now I've just going to ask you about one last
23 question and answer in this interview. It follows -- it's a few after
24 the one we've just been talking about and the newspaper asks: "In the
25 West, the UCK is frequently assessed as a terrorist movement. Why does
1 it kill peaceful Albanians?"
2 And the answer you give according to the document I have is:
3 "Collaborators are warned that we will kill them if they continue
4 to follow the wrong path. However, as an army, we observe all
5 international rules of warfare."
6 And my question is: Did you say this during the interview?
7 A. Yes, I did say that. And I would like to explain this issue if
9 Q. You may -- excuse me. You may --
10 A. Please --
11 Q. I would just ask if you could --
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Krasniqi, could you please hold one moment;
13 Mr. Whiting is putting something to you.
14 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, you may explain. We just have five minutes until
16 the end of the session and I would just ask if possible if you could
17 provide a brief explanation so we can finish with this document before
18 the end of the session. Thank you.
19 A. I'd like to be brief. I think that the attempt to argue the fact
20 that the KLA has fought against the Albanians after the war and after the
21 damage incurred by the war is an attempt and a great damage done to our
22 war. We have never aimed at killing Albanians, as you allege. But our
23 -- indeed, the killing or murders were not an aim for us. But this
24 happened at those moments when there was no way out for our people other
25 than that of war. And we fought against the Serb police and army, the
1 violent Serb apparatus that was installed in Kosova. We didn't fight
2 against Albanians, we fought for the Albanians. And today in Kosova each
3 and every one enjoys this reality. More than the KLA -- former KLA
5 I believe it's a very serious slander, insult, done to the KLA,
6 to the Albanian people, that we have allegedly fought against the
7 Albanians and not against a violent Serb apparatus. I think that such a
8 practice should come to an end. We as people, Honourable Judges, have
9 never had a problem with justice. As an argument of force, our problem
10 in the course of history has been with the force -- with the force as an
11 argument of justice.
12 Q. Just to be clear, Mr. Krasniqi, nobody is alleging that the aim
13 of the KLA was to kill Albanians, and you've provided that explanation
14 and I think it's clear in your testimony.
15 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this document be given a
16 number, please.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be Prosecution Exhibit number
20 MR. WHITING: And I think it would be a convenient time.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Krasniqi, we've come to the end of our day.
22 We have to adjourn now, and because the Judges are engaged in another
23 matter all day tomorrow I'm afraid we can't continue with your evidence
24 until Monday. So we would ask that you return on Monday at 2.15 when
25 your evidence will continue. You'll be given more precise assistance
1 with that by the people assisting you outside.
2 We will now adjourn.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Monday, the 14th day of
5 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.