1 Wednesday, 31 May 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm aware of the housekeeping issues that arose

6 yesterday. Can we deal with them at the end of the day, or at the end of

7 this witness, if we can finish him today?

8 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, it's -- of course, as the Trial Chamber

9 wishes. However, we anticipate that the direct examination of this

10 witness will be completed in approximately two sessions today. So the

11 issue that we raised yesterday about asking that the Defence predict how

12 long the cross-examination will be at the beginning of the

13 cross-examination would arise then today with this witness. So we would

14 ask, if it's possible, that it could be addressed before that happens,

15 that we would appreciate it. I have also another matter which I wanted to

16 address briefly with the Trial Chamber.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we then deal with this issue and all other

18 matters at the end of -- can I say the end of the examination-in-chief of

19 this witness? We can't do that. He'll be sitting here at that time.

20 Okay. So maybe the best thing is to deal with them right away now.

21 Okay. Let's do that. If my memory serves me well, the two issues that

22 arose yesterday were the length of cross-examination and an extra session

23 or extra sitting to cover up time.

24 MR. WHITING: That's correct, though I think that the one that is

25 already been resolved.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's resolved by circumstances --

2 MR WHITING: Right.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- but then it can be looked into in the next week.

4 As to the question of the length of cross-examination, I don't

5 think there is any order to be made here. The order is there, the

6 guidelines are there. It's just a question of making sure that we

7 implement them strictly. Now, in order to do that, is it possible to get

8 an idea what time this witness began his evidence yesterday?

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: Yeah, it was at 6.30, so I spent a little bit

10 less than 30 minutes with the witness.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: 6.30 on the 30th of May.

12 [Microphone not activated]

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: So sorry.

15 So at the end of the examination-in-chief, we will have to check

16 how long it took you and then warn the Defence about the time. And the

17 Chamber does intend to implement that guideline strictly henceforth.

18 Any others thing to raise on that point?

19 Mr. Milovancevic, do you have anything to say?

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. At least we've got it on the record.

7 The next issue was the question of extra sittings to try and cover

8 up on time. I could not agree more that we do need to cover up on that

9 time. I am aware that it was discovered that in fact there are -- there

10 is no time available, court time available, on Friday for an extra

11 session. But looking at next week's courtroom schedule, it looks like

12 Courtroom III is available on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, and would

13 there be any problem with us sitting the whole day on those -- any one of

14 those three days?

15 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I -- the suggestion for the extra

16 sitting was -- came from the Prosecution, and it was really because we

17 were very squeezed for this week. So it was kind -- it was really as a

18 kind of measure to address this week, and I was thinking really just of

19 one day. The difficulty -- I think there may be some difficulties in

20 sitting full days for a number of days that are -- I think it does put

21 quite a burden on witnesses who have to testify for that long a period of

22 time. And I think also Defence counsel has indicated a number of

23 difficulties that it poses both for him in terms of his preparation and

24 also for the accused in terms of his health.

25 So I certainly would not press that we sit extra days next week,

1 but, of course, if the Trial Chamber decides that that is required, we'll

2 do our best to accommodate that.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, I appreciate what you do say. The pressure

4 from the side of the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the Prosecution's

5 case is completed as close as possible to the originally planned date. We

6 already see that we are going to be out by four weeks. And we are trying

7 to reduce that four-week period to -- if to zero, to zero; if not, to

8 whatever we can do. So it is not just -- from the Chamber's point of view

9 it's not just a question of this week. So having said that, the Chamber

10 would appreciate, even if it is not sitting two sessions every day for

11 three days but as we go along, an extra session somewhere if we can find

12 one would be appreciated, just so that we cover up.

13 MR. WHITING: That's fine, Your Honour. Just so the Court is

14 aware, we still are aiming to finish by June 16th, though it may slip by a

15 couple of days. But I would think even if we did not sit any extra days,

16 I don't think it would slip by more than a couple of days.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: But originally you were finished by the 2nd of

18 June.

19 MR. WHITING: Right, of course. That was before the two-week --

20 the two weeks off that we had because of the health.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Those are the two weeks I want to try and cover up.

22 MR. WHITING: Right. And -- I think even if we sit an extra

23 sitting, we are not going to finish substantially earlier than June 16.

24 It's just -- just logistically becomes difficult to bring witnesses and

25 get them scheduled and so forth. So I'm happy to sit an extra session as

1 long as we know -- as long as we know in advance when it's -- you know, a

2 number of days in advance when it's going to be. We can do our best to

3 accommodate that.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But you being the dominus litis, you would have to

5 guide the Chamber because you would know when you're going to have your

6 witnesses.

7 MR. WHITING: Well, we are constantly adjusting our schedule.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure.

9 MR. WHITING: So any time next week, if we sat an extra morning,

10 that would be fine.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's all I'm saying.

12 MR. WHITING: Yeah.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: At least because you are in the driving seat,

14 you'll let us know if there is any need and we can try and schedule that.

15 MR. WHITING: Right. I will say one thing, Your Honour, and I

16 don't know if it -- if it -- I don't know if this will be of any

17 assistance. But I'm not sure -- of course, the motion with respect to

18 Milan Babic's evidence is pending. We understand that. I don't know what

19 the contemplated schedule is for a decision from the Trial Chamber. I do

20 think it will be impossible for us to rest our case without a decision on

21 that motion. And I don't know if that poses any difficulty but I thought

22 it's something I should raise.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't think it does. I think you will get your

24 decision before.

25 MR. WHITING: Okay. Thank you.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you very much.

4 I guess we can call the witness.

5 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, if I may. I just had one other issue

6 to raise. Perhaps --

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: So sorry.

8 Mr. Milovancevic, you stand up -- you carry on Mr. Milovancevic.

9 Mr. Whiting has been standing quite often this afternoon; you can get a

10 chance.

11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. As

12 regards the additional sitting hours, it is the position of the Defence

13 that this trial has been on for every working day for the whole week, full

14 time, and we believe that the trial is following a normal procedure. The

15 accused is of the same opinion. He was waiting for four years for the

16 trial to commence, and in that sense, any proposal for additional hours

17 depends on the assessment of my learned friends as to when their case

18 could be finished. Their assessment was just an assessment, and if that

19 is the only reason for additional hours, the Defence does not consider

20 this any valid argument; however, that is one issue.

21 But the second issue that is of essence for the position of the

22 Defence is the fact that this trial calls for certain exertion on the part

23 of all the participants. Every day after the sitting we have to prepare

24 for the following day. If we have to sit a whole day, the work of the

25 Defence counsel will be rendered more complicated and this additional

1 effort under the circumstances, in our view, is absolutely not called

2 for. It is not justified and it wouldn't be good. I agree with my

3 learned friend that it would mean very little in the sense of gaining time

4 or gaining momentum under the circumstances, as have been presented by

5 Mr. Whiting.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. As there is no

7 imminent sitting that is being discussed, I think we can let the matter

8 rest at that point. We will re-look at it, as and when the needs arises.

9 Yes, Mr. Whiting, you wanted to say something.

10 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. As Your Honour will recall,

11 last week on the 26th of May the Trial Chamber ordered the parties to take

12 certain steps with respect to three exhibits, three books that are in

13 evidence.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's correct.

15 MR. WHITING: Exhibits 24, 238, and 476. Now, two of those

16 exhibits, two of those books, we are responsible for, the Prosecution,

17 that's 24 and 476. With respect to those books, they are available - both

18 complete B/C/S and English translations of the books - and we will have no

19 difficulty making the selections and following the -- abiding by the

20 Court's order by the date of the 2nd of June.

21 With respect to the third book, however, the book that was put

22 into evidence by the Defence, number 238, for that book there is only the

23 B/C/S, and there is a very -- there are very brief selections which are

24 translated into English, but there is not available an English

25 translation. So that has slowed our review of that book, because it's

1 obviously -- because it's not in English. So we have to have somebody,

2 who understands the language and understands the issues, review the book

3 to help us select the portion that we would like to put into evidence. So

4 all I'm asking is if we could have an extra week to do -- with respect to

5 that book, to accomplish the exercise that was ordered by the Court. So

6 that if we could have that accomplished by June 9th.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Given that that book was tendered by the Defence,

8 is the Defence not able to provide a quicker translation of that? I would

9 imagine the Defence would be in a position to meet the deadline of the 2nd

10 of June, and couldn't they share that information with the Prosecution?

11 Mr. Milovancevic?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as regards this

13 book, the Defence at the moment when it started using it in these

14 proceedings, wanted to have it all translated. However, it is a long book

15 and the CLSS have asked us to mark only those parts that we were to use.

16 It would take some time for the whole book to be translated, and we will

17 ask the CLSS to do that. In the meantime, we will mark only those parts

18 that we will be using. In any case, we believe that the 2nd of June

19 deadline is far too short.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: You remember that the decision that was rendered

21 last week indicated that only those relevant parts that the tendering

22 party regards as relevant should be tendered. Therefore, the request is

23 not that the entire book be translated but that the relevant parts be

24 translated, Mr. Milovancevic. I can understand the position of the

25 Prosecution wanting to understand the entire book so that they,

1 themselves, can choose what they want to choose from the pages of the book

2 as relevant. But from the point of view of you, who are tendering the

3 document, all you need to do is to tender what you regard as relevant, not

4 the entire book.

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour. We

6 have already marked those sections, and in that sense there shouldn't be

7 any problem. Thank you very much.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. In that event, then,

9 you'll be held to the deadline of the 2nd of June, Mr. Milovancevic,

10 and -- with respect to that book; and the Prosecution will be held to the

11 deadline of the 2nd of June with respect to Exhibit 24 and 476 and the 9th

12 of June with respect to Exhibit 238.

13 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm grateful.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're welcome.

15 Next witness.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Your Honour, before the witness enters the court,

17 yesterday I used -- I utilised a map which was marked by the witness, it

18 was 65 ter 929. It was a map which depicted the Sector North. And as we

19 finished at 7.00, I didn't manage officially to move this exhibit into

20 evidence, so I would like to do it now and ask for the map, 65 ter 929 be

21 admitted into evidence.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: May 65 ter 929 please be admitted into evidence and

23 be given an exhibit number.

24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit Number 745, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

1 MS. RICHTEROVA: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 [The witness entered court]

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon, Mr. Kirudja. I see you're

4 surprised to see a completely different composition of the Bench. May the

5 Court remind you that you are still bound by the declaration you took

6 yesterday to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else but the

7 truth. Is that okay?

8 THE WITNESS: It is okay. And thank you.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Kirudja.

10 Ms. Richterova, you may proceed.

11 MS. RICHTEROVA: Thank you.

12 WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA [Resumed]

13 Examination by Ms. Richterova: [Continued]

14 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Kirudja. Before we adjourned yesterday, we

15 talked very briefly about people who you met after you arrived to the

16 Sector North. You mentioned Lieutenant-General Nikovic, then you

17 mentioned Slobodan Lazarevic. At this early stage, did you meet or did

18 you pay any visit to any mayor in the Sector North?

19 A. At this early stage, when we are talking about April 1992, we had

20 to get going with the process of demobilisation and we began meetings from

21 various places. The first instant where we met a mayor was just a week or

22 so after my arrival in Sector North, when also the sector, the force

23 commander, General Nambiar, also paid a visit. We had a large meeting in

24 Petrinja, where the mayors and the commanders met us for the first time.

25 This is about probably April 19 or something like that. Thereafter, we,

1 of course, proceeded to continue our initial phase of the mission, meeting

2 with the military commanders.

3 Q. At this early stage, did you mean -- did you meet by any chance

4 the mayor of Vrginmost?

5 A. Not at this very -- this very early stage, Vrginmost was not

6 particularly at the forefront. If you look at the map it's right inside,

7 with -- not very close to the borders. Yes, we met him briefly but -- in

8 the context of the military, we had a huge meeting in the hotel in

9 Topusko, and he was there among other members, at this early stage.

10 Q. During the time when you were working to implement the Vance Plan,

11 were you able to observe how the Croatian side and the side of Croatian

12 Serbs viewed the plan? Were there -- how did they interpret the plan?

13 A. Yes. Even at this very early stage, our job was to interact,

14 engage, both sides, meaning the signatories to the Vance Plan, the

15 authorities in Zagreb represented on the other side of the confrontation

16 line, and the other signatory of the Vance Plan was Belgrade authorities.

17 But we weren't dealing with the Belgrade authorities in the sector, we

18 were dealing with the Serbs who were inside the sector. Yes, we

19 interacted with both, and again, at the early stages, the preponderance of

20 meetings with the military on both sides.

21 Q. And when you met them, did they -- these two sides, did they have

22 the same opinions or did they -- opinions or the views of the plan, were

23 they same or different?

24 A. The first time we noticed that they had different views, we had

25 met in Sisak. We went to Sisak to begin to talk to them about where the

1 confrontation line should be marked. We met with the Croatian side, at

2 that time led by General Budimir, and we suddenly realised that they had a

3 set of maps showing where the boundary that I showed you yesterday should

4 be, their own map. We had our own maps, and when they saw our map, they

5 said, "Wait a minute. We have a different map. Your boundaries is all

6 wrong," they said. "Let's talk about this." And then we realised that

7 they were interpreting the Vance Plan as follows: The boundaries of where

8 the sector boundaries should be would be the outer edges of the civic

9 borders of each of the named opstinas. I repeat, each of the named

10 opstinas has a civic boundaries, and the outer boundaries of these

11 opstinas would be the edge of our sector, UNPA. That's the Croatian

12 interpretation of it. The facts on the ground were totally different.

13 The Serbs had taken this war up to where they wanted to take it and

14 defined a confrontation line.

15 Q. Can I interrupt you at this very moment?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I have a map with me, and maybe it would be easier when you are

18 explaining this situation to show it exactly on the map.

19 MS. RICHTEROVA: It is -- it doesn't have a 65 ter exhibit number

20 but it has ERN number which is 0400-7970. As yesterday, this is a big

21 map, it's A3 format, so it would be difficult to display it on the

22 screen. So I would like to provide the parties with map.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: While the map is being distributed, and for my

24 sake, Mr. Kirudja, what's an opstina? Is it a village or a town?

25 THE WITNESS: Sorry about using that word. It is a Serbo-Croatian

1 word that loosely stands for a municipality.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

3 MS. RICHTEROVA: If we could place it on the ELMO.

4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Is this on the e-court also?

5 MS. RICHTEROVA: It is on the e-court.

6 If we could make it a little bit smaller? No, the other way

7 around. Exactly. Perfect.

8 Q. So if you could explain to us what you said, the edges of

9 municipalities or opstinas, as you were using, and then the line where the

10 Serbs -- the line where -- which Serbs reached.

11 A. Thank you for the helpful map. On this map, you can see that

12 inside there is a blue colour and that on the blue colour, as you can see

13 where I'm pointing at, what I called the edge, the civic boundary, at --

14 the edge of the opstina - in this case we are talking about Kostajnica -

15 you see that the edge of the civic boundary goes this way, what I'm

16 tracing.

17 Q. And you are referring to the northern boundary on the map?

18 A. Northern boundary, the edge of the opstina named in the Vance Plan

19 as Kostajnica. Its civic boundary would follow that course that I'm

20 tracing now. When we come here, we switch from Kostajnica and then we get

21 to Petrinja, and this course -- not Petrinja, no -- oh, no, I'm still in

22 Kostajnica. And it goes that way, that way. And when we come in

23 Petrinja, we pick up the northern edge of Petrinja and we continue this

24 way. And when we come here, we pick up the northern edge of Vrginmost,

25 and you continue this way - and this is still Vrginmost. And from here on

1 we pick up the edges, the western edge, of Vojnic, and we continue this

2 way. And we pick up the western edges of Slunj, and we continue down this

3 way to -- as you can see. Now, there is a line that you will see, a thick

4 line, this line.

5 Q. Are you referring to line which is in red?

6 A. Yes. This line is actually where the confrontation line was.

7 Was.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: That shows the actual situation on the ground?

9 THE WITNESS: Right. At that point, this is the map -- the map

10 that we had drawn only had shown this confrontation line. Now, you can

11 see there is now a difference between where the confrontation line is and

12 where the edges of the civic boundaries of the opstinas are. At that

13 time, when we were talking to the Croatian side in Sisak, our maps, and

14 theirs, showed the difference between those areas, this area, you see that

15 difference, you see this difference, in pink. They were shown in the maps

16 in pink. You can see they are also shown here, this whole area from

17 Slunj, see here. This whole area. And there is a confrontation line

18 there. That difference became a major problem at the very beginning of

19 the mission in the interpretation of how this -- both sides saw our role

20 and it became a matter of Security Council resolution that said these pink

21 zones have to be treated differently from the Vance Plan mandate that

22 applies in the plan -- in the blue area.

23 Now, to complete my explanation to you -- so I did seek to

24 understand from the people who waged this war why they stopped where they

25 stopped along that confrontation line. I had an evening discussion with

1 General Spiro Nikovic, and he told me -- since he was the Yugoslav

2 National Army commander for the 10th Corps, that covered the entire

3 Sector North and parts of this, "Why did you stop there? Why did you put

4 that confrontation line? And he said, "You see, we could take, as the

5 Yugoslav National Army, this war beyond that confrontation line, but it

6 wouldn't have served our purposes because the area beyond that

7 confrontation line is predominantly peopled by Croats," especially the

8 city of Karlovac which you see here, it's a major city, very close to the

9 confrontation line. And Sisak, which you see here, is very close; and so

10 is Zagreb, by the way, but you don't see it here in the map, or do you?

11 You don't.

12 He said, "We wanted this boundary to correspond to a natural

13 boundary of where we want to take this conflict," and this boundary

14 loosely corresponds to rivers Mrezinica, Kupa River, and on this side

15 River Korana. They wanted a natural boundary.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Thank you. I would like to tender this map into

17 evidence.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the map be given an exhibit number, and it is

19 admitted into evidence.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it will be Exhibit 746, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

22 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

23 MS. RICHTEROVA:

24 Q. You stated that this area was supposed to be treated in a

25 different way. What do you refer to? Which way?

1 A. If you recall yesterday, I said that our mandate as defined in the

2 Vance Plan required all forces, armed, former Yugoslav National Army, to

3 be totally demobilised, their weapons kept in storage, and the only

4 permissible armed force were Milicija, what we call police, with only

5 light side-arms. So in that case, the areas named in the Vance Plan would

6 be devoid of all armed personnel other than ordinary police, what they

7 call Milicija. And everybody had to pull out from that area, meaning the

8 Yugoslav National Army and the Croatian army, which were close across the

9 confrontation line. But when those areas of difference cropped up, the

10 question was: What do you do or what is your mandate inside those areas

11 that came to be known, in the correspondence you will see, as pink zones

12 and were a subject of the Security Council resolution? The answer was:

13 There, in those areas that are pink zones, not only would all parties pull

14 out, but Croatian authority was to be restored sooner in those areas than

15 the overall political settlement that I discussed yesterday that was yet

16 to be found as to the disposition of the UNPA, United Nations Protected

17 Areas. So the Croatian authority was supposed to be restored in those

18 pink zones as quickly as possible, and also, the withdrawal of all the

19 Serb elements in that pink area was also to be accomplished. That was the

20 slight different treatment.

21 Q. And when you say "all Serb elements," do you also refer to police?

22 A. Yes. Not only the military, but the police in the pink zones.

23 The Serb police were not to operate in the pink zones either. It didn't

24 turn out that way.

25 Q. You already mentioned that the primary goal was to disarmament of

1 JNA. Were you dealing -- did you participate in these negotiations?

2 A. Yes. Full and for the 1st of April through May, yes, and that

3 took us on whatever the commanders were on both sides, the Croatian

4 controlled side and the Serb-controlled side and the Bihac pocket.

5 Q. I would like to now show you one of the row of reports. Did --

6 writing reports, was part of your duties?

7 A. Yes. It is an essential part of our duty to prepare reports of

8 every significant event and summarise -- and summarise our analysis of the

9 situation as it developed. Usually they turned out to be weekly reports

10 for -- civilian kind of reports coming from me, except where there was an

11 incident that required immediate reporting and interpretation of what it

12 meant.

13 Q. What was the source of information which you put into your

14 reports? Was it only what you personally observed or did you -- did you

15 receive some information from other sources?

16 A. As I explained to you, I was a full participant in all the

17 meetings where the parties were involved in trying to implement the Vance

18 Plan. I was also the reporting officer for the civilians who worked under

19 me, and they would also submit and discuss with me the information they

20 gathered. Thirdly, the military and the police also prepared reports

21 which were also -- theirs were daily, I mean military and police, which

22 were also available to me. So my reports embodied all these sources of

23 information that would come to me in the course of the day, as I meet

24 them, as I interact with them, and at the end of the day or the end of the

25 week, I ask myself: What does all this mean in terms of our success or

1 lack thereof in our mandated activities?

2 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to show the witness 65 ter Exhibit

3 Number 814. Can we scroll a little bit down? Can -- a message as in

4 attached there --

5 THE WITNESS: Three-page memo.

6 MS. RICHTEROVA:

7 Q. Three-page memo. "Regards, C. Kirudja."

8 Is it something that you prepared?

9 A. Yes, this is my handwriting.

10 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 2?

11 Q. The date here is 30th of April and the subject is: "Meeting with

12 General S. Nikovic."

13 Do you remember this meeting?

14 A. Yes. On 30th April, this must be one of the very earliest

15 meetings that we held with Lieutenant-General Spiro Nikovic.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we scroll down a bit, a bit, a bit?

17 Q. I want you to have a look at the third paragraph. Can you read

18 it?

19 A. Which is it? The one that starts with the "General Nikovic ..."

20 or the one starting with "One of the options ..."?

21 Q. "One of the options in consideration ..."

22 And can you tell us the substance of what you were talking about

23 during this meeting?

24 A. This is an essential part of what I said that the JNA that was

25 running and waged this war was to demobilise and hand over the weapons to

1 us, and have all the personnel who were military lay down their arms. But

2 as we started in this process, the announcement that there is a new

3 reality shaping up in the former Yugoslavia by the general, saying that

4 there will be the necessity for the officers who were conducting or who

5 were in command of the established Yugoslav National Army, those who were

6 not born in the area he called Serbian Krajina, had to relinquish their

7 command earlier than others and get out, both this Serbian Krajina, and

8 return to whatever it is that they were born. Remember, at that time the

9 Yugoslavia before the war was one entity and the military commanders were

10 coming from all over former Yugoslavia.

11 When they were to hand over command of this area, which yesterday

12 I mentioned that fell in three commands, those commanders who were there

13 and were not born in that region will have to leave the area. And he --

14 at this time they were also concerned - at least the general was - what

15 the state of relationship between the opposing forces, the Croat forces,

16 would be like after he has demobilised. And that is the reference to:

17 "They would have to leave certain weapons to counterbalance Croats who

18 were now strengthening their positions," as you can see there between

19 quotes. It was a concern they had. So this is what the paragraph

20 generally was referring. There is more to it, but that's generally what

21 the paragraph was referring to.

22 Q. And if you could read for us the very last sentence in this

23 paragraph.

24 A. "The Milicija and other armed units formerly under the JNA

25 control will switch to the control of the Republic of Serbian Krajina or

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina as appropriate."

2 Q. It is what you already mentioned: Those who were born in Krajina

3 would stay in Krajina, who were born in Bosnia would go to Bosnia or

4 elsewhere?

5 A. Yes. There is -- I must mention there is an another paragraph, I

6 don't know whether it's covered at the top there, which puts that

7 statement in context. He had begun by mentioning to us, and I

8 quote: "There is a new reality in the former Yugoslavia. As of today," he

9 said that day, "there will be six new republics formed out of the former

10 Yugoslavia," and he proceeded to name them according to the way they

11 should be. And you will see in the naming of those republics, he named

12 Slovenia; Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one entity; a new Yugoslavia

13 formed by combining Serbia and Montenegro; and sixth Serbian Krajina as a

14 new republic.

15 Q. What was your reaction when he said there would be this sixth

16 republic?

17 A. Well, we took note of it, but also it is obvious we knew that a

18 concept of a Serbian Republic -- Serbian Krajina republic was inconsistent

19 with the Vance Plan, and we knew that would be a problem because there was

20 not to be an overarching authority, other than each of the opstinas

21 running independently -- not totally independent but in a coordinated

22 manner. So when that announcement was made it two elements of trouble.

23 One, it would be an entity, and that other point that there would be

24 weapons left behind to -- as you can see, already served notice that we

25 have a bit of a problem here because we expect all weapons to be

1 demobilised.

2 Q. Did you -- did you make any comment to his announcement about --

3 that one of these countries will be also Krajina?

4 A. It was the first time we heard it. Normally when we hear

5 something new, we don't debate about it, we just take note about it.

6 Q. I would like to go to the last page, which is page 4. It's -- in

7 this paragraph, it says: "The recent emergence of a newly fortified

8 Milicija is not hard to notice. Former military vehicles have been

9 re-painted from green to blue, the colours of the present police force..."

10 And it continues: "The JNA said seems to be taking advantage of

11 the Vance Plan, which apparently excludes police units from those that

12 must be demobilised, and their weapons put in storage."

13 Is -- does it reflect this last paragraph -- does it reflect the

14 reality in the field?

15 A. This -- it does, and at the very beginning of it -- because we

16 were serving notice that there is a loop-hole in the Vance Plan that even

17 at that early stage was being exploited and to prevent the intent and

18 purpose of the Vance Plan, to have no armed elements in the UNPA. And we

19 are serving notice that's what was happening even at that early stage.

20 They had even begun, as you see earlier in the same report, talking about

21 Territorial Defence forces for fear that if they totally were without

22 these means of self defence, they were apprehensive even from that very

23 early stage. When I say "they," I'm meaning the Serbs. That the Croats

24 would take advantage because the Croats were not being disarmed by the

25 Vance Plan, and that -- that loop-hole began to be their way to

1 counterbalance that perception that they wouldn't be protected.

2 Q. So did you see that -- what did you see in -- regarding to this

3 last paragraph when: "Many of the Milicija men have begun to sport new

4 blue uniforms," et cetera? Were you able to see this change?

5 A. Yes, because that is what we are observing. These are the people

6 whom we are meeting from day to day, and one day you're wearing the

7 military fatigue in green and then the next day you come in blue, so we

8 noticed that.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let me get that very clear. The people that you

10 saw wearing these new blue uniforms were the same people who had been

11 wearing the green JNA uniforms previously?

12 THE WITNESS: Some, not all of them. Some. And some who were in

13 civilian clothes also were switched to blue uniforms. Like some mayors

14 who the day before were wearing civilian clothes will come in blue

15 uniform, some mayors.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And did any of those people who were members of the

17 police force, the Milicija, suddenly switch over to blue uniforms?

18 THE WITNESS: Not suddenly.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, did they --

20 THE WITNESS: Gradually.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did some of them also begin to wear blue uniforms?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, they began to do that and actually also travel

23 in vehicles which had been repainted from the green.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: To blue?

25 THE WITNESS: To blue.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

2 You may proceed, Ms. Richterova.

3 MS. RICHTEROVA:

4 Q. Did you meet with Nikovic after this initial meeting and discuss

5 the withdrawal of the JNA?

6 A. Yes. A number of meetings culminating to sometime in May when he

7 presented a full plan of how the JNA were to withdraw. In between 30th of

8 April and 25th of May there were plenty of meetings with General Nikovic.

9 Q. Did he also provide you with a list of all units which were in the

10 area?

11 A. Yes. I got a list of about a dozen or so units that were

12 deployed. When I say "I," I mean military -- our military component.

13 They are all colleagues to me. When the list is provided, it's also

14 passed to me pass a civilian. It was a list of all the units that were

15 part of the Banija command or Kordun or Lika that were in Sector North.

16 As I remember, they were all at the brigade level and there were about a

17 dozen of these units.

18 MS. RICHTEROVA: Your Honour, before I continue with another

19 document, I would like to tender this document, 814, into evidence.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document marked 814 is admitted into evidence.

21 May it please be given an exhibit number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit Number 747, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

24 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

25 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to show the witness 65 ter exhibit

1 number -- document 924.

2 Q. Can you have a look at this document and tell us whether this list

3 corresponds?

4 A. Yes. This bears a certain -- I recognise these brigade units. As

5 I said most of them and if you -- probably there are about 12 of them or

6 something like that, I don't see the bottom.

7 Q. Is this the list --

8 A. Yeah, about that.

9 Q. I'm sorry. Is this a list which you prepared based on the list

10 which Nikovic provided you?

11 A. This was a list that we worked with. I don't remember me

12 personally working on it, but maybe a Chief of Staff or a military person

13 preparing and handing it to me.

14 Q. And at the bottom, if we could scroll down, also we can see

15 weapons left behind by JNA?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. What happened to these documents -- to these weapons?

18 A. Again, the idea was according to the Vance plan, these units that

19 had fought within this contested area would demobilise. The weapons that

20 are listed there - and that were left behind by the Yugoslav National

21 Army, as I mentioned earlier in one of the documents - these weapons were

22 left behind for -- were to be in custody of the UNPROFOR in a double-key

23 system - one key with a command, the Serb command, and the other key with

24 UNPROFOR - and they will be in a storage guarded and controlled by

25 UNPROFOR. That storage, what was in storage, comprised the weapons listed

1 there.

2 Q. Were -- you also mentioned that some weapons were left behind as

3 counterbalance for the possible attack. Did really some weapons stayed

4 with, as you mentioned, with police or this Territorial Defence?

5 A. Yes. And if you permit me a few minutes, the situation began to

6 develop very fast. While we were trying, and to some extent succeeded, in

7 putting these weapons under storage as per Vance Plan, on the ground,

8 something else was happening. The Territorial Defence forces and the

9 police were also taking positions along what they called borders of the

10 RSK. And that was explained by their sense that the Croats would still

11 attack them. Therefore, they began this process of deploying these --

12 first they were in blue but carried the weapons prohibited by Vance Plan

13 because the Vance Plan permitted police only to carry side-arms. No, they

14 had full-scale assault weapons, and they were deployed along the so-called

15 RSK-bound border. And over time, they switched back to green, those which

16 were deployed along that border, starting in the area of Slunj and ending

17 the area of Petrinja, a whole cadre of force developed, deployed along the

18 border.

19 Q. Do you remember approximately when they switched from these

20 blue -- from these blue uniforms into -- back to green?

21 A. I would only give you a time-line, but we managed to get the

22 weapons that you see on this screen put in storage around May, 25th of May

23 and towards the end of May. Thereafter, what I described began to happen,

24 and by two or three months, in August, there was a full-fledged unit more

25 powerful than the police, that start to operate from the area of Slunj,

1 commanded by one Colonel Novakovic and another one -- group centred

2 around -- that group was centred in the Kordun area and another group

3 centred in Banija under Colonel Tarbuk, and they were full-fledged

4 military in green by the -- August or so.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I get some clarification? According to the

6 Vance Plan, they were supposed to be demobilised and disarmed. You took

7 these weapons and you put them in storage. The weapons that were left for

8 counterbalancing were left with who? With the Milicija?

9 THE WITNESS: It's obvious that we didn't take all the weapons;

10 that's the implication in storage. That actually they did get weapons.

11 Now, where they were coming from, Your Honour, I can't tell you where but

12 it's not difficult to imagine. I remember yesterday I also showed you the

13 boundary between the UNPA, where it was completely nominal, between the

14 UNPA and other areas of Bosnia. So they could travel freely and Bosnia

15 was fully armed. So the Serbs were on that part from Kostajnica through

16 Dvor. The boundary within the sector and in Bosnia was only nominal

17 because they controlled both sides.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. But you say it's obvious you did not get all

19 the arms back.

20 THE WITNESS: Either we didn't get all of them or new ones came in

21 through any number of ways.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, when you say they were -- these weapons were

23 kept under lock and key --

24 THE WITNESS: Double key.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Double lock and key, what do you mean by "double"?

1 THE WITNESS: Because the Vance Plan envisaged that there would be

2 a continuance of hostility on both sides, the mission itself was not even

3 charged with the responsibility of politically trying to solve the issue;

4 that was left somewhere else, in the ICFY. The designers of that peace

5 agreement allowed that there could be a reason for it by implication,

6 because they said, You put them in storage, one key -- like a bank, when

7 you go into a bank to get your private -- the bank comes with one key and

8 you come with another key. Similar thing. If you ever wanted to take

9 those weapons for whatever reason - though we didn't even envisage they

10 would be taken - you have a key with UNPROFOR and a key with the Serbian

11 command.

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: My last question before I hand you over back to

13 Ms. Richterova. To your knowledge, were any weapons removed from storage

14 without the knowledge and consent of UNPROFOR?

15 THE WITNESS: No, not in that sense, but at a certain time, war

16 broke out and they came in and took the weapons, and four times we had a

17 war breaking out. We'll get into that if the counsel get you there. They

18 were taken out for the purposes of waging a war later.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

20 Ms. Richterova.

21 MS. RICHTEROVA:

22 Q. In fact, we can jump ahead of [sic] time, and when you said that

23 these weapons were taken, were they taken by Serbs?

24 A. Yes, they are the ones with the second key.

25 Q. Yes. And when was it?

1 A. Later, towards the end of the year.

2 Q. And what was the purpose?

3 A. There was a war that followed, because the Croats took some

4 precipitous actions, beginning very far away from Sector North in a place

5 called Maslenica; and remember, these sectors spread all over. We are

6 only talking about Sector North. An action taking place in Sector South

7 or Sector East or Sector West would precipitate a reaction from the Serbs.

8 Q. So these -- were these weapons taken before the Croats attacked

9 Mas --

10 A. No, after.

11 Q. It was after?

12 A. And they were taken again when there was an attack in Medak

13 pocket.

14 Q. Does it mean that there were still some weapons left?

15 A. In the storage?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. Actually, after they took them out, the first time, they never put

18 them back all over again, it would be -- no. We never returned to the

19 status quo.

20 Q. Yeah. Thank you. We were talking about this meeting with Nikovic

21 who provided you with the names of the brigades and units which were

22 deployed in the area. Did he say when and under which conditions which

23 would JNA with -- would withdraw from this area?

24 A. Yes. General Spiro Nikovic was a very, very correct military

25 officer, one I still remained admiring in trying to do a difficult job.

1 Actually, he intended to accomplish what the Vance Plan did and did run

2 into trouble. As a matter of fact, he didn't even complete his tour

3 because about a week or so after this, he called us again to Bihac and let

4 out a bomb-shell and said: I'm now a retired general. He had been

5 relieved of his command.

6 Q. So when you say "after a week," are you referring to this meeting

7 on 29 of April?

8 A. Yes, yes. He had been even for -- for his own expectation he was

9 surprised, but as a soldier, he didn't -- didn't mince words. He just

10 said: I'm -- from now been -- I'm a retired general.

11 Now, going back to your question, he had tried, against some

12 opposition, to accomplish this demobilisation. And I say "some

13 opposition" because a lot of officers below him, particularly even if the

14 sector, opposed what he was doing, the demobilisation. But he

15 accomplished it any way, and he did order -- as a general -- the

16 ranking -- the most-ranking general, he did order them to proceed as

17 required, notwithstanding the opposition.

18 So on that day, on 29th, when he had been relieved of his command,

19 within a day, I got word from Lazarevic, probably in Kordun, telling me:

20 Go tell him that he's no longer welcome here, and if he sets foot in this

21 place we shall arrest him. And I knew that warning was not a vague one

22 then, so I did take a car and drove at night. By 8.00 I got into Bihac to

23 warn him that this is now the situation: You're no longer in command and

24 you have this warning, take heed.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let me understand you. General Nikovic --

1 THE WITNESS: Yes.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- heard for the first time from you --

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- that he's relieved of --

5 THE WITNESS: No, no, no, no. He's the one who told us that he is

6 relieved --

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right.

8 THE WITNESS: -- of his command.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right.

10 THE WITNESS: As soon as the word got out --

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.

12 THE WITNESS: Now, he was the one that the unit in the sector

13 reported to as the ranking general. The moment that word got out, that

14 got to me, that: Tell him now, he's no longer welcome here.

15 MS. RICHTEROVA: Before we continue I would like to tender this

16 document into evidence.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence, may it

18 please be given an exhibit number.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 748, Your Honours.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

21 MS. RICHTEROVA:

22 Q. I would like to ask you something which we started talking about

23 already yesterday. You mentioned that there were three command zones, one

24 in Kordun, the other one in Banija, and the third one in Lika, which in

25 fact was not in Sector North?

1 A. It was partly in Sector North.

2 Q. Before this -- before the JNA withdrew, did General Nikovic talk

3 to you about the involvement -- did he talk about involvement of Belgrade

4 with this withdrawal?

5 A. Yes, and in very clear terms. He even mentioned a legal fact,

6 said that this peace agreement is signed in Belgrade and in Zagreb, and

7 this was in reference to the resistance he was encountering about getting

8 his order about demobilisation. He said: What is decided in Belgrade for

9 us is orders for us, and this is what should be done. Belgrade had

10 decided at that moment all officers in that area who were not born there

11 must leave; that had only consequences immediately in Banija and for

12 himself. He was from Montenegro. And the commander of Banija at that

13 time, General Rakovic, was also from Montenegro. So those were affected

14 by those orders almost immediately, and somebody else had to take

15 command. Not so in Kordun because the commander was Cedo Bulat and Cedo

16 Bulat comes from Vrginmost.

17 Q. In this respect, I would like to ask you, did he mention how

18 many -- how many, let's say, Serb soldiers would go to Bosnia, in

19 percentage, and how many would stay in Krajina?

20 A. Yes. I recall some percentage, but I don't have it in my mind

21 right now, I need some refreshment. But he did mention something like

22 that. I'm not clear right now.

23 Q. Did he mention whether it would be significantly small amount of

24 soldiers who would stay in, for example, in Bosnia or, on the other hand,

25 significantly big number?

1 A. He was not talking about soldiers, counsel. He was talking about

2 the command.

3 Q. Commanders.

4 A. And the commanders, obviously, are not that many -- actually he

5 did mention that the order affected -- there would be about 13 commanders

6 left in there. The rest of them have to go back to Serbia or wherever

7 they came from.

8 Q. Now, I want to go back to these three operational or command

9 zones, Kordun, Banija, and Lika. What happened after the JNA withdrew?

10 What happened to these command zones?

11 A. Interesting that not much changed. They remained pretty much the

12 way the JNA had organised them, except for the change of command. The

13 greatest change was in Banija, where, as I said, there was a ranking

14 general there, who when Spiro Agnew -- Spiro Agnew, I'm sorry, an American

15 name. Spiro Nikovic had been relieved of his command, Rakovic took over

16 temporarily. And he himself having come from Montenegro was also relieved

17 of that command, and eventually the command in Banija settled around

18 Colonel Tarbuk, towards the end. There were others in between, but since

19 they were changing so fast. Suffice it to say that command settled by the

20 longest time I was there around Colonel Tarbuk.

21 In Kordun, it didn't change because Cedo Bulat fitted the

22 criteria. He didn't have to leave. He was in command before. He

23 remained in command. In Lika, that didn't -- I didn't follow that in

24 great details because most of their command was in Sector South, and only

25 a small part of their command was in Sector North. I'm talking about that

1 area known as Plaski, that fell under their command.

2 Q. And can you judge whether the command structure was significantly

3 smaller or bigger or the same after the -- after the withdrawal?

4 A. Remained the same.

5 Q. And gradually, this command operational zones and the soldiers

6 gradually, how were they referred to?

7 A. Referred to? It started in that meeting that you referred to on

8 the first slide, when we were getting the weapons and the units, they were

9 at that time only referred to as Territorial Defence forces, TDF, in our

10 documents. And within a short time - "short time" meaning months - they

11 had developed into an army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 MS. RICHTEROVA: I think it is a time for adjournment or a break.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Ms. Richterova.

15 We are going to take a short break and we will come back at 4.00.

16 Thank you very much. Court adjourned.

17 --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Ms. Richterova.

20 MS. RICHTEROVA:

21 Q. Mr. Kirudja, you mentioned that according to the Vance Plan, there

22 shouldn't be any overarching government beyond each of the opstinas, some

23 kind of umbrella government. Did you learn that such a government really

24 exist in this area?

25 A. Yes. And it came very early, again, in the -- in April, where the

1 same man I referred to earlier, Slobodan Lazarevic, came and announced

2 that we now -- very, very happy, very gleefully, we now have our own

3 government. And I said, Where? And he said, It's in Knin. And I said,

4 What's the name? Republic of Serbian Krajina.

5 Q. Did you try to meet with some representatives of this government?

6 A. One, there was no need for me to do so under the terms of my job.

7 Everything that I was required to do was in Sector North. If the

8 government was in Knin, that was somebody else's responsibility. My

9 counterpart there was Victor Andreev, so that was not my immediately of my

10 concern. What was of my concern immediately was after he announced that

11 there was a government of Serbian Krajina, he also began to do certain

12 things that were in all effect an interference with our job and the local

13 staff that we hired.

14 Q. Can you give us very briefly some examples?

15 A. The first thing was because they were government of Serbian

16 Krajina, they wanted us, as the United Nations, to consult with them for

17 those of the local people that we hire, something we were not prepared to

18 do, nor do we do then or now. Wherever the UN is deployed, whoever we

19 hire is our business. And the second element of interference was when he

20 began, and some of their police, to request to see passports of different

21 personnel in the -- who were with the UN. That interference continued to

22 the extent at one time I was already outside the sector in a meeting of a

23 military nature, when I came back to find out he had organised the

24 forceful removal of one of our interpreters whom we had hired locally by

25 the name Indira Kulenovic.

1 Q. May I interrupt you here?

2 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to show the witness 65 ter Exhibit

3 816.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: While the exhibit is coming on the screen, did you

5 employ a large number of local people?

6 THE WITNESS: Well, large is relative, in the sense that this was

7 not a very large mission. We had a substantive number of people, like

8 interpreters, there were contractors to do certain things, but not very

9 large compared with other missions that I have known, too -- I have known,

10 where we have a much larger component.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

12 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can you please scroll it down?

13 Q. Is this one of the memos prepared by you?

14 A. Yes, and I recognise that too is my handwriting.

15 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 2?

16 Q. This document is dated 15 of May 1992, and it is meeting with the

17 president of parliament, Republic of Serbian Krajina. You stated in this

18 document that present were Mr. Mile Paspalj, president of the parliament

19 of the Republic of Serbian Krajina; and you also mentioned Mr. Toso Paic,

20 Deputy Minister of the Interior and commissioner of police for Kordun.

21 Can we stop here for little bit, and can you tell me how did you learn or

22 why did you use this term, "Deputy Minister of Interior"?

23 A. In the context of this memo or earlier? Because there is the

24 context of the memo, the circumstances being addressed in this memo, and

25 if I understand your question earlier about the title of Toso Paic, it

1 didn't arise from the context of this memo but I can still tell you how it

2 did.

3 Q. Please, can you tell us?

4 A. Yes. Earlier on, and I briefly mentioned yesterday, that the same

5 Lazarevic had come to my office earlier than the incident being addressed

6 by this memo, to tell me that if I wanted to have anything that involved

7 the police, the most important person I should know about was Toso Paic.

8 And he told me, one, he had the title of commissioner of police for Kordun

9 but he was also Deputy Minister of the Interior.

10 Q. And did he, Lazarevic or anybody else, did he also tell you what

11 was his relationship, working relationship -- I will rephrase it.

12 Who was his superior?

13 A. Yes. If he was the deputy, I asked, Who is the Minister of

14 Interior? That's natural to ask. And he told me, Mr. Milan Martic.

15 Q. And did he tell you anything about the relationship between a

16 minister and deputy minister?

17 A. At this point, please recall that I'm being told something which I

18 interpreted to be inconsistent with my -- our mandate, there is an

19 overarching authority. I am not also at liberty to encourage that. So

20 other than getting bare minimum of the information I needed, I didn't at

21 that time want to go into the great details, who was the minister, when

22 were they appointed, because it's already a problem that there is an

23 overarching issue. So I got all the minimum information that I needed in

24 the earliest incidents, and I repeat when he told me this, he didn't even

25 present Mr. Paic. He just mentioned the name, Mr. Paic. It took days

1 before I would actually meet Mr. Paic.

2 Q. Going --

3 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Before you proceed, could I hear from you what

4 the acronym CCAO stands for?

5 THE WITNESS: I actually referred to that yesterday when I said

6 that at the earliest beginning I had been given that title, chief civil

7 affairs officer, which was revised in months and stabilised for all

8 sectors to CAC, which stood for civil affairs coordinator.

9 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And SC?

10 THE WITNESS: SC stands for sector commander.

11 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: SMPAO.

12 THE WITNESS: SMPO is senior military -- where does it appear?

13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: In the -- in the first paragraph.

14 MS. RICHTEROVA: It is in the first line.

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: With the SC where the CCAO --

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And the other acronym that follows. S -- it

18 looks to me like SMPAO.

19 THE WITNESS: Yeah. That -- that one, I'm not even clear whether

20 there's a misspelling because the only other person who must have been

21 there would have been police officer. Therefore, that chief of CIVPOL,

22 who probably had that -- it could mean a lot of things. It either mean

23 the civil police or the military -- senior military police. There were

24 also some military police around. So it was one of the two. And that --

25 I have to refer to it back again. It doesn't stand out to me.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which one is that now? Senior military police,

2 which one is it?

3 THE WITNESS: Also present with the SC were the CCO, meaning

4 myself; the SMPO, the chief of CIVPOL; and UNPROFOR's local interpreter.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much, Mr. Kirudja.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, but you didn't say what AMPO is.

8 THE WITNESS: That's the one I'm having difficulty recollecting

9 who it was.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

11 MS. RICHTEROVA:

12 Q. In the second paragraph, you stated, "The meeting was convened as

13 a matter of urgency following a series of actions by local police against

14 UNPROFOR personnel," and it is what you --

15 A. It's what I had begun to explain with the announcement that there

16 had been established a Serbian Republic in Krajina where they began to

17 insist that they should get all the employees locally vetted by them. And

18 when we told them that was not acceptable, they proceeded anyways. And

19 the first precipitous action that was taken along that line was the arrest

20 of this local staff member. When I returned to Topusko, I recall that day

21 I was out, she had been rounded up and arrested and held at Vrginmost

22 police station. And when I came, I found out that that was the case, and

23 I did take several actions as a result of that arrest of Ms. Kulenovic.

24 One was to do something that put her into safety, and that is transferring

25 her to -- out of the sector. But I also had to take issue with this

1 action by the local authorities, which I considered not only not a

2 welcome, but it was a violation of a number of things and an interference

3 with the United Nations mandate. And not knowing now how the nexus of how

4 this matter was created, it occurred me if they are telling me there is a

5 government in Knin, who did I have in Sector North that would give me a

6 way of addressing and talking about that?

7 It occurred that I had learned that along with other positions

8 that they had established as part of that government in Knin, there was

9 the position of the president of Serbian Republic Assembly, what you would

10 in other countries call the Speaker of the House, but he was called

11 president of the Serbian Republic Assembly, Mile Paspalj. And I also had

12 learned that Mile Paspalj, of course, was a resident of Sector North,

13 specifically his place of residence was in Glina. I also realised that he

14 was a particularly important personality because the actual agreement, the

15 agreement that put into effect the Vance Plan, was signed on behalf of the

16 Serbs by Mile Paspalj because the original person requested to sign,

17 Milan Babic, didn't want to sign it.

18 On that account, I realised that he waged a lot of importance, and

19 I asked to see him so that I can protest this action because it's a

20 violation of the mandate which he signed as representing the Serb side.

21 So I quickly called that meeting, and the people shown in this memo were

22 in attendance.

23 Q. And when you lodged the complaint, was it Paspalj who replied?

24 A. No. Interesting, I only wanted to see him and I got the

25 appointment time. When I showed up in his -- in his -- where he worked

1 out of in Glina, I was surprised who else turned up - and I hadn't even

2 mentioned to him about my demarche, the one I wanted to make - it was

3 Toso Paic. He had been invited obviously, by Mile Paspalj because he had

4 asked what is the nature of my meeting. And I said, About this abuse of

5 the authority and the -- the staff member. And when I started my

6 complaint, kind of laid out, it was Toso Paic who responded. Mile Paspalj

7 just stood there quietly and listened.

8 Q. Were all these complaints at the end settled?

9 A. Yes. It was important that -- I was actually quite happy that

10 Mr. Paic had shown up because this was a police action, and the police

11 action had been taken in Kordun specifically by the chief of police in

12 Vrginmost, one Djuro Skaljac who had taken that action. The charge sheet

13 that I was shown was also from Vrginmost. In short, Mr. Paspalj [sic], in

14 his capacity, as he said - I was the commissioner of police for Kordun -

15 this was a mistake, we didn't -- anyway, he did reverse the whole course

16 they had taken by -- by saying, by conceding that it was not an action

17 that his police would have wanted to take and it was a mistake, it was a

18 misunderstanding, and it wouldn't happen again.

19 Q. And what about the other issues which you mentioned, checking the

20 passports --

21 A. That too, they began to justify that the reason why we were

22 checking all this was because we didn't want you to wander around, you

23 might be in trouble with the local people, you might run into mines, but

24 sorry, we won't do that again either.

25 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we -- can this document be admitted into

1 evidence, please?

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

3 please be given an exhibit number.

4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 749, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

6 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

7 MS. RICHTEROVA: I just was informed that we have a small error in

8 the transcript. Page 38, line 25, instead of "Mr. Paspalj," there should

9 be "Mr. Toso Paic" because it says, "in his capacity, as he said ... the

10 commissioner of police for Kordun." So it was just a small error.

11 Can we now, please, display 65 ter Exhibit 817?

12 Q. Was -- is this another report prepared by you?

13 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we scroll it down, please?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. That, too, is my handwriting on the front of

15 this document.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page number 2?

17 Q. The date is 16 of May, 1992, and it's statement of the president

18 of parliament, Republic of Serbian Krajina. Is this document a

19 continuation of your reporting about the meeting with Mile Paspalj, or

20 were there two separate meetings?

21 A. It is a continuation. When the incident had passed, the incident

22 involving the interpreter had passed, Mile Paspalj actually began to seize

23 on the opening that I had created by inviting him, to give us the benefit

24 of his thoughts about how the mission was being carried out and the issues

25 that he saw as important.

1 Q. I will ask you to make comment on two brief passages from your

2 report. The first one is second paragraph, the first sentence, which

3 reads, "The Republic of Serbian Krajina does not have an army, the people

4 are the army, and when UNPROFOR talks about withdrawal, it should be

5 understood that our people could not withdraw from here."

6 And then I would want to refer you to fourth paragraph, the last

7 two sentences, "We want to establish the state of Serbian Krajina," said

8 the president, "in order to survive." He made reference to atrocities

9 attributed to the other side during the Second World War and added that

10 his people do not wish to be extinct.

11 Can you make a comment on this? What did -- what did you discuss

12 with Mile Paspalj about this establishment of state of Serbian Krajina?

13 A. Thank you. Can you please scroll this document to the top where

14 the date is visible? Thank you.

15 You can see that date is in May, the middle of May.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: While you're on the date, what does 1310, 14, stand

17 for?

18 THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon?

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the middle -- the third line of that first

20 paragraph, it says, the meeting was at Glina on 1310, 14 May 1992.

21 THE WITNESS: That's military. It means it took place at 1.00 --

22 it's a military time. These documents were all reflecting the fact that

23 we were largely a military establishment. The transmission of this

24 document was being done by a military company, specifically a Dutch

25 military communications unit. So all the reference to date and time were

1 in military format.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Although this is ten past 1.00 on the 14th?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

5 MS. RICHTEROVA:

6 Q. Can you please continue if you want to --

7 A. Yes. The date is May. The incident is -- the content of the --

8 of the document is after that incident that we had talked -- we have just

9 talked about. What was going on then, apart from the incident, was the

10 demobilisation effort. At that time we were in full swing, asking for

11 identification of all the units, all the forces, with a view to asking

12 that they all be demobilised and the arms taken into storage. And

13 Mile Paspalj, of course, knew about that what was going on on the military

14 side.

15 This was the beginning of a constant policy line, constant

16 concern, that the people who were in these UNPA would not be properly

17 protected by UNPROFOR because UNPROFOR didn't have all the force they

18 thought was needed to ward off, to contain, a perceived threat to come

19 from their opponent, namely the Croatian side of the conflict. Even if on

20 the military side, remember this is the 16th of May, General Spiro Nikovic

21 is still ordering and gathering all the weapons to be put in storage, I

22 said earlier this morning there were people opposed to that effort. The

23 logic of why they were opposed and what it is, he is now beginning to

24 voice that logic, one, it is we don't even have arms for you to take into

25 storage. It's a rhetorical statement because obviously we do and we have

1 them. We can see them. They are on the streets. They are in the form of

2 tanks, artillery, APCs.

3 Secondly, most of the people, ordinary people, they all -- even

4 when they are not particularly involved in any services, you'll find them

5 carrying weapons. So what he was talking about was to prepare ground for

6 their argument that they don't have to lay down their arms, and they were

7 not in agreement that all these weapons be taken. And lastly, the last

8 paragraph you mentioned, was we are in the process of creating a new state

9 for ourselves, and, of course, all the elements of a state, other than

10 boundaries, it's a government, and part of the government is an army.

11 Q. Mr. Kirudja, during the time you were there, did you had frequent

12 or infrequent contacts with the local Serb mayors in Sector North?

13 A. Yes. I -- I alternatively would meet on the military side -- and

14 because I had this other part of the mandate to be completed, we would

15 also meet on the civilian side, and that civilian side meant either we are

16 meeting with the mayors or we are meeting with the police.

17 Q. When meeting these people, was there anything common about their

18 views, their expressions, about what was their desire for the political

19 structure under which they want to live?

20 A. Yes. And it varied with each mayor, from those who were

21 completely silent and did their jobs and were not giving any -- were not

22 very vocal, if at all, on political views - and that would -- was best

23 represented by the mayor of Vrginmost, the late Obradovic - to those who

24 were very vocal about political issues and how they saw the future in

25 Croatia, represented perhaps best by the mayor in Petrinja, who was very

1 vocal. Those who were very vocal engaged us very early. As I recall from

2 day one, when we met in Petrinja, this was on 19th of April, when I

3 mentioned earlier that the General Nambiar had come to visit there, those

4 speeches began in earnest and they went something like this.

5 Mr. Kirudja, they will tell us -- and whoever it is they were

6 addressing, We think you should understand one basic fact here. We have

7 had this war because we can't live together as Serbs and Croats. The

8 sooner -- I remembered the words. The sooner you understand that, the

9 better for us, we can't live together as Serbs and Croats. And we would

10 like to have our own area where we are, as Serbs, in control. That's the

11 gist of those speeches.

12 Q. What was your reaction? What was your response to this?

13 A. None, because, as I have mentioned earlier, our mandate did not

14 include any political settlement because that was left in the

15 international conference for the former Yugoslavia where all the issues of

16 political concerns were being addressed. Other than listening to that we

17 wouldn't even engage in a debate about it because we would be getting

18 outside our mandate. Our mandate did not include looking at the future

19 vision or looking at how this land that was called the United Nations

20 Protected Area, how it will finally be disposed of, so we didn't engage

21 beyond listening.

22 Q. You said that you had been told, We can't live together as Serbs

23 and Croats, and we would like to have our own area where we are, as Serbs,

24 in control.

25 Did they also mention any connection with other Serbian areas in

1 the former Yugoslavia?

2 A. Not so directly other than in action and fact. They acted it out;

3 they didn't have to say it. An example what I just said: I did obviously

4 go to each headquarters of the mayors. The example what I'm saying is

5 played out best in Dvor, when I went to Dvor to meet the mayor of Dvor.

6 The mayor of Dvor at that time, Yugoslav Borojevic, was interested with

7 other things than what I was going to talk about, the implementation of

8 the Vance Plan. He was interested in getting us to get involved with the

9 removal of some 10.000 people or so from across the border into Bosanski

10 Novi, and he was in touch with the other side of -- his counterpart in

11 Bosanski Novi, to the extent that he will tell me, I have the mayor of

12 Bosanski Novi here, come to talk to him.

13 Q. Mr. Kirudja, I will interrupt you. I want to talk about this

14 particular event.

15 MS. RICHTEROVA: But before we move there, I would like to tender

16 this document into evidence.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

18 please be given an exhibit number.

19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 5 -- 750.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

21 MS. RICHTEROVA:

22 Q. And before, before we start talking about the events in Bosnia, I

23 would like to show you the last document from this area, which is 65 ter

24 819. Can you recognise this document? It is written by you?

25 A. I recognise it.

1 Q. Can we go to page 2? This document is dated 18 of May, 1992, and

2 it says, meeting at Glina, 1811 hours, May 1992. Present at the meeting,

3 and among others, there were president of the district court of justice

4 and district prosecutor for the courts in both Kordun and Banija. What

5 was the primary purpose of this meeting?

6 A. I had called this meeting which took place in the town hall of

7 Glina basically to begin to explain to the civilian authorities what it is

8 we are doing, and to hear and gauge their understanding of the same. And

9 because of the various aspects our mandate covered, we not only invited

10 the mayor, we also invited those who were in charge of the system of

11 justice.

12 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we move to page 3? Can we scroll little bit

13 down?

14 Q. I want to refer to paragraph 2 on this page. Yes, it starts with,

15 "The community leaders..."

16 I will read for you couple of sentences, and if you could make a

17 comment.

18 "The community leaders went on to state that the EC, in

19 particular, was trying to prejudge the political outcome of the conflict.

20 The EC, they said, is attempting to give a special status to the RSK

21 which, according to the local community, is contrary to the Vance Plan.

22 It will not be possible, they added, to resolve the political problem

23 without the legal representatives of this area and the RSK."

24 Can you please comment on this paragraph or section of this

25 paragraph?

1 A. Yes. As I said earlier, one of the things I wanted was to gauge

2 their understanding of what it is that we, as the UNPROFOR, were supposed

3 to achieve in this area. And I mentioned yesterday the EC, the monitors

4 from European Community, were on the ground, well before the deployment of

5 UNPROFOR in this area. Again, this memorandum is on 18th of May. We are

6 in the middle of accomplishing the demobilisation, or attempting to

7 accomplish, the demobilisation. These being community leaders, this is

8 Glina, this is the headquarters of Mile Paspalj, the other person who had

9 spoken along the lines that we would like to establish our own Krajina for

10 the purposes of achieving a number of objectives, among them their own

11 security.

12 In this particular paragraph, the message was being sent to me

13 that they didn't agree or appreciate what they were hearing from the

14 European Community. The European Community monitors, though they were not

15 in the meeting, were also not very involved with us. They had their own

16 separate and parallel mandate. In this particular paragraph, where they

17 are referring to that the EC is attempting to give a special status to the

18 RSK, which according to the local community is contrary to the Vance Plan,

19 it's another way of saying they didn't -- the European Community was not

20 in support of an overarching entity called RSK. And the European monitors

21 would have been much more forthright in saying they don't support it.

22 When the local people are saying that the European interpretation

23 of what was happening in RSK is contrary to the Vance Plan, their

24 interpretation itself was contrary to the Vance Plan. They were just

25 using this opportunity to simply say, We don't like what they are doing

1 here. We can't agree with them.

2 Q. Last question about this document. Was there a prison in Glina?

3 A. There was a very sizeable prison in Glina, a very large one, too.

4 Q. Did you have any dealings with local authorities regarding some

5 prisoners in this prison?

6 A. Yes. And I did actually take the opportunity to go and look into

7 that prison because it did contain a number of people being held in there,

8 not just from Sector North but from far beyond, some even from Sector

9 West, others from Bihac pocket that were being held there. And in

10 particular, because we were always responding to both sides of this

11 conflict, the Croatians, they were constantly talking to us about Croats

12 who were being held in prisons in there. So part of the reason we kept an

13 eye to that prison and what was going on was to be able to respond to them

14 that, yes, such and such prisoner is or isn't in that prison.

15 Q. And were you also involved in release of some of the prisoners?

16 A. Some, yes.

17 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to tender this document into

18 evidence.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

20 please be given an exhibit number.

21 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 751, Your Honours.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry.

25 Are you able to estimate how many people you facilitated the

1 release of?

2 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour, because this question, I answered

3 in the full time. Because over the two years when I was there, there was

4 a good number of people who were in and out at different times, so the

5 number is not right in my head.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: But are you at some stage able to give the overall

7 number of the people over the period of two years?

8 THE WITNESS: Based on one incident that took place or -- either

9 in August or September, where a large number of Muslims were being held in

10 Glina -- when I'm talking about large numbers, I'm talking about tens of

11 them. I don't know, probably reached even almost to 100. And it had been

12 an incident where an operation had been undertaken from the Muslim side on

13 the Plaski area, a military operation, that attempted to cross

14 Sector North. They were intercepted by the Serb border police, a couple

15 of them were killed and a large number of them were taken prisoner, and

16 they were taken to Glina. And we were involved in a lot of discussions

17 about those prisoners. That group alone, later on they were released.

18 It's a large group. There were individuals in between, so that's why the

19 number is --

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: But they were a military group?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, they were. They had -- they had forced their

22 way across.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.

24 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed.

1 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to show document 65 ter 834.

2 Q. And before this document is displayed, just going quickly back to

3 the Judge's question. You mentioned a release of some Muslims. Who were

4 primarily the people who you were involved -- you were involved in their

5 release? Were they Serbs, Croats, or Muslims?

6 A. We were not involved in the common criminals or those who fell in

7 the category of common criminals in the streets of Glina or somewhere who

8 were Serbs. We were only involved when the prisoners were either Croats

9 or Muslims and their plight had a political dimension to it.

10 Q. Now we have on the screen another document. Can you recognise

11 whether it was written by you?

12 A. No. This one is not my handwritten. Usually that my staff

13 will -- when I became very busy, they would transmit documents authored or

14 released by me and since they had to go and take them physically to the

15 Dutch transmitters, I authorised them this time they can put the cover

16 which was necessary for transmission. This particular one was one of my

17 staff.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is the name at the bottom there not your name?

19 THE WITNESS: It is my name but the handwriting is not my

20 handwriting. I just -- you might have realised there is a difference

21 between this handwriting and the previous document.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

23 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 2?

24 Q. This document is dated 8 of June, 1992. Was this memorandum then

25 prepared by you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. In first -- the subject is: "Investigative report on the

3 displaced people observed in Bosanski Novi." In the first paragraph, you

4 mention people observed as being held in a stadium at Bosanski Novi, and

5 then paragraph 3 starts, "On 26 May, the CAS" -- I'm sorry, "CAC, met with

6 the mayor of Dvor," et cetera, et cetera.

7 Is this the meeting when you started talking about before I

8 interrupted you?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you tell very briefly what this meeting was about, what

11 Mr. Borojevic wanted from you.

12 A. As I began to say earlier, I wasn't really going there to talk

13 about Bosanski Novi. Bosanski Novi is in Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was

14 outside of our mandate. I was just going to the opstina of Dvor to talk

15 about implementation of the Vance Plan.

16 Q. Can I stop you for a second? Can you tell us where Bosanski Novi

17 is?

18 A. It's across the River Drina, Drina or whatever, that river, there

19 is a river across, and it is inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this

20 moment, I believe it was renamed, I don't know what the new name it has

21 now.

22 MS. RICHTEROVA: We can see it in the concise atlas on page 21,

23 grid C3.

24 Q. And it is right on the border.

25 A. Across the river.

1 Q. Across the river. And then it's -- it's River Una?

2 A. River Una, sorry. Thank you. You could see -- if you were

3 stationed at where the company, the Danish company was operated from Dvor,

4 you can, if you have good eyesight or binoculars, you could see

5 across to where the incident was taking place without physically even

6 being there.

7 Q. So now you are referring to the --

8 A. To the incidents in this memo.

9 Q. In the first paragraph about these people observed at the stadium?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So can we go back to the meeting, what Mr. Borojevic wanted from

12 you?

13 A. Right. And I was beginning to illustrate where the cooperation

14 between the Serb authorities in the UNPA and the Serb authorities across

15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a given and went naturally; you didn't have

16 to discuss it. It was happening on a day-to-day. So on this particular

17 meeting, while we were coming to talk about the Vance Plan, the entire

18 thing was changed by the mayor, because we wanted to talk about what was

19 going on in Bosanski Novi. And I was taken aback by that request and he

20 said, "We have a request," to me as the UN representative in this sector,

21 from the mayor of Bosanski Novi. And I said to myself, But I don't have

22 much to do with the mayor of Bosanski Novi. And he still proceeded to

23 tell me about what he wanted. And when I declined to do so, he dialed the

24 mayor on the telephone and he said, "The mayor is on the phone here.

25 Please talk to him." Still, I politely told him that it has to be done at

1 a different place and different time; in other words, whatever these

2 groups were doing was almost seamless. If they are Serb on the Bosnian

3 side and if they are Serb on the UNPA, it was total cooperation, it was

4 seamless cooperation.

5 Q. So he -- mayor of Dvor Na Uni asked you about to do something --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- in relation to people in Bosanski Novi. What was your

8 reaction? What --

9 A. First is that of total surprise because, as summarised in this --

10 if you can scroll this document up, please. No, up. See that A, B,

11 there, that was the gist of what he wanted to talk about, that we would

12 participate -- he would request us, as the United Nations, to participate

13 in a process that would have led to the transition of these people in

14 Bosanski Novi through the sector and out into Croatia, and to guarantee

15 that none of them remained in the sector and they were going to get out.

16 Q. Did you agree with this?

17 A. No, because the first thing I wanted to know is what was this all

18 about? Why are they moving? What is causing them to move? All that I

19 needed to know.

20 Q. And did he mention -- I'm sorry, I probably missed it. Did he

21 mention who were these people who wanted to leave, what nationality?

22 A. All Muslims.

23 Q. So did you receive -- did you receive the answer what made them to

24 leave? Why did they wanted to leave?

25 A. This came -- there is a small sequence, I briefly will tell you.

1 The first notification was from Mayor Borojevic, mayor of Dvor. He

2 delivers the message that the mayor of Bosanski Novi, Mr. Pasic, wants to

3 talk to you about this matter. I decline to talk about the matter. I

4 returned to Topusko. Within a day or two, Mr. Pasic himself, not mayor of

5 Dvor, shows up in my office, the mayor of Bosanski Novi, along with a

6 group of people. And that's when we start -- I start getting answers to

7 the questions you are asking: Who are these people? Why they want to

8 move?

9 Q. What was his answer when you asked him why?

10 A. The first thing was a story that was difficult for me to

11 appreciate because they were all Serbs and they were talking about Muslims

12 voluntarily wanting to leave, and they underscored the word "voluntarily"

13 want to leave their homes. And I said, you are the mayor is -- why would

14 people voluntarily in those numbers, want to leave? What's going on? And

15 it -- bottom line was, well, they were not really voluntarily trying to

16 leave. They had a situation developing. And I said, What kind of

17 situation? That's when I got the -- an answer, We also have a new

18 Republic of -- Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new entity is

19 announced. And these Muslims would not swear loyalty to this new entity.

20 We told them that if they don't swear loyalty to this entity, they must

21 leave. And I said, Then they are not leaving voluntarily.

22 And so on the conversation, the bottom line, we established that

23 they were being forced out, they were not leaving voluntarily, and they

24 were -- and Mr. Pasic was asking us to participate in making refugees out

25 of people from their own homes.

1 Q. Mr. Kirudja, at this time when you met Mr. Pasic for the first

2 time, did you agree to participate at their departure to Croatia?

3 A. No. Not only I didn't agree. When they realised that I don't

4 agree, he wanted to know who I reported to so that he can go and get over

5 some -- the boss. And I told him, You can go all the way to the

6 Secretary-General. This is not going to change. We don't make refugees

7 out of people in their homes.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move this document into evidence, please?

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

11 please be given an exhibit number.

12 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 752, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

14 Ms. Richterova.

15 MS. RICHTEROVA:

16 Q. I want to show you 65 ter document 842. Can you recognise whether

17 it is written by you?

18 A. It's written on my behalf.

19 Q. And can we go to page 2? This document is dated 3rd of July and

20 subject is: "Humanitarian aid." Do you remember whether you prepared

21 this memorandum?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. This document again in the first or, better say, the second

24 paragraph is talking about the football field in Bosanski Novi. Can you

25 very briefly say what in fact happened in this -- on this football field?

1 Why it is always mentioned in this, very briefly?

2 A. Note that this it's in July. The date of that is July, if you

3 look at the top. The top of the document. That's in July. And if you

4 recall, the earlier incident when we are talking about football field was

5 in June, much earlier. The incidents about people gathering in the

6 football field, quite briefly, this is what happened in June, not in

7 July. The soldiers, the Danish soldiers, sitting in Dvor, observing with

8 binoculars at that football field. On a clear day they just saw a good

9 number of people on buses being shuttled into the field, into the field,

10 and one of them was particularly observant that those people sat and

11 formed an SOS, human SOS. And he realised that there was trouble, but we

12 didn't know what trouble was because it was across, and in Bosnia.

13 We told -- or I did, I told my headquarters about it. The

14 military told in a different channel the same thing, and my colleague from

15 UNHCR, I sent him because the mandate of UNHCR had more flexibility to go

16 and get more information. We did all of that. Now, the memo you are

17 showing here is a bit of an inside problem in the UN where the paragraph

18 is a bit of a complaint by me that, I told you all this, you ignored it,

19 now you want me to talk about it again when it has -- it has finished.

20 That's what the paragraph is talking about, our frustration is not to

21 investigate; it's the fact that we have already brought this matter to the

22 headquarters' attention but it wasn't paid attention.

23 Q. Did you subsequently learned who were the people at the -- in the

24 football stadium?

25 A. Yes. This was the beginning of this number of people in Bosanski

1 Novi, particularly being rounded from a village called Blagaj, that they

2 were sorting them out in the process that I mentioned briefly earlier,

3 when they wouldn't swear allegiance to the new Republika Srpska. And this

4 is the group that eventually was actually forcefully removed from Bosanski

5 Novi through Sector North.

6 Q. So we are referring to Muslims?

7 A. Yes, again they were all Muslims.

8 Q. I would like to read you the second paragraph, of course, only

9 portion of that second paragraph.

10 "We believe the football field detainees are only a tip of the

11 iceberg involving the concerted action of local Serbian authorities in BiH

12 trying to establish a Serbian Republic of BiH free of Muslims. In that

13 process, the mayors, the Milicija, and TDF of Bosanski Novi acting in

14 unison with their counterparts, not only in the UNPA, Dvor and Kostajnica,

15 but also with Bosanska Dubica, Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and

16 Kljuc."

17 When you mention "acting in unison," can you elaborate on that?

18 A. Yes. The first notification from -- about this matter was

19 delivered by the mayor of Dvor, a Serb based in Dvor. He didn't even say,

20 I'm delivering a message; it was more or less like a common cause. They

21 demanded a number of things which we have just discussed about

22 transitioning through the sector and calling international media to watch

23 that this was going on. And now the fact that the mayors of Bosanski Novi

24 felt free -- just cross and come to my office with no notification and

25 begin to discuss the same thing. No Muslims couldn't cross that border.

1 Every time a Muslim crossed that border, we had to -- we had an issue

2 because the Serbs wouldn't let them. Neither would Croats. Just the

3 Serbs would cross that border without any problem, whether they are mayors

4 or not mayors. Not only that it was the mayor of Bosanski Novi who came.

5 Later on, in a second visit, after the first one, he brought the

6 representatives of all these -- of all these towns, Bosanska Dubica,

7 Sanski Most, and Kljuc, they were all in my office, both mayors and

8 police.

9 Q. So does it mean that after you refused to participate, that this

10 attempt to move these Muslims continue?

11 A. It continued and to my chagrin, they -- I'm condensing the story,

12 it -- bottom line is that they got permission from UNHCR and the Croats

13 that they can move the fast -- the first batch that they wanted to move,

14 notwithstanding our strong objection to it, and I'm talking about a strong

15 objection that I had sent to both my headquarters and to UNHCR

16 headquarters.

17 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move this document into evidence, please?

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

19 please be given an exhibit number.

20 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 753, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

22 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

23 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to display 65 ter document 843.

24 Q. This document is dated 6 of July, 1992, and it is Srpska

25 Republika, Bosnia-Herzegovina, opstina Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff.

1 MS. RICHTEROVA: We have on the screen B/C/S version. Is it

2 possible to have English, please? Thank you. Can we slowly scroll it

3 down?

4 Q. Do you --

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Wait just a second. I still have B/C/S.

6 MS. RICHTEROVA:

7 Q. Mr. Kirudja, do you have English version or B/C/S version?

8 A. The one that is in front of me?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. I have the English one.

11 Q. I have --

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm fine now. I've managed. Thank you.

13 MS. RICHTEROVA: Thank you.

14 Q. Do you recognise this document? Have you seen it before?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. I would like to go to third paragraph from the bottom. And it

17 says, "In relation to citizens requesting and in order to provide them

18 personal and property safety, we organise the meeting between

19 representatives of Bosanski Novi municipality, Dvor, and above-mentioned

20 Crisis Staff on date of 6 July, when if agreed on mutual satisfaction they

21 is need organised departure," it's how it is stated, "with buses of

22 companies, Kozara Prevoz, Autoprevoz, Dvor."

23 And then the second paragraph from the bottom, "Safeguarding to

24 the convoy they will be provided," here it's provide, "by internal affairs

25 of Republic of is Serbian Krajina workers."

1 What, in gist, what this document is talking about, is it the

2 agreement of -- for the departure of these people or what is it?

3 A. This was one of those bases why I used the word "unison," acting

4 in unison, concerted effort of the Serbians in both sides. If you look at

5 the top of this document --

6 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we scroll it up?

7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. See, it is coming from the a group calling

8 itself crisis committee in the municipality on Bosanski Novi, which is in

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina. [Indiscernible] -- it is at a different place.

10 The addressee of this memo is myself, who is in the United Nations

11 Protected Area. There was not -- it was a small difference to them. It

12 is no problem. Notwithstanding that, we have nothing to do with Bosanski

13 Novi. But we were in Dvor, which is now, if you scroll down, on the memo,

14 the paragraph that counsel read, you will see one other sentence after the

15 buses being provided by the companies Kozara Prevoz and Autoprevoz Dvor,

16 the bus company was to come from Dvor.

17 Now, these are people in a different city talking about this being

18 provided in another, yet different, city but because they were all Serbs,

19 didn't seem to be unusual. And by private vehicles and other means of

20 transportation on relation in Dvor-Vrginmost-Topusko, that is the route

21 they were supposed to take. And then that paragraph, "Safeguarding"

22 should really have been translated into "security," "to the convoy will be

23 provided by internal affairs of Republic of Serbian Krajina."

24 In short, they would have to -- this was information being given

25 to us that they intend to do this and they were going to do it along those

1 lines. Fast-forward, it took place exactly as they had described it, with

2 buses provided the same way, and there was Toso Paic and all his police

3 representing the internal affairs, manning the route.

4 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move, please, this document into evidence?

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

6 please be given an exhibit number.

7 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit number 754, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

9 Ms. Richterova.

10 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to display 65 ter document 844. If

11 we managed to have -- shouldn't be -- I hope that I didn't state it wrong.

12 I apologise. I apologise. I stated a wrong 65 ter. It is 845. On the

13 screen we have B/C/S version and now we have English version. Thank you.

14 Q. This document is dated 8 of July, and it is issued by Republic of

15 Serbian Krajina Dvor Na Uni Assembly municipal Crisis Staff. And it says,

16 "At session on 7 July 1992, the Dvor Na Uni municipal Crisis Staff

17 discussed a memo from the Bosanski Novi municipal Crisis Staff" - and the

18 number, if we compare this -- these two documents, we would see that the

19 previous one had the same reference number - "concerning voluntary

20 departure of people of Muslims and other ethnicities from the territory of

21 the Bosanski Novi municipality."

22 Have you seen this document?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Are you -- if we go to Article 3, "The Dvor Na Uni public security

25 station is instructed to step up controls of the crossing from the

1 Bosanski Novi to Dvor Na Uni municipality in order to prevent the passage

2 of people of Muslim and other ethnicities and which -- to the departure

3 from the territory of Bosanski Novi municipality."

4 To your knowledge, and you already mentioned it, was police from

5 Dvor Na Uni involved in the transfer of these people from Bosanski Novi to

6 Croatia?

7 A. Not only the police in Dvor, but all along the route, that took

8 them from Dvor through -- if you look at the map, the route they would

9 have followed would bring them to Vojnic, from Vojnic through Vrginmost.

10 They were all involved.

11 Q. And you also mentioned that Toso Paic was involved. Can you

12 briefly tell us in which way?

13 A. I said -- I also used the term "fast-forward," because this was

14 the preparatory stages. All this document was preparatory to the

15 movement. And I said when the movement actually occurred, it went in as

16 the memo had said it would, and Mr. Paic was the regional commissioner of

17 police, as I mentioned his title, his capacity; and he was also the Deputy

18 Minister of Interior. There were several elements that were of concern to

19 the so-called Republic of Srpska Krajina which was to ensure that this

20 number, these many Muslims who were going to cross from Bosanski Novi,

21 they would not kind of remain or disappear into the territory controlled

22 by the Serbs and, of course, become a source of a problem. So they had to

23 ensure that they passed through and nobody stopped in there. That was the

24 intention. No one would stop there.

25 And the last element of all of this, they had to be an agreement

1 between the Croatian government that this group can transition the sector,

2 but, more importantly, they will end up in turn next to Karlovac where the

3 Croatian authority would have the burden of taking care of all these --

4 the original number was 4.000, double the number actually crossed. So on

5 both sides of this thing, there was a concern both from the Serb side and

6 on the Croatian side, all elements had to be in place before the movement

7 would take place.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: I think it's time for the break.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Ms. Richterova.

11 We will take a break and come back to quarter to 6.00.

12 Court adjourned.

13 --- Recess taken at 5.17 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 5.44 p.m.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Ms. Richterova.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Your Honour, I would like to tender into evidence

17 the document which we were discussing before the break.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

19 please be given an exhibit number.

20 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 755, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

22 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

23 MS. RICHTEROVA:

24 Q. Mr. Kirudja, before the break my question was about the

25 involvement of Toso Paic and the police. Based on what you observed, did

1 Toso Paic and police of Republic of Serbian Krajina help to facilitate the

2 movement of Muslims from Bosanski Novi?

3 A. Yes, they did.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to show the witness another

6 document. It's 65 ter 2021.

7 Q. Before this document is displayed, I want to ask you, after this

8 initial transfer of Muslims -- we have now the document in front of us.

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can you scroll it down, please?

10 Q. Can you recognise the handwriting?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is it yours?

13 A. No.

14 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to the page 2?

15 Q. This memorandum is dated 13 of August, 1992. Subject: Status of

16 refugees, attempt to cross through Sector North.

17 Did you prepare this memorandum?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. I didn't manage to finish my question. After this initial

20 movement of Muslims across the border to Croatia, was there another

21 attempt to move additional Muslims? But can we be very brief? I would

22 read you a small passage from this memorandum. I'm starting in the

23 middle. You met with the representative of UNHCR, the name is mentioned

24 in this document, to discuss the approach to be taken on the new wave of

25 refugees wishing to transit through Sector North, as today the estimate

1 has shot up to 28.000. And then I want to skip one sentence and continue.

2 "To do so would be to participate directly in the process of

3 ethnic cleansing unleashed by the Serbs in Bosnia."

4 Do you remember that you wrote this information about the number

5 of potential refugees in this memorandum?

6 A. Yes. I remember, and this memorandum was a case of our prediction

7 coming true, when in the initial stage we were not listened to and the

8 first round of removal of refugees took place. We told them, having

9 achieved that, you just opened the doors. This would be round one. There

10 will be round two and so forth. And this awful practice of ethnic

11 cleansing, unless you do something about it, will now be in full swing.

12 This is the gist of my discussion with the gentlemen who headed UNHCR

13 named in paragraph 2.

14 They -- and I gave them the numbers of 28.000, they were not all

15 from Bosanski Novi. They were supposed to come from a wider -- the

16 numbers added to 28.000, but they were collected from points along

17 northern Bosnia, points such as Bosanska Krupa, Bosanska, Sanski Most,

18 Kljuc. All of these areas had their own estimates. It had begun to

19 gather momentum.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I interrupt?

21 MS. RICHTEROVA: Yes.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Am I to understand that the practice is not to show

23 documents with names of UNHCR personnel? Am I -- is that -- do you know

24 anything about that?

25 MS. RICHTEROVA: No. The practice is that documents which would

1 be provided by UNHCR shouldn't be displayed in court or used. This

2 document was provided by -- by UNPROFOR, I'm sorry, by UNPROFOR. Out of

3 caution, I didn't mention the name of the representative, but it's true

4 that in fact this document is displayed. So if there is any chance that

5 this part would be -- or the document would be -- would -- I would like to

6 tender this document into evidence, if it could be tendered under seal.

7 And if the part of the tape could be also redacted, which shows the name.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: It doesn't look like the transcript shows the name,

9 but the document does.

10 MS. RICHTEROVA: Yeah, the document.

11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you so much. We will then ask that

13 where the name was broadcast, it be deleted from the transcript. Thank

14 you so much.

15 You are not yet making your application to tender this into

16 evidence? You will still make an application later?

17 MS. RICHTEROVA: I can -- if I may, I can make this application

18 now and continue with my questioning, not to forget to tender this

19 document into evidence.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Well, then the document is admitted into

21 evidence under seal. May it please be given an exhibit number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 756, under seal.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

24 Okay. You may proceed, then.

25 MS. RICHTEROVA:

1 Q. We were talking about your discussions with the representatives of

2 UNHCR. Did really this movement of certain amount or huge amount of

3 Muslims materialise during the remaining part of the year?

4 A. I'm happy to say that after the first movement of refugees, our

5 message began to hold and be the line that was taken not just by the UN

6 but the UNHCR itself, that there shall be no more of these movements. And

7 this attempt did not take place, involving these numbers shown in

8 paragraph 2.

9 Q. Did it happen, however, that people would be still leaving Bosnia

10 and entering either Sector North or any parts of Croatian area?

11 A. Yes. Incidents of small numbers of people, Muslims, as well as --

12 yeah, mostly Muslims continued to cross the sector, but not in this kind

13 of organised way.

14 Q. Thank you. I would like to now move in time, and I will ask

15 another document to be displayed.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I just ask, the Muslims who moved in small

17 numbers, did they move voluntarily or were they still moving under

18 pressure?

19 THE WITNESS: They were moving mostly under pressure -- actually

20 they were the true escapees from a problem and were crossing the River

21 Una, because that's where they hoped to find some refuge. But for many of

22 them it wasn't a refuge because they were moving from one Serb-controlled

23 area to another; and when they got into the sector, often it became our

24 responsibility to whisk them to wherever we could find safety for them,

25 usually meaning across to the Croatian side.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: But the pressure that you seem to be talking about

2 is the pressure that's different from the one where a voluntary move was

3 being organised which was not voluntary?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. It was simply the groups themselves

5 running away and finding their way to our sector.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: And these that are talked about in this document,

7 the 28.000, were they also leaving under that kind of -- which kind of

8 pressure were they leaving under?

9 THE WITNESS: This one was a lot more subtle because some of them

10 had been convinced that having been offered these impossible choices they

11 were actually going to take the choices and leave as long as they were

12 safe to leave, The organised ones. To the extent that the names of those

13 who wished to transition had been collected in the second round, the round

14 here -- at one time they brought me a printed computer list containing all

15 the names of the people who had "signed on," to leave.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: So in fact, can it be deduced therefore from what

17 you are saying that the phrase, refugees "wishing" to transit, wishing is

18 in quotes?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

21 Thank you very much. You may proceed, Ms. Richterova. You want a

22 new document on the screen?

23 MS. RICHTEROVA: Yes. I would like to have document 854, 65 ter

24 exhibit.

25 Q. Now, we you -- we can see on this cover page, a name, P. Raffone.

1 Can you tell us who he was?

2 A. A man on my civil affairs staff, there was one named Paul -- Paolo

3 Raffone. And given the kind of hectic days we had, where I'm not always

4 where I'm supposed to be for purposes of transmitting documents, he would

5 call me on the telephone, we would finalise the document itself, and then

6 I will give him authorisation to release it. This is one instant.

7 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 2?

8 Q. This document is dated 20th of July, 1992, and it is: "Periodic

9 overall reports." This document is quite a lengthy. Can we -- and it is

10 signed -- is it correct that it is signed by you?

11 A. Yes. This is a document prepared, as because of its length, with

12 the full resources of my office, but is one that I take the

13 responsibility, not only for its content but for its release.

14 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go now to page 12? The last four digits

15 in the ERN number -- yes, should be 2261. Can we scroll down? More,

16 please. So we can see what is under this local authorities.

17 Q. Here it says, "Almost all the mayors of the seven opstinas of

18 Sector North were appointed when the Croatian authorities pulled out of

19 the territory during the autumn of 1991. The only mayor who served both

20 before and after the conflict was Mr. Obradovic of Vrginmost. He was

21 assassinated recently on the road, about two kilometres from Topusko."

22 Can you please briefly tell us something about, first about

23 Mr. Obradovic? For example, what was his view of implementation of the

24 Vance Plan?

25 A. Yes. I had alluded to it, to that matter, in an earlier question

1 today, when I said the views of the mayors ranged from those who didn't

2 give any -- and I mentioned his name - and those who gave very, very

3 passionate views about the future. Mr. Obradovic, of whom I had the

4 pleasure of meeting so many times, was the kind who did what he thought

5 the Vance Plan required. He didn't talk about it much; he just did it.

6 He also tried to -- to be the mayor as envisaged in the Vance Plan, not

7 referring to any overarching authority, meaning you -- I never would hear

8 him talking about the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Knin or anything.

9 All matters were within the mayoral responsibilities. He was also rather

10 efficient in doing what he did. That was -- and he did it quietly.

11 Q. In this report, you mentioned that he was assassinated. What do

12 you know about the circumstances or what followed after his

13 assassination? Was there any investigation?

14 A. It was one of those traumatic events, as the paragraph says, it's

15 only two kilometres from where we were. I recall it might have been

16 Saturday morning. The area where his house was located is rather wooded,

17 kind of -- you drive for a kilometre in a completely wooded part of that.

18 That's where he was waylaid. His car was well known - it was red and you

19 couldn't miss it - it was sprayed with bullets, and he was immediately

20 taken to a local hospital. I was also immediately called by his

21 colleagues, including Mile Paspalj and others. When I arrived in the

22 hospital, they were there.

23 The reason I was asked to join them is if I could provide them

24 with a med evacuation, helicopters to evacuate him, to a better hospital.

25 He was still in surgery when I arrived. What was interesting was that it

1 was a charged atmosphere. The local people were literally terrified.

2 Mr. Paspalj packed a gun, which he normally -- Mile Paspalj, he normally

3 wouldn't wear. He was packing a gun. There was an element of fear

4 about -- all among them, not explainable by just the assassination.

5 We couldn't give them what they wanted because when I said -- when

6 they asked me, Could we evacuate him to a better hospital, the answer was

7 Yes. And the nearest -- we have a helicopter. The nearest we will

8 evacuate you is Zagreb. They refused flatly, saying, "We should evacuate

9 them all the way to Belgrade." That was, of course, not a viable option,

10 nor was it being considered on basis of medicine; it was being considered

11 for other reasons other than medicine.

12 Anyway, the debate became moot because by 1.30, while we are still

13 talking in the anteroom to the operation room, the doctor came and said he

14 had died. Immediately there was the usual panic about who killed him,

15 with some speculation that -- of how he might have been killed. None of

16 the usual rhetoric that I heard was present in this case, because if he

17 had been killed by the parties to the conflict on the other side, meaning

18 Croats, I would immediately have heard, it would have been condemned that

19 the Croats came and committed assassination here. We didn't hear that.

20 Secondly, the entire route within those two kilometres was fully

21 manned with the -- with the -- the armed Serb people at the junction of

22 the road between Glina and Vrginmost, there was a junction control manned

23 by the military. And you couldn't commit that crime and run away.

24 Anyway, nobody was ever arrested or ever charged with the crime of killing

25 Obradovic. When I asked for it, not a single person in or outside of the

1 authorities wished to discuss it. They were all apprehensive of the very

2 question, Can you tell me who killed Mr. Obradovic?

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now turn to following page, please? It's

5 page 13.

6 Q. I will concentrate on the first paragraph.

7 "Prior to the assassination of Mayor Obradovic, we observed two

8 parallel lines of politics and control. The Milicija on one side appeared

9 to be getting direct instructions from Knin; the mayors, on the other

10 hand, seem to exercise a measure of political autonomy depending on the

11 opstina. Some mayors have told us that the chiefs of the local police

12 were not informing them about their activities."

13 After the assassination of Mr. Obradovic, was there any change in

14 these two parallel lines?

15 A. Yes. There were completely the absence of anyone who would even

16 venture an opinion that was not aligned to what was perceived to be the

17 correct opinion or policy coming from Knin.

18 Q. When you say "correct opinion or policy coming from Knin," what do

19 you --

20 A. I mean no one would exercise any kind of independence similar to

21 what Obradovic seemed to exhibit or not to be obviously singing the line

22 from Knin. They all began now to talk about whether the republic of

23 Serbian Krajina and their government in Knin. They were kind of all

24 aligned, and some were also changed. The mayor of Vojnic, for example,

25 was changed. Some police or some police chiefs -- I don't remember

1 exactly where that might have happened, but the mayor of Vojnic is a case

2 where we had a change.

3 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now please go to page 5 of this document?

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: What would page 5 be?

5 MS. RICHTEROVA: Page 5 of the document which is displayed. I

6 started from the backward.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. My pages end at 2263. Is -- would that be

8 it?

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: No, it is 2254.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

11 MS. RICHTEROVA:

12 Q. You already discussed that in fact during your work you had to

13 discuss certain issues with both sides, Croatian side and Serb side. This

14 part refers to your discussions with Croats, and it says, "Protection of

15 Croats in the UNPAs."

16 And it says that, "The Croatian commissioners have supplied a list

17 of over 1.700 persons left behind in the UNPA and over 22.000 said to be

18 displaced or missing," and then there is a breakdown.

19 What we are seeing now on the screen, is it a something what you

20 prepared or is it something what you were provided by the Croatian side?

21 A. Something that was provided by the Croatian side, and taking off

22 your comment about our discussion on the Croatian side, I would like to

23 specifically to add that on the Croatian side, they had mirrored -- like

24 shadow, mayors and shadow police who had been within the sector and were

25 forced to move out of the sector. They were concentrated either in

1 Karlovac or Sisak. Organisationally they were led by the Deputy Prime

2 Minister, Dr. Ramljak who'd chaired them when they met as the shadow

3 mayors of Slunj, Vojnic and all of that. And each time I went into that

4 room, it was -- it was a very hot room because it was full of people,

5 angry, and, of course, very concerned about what happened in the sector.

6 They had at this point in time begun to focus on what they called

7 Croats left behind when they themselves took to refuge across the

8 confrontation line. The question to me was, How are they doing? Are they

9 protected or are the Serbs terrorising them? In answer to all those

10 questions was, I don't know, because I don't know who is left behind, and

11 I don't know where they are, because we don't go looking for them as

12 Croats. So they gave me a list saying, We think you can find so many,

13 like 352 in Slunj - and the number is shown on the screen - this is what

14 we expect you should be finding. We had a long discussion with the

15 government, Dr. Ramljak as the Deputy Prime Minister. And I told them

16 that I would like them to make a choice.

17 Some of these people, the fact that we don't know, the anonymity

18 may be the only reason they are protected. If you identified them -- we

19 had seen incidents, particularly around Glina opstina, where if they were

20 identified as Croats they were subjects of attacks, and some had been

21 murdered, there were several murders there. So will you, the government,

22 make a choice? If you ask you us to go looking for them, the consequence

23 of identifying them will also be loss of protection by anonymity which

24 they enjoyed. They took some time to think about it, and they decided

25 they will take the responsibility and therefore I should accept this list

1 and go back to the sector and account for either their presence or

2 absence. That's the context in which this is presented.

3 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we -- can I move this document into evidence,

4 please?

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

6 please be given an exhibit number.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, it will be Exhibit 757.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

9 MS. RICHTEROVA:

10 Q. I will continue with line of question -- my questioning about

11 Croats left behind, but before I do it I would like to show you one

12 document. It is 65 ter 856.

13 Did you write this cover page?

14 A. I also recognise this to be done similarly on my behalf, not my

15 handwriting but on my behalf.

16 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now go to page 3?

17 Q. And this is a document dated 21st of July, 1992, and it is meeting

18 with Mr. Spanovic, and he's identified here as a Defence Minister of the

19 Republic of Serbian Krajina. In fact, this document refers to what you

20 said before, under -- if we can --

21 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we scroll down, please? More.

22 Q. Local police and Milicija. It refers to: "Our discussions on

23 local police matters centred on three unresolved murders of Croatians in

24 Glina and two others in Slunj. We explained to him that while the

25 attitude of civilian authorities against the perpetrators of the crimes

1 was admirable, the progress of the local police seems slow."

2 Do you know whether -- anything about the progress of the

3 investigation of these murders?

4 A. I was always assured that they were being done to the best of

5 their abilities. As of this day, I don't recall this investigation being

6 brought to an end and a suspect being charged or convicted for any of the

7 murders.

8 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go now to page 3 -- I'm sorry, 4.

9 Q. The first paragraph says, "Mr. Spanovic took note of the details

10 of the cases and promised a swift solution. He also repeated that Knin

11 authorities should be informed of problems such as this."

12 Who did he refer to as authorities in Knin? Which authorities

13 should have been informed?

14 A. In this instant, I was the intermediary between the Croatian

15 authorities led by the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Serbs representing

16 Serbian Krajina, led by Colonel Spanovic. He was a colonel, and he was

17 the Defence Minister. When the Croats took the position that all of these

18 people must be identified, it was also requested of me that I take each of

19 the lists that they had prepared and officially and formally present it to

20 both the mayor and chief of police of each of the opstinas. That was

21 done. But because they were presented by that official request through me

22 from the government of Croats -- of the Croatian -- they also replied in

23 kind, that they needed a decision by the government of Krajina.

24 When Colonel Spanovic was talking to me, since he was himself a

25 government member, in fact, he wore the title the Defence Minister, he was

1 talking about discussing it with broad -- I assume the cabinet, if there

2 was a cabinet meeting over there. Anyway, whatever it is they discussed,

3 the result was an answer as to the policy they would follow about this

4 matter.

5 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we scroll down, please?

6 Q. We have return of displaced persons. You already mentioned

7 yesterday that it was one of the features of the Vance Plan, the voluntary

8 return of displaced persons. If we look to the first paragraph under the

9 heading, "Return of displaced persons." In the middle it says,

10 "Mr. Spanovic said his government would be guided by regulations passed in

11 Knin on return of refugees. Today he sent me an English version of the

12 regulations."

13 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now go to page 2?

14 Q. Could you have a look at this decision, if we could scroll down a

15 little bit? This document was dated April 21st, 1992. Yes. Thank you.

16 Did you -- do you remember seeing this document at the time when

17 you wrote this report?

18 A. I do.

19 Q. If we could look to -- yes, under Article 2, it -- this document

20 is showing how to -- what is necessary to do when someone wants to return;

21 is it correct?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. And it says, "Upon the reception of the written request of the

24 persons asking for the return, permission within 90-day long deadline, the

25 Secretariat of Internal Affairs is incumbent on carrying out the

1 verification of the eventual collaboration, direct or indirect, in the

2 enemy forces or the nationalist, fascist parties that used to propagate or

3 execute the activities to the damage of Serbian people, which finally

4 entailed the genocide repetition."

5 Did you discuss with Mr. Spanovic this decision and how helpful

6 the decision it is for the return of refugees?

7 A. First, I'm -- I want to say I had very good cooperative

8 relationship with Colonel Spanovic. In most of the issues that I engaged

9 him, he did produce some result, not always satisfactory, but he did. He

10 was a soldier. This is a civilian matter involving legislation. We knew,

11 both him and I, when I looked at it, particularly paragraph 2. I spoke

12 earlier on the constant refrain from Serbian mayors and others, we can't

13 live together with the Serbs and Croats.

14 Secondly, they all knew the provisions of the Vance Plan, that the

15 right by the signatories of that document was given to all parties to

16 return to their homes with no such conditions. So I read it as they

17 finally had figured a way of actually preventing or making it impossible

18 for anyone to return by the conditions that they outlined in paragraph 2,

19 where every Croat -- very few of them would escape the clause, that they

20 were collaboration with the enemy forces or with the nationalist, fascist

21 parties that used to propagate those -- that paragraph was a catch-all

22 paragraph that would have actually denied the very thing it purports to

23 enable. We didn't take it seriously, in the sense that it would permit

24 any Croats to return. No. We knew it will be used as the reason for not

25 allowing them to return.

1 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move this document into evidence, please?

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

3 please be given an exhibit number.

4 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 758, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

6 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

7 MS. RICHTEROVA: Another document I would like to display is 65

8 ter 863. Can we go, please, to page 3?

9 Q. This document is dated 8 of August, 1992. Do you remember this

10 document as the one you prepared?

11 A. Yes.

12 MS. RICHTEROVA: If we could scroll down a little bit, there is a

13 local Milicija.

14 Q. It says, "Series of meetings with the commanders of the local

15 Milicija have been held. The sector commander has firmly impressed on the

16 Milicija that the switch of personnel from TDF" -- you said it's

17 Territorial Defence forces; is it correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- "to the Milicija or special police forces is not acceptable.

20 The personnel have to be completely demobilised."

21 Does it reflect the situation as it was in the Sector North in

22 August, that there were still personnel which was switching to the

23 Milicija?

24 A. Yes.

25 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 4?

1 Q. Under Article 4, "The local Milicija disagreed, however, with the

2 Vance Plan requirement that they carry only side-arms, as well as UNPROFOR

3 insistence that they discard all military camouflage uniforms, which some

4 of them still wear, with a Milicija arm-band."

5 Does it reflect the situation in -- still in August in the area?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. When you are talking -- when you are talking here about this

8 Milicija arm-band, do you remember how it looked like?

9 A. Yes. The insignia of the Milicija was always in blue with some

10 coat of arms and some inscription which was invariably in Cyrillic.

11 MS. RICHTEROVA: Is it a please possible -- I will return back to

12 this document or maybe we can place one document on the ELMO. It is

13 already court Exhibit 266.

14 Q. Do you remember seeing this arm-band?

15 A. Yeah, it's a familiar sight.

16 Q. Is it the one you are referring to in this document?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now return back to the document 863?

20 Thank you.

21 Q. This same article continues, "The local commanders cited the

22 following in support of their dissent." And we don't need to read all

23 these four -- four or how many -- subarticles, but we -- I would like to

24 read you subarticle or subparagraph (d).

25 "The special police, Milicija, does not fall within the command

1 structure of the normal Milicija. They operate mostly in camouflage

2 uniforms and have most of the assault rifles. They are commanded by two

3 separate individuals, one each for Banija and Kordun, and report directly

4 to Mr. Martic in Knin."

5 Is it how the local commanders saw the situation?

6 A. You might have heard me refer to this very thing very early, when

7 you asked me, Your Honour, about the switch of uniform. I said over time

8 they also switched back and put these Milicijas in the border or the

9 so-called border with -- of the RSK. I specifically also mentioned that

10 the -- at the beginning the first group was commanded out of Slunj and

11 commanded by Colonel Novakovic; and the second group was centred in Banija

12 under Colonel Tarbuk. They all wore green, not blue, and they were in

13 certain ways a lot more powerful than the Milicija in blue uniform. And

14 as this paragraph indicates, since this was an interior matter, the person

15 who ran the interior affairs was Mr. Martic, and they were beholden to

16 Mr. Martic.

17 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move this document into evidence?

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

19 please be given an exhibit number.

20 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 759, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Ms. Richterova?

22 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can document 871 be displayed? 65 ter.

23 Q. Is this document submitted by you?

24 A. Yes.

25 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we go to page 2?

1 Q. This document is dated 26 of September, 1992. It's civil affairs

2 sitrep, and under Article 2, it says, "It is a common perception among the

3 Serbian leadership here that the provision in SCR, Security Council

4 Resolution, 762, requiring the restoration of Croatian authority in the

5 pink zones was a betrayal of their cause."

6 And before I ask you a question, I would like to go to page 5.

7 And the subheading is: "Demobilisation of the Special Milicija," and if

8 we could go, scroll down. Mr. Kirudja, if you could have a look at

9 paragraph 11, and make a comment regarding this demobilisation of the

10 special Milicija? What was the situation? How did they see it? And is

11 it correct, as we saw at the beginning, that this is referring to the pink

12 zone?

13 A. Yes, counsel. I took the opportunity when I was tracing the pink

14 zones at the very beginning to mention that they became a subject of a

15 special Security Council resolution, and I also mentioned they required

16 that the Croatian authority be restored. I didn't use restoration, but I

17 said that their control should be returned sooner, and -- irrespective of

18 the UNPA. Yes, that paragraph refers to that resolution and its effect.

19 On paragraph 11, we were still trying to accomplish the

20 demobilisation that was called for by the Vance Plan elsewhere in the rest

21 of the UNPA. This -- because of the time it took to accomplish it, events

22 had formed on the ground creating this issue of the special Milicija that

23 I just described that used to start -- in the -- in the borders, and then

24 the order came. The negotiations were being done for a demobilisation and

25 laying down of the arms, and because of the protracted nature of those

1 negotiations, they couldn't be done sector by sector. So the mission

2 approached the matter from the top, that the terms of whatever is agreed

3 by the Serbs will apply to all the sectors. In order for that to be

4 practical, it involved an agreement reached between the force commander

5 and Mr. Martic. Mr. Martic -- and mainly because at that point he had

6 total control of these forces. Therefore, to demobilise them, they had to

7 reach agreement with the force commander, and that agreement was then

8 communicated to each of the sectors, including our sector. This is what

9 is in reference to. And there was a meeting where the local commanders,

10 both in Kordun, Banija, gathered to hear the terms of this

11 demobilisation. That's what the reference is about.

12 Q. I asked you at the beginning, was -- did it refer to specifically

13 to demilitarisation of the pink zones?

14 A. No. The pink zones were to be treated under the terms of the

15 Resolution 762. There was by nature -- because it's on the front line,

16 you have to think of it how the front line looks like. There is an area

17 on both sides, about two or three kilometres, which is an approachable for

18 all kinds of reasons, because of either mining or because it is very

19 hostile area, but the pink zones also carried beyond the area that you

20 would know as confrontation zones, as you saw there, and take a whole

21 chunk of an area into the control of the Serbs. That is the areas which

22 had not been named by the Vance Plan. The resolution 762 restored that

23 request by the Croatian government that we are not going to wait for the

24 Vance Plan to play out. The Security Council agreed. You, UNPROFOR, are

25 to do what you have to do to restore the Croatian authorities in those

1 areas, and then you get on with the Vance Plan as originally conceived.

2 MS. RICHTEROVA: Your Honour, I would like to move this document

3 into evidence.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

5 please be given an exhibit number.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 760, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

8 Ms. Richterova.

9 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to display document 851. And it

10 looks that in the e-court it should be under 851A and 851B. 851, just --

11 I can see this production list, so let's hope that the whole document is

12 in the e-court. Can we go to page 2? There should be another page which

13 is ZA022270.

14 Q. We are now in the subject of the treatment of Croats. This

15 memorandum, did you prepare it? It's dated 16 of July, 1992.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. And the subject is: "The five Croats from Sector South now in

18 Park Hotel Slunj." What happened to these five Croats?

19 A. First, a quick summary how they got there. They were not

20 originally from Sector North. They were from somewhere in Korenica in

21 Sector South, where they had been expelled from their houses by some

22 Milicija in Korenica. I can't tell you the details, other than they

23 showed up on their way out in Slunj, where they were accommodated into a

24 hotel by the mayor and his chief of police, and we are talking about mayor

25 of Slunj, Babic -- or what is his name? I'll see it in a minute there,

1 and his chief of police, Mr. Klipe [phoen]. That one doesn't come readily

2 into to my head. I never --

3 Q. If we scroll down, we can see the name of the mayor in Slunj, if

4 you could read it.

5 A. Bosic -- Bosnjic, yeah, that's the mayor, Bosnjic. And they -- to

6 my -- it was kind of unusual surprise that they did something that I

7 wasn't used to seeing, and which I hoped would happen more often, because

8 the mayor and his chief undertook to house these Croats at a great risk

9 which he spoke to me about, and he spoke to me about it saying, "I will

10 only be able to keep them there for a while, while you find a solution to

11 what we, UNPROFOR, found a solution what to do with these five Croats.

12 There they were ordinary people. These were not people involved in any

13 particular thing; they were just ordinary folks that had been thrown out

14 of their house.

15 Q. What happened to them? Did they -- were they able to return or

16 did they stay in Slunj or did they end up elsewhere?

17 A. Eventually, they were removed from the sector, but under

18 circumstances where the Croats themselves facilitated that, but I won't

19 get to the circumstances because it happened later after the Medak

20 attack. The Croats now were sure that whatever Croats were around there

21 might be subjected to a back-lash so they were removed much later, but for

22 a very long time, they were in the hotel in Slunj.

23 Q. In connection with these five Croats, did you try to communicate

24 with Mr. Martic?

25 A. Yes, I did. And that's what I was trying to get at, because when

1 Mr. Bosnjic approached me he was very concerned that as mayor, as well as

2 the chief of police, the very act, the humane act of keeping them in a

3 hotel was a problem for him. And I said to him, "Under the terms of this,

4 that's your government. They were chased out of another part. The only

5 solution is to take them back to their home." He said, "I can't do that,

6 but they are here and I can't continue using public funds," which they

7 were using, "to keep them in the hotel." And the hint was he would get

8 into trouble with Knin. Knin was in that case -- since this is a police

9 statement, Mr. Martic was the Minister of Interior. All the security of

10 everybody, ordinary people -- if you are a Minister of Interior you're

11 responsible for the plight of everybody. So I wrote to them saying, I

12 wrote to Mr. Martic to say to him, "These people are here. They are

13 being -- they are being taken care of. We are glad they are being taken

14 care of by the mayor, and we think it's up to your authorities to complete

15 this matter and return these people to the safety of their own house."

16 Q. And what happened? Did he reply?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Was it the first letter or first communication which you sent to

19 Mr. Martic or were there more than one?

20 A. I can't remember sending more than one or -- or this

21 communication, because on matters that I had to reduce to writing had to

22 come to a certain level of seriousness for me to do so. And I did this

23 because I found out if I wanted a solution, putting things in writing

24 actually wasn't always the best way of finding a solution. I preferred to

25 talk to them and persuade them on a one-to-one basis of something to do.

1 I didn't have that opportunity. Mr. Martic was based in Knin, and I'm

2 based in Topusko and this is happening in my area of responsibility.

3 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to move this document into evidence.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

5 please be given an exhibit number.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. It will be Exhibit 761, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

8 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now display 65 ter 838? Can we go to page

9 2 -- I'm sorry, page 3.

10 Q. This document is dated 21st of June. If we could scroll down, we

11 would see that this report was prepared by Paolo Raffone, and it talks,

12 "Suspected new expulsion of Croats on the border between Sector North -

13 South."

14 And if we look at the second -- in the second paragraph, there

15 is -- it states that according to one Mr. Hajdukovic, a group of uniformed

16 persons arrived in the village on 19th June, driving a tractor. They

17 entered the house of the 12 Croats and expelled them immediately from

18 their houses. Only four persons are left now in this village.

19 If we could go to page 2. This is signed by you, and it says, it

20 is a self-explanatory report. Based on this, do you remember seeing this

21 report on the page 3?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know about this incident?

24 A. It was an incident that, when Mr. Raffone, as I explained earlier

25 who was one of staff reporting to me, drew to my attention, and the nature

1 of the incident itself, I was afraid it might be the beginning of a bigger

2 pattern where people would be thrown out, if they are Croats, so to make

3 room for other Serbs coming from wherever they came from, including from

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now, bear in mind that even if a lot of people

5 had been expelled from the sector, there were not too many empty houses

6 because the act of expelling them was also precipitated by destruction of

7 most houses. So accommodation was a precious thing.

8 So in order to accommodate Serbs, who have also been expelled, or

9 reportedly expelled, from Bosnia - because I wasn't in Bosnia to see the

10 act of expulsion - those who came in, like this case wherein they looked

11 at a group of people called Croats and expelled them, was of great concern

12 to me so that it doesn't gather momentum.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: You talk of people being expelled from the sector.

14 Were they being expelled from the sector?

15 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honour, I wasn't clear. What I meant is

16 that prior to our arrival the expulsion had already been completed in --

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the sector?

18 THE WITNESS: In the sector.

19 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now go back to page 3? Scroll down a

20 little bit more.

21 Q. And it's something what you already mentioned. "They also,"

22 referring -- it's paragraph 3, "Polish battalion."

23 "They also confirmed that some days before the reported incident,

24 some houses were burned in Catrnja and Smoljanac."

25 When you travelled in the area, were you aware of any such

1 incident or did you see burned houses, destroyed houses?

2 A. Counsel, this was almost impossible to distinguish, almost every

3 house you saw was shot, burned, or blown out, one way or the other. If

4 you took a car and drove in any of these towns, you will be impressed by

5 the amount of violence that was visited in every house that you saw. So

6 that if a recent event would occur -- so that whatever house that was left

7 standing is subsequently also fire-bombed or the -- it would make very

8 little difference, you probably not even notice by driving around.

9 Q. Were you able to distinguish whether these villages or the houses,

10 who lived in these villages and whose houses were destroyed?

11 A. Depending on which opstina you're talking about, some were readily

12 easy to tell who used to live there, especially, say, in Slunj. A good

13 number of -- a very large number of those who lived in Slunj were Croats

14 who were already gathered in Karlovac, which I mentioned earlier today. A

15 huge number of those who had been forced out of Slunj, I would meet a lot

16 of them in Karlovac. They were Croats. If you go into Vrginmost, some

17 parts of Vrginmost, most villages were left intact because the predominant

18 population there wasn't all Croats, except as you approach the

19 confrontation line. Then the destruction picks up, and that tells you the

20 majority of the people who lived along that area from Tursilovic [phoen]

21 to Turijn [phoen] and along the Mrezinica and Kupa River on the side of

22 the Serb side, most houses had been destroyed. That tells you the

23 occupants mostly were Croats, and the story is repeated that way all over.

24 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can I move this document into evidence, please?

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

1 please be given an exhibit number.

2 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit 762, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

4 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

5 MS. RICHTEROVA: Can we now display document 65 ter 874? Can we

6 go to page 2?

7 Q. This document is dated 16 October 1992. It's from Mr. Kirudja.

8 Subject: "Urgent measures to ensure the protection of minorities in Glina

9 opstina."

10 I want to refer you to the first paragraph, somewhere in the

11 middle. It says, "Information reaching us recently show, however, a

12 disturbing pattern of abuse, harassment, and discriminatory treatment of

13 Croats, particularly in seven villages south of Glina town."

14 We are now in October, so I would like to talk to you about the

15 situation in the sector around this time, September, October, November.

16 How was the situation, and mainly if we could focus on the treatment of

17 Croats? What did you personally observe?

18 A. This was the result of what I said earlier and is mentioned on the

19 very sentence on this memo, first sentence on paragraph 1, that with

20 agreement of both sides, both the Croatian side and the Serb side, I sent

21 out letters to each of the opstinas telling them there were Croats, or

22 expected Croats, so many in -- in your opstina. When this letter arrived

23 in Glina, part of what I was originally concerned began it play out,

24 because now they started focusing on them. And it was also -- even before

25 the letters were sent out, it was also Glina where a lot of hostilities

1 was unleashed, including the murders mentioned earlier on Croats.

2 So this situation became critical enough because those villages

3 which I identified as containing mostly Croats, began to be terrorised,

4 the people there began to get repercussions. We didn't have enough of our

5 protection forces deployed in those villages where this was occurring. So

6 I used -- this memo, I used it to formally request the sector commander to

7 adjust the deployment of the military contingents closer to where these

8 villages were, to give them some relief by the mere presence of UNPROFOR,

9 because there was a constant harassment of the -- of the people in those

10 seven villages, particularly one of them called Maja.

11 Q. You were still in the area in 1993. Did this pattern of

12 harassment, ill treatment, did it continue in 1993?

13 A. 1993, the time-line -- I wish I remembered the date because I

14 don't have it ready in my head when Medak attack, the Croats attacked

15 viciously, unexpectedly, with such force a village called Medak. I don't

16 have that date, but it's a watershed date because the reaction of the

17 Serbs was particularly also and expected to have been very -- there was a

18 big back-lash.

19 Q. May I interrupt just for a second? To your knowledge, this Medak

20 village, was it in the pink zone?

21 A. No -- probably, but it was in Sector South, that's why I don't

22 have the details. It was not in my sector. But remember, events I said

23 earlier, in all sectors, if they were precipitated events by one side or

24 the other had an affect in all sectors. The effect of Medak was while the

25 Croats were resisting all the time, the pressure for those Croats who

1 wanted because of insecurity to cross over the line -- the conflict and go

2 and join their friends and others, either in Karlovac or Sisak, the Croats

3 would refuse to let them come. But after Medak, they knew they can't

4 maintain that policy, and they opened -- they made it much easier for any

5 Croat who wanted to take refuge across the border. So the numbers of

6 those people who were -- who had -- Croats left behind was suddenly

7 reduced by those who fled after Medak or possible repercussions.

8 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to move this document into evidence.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

10 please be given an exhibit number.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it will be Exhibit 763, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

13 Yes, Ms. Richterova.

14 MS. RICHTEROVA: I would like to display another document, and it

15 is 887.

16 Q. This document is dated 10 of February, 1994. You can see that we

17 move a little bit forward in the time. At this time, you were still in

18 Sector North.

19 MS. RICHTEROVA: If we could go to page 2, a little bit

20 scrolled -- now it's too much. I'm sorry. Thank you.

21 Q. In the second paragraph, this document talks about result of the

22 elections that Mr. Martic was elected president. And at the end of this

23 paragraph, it says, "It was against this eventuality that Martic won

24 support of Milosevic against Babic in the recent campaign and won. Now

25 the question is whether or not he, Martic, can govern."

1 Did you follow still -- in the Sector North, did you follow the

2 events -- the elections in Republika --

3 A. We did.

4 Q. You made this comment, "support of Milosevic." So how did you --

5 based on the knowledge of the situation, the political situation, how did

6 you view the result of the elections?

7 A. This election was very well publicised. It was -- there was a --

8 I hasten to call it a campaign. There was a lot of talk about this

9 election, about ballots being printed and reprinted, and it was something

10 that occupied all leaders that we spoke with, about this election.

11 Now, bear in mind it was a contest that pitted Mr. Martic and

12 Mr. Babic, and Mr. Babic's view of this sector -- I started yesterday to

13 mention that from the very beginning, Mr. Babic didn't see eye to eye on

14 Vance Plan. As a matter of fact, he had -- was originally expected to

15 sign that Vance Plan and didn't -- because he didn't like it, he refused

16 to sign it. And instead, Mile Paspalj, the gentleman I spoke about,

17 signed it at the request of Mr. Milosevic.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me. I thought you talked about this a

19 little earlier today.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: And I thought you then said it was Mr. Martic who

22 refused to sign, not Babic.

23 THE WITNESS: No, no, no, it's Babic.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's Babic.

25 THE WITNESS: It's Babic.

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: So I must have been --

2 THE WITNESS: Not Mr. Martic.

3 Now in this context, because Mr. Milosevic had a certain vision of

4 how all this matter should end - I won't go into details, I had occasion

5 to talk to him personally on it so I can summarise - it was not possible

6 for Babic to -- for Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Babic to see eye to eye if he

7 was in charge, if he had won the election. The direction of how all of

8 this will go would not have gone in the direction Mr. Milosevic was

9 envisioning. So this election was fought, and there were a lot of talk

10 about ballots and no ballots, but in the end he won. And my surmising was

11 that he won because he had the support from Belgrade this -- and that's

12 what I said, "support of Milosevic" on this matter.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: What -- what do you read into -- you mentioned

14 twice now. You said, there were printing and reprinting of papers, and

15 then you said there were ballots and not ballots. What do you read into

16 that.

17 THE WITNESS: I got the idea that there was a lot of contest about

18 whether -- how the voting went locally. We were -- we had no role to

19 participate in it, so we were just watchers of what was going on. And I

20 was hearing there were not enough ballots here. They have sent new

21 ballots there. That sort of thing. In an election when you're hearing

22 about ballots being printed, sent here and there, you know what, it can

23 always mean a whole lot of things.

24 MS. RICHTEROVA:

25 Q. A question following is: Do you know where these ballots were

1 printed?

2 A. Went -- without saying everything, that was in support of this

3 UNPA was being done from Belgrade. Though I didn't see them actually

4 being printed, it would have been hard to imagine they were being printed

5 in Zagreb.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 MS. RICHTEROVA: Your Honour, I can see that it's already a little

8 bit after 7.00, and I will start a new area and it will -- it won't take

9 very long, tomorrow of course.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Ms. Richterova.

11 It is 7.00 or actually five past 7.00. We are going to adjourn

12 and we will carry on tomorrow at quarter past 2.00. Tomorrow at quarter

13 past 2.00 in the same courtroom. Court adjourned.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 1st day of

16 June, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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