1 Thursday, 14 September 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning. Good morning.
7 Yes, Mr. Black, good morning.
8 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. And I think you customarily
9 also remind the witness of his oath.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Thank you so much.
11 Witness, let me take this opportunity to remind you that you are
12 still bound by the declaration you made at the beginning of the -- your
13 testimony, to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing else but the
14 truth. Thank you.
15 MR. BLACK: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
16 WITNESS: LAZAR MACURA [Resumed]
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Black: [Continued]
19 Q. Good morning, Mr. Macura.
20 A. [In English] Good morning, Mr. Prosecutor.
21 Q. At the end of the day yesterday we were talking a little bit about
22 the end of August 1990 and the barricades, so I am going to continue with
23 that topic, okay?
24 A. [Interpretation] May I ask for something from the Trial Chamber,
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may. Go ahead.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I, of course, don't know what
3 questions the Prosecutor is going to ask, but if he asks questions about
4 territory of the former Yugoslavia, I would like to be given a map of the
5 former Yugoslavia so that we don't speak about an imaginary country, but
6 that we are all able to see what it looked like on the ground, if it's
7 possible. Thank you.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just wait for the questions, and I'm sure the
9 Prosecutor will attend to that problem if and when the need arises.
10 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. I hadn't intended to ask any
11 questions that would require a map, but if I do, I'm sure one can be
12 provided to the witness.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MR. BLACK:
15 Q. Mr. Macura, if you think you need a map, you can ask for one,
16 although as I said, I don't think it is going to be necessary.
17 So let me go back to August 1990 and the barricades which we were
18 talking about at the end of the day yesterday.
19 You suggested in the first part of your testimony, in your direct
20 examination, that the barricades were initially erected spontaneously, but
21 then later they were organised and you said because so many barricades
22 were causing communication problems. Do you remember telling us about
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. You also testified that on the 17th of August, 1990, and the two
1 or three days after that, you personally participated in organising and
2 coordinating the barricades until Milan Babic relieved you of that duty a
3 couple of days after the 17th; correct?
4 A. Yes, that is correct. I was at the warning centre, and there I
5 was in communication with the barricades or the roadblocks.
6 Q. And I think the words that you used on Monday were that you were
7 the unofficial -- an unofficial commander of the barricades during that;
9 A. I used the term only conditionally. I was the deputy commander of
10 the Crisis Staff, because in the state of an emergency you set up a Crisis
11 Staff, that's according to the statute of the municipality, and because
12 President Babic was not present in Knin at the time, I had to take his
13 place and perform these duties.
14 Q. Okay. Well, in fact, from the 17th of August, 1990, Milan Babic
15 was -- excuse me, Milan Martic, I apologise, was in command of the
16 barricades, right, from -- already from the 17th of August.
17 A. I think that is not correct.
18 Q. Okay. Well, I'd like to -- I'm going to read to you --
19 A. Because I know that Mr. Babic replaced me on the third day. But
20 as I told you, Mr. Prosecutor, I did not take note of the dates or
21 anything, but I think that is how it was. On the third day, I was
22 relieved of my duty, and Milan Babic phoned me and told me that I
23 replaced, I said fine, and I no longer had anything to do with it.
24 Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you a couple of more questions about what
25 you've just said. And first, I would like to show you -- I would actually
1 like to show you part of Exhibit 496 in evidence. Mr. Macura, this is an
2 interview Milan Martic gave to the BBC in October of 1994.
3 Hopefully in a moment we can see it on our screens and I will show
4 you the part that I'm interested in.
5 I'm not 100 per cent sure, but I think another button needs to be
6 pushed like a broadcast button so that it's actually e-court that we're
7 seeing on the screen. Right now we're seeing the e-court version of the
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're talking above me, Mr. Black.
10 MR. BLACK: I apologise, Your Honour. I was trying to assist the
11 court officer.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: We don't need to do anything on our screens.
13 MR. BLACK: We shouldn't need to do anything, Your Honour. It is
14 just the regular e-court button, that's what we need to press. I
15 apologise for the confusion.
16 Actually, the particular page I would like to look at is -- has at
17 the top 02195509. I think it is about the sixth page.
18 Just a moment, Mr. Macura. We're having some technical issues.
19 THE WITNESS: It's all right. No problem. No problem. Just do
20 your job. It's all right.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. We have a technical problem with
22 e-court and the technician will be coming to help.
23 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. Should we just wait for a
24 moment. Is it going to be right away or should I ...
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe let's just wait for a moment and hopefully he
1 will be coming almost right away. Or am I wrong?
2 THE REGISTRAR: He will be coming any moment.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 [Technical difficulty]
5 THE WITNESS: If I may help? If you have an original in
6 English --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not a problem. We don't have a need for your help,
8 Mr. Macura. It is not a question of language. It is a question of
10 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's okay.
12 MR. BLACK:
13 Q. Mr. Macura, do you have something on your screen now? Can you see
14 a document on your screen?
15 A. [In English] United Nations. Now United Nations.
16 Q. That's not it. Let's see if ...
17 MR. BLACK: I don't know if this is of assistance, but if we can
18 make sure that the Defence and the accused and the witness have it, then
19 we can certainly get by on the Prosecution side.
20 [Technical difficulty]
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: It looks like it is going to take a little longer
22 to repair the problem. Maybe we should take a break and come back at half
23 past 9.00.
24 MR. BLACK: Certainly, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
1 Court adjourned.
2 --- Break taken at 9.20 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 9.34 a.m.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just when we thought everything was fine, our
5 reporter reports that LiveNote has gone down. Can somebody help?
6 [Technical difficulty]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thanks. Sorry about all of that inconvenience.
8 Mr. Black, you may proceed.
9 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. Technology is a blessing and
10 a curse sometimes.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: The problem with it is when it collapses, then you
12 are done.
13 MR. BLACK: That's exactly right. I think we have it sorted out
15 So on the e-court we have the B/C/S version now visible to the
16 witness, and if we could turn to page 6, please, of the B/C/S version. In
17 the English I think we're seeing the right page. It's the one that ends
18 in ERN 5509.
19 To page 6 of the B/C/S is what we need to see. This is -- page 1
20 is what I see right now and we need to go to page 6. Yes. Perfect. If
21 we could scroll down to the -- a little further please, yes. That's
23 Q. Mr. Macura, now you see on the screen in front of you the
24 transcript of this interview which, again, I remind you it was an
25 interview give by Milan Martic to the BBC in October of 1994. And in this
1 paragraph you can see he talks about the 17th of August?
2 A. [In English] Yes, I can see it.
3 Q. And I think maybe it will be easiest if I just read out this
4 paragraph, and you follow along with me. It says: "On the 17th of
5 August, two days before our referendum, we got an info that Croatia with
6 its police had started to disarm the police stations in Serbian opstinas.
7 In Knin we allowed them to disarm us. In agreement with Raskovic and
8 Babic, we decided to take all the weapons from the storages of the reserve
9 militia and we made a false attempt as if the citizens broke into the
10 storage. We took the arms and from that moment I personally assumed
11 command over the roadblocks."
12 Do you accept that, Mr. Macura, that on the 17th of August,
13 Mr. Martic assumed command --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry. Sorry, Mr. Macura your microphone is off.
16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
17 MR. BLACK:
18 Q. Please repeat your answer.
19 A. [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, this is not correct. This is
20 simply not correct. I was replaced on the third day. I did not sleep for
21 two days, and then I was replaced on the third day. And then I took my
22 children halfway from Knin to Bosnia for them to remain there and then I
23 went back.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, you were replaced on the third day, from
25 which day? When was the first day?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was replaced on the 19th. I spent
2 two nights --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
4 Yes, Mr. Black.
5 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Mr. Macura, is it possible that in those days, when you tell us
7 that you were in charge, that you were in charge in the political sense,
8 while Mr. Martic was in charge of the barricades in an operational sense.
9 Is that a possible distinction?
10 A. That is not possible. That is not possible. I was in charge of
11 the roadblocks in any sense, because I was the deputy commander of the
12 Crisis Staff, Mr. Babic, so I was absolutely in charge of the barricades.
13 And on the third day, Babic replaced me, and from then on I had nothing to
14 do with the barricades.
15 Q. Okay. So in your view, at least would you accept that Martic was
16 in charge of the barricades after that day when you were relieved of your
17 duties. Would you accept that?
18 A. Babic told me that I was replaced. And apparently he then
19 appointed Milan Martic, but he didn't tell me that. And he told me I was
20 relieved of my duties, and I asked him whether I could then go home and he
21 says, yes, fine, you can go home now.
22 Q. Okay. You say that he didn't tell you that. But did you know or
23 did you learn that Babic had put Martic in charge of the barricades?
24 A. I did learn that at a later date.
25 Q. Sir, when you mentioned the Crisis Staff, is that the same thing
1 as what could be called the Staff for the Defence of Knin? Or is that a
2 different body?
3 A. The Crisis Staff is the civilian body. It's a civilian authority
4 that is set up in any state of emergency or any emergency situation,
5 floods, any kind of natural disaster. It has nothing to do with the
6 police. And somebody from those structures can, of course, be involved in
7 the work of the Crisis Staff, but that is up to the people in the Crisis
9 Q. Okay. Maybe my question wasn't perfectly clear. Did you hear
10 about something called the Staff for Defence of Knin which was then later
11 renamed the Council for National Resistance. Are you familiar with that
13 A. I didn't hear about that at the beginning. Later on, there were
14 some communiques over the radio, signed by that body, but I don't know
15 anything about that.
16 Q. Okay. And you never heard or learned that that body operated from
17 Golubic and had a role in the organisation and the coordination of the
18 barricades at some point?
19 A. I know that there was a police school in Golubic later on, but I
20 don't know anything about this Council for National Resistance that you're
21 talking about.
22 Q. Okay. Since you mentioned police, you testified that sometime
23 after the 17th, 18th and 19th of August, 1990, that the police took over
24 the operation of the barricades. I think what you said was that the
25 barricades were removed and check-points were set up. Do you remember
1 telling us that?
2 A. Yes, I do remember. That is how it was, because there were too
3 many roadblocks and only -- the police check-points were set up at only a
4 few places, and I had nothing to do with them at any rate.
5 Q. Okay. The police at those check-points, as you call them, they
6 wore uniforms and wore their regular weapons, right?
7 A. Yes. But that was not right at the beginning, but only later on.
8 And I can't really recall the dates.
9 Q. On the subject of weapons. You testified a little bit about
10 Croatia obtaining weapons from Hungary. It's true, isn't it, that on the
11 17th of August, 1990, as we saw in this interview, Martic and others
12 organised the removal of the reserve police weapons from the Knin police
13 station and they distributed those weapons to Serbs at Golubic.
14 A. If that is what Mr. Martic says, I believe that it was so.
15 Q. Well, and you -- you had at least heard that yourself at the time,
16 didn't you? Did you know anything about this at the time?
17 A. Well, I had my regular job, my regular tasks. And I had heard
18 thousands of stories during the war and I cannot really talk about that
19 now in court. I cannot say anything about it. There were rumours that
20 there had been people killed here and there, and I tried to calm people
21 down over the radio, not to panic. There weren't any people killed. And
22 I even sent people to check whether any Serbs had really been killed at
23 Osijek and they are verified that no one had been killed there, and you
24 know how things just spiral out of control in such a situation.
25 Q. Okay. This was actually something that Milan Babic knew about,
1 because Babic went to Golubic and saw Martic distributing these weapons.
2 Milan Babic never mentioned this to you?
3 A. Milan Babic never told me anything about any distribution of
5 Q. I'm going to move on now to events of 1991, so I'm moving ahead a
6 little bit in time. You mentioned a conflict in Plitvice on Easter of
7 1991. Do you remember testifying briefly about that?
8 A. Yes. I passed through that road a couple of hours before the
9 clash, through Plitvice. I was driving from Vojnic in a car.
10 Q. Yes you explained that yesterday and I don't need you to repeat it
12 But the conflict, the clash in Plitvice, that was actually started
13 when Serb policemen entered the area, which then provoked a response from
14 the Croatian police, and that's how fighting started. Correct?
15 A. That's what you say. I don't see it that way.
16 Q. Well, it's not really a question, I don't think, of how it is
17 seen. It's true that the Serb police moved into Plitvice before this
18 fighting started, and then the Croatian police responded to that, and
19 that's how the fighting broke out. Is that a correct chronology?
20 A. Well, Plitvice is the Serb territory with a Serb majority, and the
21 police station was set up in Sabarsko, and troops were masked there,
22 police forces from Croatia, and I don't know who went in where. I really
23 can't talk about that.
24 Q. Okay. So don't really know who went in where first?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Okay. Well, I will move on to something else, then. And it's
2 something that you just mentioned. I think you were referring, when you
3 mentioned Saborsko. You said during your testimony that Croatia set up
4 new police stations in places like Kijevo and Saborsko in 1991.
5 A. Yes. They brought in a large force, with the intent of attacking
7 Q. Well, you don't really know what their intent was, do you?
8 A. Why else would they bring in such large forces into a police
9 station for any other reason? I really can't see any other reason, except
10 an attack that they wanted to launch.
11 Q. Okay. But just so that I am clear. That's just your sort of
12 speculation about their motives, right?
13 A. Well, you can say that this is my speculation, but that's what I
15 Q. There was nothing unlawful about Croatia establishing new police
16 stations within its territory, right, on the territory of the Republic of
18 A. I don't know whether this was unlawful or lawful, but I think that
19 their intentions were bad.
20 Q. But wasn't it understandable that they would create police
21 stations in places like Kijevo and Saborsko, which were Croat villages
22 surrounded by Serb-controlled territory, given the tensions in 1991?
23 A. Well, no one attacked Saborsko or Kijevo. Neither Saborsko nor
24 Kijevo had been attacked.
25 Q. Well, in fact, Kijevo was attacked by Serb police and by the JNA
1 in August of 1991, wasn't it?
2 A. I don't know that that happened in Kijevo. There was an attack
3 later on, but I don't remember whether it was indeed in August. But at
4 that time the Croatian forces were already deployed there.
5 Q. Right. And Saborsko was attacked by the JNA TO and police in
6 November of 1991, right?
7 A. That's possible. That's possible, but the Croatian forces were
8 already there. The village of Saborsko, the civilians were not attacked.
9 The attack was launched on the Croatian forces that were masked there. It
10 was a military operation, at least that's what the Serb officers say.
11 Q. Right. But you didn't participate in that, you don't really know
12 what happened in Saborsko, do you?
13 A. [In English] No, no, of course not. Of course not.
14 Q. Another thing that you testified about in 1991 -- well, actually,
15 the date is something I want to ask you about. You testified about a ZNG
16 parade in a stadium in Zagreb, and you said you thought this occurred in
17 1990. Do you remember the parade that I'm talking about in that stadium?
18 A. [Interpretation] Well, I remember seeing it on TV because the
19 Croatian TV did broadcast this event, but I don't remember the date. And
20 I have to apologise to the Court, I never thought that I would have to
21 write down the dates. But at any rate, this was not a secret. This was
22 shown on TV, in order for even greater effect to be achieved, both on the
23 Croat people and on the Serb people. In fact, this was the -- an act of
24 the establishment of an army.
25 Q. Okay. Would you accept that that parade actually took place at
1 the end of May 1991?
2 A. No, no, I couldn't say that, really.
3 Q. Because the ZNG wasn't even formed until May 1991, was it? So it
4 couldn't have been -- there couldn't have been a ZNG parade before May,
5 because May 1991 is when it was created.
6 A. I trust that you are right. I don't remember the exact date.
7 Q. Another thing about the ZNG, you said that it was set up by the
8 HDZ, but in fact it was the Croatian government that established the ZNG,
9 not the party itself, right?
10 A. The political party formed the government, the political party
11 dictated all the conditions.
12 Q. But you agree with me that as it actually the government, the
13 Croatian government that set up the ZNG. It wasn't -- they weren't armed
14 forces of the party. They were a force of the government, Croatian
16 A. You may be right, but the HDZ initiated all that.
17 Q. Let me move now to the delegation which you participated in, that
18 went to Belgrade to announce the results of the referendum from April or
19 May 1991. Do you know the topic that I'm focused on now? Do you
20 understand me?
21 A. I can only ask you whether you're referring to the second
23 Q. Yes. The 1991 referendum.
24 A. Yes. I was a member of the delegation, that is correct.
25 Q. Okay. A little bit kind of background of this referendum. On the
1 1st of April, 1991, the SAO Krajina Executive Council had actually taken a
2 decision to annex Krajina to Serbia; correct?
3 A. I remember that the question at the referendum was: Are you in
4 favour of Krajina remaining in Yugoslavia and for the unification of
5 SAO Krajina with Serbia? I think that this is exactly how the question
6 was worded.
7 Q. Okay. What I was asking you was about something slightly
8 different. Before the referendum on the 1st of April, 1991, do you
9 remember that there was a decision of the SAO Krajina Executive Council
10 taking the decision to annex Krajina to Serbia? This is an agreed fact
11 among the parties in this case. Do you remember that that happened, or do
12 you not remember?
13 A. Well, that's how it was. Mr. Milan Babic was the chairman of the
14 Executive Council.
15 Q. Okay. And on the basis of that decision on the 1st of April, it
16 was on the 30th of April, 1991, that there was the decision to hold the
17 referendum with the question essentially as you stated it, right, that was
18 the chronology?
19 A. Yes. Yes, yes.
20 MR. BLACK: And, Your Honours, I would just note that that
21 decision of the 30th of April is Exhibit 148. Actually, if we could show
22 Exhibit 148 on the screen, just so the witness has a chance to see it,
24 Thank you. That's perfect. If we could just look at -- scroll
25 down a little bit to article 3. Yeah, that's fine.
1 Q. Witness, you will see there that it says the question to be
2 answered at the referendum is: "Are you in favour of the accession of
3 Krajina to the Republic of Serbia and of Krajina's staying in Yugoslavia
4 with Serbia Montenegro and others who wish to preserve Yugoslavia?"
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Black.
6 MR. BLACK: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Something has now popped up.
8 MR. BLACK: I apologise. I went too fast.
9 Q. Mr. Macura, this is - this is essentially the question as you
10 remember it; correct?
11 A. Yes. Actually, I remember that in a slightly different form but
12 now I can see the exact wording, but the essence is the same.
13 Q. Okay. I think that's all for that exhibit.
14 Mr. Macura, in fact Slobodan Milosevic reacted quite strongly to
15 the decision on the 1st of April about annexing Krajina to Serbia and he
16 even asked Milan Babic to withdraw that decision, didn't he?
17 A. Yes. Mr. Slobodan Milosevic was absolutely against such a
19 Q. And Milosevic asked that the referendum question be framed in
20 terms of supporting Yugoslavia rather than mentioning annexation to
21 Serbia; correct?
22 A. Mr. Milosevic wouldn't hear of a decision about its annexation to
24 Q. And that was because Mr. Milosevic's strategy was to arrive at his
25 political goals of uniting Serbs in Yugoslavia but not in such an openly
1 public way. Publicly he insisted that the rhetoric be about preserving
2 Yugoslavia, right?
3 A. That is your conclusion, and that is not my impression.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: What is your impression, Mr. Macura?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My impression is that Mr. Slobodan
6 Milosevic did not, at all, want any annexation of Krajina to Serbia, as is
7 written here. And my impression is that he did not associate the Krajina
8 with Serbia in any way whatsoever.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's not a question. The question put to you is
10 that it was Mr. Milosevic's strategy that the rhetoric should not mention
11 annexation to Serbia, but it must be seen to be annexation to -- to
12 maintain Yugoslavia as a unit. That's the question. What's your
13 impression on that?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think that that is correct.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Black.
16 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. It may be, Mr. Macura, that we're getting hung up on the word
18 "annexation," but you agree with me, don't you, that Mr. Milosevic was in
19 favour of the idea of all Serbs living in one common state, be it called
20 Yugoslavia or by some other name. He was in favour of that; correct?
21 A. He advocated that, counting on Yugoslavia's survival. But later,
22 he abandoned the idea. He did not want Yugoslavia to be brought down as a
23 state first and foremost, that was his basic strategy. But it was
24 aborted. He failed in it.
25 Q. In 1991, in May of 1991, the time we're talking about, he still --
1 still subscribed to this goal of all Serbs living in one common state, be
2 it Yugoslavia or another one, right, that was still his position then?
3 A. It was normal position seeing that we all were living in one state
4 and we wanted to remain in it. I, too, wanted to remain in Yugoslavia,
5 but not to live in Belgrade. I wanted to remain in it, living in Knin.
6 Q. And when is it that you say that Milosevic abandoned this idea?
7 A. Very soon, I believe. From what I heard from the lady journalist,
8 Mila Stula, who was close to the leadership, the Hotel Moskava in
9 Belgrade, and I had a lengthy talk with Mila Stula, this lady journalist
10 who was close to political and leadership circles, and she asserted that
11 Mr. Milosevic had practically renounced the Krajina in agreement with
12 Tudjman and that he had done this, that they had done this in
13 Karadjordjevo. But I cannot really tell you the date. This was quite
14 early on.
15 She referred to that. Also, to the fact, and I don't know whether
16 it is true, that Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman were talking about a
17 division of Bosnia, and in that option, the Krajina had to remain in
18 Croatia definitely. There could be no word of the Krajina's remaining in
19 Serbia, or of any such agreement being struck.
20 Q. But this was all later. This was after 1991; correct?
21 A. Well, I'm not sure that it was that much later, because already in
22 1992 we have the United Nations deployed in the Krajina, so that it
23 couldn't have been that much later.
24 Q. You would agree with me, wouldn't you, that in April and May -- in
25 April and May 1991 Serbia was providing support to the Krajina in several
1 ways, including the training centre at Golubic which you've mentioned,
2 weapons, and other kinds of support to the Krajina, right?
3 A. Yes, I agree with you.
4 Q. And the refusal to -- to receive your delegation, about the
5 referendum, that didn't interfere with those other kinds of support, did
7 A. I have no information whatsoever about that, because I was not a
8 part of those circles.
9 Q. You were asked a couple of questions yesterday or the day before
10 about peace talks in The Hague in September 1991. Do you remember that
12 A. That was in September 1991, and I myself was in The Hague as a
13 member of a delegation attending those talks. I believe the Presidency of
14 Yugoslavia, its members had arrived to The Hague before that, and then the
15 later they invited us also. Mr. Babic, Milan Babic was there. Dr. Smilja
16 Avramov was there, I myself was there.
17 Q. Okay. Sorry to interrupt you. We don't need to go into that,
18 indeed, specifically. But the purpose of that peace conference was to
19 consider the so-called Carrington Plan, correct, which was a plan to
20 globally consider the issues happening in Yugoslavia at the time.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Just so there is no confusion, the Vance Plan came later and it
23 was specific to Croatia, right?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you a couple of questions about the Vance
1 Plan. You told us that Cyrus Vance went to Slobodan Milosevic to
2 negotiate the plan; correct?
3 A. I think that it is correct, because after that Slobodan Milosevic
4 brought pressure to bear on Mr. Babic to accept the plan. But I did not
5 see Mr. Vance go and visit Mr. Milosevic, I can say that.
6 Q. Okay. But it would make sense that Vance would go -- speak with
7 Milosevic because Milosevic was recognised as the leader of the Serbs in
8 Yugoslavia at that time, right?
9 A. Yes. Okay. That is so.
10 Q. Okay. And it's also correct that the negotiations for the
11 Vance Plan were between Mr. Vance, Milosevic, Veljko Kadijevic, and Franjo
12 Tudjman. Those were the people who really negotiated the plan; correct?
13 A. Possibly. I don't know the exact composition of the delegation
14 representing the Yugoslav side. But given the offices which they held,
15 that should be the case.
16 Q. Okay. And do you remember that the first real step towards
17 agreement of the Vance Plan was a cease-fire that was signed by those four
18 people on the 23rd of November, 1991?
19 A. Yes. There were a number of cease-fires and a number of
20 cease-fire agreements, but they were frequently violated.
21 Q. Okay. If I could show a document on the e-court, please. And the
22 document ID number is 01198871. That's the first page of the ERN range.
23 This is a document I believe we only have in English.
24 I'm not sure if any --
25 MR. BLACK: Your Honours, do you have it on your screen?
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: No. We have nothing on our screen.
2 MR. BLACK: Okay, thank you. I don't either. We need to see -- I
3 don't know if they're having trouble finding it. The ERN number again is
4 01198871 to 8873. And it's a document that's only in English, so we will
5 all need to see the English on the -- on our monitors.
6 You know, it's possible that --
7 THE REGISTRAR: We don't have the document in our inbox. I'm
8 sorry. We haven't received it.
9 MR. BLACK: That's my apologies. I thought this was being
10 uploaded this morning. I brought hard copies just in case, so we will do
11 it the old-fashioned way. My apologies, Your Honour.
12 With the assistance of the usher, we have copies for everyone, the
13 witness, Defence counsel, and the Bench, thank you.
14 My apologies to the registrar for leading her on a wild goose
16 Q. Mr. Macura, you can see that this is a United Nations Security
17 Council document. And if you look at -- if you look at the fourth
19 THE INTERPRETER: Excuse me, can it be placed on the ELMO for the
20 benefit of the interpreters.
21 MR. BLACK: Yes. If we can put one on the ELMO, please.
22 Yes, thank you. Actually we'll be flipping pages so if the usher
23 wouldn't mind standing by.
24 Q. Mr. Macura, you can see towards the bottom of the page, there is a
25 paragraph that starts: "On Saturday, 23rd November ..."
1 A. [In English] Yes, yes, I can see very well.
2 Q. Okay. And it says -- it talks about Mr. Vance convening a meeting
3 with Mr. Vance, President Milosevic, President Tudjman and General
4 Kadijevic. And then the last line of that says: "The parties reached an
5 agreement, the signed text of which is attached to the present letter."
6 You see that, right?
7 A. [In English] Yes, I can see it.
8 Q. If we can just then look at the last page in the document, page 3.
9 There we see the signatures of Milosevic, Tudjman, Kadijevic and Cyrus
10 Vance; correct?
11 A. [Interpretation] Correct.
12 Q. So this, this is essentially the November 1991 cease-fire
13 agreement; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. BLACK: Your Honours, could this be admitted into evidence,
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
19 please be given an exhibit number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number will be Exhibit 948.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
22 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. And I'm assuming we want to
23 stick to the usual schedule, despite the slight delay this morning. It
24 would be a convenient time for a break.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe let's do that, because then we don't get out
1 of kilter with our schedule.
2 We will take a short break and come back at quarter to 11.00.
3 Court adjourned.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.15 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Black.
7 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Mr. Macura, just before the break, we had taken a look at that
9 November 1991 cease-fire agreement. And it was on the basis of that
10 agreement that then the details were sort of worked out. And in February
11 of 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution which
12 provided for the deployment of UN peacekeepers, right?
13 A. That is right.
14 Q. At the time of these negotiations at the end of 1991, Slobodan
15 Milosevic, he was not a member of the SFRY federal government, right?
16 A. No, he wasn't.
17 Q. And Milosevic didn't consult with Krajina leaders in his
18 negotiations with Mr. Vance and the others, did he?
19 A. No, he had no need to.
20 Q. What do you mean by "he had no need to"?
21 A. Mr. Milosevic could only issue orders to the Krajina, rather than
22 consult with it.
23 Q. Okay. And the Krajina leadership later complained about that lack
24 of consultation, including at the SFRY Presidency sessions; correct?
25 A. The Krajina leadership was in a subordinated position, but had no
1 one to complain to. I don't know how do you mean that. How you mean
2 that, to complain to whom? Because Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Bora Jovic were
3 two of a kind. They shared -- they had a shared opinion. Bora -- sorry,
4 Bora Jovic was at the federal level and Slobodan Milosevic at the
5 republican level, that of Serbia. We had no one to complain to, actually.
6 Q. Well, what I mean -- you yourself talked about Krajina leaders
7 going to Belgrade to a meeting with members of the SFRY Presidency, and
8 you talked about the discussions there, right?
9 A. That is true. And actually, we were being imposed a solution that
10 we were against, but it was imposed on us.
11 Q. Right. But what I meant to say was that the Krajina leadership,
12 at those Presidency sessions, they voiced their discontent. They
13 complained about the fact that they hadn't been consulted, right?
14 A. Yes, that is right, because we were talking about our own mix.
15 Q. You testified a little bit yesterday and maybe the day before
16 about the attitude of Serbia and the remainder of Yugoslavia towards the
17 Krajina Serbs, so I want to ask you a couple of questions about that.
18 First, you referred to a meeting of the SFRY Presidency. Did you
19 personally attend that meeting?
20 A. Yes, I did. I personally attended that meeting, and there were
21 many of us at it.
22 Q. Can you remember the date or even the month of that meeting?
23 A. I do not recall that, but it was certainly after this cease-fire
24 agreement, when already actions aimed at toppling the government of Milan
25 Babic were underway.
1 Q. Sorry, it was certainly after November 1991 --
2 A. Yes. I think that it couldn't have been any other way.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. Because it was associated with the Vance Plan. It was directly
5 connected with the Vance Plan, with its acceptance, in fact.
6 Q. Okay. So it probably would have been in December or January,
7 December 1991 or January 1992; is that right?
8 A. That's right.
9 Q. Do you know if you were recorded in the minutes as being present
10 at that meeting?
11 A. I don't know about that. I didn't check it. I was probably
12 recorded in the minutes as attending the meeting.
13 Q. Okay. Is there any reason why your name wouldn't appear on the
14 minutes? So that if I, or someone else, were to go look through those
15 minutes of the sessions from December and January, is there any reason why
16 you might not appear there, that you can think of?
17 A. I can't think of any reason why I shouldn't feature on the
18 minutes, in the minutes, but if someone had that kind of a reason, I
19 wasn't aware of it.
20 Q. Okay. Serb leaders, both in Serbia and in the federal government
21 of Yugoslavia, they had several reasons for supporting the Vance Plan, and
22 they explained some of those reasons at the Presidency session, right?
23 A. Yes. And they gave us guarantees that they would be the ones to
24 protect the Serbs in the Krajina. In military terms, that would have been
25 the Yugoslav People's Army. So that they reassured us that we would be
1 completely protected by the UNPROFOR and by the JNA, which was a right of
2 Knin, 15 or 20 kilometres from Knin in Grahovo. And that is quite near
3 the border with Bosnia, as is Knin.
4 Q. Okay. Let me just focus for a second on the reasons why Serbia
5 and the Yugoslav authorities supported the Vance Plan.
6 They thought, really, that there were only two alternatives at
7 that point: Accept the Vance Plan, or continue with the war. That was
8 the way they saw the two alternatives, right?
9 A. Possibly. That is possible.
10 Q. And Serbia, in particular, was not enthusiastic about continuing
11 with the war, right, in part because there was an anti-war movement in
12 Serbia at that time, which opposed the war in Croatia?
13 A. I think that that was rather on account of external factors,
14 because at the talks which we had with Mr. Jovanovic, who was the foreign
15 minister at the time, he told us that they were being threatened, that
16 Belgrade was being threatened with bombing, if the conflicts in Croatia
17 continued. So that I believe that it was rather on account of these
18 external pressures than on account of the internal situation that that was
19 so, although it is quite possible that some internal movement could have
20 been of bearing on that position, even though Mr. Milosevic had things on
21 internal scene under very good control.
22 Q. Then you mentioned external pressures. Milosevic and some others
23 in Serbia in the leadership of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, they thought that
24 rejecting the Vance Plan would make -- make it look like the Serbs were
25 not really interested in peace, that they were rejecting a peaceful
1 solution. That was the way they perceived this, wasn't it?
2 A. Maybe. That is also possible.
3 Q. Well, wasn't that expressed to you and other Krajina leaders?
4 A. Well, I have mentioned General Adzic, who actually grabbed
5 Mr. Stikovac by the neck to strangulate him, and he said to him, as I told
6 you: You Knin riff-raff, you see what the entire state has to go through
7 on your account.
8 Q. I think you mentioned that before. But I'm really focused on
9 isn't it true that this was one of the reasons that was put forth to you
10 as an explanation by the federal and the Serbian leaders, that they didn't
11 want to reject the Vance Plan and thereby allow the accusation against
12 them, that Serbs were rejecting peaceful solutions?
13 A. That is possible.
14 Q. Well, is that something that you remember from the Presidency
15 session which you attended?
16 A. Well, the essence of it was that Yugoslavia did not want to be
17 Krajina's victim, to be hostage to the Krajina.
18 Q. And that means that, really, Yugoslavia was facing a lot of
19 pressures from the international community and they didn't want to be
20 forced into rejecting the Vance Plan, because that would have undermined
21 their position vis-a-vis the international community, right, that was
22 their reasoning?
23 A. I believe that you are right.
24 Q. Another factor in the thinking of the Serbian and the Yugoslav
25 authorities was, they thought that by accepting the Vance Plan, the Serbs
1 in Krajina would also have a chance to consolidate the political and
2 territorial gains which they had made in 1990 and 1991; correct?
3 A. That is right, because they guaranteed to us that the Yugoslavia's
4 laws would be applied on Krajina's territory. That was guaranteed under
5 the Vance Plan.
6 Q. And so in light of sort of the reasons we talked about, it
7 wouldn't be fair, would it, to say that Milosevic or Serbia or the
8 Yugoslav authorities were abandoning Krajina by accepting the Vance Plan.
9 They were simply taking a pragmatic decision based on what they thought
10 was best under the circumstances, right?
11 A. The Vance Plan definitively amounted to an occupation of the
12 Krajina. That was our opinion. I believe that the people in Belgrade
13 were aware of that, too, but they were saying something else.
14 Q. Right. I think you explained that before, about your view of the
15 Vance Plan. And I was just interested in the characterisation of what
16 Milosevic and the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities thought.
17 It wouldn't be fair, would it, to say that they were abandoning
18 Krajina by this decision, but that was their pragmatic decision under the
19 circumstances, that the Vance Plan needed to be accepted and that you
20 would work from there, sort of within that framework of the Vance Plan.
21 A. I do not agree with you.
22 Q. How is it that you disagree? What about what I said was
24 A. I believe that in is not about pragmatics. They knew that Krajina
25 practically would not exist anymore, that it would have to be reinstituted
1 within Croatia's borders, but they were actually deceiving the people and
2 they were giving statements to that effect precisely with that purpose in
3 mind, to deceive the people.
4 Q. Well, that's certainly not what they told you and the other
5 Krajina leadership, right? Or are you saying they were trying to deceive
7 A. No, that's not what they told us, but they tried to deceive us,
8 and we refused to accept this deception and that is why we had to be
9 removed from the political arena.
10 Q. This decision, which you say was imposed on you by Belgrade to
11 accept the Vance Plan, that didn't signal the end of support, Serbian and
12 Yugoslav support for the Krajina, did it?
13 A. They had to pretend that they gave us support for a time. That's
14 how I see it. Just in order to keep the people deceived for a little
15 while longer.
16 Q. Well, it wasn't just a little while longer. For instance, even up
17 until 1995 people in the SVK received their pay from the VJ, right, so
18 that kind of support continued after the Vance Plan was accepted.
19 A. Yes. But this pay was really very low, it was miserable. It
20 wasn't something that you could live on.
21 Q. And I'm correct, aren't I, that the -- there was also other kinds
22 of economic support that were provided besides just the pay of army and as
23 well as police officers in Krajina?
24 A. Yes, that is correct. But there was some assistance, economic
25 assistance rendered to Serbia from Krajina and this is not something that
1 should be overlooked.
2 Q. Okay. Certainly before the end of 1991, you know before the Vance
3 Plan, you agree with me also that Serbia and Yugoslavia provided
4 substantial support to the Serbs in Krajina?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. And in October of 1991, in a statement I believe to the media, you
7 had singled out Milosevic for his "immeasurable contribution towards
8 finding a solution for the problems of the Krajina Serbs." Right?
9 A. I don't remember that, but it's possible. And I have to tell you
10 that when I said those things, I did not speak for myself, but in my
11 capacity as the minister of information.
12 Q. Okay.
13 MR. BLACK: If we can look at another document, please. This one,
14 the doc ID of this is 02642959. It is quite a large document. I'm only
15 interested really in one page, which is page 286 in the B/C/S and I think
16 we just have an English translation of just that one page. Hopefully it's
17 all in e-court.
18 Yes, that's right. It should be page 286 there in the B/C/S. The
19 ERN at the top will be 02643208.
20 Yes. Exactly. If we could -- there, if we could centre on that.
21 Q. Mr. Macura, this is from the 6th of October, 1991 --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, did you say there is an English version of
24 MR. BLACK: I hope there is, Your Honour. I believe it is coming.
25 Sorry. I will wait.
1 THE REGISTRAR: The English version is not accessible.
2 MR. BLACK: That's possible. Your Honour, and this is -- I
3 suppose if it's anyone's fault it is mine. It was just a question of we
4 get these things translated, sometimes they come in at the last minute and
5 we send them to be uploaded, and there is simply not enough time to get
6 everything done. It's really -- I am only interested in one line.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's go on.
8 MR. BLACK: And we will get a translation and put it into e-court
9 as soon as we have it.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
11 MR. BLACK:
12 Q. Mr. Macura, if will look at this, you will see that this is an
13 article recording some statements by you on the 6th of October, 1991. And
14 you see at the very end of the article, in bold, it says: "While
15 supporting all decisions of the latest agreement in The Hague, Professor
16 Macura stressed one more time 'the immeasurable contribution of Slobodan
17 Milosevic towards finding the solution to the position of Serbs in the
18 former Republic of Croatia'..."
19 And that was your view at the time, in October of 1991, wasn't it?
20 A. That was my hope, but it fell through.
21 Q. Right. But at the time --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me, excuse me. Can you just read that
24 MR. BLACK: Absolutely, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that statement expressed in hope or expressed in
1 commending? Does it commend Milosevic or does it hope that Milosevic is
2 going to ...
3 MR. BLACK: Perhaps I can read it one more time and then the
4 witness can answer?
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, please.
6 MR. BLACK:
7 Q. Mr. Macura, you can see, if you'll read along with me. It says:
8 "While supporting all decisions of the latest agreement in The Hague,
9 Professor Macura stressed one more time 'the immeasurable contribution of
10 Slobodan Milosevic towards finding the solution to the position of Serbs
11 in the former Republic of Croatia.'"
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: It doesn't seem to be expressing a hope.
13 MR. BLACK:
14 Q. Mr. Macura, at that time you were speaking --
15 A. From my perspective today, I say that this had been my hope, but
16 it fell through. I'm not a lawyer, so you have an advantage over me
17 there, but when I spoke about the nation and the ethnic minority, the
18 nation is an entity that has the right to self-determination. This is
19 what I spoke about when I spoke about the fact that Croats throughout
20 Serbs from the constitution, because the Serbs as a constituent people
21 would have the right to self-determination and to secede. This is what I
22 was hoping, that Slobodan Milosevic would achieve.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Witness, this has nothing to do with being a
24 lawyer or not being a lawyer. Simple language. You are being quoted
25 here. We are just looking at the language that you used. That language
1 doesn't express hope. It doesn't matter how much you rant and rave in
2 court here now. It doesn't express hope. You can see that, can't you?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you, Your Honour. Yes.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please.
5 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: What newspaper or publication is that, from which
7 document comes from? Because it says Frankfurt.
8 MR. BLACK:
9 Q. Mr. Macura, are you able to tell us that?
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: As far as I can read.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a newspaper published in
12 Frankfurt, in the Serbian language.
13 MR. BLACK:
14 Q. And the name of the newspaper --
15 A. But I did not actually read this newspaper at all, ever. Novosti,
16 that means news.
17 Q. Okay. In Novosti, or News, is the name of the newspaper. That's
18 what it appears to be, right?
19 A. Yes, yes.
20 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you.
21 MR. BLACK:
22 Q. Just so I am clear, Mr. Macura, in October 1991 when you said
23 these words you were talking about the immeasurable contribution of
24 Slobodan Milosevic up and to and including that time. It wasn't something
25 about the future. It was really about that time, right?
1 A. Sir, Rade Matijas is the journalist who signed this. Now I don't
2 know whether he quoted me correctly. We would need to have the transcript
3 to see whether I really said that, because this interview took half an
4 hour, an hour, not five minutes. So I cannot claim with any certainty
5 that these are my exact words. These are words that he may have put into
6 my mouth.
7 But at any rate, I thought that there would be a solution found
8 and that I would not be among the remnants of a people that had been
9 expelled and slaughtered.
10 Q. Mr. Macura, just please try to focus on this, this issue of
11 Mr. Milosevic's contribution.
12 A. [In English] Okay.
13 Q. In October 1991 you believed, didn't you, that Slobodan Milosevic
14 had made an immeasurable contribution to the Krajina Serbs.
15 A. [Interpretation] I don't know whether I actually used the term
16 "immeasurable," but it's possible. But at any rate, he did give his
17 contribution. Without his help we would not have been able to survive.
18 MR. BLACK: Okay. Could this be admitted into evidence, please,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
21 please be given an exhibit number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the Exhibit number will be 949.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 THE REGISTRAR: We have received the English translation.
25 MR. BLACK: Excellent. Thank you. And, Your Honour, just so it
1 is clear, and this is the same as last time, I am only interested in this
2 page, not the entire range of B/C/S, and so we will, we will upload just
3 that one page so there is no confusion in the future.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Just this page, the page and
5 its translation.
6 MR. BLACK: Yes.
7 Q. Mr. Macura, even after the acceptance of the Vance Plan, it was
8 still clear that Slobodan Milosevic and Serbia were the most important
9 supporters of the Krajina Serbs; correct?
10 A. After the acceptance of the Vance Plan, I did not play any role,
12 Q. Well, let me ask you to watch a short video clip.
13 MR. BLACK: So if we could turn to the Sanction, please.
14 Your Honours, this is -- the transcript of this clip is found at
15 65 ter number 2266, if that is helpful, but it is synchronised on the
16 clip, as usual. At least I hope it is.
17 If we could see that clip, now, please.
18 [Videotape played]
19 MR. BLACK:
20 Q. Mr. Macura, it was kind of a long clip. But you would -- well,
21 first of all, this interview appears to be from around January of 1992;
23 A. It's possible that this was the time, because at that time we had
24 a lot of activities in Krajina. And I was actually at the opposite end of
25 the spectrum from Mr. Martic. I did not subscribe to what Mr. Martic
1 said, because I had read the Vance Plan through; in fact, I translated it
2 into Serbian.
3 Q. Okay. So you had an opposite view. But it's accurate that
4 Mr. Martic, at that time, was still fully supporting Mr. Milosevic and
5 considered the contribution of Milosevic in Serbia to be the most
6 important support of the Krajina Serbs; correct?
7 A. It is clear from what has been said. This was said here quite
9 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could we exhibit this video clip and the
10 accompanying transcript, please.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry? Are you tendering them?
12 MR. BLACK: Yes.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
14 The video clip is admitted into evidence. May it please be given
15 an exhibit number.
16 And what else?
17 MR. BLACK: It's just the clip and the transcript which is at
18 65 ter number 2266.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: And 65 ter number 2266, together with the clip.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The video clip will be Exhibit 950 and the
21 transcript 951.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Macura, I believe you testified both that Milan Babic was
25 opposed to the Vance Plan and that you, yourself, were also opposed to the
1 Vance Plan. Correct?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. In December of 1991, Milan Martic held that same view, and he also
4 opposed the Vance Plan, didn't he?
5 A. I don't know about that.
6 Q. Well, you know that at least initially, at one point, he opposed
7 the Vance Plan; correct?
8 A. That's possible, but I really don't remember that.
9 Q. Well, perhaps I could -- I will show you Exhibit 518. I hope this
10 is in the box. I hadn't necessarily anticipated showing this.
11 I'm not sure if this was on the list of documents that we always
12 send to Defence counsel. If it was not, I apologise.
13 While we're waiting for this to come up on the screen, Mr. Macura,
14 so that it's clear, Babic was opposed to the Vance Plan as it was
15 conceived, although he would have supported it, if amended in certain
17 A. That's correct. That's correct.
18 Q. Hopefully in a moment now we will have Exhibit 518 on the screen.
19 Thank you. And if we could turn to the next page, please, in
20 B/C/S. It is also the second page on the English.
21 Mr. Macura, do you see that this is a document from the
22 SAO Krajina, Ministry of the Interior, from the --
23 A. [In English] Yes, I can see here.
24 Q. Okay. It's from the 12th of December, 1991; correct?
25 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
1 Q. Actually, if we can go to the last page, just to see the
2 signature, briefly. Thanks. If you can scroll down to the bottom.
3 That's the signature of Milan Martic as the author of this
4 document, right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So if we could go back to the second page, please. Thank you. If
7 we could scroll down a little bit so that we can see the second and third
8 paragraph. Perfect.
9 We don't need to read it out, I guess, Mr. Macura, but if you can
10 confirm to me. It says here that the Krajina Ministry of the Interior
11 agrees with the position of the SAO Krajina government that peacekeeping
12 forces could be deployed exclusively along the demarcation line. It says
13 that in the second paragraph; correct? Do you see that?
14 A. Yes, I can see that.
15 Q. And in the next paragraph down it says that: "... any bringing
16 of blue helmets," which is a reference to the UN peacekeepers, "... to the
17 territory of SAO Krajina is out of the question. The SAO Krajina Ministry
18 of the Interior rejects the proposal of Cyrus Vance."
19 That's what it says, right?
20 A. [In English] That's right.
21 Q. So on the basis of this, you would agree with me, wouldn't you,
22 that in December of 1991 Milan Martic opposed the Vance Plan?
23 A. [Interpretation] That's correct. But I was not aware of the
24 existence of this document. This is the first time that I see it.
25 Q. I understand. Milan Martic subsequently changed gears and he
1 supported -- he eventually supported the Vance Plan and the acceptance of
2 the Vance Plan, didn't he?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. And he was persuaded to that view by Slobodan Milosevic, right?
5 A. That's probably how it was.
6 Q. And certainly by January of 1992, Martic openly supported the
7 Vance Plan, right?
8 A. Yes, yes. At that time we were practically on our way out from
9 the political arena.
10 Q. Okay. And when you say "we," who do you refer to?
11 A. I am referring to Mr. Babic and his government.
12 Q. You would agree with me that Milan Martic had a different view
13 than you did. He continued to view Slobodan Milosevic as the leader of
14 all Serbs, all the way until he became RSK president in 1994; correct?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And, in fact, even during the presidential campaign in December of
17 1993 in January of 1994, he openly embraced Milosevic, didn't he?
18 A. [In English] That's right.
19 Q. Did you ever hear him say things like that if he won the election,
20 he would pass on the baton to the all Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic,
21 or him to say that he was proud to call himself a Slobodan Milosevic man?
22 A. [Interpretation] Well, I think that statements to that effect had
23 been made. But I can't now quote him verbatim.
24 Q. Okay. I understand that. And Martic received support for his
25 campaign from the Belgrade media, and from Serbia, didn't he?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Changing subjects a little bit, moving away from the Vance Plan.
3 You testified that Milan Martic refused to consider the Z-4 plan
4 unless or until the UNPROFOR mandate was extended, right?
5 A. That's correct. He had good reason. He didn't want to discuss
6 the Z-4 plan unless the mandate continued in the same -- with the same
7 conditions, because Tudjman had announced that the current, the then
8 mandate of the United Nations would have to cease existing.
9 Q. Okay. And until that mandate was going to be extended, he didn't
10 even want to consider the Z-4 proposal, not even really to look at it.
11 Martic, I mean.
12 A. Yes, yes.
13 Q. And that was his position despite the fact that international
14 representatives really urged him to consider the plan.
15 A. Yes, that was his opinion at any rate.
16 Q. Is it correct or, if you know, that Martic rejected the Z-4 plan
17 because Slobodan Milosevic told him to reject it.
18 A. I don't know about that.
19 Q. At any rate, the UN mandate in Croatia was extended on the 31st of
20 March, 1995, correct, and they changed the name and it became UNCRO
21 instead of UNPROFOR. Do you remember that?
22 A. That's correct. But the essence was the same, both under the
23 UNPROFOR and UNCRO.
24 Q. Okay. And even after that mandate was extended and the name was
25 changed to UNCRO, Milan Martic still did not engage in negotiation of the
1 Z-4 plan, did he?
2 A. I don't think he did, but I don't know any details.
3 Q. And, in fact, the insistence on the extension of the UNPROFOR
4 mandate, it was kind of an excuse. He rejected the Z-4 plan because he
5 wasn't willing to accept anything short of a separate state for the RSK.
6 Is that accurate?
7 A. That is your conclusion. I don't know about that.
8 Q. Okay. Do you have a different view of it? Or you just don't know
9 what his position was or his reasons at the time?
10 A. I don't know, because I did not talk to him. I was not in contact
11 with him.
12 Q. You yourself took a hard line position regarding the Z-4 plan.
13 You considered it completely unacceptable, didn't you?
14 A. That is correct, sir. And I will tell you why, if you allow me.
15 Q. If you can be brief, please go ahead.
16 A. Because this was a deception. This was not -- this was a trick.
17 This was not an autonomy for Krajina, but just two districts, Glina and
18 Knin. And this was not -- this did not cover even a fifth of Krajina, and
19 the Knin and Glina districts were not even linked with the same -- they
20 were not adjacent, and large portions of Slavonia and Lika remained
21 outside of that.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you for that explanation. I'm going to ask you to
23 look at another document, now. This document has the ERN ZA022624 to
24 2626. If we could see that on e-court, please.
25 THE REGISTRAR: I have a document ZA022614. Might that be the
1 document you're referring to?
2 MR. BLACK: It could be in that range and then I'm looking for the
3 particular page. I apologise for the confusion.
4 I see that that is the range that we have uploaded, so it is
5 probably around page 10. If we could move forward until the page, until
6 at the top of the page it has the ERN number ZA022624, please.
7 All right. Thank you. And actually, it's the next page that I am
8 mostly interested in. If we could pass to the next page, please. Thank
10 Q. Mr. Macura, if you look at this document with me, I'm sorry that
11 it's only in English. But this is -- this is a memo which refers to a
12 meeting between you and Grace Kang of the United Nations on the 2nd of
13 March, 1995. Do you remember that meeting or having meetings with that
14 person, around that time?
15 A. I don't remember any such meeting.
16 Q. Do you remember this person, Grace Kang? Is that a name that you
18 A. It doesn't ring any bells. I can't recall it at all. Then 15
19 years have passed, and I don't remember many things from that period.
20 Q. Sure, I understand that it's been a while back. And if we could
21 turn to the next page and focus on paragraph 5. Thank you.
22 Mr. Macura, if you look there with me at paragraph 5 and tell me
23 if this helps you remember the meeting. It says: "Macura expressed a
24 hard-line attitude with respect to the Z-4 plan. It was unacceptable
25 because it reduces RSK territory to 11 municipalities, leaving out towns
1 such as Slunj. He also expressed dissatisfaction with the concept of
2 autonomy within a Croatian state, particularly if autonomy does not
3 include a separate military for the RSK. He said, 'What can you do with
4 autonomy without an army?'"
5 Do you remember expressing those positions?
6 A. I don't remember having expressed such positions.
7 Q. It was, in fact, your position at the time that the Z-4 plan was
8 unacceptable; correct?
9 A. It definitely was my position that that plan was not acceptable.
10 Q. And was it -- and you were also dissatisfied with the idea of just
11 accepting just autonomy within the Croatian state, if you couldn't have a
12 separate RSK armed forces, right?
13 A. Well, sir, I can only say that, that I expressed my personal views
14 in that situation, but also, when I expressed my views as the minister of
15 the information, I was practically subjected to the discipline of the SDS
16 and the president, Milan Babic. I could give you interviews where I give
17 my personal stories, which are different altogether.
18 I was severely criticised when I told the journalist that I would
19 accept to live within Croatia if it were a democratic -- country. And
20 then I was harshly criticised at the Main Board meeting of the party who
21 said that this was not the position of the party. Of course, you have the
22 advantage here because you can, of course, extract what is -- what is that
23 suits you, and of course I can tell you things that suit me.
24 Q. Okay. Well, so that I'm clear, your rejection of the Z-4 plan,
25 was that a personal position? Or was it your position as a holder of
1 public office, or both?
2 A. I was not -- I was not holding at that time a public office,
3 except that I was the president of the Committee for Foreign Relations in
4 the Assembly. But it was certainly my position that the entire
5 position -- the entire territory of the Krajina that was under our control
6 should be part of that autonomy, rather than be compartmentalised.
7 Q. Okay -- excuse me, sir. And was it your personal or sort of your
8 public position that you were dissatisfied with the idea of autonomy if it
9 didn't include an RSK military?
10 A. That is still my position, because I couldn't trust the Croats, in
11 view of our history and in view of everything that was transpiring.
12 Q. Okay. Let me ask you about some other parts of this document
13 while we have it up. First of all, before I do, who is Borislav Mikelic?
14 A. Borislav Mikelic was an old communist cadre. He discharged
15 different political offices during the communist regime and he was also
16 the director of a large meat-packing plant the Gavrilovic plant in
17 Petrinja, and I know and knew him very well. He offered me two positions
18 in his cabinet, that of the minister of information and that of the
19 minister of education. But I wouldn't cooperate with him because I
20 personally held a very -- had a very poor opinion of him, and secondly, I
21 no longer wanted to be a part of the cabinet once the Vance Plan had been
22 accepted, because I knew that there were no chances at all for Krajina's
23 getting anything within Croatia.
24 Q. Okay. You know, you made reference to his cabinet. What was the
25 public position or did Mr. Mikelic have a public position or public role
1 in March of 1995?
2 A. At a certain point in time Mr. Mikelic was the prime minister of
3 the Krajina. I am not quite sure of the exact dates, from which date to
4 which date, I can't say. But at any rate, he was a person who had
5 dealings with the Croats on every possible front, be it trading in oil.
6 He was a businessman. And that is in inverted commas, "a businessman."
7 Q. Let's look at the prior page of the document, please, and I will
8 focus your attention on paragraph 1.
9 There it makes reference to the fact that this person Grace Kang
10 said she had an informal meeting with you. And then it said you explained
11 why Prime Minister Mikelic came under extreme political fire during the
12 parliamentary session, including for a vote of no confidence. "'We think
13 he is a good Croatian man," Macura said of Mikelic. Macura said he
14 disliked the fact that Mikelic 'does business with the Croats.' And
15 Mikelic wants to promote business relationships with the Croats, including
16 implementation of the Economic Agreement 'too fast.'"
17 That's sort of what you were just telling us, right, that was your
18 view of Borislav Mikelic at the time?
19 A. Yes. That's right.
20 Q. Does this help you remember whether or not you could have talked
21 about this at a meeting with someone named Kang?
22 A. No. Absolutely not. I really cannot recall it.
23 Q. You can also see paragraph 2 there on the screen. It says:
24 "Macura said the RSK would never accept blockade monitors on the
25 Croatian-Bosnian border as a way to extend the mandate."
1 And that's talking about extending the UN mandate.
2 "He would prefer war."
3 "Indeed, he made hard-line statements against UNPROFOR, including
4 a wish that UNPROFOR had never come to RSK territory because it only
5 protects Croatia."
6 A. I still hold that view today, sir. That is still my position.
7 Q. Okay. That was my next question. And actually, the last sentence
8 of this paragraph says: "When asked why the RSK wants UNPROFOR's mandate
9 extended, he replied, 'it was a game.'"
10 And that's right, wasn't it?
11 A. That is right, and it turned out that that was exactly right.
12 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: One moment, please. Where Mr. Mikelic is
13 referred to as "a good Croat man," was that sarcasm, he is in fact a Serb?
14 Or was he a Croat?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was not a Croat. His mother is a
16 Serb. I don't know about his father. But throughout that period, he had
17 dealings with the Croats, working with them on the reintegration of the
18 Krajina into Croatia.
19 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Understood. Thank you very much.
20 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Now we've scrolled down, you can actually see paragraph 3 there as
22 well. And it makes a reference to the Maslenica and the Medak. Those are
23 Croatian negotiations against the pink zone; correct?
24 A. Yes. I remember.
25 Q. And then apparently it says that you indicated that the RSK Serbs
1 will, of course, respond to these attacks with counter-attacks in a way
2 that will not spare the Croatians living in RSK territory.
3 Now, that is not in quotation marks, but is that something, was
4 that your position at the time?
5 A. No, no. That was never my position.
6 Q. If we could turn again to the next page and we will just look at
7 one last passage. If we could scroll down to paragraph 6.
8 Mr. Macura, here you can see at least according to this memo, that
9 you discussed the relations of Martic, Mikelic and Babic with each other.
10 And it says there that Martic's relationship with Milosevic is bad.
11 There was a change in the relationship between Martic and
12 Mr. Milosevic sometime between the presidential elections in 1994 and here
13 in March of 1995. They had a falling out. Isn't that correct?
14 A. That is probably correct, but you should ask somebody else about
15 the details of that.
16 Q. Okay. So I guess you're saying you don't know the details. But
17 you do know that that was the case, generally speaking?
18 A. No. Well, generally, yes, perhaps.
19 Q. Okay. Thank you.
20 MR. BLACK: Could this be admitted into evidence, please, Your
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
23 please be given an exhibit number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour the next number for the exhibit is
25 Exhibit 952.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
2 MR. BLACK: Thank you. Again, it is just the -- despite the fact
3 that we uploaded a larger range, it is just these three pages from
4 ZA022624 to 2626 that we would like to have in evidence. Just so that is
5 clear for the record.
6 Q. Mr. Macura, you remember yesterday looking at a photograph of
7 United States Ambassador Peter Galbraith, and there were some questions
8 about that.
9 A. Yes, I remember the photograph.
10 Q. That photograph was taken near Dubrovnik in August of 1993, nearly
11 two years before Operation Storm, and it was, in fact, published in the
12 media or other places before Operation Storm. Is that right?
13 A. I don't know that. I don't know about that.
14 Q. You testified that in August 1995 you and a RSK delegation went to
15 Geneva on -- sort of on the eve of Operation Storm. And you said that you
16 accepted all of Mr. Stoltenberg's demands.
17 A. That is correct. Correct.
18 Q. But, in fact, the RSK delegation in Geneva didn't change its
19 position at all before Operation Storm, did it? There was no change in
20 the position. It didn't accept all of the demands.
21 A. We accepted all the demands of the international community, and I
22 said what those demands were. In 15 days Croatia was to function in its
23 entirety as far as transportation, the oil pipeline, and other things were
24 concerned. And we agreed there should be technical commissions set up to
25 see that that is implemented on the ground.
1 Q. Let me ask you to look at another document.
2 Could we see Exhibit 391 on the e-court, please.
3 Mr. Macura, what we're looking at there, again this is just in
4 English. This is a cable from Gavin Hewitt, who is the British Ambassador
5 to Zagreb in 1995. You can see at the top there that the date of the
6 cable is the 3rd of August, 1995. And if we could just go to the next
7 page, please, and focus on paragraph 7. Thank you.
8 You can see, follow along with me. Starting on the third line it
9 says: "Stoltenberg, however, had reported from Geneva that there was no
10 indication from the RSK delegation of any shift in their position. They
11 were certainly not talking on the lines of Babic," who at this point was
12 trying to reach an agreement with Peter Galbraith. And it
13 continues: "They seemed to have no new instructions."
14 And that --
15 A. We had no contacts with Mr. Babic. He called up sometime late at
16 night. We were taken to a certain person called Daniel Boyer [phoen]. I
17 believe that he was a CIA colonel; that is what Misa Milosevic [phoen]
18 told me later. But Mr. Pavicevic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Geneva, took
19 us there, and we stayed long into the night talking with Mr. Boyer, and we
20 had no contacts with Mr. Babic. He probably was trying to find us but
22 Q. Okay. Babic was actually in Belgrade at the time while you
23 were -- and the others were in Geneva; correct?
24 A. Yes. That is correct. Now, whether he was in Belgrade, I can't
25 say. But when I returned there, he was in Banja Luka.
1 Q. And so when it says here that Stoltenberg had reported from
2 Geneva, where you were, that there was no indication from the RSK
3 delegation of any shift in their position, you don't accept that. You
4 would say that that is not true, right?
5 A. No, I don't accept it -- accept it. And I am really surprised at
6 Mr. Stoltenberg should have stated something of the kind. I'm not sure
7 that that is what he said. I know what we talked about.
8 Q. Let me turn to a different topic. You remember that Zagreb was
9 shelled by the RSK on the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1995; correct?
10 A. Yes. I heard about it in the media.
11 Q. And do you remember giving interviews or statements to the media
12 yourself around that time?
13 A. No, I don't remember, but I may have given some statements.
14 Q. Well, let me ask you to look at one last document. It has the
15 ERN 06037131 to 7132.
16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, Mr. Black, what is the date of this
17 last document, before you go on to the next one?
18 MR. BLACK: It's the 3rd of August, 1995, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much.
20 MR. BLACK: Okay. Thank you.
21 Q. And you can see there, Mr. Macura, this is a news article from the
22 Washington Post which is dated the 3rd of May, 1995. And if we could
23 scroll down to the bottom of this first page, please.
24 Mr. Macura, if you can follow along with me there on those last
25 three paragraphs where it refers to you. It says: "Lazar Macura, a
1 leading Croatian Serb politician, said his enemies in Croatia could look
2 forward to more such rocket raids." 'That's right,' he said in a
3 telephone interview with the BBC, 'you can expect some other clashes in
4 other parts of the border between Krajina and Croatia ... there are many
5 places which are very vulnerable.'"
6 "Asked if he thought the rocketing of Zagreb was a legitimate
7 military action, he responded, 'It's not legitimate, of course, but if our
8 civilians are under fire, we can't spare their civilians, too. So it's a
9 kind of fair play.'"
10 You said those things, didn't you, Mr. Macura?
11 A. I may have said it and I still today maintain that we are entitled
12 to self-defence. I consider that to be self-defence. If you are
13 attacked, you have to defend yourself. And you know about the Flash and
14 about the Storm later, and that was, I believe, after the Flash, right?
15 Q. That's right. It was at the same time-period of Flash. So you're
16 saying that at the time and still today, you knew that the attack wasn't
17 legitimate and that civilians, innocent civilians were at risk but you
18 defended -- defended and you defend today that shelling of Zagreb anyhow,
19 don't you?
20 A. Yes. Because there were just as illegitimate [realtime transcript
21 read in error "legitimate"] attacks on our objectives. So although it was
22 measure for measure, nothing more, it was a reaction. It was not an
24 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could this article be admitted into
25 evidence, please.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
2 please be given an exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the exhibit number is Exhibit 953.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
5 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Mr. Macura, I think there may have been -- yeah, there was a
7 mis -- we didn't get the transcript exactly right. Let me see. You said
8 in response to the last question that "because there were just as
9 illegitimate attacks on our objectives."
10 Is that what you said? Because what the --
11 A. [In English] Illegitimate. That's right.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you. So the transcript should reflect that you said
13 there was just as illegitimate attacks on our objectives. Correct?
14 A. [In English] It's not legitimate, so it is the same story.
15 Q. Okay. I think that is clear.
16 MR. BLACK: Mr. Macura, thank you for my patience with my
18 Your Honours, that completes my cross-examination.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Black.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.
22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Your Honours, before I start putting questions to Mr. Macura, may
24 I ask the Trial Chamber to admit as Defence exhibit the documents 1D0128
25 and 1D0129, because I omitted to tender these during the
1 examination-in-chief. This is the presentation and translation of the
2 title page of the book translated by Mr. Macura. I withdrew the initial
3 proposal, because this was meant to be done under one act. So I should
4 like these two documents tendered into evidence, and if it is technically
5 feasible for both to be admitted under a single number.
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Mr. Milovancevic, can you show us the place in the
7 transcript when you dealt with the question of tendering these documents
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, to avoid my
10 having to quickly consult the transcript, can I ask your leave to give you
11 this answer at the next session? Because I have to check during the
12 break, please.
13 JUDGE HOEPFEL: So why don't we deal with the issue after the
15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Milovancevic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Macura, do you recall that during the
18 cross-examination my learned colleague, the Prosecutor, asked you about a
19 resolution on Kosovo?
20 A. [Interpretation] I do.
21 Q. Do you remember that the colleague Prosecutor asked you whether
22 this involved a double standard?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Excuse me. In view of the fact that he presented to you the text
25 of the resolution, which reads that the sponsors of those -- of the
1 resolution were adamantly against two Albanian states in the Balkans and
2 that he also likened that to your request in connection with the Krajina.
3 Do you remember that?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. Can you tell us, in what region of the former Yugoslavia did
6 Albanian population live in? Most numerously, so to speak.
7 A. In the region of Kosovo and Metohija.
8 Q. What status did Kosovo and Metohija have in the former Yugoslavia?
9 A. Kosovo and Metohija was an autonomous province of Serbia, but
10 practically under the constitution it was above Serbia.
11 Q. Thank you. That will suffice.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we go a little slower. I can hear the
13 interpreter actually getting agitated and raising her voice in an attempt
14 to keep pace with you. Can we go slower, please.
15 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Sorry.
16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Perhaps it would be a convenient time to take our break.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is indeed such a time. We will take a break and
19 come back at half past 12.00.
20 Court adjourned.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.
24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. We spoke about the document entitled the resolution on Kosovo that
1 was shown to you by my learned colleague from the Prosecution. Do you
2 remember that the Prosecutor showed you part of the text from this
3 document that says that you advocate that the Albanians in Kosovo retain
4 all their rights that all the minorities in the most democratic countries
5 in the world have, education, schooling, health care system, the Albanian
6 academy of sciences; do you remember that? The Albanians, or the Siptars,
7 which was the more usual term for them, what were they in Yugoslavia and
8 in Serbia? What was their status?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please. Microphone
10 for the witness.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were an autonomous province.
12 Thank you, thank you, I'm sorry.
13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. In the national sense, in the ethnic sense, what were they? In
15 fact, were they a nation or a nationality?
16 A. They were an ethnic minority within Yugoslavia, or a national
17 minority within Yugoslavia.
18 Q. Thank you. When you say they were a national minority, what were
19 the nations in Yugoslavia?
20 A. The nations in Yugoslavia were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, I don't
21 know sometime in the 1970s Muslims also became a nation, so they were a
22 more recent creation, and Macedonians. And the Montenegrins, which I
23 think also became a nation at a later stage.
24 Q. In accordance with the Yugoslav constitution, who was entitled to
25 the right to self-determination?
1 A. The right to self-determination belonged to the nations within
2 Yugoslavia. Or peoples.
3 Q. Just one more question. What is a national minority? What is the
4 difference between a national minority and the nation?
5 A. A national minority comprises members of an ethnic group that has
6 its own state outside of the borders of Yugoslavia. In other words,
7 Albanians had their own state in Albania, and in Yugoslavia they were a
8 national minority, whereas Serbs were a nation within Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Do you remember my colleague from the Prosecution showing you a
10 resolution on Kosovo listing that you are strenuously opposed to two
11 states, two Albanian states in the Balkans, one of which would be created
12 within the borders of Yugoslavia?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In light of your previous answer about the status of a national
15 minority, the position of the Albanians and Serbs, can it be compared, is
16 it comparable at all in 1990s, in 1990, legally and factually?
17 A. These two cannot be compared. This is totally incomparable,
18 legally and factually, because one is a nation and the other is a national
20 Q. In the territory of the then SFRY, which was the only
21 internationally recognised subject?
22 A. It was the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and no other
24 Q. Did any of the states within Yugoslavia have the status of an
25 internationally recognised state? Any of the republics within the former
1 Yugoslavia, did they have such a status?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Do you remember the Prosecutor asking you -- and I have to
4 apologise to the interpreters.
5 Do you remember the Prosecutor asking you about Osijek and the
6 plight of the Serbs there?
7 A. Yes, I remember that.
8 Q. I would now like to show you a document. I would like to ask the
9 usher to show a copy to the -- to distribute copies of this document to
10 the Trial Chamber and to the Prosecution. Thank you.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Before I ask you to give your views on this document, the
14 Prosecutor's questions related to Osijek pertained to Mr. Glavas; do you
15 remember that?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. After those questions, the Prosecutor went on to ask you some
18 other questions related to Sisak.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. He asked you how do you know about who -- the casualties in Sisak.
21 A. Yes, I do remember, and I mentioned the name of Mr. Nikola
22 Dobrijevic as the man who told me about that.
23 Q. Now, could you please look at this document. This is an Amnesty
24 International report. This is September 2006, page 1. Of course, I don't
25 mean -- you don't see it on your screen, of course.
1 MR. BLACK: Excuse the interruption. Unless I'm misanticipating,
2 if that's a word, unless I'm not sure where counsel is going with this,
3 this seem to me to be something that should have been led during direct
4 examination, not reserved for re-examination.
5 If this is about crimes in Sisak, it seems like it is something
6 that counsel should have put during his direct examination, then I
7 cross-examined on what the witness knew and I don't believe that this
8 document addresses what the witness knew, but rather other additional
9 evidence of crimes in Sisak which don't seem to arise from my
10 cross-examination. And to the extent they deal with the question of
11 crimes in Sisak, that is something that was available to counsel before
12 and should have been used by counsel during direct examination.
13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this was not at my
14 disposal, and I did not intend to use it in my examination-in-chief,
15 because the witness is not from that area at all.
16 In the examination-in-chief, I merely asked the witness questions
17 about what he knew, whether directly or second-hand, in other words, that
18 he heard from others, and the witness spoke about that.
19 But in the cross-examination the Prosecutor asked a large number
20 of questions about the situation in Sisak, asking the witness to provide
21 explanations as to where he obtained the information he had and even
22 implying that this is all hearsay and rumours. So let's look at this
23 document then.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: What you are saying, Mr. Milovancevic, confirms
25 that in fact it doesn't arise out of the cross-examination. You're saying
1 very clearly it was not at your disposal at the time. So it was not also
2 at the disposal of the Prosecution. So they didn't ask questions out of
3 this document. They asked questions as a result of what you had led to
4 the witness to say, and I don't see how it becomes relevant at this stage.
5 The fact that the witness said he heard from other people, that's
6 what he heard from other people. The witness didn't hear from this
7 document. And you haven't asked the witness a single question relating to
8 this document before you asked him to look at it. So that it just doesn't
9 come in.
10 This is evidence -- this is new evidence. Otherwise the
11 Prosecution must now get an opportunity to cross-examine this witness on
12 this document, if you are going to put it in. And we don't have that
14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Prosecution is
15 always entitled to ask additional questions after the Defence has
16 finished. But the Prosecutor insisted on the claim that this witness is
17 talking out, is just inventing things, that he is not saying things that
18 he actually knows about. This is the only thing that I want to prove by
19 tendering this document.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: But this witness didn't know this document. So
21 it's not as if what he was being asked is what is contained in this
22 document. This document doesn't assist the witness in any manner, because
23 it's not -- his recollection doesn't depend on this document. He told us
24 what he knew. And what he knew is on the record. This document is new
1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will, of course,
2 comply with your instructions. I will withdraw this document. This
3 document could assist the Trial Chamber, not the witness. The witness is
4 here to assist you, us, and the Prosecutor. And if this is the position
5 that you take, I will tender this document through another witness. It's
6 not a problem at all.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, it's not a question of what
8 position the Chamber takes. It's a question of rules of procedure, okay?
9 We do things here according to laws and rules, and we don't just do things
10 because it becomes convenient for us to do things.
11 The Court orders that this document is out of order and it is
12 overruled and must be withdrawn.
13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Witness, as regards Mr. Glavas, the Prosecutor asked you if he is
15 a Croat nationalist and whether he was an extremist?
16 A. Yes, I do remember that.
17 Q. He asked you whether Mr. Glavas was a member of the parliament;
18 do you remember that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Did Mr. Glavas have any post, any position in the Yugoslav
21 Assembly; do you know about that?
22 A. No, I don't know about that.
23 Q. You spoke about the large number of people that were killed in
24 Osijek in your cross-examination.
25 A. I don't know how many people were killed in Osijek, but I -- the
1 Prosecutor told me that two Serbs, the murder of two Serbs are a subject
2 of a trial that is now going on, but I know that many more Serbs were
3 killed there.
4 Q. Yes. There are indication that many more Serbs were killed in
5 Osijek, but people are on trial for the murder of just two of them.
6 MR. BLACK: Objection, Your Honour.
7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] My question --
8 MR. BLACK: I apologise for the interruption, but again counsel is
9 essentially testifying now. I would ask that there not be comments like
10 counsel saying "there are indications that many more Serbs were killed in
12 I don't know if it's a leading question or if it's just an
13 improper comment, but either way I think it is objectionable.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, any response?
15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps this was an
16 inappropriate comment. I didn't even ask my question because my colleague
17 interrupted me.
18 I wanted to tell -- to remind the witness about what the
19 Prosecution asked him about yesterday. Okay. So I withdraw this part.
20 And my question is, if you are agreeable, Your Honour?
21 Okay. Now I will then ask the question.
22 Q. Witness, do you know at what -- what is the stage in which the
23 proceedings are right now, investigation, trial, judgement?
24 A. I think that it is in the stage of investigation and no judgement
25 has been made yet.
1 Q. So this is an investigation for the torture of two Serbs who were
2 later killed, 14 or 15 years ago; is that correct?
3 A. I think that is how it is, but I am not familiar with the details.
4 I'm not really following this.
5 Q. What is your view? Why this investigation is being conducted now,
6 and what is the objective of the proceedings?
7 A. I think this is more or less -- more a matter of a conflict within
8 the HDZ and that Glavas is not in favour with another faction within HDZ
9 and they're trying to actually remove him from the party.
10 Q. Thank you very much. I don't have any more questions about this
12 Can we now look at Exhibit 180.
13 The Prosecutor showed you an agreement signed by Mr. Babic and
14 Mr. Boljkovac. I think it is the 10th of December [as interpreted],
15 1991. Do you remember that?
16 A. Yes, I do remember. But I was not aware of the existence of this
18 Q. Do you remember that the Prosecutor asked you whether you had
19 heard that the National Resistance Council had rejected this agreement and
20 that there were some problems with Babic?
21 A. Yes. That is the question that I was asked.
22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness and counsel make pauses
24 between question an answer, please.
25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Please do that. And you said an agreement
1 between Mr. Babic and who else? The name? Could I get the name, please.
2 I think it is the 10th of December, 1991. Please repeat the name of the
3 other person with Mr. Babic.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was an
5 agreement on the 10th of September, 1991, and Mr. Babic led the delegation
6 on the Serb side, and the Croatian side was led by Mr. Boljkovac who was
7 the minister of the interior of the Republic of Croatia, and this is
8 contained in this document.
9 Q. Do you recognise this document, Mr. Macura?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can you read last sentence in this document, please.
12 A. That the minister of the interior is obliged ... I am unable to
13 read this word.
14 Q. Probably as the competent --
15 A. Probably. "... the competent organ to launch an initiative before
16 the Croatian parliament for the return of the SUP to Knin."
17 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether this document was ever tabled to
18 the SAO Krajina government?
19 A. I don't remember that being done. I don't remember.
20 Q. Do you know whether this document was ever shown to the
21 SAO Krajina Assembly?
22 A. This is the first time that -- I saw this document for the first
23 time yesterday, so I don't know anything about this document.
24 Q. Do you know whether the initiative was, indeed, launched before
25 the Croatian parliament to establish the SUP in Knin and whether that SUP
1 actually existed, the police?
2 A. [No interpretation].
3 Q. I don't have any further questions on this document. The document
4 can be removed from our screens. Thank you.
5 A. My answer did not get into the transcript. I said that this
6 initiative was not launched in the parliament for the return of the SUP.
7 Q. Thank you very much for your correction, Mr. Macura.
8 Do you remember that the Prosecutor asked you about the
9 establishment of the National Guards Corps, or the ZNG?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Do you remember that the Prosecutor made the claim couched as a
12 question that it was in May 1991?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you remember that this was, in fact, a parade of the ZNG at the
15 Zagreb football stadium?
16 A. Yes. It was in Kranceviceva [phoen] Street. It was some kind of
17 a parade.
18 Q. You say it was some kind of a parade. What does it mean? Can you
19 tell us, briefly, in a couple of sentences, what was happening there.
20 What kind of a parade it was, and where was this ZNG paraded, and before
22 A. In fact, it was a show of force. That's it, in brief.
23 Q. Thank you. But I don't think you actually answered my question.
24 A. Do you mean Franjo Tudjman? Okay, yes.
25 Q. Please, do wait, Mr. Macura.
1 Since you said this was a parade, were some people lined up there?
2 How were they dressed, and what were they doing? Were they moving about?
3 Were they stationary?
4 A. Well, this was the usual kind of parade, when you want to
5 demonstrate the kind of force that you have. I don't remember. I know
6 that they had their new uniforms on.
7 Q. Thank you. Did I understand you correctly, then, that this was a
8 military parade?
9 A. Yes. For all intents and purposes, it was a military parade.
10 Q. In May 1991 what state existed in the area of the Yugoslavia under
11 international law?
12 A. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in existence.
13 Q. Who represented the legal, constitutional and lawful armed forces
14 of the SFRY?
15 A. The Yugoslav People's Army did.
16 Q. Were the Yugoslav republics as -- did the Yugoslav republics, as
17 members of the federation, have their own armies?
18 A. No. They couldn't have those under the constitution.
19 Q. How would you designate these units that were shown at this
20 review, at this parade? How would you characterise them?
21 A. They can be simply characterised as military mutiny, military
22 rebellion against the state in which they lived.
23 Q. Thank you. That will do.
24 Do you remember that the colleague from the Prosecutor asked you
25 about a meeting in Geneva on the 23rd of November, 1991?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you remember his mentioning the participants, Mr. Vance,
3 Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Tudjman, and Mr. Kadijevic?
4 A. I've seen that document.
5 Q. Do you recall the Prosecutor asking you whether it was true that
6 Mr. Milosevic was representing all Serbs?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. What was Mr. Milosevic's function at the time?
9 A. He was the president of Serbia.
10 Q. And who was the prime minister, do you remember of the -- the
11 prime minister of Yugoslavia? Do you remember?
12 A. As far as I can recall, that was Ante Markovic.
13 Q. And who was the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia at that
15 A. I believe that it was Stipe Mesic.
16 Q. Were the Yugoslav republics members of the federation in position,
17 did they each have their own presidents, prime ministers and other organs?
18 A. Yes, they did.
19 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic have any constitutional and legal powers outside
20 Serbia in the territories of the other republics?
21 A. Of course he didn't.
22 Q. Can one say, then, that Mr. Milosevic represented all Serbs?
23 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Excuse me.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Such a conclusion cannot be drawn.
25 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Mr. Milovancevic, we are now in the middle of a
1 juridical seminar, aren't we? About the power of the president of one
2 republic within the SFRY? The witness is no expert in that. So that will
3 not help us very much to ask him his opinion in that.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is exactly
5 what my learned colleague the Prosecutor did in a very polished way,
6 without presenting either the constitution or the legal procedure and the
8 I'm asking the witness for his opinion as an ordinary human being,
9 as an ordinary man.
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: So --
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] My question is motivated by the
12 fact that, as far as I know, no one was the duce. There were no leaders
13 in Yugoslavia at the time. Everybody had their own constitutional and
14 legal powers.
15 In respect of Mr. Tudjman, who was the most authoritative of
16 Croats at the time, nobody saw fit to call him the representative or the
17 leader of all Croats. That is why I ask this question.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Black.
19 MR. BLACK: Objection, Your Honour. And counsel seems to be
20 saying that that was his explanation or his response to the Judge's
21 comments, but I think that he is just leading his witness to the answers
22 that he wants the witness to speak about. I think that is not proper.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.
24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if the question
25 of my learned colleague is whether Mr. Milosevic is the representative of
1 all Serbs, if it is a leading question, then my question is also leading.
2 JUDGE HOEPFEL: I think for cross-examination they apply to
3 different rules, don't they?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't understand the statement that -- I am
5 trying to read it and get its meaning. I don't understand what you are
6 saying, Mr. Milovancevic. I'm not sure whether you've answered the
7 objection by your learned friend that you are just leading your witness.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just tried to
9 explain. I asked the witness what his opinion --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] -- was, and I tried to explain
12 why I asked that question. I don't know whether you understood exactly
13 what I was saying. I'm sorry.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. I don't understand.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, could you please turn the
16 microphone on.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm so sorry. You know, given the way things are
18 going, it is just not very easy to keep pace with every little thing that
19 has to be done.
20 The problem, Mr. Milovancevic, is that when an objection is made
21 to what you are saying, in trying to answer the objection you want to
22 carry on to explain what you are saying the very thing that is being
23 objected to. And I can't you allow you to go there, because it is being
24 objected against.
25 Now, you've got to tell me why you think that what you have done
1 is not objectionable, without talking about what you were talking about
2 previously, because that is being objected to.
3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I regret the fact
4 if I went beyond the topic or failed to properly understand the question
5 the way it was formulated. I tried to respond to the objection, that this
6 is a legal question and to the fact that there was an objection to it.
7 I opposed the opinion that what I put to the witness is legal, is
8 a legal matter and also tried to respond to the objection that this was a
9 leading question. My position being that it is neither.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Then you've got to show us why it is neither a
11 legal matter nor a leading question. But you don't have to do that by
12 repeating the very thing that is being objected against. That's all I'm
13 saying to you.
14 Now you tell us, first, why you think it is not a leading
15 question. And then when we have settled that, then we'll go back to why
16 you say it is not a legal question.
17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I didn't utter a
18 single word to lead the witness to the answer, to suggest the answer to
19 the witness. I only asked him what his opinion was.
20 I fail to comprehend the sense of the Prosecutor's objection to
21 the effect that mine was a leading question. I certainly comprehend the
22 position of His Honour Judge Hoepfel that it is a legal question, but
23 perhaps it is a legal matter when we observe it as jurists, but to the
24 witness, it is just a factual question. Was Milosevic the leader of all
25 Serbs or was he not?
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I could interrupt you, Mr. Milovancevic. I
2 asked you to deal with these things separately. First, whether it's a
3 leading question or not. When we have done that, we will go to whether it
4 is a legal question or not.
5 Now you say, if I could deal with the question of whether it is a
6 leading question, you say you do not understand why your learned friend
7 says it is a leading question. Let's find out from your learned friend
8 why he said it is a leading question.
9 Mr. Black.
10 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 And my objection was not to the question, can one say -- well,
12 actually, can one say, then, that Mr. Milosevic represented all Serbs, is
13 also a leading question.
14 My real objection is that that's the question that counsel puts to
15 the witness. Can one say that Mr. Milosevic represented all Serbs? And
16 then, in response to Judge Hoepfel's intervention at page 44, line 13
17 and 14, counsel gives the answer to the witness. He says: "As far as I
18 know, no one was the..." And then it's not -- there were no universal
19 leaders in Yugoslavia at that time.
20 So in response to a question from the Bench, counsel is basically
21 giving the witness that he wants from the question that was not answered
22 before. That is my objection.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you now see that, Mr. Milovancevic? I hope
24 you've seen what Mr. Black has been talking about.
25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I propose how
1 we can resolve the situation? I shall simply withdraw my last question,
2 and I shall accept that this can be what my colleague the Prosecutor
3 says. I have gotten answers to my previous questions. I do not need to
4 insist on this last question, which I shall retract, withdraw.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just withdraw it. Don't tell us a long story,
6 Mr. Milovancevic. Fine. You have withdrawn that question. Therefore you
7 accept that you know it is a leading question.
8 Now, can you answer then why you think it is not a legal
9 question. In other words, you are now dealing with the issue raised by
10 Judge Hoepfel.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I do not perceive it as a legal
12 question, because the Prosecutor did not formulate that question as a
13 legal matter but as a factual question and some sort of a trap question,
14 if you will.
15 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Mr. Milovancevic, I didn't deal with the
16 Prosecutor's question but with your wording, which was constitutional and
17 legal powers. That was the words which were contained. But I understand
18 also that you are withdrawing the whole question anyway, so I say thank
19 you, and that's -- I would think that that's it.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. I'm sorry. I should have
21 seen that. Thank you very much.
22 You may proceed, Mr. Milovancevic.
23 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Macura, that the Prosecutor asked you whether
25 the photograph of Mr. Galbraith was from the area of Dubrovnik and taken a
1 long before -- before the Storm operation?
2 A. We didn't talk about that. We just talked about the photograph
3 itself, and I pointed to Mr. Galbraith on the photograph. But we did not
4 talk about Dubrovnik. Actually, the Prosecutor referred to Dubrovnik this
5 morning, not yesterday when we had the photograph displayed. That I saw
6 Mr. Galbraith on television.
7 Q. Thank you. As regards the date of the photograph, can we see a
8 document, and I only have one copy in hard copy. Can we please put it on
9 the ELMO.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that a document that you used during your
11 leading, Mr. Milovancevic? Before you put it on the ELMO, your learned
12 friend -- your learned friend must see it, Mr. Milovancevic, and decide
13 whether he agrees that it be put on the ELMO.
14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Certainly, Your Honours. That
15 is the photograph of Mr. Galbraith.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh, is that the photograph that we saw the other
17 day? Mr. Milovancevic?
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours. It is a new
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Your learned friend must look at it first.
21 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I don't object to it going on the ELMO, I
22 don't think, but I wonder why this is a different version of the
23 photograph -- or -- well -- or of the newspaper article than what was used
24 yesterday and put into evidence.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: My question about it is the same as the earlier
1 document. What is now going to be asked the witness does not arise from
2 cross-examination. It arises from a document which is a new -- which is
3 new evidence. That's my problem. We are now going to see new evidence
4 here on which there is going to be a need for cross-examination.
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand. Your
6 Honours, this is the same photograph but carried by another newspaper. I
7 am showing this photograph because of the date on which it was published.
8 The one that we tendered as a document was published on the 11th of
9 August, 1995 in the Nin, and this image will show when the photograph
10 was --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's new evidence.
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] -- taken and published.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: That new date is new evidence, and the Prosecution
14 then is entitled to cross-examine on this new evidence that you are
15 tendering. You didn't tender that evidence earlier, Mr. Milovancevic.
16 You know, we have to go according to the rules. Why didn't you tender
17 that together with the other one earlier?
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understand. But
19 this is a photograph of the same person, of the same date, on the same --
20 in the same position, atop a tank, but the one that we introduced is a bit
21 clearer than this one which is more fuzzy, and it is just a matter of
22 choice, which one we will use.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, you have just told us that the
24 date on that document that is in your hand is different from the date on
25 the document that we have tendered. Therefore, you are introducing new
1 evidence. You are introducing a new date. Now this is what you should
2 have done and you're leading. I'm not quite sure I'm explaining myself
3 clearly here.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I fully understand, Your
5 Honours. But if I can take another look at this document, I believe that
6 it is the same date. The photographs are both from August 1995. Except
7 that it is in another newspaper.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, don't testify. Now you are
9 telling us of the date of August 1995, which is the very thing that we are
10 trying to find out, whether you may or may lead into evidence. Don't
11 testify. Please.
12 Now take a look at it and check your documents. But whatever you
13 do, you've got to lay a proper foundation why you need to put this
14 document on the ELMO in re-examination, and the Chamber must rule on that.
15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Before you proceed. It is clear, in any event,
17 that you could not put that document, because you would recall yesterday
18 quite some time was spent having regard to the fact that you have made an
19 admission as to the relevant date and Mr. Ambassador Galbraith and the
20 truth of the statement which he made.
21 So having regard to that admission, I consider that the chapter is
22 closed there. By the horse's mouth and your own admission, why would you
23 now want to contravene what you have admitted before? What is the purpose
24 of putting this new document now when you have already made that
25 admission? It is part and parcel of the Defence case.
1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I fully accept the
2 view of the Chamber and I withdraw this photograph. So I will not be
3 tendering it into evidence.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic.
5 You may proceed, Mr. Milovancevic.
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Q. I would now like us to look at the screen, Exhibit 948.
8 Mr. Macura, you remember that you were shown a United Nations
9 document about meeting in The Hague, Vance, Owen, Milosevic and Tudjman.
10 A. Yes, I do remember, but it's not on the screen.
11 Q. This is a document in English. We only have an English version of
12 this document, if I remember it correctly.
13 A. Yes, I can see it now.
14 Q. Do you remember the Prosecutor telling you that in this report, a
15 report is made about a cease-fire agreement as the basis for any future
16 peace operations in Yugoslavia?
17 A. I remember that.
18 Q. I would like us to look at the very bottom of this document, the
19 lower part of this document. Can you please read the last two sentences
20 and then to read on what it says in the same sentence that runs on to the
21 other page. Could you just read it, not out loud, but just to yourself.
22 A. The last passage?
23 Q. Yes. Then go -- can we go over to the next page, this is 8872.
24 Did you read the sentence through, the one that you started reading?
25 A. Yes. Now I can read it to the end. But could we please enlarge
1 it a little bit?
2 Q. The information contained in this document to the effect -- in
3 fact, does it correspond to your memory of it? Because the Prosecutor
4 asked you, questions saying that this was in fact just one of the
5 cease-fires that was supposed to be the basis for any peace operations.
6 A. It says here that Croatia was supposed to deblock the barracks of
7 the Yugoslav People's Army and that there should be an immediate
8 cease-fire. There were many such agreements, but cease-fires were usually
10 Q. Did you see this sentence that goes on for the -- where it is
11 stipulated that the personnel and the equipment of the JNA should withdraw
12 once the barracks are deblocked?
13 A. I did not read that.
14 Q. Please read the sentence through to the end, the first four lines
16 A. Yes. The immediate withdrawal from Croatia of -- that it should
17 immediately withdraw and that the barracks should be deblocked, to this
19 Q. This agreement, then, obliges the signatories, Croatia on the one
20 hand, to lift the blockades of the JNA barracks, and the JNA, for its
21 part, should withdraw its personnel from the facilities that are under the
22 blockade. And this should enter into force on the 24th of November,
23 1991. Did you read that?
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. Do you know what was the situation with the cease-fire agreements,
1 and when did the cease-fire that led to the Vance Plan being implemented
2 actually come into effect?
3 A. I don't know the exact time line, but there were many cease-fires
4 during the war. They were often violated. I don't know the exact date
5 for this cease-fire, when this cease-fire was actually implemented.
6 Q. I will ask you one more question about the opposition to the Vance
7 Plan. What was your view and the view of the then leadership of the
8 SAO Krajina - now I'm referring to Mr. Babic - about the withdrawal of the
9 JNA from the Croatian territory?
10 A. Our review was in effect that the Vance Plan would lead to an
11 occupation of Krajina, not its protection. So this would be it in a
13 Q. Thank you. This is what you said to my learned colleague from the
14 Prosecution when he asked you this question. But can you tell us why did
15 you think that the United Nations arrival would mean the occupation of
17 A. Because the purpose of the Vance Plan was to bring Krajina back
18 into Croatia.
19 Q. Did this actually say -- was it actually said in the plan? Or was
20 it something that you yourself feared?
21 A. No. This is explicitly stated in the plan.
22 Q. When approval was sought for the arrival of the United Nations
23 troops, the Yugoslav leadership, was it for the plan or against the plan?
24 A. It was for the plan.
25 Q. Thank you. That will be enough.
1 Do you remember the Prosecutor asking you about the acceptance of
2 the Z-4 plan, or the reasons why actually this plan was not even taken
3 into consideration?
4 A. Yes, I do remember that.
5 Q. Did you remember that one of the questions asked by the Prosecutor
6 was whether, in essence, the position of the Krajina leadership was that
7 Krajina should not be brought back under the Croatian authorities, and
8 that this possibility was to be avoided.
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. Do you remember the Prosecutor asking you whether, in essence, you
11 were trying to elude talks and agreements, that you were uncooperative,
12 that was the gist of it?
13 A. As regards negotiations and talks, there were many of those in
14 many venues. But the Croatian side was never really in favour of
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Milovancevic. That question that you
17 asked, just for the sake of clarity, when you say the Prosecutor asked you
18 whether, in essence, you were trying to elude talks, who do you mean
19 by "you" There? And that you were uncooperative. Who do you mean
20 by "you" there?
21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I was
22 referring to the Krajina leadership, including the witness himself, at the
23 time, if he held an office there. So I was referring, in essence to the
24 Krajina leadership.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just to avoid confusion, because when you
1 say "you," I think you are talking to him now. Okay.
2 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the document,
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: The same document on the screen?
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. No, Your Honour. It's
6 a document in English. It was given to us by the Prosecution. This is
7 R0033582. It is a report by Mr. Annan. In fact, it is a report submitted
8 to Mr. Annan in New York about a meeting with the Krajina leadership. It
9 is dated 22nd of February, 1995. This is a document provided to us by the
10 Prosecution as part of their pre cross-examination disclosure.
11 I really have to beg for your understanding. I identify the
12 document by the number it bears at the upper right-hand corner. This is a
13 document that was given to us by the Prosecution. This is R0033582, I
14 don't know if it is a part of a larger document or not, so this is the
15 only ID -- identification that I can provide you with.
16 If it's a problem, since this is a document in English, perhaps we
17 can just look at it on the ELMO, to just speed things up.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: That perhaps might be helpful, Mr. Milovancevic,
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the document is not available in
21 e-court. Not on the number that counsel indicates.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now that we get that report, can you just show the
23 document to Mr. Black first. Let's confirm that he knows that it is a
24 document that's in the record.
25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] If I may perhaps assist my
1 learned colleagues, this is one of the documents from the bundle that was
2 given to the Defence as documents that the Prosecution might use in its
3 cross-examination. So this is one of the documents from this bundle.
4 This document that you have now before you.
5 MR. BLACK: I don't think that is the case, actually. I'm
6 familiar with another document with an ERN that ends I believe in -- it's
7 R0033588, which is Exhibit 97 in evidence, but I'm not familiar with this
8 document, as far as I know. And I think, Your Honour, that it may be the
9 same issue that we saw before. It's a new document. It's not in
10 evidence. And unless counsel can explain how it arises from
11 cross-examination, I don't think it is proper to go into it.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, we've got a problem. Your
13 learned friend, you've heard what he has said. You've heard what the
14 Court officer says. She says she doesn't have it on -- in evidence.
15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will withdraw
16 this document, so that we don't waste any more time and not to make things
17 even more complicated.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just a second, Mr. Milovancevic.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, I just checked. It is not
20 Prosecution or exhibit number 00097. It is a different document. Just to
21 confirm that it's not in our system.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. That's okay. Mr. Milovancevic is prepared
23 to withdraw it.
24 Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic. You may proceed.
25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Witness, does the name of General Delaprel [phoen], Mr. Musali
2 [phoen], and Mr. Biveld [phoen], do those names mean anything to you?
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Milovancevic. You see, when you
4 withdraw the document, you don't then go ahead and ask questions from it.
5 You put it aside and carry on.
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I'm sorry.
7 Q. With regard to this last question, whether the Republic of Serbian
8 Krajina was --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought you were going to the question of General
10 so and so, because that was the last question. Okay.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. No. No, Your Honour.
12 Q. Witness, you remember that the Prosecutor asked you about the
13 reasons why Z-4, the plan Z-4 was never even considered?
14 A. Yes, I do remember.
15 Q. When was the UNPROFOR mandate extended, in relation to this date
16 when the Z-4 plan was tabled? Do you remember that date was mentioned?
17 A. I don't recall the exact date.
18 Q. Do you remember that the Prosecutor put it to you that in -- that
19 in fact that he said that UNCRO was established instead of UNPROFOR?
20 A. Yes. In fact, the mandate was supposed to be changed, but in fact
21 it was the same mandate under a different name. In my opinion.
22 Q. Do you remember that you said that you were a member of the Serb
23 delegation in Geneva?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Who was the president of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina at
1 the time?
2 A. Milan Martic was the president of the Republic at the time.
3 Q. Answering the questions put to you by the Prosecution, you may
4 recall that he asked you what you accepted in Geneva. Can you tell us
5 once again, what you actually accepted in Geneva, as a delegation?
6 A. As a delegation, we accepted the proposals made by
7 Mr. Stoltenberg, but we did not agree to recapitulation which was asked of
8 us of by the Republic of Croatia.
9 Q. What were the demands made to you on behalf of the international
10 community by Mr. Stoltenberg, that you accepted?
11 A. It all boiled down to making Croatia functioning normally in any
12 way. Roads, railway network, the pipe -- the oil pipeline, and we
13 guaranteed that within 15 days everything would be functioning, that the
14 trains would run from Zagreb to Split, and that the oil would go through
15 the pipeline normally, and we would, then, have to just take care of the
16 technical side of the things within 15 days with the experts from the
17 Croatian side.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I ask you once again to please pause between
19 question and answer and speak slowly. The interpreters are really trying
20 desperately to keep up with you. It is not very easy. Please go slowly.
21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I
22 perhaps have just one or two questions and I will be brief and hopefully
24 Q. During these talks in Geneva, did Mr. Stoltenberg's presence --
25 was there anything actually that Mr. Stoltenberg asked you to accept and
1 you did not accept it?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Namely you accepted everything that Mr. Stoltenberg asked you to
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. And then what happened on the 3rd of August, 1995, in the evening?
7 A. In the evening I had an encounter with the representative of the
8 Russian mission to Geneva, where he informed me that the United States of
9 America and Germany had given the green light to Croatia to attack
10 Krajina. And also that they would assist it in it.
11 Q. Who would assist them, the Russians? Whom do you mean?
12 A. The United States and Germany, who had, as I said, given it,
13 Croatia, the green light.
14 Q. When did the Storm [realtime transcript read in error "US"]
15 operation start?
16 A. The Storm started on the next morning in dawn. On the 4th of
17 August at dawn.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I have no more questions for
20 this witness.
21 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, if I might, I think it's a transcript
22 error, but it reads as Page 60, line 17 "when did the US operation start,"
23 and I don't think that's what the witness said, just so that can be clear.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. Can you correct that question,
25 Mr. Milovancevic.
1 THE WITNESS: No, no, I didn't say that. Definitely.
2 JUDGE HOEPFEL: You were not addressed.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are not being addressed.
4 THE WITNESS: Sorry, sorry.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just keep quiet.
6 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. Excuse me.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just keep quiet, please.
8 THE WITNESS: All right.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic. That question at line 17, is
10 that what you asked? "When did the US operation start." That is the
11 question that is printed there. I think it must be a misinterpretation
12 there. Or a misprinting.
13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Sorry, Your Honour. I wasn't
14 looking at the right line. No. Of course that was not my question. I
15 have no grounds to put the question.
16 The question was: When did the Storm operation start. Not the
17 US operation, of course.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much,
19 Mr. Milovancevic.
20 Questioned by the Court:
21 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Witness, I would have some questions.
22 Can you, first, going back to August 1991, all right? Can you
23 describe, briefly, what you know -- the connection, can you describe the
24 connection between the referendum and the barricades. Just in short.
25 A. I'll try to be brief. We were threatened. Mr. Boljkovac as the
1 minister of the interior as well as other Croatian politicians, threatened
2 they would be preventing a referendum by every means available.
3 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Does this answer refer to the barricades?
4 A. Yes, it does, because the weapons had been seized prior to the
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: What do you mean by "we," and who organised the
8 A. [No interpretation].
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: We are getting no translation.
10 THE INTERPRETER: The witness said: I didn't say "we," but I
11 said "on the eve." The interpreter said "prior."
12 JUDGE HOEPFEL: No, no. I was referring to the word "we" that you
13 used: We were threatened. At least here you used that word. Please,
14 come on and explain, in short version, about the barricades.
15 A. That was not secret. This was published in the media, by the mass
16 media, that --
17 JUDGE HOEPFEL: That is not --
18 A. -- Zagreb.
19 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Just tell me, give me your answer.
20 A. I said that the referendum would be prevented by all means
21 available, and that came for the Croatian side. Namely, that a referendum
22 for the SAO Krajina would be -- would be prevented by all means available.
23 After that, they seized the arms in Benkovac and also tried to do that in
24 Obravac, and the referendum itself started on the 19th.
25 JUDGE HOEPFEL: You didn't explain to me really. I said, now
1 speaking of the Serb side, yeah, what is "we," and how came the
2 barricades, how were they organised?
3 A. The barricades were erected spontaneously, and then we placed them
4 under control. And that was after the incursions into Benkovac and then
5 into Obravac of police forces of Croatia.
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: So do I understand you correctly when you spoke of
7 yourself having had, I quote, "the unofficial post as a commander of the
8 barricades," that this role of a commander was meant in the sense of
9 controlling organ?
10 A. Exactly.
11 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Controlling what?
12 A. We had to control the people manning the barricades and their
13 conduct on the barricades. I personally went to the village of Padjeni,
14 because there was a car with foreign tourists there, and they were not
15 able to leave the Krajina.
16 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Okay. That's enough.
17 A. Then I ordered that they be let past, through.
18 JUDGE HOEPFEL: That's an example, in one spot. You were talking
19 about commander role. So I was supposing that must mean something.
20 A. Your Honours, I was in the warning centre. And I had telephone
21 communication with the people manning the barricades, and I had to give
22 them instructions as to how to behave in different circumstances, in
23 different situations.
24 JUDGE HOEPFEL: So that means it was sort of a coordinating
25 function? Or was it just a single communique --
1 A. You can call it that, yes.
2 JUDGE HOEPFEL: There was some overlapping with my last question.
3 I was saying or was it just a -- just a single communications.
4 And I take it you say one may call it a coordinating function? Yes? That
5 would then be enough about that.
6 A. Yes. I maintained a communication line with the barricades and
7 they communicated with me. So we could call each other through these
8 communication lines mutually.
9 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. Now, let me go to a different field.
10 We heard all kinds of names of politicians and saw them on the
11 documents, even including Dr. Karadzic. I was wondering where was
12 Dr. Raskovic? What role did he play at this time, which we discussed?
13 A. You mean at the time of the barricades?
14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Yes. In Krajina.
15 A. Dr. Raskovic played no role whatsoever in connection with the
17 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Where was he at that time?
18 A. I don't know where he was at that time. But he was not with us.
19 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Okay. As to your own political career, I
20 understand you were only a volunteer as a minister and also as the head of
21 the committee, of a committee of the parliamentary party.
22 A. Yes, that is correct. It was all on a voluntary basis.
23 JUDGE HOEPFEL: When you were replaced as the minister of
24 information, by whom were you replaced? Just a name, please.
25 A. I was replaced when the entire cabinet fell in connection with the
1 Vance Plan, and Milena Tanjga [phoen] was installed in my stead. Milena
2 Tanjga. And she was in Zdravko Zecevic's cabinet, which was the new
4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. Now --
5 A. That was in February 1992.
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Yes. I understand. Are you still holding any
7 position of a political nature in regards to the Krajina?
8 A. No, Mr. Hoepfel. I have no political position. I am a
9 professional translator.
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. Well, I am asking because some of your
11 answers sounded as the answers of a politician.
12 Please forgive me, but let me go back to an answer you gave on the
13 12th of September. This is the day before yesterday. And you
14 characterise being asked about the Vance Plan and about the United
15 Nations, that -- I quote from pages 8209 and 8210: "How basically we
16 Serbs seemed to be guinea pigs, because things tend to happen for the
17 first time to the Serbs or with the Serbs."
18 You remember? Do you remember? I'm asking you if you remember.
19 A. [In English] Sorry.
20 JUDGE HOEPFEL: I am continuing: "And so has this Tribunal" --
21 A. [In English] Yes, yes.
22 JUDGE HOEPFEL: "And so has this Tribunal been set up as the first
23 one precisely for the Serbs."
24 Then you continue: "But to go back to the original question."
25 So you did this without being asked about the Tribunal. I take it
1 that you have a --
2 A. [In English] I'm sorry, Judge Hoepfel. I didn't know the
4 JUDGE HOEPFEL: It's not about procedure. But your explanation is
5 shocking to me, and I was, in fact, expecting Mr. Milovancevic taking care
6 of that. He could have controlled you, and thinking about what you said,
7 I wanted to get back to that. I must say this statement about the
8 Tribunal is not only superfluous, but also wrong, and contemptuous. And I
9 cannot accept that.
10 A. [Interpretation] My apologies. I do apologise, but if I could
11 explain what I meant?
12 JUDGE HOEPFEL: No. No. No explanation.
13 A. [In English] I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: I will take your apology on behalf of the Bench.
15 I cannot talk on behalf of the whole Tribunal. I'm not a speaker of the
16 Tribunal. I cannot speak on behalf of the United Nation's Security
17 Council, who established, by resolution, within Chapter 7 of the UN
18 Charter in 1933 this Tribunal, but not as an anti-Serb tribunal. May I
19 clarify that. Thank you. That was my demand and my questions.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Judge. Thank you, Judge.
21 I suppose this would be a convenient time to take the adjournment
22 for the day. We will come back - what's tomorrow? - Friday. We are at
23 quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon?
24 We will come back tomorrow at quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon.
25 Court adjourned.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m,
2 to be reconvened on Friday, the 15th day of
3 September, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.