1 Thursday, 9 November 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning, everybody. Two little points of
6 housekeeping, just before we call the witness.
7 Mr. Milovancevic, I just wanted to check out with the Defence the
8 estimate of the time for the next witnesses, and also to know who is the
9 next witness coming so that if it is the one that I think it is, I can
10 raise the next point.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. The
12 next witness is Mr. Barriot. In our estimation, he will be a live witness
13 and there is a change, Your Honours. There should have been two witnesses
14 covering the same topic, and we thought it would be more efficient to
15 bring only one witness, to call only one, to save time and simplify the
16 proceedings. We also felt that live testimony would help us be more
17 expeditious. Mr. Perovic will conduct the examination-in-chief and, in
18 our estimation, we will need up to two sessions for the
19 examination-in-chief, not more. That, of course, is only an estimate,
20 Your Honours.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Examination-in-chief only, two sessions?
22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, thank you for giving that estimation and for
24 telling us who is next. Indeed, I did suspect that it was going to be
25 Mr. Barriot who was coming next, and I wanted just to say, moving now to
1 the next point, that based on the summary that you filed, it looks like
2 there are parts of his summary that deal with areas that have been
3 excluded in the oral order that we made the other day. If you look, for
4 instance, at -- yeah, there are a number of places that I picked up that I
5 think relate to areas. There is one, two, three, four, five, the sixth
6 paragraph, for instance, on page 2; the third paragraph from the bottom on
7 page 2; the second paragraph on -- from the bottom on page 2; the second
8 paragraph from the top on page 2; and I'm not quite sure of the relevance
9 of one, two, three, four, the fifth paragraph from the top on page 2; and
10 the last paragraph on page 2.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if we are
12 referring to the summary by which we announced this witness on the list of
13 witnesses, we bore in mind the instruction issued to us by the Trial
14 Chamber and we shall seek not to repeat those themes at all and have the
15 witness testify only about issues which have not been mentioned here.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm looking at the summary which I think was filed
17 very recently, apparently it's called the updated -- it's not titled that
18 way but when it came I was advised that it was the updated summary. It
19 stands alone on a piece of paper. It's not part of the bunch that you
20 gave, but anyway, I've raised those issues and we will look out for them
21 as the witness carries on with his evidence. You may call the witness.
22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] We shall bear that in mind,
23 Your Honours, thank you.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
25 Sorry, Mr. Milovancevic, what has changed now that the original
1 estimate was plus/minus two hours?
2 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that was the
3 estimate on the assumption that there would exist a written statement that
4 would be admitted into the file. Right, 92. So we have abandoned that in
5 order to simplify the procedure and gain time.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the witness please make the declaration.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will tell
9 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: PATRICK BARRIOT
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may be seated, sir. I'm
13 sorry about that.
14 Yes, Mr. Perovic.
15 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
16 Examination by Mr. Perovic:
17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Barriot. As one of the counsel on the Defence
18 team of the accused, Milan Martic, I shall be conducting the
19 examination-in-chief today. I should like to ask you to pause between my
20 questions and your answers in order to enable the interpreters to do their
21 work, and I should like to also ask you another thing. My questions will
22 be concise and I should like your answers to be just as concise, and I
23 thank you in advance for that.
24 Mr. Barriot, for the record, would you give us your first name and
25 last name.
1 A. My name is Patrick Barriot. I was born on the 5th of October,
2 1955, in Bedarieux, in France.
3 Q. What are you by nationality and a citizen of which state are you?
4 A. I am a French citizen.
5 Q. What is your profession?
6 A. I am a medical doctor. I'm specialised in anaesthesiology,
7 emergency medicine, disaster medicine, and emergency toxicology, and I
8 served in the French army for 25 years.
9 Q. So you have a degree in medicine?
10 A. Yes, I have a degree in medicine. I am a specialist also. I
11 served in the army during 25 years. I left with the rank of colonel, and
12 I'm currently a specialist serving in hospitals, working in hospitals.
13 Q. During your military service, were you awarded any honours; and if
14 so, what particular honours are in question?
15 A. Yes. I received a number of distinctions. I am chevalier of the
16 Order of the Merit. I received four medal for acts of bravery. I
17 received them from the prefect of the French police in Paris. And I
18 received three letters, first from the Ministry of Defence, from the Chief
19 of Staff of the army, and from the Ministry of Cooperation; letters of
20 congratulation for having served France; and given generous image of the
21 French country during operations abroad, operations conducted to help the
22 civilian population in these countries.
23 Q. What profession are you pursuing today, what particular
25 A. I am currently a specialist working in hospitals, and I am also a
1 lecturer in many schools of medicine, universities in France. I am also a
2 member of a group that works and studies anti-terrorism operations,
3 working on the risks caused by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot, for these particulars from your
6 Were you assigned at any moment during your career to any duties
7 in the former Yugoslavia?
8 A. Yes. I was deployed in the former Yugoslavia, more precisely in
9 Croatia, in Krajina, and that was in the year 1994. At the time I held
10 the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and I was appointed and assigned as a blue
11 helmet at the 1st Infantry Battalion of the -- of UNPROFOR, the
12 1st Battalion was a French battalion and it was stationed in Glina. The
13 medical unit I was a member of was deployed in Topusko next to Glina, in
14 the south sector of UNPROFOR.
15 Q. Had you been to Yugoslavia before that?
16 A. No. It was the first time I went to Yugoslavia.
17 Q. And before you arrived in Yugoslavia, did you know anything about
18 the situation in the former Yugoslavia?
19 A. When I arrived in the former Yugoslavia with Eve Crepin, the only
20 thing I knew about the former Yugoslavia was what I had read in the
21 newspapers or heard in the news, on television, so I had no personal
22 opinion. I only had the information that were broadcasted by the French
24 Q. Mr. Barriot, what was UNPROFOR's task in the protected zones? Are
25 you familiar with that?
1 A. Theoretically, the mission of UNPROFOR in these protected or safe
2 areas that were introduced in 1992, the mission was to be there between
3 the Serbs and the Croats, to interpose themselves in order to protect the
4 Serb population in the Krajina region.
5 Q. Tell us, Mr. Barriot, what were your specific duties, yours
6 personally, within the UNPROFOR mission?
7 A. I was an anaesthesiologist at the surgical unit based in Topusko,
8 as I said earlier on, but since there was little work to do, little care
9 to be provided to the French soldiers there, I was a member of a medical
10 team that would go to all the villages in the surrounding area. We would
11 go to isolated farms in order to provide medical care to people who needed
12 it, and since the hospital in Glina had no anaesthesiologist anymore,
13 Dr. Knezevic was the held doctor of the hospital, asked me if I would be
14 able to work there as an anaesthesiologist, in the operation theatre every
15 morning. Therefore, every day I would work as an anaesthesiologist at the
16 Glina hospital. That was the medical part of my work.
17 Apart from this, as superior officer, I would take part in all the
18 briefings organised by UNPROFOR, and these meetings would take place once
19 a week or twice a week, let's say, more often than not twice a week. And
20 these -- in these meetings there would be French officers but also foreign
21 officers, most of them being Canadians.
22 Q. Mr. Barriot, in the territorial sense, what area was covered by
23 your activity, if you can tell us that?
24 A. I moved around regularly on the entire -- in the entire south
25 sector, the region of Banija, Kordun, Lika, the north of Dalmatia, and the
1 Knin-Krajina region, and that's for the Krajina region. I would also
2 regularly go to Bosnia, to the Bihac pocket, and I would in particular go
3 to Velika Kladusa, where I met Mr. Fikret Abdic among others. I would
4 also regularly go to Zagreb for missions of liaison, to liaison with my
5 superior officers there.
6 Q. At the time when you were there in that area, did only Serbs live
7 in that area or were there members of other nations and ethnicities there
8 as well?
9 A. There were members of other ethnic groups, of course. I can state
10 that because at the Glina hospital, you had staff members who were Croats,
11 but a lot of Muslim patients would come to the hospital, especially
12 wounded people from the Bihac pocket, they would come to the hospital to
13 receive medical care there. And these patients have always been welcomed
14 and they always received medical care at the Glina hospital. Furthermore,
15 in 1994, during the summer of 1994, I was there when the 5th Corps of the
16 Bosnian army under the command of Atif Dudakovic, General Atif Dudakovic
17 expelled the partisans of Fikret Abdic from the pocket and expelled them
18 to the Krajina region. Therefore, there were about 40.000 Muslims,
19 supporters of Fikret Abdic, went to the Krajina to several camps, the camp
20 of Batnoga among others, and these 40.000 Muslims received food, medical
21 care, despite of the very difficult situation that prevailed in Krajina at
22 the moment, and they also received medical care at the hospital.
23 Q. In this connection I should like to ask you this: You have
24 referred to this already but what was the status of primarily the Croats
25 in the areas in which you were? Were you able to find out anything about
2 A. Yes. There were two types of cases or situations. In the first--
3 the first case was the case of the Croats who accepted or who decided to
4 stay in the Krajina and to live in peace with the Serbs. I met these
5 Croats in isolated areas, small villages, isolated farms, and these people
6 were never attacked, were never threatened by the Serbs. They lived in --
7 they lived peacefully, but there were other Croats who had decided to
8 leave the Krajina region and to go to other cities, such as Zagreb. And
9 mostly because the living conditions in the Krajina were extremely
10 difficult, the economic situation was extremely bad because of the embargo
11 imposed on the region, and therefore life was easier outside of the
12 Krajina; but I never noticed any threats, any forced expulsions. I never
13 saw anything of the kind.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot. I will now show you on the screen
15 document 1D0-048, which is one of the weekly reports of the European
16 Monitoring Mission, and for the week which ends on the 23rd of December,
17 1993. Do you see that document on your screen? Can we turn to page 2 of
18 this document, please? I'm going to read out for you the paragraph under
19 number 4(B), which is, and I quote: "The UNCIVPOL Glina stated that of
20 the 818 Croat families living in the Glina area, 90 per cent are living in
21 good conditions and are accorded the same rights as Serbs. Generally, we
22 have found that minorities are being well-treated in most of the CCAOR,"
23 which is an abbreviation which I presume refers to the Knin Krajina.
24 You said that you arrived in the Krajina in March 1994. Did you
25 find, when you arrived, a situation which corresponds to this description
1 in the document of the European Union's Monitoring Mission which I have
2 just read out to you?
3 A. Absolutely. I can fully confirm this report, if I saw it
4 correctly. This report was established at the end of 1993, and I can say
5 that in 1994 the Croats were treated -- benefited from the same treatment
6 in 1994 as is stated in this report.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] May this document be admitted as a
9 Defence exhibit?
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Perovic. What is this document? It
11 doesn't seem to have a heading. Mine starts with a B, unconfirmed; then
12 C, protests. Is that it in the English?
13 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] That is the second page of this
14 document, and the document is a weekly report of the European Union's --
15 European Community's Monitoring Mission for the week which ends on
16 December 23rd, 1993.
17 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can we look at page 1, please?
18 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] May we see page 1 of this document,
19 please, on the screen.
20 JUDGE HOEPFEL: According to what I have on the screen, this
21 document has two pages; is that correct?
22 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] This is the first page of this
23 document, the front page.
24 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And the document has an amount of two pages; is
25 that correct, Mr. Perovic?
1 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely so, Your Honours, I
3 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Perovic.
5 The document is admitted into evidence. May it please be given an
6 exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit Number 1006.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
9 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
10 Q. You have already said something about this, Mr. Barriot, but I
11 will ask you any way. During your sojourn in the Krajina, did you
12 personally observe any pressure on the Croats or other non-Serbs to move
13 out of the area?
14 A. No. And I can say it with a great deal of certainty because I was
15 taking part in the daily life of the citizens in the Krajina. I would go
16 to the hospital in Glina every day to work there as an anaesthesiologist.
17 I would move around the whole territory of Krajina. I would go to cities
18 such as Knin, Glina, et cetera, but I would also go to the smallest
19 villages and the -- and isolated farms. And I can state with all
20 responsibility that I was never a witness to any acts of violence or any
21 acts of pressure aimed at making Croats or Muslims move out.
22 Q. If I understood you correctly, you mentioned that a certain number
23 of Croats left the Krajina for economic reasons. My question in this
24 regard is the following: What was the situation you found in the Krajina
25 on your arrival with regard to the economy?
1 A. In 1994, the situation, as far as the economy was concerned, was
2 disastrous. It's something that you were able to notice every day in --
3 because the Krajina citizens were missing the most basic things, such as
4 soap, washing powder. It was extremely difficult to find candles because
5 the -- at most times there was no electricity. There was a primary school
6 next to the surgical unit in Topusko, and the students there, the pupils
7 there, didn't have any thing to write with, any pens. And at the
8 hospital, there were no antibiotics. There was -- there were not enough
9 products to -- for the anaesthesiology department. There was something
10 missing also at the radiology department, same for the biology
11 laboratory. And at every level of daily life it was obvious that the
12 citizens of the Krajina were missing the most basic commodities in their
13 daily life.
14 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Sorry, Mr. Perovic, didn't you ask about the
15 Croats especially, having left for economic reasons, as you said? It
16 wasn't quite clear to me actually to what sentence you referred actually
17 when you said: "If I understood you correctly, many Croats left for
18 economic reasons." Can you clarify that without leading that?
19 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] That was one of my previous
20 questions. Your Honours, that was one of my previous questions.
21 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Yes. I understand, but to what previous answer
22 had you referred to, to make it clear? I don't understand it. I was
23 asking myself that already when you asked that question, but can you now
24 maybe help us? Because I tried to find it and I didn't find it, that
25 Croats left for economic reasons.
1 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] The witness, responding to one of my
2 previous questions, said there were two categories of the Croatian
3 population, one part remained in the Krajina, living in the villages,
4 while some Croats moved to cities, such as Zagreb, for economic reasons
5 because, as the witness said, the situation in the Krajina was very
6 difficult. That was in response to one of the previous questions, whereas
7 my last question --
8 MR. BLACK: If I can assist, Your Honours I think that answer is
9 found at page 8 -- actually starting at page 7, line 25, and continuing on
10 to page 8.
11 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. Thank you.
12 You may proceed, please.
13 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. My last
14 question was what economic situation the witness found on his arrival in
15 the Krajina, and he spoke about it; and he explained how this was
16 reflected on the work of the hospital in Glina.
17 Q. Under such conditions, Mr. Barriot, were the patients in the
18 hospital in Glina Serbs only, or were there also members of other ethnic
20 A. There were members of other ethnic groups, as I already pointed
21 out. There were Croats, some of them were patients, and there were a lot
22 of Muslims. I emphasise there was absolutely no difference being made to
23 the way people were treated, depending on their ethnic background or their
24 religion. I remember one thing precisely. I remember a Muslim woman who
25 had been operated on, had a Caesarean surgery and a lot of haemorrhaging,
1 and a little blood supply that was left in the hospital was used for her
2 for a transfusion, so it was given to her. This is to show you that there
3 was no discrimination whatsoever in the way patients were treated,
4 whatever their ethnic background or religion may have been.
5 Q. Mr. Barriot, in the course of the time you spent in the area, did
6 you have occasion to meet the local population; and if you did, how did
7 they feel and think at the time? Could you tell us something about that?
8 A. Of course. As to the contacts I had with the local population, I
9 can say they happened gradually of course, because initially I was a
10 foreign military. Of course I came to help them at the hospital, but it
11 took time to, as it were, tame them, but as time went by, I got to be
12 accepted by the population. I was invited to their homes. I attended at
13 weddings, funerals. I can say that I really lived within the population,
14 among them. And one thing struck me particularly, that is the fear that
15 prevailed. These people were really terrorised. They continuously
16 referred to World War II, to the massacres by the Ustashas. So it was all
17 the more intense in the Glina area. You have to know that there were
18 atrocious massacres committed by the Ustashas in the Glina church, all
19 such memories were surface; also because the Croats, starting in 1991,
20 would display a lot of Ustasha emblems, the red and white chequer-board.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it correct that you said you arrived there in
22 March 1994?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: How do you testify to events of 1991 then? How do
25 you know that?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as I just stated,
2 Mr. President, I did live with people who told me that every day, and also
3 every week I attended UNPROFOR meetings, together with officers who were
4 in charge of analysing the situation, its development, and they had been
5 doing that since 1991.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: What you said was: "Also because the Croats,
7 starting in 1991, would display a lot of Ustasha" -- you're not telling us
8 something that you are told, you're telling something that -- you're
9 putting it as if it's first-hand information.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. As I told you, these were
11 people I lived with in Glina, and they told me so. They saw it with their
12 own eyes. I'm just reporting what I heard from them.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Then say they told me. Don't say: "Also because
14 the Croats, starting in 1991, would display a lot of Ustasha emblems, the
15 red and white chequer-board." I'm referring specifically to what you said
16 before I stopped you. You understand that?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. I do understand. I was
18 about -- I was just developing my thoughts, you see.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, develop them and then say them; don't say
20 things first before you develop them.
21 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: One moment.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Perovic, in fact, Judge Nosworthy was
24 just also pointing out to me that that's in fact an area that we had cut
25 out in our oral decision.
1 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was not my intention
2 to elicit such an extensive answer when I put my question.
3 Q. Mr. Barriot, what was the attitude of the local population toward
4 the blue helmets, to put it that way? You said something about their
5 attitude toward you personally, as a member of the blue helmets. I'm now
6 asking you what the attitude of the local population was towards the blue
7 helmets in general.
8 A. Well, the attitude of the local population in Krajina towards the
9 blue helmets was one of hope and confidence and trust. As I explained to
10 you earlier, they were really terrorised. They feared an invasion of
11 Krajina, and they set all their hopes on the international community,
12 therefore on the blue helmets, hoping that they would therefore be
13 protected from a renewed aggression.
14 Q. Did you, in the course of your mission as a member of UNPROFOR,
15 have occasion to go to Croatia outside the UN protected areas, to Zagreb,
16 for example? And if you did, what was the attitude there towards members
17 of UNPROFOR? What was the attitude of the Croatian authorities and the
18 attitude of the population towards UNPROFOR?
19 A. To give you an accurate answer, I can say I would regularly go to
20 Zagreb for liaison assignments, either to meet with our hierarchy or
21 because we were a kind of postman, go between, between Croat citizens
22 living in Krajina and their families in Zagreb, so we would carry their
23 mail and parcels. We would regularly go to Zagreb. And I can tell you
24 that the general attitude of Croats in Zagreb towards the UNPROFOR was
25 totally different; it was characterised by manifest aggressiveness towards
1 anybody in an UNPROFOR uniform. When we would go to Zagreb, our superior
2 officers told us to go without uniforms, to be in civilian clothes when we
3 were in Zagreb, for a simple reason. In the eyes of the Croats, the
4 UNPROFOR soldiers were there to prevent the Croats from taking back
5 Krajina by force.
6 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I believe that the first part of the question
7 was the attitude of the Croatian authorities, and the second part was
8 having to do with attitude of the population towards UNPROFOR; and the
9 witness has not really effectively addressed the first part of your
10 question. So maybe you could put it to him again and let him place the
11 evidence before us, if he's able to.
12 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will do
14 Q. Mr. Barriot, I asked you what the attitude of the Croatian
15 authorities was towards members of UNPROFOR. At the same time I put
16 another question, namely: What was the attitude of the Croatian
17 population towards UNPROFOR? Could you distinguish between the two?
18 Could you say something about the attitude of the Croatian authorities and
19 then something about the attitude of the local population?
20 A. Yes. I may not have been clear enough, but I believe that there
21 is a link there, these two aspects are intertwined. If the population was
22 aggressive towards the UNPROFOR, they did so because they were sort of fed
23 by the statements and the attitude of the political authorities. It was
24 obvious that everything at the level of the Croatian political authority
25 was done to terrorise the Serbs. I told you there were the emblems, you
1 could see again the Ustasha emblems, especially the chequer-board; also
2 street names, square names were changed. The square of the victims of
3 fascism became the square of the great Croats. All the work by
4 Mile Budak, who is an Ustasha historian, were again in vogue and they were
5 taught in schools. The dinar was replaced by the kuna. And in the army,
6 Ustasha ranks --
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot. You spoke about weekly briefings with
8 UNPROFOR officers, which you attended. I would like to know whether you
9 had occasion to talk to UNPROFOR officers outside these meetings; and if
10 so, what you discussed and what they told you, outside the official
12 A. Yes. I do understand the meaning of your question, but first of
13 all I'd like to say that it is quite normal -- when a new unit or a new
14 surgical mobile unit would arrive, it's normal for the ones before them,
15 the authorities would present the situation in a detailed manner and would
16 remind them of the situation as it started. So that was quite normal.
17 Secondly, it is also obvious that as a senior officer, I had a lot
18 of discussions in the canteens, in -- personal discussions with numerous
19 officers who had been there for -- some of them since 1992, and who were
20 perfectly familiar with the situation. I also talked with foreign
21 officers. One thing was clear and it was told us from the very
22 beginning - I arrived in March 1994 - and all our predecessors told us
23 this: The war is going to start again. It's going to resume in Krajina.
24 We have many indicia showing that the Croats are arming themselves, are
25 organising themselves, in order to take back Krajina. So there was no
1 ambiguity in this respect.
2 Q. Mr. Barriot, at that time, was there a prohibition on the import
3 of weapons on to the territory of the former Yugoslavia?
4 A. Yes, yes. I'd say this is a follow-up question to the previous
5 one, inasmuch as we were talking about this. Of course, this is the
6 primary worry and concern of a military. It is the way weapons circulate,
7 the way weapons are smuggled. It was clear that there was an embargo on
8 arms in the entire area in place since 1991; but equally obviously, the
9 Croats were arming themselves then with the help of Germany and the USA.
10 In 1994, a private American military company, Military Professional
11 Resources Incorporated, MPRI, came to settle in Croatia. They had a team
12 in Zagreb at the level of the American embassy, and that team was
13 responsible -- in charge of the arms smuggling and the arms supply to the
14 Croatian army.
15 Q. If I understand you correctly, Mr. Barriot, the embargo on the
16 import of weapons was not respected; and if I understood you correctly,
17 the embargo was violated by the Croatian authorities with the assistance
18 of certain foreign factors. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes. You understood me perfectly. I would not say that the
20 embargo was violated by chance; it was done on purpose.
21 Q. Did the UN take any steps to sanction such violations of the arms
22 embargo? Do you know something about that?
23 A. No, nothing was done, no step was taken, in order to prevent the
24 embargo from being violated. I would even say that the military were
25 tasked to keep their eyes closed, you know, including the UNPROFOR
1 members. As to the violations of the embargo, they had been told not to
2 mention that in their reports. An example, in 1994, the military in my
3 unit had seized assault weapons of American make, the MN-16, and in the
4 Bihac pocket they had been provided by the USA to the 5th Bosnian Corps,
5 that of Dudakovic, who had been charged with attacking the Krajina and the
6 partisans of Fikret Abdic. So there was an obvious desire to turn a blind
7 eye on such violation as to the arms embargo by the Croats.
8 Q. Apart from this arms embargo, Mr. Barriot, to the best of your
9 knowledge, was there any other embargo imposed by the UN on the territory
10 of the former Yugoslavia?
11 A. Yes, of course. There was a dual embargo. There was the air
12 embargo, in trade and oil-related, on Yugoslavia; but there was also
13 Resolution 820 of the UN Security Council prohibiting any import or export
14 to or from the Serbian Republic of Krajina. In other words, the small
15 republic was totally cut off, isolated, from the world; and this, as I
16 told you earlier, resulted in total poverty for people there and it really
17 drove a lot of them to despair.
18 Q. Did this -- or was this economic embargo you have just mentioned
19 respected, in contrast to the first one you just mentioned?
20 A. No. It is obvious that this embargo was totally complied with.
21 As I told you, you could see it in the care provided to the population,
22 who could not enjoy quality care because they lacked the bare minimum. So
23 the economic embargo on Krajina was applied very rigorously, whilst
24 obviously the arms embargo was continuously violated by Croatia, so it was
25 obviously dual standards in terms of embargoes.
1 Q. Under these conditions, did the international community give
2 humanitarian assistance to those areas; and if so, to what extent?
3 A. I can give you a very clear answer. There was no humanitarian
4 assistance whatsoever given to the Serb population in Krajina. I can tell
5 you so because I'm a specialist in humanitarian assistance. I have not
6 seen a single NGO, be it a Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres.
7 Nobody helped. I say nobody helped the Serbs in Krajina.
8 Q. When did your mission within UNPROFOR end, Mr. Barriot?
9 A. My time of service within the UNPROFOR ended in June 1994, but
10 later on I went back to Krajina regularly, every other month, in order to
11 work in the surgery department in the Glina hospital. With just a tiny
12 Serbian organisation, the Krajina association founded by Mile Bucan -- and
13 they had basically no means so I would get money out of my own pocket to
14 buy drugs, medical supplies, which I would take regularly to the Glina
15 hospital, which lacked everything.
16 Q. I assume you then had occasion to meet refugees. What did they
17 tell you?
18 A. Of course I did. In Krajina, I met with a lot of refugees. They
19 had been expelled from Croatia in 1991. And they described to me the
20 situation as it prevailed in Croatia in 1990 and 1991, at the time when
21 they were regarded as second-class citizens, when their constitutionally
22 established rights were abolished, when their basic rights were trodden
23 upon. So these were people --
24 Q. Apart from the Serbian refugees, did you have occasion to see any
25 other -- refugees belonging to any other ethnic groups on the territory of
1 Krajina; and if so, which?
2 A. Yes. I met refugees from other ethnic groups, mostly Muslim
3 refugees. There was a great number of Muslim refugees from the Bihac
4 pocket. As I mentioned earlier on, they would come to receive medical
5 treatment, to find refuge in the Krajina; and during the summer of 1994,
6 these 40.000 Muslim refugees came after having been expelled.
7 Q. I apologise for interrupting. I wanted to ask you what was the
8 attitude of the government, the authorities, and the population in Krajina
9 towards these Muslim and other non-Serb refugees? Do you know that?
10 A. Yes, I know that, because I was working in a hospital, and a
11 hospital in a situation of that kind, the hospital is the most appropriate
12 place to go if you want to understand the situation. When you have almost
13 no blood supply left recognition, when you have almost no medicine, the
14 natural reaction is to keep what little you have, to keep it for your own
15 people, for the members of your ethnic group, but that's what -- not what
16 happened. I'd like to repeat it. When there was a wounded Muslim, Croat
17 patient, or -- there was no discrimination. If there were only two blood
18 bags left, they would be given to the Muslim patient; what little
19 antibiotics was left was given to Serbs and Muslims. There was absolutely
20 no discrimination there.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot. Are you familiar with the position of the
22 Croatian authorities with regard to the resolution of the question of the
23 UN protected zones? Do you know anything about that?
24 A. Yes. I know something about that. I know what was said in the
25 south sector for UNPROFOR, what was said by the officers of UNPROFOR, and
1 it was that the Croats would not take that into account, the protection
2 afforded by the United Nations, and that as soon as they would be ready
3 to attack. That is to say, as soon as the Americans and MPRI would have
4 provided them with the necessary logistical support and with the necessary
5 supplies, they would attack these protected areas without any regard for
6 their status, for their protected status.
7 Q. Do you know whether Croatia launched any military operations
8 vis-a-vis the UN protected zones?
9 A. Yes, of course. I was in touch with French officers, especially
10 people working with General Kot, who were direct witnesses of these
11 attacks because between the years of 1992 and 1993, there were three major
12 attacks led against these safe areas of the United Nations; the first one
13 took part in the month of June 1992 on the Miljevac plateau, in the
14 northern part of Dalmatia. The second --
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. Well, the Croat army, the Croatian army, attacked these safe areas
17 deliberately and no one did anything about it; and in any case, UNPROFOR
18 was not in a position to put an end to these operations.
19 Q. These operations have been discussed here and we shall not dwell
20 on that now because of that. But from what you have seen in the field,
21 Mr. Barriot, you are a physician but you are also a soldier of long
22 standing, I suppose that you could answer the question: What was the
23 weaponry that the RSK army had? Do you know that?
24 A. I can give you a very specific answer because in 1994, I was a
25 senior officer of the French army, and I would go abroad on a regular
1 basis; and therefore I was in touch with intelligence French officers from
2 the DGSE, French Intelligence Services. And at the time the DGSE asked me
3 to tell them about what sort of weapons systems there was in the RSK.
4 They showed me pictures of all the types of tanks and artillery systems
5 you can imagine; and what I can tell you is that at the time, there was no
6 heavy-weapon system in the RSK. You had rifles, of course, a few
7 rocket-launchers, but there was no heavy weapons system, contrary to
8 Croatia, where you had MiG 21, heavy weapons system, weapons fit to
9 conduct an invasion. The only type of weapons you could find in the RSK
10 were light weapons of an exclusively defensive type.
11 Q. Mr. Barriot, you said that the role of UNPROFOR had been a
12 protective one, and you also said what the UNPROFOR officers told you.
13 According to what you saw and experienced in the field, did the UNPROFOR
14 mission in which you also participated, successfully perform its mission?
15 A. No. My answer will be very clear about this. UNPROFOR did not
16 perform its mission because the mission of UNPROFOR was to protect a
17 population that was defenceless, that had no heavy weapons at its
18 disposal. It was a defenceless population that was located in a safe area
19 of the United Nations; and therefore, the role of UNPROFOR was to protect
20 these civilians who were defenceless. And it was never the case, because
21 these civilians from 1992 to 1994 were subject to attacks and to the
22 atrocities of the Croats.
23 Q. Talking about these attacks, this aggression on protected areas,
24 UN protected zones, do you know whether any foreign states had played any
25 role in these Croatian operations? And if that is the case, and if you do
1 know something about it, what was that role?
2 A. The main part was played by the United States on two levels.
3 First of all, the American army - I'm talking about the American army, I'm
4 not talking about NATO - the American army intervened directly to shell
5 Serb forces in -- first of all, when they shelled the Udbina airport in
6 1994, and there was also of course the Knin -- the shelling of Knin, that
7 marked the beginning of the Storm operation. Therefore, the American army
8 intervened directly in these two cases at least. And then there was also,
9 even more important, an indirect intervention through MPRI, Military
10 Professional Resources Incorporated, because here you have a private
11 military company that is under the command of the Pentagon. Its leaders
12 or directors are former American generals, and these are the people who
13 trained the Croatian army and armed the Croatian forces with a view to
14 conduct the Flash operation and the Storm operation. An agreement was
15 concluded in that respect between Gojko Susak, who was the former defence
16 minister of Croatia, and the director of MPRI; it was called, this
17 agreement, Assistance to Democratic Transition, that was the name of the
19 MR. BLACK: Your Honours, could we have a basis for what's just
20 been said? I wonder -- just be curious to know how the witness knows
21 that, if it's first-hand information or second-hand information, et
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Perovic?
24 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] I assume that my learned colleague,
25 the Prosecutor, will put his question when he examines the witness.
1 MR. BLACK: Well, Your Honour, no. There has to be some basis for
2 this to have any probative value before it can be admitted as evidence;
3 that was the gist of my objection.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think Mr. Perovic you need to lay a foundation.
5 How does the witness know all this? Did he see it first-hand? Was it --
6 was he told by somebody?
7 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Well, all I can do is to ask him.
8 Q. How did you come by this information that you have just related to
9 us? I'm talking about this relation between this American organisation
10 and the Croatian authorities.
11 A. All the information I'm giving you today were given to me by
12 senior officers of the French army and senior officers of the Canadian
13 army who were deployed in Croatia at the time. I am a senior officer. I
14 said that I would tell the truth here, and there is nothing more I can
15 add. But of course, I'm not going to give you a document by MPRI; I can't
16 do that.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would that be a convenient point?
18 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was just about to
19 thank Mr. Barriot for his testimony, and that concludes my
20 examination-in-chief. Thank you.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Perovic. Then this is a convenient
23 time to take the break.
24 We'll take a short break, sir, and come back at quarter to 11.00.
25 Court adjourned.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Black.
4 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Black:
6 Q. Good morning, Mr. Barriot. My name is Mr. Black. I'm one of the
7 Prosecutors on this case, and now it's my turn to ask you some questions
8 for a little while. I would say -- I'm not going to address every single
9 topic you mentioned because the Trial Chamber knows our positions on a few
10 things like the chequer-board symbol, et cetera. Just so you understand,
11 it doesn't mean that we accept what you say, but I'm not going to ask you
12 questions about that. I'm going to try to focus on other things. Do you
14 A. Yes, I do. Good morning. Thank you.
15 Q. Thank you. I guess first of all, since we find ourselves here, do
16 you have any views on this International Tribunal, especially about its
17 purpose or its impartiality?
18 A. May I give you a candid answer? I believe that this Tribunal was
19 not set up on a legal basis, on a legal foundation.
20 Q. Could you explain a little bit what you mean by that?
21 A. Yes, I could explain a little bit. I believe that a resolution of
22 a Security Council is not enough to establish such a Tribunal. A vote by
23 the General Assembly of the United Nations was necessary to give the
24 necessary legal foundation to this Tribunal; therefore, I deeply think
25 that this Tribunal is illegal.
1 Q. What about its partiality? Do you have any views about the
2 partiality of the Tribunal?
3 A. I have a view about it, yes. Obviously this Tribunal is a partial
4 Tribunal. No representative of the Croatian authority was indicted;
5 President Tudjman was not indicted. Not a single Croat minister, Muslim
6 minister, was ever indicted; on the other hand, all the representatives of
7 the Serb authorities were indicted. And if you look at the convictions,
8 you see that Naser Oric was sentenced to two years in prison for the
9 crimes he committed as if he had just stolen a motorbike, whereas all the
10 Serbs who were convicted were convicted very strictly, received very steep
12 Q. That you for that. Let me ask you about a book of yours on the
13 same subject. In fact, we could look at it on our screens. The ERN is
15 MR. BLACK: Your Honours, there is a book that was obviously
16 written in French. I had translated just one very small excerpt, not the
17 whole book. I don't intend to move it into evidence. Hopefully we can
18 deal with it using the simultaneous interpretation to read any passages
19 that we need to other than what's been translated.
20 Q. Mr. Barriot, you see in front of us, this is your book, titled, I
21 guess, "Our testimonies About Serbia," written by you and your partner,
22 Eve Crepin, right?
23 A. Yes. It's one of the many books we wrote together with Eve Crepin
24 because we wrote a total of five books together about the former
1 Q. Okay. And I'd ask -- this line in particular includes articles
2 that -- some of which were separately published and some of them were
3 authored just by you or just by her and then were collected in this work.
4 Is that right?
5 A. Yes, that's exactly the case.
6 Q. Okay. Let me ask you to look at one in particular, and it starts
7 at what is ERN Y00061865. If we could navigate to that on our screens,
9 MR. BLACK: And, Your Honours, the English translation which has
10 been provided is -- it's actually not that clear from the English
11 translation, but it's just a couple of paragraphs from what -- the French
12 article that we'll be seeing. And we'll point that out so that it's
13 clear, I hope.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well --
15 MR. BLACK: The translation should be in e-court, I hope. I mean,
16 I'm sure that it's in there. The translation may be under the specific
17 ERN Y0061865. Okay. That's the -- and in the French we need to move
18 ahead a couple of pages to 1865, please.
19 Q. Mr. Barriot, you see there --
20 MR. BLACK: Oops, now we see the English translation. If we could
21 have the French up on the witness's screen again, please.
22 Q. Mr. Barriot, sorry, it will just be a second. This is the first
23 time we've used French and English documents in the trial; it's usually
24 English and B/C/S, so we have to sort out our technical issues a little
25 bit. Okay. I think we can proceed now. You see there--
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, can you just get us to the English, please?
2 I have French on both screens.
3 MR. BLACK: Oh, okay. Mr. Whiting says that he has English on
4 his. I don't know if it's a question of maybe refreshing it or --
5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I also do have English.
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters do not have the English version
7 on paper. It would be good to have both French and English, to be sure
8 they are accurate.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I have English now, thank you very much.
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can we provide the interpreters with the English
12 MR. BLACK: I do not have the English translation in hard copy,
13 Your Honour. I thought since it was on the e-court system, the
14 interpreters could access it on the e-court.
15 JUDGE HOEPFEL: The interpreters say they cannot access it.
16 THE INTERPRETER: They cannot.
17 MR. BLACK: We do not have it in hard copy. I guess the registrar
18 is going to save me on this one and she'll print it out and provide it. I
19 appreciate that. Thank you.
20 Q. Mr. Barriot, can you confirm just that you have the French version
21 on your screen, is that right, the original version?
22 A. I do not answer what you want me to confirm -- I do not understand
23 what you want me to confirm.
24 Q. Just whether or not you see the French -- the original French
25 version on your screen because we are having some trouble about which
1 version is on whose screen, but you're seeing the French; correct?
2 A. Yes. I've got pages 26 and 27 in French on the screen.
3 Q. Perfect. Okay. Thank you. And what you see here is -- on the
4 right-hand side is an open letter to -- it says: "To a friend who is or
5 is alleged to be a war criminal"; correct?
6 A. Yes, that's right.
7 Q. And this is an open letter to Milan Martic, right?
8 A. Yes. It's an article we wrote together with Eve Crepin a few
9 years ago.
10 Q. I think, in fact, it was first published in September of 1997; is
11 that accurate?
12 A. Yes, I think that's the case. We wrote a number of articles, so
13 it's difficult for me to remember the dates of all the articles.
14 Q. I understand that.
15 MR. BLACK: If we could focus, please, on the second paragraph in
16 that right-hand -- the right-hand page.
17 Q. And I just wonder if you could -- you see the sentence that begins
18 there with "Nietzsche, Nietzsche said."
19 Could you read out that to the end of the page, please, for us.
20 A. Gladly, gladly. Thank you very much for the interest you have for
21 our articles. Let me read out.
22 "Nietzsche said that only in the sphere of the common man is the
23 enemy always considered to be evil. The International Criminal Tribunal
24 is the jurisdiction of the common man. War that has not lost -- that has
25 lost none of its horror has now lost all of its honour. So-called
1 international justice is nothing more than an adulterated ersatz of
2 justice contrived by the victors. Its emblem should depict a
3 greengrocer's scale, the rigged scale of a crooked grocer."
4 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. And that's, I take it, still your
5 position now as you sit here, not only when you wrote this article but
6 that's still your position?
7 A. I believe that I've answered your questions very clearly.
8 Q. So far, absolutely. But this question -- I take it that this
9 is -- the view expressed here in this article is still your position
10 today; correct?
11 A. Yes, I can confirm that.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you.
13 MR. BLACK: Can we turn to the next page, please, in French.
14 It's in the continuation of the same paragraph in English, Your
15 Honour. And as I was saying, this was prepared -- of course we found out
16 the witness was coming on Monday morning, so this was prepared -- I just
17 got it yesterday and it's just a couple of paragraphs, which I hope is
19 Q. There at the top left-hand corner, that -- the last sentence of
20 that paragraph, it says that: "The Tribunal is based upon a crime against
21 the consciousness which postulates that the army of the victors is just
22 and the army of the vanquished is wicked."
23 Is it still your view, sir, that this Tribunal is based upon a
24 crime against conscience or against consciousness?
25 A. Yes, it is still my position.
1 Q. Okay. Thank you. Just one more question on this article.
2 MR. BLACK: If we could scroll down a bit to the next paragraph
3 there, still on the left-hand side.
4 And this is the next paragraph in the English translation, Your
6 Q. You see where it says: "Dear, Milan Martic. Why is your name
7 written on these lists?"
8 And then it says: "On Tuesday, the 2nd, and Wednesday, the 3rd,
9 of May, 1995, on your orders, three or four Orkan rockets were launched on
10 Zagreb killing five. The order was given in retaliation for the Croatian
11 army's brutal invasion of Eastern Slavonia."
12 I have a couple questions about that. First of all, you confirm
13 here that the shelling of Zagreb was ordered by Milan Martic; correct?
14 A. No. That's the only thing I cannot confirm. I can confirm
15 everything else, but I do not confirm that fact. I did not have the
16 information, the relevant information. I think I made a mistake. I do
17 not confirm -- I would like to insist on that point, I do not confirm that
18 it is on the order of Milan Martic that the rockets were fired.
19 Q. Well, on what basis did you write that in this article in 1997
21 A. I relied on false information, false data, and on the fact that I
22 believe that President Milan Martic wanted to assume the responsibility of
23 an act that he did not order. But since he was -- he had a very high
24 opinion of his office as a president, he was ready to assume any kind of
25 responsibility; but I would like to withdraw the sentence you've referred
2 Q. Okay. Now, what's your basis for saying that Martic wanted to
3 assume responsibility for an act that he did not order? What have you
4 learned since 1997 that leads you to that conclusion?
5 A. I believe you have to replace yourself in the context of the
6 time. What was going on when these Orkan rockets were launched on
7 Zagreb? What was going on is that the Croatian army, with the support of
8 the United States, was shelling --
9 Q. Sorry, I apologise for interrupting. I'm not sure you understood
10 my question. What is it, since you wrote this article in 1997, that has
11 now illuminated you and you realise that Martic was just trying to take
12 responsibility for something that he didn't in fact do?
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you answer, sir, can you please speak
14 slowly. I can hear the interpreters struggling to keep pace with you.
15 Talk slowly.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that there is already a
17 mistake as to the date when this article was written; it was published
18 here in this book, indeed, but it was written earlier. Therefore, these
19 are articles that were written in the heat of the moment when these events
20 took place.
21 MR. BLACK:
22 Q. Well, let me just tell you something so that you understand it. I
23 don't want us to get into an issue that we don't have to. You know, the
24 Defence in this case has not disputed the fact that Mr. Martic ordered
25 that shelling. They have other defences about why he may have done it,
1 things like that, but just so you understand that. Do you understand what
2 I've just told you?
3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic. I thought it was
5 Mr. Perovic, but anyway, go ahead.
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the Trial
7 Chamber. Just a brief consultation, please.
8 [Defence counsel confer].
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Your Honours, bear
10 with me, please. I forgot myself. I was not conducting the
11 examination-in-chief. Everything is in good order. There is no
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic.
14 Yes, Mr. Black.
15 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Actually could we look -- I just want to address something here if
17 we could look at the --
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, you had a question to the witness; it's not
19 answered yet.
20 MR. BLACK: I think my question was just if he had understood what
21 I had said to him.
22 Q. Do you understand what I have said about the fact that the Defence
23 has not disputed that Mr. Martic ordered the shelling? Do you understand
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. But then you also wanted him to answer the
1 question what has he learned since 1997 that changed his position.
2 MR. BLACK: Absolutely, Your Honour. I'm still on that. I want
3 to deal with a sub-issue to help clarify this, but I haven't forgotten
4 that question. I appreciate it.
5 If we could look, please, at page Y0061924. It's very near the
6 end. In fact, I think it's the second-to-last page in the original.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Same page in the English?
8 MR. BLACK: This does not appear in the English at all, Your
9 Honour. It's just -- this is a list of publications. I just want to
10 establish the date of this article that we've been speaking of.
11 Thanks, and if we could look at the right-hand side.
12 Q. See the sixth entry down there, sir, there is a reference to this
13 article that we have been discussing, the open letter, and it says that
14 it's from September of 1997. Now, based on this list from your book, do
15 you agree with me that the article was first written or published in
16 September of 1997?
17 A. No, no. I do not agree with you on that because these are
18 articles that were published several times in various publications or
19 newspapers, and I only wanted to mention the reference to Balkan info, so
20 I do challenge the date of writing. I wrote them earlier, and this being
21 said I want to emphasise this: You take out three words in a major
22 article and the three words are not relevant. What was relevant was to
23 show that this was an act of desperation in the face of the assassination
24 of civilians by the Croatian army.
25 Q. Thanks. Please just try to focus on my questions and we'll move
1 along more quickly. So despite the only reference in your list of
2 publications, you insist that this article was actually written before --
3 much earlier than September 1997, and I think you said "in the heat of the
4 moment when these events took place"?
5 A. More often than not, all the articles and books we wrote like this
6 book people is assassinated and the other ones in 1995. This was written
7 in reaction to atrocious events for the people, the Serb people, in
9 Q. Okay. Now let me get back to my original question. What was it
10 since you wrote this article, be it in 1997 or earlier than that, that has
11 now illuminated you and made you realise that Martic was just trying to
12 take credit for something that he did not actually do?
13 A. Well, as a matter of fact, I think it is the analysis of his
14 personality which I could make as I met him. I believe he's a man who had
15 a very high idea of his responsibility. His only objective was to protect
16 the Serbian people in Krajina; and as any leader worthy of the name, he
17 always covered or took on him anything done by his people below him, which
18 is done by any good leader anywhere.
19 Q. Have you ever seen any video or heard from Mr. Martic or seen
20 anything where he took responsibility for the shelling himself? Did you
21 see those videos that were widely aired at the time?
22 A. I can't remember, precisely all the more so since there is a
23 little language-related problem because Milan Martic speaks Serbian and I
24 do not speak Serbian fluently. So there is always a bit of an obstacle
25 because of translation problems.
1 Q. Okay. I'll try to move on to this, but I want one thing to be
2 clear. Your sole basis for now changing your opinion and thinking that he
3 didn't actually order the shelling is just your analysis of his
4 personality? That's what led to you change positions?
5 A. Yes. And sometimes there is subtle nuances that can appear in
6 translation; it's true. But he always said, I am the president;
7 therefore, it is my duty to take on me -- to take responsibility for
8 things that are being done.
9 Q. Did he say that to you specifically about the shelling of Zagreb,
10 or do you just mean on other occasions in general?
11 A. No, no. I'm very specific.
12 Q. Okay. So you spoke with him about the shelling of Zagreb?
13 A. Of course, of course. We spoke about the entire situation, about
14 everything that had been done.
15 Q. Okay. And he told you that he had ordered the shelling, or did he
16 tell you something different?
17 A. No. He never said that he had ordered the shelling. He only said
18 that he was willing to take responsibility for anything that had been done
19 by subordinates, and that he would not accept that subordinates would be
20 jailed or convicted whilst he was the president and he was at the top of
21 the nation.
22 Q. How did this topic of conversation come up?
23 A. Because we talked a lot about this concept of responsibility of
24 statehood and state. And since you put the question to me, he often
25 repeated, I am the president. I'm here in order to ensure the safety of
1 the Serbian citizens in the RSK, the citizens are the Serbs, and all those
2 who want to live peacefully with the Serbs, be they Croats or Muslims.
3 Q. You know, there is one other -- the next -- one of the other
4 sentences I read, the last sentence I read out, said that -- maybe you're
5 going to say that you can't talk about this either, but you said in your
6 article that: "The order was given in retaliation for the Croatian army's
7 brutal invasion of Eastern Slavonia."
8 Do you stand by that or is that something else you want to -- you
9 want to change now?
10 A. But this is obvious. This rocket firing is a result of the
11 invasion of Western Slavonia, as a result of the hundreds of defenceless
12 civilians that were massacred by the Croatian army. If you see today that
13 two Israeli soldiers are being kidnapped, and therefore hundreds and
14 thousands of children and women are being killed in --
15 Q. I know it's tempting to make analogies to other things that are
16 happening in the world today or at different times, but please let's just
17 stay focused on the conflict in former Yugoslavia. I take it that in your
18 view, the shelling of Zagreb was wholly justified by what was happening in
19 Western Slavonia, notwithstanding the fact that there were civilian
20 casualties in Zagreb?
21 A. If the UNPROFOR had done their job properly, it would not have
22 been justified; but inasmuch as the UNPROFOR failed to carry out their
23 mission to protect those people, somebody had to do for them, that it was
25 Q. Okay. So you think under the circumstances you've described, it
1 was justified to shell Zagreb, notwithstanding the deaths and injury to
2 innocent civilians; correct?
3 A. Well, look, now the military is going to answer you. On the one
4 hand, it was a desperate act, it was self-defence; on the other hand, the
5 Orkan rockets aimed at military structures, especially the Ministry of
6 Defence. Indeed, there were casualties. But when you see that the
7 so-called smart weapons of NATO guided by laser and GPS killed hundreds of
8 people in collateral damage, you're not going to say that an Orkan rocket
9 launched from Petrinja or Petrusan could have been more accurate. I'm
10 sorry, it could not have been done; they didn't have the means.
11 Q. By no means am I suggesting that an Orkan attack might have been
12 more accurate, quite the contrary. It seems like you think you know
13 something about this. Isn't it true that the Orkan rocket, by its very
14 nature, if you launch it into a city, into a populated area, there are
15 going to be civilian casualties?
16 A. But this is the very proof that if those Orkan rockets were fired,
17 it shows that the RSK did not have any heavy weaponry, no heavy armaments,
18 and all they had was these miserable poor rockets they had, and they
19 defended themselves. This is an act of survival, an act of desperation,
20 using whatever they had; and the only thing it goes to show is that they
21 did not have heavy armament and no performing accurate artillery.
22 Q. We'll come back to that. Let me show you just briefly Exhibit 91
23 in evidence in this case, please.
24 Actually, Mr. Barriot, I understand that you don't speak B/C/S.
25 Do you speak English? Do you read English?
1 A. [In English] I will try.
2 Q. Okay. Actually I don't want to put you in a difficult position.
3 MR. BLACK: So if we could see the last page of the English, but
4 also I'll read it out so that it could be translated into French just so
5 that everything is clear. Thank you. And it's those top two paragraphs
6 in the English.
7 Q. Sir, this is an interview with General Milan Celeketic, the
8 commander of the SVK on the 24th of March, 1995. Mr. Celeketic there
9 says: "In the case of the Ustasha aggression, we will certainly not miss
10 the opportunity to hit them where it hurts the most. We know their weak
11 spots and where it hurts the most. Weak points are city squares, and we
12 know who goes there: Civilians. I've already said this and was
13 criticised a little. Well, now, they may ask which squares and in which
14 cities? I shall reply that it's a military secret. We shall make a
15 decision about it, and I think we will be precise."
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, where are you reading? I'm sorry, I'm lost.
17 MR. BLACK: It's at the very top of the last page in English,
18 Your Honour. It's on the public screens.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Of the last page?
20 MR. BLACK: Yes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you.
22 MR. BLACK:
23 Q. And then, Mr. Barriot, it continues it says -- Celeketic says:
24 "It is hard to say these words because there are, as I said, civilians in
25 the squares, innocent people. However, if we are in war and we are waging
1 a filthy war for which they are first and foremost to blame, then there
2 will be no mercy, not only will we be merciless but as a commander I shall
3 decide where we will direct our attacks, when and where it hurts the
5 Mr. Barriot, this doesn't say anything about military targets. It
6 talks about intentionally targeting city squares because that's where it
7 hurts the most.
8 A. Two observations on this text. On the one hand, this general is
9 the one who can speak for what he said. What I do maintain is that these
10 Orkan rockets were firing at military structures and that the casualties
11 were collateral damage in the NATO speak, and also that this type of
12 speech is aimed at deterring. This man thinks that he wants to avoid the
13 invasion, the Storm and Flash operation, at all price whilst they were
14 being prepared. It was one way of deterring the Croatian army. It was a
15 desperate attempt to deter them. I do not think at all that this was a
16 plan and that it was carried out in this way.
17 Q. Did you personally ever hear such comments, either from
18 General Celeketic or from Mr. Martic that you recall?
19 A. Never.
20 Q. Just before -- well, actually, what's your basis -- you've
21 insisted on the fact that military targets were the target of this
22 attack. What's your basis for that?
23 A. Because it was said so by the leaders of the RSK, but not by
24 Mr. Milan Martic.
25 Q. When you say "it was said so" -- oh, so you say that you heard
1 other leaders of the RSK say that military targets were the object of the
2 attack? Is that right?
3 A. Indeed.
4 Q. Isn't it true that in the first day or two after the shelling,
5 Martic took responsibility for ordering it. No one mentioned military
6 targets at all. It was only a couple days later, once there was an
7 international uproar over this, that this theory of military targets
9 A. It's curious that you should say so. The international community
10 did not feel upset by the fact that there were hundreds of children and
11 women who were massacred in Western Slavonia, but they were in an uproar,
12 up in arms, because there were five people killed in Zagreb. And this
13 goes to show that there was in this terrible war really dual standards.
14 Q. Okay. And it was only after that international uproar that anyone
15 mentioned military targets in Zagreb; correct?
16 A. You do not place yourself back in the time. It was a period of
17 utter confusion, that the RSK was in a state of shock, was of utter
18 despair. They could see that the Croats were in the process of killing
19 and butchering their families, and this was a last-ditch attempt to defend
20 themselves. They knew that following the Storm operation, there would be
21 the -- or the Flash operation, there would be the Storm operation;
22 everybody knew that very well.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, can I interject here?
24 I would like, sir, you to answer the question that was put to
25 you. The question was: "Isn't it true that in the first day or two after
1 the shelling, Martic took responsibility for ordering it?" Can you
2 respond to that question? You were asked that question. Something else
3 was added and then you commented upon the [Microphone not activated].
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, I cannot answer
5 the question because I do not have the exact statements made by
6 Mr. Milan Martic in the following days. All I can tell you is that --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's enough.
8 You may carry on, Mr. Black.
9 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Let me just see if I can get an answer to my last question which
11 was: It was only after this international uproar that we talked about
12 that this theory of military targets was talked about; correct? Or -- if
13 you don't know, that's fine; you can say so.
14 A. No, no. This idea of military targets, I knew about it from the
15 very first shots.
16 Q. How? How did you know that?
17 A. Because I was in touch with leaders of the RSK, especially with
18 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Slobodan Jarcevic.
19 Q. Okay. And when was the first time that he told you that there
20 were military targets being targeted in Zagreb? Be as specific as you
21 possibly can.
22 A. I will be extremely specific, because I was in charge of the
23 office representing the RSK in Paris. In this capacity, I received the
24 dispatches by Mr. Milan Martic to be transferred to the AFP news agency.
25 So as of the 1st of May, I conveyed the appeals for help launched by
1 Mr. Martic to the international community; this remained without an
2 answer. Later on, with the first rocket shots, or fires, I knew that
3 there were military targets being targeted. I knew it from
4 Mr. Slobodan Jarcevic, with whom I was in direct contact, and he was the
5 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
6 Q. Okay. Let me move on to something that you said reminded --
7 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Black, before you move on, please, I'd like
8 to ask Mr. Barriot a question.
9 Mr. Barriot, could you please tell me, were you given specific
10 military targets by Mr. Jarcevic, or were you just advised that generally
11 there would be military targets? Did you have more specific information
12 concerning which buildings might be targeted or which particularly --
13 which particular military objects would be targeted?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a dim memory because after
15 all this goes back over ten years, but I seem to remember that there was a
16 Ministry of Defence and there was also a military airfield, but that's all
17 I can tell you. This is not very precise memory I have of it.
18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And you got this information from Mr. Jarcevic?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Indeed.
20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And when precisely did you receive this
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't tell it to the day,
23 but it was in the beginning of May, must have been around the 4th of May,
24 1995. One day or two, I can't be absolutely certain, but yes, that's
25 about the day.
1 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And did you share this information with anyone,
2 outside of persons who were part of the Krajina authority? Did you share
3 it with any member of the UN or any other organisation?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I trans -- I did share this
5 information to all organisations, to the AFP news agency, but no press
6 release was published. But I did send some press releases for the Storm
7 operation and they were published, but all this had been sent to the AFP
8 news agency. All this information had been conveyed.
9 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much, Mr. Barriot.
10 Mr. Black, please continue.
11 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Just one point of clarification, sir. You mentioned Mr. Jarcevic,
13 but you also said "the Minister of Foreign Affairs." Mr. Jarcevic was no
14 longer the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1995; correct? He no longer
15 served in that position after April of 1995?
16 A. That's true. For me, he remains the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
17 that's the way I call him. But you're right. I'm not trying to sort of
18 play on dates here.
19 Q. Okay. But you were indeed speaking about Mr. Jarcevic?
20 A. Yes, of course, of course.
21 Q. I'm going to change topics now for a minute. In actually around
22 this same time in May 1995, both you and Eve Crepin became RSK citizens;
23 isn't that right? You applied for and received RSK citizenship?
24 A. No, that's not quite the way it happened. We received RSK
25 citizenship as an honour, in an honorary fashion, for the assistance we
1 provided to the people in need. There was no political connotation to
2 this gesture. You know, you can be appointed honorary citizen for a city
3 due to the efforts you deployed to help the population of that city.
4 Q. But there certainly way as an official character to your
5 appointment by Mr. Martic as RSK representative in Paris; correct? That's
6 something that happened I guess in June or July 1995? Can you confirm
8 A. I must have received the official letter around that date; that's
9 true. But to all intents and purposes, I had been the representative
10 since the -- late 1994.
11 Q. Okay. And you received -- you were appointed to that position by
12 Mr. Martic; correct?
13 A. Yes, I was.
14 Q. That -- how did that idea come about? Could you just very briefly
15 say what it was that led to you being named representative of the RSK in
16 Paris? Was it your idea or Mr. Martic's idea or how did it arise?
17 A. It came about naturally, but I could tell you that it was a joint
18 idea, that sort of matured as months went by, as discussions went by,
19 because Eve Crepin and I were involved in humanitarian aid and we tried by
20 all means to make it possible for the Krajina Serbs to have a voice in the
21 media. So this is an idea that arose jointly as time went by.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. This caused you problems, correct, at home?
23 And in fact, it was this position as representative of the RSK which
24 caused you to lose your position in the French army. Is that right?
25 A. It is true. There was a complaint by Mr. Mate Granic, who was
1 then the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who complained to the UN
2 that a French army un -- officer it would help the Serbs, and
3 Charles Millon, the French minister, punished me for not complying with
4 the obligation of reserve that is imposed to officers. I was not punished
5 because I would have violated the honour of the army or because I would
6 have collaborated with the enemy; I was punished for saying what I had
7 seen, what I had witnessed.
8 Q. And in effect, you were, I guess -- correct me if I'm wrong, but
9 you were dishonourably discharged, you lost your rank and you had to leave
10 the army; correct?
11 A. Your information is not accurate; it's false. My superiors
12 offered me a kind of deal. They told me, if you decide to go back on
13 everything you have said so far, if you say that you have been manipulated
14 by the Serbs from the Krajina, you can remain in the army and you can
15 continue your career, but you have to do this in writing. But if you do
16 not accept to do that, you'll have to leave the army. Then, of course, I
17 refused to go back on what I had said. I left the army, but I left the
18 army with the rank I was holding, with my rights to my pension; and
19 therefore, no sanctions were taken against me because my only fault, the
20 only fault I had committed, was that I had told the truth.
21 Q. Okay. Thanks for the explanation. I think I understand you.
22 Do you have any regrets about sacrificing your military career
23 to -- you know, to support the RSK, to accept this position?
24 A. No. I have no regrets. Eve Crepin does not regret anything
25 either because she also lost as much as I did; she lost her career. But
1 we believe that the greatest injustice that can be committed is the
2 injustice committed against an entire people, and we believed that we
3 saved the honour the French army. And I believe that -- I must say that
4 it's a young lady, a young woman, who saved the honour of the French army,
5 Eve Crepin.
6 Q. Let me move on to another topic. Just so I'm clear about this,
7 you were in UNPROFOR in Croatia for three months, from March to June 1994;
9 A. That's right.
10 Q. And you were serving as a military -- or, excuse me, as a medical
11 officer, as a doctor basically, during that time, right?
12 A. Yes. I was serving as an anaesthesiologist for the forward
13 surgical mobile unit.
14 Q. Okay. So primarily, you were treating patients, not analysing
15 intelligence or commanding troops in the field. Your duties were
16 primarily medical; correct?
17 A. No. That's not quite correct. Yes, that's right, I was there as
18 a doctor, my duties were medical; but as I said earlier on, the
19 intelligence services, the French military intelligence services, were in
20 touch with me and they had asked me to supply information about the
21 weapons in circulation in the RSK. I mentioned that previously. So I
22 would have regular meetings with the man in charge for the Yugoslavia. He
23 would show me pictures of all types of weapons systems for me to be able
24 to recognise them, but I didn't have to recognise anything because there
25 were no weapons.
1 Q. Okay. I'm talking just now about March to June 1994. So you're
2 saying you were in touch with these intelligence people then, or was that
3 something that came later?
4 A. It took place at that time from March 1994 to the summer of 1995.
5 Q. You were stationed in Glina, which is some 50 or 60 kilometres
6 away from the headquarters in Zagreb, right?
7 A. Well, the mobile unit was in Topusko, but that's very close to
8 Glina, yes.
9 Q. Okay. Thank you. So -- and you talked about the briefings you
10 had and that you were in contact with these intelligence officers. But
11 you didn't have, for instance, daily access to the intelligence reports
12 such as what those officers in the headquarters in Zagreb would have;
14 A. Yes, but as I said earlier on, there were about two meetings a
15 week at the battalion level, very frequent meetings, and I would go to
16 Zagreb on a weekly basis.
17 Q. This first three-month mission in Krajina was when you met
18 Eve Crepin; correct?
19 A. Yes, that's correct. We were working in the same hospital in
20 Metz, before but before we didn't know each other. We actually met in
22 Q. And I have no intention of getting into your personal life. But
23 just so that it's clear, since then you've been living together; correct?
24 You're in a relationship with Ms. Crepin?
25 A. Yes, that's indeed a personal matter. I was -- I had indeed a
1 relationship with Mrs. Crepin to the last few days.
2 Q. Okay. I have no -- I don't want to get into that any more. I
3 just wanted to establish that for the record.
4 You also developed, it appears, an extremely strong bond with the
5 Serb people in the Krajina while you were there. Is that an accurate
6 description, an accurate statement?
7 A. Yes. And I believe that that brought us together, Eve Crepin and
8 myself. Is that the -- it's the awareness that these people had been
9 demonised, unjustly accused, and we decided to help these people as much
10 as we could, considering our resources, our means.
11 Q. Okay. So to do that after you were no longer part of UNPROFOR,
12 you returned several times in your private capacity; correct?
13 A. Yes. Eve Crepin and myself would go back very frequently, every
14 two months or so, and we would bring supply, equipment, medical supply for
15 the hospital, and we would stay there for two to three weeks. We would
16 work in -- as anaesthesiologists in the surgical unit of the Glina
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. There is one thing from my notes I just wanted
19 to get clarification from you. It's at page 13 of the transcript. You
20 were talking about your contacts with the local population. And you
21 said: "I can say they happened gradually of course because initially I
22 was foreign military, of course I came to help them at the hospital, but
23 it took time to, as it were, tame them. But as time went by, I got to be
24 accepted by the population."
25 I was just wondering what you meant by that, by it took time to
1 "tame" the local population.
2 A. Sorry, either you misquoted me or I did not express myself; I said
3 we tamed each other. In other words, I just wanted to say that we got to
4 know each other because they would tame me as much as I would tame them,
5 but it's a sort of affectionate way of speaking about our relationship,
6 and it was bilateral.
7 Q. Okay. Thanks for the clarification.
8 Another thing, at page 6, lines 1 and 2 of the transcript, you
9 were talking -- you were asked about the task of UNPROFOR in the protected
10 zones, the UNPAs. And you said there: "The mission was to be there
11 between the Serbs and the Croats, to interpose themselves in order to
12 protect the Serb population in the Krajina region."
13 And my question is that the UNPROFOR's mission was not just to
14 protect the Serb population, but to protect all civilians in the UNPAs;
16 A. Yes. It was to protect all those people living in these UNPAs
17 that were -- that had no weapons.
18 Q. One other thing, I guess while I'm on the topic of
19 clarifications. At page 21 of the transcript, you were talking about how
20 there was no discrimination in the hospital in Glina and you said: "The
21 natural reaction is to keep what little you have, to keep it for your own
22 people, for the members of your ethnic group." And then you say: "But
23 that's not what happened."
24 Why do you say it would be your natural reaction to keep medical
25 supplies and life-saving techniques for members of your own ethnic group?
1 A. It seems obvious to me. If you're starving and you find a piece
2 of bread, you're tempted to eat it yourself or to share it with the
3 members of your family, but you're not really tempted to give it to
4 someone else to someone who is not really close to you. What I wanted to
5 say is that despite the dramatic circumstances, the dramatic conditions
6 these people were living in in the Krajina, they still remained generous
7 towards people who were not that close to them.
8 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Excuse me, Witness, were you are not also speaking
9 of the attitude of the medical personnel in this regard? And if I
10 understood you correctly, and you included doctors of medicine, would you
11 say it's a natural attitude of a doctor to make these differences?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not only referring to the
13 medical staff. I was -- also to the doctors. I was also talking to [as
14 interpreted] those working as nurses, working in the labs, and I was
15 talking about everyone.
16 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Sir, please answer my question. I asked you if
17 you included them and if you would say that about the natural attitude of
18 a doctor of medicine?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a rule in what we call disaster
20 medicine; it's not a rule that applies in the normal circumstances.
21 Please let me explain yourself [as interpreted]. When you're confronted
22 with a disaster, you have to select amongst the patients. I'm a
23 specialist in the matter. I can tell you, in some circumstances I have to
24 make a selection; and in these circumstances, they could have made a
25 selection but they did not do so.
1 JUDGE HOEPFEL: You mean there are rules in anaesthetics and
2 emergency medicine about selection which include criteria of certain
3 groups of the population, social groups, or are these only medical
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only medical criteria are operative,
6 but what I was telling you --
7 JUDGE HOEPFEL: What do you mean you were telling me?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was saying that the cases I
9 referred to were desperate cases. These people could have been left to
10 die, but nevertheless everything was done to save them. They were given
11 medicine, treatment, although their state of health was desperate and --
12 but these people were non-Serbs.
13 JUDGE HOEPFEL: And you would regard this an extraordinary
14 phenomenon just in these cases?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that's displaying a great
16 deal of generosity, and I think that I'm in a position to be able to
17 assert that.
18 JUDGE HOEPFEL: As a doctor of medicine, you mean, so this is why
19 I asked you that, you know. Thank you.
20 You may proceed please.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
22 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Barriot, you testified that while you were in the RSK, the RSK
24 had no heavy weapons, they only had light weapons that were -- I think you
25 said "exclusively defensive."
1 MR. BLACK: And that's on -- for the benefit of counsel and the
2 Chamber, on page 22 and 23.
3 Q. Yes you said: "The only type of weapons you could find in the RSK
4 were light weapons of an exclusively defensive type."
5 You don't deny, though, that the RSK had its own army, the SVK, at
6 the time, right?
7 A. Yes, I know it. I'm talking about operative weapons. I'm not
8 talking about a few tanks, a few very antiquated tanks that didn't not
9 have any fuel to run.
10 Q. Okay. Well, obviously the SVK also had at least some
11 sophisticated weapons, like the Orkan multiple-barrel rocket-launcher that
12 we mentioned earlier, right?
13 A. I don't believe that you can call them sophisticated weapons,
14 these Orkan rocket-launchers.
15 Q. The SVK also had combat aircraft in 1994, 1995, didn't they?
16 A. These planes never took off. They were not operational. In any
17 case, the US army had destroyed all the systems.
18 Q. Let me ask to you look at a document.
19 MR. BLACK: It's R0014619, if we could see that on our screens,
20 please, and I'm afraid this is one that I only have in English, I believe.
21 Thank you.
22 Q. As you can see - I'll try to explain it if you have any trouble
23 with the language - but this is a letter from the Special Representative
24 of the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia under UNPROFOR
25 letter-head to Mr. Martic on the 15th of November, 1994.
1 MR. BLACK: And if we could scroll down a bit, please -- actually
2 to the last -- that last paragraph.
3 Q. The second sentence says: "A combat plane based at Udbina is also
4 reported to have launched a missile attack against Bihac town on 9
5 November with civilian casualties and considerable material damage."
6 Udbina is within the territory of the RSK; correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. So this refers to a combat plane taking off from RSK territory;
10 A. This is a lie. The same lie that was propagated that at the time
11 of the Knin attack, the aim was to justify the American attack against the
12 Udbina airport. They stated that the radars had spotted a NATO airplane
13 and then they opened fire, but this was just a way of justifying the
14 attacks of the US army planes on Serb defensive systems.
15 Q. Okay. So in your view, what Mr. Akashi says here is a lie? There
16 is just no truth to it?
17 A. I believe that he's justifying things that had been decided
19 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could this be admitted into evidence,
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
22 please be given an exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit Number 1007.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. BLACK: Thank you.
1 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Black, just please permit me once again.
2 Mr. Barriot, what makes you say with such certainty that it's a
3 lie? Why do you declare it a lie, on what basis?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I declare it on the basis of the
5 analysis conducted by intelligence services, who were perfectly well
6 informed about what was going on. I'm not talking on the basis of
7 statements made by politicians or statements of a highly political nature.
8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: So you would not be relying on your own personal
9 knowledge? You are relying on information supplied to you or not supplied
10 to you by intelligence services?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm relying on facts. I'm relying
12 on the fact that the US army shelled the Udbina airport, and I'm relying
13 on the fact that its combat aircraft, American aircraft, that launched the
14 first missiles during the Storm operation. These are facts.
15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much.
16 Mr. Black, please do continue.
17 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Just before we leave that, sir, you say that these are facts and
19 that makes them so. But I mean, these are just things that you were told,
20 right? You didn't personally witness these; you're just accepting the
21 word of someone else.
22 A. Yes, but you do exactly the same here at the Tribunal. That was
23 written up in all the newspapers. It's not even a secret. Journalists
24 have said it. It's been filmed, so you can't really deny it. If you deny
25 it, then you do not accept anything. If you take -- if you have that
1 point of view, then nothing can ever be proven.
2 Q. I assume that what you're talking about is the distinction between
3 hearsay, and you're right second-hand information is accepted here but
4 it's accepted as such. And there is a distinction that's made between
5 first-hand information and second-hand information. Do you have a
6 difficulty distinguishing yourself about what's first-hand knowledge and
7 what's second-hand knowledge?
8 A. No, no. I can make the distinction without any problem. Do you
9 deny the fact that the US army shelled the Udbina airport? Do you deny
10 the fact that two aircrafts from the Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier
11 conducted shelling at the beginning of the Storm operation? Do you deny
13 Q. Sir, first of all, it's not my position to deny these sort of
14 things, but don't assume what I accept or deny or what I'm going to say to
15 you. Your job here is to answer my questions, okay. Do you understand
17 A. Yeah, but I've answered your questions. I told you that these --
18 this information had been given to me by sources from French intelligence
19 services, and at the beginning of my testimony I said that I will tell the
20 truth. I can't add anything to that.
21 Q. Okay. So when you say something is a fact, you mean it's
22 something that you could have heard from someone else and you accept as
23 true, yourself personally? Just so we are clear about what we are talking
25 A. No, it's not hearsay. It's a number of arguments, information
1 from intelligence services, the reports made by journalists on the spot.
2 It's a great deal of information. You're saying it's very vague, but it's
3 not the case. It's a whole series of facts that corroborate each other.
4 Q. Let me move on to another document, I think, at this point.
5 MR. BLACK: Or actually -- excuse me, Your Honour, if I could just
6 take a moment. I forgot whether I'd asked for this last document to be
7 admitted into evidence. Yes, okay, 1007. Thank you very much.
8 Could we see R0014455 on the screens, please. Actually -- and if
9 we could go to the second page, please. Thank you.
10 Q. Mr. Barriot, you see here this is a letter, again to Milan
11 Martic. This time it's from the force commander of UNPROFOR. So this is
12 not a politician, this is a military man speaking here. It's dated the
13 18th of November, 1994. And if you see it, that second paragraph, it
14 says: "At approximately 1100 hours this morning, two 'Orao' planes that
15 had taken off minutes earlier from Udbina airport struck Bihac with one
16 cluster bomb and one napalm bomb. We have irrefutable proof that the
17 above-mentioned planes belong to your forces."
18 Sir, you have no grounds to dispute what's written in this
19 document, do you, by an UNPROFOR force commander do you, or do you contend
20 that this also is a lie?
21 A. I'm only saying that these irrefutable proof they are talking
22 about, they are not produced here; therefore, I suppose following your way
23 of -- your reasoning, I believe that we should take his word for it.
24 Q. Sir, please don't follow my way of reasoning. I want to know what
25 you think. I mean, you have no reason to dispute what's written in this
1 letter; correct?
2 A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do, because, as you said if -- using the
3 argument you use against me, I use this against the general who wrote this
4 letter. I do not see in this letter any irrefutable proof that these
5 planes were indeed coming from Udbina and were supposed to attack the
6 place they'd attacked.
7 Q. Sir --
8 A. Bihac pocket.
9 Q. -- I'm not asking you whether you can see irrefutable proof in the
10 letter, okay.
11 Do you accept or do you not accept what's stated there, that these
12 two planes took off from Udbina and struck Bihac? Do you accept it or
13 don't you?
14 A. No, I don't and I'll tell you why I don't accept it, because there
15 was -- the American army wanted to destroy the airport at Udbina; that's
16 why I'm very suspicious about any type of information of the kind. We can
17 seriously doubt what is saying by UNPROFOR, because at the end of 1994
18 UNPROFOR did not conduct its mission of protection in the southern area of
19 the zone and we are here precisely talking about zone south in the
20 protection area.
21 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could this be admitted into evidence,
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
24 please be given an exhibit number.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, there becomes Exhibit Number 1008.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
2 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. I think we are at the time of
3 our regular break now as well.
4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes. Before we go, I would like to ask two
5 questions, or rather, one question in relation to this document. May I?
6 Mr. Barriot, would a cluster bomb be an offensive or defensive
7 weapon? And in relation to a napalm bomb, could you also apply the
8 question to that also, that bomb also, in terms of weaponry? You'd spoken
9 before about defensive weapons and I wanted to know.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, there has never
11 been any napalm bomb in Krajina. As for cluster bombs, the word of
12 cluster bomb is a very vague term. We would need to know whether we are
13 talking about bombs aimed at piercing an armour, the armour of a tank, or
14 aimed at attacking a column of tanks that were conducting operation in the
15 Bihac pocket, because we know that the 5th Corps was there and was getting
16 ready to attack the Krajina region.
17 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: All right. Given that you do not believe that
18 the RSK had, is it napalm - how is it pronounced? - bombs, could you still
19 apply my question to the type of weaponry that it is? Would it be an
20 offensive or defensive, to apply the descriptions which you had used much,
21 much earlier on in your evidence? Accepting that you say that the RSK did
22 not have this type of weaponry.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you use a cluster bomb and napalm
24 bomb, it can only be defensive weapon in front of an attack, in
25 preparation. But I'm very surprised because as far as I know, no victim
1 was ever recorded, no person who would have been burned by a napalm bomb.
2 Because people who fall victim to that type of weapon, a napalm bomb, are
3 burned in a very specific manner, and this could not have passed unnoticed
4 in the medical centres of the region.
5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's time to take a break. We'll come back at half
7 past 12.00.
8 Court adjourned.
9 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry about that.
12 Yes, Mr. Black, you may proceed.
13 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Barriot, you testified that the Krajina received no
15 humanitarian assistance during the time that you were there. It's true,
16 isn't it, that UNPROFOR, and in particular the UNHCR, did provide
17 humanitarian aid to the Krajina in 1994 and in early 1995?
18 A. Yes, it is correct. In 1994, when I was a blue helmet in Krajina,
19 in Glina, there was an office of the UNHCR headed by Bertrand de Lapresele
20 and there was some degree of humanitarian assistance but it was totally
21 disproportionate with regard to the needs on the spot. At any rate, there
22 was no NGO. The NGOs -- they only helped the Croats and the Muslims.
23 MR. BLACK: If we could perhaps look at a document just quickly.
24 It's actually one that I didn't get uploaded into e-court, Your
25 Honours. I have hard copies. I've given a hard copy already to the
1 Defence and one for the interpreters. So if a copy could be given to the
2 witness and to the Bench, please. Thank you very much. For the record,
3 this, is -- bears the ERN 01733271, and I'll get -- we'll get into this
4 e-court just as soon as we can.
5 Q. Mr. Barriot, you see that this is a document from the UNHCR. It's
6 a letter, actually, to Mr. Martic dated the 8th of March, 1995. And if
7 you just look with me at the first paragraph, let me read it out so that
8 you can also have the benefit of the oral translation.
9 It says: "Dear Mr. Martic, I have the honour to refer to our
10 meeting in Knin on Tuesday, 21 February. You will no doubt recall that on
11 that occasion, I emphasised that UNHCR was finding it increasingly
12 difficult to justify continuing to meet 100 per cent of the needs in the
13 UNPAs while obstructions to the passage of aid convoys to the Bihac
14 enclave through territories under your control meant that UNHCR had only
15 be able to deliver close to 20 per cent of the needs there since May
17 First of all, this says that they were meeting 100 per cent of the
18 needs in the UNPAs. Do you dispute that characterisation?
19 A. Well, I do dispute that categorically. When you are in the Glina
20 hospital which is the most important hospital in the area, when you do not
21 have antibiotics, you do not have any anaesthetics, you don't have any
22 blood supplies, you don't have any biological reaction products, how can
23 you say that you have 100 per cent of your needs catered? You have zero
24 per cent of the needs that are catered then.
25 Q. What about food and drinking water and things like that? It's
1 correct that the UNHCR was providing that, whether or not it's
2 100 per cent in your view, but they were providing supplies to the
3 civilian population; correct?
4 A. No, there wasn't. I don't think you know the area. It is an area
5 where people live off their farm produce, their pigs they raise, their
6 crops. The UNHCR did not provide them with that.
7 Q. It's correct here what's referred to about obstructions to the
8 passage of aid convoys to the Bihac enclave through RSK territory, you
9 were aware of such obstructions at the time; correct?
10 A. But I fail to see where the convoys would have come from if they
11 were crossing. They could have come from Croatia, if they had to cross
12 the RSK to go to the Bihac pocket. I can't understand which route they
13 took, because all the supplies for the 5th Corps of Dudakovic was
14 regularly daily supplied from Bosnia. They didn't lack anything. So I
15 really fail to understand which route was taken or the meaning of this
17 Q. Well, let's look at the second paragraph, and maybe that will help
18 clarify it. There, it's written: "Since our last meeting only four
19 convoys were allowed in the Bihac enclave, and the last convoy team has
20 been prevented from returning to Zagreb since the 28th of February.
21 Although fighting may be occurring in the area through which they plan to
22 drive, there are other safe routes to leave Bihac such as the one through
23 Petrovo Selo where no fighting is occurring at the moment."
24 So it appears that these convoys were going between Croatian
25 territory in the Bihac pocket, and to do so they had to cross RSK
1 territory but they were being obstructed. Now, do you know anything about
2 that? Did you know about that at the time? Can you offer any comment on
4 A. I can give you a very simple comment. The letter is dated March
5 1995. As of the summer of 1994, until the beginning of 1995, there was
6 fighting in the Bihac pocket between the 5th Bosnian Corps of Dudakovic
7 and the men of Fikret Abdic. If it was impossible to go through to the
8 Bihac pockets, it was because of the Muslim army not because of the
9 Serbs. At any rate, the 5th Corps was always very well supplied. Those
10 that did not get supplies, they were the people from -- the Serbs from
11 Krajina, so this is absolutely nonsensical.
12 Q. So your position is that this letter is not correct. It wasn't
13 the RSK that was obstructing access to Bihac, it was just the fighting.
14 That's what you're saying, right?
15 A. But of course, yes, that's what I'm saying. It's the access
16 through Bosnia to the Bihac pocket, it was totally controlled by the
17 5th Corps. So if somebody was obstructing, it was the 5th Corps; they
18 controlled the area.
19 Q. So just so that it's clear to everyone. When you talk about the
20 5th Corps, you're talking about the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
21 correct, the Bosniak army?
22 A. Yes, absolutely. Headed by General Atif Dudakovic who, as far as
23 I'm aware, was not indicted for the crimes he committed.
24 Q. And are you saying that the 5th Corps even controlled the boundary
25 with RSK? That there was no way that you could get from the RSK into the
1 Bihac pocket without going through the 5th Corps?
2 A. It is the 5th Corps that drove all the men of Fikret Abdic to
3 Krajina at that time, so he was the one in control of the area. On the
4 other hand, in -- when there was the Storm operation, when over 200.000
5 Serbs were expelled from Krajina, they could not receive any aid whilst
6 they were in the Banja Luka area because the Muslims, Bosnians, were
7 against the passage of humanitarian convoys. Whenever there was
8 obstruction, it was done by the Bosnian Muslims not by the Serbs because
9 the Serbs needed that.
10 Q. Let me just look at one last paragraph in this document and it's
11 the third one. I don't -- well, maybe I don't need to read it out, but it
12 says here that: "Because of the obstruction by the RSK, the UNHCR is
13 forced to suspend humanitarian assistance to the UNPAs and Velika Kladusa
14 until regular access to Bihac has been opened."
15 So, at least from the point of view of the UNHCR, it was the RSK
16 that was obstructing humanitarian assistance in this case, right?
17 A. Well, it's quite delirious, that's what this letter says, but it
18 is absolutely nonsensical. I repeat it. This goes to show that those who
19 believe in this letter did not know anything about the military situation
20 prevailing in the Bihac pocket.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me, sir, let me just sort of say we try to
22 speak with respect here. It's the second time you're using that word
23 "nonsensical." I'd ask you to stop using it, okay? And in any case, let
24 me just say that whatever you may think about the nonsensical -- this man
25 being nonsensical, the addressee of the letter would have understood what
1 was being said to him and he should have been able to say if indeed it was
2 nonsensical and it was impossible for the RSK to implement what was being
3 requested of them. I don't know whether any response in that line did
4 come out.
5 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. May I proceed?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.
7 MR. BLACK: Actually could this document receive an exhibit
8 number, please?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
10 please be given an exhibit number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit Number 1009.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
13 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Barriot, I'm going to ask you a couple questions, if you don't
15 know -- if you don't have any information on these topics, you can tell
16 me. After the cease-fire agreement in March of 1994 -- this is in the
17 context, by the way -- you talked about conditions in the Krajina,
18 including economic conditions, and so I have a couple of questions
19 about -- following on from that topic.
20 MR. BLACK: Mr. Martic has a note for his counsel.
21 Q. Let me start my question again because I was being confusing.
22 You spoke about conditions in the Krajina, including economic
23 conditions, and I just had a couple questions following on from that.
24 Isn't it true that after the March 1994 cease-fire agreement, the Serb
25 side stalled and obstructed negotiations on an economic agreement up until
1 December of 1994?
2 A. No, not as far as I know. As far as I know this information is
3 not correct. One thing is certain: The cease-fire agreement was not
4 respected by the Croat side.
5 Q. Nor by the Serb side, correct?
6 A. The UNPROFOR reports show that there were regular and irregular
7 units of the Croatian army that penetrated into Herzegovina and
8 Western Slavonia.
9 Q. Sorry to interrupt, but my question was about the Serb side. The
10 Serb side also violated the March 1994 cease-fire agreement; correct?
11 A. When did they do so and where?
12 Q. Certainly before August of 1994. Do you agree?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Okay. Well, let me take a little detour here and show you
15 Exhibit -- document which is not yet in evidence. It's ZA024795 to
17 MR. BLACK: If we could see that on our screens, please.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you say 024 or 042?
19 MR. BLACK: Let me just read it again so that hopefully I get it
20 right. ZA024795.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you.
22 MR. BLACK: That's fine, actually. This is the page I was looking
24 Q. Sir, you see in front of you another letter from the UNPROFOR
25 force commander, and it's dated the 15th of August, 1994, and this one is
1 addressed to General Celeketic. And in the first paragraph there, just
2 quickly, it says: "I know your personal commitment towards the
3 consolidation of the 29 March cease-fire agreement. In that respect, I
4 want to express my deepest concerns as well as a strong protest for the
5 continuous and increasing violations of the cease-fire agreement. I
6 consider these violations a list of which is attached to this letter as
7 extremely serious insofar as they are not any longer the result of
8 regrettable local initiatives, but of a deliberate plan which simply
9 ignores the commitment signed by your political authorities."
10 Having seen this, do you accept that the RSK was violating the 29
11 March, 1994, cease-fire agreement?
12 A. But of course not. This is just small-talk. There is no fact, no
13 date that is given, nothing accurate, and this is dated the 15th August,
14 1994, when the 5th Bosnian Corps was attacking Krajina through the Bihac
15 pocket and was pushing, driving, all the Muslim from the Bihac pocket
16 towards Krajina. So there is not a single fact in there. It's really --
17 Q. Sir, this --
18 A. -- sad.
19 Q. Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Lapresele - I say that very
20 poorly - but this person was your commander when you were in UNPROFOR,
22 A. Yes, he was, and he gave me a medal. He rewarded me, and this
23 shows this dual standards all the time. You know, on the one hand you
24 have the 5th Bosnian Corps who enters the Krajina, and all you can see in
25 this letter by UNPROFOR is very vague accusations of violations of a
1 cease-fire agreement. However, the Flash and Storm operations were true
2 violations of this agreement. All this is just mere talk.
3 Q. Okay. Well, I don't want to spend too much time on this.
4 MR. BLACK: But can we move to -- I guess it's pages 4, page 4 of
5 the -- this document, please.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: My document is -- ends at 3.
7 MR. BLACK: Oh really, Your Honour, I'm sorry. Because there is
8 an attachment to this which details the cease-fire violations but it's --
9 I'll move on, Your Honour. I'll leave it at that.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, no, no, no, no. Carry on.
11 MR. BLACK: Well, well let me just read it out to him.
12 Q. Sir, according to attachment to this document regarding Serbian
13 violations of the cease-fire agreement, as of the 14th of August, 1994, it
14 says: "In Sector East, there were nine violations regarding heavy
15 weapons, the failure to withdraw heavy weapons, one violation regarding
16 monitoring of the ZOS."
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I just wanted to say to you I'm with you now.
18 MR. BLAKC: Okay.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: My page 3 talks about what your page 4 talks about.
20 MR. BLACK: Oh, thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. It continues: "In Section West, there were two violations of the
22 cease-fire agreement by failure to monitor the ZOS. In Sector North, four
23 violations regarding heavy weapon withdrawal and four violations regarding
24 monitoring the ZOS. In Sector South, nine violations regarding monitoring
25 the ZOS."
1 Is it nevertheless your position, sir, that all of this is, as you
2 say small-talk, it's not fact? It's all fabrication?
3 A. Yes. I maintain what I said because this sort of document has no
4 value at all. Not even a single wounded is mentioned, nothing is said as
5 to who fired, whether there was a response fire. Next to that you have
6 the Flash operation, the Storm operation, with hundreds of casualties,
7 hundreds of dead, with shells falling. That -- these are violations of
8 the cease-fire agreement. This document here has no value whatsoever.
9 Q. Okay. Thanks. You realise that in August 1994 there had been no
10 Flash operation, no Storm operation, right? So of course, you can't
11 expect to see that in a document from August of 1994, can you?
12 A. But this has been prepared. We know that there were infiltrations
13 in the time before this in order to prepare for these operations. And
14 those operations were real violations of the cease-fire. You don't even
15 see a single wounded in this paper, so what does that mean?
16 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could this be admitted into evidence as
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
19 please be given an exhibit number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit Number 1010.
21 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Sir, perhaps you don't know about this, but maybe you do so I'll
23 ask you: Isn't it the case that in 1994 and 1995, the RSK rejected any
24 proposed agreement that did not include independence, including the
25 so-called Z-4 plan?
1 A. It is wrong. You refer to the Zagreb Z-4 plan. If there was no
2 agreement, it is because President Tudjman said that he did not want to
3 sit together with Milan Martic at the negotiating table. The Krajina
4 Serbs were ready, were willing, to do any kind of compromise and
5 concessions. It is the president, President Tudjman, who refused to sit
6 down with them.
7 Q. Let me read you one quote, and it's from an exhibit, 1003, which
8 is under seal.
9 MR. BLACK: And I don't want to bring it up on the screen,
11 Q. But let me just read out to you a very short quote.
12 MR. BLACK: Thank you.
13 Q. I just want to read out a very short quote from an RSK official.
14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, Mr. Black.
15 MR. BLACK: Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Is not this area on the list of prohibited
17 subjects or not? Because if we don't allow the Defence to go into it, it
18 seems rather unfair to permit to you cross-examine on it. Is it -- am I
19 recollecting correctly that it is one of the topics?
20 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, could I have a moment to confer with
22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I do agree that the Z-4 plan was one of
25 the things mentioned by the Trial Chamber - actually I have the cite there
1 but not at hand - but this is in response to the witness's testimony about
2 economic conditions, about the fact that the Serbs were always delighted
3 to negotiate and that the Croatian side was the one who was violating the
4 cease-fire agreements and not negotiating in good faith. I don't intend
5 to spend have very much time on it, but I would ask to be able to put one
6 more question to him on it, since it is something that was discussed in
7 his testimony on direct examination and further in cross-examination.
8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Maybe we could hear the question first.
9 MR. BLACK: Certainly, Your Honour. I'll put the question.
10 Q. Mr. Barriot, if you could just wait a second after I ask you the
11 question, and then the Judges will decide whether or not you have to
12 answer it. Would you agree with the following statement by a RSK official
13 whom I won't name?
14 "There was no willingness to talk about peace or making peace our
15 dominant option. The prevailing policy said that the Ustashas were the
16 opponent. This was to be no discussion with them except through the sight
17 of the rifle. We would accept the international community's proposals
18 about likely negotiations, but only to block them eventually with concrete
20 MR. BLACK: That's my question, Your Honour. And, Your Honour, I
21 believe this goes to what the witness has testified about, negotiations
22 between the sides and the condition in Krajina in 1995. But I'm in your
23 hands as to whether or not to proceed to the next topic.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Black, the Trial Chamber will allow the
1 question, but it is to be kept extremely limited, to ensure that there is
2 no offence of the Trial Chamber's order, and subject to re-examination
3 limited by the Defence in respect of it.
4 MR. BLACK: I'm extremely grateful for your guidance, Your Honour.
5 Q. Mr. Barriot, now if you remember the question, please go ahead and
6 answer, whether or not you agree with that statement that I read out to
8 A. Listen, you're asking me to give a response to a document that you
9 do not present, mentioning somebody whose name you hide, so it's like fog
10 in a tunnel. Still, I'm going to answer.
11 Q. Please go ahead and just continue.
12 A. My answer is this: The only side that refused to negotiate was
13 the Croat side, and as was shown later on. They were the one who is
14 attacked Western Slavonia and Krajina. They were the ones who massacred
15 the civilian population. If that is the willingness to negotiate,
16 well ...
17 Q. I think I'll move on to the next topic, and that's the alleged
18 involvement, according to you, of the United States in Operation Storm. I
19 don't intend to spend a lot of time on this, but --
20 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, objection. Is not
21 Operation Storm also on the index of banned topics?
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is. But I thought what he was saying was:
23 "... and that's the alleged involvement, according to you, of the United
24 States in Operation Storm. I don't intend to spend a lot of time on
25 that." But unless -- are you going to talk about it?
1 MR. BLACK: I am, Your Honour. On 53 of the transcript, and I
2 believe in other places, the witness talks about this and he makes
3 allegations about things that happened. Page 53 -- that's just one
4 example, but about the United States army planes attacking, about this
5 Military Professional Resources Incorporated. This is stuff that the
6 witness addresses on direct; we do not accept it. And there are things I
7 think I need to put to him. It's only fair, Your Honour. The witness
8 can't testify about something on direct and then we be then excluded from
9 cross-examining on it. That's --
10 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: It was done incidentally, though. It was -- the
11 evidence that was given was more incidentally, but --
12 MR. BLACK: It happened on several occasions, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Yes, I will admit that.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Page 53, what lines are you looking at?
15 MR. BLACK: Page 53, lines -- line 25.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And this is under direct?
17 MR. BLACK: Yes, Your Honour. I'm trying to see if I can find
18 other --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh: "Radar had spotted airplane."
20 MR. BLACK: Actually, I'm told 53 was cross. Let me find the
21 cite, Your Honour, because this was discussed in direct. I believe it was
22 the last topic discussed before my cross-examination, before the break. I
23 apologise for not having a cite more quickly at hand, Your Honours, but
24 I'm finding it right now.
25 For instance, at page 25, there is, at line 6, a question about
1 this relation between the American organisation and the Croatian
2 authorities. According to our searches, this MPRI, Military Resources
3 Incorporated, is mentioned five times in the transcript. Paragraph 24 it
4 is said that: "MPRI, under the command of the Pentagon," there are a
5 number of references there, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
7 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] These comments by the witness were
8 not answers to my question. I did not put a single question in connection
9 with Operation Storm or any possible involvement by American elements in
10 that operation.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: But the witness testified about those things, and
12 you didn't stop him, Mr. Perovic.
13 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, on several occasions.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: So they are on record. Those statements are on
15 record. What the witness has put on record I think that the Prosecution
16 is entitled to cross-examine him on -- on it.
17 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] I withdraw my objection.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Perovic.
20 MR. BLACK: Thank you, and I'll try to be brief.
21 Q. Sir, you know the topic that I'm referring to now. First of all,
22 this idea of United States planes attacking Knin at the beginning of
23 Operation Storm, I think you said. Isn't it the case that the incident
24 you're talking about was where planes flying under the NATO flag attacked
25 an RSK surface-to-air missile defence site near Knin which had locked on
1 to NATO planes, locked on their firing mechanisms? I think you referred
2 to this somewhere in your testimony. That's the same incident we're
3 talking about; correct?
4 A. Yes, but you are changing things. This incident is very clear.
5 The US planes, now you mentioned NATO. That's wrong, that's false. It's
6 not NATO, or else you have to show us the NATO intervention order. You
7 know for NATO to start air-strikes, the NATO ambassadors have to sign an
8 order. So it's not NATO that intervened. It is the US, from the aircraft
9 carrier Theodore Roosevelt, and then if they struck the anti-aircraft
10 defence in Knin, not because they were a threat to them, they wanted to
11 destroy it so that the Croatian army could destroy -- could bomb Knin for
12 the MiG 23 to intervene peacefully in -- and that's the true.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters ask counsel to slow down when
14 they put questions. Thank you.
15 MR. BLACK: Thank you. I'll try to speak slower.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what about the witness himself?
17 Mr. Witness, you must also please slow down when you speak.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.
19 MR. BLACK: We'll both try to go slower.
20 Q. You're aware, sir, that human Rights Watch was of the view and
21 published a report that this was NATO planes and gave the description that
22 I've just given, right?
23 A. Well, look, I stop you right there. I can see what document you
24 are thinking of. What does Human Rights Watch rely on? On an article
25 published in an American newspaper. Human Rights Watch did not see that
1 themselves. They rely on an article published in the American press, and
2 I'm familiar with it. So first of all, this is second-hand knowledge
3 based on an article; secondly, Human Rights Watch is not at all in a
4 position to say whether it was NATO or the United States that intervened.
5 I do not think that they have the necessary military knowledge to know
7 Q. Okay. But you do, and according to you it was all just -- it was
8 just a hoax, it was a justification so the Americans could attack Knin.
9 That's your evidence, right?
10 A. Yes, of course. You've got American aeroplanes who would fly over
11 Knin. Of course they are going to be spotted by the radar.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Slow down.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. So you have American airplanes
14 that fly over Knin. Obviously, the radars will spot them and then they
15 will bomb the radars. Saying that we have been spotted by these radars is
16 just a lame excuse, to destroy the batteries and to allow the intervention
17 of the Croats as part of the storm operation.
18 MR. BLACK: Okay.
19 Q. I want to move away from this topic. But with regard to Military
20 Professional Resources Incorporated, this private company you talked
21 about, first of all, this was a private company and not a branch of the
22 United States government, right?
23 A. No. I do not agree with you. Yeah, we can talk about MPRI, if
24 you like.
25 Q. Sir, actually let me -- sir --
1 A. Do you want me to answer your questions or not?
2 Q. Yes, I want you to answer my specific question. Okay? That's our
3 role here. I put questions and you answer.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sir, let's -- excuse me, sir. Excuse me, sir.
5 Look here. I'm talking to you. Now, here he asks questions, you answer.
6 You don't postulate somethings next to the answer. Listen to me. I'm
7 talking. I'm talking. Okay? You listen to the question carefully and
8 you answer the question. Okay? You don't go into debate with -- fine.
9 Listen to the question and answer the question. I'm going to be listening
10 very carefully and I will tell you if you're not answering the question.
11 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. The question is narrowly, this MPRI is a private company and not a
13 branch of the United States government; isn't that right?
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: The answer should be yes or no and stop there.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It's under the orders of the
17 MR. BLACK:
18 Q. So according to you, this is a company that's either part of the
19 United States government or taking orders from the Pentagon? Have I
20 understood you correctly?
21 A. Yes, you've understood me perfectly. It's a way of -- for the
22 American government to be able to intervene on the sly.
23 Q. And I suppose your basis for there is, again, intelligence
24 services? Am I right?
25 A. Yes. I could give you a very long answer about that if you want
1 to have all the details.
2 Q. I don't think we need the details. Let me just put one thing to
3 you for your comment and we can go on to the next. I'm glad you find your
4 experience here a humorous one, sir, but if we could be serious for a few
5 more minutes, I'll finish your cross-examination.
6 Let me just put one more thing to you. Isn't it the case that
7 MPRI provided training on human rights and leadership issues. They did
8 not arm the Croats, and the United States respected the arms embargo
9 regarding the former Yugoslavia? If you disagree with me, you can just
10 say so, and we'll move on.
11 A. I disagree with you completely.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you. You've always considered the charges in this
13 Tribunal against Milan Martic to be illegitimate; isn't that right?
14 A. Yes, and I stand by my position.
15 Q. And that position is one that you formed long before this trial
16 started, right, without seeing any of the evidence that was led at this
18 A. No. That's not the case. I've been working for more than 12
19 years on the history of the Serbs in the Krajina region and I believe I
20 know their history very well indeed.
21 Q. My question was that you formed this opinion before this trial
22 started and before you were able to see the evidence that was led at this
23 trial concretely, correct?
24 A. Yes, but I knew most of the evidence before the beginning of the
1 Q. Earlier we saw the open letter to your friend Milan Martic, which
2 reminds me, Your Honour, I forgot to move that into evidence. I wonder if
3 just that section, the article along with the two pages of English could
4 be admitted into evidence and we'll make sure the proper pages are
5 uploaded into e-court?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the open letter to friend be admitted -- it is
7 admitted into evidence. May it please be given an exhibit number,
8 together with the French version?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will become Exhibit number
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
12 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Just a couple more quick questions while I have this book. In
14 addition to the article we saw earlier, there is another article in here
15 called, "What Justice for Krajina" in which you basically defend Milan
16 Martic against the charges which he faces here today, correct? Is that
17 correct, sir?
18 A. I've written so many articles and so many books about Krajina that
19 I do not quite see what article you're referring to.
20 Q. This one is called "Quelle justice pour la Krajina". It's
21 Y0061918, if we need to see it on the screen. I hadn't intended to go
22 into it in any detail. Is that an article that you recall?
23 A. Based on the title, yes, I suppose that I indeed submit all the
24 arguments to show that Krajina was the victim of a great injustice.
25 Q. And Mr. Martic, in particular, you also think has been the victim
1 of a great injustice here, right?
2 A. Yes, of course, of course. That's for sure.
3 Q. Just one other article worthy of -- that I think I should mention.
4 There is also an article about Srebrenica here. Let's see if I can find
5 the title of this one. It's "Quelques verites sur Srebrenica et sorsu qui
6 recollect." I apologise if my pronunciation isn't that great, but in this
7 article you basically suggest that the crimes in Srebrenica have been
8 exaggerated and that the Bosnian authorities sacrificed Srebrenica to gain
9 the sympathy of the international community, correct?
10 A. I'm not the one who is saying it. It's General Morillon himself
11 who said it and I don't think that you can challenge what General Morillon
12 said because he was there in Srebrenica. He's presented as the defender
13 of Srebrenica and he himself said that. Alija Izetbegovic decided to
14 sacrifice Srebrenica.
15 Q. And that's the argument you make in that article in that book,
17 A. Of course, I'm using the arguments of the people who were there
18 and whose word you can't challenge.
19 Q. And I take it that you stand by everything that you say in that
20 book, you stand by that here today, it's still your view, right?
21 A. I do not see the link between that and between the trial of Mr.
22 Milan Martic. Yes, but I stand by the position I expressed in this
24 Q. Okay. Not with standing judgements rendered by this Tribunal that
25 have come to very different conclusions about what happened in Srebrenica,
1 for instance, right?
2 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honours. I believe
3 that the witness observed, rightly, that the trial associated with
4 Srebrenica has nothing whatsoever to do with this trial, so I fail to see
5 the relevance of my learned colleague's question.
6 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, with respect, I think his views and his
7 clinging to views, despite the work of this Tribunal or other evidence, is
8 relevant to his credibility. That's why I'm asking these questions.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any reply, Mr. Perovic?
10 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] I don't think that this is the right
11 answer from the Prosecutor. I continue to maintain that this is an
12 irrelevant question because Srebrenica has nothing whatsoever to do with
13 the indictment against Milan Martic.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you say something in response to the argument
15 that he's testing credibility?
16 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Then I can say that it is in an
17 inappropriate way that he seeks to discredit this witness by the story
18 about Srebrenica.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The objection is overruled.
20 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll just put this question
21 and then move on. I'll just put the same question and try to get an
22 answer and then move on.
23 Q. Sir, you stand by these views about Srebrenica and other things in
24 your book today, notwithstanding the judgements that have been rendered by
25 this Tribunal which have come to different conclusions, right?
1 A. I stand by the statements of General Morillon, which he made
2 before a commission at the French assembly. This is in the archives of
3 the French parliament, and he stated very clearly that Izetbegovic
4 sacrificed Srebrenica.
5 Q. Sir, I'm asking about you, not General Morillon. I think it's a
6 simple question, and once you answer it we can get on. But you stand by
7 these positions notwithstanding the, sort of, contrary findings of the
8 Tribunal, right?
9 A. Yes, in the same way as I stand by the position of General Michael
10 Rose, General Pierre Geloire [phoen] and all the other generals who told
11 the truth.
12 Q. Okay.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have missed some of the names.
14 MR. BLACK:
15 Q. Sir, another book which you co-authored with Ms. Crepin is "The
16 Murder of a People," referring to the Krajina Serbs, correct?
17 A. It's not "The Murder of a People." It's based on a sentence
18 written by Viktor Hugo, A People is Being Murdered." It's not exactly
19 what you said.
20 Q. That was the translation I got into English, so we are talking
21 about the same book. Milan Martic contributed a preface on that book,
23 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Can you please clarify that? What is the original
24 title of the book in question?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The title is "A People is Being
1 Murdered," the Serbs from the Krajina region -- Krajina Serbs.
2 JUDGE HOEPFEL: When was this book published, and in which
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The book was published in French in
5 September 1995, by L'age d'homme.
6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. You may go on.
7 MR. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honour. We can look at the book. I
8 have not asked that any parts be translated into English, but the original
9 is at 03593652 and continuing.
10 Q. Sir, while that's being brought up, Milan Martic contributed a
11 preface to this book, correct?
12 A. Yes, Mr. Milan Martic wrote the preface to this book because I
13 asked him to do so.
14 Q. Okay. And I believe there were also contributions by Radovan
15 Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. If we could just look at one page, it's the page with the ERN
18 03593659, and this, sir, I think you'll recognise, is part of your own
19 introduction or preface to the book. And if we could look at the top
20 right-hand corner, please.
21 Sir, so that it's on the transcript, could you please read out for
22 us that paragraph that begins "C'est pour moi ..."
23 A. "It is for me a huge honour to have in this books texts written by
24 President Milan Martic, President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
25 Mladic, united in the defence of the Serb people, and its Orthodox church,
1 represented by Bishop Longin. They write in the honour of the memory of
2 Prince Lazar and the Serb chevaliers who fell at the Battle of Kosovo
3 Polje, on that terrible day of June 1389. They are the deserving heirs to
4 these people and I would like to respectfully greet them."
5 MR. BLACK: My thanks to the French interpreters for that
6 difficult translation and fast translation.
7 Q. But, sir, this is dated the 15th of August 1995. At the time,
8 Milan Martic had been indicted for the shelling of Zagreb; the world was
9 blaming Karadzic and especially Mladic for what happened in Srebrenica in
10 July 1995. But you stood by those men, didn't you?
11 A. No. You're mischaracterising what I'm saying. I'm not sure
12 you've read my book. This book, it was written at the time of the Storm
13 Operation and the aim was to defend a people that had been the victim of
14 the worst operation of ethnic cleansing that took place in the war in the
15 former Yugoslavia. And if you read what Karadzic and Mladic wrote, there
16 is nothing unacceptable in what they wrote. They just analysed the
17 situation in the Bihac pocket. So you should not mischaracterise what I
18 wrote and make suggestions that are totally inappropriate.
19 Q. Sir, I'm not characterising anything. We just read out your very
20 own words. One last question: Do you still respectfully salute these
21 three men today?
22 A. I believe that these men defended their people and that they
23 performed this mission in a very difficult situation, in a situation of
24 civil war. I'm not saying that atrocities were not committed on one side
25 and on the other. But it was an atrocious civil war, and each one of them
1 tried to defend their people, the people who they were responsible for.
2 Q. Thank you, sir.
3 MR. BLACK: No further questions at this time.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Perovic.
5 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Is this book now tendered?
6 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, since the part I was interested in was
7 read out on the record, I hadn't intended to tender it. Thank you.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
9 Mr. Perovic.
10 MR. PEROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no redirect for
11 this witness.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Perovic.
14 Questioned by the Court:
15 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Well, I would like to ask you one very general
16 question. You were asked about your opinion about this Court. Are you,
17 Witness, regarding this Tribunal as a court against a people or
19 A. To give you a candid answer, Your Honour, I believe, from the
20 bottom of my heart, that this is a biased and partial Tribunal that was
21 established to indict and to convict the entire Serb people.
22 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Okay. I take your answer in the affirmative as to
23 the question if this is a Tribunal against an entire people. How do you
24 know? Did you reach this conclusion on your own; if not, who told you
1 A. No, Your Honour. I reached this conclusion after many years of
2 work, many years of being present in the field. I believe that this
3 Tribunal is another way of continuing the war waged against the Serbs,
4 only with other means.
5 JUDGE HOEPFEL: What do you mean, "in the field"? Is this
6 Tribunal in the field?
7 A. No, no. What I meant to say is that the Tribunal is continuing
8 with legal means the work towards total -- until there is a total
9 destruction of the Serbian people.
10 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Have you got any education in international law?
11 A. No, but I work in close cooperation with Maitre Jacques Verges.
12 JUDGE HOEPFEL: With whom?
13 A. Jacques Verges, who has all the legal arguments at his disposal
14 that could be developed, also.
15 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Could you spell out the family name, for the
16 record. And that's enough from me.
17 A. His first name is Jacques. His family name is V-e-r-g-e-s. He's
18 the most famous French lawyer.
19 JUDGE HOEPFEL: This is always a value judgement, isn't it? But I
20 pass now to my colleagues.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Judge.
23 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much.
24 Mr. Barriot, the two buildings which were targeted as military
25 targets, which you have given evidence you believed were the Ministry of
1 Defence and the military airfield, were you given any reason why those
2 specific buildings were targeted?
3 A. No, I'm sorry, I did not receive any other information. I must
4 say I didn't ask for it either.
5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you. And you spoke of the circumstances
6 under which you came to leave the French army, and you mentioned the fact
7 that there was a complaint by a Monsieur Granic that you had not complied
8 with an obligation of reserve. What is that obligation of reserve? Could
9 you explain what it is.
10 A. Well, Mate Granic, he's the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in
11 Croatia. He complained with the French government, because I was together
12 with Serb local population and starting from that, Charles Millon, who was
13 the French Defence Minister, who ordered for me to be arrested for several
14 days and to be punished because I did not maintain the reserve that is
15 imposed on military, because, in other words, I had expressed my views.
16 Without having the authorisation to do so from my hierarchy, I had
17 expressed my opinion on a sensitive subject.
18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you. It seems to me that you feel very
19 passionately about this subject matter of the Krajina and the
20 circumstances of the Serbs in the Krajina over the relevant period. How
21 many publications in all have you authored and published in relation to
22 this subject of the victimisation, as you perceive it, of the Krajina?
23 A. To date, I have authored five books and over 100 articles,
24 together with Eve Crepin, of course.
25 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Now, there is one area in which you seem to be a
1 little bit at variance in your evidence. You spoke initially about the
2 circumstances of the people in the Krajina and the difficulty they had in
3 terms of having access to basic necessities, and I believe food was
4 mentioned as one of them. But I believe at a later stage now, when asked
5 about the Bihac pocket, you indicated that one should remember that this
6 was farming people and they produce their food and had access to food, as
7 a means of undermining what counsel had put to you in terms of the
8 obstruction of the passage of humanitarian aid.
9 So could you tell me which one is true? Or is it a case where, in
10 some areas, there was the absence of these -- the basic necessity of
11 access to food, but in other areas there was the farming and the people
12 were able to sustain themselves? Which one is it?
13 A. Your Honour, there is no disparity, nor variance. Look at what I
14 stated. I never said that there were people who did not have enough to
15 eat. I did mention basic necessities as to medical supplies and
16 hospitals, school books at school, on candles and soap, but I told you
17 that altogether they did not need any food assistance because basically
18 there were people from a rural area.
19 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much for that clarification. No
20 further questions of you, Mr. Barriot.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. It's now my turn to ask you a few
22 questions, sir. Let me just start here. Is Ms. Eve Crepin also an
24 A. Eve Crepin is a specialist nurse, specialised in emergency care
25 and intensive care.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You testified this morning
2 that because of the economic situation in the Krajina, Croats decided to
3 leave the Krajina to other cities; do you remember that?
4 A. Yes, I do remember, Mr. President. I said that some stayed whilst
5 others left.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, was it only the Croats who were so affected by
7 this economic situation that they left?
8 A. No, but they were the only ones who were able to go because the
9 Serbs had to stay. Only the Croats could go somewhere else in Croatia.
10 But the Serbs could not precisely because they had just been expelled from
11 the rest of Croatia.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: And the Muslims?
13 A. Well, the Muslims, they sought refuge in Krajina, when they were
14 driven out of Bosnia and out of the Bihac pocket. But they didn't go to
15 Croatia. They came from an area where they were still more miserable.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And they didn't find it necessary to -- when they
17 get to the Krajina and find the bad economic situation, they didn't find
18 it necessary to also then leave the Krajina, go to Croatia, they coming
19 from Bosnia?
20 A. As soon as they were able to leave, they did, especially those
21 40.000 Muslims from the Betanija and Turan camps. They arrived in August
22 1994 and they left again in January 1995. But it's true that the Krajina
23 area was not a nice place to live.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: But you didn't refer to them as having left the
25 Krajina. You only referred to the Croatians. Why didn't you mention
2 A. You know that for a Muslim it was not a very good idea to go to
3 Croatia. You know that there is not even a single mosque in Croatia.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't know that. I don't know that. I just want
5 to know why they didn't leave. And was Bosnia the only place -- Croatia
6 the only place they could go to? They could have gone to some other
7 places. They could have gone to Serbia.
8 A. But, Mr. President, do you speak about the Muslims or the Croats?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm talking about the Muslims.
10 A. Well, whenever the Muslims wanted to seek refuge in Krajina, they
11 could find a place to be. Whenever they wanted to go again, they did.
12 Nobody was against their coming or leaving in Krajina.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: My question to you was: Then why was it only the
14 Croats that you mentioned as having left the Krajina because of the
15 economic situation? Why didn't -- and now you have said that -- you're
16 saying that the Muslims could also leave. Why didn't you mention them in
17 your evidence-in-chief, these Muslims?
18 A. But I did speak about the Muslims at length, especially about
19 those who came to be treated from the Bihac pocket in Glina.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're not listening to my question. I'm not
21 saying you didn't speak about Muslims. I said you didn't mention them as
22 people who also left the Krajina because of the economic situation.
23 Please listen to my questions and answer them. Not your own.
24 A. Well, I do answer your question. They could go -- they could only
25 go to Bosnia. Anyway, they could not go to Croatia. So whenever some
1 left, they did go to Bosnia.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that you say they could go. My
3 question to you is: Why didn't you mention them in your
4 evidence-in-chief, when you were asked -- when you talked about the bad
5 economic situation, why did you say only -- why did you say Croats decided
6 to leave the Krajina?
7 A. Yes. That's what I stated, because the problem, the tension, that
8 existed was between the Serbs and the Croats. There was no tension
9 between the Serbs and the Muslims. This is the reason why I mentioned the
10 Croats only.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's more like an explanation. You indicated
12 that you discussed with Mr. Martic on the subject of the shelling of
13 Zagreb, and in your discussions it became clear that he had not ordered
14 the shelling but he took the responsibility as president. Do you remember
15 that testimony by you?
16 A. Yes, I do, Mr. President. That's how I perceived it and that's
17 the memory I have of it.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: When did you have this discussion with Mr. Martic?
19 A. Well, I had several discussions with him, towards the end of 1995.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Towards the end of 1995. And towards the end of
21 1995, that was before you wrote the article that was shown to you, that is
22 said to be dated the 15th -- I'm sorry -- the 15th of September 1997.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, in fact, the publication date is
24 not a good one, because this article was published before that date, as I
25 pointed out to the Prosecutor. It was published several times, and you
1 have the late -- well, the latest publication date here.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: When was it first published?
3 A. I'm so sorry, I'm unable to answer you accurately. I wrote over
4 100 articles and I can't remember all the publication dates, I'm sorry.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you know whether the article -- your discussion
6 with Mr. Martic was before or after writing the article? If you're not
7 able to, that's fine.
8 A. I think that this article was written before, precisely -- you
9 know, this is -- when I say "under orders," I mean it's a way of putting
10 it. A lot of insistence is put on these three words, because for me it
11 was a desperate reaction by the Serbs as a whole. There was an article on
12 the Krajina Serbs. This is not a legal process, trying to ascertain guilt
13 or responsibility. This is a way of speaking.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: What are you talking about? I'm not sure what
15 you're answering to now. What are you telling me? I asked you a simple
16 question: Was it before or after writing the article that you had the
17 discussion with Mr. Martic? What are you answering to?
18 A. I answered your question. I said that I had this discussion after
19 writing the article.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, when you say you think the article was written
21 before precisely, and then you say "a lot of insistence is put on these
22 three words," I don't know which three towards you're talking about. What
23 has that got to do with my question? My question --
24 A. But this is a very specific issue of the responsibility one might
25 have, because the Prosecutor insisted on order, upon orders given by
1 President Martic, and I wanted to show that this is just a general
2 expression, that it was not at all to demonstrate guilt. This is what I
3 meant to say.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: There was the matter -- when you write articles and
5 when you write books, what is the purpose? I suppose the purpose is to
6 document the truth, isn't it, as you see it? This is for posterity.
7 A. Of course, of course. But the truth was that the Serbs were being
8 massacred in Western Slavonia and they had a very desperate reaction of
9 self-defence. That's the truth.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let me warn you once again. Please listen to my
11 question and answer my question and my question only. I'm asking you,
12 when you write -- the purpose for your writing is to tell the truth. You
13 can say yes or you can say no. I don't need a long explanation, okay?
14 When you write, like when you talk here - you've been telling us several
15 times that you took the oath this morning to tell the truth - you write
17 A. Yes.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: And to be sure that you write truthfully, you
19 investigate and check your sources before you write, don't you?
20 A. Yes.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: And but that notwithstanding you still go and write
22 inaccuracies in your books. Why do you accuse Mr. Martic of having
23 ordered the shelling when, in fact, he hasn't? You are now telling an
24 untruth to those who read the book.
25 A. No, no, not at all. I did not accuse President Martic of ordering
1 the shelling.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said in your article he ordered it. You only
3 corrected the article this morning in court. You said he ordered the
4 shelling of Zagreb because of the shelling of Western Slavonia.
5 A. No, no, this is not what I said. I said that as a president, he
6 took the responsibility for this act of self-defence.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: That is the explanation you gave today in court.
8 That is not what you wrote in the document. You explained that what you
9 wrote in the document was incorrect because you have since established
10 that, in fact, he didn't order it. So what is in that article is
11 incorrect. You're telling the world an inaccuracy. Do you realise this?
12 On your own version.
13 A. No.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you mean, "No"? No, what? You don't
15 realise it?
16 A. No. I say no to the question you put to me.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: My question is: Do you realise this? So if you
18 don't realise it, I'll make you aware, because that article -- in that
19 article you say Mr. Martic ordered the shelling.
20 A. No.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Anyway, it is long past the time for -- I'm
22 sorry, I didn't realise the time. We will stop there. We'll carry on
23 tomorrow at quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon, sir, in the same court.
24 Court adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Friday, the 10th day of
2 November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.