1 Friday, 17 November 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: The Chamber has decided to sit this morning in the
7 absence of Judge Kamenova. We consider it in the interests of justice to
8 continue. She is absent for personal reasons.
9 We can now go into closed session to enable the witness to come
10 into the courtroom.
11 [Closed session]
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Good morning, Mr. Tanic. You can hear me, can you?
23 THE WITNESS: No.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, do you want to deal with the issue of
2 whether or not the witness should be invited again to give the
3 identification of personnel with whom he worked, or do you wish to proceed
4 first with your re-examination?
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I was prepared to do either one. It may
6 help if I ask him some questions first that will assist me with my
7 arguments about least one of those points.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: I think also that when we do have the discussion on
9 that matter, we should do so in the absence of the witness.
10 MR. HANNIS: Yeah.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, the evidence will now continue. Mr.
12 Hannis will have a chance to re-examine you. Again, please bear in mind
13 that the solemn declaration to tell the truth continues to apply to your
14 evidence today.
15 Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:
20 Q. Good morning, Mr. Tanic. I want to start by asking you some
21 questions related to the topic of NATO target information; and in
22 paragraph 117 of your statement where you indicate you personally passed
23 on to Milosevic information, you also say: "This information was also
24 included in an official memo on NATO targets sent by the SDB to
1 My question is: When you say "this information," do you mean the
2 information that you had, or do you mean general information that the SDB
3 had from sources other than you?
4 A. I mean my sources, but I would not be surprised if other
5 information from other sources had been added to that. But I primarily
6 meant my own sources.
7 Q. So if I understand correctly then, this official memo contained
8 the information that you had provided from your western source?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And in paragraph 118 you mention -- well, you say: "I know from
11 my SDB contacts," which you have told us previously in response to a
12 question from Mr. Ackerman, were the ones where we've been calling number
13 1 and 2 that you named in closed session. "I know from my SDB contacts
14 that the SDB provided Milosevic with maximum information about future
15 targets, which they received from western friends in good-will in order to
16 avoid civilian casualties."
17 Regarding that "maximum information about future targets," were
18 you the source of that information, or are you indicating that number 1
19 and number 2 got other information about targets from western sources?
20 A. There was other information apart from the information I provided,
21 in particularly when it came to potential civilian casualties in the
22 vicinity of military targets or in civilian facilities that were now used
23 for military purposes. And as far as I understand, there was some
24 understanding in the NATO alliance for any leaks of information regarding
25 potential civilian casualties. This was not espionage.
1 Q. [Previous translation continues]... received and provided about
2 the RTS television station. Was that the only target information that you
3 had passed on, or was there other?
4 A. There was other information, too.
5 Q. Do you recall now any of the specifics regarding the other
6 targeting information you passed on? Are we talking about two or 20 or
7 200 targets?
8 A. No. As you know, NATO divided its air campaign in three stages;
9 one, two, and three. And I had certain targets revealed to me in all
10 those stages, primarily related to potential civilian casualties, but also
11 some that regarding -- that had to do with military targets; and, of
12 course, this was much more strictly kept military secret.
13 Q. Can you give me any rough estimate of how many that would total?
14 You received some information regarding each of the three stages, but any
15 idea of the total number of targets we're talking about?
16 A. It is difficult for me to recall now.
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now I want to go to the topic of the
18 tape-recording that you described having opportunity to listen to portions
19 of that purport to be between Mr. Sainovic and General Lukic. I think you
20 testified yesterday at page 85, line 21, that you didn't recognise the
21 voices. Was there anything, however, about the content of the portions of
22 the conversation you heard that was inconsistent with that being a
23 conversation between Lukic and Sainovic, if you understand my question?
24 MR. LUKIC: Speculative, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: No. I think that's a perfectly reasonable question
1 to ask in the circumstances. I repel that objection.
2 Mr. Hannis.
3 MR. HANNIS:
4 Q. Did you understand my question?
5 A. Yes. I really couldn't recognise them because I don't know their
6 voices, but there was nothing in there that would be not something that
7 they would not be talking about. I said yesterday that I couldn't
8 authenticate the tape, and I can just confirm that the tapes existed.
9 Q. Okay. And I -- I know yesterday, at one point in time, I think it
10 was you or maybe Mr. Lukic pointed out, that we had made a mistake in the
11 transcript. It was initially written down as Vracar, V-r-a-c-a-r, when it
12 was actually Racak that you were speaking of. But I note that at -- the
13 last time I checked at page 78, lines 5 and lines 17, we still had Vracar.
14 In all cases regarding that tape, are you talking about Racak?
15 A. The contents that I could hear and the way I remember it, it
16 pertained to Racak because it was mentioned. But the contents are really
17 quite hazy in my memory right now.
18 Q. Thank you. I want to now go to a question Mr. Ackerman asked you
19 on -- yesterday at page 55, line 11. You pointed out that when you
20 testified in Milosevic you indicated that you had not requested any name
21 change or move. But since you testified in Milosevic, you actually have
22 been put in the witness protection programme.
23 You have gone to a new country and received a new identity. Did
24 anything happen after your testimony that caused you to you change your
25 mind about whether you wanted or needed a new identity?
1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, he said yesterday that what happened
2 was that he had been kidnapped, and that's what changed his mind. So I
3 think that's what Mr. Hannis is fishing for, and he's already given the
5 MR. HANNIS: That's not what I'm fishing for, Your Honour. He was
6 kidnapped before he testified. I'm asking if something happened after he
7 testified that changed his mind, because he said in May 2002 he didn't
8 want it. Since then he has apparently changed his mind.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. I repel that objection.
10 Carry on, Mr. Hannis.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The key decision for me to accept a
12 new identity, together with my wife and for us to start a new life from
13 scratch, was based on when I spoke to Mihajlovic in Paris, I mean Dusan
14 Mihajlovic. I realised that it was absolutely not possible for me to get
15 my property back, to have some kind of reasonable way of life in the
16 country. Until then, I had hoped that this would be resolved in some way,
17 but then I realised that there was not a chance of that, and the degree of
18 threat was the same as it was during the Milosevic regime.
19 So this was the key element. Before that, I had sent him a few
20 faxes, asking him to solve all those problems with the units for
21 especially operations and -- regarding my property, but nothing -- nothing
22 happened. I couldn't even get my books back, the books that belonged to
23 me and my wife that had been stolen. So this was what actually made me
24 decide. And when I testified in the Milosevic case, I was already in the
25 witness protection programme, but I noted that I had not asked that before
1 the testimony -- before I gave evidence. When I met with the OTP
2 investigators, I had hoped that I would be able to be able to go on living
3 under my identity, but unfortunately that didn't work out.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... in Paris, when did that take
6 A. I think that it was in 2001 or early 2002, about six months before
7 I gave evidence in the case against Mr. Milosevic.
8 Q. And that's described in Mr. Mijatovic's book, isn't it? He writes
9 about it?
10 A. Yes. That's -- this meeting is described in that book.
11 Q. Now, at page 50, line 7 from yesterday, Mr. Ackerman was asking
12 you about New Democracy and the elections in September of 1997. Do you
13 recall exactly when New Democracy left the coalition? Did that happen
14 before the elections? At the time of the elections? After the elections?
15 A. Before the elections. We simply were not on the same slate as we
16 had been until then. Our list was SPS, JUL, New Democracy, Slobodan
17 Milosevic. We simply did not accept Milosevic's invitation to join in
18 again. We prepared our own platform, Mr. Mihajlovic and I drafted it. We
19 presented the main arguments for our rift, and we adopted this platform,
20 and then we parted ways.
21 Q. How did you go about leaving the coalition? I'm not clear on how
22 that worked. Did your party make some kind of announcement or have a
23 press conference, or did you just walk out of the building? How did that
25 A. We simply were not put on the slate for the new elections, and we
1 had decided that at the session of our Main Board, that we should go to
2 the elections alone and not in coalition with Mr. Milosevic. And the main
3 reason was the reason I described earlier, our disagreement on his Kosovo
5 Q. I guess my question is: Did your party convey that information to
6 Mr. Milosevic, that you no longer wanted to be part of the coalition?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And can you tell us when and how that was done.
9 A. I think it was done in a face-to-face meeting between Milosevic
10 and Mihajlovic. I don't recall the exact date.
11 Q. All right. Thank you. Let me ask you one more question about
12 targeting, that I forgot to ask earlier. You mentioned that the SDB was
13 also obtaining information from western sources, other than simply through
14 you. Do you know or did anyone tell you whether or not Mr. Milosevic was
15 receiving that information?
16 A. I'm absolutely certain he received this information because, first
17 of all, I cannot imagine how he wouldn't receive them; and secondly, what
18 SDB did was, regardless of the level of the operatives, it all fed
19 straight to the top; and then Rade Markovic relayed this information to
20 Milosevic. It is absolutely certain that Mr. Milosevic had at his
21 disposal all the information relevant that could shorten the war, reduce
22 the casualties.
23 As far as I know, there were several credible sources, so I don't
24 want to claim all the credit. I spoke about myself here, and that's why I
25 keep says "I," "I," but there were other credible sources that provided
1 this kind of information to the State Security Service.
2 Q. If I understand your answer correctly, you seem certain that he
3 did receive that information because it should have worked that way, but
4 did anybody tell you that he had received that information? Did anybody
5 in SDB say, Yes, yes, he knows, or are you just assuming based on how
6 things worked in the SDB?
7 A. Well, on several occasions, number 2 - whom we mentioned closed
8 session - told me that this was going to Radonjic and Rade and directly on
9 to Milosevic.
10 Q. And are you aware of any event or situation that would indicate
11 Mr. Milosevic had received information about targeting and had taken some
12 action based on that information?
13 A. As regards the facilities in Belgrade where there could be
14 civilian casualties, some measures were taken primarily as regards the
15 house where the -- the building where his daughter had her radio station
16 and the republican MUP was evacuated. But I think that they did it on
17 their own initiative; they did not wait for his say so.
18 Some of the civilian targets in Belgrade that should have been
19 evacuated had not been; and as regard the military targets, I was not on
20 the ground and I had nothing to do with the military targets, so I cannot
21 give you my assessment.
22 Q. Thank you. I want to now go to Wednesday, the 15th of November,
23 Mr. Ackerman was asking you about your SDB sources, and I think the page
24 69, line 1 - I'm sorry I don't have the current four-digit number - Judge
25 Bonomy was asking about your SDB sources.
1 And you mentioned that: "A lot of other individuals over a number
2 of years in the SDB" were persons that you had dealings with. But you've
3 told us that basically your four sources were Zoran Mijatovic, Jovica
4 Stanisic, and source 1 and 2, who you named in closed session. Those four
5 persons of the information that you've passed on to us in your report and
6 your testimony, what percentage of your information came from those four
7 sources, as opposed to the "lot of other individuals over the years?" Do
8 you understand my question?
9 A. The largest percentage came from those four persons. As for the
10 strategic information, Zoran Mijatovic provided vast majority of it and
11 number 1 would relay his information or the information from Mr. Stanisic
12 when we're talking about strategic information, the attitude towards JUL,
13 problems in the domestic situation, the so-called internal enemy, problems
14 in foreign relations, the exchange of information between the Serbian and
15 British intelligence services that took place three times.
16 The first time was in 1994, then in 1997, and I don't recall the
17 third time when it was. Every time it happened through me and the
18 gentleman whose name is not mentioned here. This means that both services
19 knew who I was; and because I was not in espionage, I could function there
20 in this channel. And of course primarily Kosovo, how to prevent the war
21 in Kosovo.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. --
24 MR. ACKERMAN: Maybe Mr. Hannis could assist. He -- the
25 transcript, page 69, line 1, has nothing to do with the question he asked.
1 Mr. Lukic was cross-examining at that point, so I'm wondering where, if he
2 knows, in the transcript that this came from.
3 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I know the quote was based on a question
4 that you had asked, and the witness had given an answer about a lot of
5 other individuals.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Because you've attributed the issue arising to Mr.
7 Ackerman, he's anxious to know where in the transcript that is, I think,
8 so that he can check it. Can you help, since apparently page 69 is during
9 Mr. Lukic's cross-examination?
10 MR. HANNIS: It appears that it's on page 6682, that answer about
11 a number of individuals -- I'm sorry, it is Mr. Lukic who is speaking at
12 that time, and I apologise to both of them.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 MR. HANNIS:
15 Q. I think your answer then did indicate that the vast majority of
16 your strategic information came from Mr. Mijatovic. And with regard to
17 the information you got from your SDB sources, you told us about seeing
18 rules of procedure or operation for police, and you told us about the tape
19 purporting to be a conversation between Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Lukic.
20 Did the SDB also provide you information in the forms of any other
21 kinds of documents, or was it all simply orally communicated to you by
22 your sources?
23 A. For the most part, it was orally communicated. The SDB is not in
24 the habit of providing documents. On very rare occasions, they simply
25 show you documents. They don't let you take them home if you need to
1 check something or compare things.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. HANNIS: Now, if we could bring up Exhibit 2481.
4 Q. Now, I do believe this was Mr. Ackerman. He was talking to you
5 about the -- I think it's your -- your inference that Mr. Milosevic's
6 speech, in June 1997, undoing the agreement that you and others had tried
7 to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians. Exhibit 2481 is the jointly
8 agreed positions, which I think you testified to earlier as being those
9 that came out of a meeting in New York. Is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. But in your statement at paragraph 32, you indicate that you and
12 Fehmi Agani had initially agreed on these terms as far back as 1995.
13 A. In principle, yes, generally speaking, yes, because the Albanian
14 side had really been knocked down, and they had to adopt a much softer
15 position after the Dayton peace. Albanian policy in Kosovo was at that
16 time not friendly, but they were willing to give way to a greater extent.
17 We had to make sure that negotiations got started without any
18 preconditions attached.
19 Q. And is paragraph 2 of that document entitled, "Jointly Agreed
20 Positions" the reflection of how you tried to resolve that thorny issue of
21 Kosovo's status or independence or secession by having both sides agree
22 that there weren't going to be any preconceived positions or
24 A. Yes. It is stated clearly in point 2 that the problem can only
25 be solved through dialogue and mutual agreement with no preconditions or
1 prejudgement of possible outcomes, and point 3 compliments this. But it
2 was not me who created this agreement; it was arrived at step by step.
3 Every two or three months, we would get a little closer to it.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honour, I object to that. His direct
5 evidence -- his direct evidence on this is that point 2 means that the
6 agreement -- the Kosovo Albanian agreement was to step back from
7 independence; that's his direct evidence. This is re-examination; this
8 isn't appropriate to ask the witness to change his answer.
9 MR. HANNIS: I'm not sure those two things are inconsistent, Your
11 JUDGE BONOMY: They may be, Mr. Hannis. The problem is it's a
12 leading question, and the answer really is of little value in view of the
13 nature of the question I think. My recollection of the evidence, the
14 initial evidence, was that paragraph 2 was interpreted by the witness as
15 something different from what its actual contents on the face of it -- on
16 the face of them mean.
17 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, and he does make a statement about
18 paragraph 2.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: It can't be --
20 MR. HANNIS: In paragraph 2 of his statement.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: It can't be undone, Mr. O'Sullivan, but your point
22 is well made and will be taken into account.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
24 Q. Now I'd like to move to another topic, Mr. Tanic. This is from
25 Tuesday, the 14th. You were being questioned about your -- when you were
1 seized off the street; your kidnapping, as you've described it. Why, if
2 you know, did your captors let you go? Why did they release you?
3 A. I think there were three reasons. The first was pure luck,
4 because they released us only two or three hours after the unsuccessful
5 attempt to assassinate Vuk Draskovic on the Ibar main road. As my wife
6 and I were abducted in the course of the day, of course, this became known
7 in Belgrade, because very arrogantly they sealed off the entire
8 neighbourhood and kidnapped first her then me. Then they attempted to
9 assassinate Vuk Draskovic on the Ibarski main road, and I think they found
10 it inconvenient to deal with us at the same time, so they wanted to get
11 rid of us. I think that's the first reason.
12 The second reason is that intending to protect my life and the
13 life of my wife, I left them in the conviction that some things might be
14 completed; this had to do with the British intelligence service. And
15 thirdly, they were confused because they had received contradictory
16 orders. They appeared to be confused. They said, "Look, this is a
17 British spy. Kill him. Beat him."
18 And then in the course of their investigation, it turned out --
19 well, I can't say we were comrades, but it turned out we were on the same
20 side at least when normal things -- where normal things are concerned. So
21 when you add up all these three elements I think they all contributed to
22 our release. But I think the first element is the assassination attempt
23 because they arrived all in a sweat, and they were in a great hurry to get
24 rid of us.
25 Q. And with regard to the second item you mentioned in that answer,
1 were they requesting you try to do something in connection with the
2 British secret service; and if so, what was that?
3 A. Yes. They tried to pretend that all this beating was a test, to
4 show how strong I was physically and psychologically, that they wanted to
5 establish contact with the British intelligence services through me, and
6 to defect, to oppose, the Milosevic regime. But this seemed a little bit
7 like science fiction.
8 But this possibility was left open to see whether they were
9 sincere, but in fact it transpired that they were trying to trap the
10 British intelligence services, together with representatives to come to
11 Serbia or Macedonia, and then to arrest them all and to put us all in
12 prison. I'm sure it was a came they were trying to play.
13 When they couldn't get anything out of me through beating and
14 torture, they tried to trick me. That was my understanding of this event,
15 although I don't know, of course, what was on their minds.
16 Q. Thank you. When Mr. Fila was questioning you on Tuesday of this
17 week, he was asking you about tape-recordings. At page 6527, line 13, you
18 said: "Everything was taped during the war."
19 With regard to that, can you tell us what agency or agencies were
20 tape-recording people; and particularly, what agencies would have been
21 tape-recording Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Lukic -- General Lukic, I should say,
22 rather than counsel Mr. Lukic.
23 A. Intercepting communications, wire-tapping, those are normal
24 methods used in wartime, and they were used in our case. They tried to
25 see what they could get. The SDB did those things, as did the foreigners,
1 of course. I can't say there were any special targets. Some people were
2 of interest to the security services and these were monitored. But in
3 general, they were just recording everything to see what they could find.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... anything about where those
5 tapes are stored or where the archives are maintained relating to those
6 kinds of materials?
7 A. No, no.
8 Q. Next I want to go to the 14th of this month, Tuesday. I think it
9 was Mr. O'Sullivan was questioning you, at this point in time, about
10 paragraph 108 of your written statement, where you had indicated you had a
11 heated conversation with Mr. Milosevic about the NATO bombing and his
12 claim about the need to have enough civilian casualties to influence
13 public opinion regarding NATO's bombing.
14 I would like to go through this again and see if I have it clear.
15 Did you speak one-to-one with Mr. Milosevic about this?
16 A. Yes, briefly.
17 Q. Did you also hear him on a speaker-phone with Vuk Draskovic
18 talking about this?
19 A. Yes. But I have to say that Mr. Draskovic later denied having
20 that conversation.
21 Q. Yes. Regarding that conversation, though, I believe you
22 indicated -- well, tell me, were other persons present when that
23 conversation occurred that you overheard on the speaker-phone? Anyone
24 else present or listening in, other than Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Draskovic
25 and yourself?
1 A. No. The others were in the next room while we had a light lunch.
2 Q. And what building did this take place in?
3 A. It was the seat of our party in a villa in -- oh, god, I've
4 started forgetting street names. It was a villa in the centre of town,
5 the headquarters of New Democracy.
6 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, you mentioned at the beginning of
7 your testimony, on that day, a book by Predrag Simic. Can you tell us who
8 Mr. Simic is or was.
9 A. Mr. Simic was the managing director of the Institute of Strategic
10 Studies established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the
11 director of that institute. Later on, because of some disagreements, he
12 became an associate; and after the fall of the Milosevic regime, he became
13 one of the advisors of the new president, Mr. Kostunica.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go on any further with that, Mr. Hannis,
15 allow me to ask one thing more of the witness.
16 The face-to-face brief discussion about the need for civilian
17 casualties and the speaker-phone conversation, did they occur on different
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No -- oh, yes, yes. Yes, on two
20 different days. Yes, excuse me, on two different days.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you remember roughly how far apart they were?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, maybe two or three days.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS:
1 Q. And to follow-up on that, do you recall which one occurred first?
2 A. No. It's quite difficult for me now.
3 Q. Thank you. Back to Mr. Simic, do you know the name of the book he
4 wrote that dealt with -- well, with you and the negotiations?
5 A. It dealt with the negotiations, and I was mentioned in it. The
6 title of the book is: "The Road to Rambouillet."
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have no more questions for this
9 witness. I have an excerpt from that book which we've disclosed to the
10 Defence, and I would propose to submit to you later on, once we've loaded
11 it into e-court pertaining to Mr. Tanic's participation in the
12 negotiations he's talked about. And with that, I'm ready to discuss the
13 other if the Court desires.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the appropriate way to deal with this to
15 actually put to the witness the extract and ask him if it's consistent
16 with his recollection.
17 MR. HANNIS: I've thought about that doing that, if that's
18 agreeable to the Court.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: How lengthy is it?
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have -- I have three -- three separate
21 extracts that total maybe two pages.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: And has he already given evidence in relation to
23 all of these references? I don't mean about -- I don't mean in the
24 context of the book. Does each of the references deal with something he's
25 already given evidence about here?
1 MR. HANNIS: Yes. Yes. It's 11 pages in the B/C/S. It's ERN
2 K053-6040 through 6051 that we provided to the Defence.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Does anyone have an objection to that being
4 exhibited? No. Very well. We'll just exhibit it without following the
5 course I suggested, since the witness has had a chance to deal with the
6 matters referred to in that. You'll need to deal by e-mail with
7 confirmation of a number for that in due course.
8 MR. HANNIS: I will, Your Honour. Thank you. I don't know if the
9 Court wants to have questions for the witness, or if we want to send him
10 out and discuss the revolving -- involving the three unidentified sources.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Just give me a moment, Mr. Hannis.
12 We'll go into closed session while the witness leaves the
14 Mr. Tanic, we are going to deal with a matter of law, and while we
15 do that you should remain outside the courtroom and then you'll return
16 when we've made a decision.
17 [Closed session]
11 Pages 6779-6789 redacted.
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think I need to wait. The
2 translators said yesterday these make too much noise.
3 Your Honour, I have very little to say. I think I have made my
4 position very clear yesterday on more than one occasion. The only issue
5 that came up this morning from what Mr. Hannis said I think was his
6 uncertainty about the meaning of contumacious. And I don't think there's
7 any uncertainty about the meaning of contumacious at all.
8 If the Court orders somebody to do something and they say: "No,"
9 that's contumacious. So if you say to the Witness, Mr. Witness, would you
10 answer the question, and he says, I decline. I don think that's contempt
11 wish to do so. But when you order him to do so, and he declines, then it
12 is. He hasn't justification for doing that and that is irrelevant.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you're quite right on that and that seems
14 to be the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which I think has established in
15 only the one -- well, there may be more than one case now, but a case in
16 which I was involved.
17 There is the earlier question, though, whether the order to answer
18 the question ought to be made. And it's to that really that Mr. Hannis's
19 argument applies properly. In other words, is there a good national
20 security interest to justify the Bench declining to accept your invitation
21 to order him to answer.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, if the matter was, as I thought for a
23 while it was yesterday, that it involved a member of the British secret
24 service or the CIA or some such agency that would identify an undercover
25 operative, then I would think so, but it's not in that format anymore.
1 It's a diplomat who's a publicly known person, obviously.
2 So I think identifying that person does not implicate any national
3 security interests that ought to be of concern, as long as that
4 implication remained in private session, so it doesn't become wildly
5 public. And beyond that, I think it's -- I think it's rather clear that
6 the answer should be compelled, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: You don't think you might be better off without it
8 being compelled?
9 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, if the Tribunal were to take the position
10 that the evidence will not be considered if he doesn't answer it, then,
11 yeah, I'd prefer that one, Your Honour. Of course.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, I think the other two matters are matters
13 that initially arose with you. Can you deal first of all with the
14 question of the person who told him to go abroad. Are you satisfied now
15 that we know as much as this witness could possibly tell us about the
16 identity of that person?
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I merely said -- I merely
18 noted this is as far as I can go, and then you have to take it from there.
19 This is all I said.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But it appears from what Mr. Hannis is
21 saying, that the witness has actually given all the information. His
22 direct contact was one of the numbered individuals, and he then mentioned
23 the names of four people who could have been the numbered individual's
24 source and said that he had no more information. Now, do you accept that
25 that is the factual position now?
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. No, I do not accept that, because
2 he said that number 2 had told him where the order had come from. It is a
3 big order, and here we have Milosevic relaying that through this number 2,
4 who is a low-level operative, sending Tanic to negotiate abroad. We have
5 to understand one thing. Both number 1 and number 2 are defined by
6 Tanic's operatives; that would be the lowest level. In this regard, I
7 want to say that Mr. Hannis asked this morning Witness Tanic whether
8 number 1 and number 2 had had information from any other sources, apart
9 from Mr. Tanic.
10 Number 2 [as interpreted] and number 2 cannot have any
11 information. They are at a very low level. So number 2 cannot send him
12 there. He had to tell him this such and such a person is sending you, and
13 this is who you get the money from. So he merely physically drove him
14 there and physically gave him the money, and Tanic said he knew where the
15 orders had come from. He has to identify the person who had told him
16 that. I'm not --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on. You say that Tanic said he knew where the
18 orders come from. Can you give me the page reference for that, because
19 it's that --
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I don't know that off the cuff. But
21 when I asked him, he said that he didn't want to give us the name of the
22 person because that would bring that person into an unenviable position.
23 After all, we can --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Well, let's --
25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] So my proposal is not to punish him,
1 but just to simply push this matter aside, and his testimony.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, these are two separate matters. We can
3 refuse to order him to answer, and then we can make what we can of the
4 evidence, which may or may not be very much. You have to decide whether
5 you are inviting us now to order him to answer the question, identifying
6 that person. We will then have to check the transcript to see if in fact
7 there was a refusal to answer, because it's not clear to me at the moment
8 that there was at the end of the day a refusal to answer.
9 Now, are you saying that there is an order that the Court ought to
10 make on the witness in relation to this issue; and if so, what is the
11 order that you say we should make?
12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I can say the same things that Mr.
13 Ackerman said, the same arguments, but I merely allow that there is also
14 the option of you striking off the record the relevant portion of his
15 testimony. I think you should order him to answer this question, pursuant
16 to Rule 70, or punish him because that would be contempt of court.
17 And I would also be satisfied if you were to simply strike off the
18 record the relevant portion of his testimony. So force him to answer; or,
19 if he still refuses to answer, or if you don't want to do it, then simply
20 strike the relevant portions off the record. I think I have been quite
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.
23 Now, on the other matter of the tape and the person who gave
24 access to the tape, what do you have to say on that?
25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] In this respect, I can say the same
1 thing as I said regarding the first tape. I think that his testimony
2 about this tape has been changed to such an extent and has been to
3 relativised [as interpreted].
4 And now he doesn't know who it was, whose voice it was, what can
5 be heard. It can be, but it needn't be. I think the most elegant
6 solution would simply be to strike this off the record. But I reiterate
7 all the arguments that I noted in the first instance. I think that Mr.
8 Hannis should simply forget all about these tapes and let them go.
9 And just one more thing. When Mr. Hannis asked about number 1 and
10 number 2, I think that Mr. Tanic did not give the answer to Mr. Hannis's
11 question, but perhaps I'm mistaken here because of interpretation. But it
12 wasn't quite clear when he asked him today, I think that Mr. Hannis would
13 remember. I think it was one of the first questions here. I think that
14 witness was non-responsive, but that's just one remark, and in good-will.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: When he asked him what, Mr. Fila?
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] My learned colleague asked whether
17 number 1 and number 2 obtained information from other sides, other
18 sources, and I think that the witness did not respond quite clearly to
19 that question. That's what I think. It's page 3, line 11. That's the
20 question that I'm talking about. I think that the answer itself was not
21 quite clear, but this is just a well-meant remark.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
23 Well, these submissions -- sorry, Mr. O'Sullivan.
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Just, one point. If the Chamber is inclined to
25 exclude the evidence, we submit that Rule 95 may be germane in your
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 Mr. Lukic.
4 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I know that yesterday we
5 didn't speak about this, but I think that two remaining persons we have
6 would not reveal the identity. One is the western diplomat, who actually
7 was the only story before the November of this year. The only source for
8 this tape was his western sources or western diplomats regarding the tape.
9 And another one is the official from MUP who gave him the access
10 to the rules of MUP, which were at that time a state secret. So I think
11 that we should consider these two persons as well.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: But you didn't ask -- you didn't push the matter at
13 the time when it -- you ought to have addressed it. And --
14 MR. LUKIC: I wanted to yesterday, Your Honour, but we finished --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that -- I don't find that acceptable. We are
16 bending over backwards to accommodate your needs. It's artificial now to
17 try to deal with that issue with the witness. The time to deal with it is
18 in cross-examination --
19 MR. LUKIC: I did --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: -- when he's faced with it -- no. But to say to
21 him that you're insisting on an answer, and then address us on requiring
22 us to insist on that answer. Now, that didn't happen yesterday, Mr.
24 MR. LUKIC: I did insist it with him. I didn't maybe ask that of
25 the Chamber.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: I certainly don't have that impression from
2 yesterday's evidence.
3 MR. LUKIC: But at any event, we have the situation where we -- he
4 didn't mention the source, so --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But if it's just passed over and left to run,
6 there's no reason for the Bench to intervene. The Bench will only
7 intervene where counsel is insisting on an answer, but that he's not
8 getting. We have to be assisted by you in these situations. We've got to
9 know from you what are the answers you insist on getting. Because it's
10 clear in this sort of position, that it could be to your advantage simply
11 to hear from the witness: I'm not telling you.
12 And you make a value judgement that the Bench could never put
13 weight on that and move on; whereas if I insist on getting the person
14 named, it may well be that he'll end up naming him and the Prosecution
15 position will be strengthened. These are value judgements and we rely
16 that you have made the judgement when you push the issue when the witness
17 refuses to answer.
18 MR. LUKIC: All right, Your Honour, thank you.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: You've put us in a difficult position now. One was
20 the person from the MUP who gave him access to the rules, and the other
21 one was?
22 MR. LUKIC: Western diplomat, who told him about the tape. Only
23 in November of this year, he mentioned the insider from MUP and that he
24 listened to that tape. In previous statements, he was mentioning only
25 this western source.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's time for our break. We will return at
2 ten to in closed session and we'll bring the witness in. There are --
3 there's at least one matter I want to ask him. If there are others that
4 we identify, we can deal with it at that stage.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I know you want to break. There is, I believe,
8 still one outstanding issue in relation to this witness and that's his use
9 of his statement --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes, I'm well aware of that and I will deal
11 with that at the end of the evidence.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
14 [Closed session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, do you have the transcript reference
21 for Mr. Fila's cross-examination in relation to the person who told the
22 witness to go abroad during the war, the part where you say the evidence
23 is now complete?
24 MR. HANNIS: I do, Your Honour. Let me find my note. I believe
25 it starts on page 6511, but I can --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Which date is that --
2 MR. HANNIS: 6511, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: No, which date?
4 MR. HANNIS: That is the 14th.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: 14th.
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm double-checking. I may have
7 transposed digits. It may be --
8 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, page 6529, line 18, that the question
9 is: "Who told you to go abroad?" That might be what you're referring to.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that deals with the matter. Thank you.
11 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, at 6611, beginning at line 14, Mr.
12 Ackerman is saying: "Who in the SDB authorised you? Is that someone's
13 name you've already given; if so, just say yes."
14 He said: "No, these people were the superiors of those people
15 mentioned in closed session." And if you follow that on down, you'll see
16 where he says it was one of those three or four, but he didn't want to
18 Line 23: "The aforementioned person, the one mentioned in closed
19 session, would be able to tell you who was up the chain of command." At
20 6612, Mr. Ackerman: "The essence of that big long speech is you don't
21 know who it was, is that true?
22 "A. No, that was not the essence. I cannot give you an answer
23 of which I can be certain." And then he's goes on to explain who they
25 He explains: "One cannot leave the country and be given
1 communications equipment and money in wartime without authorisation from
2 high up," et cetera. So it goes on for a while.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
4 Sorry, Mr. Fila.
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The -- well, first of all, we were
6 discussing what the witness said to me, not to Mr. Ackerman. I have
7 checked the transcript. You have 6509, line 23, I apologise, line 6.
8 6509, line 6, that's where it begins, and that's where you will find what
9 the witness said in response to my question.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 Questioned by the Court:
12 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Well, I have to ask you a -- I just actually
13 wanted to be apprised of your -- your political thoughts, because there
14 are a lot of material and materialistic things we have discussed, but we
15 haven't discussed the metaphysical parts. And I think you spoke of many
16 tumultuous events that took place. You also commented that it was a --
17 there were many misfortunates and about your destiny. And you were
18 accused of material gains. You denied all that. But you did claim that
19 you are a political thinker.
20 Now, I just wanted to know who influenced your thoughts when --
21 whether you were in adolescence or when you grew up and when you entered
22 all this, because after all you took a career of that sort. And I suggest
23 was it people like Machiavelli, was it people like Chanakya. Was it this
24 great Serb leader Arseniji or anybody else because we would like to
25 understand. And I also suggest that you give us some clue in the same
1 context with respect to the oligarchy with whom you were working in the
2 same context. This is in fact my main question, and this is a brief
3 question which will be later on. I thank you. But I do expect a brief
4 reply, please.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Initially, the greatest influence
6 was my father. He had been an officer before the war. During the war, he
7 was in a concentration camp, and he was interested in politics. As for
8 the train of thinking, my education rests mainly on Kant and Heideger.
9 Those are my two favorite thinkers, and Huntington in politics. In my
10 political life, my first mentor was Mr. Nebojsa Popov, a well-known
11 intellectual, a socialogist who is well-known in Serbia, and Mrs. Vesna
12 Pesic. That's where I acquired my ideas about liberal democracy and so
13 on. These were the spiritual influences, both remote and direct. I have
14 tried to be brief.
15 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Did you read "The Clash of Civilisation," and do
16 you agree with that, Huntington's book?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree. I see that time has
18 proved them right. They may have been too severe, but conflicts are
19 already arising because of cultural differences, not simply for the same
20 sake of conquering territory. I think he is right to a great extent,
21 although he's not popular among politicians in the west because they feel
22 he is too severe; however, I feel that it is a diagnosis which shows how
23 to avoid a conflict of civilisations. It doesn't mean that it will
24 necessarily come about.
25 JUDGE CHOWHAN: And any short comment about the political thinking
1 of the oligarchy and whether the main person you are naming aspired to be
2 like Arseniji.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Nebojsa Popov influenced me
4 most. I am happy to be able to repeat his main thesis, which is that the
5 conflicts on the territory of Yugoslavia were a rebellion against
6 modernity. We had a good state, the former Yugoslavia. Of course there
7 were intentions among the republics in that state, but then suddenly
8 people and politicians came to the for, who did not want Yugoslavia to
9 develop further.
10 Because if it developed further, they would not have any place in
11 it anymore. As seen from a sociological and philosophical point of view,
12 it was a large scale of rebellion against modernity. And I could see in
13 that all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia. People
14 came to the fore who were simply inventing reasons to pull the republics
15 back, to regress from modernity, even if it required conflicts and crisis.
16 This may be putting it in very blunt terms, but that's the thesis that he
18 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you very much.
19 Now, the last question was had -- they were agreeing -- I mean,
20 the other side was agreeing on anything short of secession. Did that mean
21 a sort of a confrontation?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The first chance to save the
23 former Yugoslavia was to transform the Federation into an alliance of
24 sovereign states. That was the first idea held by my party. I did not
25 participate much in its formulation, because I was then a junior
1 politician. But the idea was to transform it into an alliance of
2 sovereign republics, as had been done, for example, in -- well, Russia
3 made an attempt, but the experiment was not successful.
4 In our case, it could have been successful. Each republic could
5 have had full autonomy, be a state within a state, but functioning
6 according to the American system. A joint border, a joint currency, and
7 as such we could have entered the European Union --
8 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I've got your answer. Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I have had an opportunity during the break to read
11 the parts of the transcript that are required to read to deal with the
12 issue that was outstanding in my mind, so I have no further questions.
13 Mr. Tanic, that completes your evidence. Thank you for coming to
14 the Tribunal to give it. You are now free to leave, and we'll go into
15 closed session while you leave.
16 [Closed session]
22 [Open session]
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we're now again in open session. The Chamber
24 has decided to make no order obliging the witness to answer.
25 The first matter related to the identity of a NATO diplomat, the
1 Chamber takes the view that the submissions of the Prosecution indicated a
2 potential risk or a risk, in fact, to the national security interests of
3 members of the NATO alliance; and the Prosecutor did not support the
4 application for such an order in the full knowledge that that may result
5 in the Chamber excluding the evidence from consideration or giving it
6 little weight.
7 We can't make a final decision on how to view that evidence until
8 we've heard all the evidence in the case, but the Prosecutor's concern is
9 fully justified. The Chamber will be very circumspect in its approach to
10 that evidence, having taken the view that in the state of its knowledge,
11 it was not prepared to make an order that could compromise the national
12 security interests of a state.
13 In relation to the second point, that was the identity of the
14 person who made the tape available, the witness himself advanced concerns
15 for the security of a member of the security and intelligence services of
16 the Republic of Serbia. The Prosecutor did not positively support the
17 Defence request, although he was at one stage plainly ambivalent about it.
18 In these circumstances, again, the Chamber does not consider it's
19 in a position to conclude that these concerns were not legitimate. In
20 this instance, the risk that the evidence will be excluded completely in
21 due course is even greater than in relation to the first matter. And,
22 again, the Chamber is not in a position to make a final decision on what
23 to do with the evidence, until of course it's heard all the evidence in
24 the case, in case something else comes in that changes the position.
25 So far as the third matter is concerned, that's the instruction to
1 go abroad, we do not consider there is a clear case there of a failure to
2 answer a question. The evidence appears, at the end, to have been as
3 complete an account as the witness was able to give of this. Whether he's
4 telling the truth and whether he's reliability is quite another matter;
5 but on the face of it, it's as complete an account as he could give about
6 the matter. And, therefore, we could not make an order with the obvious
7 consequences of failure to comply with it in these circumstances.
8 In relation to the two matters mentioned by Mr. Lukic, we consider
9 that his interventions came too late for the reasons already discussed;
10 however, we are alert to significant difficulties in relation to the
11 evidence on both matters. And these are matters that can be addressed in
12 submissions at a later stage.
13 So far as the exhibition of the statement of the witness is
14 concerned, then the rule we've -- or the general rule we follow here
15 inevitably means that that whole exhibit is now an exhibit in the case. A
16 number of counsel following Mr. O'Sullivan referred to a large number of
17 paragraphs of the statement without doing as he did, reading the
18 particular paragraphs into the transcript; but their questions clearly
19 assumed that the witness's position was as set out in the statement. And
20 to enable a full understanding of the question asked and the answer given,
21 as necessary -- it will be necessary for the Chamber to consider the
23 But that doesn't carry with it the proposition that we will look
24 at parts of the statement which were not referred to positively by the
25 Prosecution and take them as evidence, positive evidence, for the
1 Prosecution case; we will take the statement in the context - that's the
2 parts not directly admitted in the Prosecution case - we will take in the
3 context of the questions and the answers given when various passages were
4 being referred to.
5 Now, because of that, Mr. O'Sullivan, it is necessary for the
6 Defence to produce a properly redacted version of this, which would become
7 the public version in the case. Meanwhile, all parts after paragraph -
8 someone will need to remind me of the paragraph, the final paragraph
10 MR. O'SULLIVAN: 45.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: All paragraphs after 45 will be admitted under seal
12 until that is done.
13 It may be, Mr. O'Sullivan, you should be passing the buck to
14 someone else in the circumstances, but someone has to take responsibility
15 and the matter mustn't remain outstanding. So could we have it done by
16 Tuesday at the latest, please.
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
19 That deals with all outstanding matters arising from the evidence
20 of that witness.
21 Your next witness, Mr. Hannis.
22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, our next witness will be Richard
23 Ciaglinski. There is one matter with the last witness, Your Honour, the
24 excerpt of the book, "The Road to Rambouillet," now does have an exhibit
25 number; it's P2511.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 MR. HANNIS: It's available in e-court.
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, there's a matter with the last witness
4 I neglected to mention earlier. During my cross-examination, I mentioned
5 the eight-day OTP statement of General Perisic, and you inquired if he had
6 ever been asked about Operation Horseshoe. I've searched those with a
7 word search programme, computer word search programme. The word
8 "horseshoe" doesn't seem to have appeared either as a question or an
10 JUDGE BONOMY: That may not be the complete answer; I don't fault
11 you for that. It may have been asked in a different way. I was concerned
12 to know what the value of reference to Perisic's statement was, unless we
13 knew that the issue had in some way or another been explored or unless we
14 knew that questions had been asked that you would have expected to elicit
15 the answer that this -- a reference to this operation.
16 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, my colleagues might correct me.
17 But my recollection, as I stand here right now, is that those interviews
18 took place after the testimony in Milosevic that we were talking about.
19 And Mr. Nice, who was a Prosecutor in Milosevic, was a questioner in
20 those -- in those interviews. And so one would expect if he had any
21 credence in the Operation Horseshoe testimony of this witness, that he
22 certainly would have asked it of Perisic. But that's very nebulous, I
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
25 Let's have the witness, please.
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Ciaglinski.
3 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to
5 speak the truth by reading aloud the form placed in front of you..
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI
13 Examination by Mr. Hannis:
14 Q. Good morning. First off, I've been reminded by the court reporter
15 and the translators that since you and I both speak the same language,
16 that we need to pause between the end of my question and your answer, and
17 me after your answer before my next question.
18 Could you please tell us your name and spell your last name.
19 A. Right. My name is Richard Ciaglinski, spelled
21 Q. And may I call you Colonel Ciaglinski or Mr. Ciaglinski? Do you
22 have a preference?
23 A. I don't mind at all, whatever.
24 Q. Colonel, you were a, as I understand it, a career soldier?
25 A. Yes, I was.
1 Q. And when did you retire?
2 A. About two and a half years ago.
3 Q. And did you have occasion to give a statement to ICTY
4 investigators in March of the year 2000?
5 A. I did.
6 Q. And, more recently, did you give a short supplementary statement
7 to other representatives of the ICTY on the 1st of November of this year?
8 A. I did.
9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, this -- those two have been put
10 together as one document, which bears exhibit number P2488. This witness
11 is being offered under Rule 92 ter for both his statement and his
12 transcript. I will first go through a few questions about some minor
13 corrections in his statement.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS:
16 Q. Colonel Ciaglinski, on Tuesday of this week, did you have occasion
17 to meet with Ms. Carter and myself to go through your statement?
18 A. I did.
19 Q. And in the course of doing that, did you note a couple of things
20 that we needed to correct and bring to the Court's attention?
21 A. I did.
22 MR. HANNIS: For the record, Your Honours, on page 2 of his 2000
23 statement, in the middle of the page, there's a reference to: "In October
24 of 1988."
25 Q. About your being based at the headquarters of the UK support
1 command. Was that 1988 --
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. -- or 1998?
4 A. It was 1998.
5 Q. Thank you. And I believe on page 8, in the next-to-last
6 paragraph, we noted that General Lazarevic's name was misspelled by one
7 letter. Is that correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Finally, on page 10 of your 2000 statement. We'll address this in
10 more detail in a moment, but you indicated that you had photographs of
11 this pile of burning documents and would make those available to the ICTY.
12 Except for one photo, which is now marked P2504, were you able to
13 locate the photos you had taken of that burning pile of documents?
14 A. What happened was that a lot of time has elapsed since the -- Mr.
15 Milosevic's trial, and we also moved house several times. And my wife,
16 being an extremely good housekeeper, she threw away a lot of stuff, and I
17 think she might have gone through my photographs and paperwork and threw
18 it out. So the only picture I had left was the one I submitted.
19 Q. And was the one you were able to provide us was the one or the
20 best one you had in mind when you described that in your statement?
21 A. Not at all. Unfortunately, it's one taken from an angle that
22 doesn't actually show it very well at all.
23 Q. Thank you. In connection with your statement, having noted those
24 corrections, are you otherwise satisfied having reviewed your statements
25 and can you attest that that March 2000 statement and your November 2006
1 statement are true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief;
2 and if you were asked the same questions, would you give the same answers?
3 A. Yes to all.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. HANNIS: Now, Exhibit P2489, Your Honours, the transcripts of
6 Colonel Ciaglinski from his testimony in the Milosevic case in April of
8 Q. Colonel, did you have a chance to review your transcripts?
9 A. I did.
10 Q. And having done so, are you satisfied that they accurately reflect
11 what your evidence was in that case?
12 A. In general, yes.
13 Q. You say, "in general," you have a reservation about whether
14 they're accurate or --
15 A. Well, a lot of time has elapsed and memory plays tricks on you.
16 Q. Okay. Was there anything you noted that you thought was a mistake
17 in how your evidence was taken down?
18 A. I don't think so, no.
19 Q. And was it true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and
20 remembrance and belief at this time?
21 A. Yes. It's just surprising when you read back through it, how much
22 was said and done, and I would say it's difficult to remember everything
23 that happened four or five years ago.
24 Q. Can you attest that you would give the same answers today if asked
25 the same questions?
1 A. I hope so.
2 Q. All right. If you don't, I'm sure it will be brought to your
3 attention by one or more of us in the courtroom.
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, with that, I would tender his
5 transcripts of Exhibit 2489.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS:
8 Q. Now, Colonel, your written evidence in the form of the transcript
9 and your statements is in evidence. The Judges have read it. If -- or if
10 not, they will read it. So I will try not to repeat needlessly everything
11 that is down, but I do want to highlight a few things. Can you tell us
12 briefly, you began your military career in 1974?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And in late 1998, you volunteered for and were accepted as a
15 member of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Do you recall the date you started your duties?
18 A. I flew out to Macedonia, and I think I was in Kosovo around the --
19 the end of the first week of December, somewhere around the 5th, 6th, 7th;
20 and I believe I started my duties in Pristina around the 9th, 10th of
22 Q. Were you based in Pristina?
23 A. I was based in Pristina.
24 Q. Did you travel throughout Kosovo during the -- during your tenure
1 A. Extensively.
2 Q. What was your primary role or duties during the time you were
4 A. Initially, the OSCE intended me to run the -- be one of the major
5 instructors of the training centre at Brezovica; but I was taken to
6 Pristina, as it was felt I had other skills which might be valuable. And
7 I understudied Donna Phelan, who was in charge of weapons and arms
9 Q. And then subsequently, what was your main job during the rest of
10 your stay in Kosovo?
11 A. When Donna Phelan's job was -- when she moved to run the fusion
12 centre for a time, I was then moved across to -- being in charge of
13 weapons and verification. And I also then took on the responsibilities of
14 liaison with both the Serbian side and the KLA, but the KLA -- the two
15 duties were incompatible. So I just focussed on the Serbian commission
16 for cooperation.
17 Q. A few follow-up questions on that answer. First of all, you
18 mentioned the fusion centre. Can you explain briefly what that was?
19 A. Yes. Obviously, we had a lot of people in the field who sent in
20 information of what they saw, people they spoke to. They would write
21 reports and send it back to Pristina, to our headquarters, where the
22 information would be collated and fused together to make a report.
23 Q. And, initially, you say you took on the responsibilities of
24 liaison with both the Serb side and the KLA, but these duties were
25 incompatible. Can you tell us briefly how you came to that determination?
1 A. Yes. The -- certainly my impression and others around me was that
2 it was very difficult to work with both side and have both sides trust
3 you; and therefore, either side could suspect me of passing information to
4 the other side. And I also felt personally, and I think my bosses felt,
5 that it was for the sake of myself and for my credibility, to just focus
6 on one side.
7 Q. And then you indicated that you became the liaison for the Serb
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who was your immediate supervisor?
11 A. My immediate boss at all times was General DZ, Drewienkiewcz.
12 Q. And DZ is an abbreviation or a nickname, because his full last
13 name is somewhat difficult to spell and pronounce?
14 A. Yes. Throughout his career in the British military, he was
15 referred to as DZ, because it has all the letters of the alphabet from D
16 to Z.
17 Q. You mention in your statement, in the English page 2, the last
18 paragraph, I'm sorry, I don't have the B/C/S in front of me, that in
19 relation to VJ site visits that you were doing, there were three main VJ
20 sites that you wanted to visit. Do you recall where those were or what
21 those were?
22 A. Yes. They were three company group locations that we were allowed
23 to visit on one occasion.
24 Q. Do you recall the geographic location?
25 A. Yes. I mean, there was -- there was one in the south overlooking
1 the main road that went to the Prizren. There was one up in the north and
2 one in the central, sort of western district.
3 Q. You mentioned this Commission on Cooperation. First of all, can
4 you tell us what that was.
5 A. It was an organisation in Pristina located in the administration
6 building where the administration of Kosovo was situated, and it was one
7 of several. There was another higher-level contact point, obviously in
8 Belgrade, where General Bo Pelmas was working. There was one in Pristina
9 normally composed of General Loncar, who was in charge; Colonel Kotur;
10 Colonel Mijatovic; various people over the time from the Foreign Ministry
11 and Interior Ministry, as required.
12 [Could the witness sit closer to the microphone]
13 Q. And General Loncar and Colonel Kotur were members of what body or
15 A. This cooperation commission.
16 Q. And outside the cooperation commission, what were they? Were they
17 police, military?
18 A. No. Colonel Kotur was a retired -- was a Serbian military
19 officer, I understand, in the intelligence services; and General Loncar
20 was a retired general who had a long successful career, well-respected.
21 Q. And Colonel Mijatovic?
22 A. He was the deputy to General Lukic, working with the MUP in
24 Q. And representatives on your side, on KVM, was it just you or?
25 A. Well, in theory, the representation should have been at the very
1 highest level. So the meetings were designed, I suppose, for the
2 ambassadors or director Walker to attend, which he delegated to General DZ
3 who attended very many of the meetings. But the meetings General DZ
4 couldn't attend, I was delegated to represent.
5 Q. And over time, did it transpire that you became the primary
6 attendee on behalf of KVM?
7 A. I probably attended 90 percent of the meetings.
8 Q. How often did the commission meet?
9 A. Every day.
10 Q. Once a day?
11 A. Usually once a day, sometimes two or three times a day.
12 Q. When you weren't attending meetings of the cooperation commission,
13 what were you doing to carry out your duties?
14 A. I would be usually in the field. General DZ would use me as a
15 person who would travel around and solve problems for him in Kosovo.
16 Q. I guess I should back up for a minute. I jumped ahead of what our
17 evidence has been in this case so far. Can you tell us how the KVM came
18 to be created, and what its primary job was?
19 A. Certainly. It was the result of following UN resolutions, and it
20 -- the document, which actually created and gave the terms of reference
21 of the KVM, was the meeting of the document signed by Mr. Geremek, I
22 believe, on the 16th of October, 1998. And in that document, it quite
23 specifically details what our composition and what our duties and rights
25 MR. HANNIS: If we could show the witness Exhibit P658, please.
1 Q. Now, were you aware of the details of this agreement? Did you
2 have a copy of it that you referred to while carrying out your duties?
3 A. Yes. I carried a copy at all times. In fact, there were three
4 documents, and I would carry usually all three somewhere in one of my
5 pockets, just in case I was ever challenged or questioned about access or
6 what our duties were.
7 Q. Did that ever happen during course of carrying out your duties
8 that you got challenged about your right to be where you were or doing
9 what you were doing?
10 A. Yes, often.
11 Q. I'm waiting for a moment here to see if we can show you one of
12 those documents. That one that you referred to is as the Geremek
13 agreement is one of the three. Do you recall what the other two were that
14 you had or who would sign them?
15 A. Yes. There was one signed by Nauman and the other one was signed
16 by Shaun Burns. So only on one of the three documents, there were
17 signatures. I believe Mr. Sainovic, Milosevic, Clark Nauman.
18 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, we seem to be having some
20 Q. Do you recognise that document that's on your screen now?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. And which one of the three is that that we've been referring to?
23 A. This is the main Geremek agreement. He was the chairman in office
24 of the OSCE at the time.
25 Q. And did you rely on one of the provisions of that agreement as
1 your authority to go basically anywhere in Kosovo?
2 A. Yes, absolutely. It comes under the terms of reference, and it
3 guarantees our ability to move and access anywhere in Kosovo.
4 MR. HANNIS: Can we go to the next page of both the English and
5 the B/C/S, please. Could we go to the top of the page -- the very top of
6 the page. I'm sorry, Your Honour. May I have a moment.
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, I think we have to go one more page, I
9 believe. Yes, at the very bottom of that first page and then on to the
10 next page.
11 Q. Can you read item number 1 and then we'll turn the next page for
12 you, Colonel.
13 A. "The verification mission will travel throughout Kosovo to
14 verify ..."
15 MR. HANNIS: And then can we go to the next page to the very top.
16 Q. Please continue if you have it on the left.
17 A. "The maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements. It will
18 investigate reports of cease-fire violations. Mission personnel will have
19 full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times."
20 Q. And in real life on the ground, did it work out that way?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Can you tell us briefly how it did work or not work.
23 A. Well, I suppose initially our freedom of movement was greater; but
24 as time went along and more and more military operations and police
25 operations being carried out, we were prevented from entering many areas.
1 There were two really main sort of things we were interested in. One was
2 verifying what was happening on the ground, but we were also interested in
3 verifying what was happening and what was going on and being stored inside
4 military barracks and installations and garrisons. So in regard to the --
5 the barracks, we did try to carry out on-the-spot, no-notice inspections,
6 but that met with zero -- well, zero possibility.
7 We were not allowed to carry out inspection. We were held outside
8 barracks, not allowed in; and in fact threatened if we -- told if we
9 didn't remove our vehicles as well as ourselves, it would cause an
10 incident of some sort of some severity.
11 Q. And who did you bring this up with when you had access denied?
12 Was that something discussed at the cooperation commission?
13 A. Yes. Obviously our point of contact for all these matters was the
14 cooperation commission. When the incident was happening, we would
15 obviously report it to the people on the ground denying us access, saying
16 we would have to go back to Pristina, to the cooperation commission, and
17 to General Loncar, and to voice our protests.
18 Q. In addition to trying to carry out the on-site inspections, were
19 you also trying to verify when there were reports of conflict or
20 violations of the cease-fire by either side?
21 A. Yes. I mean, in accord with the agreement, that was one of our
22 major tasks; and we would try to establish who the guilty parties were,
23 what would cause the problems, and the extent of damage or injury. If we
24 didn't have access, then obviously we couldn't do our job.
25 Q. In your statement of March 23rd, 2000, at the bottom of page 3,
1 the last paragraph, you state that it was your view that Loncar and his
2 subordinates really saw the Commission of Cooperation and the KVM as a
3 means of proving to the world that they were the innocent party, but they
4 were very specific as to what they wanted us to verify.
5 It goes on to the next page: "Whenever something happened to a
6 Serb force, they would call us up and ask us to come down and verify the
7 event, but they would not allow us to verify events that they had caused."
8 First of all, how do you know about that, that they wouldn't
9 wanton allow you to verify events that they had caused? What was your
10 source of information about that?
11 A. Well, it was the verifiers on the ground and of myself in person.
12 If an incident took place, you know, we would send out personnel from the
13 local field office or the local regional centre or from Pristina to try
14 and investigate what was going on. And these people would then go there,
15 try to do their work. If they couldn't or if they could, regardless, they
16 would write a report as to what happened. And they would state that they
17 did have difficulty, if they did have difficulty.
18 Q. At the moment off the top of your head, can you give the Court an
19 example where you or your verifiers were not allowed to verify something
20 that you believed or had information that the Serbs had caused in terms of
21 a violation?
22 A. There were quite a few incidents.
23 Q. And where were those reported? Did you have a daily or a monthly
25 A. Sorry, yes. We had a daily reporting system, and we also kept all
1 the documents in the blue book. They were compiled regularly, daily, in
2 the blue book.
3 Q. How many branch offices did you have?
4 A. We had five regional centres throughout the whole of Kosovo; and
5 then we would have houses in various villages, field offices, a great many
6 of those. We were very well spread in the field.
7 Q. Approximately how many verifiers in total did you have in Kosovo?
8 A. Well, I believe by the end, we had 1.400 or there about.
9 Q. With relation to the cooperation commission, you say in your
10 statement, page 4, at the beginning of the page that General Loncar
11 initially appeared to be the representative of the Federal Government, but
12 over time it appeared that his authority diminished.
13 A. Mm-hmm.
14 Q. In what way did you notice that his authority appeared to diminish
15 over time?
16 A. Well, initially our dealings with General Loncar and the
17 commission, we would get answers very quickly to our questions. And
18 General Loncar was present at all the meetings. And as the time
19 progressed, then General Loncar would appear less and less frequently.
20 Q. During the that time, you say he regularly went back to Belgrade.
21 How often did he go?
22 A. Well, towards -- and maybe in February/March, March especially, he
23 was there, I would say, almost every week.
24 Q. In your statement page 4, paragraph 2, you describe an incident
25 around Christmas of 1998, I believe the 27th of December, 1998, where you
1 had a meeting with General Loncar and he told you about the Albanians
2 having captured a Serb farmer?
3 A. Mm-hmm.
4 Q. Can you tell us why that was significant and what happened. Where
5 did that take place, first of all?
6 A. Right. The incident -- the way we learned about it in the first
7 place was at the end of almost a three-hour meeting. We were informed by
8 General Loncar that we should be aware that they had -- the Serbian
9 authorities had decided to launch an action the south-west of Podujevo, on
10 what we or referred to as an area sort of a tank hill, but really was
11 towards the villages of Gornja Lapastica and Obrandza. It came as a
12 surprise because although we knew that the Serbian army -- the VJ army had
13 been deployed south-east of Podujevo - which again came as a surprise
14 because the units were not really supposed to be deployed from the
15 barracks, but we were assured that this was a recognised training area.
16 And one of the agreements does allow for the VJ to carry out
17 normal training. But we knew where these -- the tanks were, the T-55
18 tanks, and also the artillery were located on this old, disused air-field.
19 And it didn't seem a great problem because they weren't actually doing
20 very much. But then when General Loncar announced that this unit would be
21 one of the units taking part in this action to free what appeared to be a
22 farmer that the KLA had captured, it -- and also knowing what I knew, that
23 what was waiting on the other side of the mountain, around Obrandza, I
24 knew that this could actually escalate into quite a vicious battle.
25 Q. What did you know what was waiting on the other side of the
2 A. Well, we visited -- Podujevo was one of the hot spots for
3 problems. The KLA had a habit of using snipers to shoot -- shoot up
4 military VJ convoys coming to resupply the garrisons in Kosovo. And so we
5 were very often up there talking to the unit on the hill overlooking the
6 area, which had replaced the KLA. And it was also the -- not far from the
7 headquarters or the Remi, one of the KLA commanders who were very active
8 in that area; and, therefore, I had spent almost part of every day in that
9 area. So I was aware what was happening from the other side. So the KLA
10 were preparing a defence by bringing in additional forces and equipment,
11 ammunition. It was no secret. I believe the other side could have seen
12 it, too.
13 Q. Podujevo is located in the north of --
14 A. It's just north of Pristina.
15 Q. Along the main -- one of the main north-south roads between Kosovo
16 and Serbia?
17 A. Yes, yes. I would say that the road passing by to the east of
18 Podujevo was the main re-supply route and the main communication route to
19 Serbia, Belgrade, Nis, and Belgrade.
20 Q. And this seems to be a large engagement of forces on both sides
21 involving the kidnapping or holding of one Serbian civilian.
22 A. Well, what had happened earlier is that the -- a unit of the MUP
23 had attempted to rescue this farmer and had come under heavy fire and
24 sustained a number of injuries, serious injuries. And therefore, it was
25 believed by the VJ and the MUP, I presume, that a stronger, larger, force
1 would be necessary to take out this one farmer.
2 Q. Okay. Including tanks?
3 A. Yeah. It's unusual to use regiment or two regiments of tanks and
4 artillery, but it probably would work.
5 Q. Knowing what you knew about the KLA forces on the other side and
6 the proposed contingent for the Serbian force, you told us you had some
7 concerns about what might happen. What did you do to try and prevent
9 A. Well, we were always being accused or goaded by the commission
10 that the OSCE did nothing. We just reported in a biased way; and that we,
11 you know, didn't get our hands dirty, basically, by doing anything. And I
12 saw an opportunity here to actually show that we -- that we might try to
13 do something, which would actually defuse the situation, by volunteering
14 to actually go and talk to the KLA and ask the KLA to release the farmer;
15 and, thereby, preventing what we believed to have been a major escalation
16 of the violence and a great number of lives being lost on both sides.
17 Q. So you volunteered yourself or proposed to do that?
18 A. I did. And I suggested that myself, David Wilson, my colleague
19 who had relations with the KLA, and maybe a member of the Red Cross should
20 go in and attempt this action.
21 Q. Well, what did -- you described some of it in your statement.
22 General Loncar heard this proposal from you and thought it was a good
24 A. I think he was quite surprised. I was quite surprised myself that
25 I offered; but, yes, he said that it was an interesting proposal. But he
1 wasn't able to actually make a decision as to whether we could actually do
3 Q. So what did he do?
4 A. He suggested that he went out and made a phone call.
5 Q. Did you subsequently learn who he called?
6 A. Yes. My first guess was that he was going to call Mr. Sainovic,
7 because we knew that Mr. Sainovic had a prominent role. He was
8 responsible for Kosovo, deputy prime minister; therefore, he probably
9 could or would know who to get authority from to carry this action out. I
10 subsequently discovered, by talking to members of the commission, when I
11 suggested that it was Mr. Sainovic; they said, "No. It was even higher
12 than Mr. Sainovic."
13 Q. And based on your knowledge of who was in the hierarchy, who was
14 higher than Mr. Sainovic with regard to Kosovo?
15 A. Well, when I was told that, you know, you can't imagine how high
16 -- in what a high position the person was. I could only imagine at the
17 time that it was Mr. Milosevic.
18 Q. Then you had the approval, and you went and tried to resolve this
19 matter by getting the farmer out?
20 A. Yes. I first of all while the phone calls were taking place, I
21 was on the phone to my headquarters giving the -- passing the proposal to
22 them for their approval, because there was always the chance that they
23 might say no. And while I was doing this, the approval came through
24 that -- in fact, that the action would be held at bay to give us a chance
25 to carry out the rescue of the farmer.
1 Q. And did you succeed?
2 A. Yes, we did. It took most of the day, but we managed to get the
3 farmer out and hand him over to the police of Podujevo, police station.
4 Q. Did you --
5 A. And there was no subsequent action following that by the forces.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. HANNIS: Could we show the witness Exhibit 615, please, this
8 is a Kosovo atlas at page 19, I believe.
9 Q. When the map comes up, Colonel, I would ask if you could locate on
10 there the location where this occurred. Did you get anyone else out
11 besides the farmer?
12 A. We managed to take out as part of the sort of deal, we managed to
13 get a wounded Albanian out as well. Nothing is simple in this world.
14 There is always a quid pro quo.
15 Q. The Kosovo Albanians wouldn't let you take the farmer out unless
16 you took out their wounded comrade?
17 A. Precisely.
18 Q. Where did you take him?
19 A. He was taken to a clinic in Pristina, where he died.
20 Q. Do you recognise the area that's depicted on the map on the screen
21 in front of you?
22 A. I do, yes.
23 Q. And we Pristina on the lower left.
24 MR. HANNIS: Could we enlarge the upper left corner. Yes, please.
25 Q. Now, do you know where Podujevo would be on this map --
1 A. Podujevo is at the very top, this side of the -- top left-hand.
2 Q. Where we see a little bit of orange and the railroad track --
3 A. Yes, the railroad track -- in fact, we're now getting to the
5 Q. Thank you. We see it better now. Can you indicate the area where
6 this occurred.
7 A. Yes. The Serb VJ forces were based on this air-field here shown
8 in yellow.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. And I did, in fact, spend several days sitting just outside their
11 position following the incident -- well, before and following the
12 incident --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ciaglinski, since you were here before,
14 technology has moved on. The pointer you've got there doesn't work with
15 the equipment we now have.
16 THE WITNESS: That's wonderful. Oh, there's a pointer.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, this time things have to be marked on the
18 screen for us to be able to see them.
19 MR. HANNIS: Yes, with --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis will probably ask you to mark something.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. With that pen you can actually draw on the screen.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. If you could draw us a circle around the air-field.
25 A. Well, the air-field is there, and the forces are basically dug-in
1 inside that air-field complex. It was a disused air-field, and I spent
2 several days sort of sitting on a road in this area where.
3 Q. Where you've made an X inside the circle.
4 A. Yes, that's right. The X was my position.
5 Q. Can you indicate where the KLA positions were.
6 A. Yes. I mentioned the Obradza, so we are talking about an area, as
7 indicated now by that very untidy circle.
8 Q. You've made a large circle to the west of Podujevo?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And where was the Serbian contingent with the tanks that was
11 proposed to be used to rescue this farmer?
12 A. Can the map be raised a bit or dropped a bit more, so we can see
13 more of Podujevo.
14 Q. I don't think. On this map, we are at the top.
15 A. Exactly. I can't remember. But -- looking at the main road,
16 somewhere in this area here, I believe, was the tank position, tank hill.
17 And then the village where the Serb was being kept was back in this area
18 here, in Lapastica.
19 Q. All right. Thank you.
20 MR. HANNIS: Could we take a screen shot of that and give it the
21 next in-court number, please.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC109, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
25 Q. I don't think I need the pen anymore on that, Colonel. I want to
1 ask you then about some subsequent meetings. You mentioned a meeting that
2 took place on the 6th of January, 1999, at the government building in
3 Pristina at page 5 of your statement, third paragraph -- or fourth
4 paragraph from the top. This was in the conference room of Mr.
5 Andjelkovic, who was the Serb administrator.
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. Was this a usual meeting of the cooperation commission, or was
8 this some kind of unusual extraordinary meeting?
9 A. I think it -- well, I think it was an extraordinary meeting.
10 Q. And how so? Why was it out of the ordinary?
11 A. Well, there were several major issues which had been resolved to
12 our satisfaction and making our life extremely difficult, making the KVM's
13 duty duties very difficult and in some cases impossible.
14 Q. For example?
15 A. There was a whole list of issues that were dealt with. The
16 meeting was chaired by Mr. Sainovic. And, for example, our rescue
17 helicopter which we had sitting outside of Kosovo, which we had arranged
18 to cas-evac any casualties that we had and which was on the entrance and
19 exit of Kosovo, was covered by the Geremek agreement; and permission had
20 never been given for us to bring the helicopter in.
21 We had problems with lack of fuel. We found it very difficult to
22 get diesel fuel for our Land Rovers. Most fuel stations refused to sell
23 it to us. There was also the issue of the KLA prisoners who were being
24 kept in a prison in Nis, and access to those prisoners. And of course,
25 there's always the issue of fair or unfair verification. Mr. Sainovic did
1 in fact give us quite a hard time in accusing us of not verifying fairly
2 and just reporting really the misdemeanours of the Serbian side, never
3 mentioning the KLA side and the Albanian side.
4 Q. In the next paragraph of your statement you mention that some of
5 the attendees at this meeting included Ambassador Keller. Where was he
7 A. Ambassador Keller was one of the deputies to Ambassador Walker and
8 he was probably our -- the main contact with Mr. Sainovic.
9 Q. And General Maisonneuve?
10 A. Yes, General Maisonneuve. He was representing General DZ. He was
11 in charge of one of the regional centres. When General DZ was away, he
12 was standing in for him.
13 Q. Who chaired the meeting? Who ran the meeting?
14 A. The meeting was run completely by Mr. Sainovic.
15 Q. Now, I want to go to page 6 of your statement and at page 6,
16 paragraph 4, you mention Colonel Kotur. What was his role on the
17 commission? Was he subordinate to General Loncar?
18 A. Yes, he was. He was subordinate to General Loncar, and he was --
19 he had the contact -- he was the point of contact of the commission with
20 the VJ units in Kosovo. He certainly was able to -- if ever we had any
21 problems with the -- of access or questions to be asked or visits, then
22 Colonel Kotur would facilitate those activities.
23 Q. What was the nature of your relationship with him, given your role
24 as an OSCE/KVM representative to the commission?
25 A. Well, I think on the personal side, we got on quite well; and we
1 sort of spent a lot of time together sort of visiting units, working on
2 the border. Every day I could -- I would be with him for three or four
3 hours at these meetings of the cooperation commission; and, therefore, we
4 were -- I wouldn't say we were close, but we actually sort of knew each
5 other quite well, I believe.
6 Q. Now, in your statement page 7, paragraph 1, you indicate that
7 sometime during the last weeks that Colonel Kotur was there, he told you
8 about a proposed manoeuvre plan that was going to be used for an operation
9 to eliminate the KLA. Can you tell us how that came about?
10 A. Yes. It was right towards the end when we'd already decided, I
11 believe, to leave.
12 Q. And when would that have been, approximately?
13 A. Well, the -- you mean the decision to leave or the --
14 Q. Or the leaving.
15 A. Well, the leave -- the decision to leave and the planning to leave
16 was -- you can take that right back to somewhere shortly after Christmas,
17 when Ambassador Walker ordered us to make plans for a possible evacuation
18 at some point.
19 Q. And then when did you actually leave?
20 A. We didn't leave until the 23rd of March.
21 Q. Okay. So in that time-frame, between Christmas and your leaving
22 in -- near the end of March, when was this --
23 A. No. This discussion with Colonel Kotur, which came as a surprise
24 to me, happened a few days before we left.
25 Q. And who was present when this discussion took place?
1 A. Well, it was -- it was following one of our sort of final meetings
2 at which the commission had been present; and when everybody else had
3 gone, I was -- I remained with my interpreter and Colonel Kotur was sort
4 of seeing us out of the building or was going to see us out of the
5 building. But prior to that, he suddenly took me to a map on the table
6 and told me something unusual.
7 Q. Was it just the two of you, or was anyone else present?
8 A. No, there was just Colonel Kotur, myself, and the interpreter.
9 Q. And what language was the conversation being carried out in?
10 A. Well, Colonel Kotur spoke in Serbian. I don't think he -- I'm
11 sure he didn't speak English. He might have understood some English.
12 Q. Did you speak or understand any Serbian?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. But did the interpreter interpret for both of you, or just for
16 A. For both.
17 Q. And what happened? What was unusual in this conversation?
18 A. Well, during -- during our entire time there and my relationship
19 with Colonel Kotur, you know, we spent a lot of time in the field and
20 dangerous situations and, you know, I would call a spade a spade if I
21 regarded something as a terrorist incident carried out by terrorists, I
22 would call it that way. And I think we built up a respect as colleagues,
23 as professionals. And he suddenly just turned to me and said, I will show
24 you how we will deal with the KLA and with the population.
25 Q. And did he say when this was going to happen?
1 A. After our departure. He said that -- this was something they
2 would have to do, because it would save NATO a job in the future.
3 Q. Did he specify what he meant by that?
4 A. No. But I am -- my interpretation was that there was a problem
5 with -- a Muslim problem or a Kosovar problem that if they've dealt with
6 it, then we wouldn't have to deal with it in the future.
7 Q. What did he then proceed to detail you about how this was going to
9 A. Well, with his hand he actually pointed out on the map how he --
10 what he thought was actually going to happen and how the military action
11 would take place to displace the KLA.
12 Q. If I show you a map that you've used before in connection with
13 that, will that assist you in recalling how he said it was going to go?
14 A. Yes, mm-hmm.
15 MR. HANNIS: Could we show the witness Exhibit Number 2484,
17 Q. And your recollection is that he mentioned both the KLA and the --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- population, meaning the civilian population?
20 A. Yes. He -- I will not paraphrase exactly how it was, but the gist
21 was they would deal -- get rid of the KLA, and they would remove the
22 Albanians from Kosovo forever.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MR. HANNIS: If we can --
25 Q. I don't know, is that too small or --
1 A. No, it's fine.
2 Q. Can you deal with that again. This is a map of Kosovo, and there
3 are some green lines. Can you explain to the Judges what this is.
4 A. This is a green line I drew on this map during the trial of Mr.
5 Milosevic. If I had a pointer, I could point maybe.
6 Q. Do you want to use the pen to mark on the screen, or do you want
7 to point --
8 A. Well, I can describe. I can describe. The activity was due to
9 start in the top right-hand corner where it says "Serbia," but the
10 activity was actually going to take place in the Vucitrn area and the
11 Glogovac. And he basically just showed me the directions that he thought
12 -- well, he said the military would be moving to push and then cut off
13 and kill groups of KLA. So first of all, in the area of Vucitrn, towards
14 Glogovac, Mitrovica; and then also have forces push across from Podujevo
15 across the mountains through Remi sort of territory, push the KLA into
16 areas where they would be dealt with as well.
17 So it's far more complex, the actual -- obviously, the logistics
18 of this and the planning of this. But in general the activity would take
19 place up there, and then it would sort of move down. As you can see
20 southwards, across to Prizren, up to Djakovica, Decani, and ending in Pec.
21 And on the way, sort of, mopping up those pockets of KLA.
22 Q. That describes what the plan was with regard to the KLA.
23 A. Right.
24 Q. Did he say anything about what would happen with the civilian
1 A. No. I was just told that they would be removed.
2 Q. You mentioned in your answer before the most recent one Remi's
3 area. Who was he and what was his area?
4 A. The area between, if you like, to the west of Podujevo, but not
5 quite as far as Mitrovica-Vucitrn, because then you're crossing areas --
6 other areas where people I think like Rahman was operating.
7 Q. Tell me who Remi and Rahman were?
8 A. Well, Remi was the local KLA commander in the Podujevo area, a
9 very dangerous man. He didn't say very much. I think his actions spoke
10 for his words. Rahman was another commander, local commander, who was
11 probably even more dangerous. And my only dealings with Remi, I attended
12 several meetings in his headquarters as an observer very early on. With
13 Rahman, later on I was dealing with trying to get the release of captured
14 VJ soldiers who'd accidentally driven into his area, into Rahman's area,
15 and were captured.
16 Q. Did Colonel Kotur tell you why he was telling you this? It seems
17 an unusual thing for him to do.
18 A. Well, in the sort of few meetings preceding this, he was
19 basically -- he told me he was fed up with all the politicking. He was
20 fed up with the whole situation. It wasn't really getting anywhere, and
21 it was time for some action.
22 Q. Was he still on the cooperation commission at this time?
23 A. It was very strange because I was told at an earlier meeting, when
24 we had been -- General Loncar announced that we were getting a new
25 commission headed up by General Brankovic, and I was told then that
1 Kotur's position would be replaced by Colonel Petrovic.
2 Q. Do you recall approximately when that happened? How long before
3 you left?
4 A. Oh, a few weeks. Not that long, no.
5 Q. Did you have any other conversations with Colonel Kotur after this
6 date when he showed you this?
7 A. Yes --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you --
9 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: -- move on to that, if I may.
11 Your statement doesn't appear to me to refer to civilians at all
12 as part of this, unless I'm missing --
13 THE WITNESS: I think it says -- does it say "Albanians?" I can't
14 remember. I'm sure I mentioned both in my statement.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have a copy of your --
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, there's not a reference in the written
17 statement, but I believe there's a reference in his prior testimony in
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, in Milosevic, yes.
20 In your statement, you actually say: "It appeared to me that
21 Kotur had become totally disillusioned," which you've just been saying "by
22 the whole thing and the pending departure of the OSCE. And there was only
23 one remaining option to eliminate the KLA."
24 Now, is that a legitimate military objective?
25 THE WITNESS: Well, the KLA, by this time, had actually become
1 a -- a military -- fairly substantial military force of possibly 10.000
2 armed personnel. So I suppose if they were waging war on the VJ and the
3 police force, on the country, on the people, then I would say it probably
4 was a legitimate target, yes.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
8 Q. You testified in the Milosevic case about this?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And at that time, you mentioned this conversation with Colonel
11 Kotur in private session, I believe.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Because at the time you had a concern for his safety?
14 A. Yes. I knew Colonel Kotur well, and I also had met his wife, who
15 was an interpreter and an assistant to the secretary of Mr. Andjelkovic.
16 Q. Did you consider yourselves friends as well as working colleagues?
17 A. Well, we spent several sort of evenings in Kosovo in military
18 units, where we sort of ate and drank together, and we did tour
19 extensively around Kosovo together. So I think we were colleagues. I
20 wouldn't say that we were friends.
21 Q. All right. You're aware that Colonel Kotur testified in
23 A. Yes. I read the transcripts.
24 Q. And are you aware of what he said about this conversation that
25 you've just told us about?
1 A. Yes. He denied it.
2 Q. In your statement of November of this year, you talk about this.
3 Did you have any contact from Colonel Kotur and/or his wife after your
5 A. I had two contacts with the Kotur family. One was shortly after I
6 left the area in June of 1999.
7 Q. And what was that about?
8 A. Well, I had returned to my job in Rhinedahalen in the
9 headquarters, and Mrs. Kotur rang me to ask if I could help her regain
10 their apartment from Pristina, which had been taken from them and handed
11 over to some Albanian families. And indeed I tried to use my contacts to
12 try and facilitate this, unsuccessfully.
13 Q. Was that the only subject that you talked about on that occasion
14 in June 1999?
15 A. Yes. We exchanged -- she faxed me documents and title deeds,
16 which I then passed back to the UN headquarters in Pristina, but that was
17 the main topic of conversation. Several phone calls and several passages
18 of faxes.
19 Q. But all about that subject?
20 A. Completely.
21 Q. And the next time you had contact from either Mrs. Kotur or
22 Colonel Kotur would have been when?
23 A. This was post the -- my giving evidence at the Milosevic trial,
24 and I was working in the British embassy in Sopija as the Defence
25 attache. I received a phone call from the switchboard to tell me that
1 there is a lady from Kosovo is on the phone. So I spoke to her, not
2 realising it was Mrs. Kotur.
3 Q. Okay. And she's an interpreter. She speaks English?
4 A. She speaks excellent English.
5 Q. Your conversation was in English?
6 A. In English.
7 Q. What was this about?
8 A. This was a rather bizarre call because initially she sort of
9 launched a tirade against me for destroying her husband's reputation,
10 career, prospects, the possibility of remaining in decent military
11 housing, their relationship with their friends as a result of my testimony
13 Q. At that time had your testimony been made public, or was it still
14 under seal, as far as you know?
15 A. I know that -- well, I hope that the name of Colonel Kotur had
16 been kept out of any documents or transcripts which had been published on
17 the ICTY web site.
18 Q. Did you ask her how she'd become aware that you had mentioned --
19 A. No, I was -- you can imagine how I felt when I'd suddenly been
20 accused of destroying everything that the Koturs had ever cherished or
22 Q. How did you respond to that?
23 A. Well, my response was silence, at which point she said to me, "But
24 I forgive you. Come and have lunch with us at Nis."
25 Q. Okay. Did you do that?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Why not?
3 A. Well, I passed -- I ran this information past my ambassador, past
4 other people in the embassy, and they all advised me that it probably was
5 unwise for me to go to Serbia to have lunch with the Koturs, bearing in
6 mind that during the -- following my testimony, there was quite bad
7 reaction, I believe, to me and my evidence. And the -- my colleague, the
8 defence attach in Belgrade had actually warned me off at that time shortly
9 after the evidence not to go to Belgrade for my own safety.
10 Q. And when you say a bad reaction to you and your evidence, bad
11 reaction on the part of whom?
12 A. I -- I believe that there was some threat to me and my personal
13 well-being from people who believed I'd lied or sort of besmirched the
14 name of the VJ or the authorities.
15 Q. And any other conversations with Mrs. Kotur or Colonel Kotur since
16 that day?
17 A. No, not at all. I said I would get back to her and I did not. I
18 did actually pass the information to the -- my colleague at the Serbian
19 embassy, and also I raised the matter with his ambassador, the ambassador
20 of Serbia.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, is that a suitable time?
22 MR. HANNIS: That's a good time, Your Honour, if we may.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: We have to have a break now, Mr. Ciaglinski, for
24 half an hour or so. Would you please just leave with the courtroom with
25 the usher, who will show you where to wait.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, in the direct evidence in
4 Milosevic, where does this actually arise? Can you give me a page
6 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. It appears -- I'm having trouble
7 reading the small print. It looks like it's on page 3224, lines 5 through
8 7, and it looks like it was on the 14th of April, 2002.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
10 Well, we'll resume at ten to 1.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask counsel and witness to
17 make pauses between question and answer if possible.
18 MR. HANNIS:
19 Q. Colonel, we just talked about the contact with Mrs. Kotur. One
20 other item in your statement of 2006 I wanted to ask you again
21 concerning -- I have to go back to the Podujevo incident around Christmas
22 of 1998. In your statement you say at page 2 of the 2006 statement at the
23 bottom, that in a meeting with Loncar and others you were told that this
24 deployment by the Serb forces was allowed under the October agreements
25 because it was a training ground.
1 Did you have some considerations about where the training areas
2 where in Kosovo?
3 A. Yes. The -- it was a -- it became an issue as more and more units
4 started to deploy outside the garrison and barrack areas, and so we raised
5 the question: What constituted a training area? And some areas, like the
6 air-field south-east of Podujevo had actually been used for a number of
7 years as a deployment area during exercises. But the answer which
8 surprised all of us was when we were told that basically the whole of
9 Kosovo was a training area and it could be used.
10 Q. Every -- every square metre?
11 A. That's what we were told. It was that Kosovo had been used or
12 traditionally was -- had been, would be a training area.
13 Q. How did that impact your ability to carry out your job of
15 A. Well, the problem was that it was difficult enough with the
16 verifiers we had to keep tabs on all the activities going on; but once the
17 units deployed into the field it made our job, I would say, say nigh on
18 impossible, mainly because once the units deployed in the field, they
19 would close off all the areas, so all the access tracks, roads, routes
20 would be sealed. So the areas could be 10 by 10 kilometres or 20 by 20
21 kilometres. So if there was any activity happening in those areas, we
22 just had no way of getting in and verifying anything.
23 Q. Did those training areas that were established sometimes include
24 villages where civilians were living?
25 A. Well, the -- as I said, the training areas that we were told about
1 and we observed did include villages because it was difficult not to
2 include villages.
3 Q. Now, let me go back to what you said earlier about there came a
4 time where General Loncar and Colonel Kotur were replaced on the
5 Commission For Cooperation. You indicated -- in your statement, you say
6 that they were replaced by General Ilija Brankovic, who replaced Loncar,
7 and Colonel Petrovic replaced Colonel Kotur. Was there a change in the
8 relationship between you, the OSCE/KVM on one hand and the Serbs with this
9 new contingent?
10 A. Yes, there was. From what had been a working relationship that we
11 could make work and where we could get difficult points across or even
12 sort of have fast reaction for certain activities, we went from that to a
13 position where the whole thing just slowed down.
14 General Brankovic announced that in future the meetings would have
15 to be announced ahead. The points for the agenda would have to be
16 submitted 24 hours in advance, which therefore meant we couldn't deal with
17 anything current. And in Kosovo things were happening by the minute.
18 There was no way of guessing what was going to happen in 24 hours.
19 Q. Did he insist on that condition for the duration of your time
21 A. He tried to be insistent and our reaction was that we wouldn't
22 comply with that -- with these new specifications. And I think we tried
23 it once or twice, and eventually we were allowed to sort of go back to our
24 10.00 type meeting. But it was difficult. It was nowhere near as useful
25 or cooperative as the mission had been before.
1 Q. Let me change gears on you now and go forward -- well, perhaps not
2 forward depending on what date the change took place. In paragraph -- on
3 page 8, paragraph 4 of your statement, you mentioned the events in Racak
4 on the 15th of January, 1999. And you say you later learned that NATO had
5 intercepted radio traffic that showed the Serbs were more heavily involved
6 in this massacre than they were admitting, and they gave orders to
7 actually kill people.
8 Who was your source for that?
9 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
11 MR. SEPENUK: Just on the Racak matter, we have Your Honour's
12 order concerning Racak and I'm not sure if Mr. Hannis's question is in the
13 spirit of that order when he talks about he's now trying to assess
14 responsibility for what happened there. And I think that that does not
15 comport with the -- both the letter and the spirit of Your Honour's order.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the question he's actually asked is for an
17 identification of the source for the information. So there's no breach of
18 any earlier order in that, Mr. Sepenuk.
19 MR. SEPENUK: Well, what concerned me, Your Honour, was the
20 statement that showed that the Serbs were more heavily involved in this
21 massacre than they were admitting. I think that gets right into the
22 merits of the case, Your Honour. It is very difficult for us to rebut
23 that under the letter and the spirit of Your Honour's order.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the witness hasn't given an answer that would
25 give rise to that problem, Mr. Sepenuk, and the question he's been asked
1 is a much more specific one. So as and when the problem arises, we shall
2 address it. But meanwhile that question can be answered.
3 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: You're being asked, Mr. Ciaglinski, for your source
5 for that information.
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, both sides by this point were
7 monitoring each of the telephone and radio traffic. And when I went --
8 when we left Kosovo, I was the liaison officer between the OSCE and the
9 NATO headquarters, General Jackson. And I had to occasionally be in the
10 intelligence cell of that headquarters. And this was certainly something
11 which was discussed, radio-telephone traffic monitoring.
12 MR. HANNIS:
13 Q. You just -- your answer said radio-telephone monitoring. In your
14 statement you say "radio." Do you recall what you knew at the time or
15 what you were told about where this information came from? Was it
16 intercepted telephone conversations or radio communications or both?
17 A. I wasn't able to ascertain whether it was telephone or radio, but
18 it was communications. We have communications centres that cover both.
19 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to page 9 of your statement, and it's
20 the fourth paragraph on that page. You describe --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: The -- I take it, Mr. Hannis, that the part
22 there -- I've rather, I think, been unfair in what I've said to Mr.
23 Sepenuk because I was ignoring or overlooking the fact that there is a
24 statement here in front of us. It's not simply a question and an answer
25 that we are dealing with.
1 Now, the question of orders may be relevant if in some way there
2 is implication of the accused here. The Chamber is interested in evidence
3 which shows the relationship between the activity that might be
4 characterised as a crime and the conduct or exercise of responsibilities
5 of the accused. We are not interested, as you know, about the details of
6 the events in Racak in this trial.
7 Now, can I take it that that answer there is to remain -- or that
8 statement is to remain in the very unspecific form in which we see it at
9 the moment?
10 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
12 MR. HANNIS: We've talked about the difficulty in completely not
13 speaking the word "Racak," because I think that's nearly impossible to do.
14 But this evidence is offered for a couple of other purposes, too, rather
15 than showing whether or not there was a killing and massacre --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not -- I'm not preventing you asking these
17 questions. I just wanted to know if anything was -- anything more was
18 going to be explored about what these -- or who was involved in giving
19 these orders that might be of relevance to the case against the accused
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, we had testimony from the previous
22 witness about phone conversations between two of the accused concerning
23 these events.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, precisely.
25 MR. HANNIS: There's a newspaper article about that. What I'm
1 trying to show -- and our witness said that some of his sources for that
2 information came from western sources.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
4 MR. HANNIS: I'm trying to connect things up.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Now the Chamber will not prevent you from
6 exploring this issue to do that, but I can also re-assure Mr. Sepenuk that
7 we will be giving no weight to the specific allegation about what happened
8 in Racak. That's there simply to give context to what might otherwise be
9 relevant information about the chain of responsibility.
10 Mr. Hannis.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
12 Q. Now, on page 9 of your statement, the fourth paragraph down, you
13 describe an incident that you saw along the Podujevo-Pristina road where a
14 VJ colonel was shot, and then there was an operation carried out by the VJ
15 to try and deal with that sniper. You've described that that appeared to
16 be carried out in a professional manner, that there wasn't any wholesale
17 shelling or attack on the village, no destruction, no killings, no
18 retribution. You were there watching when this happened?
19 A. I had been in Podujevo, and I was on my way back when I came
20 across the blockage of the road next to this village. I can't remember,
21 the name was Lebane, Lebana. And I was intrigued about what was
22 happening. There was no police involved at all.
23 There was an army, VJ, operation and I was allowed to travel up
24 and down the road, go and look at some of the military units that were
25 involved, and I was able to see the entire operation from the west side of
1 the road through my binoculars standing next to a VJ T-55 tank. And I saw
2 nothing improper at all. It was a well-conducted military quarterman's
3 search of the village.
4 Q. And were you there in your KVM vehicle?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. How was it marked to distinguish it?
7 A. My -- our vehicles were bright orange. This was something that
8 was decided earlier on in the mission because UN vehicles tend to be
9 white, but there was a problem with some of the Serbian police vehicles
10 also being white. And to avoid any confusion and to make our vehicles
11 stand out, General DZ I think decided to have them painted in an
12 outrageous colour, which seemed to work.
13 Q. Were they able to see that you were there watching them carry out
14 the operation?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Page 10 of your statement, you describe your return to Kosovo
17 after the fighting with NATO ended, and on the 13th of June you went into
18 Pristina and took over an office that the MUP had been in. You describe
19 seeing a pile of burning documents which you determined, upon inspection,
20 to contain passports and identity documents and application for passports.
21 Were all the names that you saw in the samples you looked at Albanian
23 A. Yes. All the documents that we looked at, we took several
24 handfuls and asked our interpreter to tell us what they were. This was on
25 our second day in Kosovo, because on the first day we were somewhere else;
1 and on day two, we decided to take over an office to conduct our
2 operations from. This was the Ministry of the Interior buildings and the
4 Q. You took -- you took some photographs of those documents. Did you
5 actually take some samples of the documents you were able to pull out of
6 the pile?
7 A. When we arrived, the whole building was enveloped in smoke; and it
8 make our sort of presence in the building quite unbearable, but we carried
9 on. We tried to identify -- it wasn't hard to identify the source of the
10 smoke because it was -- there was a large pile of paper in sort of an
11 alcove of the building. And it had been burning probably for nearly a day
12 or so. And so we sort of examined it. I took some pictures, maybe three
13 or four pictures, of this burning pile.
14 MR. HANNIS: Could we show the witness Exhibit P2504.
15 Q. How big was this pile of documents?
16 A. I think in my original statement I mentioned it was the size of a
17 truck, but obviously this had burnt down, but it covered a large area
18 between -- from wall -- three walls, three sides of an alcove. Probably
19 the pile was a metre and a half high and as wide as a truck.
20 Q. Can you see the paragraph on the screen in front of you now?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you tell us what that is.
23 A. Well, it certainly wasn't my intention to take a picture of a
24 vehicle. What I had done is I had taken a number of pictures from the top
25 window, which -- through which I believe the documents had been thrown,
1 and I went downstairs to locate -- take a picture from the road, the
2 pavement, towards the pile of paper, but there was a vehicle parked so it
3 was difficult. But the other pictures would have shown the pile. What
4 you can see is the smoldering, the same smoldering behind the vehicle and
5 to the sides.
6 Q. Could you take the pen from the side of the screen there or the
7 usher will assist you, and if you could mark there what you have just
8 talked about.
9 A. The original picture was taken from a window on the side of the
10 building here, behind these trees or those windows there.
11 Q. You've drawn a rectangle and some lines on the upper right-hand
12 corner of the photo.
13 A. Mm-hmm. And I was standing in the road, the main road running
14 through Pristina, the OSCE headquarters would have been off to the right
15 somewhere, and this is the vehicle. And behind it you can see that there
16 is an outline of smoke, which I can assure you is not the smoke of the
17 engine because the engine wasn't running.
18 Q. And where were the documents?
19 A. The documents were actually behind, in this area, behind the
21 Q. Okay. You've indicated the document with two sort of half
22 moons --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- on the lower portion of the drawing outside the vehicle.
25 A. Mm-hmm.
1 Q. When was this photograph taken?
2 A. This was taken second, third day of our presence in Kosovo.
3 Q. And when had you seen the documents burning initially?
4 A. On the very first time we went to this building.
5 Q. So the pile was still smoking two days later?
6 A. It was smoking for days. It was smoldering. It was thick with
7 documents, and that sort of fire doesn't burn very well; it just smolders.
8 Q. Thank you?
9 MR. HANNIS: Could we take a screen shot of that and give it the
10 next IC number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC110, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 MR. HANNIS:
14 Q. I want to show you two more photographs while we're on
16 MR. HANNIS: Can we show the witness Exhibit 2506.
17 Q. Can you tell us who's in this picture.
18 A. Mm-hmm.
19 Q. From left to right.
20 A. On the left-hand side the large man is Colonel Kotur; the female
21 is -- was Ms. Babic, my interpreter; myself; and a local Albanian who was
22 able to let us into this property.
23 Q. And where are you standing?
24 A. Sorry, I'm the third from the left.
25 Q. No. I meant wherefore are you standing?
1 A. This is a house in western Kosovo. Next -- not far, I believe,
2 from some of the villages of Djakovica and that area.
3 Q. Okay. And when, approximately, was this taken?
4 A. This was probably taken maybe January.
5 Q. Why were you at this location?
6 A. This was one of my trips with Colonel Kotur. He was taking me
7 around, showing me things. As I said, we had a good relationship; and I
8 was probably the only verifier, besides General DZ, who had access to most
9 units, areas, as long as I was with Colonel Kotur. And he was showing me
10 some of his handy-work, because he had been, I believe, a brigade
11 commander in this area at one time. He knew it well. And the reason he
12 took me to this house, he wanted to show me what happens to a house or
13 property of Albanians who cooperated with the Americans.
14 Q. And this was such a house?
15 A. This indeed was the house, I believe, where there's -- there are
16 recorded photographs of -- I'm not sure of Chris Hill, but certainly
17 Holbrooke sitting cross-legged smoking a pipe having meetings with the
19 Q. And when had that occurred, do you know?
20 A. Well, that would have been probably October, before October,
22 Q. Of 1998?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. HANNIS: And could we show the witness Exhibit 2506 -- I'm
25 sorry, 2505.
1 Q. Tell us what that is, please.
2 A. I believe that's the house from the outside.
3 Q. And what did Colonel Kotur tell you, if anything, how it came to
4 be in that state.
5 A. He told you Maine that the house, following this meeting, they had
6 identified it from the photographs and from local knowledge, and they had
7 come back and they had burnt and blown up the house.
8 Q. Did he tell you when that had happened?
9 A. Not exactly. I can't remember a date, but it would have been
10 shortly afterwards.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. HANNIS: I'm finished with that. Next could we show the
13 witness Exhibit 1966.
14 Q. Colonel, when you were proofing with Ms. Carter and I earlier in
15 the week, did you have occasion to review some documents in the nature of
16 military orders dated in late March 1999?
17 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Petrovic is on his feet.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you will allow me,
20 the Defence objects to the tendering of this evidence through this witness
21 for a very simple reason. As we heard from Mr. Hannis, the witness saw
22 these documents for the first time while he was being proofed for his
23 testimony here, and all those documents pertain to the time -- it's a
24 whole series of documents that I believe my learned colleague would like
25 to show this witness.
1 So these documents, at least at first glance, are documents that
2 were drafted after or created after his tour of duty in Kosovo as a member
3 of the KVM. And these documents are also the kind of documents that he
4 could not have seen or been aware of at the time when he was there. He
5 would not have been aware of what they contained. I think that we cannot
6 establish the minimum level of reliability of the evidence that would be
7 necessary for the Trial Chamber to admit them into evidence. And that is
8 why we would like to object to their tendering into evidence or admission
9 into evidence in this manner.
10 And also it should be noted that these documents have not been
11 signed, have not been sealed, but this is a matter for some other debate.
12 Thank you very much.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. These documents, starting
15 with Exhibit Number 1966 through 1969 plus 2015, are -- appear to be
16 documents from the Joint Command regarding military operations proposed in
17 late March 1999. Your Honours, these are documents -- Exhibit 2015 is a
18 document that was a Defence exhibit in the Milosevic case provided by Mr.
19 Milosevic. 1966 through 1969 are documents that we have received pursuant
20 to RFAs to the Serbian authorities. And another document, 1990, which is
21 a MUP staff meeting from February 17th of 1999, was also obtained pursuant
22 to an RFA.
23 The purpose in showing these to the witness was just to have him
24 look at -- well, Your Honours, I have some hesitation about continuing
25 this conversation in front of the witness.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ciaglinski, I'd have to ask you just
2 briefly to leave while we deal with this matter of law and you'll be
3 brought straight back when we finish.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 MR. HANNIS: I see the witness is safely out of the room, Your
6 Honour. In his testimony at page -- beginning at page 3222 in the
7 Milosevic case, the witness gave some detailed description of what Colonel
8 Kotur had told him about what the operational plan was going to be to
9 remove the KLA, what areas they were going to be operating in, et cetera.
10 These documents that we received pursuant to RFAs or in the one case that
11 was a Defence exhibit by Mr. Milosevic show orders for military -- a joint
12 military and MUP operations, which we will argue later on in the case
13 line-up in many ways with what Witness Ciaglinski says about what Mr. --
14 or what Colonel Kotur told him.
15 I don't really need the witness to do that. He's not -- we're not
16 proposing him as a military expert or anything else. It just seemed to be
17 the appropriate time to offer these, and these are things I would tender
18 from the bar table at the conclusion of his testimony. I just wanted to
19 indicate that he had seen them.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: He doesn't -- just give me a moment.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, there is no objection to you asking
23 this witness by presenting the terms of the order, as it were, whether
24 that's consistent with a plan that he's describing; but he's not an
25 appropriate vehicle, in our opinion, for introducing these documents. We
1 don't think it appropriate for you to give him the documents, thus giving
2 them some sort of status in the proceedings that's not merited at this
3 moment. And, as you indicate yourself, there are other ways of dealing
4 with that.
5 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, I offered -- I propose to just
6 offer them from the bench and take no comment from him, but it seemed in
7 terms of the chronology of the trial to put them in now when he's talked
8 about Colonel Kotur and I wanted to make the link, but I take your point.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: So if you want to establish consistency between the
10 terms of these and what his understanding of the description of the
11 operation was, then you'll have to do that through oral question and
12 answer. But if you don't think that's necessary, then these can be
13 submitted in some other way at another stage, but not through this
15 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, he testified in Milosevic describing
16 what Colonel Kotur told him about where the operations were going to take
17 place. I can make the argument based on his prior testimony about the
18 documents. I don't need to go through that again with him. I don't think
19 that's the best use of my time.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
21 Well, we can have the witness.
22 Sorry, Mr. Petrovic.
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you'll allow me
24 just very briefly. I would like to make a few remarks that may be of some
25 use to us. Quite to the contrary to what my learned colleague is
1 claiming. In his testimony in the Milosevic case, the witness now in
2 court specifically stated that Kotur had not revealed to him any specific
3 plans, nothing that could really take place after the departure of the
4 mission from Kosovo. That's on page 3262 of the testimony of this witness
5 in the Milosevic case.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic, the interpretation of the evidence is
7 a matter we can address in later submissions. If Mr. Hannis has
8 overestimated his case at this point, then he'll, no doubt, learn the
9 consequences in due course.
10 Let's have the witness back, please.
11 [The witness takes the stand]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not going to be necessary to deal with these
13 documents here, Mr. Ciaglinski.
14 Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
18 The only other thing I wanted to do with this witness, Your
19 Honour, is number of the other exhibits that were shown to him and
20 discussed by him in his testimony in Milosevic are on our proposed exhibit
21 list. I don't intend to walk him through that again because you can read
22 that in his transcript. But I did want to indicate to the Court the
23 numbers and the transcript page references to those documents. I don't
24 know the most efficient way you would like me to do that.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it a long list?
1 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, there are about 15, 16 documents
2 that have transcript page references.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the easiest way is probably to read it into
4 the transcript now and just give us them.
5 MR. HANNIS: I will, Your Honour. Our Exhibit P44 is a map of
6 Kosovo, and that was cited at page 3220 in the Milosevic transcript, and
7 it is Milosevic Exhibit Number 61.
8 Exhibit 395 on our list is Milosevic Exhibit 94 at tab 3 on page
9 3141, line 6.
10 Our Exhibit 394 is Milosevic 94 at tab 4, also on page 3141.
11 Our Exhibit 677 is Milosevic 94, tab 52, at page 3148.
12 Our Exhibit 623 is Milosevic 96 at page 3156.
13 Our Exhibit 634 is Milosevic 94, tab 63, at page 3181.
14 Our Exhibit 1325 is Milosevic 17 at page 3184.
15 Our 1326 is Milosevic 18, also at 3184.
16 Our Exhibit P1324 is Milosevic 21A and 21B, also at page 3184.
17 Our Exhibit P655 is Milosevic 97 at page 3217.
18 Our Exhibit 2484 is Milosevic 61A at page 2235.
19 Our Exhibit P2238 is Milosevic 98 at page 3252.
20 Our Exhibit 641 is Milosevic 94 at tab 53 on page 3341.
21 Our Exhibit P396, Milosevic 99, at page 3346.
22 And our Exhibit 506, Milosevic 100, at page 3348.
23 And we would tender all these.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
25 Mr. O'Sullivan.
1 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, the order will be: Mr. Sainovic,
2 General Lazarevic, General Lukic, General Pavkovic, General Ojdanic, and
3 Mr. Milutinovic.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
5 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski, I have some questions for you,
8 and I would like to first ask you about the work of the commission that
9 you spoke about yesterday and described in your previous statements, where
10 you said that you actually cooperated with the Yugoslav commission for the
11 cooperation with OSCE, and that you met with them quite frequently, and
12 that this commission was, in fact, the official body through which the
13 OSCE commission cooperated with the Yugoslav authorities, if I understood
14 you correctly.
15 Could you please tell me how many meetings were there between the
16 commission -- the Yugoslav commission and your commission in the period
17 between December and March, the period that you can actually testify
19 A. The -- can I just clear one thing up. There was a higher level of
20 commission, of course, in Belgrade itself. That was the top level. Our
21 local Pristina one, we had at least one meeting every single day in that
23 Q. How many meetings are we talking about in this period between
24 December and March? If they took place every day, how many of them would
25 be in total?
1 A. Well, exactly the same as the number of days in that period.
2 Q. How many such meetings did you attend of the total number? So
3 there would have been about a hundred meetings. How many out of those
4 hundred meetings did you personally attend?
5 A. Probably every one. I might have missed one or two, but the
7 Q. How would you describe the point of these meetings. These are the
8 meetings where you established the liaison between your commission and the
9 Yugoslav authorities. Am I right when I describe the point of these
10 meetings in these broad terms?
11 A. The point of the meetings was to pass on any concerns and reports
12 of our activities to your commission and also to hear reactions and
13 complaints or reports from the field from the Yugoslav side also.
14 Q. So the point of the meetings was to exchange information. You
15 gave them your information and you asked them your questions, and the
16 Yugoslav side did the same, if I understand you correctly?
17 A. In general, yes.
18 Q. How did this -- what did this look like in practice? If you had a
19 question, an issue, to raise, request pertaining to some information that
20 pertained to the police, you would then ask this question or make this
21 demand to the liaison officer from the police who attended the meeting.
22 Is that what it looked like? When you had an issue that pertained to the
23 work of the police. This is what I'm specifically interested in.
24 A. Absolutely correct. The police were not always represented at
25 these meetings. Colonel Mijatovic didn't come every day, not very often,
1 in fact, and so the information was taken by the remainder of the
2 commission, who then would pass on that information to the MUP.
3 Q. Thank you. I'm now just talking about the methodology of your
4 work. I'm not asking you about any specific events. I merely wanted to
5 know what -- how it functioned, and did this also apply to the issues
6 related to the military. If you wanted to know something related to the
7 work of the military, you would ask the representative, the liaison
8 officer, from the Yugoslav army. Is that correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Thank you. At those meetings you also presented various requests
11 related to logistics support, accommodation, fuel. You would make those
12 requests to the persons who were there representing the relevant state
13 body in charge of those matters. Is that correct?
14 A. If there was no one present to go down to the question, then the
15 commission would direct those questions further, I presume.
16 Q. Please focus on what I'm asking you about. If you had a logistics
17 problem, you would present it to one of the persons present there
18 representing the state body in charge of this matter who would be able to
19 resolve that problem. Of course, if that person was not present, then of
20 course it would be forwarded to the relevant person. But if that person
21 was there, you would ask that person. For instance, if you had a visa
22 problem, you would ask it to the representative of the relevant state body
23 dealing with visas. Is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And the issues related to the entry into the country of the
1 commission members, were they also resolved in -- by you putting them to
2 the commission at the commission meetings?
3 A. If we had difficulties at the border, as we did a few times at
4 Djeneral Jankovic, then we would in fact raise it at this meeting or that
5 could even be written to an ambassadorial level or Ambassador Keller would
6 get straight on to Mr. Sainovic.
7 Q. I would now like to ask you about your impression about the actual
8 powers of this commission. You spoke about that at the Milosevic trial.
9 We know what you said there. Can you now please confirm whether you still
10 state that; in other words, that to your knowledge people present there,
11 members of the commission, and other people who attended those meetings,
12 that those people were not part of the chains of command of the military
13 and the police as far as you knew.
14 When asked specifically by Judge Kwon at the Milosevic trial, you
15 stated that it was absolutely true that these people had not been in the
16 chains of command. This is transcript at page 3271 in the Milosevic
18 A. General Loncar, as a retired general, I can't believe he would
19 have been in the chain of command. Colonel Kotur, as a serving officer,
20 he wasn't commanding anything, to my knowledge, but he had a huge
21 knowledge of the country and the KLA. However, Colonel Mijatovic was in
22 the chain of command --
23 Q. I have to apologise for interrupting you. What I want to know
24 specifically is whether what you said in the Milosevic case, whether you
25 confirmed that today or whether there is a reason for you to change your
1 testimony. There were no dilemmas at that time.
2 At one point your answer was quite unclear, as was your answer
3 just now; and then when the Chamber asked you specifically, you said this
4 -- you made a statement that I just quoted to you. In other words, that
5 the members of the commission were not part of any chains of command. Can
6 you confirm that now? I can read it out to you, if you want me to refresh
7 your recollection.
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] If the Chamber requires it.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Ciaglinski, you should continue the
10 answer that you had begun and complete it.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 On reflection and at the time -- I should say that Colonel
13 Mijatovic - I'll remind you what I said earlier - did not attend all the
14 meetings. Colonel Mijatovic was part of the MUP chain of command; and
15 therefore, except for him, then that is, as I say, he's in the chain of
16 command. When the remainder of the commission arrived, the new
17 commission, General Brankovic and company, they were there for too short a
18 time for me to be able to comment if they were in a chain of command or
20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Well, I really don't know what your position on this really is.
22 So when Judge Kwon asked you: [In English] "Not whether they were.
23 General Loncar and some other officials were aware of the fact what was
24 happening at the time, rather, the question was this: Whether they were
25 in the chain of command or not. You can make the answer simpler."
1 [Interpretation] And your answer: [In English] "They were
2 obviously not in the chain of command."
3 [Interpretation] So do you still state that, yes or no? Is this
4 still your evidence?
5 A. I stick by my comment about the remainder of the commission, but
6 I, on reflection, stick to my point now that Colonel Mijatovic was in the
7 chain of command.
8 Q. Very well. Let us move on to some other issues. Do you know who
9 actually sat on the commission of the Yugoslav government for the
10 cooperation with the OSCE; in other words, who were the members of this
11 commission? Could you please give me as many names as you can recall.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this the one in Pristina you're concerned about?
13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm talking about what
14 this witness terms the commission for the cooperation with the OSCE in his
15 testimony and in his -- in the transcript of his previous testimony.
16 Now he is changing his testimony somewhat, but in his statement
17 and in his testimony in the Milosevic case, he is quite clear that there
18 is just one such commission of the Yugoslav government with the
19 cooperation with the OSCE, and this is the commission that I want to ask
20 him about. If he now can share some other insights with us, that would be
21 quite welcome.
22 Q. So I'm talking about the Yugoslav commission that you speak about
23 in your statement in 2001 and your testimony in the Milosevic case. So my
24 question to you is: Who were the members of that commission?
25 A. As I mentioned that I believe that there was a higher level set up
1 in Belgrade; but as I had nothing to do with it on any sort of basis,
2 daily or irregular, I cannot tell you who sat on that commission, except
3 our representative in Belgrade was General Bo Pelmas, and I believe a
4 number of high-level people sat on it from the Serbian side.
5 I've already gone over the people who sat in Kosovo headed by
6 General Loncar, Colonel Mijatovic, Colonel Kotur, there were a number of
7 people from ministries who came and went, whose names I cannot remember so
8 easily. One was a civilian, I think Mr. Petric or Petrovic.
9 Q. What I want to know is why, at least as far as I was able to see
10 from my analysis of your testimony, why you have never mentioned the
11 existence of those various levels, the higher and the lower level, in the
12 commission. Is it true that you have never actually mentioned that, that
13 this -- we hear about this for the first time now in this courtroom?
14 A. No. I'm somewhat surprised because I speak about what I know, but
15 I believe that others have spoken about what they know. And it has been
16 discussed in their evidence.
17 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, I'm not asking you about what other people said.
18 I'm talking about what you, yourself, have said. You never mentioned any
19 different levels, different compositions of the Yugoslav commission for
20 the cooperation with the OSCE. Very briefly. Is it true that this is the
21 first time that you mentioned this today, although you have had plenty of
22 opportunity to say something about it in the previous occasions. So yes
23 or no.
24 A. At my level, the commission I dealt with is the one in Pristina.
25 And to answer the other part of the question: Since no one asked my, I
1 didn't answer the question.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Petrovic, we will have to break off
3 there, if that's convenient to you.
4 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: That brings our session for today to an end, Mr.
6 Ciaglinski. You will have to resume on Monday, and on Monday we'll be
7 sitting in the afternoon at 2.15. So you need to be back, ready to start
8 your evidence at 2.15. It is important that between now and then you have
9 no discussions with anybody at all about your evidence, that's either what
10 you've said already or what you might yet say in the evidence. Just talk
11 about whatever else you wish, but not the evidence. If you would now, now
12 leave the courtroom with the usher, we'll see you on Monday afternoon.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I wanted to alert you to a possible
17 scheduling change next week. Subject to my conversation with Defence
18 counsel at the close of this and their estimates on how long
19 cross-examination of this witness will be, we may have a change in the
20 order and I will alert you, through your Legal Officer and through Mr.
21 Haider, of what that is so you don't read too far on something that's not
22 coming up for a while.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 We'll resume at 2.15 on Monday.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 20th day of
2 November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.