1 Friday, 1 December 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 8.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Loncar. Are you receiving the
6 sound from our interpretation?
7 TECHNICIAN: [In Belgrade] There's no translation as of yet.
8 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, if you allow me to say, we can hear
9 translation on B/C/S.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: You can.
11 Good morning, Mr. Loncar.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Your cross-examination will now continue. You were
14 being asked questions by Mr. Cepic yesterday and he will continue now.
15 Mr. Cepic.
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 WITNESS: DUSAN LONCAR [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 [Witness appeared via videolink]
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic: [Continued]
21 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. If I may have a moment. Yesterday we were discussing Podujevo and
24 the crisis which erupted when the -- when one of the Serbs was killed in
25 that area. Mr. Ciaglinski mentioned that there were 1 to 2.000 KLA
1 fighters there, equipped and with ammunition. In paragraph 49 of your
2 statement you stated that several days later the Army of Yugoslavia
3 arrived with no intention to use tanks. Mr. Drewienkiewicz accused the
4 Serb side for excessive use of force subsequently. The term of "the
5 excessive use of force," could you please explain it to us and can you
6 give us your assessment of Mr. Drewienkiewicz's opinion for the army
7 having used excessive force.
8 A. I just wanted to correct something. The army was not deployed
9 with tanks. It was an exercise which had been planned and announced to
10 the OSCE, and it had to do with the training of the new generation of tank
11 operators, and they were exercising in the vicinity of Podujevo. They
12 thought it as a tout of force, as an excessive use of force, but it was
13 merely by chance that both the army and the police were there at the same
14 time, although their tasks differed.
15 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 62 of your statement, you state that the
16 Kosovo Verification Mission also assessed that as the excessive use of
17 force by Serb forces under the circumstances in which the KLA actually
18 attacked the Serb forces. You also stated that you know of no facts which
19 could corroborate that. Could you please explain this term "excessive use
20 of force," and did it occur indeed, either carried out by the police or
21 the army in the relevant time in Kosovo.
22 A. When discussing any incident, when discussions were held between
23 me and my team and the OSCE, they never said that proportionate force was
24 used; they always kept saying that it was excessive. And I was under the
25 impression that we, according to them, should have sent two soldiers or
1 two policemen, and even then they would call it excessive use of force.
2 Therefore, their assessment was based on their opinion that we needed to
3 use less forces, less troops; however, my opinion was to use what was
4 available, and I believe that even those troops were insufficient to try
5 and confront the situation that was on their hands at the time.
6 Q. Thank you, General. Another thing that I wanted to clarify as
7 regards this. Mr. Drewienkiewicz in his statement states that you
8 suggested that APCs be used, two APCs and 13 Pinzgauers, to deal with the
9 situation in Podujevo. Further on he states that there were negotiations
10 at Walker's office, and while you were negotiating there was an incursion
11 into the village and, once having received that information, Walker
12 started shouting at you and kicked you out of his office. Can you tell us
13 precisely what happened on that occasion.
14 A. First of all, he didn't kick me out and I wouldn't have allowed me
15 to. I wouldn't have been kicked out by anyone. Mr. Walker was a diplomat
16 and he conversed at that level. We had an argument a discussion. I was
17 convinced that he was given wrong information [Realtime transcript read in
18 error, "I was given wrong information"] on the engagement of our
19 mechanised forces, as regards the 11 APCs and so on.
20 I left the meeting because I was pressured by the information,
21 misinformation he received. And since he wouldn't listen to my
22 explanations, I left. Later on we discussed it further and clarified
23 things because what was forwarded to the meeting at that very moment was
24 incorrect, it was forwarded by means of communication.
25 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, there's a significant transcript
1 mistake at 3, 17, where it says, "I was given the wrong information." He
2 said, "I have the impression -- I had the impression he was given the
3 wrong information."
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that correct, Mr. Loncar?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was under the impression that
6 Mr. Walker had been given wrong information during the meeting.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 Mr. Cepic.
9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Another thing to clarify concerning Podujevo. Both Mr.
11 Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Ciaglinski mentioned the so-called Tenkovsko Brdo,
12 tank hill, and that you discussed that topic with them. Do you remember
13 this so-called tank hill? It was actually a terrorist location where
14 there were numerous trenches, and there were daily terrorist attacks from
15 there against the police, the army, and citizens.
16 A. If you are down on the road facing the tank hill, you could see
17 with the naked eye, and, especially with the binoculars, you could confirm
18 what Mr. Ciaglinski and Drewienkiewicz said. It was a dominating feature
19 in that area and there were strong fortifications and some terrorist
21 Q. To be clear, General, they didn't state it was a terrorist
22 stronghold. It was me who stated it; however, they said that such a tank
23 hill did in fact exist, but at the later stage the Army of Yugoslavia was
24 deployed there. I wanted to know about the period before the 22nd of
25 December, whether it was a terrorist stronghold?
1 A. Yes, it was. When I travelled between Pristina and Belgrade, I
2 could see for myself there. They moved about freely, and their forces
3 were up at the tank hill.
4 Q. General, you've mentioned that there was an exercise in place by
5 the Army of Yugoslavia, a tank exercise between Pristina, Podujevo, and
6 Prepolac; and on the 22nd of December on that axis, or rather, at the tank
7 hill, a tank was damaged. It was put out of operation, and a smaller
8 group of 20 soldiers remained at the tank to guard it until conditions
9 improved, so as to be able to repair it. And that is why the tank hill
10 was termed in that way --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, Mr. Loncar.
12 Mr. Hannis.
13 MR. HANNIS: I have an objection to the form of the question.
14 Mr. Cepic seems to be testifying. If he would cite a reference to what
15 he's saying I wouldn't have a problem but as it stands it sounds like it's
16 just his evidence about what happened on December 22nd. If he puts it in
17 the form of the question, I don't have an objection about that either, but
18 not the way he's doing it.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Which paragraph is this, Mr. Cepic?
20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] The last question, it was page 5, line
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, but which paragraph is it in the
24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] By your leave, Your Honour, this
25 concerns Mr. Ciaglinski's and Mr. Drewienkiewicz's statements.
1 Mr. Drewienkiewicz in paragraph 104 mentions the tank hill.
2 Mr. Ciaglinski mentions it on several occasions, including during his
3 cross-examination; he mentioned the term tank hill. This was the basis
4 for my questions.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I understand, but what is the question you're
6 about to ask because it just sounds as if you're giving evidence; it
7 doesn't sound as if it's coming to a question.
8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I can reformulate, with your leave,
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, okay. Try again.
11 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, do you know why that feature is or was called tank
14 A. Because of the tank which had been left behind and because of that
15 event. That exercise, the tank exercise, had been announced to the OSCE
16 and they dispatched their monitors to follow the situation. The tank was
17 damaged during the exercise, and later on was pulled out from the location
18 of tank hill.
19 Q. Thank you, General. Did you know that on that occasion three VJ
20 soldiers were injured when the tank was damaged?
21 A. Yes, I did.
22 Q. Thank you. Mr. Drewienkiewicz in his statement mentions that he
23 demanded a meeting be held with the generals.
24 MR. CEPIC: I do apologise, just one correction for transcript.
25 The witness answered: "Yes, I know," not, "Yes, I did." Page number 6,
1 line 17.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it comes to the same thing, Mr. Cepic, so
3 there's no harm done.
4 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I do know.
6 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. To go back to my previous question, General, did
8 Mr. Drewienkiewicz ask for a meeting to be called with Generals Pavkovic
9 and Lazarevic? You said that due to their recent promotion, no meeting
10 could be held or discussed. It was out of the question. Were you ever
11 forwarded such a request by Drewienkiewicz?
12 A. As regards the case we have been discussing, I cannot be fully
13 certain as to whether he demanded such a meeting or not. It was only on
14 one other occasion that Drewienkiewicz asked to see either Pavkovic or
15 Lazarevic. As for this particular instance, I don't think he asked to see
16 them but I cannot be certain. Had he asked to see them, believe me, I
17 would have made it possible for him. If not, to have Lazarevic or
18 Pavkovic there, then at least someone else from the top of the Pristina
19 Corps command.
20 Q. Thank you. General, is it correct to say that one of the basic
21 tasks of the KVM was to verify the cease-fire and any conflict in the
23 A. It was their basic and primary goal -- task.
24 Q. As regards the touring of facilities and the restricted area of
25 movement in the border belt, did you know that for separate visits and
1 inspection of the facilities and barracks, such activities had to be
2 notified and given permission by the Pristina Corps was it was not part of
3 the agreement?
4 A. Yes, I do know of it.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you know that such a procedure was in place that
6 the KVM representatives can tour units with a mandatory presence of an
7 officer from that unit or corps?
8 A. Yes, that was the position.
9 Q. Did you know that touring of the units in the border area had to
10 be announced previously and that such monitors must have been escorted by
11 an officer because of the possibility of ambush or an encounter with
13 A. Yes, I particularly tried to stress those conditions and those
14 prerequisites to both Ciaglinski and Drewienkiewicz for their own safety
15 and for the reasons of the safety of the monitors.
16 Q. Thank you. The OTP put forth an exhibit number P506 describing
17 your meeting with Mr. Drewienkiewicz on the 20th of December, 1998. The
18 topic discussed was --
19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could I kindly ask the registrar, the
20 court officer next to the general to show that exhibit to the general.
21 Q. You in fact asked for a meeting with representatives of the Kosovo
22 Verification Mission due to increasing problems created by terrorist
23 attacks on this road, Podujevo-Pristina, so it was one of the primary
24 topics, General, wasn't it?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz demanded that the Kosovo Verification Mission
2 be notified about training exercises of the army and that the army should
3 report it, and before that it was asked on our part that the situation in
4 Podujevo be verified and to increase patrols on that axis. On that
5 occasion, General Drewienkiewicz assessed the presence of the army in that
6 area as logistically justified. Is that correct?
7 A. There was great insecurity among the population about using those
8 roads, and there were cases when even members of the OSCE mission were in
9 jeopardy when using those roads. So they finally accepted this as
10 necessary, indispensable, and even welcomed the increased control on
12 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 43 of your statement you stated that you
13 were not aware of any offensive operations of the army outside of the
14 border belt and also that the army and the MUP only responded in
15 self-defence and carried out a small number of anti-terrorist operations,
16 of which the OSCE was notified in advance. My question is this: Did
17 units of the Pristina Corps fully comply with the rules of engagement and
18 all the other regulations?
19 A. From what I know, yes.
20 Q. Thank you. Mr. Drewienkiewicz in his statement, paragraph 197,
21 states that to the extent of his knowledge, not a single member of the
22 OSCE mission was never allowed to enter the staff of the army or the Main
23 Staff of the police. Mr. Loncar, in your -- paragraph 44 of your
24 statement, you stated that Colonel Kotur had meetings even in the Main
25 Staff of the corps with the gentlemen Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski. My
1 question is: Were members of the mission able to visit the said buildings
2 if they wanted to?
3 A. Yes, they did. I would like to emphasise that this is incorrect.
4 Every morning the representatives of the OSCE came to the command of the
5 police to see Mr. Mijatovic, where Mijatovic would report to him about the
6 incidents and situation of that day. They met with Colonel Kotur as well.
7 It was on the premises of the police command and in my offices. It did
8 not happen in the command of the Pristina Corps, but the demand to visit
9 the command of the Pristina Corps was submitted. Verifiers did go, and I
10 know that Drewienkiewicz had visited the Pristina Corps command.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me if you remember the name of the
12 mission representative who went to the building of the Ministry of
13 Internal Affairs and met with Colonel Mijatovic.
14 A. I don't have my notes here, but this is verifiable.
15 Q. Would it jog your memory if I mentioned the name of Guy Sands?
16 A. Yes. Yes, it's Guy. I couldn't remember that name on the 28th
17 and I didn't run into that name in my notes. But now that you told me the
18 name of the gentleman, I remember it was him.
19 Q. In your statement at paragraph 60, you stated that efforts had
20 increased primarily on the part of the mission -- sorry, commission in
21 concert with the KVM to gather information, among other things, about what
22 the prevailing opinion is among civilians and what their living conditions
23 were. Do you know that members of the KVM, together with army officers,
24 toured Albanian villages 42 times primarily in the border belt, and talked
25 to inhabitants of Junik, Vrmnica, Goden, Svrhe, and other villages?
1 A. Whether it was 42 times and what villages they visited, I don't
2 know, but I know that such an activity took place. I cannot confirm the
3 figures you mentioned, but I know it was a long-term activity that was
5 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 61 of your statement, you stated that you
6 had informed the Federal Commission at the meeting of the 9th of January,
7 1999, that the cooperation was good among regional centres of the Kosovo
8 Verification Mission and the Army of Yugoslavia.
9 In that sense, do you know that there was a great number of
10 meetings and other activities between the army and the mission? My figure
11 is that there were 101 meetings between representatives of the Pristina
12 Corps on the one hand and the KVM on the other.
13 A. I know the cooperation and relationship were very intensive,
14 because it was precisely my job to transfer obligations to a lower level.
15 General Drewienkiewicz accepted it and visited Colonel Delic at least 15
16 times, which seems to confirm that there were numerous meetings. Because
17 it's better to discuss incidents at a lower level, in more specific terms,
18 than just to discuss it at a higher level between Walker and myself.
19 Q. Thank you, General. Do you know that reports from regional
20 centres of the KVM frequently differed from assessments and positions
21 taken by the top of the mission based in Pristina?
22 A. In my frequent meetings that were very vociferous and very
23 argumentative, we had reports from observers and those who were not there
24 but wrote reports as if they had been. So there were differences between
25 verifiers themselves.
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, I apologise, but we have a -- some
3 mistake in the transcript. The witness stated that Mr. Drewienkiewicz
4 informed him about -- about the position of KVM, but his name is not in --
5 that should be in line -- line 20, page 11.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, you said in your frequent meetings that
7 were very vociferous and very argumentative, you had reports from
8 observers and those who were not there but wrote reports as if they had
9 been. Did you mention Drewienkiewicz in that answer?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not saying that we
11 had quarrels at every meeting. Everybody defended their own positions and
12 interests quite loudly, and both Mr. Drewienkiewicz and us. But we had
13 rather high-tempered discussions, maybe that's the best term. And
14 Drewienkiewicz would sometimes say, "We also have verifiers that observed
15 things from a kilometre's distance," but write about things as if they had
16 been on the spot, and those were the differences among verifiers
17 themselves. They report things in a way that was not authentic and
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
20 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to see on ELMO the Defence Exhibit
23 MR. CEPIC: They do have a copy in Belgrade, so everything is
24 fine. I apologise.
25 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
1 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation].
2 Q. General, we see a report from the command of the 125th Motorised
3 Brigade for the 10th of March, 1999. It states that the meeting, or
4 rather, the touring of the terrain was attended by Captain Schaffler
5 Ferdinand and Major Aleksandar Gubarenko on behalf of the OSCE mission,
6 and that they toured villages Bukos and Brusnik. Mr. Aleksandar Gubarenko
7 personally could see that not a single house was burned or destroyed;
8 whereas, they had reports saying the opposite.
9 My question is: Do you know of events wherein KLA members trying
10 to show the activities of Serb forces around Vucitrn and other places made
11 fires around Vucitrn, and another example of this was the 11th of March in
12 Podujevo. Do you know of such reports?
13 A. Such reports came into my office and they were an integral part of
14 the tactics of the KLA, but the verifiers became aware of those moves at a
15 later stage and no longer went out to check out every time.
16 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, if you allow me to say, we have a problem
17 in transcript again. The answer is not correct in the transcript, because
18 with my best recollection the witness is not stated: "No longer went out
19 to check out every time." I think that he answered something different.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Loncar, can you give us that answer
21 again. You said there were such reports, came to your office. They were
22 an integral part of the tactics of the KLA, but the verifiers got wise to
23 that; and then what did you say?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The verifiers realised that and
25 later did not react to such moves by the terrorists.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: I think it comes to the same thing, Mr. Cepic.
2 Anyway, please continue.
3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] "Succumb to pressure," I think it was.
4 Thank you.
5 Q. Paragraph 64 of your statement you said: "Members of the
6 so-called KLA kidnapped a large number of people." You then stated that
7 when the so-called KLA planned an operation, they ordered civilians to
8 leave the area, but to say that it was on account of the MUP. Do you
9 know, General, that in the period while the mission was there, a large
10 number of people got killed, over 180, in fact 183; members of the army,
11 members of the police, and civilians. In fact, it was mostly civilians,
13 A. Yes, I do know. I also used aggregated statistics of the killed,
14 kidnapped, and wounded, based on daily reports. And it's true that
15 members of the KLA were very diligent about protecting their population.
16 They did it in a very planned, well-thought-out way. They had good
17 instructions and good technical moves, and it was part of that not to
18 expose their civilians to danger. And it's true that there were members
19 of the army and the police who were injured and wounded and targeted.
20 Q. Can we say that it was the KLA that instructed their own civilian
21 population to move out or transfer somewhere else?
22 A. I don't know about the cooperation between the KLA and their own
23 ethnic Albanian population; but from the military aspect, it was obvious
24 that there was obedience and cooperation. As soon as they ordered
25 something, it was done. So, yes, that's true.
1 Q. Thank you, General. In paragraph 69 of your statement -- in fact,
2 I'd like to come back to another point. You know that in those actions of
3 the KLA of population transfers they cleansed from Serbs, disloyal
4 Albanians, and members of ethnic and other communities, as many as 36
5 villages during the tenure of the mission. Do you know about that figure?
7 A. Certainly. At meetings with top leaders of the OSCE, I often
8 tried to prove some of my positions and allegations and claims, by
9 presenting these reports to the verifiers, most often to General
10 Drewienkiewicz and others, so that Walker, Drewienkiewicz, Ivanov, and
11 Keller, and others were aware of these data.
12 Q. Thank you, General. Paragraph 69, a meeting was held in the
13 federation palace and Sainovic's office on the 26th of February. And it
14 was decided, amongst other things, in order to improve communications
15 among units of the Pristina Corps of the Army of Yugoslavia and the
16 verification mission on the other side, to assign 15 officers to units who
17 spoke English to improve the communication.
18 Are you aware that these new officers met with Mr. Drewienkiewicz
19 on the 16th of March in the Pristina barracks when they met?
20 A. I am sorry. I have to digress here a little bit. At that time -
21 and it was already the end of February - it was very difficult in Kosovo
22 and Metohija. At the time, there was public talk about bombing already,
23 NATO attack, and all of this was present amongst all the structures of
24 Kosovo-Metohija. And it could be sensed also in the work of the
25 verification mission. The intensity of work had dropped off a little bit,
1 and I was thinking and I suggested at a meeting on the 26th of February
2 that we needed to step up and make additional efforts with the OECD,
3 because it was our last chance so that they would not achieve their
5 So it was my proposal to the federal government to send out
6 officers who knew English well, to improve communication; and I personally
7 asked General Drewienkiewicz, with the agreement of Mr. Sainovic, that he
8 should give a lecture to these officers of the VJ. And he agreed to do
9 this, General Drewienkiewicz did.
10 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Drewienkiewicz, in his statement in
11 paragraph 169, says that getting to know the new officers on that occasion
12 was a time when you were quite reserved and restrained, which led him to
13 the conclusion that there was a different attitude taken towards the
15 These measures, were they something that the federal government
16 used in order to strengthen cooperation between the mission on one side
17 and the Serb party or the side on the other in the way that you have just
19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Before I respond I would just like to
20 have the transcript corrected. It's line 9, page 16, it was recorded as
21 "commission" instead of "mission."
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. But the witness will have the correct
23 version, so please carry on.
24 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: This will have to be your last topic or subject.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know where this
2 position comes from of Mr. Drewienkiewicz, that I was angry. I actually
3 believed that we needed to initiate more cooperation and that we mustn't
4 neglect that. The actual course of events was different, so I don't know
5 why this remark of his. Although, after these measures were implemented
6 our main objective, I repeat, was to initiate the intensity of the work of
7 the mission, and Mr. Drewienkiewicz worked in the same way as he did
9 He never showed any kind of slacking off, so there was no
10 obstruction in the work. We all wanted -- first of all, I did. We all
11 wanted to initiate the intensity and the quality of the work of the OSCE
13 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you would permit me
14 five minutes of additional time.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry. If we have five minutes later, you'll
16 get it, but I cannot do that now. We've -- you've asked a lot of
17 questions, which are not really directly questions about the personal
18 knowledge of the witness, and I think you've had a fair opportunity to
19 cross-examine in the context in which we agreed that this would be done at
20 this stage.
21 If you need to question him later, because we don't have time
22 later today, then you will have to call him as a witness for the Defence.
23 Thank you, Mr. Cepic.
24 Mr. Ackerman.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:
1 Q. Good morning, General Loncar.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. I'm John Ackerman, and I represent General Pavkovic. You'll
4 remember during your testimony yesterday that you were asked a question by
5 Judge Bonomy. The Judge asked you this:
6 "Mr. Loncar, from a personal point of view, I entirely understand
7 what you're saying. But I wonder if I could ask you to consider this,
8 that rightly or wrongly, agreement had been reached between the federal
9 authorities and the OSCE, which involved monitoring the conduct of two
10 sides, the forces for which you were the liaison. And the OSCE had on the
11 other side contact with the forces ranged against you, which you called
12 terrorist. They occasionally did, but they were more commonly known as
13 the KLA. Perhaps they saw a difficulty in trying to restrain or have any
14 influence upon the activities of the KLA if they branded them as
15 terrorists. Is that a possibility?"
16 You answered: "I agree absolutely. I agree it is a possibility;
17 however, I think it would have been fair on their part to address -- to
18 have addressed it differently. We asked them not to insist on it;
19 however, it was never accepted and of course, there's always a
20 possibility such as the one you've suggested."
21 Would you agree that if that was their purpose, to improve the
22 influence they might have on the terrorists, on the KLA, that it was a
23 complete failure, it didn't work?
24 A. I understood that this referred to the verification mission, to
25 the KVM, and the OSCE based on my information and the freedom of movement
1 in the area that was exclusively under the control of members of the KLA,
2 first of all, Walker and Drewienkiewicz and all of those who worked on the
3 security issues. They were welcomed there. They were -- they had freedom
4 of action and freedom of movement. I think that they had very good
5 relations with members of the KLA. They knew everything that was going on
6 as far as the KLA was concerned.
7 Q. I think the -- what I was really trying to get when I asked the
8 question was: If what they were -- well, let me go back. You told us
9 that you -- one of your tasks, one of your goals, was to try to get the
10 mission to refer to the KLA as terrorists and to their acts as terrorist
11 acts and that you didn't succeed in that, that they primarily referred to
12 them as KLA. It was suggested that maybe that was an effort on their
13 part, to improve their relationship with KLA so that they could exercise
14 greater control over their activities. What I'm suggesting to you is that
15 if that was what they were doing, it was a complete failure, wasn't it?
16 A. I believe that what the KVM was doing in relation to the Albanian
17 side was essential. They had to gain the confidence and trust of the
18 members, because without their trust you couldn't work with them. They
19 wouldn't accept anyone that they didn't trust. So what you are asking me,
20 I believe that you are right. So my answer would be yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I have to say, Mr. Ackerman, I would take the
22 answer as no.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: I understand that, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: And I understand also entirely the point you're
25 trying to make. It doesn't follow that just because they had good
1 relations they actually had any influence, and if you want to put it as
2 precisely as that to the witness, then you may get closer to what you're
4 MR. ACKERMAN:
5 Q. Well, General, I want to go back again to your own statement that
6 one of your tasks there was to try to get the OSCE mission to refer to the
7 KLA as terrorists and to their acts as terrorist acts. Now, that did not
8 happen, and I would assume that you have -- you had a reason for that, and
9 I wonder if you believe now that it would have made a difference, had the
10 OSCE adopted your recommendation and referred to them as terrorists
11 instead of KLA; and if so, what difference?
12 A. Precisely. Thank you for the clarification; that is what I also
13 believed, and this is what we wanted to achieve. If the world -- the
14 international community and the political subjects of Europe and the
15 United Nations are told that a state in a part of its territory is dealing
16 with terrorists and terrorist forces, then the relations between those --
17 or of those subjects towards that country are quite different, political
18 and all other kinds of relations. Not only was it a fact that in the
19 assessment of the acts of one and the other side, that element was ruled
20 out, that there were a lot of terrorist activities and incidents there,
21 but this was presented as the activity of a liberation army for purposes
22 of independence.
23 Q. And one thing that you've told us in your testimony deals with the
24 treatment the KLA was dealing upon their own people, the abductions, the
25 kidnappings, the arrests, the killings, even, of Albanian citizens. Would
1 you say that's characteristic of a group of freedom fighters, a liberation
2 army, or is that more characteristic of terrorists?
3 A. I didn't just formally accept as a task to try to present to our
4 public and the international public that there was a terrorist force
5 active in Kosovo, expressed through various forms of terrorist activities.
6 But when I went to Kosovo, I understood that as being true. I accepted
7 that as a soldier and as a human being because the way they treated
8 non-Albanian population was something that had to be condemned. They were
9 even more strict and rigorous towards those Albanians who supported the
10 then-authorities of Serbia or Yugoslavia. The crimes were even harsher.
11 And even now I would characterise that attitude as a terrorist and a
12 criminal one.
13 Q. Do you have any -- do you have any view as you sit here today as
14 to why it was the OSCE did not make greater efforts to control the KLA,
15 the terrorists?
16 A. In preparation for this testimony, I thought a lot about that
17 time. But from the perspective of now, from a distance, that area and
18 such intensely disrupted relations called for a larger number of
19 verifiers. I think that there was supposed to be 2.000, but I believe
20 that the maximum number that they managed to actually get from day-to-day
21 was about 14 to 1500. So there were not enough verifiers.
22 Second, it was a very short period of time since -- from their
23 arrival until they finished their activities. Mr. Walker arrived at
24 Pristina airport on the 15th of December and left already on the 23rd of
25 March. More than two-thirds of the time of that was spent in him
1 travelling in Europe, seeing the United Nations, going to Vienna,
2 Brussels, and so on, because this is what he had to do. It is my
3 conviction that a large number of verifiers were not sufficiently
4 professional and were not up to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija at
5 the time.
6 I believe that I am right because as far as military matters were
7 concerned, resolving of incidents, arbitration, most of the verifiers were
8 civilians, and I believe that in that situation they should have been
9 military personnel with combat experience. So all of these factors
10 prevented the OSCE mission, and there are some other remarks also that
11 could indicate that they did not understand very well our mentality and
12 our problems or the Albanian mentality and problems. So all these issues
13 were factors contributing to the mission not fulfilling its objective.
14 Q. All right. I want to go to a slightly different question now.
15 I'm referring now only to the time that you were there and able to make
16 the observations you were able to make. I want to ask you about VJ. Was
17 the VJ involved in any offensive operations against the terrorists while
18 you were there or were they basically in a responsive mode, responding to
19 attacks on them by the terrorists?
20 A. I must state decisively that the army, the members of the Army of
21 Yugoslavia and the Pristina Corps first of all did not conduct a single
22 offensive action. Their activities were exclusively in response, but it's
23 true that there were fewer attacks on the army than on the police. The
24 army did not participate in offensive actions, just responded to incidents
25 directed at its members.
1 Q. In paragraph 66 of your statement you said this: "Usually the
2 most important issue for the VJ was security of the border with Albania."
3 Can you elaborate on that at all? Explain that a little more for us.
4 A. At the time, the largest number of incidents and the greatest
5 danger to the population came from Albania. Convoys with ammunition and
6 weapons, the freedom of movement of members of the army in either
7 direction was something that influenced a change in the ratio of forces.
8 So the border or the rear was completely open, was not monitored, and I
9 can say that at the time it was under the control of the KLA and the
10 Albanian armed forces.
11 That is why each of our demands and each report to the OSCE
12 members was aimed at directing their attention to deal with the problem of
13 the border with Albania. So materiel support in weapons, equipment,
14 evacuation of injured, KLA members, it was all done in the direction of
15 Albania and because of the terrain, it was very difficult to monitor this
16 area. And there were all the possibilities there available for the
17 Albanian side to provide support to the KLA.
18 Q. We've heard evidence in this case recently that during the OSCE
19 mission, the VJ was increasing the number of troops in the Pristina Corps.
20 You say in your statement that the Pristina Corps was an A formation,
21 always a hundred percent full, and therefore no need for it to increase in
22 number. It's possible, is it not, that the OSCE mission mistook
23 replacements for additions to the corps? Could it be that that's the
24 basis for their report in that regard?
25 A. The strength of the Pristina Corps was specified under an
1 agreement, and I assert that the Pristina Corps did not deviate from this
2 agreement. Changes in the strength, I repeat, changes in the strength
3 never happened, but there was a part of the members of the Pristina Corps
4 that were replaced.
5 A generation or a contingent of soldiers who were on their regular
6 military term of duty in the Pristina Corps had expired by three months.
7 So it wasn't 12 months but 15 months, three months extra, so these
8 children, these soldiers needed to be replaced. An appropriate number of
9 recruits from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came. They replaced that
10 contingent of troops who had served their term of duty, but it was
11 announced to the OSCE and they controlled and monitored it. In the
12 beginning, they looked at it with a dose of skepticism. They tried to
13 compromise us by putting the question of whether the Pristina Corps was
14 being expanded, but I repeat it was just a question of replacing the
15 soldiers and officers with a fresh contingent.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, how many soldiers were involved in this
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I cannot speak off the
19 top of my head, but it must be noted down somewhere in the archives, in
20 one of the reports. And it could be checked. But I am positive that the
21 number of those who left equalled the number of those who arrived. I
22 listened to what Mr. Drewienkiewicz said, and he was satisfied with the
23 content, meaning -- with the numbers, meaning that the number of those
24 replaced was unchanged compared to the of those who arrived. There was no
25 other reaction on the part of the verification mission.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: But as I understand what you've said, the ones who
2 were to leave stayed for three months longer. So presumably for three
3 months, there was an increase in the forces in the area, or have I
4 misunderstood that?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By the federal government's decision
6 or the decision of the federal council, the decision on the extension of
7 the military term was made for a number of troops. By that decision, they
8 prolonged their military term from 12 months to 15. The border of the FRY
9 was closely monitored by the mission, and no soldiers could pass without
10 being noticed. In that light, I can responsibly claim here that the
11 number of soldiers was not increased, it was just that the people who were
12 doing their military term who remained a bit longer. It would have been
13 established by the verifiers that, or rather, the verifiers would have
14 established anything that would go to the contrary, and we would have
15 received their objection or protest.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean that while the new ones were being
17 trained after arriving, the ones who had been there remained for an extra
18 three months and that therefore both lots were there at the same time? Or
19 have I misunderstood that? Forget the justification; just tell me the
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. Your Honour, on the same
22 day, the first group left Kosovo. They went to Merdare, and that road was
23 used to link Serbia and Kosovo. And the other group came from Merdare to
24 Kosovo. So the replacement happened in one day, so at no time there was
25 an increase in numbers.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: That clarifies the position. Thank you.
2 Now, Mr. Ackerman, now I'm trying to allow for an hour for each of
3 two more counsel, and I know you didn't even want the length of time you
4 already had. So how are we going to deal with this? I know you've been
5 brief but I made a plan according to what I was told.
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, I'm nearly finished but --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Well, carry on, but others are going to lose
8 and I take it that's understood.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: Part of my time has been Judge's questions, which I
10 hope you allow for.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, but they didn't start until your 15 minutes
12 were up, I can assure you.
13 MR. ACKERMAN:
14 Q. In paragraph 53 of your statement you state that Generals Pavkovic
15 and General Lukic had regular contacts with Sainovic and that you knew
16 that because when you would report something to Sainovic, he would tell
17 you he already knew about it. My question is, did you know that
18 Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski also had direct and regular contacts with
19 Sainovic and were reporting things to him?
20 A. As far as I can recall, Mr. Sainovic met Mr. Drewienkiewicz on two
21 occasions. Mr. Ciaglinski was present there alongside Mr. Drewienkiewicz.
22 I don't know what the agenda was for the day, but in any case there were
23 two such meetings.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. You've answered the question. Thank
25 you, Mr. Loncar, you have answered that question.
1 Mr. Ackerman.
2 MR. ACKERMAN:
3 Q. And there were also telephone contacts between them. It wasn't
4 just meetings; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. In your statement you described General Pavkovic as a capable
7 military leader. I'm wondering if -- if you had occasion while you were
8 there to make any judgements about the professional conduct of Generals
9 Pavkovic and Lazarevic; and if so, what was that judgement?
10 A. I can say that I have known General Pavkovic since his student
11 years at the military academy, that is 1966. By chance I know him
12 exceptionally well and I can state freely that he's an exceptional
13 professional and a military leader, an exceptional general. As for
14 Lazarevic, I can state what most other officers of the VJ believe, that
15 this is a general par excellence.
16 Q. I have one final question: Do you have any knowledge of the KLA
17 ever having shot down or shot at a helicopter containing first aid
18 markings, Red Cross?
19 A. No.
20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
21 A. I have no such knowledge. I know that they opened fire at regular
22 helicopters without the sign of the Red Cross.
23 Q. Thank you very much.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: That's all I have, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
1 Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
4 Q. Good day, general Loncar. My name is Dan Ivetic and I am one of
5 the attorneys for representing Sreten Lukic in these proceedings. The
6 first area of questioning that question I have for you relates to a topic
7 that Mr. Ackerman touched upon in your testimony, where you claim that
8 there was regular reporting going between Generals Pavkovic and Lukic on
9 the one hand and Mr. Sainovic on the other hand.
10 Now, I believe you testified that it was General Lukic -- General
11 Lukic was obliged to report to Mr. Sainovic any major incidents. Now, did
12 any -- did this obligation arise by way of some specific legislative act,
13 meeting, or order? I mean, please enlighten me.
14 A. Mr. Sainovic organised and planned the work of all the structures
15 involved in Kosovo and Metohija since he was familiar with the area. As a
16 member of the cabinet and the president of the Federal Commission, he was
17 of the opinion that he had to be informed of everything, especially
19 Therefore, the communication between General Lukic, Pavkovic, and
20 Lazarevic, by way of informing Mr. Sainovic, was governed by the principle
21 that those most responsible and well-versed in the individual parts of the
22 terrain informed them so that they could forward that information to Mr.
23 Sainovic himself so that he could have an insight.
24 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
1 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Correction for the transcript.
2 Page 28, lines 2 and 3. The witness said that Sainovic organised the work
3 in a way so as to be able to gather information. It is missing, and in
4 the second row or the third row it says: "Since he was familiar with the
5 area." What the witness meant was that he organised in such a way as to
6 be able to collect information, and perhaps we can clarify that with the
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that what you actually said, Mr. Loncar?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, so that he could gather
10 information. He put things in that order.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.
12 WITNESS: It only concerned the more important incidents in Kosovo
13 and Metohija.
14 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise for having to intervene
15 again the witness said not only daily incidents and it appears as
16 Judge Bonomy having said that. It has been corrected.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. IVETIC:
20 Q. General Loncar, this Federal Commission for cooperation that was
21 established by the organs of Yugoslavia that you describe at paragraph 14
22 of your statement, you actually identify members of this commission,
23 including Vlajko Stojiljkovic the minister of the interior of the Republic
24 of Serbia. Am I correct that this commission as a whole was meant to
25 function so that all members were to provide the information necessary for
1 the head of the commission, Mr. Sainovic, to be sufficiently apprised of
2 the events relating to the OSCE in Kosovo and Metohija ?
3 Sir, is that correct, that the members of the Federal Commission
4 that you identify at paragraph 14 of your statement, including the
5 minister of the interior Vlajko Stojiljkovic, were meant to communicate
6 and pass along information to the head, Mr. Sainovic, to keep him
8 A. The concept or the idea behind the foundation of the federal
9 council can be deducted from the people appointed. They were supposed to
10 cover all spheres of life and work in Kosovo. Mr. Sainovic was the
11 president of the commission and a cabinet member, and his idea was to
12 ensure that one person from each of the ministries and other structures be
13 involved, and they were supposed to inform Mr. Sainovic.
14 For example, the representative for the internal affairs had to
15 inform him of such affairs between the two sessions. The role was or the
16 idea was to inform all the commission members, and I was to inform them as
17 to the growth in strength of the mission, the method used, where the
18 problems were, et cetera. I always took part in their meetings, and I
19 informed the entire commission as well as Mr. Sainovic himself.
20 Q. Okay, sir. You said that the representative for internal affairs
21 had to inform him of such affairs between the two sessions. Am I correct
22 that for a majority of the time, both Minister of the Interior
23 Stojiljkovic and Mr. Sainovic were based in Belgrade?
24 A. During my stay in Pristina and Kosovo, I heard or saw him maybe
25 once or twice, as regards Mr. Stojiljkovic. As for Sainovic, I said that
1 he used to come once or twice a week.
2 Q. When -- when they were not in Kosovo, both were in Belgrade.
3 Isn't that correct?
4 A. It is. Or somewhere else, but not in Kosovo.
5 Q. Was it your understanding that this information that you talked
6 about, the -- where the representative for internal affairs had to inform
7 Mr. Sainovic of things between sessions, is it your understanding that
8 this took place on a daily basis?
9 A. I don't know how that daily relations worked between
10 Mr. Stojiljkovic and Mr. Sainovic --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, that answers the question.
12 Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
14 Q. Now, at paragraphs 29 and 30 of your statement, sir, you described
15 meetings that were held every Tuesday in Belgrade among the commission
16 members, where the MUP minister Stojiljkovic gave reports and information
17 to Sainovic. You never saw Sreten Lukic at any of these regular meetings
18 in Belgrade, did you?
19 A. I never saw either Lukic or Pavkovic or Lazarevic, for that
21 Q. Okay. Therefore, wouldn't you agree with me that it is just as
22 logical that any information Sainovic already had when you talked with him
23 could have come directly from Minister Stojiljkovic, and not via Sreten
25 A. One could presume that, but what I said and what I know there was
1 in practice was that any important incidents upon Sainovic's request,
2 Lukic had to inform him first and then to report to Stojiljkovic, who was
3 his superior. That was the line of reporting. As for any other
4 possibilities, well, I cannot exclude them of course.
5 Q. You say you know that this was the practice. How do you know it?
6 Again, I asked you previously if there was any order, act of the
7 legislature, act of the commission establishing this practice. How is it
8 that you know of this practice that you claim was in place?
9 A. When I came to Kosovo for the first time on the 12th of November,
10 in the presence of Mr. Sainovic, in General Lukic's office --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the answer; it
12 was unclear.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, just a moment. The interpreter has not
14 heard that answer. I'm sorry about this, but could you start the answer
15 again, please.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Understood. When I went for the
17 first time to Kosovo and Metohija with Mr. Sainovic on the 12th of
18 November, at General Lukic's office, we saw him and General Pavkovic. Mr.
19 Sainovic introduced me to them, and he told them I was a member of the
20 Federal Commission and he explained my tasks. He said that all liaising
21 between them and the OSCE should go through me, and that the practice
22 should stay in place; that should there be any important incidents, they
23 should report to him and -- by phone. Loncar, that is me, was to get that
24 information from you as well and to forward it to the OSCE. That is how I
25 realised that there had been a daily routine in place.
1 MR. IVETIC:
2 Q. You never witnessed any reports being made in that manner, did
4 A. No. I don't know how they communicate; Pavkovic and Lukic, or
5 Lukic and Sainovic, and Pavkovic and Sainovic. All I know is when I would
6 call Mr. Sainovic to tell him something, he would say, "I already have
7 that information." It must mean that it had been reported to him
9 Q. But you don't know by whom it had been reported to him, do you?
10 A. As stipulated, General Lukic was to report to him any police -- as
11 regards any police matters, and General Pavkovic any army matters, or
12 someone from their respective office.
13 Q. Do you know, sir that Minister of the Interior Stojiljkovic in
14 Belgrade was privy to and received daily reports from all the various MUP
15 structures in the field directly?
16 A. I don't know. I hear this now, but it strikes me as something
17 regular and normal. The minister in charge of the police needed to be
18 apprised of any police matters in the field, although I didn't know it
19 until now. This principle would also have to have a chain of command and
20 some type of subordination in place to work.
21 Q. And, sir, am I correct that your entire professional history and
22 background was spent in the military, and that you have no experience
23 within the civilian police structures of either Federal Yugoslavia or the
24 Republic of Serbia. Is that correct?
25 A. Completely correct.
1 Q. Okay. Now I would like to turn to the role of Colonel Mijatovic,
2 whom you mention as being one of the individuals who worked with you in
3 the arm of the commission in Pristina dealing with police matters. With
4 respect to Colonel Mijatovic, you do not recall a single incident where
5 Colonel Mijatovic refused to attend a meeting you had scheduled, do you?
6 A. Absolutely never. He was always fair and attended whenever a
7 meeting was convened by myself or the OSCE. He was never absent, not a
8 single time.
9 Q. So then would you be surprised to learn that Colonel Ciaglinski of
10 the KVM claimed as part of his testimony here that "whilst Mijatovic was
11 the MUP representative at the commission, he would rarely appear." Is
12 that correct?
13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, Ciaglinski talked about a number of
14 meetings that Mr. Loncar was not present at. So I think the question
15 needs to be considered in that context.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
17 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, the use of the term "rarely"
18 implies a complete different set of circumstances than is being presented
19 by the Office of the Prosecutor.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: No. You need to relate your question to meetings
21 that Mr. Loncar was at.
22 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
23 Q. Mr. Loncar, during the meetings that you were at and that you
24 chaired in Pristina between yourself and Colonel Ciaglinski, was there
25 ever a meeting where Colonel Mijatovic failed or refused to appear, to the
1 best of your knowledge?
2 A. I just said - and I can reiterate - that Mr. -- Colonel Mijatovic
3 never as much as tried to refuse to attend any meetings convened by
4 myself; however, I wanted to clarify this, as His Honour is right. There
5 were two levels of meetings; one convened by myself, and the meetings
6 convened by Colonel Kotur and Colonel Mijatovic. One for the army, the
7 other for the police. Colonel Mijatovic had daily meetings with Mr.
9 As for Mr. Ciaglinski, he had daily contact with Colonel Kotur;
10 and that such meetings between the two of them, there was no need for
11 Mijatovic to be there. The same goes for the meetings of Mijatovic and
12 Guy, there was no need for Ciaglinski to be there. One needs to
13 understand their relations, and Mr. Mijatovic never tried not to attend
14 any of the meetings convened by myself.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it, Mr. Ivetic, we should read the beginning
16 of line 18 as "Guy."
17 MR. IVETIC: I believe, either Mr. Sands or Guy. I'm not sure
18 what came through on the B/C/S.
19 Q. Now, with respect to these daily meetings that Colonel Mijatovic
20 had with Mr. Sands - I believe at the time he was also a colonel - at
21 paragraphs 28 and 31 of your statement, you describe how you received
22 daily reports from Colonel Mijatovic regarding what had been discussed at
23 these meetings with Mr. Sands, and you forwarded these to Walker. At
24 paragraph 35 of your statement, you further describe that these reports
25 were thorough and that the KVM was well-informed about all incidents.
1 Now, what I would like to know from you is were these reports received
2 from Mijatovic in written form or were they oral?
3 A. The oral form was unacceptable. The reports I received from
4 Colonel Mijatovic, regarding police matters, were typed and stamped and
5 registered. They were with the police archives and in my archives, which
6 I later turned over to the federal archives. Therefore, it was typed,
7 registered, and stamped.
8 Q. Do you recall in general how, what length these daily reports
9 were? Are we talking about one page? Several pages? A book?
10 A. Sometimes a single page if there were few incidents. Sometimes
11 even up to 27. If I remember well, one report contained 31 incidents, and
12 it had three pages. Therefore, depending on the number of incidents and
13 the description, it could be one, two, or three pages.
14 Q. And, sir, in addition to these regular meetings with yourself
15 where Colonel Mijatovic was present, these regular and daily meetings with
16 -- between Colonel Mijatovic and Mr. Guy Sands, do you recall a also at
17 each regional and municipal level of the MUP structure, a MUP officer was
18 assigned to act as a direct liaison to the KVM to be in daily contact with
19 them regarding events that occurred within that locality?
20 A. Yes. It was my position that I presented to the MUP, and they
21 agreed to it. We accepted the OSCE mission's division of Kosovo in the
22 four sectors. They had their people covering respective areas. We
23 followed that structure for our police, military, and administrative
24 matters; and, therefore, in each of the sections, there was someone to
25 liaise with the OSCE from the ranks of the police and the army.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: We've reached the stage of our first break, which
2 will be until 9.50, ten minutes to 10.00. We'll then sit for another 90
3 minutes till 11.20 and have a half-hour break and resume at 11.50 and sit
4 until 1.00. That means that the cross-examination will need to be
5 concluded in the next session. So you can work out your scheme
6 accordingly, but that allows roughly the time that you each were looking
7 for and it leaves the final session for re-examination.
8 MR. IVETIC: That should be doable, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: So we'll resume at ten minutes to 10.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 9.32 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 9.51 a.m.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: We can resume now, Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Now, General Loncar, we've been talking about these daily reports
15 that were sent to the OSCE-KVM mission about events that had already
16 happened. But at paragraph 43 of your statement, you also indicate that
17 the OSCE was informed of all anti-terrorist operations in advance of such
18 operations, including Racak on 15 January 1999.
19 I take it then that in addition to the daily reports covering
20 events that had already occurred that there was also significant
21 communication between at least the MUP and the KVM relating to operations
22 that were being anticipated. Is this correct? Does this comport with
23 your recollection?
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot hear the witness.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: There is obviously a technical problem with the
1 microphone at Belgrade. We did not hear that answer. Just hold on, Mr.
2 Loncar, until we are sure that the microphone is working.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was our obligation to announce
4 our activities and movements, and we did it regularly and always.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you who it was that notified the Racak
6 operation in advance?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nobody then mentioned Racak, and
8 nobody knew that Racak would happen. An activity was notified that would
9 probably be a response to a prior incident. The monitors were there. It
10 was probably an activity that was ongoing; and in the framework of that,
11 Racak happened. Racak was never notified.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, that clarifies the position.
13 Mr. Ivetic.
14 MR. IVETIC:
15 Q. All right. Let me move on. Now, in addition to all these
16 meetings and contacts between Mijatovic and Guy Sands of the KVM, am I
17 correct also that a General Richard Heaslip of the KVM was also assigned
18 to liaise directly with General Lukic of the MUP staff?
19 [Interpretation] In B/C/S, it would be General Heaslip?
20 A. Yes. Heaslip, yes.
21 Q. Did you yourself know or verify any situation where General Lukic
22 failed to cooperate with any requested communication on the part of the
23 KVM, or did General Lukic cooperate fully with them, to the best of your
25 A. As far as I remember, there were no special requests for anyone in
1 the OSCE mission for any contacts or meetings with General Lukic, although
2 there was one meeting once between General Drewienkiewicz and General
3 Lukic. General Lukic was very diligent in that particular activity. He
4 never refused a request. On the contrary, I know first-hand that he even
5 insisted through Colonel Mijatovic on maximum cooperativeness in relations
6 with the OSCE mission.
7 Q. General, I'd next like to ask you about a matter you might
8 remember relating to Malisevo. Do you recall any discussions that were
9 forwarded to the commission in Belgrade relating to a request on the part
10 of the KVM to decrease the police presence in the town of the Malisevo?
11 A. I remember that request well, and I participated in its
12 forwarding. And the decision -- I don't remember what it was. I remember
13 that the request was not met, because Malisevo was a key location for the
14 KLA. They were very anxious about it, and Malisevo would have provided
15 them with the strategic advantage in that region.
16 Q. Now I'd like to clear up one other matter. At paragraph 76 of
17 your statement and, again, in your testimony these past two days, you have
18 mentioned efforts to create what you call multi-ethnic police forces to
19 protect villagers from the KLA.
20 Now, are you actually aware that these so-called local security
21 formations in these villages were in fact established and run by the
22 municipal civilian authorities within the municipalities, rather than by
23 the MUP, and that they were not a part of the Ministry of the Interior?
24 A. Those multi-ethnic police forces had no point of contact with MUP
25 forces or the police. Those were forces that were supposed to encourage
1 people to stay where they were at their homes, to continue living and
2 working there while protecting them, but it was neither the army nor the
3 police. They were precisely from that community. It was a body of the
4 local authorities, not the army or the police. And their purpose was to
5 encourage and protect the inhabitants of any given area.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
7 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] If you allow me, Your Honour, page
8 39, line 11, he said, "neither the police or the army or the republic or
9 federal authorities." The latter two are missing.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
11 Mr. Ivetic.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
13 Q. And, General, are you aware of the fact that these formations,
14 this local security, had actually a completely different uniform from that
15 of either the army or the police?
16 A. Yes, absolutely.
17 Q. Okay.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: What was their uniform?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite honestly, there were civilian
20 parts of the clothing with military trousers and caps. They could wear
21 blue worker's overalls. They were not uniformly dressed like the army and
22 the police; it was just, conditionally speaking, a military set of
23 clothing for those people.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Sounds like a rag-tag and bob-tail operation. Was
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, because there was no
2 standard uniform for them. It was mostly like some sort of uniform of
3 civilian protection; worker's blue overalls, shirts, jackets.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 Mr. Ivetic.
6 MR. IVETIC:
7 Q. Now, General, at paragraph 57 of your statement, you describe a
8 diplomatic issue that arose at the Djeneral Jankovic crossing concerning
9 the KVM bringing in some boxes. If I can refresh your recollection, did
10 this have to do with credible information from the state security, the
11 RDB, that there was a possibility of weapons being brought in by the KVM
12 in their diplomatic pouches?
13 A. Yes. In dealing with this case, I was involved, plus Mr. Mihalj
14 Kertes, Director of the Customs Administration, and Mr. Rade Markovic was
15 involved. He was head of the State Security Service. We went there based
16 on a report, based on information that there was smuggling of weapons
17 through the OSCE mission. The customs post at the Djeneral Jankovic
18 border crossing towards Macedonia said the vehicle used by General
19 Drewienkiewicz contained two wooden cases, and we were instructed to go
20 there and find out what it was all about.
21 We went there. It was ordered to open the boxes, and we found a
22 set of military binoculars but there was, in fact, no ammunition, no
23 weaponries. In fact, there were night-sights and binoculars.
24 Q. And, sir, am I correct that this issue arose and was handled by
25 the -- by Mr. Kertes that you talked about, the Federal Customs
1 Directorate, that they had priority over this incident as it involved
2 customs and the Vienna Convention on consular relations?
3 A. I said clearly that it was mostly the customs administration that
4 dealt with it. I was there because Mr. Walker and Mr. Drewienkiewicz
5 insisted that I should be there. I don't know whether representatives of
6 any other country were there. I know I was there, Mr. Kertes, and Rade
8 Q. Now, sir, at paragraph 59 of your statement, you describe how the
9 relations between the KVM and the FRY, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
10 changed after William Walker gave his first report to the UN Security
11 Council. First of all, sir, could you clarify, did the relations change
12 for the better or for the worse after Mr. Walker's report?
13 A. The beginning of our work and the initial good-will on both sides,
14 our side and the OSCE mission, gave good results. And we did our best to
15 implement the agreement from the viewpoint of our obligations towards the
16 OSCE. And it was a constant effort invested by army and the police forces
17 and everybody else in Kosovo to show our good-will to the international
18 community to resolve all problems peacefully.
19 And we expected justly, from that report, a certain expression of
20 optimism and a recognition that we were giving our contribution to that.
21 However, we found that that report was defeating. I personally was
22 insulted and I felt short-selled, and others felt that, too. And our
23 relations became, conditionally speaking, tense; however, we got over it.
24 And we decided to intensify our work and maximise our efforts towards the
25 OSCE with more demands and maximum engagement.
1 Q. Thank you, General.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, what was the date of that report?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I really couldn't give
4 you the date, but there must be --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, perhaps Mr. Ivetic can.
6 Can you, Mr. Ivetic?
7 MR. IVETIC: Not at present, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Let's carry on for the moment.
9 MR. IVETIC:
10 Q. Now, General Loncar, the last question I have for you: Would you
11 agree with me that one of the main problems and points of contention
12 during the period of the KVM mission was that various personnel,
13 particularly within the KVM mission, had differing interpretations and
14 understandings of the terms of the various agreements that were being
16 A. It's a very difficult question, but what I experienced - and I'm
17 not a -- I'm not a psychologist, just a soldier - but in the mission, the
18 composition of the personnel was such that you could see from the word go,
19 who was more inclined and had sympathy for us and who was more biased
20 towards the Albanians. And that was not good.
21 It's my personal conviction. And I think the mission should not
22 have started to work until it had at least 60 or 70 percent of the
23 envisaged personnel. I think that was one of the main and the basic
24 reason for the failure of that mission.
25 Q. Thank you, General Loncar.
1 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, from paragraph 59 of the statement, it
2 would appear that the Walker report happened no later than early January
3 1999, although it does not have a specific date.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
5 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.
7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Visnjic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] General Loncar, good morning. My name is
10 Tomislav Visnjic, appearing for General Ojdanic. I'll ask you some
11 questions that mainly are related to documents. I have provided the
12 registrar in Belgrade with certain documents, and I would like him to show
13 you 3D411.
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And can we please have on e-court
15 3D411, page 4 in English and page 4 in B/C/S.
16 Q. Before I start my cross-examination, I would like to ask you:
17 Have you seen this document before?
18 A. Let me find it. Good morning, Mr. Visnjic. I would like to greet
19 you and my commander, General Ojdanic, if that is allowed.
20 Could you repeat, again, which page.
21 Q. 3D411, page 4, the instruction of the VJ for cooperation with the
22 missions of OSCE and NATO from October 1998.
23 A. You mean chapter 2? I found it.
24 Q. Then could you please go back to chapter 1 and find paragraph 2.
25 So my first question was: Have you seen this document before?
1 A. I can't be sure. Although, I know that the army had instructions
2 of this kind, but maybe I didn't have them.
3 Q. Thank you. Then I'll move to chapter 2, paragraph 1. General, in
4 paragraph 1, we see the composition of bodies through which the Army of
5 Yugoslavia was honouring its obligations towards the KVM; and according to
6 this composition, bodies are designated at the level of the General Staff,
7 the level of the 3rd Army, the level of the air force and air defence, and
8 all the way down to the Pristina Corps, and even further down to garrison
9 level and border battalions.
10 My question is: This composition, as we see it on this page, is
11 it consistent with what you found in practice when you arrived in Kosovo
12 and Metohija? Were these indeed the bodies with which you cooperated on
13 behalf of the Army of Yugoslavia?
14 A. Yes -- I'm sorry. I heard there was a liaison team for the
15 mission, and I knew about the first item; namely, relations within the
16 Ministry of Defence. I was aware of that.
17 Q. Did you have the impression that the Army of Yugoslavia was trying
18 throughout the tenure of the mission to increasingly institutionalise its
19 relations with the mission to improve its success?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we turn to page 5 now.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, when was this document produced by?
23 In 1998, was it?
24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] In October 1998, and it was signed
25 by the head of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia; at that time
1 it was General Momcilo Perisic.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: It strikes me as very odd that the witness didn't
3 have this. This is the Bible you would expect to be operating the -- on
4 which he would be operating the relationship. Astonishing.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's a military
7 document. And I think the witness explained, in the course of his earlier
8 testimony, his own function within the team. I mean, the witness's
9 function, not the role of the army --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, this is a man who is on the
11 commission. This isn't just a man who's functioning as a -- some sort of
12 underling in the set-up. So, anyway, it's a matter that can be addressed
13 at a later stage.
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, could you please look at page 5.
16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we just see, in the B/C/S
17 version, the next page.
18 Q. So, General, I want to ask you this: At the time when you arrived
19 in Kosovo, in this document here, it is stated that the bodies we've just
20 mentioned relate to the mission through the following. And I'll draw your
21 attention to the appropriate paragraph, which is 3V in Serbian; in
22 English, it would be 3C. In this paragraph, it is stated that beginning
23 with the 23rd October 1998, "On a weekly basis for the previous week, the
24 aforesaid teams shall submit reports," and then it is specified about
25 which. So the reference is to weekly reports.
1 Would I be right, General, in saying that in the initial period of
2 your work, the Army of Yugoslavia submitted weekly reports to liaison
3 officers and probably to your organs as well, that is the OSCE mission?
4 What I mean is that the report went to the OSCE mission through your
6 A. Unfortunately, I only now realise what various relationships were
7 at the time. Only now do I understand why General Obradovic presented his
8 view of the situation at the Federal Commission, which had nothing to do
9 with my reports. He was working precisely on the basis of this. I was
10 always wondering why he was presenting that information when we had
11 already sent it through another channel.
12 And now I understand that it was his right and obligation to
13 report [Realtime transcript read in error "errors"] at these meetings on a
14 weekly basis. But before these meetings of the commission, I was not
15 actively involved, and you must be right that these weekly reports were
17 JUDGE BONOMY: There is a mistake. You'll see in the transcript
18 the word on line 15 should be "report" and not "errors."
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. In this report, it is said that, "The OSCE mission should be given
21 information about movements of units the strength of a company or larger,
22 unit arriving, departing, with or moving within the administrative borders
23 of Kosovo and Metohija, and incidents in which VJ units took part, and
24 steps taken against members of the VJ who took part in these incidents;
25 accompanying the OSCE verification mission in the course of its activities
1 in border areas; and taking part in investigation of the causes of the
2 incidents involving VJ units."
3 I don't want to read the whole paragraph. Of course, there is a
4 whole series of other elements here, which are -- which stem from the
5 duties given by the federal authorities to the Army of Yugoslavia that
6 have to do with implementation of the agreement on the verification
7 mission. General, sir, what I wanted to ask you is: Were these reports,
8 if you did receive them in this form, contain this information?
9 A. The reports that I received, regular daily reports and all others,
10 said that what you have just mentioned was consistently implemented.
11 Q. Thank you. General, now I would like to ask you to --
12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] If we could look at the next
13 exhibit, and that is Exhibit 3D409. It's an order assigning a liaison
14 team with the OSCE and NATO missions, and the document gives the
15 composition of this body.
16 Q. Earlier, you mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Obradovic?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Lieutenant-General Milorad Obradovic was the head of the liaison
19 team of the VJ, General Staff, in the time of General Perisic and in the
20 time of General Ojdanic throughout the time of the mission's operation.
21 Is that correct?
22 A. Yes, you are right.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at Exhibit 3D458.
25 Q. General, this is an order - we can see it on our monitors now - an
1 order from the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, signed by the
2 Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, General Momcilo
3 Perisic. The date is the 16th of November, 1998.
4 General, sir, my question is: Do you know that the General Staff
5 of the Army of Yugoslavia occasionally inspected the work of the teams and
6 officers for liaison; and after these inspections, orders were issued
7 creating more favourable conditions for the implementations of the tasks
8 and assignments of the tasks relating to the mission?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So I'm asking you whether you were aware that the work of the
11 teams was controlled?
12 A. Yes, I know that it was.
13 Q. General, are you aware that the Army of Yugoslavia - and you can
14 see that on page 2 in paragraph 4 - prepared certain material
15 preconditions for a more favourable and more efficient cooperation; such
16 as suitable workspace for the contacts, a certain number of officers and
17 soldiers familiar with foreign languages, also report forms, and other
18 essential measures in order to make the work easier, both for the Army of
19 Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Verification Mission?
20 A. Yes. I know that they put in a lot of effort to have quality work
22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 1, again,
23 please, page 1 of this document.
24 Q. And I would like to ask you, General, to confirm or deny, if you
25 can, whether in the initial period of the work of the KVM, the Army of
1 Yugoslavia realised its relations with the mission through the appropriate
2 organs as it was announced, and only in exceptional situations and with
3 the approval of the superior command liaison officers, independently
4 mediated in the verification of certain activities. I'm talking about the
5 16th of November, 1998; that's the period.
6 A. To tell you the truth, all the activities of the army in this area
7 that had to do with the cooperation with OSCE considered -- and was
8 informed about through Kotur after when the general came, who was the
9 assistant for logistics - I can't remember his name - who was assigned --
10 yes, General Mladenovic, who was assigned by the 3rd Army as the main
11 bearer of the OSCE cooperation team. That was when I actually saw what
12 you're talking about in its full measure.
13 Until that time before he was appointed, I had already started in
14 early December or late November. In early December, actually, when he
15 arrived, I learned about all of these documents, inspections. He told us
16 what they were doing and how they were doing, and I can say that we
17 coordinated also some matters and some positions that had to do with the
19 Q. Thank you, General. I would just like to note that in paragraph 1
20 of this document, it also says that prior notification of inspection of VJ
21 weapons or units, which does not comply with the provisions of the
22 agreement on the work of the OSCE or NATO verification mission in
23 Kosovo-Metohija, would be rejected. And this was signed by General
24 Momcilo Perisic on the 16th of November, 1998.
25 General, I would now like to show you Exhibit P503, and I would
1 like you to look at page 3 of that document. I apologise. It was
2 document P504. Can you please look at page 3 in Serbian, and it is page 4
3 in English.
4 General, did Ambassador Walker ask you to pass on or insist in a
5 different way that cooperation with representatives of the Army of
6 Yugoslavia be improved, by asking them to submit daily reports and
7 establish daily contacts, as is stated in this document?
8 We're talking about the last sentence of paragraph 1, which is
9 just above paragraph 2. I don't know if you found that.
10 A. Yes. Yes, I have. It says:
11 "In addition, Loncar accepted Walker's assessment that the
12 cooperation between the KVM and the KDOM is satisfactory and
13 well-established, and that the same kind of cooperation should be
14 continued with representatives of the Yugoslav army (the submission of
15 daily reports and the establishment of daily contacts)."
16 Mr. Visnjic, relating to the question of whether we knew of the
17 contents of the agreement for the inspection and monitoring of weaponry, I
18 had the opportunity at a meeting with General Drewienkiewicz, who sought
19 to inspect the facilities of a brigade, and he referred to General
20 Ojdanic's agreement, who was at the time the Chief of the General Staff of
21 the Army of Yugoslavia.
22 Then I arranged a meeting and he confirmed that this was part of
23 the agreement, but he said that he did not agree or approve that General
24 Drewienkiewicz to go into a brigade and monitor their weaponry, so on and
25 so forth. This is what we knew and this is what he adhered to. As for
1 this question, I affirm that the cooperation was good, and the army agreed
2 to start sending daily reports.
3 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, General, but we seem to have last track in the
4 interpretation. My colleague says that the entire interpretation - and
5 this is page 50 or something - the whole translation that starts from page
6 50, line 14 to line -- to page 50, line 25 has actually a little bit
7 slipped up. So I would like to put the question to you again.
8 Before you testified what the framework of the agreement was and
9 what the rights of the verifiers were, my first question is: Whether the
10 Army of Yugoslavia ever had the habit of interpreting international
12 A. No. I never saw anything like that.
13 Q. According to your understanding, is the Army of Yugoslavia an
14 operative organisation, and does it implement everything that is concluded
15 at the federal level?
16 A. Absolutely, yes.
17 Q. It is the organ that implements --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- decisions of the federal organs?
20 A. Just as the staff is in the command, that is what the federal
21 government is in relation to the army.
22 Q. Thank you. We're still on this topic, and that is why I would
23 like to ask you to look at Exhibit P506, page 2, paragraph 2. Could you
24 please read the first few sentences of this paragraph, and then I will put
25 my question to you.
1 A. Should I read it aloud or for me?
2 Q. No, just read the text for yourself, please.
3 A. Yes, I've read it.
4 Q. General, you were aware that General Drewienkiewicz spoke with
5 General Ojdanic. I don't know if you know the date, but this was on the
6 27th of November, the same day that General Ojdanic assumed his duties
7 from General Perisic.
8 A. Yes. Drewienkiewicz told me that.
9 Q. After that meeting, do you know - and I can see that you do know
10 about it, based on what you said - that the General Staff team went to
11 Kosovo with the objective of establishing the framework and the content of
12 the future cooperation of the VJ and the KVM. Do you know that the team
13 went there?
14 A. Yes. Yes, I know. And I had contacts with the people.
15 Q. Regarding these different interpretations of the agreement that we
16 discussed, are you aware also that the VJ asked clarification from
17 relevant federal organs about the rights and the duties of the army and
18 the rights and the duties of the verifiers?
19 A. Yes. This is what General Ojdanic told me in my telephone
20 conversation with him. In the presence of General Drewienkiewicz, we were
21 asking for clarification.
22 Q. Thank you, General. Now I would like to ask you to look at
23 exhibit -- well, to put it in context, we are talking about the 20th of
24 December. This conversation with Mr. Drewienkiewicz in the presence of
25 other members, but for now let's leave that aside. So you conducted this
1 conversation on the 21st -- no, the 20th of December, 1999 [as
2 interpreted]. Can we now look at Exhibit 3D408. And I'm sorry, but in
3 the transcript it should state 1998; the 20th of December, 1998.
4 Three days after this conversation, the General Staff of the Army
5 of Yugoslavia issued an order signed by General Ojdanic. This was the
6 23rd of December, 1998. In the order, the measures are stated in detail
7 as well as the framework of the cooperation and measures that are to be
8 taken in order to upgrade this cooperation. This is an additional order
9 to the instructions that we mentioned already.
10 This is 3D411 and 3D458. General, I would like to ask you to go
11 through the document. I will begin from some important issues - our time
12 is limited - so let's look at paragraph 3. You said that officers who
13 were assigned as liaison team officers, besides their regular duties, also
14 carried out this additional duty of liaison officers. They did that on
15 top of their regular duties. Am I right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. This order, in paragraph 3, enables them to be released from a
18 part of their regular duties so that they could devote themselves more to
19 this assignment of being liaison officers with the KVM and to be available
20 24 hours.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Visnjic, you don't really need to read all
22 this out. If there's a particular question you want to ask the witness,
23 you should go to the question. It would actually help your case much more
24 if you were asking -- you don't have to, obviously, in cross-examination.
25 But bearing in mind this is building a Defence case, it would be far more
1 valuable if you asked him questions and we got spontaneous answers, rather
2 than lead him by the nose through documents just to nod his head in
3 response to your assertion of matters.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I have
5 already asked the question. I can't go back, but I'll try this way.
6 Q. General, was it the intent that liaison officers should be
7 available 24 hours a day?
8 A. Let me tell you, this did not happen on the 23rd. It happened a
9 few days later. Kotur came from the command where he was based. He would
10 only come just before meetings or in the morning to meet Ciaglinski and
11 told me that this order had come in.
12 And I remember this because he was a specifically designated
13 officer for contacts with the OSCE, and this man was specifically
14 designated as liaison officer for border battalions. And he was always
15 involved whenever border incidents were discussed. So I know that these
16 officers were specifically tasked to deal with the OSCE.
17 Q. Thank you. Let us move to paragraph 4. Is it the case that at
18 some point the Army of Yugoslavia started submitting daily reports to the
19 OSCE mission, in keeping with the request of Mr. Walker and in keeping
20 with your discussions with General Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Walker, from the
21 20th of December, and a prior meeting of the 16th of December?
22 A. I didn't wait for that order. I thought it was necessary. It
23 needed to be done, as soon as we started contacting with the mission. And
24 the order just confirmed that this is the way it should be done.
25 Q. This decision also specified the framework of verification, which,
1 unlike the previous order from General Perisic, specified that verifiers
2 also have the right to inspect units outside barracks, which was not said
3 in the previous document. But equally some restrictions were placed on
4 them consistent with earlier restrictions made by Perisic.
5 A. Yes, I think it was a very good framework that left no room for
6 any dilemmas or any inclarities.
7 Q. One of the problems was that a certain number of designated
8 liaison officers did not speak English. To what extent did this
9 complicate the work of liaison teams?
10 A. A great deal, a great deal. I felt it personally. My lack of
11 English resulted in longer meetings, and I felt handicapped on all levels.
12 Q. Thank you. You mentioned a moment ago that an officer, a liaison
13 officer was designated for the border belt who became a permanent member
14 of the team. Is that consistent with what is written in paragraph 5 of
15 this order? And I mean --
16 A. Yes, yes. It is completely consistent.
17 Q. The activities of border units guarding the state border?
18 A. Yes.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness 3D408. [In
20 English] Pardon, I'm sorry. [Interpretation] 3D407, in fact.
21 Q. In the period following this order, or let's say from the end of
22 year 1998 until this order in 1999, I suppose that you had gained some
23 experience, and some deficiencies in your work had been observed. Tell
24 me, General, was the framework of cooperation constantly improved? Were
25 there any attempts to address problems and deficiencies or to alleviate
2 A. By the very nature of those activities, it is normal that from the
3 beginning we need to put certain things on track and activities constantly
4 improved. The number of verifiers increased. We had gained more
5 experience with time; and just in the normal course of things, our
6 relations in cooperation with the OSCE improved day by day. And that
7 continued until the first report submitted by Walker, then there was a
8 brief stag nation, and then it returned back on track, and then --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last part of
10 his answer. He's speaking too fast, constantly.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, if I can interrupt for a moment.
12 Mr. Loncar, the interpreter is asking you to speak a little more
13 slowly, if you can.
14 And, Mr. Visnjic, please wait until the answer is finished on the
15 transcript before you start your question. Thank you.
16 MR. VISNJIC: I'm sorry. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thank you, and I'm sorry.
18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, this order of the 8th of March, 1999 was signed by
20 General Ojdanic. It sets out a new structure of the teams of the Army of
22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see the last page of
23 the document.
24 Your Honour, in order to avoid going through the entire document,
25 I will tender it later. But the last page shows a schematic of VJ liaison
1 teams, and I would ask the witness to comment upon it based on questions I
2 will ask.
3 Q. General, I'd like the first schematic we've seen to be found in
4 the order of General Perisic from October 1998 titled, "Instruction,"
5 3D411. I see that in this schematic, the teams of the 3rd Army and the
6 Pristina Corps were integrated into one. What is your explanation for
7 this, for this reorganisation?
8 A. I think that higher quality of relations was achieved in this way.
9 Q. Thank you. My next question has to do with the composition of
10 liaison teams. And in the right bottom corner - I don't know if you can
11 see it well in your copy - but we see the total number of officers,
12 generals, and civilians. Now we have as many as three generals and 49
13 officers working on liaison teams. Did this number reflect an increase in
14 the numbers of the verification mission in that time?
15 A. Could you repeat the question, please.
16 Q. Does this number correspond to an increase in the numbers of the
17 verifiers in the previous period?
18 A. The OSCE mission continued to be reinforced until the end of the
19 year. After the new year, 1999, new verifiers stopped arriving and the
20 number stopped at 1400 or 1500. Of course, the increased number of
21 officers considerably improved our engagement and our ability to carry out
22 specific actions, more actions, and better cooperation with the OSCE.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, just before you move on, one
24 transcript point, line 6 on page 57. I was expecting it to change, but it
25 hasn't. It should read "unlike the first schematic." Please carry on.
1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Q. Speaking of quality, General, is it true that these officers
3 included in the mission, according to the new schematic, all spoke English
4 and had passed certain vetting. Do you know anything about that?
5 A. That group of officers was discussed with the previous counsel.
6 Mr. Drewienkiewicz had a meeting with that new group of officers, who had
7 very good English, and briefed them about the situation in Kosovo from the
8 viewpoint of the OSCE mission. I can really say that it was a new
9 quality, indeed, but they arrived to late in Kosovo in my opinion.
10 Because just after they arrived, the mission threatened to leave.
11 The possibility of bombing was mentioned more and more often in public,
12 and that new group of officers did not have time to make a contribution
13 because of other things.
14 Q. Thank you, General. On page 3 of this order, it is ordered to
15 prepare new liaison officers through a workshop to be held on the 15th of
16 March, 1999. And that is precisely the workshop that you mentioned,
17 responding to the questions of my colleague Mr. Cepic. That workshop was
18 attended by both you and General Drewienkiewicz. Is that correct?
19 A. I was there the whole time; whereas, General Drewienkiewicz
20 visited only when he gave his presentation and answered the questions of
21 the attending officers.
22 Q. Just one related question based on a document. Never mind. We'll
23 move on.
24 General, I'd like to go through a couple of documents together
25 with you. We have a whole series of documents, in fact. Could you please
1 look at 3D459. It is a report of the liaison team of the 3rd Army command
2 sent to the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia to the General Staff's
3 liaison team.
4 General, about these reports that went through military channels,
5 did you receive them in this form, or were you informed, as you described,
6 directly by representatives of the army in your team?
7 A. It was not in this format; but if I look at the content, it's the
8 same as what we had. But we had a different format for writing reports
9 that was prescribed for both the MUP and the army for easier reporting to
10 the OSCE mission.
11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to say
12 about the format that the general is talking about, it is to be found on
13 the last page of 3D408. It's an integral part of the order to be found in
14 Exhibit 3D408.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on, Mr. Visnjic. I'm becoming confused. This
16 one that's on the screen at the moment is a daily report to the liaison
17 team, but the witness has just said he didn't get this. So I'm struggling
18 to understand what we're looking at.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Shall I explain or do you want the
20 witness to?
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you try to explain to me, and we'll see if
22 we need his assistance.
23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the 3rd Army had its
24 own liaison team for cooperation with the mission, and that team sent
25 reports to the General Staff's team. So in addition to direct reporting
1 to Colonel Kotur and General Loncar at the level of Kosovo, there was
2 parallel reporting directly to the General Staff through military
3 channels. But what I wanted to ask General Loncar is whether the content
4 of the documents was similar.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please carry on.
6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Rather, the pattern.
7 Q. General, could you please look at some of the events described
8 here; for instance, a border incident in paragraph 2.
9 A. Yes. If you allow me, I would like to answer this question.
10 Q. Go ahead.
11 A. Frankly speaking, as a member of the Federal Commission and the
12 main man in cooperation with the OSCE, I was not at all interested in your
13 military reports that you sent through the chain of command that describe
14 the situation. I was only interested in reports from the Pristina Corps
15 concerning the territory of Kosovo and Metohija that I received every
16 morning from Colonel Kotur.
17 And that was the channel: Pristina Corps to the Federal
18 Commission, and through the Federal Commission to the OSCE. And this was
19 the reporting within our own structures regarding military knowledge from
20 the lowest-level observer to the highest organs. Otherwise, all the
21 issues covered here were covered in my reports. And, as I said, the army
22 and the police had a slightly modified report that I submitted to the
23 mission every morning. I wanted just to explain this to the Trial
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, what do you then understand that this
1 document on the screen actually is?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document, in my view, is an
3 order and a form of reporting about incidents from the Kosovo and Metohija
4 area to the army structures; and on the basis of that, analysis were made
5 and appropriate measures are decided on in relation to the incidents. So
6 it had to do with military subordination. I, as a member of the
7 commission of a political organ or body, received the same thing but in a
8 different form from the Pristina Corps, and I would send that on to the
9 mission. So according to me, this was a form of a report intended for
10 military structures.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Mr. Visnjic.
13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would not put any
14 more questions to the witness on this document or a whole series of
15 documents that I had, because he's already answered the question. But I
16 would like to ask two more questions to the witness.
17 Q. General, we are going to go back to what you talked about with my
18 colleague, Mr. Cepic. My colleague, Mr. Cepic, put some questions to you
19 about General Drewienkiewicz's statements and the statements by Colonel
20 Ciaglinski. Both used the word "manoeuvres." General, regular training
21 at the level of a platoon or a company, can that be considered a
23 A. No. According to the military terminology, the term should be
24 "viewed" in the context in which it was applied. In our conditions,,
25 manoeuvres imply the engagement, the training, and the movement of units
1 of a strategic level; whereas, platoon, a company, a battalion are
2 tactical units. So, the term manoeuvre is inappropriate here.
3 Q. Thank you. During the time you were in Kosovo and at the time the
4 KVM was there, did the Pristina Corps at any time conduct exercises and
5 manoeuvres in the area 20 by 20 kilometres, which would also include a
6 large number of Albanian villages and the closing off of access?
7 A. A corps does not carry out manoeuvres. A corps also conducts
8 tactical, joint exercises of an operational level. So it's not correct
9 that a corps can execute manoeuvres, at least in our military terminology.
10 Secondly, any movements of units of the Pristina Corps from a section
11 upwards was announced to the KVM, and we adhered strictly to the
12 provisions of the agreement.
13 Q. Were Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski at meetings with you ever said
14 that there were more than 15 companies outside of barracks in Kosovo,
15 which would constitute a violation of the agreement?
16 A. There was always their effort to pass on their request that units
17 outside of the barracks be returned to the barracks; however, I explained
18 to them that the agreement provided for the deployment outside of barracks
19 of four combat groups. This was entered in all the maps and provided as
20 an annex to the agreement.
21 These are four combat groups, the strength of four reinforced
22 companies, and not the number that they used, that you mentioned. So only
23 four combat groups were deployed outside the barrack facilities, and this
24 was in accordance with the agreements.
25 Q. Thank you, General. And one question that is not directly related
1 to this topic --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go on to that then. I don't know if the
3 earlier question was actually answered.
4 Mr. Loncar, were there circumstances where a training exercise
5 involved closing off access to villages inhabited by Albanians?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The combat groups, the four
7 combat groups could only execute movements and use a limited area, which
8 was specified on the map and in the field. They did not go beyond those
9 approved sectors. They did not perform exercise activities outside. This
10 is what I know.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.
12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And finally, one question, General, that is not directly related
14 to the topic of Kosovo. At a certain point in your career, you worked
15 together with General Ojdanic. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber
16 what your opinion is of him as an officer.
17 A. I would like to inform the members of the Trial Chamber that I was
18 in the Uzice Corps as Chief of Staff, and my commander was General
19 Ojdanic. So I was his first associate or I was deputy corps commander.
20 General Ojdanic left to become the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, and I
21 assumed his duties in the Uzice Corps.
22 Other than those two, three years of work together, I have known
23 General Ojdanic since 1961 or 1962. We had an identical career, it was
24 similar; and I can only say the best of General Ojdanic and the awards and
25 recognition he has received affirm his qualities and his good work. I was
1 on particularly good terms with the family of Mr. Ojdanic. It's a very
2 honourable and good family.
3 Q. Thank you, General.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.
7 Mr. O'Sullivan.
8 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No questions.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
10 Now, Mr. Hannis, is the final session going to be sufficient for
12 MR. HANNIS: It is, Your Honour, I wonder if we could take our
13 break now and finish ten minutes earlier.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Before we do that, I want to ask if Mr. Cepic wants
15 his other five minutes in that case.
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic: [Continued]
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Loncar, my colleague, Mr. Visnjic, asked you
19 about the deployed units which, in keeping with the agreement, were on
20 certain locations to protect roads. You probably know that there were
21 also nine combat groups were in-depth security of the border and the
22 verification mission knew their coordinates and visited them in the border
24 A. Yes. But those were units that were on specific locations, and
25 only if necessary would they be engaged according to a particular decision
1 of the commander of the Pristina Corps.
2 Q. Thank you, General. Just one correction, if you accept it. Is it
3 the case that there were, in fact, three companies deployed in locations;
4 Dulje, Lapusnik, and Volujak according to the agreement?
5 A. Whether it was three or four, I don't know after such time. But
6 there is a document that we could look up. It could have been three or
7 four, but the document specifies exactly how many and where they were
8 deployed in accordance with the agreement.
9 Q. Thank you. My last question: Do you know if there was any plan
10 ever to attack the civilian Albanian population and expel them from the
11 area of Kosovo and Metohija? Did such a plan ever exist, General?
12 A. First of all, knowing the people at the head of that corps,
13 General Lazarevic, General Pavkovic, and all the chief commanders and
14 heads of organs, I would exclude any kind of possibility in that sense,
15 and I think that that would be highly inappropriate.
16 Q. Thank you very much, General.
17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
18 questions. Thank you.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.
20 Well, in that case we will take the break now and we will resume
21 again at 20 minutes to 12.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 11.11 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 11.43 a.m.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: We can again resume the hearing.
25 Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:
3 Q. General, yesterday Mr. Fila asked you some questions about Mr.
4 Sainovic and where he got his authority from for his job with the Federal
5 Commission. At page 7585, line 15, in your answer you said:
6 "Anything he did within the commission was within the part of his
7 duties as the deputy prime minister, based on the task and position he
8 received from the federal government."
9 And on the next page, 7586, in another answer where you talked
10 about, "sometimes Sainovic was not able to give an answer immediately and
11 he had to pass those demands on. He had to consult the federal
12 government." In those two contexts, General, who was the federal
13 government? The federal government as made up of individual persons.
14 What persons did Mr. Sainovic get his authority from to do the work on the
15 Federal Commission?
16 A. Your Honour, just one correction. It's a slip. He wasn't deputy
17 minister, but he was the deputy prime minister.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the federal government, the
20 executive organs are -- consist of ministers, and they, together with the
21 prime ministers, the deputy prime ministers, make up the government. Mr.
22 Sainovic was the deputy prime minister. He didn't have an executive
23 function like the ministers did.
24 His activities and implementation of decisions, orders arose from
25 the powers of the government. The government had to make the decision and
1 then transfer the authority to him for him to implement those decisions.
2 So that is how Mr. Sainovic would be able to provide an answer to some
4 MR. HANNIS:
5 Q. My question was: What person or persons gave him that power?
6 What person or persons told him what answers he could give to the KVM
7 verifiers? It had to be some individual persons.
8 A. The decision of a state is a collective decision by the
9 government, which is headed by the prime minister. At the time, it was
10 Mr. Bulatovic; that is why I conclude that he was the prime minister.
11 Based on the government of -- based on the decision of the government;
12 thus, it was Mr. Bulatovic.
13 Q. And isn't it a fact that in connection with the work of the
14 Federal Commission that Mr. Bulatovic would have also taken direction or
15 instruction from Mr. Milosevic?
16 A. Your Honour, in all countries of the world, regardless of the
17 social order, whether it's a monarch, an emperor, a president, and so on
18 and so forth, he would be the most prominent political person and, of
19 course, would have the influence to a greater or lesser degree on the
20 position and the work of the government.
21 So it would be normal to expect that the president of the state
22 had an influence on the decision of the government -- on the decisions of
23 the government, which in my view is quite normal.
24 Q. I agree with you, it's quite normal. Would you agree that that
25 was the case in the former Yugoslavia at that time, in 1998, that Mr.
1 Milosevic would have had that power and exercised that influence?
2 A. The late president was well-known for his dynamic work and his
3 activities, which means he was probably abreast of the events and had an
4 influence on the work of the government.
5 Q. And in that connection in paragraph 14 of your statement, you talk
6 about when Mr. Milosevic asked you to meet with him about working on the
7 Federal Commission; and in the last sentence of that paragraph you say:
8 "Since Milosevic wanted me on this council, he said he would instruct
9 Bulatovic to include me." Correct?
10 A. I don't know if he used the term "instruct," but the gist comes
11 down to this, that he would contact Bulatovic and indicate to him to
12 include me in the Federal Commission. I don't know if I used the adequate
13 term, but it was said that he would contact Bulatovic, and he would
14 present to him the need to include me in the composition of the Federal
16 So I assume that it would be so that in the contacts with Walker,
17 there would be some sort of relationship established; and he could get
18 some points on account of me, because Mr. Walker had expressed the desire
19 to work with me in Kosovo and Metohija.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, page 68, line 10,
22 suggested that I be "included" and here it says "indicated." The witness
23 said, "to suggest to Bulatovic to include him in the work of the
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
1 Mr. Hannis.
2 MR. HANNIS:
3 Q. And as a result, after that meeting you were appointed to the
4 commission, yes?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Mr. Fila then, at page 7589, asked you whether or not
7 Mr. Sainovic was just the first among equals and whether or not he had
8 greater powers than you. You said in some missions, in some tasks, you
9 had more responsibility than him.
10 Let me ask you this: At the Federal Commission meetings in
11 Belgrade or any meetings that Mr. Sainovic chaired in Pristina, who
12 chaired those meetings? Who led those meetings when Mr. Sainovic was
14 A. When the meetings were held between Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Walker,
15 the meetings were chaired by Mr. Sainovic on our side and by Mr. Walker on
16 the side of the OSCE. In view of the fact that Mr. Sainovic knew English
17 very well, the dialogue between those two figures proceeded in the English
18 language. I always had an interpreter next to me who translated their
19 dialogue to me into Serbian. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Sainovic.
20 Q. What about the weekly meetings in Belgrade of the commission, just
21 you Serbian members of the commission, who chaired those meetings?
22 A. The meetings when the work was analysed and the results of the
23 work of the Federal Commission, which was always held in Mr. Sainovic's
24 office, Mr. Sainovic would be the one to chair the meeting or to conduct
25 the meeting, in other words.
1 Q. And in your statement, you indicated to us that Mr. Sainovic would
2 give instructions, specific instructions to some of the other members of
3 the commission; correct?
4 A. Yes, that is correct. Let me use my own example. When I
5 suggested on the second meeting of the Federal Commission that it would be
6 rational to form five lower-ranking teams in the territory of Kosovo,
7 lower-ranking in relation to mine and what their composition would be -
8 and there was some other proposals brought out also by other members of
9 the commission - and in the end when Mr. Sainovic took the floor and said,
10 "What you suggested, General, was very good and you can start to
11 implement that." So in that context, he did issue specific assignments to
12 certain people.
13 Q. Did anybody else in the group assign tasks, other than Mr.
14 Sainovic, during those meetings?
15 A. No one assigned tasks. Mostly they were ministers from the
16 federal government. In a way, in their briefings, they acquainted the
17 other members who were not members of the federal government, like me, Mr.
18 Kertes, General Obradovic, not to mention any others, what he as a
19 minister was given as an assignment relating to duties in Kosovo and
20 Metohija. So, indirectly, they stated their assignments and acquainted
21 everybody else with their assignments.
22 Q. At page 7598, line 11, from yesterday, Judge Bonomy asked you a
23 question regarding the request for a helicopter from Mr. Walker. And you
24 had indicated that this was a cabinet decision and not something that Mr.
25 Sainovic had the right to make himself. Do you know -- well, how do you
1 know that the question about the helicopter was a decision for the
2 cabinet, instead of Mr. Sainovic as president of the commission?
3 A. I'm going to try my best to remember this relation between Mr.
4 Sainovic and me when he more or less told me -- I think I'm right to say
5 that he said, "General, when the helicopter is in question, please tell me
6 Mr. Walker that it has been decided not to approve bringing the helicopter
7 from Switzerland, but if they would like I'm -- we are going to provide
8 our own helicopter and they can adapt that to their needs."
9 So I think that is the suggestion. I think he addressed me with
10 the term -- I don't think he addressed me with the term "I decided," but
11 it was decided. So I think, Judge, this was an indication that this
12 decision had come from a higher level.
13 Q. In your answer yesterday at page 7599, lines 4 you said the gist
14 of what Mr. Sainovic responded was that this was not something provided
15 for in the agreement, and he said, "He would pass it on to the proper
16 authorities and get a reply." Who would have been the proper authorities
17 for that question, if you know?
18 A. The federal government headed by the prime minister, Bulatovic.
19 Q. All right. Let me move on to some questions that Mr. Cepic asked
20 you. At page 7611, yesterday Mr. Cepic asked you about whether or not the
21 army commanded the MUP or the MUP commanded the army. You said while you
22 were there neither one, neither the MUP commanded the army nor the army
23 commanding the MUP.
24 General, do you know during this -- during a state of war or one
25 of the three extraordinary states in the former Yugoslavia, was there a
1 provision whereby for combat activities the MUP was to be subordinated to
2 the VJ?
3 A. Honourable Judge, our rules and regulations provide precisely what
4 you say was applied in those three extraordinary situations. And it
5 clarifies if in a given area a large number of MUP forces are situated and
6 they are the bearers of combat actions and there is a lower-ranking unit
7 there, then the army is subordinated to the police and the other way
8 around, but always the case was that there were more soldiers and
9 policemen. But the practice that is always -- that is the practice that
10 is always applied in accordance with our positive military regulations.
11 Q. And, General, that sounds logical. In your answer yesterday, you
12 went on at page 7613 at lines 3 and lines 17, to say that: "As for combat
13 activities, a full cooperation was needed between the two armed components
14 of the state. It was necessary and indispensable."
15 Were you aware of the existence of a body called the Joint Command
16 for Kosovo and Metohija during the time that you were in Kosovo in late
17 1998 and early 1999?
18 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this goes
21 far beyond the framework of the cross-examination, this term, this
22 institution referred to has not been mentioned in any of the
23 cross-examinations. Therefore, I believe it is inappropriate for the
24 Prosecutor to introduce it now, trying to put forth new evidence in this
25 phase of this witness's testimony.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, in relation to the questions about
3 whether or not MUP was in charge or VJ was in charge, cooperation,
4 coordination, et cetera.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll repel the objection. We are satisfied that
7 coordination of operations was an issue in cross-examination, and it's
8 appropriate to re-examine on that.
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
10 Q. General, do you recall my question?
11 A. Yes. Generally speaking, as for your question, I can reply in a
12 general way. Of course the effect of joining the police and police forces
13 is far better if coordination is sufficient and good and if the forces are
14 being put together.
15 But during the activities in Kosovo, there were no Joint Commands
16 and no joint activities. As for what was reported in the media - and I
17 tried to follow that as a retired general - it was never mentioned that
18 such a thing as the Joint Command was in existence.
19 Q. You were asked a question by Mr. Cepic about something that
20 General DZ had said in his statement. I think it's at paragraph 166 of
21 General DZ's statement, and this was when you were sent to Rogovo in
22 connection with an incident that happened there in late January 1999.
23 I think Mr. Cepic asked it in terms of DZ put you in the chain of
24 command for the MUP. His statement says, "There I saw Loncar. He was
25 clearly in charge of the situation. He was giving orders to the police
1 present, and they also sought instructions from him."
2 General, when you were out there, were you talking with the police
3 on the scene?
4 A. Yes. I was talking to the policemen there; however, Your Honour,
5 my primary task as a commission member and the person heading a team, as
6 well as the duties of Mr. Walker or his assistants, were to try and be
7 arbiters in case of incidents, to try and determine who was to blame for a
8 given incident. Then the Rogovo incident occurred. I was called by Mr.
9 Sainovic. I received a phone call, and he told me, "General, go there and
10 don't allow them to ascribe the responsibility for this one as they did
11 for Racak."
12 I thought it was important for me to be there, and I contacted the
13 policemen who were there in numbers, as well as many OSCE monitors.
14 Drewienkiewicz came an hour or an hour and a half after me. In the
15 presence of the most responsible person of the OSCE for the west, I asked
16 him, with several witnesses standing by, to describe to me what sort of
17 clothes the KLA terrorists wore. And he said, "They wore military
18 uniforms." And he said, "They did."
19 And what -- I asked what type of weapons they had, and he
20 described them, and it was all noted down. When I asked him whether they
21 had gone through all the verifiers and everything they had to say, they
22 said they did. And then I tried to make use of the authority I enjoyed
23 there, and I said, "Well, carry on with the activities." And then Mr.
24 Drewienkiewicz came, and I guess this is what he saw me as being someone
25 who was issuing orders and commanding, although I had no authority to do
1 that at that place.
2 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Petrovic on his feet, Your Honour.
3 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise. A
4 correct for the transcript, page 74, line 18, it says: "Carry on with the
5 activities." The witness said: "Carry on with the activities pertaining
6 to the on-site investigation." That is what the witness said.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
8 Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS:
10 Q. General, DZ said in his statement that there were two different
11 types of police out there at Rogovo. Do you recall who was there from the
12 police and do you know which units they were with?
13 A. This is the first time I heard there were two types of police in
14 Kosovo. There was only one police; however, some of them wore their --
15 wore camouflage police uniforms, whereas the others wore the official
16 regular uniform. This is what may have caused the impression with General
17 Drewienkiewicz as having seen two types of police, but I claim that there
18 was only one police force in Kosovo.
19 Q. Well, General, in connection with that, were you aware of the
20 existence of various elite or special units of the police, such as the PJP
21 or the SAJ?
22 A. No, I knew there was the so-called cobra special anti-terrorist
23 unit in the military. As for the police, I didn't know they had any
24 special or specialised units. I knew they all underwent intensive
25 training in both Serbia and Kosovo to combat terrorism --
1 Q. So I take it you weren't --
2 A. -- and I presume they drew people from those ranks. But as to
3 whether they had ...
4 Q. Okay. So I take it you weren't familiar with a state security
5 special unit called the JSO?
6 A. I knew it existed, but in the territory of Serbia and not in
7 Kosovo. That unit was not in Kosovo at the time. I know of it. It was a
8 much discussed unit in the political circles the year before, but at that
9 time it was not present there. I know that it exists, though, but it is a
10 security type of force rather than a force of the police.
11 Q. Thank you. Then today Mr. Cepic was asking you some questions,
12 and he spoke to paragraph 49 of your statement and discussions with DZ and
13 DZ's complaints about excessive force being used by the Serb forces. In
14 your answer at page 2 today, line 10, you say, "The army was not deployed
15 with tanks. It was an exercise which had been planned and announced to
16 the OSCE and it had to do with training of the new generation of tank
17 operators." At the end of that paragraph you say: "But it was merely by
18 chance that the army was there at the same time, though their tanks
19 differed." That answer doesn't seem to make sense to me. Did somebody
20 else have tanks besides the army, or has that been mistranslated some way?
21 You seem to be referring to the fact that both MUP and VJ were in the area
22 at the same time.
23 A. Precisely so. At the same time, in the same area, they had
24 physical contact. We had the MUP and the army troops there. In the
25 planning of exercises for every unit, the place is specified. And if you
1 go through such documents you can see that exercises are being planned for
2 a month ahead, specifying the location where the tank unit was. But it is
3 another thing that the incident happened to -- or in the proximity of that
4 tank unit, and then it turned out as if the army and the police were there
5 together. But such training had been pre-planned in order to train
6 members of the tank unit.
7 Q. Okay. I guess you still haven't answered the last part of my
8 question, though. It says: "Though their tanks differed." Whose tanks
9 differed and in what way?
10 A. I said that the armoured vehicles of the police differed from
11 those of the army. Armoured vehicles, that does not include only tanks.
12 That should include APCs, tanks, and so on and so forth. The first
13 category is blue, the police ones; and the military ones are the
14 olive-green-grey colour. That was the context in which I meant the tanks
16 Q. Thank you. Today at page 9 Mr. Cepic had asked you about DZ and
17 the OSCE's request to visit -- visit facilities of the VJ. And the OSCE
18 complained about not being able to visit the barracks, did they not?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And in paragraph 33 of your statement, General, you say that DZ
21 wanted to inspect facilities but Sainovic told you: "Always said it was
22 not in the agreement or annexes." Is that correct.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 A. And it wasn't in the agreement or the annexes.
1 MR. CEPIC: I apologise. Your Honour, I do apologise. I thought
2 that the complete answer wasn't in the transcript.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay.
4 MR. HANNIS:
5 Q. At page 12, line 11, today you were answering a question about the
6 conduct of the verifiers, and you said: "We also had verifiers that
7 observed things from a kilometre's distance but write about things as if
8 they had been on the spot. They report things in a way that was not
9 authentic and accurate." You're not saying that all verifiers wrote
10 things that were not authentic and accurate, are you?
11 A. It is correct. I said a part of them observed things from a
12 distance, and they feared for their lives, lacking the courage to
13 approach, whereas some others did. So I didn't mean to include all of
15 Q. Are you aware, General, that in some instances when KVM verifiers
16 tried to approach more closely areas of alleged incidents, that they were
17 sometimes forced away at gunpoint?
18 A. No, I hear of this for the first time.
19 Q. I know it was not your job, General, but apart from Rogovo, when
20 Mr. Sainovic sent you there, did you personally go to any incident sites
21 to see for yourself whether what KVM was reporting was accurate or not?
22 A. After the bombing attack of the terrorists in Pristina, I was in
23 the area of Devet Jugovica. I was observing tank hill, as was termed
24 here. I was also in the area of Podujevo when there were Albanian
25 demonstrations. Therefore, I was in the field on five or six occasions.
1 Q. I know you indicated that on --
2 A. There was something that was in dispute.
3 Q. Sorry. I interrupted you, General. Were you finished?
4 A. Your Honour, I just wanted to say this: As I stated a minute ago,
5 we had to act as arbiters in any and in every incident, and in most cases
6 it was done at the lower level of the commission. As for Mr. Walker and
7 myself, and Mr. Drewienkiewicz and myself, I did not receive any
8 invitations from Drewienkiewicz to go together in the field. The first
9 and only instance was when he called me to go to Racak together.
10 Q. I think you indicated in an answer about the daily reports you
11 were getting from the MUP that one day you had a report with 33 incidents
12 in it. And there simply was no way you could go out and try to confirm or
13 verify all the reports that you were receiving from the MUP, from the VJ,
14 and from the KVM, was there?
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on, please, Mr. Loncar. Just a moment we have
16 counsel on his feet.
17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps my learned friend
18 Mr. Hannis could state the foundation for this question, to what part of
19 testimony does this refer to. Thank you.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: I think he -- he may have misquoted the figure as
21 33, but the witness definitely referred to a report with 31 incidents in
22 cross-examination this morning.
23 MR. HANNIS: Yes, I'm sorry, Your Honour it is 31 and it was at
24 page 35, line 19.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
1 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Please proceed with your answer, Mr. Loncar.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is correct that I mentioned the
4 figure of 31. If I recall it correctly, that was the number of incidents
5 in a single day, but those were the incidents such as a group of
6 terrorists barged into a house and harassed a Roma woman in the presence
7 of her parents --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, the question is --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Raped a Roma woman --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand you wanted to tell us some of the
11 detail, but the question was: There simply was no way you could go out
12 and try to verify all the reports you were receiving because of the volume
13 of these reports. That's your answer to that?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The answer is: Yes, precisely.
15 Most of the incidents were investigated by the commission at its lower
17 MR. HANNIS:
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. At page 14, line 16, today, Mr. Cepic asked you
19 if you could say it was the KLA that instructed their own civilian
20 population to move out or transfer somewhere else. You said: "I don't
21 know about the cooperation between the KLA and their own ethnic Albanian
22 population, but from the military aspect it was obvious that there was
23 obedience and cooperation."
24 So if I understand you correctly, it appeared that the KLA was
25 able to operate -- to command and control their fighters, but you have no
1 knowledge about whether or not civilians were being instructed and obeying
2 instructions of the KLA. Is that correct?
3 A. It is correct, but all the incidents and activities taking place
4 caused by the terrorists or the KLA involved no civilians. Who could have
5 ordered civilians? The police and the army or the terrorists, forcing the
6 people of their own ethnic background to move? What you stated is
7 correct, but also it should be put in the wider context.
8 Q. You yourself didn't have an opportunity to interview any KLA
9 commanders or any Kosovo Albanian civilians about that particular aspect,
10 did you?
11 A. Directly as regards to that issue, no. As for the commanders, I
12 never had occasion and I never wanted to.
13 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ackerman today asked you a question at page -- I
14 think beginning at page 18, and he was referring you to something that
15 Judge Bonomy had asked you yesterday about the KVM not referring to the
16 KLA as terrorist. And Judge Bonomy raised the issue with you if it wasn't
17 a possibility that one reason they didn't do that was to try and have a
18 better relationship with them and maybe be able to dissuade them from
19 doing certain things. Mr. Ackerman asked, "Would you agree that if that
20 was their purpose, to improve the influence they might have on the
21 terrorists, on the KLA, that it was a complete failure. It didn't work?"
22 And you said -- well, your answer went on for a little bit. In
23 the end you said: "So what you're asking me, I believe you're right, so
24 my answer would be yes." But, General, you couldn't know about the times
25 that KVM may have been successful in persuading KLA to either withdraw
1 from an area or refrain from a certain action or not engage in
2 provocations, because there wouldn't have been any action; correct?
3 A. Absolutely correct. I didn't know what they were doing when they
4 went to visit the Albanian side, and they never told us of any successes
5 in doing that.
6 Q. At page 22, line 12, today in an answer to Mr. Ackerman, I think
7 you said, "I must state decisively that the army, the members of the Army
8 of Yugoslavia, and the Pristina Corps, first of all, did not conduct a
9 single offensive action. Their activities were exclusively in response."
10 Can I ask you: Do you know, was the army involved in, either
11 directly or indirectly, in support of the MUP by providing artillery fire
12 or tank fire or by simply setting up a cordon around the perimeter of an
13 area where the MUP was carrying out activities in, first of all, Podujevo
14 in December 1998? Was the army involved any way in connection with that?
15 A. Your Honour, during the time I was there, I had no knowledge of
16 that. I really don't have any knowledge.
17 Q. No knowledge --
18 A. There were no such coordinated activities between the police and
19 the army.
20 Q. And as far as you know, no VJ involvement in Racak on the 15th of
21 January, 1999?
22 A. As far as I know, the army did not take part.
23 Q. What about on the 12th of March, 1999, in the area of Jeskovo
24 village, an operation involving elements of the 549th Motorised Brigade?
25 A. Excuse me, on what day or date?
1 Q. The 12th of March, 1999.
2 A. I have no knowledge about that, because at that time we were
3 intensively trying to organise the evacuation of the OSCE mission. And
4 they were busy with their own withdrawal as well. Therefore, I have no
5 knowledge of this incident. I didn't even know about it.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you. I need to follow-up a question regarding the --
7 those conscripts who had finished their 12 months and then were extended
8 for another three months, the ones that we were calling the 15-monthers.
9 When they stayed their additional three months, did they stay in Kosovo
10 the entire time until their 15 months were up?
11 A. Yes, within their units. They spent all that time in Kosovo and
13 Q. And did their replacements not arrive in Kosovo until 15 months
14 were up, or had they come at the end of 12 months?
15 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I think that's been asked and answered.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but it's a simple question and
17 there's -- since it does arise, the Prosecution -- from cross-examination,
18 the Prosecutor is entitled to ask.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only after the 15th month has
20 expired in their military service, they were replaced by another
21 contingent from Serbia. So the replacements did not arrive after the
22 first 12 months but after the 15th month.
23 MR. HANNIS:
24 Q. Okay. Well, then in --
25 A. The essence - I apologise - is that they did not spend three
1 months together. They were not together for a single day, the two
2 contingents. The exchange was done the same day. One contingent left
3 Kosovo and the other one entered.
4 Q. Okay. But I was confused because I thought you indicated when --
5 when that replacement or that transfer or that shift occurred, that one
6 group went to Merdare. Can you tell us where Merdare is located.
7 A. Merdare is the northern-most location. It is on the very border
8 between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia. Therefore, it is the
9 northern-most location in Kosovo, the first one comes across when coming
10 from going Serbia. It is on route from Kosovo to Serbia towards Prokuplje
11 via Merdare, and at Merdare the Serbian contingent entered and the Kosovo
12 one left.
13 Q. And I take it that since their 15 months was up, they were going
14 home. They were leaving because they had finished their term of service;
16 A. Yes. They all went home after the completion of their military
18 Q. General, were you aware of elements of the 37th Brigade being
19 brought into Kosovo on or around the 7th of March, 1999, brought in from
21 A. Your Honour, through a combination of circumstances --
22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, something is missing --
23 oh, it's coming into the transcript now. It's just we heard something in
24 Serbian that was not on record.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Does it affect the question?
1 MR. VISNJIC: No.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can deal with it later if it still has to
3 be dealt with.
4 Please carry on with your answer, Mr. Loncar.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So through a combination of
6 circumstances, I was commanding the Uzice Corps or I was the Chief of
7 Staff, and that 37th Brigade was part of the Uzice Corps and based in
8 Racak. So it couldn't have come from Montenegro. It had never been in
9 Montenegro. So that's one correction.
10 And the second correction is that it was a period when the
11 situation was already clear. It was clear that the air-strikes were
12 coming, the situation was increasingly complex. I don't know, but if I
13 had been commander, I would have ordered movement of that brigade that was
14 closest to Kosovo just for prevention purposes. That is what all wise
15 armies would do.
16 MR. HANNIS:
17 Q. I don't disagree with you on that, General, but my question was:
18 Did you know that elements of the 37th Brigade entered Kosovo on or about
19 the 7th of March, 1999; yes or no?
20 A. Your Honour, nobody except the establishment of the Pristina Corps
21 entered Kosovo. I don't think it's correct that the 37th Brigade or any
22 of its troops entered Kosovo.
23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] May I now, Your Honour?
24 JUDGE BONOMY: No.
25 Mr. Loncar, you referred to the 37th Brigade being based in Racak.
1 Did you mean to say that?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Raska, R-a-s-k-a, that is a town in
3 the south of Serbia. That is the establishment location of the 37th
4 Brigade. That is in the area of Sandzak.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. General, Mr. Ivetic, counsel for General Lukic, was asking you
9 some questions about the multi-ethnic police forces, which he explained
10 were actually local security and had a completely different uniform than
11 the army or the police. Do you know what these units were called? Do you
12 know what the name for them was?
13 A. First, I have to emphasise that General Lukic and his police had
14 nothing to do with those multi-ethnic forces. Since their forces -- since
15 their tasks in -- I know who baptised them as police forces, because I
16 already specified those were local forces, who were there to encourage and
17 protect the local residents as much as they could. What their name was, I
18 don't know. I personally referred to them as local police of Kosovska
19 Mitrovica, say, or the local police of Prizren when they were in question.
20 They had -- they were multi-ethnic in character. That's all I can tell
21 you. Because they were--
22 Q. Do you know who provided them their weapons?
23 A. I don't know. I don't know what they were armed with or who armed
24 them. I mean, I really don't know.
25 Q. In a -- well, there's been evidence to suggest that there were no
1 paramilitaries in Kosovo. If these security forces were not under the VJ
2 and not under the MUP, wouldn't they have been a paramilitary?
3 A. Well, in view of your explanation and your question, yes, they
4 would have been paramilitary. But I believed they belonged -- in fact,
5 they were forces of security. They belonged to the security sector.
6 Q. In --
7 A. They were certainly not from the police, and they were certainly
8 not from the army. They could only have belonged to security forces.
9 Q. And, General, in a state of emergency, state of war, or state of
10 imminent threat of war, under the Law on Defence and other applicable laws
11 in the former Yugoslavia at the time, under whose authority would these
12 local security forces fall? Who would control them? Who would direct
13 them in times of war and combat?
14 A. Well, whoever established them, because they would have been
15 directed subordinated to the entity that established them. So they were
16 established by the security council within the FRY, and it's probably that
17 security council that commanded them.
18 Q. General, if -- would these security forces then be what is
19 referred to in Joint Command orders, in late March 1999, as the armed
20 non-Siptar population?
21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I think that calls for speculation.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Hannis, there's nothing wrong with the
23 question. It's the source that just complicates it. What you're asking
24 the witness is whether that description would fit. Is that right?
25 Because he's denied any knowledge of any Joint Command.
1 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. I guess, but I'm asking the
2 question in connection with that because the orders direct the armory to
3 engage the non-Siptar population -- the armed non-Siptar population.
4 That's why I ask it in that context.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can --
6 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, just
9 a brief comment about the police that my learned friend Mr. Hannis is
10 referring to. He's talking about the non-Albanian population. As far as
11 I understood the testimony of this witness, it's not about non-Albanians.
12 On the contrary, most of those people were Albanians, ethnic Albanians
13 within those units. That's --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic, that comment may be made in due
15 course about what this evidence amounts to. I know that Mr. Ivetic asked
16 the questions, based upon the idea that this was an Albanian security
17 force. But Mr. Hannis's questions come at it from a rather different
18 angle, and he's trying to build on what emerged from the evidence in
19 cross-examination. So there's nothing inappropriate about that. But, Mr.
20 Ivetic, you wanted to say something else?
21 No. The question will be allowed, but not on the basis of the
22 Joint Command, Mr. Hannis. So you can put it differently, as I've
23 suggested already.
24 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
25 Q. General, were you aware of the armed non-Siptar population in
1 Kosovo? Who would that have been that were not in the army, that was not
2 empty MUP, that was armed, and that was non-Siptar?
3 A. It must be that I wasn't precise or concise enough. What I'm
4 trying to say is that the main trend and the main effort was to set up a
5 structure or a unit or a component, or call it what you like, of the
6 police that would not be mainly Serb, because there was already a Serb
7 police force commanded by General Lukic, but it was poorly accepted by
9 So something new needed to be created, something that would have
10 had and enjoyed the confidence of the people, and that's how this
11 multi-ethnic police came about. They were established at the local level,
12 by local authorities, and most of the men were Albanians, Gorani, et
13 cetera. So that is what we are talking about.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Loncar, the question is rather different.
15 We've had evidence earlier of a reference to the mobilisation of the
16 non-Siptar population. Now, assuming that's accurate evidence, what --
17 just hold on until I finish the question. Assuming that's accurate
18 evidence for the moment, to what would it be referring?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If there is a mobilisation of the
20 Serbs going on, that means that some operations are being prepared, which
21 means that more personnel is mobilised in order to reinforce units and
22 bring them up to a higher level of readiness, if that is so. But I don't
23 think anything about that sort of mobilisation.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. I realise I may have phrased that
25 question wrongly. I think it was arming you were concerned about, Mr.
1 Hannis. Is that right?
2 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you want to ask the question again?
4 MR. HANNIS: No, that's all right.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
6 MR. HANNIS:
7 Q. General, do you know how many of these security forces there were
8 in Kosovo, and where they were located? Do you have any personal
9 knowledge about that?
10 A. Personal knowledge, no. I was not there. I noticed them in
11 passing. I saw a few members of that or such unit. They were present the
12 most in Kosovska Mitrovica. There were attempts made elsewhere as well,
13 but I don't know what their manning strength was or what the number of
14 such units was. It is not within the domain of my personal knowledge, but
15 it was rather what I may have overheard when discussing police matters.
16 Q. You were -- you mentioned that one of -- one of your disagreements
17 with the OSCE was that they referred to the -- what you called the
18 terrorists, they referred to as the KLA or the UCK. And I think you said
19 that DZ called them terrorists once and Ciaglinski maybe a couple of
21 Isn't it true that Mr. Walker also referred to them as terrorists
22 on at least one occasion? And I direct you specifically to Exhibit 504
23 that Mr. Visnjic showed you today at page 50. On page 4 of that exhibit -
24 I don't know if the witness has it there - the last sentence under
25 paragraph number 4, which is entitled "Comment," it talks about Mr. Walker
1 using the term "terrorist."
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it possible to answer the question?
3 MR. HANNIS:
4 Q. Have you found it, General, the last question is translated in
5 English as, "There are specific moments when he referred to terrorist
6 actions as terrorists."
7 A. Yes, I read it.
8 Q. Were you present in that meeting? Do you recall him saying that?
9 A. I can't recall this meeting and when he may have said this. I
10 can't say whether Walker ever used the term terrorists. I'm sure that
11 Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski did. I know Mr. Walker's position. He
12 expressed on one occasion --
13 Q. Thank you, General, let me --
14 A. -- he said that --
15 Q. Let me stop you there. I'm running out of time. I just want to
16 ask two more questions. Mr. Cepic, on his second round today, asked you
17 if you were aware if there was ever a plan to deport the Kosovar
18 Albanians, and you said you were not aware of any such plan. I think at
19 page 64, line 18 is where this first came up today -- or, I'm sorry, it's
20 a little later. General, you were retired from the army in 1994. Is that
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And after that time, you never attended any VJ collegium meetings,
24 any General Staff meetings, or any Joint Command meetings, did you?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Thank you, General. I don't have any more questions for you.
2 Thank you for your time.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I hope you haven't rushed yourself unnecessarily.
5 You obviously still have some time if you want it.
6 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: We were willing to give you another ten minutes
8 beyond that if necessary, and that's why Judge Chowhan had to leave as a
9 matter of urgency, but we were prepared to continue.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: General Loncar, that completes your evidence.
12 Thank you for making the arrangements you did, to accommodate the
13 Tribunal, and for coming to give evidence. That completes your
14 involvement, and we will now terminate the videolink.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good day to you.
16 [The witness withdrew]
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I want to express the gratitude of the Trial
19 Chamber to all who were involved in making these exceptional arrangements
20 to ensure that the witness's evidence could be taken so far as possible
21 over yesterday and today. We'll now adjourn for the week, and we will
22 resume on Monday morning at 9.00.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.52 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Monday, the 4th day of
25 December, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.