1 Thursday, 8 February 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm told you have something to raise, Ms. Carter.

6 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour. I have spoken further with

7 the government of the United Kingdom and they have indicated that so long

8 as the documents that are being entered into evidence here by either the

9 Prosecution or by the Defence, so long as they are the redacted versions

10 as redacted by the United Kingdom they do not need to go under seal.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: What in general do the redaction relate to.

12 MS. CARTER: Privileged information, confidential information.

13 There's redactions to people who were receiving at the United Kingdom,

14 that type of thing.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So essentially the content of the documents would

16 be public.

17 MS. CARTER: Largely, yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: That is excellent and thank you for dealing with

19 that so quickly.

20 We'll now go into closed is session to allow the witness to enter

21 the courtroom.

22 [Closed session]

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 [Open session]

3 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sure you'll recollect, Mr. Crosland, being

5 reminded when you were here before that the solemn declaration you made at

6 the outset of your evidence to speak the truth will continue to apply to

7 that evidence until it's completed.

8 THE WITNESS: I understand that, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan, the order of cross-examination?

10 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Good morning, Your Honour. We will follow the

11 indictment with one change. General Lazarevic will precede General

12 Pavkovic.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: You have questions?

14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. O'Sullivan:

17 Q. Good morning, Colonel?

18 A. Good morning, sir.

19 Q. Yesterday, you testified about your visit to Glodjane, and you

20 also talk about that in your statement P2645 at paragraph 41, and you say

21 that you were taken under MUP escort to the village of Glodjane where you

22 witnessed six to eight bodies. You were told that they were Serbs

23 allegedly killed by the KLA, but you add that you were not sure, it was

24 impossible to tell who the victims were at the time. I'd like to ask you

25 some further questions about that.

1 The location you were taken to was the canal leading to Lake

2 Radonjic which is near the village of Glodjane; is that correct?

3 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

4 Q. And it would be fair to say, I think, that you had been brought

5 there, there had been no investigation conducted, and it was impossible to

6 tell who the victims were just by looking. Is that a fair statement?

7 A. That's an entirely fair statement, yes.

8 Q. Sir, I've received a p copy of a statement you gave to the

9 Prosecutor in June 2006. It's a statement you gave in connection with the

10 Haradinaj case, and in that statement you told the Prosecutor that on that

11 day you toured the site at Radonjic Lake and you noticed that there were

12 ten to 15 splash marks of gunshots on the wall of the canal; correct?

13 A. There were a number of gunshots, yes, on the canal, yes.

14 Q. And you collected six to 12 empty cases of Chinese ammunition

15 close to the bodies. You brought these cases back to the UK for analysis,

16 and the forensic people in the UK confirmed that the ammunition was of

17 Chinese origin; correct?

18 A. As I understand, it's correct, yes, sir.

19 Q. And this was an indication that the KLA was responsible for the

20 killings because the KLA used Chinese munitions and the Serbs did not.

21 You knew that?

22 A. That's, if I may say so with respect, sir, a generalisation in

23 that ammunition could have been placed there. It -- what you are saying

24 is correct, that in general the KLA, as far as we understand, did use

25 Chinese ammunition.

1 Q. All right. And you also told the Prosecutor, in this statement,

2 that the canal where the bodies were found was about one kilometre from

3 the headquarters of Ramush Haradinaj and that he was the undisputed KLA

4 commander of the area, and you said the crime scene was in his backyard.

5 That's how you put it; correct?

6 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. And during this interview you were informed by the Prosecutor that

8 Mr. Haradinaj had been indicted for the events that you saw at Radonjic

9 Lake; correct?

10 A. If you say so, sir, yes.

11 Q. And then in paragraph 30 of this statement, you say you met

12 Mr. Haradinaj three to four times at his headquarters. That's correct,

13 isn't?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. And you were also told by the Prosecutor that the indictment

16 against Mr. Haradinaj included approximately 39 victims, and you were --

17 you know that -- you were told that the victims included Serbs, Albanians

18 of Islam-- Islamic faith and Catholic faith and non-Serbs and

19 non-Albanians from Kosovo; correct?

20 A. We encountered various persons who had been shot and dumped by the

21 road. Their exact origins would be very difficult to -- for me to testify

22 to under -- under oath.

23 Q. But you knew the KLA did in fact execute Serbs and Albanians and

24 other people who lived in Kosovo of other ethnic groups?

25 A. That was the intelligence that we understood, yes, sir.

1 Q. At paragraph 27, you say this: "From my experience on the ground,

2 it is clear to me that Ramush and his brother were involved in criminal

3 activities, fuel, cigarettes, prostitution, racketeering, et cetera. I am

4 sure Ramush is up to his neck in it even to this day." This is

5 information you provided; correct?

6 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. And at paragraph 28, again, you say: "In the area that Ramush

8 controlled, there were well-tried smuggling routes date being back to the

9 Ottoman times. The same routes were used by the KLA to smuggle weapons

10 and other goods. Pec, for example, was well known for its various

11 nefarious activities during the war partly because it was so close to

12 Montenegro."

13 Now, this is information you provided also; correct?

14 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

15 Q. Then you told the Prosecutor this at paragraph 21: When you were

16 asked whether anybody confronted Mr. Haradinaj with the killings at the

17 canal leading to Radonjic Lake, you said, and I quote:

18 "I think that a conscious decision had been made to support the

19 KLA, and then as a result the difficult questions were not asked. Perhaps

20 for this reason I am not aware of anyone from the international community

21 asking Ramush tough questions about the bodies found in the canal leading

22 to the Radonjic Lake.

23 "I never did, even though I met him on several occasions. It was

24 clear in those days that Ramush and his brother Daut were the future main

25 players in this area. They were clearly the bosses of the Pec, Prizren,

1 Decan, Djakovica area. The international community wanted to keep them on

2 side, not alienate them or tarnish their reputation."

3 That's what you told the Prosecutor; correct?

4 A. That is correct, sir and I think that has appeared to be the case

5 so far.

6 Q. At paragraph 25, you said this:

7 "The international community supported the KLA and they knew that.

8 Bill Clinton, Richard Holbrooke, Madeleine Albright had decided that there

9 was going to be regime change in Serbia and the KLA was one of the tools

10 to make this happen. From that point on, whatever reservations I or

11 others may have had against the KLA was not relevant. The position of

12 the -- the position the international community took at Rambouillet in

13 1999 was consistent with that policy."

14 This again is what you told the Prosecutor?

15 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

16 Q. And when you completed this interview in June 2006, after you

17 reviewed the statement and initialed every page, you signed and dated an

18 acknowledgement stating that the statement was true, to the best of your

19 knowledge and recollection. You gave the statement voluntarily and you

20 knew it may be used in proceedings in this Tribunal; correct?

21 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I have no further questions.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. O'Sullivan.

24 Mr. Fila.

25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

1 Cross-examination by Mr. Fila:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Crosland, my name is Toma Fila and I'm

3 Defence counsel for Mr. Sainovic. Good morning and I won't take up too

4 much of your time.

5 I would like us to deal with something first and foremost that

6 someone -- that no one has dealt with before as far as your statement is

7 concerned. I'm referring to the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement. If you

8 have your statement, this is paragraphs 61 through 64.

9 A. Yes, I have it.

10 Q. Right. In your report, you stated that you -- or, rather, in your

11 telegram of the 2nd of October, you said that the MUP and the army of

12 Yugoslavia ceased all activity, that there are signs of troop withdrawal,

13 and that this is when Milosevic and Holbrooke were negotiating.

14 Now, you said that the formal agreement between Milosevic and

15 Holbrooke, and that is what is stated in your statement on the 28th and

16 29th of October, that is not correct. That is not when the agreement was

17 actually reached. It was earlier. It was the 13th or 14th of October.

18 Do you allow for that possibility?

19 A. If that is -- excuse me, sir, if that is what is in the statement

20 then, yes. I don't have the statement in front of me, so I can't argue

21 with your supposition.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, the -- the statement says the formal

23 agreement followed. That's after the Holbrooke-Milosevic talks with 28th

24 and 29th October specified for the withdrawal of forces. I don't think

25 it's being said to be the date of the agreement.

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I -- I physically supervised the

2 withdrawal.

3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The agreement concluded on the 28th,

4 29th of October. That is what it says here. Well, never mind. That is

5 not the reason why I'm putting this question.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I think there's a language problem because the

7 English -- the English version of the statement, which is its original,

8 says the 28th and 29th were the dates specified for the withdrawal of

9 forces. Now, do you know the actual date on which Milosevic and Holbrooke

10 reached agreement.

11 THE WITNESS: I am not certain, Your Honour. All I can say is I

12 was physically on the ground when the three battle groups concerned moved

13 back to barracks, and I then reported that both back to the Ministry of

14 Defence and to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley

15 Clark. What date that was, I'm sorry.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: As far as we can tell, this fundamental agreement

17 doesn't appear to exist in black and white.

18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Nobody has been able to find a copy of it. There

20 are summaries in press statements, but we haven't seen the agreement

21 itself.

22 THE WITNESS: Sorry. Forgive me, sir. All I was doing was -- or

23 overseeing the physical withdrawal of the three battle groups, and I then

24 sent that required message to the authorities and stated. At the same

25 time and to the credit of the Serbs, three other MUP were then killed

1 virtually in front of me, so the VJ did what -- and the MUP did what they

2 were asked.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. President, that is precisely the reason why I put the

6 question. I hope that the translation is not wrong yet, again. In

7 paragraph 63, you say when the Holbrooke Agreement was signed in 1998. So

8 because of the letter that you sent me, I conducted an investigation to

9 Belgrade to see whether there was ever an agreement in writing, I

10 emphasise in writing. I talked to the Prime Minister who is going to

11 testify here with the Foreign Minister with all the Socialist Party

12 witnesses.

13 I don't want the Prosecutor to hold this against me. I'm not

14 taking the stand myself. Everybody said that Milosevic showed a little

15 piece of paper with his own handwriting - Milosevic's handwriting, that

16 is - that he dictated to Prime Minister Marjanovic 11 points, and that is

17 what I consider to be the agreement until you warned me. So the point is

18 that this was never signed. A written agreement was never signed. This

19 is why I put this question to the gentleman, and I'm not going to deal it

20 any more and let's move on again?

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That's probably saved you bringing four witnesses

22 here, Mr. Fila.

23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. Now I'll deal with

24 something else.

25 Q. Now I'd like to draw your attention to your statement again,

1 paragraph 47. You said there that you assume you are not making any

2 claims, but you assume that there was a coordination centre presumably in

3 Pristina in order to avoid friendly fire or blue-on-blue, as you had put

4 it. In response to Ms. Carter's questions, you said that there should be

5 at least two parties involved there. I assume that you meant the army and

6 the police, and you also refer to some politicians.

7 Before I put a question to you, I would like to ask you that -- to

8 tell you, rather, that General Klaus Naumann, you know who that is,

9 testified here on the 14th of December, 2006. And on page 91367, lines 10

10 through 23, he said that from his own intelligence sources, NATO, that is,

11 he had the knowledge that there was a coordination centre in Nis and in

12 Belgrade. Do you allow for that possibility?

13 A. Sir, I -- I would be very surprised if there was not an

14 alternative communications centre at the heart of 3rd Army in Nis and a

15 further one in Belgrade for the day-to-day handling of the political level

16 of what was a very serious incident. So it doesn't surprise me at all,

17 sir, no. Thank you.

18 Q. Thank you very much. So don't you find it logical that

19 politicians would be sitting in Belgrade and resolving these questions, as

20 you saw from one of the documents that the Prosecutor showed you? Don't

21 you think that would be logical, rather than in Pristina?

22 A. Sir, with respect, I think that was -- I was indicating,

23 yesterday, you had political persons in Pristina throughout this incident,

24 and I suspect that those local politicians of considerable weight would

25 also be involved in a coordination centre which, would be linked to the

1 headquarters of 3rd Army in Nis as also to the headquarters in Beograd.

2 So I'm delighted to hear it. I don't find it strange. I would

3 welcome that political control over the military forces, which is

4 hopefully more or less standard procedure across the civilised world.

5 Q. Now I would like to deal with a third group of questions, my last

6 one. In several statements, you said that you were in Kosovo many times

7 from 1996 onwards and in Belgrade, and that you never met Nikola Sainovic;

8 is that correct?

9 A. As far as I'm aware, sir, I never met him. I may have -- he may

10 have been present at one of the many functions that defence attaches were

11 asked to come to.

12 Q. Do you know perhaps that Mr. Sainovic, in the government of

13 Yugoslavia, was in charge of foreign policy from 1996,; that is to say,

14 the implementation of the Dayton agreement onwards and that then Kosovo

15 came under that? Do you know that?

16 A. I didn't know that at the time, sir, no. I mean, I was -- as a

17 defence attache, I'm accredited to the Vojska Jugoslavija, not to the MUP.

18 So we had very little dealings with the MUP and all the personalities

19 within the MUP.

20 Q. Nikola Sainovic is not a person from the MUP. He's a person from

21 the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; whereas, the MUP is

22 the MUP of Serbia.

23 A. That is very correct, sir. I, as a defence attache, am accredited

24 direct to then the Chief of the General Staff, General Perisic, and to the

25 Vojska Jugoslavija, full stop, sir.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: In your role, though, would you not normally be

2 aware of who -- who was the Minister responsible for the Department of

3 Foreign Affairs?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. We were briefed on that, Your Honour. The --

5 the gentleman just asked me a question. I don't recall at the time, it's

6 nearly 10 years ago now, who was exactly in which position, as these

7 positions did actually change quite frequently. But I obviously, as part

8 of the my brief, sir, I would attempt to keep up-to-date with the key

9 personalities, and I apologize if Mr. Sainovic was the Foreign Minister.

10 My mistake.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it may be important, because the point is

12 being put to you that he was in that role from 1996, and therefore we

13 might draw some conclusions about how prominent he was depending on your

14 knowledge of that fact because you were there from 1997.

15 THE WITNESS: I was there from September 1996, sir, till 1999.

16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] With your permission, Nikola Sainovic

17 was not Minister of Foreign Affairs. Zivorad Jovanovic was Minister of

18 Foreign Affairs. He was deputy federal Prime Minister under Bulatovic's

19 authority, and Bulatovic will testify here. He was in charge of the

20 foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as deputy Prime

21 Minister. But all right, I would like --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Help me on that, Mr. Fila. You're quite right as

23 Judge Kamenova was pointing out to me. He wasn't the Minister of Foreign

24 Affairs. But the way you put the question was that he was in charge of

25 foreign policy. Does that mean that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was

1 answerable to Mr. Sainovic?

2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. They were all answerable to Prime

3 Minister Momir Bulatovic. But relations with foreign diplomats were of

4 particular significance because the implementation of Dayton, Your

5 Honour, was very important. It had to do with Bosnia, partly Croatia as

6 well and then it went further on. Quite simply the volume of the work

7 involved was big.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] And there were five deputy Prime

10 Ministers in the government, not only one, five. But all right.

11 Could we have 2D8 on the screen, please, the English version, of

12 course, so that the witness can see it.

13 Q. Can you please have a look at this document, and you'll see that

14 Mr. Nikola Sainovic was the chairman of the Commission for Cooperation

15 with the OSCE. This is the Serbian version. It would be better to have

16 the English version displayed?

17 JUDGE BONOMY: We also have the English one now, Mr. Fila.

18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Can you see it, Mr. Crosland?

20 A. Yes, thank you.

21 Q. Can one infer on the basis of this that he was put in that

22 position because he was in charge of foreign policy with regard to Kosovo,

23 and the OSCE was actually in charge of that particular segment of foreign

24 policy?

25 A. I don't -- I don't dispute that. I mean, I came into -- I had

1 very little to do with the OSCE mission, as such. We briefed them when

2 they first arrived, the Kosovo Verification Mission, and then it was a

3 separate entity with all these gentlemen, as you've laid out there in

4 paragraph 3.

5 Q. All right. Yes. Fine. Now I would like to deal with P683. This

6 is a telegram that you sent, Mr. Crosland, in relation to the meetings

7 held on the 3rd of October. That is when you received General

8 Dimitrijevic. However, what I'm interested in is paragraph 10. Let me

9 jog your memory. You say that it was your idea to have an ambassadorial

10 meeting held; that is to say, between Her Majesty's ambassador and Perisic

11 and Sainovic, and they were not there and Bugarcic came instead of

12 Sainovic.

13 A. I'm sorry, can you back to the -- could you go back to the top,

14 because I'm not certain whether this was a telegram or a telegram sent

15 from me as a Brit mil attache. If it's a diplomatic telegram --

16 Q. Bugarcic. It is paragraph 10 of your telegram.

17 A. Well, I don't --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness wants to see the beginning of the

19 telegram, Mr. Fila, so he can identify the document to his own

20 satisfaction.

21 THE WITNESS: This -- with great respect, sir, this document has

22 been sent by the ambassador and not by myself. My -- my telegrams where

23 I -- the telegrams that I sent were Brit mil attache.

24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I'm sorry. I thought it was your telegram. I apologise, but

1 nevertheless you attended that meeting. So I wanted to ask you about

2 that. Could you please just look at paragraph 10. And I do apologise to

3 you because I did believe that it was your telegram.

4 So could we please have paragraph 10 displayed. Right. At the

5 very bottom down here. Could you just lift it up a bit, please, the text.

6 Have you read it?

7 A. Yes. I read it, sir, yeah, but it's only half of the paragraph.

8 Q. Yes, it continues. Could we please see the next page of the

9 English version.

10 A. I've read the paragraph, sir. Thank you.

11 Q. Now I would like you to comment on something. You see that

12 Bugarcic is informing his excellency the ambassador of the United Kingdom

13 and you, both of you being present there, to the effect that Sainovic

14 confirms what Andjelkovic had said, and that that is an official statement

15 made by the government regarding their obligation of civil reconstruction;

16 that is to say, to rebuild what had been destroyed. And the second thing

17 they are informing you about is that six battle groups had returned to

18 barracks and so on and so forth.

19 My question is the following: Is that not what a deputy Prime

20 Minister should do, a person who is politically in charge of Kosovo, that

21 he should inform your ambassador who should in turn inform your government

22 as to what was going on? Don't you think that this is a political move

23 made by a politician? Is that not his duty? Is that not his obligation,

24 If you agree with what I'm saying?

25 A. Sir, with great respect, I've said in my statement that there were

1 occasions when pressure was applied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

2 that troop reductions were made throughout the province of Kosovo. I'm

3 afraid to say that these lasted for some couple of weeks and then --

4 Q. I'm sorry that's not my question. That's not my question.

5 A. I --

6 Q. My question, Mr. Crosland, is how do you interpret the fact that

7 Sainovic is conveying the decision of the government of Serbia to rebuild

8 what had been destroyed? Is that not the right kind of gesture to be made

9 by a man who is in charge of foreign policy, to inform the ambassador of

10 another country as to what was going on?

11 I'm not asking you about troop withdrawal. I'm asking you about

12 what Mr. Sainovic did. Is that not the kind of thing a politician would

13 do? Is that not the impression that you had had? I don't know whether

14 you understand what I'm saying.

15 A. Sir, with great respect, when I left Kosovo on the 18th of March,

16 1999 for the last time, there had been no rebuilding of any kind at all.

17 There was continued excessive damage caused to Kosovo Albanian housing

18 throughout the whole province of Kosovo. Those, sir, are the facts. They

19 are documented in several of my reports and several other personnel have

20 seen them. So I can't accept Mr. Sainovic may --

21 Q. That is not what I asked you. You're not responding to my

22 question.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Try to leave out of account whether the information

24 was accurate or inaccurate, and try to confine your answer to the essence

25 of this question which is, in fact, assume for the moment the

1 information's accurate, is that the sort of thing you would expect a

2 politician to be doing, to be conveying this sort of detail to your

3 ambassador?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, yes. Well, one would. The fact of the

5 matter is that nothing was rebuilt.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: That's quite Sir, I understand, but there's no

7 need to be quite so defensive on that point, because we do understand the

8 distinction between what's said and what's actually done.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And, therefore, we must try to separate these.

11 Mr. Fila.

12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Let me just have a look. I don't think

13 I'll have any more questions.

14 Q. Finally, you left Kosovo and Yugoslavia, in general, on the very

15 eve of the bombing, roughly when the mission left, too; is that right?

16 And then you returned when NATO came in or, rather, when the UN came in?

17 A. Sir, we left Belgrade on the night before the bombing, and then I

18 returned as a liaison officer for the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps when we

19 came back into Kosovo; and then subsequent to that in 2000, I came back to

20 reopen our embassy.

21 Q. All right. So your information ends on that day, on the eve of

22 the bombing. I want to ask you whether you know what the positions of

23 Yugoslav politicians were during the bombing itself. Do you have

24 information of that kind? Yes or no? During the state of war, that is.

25 A. I have information of that kind, yes, sir.

1 Q. And what is that information?

2 A. I was working within our Ministry of Defence, which is quite

3 natural because I'd been the last person within Federal Republic of

4 Yugoslavia, and advising on how the -- the situation should go forward,

5 which is extremely difficult situation. And I was attempting, if you

6 really want to know, to put the Yugoslav position to our government and to

7 those who would listen, and I have no problem in telling you that.

8 Q. Very well. That is what I had to add to Mr. O'Sullivan's

9 questions. And now I would like to ask you something else. Twice you

10 talked to Mr. Philip Coo in 2006 and earlier on, was it? Can I ask you in

11 what capacity he talked to you the first time and the second time?

12 A. Sir, I think -- I think it's about the fifth time that I have of

13 attended this court and I've given many, many interviews. So, with great

14 respect, sir, it was during one of the investigations that I was asked for

15 my views. I think one of the times I met Mr. Coo, and Ms. Carter will

16 tell me otherwise, was in preparation for this particular trial and one, I

17 think, was in preparation for Ramush Haradinaj, I think. But, as I say,

18 I've given many interviews in -- for the benefit of this court.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: The question, Mr. Crosland, is in what capacity

20 Mr. Coo was speaking to you. Do you know what his role was when he

21 interviewed you?

22 THE WITNESS: As I understand, Your Honour, he was one of the

23 investigators for the ICTY, sir.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. That would be the

1 end of my questions. Thank you.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

3 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Sepenuk:

5 Q. Good morning, Colonel Crosland?

6 A. Good morning.

7 Q. I'm Norman Sepenuk, and I'm an attorney for General Ojdanic?

8 A. Thank you, sir.

9 Q. I want to spend a little bit of time talking about your prior

10 statements and testimony concerning Lord Ashdown. We do know from

11 Prosecution Exhibit 2645, that's your statement of October 31 2006, a

12 statement which you swore was true to the best of your knowledge and

13 recollection.

14 And you said at paragraph 51, page 11, and I am quoting now, sir:

15 "On September 26, 27, 1998, Lord Ashdown and I showed Ojdanic

16 photographic evidence of the VJ shelling Suva Reka on 27 August 1998. His

17 reaction was that force would be met with appropriate force." Correct,

18 sir?

19 A. With -- with great respect, sir, I think we covered this

20 yesterday, and there appears to be a date problem.

21 Q. Okay. Well --

22 A. As far as I recall, and with the best of intentions and under

23 oath, I did not show Lord Ashdown this and that statement, as we went

24 through yesterday, is incorrect. And I think, Your Honour, we went

25 through this, yesterday, so we're back into the same maelstrom of

1 questions.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: It sounds though, Mr. Crosland, that Mr. Sepenuk

3 may be wishing to explore why that happened; and if he does, then that's a

4 legitimate thing for him to do.

5 THE WITNESS: I understand, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: So bear with the question.

7 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Colonel, and thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. And then about six years earlier, Colonel, on December 7, 2000,

9 you submitted a statement to the Prosecutor, which you swore was true to

10 the best of your knowledge and recollection, to the same effect - this is

11 six years earlier - where you said, .

12 "On 26, 27 September 1998, the leader of the UK democratic party,

13 the Right Honourable Paddy Ashdown, and I showed Ojdanic photographic

14 evidence of the VJ shelling Suva Reka on 27 August 1998. His reaction was

15 the categorical denial of the use of the VJ air force and that force would

16 be met with appropriate force."

17 That's 3D508. That's the exhibit, paragraph 5, page 3, and you

18 recall that do you not, sir?

19 A. If you say so, sir, that is correct. It's a long time ago.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. But the -- I don't understand this business about "air."

22 Q. Well, that's what you said in the statement. You might not

23 understand it, but that's what you said in the statement says, "the denial

24 of the use of the VJ air force and that force would be met with

25 appropriate force." That's a direct quote from your statement.

1 A. I'm sorry. I don't see the paragraph concerned, sir.

2 Q. 3D508. Could we put that up, please? We're talking now about

3 your statement of 7 December 2000. Paragraph 5, page 3.

4 A. I still haven't got it, sir.

5 Q. Can we -- paragraph 5, page 3. 3D508. There we go. You see

6 that, sir, at the top? His reaction was "the categorical denial of the

7 use of the VJ air force and that force would be met with appropriate force

8 you." You --

9 A. Well, I never claimed that the VJ air force was being involved in

10 any activities in Kosovo. If fact, I saw, on some occasions, MiG 21s

11 flying out of -- out of Pristina, and there was one occasion I saw a

12 helicopter. And that, during the entire time, was the extent of Vojska

13 Jugoslavija air force in Kosovo.

14 So I don't -- I don't understand. You know, his reaction was a

15 "categorical denial the use of the VJ air force." I never stated that the

16 VJ air force had been used in defensive operations.

17 Q. But you do not deny that appears in a statement, which you swore

18 to be true to the best of your knowledge and belief.

19 A. You're actually correct, sir. That's an oversight on my behalf,

20 but I'm stating here that I never stated that the VJ air force was used in

21 an aggressive role.

22 Q. Thank you, sir.

23 A. So how that crept in, I don't know.

24 Q. And then in the -- in the Milosevic trial, you testified to this

25 effect, looking now at 3D505. Transcript 7938, you were being questioned

1 by the Prosecutor Mr. Ryneveld, and the question was: "Did you also take

2 any video or photographic evidence of what you had seen," and he was

3 referring to a tour that you had taken with Lord Ashdown in late September

4 1998. You remember the tour with Lord Ashdown, don't you sir?

5 A. I do indeed, sir, yes.

6 Q. And in answer to that question, whether you took any video or

7 photographic evidence at that time, your answer was,"Yes. We did sir,

8 yes." And the question was then put, "And later on did you have a meeting

9 with General Ojdanic in the presence of Lord Ashdown?" Answer: "I believe

10 we did sir, yes."

11 Now, we now know that that testimony was not true; correct sir?

12 A. That is correct, yes. And I've stated that yesterday that I

13 believe the dates between August and September have been muddled up in

14 these huge amount of documents. I apologise for that. It's not an

15 intension to mislead the court at all. I just believe it's a

16 misrepresentation of the dates concerned, sir.

17 Q. Well, when you testified in the Milosevic trial, this muddling up

18 of paragraphs 50 and 51, that wasn't involved, was it? You just flat out

19 testified. That wasn't a statement; that was testimony. So what -- there

20 was nothing muddled up, was there?

21 A. With respect, sir, I've said I've been asked to testify here on

22 many occasions, and I think there should be some leniency for dates being

23 muddled up. It's not intentional, and I don't intend to mislead the

24 Court, far from it.

25 I think over the 70-odd reports that I have produced for this

1 ICTY, which have given a huge background to the whole situation, that a

2 little bit of leniency should be allowed in an attempt to represent in a

3 very fair and positive manner both sides of this very difficult situation.

4 I have supported the Vojska Jugoslavija, and I've also made it

5 clear, as I've stated in this Court, that they were facing a growing

6 internal counter-insurgency operation. So I don't think I can be accused

7 of being against the Vojska Jugoslavija.

8 Q. Sir, I'm not accusing you of anything, believe me. All I am

9 saying is that that testimony you gave in the Milosevic trial, that you

10 had a meeting with General Ojdanic in the presence of Lord Ashdown was not

11 correct, that's all. And that's so, right?

12 A. This appears to be correct, and I stated that this is one of the

13 areas that appears to be muddled up. I apologise for that.

14 Q. Okay. And then you came to The Hague to testify in this case, and

15 by the way when did you get here?

16 A. On which occasion, sir?

17 Q. Well, we had a supplemental information sheet of information you

18 supplied to Ms. Carter on February 6 2006. Did you -- is that when you

19 got here to prepare your testimony?

20 A. In 2006?

21 Q. 2007. Actually, this says 2006. I will -- I never blame myself,

22 Colonel, for anything. I'm blaming Ms. Carter for that?

23 A. Having got a wife and three daughters, sir, I know exactly where I

24 stand. I believe I arrived on Monday this week, sir. Whatever date that

25 is, I don't remember.

1 Q. That's the 5th?

2 A. You're absolutely correct, sir.

3 Q. And did you meet with Ms. Carter on the 5th?

4 A. I think -- I think not. I think we met on the 6th, because I

5 didn't arrive here until quite late on the 5th.

6 Q. Now, when you came here, am I correct in assuming that you were

7 going to testify here pretty much as you had stated in your prior

8 statements of the year 2000, October 2006, and at the Milosevic trial.

9 You were ready to testify that you and Lord Ashdown had shown General

10 Ojdanic photographic evidence of the shelling of Suva Reka on August 27,

11 1998. Is it fair that you were prepared to so testify before you met with

12 Ms. Carter?

13 A. Sir, no, that is not actually correct. Because I was approached

14 by Lord Ashdown and my farmer ambassador over this very question, because

15 Lord Ashdown was unhappy that the dates did not tie up with his

16 remembrance of these events. When I got here, I spoke to Ms. Carter and

17 the specific paragraphs were 50 and 51, which we went through in some

18 detail yesterday. Because I said these paragraphs are not, not correct.

19 Now, I apologise that previous statements have been allowed to go

20 forward that stated that I showed this with Lord Ashdown to General

21 Ojdanic. That is not correct. I can only apologise for that mistake.

22 Q. Colonel, you said that you were approached by Lord Ashdown and

23 your former ambassador over this very question, because Lord Ashdown was

24 unhappy that the dates didn't tie up, et cetera? What -- what do you

25 mean? When were you approached by Lord Ashdown and the former ambassador?

1 A. Exactly what I say, sir. I was contacted by Lord Ashdown, who I

2 believe came here to give evidence. I don't know, because I wasn't

3 involved. And --

4 Q. My question -- excuse me, sir. My question is when did he contact

5 you? When?

6 A. I think -- I think it was prior to Christmas, because there was

7 some intent then for me to come before Christmas. That was cancelled or

8 postponed for various reasons. I then was out of the country for a month.

9 I got back on the 3rd of February and I came here on the 5th, and I

10 presume it was either very early in January this year, 2007, or the back

11 end of 2006.

12 Q. When Lord Ashdown -- you didn't call him; he called you, correct?

13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

14 Q. When he called you just before Christmas -- now we have the dates

15 right. 2006, correct?

16 A. That was last Christmas.

17 Q. Right. Okay. Did -- he initiated the call and give us the

18 substance of the conversation you had with him?

19 A. He had apparently written a diary of his trips around Kosovo, and

20 in it from his remembrance of the facts was that he did not see General

21 Ojdanic. He went back to Beograd, and he a meeting with President

22 Milosevic.

23 Q. And --

24 A. I beg your pardon.

25 Q. Please continue.

1 A. From his recall of events, that statement in paragraph 50, 51,

2 excuse me, was not correct. And that's why I asked Ms. Carter to -- to

3 change that, yesterday, and to inform the Court that an error had been

4 made.

5 Q. Did he say why he was calling you at the time? Why did he call

6 you, do you know?

7 A. Because we were we were quite friendly together, and we'd enjoyed

8 one another's company around Kosovo. And I think he was concerned that he

9 wished to give, as I do, under oath a correct version as possible, and as

10 I've said already many times, I apologise for this being incorrect.

11 Q. Did he tell you perhaps at that time that he'd been contacted by

12 the Ojdanic Defence team who had asked him to produce his diaries and any

13 other material he had on the matter and that he had, and that the diaries

14 revealed no such meeting with General Ojdanic, and that there in fact was

15 no such meeting with General Ojdanic to the best of Lord Ashdown's

16 recollection?

17 A. I don't believe he said that to me at all.

18 Q. He didn't tell you about that?

19 A. I don't think so, sir, no.

20 Q. Now, if he had not called you, if he had not called you, you would

21 have simply come here and given the evidence that you had previously given

22 in the Milosevic case, correct?

23 A. That's not correct, sir. As I said, when I arrived here on the

24 5th and I saw Ms. Carter and the team on the 6th, my first approach to

25 her, and I think she'll bear witness to that, was that I said paragraph 50

1 and 51 have been muddled up and that needs to be -- if that is the

2 procedure of the Court, and I'm not totally familiar with that obviously

3 in legal terms, that needs to be changed and your -- your side needs to be

4 informed there has been a change.

5 Q. But you say you would have come to that conclusion on your own,

6 without discussing it with Lord Ashdown? Would you have come to that

7 conclusion on your own?

8 A. Yes. I think Lord Ashdown jogged my memory. I -- as I said, I

9 produced over 70 reports. I reported continuously back to the Ministry of

10 Defence. I think the embassy sent something like a thousand telegrams

11 during that very busy year. Mistakes have been made I'm afraid, for which

12 I apologise.

13 Q. Colonel Crosland, that's -- I've made more mistakes than I can

14 tell you about my in my life, so it's not a question -- everyone makes

15 mistakes?

16 A. I agree, but --

17 Q. But had he not jogged your memory, had he not jogged your memory,

18 is it fair to say, you probably would have come here and given the exact

19 same testimony and evidence you'd previously given in those prior

20 statements; correct?

21 A. With respect, sir, I've tried every time I come here to refresh

22 myself and to bring myself back up to date with what has gone on quite

23 some time ago. I was unhappy with it, because I didn't think it was

24 correct. I had made the statement previously. I have apologised for

25 that. I can say no more. I mean -- you know.

1 Q. You didn't discover the mistake prior to testifying in the

2 Milosevic case, did you?

3 A. Apparently not, no.

4 Q. Okay. Now, when you discussed this with Ms. Carter, did you

5 also -- by the way, on the question of, again, Lord Ashdown, I think you

6 -- you still have it wrong, I say respectfully, sir, on Lord Ashdown. In

7 answer to a question, yesterday, by lord -- by the Chief Judge, Judge

8 Bonomy - I said Lord Ashdown and Lord Bonomy - so, Judge Bonomy said, and

9 this is on page 58 yesterday, "Can I be clear about one thing," he said to

10 you,"on the 27th of August, when you observed events at Suva Reka, was

11 Ashdown there?" And you said, "Yes, Your Honour. He was there with the

12 BBC crew and Ambassador Donnelly."

13 Okay. Now, that's not so, is it?

14 A. As I said, sir, I think the dates have been muddled up; and

15 whether we got September or August, you know, our asking me to come back

16 to a date ten years ago.

17 Q. Well, didn't --

18 A. I'm sorry.

19 Q. You haven't reviewed your situation reports for when you met with

20 Lord Ashdown? Don't you know that you have a situation report of -- of 28

21 September 1998, which talks about meeting with Lord Ashdown on 26 and 27th

22 September, 1998? You never met with him in August, and I represent that

23 to you, sir. You never met with him in August?

24 A. It may -- there may have been a -- I need to look at the report

25 sir, with -- frankly and honestly, to answer your question.

1 Q. Okay. Well the report is K0198390. It's a report of a visit by

2 Judge -- by Lord Ashdown in September 26 and 27 of 1998; and the fact is

3 that, as Lord Ashdown has further noted, he's never been in Kosovo during

4 that period.

5 A. Well, then we've got the wrong date, as simple as that. I took

6 Lord Ashdown twice around Kosovo, and he was there with the BBC, who may

7 well have a film of it, of the shelling of Suva Reka and villages to the

8 West?

9 Q. And you did indeed take him around in September and December of

10 1998. We have both of those reports.

11 A. Thank you for informing me. I apologise for the date being

12 wrong.

13 Q. Okay. And by the way, again, in answer to Judge Bonomy's

14 question, you said,"On the 27th of August, when you observed events at

15 Suva Reka, was Ashdown there?" Well, you didn't -- did you observe events

16 at Suva Reka on August 27th? Wasn't that the day of the attache meeting?

17 A. That is my point, sir. We appear to have muddled up a month -- a

18 date by a month, for which I apologise. I was spent an awful lot of my

19 time in Kosovo.

20 Q. And when you were discussing these matters with Ms. Carter, did

21 she point out to you at all any inconsistencies, discrepancies in your

22 prior testimony concerning the alleged turnover of this video to General

23 Ojdanic? Was that discussed at all?

24 A. Not as far as I'm aware, sir, no.

25 Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to get to it that a little bit later, but I

1 just want to clear away a few things here on whether or not you gave the

2 video to -- whether you turned over the video to General Ojdanic. And I

3 respectfully submit to you, sir, that I think you're wrong about that,

4 just like you were wrong about Lord Ashdown. And I'll -- we'll go into

5 why I'm saying that.

6 And by the way, sitting here now, sitting here now, before I get

7 into my questions, are you prepared to concede if I make a sufficient

8 demonstration to you, that you got that wrong, too. That, in fact, you

9 never really showed this video to General Ojdanic?

10 A. No. I represent, as I've said, the video was given to the Vojska

11 Jugoslavija. Whether General Ojdanic or anyone else looked at it, I have

12 no idea.

13 Q. Oh, so you don't even know if he looked at it?

14 A. With great respect, sir, I'm not going to tell a very senior

15 general to look at a video. If he has not or other people or his staff

16 have not looked at it, that is their business. I'm -- you know, it would

17 be extremely inquisitive and rude of me to demand a general or anyone else

18 to look at evidence that he may not wish to see.

19 Q. Then I must have misunderstood your testimony, yesterday, then.

20 You never did see him look at a video?

21 A. I've just said to you, sir. I don't know whether he has ever

22 looked at it. It was handed over as a demonstration that what was being

23 reported on a daily basis by various members of the Attache Association,

24 mainly by myself and other people, that we had evidence that the Vojska

25 Jugoslavija and MUP were carrying out combined operations that were both

1 damaging and not helping the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's cause

2 against an insurgent operation.

3 Q. So, you didn't show this video to General Ojdanic on August 27th

4 1998?

5 A. I presented it to him or to his staff; and what they did with it,

6 I do not know.

7 Q. I presented to him or his staff. There's a difference. There's a

8 difference, sir. Who did you present it to?

9 A. I think at the time Colonel Negovan Jovanovic [Realtime transcript

10 read in error "Negovanovic"], who was the head of FLS, was at this

11 meeting, and I probably gave it to him.

12 Q. So you gave the video to Colonel, give me the name again?

13 A. Colonel Jovanovic.

14 Q. Okay. You didn't give it to General Ojdanic. You gave it could

15 the Colonel?

16 A. I passed it had across to the Foreign Liaison Service, which was

17 headed up by Colonel Jovanovic, through which all Attache Association

18 requests for interviews with various personnel, for permission to move

19 across Yugoslavia, all the staffing was done through the Foreign Liaison

20 Service; therefore, that is the entree, a correct entree, for a Defence

21 attache to present any information he wishes to pass.

22 Q. So sitting here right now, is it fair to say you have no idea

23 whether General Ojdanic ever viewed that video?

24 A. I've just told you that, sir. I -- it was not my job to ask the

25 General to look at a video, because in my army you would be put in clank.

1 MR. SEPENUK: Your Honour, I had a number of questions, I mean

2 lengthy, to go with prior statements and what -- I'm going to forego that

3 right now. And I don't know, if we ever get into a problem here on time,

4 I would like permission to perhaps come back to that because -- and I'll

5 go on to something else now.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: What you're suggesting is if there's time at the

7 tend to come back to it.

8 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, Your Honour, because I have a considerable

9 amount of material on this that I was going to present, quite frankly, to

10 Colonel Crosland, in terms of prior inconsistent statements and that

11 kind -- let me see if can do it in just a few minutes then.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: But I doubt if it's a productive exercise for you,

13 even what's happened so far might be described as a bit of overkill,

14 Mr. Sepenuk, in view of the role that we play here. It's achieved its

15 objective, though, because you've got to something that you might never

16 have discovered, and you may have reached it by accident.

17 And it's an important piece of evidence that the statement

18 yesterday, even in its revised form, still said, before we excluded it

19 completely. "I showed Ojdanic photographic evidence of the VJ shelling

20 Suva Reka." And that's been the main achievement of what your cross has

21 gained so far. There is one question though. I'd like to ask which may

22 alter you view of this.

23 What was it that actually prompted Mr. Ojdanic to say, "force

24 would be met with appropriate force?"

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think it was the very precise

1 information that we were passing to General Ojdanic and the VJ staff, that

2 the VJ was actively engaged in operations with the MUP, and they were

3 providing, as I said yesterday, both the direct fire support from tanks,

4 the indirect from artillery, and mortars. And we had had evidence of

5 that, and this was a very controversial issue in -- in both our -- in our

6 eyes and obviously news that General Ojdanic and the staff did not want to

7 hear.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: And was it at the meeting of defence attaches that

9 you gave the video to Ojdanic.

10 THE WITNESS: As far as I can recall, sir, yes. As I've attempted

11 to explain to Your Honour and the Court, the FLS, the Foreign Liaison

12 Section, was the correct staff entry for a defence attache.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that. I just wondering if it was at

14 that meeting.

15 THE WITNESS: As far as I can recall, sir, that is correct.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

17 MR. SEPENUK: Mr. Visnjic has a comment about the record, Your

18 Honour.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, page 30, line 23, and

20 then line 5 on page 31, Colonel Crosland said the name of the officer that

21 he was liaising with. It should be have been Negovan Jovanovic.

22 THE WITNESS: Correct.

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Just for the transcript. The

24 transcript reflects a different name.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

1 Mr. Sepenuk.

2 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Q. Colonel, I'm going to be getting to the briefing a little bit

4 later on, but before that I want to ask you a few questions about the KLA

5 and get some background for the briefing and generally for the benefit of

6 the Trial Chamber. Is it fair to say that at least by early 1998, there

7 was a genuine fear on the part of the Serbian authorities that the then

8 KLA insurgence movement would gain strength and they would lose control

9 over Kosovo?

10 A. That is quite correct. And I, with the many conversations I had

11 with both General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, attempted to explain,

12 having had considerable experience in dealing with counter-insurgency

13 involvements, that this -- this insurgency was not going to be a simple

14 task to achieve and could take a very long time in both men and materiel

15 and had severe political implications down line. So I think my advice and

16 my -- and unfortunately my prognosis and diagnosis was correct.

17 Q. And do you agree, Colonel, that taking Kosovo out of Serbia is

18 like taking Wales out of England?

19 A. You've taken that from a statement I made.

20 Q. I certainly have?

21 A. That got me into a lot of trouble. Perhaps why my career ended.

22 Q. That is correct, sir?

23 A. That is absolutely correct.

24 Q. And you when the KLA took up arms against the sovereign state of

25 Serbia, Serbia clearly had the right to respond to the terrorist tactics

1 of the KLA?

2 A. This is -- again, you may obtained that from a statement I made.

3 I don't know. But that is entirely my position, and it remains my

4 position to this -- to this very day, sir.

5 Q. I am taking it from a statement. I will say this. I am taking it

6 from the same statement that Mr. O'Sullivan uses. A statement you gave

7 just four months prior to the statement that was submitted by the

8 Prosecution, your October 2006 statement. This other statement was made

9 by you, sir, in June of 2006, prior to the Prosecution who is preparing

10 the Haradinaj trial.

11 And all the Trial Chamber has right now is that one statement you

12 made, October 2006, which only contains about a page, a little over a page

13 on the KLA. And, again, to get a complete picture here for the Trial

14 Chamber, I'm going to refer quite extensively to the statements you gave

15 to the Prosecution in preparation for the Haradinaj case. And just so

16 there's no doubt about it, in your opinion the KLA was indeed a terrorist

17 organisation?

18 A. That is correct, sir.

19 Q. Now, I want to deal with just a few aspects of the KLA and the

20 size, its membership, its weaponry, that kind of thing. And you have it

21 starting out as an insurgent force, which you now agree is, of course, a

22 terrorist operation of some 400 men, which later grew to 3.000 men, or

23 you're not precise, but that's roughly your testimony. And I want to -- I

24 want to go over what you said in your earlier statement, June 30 2006.

25 And in paragraph 42 page 7 of that statement --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

2 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, I believe Mr. Sepenuk is

3 misquoting this witness's testimony. He's been very clear all along he

4 believed there was approximately 400 fighters. He said that repeatedly in

5 the trial. I don't recall any testimony where he said they grew to 3.000

6 men, as noted on page 35, line 8 by Mr. Sepenuk.

7 MR. SEPENUK: Actually, it was in yesterday's testimony. If we go

8 to the break, I can't it right now but it was in yesterday's testimony.

9 And I don't think we need be detained by that Your Honour.

10 With Your Honour's permission, I'll go on.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Colonel Crosland can tell us, again, what he

12 reckons was the ultimate maximum strength of the KLA.

13 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think Mr. Sepenuk is possibly

15 correct. The figure of 3.000 did come came up yesterday. Yesterday is a

16 bit of a blur. I have repeatedly said I -- there was a hard-core of

17 approximately 400. This may have may have grown as the possibility of the

18 KLA being successful or however you want to put it, and therefore it may

19 have grown to a considerable number beyond that. But whether 3.000 -- I

20 would -- I personally would stick with 400 and a lot of hangers-on that

21 can see a victory march in Pristina at the end of the day.

22 MR. SEPENUK:

23 Q. And those hangers-on, I think you opined, yesterday, might have

24 been about 3.000?

25 A. With respect to Ms. Carter, I will accept that as, yeah, as

1 hangers-on. Let's not get too, with respect, hung up about people just

2 wearing uniforms for the sake of it.

3 Q. Okay. Now, on paragraph, again, paragraph 42 of your statement of

4 June 2006, 3D510, you said,.

5 "The KLA started from a very fledgling organisation and matured

6 after the beating they took in the fall of 1998. They responded well by

7 building up their capacity and made quantum leaps when it came to

8 manpower, weapons, structure, et cetera. The KLA definitely had a

9 political and military wing, and they were complementary. In these sense,

10 they were similar to the IRA. The KLA was organised but to call the body

11 at the top a General Staff might be misnaming it."

12 I'm simply asking you, sir, whether that's a true statement. By

13 the way you did state -- in your statement, you said that everything was

14 true to the best of your knowledge and belief.

15 A. Yes. With respect, I made that statement, and I think I made

16 the -- the similarity between the KLA and the IRA because this had come up

17 before. The idea of a General Staff and brigades of KLA throughout the

18 province of Kosovo was, in my humble opinion, something we'd done in

19 various other operations around the world, where we call a brigade, like

20 the Londonderry Brigade is about eight men. A brigade is 3.000. It looks

21 very good on an intelligence map and you might guess, and I am not very

22 keen on some of the intelligence that one is being given during operations

23 that I have taken part in. So I -- I don't say that flippantly. But I

24 say we need to be careful as to the General Staff of the KLA, I think is

25 an overstatement, as I say it here.

1 Q. We'll get to that a little bit later?

2 A. Thank you.

3 Q. And in paragraph 6 of your statement, you said,"The heavy handed

4 response of the Serbian forces definitely played into the hands of the

5 KLA."

6 A. That's correct, sir.

7 Q. "They gained massive support from the diaspora but also from the

8 international community, the international media, et cetera. This support

9 later translated into massive financial assistance that could be used to

10 buy logistical supplies. I have seen some pretty impressive KLA weapons

11 depot, including in Glodjane, Ramush Haradinaj's headquarters." True

12 statement?

13 A. That's correct, sir. And I believe that was in November or

14 September, November of 1998 when, as I think I've said in many statements,

15 there was a quantum improvement, both in the way they behaved, their

16 uniforms, and the armaments that they had -- they had got through the

17 system.

18 Q. But still 400 men, right? You're sticking with that?

19 A. Yes, I would stick with 400, yeah.

20 Q. Even though they had some headquarters in some 24 locations and in

21 your October 31 2006 statement, paragraph 26, Prosecution Exhibit 2645,

22 you mentioned 23 or 4 separate locations where the KLA had headquarters.

23 I won't name all the cities, but you know them, of course: Racak and

24 Malisevo, Junik, Sedlare?

25 A. You're absolutely correct, sir. Twenty-four locations. If there

1 were 15 to 20 in each, then you've got about 400. Now, that's my --

2 Q. Okay. We'll talk a little bit more about that later, too?

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. And then in paragraph 7, you state, "Also, there was a massive

5 influx of volunteers, including foreign nationals; Dutch, French, British

6 et cetera. Ten to 15 percent of the KLA were what I would call hard-core,

7 remaining 85, 90 percent joined out of different reasons ranging from

8 sense of responsibility to a desire to be considered a hero in the end;

9 correct?

10 A. I --

11 Q. You can just say yes or no. You don't have to comment.

12 A. That's entirely correct, sir. And if we look to the march that

13 took place in Kosovo and in Pristina at the end of it, I think that bears

14 out what I'm saying.

15 Q. Okay. And then in paragraph 27 of the statement, you said, "The

16 KLA -- KLA's core members believed in their cause, and they were prepared

17 to do whatever they saw as necessary to reach their goal. There are no

18 angels. Some of them are thugs. From my experience on the ground, it is

19 leer could me that Ramush and his brother were involved in criminal

20 activities."

21 And now I realise I believe that I'm repeating what Mr. O'Sullivan

22 said, that Ramush is up it to his neck and even to this day. And you did

23 make that statement?

24 A. That's correct, sir.

25 Q. Now I also -- I want to move briefly now to the question of KLA

1 tactics, as reflected in this statement, and I'd like to start at

2 paragraph 9, page 3. You said, "The KLA used classic insurgency tactics

3 straight out of Mao Tse-tung's good book. They first established a strong

4 base in the villages, and then basically tried to hold on until NATO

5 intervened. To say that the KLA only had political goals, independence,

6 et cetera, is very naive. They also carried out a policy that was

7 translated on the ground by the military wing of the KLA." You said that,

8 correct, sir?

9 A. That's correct, and that has come to fruition.

10 Q. Okay. And paragraph 43, you state, page 7, 3D510, "In my previous

11 statements, I have talked about a big change in the KLA's level of

12 organisation capacity, which happened in October 1998. I think the

13 international community has to answer questions for that sudden change

14 because it was radical. The KLA filled in the void when the Serbs

15 withdrew in compliance with international agreements. The OSCE's

16 Verification Mission gave them an umbrella under which to operate." Can

17 you explain what you meant by that?

18 A. Yes. I had serious doubts all the way along when the ACTORD from

19 NATO was being signed, and that the three combat groups of the Vojska

20 Jugoslavija correctly and with military precision withdrew back into

21 barracks. I warned the various authorities that if we did not fill the

22 vacuum, then the KLA would fill it.

23 And, in fact, as these three battle groups were moving back to

24 barracks, to Prizren, Pristina, and Urosevac, three MUP were killed just

25 west of Pristina on the road. Now, to the credit of the Serbian security

1 forces, they kept their fingers off the trigger and maintained their

2 discipline.

3 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

4 A. Now, I -- sorry. With respect sir, part of the my reporting, as

5 an extremely experienced and senior officer, is to try and give both

6 political and military knowledge to my seniors, because obviously at this

7 stage there was planning going on for whatever future events may or may

8 not take place. Therefore, one was trying to give, if you will, a broad

9 brush or an overview of the entire situation, because there were very

10 little -- there were very few other people apart from myself actually on

11 the ground at this particular time.

12 Q. Okay. And then finally on this will question of tactics, you say

13 on paragraph 46 of this statement 3D510,"I think that part of the reason

14 why the KLA moved in quickly is the result of a 'jungle drums' factor."

15 Jungle drums in quotes. "In Kosovo, the word spreads real really quickly.

16 Villages are really closely knit. The KLA probably had a good

17 communication system in a technical sense, too. But I think word of mouth

18 contributed to the speediness with which the KLA moved in." Correct, sir?

19 A. That is correct. And I make that statement because very early on

20 in 1996, when I first went down to Kosovo, I was struck by the huge

21 Albanian population; and when I made this statement coming back to

22 Belgrade, it concerned people that the factors of the population were not

23 correct.

24 I mean, people said at the time that the Serbs were still in

25 the -- in the majority and the Albanians in the minority. And from my

1 view of the situation and carrying out, I will readily admit, not a

2 technical census but a fairly good census of going around, most of the

3 villages and speaking to the Albanians, you would go to a house or a

4 village of 20 houses from which you may expect, I don't know, a hundred

5 people you would get 4 or 500 people.

6 And when you multiplied all the villages up, there was some very

7 rough and simple mathematics, which I will accept, but I came out with a

8 figure of nearly 2 million Albanians and about, as I said before, about

9 400.000 Serbs. So it was very clear to me from a very early age or very

10 early in the time I was there, that the Serbs may have been technically in

11 control of the government and other organisations. But the real

12 powerhouse was with the Albanians, and that was factor that I thought my

13 seniors should know about.

14 Q. So a massive Albanian population, being fair to say also, a fairly

15 large number of which may very well have elected to support the KLA in

16 their activities?

17 A. I think sadly the initial percent, as I said yesterday, most

18 Kosovo Albanians there really didn't want either the VJ, the MUP, or the

19 KLA. I'm afraid the -- the very robust actions of the VJ and the MUP did

20 damage in the long-run, many of the Albanians who eventually did turn

21 towards supporting the KLA. Now, that -- I would emphasise that there was

22 an element of fear in that by people like Ramush and that continues today

23 as you're -- you're very well aware.

24 Q. Now, I want to -- on that, I wanted to ask you for your comments

25 on a Prosecution exhibit. It's Exhibit 2136, and what is it is a report

1 of 22 June 1998 by ECMM. And would you tell the Chamber what that stands

2 for. European Community Monitoring Mission; correct?

3 A. Yes, sir. It's a blank memory there.

4 Q. I want to read from part of that exhibit that talks about UCK

5 membership, and remember this is 22 June. And here what it says,

6 Colonel: "Throughout" -- would it help you if I put it up, for you to look

7 at?

8 A. I've got it. Thank you, sir.

9 Q. Okay. And could you scroll up to UCK membership, please. Yes,

10 okay. Little bit higher. Okay. Up -- no. Up. Thank you.

11 Here's what the ECMM group says: "Throughout the pass week, the

12 team has encountered probably more UCK at check-points than Serb and has

13 been greeted by all sorts of individuals from local villagers carrying

14 shotguns to masked UCK declaring themselves as leaders. The gradation of

15 UCK member that we had previously suspected seems correct, with numerous

16 villagers carrying weapons and even boys helping with the construction of

17 trenches.

18 But uniformed membership seems more substantial than first

19 envisaged and is probably the result of more resent recruiting following

20 the expansion of UCK-held territory. The hard-core UCK membership appear

21 almost invariably to have emerged from the diaspora with, a significant

22 number from Germany in particular, Austria, and Switzerland. They are

23 confident and driven and occasionally nervous but nearly always courteous.

24 It seems they are not aware of ECMM and so far have not wished to take

25 advantage of our presence to communicate their wishes.

1 Indeed, the overall impression is that they care little for the

2 international community whom they distrust; and whilst NATO airstrikes

3 might be convenient for them, they have -- they have no intention of

4 waiting for them. The larger family unit, to which an Albanian so often

5 derives support, is still the most plausible overall structure on to which

6 the UCK is attached and will remain their greatest strength. In this way,

7 membership of the UCK becomes unlimited."

8 "In this way, membership in the UCK becomes unlimited."

9 I've repeated it, Colonel. What do you think? Some truth to

10 that?

11 A. With respect, sir, I think I've actually endorsed what you said in

12 this particular report. I mean, in my reports, I said in middle 1998, in

13 technical terms, there were four main routes across Kosovo. Three of

14 those were actually blocked at Rudnik, Lapusnik, and Stimlje, leaving the

15 VJ a mountainous route to get across to Prizren and the western areas. I

16 visited all these three positions. They were manned by 15 to 20 fighters.

17 Compared to what the Vojska Jugoslavija and the MUP had, these

18 positions, I walked through these positions. I saw the trenches. These

19 were shell scrapes. Now, having -- I don't know. I think you have some

20 military service, sir. Certainly, I wouldn't want to be in one of these

21 shell scrapes if shell-fire came down.

22 These were immature and insignificant defensive positions. I made

23 a comment to I think General Velickovic at one stage on a defence attache

24 evening, that I just didn't understand why the Vojska Jugoslavija and the

25 MUP were allowing or technically allowing the UCK to control "about 50

1 percent of Kosovo."

2 Now, what this statement here says from the ECCM [sic], and

3 forgive me I can't remember the date of it.

4 Q. June, June 22nd?

5 A. And the points they make about the exit tended family, I think

6 I've just explained that there was a massive, in relative terms, imbalance

7 between the population; the Kosovo Albanian population and the Serbian

8 population. And many of these had come from -- from Albania, which was in

9 a state of chaos from the 1977 disturbances.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So I would not disagree with that. It's entirely in line with

12 what I've told you on the bigger picture of the KLA and the potential for

13 major numbers to appear. What I go back to is the people who are actually

14 prepared to go out and face a considerable force by the VJ and the MUP,

15 and I would -- I would maintain that the hard-core fighters were still in

16 the region of 400.

17 Q. Okay all right fine?

18 A. But I accept, and I think I've given you evidence, that there was

19 huge potential to draw on, should it become clear that the KLA were going

20 to be successful, how you would like to put the phrase.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Thank you sir.

23 Q. Thank you, Colonel. You've given us your position now on various

24 aspects of the KLA. I'd like now to turn to what the VJ position was.

25 And I'm going to do that by referring to a document dated 28 July 1998.

1 And it's 4D137, and it's a directive signed by General Perisic. It's to

2 the command of the 1st 2nd 3rd Army and other groups to deploy the

3 Yugoslav Army for securing the state border with Albania. Units and

4 facilities in the area of Kosovo and Metohija and crush the armed rebel

5 forces. Again, July 28, 1998, 4D137.

6 Now, in the first paragraph, it states, and again this is an order

7 signed by General Perisic, "The Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija

8 have at their disposal about 15.000 armed personnel, about 5.000 personnel

9 for various forms of logistical support, and approximately another 2.500

10 trained terrorists in the Republic of Albania. In a very short time, the

11 number of terrorists may be increased by another 15.000 people."

12 I will pause. Again, this is signed by General Perisic. You had

13 many meetings, did you not, with General Perisic and his counter

14 intelligence advisor, General Dimitrijevic; is that correct, sir?

15 A. That is correct. And I don't believe these figures were ever

16 presented to me. If they were, I don't recall them. I can only restate

17 that when I was on the ground for most of this time that the figures like

18 this were not borne out by what I saw. And the -- the actions of the KLA

19 then, because for the majority they were, as I've said already many were

20 on the back foot.

21 Q. I simply wanted to put before you what the VJ saw?

22 A. If that's what their Chief of Staff says, then fine.

23 Q. Okay. Now you also, again, had a number of meetings with General

24 Dimitrijevic?

25 A. Correct, sir.

1 Q. And a very good relationship with him?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Considered him a fairly good intelligence officer?

4 A. I think he'd been a long time in the position.

5 Q. Right. And he had very good intelligence on the KLA, didn't he?

6 A. That's what I've said.

7 Q. Right. And some of the intelligence was in the form of

8 interception of KLA communications?

9 A. The -- the Vojska Jugoslavija and the MUP were extremely good on

10 the counter -- on the electronic intelligence, in the end, yes.

11 Q. Well, General Dimitrijevic, on 21 January, 1999, in the 9th

12 session of the collegium of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army,-

13 Prosecution Exhibit 939, said, on pages 17 and 18 of that document, he

14 said -- he had a map there, and he said,"These blue areas are sectors

15 controlled by the so-called KLA. As you can see from this diagram, the

16 approximate number of people armed and organised into units is between 12

17 and 15.000."

18 That was the assessment of General Dimitrijevic, who you agree is

19 a pretty good intelligence officer with pretty good contacts in

20 determining KLA membership. Okay, sir?

21 A. Yes, sir. I accept what you're saying. That the fact is on the

22 ground, we did not see 12 to 15.000. I -- throughout my life, I'm

23 interested in reporting facts as accurately, and with the experience that

24 I've had not in blowing up the picture for whichever side wishes to blow

25 up that particular picture.

1 Now, what General Dimitrijevic says, fine. I've never seen this

2 document before, I don't believe. I'm seen a hell of a lot of documents,

3 and I'm not certain I've seen this one. But if he made that statement,

4 then I accept it. But I'm saying what I personally saw in the time that I

5 toured throughout the area was -- was, again, about 400 hard-core

6 terrorists. The fact that you could add onto that through the extended

7 family very, very quickly up into the thousands, as happened when Pristina

8 was freed, then I think bears out what I am saying.

9 Q. Okay. Now, General, I want to -- Colonel --

10 A. That's a very quick promotion, sir, but I'll accept it. Thank

11 you.

12 Q. The open thing higher is lord?

13 A. We'll wait for that for next new year's honours.

14 Q. The 3D511 is next exhibit I'd like to discuss with you. I will

15 say as a slight aside, Colonel, and this is very little levity in the

16 trial. All the members of the Defence team refer to each other as

17 general, so I'm into that habit?

18 A. I've obviously joined the wrong army, sir.

19 Q. Now, 3D511 is a meeting of 25 June 1998 with you, if that could be

20 put up. And it's a record of a meeting that you had with General

21 Jovanovic? Is that the same general you spoke about before, the general

22 you allegedly handed the video to?

23 A. He's not a general, but a colonel.

24 Q. Not a general, but a colonel. If I said general, I am blaming my

25 colleagues, Mr. Ivetic.

1 A. I wish they had made him a general. He was a very good friend.

2 Q. A very good friend, and I take it a good and honest man of

3 integrity?

4 A. Yes. He, actually, was one of the last couple of Vojska

5 Jugoslavija officers to be trained in our Staff College.

6 Q. So the summary he gave your meeting is more likely than not to be

7 accurate; correct?

8 A. If I may have a look at it.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Apart from my name being spelt wrong.

11 Q. I'll just start, and we'll read it together as we go along.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And it says here, "The main views given at the meeting," and he

14 says, "The so-called KLA," this is his meeting with you on June 25, 1998,

15 "is increasingly revealing its fundamental characteristic of a terrorist

16 organisation which has no qualms in liquidating its members for the

17 slightest disobedience. Something that has become more apparent

18 recently."

19 A. Yes. Sorry. I would accept that entirely that there was a

20 vicious -- as I've made clear in statements, the discipline was harshly

21 enforced at times, and people who were not pro the organisation were at

22 considerable risk.

23 Q. All right. And if you don't mind a detour, Colonel, and you can

24 stop looking at that exhibit, I do want to go back. I'm sorry to say

25 omitted a few questions on the prior exhibit, which was, again, 4D137.

1 We'll get back to 3D511 very shortly, but if the usher could put back up

2 4D137.

3 Now, we discuss numbers and General Dimitrijevic's figure of 15 --

4 of some 13, 15.000, whatever it was.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. In the second paragraph there, it says, "By carrying out terrorist

7 activities in Kosovo and Metohija, the terrorists have succeeded in taking

8 control of about 30 percent of the territory; the general area of Drenica,

9 Malisevo, Studencani, Blace, and the area of Jasik, Junik, Smonica, as

10 well as Pristina, Glodjane, and Jablanica." Correct? "And spread their

11 influence to about 40 percent of the territory."

12 A. That's exactly in line with what I forecast, sir, yes.

13 Q. Okay. In fact in your statement of 30 June 2006, in paragraph 23,

14 you said,"During the same period in the summer of 1998, the KLA

15 technically controlled about 70 percent of Kosovo. I say technically

16 because they could stage insurgency attacks on the Serbs on this

17 territory."

18 You go on to say,"Of course, the situation was very fluid and the

19 percentage changed over time. I explained this more fully in the daily

20 reports that I wrote, which are attached to my Professor statements."

21 Fair enough?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. And in the third paragraph, the general, says this, the order says

24 this, the directive, "In order to accomplish their goals," in fact, why

25 you don't you read it, sir. You read it, since you're much better at

1 pronouncing these names than I am?

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk, I hope you are bearing the time in

3 mind, because you're expanding this cross examination to quite an extent

4 by a fair bit of repetition and also by reading things, where you could

5 pose focused questions rather than putting up documents and reading them

6 out and asking the witness whether he agrees. The questions could be much

7 more focused for our purposes. Of course, if you're going to be able to

8 do it within the time that you expect to have, fine. But I suspect you

9 may have difficulty.

10 MR. SEPENUK: I'll shorten it, Your Honour. Let me just let me

11 just skip to the paragraph 2 -- page 2, about the Yugoslav Army's

12 deployment so far. And it says, "The Yugoslav Army has undertaken

13 specific measures against terrorism," and I'm going to be very brief here

14 now. And I will quote now, directly, the following language, "Through its

15 presence and by carrying out the training in the entire territory of

16 Kosovo and Metohija, the army has had a repelling effect with regard to

17 the Siptar Albanian terrorist forces, and it has offered direct assistance

18 to the forces of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia."

19 Is that correct, sir.

20 A. That's what's written there, sir, yes.

21 Q. Okay. And did you have discussion was General Perisic about this,

22 about the KLA, and about the MUP and VJ working together?

23 A. I -- yes. We did, yes.

24 Q. And General Dimitrijevic, also?

25 A. Yep.

1 Q. Okay. And this is in line with that, correct?

2 A. That is what is what is written here, and I would agree with the

3 majority of it. What exactly happens on the ground, as I've said before

4 sometimes, it sometimes doesn't bear out what happens here. But we'll see

5 what is brought before me.

6 Q. All right. Let's go back now to 3D511. That's your meeting with

7 Colonel Jovanovic. And in page 2 of that meeting, summarised by the

8 colonel, he says this: "The situation" -- he said, that you said, "The

9 situation is also rendered more complex by the fact that in Kosovo

10 Metohija, there is no front line separating the two opposed forces, but

11 instead that there are terrorist groups which set up base mostly in

12 settled place with an ethnically pure population supportive of the idea of

13 Kosovo, a republic."

14 And by that, very briefly, Colonel, you meant what?

15 A. Exactly what I what has been written here, and I think I made the

16 statement to the Court this morning. I was extremely concerned that

17 the -- the total imbalance of the population of Kosovo, Albanian to Serb,

18 with this insurgency movement was not going to be an easily problem to

19 solve. I think I've state that had that on several occasions.

20 And with this meeting having gone back to the United Kingdom, I

21 made it clear to various people I briefed - and they are all in the front

22 paragraph there, some very senior people - that we had an extremely

23 difficult problem which was not going to be solved easily.

24 Q. So you were extremely concerned, and needless to say, the VJ was

25 also extremely concerned.

1 A. Understandably, yes.

2 Q. Yes. And then finally on this document, number 4 on page 2,

3 paragraph 4, and it says,

4 "The main reason why the MZ international community failed to

5 characterize the KLA as a terrorist organisation is the impact that the

6 mass media and reporting from Kosovo Metohija have, which is still in

7 favour of the Albanians, in connection with this he," meaning you, Colonel

8 Crosland, "suggested that the officials of the government of Serbia be

9 more aggressive in their interviews and an in official comments on events

10 when talking to international reporters and TV channels."

11 Do you remember that?

12 A. Yeah. And I also would ask you to look at the at the -- four

13 paragraph four -- the third paragraph: "This is not the first time that

14 Colonel Crosland has tried to convince us that he's been doing his utmost

15 to have an objective view of the Kosovo situation adopted in Great Britain

16 and broader by the multi-international organisations. He insisted these

17 view were also shared by Ambassador Donnelly."

18 So I think that's entirely in line with the overall picture that

19 I've been trying to paint of a fair and firm assessment of what is going

20 on throughout this period in Kosovo.

21 Q. Including that Serbian officials should be a little bit more

22 aggressive in presenting their case; correct?

23 A. Absolutely. Because we had up until then, I think very little-- I

24 think we had one or maybe two briefings to show or to put together the

25 Vojska Jugoslavija - we were accredit to them only - their view. I did

1 say that I thought there was mileage in making this a message to the

2 Attache Association which included all the attaches.

3 With respect, sir, I must remind you that only some of the NATO

4 attaches, about six countries, were actually touring and, therefore, had

5 the intimate knowledge that I had. So the question of trying to inform

6 the international community and the Albanians were without doubt very much

7 better at informing the diaspora to support them in this project.

8 Q. And on August 27 1998, which was now the briefing by General

9 Ojdanic of the defence attaches, didn't he adopt some of the points you

10 were making? He talked about a double standard. He talked about the --

11 blaming the international community blaming the VJ, when in fact much of

12 the blame rested on the KLA, that kind of thing. He said that, didn't he?

13 A. Well, when you go back to the report, I said I was fairly

14 condemning about the report. I think I said it was a wooden briefing, and

15 also that his remark at the end of it, "force would be met with force,"

16 which I took rightly or wrongly - and I can stand corrected on that - that

17 the same very harsh -- harsh military manoeuvres - I would call them crude

18 with respect - which were being displayed on the international media, were

19 you not doing the Serbian cause any good.

20 And that is the point, with respect, sir, which I think has to be

21 made; that the media now is incredibly invasive and intensive on military

22 operations.

23 Q. Colonel, please, just answer -- please, just listen to my

24 question. He did say that the international community was applying a

25 double standard, that it was not condemning terrorism by the KLA but was

1 focusing on acts of the Serbs. Didn't he say that?

2 A. I believe he did, and I've actually agreed with you on that case.

3 And I made the point when I made the point to my own Ministry of Defence

4 that the -- the Serbian viewpoint was way behind in intensity of that

5 being produced by the Kosovo Albanian and the diaspora at large, which was

6 supporting them massively in both finance and manpower.

7 Q. Okay. And he said forth -- we don't go into this. Again, I think

8 there was ample detail on it, yesterday. He set forth the duties of the

9 VJ, four duties. And you agree with all of them, don't you?

10 A. Yes. They make military sense.

11 Q. They make military sense?

12 A. It was nice to hear that he was now accepting what we've been

13 telling him, yeah.

14 Q. You don't think he would have come to that conclusion -- in other

15 words, you told him that what you got to do is protect VJ installations

16 and protect --

17 A. With respect, there was -- without being rude to the Court, I

18 think we're slightly splitting hairs here. As a military man, one

19 respects that General Ojdanic, as a professional soldier, was carrying out

20 his duties per se. It was nice to hear him send -- admit that the VJ's

21 main tasks had now changed, quite understandably, in the view that the

22 situation had deteriorated as we were going along. So I have no problem

23 with that at all, sir.

24 Q. And the MUP needed help, correct?

25 A. Yes. I think I stated that. From General Dimitrijevic, yes.

1 Q. All right. And he -- at the conference, he said that the MUP and

2 the VJ were cooperating, primarily to protect lines of communication. You

3 have no trouble with that, do you?

4 A. I don't have any trouble with it.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. That is the fact.

7 Q. All right.

8 A. It was the way it was being carried out.

9 Q. All right. And you pointed out -- now we no know you didn't show

10 him the video, but apparently you say you orally pointed out to him about

11 observing direct indirect fire, which was creating not a good situation,

12 and the General agreed.

13 A. Yes, he did. He got this from me then, and then he, I would

14 presume, when I met with General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, they

15 would have passed on the concerns, without blowing my own trumpet, of

16 probably one of the most experienced DAs there. So I think my views were

17 listened to, as someone who is attempting to give both a fair and firm

18 report on what was going on in an increasingly complex and difficult

19 situation, sir.

20 MR. SEPENUK: That's all I have, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Sepenuk. Good timing.

22 We need to break now, Mr. Crosland, for half an hour or so. We'll

23 go into closed session while you leave the courtroom.

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 [Closed session]

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

10 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Crosland.

13 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.

14 Q. I'm Djuro Cepic, one of the lawyers for General Lazarevic, and I'm

15 going to have a few questions for you.

16 Mr. Crosland, in the statement that you provided in June 2006, in

17 paragraph 8, you pointed out that the KLA, in the course of 1998, pursued

18 a policy of ethnic cleansing. Further on, you say that there is no doubt

19 the entire region west of Decani has been cleaned by the KLA from all the

20 non-Albanians. When you mentioned that region, did you also imply Junik?

21 A. Good morning, sir. I'm trying to recall that certainly the area,

22 the mountain area along the frontier between Albania and Kosovo at that

23 particular time, the villages I saw had been destroyed. Junik, I think,

24 was still in the hands of Kosovo Albanians, I believe, KLA. I don't know

25 whether that answers your question entirely or not.

1 Q. I believe so. Thank you. And it was about the ethnic cleansing

2 by the KLA, and you adhere by what you said in your statement that you

3 provided in June 2006.

4 A. That's correct, sir, and I think the -- the villages there in that

5 area, in the very mountainous areas, led directly to well-worn paths which

6 went back to Albania, from where the KLA was receiving its resupply.

7 Q. Can we then say that the axis across Junik was actually one of the

8 most strategic points for the KLA when it came to the supply with weapons

9 and replenishing their ranks with men? Wouldn't that be correct, sir?

10 A. You are correct, sir. That was one the main areas, as well as

11 Pastrik as well to the south by Djakovica. I'm sorry, not Djakovica, but

12 Prizren.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland. Paragraph 12 of your statement, dating

14 October 2006, you say that a majority of the villages in the region

15 especially Junik was razed in spring of 1998. What part of spring? What

16 time of spring was it when Junik was razed? Was it maybe the May, the

17 month of May of that year?

18 A. Without referring directly back to what -- to what I said, sir,

19 I'm not entirely certain. But there was an ongoing battle raging across

20 the Junik, Ponosevac, Prilep, Rznic area for about three months, and there

21 was extremely intense activity by both sides. Because, as you said, there

22 was an area of strategic importance to the KLA and was one of Ramush

23 Haradinaj's key areas.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: That was a reference, I think, to paragraph 41 of

25 the statement.

1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 MR. CEPIC: Now, Your Honour, if you allow me, paragraph 12, last

3 sentence.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. By spring, it was April, May, June, July. The

5 battleground, if I may call it that, raged for about three to four months

6 over this area because of its key issue to both sides. It was an area

7 which the MUP and the VJ required to hold. And they had, if you will, a

8 quasi-front line which went down the road from Pec through Decani down to

9 Djakovica, which was an attempt to keep a, what I would call, a thin red

10 line, and then to try and exclude the border area from incursion mainly

11 from Albania. So I would accept your statement, sir.

12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. During the period that you've just mentioned and further on, Junik

14 itself was held by the strong KLA forces, wouldn't that be right?

15 A. I think, I'm correct, in thinking, sir, that it was held. And at

16 one stage when we went into -- on several occasions, when we visited

17 there, it may have been retaken by your own forces. But if we're asking

18 specific details, then I need to look back at specific reports, sir. But

19 I think the situation was fairly fluid in that area.

20 Q. Mr. Crosland, during the period between the 20th and 25th of June,

21 1998, Mr. Holbrooke visited Junik. His visit was covered by many

22 international agencies. And in those footages, you can see a single

23 destroyed house, which means that the village was completely intact at the

24 time. Am I right in saying that?

25 A. I recall the picture. I also recall him sitting with a KLA

1 soldier, which caused intense anger within Yugoslavia. Whether there was

2 one house which was standing, I don't recall that particular picture. But

3 when I visited the place, there was -- there was considerable damage, and

4 that was throughout this period of flux and fighting in this particular

5 area.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I think Mr. Cepic's point is -- has been lost in

7 translation. Your point was that there was no house damage, is that it,

8 or are you saying there was one house dammed?

9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Not a single one was damaged, as far

10 as you could see in those footages.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: This is a very specific point. He's saying that in

12 late June 1998, that village was intact.

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that may well have been correct. It

14 certainly wasn't intact when I saw it.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, can you help us with when you saw it?

16 THE WITNESS: Well I -- well, I stated, in paragraph 12, most

17 villages in this region particularly Junik were razed in spring 1998. The

18 point I'm trying to make, Your Honour, is that during this period, there

19 was a flux of fighting which occurred in and around Junik, which was a key

20 point. And during this period of the spring, Junik was systematically

21 destroyed.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: The point is being put to you is that in June,

23 which I think we can call the summer, Junik was intact.

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I would disagree with that, sir.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Now Mr. Cepic is going to show us the film.

1 MR. CEPIC: [In English] Unfortunately, I haven't got that film

2 with me, but probably we will show to this Honourable Trial Chamber during

3 the Defence case. And also I can show something -- something from our

4 collection of potential evidence of exhibits.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

6 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can the Registrar now prepare 5D99,.

7 Q. And during -- while this is being done, Mr. Crosland, do you know

8 that on the 15th of August, 1998, the KLA forces were neutralised in

9 Junik?

10 A. Again, sir, I would -- I would not accept "neutralised," as such.

11 I did -- I think they did suffer a reverse. But in my in my opinion, and

12 for what it is worth, throughout Kosovo we had a very flexible situation

13 for most of the time, where there would be Serbian security force advance

14 and clearance of various areas, and then they would move out and the KLA

15 would regroup.

16 Now, if we start picking individual dates, as I said, it was a

17 very flexible situation, which I think I've indicated in several reports,

18 and we've spoken about during this hearing anyway. So I don't question

19 your date, sir, at all. All I'm saying is that in my opinion, it was a

20 flexible, manoeuvrable feast, if you will, where sometimes the KLA was in

21 the ascendance and other times the Serbian security forces were in

22 evidence. And I can't say any more than that.

23 Q. Mr. Crosland, I have a lot of questions. That is why I'm going to

24 put them in a very clear and concise way, and I would also like to ask you

25 for your cooperation and for as short answers as possible.

1 On the 16th of August, the village of Junik was visited by a

2 number of foreign diplomats in order to see what the situation was really

3 like, and they didn't find Junik to be razed or destroyed. Are you

4 familiar with that? Do you know anything about that?

5 A. As I said, there was a picture with Mr. Holbrooke in which there

6 was a member of the KLA, which upset, severely upset --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: That was June, Mr. Crosland. We have to move

8 ahead. We're talking about 16th of August, and the point is being made

9 that there was an international visit then and, again, the village was not

10 destroyed. Now, what I think we're trying to get to is the point at which

11 you have seen this village destroyed, but it doesn't seem that you're able

12 to remember that.

13 THE WITNESS: I'm not able to remember it, sir, without referring

14 to specific reports.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Were you not invited by the Prosecution in

16 preparation for your evidence here to do that exercise; go over the

17 reports, and look at your statement in the light of -- or compile a

18 statement in the light of that?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I was. But as you're I'm sure

20 aware, sir, with respect, there have been many statements that are being

21 made, and we may not have covered this particular area. For which, I

22 apologise.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Except for paragraph 12 says, very clearly,

24 "particularly, Junik was razed in the spring of 1998." That looks like a

25 specific piece of information that you were conveying.

1 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, I stand by what I say. If that is

2 against what Mr. Cepic is staying, then we have a disagreement, sir.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. On the screen, you have one of the reports by the army of

6 Yugoslavia, to be more precise by the 3rd Army. And if you look at the

7 last paragraph of that report, the commander of the army, which at the

8 time was General Samardzic, stated that Junik had not been destroyed, that

9 it wasn't razed, that there were no civilian victims, that there were no

10 mass graves for which the world was accusing the Serbian side. These are

11 the facts that nobody ever disputed.

12 A. Sir, I don't dispute what is said here. I didn't give this --

13 this briefing. I cannot be responsible for what the mass media produces.

14 I made my specific reports at the time that I saw Junik under heavy fire.

15 The place was razed. Now, that was in the spring of 1998. I'm sorry, I

16 can't be more specific than that. That's all I can really offer on this

17 particular subject.

18 Q. Mr. Crosland, I believe that you know Colonel Ciaglinski, a member

19 of the Kosovo Verification Commission and a colonel of the UK army?

20 A. I know him, yes, sir, Yeah.

21 Q. Did you communicate with him during his tour of duty in Kosovo?

22 A. I believe he was the military -- military aide to General DZ, or

23 Drewienkiewicz, as we said. I think I was responsible for the briefing of

24 the Kosovo Verification Mission when they arrived in Belgrade and for

25 introducing them down into Kosovo; and then obviously under Ambassador

1 Walker and General DZ, as we call him, they deployed their forces into

2 Kosovo. But I would -- I would not say that we had frequent contact

3 between us, as far as I'm able to recall.

4 Q. That meeting when you met them took place on Saturday, the 17th

5 October, 1998, at the British embassy in Belgrade. Wouldn't that be

6 correct?

7 A. Sir, if you say so, that is correct. I don't -- I don't

8 specifically recall that. But, as I've said to you already, we -- we

9 carried out a briefing prior to their deployment, and I then went with

10 them on their deployment into the area and then left them to -- to sort

11 their own modus operandi out.

12 Q. Mr. Crosland, Colonel Ciaglinski testified in this courtroom in

13 this same case and confirmed that on the 24th of January, 1999, he had

14 visited Junik, that he had spoken to the villagers there, and that the

15 villagers had not pointed out anything of importance to him. Can we

16 believe his words and to what he saw and noticed at the time when he was

17 there?

18 A. Sir, as I can say, I have stated here, and as far as my memory is

19 correct, that there was -- there was considerable damage in the area of

20 Junik.

21 Q. Very well. Thank you. Do you know that in the summer of 1998, in

22 the month of July, a team of the High Commissioner For Refugees visited

23 the area, visited Djakovica and spoke to the representatives of the army,

24 and that they expressed their gratitude with regards to the army's

25 behaviour? Are you familiar with that?

1 A. I'm not familiar with that exact statement, no, sir.

2 Q. Do you know that the High Commissioner For Refugees of the United

3 Nations, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, visited Kosmet in December, that she visited

4 Prizren, Pec, and Decani? That was in 1998, in December 1998. Are you

5 familiar with that fact?

6 A. I'm not -- I'm not familiar with the fact she visited, and there

7 were many, many organisations visiting all the time, some of which we

8 communicated with and many which we did not. But at this particular

9 stage, if your point is --

10 Q. Thank you. I believe that you know Mr. Shaun Byrnes, who was the

11 representative of the American KDOM?

12 A. Yes. I do, sir, yeah.

13 Q. Do you know that on the 21st of October, 1998, he visited the

14 command of the Pristina Corps in Pristina, and that he expressed his

15 satisfaction with the behaviour of the army of Yugoslavia, to be more

16 precise, of the Pristina Corps?

17 A. Well, sir --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the answer to that must be yes or no.

19 THE WITNESS: With respect, sir, I'm being forced into a position

20 here.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Please answer that question for me, yes or no,

22 because I'm going to deal with this issue.

23 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether that happened or not, sir.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the answer is no, you don't know.

25 Now, Mr. Cepic, we've had this situation before. This is what I

1 describe as Milosevic-style cross-examination. You are making

2 propositions that you know perfectly well the witness is not going to be

3 able to say anything about. And if you think it is necessary to do that

4 because it's somehow or remember presenting your case - and I know there's

5 a rule about that - then please don't feel obliged to do so. It's a quite

6 unnecessary way of cross-examining a witness. You should deal with things

7 that you know he will be able to comment on properly. Thank you.

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. With your

9 leave, I would like to offer a sentence for basis of this question was

10 fact that Mr. Shaun Byrnes and Mr. Crosland were the representatives of

11 their respective KDOMs. And I believe they communicated closely during

12 their tour of duty in Kosovo. That was the basis of examination even in

13 the Milosevic trial. Thank you.

14 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Crosland, you mentioned the shelling of Malisevo,

15 and you said that it had happened in mid-July. You did not cross paths

16 with the Serb forces. You left Malisevo and you left them on the road to

17 Malisevo. Were you on your way back from the KLA headquarters at the time

18 when this happened?

19 A. I went into Malisevo on two occasions, if I remember correctly.

20 One where I was taken by the KLA into Malisevo, and as I said in my

21 evidence, I was there for two hours detained by the KLA, who didn't accept

22 the licna karta that I held under allegiance to the Vojska Jugoslavija.

23 On the second occasion, I went back into Malisevo, and I met this

24 joint Vojska Jugoslavija and met this MUP force as stated. As I stated, I

25 then went back a third time with the G8 ambassadors, and Malisevo, the

1 area of the marketplace, and most of the housing had been completely

2 destroyed.

3 Q. Mr. Crosland, I asked you a very specific question, and I would

4 kindly ask for a specific answer. You said, yesterday, that in mid-July,

5 Malisevo had come under the attack of the Serb forces and that you saw the

6 forces on the way back from Malisevo. My specific question was whether,

7 at that moment, you were on your way back from the KLA headquarters. In

8 other words, had you been there before that? Yes or no?

9 A. As I said to you already, sir, I've been to Malisevo. I was

10 interrogated in the KLA headquarters there, which was to the left-hand

11 side of the road, close to where the MUP station was eventually produced,

12 in a house that is decorated with animals and all sorts of things. And I

13 then came back up the road and found a Serbian force about or very shortly

14 about to assault the place.

15 Q. And you did not stop. You didn't stay on. You just kept on

16 moving.

17 A. I think, sir, I said on --

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. -- [Previous translation continues] ... that I met. It's written

20 out there for your information, sir.

21 Q. So you actually did not witness the operation itself, did you?

22 You didn't see it?

23 A. No. Of course, I did not see the operation because --

24 Q. Thank you.

25 A. -- we were asked to leave the area. I then took the G8

1 ambassadors back into Malisevo which, as I said, had been very heavily

2 damaged.

3 Q. Now, you've said that you were kept in Malisevo. You were kept

4 there at least twice. At least twice, you were held prisoner by the KLA.

5 You were kept there for a certain period of time. You were detained.

6 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. On one occasion, you were interrogated by a member of the KLA who,

8 according to you, hailed from Middle East, and he was very rough with you.

9 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

10 Q. Thank you. On the other occasion, you were detained, together

11 with a French diplomat?

12 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to another topic. Since we've started

14 talking about shelling, yesterday, you told us that you had witnessed the

15 four-hour shelling. What places did you see being shelled? You claim

16 that you saw Junik, Glodjane, Prilep, Ponosevac, all of these being

17 shelled. Is that correct?

18 A. That is correct, sir. We were on the west-hand side of the road

19 leading from Djakovica north to Decani within certainly sight of Junik,

20 and the multi-rocket launcher battalion was firing from lake Radonjicko.

21 That was coming directly over our head. That conversation went from

22 direct satellite phone back to our foreign secretary who was in the

23 government as Richard's -- Foreign Secretary Cook at the time. That was

24 obviously not a written report. It was an immediate verbal report about

25 the intensity of what was going on.

1 Q. At the moment when you were watching the shelling of Junik did you

2 also see the other places being shelled, Ponosevac, Suva Reka, Glodjane?

3 A. These areas were worked over, to put it in military terms, from

4 time to time. And on this occasion I believe that they -- they were also

5 included in this area. It was -- it was a very -- if I may say so, it was

6 an extremely dangerous area and, as I've said already, it was an area

7 freaked by the KLA and one can understand the concern the Serbian forces.

8 What I've said all way along is that the severity of what was -- what was

9 fired is that -- is that -- what is at issue from my point of view.

10 That's a personal position.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland. You have just confirmed that you

12 yourself saw the shelling of Junik, Glodjane, Ponosevac, Suva Reka, Prilep

13 from the point where you were standing for four hours. Can I please show

14 you a map so that you can indicate the point where you were standing from

15 which you could see all these locations. Can we please see the Exhibit

16 3D388, and can this please be shown to the witness.

17 On page 67, line 12, in addition to Junik, Glodjane, Ponosevac, I

18 also mentioned Suva Reka, but I am afraid that this last name has been

19 omitted from the transcript.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: It's correct further down, I think. It's referred

21 to in line 23.

22 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 THE WITNESS: Suva Reka cannot be seen from that position. That

24 is a mistake that has crept in. Suva Reka is way, way to the east on the

25 road back to Pristina through Prizren, some 30 to 40 kilometres direct

1 line of site.

2 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Maybe even 70, I'd say?

4 A. Maybe more.

5 Q. In other words, from the point where you were standing you could

6 not see the shelling. You could only hear the sound of the shells being

7 fired probably, or maybe you saw something but not the actual shelling.

8 A. I'm not sure where Suva Reka has come from. It may be in The

9 Hague a joint report. When I was reporting on the four-hour shelling from

10 the multi-rocket launcher battalion based on the southern shores of the

11 lake Radonjicko, you could see the strike of -- of shell-fire going into

12 the area of Junik and into Prilep and the Glodjane area. Now, having been

13 under shell-fire myself, you don't have to say can I see the shells

14 landing? Well, probably not. But the damage that I saw in that area was

15 commensurate with heavy shell-fire.

16 The Suva Reka incident I believe was part of the discussion we had

17 this morning when Lord Ashdown was with us and Ambassador Donnelly. The

18 Suva Reka firing came from the area of Blace which is -- which is an

19 artillery position in the middle of the area.

20 Q. Let's just deal with this right now. It's not that you saw this.

21 You just came to this conclusion on the basis of what you were hearing,

22 the sounds that you heard, what it was that was being shelled; right?

23 A. That is -- that is not correct, sir. As I said, I have been under

24 shell-fire, and the shell -- the multi-rocket launcher battalion were

25 firing more or less directly over our head into the area of Junik and then

1 towards Prilep as well. These are 122-millimetre rockets. They make one

2 hell of a noise, and they land with considerable power.

3 Q. But you were not at that artillery position. Isn't that right?

4 A. With respect, sir, of course I wasn't at that position. We found

5 where that position was.

6 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 14 of your statement from October 2006, you

7 say that members of all units, the VJ, the JSO, PJP, and SAJ involved in

8 Kosovo wore bandannas around their heads and other types of non-standard

9 kit to varying degrees.

10 My question: Can you tell us whether you ever saw members of the

11 army of Yugoslavia with bandannas around their heads?

12 A. During the period I was down there, there were several means of

13 identification that were being used by the Serbian security forces, and

14 that amounted to --

15 Q. Could you please just be specific, Mr. Crosland. I put a specific

16 question. Did you ever see members of the army of Yugoslavia wearing

17 bandannas around their heads? Yes or no?

18 A. In the period of time that I was in -- in Kosovo the answer is

19 yes. Specifically, I cannot recall.

20 Q. So you cannot give the time or place or position where you saw

21 them.

22 A. I've just answered your question, sir.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland. My learned friend Mr. Sepenuk,

24 General Sepenuk, asked you about tactics of the KLA, and I would like to

25 add something about the tactics of the army of Yugoslavia. You probably

1 know that the tactics of the army of Yugoslavia is defined by the rules of

2 combat; right?

3 A. I understand that to be correct, yes.

4 Q. Are you familiar with the rules of combat of the army of

5 Yugoslavia?

6 A. I believe this is a very leading question. What -- what happened

7 in -- in Kosovo as I've already stated many times was a disproportionate

8 use of force against an insurgent operation.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, I don't think you need to be quite so

10 defensive about something like this. The rules of combat presumably exist

11 in a documentary form, and the question is: Were you familiar with that

12 document.

13 THE WITNESS: I was never shown this documentary form to the best

14 of my knowledge.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So there you are. The answer's no.

16 Mr. Cepic.

17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Do you know that the army of Yugoslavia extended support only

19 during the neutralisation of strong KLA strongholds? And we heard about

20 that in this courtroom. We heard a number of testimonies to that effect.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Cepic, that is not an appropriate

22 formulation for a question. If you want to be specific and put some

23 particular testimony that has a direct bearing on what the witness can

24 tell us, then that's fine, but you know that his evidence throughout its

25 two days so far has been to the effect that the support was not confined

1 to the neutralisation of strong KLA strongholds.

2 Now, if you want to challenge that in some specific way, then

3 please do so, but that general proposition you've made is plainly

4 inconsistent with the evidence he's been giving.

5 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave just one

6 sentence. Protected witnesses in this courtroom, K79, K25, did testify to

7 that effect, that the army had not been used in most of the actions that

8 they were carrying out. That was only part of the material corroborating

9 what I have been saying, and that is exactly what I asked Mr. Crosland

10 about just now.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: But you know that that's not been his evidence, and

12 you've asked him a very general question that is quite simply inconsistent

13 with his evidence. But if you want to put any particular point about the

14 way in which the army was used based on the other evidence, then you may

15 do that. But these witnesses, none of them was an expert. None of them

16 was in every part of Kosovo. None of them followed in the wake of

17 Mr. Crosland to make sure they're speaking about the same events. So that

18 approach to the cross-examination is not going to clarify anything in the

19 witness's evidence or undermine it in any way. So let's please ask him

20 questions of what he has direct knowledge of.

21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Paragraph 17 of your statement you say that it was your impression

23 that when you providing heavy fire support the VJ or MUP would use radio

24 communications to warn the KLA that an attack was imminent, thereby

25 allowing the population of the village to leave. So that is paragraph 17

1 of your statement.

2 My question: According to international standards is this not

3 regular procedure to caution the civilian population of possible combat

4 action that is to take place?

5 A. I think with respect, Your Honour, we're muddling up two things

6 here. The first point is --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: If I can explain it. I thought that paragraph was

8 a comment that was favourable to -- to the VJ and the MUP. What you then

9 say about the extent of damage is another matter.

10 THE WITNESS: That's exactly my point, sir.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: You weren't criticising them for warning the

12 population that they might be in the firing-line.

13 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

14 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. In accordance with the instructions of the Honourable Presiding

16 Judge, I'm going to ask you about a specific situation. As I already

17 said, Colonel Ciaglinski testified in this courtroom, and he mentioned an

18 army action along the Pristina-Nis road near the village Lebane on the

19 15th of March, 1999. Previously four colonels had been wounded along the

20 same road, and the army, in order to neutralise the attackers, launched an

21 action of searching those villages. Mr. Ciaglinski's assessment was that

22 it was carried out professionally and according to high standards.

23 Do you agree that Colonel Ciaglinski is competent to make an

24 assessment regarding professional behaviour?

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't answer that, because what this leads

1 to is going round the witnesses asking them whether other witnesses are

2 competent to deal with things. It's for us to judge the competence or

3 otherwise of Colonel Ciaglinski. This witness has made it clear that his

4 knowledge of him is limited, and we probably know more than he does about

5 the things you really need to know about to make a judgement.

6 The only way in which this could begin to be relevant would be if

7 this witness was present on the same occasion.

8 Were you at this event?

9 THE WITNESS: Not as far as I know, Your Honour, no.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So please move on to something else, Mr. Cepic.

11 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. The reason

12 was the fact that Colonel Ciaglinski said that on that occasion the army

13 was using tanks. Thank you.

14 Q. Mr. Crosland, in your statement you said that different cannons

15 were used of 20, 30, and 40-millimetre calibres respectively for direct

16 engagement on the ground in contravention of the Geneva Conventions, and

17 you state that in paragraphs 18 and 53 of your statement.

18 Could you please tell me where it was that you saw a 40-millimetre

19 cannon in Kosovo?

20 A. Sir, with -- with respect, I saw and collected a number of

21 calibres of empty cases ranging from 122 -- 120-millimetre tank shells

22 just outside Malisevo to 30, 40, 20-millimetre, 12.5, 5.5, 7.62, short,

23 long, you name it. Around Ponosevac, the place was covered with

24 ammunition. Now, if you're asking for a specific place, I don't quite

25 understand why. The point I'm making -- now, whether it's correct about

1 the Geneva Conventions, I've already stated that I'm not an expert on the

2 Geneva Conventions. Heavy calibre fire was poured against houses across

3 Kosovo, and that has been made quite clear in my evidence and my reports

4 that cover this entire area from early 1998 to 1999.

5 Q. Mr. Crosland, what would you say to me if I were to put it to you

6 that among the equipment of the land forces, and therefore the Pristina

7 Corps, in 1998 there were never any 40-millimetre calibre guns?

8 A. Sir, you might be correct. There may not be 40. There may have

9 been other calibres involved.

10 Q. Beforehand we talked about rules, rules for using the army. Are

11 you perhaps familiar with the rules for using anti-aircraft guns, Yugoslav

12 made; 20-millimetre calibre and 30-millimetre Pragas, Czech made?

13 A. No, I'm not familiar, no.

14 Q. Mm-hmm. By your leave I would just like to say that these rules

15 say that these weapons are used against individual weapons, mortars,

16 machine-guns, infantry on the move, landing operations. All of that is

17 contained in the rules. Not to refer to specific chapters and articles

18 because I don't really want to waste time. So their use is not restricted

19 only as an anti-aircraft weapon but it can also be used in land operations

20 for targets from 1.500 to 2.000 metres.

21 A. If that's what you're stating is correct, sir then that is the

22 rules which by you were playing.

23 Q. Thank you. In your statement you also say that you know of the

24 M-80 vehicle. On its turret it has a 20-millimetre gun. It's a

25 caterpillar vehicle.

1 A. I'm -- I'm extremely familiar with it, sir, and there were

2 caterpillar marks within metres of the Jashari family house in Donji

3 Prekaze and the Likosane incidents, which I was one of the first people to

4 go in and see. And also along with the caterpillar marks, as you quite

5 rightly call them, the tracks, there were --

6 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I'm not talking about caterpillar marks.

7 I'm talking about these weapons -- or, rather, artillery pieces. M-80 is

8 not for anti-aircraft use; right?

9 A. I think with any Armoured Personnel Carrier you can use it both in

10 a land role and in an air role. That would be crazy not to use it against

11 for air defence, a weapon of that ability.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland. Could the Registrar please show us

13 Prosecution Exhibit 2129.

14 Mr. Crosland, on the screens in front us we should see your report

15 of the 18th of May, 1998. It has to do with the village of Donji Obilic

16 in the Drenica area.

17 A. With respect, sir, this is not my report. This is an ECM report

18 from headquarters Sarajevo. If this is the one dated the 8th of May, time

19 zone 08-05-18 17:52:01, that's not my report; that's from ECMM

20 headquarters in Sarajevo.

21 Q. But this report speaks of Kosovo. Could the Registrar control it

22 down a bit?

23 [In English] Scroll down please. Okay.

24 [Interpretation] Since this was exhibited along with your own

25 evidence, were you perhaps in this vehicle on the 11th of May in Donji

1 Obilic, and were you stopped at a check-point by a 15-year-old boy armed

2 with an AK47 rifle and wearing a flak jacket?

3 A. Sir, with great respect I was stopped on many, many occasions and

4 to ask me for one specific thing -- as I say, this report is not my report

5 and if I was involved in this incident, then fine, but I have no -- unless

6 there is a report of mine that confirms this then I can't really comment

7 on it.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. Thank you.

10 Q. You also spoke of the number of soldiers of the KLA. Do you

11 perhaps know that a considerable member of -- number of members of the KLA

12 were arrested and killed in the border belt and that all of these

13 incidents were verified by mixed commissions of the Federal Republic of

14 Yugoslavia and Albania?

15 A. Sir, if I recall correctly, there was one very heavy engagement up

16 on the -- I think near -- close to the Moranje [phoen] position. I didn't

17 go to visit that one of the I was then shown pictures of another

18 engagement in the area of Pastrik mountain and I was shown pictures of

19 people of fighting age dressed in KLA uniform that had been killed whilst

20 apparently coming across the mountains, but again we were not taken too

21 this specific position.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Were you aware, though, Mr. Crosland, that mixed

23 commissions comprising representatives of the two governments of

24 Yugoslavia and Albania did investigate killings in the border belt? Were

25 you aware of that fact?

1 THE WITNESS: It doesn't come readily to mind, Your Honour, no.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Thank you.

3 Mr. Cepic.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Do you perhaps remember that in the border belt, that is to say in

6 the same situations where members of the KLA were killed and arrested,

7 enormous quantities of weapons were ceased, an amount sufficient for

8 arming a division. Perhaps you know of that? Would that perhaps jog your

9 memory?

10 A. As I said, sir, there was one -- I believe one major occasion

11 where a considerable number of KLA fighters were killed on the area. I

12 think it was in the area of Moranje. The exact numbers and details of

13 weaponry I don't -- I don't recall, sir.

14 Q. Several times you mentioned the personnel levels of the KLA. I

15 would just like to know what your own estimate is. How many members of

16 the KLA could have got killed during the fighting in 1998?

17 A. I don't know is the honest answer.

18 Q. Could you perhaps tell us what the losses would have been

19 percentage-wise compared to their personnel levels? Could you give us a

20 percentage at least what the anticipated losses could have been?

21 A. No, I couldn't, no. But what I would say is that there were

22 documents came from Serbia that indicated 688 were being liquidated. So I

23 return the question to you, with great respect.

24 Q. Mr. Crosland, I'm the one who is putting questions here, but let

25 us support what you've said just now. Could the Registrar please show us

1 6D104.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the purpose of this, Mr. Cepic?

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] If you allow me, Your Honour, with

4 your permission, of course, I would like to display the book that was

5 published in Pristina 2002, "The Phoenixes of the KLA," listing over 600

6 names of fighters from different locations who were killed in 1998. So

7 the sources from Pristina and Belgrade tally in terms of the approximate

8 number of KLA members killed in 1998. That is to say precisely what

9 Colonel Crosland said just now, over 600 fighters. Only in 1998.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: But the witness knows nothing about this. He's

11 already made it clear, and all you're doing is engaging in a tit for tat

12 contest by saying, oh, I can show you the source of that, but so what? We

13 know it exists. Let's move to something the witness can deal with.

14 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. This was just

15 because the witness said that at that time in his view there were 400

16 fighters.

17 Q. Paragraph 30 of your statement, the army of Yugoslavia provided

18 fire support to Western Kosovo from Decani, it was the army of Yugoslavia

19 and the unit for special operations that were guarding the relevant

20 artillery position. My question is whether you yourself saw that it was

21 members of the unit for special operations guarding the artillery

22 position?

23 A. Sir, we -- I physically went down to Visoko Decani, a very fine

24 monastery that's on the right of the road, on the north side of the road.

25 We then drove up towards the hotel and by some good luck or whatever we

1 actually drove right through a six-gun artillery position and out the

2 other side. In that position were both VJ and also JSO personnel.

3 Q. As a soldier do you believe that the -- the army of Yugoslavia

4 needed a police unit, a state security unit to guard its deployment

5 lines?

6 A. Sir, with respect that's a matter for the Vojska Jugoslavija. All

7 I'm saying is that the internal situation, as I understand it, was a

8 priority for the MUP in all its forms. That is something to do with the

9 Yugoslavia constitution that has absolutely no dealing with myself.

10 Q. Further on you say that in all the major cities in Kosovo there

11 were joint bases of the MUP and the army, or they were just becoming joint

12 bases. Did you mean the barracks of the VJ when you said that?

13 A. In -- for instance, in Pec and Djakovica, and in Decani, as we've

14 just spoken about, they appeared to be coming closer together. As I've

15 tried to explain, I have no problem with and would expect if both forms

16 of -- policing and military were working together, it makes perfectly

17 good sense. But as I understand it the Vojska Jugoslavija under the

18 Pristina Corps had certain bases --

19 Q. I understand you. The specific question had to do with bases or

20 barracks.

21 A. As I've said, during 1998, we saw, within what were initially VJ

22 bases, MUP personnel and equipment.

23 Q. Mr. Crosland, did you perhaps know that in the barracks of the

24 army of Yugoslavia throughout Kosovo 10 years prior to the period that

25 you're testifying about facilities were built for housing members of the

1 MUP who were on duty in Kosovo?

2 A. Well, with great respect, sir, I wasn't in Kosova at that stage,

3 so I can only take your word for it.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. Thank you very much.

6 Q. Paragraph 33 of your statement you talk about repainted vehicles.

7 That is to say that you saw different vehicles of the army of Yugoslavia

8 coloured into MUP colours from green to blue, BOV-3, BOV M, and so on and

9 so forth. If equipment was given to the MUP by the army, do you know that

10 it was done strictly through relevant state organs?

11 A. Sir, of course I don't know the answer to that. I'm just making a

12 statement that equipment that -- that was not normal to the organisation

13 of battle of the MUP was given additional equipment which came, I presume,

14 from the Vojska Jugoslavija as it had a -- green paint underneath blue, as

15 stated in paragraph 33.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you know how many villages were there in Kosovo in

17 1998? Can you give me a ballpark figure at least?

18 A. I would think several hundred. I mean, what -- what is classed as

19 a village is a couple of -- two or three houses together or what? We

20 tried to visit most of the area, and I would suspect there are several

21 hundred villages, sir.

22 Q. The areas that you visited most were Decani, Djakovica, and Pec,

23 and this is where you observed damage in the villages. Wouldn't that be

24 correct?

25 A. With respect, sir, that's not correct. We toured extensively from

1 Kosovska Mitrovica across the northern route through Rudnik and Pec and

2 all the villages there. We came across the Drenica complete. We drove

3 many times from Pristina through the principal routes from Lapusnik,

4 Komorane, to Klina and on to Pec. We then went down from Lapusnik through

5 Malisevo, Rakovina -- sorry, through Lapusnik, through Malisevo to

6 Orahovac and on to Djakovica.

7 We came down from Klina along the Beli Drim past Rakovina into

8 Djakovica. We also used to use the road from Pristina down to Stimlje,

9 through Crnoljevo, Dulje, Blace, through Suva Reka, all over the Suva Reka

10 area and the Pagarusa valley because of the IDP problem later in that

11 year, on to Prizren; and we then came south through Urosevac through

12 Strpci, Brezovica, the skiing areas, and down into Prizren. We then went

13 west of Prizren down to Vrbnica, and from Zur we went all the way down to

14 Brod and [overlapping speakers] --

15 Q. Thank you?

16 A. -- as well as going on to the eastern side of Kosovo.

17 Q. Thank you. So you're mostly talking about the western part of

18 Kosovo.

19 Do you know that in the course of 1998 from over 300 villages the

20 KLA attacked villages, institutions, the MUP, the army?

21 A. I think, sir, I've made that clear in my statement.

22 Q. Thank you. Do you also know that over 90 villages voluntarily

23 returned weapons to the state institutions and those weapons had been

24 previously given to them by the KLA?

25 A. I'm not aware of that specific fact, sir, no.

1 Q. Just answer by yes or no. Do you know that the army of Yugoslavia

2 never participated in any conflicts against the KLA around the town of

3 Prilep, in any villages around the town of Prilep? Just yes or no.

4 A. I think I made it clear that the firepower was used which came

5 from the Vojska Jugoslavija. Whether they were physically on the ground

6 or not is another matter.

7 Q. Thank you. And now let's talk about the meeting which took place

8 in Belgrade on -- on 17 October 1998 at the British embassy. You met with

9 Mr. Drewienkiewicz, and you told him that there were two chains of

10 commands in -- of command in Kosovo and that they were separate; is that

11 correct?

12 A. If you make that statement, sir, then I don't necessarily dispute

13 it. I presume you're talking about the VJ and the MUP.

14 Q. Precisely, so. And this is what Mr. Drewienkiewicz said in

15 paragraph 16 of his statement. If Mr. Drewienkiewicz states that, then we

16 can consider it to be true. Isn't at that so?

17 A. Sir, that's not my -- that's not my --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: That's going to make our job a lot easier,

19 Mr. Cepic.

20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Paragraph 48, you're talking about the border belt, and this is

22 the belt which the task of protection of state borders applied, and this

23 was to be done by the army. Can you just briefly explain what the border

24 belt was, in keeping with international laws and regulations, and what are

25 usually the authorities of the army in such a belt?

1 A. Sir, I -- I've already stated that at the beginning of the

2 conflict from what I understood by having been briefed by the FLS that the

3 border -- the international border security was the remit of the Vojska

4 Jugoslavija to a distance of 500 -- or maybe 2 kilometres.

5 The border belt you refer to I assume you mean to the west of the

6 Djakovica which is one of the key areas we've spoken about already from

7 the influx of both men and material across that border into the Dukagjin

8 area and on into the Drenica. And I think I've given credence to the fact

9 that this was understandably one of the strategic areas that the Serbian

10 security forces needed to try and control in order to limit the -- the men

11 and material coming in for the UCK.

12 So I hope I've answered your question.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Crosland. And now just to follow up on that. The

14 Kosovo Verification Mission gave it -- gave its estimate on the 15th of

15 March, or even earlier on in February of that year, having toured the

16 border, having provided their analysis of the meeting in Rambouillet, and

17 according to their estimate the army lacked some 2 or 3.000 soldiers and

18 that number would have enabled them to perform the task properly. Would

19 you agree with that estimate, that assessment?

20 A. Sir, I had detailed conversations with General Dimitrijevic

21 [Realtime transcript read in error, "Drewienkiewicz"] that this border

22 belt area between and Kosovo and that you could lose two or three brigades

23 in a very mountainous area in an attempt to keep the border area secure,

24 so I don't disagree with that estimate at all.

25 Q. [In English] I think we have a mistake in transcript. Page 84,

1 line 10, it is not General Drewienkiewicz; I think General Dimitrijevic.

2 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 A. Thank you.

5 Q. [Interpretation] And yesterday we heard that in paragraph 69 you

6 stated that additional brigades of the VJ, the 211th and the 1st armoured

7 brigade, were deployed in the area of Kursumlija, and another armoured

8 brigade, probably the 37th brigade, was deployed in the area of Raska.

9 A. That's -- sorry. I beg your pardon, sir.

10 Q. I --

11 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

12 Q. Do you know where Kursumlija and Raska are?

13 A. Yes, I visited them on several occasions, sir, yeah.

14 Q. Are they in Kosovo?

15 A. No. Raska is outside of Kosovo. Raska is north of Kosovo.

16 Q. And Kursumlija?

17 A. Kursumlija is also outside of Kosovo. As I said yesterday, sir,

18 it was one of the forward operating base.

19 Q. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Since you were on the ground, and

20 this was also stated by the Kosovo Verification Mission in their

21 assessment on the 15th of March, 1999, do you know that the KLA activities

22 escalated during the negotiations in France precisely at that time are you

23 aware of that fact?

24 A. Yes, we were all aware of that fact an extremely worried by it.

25 Q. Thank you. Do you also know that the Chief of the General Staff,

1 General Perisic, in the course of 1998 on several occasions toured and

2 controlled the -- the units that were deployed in Kosovo? I'm just going

3 to say that this was in February, May, August, October, November 1998.

4 A. I'm well aware of that fact and one would expect a Chief of the

5 General Staff to go and do a tour of his -- of his troops for all the

6 obvious reasons, sir. I think I referred to that in my report at some

7 stage.

8 Q. Thank you. Do you perhaps know that the commander of the 3rd Army

9 at the time, and we're talking about 1998, and that was General Samardzic,

10 was personally at the forward command post of the 3rd Army and that he

11 spent there several months in Kosmet, in Pristina, between July and

12 October 1998, and that he made daily decisions on the use of forces in

13 Kosovo and he daily reported to General Perisic in Belgrade? Are you

14 aware of all that?

15 A. I'm not specifically aware of that, sir, but I would entirely

16 understand that that would be in accordance with normal military

17 procedures.

18 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 64 of your statement, you're talking about

19 the withdrawal of the Serb forces after the conclusion of the agreement

20 with Holbrooke. In the case against Milosevic, on page 8041, you said

21 that the VJ withdrew, that they retired to the barracks, and that you

22 commended them for that act.

23 A. That is entirely correct, sir.

24 Q. Thank you. And now we come to Podujevo. You say in your

25 statement in paragraph 65, around the 19th or the -- 21 December you found

1 a mixed battle group of VJ and MUP to the west of Podujevo. Do you know

2 that immediately after the withdrawal of the Serb forces into Podujevo the

3 KLA took the entire region west of Podujevo?

4 A. I think so. I've already made that statement, and they came from

5 the area of Bajgora which is further north-east up to Mitrovica, which was

6 another known KLA area. I mean, as I've tried to explain, the situation

7 was extremely flexible and it would -- people would take control of one

8 area and then for various reasons would leave it, and the other side would

9 come back in. And, yes, I accept what you say, sir, yeah.

10 MR. CEPIC: If you allow me, Your Honour, just one correction for

11 the transcript. At page 86, line 17, "In the region of Podujevo," not

12 just Podujevo.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Should that be "from the region of Podujevo?"

14 MR. CEPIC: "From," exactly, Your Honour. Exactly, Your Honour.

15 Exactly, Your Honour. That's correct.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: It's withdraw from the region of Podujevo.

17 MR. CEPIC: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.

19 MR. CEPIC: I'm sorry.

20 Q. [Interpretation] You also know that the KLA arrived in Lapastica,

21 Gornja, Donja; Brusnik; and so forth, and that when this happened the

22 entire non-Albanian population was expelled from that region of Podujevo;

23 and also that there were frequent attacks on the Pristina-Nis road and

24 that road is one of the most significant roads in Kosovo. Are you

25 familiar with all that?

1 A. Yes, sir, I am. And I think I made it clear that this is your

2 main supply route, as we call it, MSR, back to 3rd Army in Nis. And,

3 again, it is of strategic importance to be held in a correct manner. I

4 don't have any problem with that.

5 Q. Can we now see Exhibit P680, please. Shortly, we will have a

6 document before us. Can we please have page 2.

7 This is a report of the Kosovo Verification Mission covering the

8 period between 26 February and for March. At the top of the page -- [In

9 English] [Previous translation continues]....

10 [Interpretation] The KLA force in the Podujevo area managed to

11 carry out an attack in the town itself effectively taking the town itself.

12 Do you know in addition to attacks on civilians the KLA also attacked the

13 town of Podujevo itself?

14 A. As I've stated, sir, many areas changed hands many times, and this

15 happened then. I know it was an area of major issue between the KLA and

16 the Serbian security forces, as I think I made clear, sir.

17 Q. And the main stronghold of these force -- forces was in the

18 villages Dobra, Bradas, Dobratin, west of Podujevo, and Gornja and Donja

19 Lapastica. Would that be correct?

20 A. I wouldn't doubt that at all, sir, no.

21 Q. If I also say that the Kosovo Verification Mission never mentioned

22 in any of their reports that those particular villages were razed, would

23 you agree with that if I put it to you that way?

24 A. No, sir, because in paragraph 65 of the current report for this

25 particular session, I state they did considerable damage to the villages

1 west of Podujevo, Bradas, Dobratin, Gornja and Donja Lapastica.

2 Q. As a result of the fighting between the KLA and the Serb forces.

3 Wouldn't that be correct?

4 A. It may well have been because of the fighting between the forces.

5 It's the degree of damage that was done to the civilian environment.

6 Whether it was KLA or civilian environment, that is for other people to

7 decide.

8 Q. Thank you. However, what you are saying was confirmed by Colonel

9 Ciaglinski who mediated between the parties in the month of December, and

10 he was awarded by a medal of the United Kingdom. His words were contrary

11 to what you're saying now.

12 A. Well, I -- with respect, sir, I don't have his statement, and what

13 you've said, there I wouldn't -- I disagree in content. But if that is a

14 statement he has made, then I cannot possibly answer that.

15 Q. I thank you. When did you meet Colonel Lazarevic for the first

16 time? Under what circumstances, to be more precise.

17 A. I can't recall off the -- off the top of my head. I'm sorry. You

18 have to remind me.

19 Q. If you'll allow me, in November 1998, the region of Dule, Colonel

20 Lazarevic had called you because the terrorists had used hand rocket

21 launchers. They attacked a column of the VJ army, that was not a combat

22 volume couple. They killed four soldiers. They wounded four soldiers.

23 And after that, you visited the outpatient surgery in Prizren where these

24 wounded soldiers were brought to. Is that all correct?

25 A. Yes. Thank you, sir, for reminding me. If that was the -- I

1 can't remember if that was the first time I met Colonel Lazarevic. But I

2 had returned from Prizren that night and we got to the area Dulje Blace,

3 and Colonel Lazarevic asked me to return with him had because of the

4 incident you've just outlined. We did that. We went back with himself.

5 He escorted himself into the hospital, where I sadly saw that one body of

6 a VJ soldier was lying. I paid my respects to him. I then offered the

7 entire contents of our medical pack. I've had medical training myself,

8 but I said I'm sure there are doctors here who are better able to treat

9 the four or five or six young soldiers, many of who were in shock. After

10 that, we then sat down together and we made a joint statement, where I

11 along with Colonel Lazarevic said that this was an illegal act by the KLA

12 against the soldiers concerned, and that statement was sent back to the

13 united kingdom. Where it went to, I don't know. And I totally agree with

14 it. I would -- as a soldier, I am under duty under the Geneva Convention

15 to offer help to any military person wounded in the course of actions,

16 whether those actions are legal or illegal. And as a professional soldier

17 that lost many people, we did that and helped as best we could.

18 Q. Now that we're talking about Dulje, do you know that a combat

19 group in keeping with the Sainovic-Naumann-Clark agreement was deployed on

20 that road in order to secure the position and to be there to prevent

21 frequent attacks by the KLA?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Tell me what the relevance of that question is to

23 the evidence that we're hearing from this witness.

24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] When the witness is talking about the

25 action in Racak, he's mentioning a unit that was nearby, and this was

1 precisely the unit that I've just mentioned, Your Honour. And we can find

2 this in his statement, paragraph 67, if my memory serves me well.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the relevance of your question? I mean, the

4 witness has, throughout his evidence, told you of the many responsible

5 things that the army of Yugoslavia were doing, and there were so many

6 things that they were doing that were in keeping with military necessity,

7 and many things were entirely reasonable. You don't have to prove that.

8 He's conceded it all along.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So what is it? What is the point of the question,

11 like so many of the others you've been asking recently?

12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] This was just to give the legitimacy

13 to the unit that was in place, to say that nothing had been premeditated.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: He just told you it was an entirely legal attack on

15 the unit.

16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your leave, I'm

17 talking about the 15th of January about Racak; and in paragraph 67, a

18 mention is made by the VJ unit near Dulje. This is what I'm talking

19 about.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: But what -- tell me the purpose of your question.

21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] The army did not participate in the

22 operation in Racak, and nothing was planned at the corps level, especially

23 not the operation in Racak as it is stated in the statement. It says that

24 there is a close cooperation between the MUP and the corps, and

25 headquarters was in Pristina.

1 General Lazarevic was in command, and it was very clear that this

2 was a coordinated action in order to clean the area of -- from the KLA.

3 However, the truth is that that unit was the play -- deployed there in

4 keeping with the previously mentioned agreement, and this is the point --

5 point that I'm making.

6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, with respect, to try and help the

7 situation, I am not stating and never have stated that the Vojska

8 Jugoslavija unit based in Dulje was involved in the operation in Racak. I

9 stated in my paragraph 67, in order to set the scene, that beyond Racak

10 down towards Crnoljevo was KLA territory, and that Dulje was further up

11 that mountainous road many times up which I travelled.

12 Whether the operation was a joint operation or not, as I say to

13 you there, I would be surprised if it wasn't. But if the learned

14 gentleman says it was only a MUP operation, then so be it.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I still don't understand what that question was

16 about, I have to confess. It must be me.

17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, is this a convenient time

18 for our break?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I was hoping you would finish before the break,

20 Mr. Cepic, but that's obviously not the case.

21 MR. CEPIC: Just a couple more questions, Your Honour, if you

22 allow me.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: I was hoping you would focus your questions. Just

24 let me find this again.

25 MR. CEPIC: [In English] And if you allow me to say in the

1 meantime, I made a mistake. I said agreement between Sainovic and Clark.

2 It is not Sainovic, Milosevic and -- Milosevic.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know that their combat group was deployed on

4 that road to secure the position because of frequent attacks by the KLA?

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That position was manned

6 throughout the -- the Kosovo incident, and it also had been a long-time

7 historical training area for the VJ, as I understand it.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I still don't understand the purpose of the

9 question, but you've answered it.

10 And we will resume at 10 minutes to 2.00. We'll go into closed

11 session while you leave the courtroom for the lunch break.

12 [Closed session]

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 [Open session]

19 JUDGE BONOMY: The Trial Chamber wishes to express its gratitude

20 to everyone for -- for being so willing to continue the proceedings this

21 afternoon in spite of the weather and in spite of the permission to

22 leave. But we realise that it's important that we complete, if possible,

23 the evidence of this witness today and the other witness proposed this

24 week tomorrow.

25 Mr. Cepic.

1 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Just two questions very

2 briefly.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Crosland, thank you. Very briefly, in

4 October 1998, that is to say towards the end of the month, you, with the

5 Canadian military attache and the assistant attache for defence of the

6 USA, toured several barracks throughout Kosovo. You were in Urosevac,

7 Pristina, and Prizren. In the barracks, you found units that were

8 carrying out their regular duties, and you did not have any objections to

9 raise during those visits; right?

10 A. I believe that is correct, sir, yes.

11 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 75 of your statement speaks of the

12 withdrawal of the units the army of Yugoslavia from Kosovo. You were

13 there yourself, and you were following the withdrawal of part of the

14 troops. My question is whether you know that during the withdrawal of the

15 army units there was an attack by the KLA against these units, and on that

16 occasion 36 soldiers of the army of Yugoslavia were abducted and killed.

17 A. I was aware, sir, that there was an attack and there was a fair

18 degree of meddling by the KLA around Prizren, and I passed the message

19 through various communications to Ramush Haradinaj that he had better

20 understand and comply with the crease fire in order to allow Colonel

21 Delic's brigade and about 5.000 or even 10.000 Serbs -- civilian Serbs to

22 leave Prizren peacefully. I, in fact, was the last person out at the end

23 of the convoy and ensured that the brigade and -- and all the Serbian

24 civilians got safely to Brezovica and Strpce or wherever else they wanted

25 to go. And I got Colonel Delic's formation into Pristina and then

1 continue kind on to Podujevo, I think.

2 Q. Thank you, Colonel Crosland. That was my last question. Thank

3 you to the Trial Chamber.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

5 Do you know that whether 36 soldiers were abducted and killed

6 during that period.

7 A. I did not know of that number, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you know of any, in fact?

9 THE WITNESS: I knew there was -- excuse me, sir. I knew there

10 was some killed in and around Prizren, and I also believe that I think one

11 or two German troops were wounded. We did also thought it was urgent to

12 get the medical supplies of the German unit in there to come and treat

13 those who had been wounded.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Ackerman.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour. I want to make it, first

16 of all, clear in the record that the Pavkovic Defence does not join

17 Mr. Cepic with regard to the statement that everything DZ said is true.

18 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:

19 Q. Colonel, my name is John Ackerman. I represent General Pavkovic,

20 and I have a lot of less questions to ask you than I thought I did?

21 A. Nice to hear, sir.

22 Q. We'll get through this as quickly as we can. I want to ask you

23 about a matter that keeps coming up, and that is the -- the purported

24 statement of General Ojdanic that force is to be met with force or force

25 will be met with force. When dealing with terrorists, isn't that pretty

1 much the standard operating procedure for the international community

2 these days. Will you deal with terrorists, you meet force with force?

3 A. There are various measures and levels of force, sir, that I think

4 are appropriate, and it is one of the golf-clubs in the security forces

5 army that should be used and used diligently and appropriately, so --

6 Q. But what Ojdanic didn't say was force wouldn't be met with

7 excessive force, he just said force would be met with force. That doesn't

8 have any particular significance by itself, does it?

9 A. Not entirely, but that was not quite true of what was going on on

10 the ground, as I have attempted to tell the Court during the course of

11 these sessions, sir.

12 Q. I want to ask you a few questions about your testimony,

13 yesterday. In your statement and in your testimony, yesterday, and even

14 in a question from Judge Bonomy at page 50 of the transcript, you were

15 talking about various key people that you were talking with that didn't

16 seem to want to hear the things you were telling them about Kosovo. How

17 did that manifest itself? Did they say don't tell me about that. I don't

18 want to hear about that. Or was it a little more subtle than that?

19 A. Is this with regards to the KLA, sir?

20 Q. Yes. With regards to what the VJ was doing, in your observation.

21 A. Well, with respect to those two questions, if it's with regards to

22 the KLA --

23 Q. It regards to the KLA, that's what -- not the KLA, I'm sorry.

24 It's in regards to the VJ. I think your statement was when you would tell

25 certain key people in Belgrade about what you'd observed --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Paragraph 42, towards the end, or at the end of it.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. Well, that -- so that is the

3 impression that I got when dealing with in particular General Ojdanic.

4 MR. ACKERMAN:

5 Q. So there was no statement to you like, don't tell me about that, I

6 don't want to hear about it. It was just an impression that you got?

7 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.

8 Q. You were asked about -- again, I want to go back to this meeting

9 force with force. At page 54 yesterday, you said this: "The KLA had no

10 answer to the heavier weapons that both the tanks, the multi-rocket

11 launcher systems, and the artillery that was deployed against various

12 positions primarily in the area of Junik and from a firing position at

13 Bjelaca over to Suva Reka and other villages that came under attack," and

14 then you said: "The KLA did not have any weapons that could match these

15 at all."

16 Now, wasn't that also the case when NATO started bombing Kosovo

17 and Serbia? The Serbs didn't have any weapons that could match cruise

18 missiles or cluster bombs or B2 stealth bombers or such weapons either,

19 did they?

20 A. Your Honour and sir, the point I was making at the time was that

21 there was disproportionate force being used by the VJ against the KLA. If

22 we want to widen the issue as to how I spoke yesterday about the Vojska

23 Jugoslavija and the MUP preparing to defend themselves from probably an

24 inevitable NATO assault, I think I gave quite a meaningful praise to the

25 army of Yugoslavia in the way they -- they deployed.

1 And I suspect that having put more troops in, whether it was to do

2 a cleansing operation or whether it was to influence the NATO planners who

3 at that stage I suspect were having to look at either an air operation or

4 a ground operation, and if there were more ground forces within Kosovo the

5 Vojska Jugoslavija, then inevitably there would be consequential

6 casualties to both sides.

7 Q. Well, that's an interesting answer that you've given us, I think,

8 on more than one occasion. And what I'm really interested in is the

9 question that I asked and that was: The Serbs didn't have any weapons

10 that would match cruise missiles, cluster bombs, B2 stealth bombers,

11 weapons of that nature, did they?

12 A. No. They didn't, no.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Ackerman, the witness has answered the

14 question you asked in a way that has a relevance for our case. But if all

15 you're doing is inviting an answer that compares NATO's conduct with the

16 conduct of the VJ, according to the witness's evidence and that of others,

17 then it is irrelevant to our case how NATO behave.

18 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I totally agree with that and that

19 isn't where I was going.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I can see it is relevant to certain issues

21 and that's why I didn't interrupt you. But because you didn't like the

22 witness's approach, which I think did credit to your question because it

23 is a vague question otherwise, then I thought that perhaps that is what

24 you were doing. But as long as it's not, then you can carry on.

25 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

1 Q. You've -- you've talk about this a number of times regarding that

2 defence attache meeting, where you claim that Ojdanic was confronted with

3 evidence regarding VJ activities in Kosovo. And I'd like you to take a

4 look at P2554, if you will. And while that's coming up, you recall this

5 morning that Mr. Sepenuk was asking you about that and more specifically

6 about a statement apparently by you that General Ojdanic denied the use of

7 VJ air assets against the KLA. Do you remember all of that?

8 A. Yes, sir. I remember all of that, and I think I made the comment

9 that I'd never implied that VJ air assets had been used in this particular

10 campaign I said I'd seen MiGs coming off Pristina airfield, et cetera.

11 Q. Yes. That's exactly what you said. I want to look at page 2 of

12 this document, P2554. And if you look at paragraph 5, and it may be

13 correct that this was not something that you had mentioned, but this

14 report which I think is your report says: "During questions, Ojdanic

15 categorically denied the use of VJ air for" something "ops." Do you see

16 that?

17 A. Sorry, beg your pardon, sir. It's still flashing around -- excuse

18 me.

19 Q. It should be on the screen there, right there.

20 A. Well, yes, I can see that, sir. As I've already stated, I've

21 never, never initiated, as far as I understand, anything about air ops in

22 this particular campaign.

23 Q. Well, is this a report that you submitted?

24 A. I -- sir, without looking at the top, I don't know.

25 Q. Okay. Let's look at the first page, please?

1 A. It's signed by Ambassador Donnelly.

2 Q. Oh, it's a Donnelly report?

3 A. So I'm afraid it's not my report, sir.

4 Q. Would he have gotten that information from you regarding that

5 meeting of defence attaches?

6 A. Yes. He would have got that view from me, yes, sir.

7 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, there were some questions also this

8 morning about the videotape that you now say was turned over to Colonel

9 Jovanovic. Have you ever seen -- that's the tape I take it that was made

10 by your warrant officer.

11 A. That's correct. I believe so, yeah.

12 Q. My question is have you ever seen that tape in any of your

13 meetings with the OTP?

14 A. Sorry, the OTP.

15 Q. Yes?

16 A. Sorry, who is the OTP.

17 Q. Office of the Prosecutor, I'm sorry.

18 A. Forgive my ignorance, sir. I have not seen it since the day I

19 passed it across to the Vojska Jugoslavija.

20 Q. Did they ever ask you to get it for them, the Prosecutor?

21 A. Not as far as I'm aware, sir, no.

22 Q. You told us that, to your knowledge, a copy was also delivered to

23 your ministry. Do you know if the Prosecutor ever requested it from them?

24 A. I don't know, is the correct answer, sir.

25 Q. I want to go to a different subject with you now. You allude to

1 this in one of your reports, but I don't want to bring up the report and

2 spend the time it would take to find it. You spent a lot of time in the

3 Balkans and in Serbian and Kosovo. I think you learned to speak Serbian

4 language; and from your statements, it's clear that you gained some

5 important and lasting impressions about the situation there and the people

6 there.

7 I'm interested in your explanation of what you learned about the

8 people and the cultural attitudes that persisted during your time there.

9 For instance, what did you find particularly striking about what you

10 described as the clan-based society of Kosovo?

11 A. By that, you were meaning the clan-based society of the Albanians.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. It was an interesting format for families, perhaps something which

14 we could all learn by in keeping our families together, rather than

15 separating them with the inevitable conferences that brings. The

16 patriarchal effect, again, I think is a positive effect. It may not go

17 down very well in today's dual society, but I think possibly we could

18 learn something from it.

19 Q. And was there some historical and cultural view of revenge that

20 you learned about, about the necessity -- the acceptability and even the

21 necessity of the concept of revenge and taking revenge?

22 A. Yes. There is the honour feud and the blood feud, and that was,

23 as I understand it, taken very seriously, yes.

24 Q. And that's very different from the kind of cultural thinking we

25 have in the West, isn't it?

1 A. It is extremely different. But as I've travelled the world, I

2 think it behooves us to try and understand the situation in which we are

3 operating and not to apply purely Western or international conditions to

4 the operational area. One must take both the good parts and the bad parts

5 of the area you're working in and try to understand them, apply oneself,

6 and see it from their point of view. After all, it is their country.

7 Q. Yes. And in your statement of June 2006, at paragraph 49, you

8 talk about this blood vengeance, and you say this that "in the Balkans the

9 man with the biggest stuck won and it's always been like that."

10 A. Well, I think, with respect, it does appear to be like that.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. The United Kingdom has gone round the world beating the hell out

13 of most people starting with the crusaders, and so on. So I will hold my

14 hand up as being guilty, as well of that.

15 Q. The same as the occasional American?

16 A. We do that as well, sir, for which I do apologise.

17 Q. You don't need to.

18 A. Thank you.

19 Q. We've forgotten that a long time ago.

20 A. Thank you, sir.

21 Q. In your October statement, the one that we're primarily using

22 here, paragraph 56 -- yeah, it is paragraph 56, you speak of your report

23 of 6 November 1998 regarding conversations with Dimitrijevic. And one of

24 the things he will told you he was concerned about, and I think this came

25 up yesterday, was with the withdrawal of VJ/MUP forces the KLA was quickly

1 occupying those locations. And what he said to you his concern was that

2 if this continued, he would concerned that MUP would forcefully react to

3 that, correct?

4 A. That is absolutely correct, sir. And that statement was passed on

5 directly to my own Ministry of Defence, and I'm sure they got in touch

6 with allied headquarters around the world who were dealing with this

7 problem because it was, as I've said already, a very genuine [Realtime

8 transcript read in error "general"] concern and had happened on more than

9 one occasion.

10 Q. Now, you also say there that he told you another concern that he

11 had was the 3rd Army commander General Pavkovic might also react without

12 permission from the General Staff and outside the military chain of

13 command; correct?

14 A. That's correct, sir.

15 Q. Now, if we look at --

16 MR. ZECEVIC: The transcript --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Your microphone, please.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: 102, 23, the witness I believe said an a very

20 genuine concern, and it says a very general concern.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

23 Q. I want to look at P684. It's a sitrep, I believe, a report of

24 this meeting. And if we look at page 2, what this contemporaneous report

25 indicates, regarding what Dimitrijevic said at that time, was: "He also

1 indicated that the 3rd Army commander may also react without permission

2 from the General Staff."

3 You see that?

4 A. That's -- if you're referring to the bottom of paragraph 4, yes,,

5 sir, I do.

6 Q. It doesn't say 3rd Army commander Pavkovic, just that the 3rd Army

7 commander may also react without permission from the General Staff,

8 doesn't it?

9 A. It would be quite in order for the field commander to react, as

10 appropriate, as a field commander. I don't have any problem with that.

11 That would be normal military procedure. Sorry, excuse me.

12 Q. But what it's saying without permission from the General Staff,

13 and bear in mind we're talking about November 1998 here.

14 A. It was a very difficult time, sir, yes. Yes.

15 Q. Yes. It was also a time when the 3rd Army commander was General

16 Samardzic, not General Pavkovic, wasn't it?

17 A. You're quite right there, yes.

18 Q. So when you say in your statement that what he said was he was

19 concerned that 3rd Army commander General Pavkovic might react without

20 permission from the General Staff, either you're wrong about what he said

21 or he was wrong. Which is it?

22 A. I think what has been muddled up here is that General Pavkovic was

23 then the head of the Pristina Corps.

24 Q. Mm-hmm.

25 A. And the immediate operational unit headquarters within that area.

1 So there is an error there, yes.

2 Q. Now, then there's I think a similar error in paragraph 57 where

3 you say: "It was apparent in the aftermath of the Racak incident on 15

4 January 1999 that Pavkovic was clearly the field commander for Kosovo

5 operations." Do you know by 15 January 1999 Pavkovic was the 3rd Army

6 commander and no longer in the field in Kosovo?

7 A. I -- I take your point as -- as a definitive point. I mean, as

8 commander of 3rd Army ultimately he is responsible for the actions of his

9 army whether he's the immediate commander in the field which I think by

10 then was General Lazarevic, I accept that point.

11 Q. Your same statement, paragraph 53. You talk about a conversation

12 with Dimitrijevic on the 3rd of October where he talked about the use of

13 heavy weapons, and he said something to you along the line that he thought

14 General Pavkovic was trying to make his name, and what you say in that

15 paragraph is implicit within that was the intention to suppress the KLA

16 and the Kosovo Albanian population.

17 When you say it was implicit in that statement, what do you mean?

18 A. That, sir, was my impression of the expression of General

19 Dimitrijevic at that -- at that particular meeting and therefore the

20 impression that I gain. Now, one can argue if that impression was right

21 or wrong.

22 Q. Yeah, I think one can, because one possibility is that General

23 Dimitrijevic was telling you that because he believed it. The other

24 possibility is he was telling you out of some kind of petty jealousy or

25 some effort to deflect attention from his own role.

1 A. I -- I can't answer that question, sir.

2 Q. I know you can't. At this same meeting, you also indicated that

3 Dimitrijevic seemed to indicate, and the words seemed to indicate are of

4 interest to me, that General Pavkovic would again stray, again stray, from

5 the military chain of command and react to orders or indications from

6 Belgrade.

7 First the qualifying language seemed to indicate apparently he

8 didn't directly say that to you.

9 A. I think my only comment on this, sir, is that this meeting I think

10 it was held in the FLS offices which I presume things were taped, not to

11 put too fine a point on it, that I don't think General Dimitrijevic would

12 say something that he didn't think was correct. It's a very brave

13 statement to have made from a man who was quite clearly or should have

14 been clearly at the centre of operations in an insurgency operation at

15 chief of counter-insurgency.

16 Q. That seems to me less than something saying directly that he

17 believed General Pavkovic would again stray from military chain of command

18 am I right?

19 A. Well, sir that is my impression that I gained from this particular

20 meeting sir.

21 Q. And you claim that -- that these words again stray from the

22 military chain of command may have been said, and I want to ask you this:

23 Do you have one concrete bit of evidence, one document, anything of that

24 nature that shows that General Pavkovic ever strayed from the chain of

25 command?

1 A. All I'm reporting, sir, is what came out of various meetings that

2 General Dimitrijevic with the ambassador as is stated if paragraph 54.

3 Q. So your full knowledge is what you're being told by Dimitrijevic

4 and maybe Perisic on occasion; correct?

5 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

6 Q. Do you know that there was jealousy going on in the General Staff

7 at that time because in some person's view Pavkovic had been promoted

8 before he should have? Did you know about that?

9 A. I did -- I did hear information to that -- to that effect, yes,

10 sir.

11 Q. And you certainly know don't you that General Perisic as Chief of

12 the General Staff would have removed Pavkovic from any post if he'd not

13 been following the chain of command or following orders or operating

14 outside the chain of command he certainly could have done that couldn't

15 he?

16 A. I presume he could have whether he had to approach President

17 Milosevic I would not know.

18 Q. And you had no indication did you that Perisic ever tried to

19 remove Pavkovic from any of his posts?

20 A. Not as far as I'm aware sir no.

21 Q. And in view of the kind of thinned that Perisic and Dimitrijevic

22 were telling you about Pavkovic, would you be surprised to learn that at

23 the same time he said these things to you he ordered a certain of merit in

24 June 1998 to General Pavkovic?

25 A. I think if I remember correctly, sir, there were quite a few

1 certificates handed out at that particular stage, which I think is

2 understandable to keep morale at a high level and reward good work, I

3 understood, that the Vojska Jugoslavija and MUP were doing in Kosovo. And

4 I think I understand that and tried to report in a fair and proper manner.

5 Q. So you believe that General Perisic as head of the General Staff,

6 believing that as he told you General Pavkovic was operating outside of

7 his orders and outside of the chain of command and in violation of all the

8 rules and regulations of the Yugoslav Army would at that time I'll ward

9 him a certain of merit was that the kind of person you knew as General

10 Perisic?

11 A. No, General Perisic appeared to me to be a very genuine person.

12 He certainly had a lot of experience being the Chief of the General Staff

13 I think it's impertinent for me to say whether General Perisic would issue

14 a certificate or not.

15 Q. Do you have any information about whether he did issue such

16 certificate to General Pavkovic? If you do I can show it to you.

17 A. As I said, I -- I don't know. It's not my -- any of my business

18 to be honest.

19 Q. All right. I'm interested now in your statement of December of

20 2000, in paragraph 2 you said this: "When Perisic was the Chief of the

21 General Staff of the VJ, the VJ kept largely to its constitutional tasks

22 of security of the borders of the FRY," and you used the word

23 constitutional task. And then when you testified in the Milosevic case,

24 at page 8024 you said this to Mr. Milosevic: "Under your constitution,

25 Mr. Milosevic, the VJ had a priority to protect the national border and

1 500 metres, and that was written down in the constitution."

2 My question is where did you get this information about this being

3 in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

4 A. That was what I understand was the briefing that I was given when

5 I joined as the defence attache in Belgrade from the FLS, because one was

6 keen to understand what the-the constitutional position of the Vojska

7 Jugoslavija was in attempting to understand the -- the whole situation,

8 you know, within Yugoslavia and within the Balkans as a whole, as it was

9 quite clear that one had joined a station that -- a country that was still

10 in turmoil after Dayton, and there was a good chance that further

11 developments would occur, which sadly has happened.

12 Q. Did anyone ever show you what they claimed was a provision of the

13 constitution in this regard, to show you the constitutional provision you

14 were being told --

15 A. Not as far as I'm aware, sir, no. I think it was a -- just an

16 informal briefing in FLS as to, you know, how the various forces of

17 Yugoslavia were integrated and frankly it was out of interest in my own

18 side to say what is the Vojska Jugoslavija and the Ministry of Interior

19 which is of -- as I say of genuine interest, and I think as a defence

20 attache one should you know understand the workings of the various forces

21 that might be deployed in an internal situation.

22 Q. Would you accept if I represent to you that there is absolutely

23 nothing in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that

24 talks about the VJ's priority to parole text the national borders or about

25 a 500 metre border belt or anything like that, absolutely nothing? Would

1 you accept that?

2 A. Well, as I say, sir, I've just said -- said that is what I was

3 told by the FLS.

4 Q. And you never -- you never checked to see if that was correct?

5 A. I didn't -- I didn't physically check, no. I accepted the

6 briefing I was told because it was part of the in-briefing that went to

7 all attaches so they understood where and how far -- how close they could

8 go to borders, for instance, without causing alarm on the -- or not -- in

9 the FRY at the time.

10 Q. Well, I'm going to suggest to you that what you were told by

11 General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic about that was absolute little

12 false and we'll go into some of that as we go forward here.

13 At paragraph 48 of your October 2006 statement you say this: "By

14 the sum of 1998 the then 52 corps commander General Pavkovic began to

15 operate outside the constitutional tasks" again you said constitutional

16 tasks, "by involving the VJ in operations against the KLA in the interior

17 of Kosovo."

18 Now, where did you get this information? Who told you that?

19 A. Well, as I've just explained you, sir, those were the -- the --

20 the parameters of what I was told when I joined the FLS. I can only

21 repeat that to you. If that is not the case, then I was falsely informed.

22 .

23 Q. When you joined the FLS you were told that in the summer of 1998

24 General Pavkovic began to operate outside the constitutional task by

25 involving the VJ in operations against the KLA?

1 A. No, with respect sir when I joined as a defence attache in August

2 or September 1996 --

3 Q. Well, I want to know with your got this information.

4 A. Well --

5 Q. Bit summer of 1998. Who told you that?

6 A. I've just stated there that's because of the briefing I received

7 when I first joined, and then when the situation developed I was told that

8 their constitutional tasks were the border security, varying in distance

9 as appropriate.

10 Q. So in the summer of 1998 somebody told you that General Pavkovic

11 was operating outside the constitutional tasks as you said here. Somebody

12 must have told you that.

13 A. Well, as a -- I've already made clear this -- these were meetings

14 we had with General Dimitrijevic.

15 Q. Yes?

16 A. Who indicated this. Now, whether he was indicating this true or

17 false, I only report what I was told.

18 Q. And you know that at that time, the summer of 1998, General

19 Pavkovic's superior was General Samardzic of the 3rd Army?

20 A. That's correct, sir.

21 Q. Did you see any orders from Samardzic to Pavkovic regarding the

22 use of the VJ during the summer of 1998? Yeah, 1998.

23 A. I'd been very surprised if I had seen any orders.

24 Q. Okay. You've never seen any?

25 A. No. I would think these are classified information.

1 Q. Did you investigate to see if there was any truth to the statement

2 that Pavkovic was operating outside his constitutional tasks?

3 A. Sir, as I've stated on several occasions, on meetings when this

4 information was passed to me it was obviously of extreme interest for our

5 intelligence and analysis back home to put it together as you're well

6 aware having had military background yourself coming from all sources.

7 Now, I'm one source. I think you've had some background, sir. If not, I

8 may be mistaken.

9 Q. Well, you're not, but I don't know how you knew that?

10 A. Well, that's good intelligence, sir. But the point I am making is

11 that if you were in a position as the defence attache, you are expected to

12 keep both your eyes and ears open, and information coming from such a

13 senior person such as General Dimitrijevic or even senior such as General

14 Perisic that there are problems in the army chain of command I would

15 submit to the Court and to your good self that that is of extreme interest

16 to one's own intelligence at home.

17 Q. No doubt --

18 A. Now whether -- I beg your pardon for interrupting you. No doubt

19 whether that is true or false, I as a source will say that. I'm sure as

20 we all know we're all bugged and on closed circuit cameras from every

21 angle we are at, someone else will come up with either a correct

22 assessment or an incorrect assessment.

23 Now, as far as I'm aware, and I can stand to be corrected there

24 obviously, that statement was never challenged by my intelligence

25 services.

1 Q. You've got me focused on your good intelligence, and it makes me

2 stand here and wonder what else you know about me, and I don't want you to

3 answer that question. Okay?

4 A. Okay, sir, no problem.

5 Q. Paragraph 48.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. General Dimitrijevic and Perisic implied to me on a number of

8 occasions that they disagreed with the VJ being used on internal security

9 operations and that General Pavkovic was bypassing the proper chain of

10 command."

11 Now, again you're using a kind of qualifying word that they

12 implied to you. Did they directly tell you this or was this something

13 that you just sort of concluded from some rather vague language of theirs?

14 ?

15 A. No, not at all sir. Again, as I have just explained, I mean, if

16 you got two extremely senior and intelligence related generals telling you

17 that they are unhappy about something going on, then either they are

18 slinging in a real fast ball to try and unsettle the other side, or they

19 are extremely concerned about the situation. And as you've indicated in

20 the previous statement that there was some internal unrest at senior level

21 about various people being promoted, et cetera, et cetera.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Now, I think -- I shouldn't say this. Even with our own General

24 Staff I am sure there are agitations between the various senior officers

25 concerned as to who is getting more influence in -- in -- in current

1 operations than he or she should be, and that --

2 Q. I can't imagine an army where that is not true?

3 A. I can't indeed, no. But as I say part of my job was to report

4 back any instances which in all good faith were told to me on -- as I said

5 on several occasions here by two very senior people which were obviously

6 of extreme interest to our intelligence.

7 Q. Well, Colonel, it's very clear to me what I've heard from you in

8 this courtroom and from your history that I've been able to read that you

9 have a very good and logical mind, and it seems to me that if we apply

10 some logic to this situation that the first thing we have to realise is

11 that the proposition that Pavkovic was going around the chain of command

12 and dealing directly with Milosevic makes no logical sense for a lot of

13 reasons, one of which we've discussed and that would be the ability of

14 Perisic to fire him. But the other one -- the other ones, clearly

15 Milosevic could order Perisic to order Samardzic to order Pavkovic to do

16 anything he wanted because he was the commander-in-chief of that military,

17 and Perisic would be bound to follow those orders or resign, I take it.

18 A. Well, as you well recall, sir, that is one of the statements that

19 I managed to get the late President Milosevic to admit to, that he was

20 actually the commander in chief, and therefore ultimately responsible for

21 the actions of the forces that were involved in this particular campaign.

22 .

23 Q. Well, with --

24 A. But I don't -- excuse me. I do not -- I accept the chain of

25 command you've outlined there is entirely correct.

1 Q. Well, if he was the commander-in-chief within the Supreme Defence

2 Council, then the orders came from him down through Perisic, down through

3 Samardzic down to the Pristina Corps if they had anything to do with the

4 Pristina Corps. That would have been the chain of command it would make

5 no sense for him to go around the chain of command and direct Pavkovic to

6 do something when he had a chain that he could work through would it?

7 A. I wouldn't disagree with it, sir. That is why when I was

8 approached by these two gentlemen I was approached by them on this

9 occasion and they made this statement -- I mean, it is an incredibly

10 serious statement to make.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. And I -- if you're saying it was a smokescreen statement, then

13 fair enough. That's -- that is a judgement that I cannot -- I only -- I

14 cannot make. As I said already, a statement made to me like that needs to

15 be reported back to my senior command for them to apply other sources that

16 might or might not reciprocate and understand the -- the importance of

17 this statement. But as far as I know, I was -- I was never contradicted

18 per se.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: I'd like the usher to come and pick up a little me

20 I have some documents that I have in it I'm going to ask you to refer to

21 and it's much easier than to try to fine the correct pages on the screen

22 and while that is being taken to you I would like you to look at a

23 document that is not in there and that is 4D138.

24 Are we getting the document? Yes, we are. We need the English

25 version, please. Go to the next page, please.

1 What we are looking at, Colonel, are the rules of service of the

2 Yugoslav Army that went into effect in 1996 and were in effect, as I

3 understand it, in 1998, the summer of 1998. And if we can enlarge

4 paragraph 473 at the bottom.

5 Now, these -- these rules of the VJ, 473 provides this: "Army

6 units may be used to combat outlawed, sabotage, terrorist and other armed

7 enemy groups," and then it has a "or" and we can skip that. "The chief

8 --" we just lost it for some reason. "The chief the General Staff shall

9 issue the order for the use of army units to carry out the task stated in

10 this item."

11 You see that?

12 A. I do, sir, yeah.

13 Q. That seems to indicate that the Chief of the General Staff can

14 issue an order to use the army against terrorist activity without any

15 constitutional authority or anything like that, doesn't it?

16 A. That is -- that is quite clear, sir, yes.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. But my point is I'm not actually against what you're saying. It's

19 -- it's the way that things unfolded within Kosovo and primarily the --

20 the initial contact in 1998 with three MUP killed at Rudnik and there was

21 a MUP reaction to that.

22 Now, I was led to believe by FLS or whatever that the primacy for

23 internal situations was with the MUP. Now, this appears to be at odds

24 with what is stated here.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter?

1 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, I'm concerned that this

2 line ever questioning is going to directly to the objections that were

3 being raised from the Defence yesterday. This witness cannot be deemed an

4 expert on the law of the army of Yugoslavia or the defence of Yugoslavia

5 or the individual constitution of the former Yugoslavia unless we would

6 caution Defence in regards to the questions that he intends to elicit on

7 these documents.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness has made a statement that says that the

9 army was acting outwith its constitutional rule without having had the

10 opportunity of seeing the provisions which might define its rule, and he's

11 now being shown documents which may be open to interpretation but do make

12 statements about the role of the army. That seems to us to be entirely

13 legitimate cross-examination on the statement given. He's not being asked

14 to give expert testimony at all. So I repel that objection.

15 Carry on, Mr. Ackerman.

16 MR. ACKERMAN:

17 Q. Colonel, you've now -- you've now seen that. I now want you to

18 look at one of the documents that I have given you and we can also put it

19 up on the screen. It's 4D137, and Mr. Sepenuk showed this to you earlier

20 today, a part of it.

21 Now, you'll notice, I think, that this document is dated 28 July

22 1998.

23 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.

24 Q. And this morning your attention was brought to some parts of it.

25 The -- the -- if you look, you'll see that it's a directive signed by

1 General Perisic on July 28, 1998, at around the same time he was telling

2 you that using the army away from the border belt was in violation of the

3 constitution. You'll see his directive the preamble says to deploy the

4 Yugoslav Army for securing state border with Albania units and facilities

5 in the area of Kosovo and Metohija and to crush the armed rebel forces.

6 And then if you go to the second page, the Yugoslav Army's

7 deployment so far, that means what have we done up to the 28th of July,

8 1998, he says this: "Through its presence and by carrying out the

9 training in the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija, the army has had

10 a repelling effect with regard to the Siptar terrorist forces and have

11 offered direct assistance to the forces of the MUP of the Republic of

12 Serbia."

13 And then if we go then to the next page, it speaks about his

14 directive regarding the engagement of the Yugoslav Army, at the very top

15 of that third page he says: "Through quick actions coordinated with the

16 force of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia, overwhelm and destroy the

17 sabotage and terrorist forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija as

18 per a special order from the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army."

19 And you'll see that same language then under the tasks of the 3rd

20 Army about halfway down the page.

21 Now, does this seem a bit of a contradiction from a general who is

22 telling you that you can't use the army this way at the same time he's

23 ordering the use of this the army in this way?

24 A. Sir, with respect I go back to --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: A moment, Mr. Crosland.

1 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. The document being shown is a

2 directive. It is a contingency plan to be used at some later stage if it

3 appears that there is a triggering event. That's the way this question is

4 being --

5 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, that's testimony that's not.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: You're now giving evidence.

7 MS. CARTER: Respectfully.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: You cannot object on the basis that you will

9 explain what answer he ought to give that's a quite inappropriate way to

10 interrupt. Now, what is it you are saying.

11 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour the way this last question

12 was asked was that this was an order that on one hand.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: It was what directive was used throughout I've

14 noted in my note here that's how it was put.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I object very strongly to this

16 objection she's telling the witness how to answer questions.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Just hold on a second, please. In closed session.

18 The witness will leave the courtroom and I'll deal with this now in his

19 absence.

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17 [Open session]

18 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, I'll remind you of the question in a

20 form which I think cannot be disputed, and that was having read the

21 document, do you agree that it seems a bit of a contradiction for that to

22 be set out in a document by a general who says you can't use the army in

23 this way?

24 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, my only comment is that, as I made

25 clearly throughout my statement, was that there was a denial, if that's

1 not too strong a word, that there'd ever have been joint MUP and VJ

2 operations. It was a surprise to me as a military man that that was a

3 case, and that was what kept coming out from the briefings by the FLS and

4 General Ojdanic. The fact that it was laid out in a document that's been

5 issued here, I don't find peculiar at all, but that was the cut of the

6 various intelligence briefings we were given. And when we pointed out the

7 VJ and the MUP were acted together, this was categorically denied, if

8 that's not too strong a term.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

10 MR. ACKERMAN:

11 Q. In your conversations with General Perisic, where he was intending

12 to you that Pavkovic was using the army illegally and going around the

13 chain of command and this was unconstitutional, did he ever tell you that

14 he had issued a directive of this nature in July of 1998 or give you an

15 idea of what that was? Or did he ever show it to you, or did General

16 Dimitrijevic ever show it to you?

17 A. I'm not aware that he ever did, sir, no.

18 Q. All right. Now, if you look at the very last page of this, I

19 think you'll notice that it was distributed to the 3rd Army. Do you

20 notice that?

21 A. This is 125, is it, at the back? Side flash 125, or P125 it?

22 Q. It's --

23 A. 25, 125. I don't know. The last --

24 Q. The document you're looking at is 137, and the page I'm referring

25 you to is actually page 7 of that document, I think, where it shows the

1 distribution -- actually, it's page 6. At the bottom, it says: "Printed

2 in seven copies and then submitted to," and then it says --

3 A. I apologies, sir. I see what you mean.

4 Q. "Copy to the 3rd Army command," see that?

5 A. Yes, I understand and see what you are showing.

6 Q. Now --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I just be clear about your last answer, two

8 answers go. Why was it a surprise to you that there were any joint

9 operations?

10 THE WITNESS: No. It was a surprise to me that there were not

11 joint -- there shouldn't be joint operations, and yet we were told there

12 were not joint operations.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I think there may be a mistake in this transcript

14 then. Just give me a second. Ah, yes. I hadn't read the entire answer.

15 Thank you. It is clear.

16 Mr. Ackerman.

17 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. The next thing that -- that we might consider, Colonel, is whether

19 this directive of -- of General Perisic that was sent to the 3rd Army was

20 ever acted on by the 3rd Army, and what I'd like you to do now is look at

21 4D140, which is I think 140 in your packet there. I think you'll see that

22 what this is is now an order -- Your Honours have seen this earlier, of

23 course.

24 This is dated the next day, 29 July 1998, and this is an order;

25 not a directive, but an order, signed by General Samardzic of the 3rd

1 Army. And you'll notice on page 13 that copy one goes to the Pristina

2 Corps command. And I suggest to you that what this is an order from

3 General Samardzic to the Pristina Corps command, among others,

4 implementing the directive from General Perisic and, in fact, using nearly

5 identical language from what General Perisic used.

6 If you look at page 7 -- page 6, it assigns unit tasks; and then

7 5.1, to the Pristina Corps; and then at the top of page 7, it says:

8 "Launch rapid and energetic attacks in coordination with Serbian MUP

9 forces to smash and destroy the terrorist forces in the zone of

10 responsibility in accordance with my special order."

11 And I think all I really want to ask you about is, do you

12 understand this is an implementation by General Samardzic of the directive

13 from General Perisic the next day?

14 A. Sir, yes. With respect, it is the classical staff dissemination

15 of orders down the chain of command, which one would have expected in an

16 army of the experience of Vojska Jugoslavija and a very interesting

17 document to see.

18 Q. And if you look at page -- page 6, about halfway down, there's a

19 kind of small heading that says "Standby." And it seems to indicate that

20 6th August at 0500 is the -- is the starting off point for destroying the

21 DTS which is the terrorist forces in accordance special order. Do you see

22 that?

23 A. I see that, yes.

24 Q. All right.

25 A. I think that's why I referred to the VJ and MUP early -- late

1 August or late summer, early August -- early autumn deployment. So that

2 is in line with what I have reported.

3 Q. But it is not in line with the proposition that General Pavkovic

4 was going outside that chain of command. These seem to be documents fully

5 within the chain of command directing activity that Perisic -- that

6 Perisic and Dimitrijevic were telling you was not proper.

7 A. I -- I fully accept that, sir. All I'm -- I will repeat is that

8 when two senior generals of that nature make that comment to me, as a

9 defence attache, I think it's only right and proper that I report it up

10 the chain of command.

11 Q. Of course, it is; that's your job. All right. Now I want to go

12 to something else. This -- this issue of how many KLA there were keeps

13 surfacing as we go through your testimony, and my colleagues have brought

14 up, even the Judge brought up various other information we've received

15 during the course of this trial, regarding numbers that are dramatically

16 larger than -- than what you've told us. And you keep telling us that --

17 that those numbers don't match what you were able to see on the ground in

18 Kosovo, and I think maybe you and I can agree that there's a way to

19 understand what you're saying.

20 When you're dealing with terrorists, Colonel, terrorists are not

21 like a conventional army. They don't gather together in barracks. They

22 don't march around on parade grounds. They don't always go around wearing

23 uniforms and carrying their weapons and looking like an army. I think

24 it's the case, and I think you'll agree with me, that terrorists can only

25 succeed by blending into the population, by making themselves basically

1 invisible except on those occasions when they launch an attack, and then

2 they go right back to invisibility again. Would you agree with that?

3 A. I think this is some of the advice that I gave to General

4 Dimitrijevic at the start of this particular campaign, that as I said, the

5 goldfish in the bowl would be the Serb and the Serb forces within Kosovo

6 in amongst a huge Albanian population. So I would agree entirely with

7 what you say.

8 Q. So it would be a virtually impossible task to stand on the ground

9 in Kosovo and count the KLA, because that -- how would you know which guy

10 you're looking at is a KLA and which one isn't. And like you said

11 yesterday, I think you said yesterday, the one to tell us how many

12 fighters there were in the KLA would be the KLA, and I think that was a

13 fair statement on your part. Right?

14 A. That, I believe, was the gist of the conversation, sir, yes.

15 Q. Yeah. Now, in the Milosevic -- I'm going to a different subject

16 again. In the Milosevic trial at page 7962, you were talking about the

17 general tactics that were being used by the Serbian security forces. I

18 can tell you that many villagers from Kosovo, who have testified here,

19 have talked about shells being fired over the tops of their villages.

20 And I think this matches up with what you said in your statements

21 here and in Milosevic where you said, "It appeared that on most

22 operations, warning shots would be fired into the area of the villages

23 that were about to be assaulted presumably to try and warn the civilian

24 population that worse was to come." Correct?

25 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

1 Q. And I think you even told us yesterday that -- that one sort of

2 notable feature of this was that it appeared that it was -- that it was

3 successful, that the civilians did leave the villages because virtually no

4 one -- no civilians were killed in these -- these kinds of attacks.

5 A. Yeah. That's as I understand it, sir, yes.

6 Q. And so I think it would be fair to say that the target of these

7 attacks was the KLA, not the Albanian people.

8 A. Well, with respect, sir, to that, you know, why was there so much

9 collateral damage done post the assault or during the assault and laying

10 waste of all the market areas in Pec, Decani, Djakovica, to name but

11 three, and Urosevac, I think.

12 Q. Well, I do understand your testimony about that, that your

13 contention is that there was quite a bit of damage done that certainly had

14 an effect on the people. But in terms of directly attacking the people of

15 Albania, I think it's your opinion you didn't see that.

16 A. Well, I think that's, with respect, sir, is a very large question.

17 I mean, the psychological damage by warfare is a huge and ongoing business

18 as we see every day in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that shells flying over

19 villages against unarmed civilians in the majority, whether they were

20 supporters of the KLA or not, I don't think is really the correct way to

21 carry out these type of operations, in my -- in my opinion, sir.

22 Q. Well, that is -- that's, of course, an absolutely astute

23 observation, and it's what we see, as you said, in Afghanistan and in Iraq

24 and in all recent conflicts that we're familiar with, especially with a

25 kind of weapon which that's being used these days.

1 I want to go to -- if you want to comment on that, please free. I

2 think that's what you were telling us?

3 A. That is correct, sir, yes. The key to winning a

4 counter-insurgency situation is winning the hearts and minds, and then

5 providing the infrastructure for the civilian population, as I said, to

6 get on with their daily life of making business, crops, farming, et

7 cetera. And unfortunately most of the businesses, the crops, and the

8 farms were burnt, razed to the ground throughout many, many areas of

9 Kosovo.

10 Q. I've just got a few more things I want to discuss with you, not

11 much more left here. In your June statement of 2006, that's the one you

12 made with regard to the Haradinaj case, you said this: "It was at one

13 occasion pointed out to me that I should consider the focus of my interest

14 better during my time in the Balkans," and then you said after that, "I

15 always tried to report objectively that there was a growing terrorist

16 problem in Kosovo. It was a regular occurrence that MUP officers and

17 others were being killed by KLA. This was not good for the stability in

18 the area."

19 Now, when you say it was pointed out to you that you should

20 consider the focus of your interest better, are you saying that you were

21 being criticised for objective reporting about the KLA?

22 A. I could get into an awful lot of trouble over this.

23 Q. Well, wait a minute.

24 A. Go on, sir.

25 Q. It's nobody's -- it's nobody's desire to get you into trouble, so

1 we can do a thing called private session where nobody only the people in

2 this room will hear your answer. Would you like to do that?

3 A. No. I'm quite happy to accept the brick bats. I always have.

4 That's probably why I was five foot eight and now I'm five foot six.

5 There was a -- a general misunderstanding about matters Balkans, I

6 would say, throughout the international community. And it's very easy, as

7 I said to many people, to view the civil war that had been going on in the

8 Balkans since 1991 in Bosnia and Croatia and Slovenia and other places on

9 the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. And I reminded people on several

10 accounts that the civil war in the United Kingdom in 1642 took brother

11 against brother, and probably one of the worst civil wars was the civil

12 war in your country, sir.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. And that was probably only about 150 years ago. In the country of

15 Holland, in which I now sit, the 100 years war and the wars of Orange and

16 so on were also very bloody. And part of my attempt was to understand and

17 to report in a correct manner and, as I think I have tried to suggest to

18 the Court today, to understand the situation that the Vojska Jugoslavija

19 in particular was in in Kosovo and to report in a fair and firm way.

20 And where I understood there to be reason to -- to query and to

21 question why very heavy firepower was being used - because I didn't

22 consider this right against primarily a civilian population, albeit maybe

23 with leanings towards or even tacit support for the terrorist

24 organisation, I was one of the few people who would call it a terrorist

25 organisation - I made it clear to the Vojska Jugoslavija that I was more

1 than unhappy with that being used.

2 At the same time, I made it very clear to many senior people that

3 there was a huge amount of provocation being absorbed by both the VJ and

4 the MUP, and that many brave and distinguished officers and men had been

5 killed by the KLA. And they were having, as my army has over the century

6 have, to accept that you are an army the political scenario and arm of the

7 political wing.

8 I still think there is a misunderstanding about the situation

9 within the Balkans and there is an attempt to make it either a black or

10 white scenario, when we know in most the world most areas are grey.

11 The current situation in Kosovo I think leads to grave concern.

12 And I know from my contacts still back in Belgrade that there is not only

13 concern, there is a great fear that Veliki Albania may well take shape if

14 - and I stress the if because I'm not in touch with what is going on in

15 Pristina - Pristina or Kosovo becomes a protectorate or another state.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand your concern, Mr. Crosland, but it's

17 an area into which we dare not go. Our problems are big enough dealing

18 with 1999 and --

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to some extent 1998.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Colonel, I want to ask you briefly about a report

24 by Ambassador Donnelly. It's P683. I don't think you have it in that

25 booklet there, but it will come up on the screen. And you'll recognise

1 that it's a report about that meeting with Dimitrijevic in October, early

2 October. The report's dated 3 October 1998.

3 A. Yeah. It is -- excuse me. It is from the ambassador, right, as

4 you said so.

5 Q. Mm-hmm. If you look at paragraph 4 -- and you were at that

6 meeting, weren't you?

7 A. Yes. I believe I was, yeah.

8 Q. If you look at paragraph 4, the ambassador says: "Dimitrijevic

9 said that it seemed to him that the decision to punish the FRY had already

10 been made." This was as early as October of 1998 he was saying that;

11 correct?

12 A. That, as it's stated there, is correct, sir, yes.

13 Q. Yes. What I want to ask you about, if we go to page 3, in

14 paragraph 12, where the ambassador puts in his comments, he said about

15 halfway down: "The expressed belief that the die is already cast is

16 partly true [Realtime transcript read in error "through"]"?

17 Now, is he saying there that Dimitrijevic is right, that the

18 decision to punish the FRY had already been made, and that what followed

19 in Rambouillet was just a sort of circus to set things up for NATO attack?

20 Is that what he's saying?

21 A. With respect, sir, I did not go to Rambouillet, and I did not have

22 anything to do with it. And I think to ask me to comment on what

23 Ambassador Donnelly said is inappropriate, if I may say so.

24 Q. Well, I'll totally respect that. Colonel, thank you. I doesn't

25 think I have any more questions.

1 A. Thank you, sir.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

3 Mr. Cepic.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave I have been

5 mentioned by my learned friend, Mr. Ackerman. Actually, in relation to

6 what the gentleman said, I claim that what we put to the witness is

7 something from another witness's statement does not mean that our Defence

8 supports that statement or, rather, that we accepted it. We would have

9 challenged it during the cross-examination if --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, Mr. Cepic. The matter was dealt

11 with lightly when it happened, and it didn't commit you to anything.

12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. [In English] Thank you,

13 Your Honour.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

15 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, there is a typo in the transcript that's

16 just at the top of the screen. Line 132 -- page 132 line 4, I believe it

17 should be "partly true," not "partly through. " I just thought I would

18 catch that while it's still within our purview.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

20 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

21 Q. Good morning, Mr Crosland, my name is Dragan Ivetic, and I am one

22 of the attorneys for Mr. Sreten Lukic. And I would ask you to pay close

23 attention to my questions and try to limit yourself to answering just

24 those questions, so we can try and move as quickly as possible through the

25 testimony here today.

1 A. Good day, sir.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, I believe you've already stated that in 1998

3 during your appointment as Defence attache to the UK embassy in Belgrade,

4 that you did not have any accreditation with the Ministry of Internal

5 Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. I want to just clear things up with

6 you. During any of the time that you were in Yugoslavia, is it correct to

7 say that you never had any accreditation status with the MUP of the

8 Republic of Serbia?

9 A. I had never had any accreditation, sir.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you and can we conclude from that the fact that

11 neither in your preparation for your assignment or deployment nor in the

12 course of your deployment did you have any formal instruction, training or

13 otherwise on the organisation, structure, or functioning of the Ministry

14 of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia?

15 A. I think what you are saying is I wouldn't know anything about it.

16 That is not correct. I made it my business to find out which -- the

17 various organs of the MUP, as I've said already, when the operation

18 started in Kosovo, it was quite clear that it would be a joint operation

19 and, therefore, I needed to understand, as best as possible, between the

20 various nuances of the MUP, sir.

21 Q. I appreciate that, sir. I think my question asked about formal

22 instruction or training. Am I correct that you did not any formal

23 instruction or training and all the acts undertaken were acts on your own

24 to try and learn as much as you could?

25 A. Yeah. That's correct, sir, yes.

1 Q. Thank you, sir. Is it correct that you did not have any

2 substantial or official contact with the MUP leadership in Belgrade or the

3 most senior MUP officers on the ground in Kosovo during the time of your

4 deployment?

5 A. As you're well aware, sir, there are numerous defence and national

6 days and other opportunities where the diplomatic corps, as a whole, gets

7 together. And being an inquisitive person, I suppose, I would try and get

8 into conversation with some of the more senior gentlemen. Sometimes they

9 would they would chat on an interested basis, because of my background and

10 sometimes they wouldn't, but I am -- it was social contact.

11 Q. I think you've answered my next question. You said there was a

12 social contact. You never had any official contact meetings or contact,

13 did you?

14 A. I mean, there were several high powered murders during our time

15 there, which had political innuendo which would be discussed within the --

16 the embassy. And, obviously, I would listen to the conversations that

17 accrued around these incidents, as I say, to understand fully or more

18 fully the whole political and military picture of Yugoslavia as it then

19 was.

20 Q. Okay. Am I correct that you would not consider yourself versed or

21 an expert in the functioning structure, authority, or duties of the MUP

22 staff in Pristina during 1998 or 1999?

23 A. No. They kept themselves very much to themselves. I think from

24 time to time I may have had the odd conversation with Andjelkovic and

25 people to do with civil order within Pristina itself, again, as part of

1 the overriding wish to find out what was going on in order to report

2 fairly and firmly to my superiors.

3 Q. You say you had the odd conversation with Andjelkovic. Am I

4 correct I never had any communication with the -- with the staff of the

5 Ministry of Interior in Pristina, anyone from that outfit?

6 A. No. I think the only -- as I said, I told you we were picked up

7 by the MUP in Djakovica and taken to the Glodjane massacre site.

8 Q. Okay. We'll get to -- I do have a couple questions with respect

9 to Glodjane that we'll get to later in my questioning. Now, as far as the

10 information you were relying upon regarding the activities of the MUP

11 police in Kosovo and Metohija, can we conclude that apart from the items

12 that you personally eyewitnessed in your statement that most of your other

13 knowledge came primarily from other sources such as the KVM, KDOM, and the

14 KLA?

15 A. No, I don't think that's correct at all, sir.

16 Q. Okay. What other sources did you rely upon then, sir?

17 A. When it became obvious that the MUP were heavily involved in

18 operations in Kosovo, I referred back to my own Ministry of Defence for

19 intelligence in that area.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. But one keeps one's eye open. I had to brief the KVM, the KDOM.

22 One spoke to members of the KLA, as I already admitted.

23 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Did you ever attempt to hear the other side;

24 that is to say, approach the high functionaries of the Serbian MUP to

25 inquire about these activities?

1 A. As I've said, sir, there were times when I attempted to engage

2 these gentlemen in conversation, and I put the questions through the FLS

3 to be answered usually with not a great deal of interest.

4 Q. And would you agree with me that these gentlemen you attempted to

5 engage in conversation are the gentlemen in Belgrade; that is to say, that

6 the requests were made to Belgrade?

7 A. Yes. I think that that would be correct, sir, yes.

8 Q. Okay. Now, you've talked here in the last two days about your

9 discussions with VJ Generals Dimitrijevic and Perisic and about the

10 various comments that they made. The question I would like to ask you is

11 as far as your discussions with these two individuals are concerned, did

12 you note any tendency on their part to try and pass responsibility or

13 shuffle responsibility from themselves onto the MUP?

14 A. No. I don't think that was the -- I think there was concern that

15 I was noting -- there was some very harsh treatment being meted out, as

16 I've already made clear during the last two days. And I'm sure that was

17 passed on to the appropriate authorities, but that's about really all I

18 can say on that matter.

19 Q. All right. If we can look at Exhibit P683 on e-court. This was

20 an exhibit that was tendered by the Office of the Prosecutor, I believe

21 through your -- through their presentation of you in this case the other

22 day. And I'm looking at I believe page 4 on e-court paragraph 12.

23 First of all, sir, looking at the first page of this document,

24 does this appear to be a document that you had knowledge of or perhaps

25 even authored during your deployment as the Defence attache to the UK

1 embassy in Belgrade?

2 A. I may well have added to this document. I would have to read it.

3 But as it's a DipTel, that comes from either my ambassador or the Deputy

4 Head of Mission.

5 Q. Correct.

6 A. I'm not authorised to release those, sir.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you say P683.

8 MR. IVETIC: That's what I'm showing, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: That's the one May Mr. Ackerman showed a short time

10 ago.

11 MR. IVETIC: I believe it is, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Which the witness wasn't happy to comment on

13 because it was a -- it contained views expressed by the ambassador.

14 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir, Your Honour.

15 MR. IVETIC: That's why I need to find out whether the comments

16 that I'm referring to are comments the witness made or comments that the

17 ambassador made.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

19 MR. IVETIC: If we could turn to page 4, paragraph 12 on e-court.

20 Q. I apologise, sir, we're still trying to get there. Four.

21 A. I've got the, by the look of it, the end page which is signed by

22 Ambassador Donnelly, if that's the one you are -

23 Q. That's the one I'm looking at, and I am looking paragraph where

24 you --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: This is the paragraph that the witness already said

1 he wouldn't comment on.

2 MR. IVETIC: He wasn't asked about that one section. I don't know

3 if he was referring to just the items that Mr. Ackerman had pointed out to

4 him or the suggestion there that, as it says here. I don't want to

5 misquote it. "He may have an eye to possible ICTY investigations recent

6 events, and was very keen to shuffle responsibility to the MUP." I

7 believe that was not one that had been raised by Mr. Ackerman, and that is

8 why I wanted to ask this witness whether he had the same position with

9 respect to that statement or whether he did have some light to shed on

10 that.

11 THE WITNESS: I think with respect to the Court, it would be

12 inappropriate for me to comment on what the ambassador has stated. I have

13 given you my comments on General Dimitrijevic and General Perisic and even

14 General Kirby's suggestions at time that they disagreed with what was

15 going on. And I hope I have explained why I reported it as such.

16 MR. IVETIC:

17 Q. That is fair enough, sir. Thank you.

18 A. Thank you very much.

19 Q. If we can move on then. Would you agree with me that all the

20 matters that are contained in your statement and your testimony here

21 these -- these last two days has been limited to the time period before

22 March 23rd, 1999, and after the conclusion of the NATO bombing campaign,

23 that is to say that you cannot offer us with a degree of certainty

24 concrete testimony relating to the time period between 23rd March, 1999,

25 and the return of KFOR to Kosovo after the conclusion of the NATO

1 bombings?

2 A. I -- I -- I was not physically in Kosovo for obvious reasons.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I was working back in the Ministry of Defence advising my -- my

5 defence about the Yugoslav position, and as I've said again, playing the

6 Yugoslav card in a rather depressing situation, to be quite blunt.

7 Q. Fair enough, sir. I've got --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, could you find a suitable place to

9 end --

10 MR. IVETIC: I was going to suggest-- I have two short questions

11 and then I'll moving to another topic, so I'll try and get through the two

12 questions and we can interrupt if that's okay with Your Honours. Thank

13 you.

14 Q. Now, sir, a state of war was declared by Yugoslavia on the 25th of

15 March, 1999, as a result of the NATO bombings. Am I will correct that you

16 do not have any specific knowledge from any source as to what effect this

17 decision had upon how the MUP of the Republic of Serbia was organised or

18 functioned under such circumstances?

19 A. As I repeat, sir, I was -- I was then back in London and one was

20 then reacting and briefing to the situation as it unfurled during those

21 days. So I really can't comment on the state of war. It's -- I don't

22 think the UK has declared a state of war for quite some time.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, we could probably pause now.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, sir.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we have to finish there for today, and you

4 will have to return tomorrow. We only have Mr. Ivetic's cross-examination

5 to complete and then re-examination by the Prosecution. I understand

6 you're intending to leave tomorrow. Do you have a time for leaving?

7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. With respect, I have got an

8 important engagement tomorrow night at about half past 6.00, about two on

9 a half hours west of London, so I need to leave here by mid-morning in

10 order to catch the plane and the --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll be sitting at 9.00, and everyone, I

12 think, has that target clearly in mind. So your evidence should be

13 completed in good time for you to make your travel arrangements.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Meanwhile, please remember to discuss anything but

16 the evidence with anyone you meet tonight, and we'll see you again

17 tomorrow at 9.00. We'll go into closed session while you leave the

18 courtroom.

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.

20 [Closed session]

21 (redacted)

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.29 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day

24 of February, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

25