1 Friday, 2 March 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Petritsch.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: The cross-examination by Mr. O'Sullivan will now
10 Mr. O'Sullivan.
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you.
12 WITNESS: WOLFGANG PETRITSCH [Resumed]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. O'Sullivan: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, Ambassador.
15 A. Good morning, sir.
16 Q. I believe the bundle of exhibits has now been placed in front of
17 you. Is that correct?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. Yesterday when we broke we were talking about Rambouillet, and the
20 first exhibit I'd like to discuss with you is 1D18, e-court pages 418 to
21 425. And for you in hard copy it's tab 33. This again is taken from the
22 compilation of materials from Professor Weller's book. And you'll see
23 there, Ambassador, that as a copy of the Rambouillet agreement as it
24 existed on the 6th of February, 1999, and we see there that there's --
25 there are four components to it. There's a framework agreement, annex 1
1 on the constitution, annex 3 on elections, and annex 4 the ombudsman and I
2 believe you were explaining during your direct examination that over the
3 period of the Rambouillet talks, there were a couple of things. And the
4 first is we notice here that the segments or elements are called annexes
5 and later I believe you said they became chapters. Is that right?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. And as time progressed different elements of the agreement were
8 tabled between the 6th and 23rd; correct, different chapters?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And the final version, which is the 23rd of February, which we'll
11 come to later this morning, has a total of nine chapters and I think you
12 would agree with me that the chapters are numbered 1 through 8 but there
13 is an annex 4(A) which makes a total of 9 chapters in the final agreement.
14 Does that sound right to you?
15 A. I would to double-check, but yeah, I'd have to look at it and I
16 guess you're right.
17 Q. Fine. We'll move --
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. I can state to you that that's --
20 A. Okay.
21 Q. -- correct, but we'll come back to that. Now, these annexes or
22 chapters, as they were later called, were tabled by the negotiators, you
23 the negotiators, on behalf of the Contact Group?
24 A. That's right.
25 Q. And in Exhibit P2658 which is the final report that you sent to
1 Vienna on the 25th of February you said this, and I'll just read it to
2 you. You said: "Negotiations" -- this is your final report where you're
3 summarising the events that took place at Rambouillet and it's sent on the
4 25th of February 1999. You say: "Negotiations with the Contact Group
5 took up more time than the negotiations between the parties to the
6 conflict. Some annexes were only agreed to upon internally at a very late
7 date and therefore only reached the parties at a late stage."
8 And I think this confirms the fact that you were tabling these
9 chapters on behalf of the Contact Group; correct?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Do you recall that during the first week, and I would put it on
12 the 12th of February, that you received a letter from Professor Markovic,
13 the head of delegation, requesting that his delegation be given all
14 relevant documents that were to be discussed at -- during the talks. Does
15 that sound familiar to you?
16 A. I do not distinctly recall the letter, but I do recall the
17 discussion about the way forward. It was reached agreement in the Contact
18 Group that we should proceed in such a way that we hand out chapter after
19 chapter in order to make progress and in order not to confuse and in order
20 to be able to focus and take this step-by-step approach.
21 Q. Perhaps we could look at Exhibit 1D96, that's tab 34 for you,
22 Ambassador. It's the letter that Professor Markovic sent to you, Tab 34,
23 1D96. It should be the next document in your bundle, tab 34.
24 A. Tab 34 starts here.
25 Q. It's a very short letter and I think it confirms what you just
1 said, that it was sent to the negotiators by Professor Markovic as head
2 and it's simply asking -- we're in the first week and he just requests
3 the -- all the relevant documents intended for discussions and I think
4 your explanation has put light on the context of this letter. Does this
5 letter does -- seeing it now, does it refresh your recollection?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Professor Markovic also approached you, the negotiators,
8 requesting to organise face-to-face meetings with the Albanian delegation
9 also, didn't he?
10 A. Yes, that's correct. After the refusal on the part of the
11 Yugoslav delegation to meet with the Kosovar Albanians in the initial
12 phase, which I already mentioned.
13 Q. That was the opening ceremonies?
14 A. Opening ceremonies.
15 Q. Where they were not comfortable sitting down with the KLA
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is that right?
19 A. With the Albanian delegation as such.
20 Q. But the central complaint was the fact that KLA was there;
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, there was also a request by Mr. Markovic on behalf of his
24 delegation, which I believe you mentioned yesterday or the day before,
25 that both delegations sign the non-negotiable basic principles or the
1 basic elements issued by the Contact Group on the 30th of January, 1999;
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Now, we never saw those elements during your direct examination
5 and 1D18, e-court page 414, tab 35 in hard copy, if you see tab 35 in the
6 left-hand column at the bottom, "Contact Group non-negotiable principles,
7 basic elements, 30 January 1999."
8 You recognise that as the basic principles?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And that is the document that the Serb/Yugoslav delegation was
11 asking to be signed?
12 A. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. And I believe yesterday you said in reference to P2662, which is a
14 dispatch you sent your foreign ministry on the 10th of February that this
15 demand was dropped on the 10th of February after Foreign Ministers Cook
16 and Vedrine and the mediators gave their assurances that the sovereignty
17 and territorial integrity of the FRY would be preserved. That's what you
18 said a couple of days ago; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And, of course, we see that one of the elements of the basic
21 elements was the territorial integrity of the FRY; correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And I believe you said also that it was quite a legitimate
24 concern, given the fact that as a state delegation that would be one of
25 their interests in preserving their sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Now, a more general question about these things we've just
4 discussed here very briefly. Would it be fair to say that requesting a
5 face-to-face meeting and having both sides sign the basic principles and
6 requesting all documents is -- can be seen as a constructive request. I
7 mean, it would be a sign of good well, confidence-building measure. It's
8 nothing other than an attempt to facilitate the discussions. Would that
9 be a fair way to put it?
10 A. Let me be more specific. The signing of the non-negotiable
11 principles was deemed not necessary by the Contact Group because of the
12 fact, as I already mentioned, that it was included in the invitation to
13 both sides. So we deemed it not necessary to waste time on the signing
14 ceremony, on the difficulties to get the two groups together. We saw how
15 difficult it was to organise the first inaugural meeting to be in the same
16 room and so on.
17 We only had one week originally; therefore, we had to move on and
18 we could not allow the procrastination and side-stepping in terms of a
19 signing ceremony which was obsolete, because it was already a
20 pre-condition for both parties to appear in Rambouillet.
21 Q. All right. I'll just stop you there, because perhaps my question
22 was too general. I'm not disputing that it was in your prerogative as the
23 negotiators to make those discussions, but the requests in and of
24 themselves were not unreasonable. They could have been constructive --
25 seen as constructive requests to meet -- to meet face-to-face, to have all
1 the documents and to sign the basic agreement?
2 A. Under normal circumstances with parties who are cooperative, that
3 would not have been a big deal. Under those circumstances, it was a big
4 deal; therefore, the Contact Group arrived at the decision not to engage
5 in this exercise.
6 Q. I accept that. Thank you. P2793 is the transcript of your
7 testimony in the Milosevic case. You don't have that in hard copy,
8 Ambassador, I just made reference to it for the record. P2793 is the
9 transcript and at page 7726 [sic] I'll read what you said about -- about
10 the Serb FRY delegation at Rambouillet. You said: "Once things started
11 to roll on both sides there was a very constructive phase with the
12 Yugoslav side experts taking over, so to speak, from the politicians
13 negotiating. Hammering out compromised solutions, proposals that were in
14 -- then in turn passed on to the Albanian side, the Kosovo Albanians
15 dealt with it and it came back and so on."
16 That was your testimony in Milosevic, and I think it's a fair
17 summary of the way it was working in that period in Rambouillet.
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. And you know that Mr. Milutinovic arrived at Rambouillet near the
20 end of the first week, which would be Thursday, the 11th of February;
22 A. I do not have a recollection when he actually arrived, but he was
23 there in Paris, yes, and then also in Rambouillet later on.
24 Q. Maybe I can help you with that then. Again it's the Milosevic
25 transcript P2793, page 7221, line 10, I'll just read it back to you to
1 refresh your memory. You said: "Later on, around 11 February," which I
2 say is Thursday, "the Serbian president, Mr. Milutinovic, arrived. He
3 stayed in Paris and also served as an informal point of contact,
4 obviously, for -- for the Rambouillet delegation, Yugoslav/Serb
5 delegation, and then later on occasionally dropped by and became more
6 involved -- more and more engaged and involved; however, on a more
7 political level when it came to contacts with the Contact Group foreign
8 ministers who were chaperoning, so to speak, these negotiations."
9 Does that help refresh your recollection?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you emphasise a couple of things here. You say
12 Mr. Milutinovic serving as a point of contact and his engagement on a
13 political level at Rambouillet. This is much the same role he played
14 throughout 1998 and it's much the same relationship he had with Mr.
15 Markovic's delegation in 1998, is it not? Would that be a fair statement?
16 A. That could be, yes.
17 Q. Now, you knew that Mr. Milutinovic had been SFRY and FRY
18 ambassador to Greece from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And you knew that he had been the FRY foreign minister before
21 becoming -- being elected president of Serbia?
22 A. Yes, I've met him in this capacity.
23 Q. And you knew that he -- that Mr. Milutinovic knew and had
24 previously worked with many of the Contact Group foreign ministers;
1 A. This I don't know.
2 Q. Would it be -- is it also correct to say that Mr. Milutinovic was
3 not the only political figure from Yugoslavia who was not a member of the
4 delegation who was present, either at Rambouillet or later in Paris; and
5 I'm thinking in particular of Vuk Draskovic, who at the time was the
6 deputy prime minister of the FRY?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. And you may also recall that Mr. Jovanovic, the foreign minister
9 of the FRY at the time, was also appearing from time to time?
10 A. This I don't recall, in fact, but it -- if you have researched
11 this, then it should be right.
12 Q. But do you recall seeing or knowing that the foreign minister
13 would come either to Rambouillet or to Paris?
14 A. Honestly, I do not recall this. Of course, I have met foreign
15 minister on several occasions, but I do not recall whether -- where --
16 whether I have met him in Rambouillet.
17 Q. Fine. But the people like -- that you did see from outside the
18 delegation, the political figures, typically at this -- these meetings,
19 they were there to meet and speak to individuals in connection with these
20 ongoing -- the ongoing process; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, going to the second week of the meetings, and I'm thinking in
23 particular of Tuesday, the 16th of February, which is the Tuesday of that
24 second week. The negotiators, you were presented with comprehensive
25 comments and responses from both delegations. Would you -- I can show you
1 a document in connection to that, but that sound right that at the
2 beginning of the second week?
3 A. Sounds right, yeah.
4 Q. And the next document I would like to look at is e-court 1D18,
5 pages 431 to 438. And, Ambassador, you have that at tab 36. We've looked
6 at the first draft of the Rambouillet Accord on the 6th of February. Here
7 on -- at 1D18, tab 36, we have the second draft dated the 18th of
8 February. Do you see that in front of you?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And this was the draft that was prepared after you had received
11 these comprehensive comments and responses from both delegations on the
12 16th; correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Now, we see here that at the very beginning of this document that
15 there is preamble included which was not in the first draft; correct?
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 Q. We see that the framework is still there, that's just below the
18 preamble. Do you see that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. If you turn the page we now see in the left-hand column near the
21 bottom: "Chapter 1: Constitution." As we've said -- as we've agreed the
22 annexes are now called chapters; correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. If you turn over -- that's the second page, third, fourth, the
25 fifth page, you'll see that there's a chapter 3. So if you keep turning
1 you'll see chapter 3. In the hard copy up at the top right-hand corner it
2 should be page 439. Top right-hand corner of your -- it's the pagination
3 from the book, go to page 439 in hard copy. Do you see that, Ambassador?
4 A. It's chapter 3, you say?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. It's in the left lower corner.
7 Q. That's right. So chapter 3 is the elections. If you turn to the
8 next page, please, we see a new chapter on the next page, chapter 4.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Economic issues.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In that same page chapter 4(A), which is also new, humanitarian
13 assistance, reconstruction, and economic development.
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Still on the same page, chapter 6, the ombudsman. And if you turn
16 over to the next page we have chapter 8, which is new: "Amendments,
17 comprehensive assessment, and final clauses." Do you see that?
18 A. I see it, yes.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, at this time I have a document I'd
20 like to hand to the Bench and to the Prosecution, and I'm going to seek
21 your leave to use it. But I would like you to see the document and I
22 would make a submission to you on it, and so if I could ask that a copy be
23 given to the Bench and to the Prosecutor for the time being. Your Honour,
24 this is a table which I prepared. I don't -- if you allow me to use
25 it -- I'll tell you the reasons why I'd use it. The left-hand column, the
1 first column, represents the elements of the agreement as it existed on
2 the 6th of February. The middle column shows the elements of the
3 agreement on the 18th. And in the third column, which you haven't come to
4 is the -- all the elements of the agreement, and I'm trying to juxtapose
5 them to it's clear to the witness and anyone following.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you a problem with that, Mr. Stamp?
7 MR. STAMP: No, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: In that case, could I ask the usher once again to
10 give the Ambassador a copy and place a copy on the ELMO for the public.
11 Your Honour, I believe if we're going to use this document, it may
12 become part of the record and can it be given an IC number now, just for
13 identification purposes at least.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC126, Your Honours.
15 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
16 Q. Now, Ambassador, this table you have in front of you is a document
17 that I produced and I can represent to you that I believe it's a faithful
18 reproduction of the elements of the Rambouillet agreement as it evolved
19 over time. And starting with the first column on the far left we have the
20 four elements of the February 6th agreement, the framework, the
21 constitution, ammendments, and ombudsman. Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In the middle column are the elements of the 18th and you see the
24 preamble is added, chapters 4 and 4(A), and 8 are added. Do you see that?
25 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
1 Q. We'll deal with the third column later, because that's the
2 comprehensive agreement, and a few moments ago I was suggesting to you
3 that there were, in fact, nine chapters, if you look at the far right,
4 because they're numbered 1 through 8 but there's a chapter 4A, which
5 means, in fact, nine chapters. Do you see that?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. But we'll come back to that. So we're dealing with the
8 Rambouillet agreement as it existed on the 18th of February with the
9 contents we have there in front of us. Now P2661 is an e-mail dispatch
10 you sent to your foreign ministry on the 18th of February. You looked at
11 that yesterday with my learned friend Mr. Stamp, and I'll just remind you
12 what you said in that. This dispatch is the 18th of February and you
13 wrote: "The new draft agreement was revised on 17th February at the
14 Contact Group expert level -- the Contact Group without the Russian
15 Federation and finished in consultation with the Russian Federation in the
16 night between the 17th and 18th of February."
17 So this is the document that we're talking about that resulted
18 from that process; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And then you wrote in this same dispatch to your foreign
21 ministry: "It was presented to the parties on 18 February with the
22 instruction to consider it final. The draft made concessions to the
23 Serbian side on points which it considered to be of -- "
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan, just a moment. Which tab number is
1 MR. O'SULLIVAN: It's not -- I don't think it's in the tab.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Ah, right. Sorry, sorry. I was looking in the
3 right place.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'm sorry.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not on the screen either, you see.
6 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
7 Can we have -- can we put P2661 on the screen.
8 Q. My apologies, Ambassador.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: We have it now.
10 MR. O'SULLIVAN: All right.
11 It's the bottom of the second page, please. Well, English,
13 Q. With all due respect, Ambassador, we'll use the English.
14 A. I can manage.
15 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well -- perhaps the Bench understands German, but
16 I would be a little hard-pressed.
17 Q. All right. There you have the segment of the dispatch you sent,
18 and I was just reading it to you, that the new -- you've confirmed the
19 first part of that bullet point that this document produced on the 18th
20 was the result of the process on the 17th and 18th among the Contact Group
21 members, which you undertook after you received the comprehensive comments
22 by both parties. It was in the middle of that bullet point that I
23 said: "The draft made concessions to the Serbian side on points which it
24 considered to be of particular importance (see above), without making any
25 substantial changes. A two-chamber system was established, giving the
1 second chamber a merely advisory role. The ties with the Serbia/FRY and
2 the stressing the issue of sovereignty were conceded by adding a preamble
3 to the constitution."
4 So this is the comment you sent to Vienna regarding the draft of
5 the 18th of February; correct?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Now, when you say you consider it final in this paragraph -- I'm
8 sorry, you sent it to Vienna, not to Serbia, your dispatch.
9 A. I understood, yes.
10 Q. When you say in this paragraph that you consider -- that the
11 parties should consider it the final agreement, of course what we're --
12 what you mean, I believe, is that it's the final political components of
13 the Rambouillet agreement. Is that correct?
14 A. It's -- it's a reference, of course, to the political part of the
16 Q. Right. Because the implementation components come later?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. All right. The next exhibit I'd like to look at is P563, P563,
19 which is tab 37. P563, tab 37, which is your e-mail dispatch to Vienna on
20 the 19th of February at 1300 hours. Do you have that?
21 A. Oh, the dispatch is 19th -- yes, correct.
22 Q. The dispatch is 19th, yes.
23 A. Mm-hmm.
24 Q. And I'm looking there at the third paragraph where you say: "On
25 18 February at 1900 hours the Yugoslav/Serb delegation presented its
1 provisional opinion, noting that the draft had been improved but not
2 indicating any change of position."
3 Would it be fair to say that at this point your understanding was
4 that the Serb delegation was in basic -- basic agreement with the
5 political components, but for the points that they were highlighting here
6 in your memo?
7 A. Yes. Our feeling at the time was that clearly -- I mean, you
8 could go on forever to make points where we would like to have this or
9 that changed. Yeah. But the feeling was that the Serb/Yugoslav
10 delegation, in fact, was ready to accept the political part, those parts
11 that we had so far thoroughly negotiated and also were backed by the whole
12 Contact Group.
13 Q. All right. Also in this dispatch at the bottom of the first page
14 we read: "On the evening of 18 February the Albanians voiced their bitter
15 disappointment with the new draft. Their cooperativeness had been abused
16 and Serbian obstinacy rewarded. Representatives of the delegation handed
17 in a written protest in which they recorded their rejection of the final
19 So the Albanians actually sent to you a written protest. Is that
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: If we can go to Exhibit 1D18, e-court 441, 442.
23 1D18, 441, 442.
24 Q. That's tab 38, Ambassador, from the Weller book. What you have in
25 front of you is the Kosova delegation statement on new proposal for a
1 settlement dated 18 February 1999. I'd like to look at a couple of
2 aspects of this with you. Let's start with the first paragraph, the last
3 couple of sentences. It says: "The delegation of Kosova returns this
4 document to the Contact Group, as it is unacceptable for consideration at
5 this late stage. In fact, it represents a breach of faith by the Contact
7 A. Unfortunately, I can't see this.
8 Q. Well, can you see the -- have you found --
9 A. That is 17, Kosova delegation statement?
10 Q. Right. Okay. There is -- the first paragraph is there beginning
11 "the Kosova delegation has studied."
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. In that same paragraph if you go down four lines --
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. -- you see what I just read to you.
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. And if you go down that column near the bottom you see a heading
18 "the issue of sovereignty and legal status" underlined, correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Go up there from there several lines and there's a sentence
21 beginning with the word "hence." Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And it says: "Hence the delegation of Kosovo returns the new
24 draft on the political aspects of the settlement to the negotiators as
25 procedurally and substantively unacceptable document."
1 Then we get into one of the complaints, which comes under the
2 heading, as you see underlined there "the issue of sovereignty and legal
3 status." And again I'll just read briefly the first paragraph.
4 "The first point relates to the insertion of the
5 word 'sovereignty' into the preamble on annex 1." Now, at this point you
6 have inserted the word "sovereignty" into the preamble of the agreement
7 haven't you? We've seen that.
8 A. Yes, that was in from the outset, in fact--
9 Q. Right.
10 A. -- but not there in the -- not there in the preamble and other
11 parts of -- I guess I -- all in all, there's three times a reference in
12 there to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in the
13 whole Rambouillet Accords.
14 Q. And continuing on it says: "This is made even worse by the formal
15 declaration that the authorities of governance set forth in the agreement
16 originate from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This action is
17 fundamentally inconsistent with the understanding that a settlement would
18 be without prejudice to the status of Kosovo in the interim period."
19 And if we could turn over to the next page, I'm looking at the
20 left-hand column. And if go down to the second full paragraph which
21 begins: "The Kosovo delegation." Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. "The Kosovo delegation will not countenance a total change to the
24 character of the agreement at the last movement, even if it is achieved
25 through the insertion of a single word. Moreover, the proposal that the
1 rights and powers of Kosova are derived from the Federal Republic of
2 Yugoslavia is similarly conceptually incompatible with the approach that
3 was taken by the Contact Group and the conference from the very beginning
4 of the talks."
5 And the last part I would like to highlight is the following
6 paragraph: "It is the position of the delegation of Kosova that a
7 referendum on the further status of Kosova must be held after the expiry
8 of an interim period. Again, a reference to sovereignty would constrain
9 the delegation of Kosova to insist on a far clearer formation of the
10 obligation to hold a referendum in the concluding provisions of the
11 framework interim agreement than might have been contemplated otherwise."
12 And there there's -- I won't continue to read, but you can see
13 they're talking -- the complaint is to the sovereignty and the territorial
14 integrity of the FRY; correct? You see that?
15 A. I'm just reading it.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. Okay, yes, I've seen it. I've read it.
18 Q. Now, you recall that on the 10th of February the two co-chairs of
19 the conference and the negotiators gave assurances to the FRY/Serb
20 delegation that signing the basic principles wasn't necessary because
21 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY would be preserved. Now,
22 was this pointed out to the Kosovar delegation by you?
23 A. Yes, of course.
24 Q. Okay. And what was their reaction to that --
25 A. I mean --
1 Q. When they were told it was non-negotiable and it would be
2 preserved, what did they say?
3 A. Nothing. I think it is -- we need to recall that the summoning of
4 the two sides to Rambouillet had a very clear framework, and that was no
5 independence but a high degree of autonomy. So from the outset both sides
6 knew there's not going to be a separation of Kosovo from the Federal
7 Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanian side of course also knew
8 that they are not negotiating independence.
9 Q. And this was made clear to the Kosovar delegation after you
10 received this response from them. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I'd like to turn then to the 20th of February, that's the
13 Saturday, which originally, as we have said, was supposed to be the last
14 day of the conference, correct, Saturday, the 20th?
15 A. Correct.
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
18 Q. On that day, the 20th, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group
19 met with representatives of both delegations; correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And there the basic question that the foreign ministers had for
22 the delegations was whether they accepted the political framework;
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And this meeting took place at Rambouillet in a room on the main
1 floor of the castle where the foreign ministers sat at a long table and
2 the negotiators were there and I think your aides and interpreters were
3 all together in this room; correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. It might have looked a bit like this courtroom.
6 A. Smaller.
7 Q. Smaller. And if you were sitting at the table as one of the
8 representatives of the negotiating team, you might at this point
9 understand that all eyes and ears are focused on you. Would that be
11 A. Well, on the three of us and the foreign ministers.
12 Q. All right. And both delegations were called in one by one; in
13 other words, they -- the Albanian delegation came in first and later,
14 after a pause, the Serb/FRY delegation came in; correct?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. Roughly speaking, do you --
17 A. Or the head of the delegation. I do not recall now distinctly
18 whether it was the whole delegation or just part of the delegation.
19 Q. Yeah, I think it was representatives of each delegation.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And roughly speaking, can you give an approximation of how long
22 did the meeting with the Albanian delegation last that morning, roughly
23 speaking? Was it 10 minutes? 20 minutes?
24 A. Well, I do not really recall the meeting inside the room. It was
25 clearly -- there were already meetings outside of the room, preparatory
1 meetings in particular with the head of the delegation, with the head of
2 the delegations, and then in the room itself it was, of course, a
3 high-wire atmosphere, and so time flew. I do not -- I cannot really
4 recall now whether it was one hour or two hours all together.
5 Q. Yes, all together being -- both --
6 A. Both parts.
7 Q. But the Albanian delegation came in first; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And as you said -- I've been misspeaking -- it's representatives
10 of the delegation came in. And to refresh your memory, the delegation
11 Albanian representatives were Mr. Thaqi, the late Dr. Rugova, Mr. Surroi,
12 and Mr. Qosja. Does that sound right?
13 A. That sounds about right, yes.
14 Q. And, of course, Mr. Thaqi was the head of that delegation.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And Mr. Thaqi spoke, and the more he spoke the more it became
19 apparent to you that he was not -- that he was going to say no to the
20 agreement and isn't it true that at one point you and Chris Hill looked at
21 each other and you knew that it wasn't going to work, that Mr. Thaqi
22 wasn't going to say yes?
23 A. Well, that was a fascinating situation, if I may --
24 Q. But, sir, is that -- do you recall him --
25 A. This, I don't recall, but it was -- one could see how a
1 30-year-old guy just taken in from the mountains into this conference
2 room, thinking he -- this will be his big hour all of a sudden realised
3 that he would have to sign up to the dissolution of the very organisation
4 that he has helped to found. So the pressure was simply too big for him
5 and he could not come up with a straight yes or a straight no.
6 Q. And when this became apparent, the Contact Group ministers got
7 more and more nervous, and in particular, the Italian foreign minister,
8 Mr. Dini stated that under these circumstances one cannot negotiate.
9 Didn't he say that?
10 A. This is about what he said, yes.
11 Q. And then Mr. Cook spoke up, speaking to Mr. Hashim Thaqi, he
12 said: Hashim, are you -- what you are saying here means no. That's what
13 Mr. Cook said, wasn't it?
14 A. I did not recall distinctly, but it could have been this way, yes.
15 Q. And to that Mr. Thaqi said: No, it's not no, but it's not yes,
16 either; correct?
17 A. That's about it, yeah.
18 Q. And Mr. Cook replied to Thaqi: That means it could be yes, but
19 something is missing; correct?
20 A. It's a good interpretation, yes.
21 Q. And there was at that point great confusion and then an
22 adjournment was called; correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Now, you've -- what I've taken you through Mr. -- Ambassador
25 Petritsch, is almost verbatim what you told Brook Lapping, a subsidiary of
1 the BBC?
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 Q. I can read it back to you, but I can tell you what I have
4 faithfully put to you what you told Brook Lapping when you sat down with
5 him and gave him an interview on videotape --
6 A. Must have been in 1999? Must have been 1999.
7 Q. Well, it could have been. I don't have the date, but for the
8 record, it's Exhibit 1D207. Do you have any reason to dispute what I've
9 just put to you--
10 A. No.
11 Q. -- or should I read the transcript again?
12 A. No, I'm sure this is basically along the lines of what I said.
13 Q. And you said that prior to the meeting, this meeting in the
14 morning, you had actually sat down with Mr. Thaqi and on the basis of that
15 short meeting in the morning of the 20th with Mr. Thaqi, you expected him
16 to say yes to the agreement, didn't you?
17 A. There was a meeting -- there were several meetings, as I have
18 indicated, and one of the meetings was with -- together with the foreign
19 minister Fischer, Joschka Fischer. Since Mr. Thaqi speaks German, it was
20 easier for us to talk to him in German. And so we sat down and went
21 through with him. Obviously, he was not -- up to then, he did not grasp
22 the whole complexity and the consequences of what is happening here, that
23 there is not going to be just one part, the part that they like, but that
24 there are also other parts in the agreement that are part and parcel of
25 the whole agreement and only the whole agreement can be signed and not
1 just cherry-picking and picking and choosing. That was basically what we
2 wanted to impress on him.
3 Q. Right. And I was, quite precisely, thinking of the short meeting
4 you had with Mr. Thaqi and Mr. Fischer just before this meeting with the
5 Contact Group ministers, and that's why you had the impression that
6 Mr. Thaqi was going to say yes; right?
7 A. Well, he, as always, never really expressed himself in a clear
8 way, but I -- we had the feeling that he understood what is at stake and
9 that we need a clear answer from both sides.
10 Q. Now, you know that on the 19th, the day before, Mr. Thaqi and
11 Mr. Morten Abramovic, one of the expert consultants to the Albanian
12 delegation, flew to Ljubljana to meet with Mr. Demaqi; correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And when Mr. Thaqi returned from Ljubljana, didn't he have a
15 meeting with you and Ambassador Hill saying that he would approve the
16 entire agreement before the 20th of February deadline?
17 A. It was not -- the deadline or the date was not really part of the
18 talk, but he indicated that he would be able to sign at a meeting with
19 Demaqi, who was against this agreement, was a positive one, and thus we
20 assumed that he would be able to say yes to the political part.
21 Q. Well, your -- my colleague here will find the -- he will find the
22 correspondence you sent to Vienna where I put to you that you said to
23 Vienna that you and Ambassador Hill had met with Mr. Thaqi after he
24 returned from Ljubljana and he promised you he would accept the agreement
25 before the 20th of February deadline. I can pull that out if you want,
1 but do you dispute that?
2 A. That's about what I said. I do not recall now exactly after seven
3 years what the words were, but basically it was positive.
4 Q. All right. You also know --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you say there that Demaqi was against the
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. Previously was protesting he did not join the
8 Kosovar Albanian delegation. They wanted to have him on board, but he was
9 against it from the outset, but then obviously, in this talk in Ljubljana
10 between Thaqi and Demaqi, Demaqi then changed his mind and was, according
11 to Mr. Thaqi, in support of this agreement.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
14 Q. Again on the 19th of February, that's the Friday, the Friday
15 before this Contact Group -- Contact Group summoned the delegations, you
16 know that members of the Kosovar delegation were permitted to leave the
17 castle to meet with General Wesley Clark to discuss military and security
18 issues, don't you?
19 A. I was not aware of it at the time.
20 Q. But you're aware of it --
21 A. I know now that this happened, yes.
22 Q. How could it be that you were a Contact Group representative and
23 negotiator and you didn't know that this was taking place? Can you
24 explain that to us.
25 A. Yes, that's easily explained, because that was the military part
1 and for the military part the NATO experts were in charge and, as I said
2 on another occasion, that was primarily with the American negotiator,
3 Chris Hill.
4 Q. And what they were discussing were, in fact, what eventually
5 became annexes 2, 5, and 7; correct?
6 A. The -- the purpose of this exercise was --
7 Q. Sir, do you know that --
8 A. Sorry.
9 Q. -- the matters that were discussed were what eventually became the
10 implementation portions of the Rambouillet Agreement, chapters 2, 5, and 7
11 that was what was discussed with General Clark?
12 A. They were already -- of course, they were already finalised, and
13 what the purpose of meeting was was to inform them, since they were not
14 formally a party to the military agreement, clearly, because this can only
15 be a government, they got the information from General Clark what about
16 the content of the implementation and security chapters.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: So these -- they don't appear in your middle column
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No, because they were not --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're not -- are you accepting the proposition
21 that's just been made?
22 THE WITNESS: Because they were not -- they were not part of the
23 18th of February --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: -- draft.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: But you're saying here they were already finalised.
2 THE WITNESS: Internally.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean by the Contact Group and --
4 THE WITNESS: No. By the NATO experts and -- but not yet formally
5 endorsed by the Contact Group because of the fact that Russia clearly
6 always was waiting until there was consensus on the part of the Yugoslav
7 side to anything that was negotiated, and only then afterwards, Russia
8 adjoined the consensus in the Contact Group.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: That fits. It's just the use of the expression
10 "finalised" wasn't clear, but it's now clear, I think. Thank you.
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, the point being that these -- although the
12 texts were finalised, they were not incorporated into the agreement until
13 the 23rd, not on the 18th.
14 Q. Is that correct, Ambassador?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And just to -- so now we have Mr. Thaqi has gone to Ljubljana.
17 Members of the Kosovar delegation have met with General Clark. And just
18 moving ahead, I hope it doesn't break the chronology too much, on the 23rd
19 of February Mr. Milo, the foreign minister of Albania, was in Rambouillet
20 meeting with the Kosovar delegation, wasn't he?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And you received a protest letter from Professor Markovic
23 complaining about Mr. Milo being in the castle; correct?
24 A. Yes, correct.
25 Q. Now, why was he allowed in the castle when you told us yesterday
1 that you know -- that you knew that the Republic of Albania was furnishing
2 organisation, recruitment, and training for the KLA? Why was that person
3 from a foreign state who supported the KLA allowed in?
4 A. I was not -- I was not saying for sure that this -- they -- that
5 this was happening through the Government of Albania. But I knew and I
6 indicated that it was happening from the territory of Albania. But the
7 role of Mr. Milo, of course, was to encourage the Kosovo Albanian side to
8 sign up to the Contact Group Accords.
9 Q. The -- let's go back to the exchange where Mr. Thaqi is not saying
10 yes and Mr. -- Foreign Minister Dini and Foreign Minister Cook intervened.
11 And I said to you -- I put it to you that Robin Cook said that the answer
12 is, yes, but something is missing. But the thing that was missing for
13 Mr. Thaqi was the referendum; right?
14 A. No.
15 Q. I beg your pardon.
16 A. Basically what -- now I cannot interpret poor Mr. Cook but what
17 he -- at the time, my impression was that what was missing was a clear yes
18 or a clear no. It was this kind of maybe yes but I don't know, and that
19 was not enough for everybody to convince us that there is an unambiguous
21 Q. Yes. And the part that was missing, the reason that Mr. Thaqi
22 could not say yes is that there was no referendum? Isn't that right?
23 A. No, that's not correct.
24 Q. Well, let's explore that. We've just looked at the statement from
25 the Kosovo delegation where they're demanding explicit reference to a
1 referendum; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And Exhibit P2260 is your e-mail dispatch of 22 February, 0900
4 hours. We don't have it in hard copy but it's P2260 -- I'm sorry, it is
5 tab 39. P2260 is --
6 A. 39, yeah.
7 Q. -- tab 39.
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. So this is written two days after this meeting with the Contact
10 Group foreign ministers. And there you write in relation to -- in the
11 first paragraph, middle of the first paragraph, you're talking about the
12 events in Rambouillet taking a turn for the worse. And you
13 write: "Nothing has changed on the now-stubborn stance on the referendum
14 issue evident since Saturday morning." You did know about this?
15 A. Yes, of course.
16 Q. All right.
17 A. I mean, the referendum --
18 Q. Well, you said no to me a moment ago, that's why I --
19 A. No, no, that was a misunderstanding. It was very clear from the
20 outset, there were several points that were absolutely clear. The
21 Yugoslav side did not want a separation from Kosovo, from the state; so
22 therefore, sovereignty and territorial integrity, that was their position.
23 The second position on the part of Yugoslavia was the presence of
24 military international military presence, that was the second point of
25 contention. And on the side of the Albanians, it was the issue of
1 independence and a referendum and the KLA. They wanted to preserve the
2 KLA, they wanted to get independence, and they wanted to have a referendum
3 for this independence.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I --
5 THE WITNESS: Just to keep this in mind, one always needs to keep
6 this in mind and it goes back and forth and back and forth.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if your question was entirely fair when
8 you read the next sentence of the dispatch. "It's becoming increasingly
9 clear that the real reason for the intransigence was the dissolution of
10 the KLA."
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, I would submit that there -- the ambassador
12 said there was two reasons: There's the referendum issue and the
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, indeed, but he's disputing your contention
15 that Thaqi would not say yes because there was no referendum.
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN: All right --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: You put a question to him based on only that part
18 of the dispatch, which I don't think, in the circumstances, was entirely
20 THE WITNESS: And it is clear that he is one of the KLA leaders.
21 The dissolution of the KLA was the toughest point in all of this.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'll return to this matter later, Your Honour.
23 Thank you.
24 Q. Well, then I'd like to look at this issue. You say what the KLA
25 wanted was independence and not autonomy or substantial self-government;
1 is that right?
2 A. That's correct. That was their ultimate goal.
3 Q. Now just --
4 A. Not just by the KLA, by the way, that was the stated goal of all
5 of each and every Kosovo leader and probably whatever, 89 per cent of the
6 Kosovar Albanian population.
7 Q. Well, let's go back -- let's go back to your testimony yesterday
8 when we were discussing 1998. And I put to you that the reason why the
9 Albanians never answered the numerous and quite legitimate invitations
10 from both Professor Markovic and, from time to time, from Mr. Milutinovic
11 is because they didn't want to negotiate autonomy or self government; they
12 wanted independence?
13 A. Absolutely right, and this is the reason why the international
14 community decided to mediate, because we realised that the Yugoslav side
15 alone will never manage to find a viable compromise.
16 Q. All right --
17 A. It was always misunderstood of something being on the one side.
18 We were always in foreign equitable solution and we increasingly more
19 realised there is not going to be a direct bilateral agreement between
20 Belgrade and Pristina possible. That's the rationale behind the
21 engagement of the international community.
22 Q. So here we are in Rambouillet in 1999 --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Just going back slightly to your answer about the
24 goal of every Kosovo leader, at least the stated goal of every Kosovo
25 leader. That would apply at that stage also to Rugova?
1 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. And already way before.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 Mr. O'Sullivan.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
5 Q. Well -- so now we are in 1999, in Rambouillet, under the auspices
6 of the Contact Group, international group, and the Kosovar -- and nothing
7 changes. Do you -- the Kosovar position is still the same, they want
8 independence, they don't care about autonomy or self government. They
9 want independence, they want a referendum guaranteeing them independence.
10 So nothing has changed; correct?
11 A. Well, the only thing has changed that, through the mediation, we
12 have provided an agreement which prevents independence, which does not
13 grant independence to Kosovo. That's the main difference, which obviously
14 was not something that Belgrade was able to achieve earlier on.
15 Q. Every proposal of Ambassador Hill in 1998 and every proposal from
16 Belgrade in 1998 did the same thing, it didn't give independence to
17 Kosovo, it gave substantial autonomy and self government, it preserved
18 territorial integrity and sovereignty, the same as you're saying you did?
19 A. Correct. And what happened in the meantime and in parallel -- we
20 have to always sort of get the feedback from the ground, and on the ground
21 violence escalated. That was the big problem. And that clearly
22 demonstrated up to the 15th of January with Racak that there is no
23 solution in direct talks.
24 Q. After the -- going back to the 20th, after there was an
25 adjournment, after the meeting between the Contact Group foreign ministers
1 and the Albanian delegation, the Serb/FRY delegation was summoned to is
2 that room as well; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And certain representatives of the Serb and the FRY came,
5 including Mr. Milutinovic; correct?
6 A. I do not now recall who was present there.
7 Q. But you recall that Mr. Milutinovic was there?
8 A. Unfortunately not.
9 Q. Don't you recall that Mr. Milutinovic spoke to the foreign
10 ministers of the Contact Group and said, "We basically agree with
11 political agreement"?
12 A. Now you're helping me on my feet. I think that this was the way
13 you just described it, yes.
14 Q. I realise you're covering lots of material and maybe I should help
15 you more often. P2792, you don't have it there, it's your interview with
16 the Prosecutor and I'll just remind you what you said on page 4. It's an
17 exhibit. It's from your interview with the OTP. You said: "The Serb
18 delegation worked substantively and we made significant progress by
19 agreeing to a compromise political and legal system for Kosovo. Even
20 Milutinovic said that the Contact Group foreign ministers on 19th
21 February, that the Serbs could live with the political aspects of the
22 proposed agreement."
23 A. I remember this, yes.
24 Q. I think the date is wrong. It is actually Saturday the 20th,
25 but --
1 A. No, there was already a meeting but Mr. Milutinovic should know
2 this better, I guess, than me. There was also a meeting, informal
3 meetings on the sides, and on the 19th in the evening I guess.
4 Q. Now, you were interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor on the
5 14th of May, 1999, and on the 9th of June, 1999, and that's Exhibit P792
6 [sic]. If you can bring that up. P792. I believe you had a chance to
7 review this before you testified. You came into court and you said that
8 you adopted this statement. Do you recall that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you can see the dates on the cover page, 14 May and 9 June,
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Well, that's approximately three or four months after Rambouillet;
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And when you were interviewed by the Prosecutor, you used your
17 best efforts to give a detailed and accurate account during those two
18 meetings with the Prosecutor; correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. And you spoke about events and individuals as you remembered them.
21 Would that be a fair way to put it?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Could we go to page 3, please. I don't think we
24 need the German, although, I'm sure the Ambassador -- that's the Serbian,
25 I'm sorry. All right, the middle paragraph there, beginning --
1 Q. I'll read it to you: "Vladimir Stambuk, the representative from
2 the Yugoslav party of the left, JUL, was well educated but the most
3 unsavory of the group. At one point, he and I were discussing various
4 alternatives to the Kosovo conflict and he said to me, If NATO bombs fall,
5 there will be a massacre in Kosovo."
6 Then you said: "He did not qualify this statement, but my first
7 and distinct impression was to interpret that as a direct threat to the
8 Albanians. He was not referring to the fact that NATO bombs would lead to
9 large-scale deaths in Kosovo, rather, he meant that a NATO attack would
10 result in a massacre of the Albanian population by Serbian forces. He
11 stated this as if it were an un -- an unequivocal fact. I was quite taken
12 aback by this statement and it made a distinct impression on me."
13 Now, did you know Mr. Stambuk before Rambouillet?
14 A. I must have met him, but I do not have any recollection.
15 Q. And you say that when he made this statement, you were quite taken
16 aback and it made a distinct impression on you; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, we can see the emphasis on this statement -- I mean if --
19 it's the line, "If NATO bombs fall, there will be a massacre in Kosovo."
20 It's centred, it's in bold, and the word "will" is underlined; right?
21 A. Mm-hmm.
22 Q. Now, nowhere in this statement, nowhere in this statement do you
23 say that Mr. Milutinovic said to you that bombing Serbia would lead to
24 massacres. Isn't that correct?
25 A. Not in the statement. When I reviewed our daily dispatches --
1 Q. Nowhere in the statement --
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. That's correct. Then you testified in the trial of Mr. Milosevic
4 in 2002 and you gave a detailed account of this evidence regarding
5 Mr. Stambuk and that's Exhibit P2793, pages 7232 and 7233. And I'll read
6 to you what you said under oath in the Milosevic trial.
7 The question is: "And what, if anything, can you share with the
8 Court about negotiations as expressed by Mr. Stambuk?"
9 And your answer is: "Well, I had several -- of course, we had
10 many, many, how should I say? - one-on-one meetings, informal meetings in
11 the "boudoir," at dinner or breakfast or wherever in Rambouillet. And on
12 one occasion, Vladimir Stambuk, and we were discussing, he was a member of
13 JUL. And when we were talking about -- when I was referring to the
14 necessity to ensure the implementation of this agreement and for this we
15 need, in order to demilitarise the KLA, international military presence.
16 And if this is not granted, then we will reach the end of our
18 And then Mr. Stambuk basically said, "Well, if there is bombing of
19 then this will -- it will mean a massacre in Kosovo. And of course it
20 was -- I was quite impressed to say the least by this. It was very clear
21 to me that he was referring to a massacre on the part of the Yugoslav Army
22 or the MUP on the Kosovo Albanians. We did not -- I -- since I was taken
23 aback very much and shocked in a way, I did not further elaborate, but it
24 felt -- it left me in the distinct impression that there was a clear view,
25 at least with Mr. Stambuk. What would happen if there was a war or
1 bombing in Kosovo?"
2 Now, nowhere in your testimony in the Milosevic trial did you say
3 that Mr. Milutinovic said to you that bombing in Serbia would lead to
4 massacres; correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Now, let's look at this exchange between you and Mr. Stambuk.
7 What comes out of it is that you're discussing the necessity of
8 implementation, demilitarisation of the KLA, otherwise, negotiations will
9 end. And Stambuk says, Bombing will lead to massacres. Now, in this
10 courtroom, on Wednesday, at page 10728, let's compare the details with
11 what you said on Wednesday with what you said during the Milosevic trial.
12 Here's the question the Prosecutor asked you a couple of days ago: "In
13 the context of these discussions you were having at the time, what did you
14 understand him to mean?" Him being Stambuk.
15 Your answer is: "Well, it was very clear we were talking about
16 the military component of the peace accords and it was clear that if,
17 unless we are successful, there is going to be an NATO activation order
18 and we, the negotiators, will be out of the game. So it was. It became
19 very, very clear at the time that either we reach a peaceful agreement
20 with -- set out in the proposal, including a military component in order
21 to - as I already said - secure a safe and security environment in Kosovo
22 for all its people there. And second, to be able to demilitarise the KLA,
23 which is part of the agreement. Unless we succeed, there is going to be
24 another main actor which is NATO, clearly.
25 In response to this, Mr. Milutinovic, President Milutinovic at the
1 time, said that: "That that would definitely lead to massacres," meaning
2 on Albanians in Kosovo. "This is my understanding, I should add."
3 Now, sir, I put it to you that you are mistaken when you say that
4 Mr. Milutinovic said this to you; it was, in fact, Mr. Stambuk, not
5 Mr. Milutinovic and your memory has failed you. Do you accept that
7 A. No, not at all. I was -- at the time when I was given the
8 opportunity to talk to the investigators, I had very much on my mind this
9 episode with Mr. Stambuk. Now, when I received those documents, my
10 dispatches to Vienna, I was reminded that the same was also said by
11 Mr. Milutinovic in one of the many, many conversations and the two, I must
12 say, were not the only ones. That were -- that was also a logical and
13 understandable reaction to say, okay, something's going to happen, you
14 know, massacre. And, as we know now in retrospect, of course, this is
15 exactly what happened when the NATO intervention took place. We have
16 numerous massacres committed by the Serb security forces during the NATO
17 intervention on the ground in Kosovo.
18 So I mean this is -- that was logical that, at the time, that they
19 said this will happen, and indeed, in fact, it happened. So I don't know
20 why you now believe that this is not correct. It was Mr. Stambuk who said
21 so, that is documented in my testimony, and it was Mr. Milutinovic who
22 said so, which is documented in one of my dispatches to Vienna.
23 Immediately after the dispatch was sent out, immediately after several
24 hours after this meeting with Mr. Milutinovic, without any thought of -- I
25 don't know, now, accusing someone. This is a totally internal dispatch
1 and was of course not written to be discussed anywhere, any time in
3 Q. Now, let's break this down. What I'm suggesting to you is this:
4 When you met the Prosecutor in May and June 1999, three or four months
5 after Rambouillet, he was asking you specifically about -- about
6 Mr. Milutinovic, among other people, specifically. Now, you knew
7 Mr. Milutinovic. You say that the declaration by Stambuk made an
8 impression on you and I believe it did.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Now, if Mr. Milutinovic had said that to you, in those words, you
11 would not have forgotten; that's the point I'm making, sir. You're an
12 intellect man, we're four months after the fact and I'm putting it to
13 you --
14 A. I beg to disagree.
15 MR. STAMP: Your Honour.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry.
17 MR. STAMP: I think what is now happening, if one looks at the
18 question, is that he was going to put -- break it down and put a simple
19 suggestion, fact by fact, or whatever. It has now become purely
20 argument -- argumentative suggestion -- [Microphone not activated]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Nothing wrong with the question. Please carry on, Mr. O'Sullivan,
23 and complete it hopefully without interruption.
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
25 Q. If we look at the context of that statement, the Prosecution, two
1 weeks later indicted Mr. Milutinovic and they were looking for any
2 information that people would have had. And they were asking you, What
3 can you tell us about Milutinovic and you never mentioned this. You said
4 Stambuk did it. And you said it made an impression on you. And I'm
5 saying that you would not have forgotten. I'm only suggesting that you
6 are mistaken and we'll come to those -- that exchange of your dispatch in
7 a moment. But it should be -- I'm trying to impress upon you that it
8 would be logical for you to remember three months later who said what and
9 particularly when you knew Milutinovic and you were dealing with him and
10 you were shocked by Stambuk's statement, not by Milutinovic's. That's my
11 point. If you can allow for the fact that maybe you're wrong about this.
12 A. I beg to disagree. Clearly, at the time when I was interviewed by
13 ICTY, obviously, this one example came to my mind and not
14 Mr. Milutinovic's example. Once I re-read the dispatch, I was reminded
15 that the same had happened also in a conversation with Mr. Milutinovic.
16 You need to keep in mind that this was a very intensive times, very
17 intensive three weeks. They are day and night negotiating. So sometimes
18 you're more impressed than other times. You remember some episodes and
19 you forget others. I was reminded on this Milutinovic incident by my
20 report, which I filed immediately after -- obviously after this meeting
21 with Mr. Milutinovic. That's all I want to say.
22 Q. All I'm suggesting is that if these words had been spoken by the
23 President of Serbia, they would have made a strong impression on you; and
24 the reason they didn't, was because they were not spoken by
25 Mr. Milutinovic. That's my point.
1 A. This is your point but it is not my point.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there the possibility that there was a mistake
3 made at the time of the dispatch?
4 THE WITNESS: Well, I must say that that is very, very unlikely
5 because you would not just write -- put something into writing about the
6 president, the acting president, or the president of a republic, part of
7 then-Yugoslavia, if it were not said, particularly in such a dispatch.
8 It's an internal dispatch, again I must reiterate, and, of course, we as
9 diplomats are bound to say and write the truth and nothing but the truth.
10 That is clearly one of the main principles.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
12 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
13 Q. Well, let's explore this a little bit more, Judge Bonomy's
14 question. This dispatch that you referred to is P562, and you saw it in
15 your testimony here at page 10729, lines 20 to 24. You say you saw this
16 dispatch for the first time last week when you came to testify here, some
17 eight years after Rambouillet; correct?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. And you -- the dispatch is at tab 28 of your materials. P562.
20 Now, you did not --
21 A. Tab 28?
22 Q. Tab 28, please.
23 A. Are you referring to my dispatch now?
24 Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I've confused you. In fact, I don't think
25 I have it in -- it's not in hard copy, my apologies. We have it in
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it P562?
3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, that's it.
4 Q. P562 is on the screen, sir. Do you see that? That's the --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. Now, we see that this -- you did not draft this document,
7 did you? It was your assistant, I believe.
8 A. Let me see. It was -- it was in all likeliness my assistant,
9 Mr. Kickert. And I would also like to point out that the meeting was also
10 attended by Ambassador Mayorski. Now you can imagine, sir, if I would
11 have written something or approved something where there were other
12 witnesses, in particular, Mr. Mayorski --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petritsch, there's been no suggestion made that
14 you're lying on this. If we get to that, that's another matter. All
15 that's been suggested is that there's a mistake made. Now, I think
16 perhaps you're addressing an issue that's not presently before us.
17 THE WITNESS: I hope so.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
20 Q. So this document was drafted by Mr. Kickert; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Now, let's go back to your statement that you gave to the
23 Prosecutor in May and June of 1999, and I can represent to you, that on
24 the cover page, Mr. Kickert is present with you on the 14th of May. He's
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, at no point did he say to you, remind you, or come to you at
3 a break and say: "By the way, Ambassador, don't forget about what
4 Milutinovic said about bombing and massacres." He never said that to you,
5 did he?
6 A. Absolutely right.
7 Q. And if we look at the top of this document, we see that it's sent
8 from your embassy in Belgrade to Vienna; correct?
9 A. Yes, because it was received as an encrypted e-mail document
10 because that -- this was the only way for us to communicate with my head
11 office in Vienna via encrypted e-mail via -- it only went via Belgrade.
12 Q. Right. And it --
13 A. Was only possible.
14 Q. So it was sent from Paris to Belgrade then to Vienna; right?
15 A. Yes, reflecting the status of the 20th of February, 6.00 in the
16 morning, it was.
17 Q. A person named Mr. Senfter?
18 A. Mr. Senfter was at the time working at the embassy in Belgrade, an
19 Austrian diplomat, who basically forwarded this again encrypted to the
20 head office.
21 Q. And this document was -- is dated 20 February, 0600 hours, so it
22 would have been prepared by Mr. Kickert just before sending it, just
23 before 0600 hours in the morning?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. During the night.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So this document passed through two sets of hands, Mr. Kickert's
3 and Mr. Senfter's?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And at page 10730, lines 2 to 7, you said this about these
6 internal reports: "They were internal reports, ad hoc reports, not
7 covering the entirety of the process in Rambouillet, clearly, because we
8 had other means of communication, telephone," and so on and so on. "It
9 was, of course, a very turbulent time, so these reports are very much ad
10 hoc, very much written immediately after the event but not in a systematic
12 Sir, what I'm suggesting is what Judge Bonomy has pointed out to
13 you, that there's an error here. It was produced in the middle of the
14 night or in the early morning hours by Mr. Kickert. There's a mistake in
15 this document. Your memory was only refreshed after eight years, you say,
16 from seeing this document a week ago. You spoke about it, Mr. Stambuk,
17 three months after Rambouillet in the presence of Mr. Kickert, you've
18 testified under oath, and you never once, never once attributed these
19 words to Mr. Milutinovic, and I'm suggesting to you that you misspoke,
20 that you -- that what you say jogged your memory, in fact, is not correct,
21 that you would never have forgotten if Mr. Milutinovic said such things.
22 MR. STAMP: Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't answer that.
24 Mr. Stamp.
25 MR. STAMP: It's asked and answered two or three times,
1 repetitious, and argumentative. That's the objection.
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I put the question in the full context, Your
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE BONOMY: We're all agreed that this question -- the answer
6 to this question will assist us, and we'll therefore allow it to be asked.
7 THE WITNESS: Such a massive insinuation or accusation, as is
8 expressed here in this dispatch, I am convinced that this -- there is no
9 mistake. It was said as was put into this dispatch.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you if you remember the actual
12 THE WITNESS: We had a meeting with -- together with Ambassador
13 Mayorski and we're talking about -- it was the 19th in the evening and we
14 were talking about the whole issues, that this was the last evening before
15 the supposed end of the conference. So clearly, that was -- that was a
16 very, very tense situation and the issues clearly were on the table, and
17 that was the military implementation part. And also what if the
18 negotiations failed, then we would have reached the end of our diplomatic
19 path. And we knew at the time -- everybody knew, including
20 Mr. Milutinovic, of course, that already since early October of 1998 NATO
21 had issued the activation order, which I already explained what that
22 meant. So the Damocles sword of NATO was dangling above our heads, and
23 these were the circumstances under which this conversation took place.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: But do you actually now remember it or are you
25 rationalising that this must have been said because it was recorded in
1 circumstances where we are bound to tell nothing but the truth, as you
2 said earlier?
3 THE WITNESS: Exactly.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: You actually do remember it being said?
5 THE WITNESS: No. I recall when I read this, then I recalled the
6 circumstances and that it was -- I can also attest to the fact that
7 whatever has been put into such reports, it was of course, as I said, not
8 an integral reflection of the conversations but more, so to speak, the
9 highlights. And, obviously, one of the highlights was intransigence, no
10 progress, and the threat by Mr. Milutinovic that in case NATO takes --
11 NATO intervenes, then there are going to be massacres in Kosovo.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but -- if you look at what's appeared on the
13 transcript, that suggests that you don't actually remember it being said,
14 but you're satisfied -- convinced in your own mind that it was because you
15 can recollect the meeting and you can recollect the circumstances of it
16 and you know the way in which these matters were reported. Have I got
17 it --
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- correctly?
20 THE WITNESS: Correct.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Now, it's time to break, but I don't want to interrupt you at this
23 minute if you want to pursue that at all.
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Just one question.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
1 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
2 Q. Why doesn't your diplomatic correspondence mention Mr. Stambuk?
3 A. As I indicated before, not everything was mentioned. We just went
4 into this. There were hundreds, if not thousands, of meetings in these
5 three weeks, you know, and of course we first and foremost wanted to drive
6 the negotiating process forward. And these reports were basically taking
7 some of the issues and reporting them back to my head office. That was
8 basically it. So it never covered -- as I indicated, it never covered the
9 whole of the meetings which sometimes took place almost 24 hours.
10 Q. So despite being so shocked by Mr. Stambuk, that didn't make it
11 into your report?
12 A. Well, over time one gets less shocked by what has happened, you
13 know, unfortunately, and less impressed.
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: We'll -- we can break now, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll break for 20 minutes now, Mr. Petritsch, as
16 we have to, and resume at 10 minutes to 11.00. If you could again leave
17 with the usher, please.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in,
23 there's a mistake in the transcript. I misspoke at page 29, line 10. I
24 said P2260. It should be 2660.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: I think there was a mistake also in one of the page
1 references to the transcript from the Milosevic trial, because the witness
2 didn't give evidence for five or six days, which would be necessary for
3 the two page references you gave to make any sense.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'll review that.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: But I didn't have a chance to check that.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE BONOMY: May we please continue.
8 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Perhaps I can attempt to clarify it now. The
9 page references I wanted to give you were 7232 and 7233.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated] --
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: 7232 and the second page is 7233.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated].
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Bonomy, please.
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Pardon.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: There was a slightly earlier reference, reference
16 to P2793.
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN: That's the exhibit, yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: And there was a transcript reference that I've
19 recorded as 7726, but it can't be right.
20 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'll have to check that, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Thanks.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
23 Q. Ambassador, dealing with the Rambouillet process I'd like to ask
24 you this: Is it your position that the Rambouillet process was conducted
25 in a transparent way and that all documents that formed a part of the
1 agreement were tabled to the parties?
2 A. You want me to answer now?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. The documents were tabled according to the prior agreed way
6 Q. And the process was transparent. Would you -- is that your
8 A. And the process was transparent.
9 Q. To be clear, there were no documents, no agreements, no side
10 deals, no side letters that were not tabled. Is that your position?
11 A. There were -- as I have already indicated, there was once the
12 attempt on the part of the US to issue a side letter, and that was then
14 Q. So your position is that there were no side agreements, no side
16 A. Not that I know of.
17 Q. Exhibit P2260 is at tab 39. 2660. I made the same mistake.
18 2660, tab 39. It's your dispatch to Vienna dated the 22nd of February,
19 1999, at 0900 hours. It's a document you looked at yesterday quite
20 extensively with my learned friend, Mr. Stamp. And I'm looking at the --
21 just to set the context for my questions. You see there that you've
22 described that: "The situation in Rambouillet took a dramatic turn for the
23 worse from 21 to 22 February."
24 Then we -- you have the reference to the stubborn insistence on
25 the referendum issue and the Kosovar intransigence regarding the
1 dissolution of the KLA. Do you see that? Do you see that?
2 A. It is on page 1? Are you referring to page 1 or page 2?
3 Q. Tab 39 for you, the first page.
4 A. First page.
5 Q. Do you see that? Do you see the document?
6 A. I see the document now, but I did not see the sentence that you're
7 referring to.
8 Q. It's the first paragraph. It begins: "The situation in
9 Rambouillet took a dramatic turn for the worse."
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And in there you highlight two problems, the referendum issue
12 which has existed since Saturday, and the question of the intransigence of
13 the KLA to dissolve itself or --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- to demilitarise.
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 Q. Okay. The next paragraph begins: "Gef," that's you the
18 undersigned, "had a last meeting with the Yugoslav Serb delegation at 2.30
19 in the morning. The only points remaining open were the review clause and
20 minor Kosovar comments on the wording for procedure when the vital
21 interests of national communities are under threat. Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So this is a meeting you had, then, with the Yugoslav Serb
24 delegation on the Sunday, the 21st -- sorry -- the morning of the -- in
25 the wee hours of the morning --
1 A. In the wee hours of the morning.
2 Q. -- on the 22nd.
3 A. Mm-mmm.
4 Q. So we're about a day and a half after the meeting on the 20th with
5 the Contact Group foreign ministers.
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. On the 20th they were summoned into the room with all of you, both
8 delegations, we're about a day and a half later; correct? And -- is that
10 A. I'm sorry. Could you repeat that. I was not fully --
11 Q. To put this in time.
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. On Saturday, the 20th --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- is when the --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- foreign --
18 A. Contact Group foreign ministers --
19 Q. And here we are --
20 A. To get the yes or no.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Mm-mmm.
23 Q. Okay. Here we are about a day and a half later --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- in the wee hours of the morning with the Serb delegation?
1 A. Mm-hmm.
2 Q. And we're still -- the Serbian position is still general
3 acceptance of the political components at this point, correct, as
4 reflected in this document in the paragraph I just mentioned. The only
5 points remaining open were the review clause and minor Kosovar comments on
6 the wording for procedure with the vital interest of national
7 communities --
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. -- are under threat. So we're in the same position, general
10 acceptance to the political framework --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- correct? You have to answer for the transcript, Ambassador.
13 A. Yes. I have said yes.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 A. Sorry.
16 Q. Then if we go to the bottom of that first page we see that the
17 real problem at this point, at least, at 9.00 in the morning on the 22nd
18 is the Kosovar delegation. You write: "The agreement of the Kosovars is
19 still more questionable at the present moment in time." Correct?
20 A. I don't see it right now, but it sounds right.
21 Q. Last paragraph, first sentence on that first page.
22 A. Oh, yes, yeah, mm-hmm.
23 Q. That was, in fact, the situation at that time, wasn't it?
24 A. I'm sorry?
25 Q. That was the situation? At this point --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- on the morning of the 22nd?
3 A. Mm-hmm.
4 Q. Okay. And yesterday, as you saw with my learned friend,
5 Mr. Stamp, in the middle of this page we have the reference to the --
6 right near the bottom of the page the reference to the Albright side
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. And Mr. Surroi came to you and asked for -- whether the EU could
10 provide a side letter?
11 A. Mm-hmm.
12 Q. Correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Okay. The next exhibit is 1D18, e-court page 449. And for you,
15 Ambassador, it's tab 40. Do you have tab 40 in front of you, Ambassador?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. Left-hand column, do you see draft for chapter 8, article 1, sub
18 3, 22 February 1999, 0525 hours and proposed draft side letter. The first
19 paragraph of this letter contains the language of the then-proposed
20 chapter 8 of the Rambouillet agreement, and below that is the text of this
21 letter. And the letter states: "This letter concerns the formulation
22 attached above. Proposed for chapter 8, article 1 (3) of the interim
23 framework agreement. We will regard this proposal or any other
24 formulation of that -- of that article that may be agreed at Rambouillet
25 as confirming a right of the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the
1 final status after three years. Sincerely, Madeleine Albright, Secretary
2 of State."
3 This is the letter that your dispatch referred to; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And your dispatch states that -- that's P2660, the one at tab 40.
6 It states: "The Kosovar delegation was informed by Albright, among
7 others, that the referendum and continued existence of the KLA were out of
8 the question" --
9 A. You're now referring to the dispatch of February 22nd?
10 Q. That's right.
11 A. On page 2?
12 Q. That's correct.
13 A. Yes. You want me --
14 Q. No --
15 A. -- to explain the process --
16 Q. You explained that letter was withdrawn and the position was made
17 clear that there would be no -- that this side letter would not form part
18 of any agreement?
19 A. Yes, that was the European position which I proposed and
21 Q. And staying with this exhibit, your dispatch of the 22nd of
22 February, you write that -- at the end of that document, second page, last
23 paragraph, it says: "Several concomitant measures were agreed upon to
24 ensure a positive decision by the Kosovars. And one is a warning that
25 various measures would be taken. Even a US statement to put the KLA on
1 the list of terrorist organisations."
2 Do you see that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So what we're saying here is that the Americans were telling the
5 Albanians, If you don't sign, then one of the consequences may be that the
6 KLA would be put on the American terrorist list. Is that right?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Sir, did you know that Mrs. Albright had told the Kosovar
9 delegation that if they signed the agreement and Serbia did not, that
10 Serbia would be bombed?
11 A. No, not at the time.
12 Q. So you learned about that later?
13 A. Later, after the end of the conference, yes.
14 Q. So let me see if I've understood the position in relation to the
15 proposed side letter. This letter was a personal initiative of
16 Mrs. Albright?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And it was not supported by the Contact Group, the EU, Russia, or
19 even the FRY delegation; correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And the letter was withdrawn?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. So the understanding at this point is that the Contact Group and
24 the EU had considered, unacceptable, a side letter concerning assurances
25 of a referendum after three years. Is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. I'd like to take you back to your testimony yesterday, and it's
3 something you said at page 10741 and 10742. You were testifying about the
4 proposed side letter in response to a question by Mr. Stamp, and it's the
5 side letter and the question of a referendum. And you said: "Now, when
6 the American side said they would be ready to issue a side letter, we
7 Europeans were totally opposed to it. The Kosovar Albanian side wanted
8 now -- they found out that the Americans would be ready to sign such a
9 letter, then they said, Why don't we also need this from the Europeans?
10 And they said to me, Mr. Petritsch, we want a letter from the European
11 Union to the same effect. And I was absolutely against it and I knew this
12 would be backed up by the European Union, by the European Union
13 Presidency, Germany at the time, so in that -- in the end we succeed."
14 Do you recall saying that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And also during your testimony, you were talking about a whole
17 question of a referendum in the Balkans and how it -- as you put it, if I
18 can paraphrase it, a referendum is a powder keg in the Balkans, it's a
19 recipe for disaster. Is that a fair way to put your -- summarise your
20 views on that?
21 A. That's correct. As was proven in the past, I now was referring to
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 Q. Powder keg, not potter cake. It's a powder keg.
24 Can we have P2659 on the screen. That's your e-mail dispatch of
25 23 February, 1999, at 1230 hours. I'll have to find the exact reference
1 here. Well, it begins at the bottom of that page and I want you to
2 explain something to the Court. Do you see the last sentence Hill and
3 Gef, you, the undersigned?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So here we are at 23 February, 1999, 1230 hours.
6 MR. O'SULLIVAN: And go down to the bottom, please.
7 Q. "Hill and the undersigned offered the Kosovars -- were offered the
8 following approach to resolving their problem."
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Next page, please.
10 Q. Second bullet point: "A unilateral statement that the Kosovo
11 delegation has interpreted 'will of the people' as a referendum, the
12 results of which will have to be taken into consideration when deciding
13 about the final status of Kosovo."
14 Now, Ambassador, would you please reconcile the fact that you and
15 Ambassador Hill were suggesting a unilateral declaration and referendum
16 when you consider a referendum to be a recipe for disaster in the Balkans.
17 Tell us how you can reconcile that.
18 A. Okay. First and foremost, the goal was not to have the
19 expression "referendum" in a legally binding international accords. That
20 was our first and foremost goal. Secondly, we, of course, realised that
21 nobody can prevent anyone from organising a referendum, and this is the
22 unilateral referendum which has no legally binding relevance. That is the
23 reconciliation that you were asking me. We told them that if you decide
24 later on to hold a referendum, we cannot prevent you from doing so, as we
25 cannot prevent Serbia from holding a referendum about Kosovo. So this is
1 a legitimate instrument in any democratic system. This is what this
2 expresses. I am very, very much interested in making this point very
3 clear. If there would have been a -- let's now think in these terms.
4 If there would have been a referendum in Kosovo, clearly one knows
5 what the outcome would have been. Yeah. Close to -- or maybe over 90 per
6 cent in favour of whatever the referendum says. If there would have been
7 a referendum in Serbia, the same would have happened with the opposite
8 result. So this is why I say, out of my own practical experience in
9 working in the Balkans, working in ethnically dominated societies, that
10 this does not make sense to have one; but secondly, one cannot, in a
11 democracy, prevent anyone from organising a referendum.
12 The decisive issue is the status of such a referendum. If it were
13 part of the Rambouillet Accords, it would have a higher legal relevance.
14 And if it is done as part of expressing the will of the people, of course,
15 it would have been taken into consideration, but not as a binding decision
16 because -- and that is the reason why we broadened this final clause and
17 included - as I've already said and I'd like to repeat it here - the
18 Helsinki Final Accords, the Paris declaration, and all the other accords
19 regarding the CSCE and there, of course, the principle is no change of
20 borders with military means or, in a positive way, change of borders only
21 by peaceful means. And in this way, of course, we have balanced, in this
22 final part of the accords, the decision which would have been taken later
23 on by an international meeting. So we made sure that this is a fair and
24 balanced formula where the two would have to come and find a compromise.
25 And in case, theoretically speaking, in case that formula would be
1 independence, it would be accepted if reached by negotiations between the
2 two sides, Belgrade and Pristina.
3 I'm sorry to be a bit longer, but I think it is very, very
4 important to stress this.
5 Q. Well --
6 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Excellency, I have a question to ask. I'm from
7 the Bench. Now, how would you, under these circumstances, place
8 plebiscite or the right of a nation for self-determination? Would you
9 have opposed that or you thought referendum was an answer to that?
10 Because there was a right.
11 THE WITNESS: Of course you --
12 JUDGE CHOWHAN: And how would you dilate on that?
13 THE WITNESS: Clearly there is a right and this was -- this is
14 expressed in all sorts of international and legal documents, but that was
15 not the point there. We had a very clear framework of autonomy for this.
16 This was the goal of the Rambouillet Accords, but since it was an interim
17 accord, clearly there needed to be in there a provision how do you proceed
18 after the interim is over, so to speak, after three years? And that was
19 the formula that we found a compromise where we thought and are still
20 convinced that both sides are included in there and that these two sides
21 have, in a democratic way, figured out, with the help again of the
22 international community, what the final status of Kosovo will be.
23 And if it's -- if the Kosovar Albanians claim the right to secede,
24 this international meeting needs to deal with it and the Helsinki Final
25 Act has to be taken into consideration. The will of the people has to be
1 taken into consideration. The achievements in these three years in terms
2 of democratisation and so on need to be taken into consideration,
3 particularly the rights of the minorities, particularly the rights of the
4 Serbs and all this stuff. By the way, this is a very appropriate
5 discussion right now because, right now, this very same discussion is on
6 about the future status of Kosovo, but that's another story.
7 JUDGE CHOWHAN: How would they have expressed without there being
8 a plebiscite or a referendum? How would you have determined that then?
9 THE WITNESS: That can be done in very different ways, but
10 including the referendum. But we did not want the exclusive right to be
11 the referendum as the decisive factor. That is the most important thing,
12 because the same would have applied to the Serbs. They could have
13 organised in their country - and Kosovo is part, formally, and in these
14 accords, part of Serbia, part of Yugoslavia - and they, of course, could
15 have organised a referendum as well. And as I said before, the outcome
16 would have been very different.
17 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: There is something that I think I have failed to
19 understand here clearly.
20 The reference to the will of the people in the bullet point that
21 you've been addressing, we saw yesterday in a later version of the
22 proposed back letter -- or side letter. Is that correct? That's where
23 this expression comes from.
24 THE WITNESS: Will of the people?
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Or have I misunderstood that? You've told us
1 that the side letter had been withdrawn by this stage.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: So where was the expression "the will of the
4 people" to come into the accord?
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I think I can be of assistance if it's -- it's in
6 evidence. We're dealing with the 18 February version of the Rambouillet
7 Agreement and it's chapter 8 --
8 THE WITNESS: The last one.
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: The language is there.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Now, that version includes the expressed will of
12 the people. The final version does not include the word "expressed." The
13 final version, being the 23rd of February, chapter 8, it says "the will of
14 the people." The 18th of February had the word, "expressed will of the
16 THE WITNESS: So we toned it down. That was upon the Contact
17 Group to eliminate the expression "expressed," so tone it down to the will
18 of the people, and not as the Albanians were asking, the expressed will of
19 its people. So these were the two changes that were made, the two demands
20 that we did not accept from the Albanians.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: But yesterday we saw that the side letter contained
22 that expression.
23 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, the side letter is at tab 40, it's 1D18,
24 page --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: What was its role then in these terms at that
1 stage? So at tab?
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Tab 40.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: 40. Yeah -- that's not the -- that's not the --
4 these are not the terms of the side letter as we saw it yesterday.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: We didn't see the side letter yesterday, Your
6 Honour. We didn't see a side letter yesterday.
7 MR. STAMP: What we had yesterday was the dispatch for the 19th
8 of --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, which quoted the proposed terms of the side
11 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm.
12 MR. STAMP: Not the side letter, the proposed terms of the
13 agreement presented on the 18th.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Ah, right. I'm sorry. I have misunderstood the
15 contents of that -- I'm sorry about that --
16 THE WITNESS: Chapter 8 --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
18 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Just to be clear, Your Honour, if you look at tab
19 40, 1D18, page 449, you see the paragraph within Mrs. Albright's side
20 letter, "three years after the entry into force."
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Now, that paragraph is in chapter 8 of the 18
23 February version of the Rambouillet Agreement and it includes the
24 word "expressed will of the people." And that -- in Ambassador
25 Petritsch's dispatch, yesterday, we had that text. And to complete the
1 picture, the final version of the Rambouillet Accord, 23 February,
2 contains this paragraph without the word "expressed" in chapter 8.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: And what's the exhibit number of the dispatch? Tab
5 MR. STAMP: 1D18, 40.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: No, the dispatch that we saw yesterday.
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: P2660.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give me a tab number for that?
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: 39. Yes, Your Honour, tab 39, and you see on
10 that first page there's a blank spot where it says "text in English." If
11 you recall yesterday, we had to look at the German original because --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, yeah.
13 THE WITNESS: But the text was already in English.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thanks. I'm sorry about that.
15 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
16 Q. Let's understand the position. The -- why was the -- the side
17 letter by Mrs. Albright you have said was vetoed as being unacceptable to
18 the Contact Group, to the EU, and Russia because it brought in an
19 interpretation of the expressed will of the people by telling -- by
20 assuring the Kosovar delegation that in three years the people of Kosova
21 could hold a referendum. That was the problem with that side letter;
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. So why is it that knowing that, why are you and Ambassador Hill a
25 day later suggesting to the Kosovars to go ahead and put that into their
1 unilateral declaration?
2 A. We cannot -- this is what they said, Okay, then, we are going to
3 put this into our declaration. And I said, We cannot prevent you guys
4 from doing this. That's -- I think logic directs us to say, Okay, we need
5 to accept this as we accept this from the Serb/Yugoslav side to say no
6 referendum and here was, Yes, referendum. But it was for us of the
7 ultimate importance not to have the expression "referendum" in the
8 Rambouillet Accords because then, as I say, it would have had a much more
9 official meaning than to say, rather, will of the people and define it in
10 a much broader way.
11 Q. Why weren't you repeating to the Kosovars the assurances you gave
12 on the 10th of February to the Serbian side that their sovereignty and
13 territorial integrity would be preserved and say, Don't do this, this is
14 leading to a problem? Why didn't you do that?
15 A. Because, I already said, three times in at least, if my
16 recollection doesn't fail me, the territorial sovereignty and the --
17 territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
18 Yugoslavia is included in the Rambouillet Accords, starting out with the
19 preamble. I think we really went the extra mile in order to secure
20 something which, at the time, was absolutely the opinion and the
21 conviction of the European Union and the European states. We wanted to
22 preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. You can
23 believe us, for us Europeans, to go with this ever more dividing and
24 atomising the Balkans, this is not a solution for us, because at the same
25 time, Europe is integrating and not being divided with yet another
1 province and so on. So it was for us very clearly the position we do as
2 much as we can to preserve the integrity of the already-reduced territory
3 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 I'm talking about 1999. I know later on Montenegro left and now
5 there is a wholly different game on, but at the time that was our stated
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Can we go to Exhibit 1D18, page 467 -- 476.
8 That's at tab 41.
9 Q. And the top left of that page is the unilateral statement or
10 declaration by the delegation of Kosovo, 23 February, 1630 hours. Do you
11 see that at tab 41?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, that is the declaration that was made by the delegation on
14 that last day at 1630 hours; correct?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And I'm looking at the last paragraph, first sentence: "The
17 delegation of Kosova understands that this would be confirmed again upon
18 signature," meaning they will come back in two weeks, "and at the end of
19 the interim period of three years, Kosova will hold a referendum to
20 ascertain the will of the people as provided in article 138 of the chapter
21 of the agreement." Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I believe it's page 467 of e-court.
24 A. Yes, I can see it.
25 Q. Do you see that?
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. And this is the -- this is the declaration you say that came out
3 publicly in the afternoon of 23 February, in the afternoon?
4 A. Yes, after the closure of the conference.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Now -- let's move to Exhibit P2658 --
6 Q. -- which is your final report to the foreign ministry on 25
7 February, 1999. And I'll just read a short section to you. So you sent
8 the report to Vienna on the 25th of February, two days after the end of
9 the conference?
10 A. I assume that was done already in the ministry in Vienna, because
11 I see Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs up there which basically means
12 that -- because we left Rambouillet on the 23rd in the evening, I guess --
13 24th in the evening, I don't know, but anyhow that is not a dispatch from
14 Rambouillet but was then written on -- what is the date?
15 Q. The date is the 25th, I believe, at the end of --
16 A. Yes, the 25th, I believe by Mr. Kickert.
17 Q. All right. And there's a section on basic agreement. On the
18 second page --
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: My apologies, Your Honour, for being a little
20 lost here. Second page. You can go down.
21 Q. Bullet point, right in the middle of that page it says: "Basic
22 agreement on the Kosovar side for unilateral declaration." Do you see
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. "Which was achieved after a chaotic and dramatic final session in
1 which Hill exclaimed: Do you want NATO or not? And in which Surroi and
2 Thaqi first signed at 1620 hours." Now, that's a reference to the
3 unilateral declaration; correct?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Correct?
6 A. No. That is basically to sign up what the -- let me re-read it.
7 Q. What I'm suggesting, if I could help you --
8 A. See, what this is is -- yes, it is referring to this -- to this
9 unilateral declaration at 1620, but it is not part of -- we wanted to get
10 from them a declaration that they would be ready to continue to negotiate
11 after the resumption of the conference, as we did in the letter of the
12 23rd of February at 16 hours from the Yugoslav/Serb side.
13 Q. To be fair to you, the unilateral declaration does say they're
14 ready to continue --
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. -- and to sign in two weeks.
17 A. That was for us the relevant --
18 Q. And what I want to pick up on here is this chaotic and dramatic
19 final session --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- which you highlight there. Did you know that during this
22 chaotic and dramatic final session that a side letter was prepared by the
23 Kosovar delegation and that the side letter was addressed to Mrs. Albright
24 personally concerning a referendum to be held by the people of Kosovo at
25 the end of the three-year period. Did you know that?
1 A. No. Since it was dramatic and chaotic, you have to understand --
2 Q. Do you know about the letter I've just described, yes or no?
3 A. Only later on.
4 Q. You knew about it?
5 A. I knew about it later on but it was a bilateral dealing between
6 the US government and the Kosovo delegation.
7 Q. When did you --
8 A. It had nothing to do with the negotiating process.
9 Q. When did you learn about it?
10 A. I do not recall, but probably in the later -- probably after the
11 end of the conference or whenever I went through and recollected the
12 information and the material in order to put together this first
13 impressions after the end of the conference.
14 Q. Well, there's no reference in your materials to the letter I'm
15 referring to, the one addressed personally to Mrs. Albright from the
16 Kosovar delegation --
17 A. Yeah, it's not in there. So therefore I didn't know about it.
18 Q. You just told me you did know about it?
19 A. Yes, at the time.
20 Q. I asked you, when did you learn about it?
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. Can you be more specific? Shortly after the conference, is that
24 A. Pretty much shortly after the conference, I'm sure.
25 Q. Did you know that this letter -- or did you know that Chris Hill
1 and Jim O'Brien from the state department were present and participating
2 with the Kosovar delegation in drafting this letter?
3 A. I don't know.
4 Q. Did you know that Jim O'Brien was blocking Hashim Thaqi's access
5 to his interpreter's computer while the letter was being drafted, not
6 allowing Mr. Thaqi to see the text?
7 A. I have no idea.
8 Q. Did you know that Veton Surroi signed this letter, the personal
9 letter to Mrs. Albright?
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, that question has been answered three times
11 already, Mr. O'Sullivan, because the witness makes it clear he doesn't
12 even know the letter exists until after the conference was over. End of
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: There's a short video clip I would like to play.
15 The video is Exhibit 1D206 --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: What does it relate to?
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN: It relates to these events in the final -- it
18 relates to the events starting on the 20th of February through to the 23rd
19 and this creation and signing of this letter.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: But are these events that the witness is likely to
21 know about and be able to comment on or are you doing this for show?
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'm doing it because I've asked him whether there
23 were any side agreements.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
25 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Any -- and whether the side agreements were
1 vetoed or not by the EU and Russian and Contact Group.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: And whether or not the Rambouillet process was
4 transparent and whether or not there were side agreements.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: And is this going to add to our knowledge of the
6 number of side agreements that seem to have been around?
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No, it won't.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry?
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No, it will not.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: So what's going to be achieved?
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, I think it goes to perhaps the credibility
12 and bias of this witness his -- he was --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Well, I'm -- okay, but if it turns out
14 this is pointless, then obviously we will have to have regard to that
15 in --
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honour --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: -- term --
18 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Certainly --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: But please continue for the moment and then we'll
20 assess the position but we will have regard to how the time is being
21 spent. We have to do that.
22 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honour, I fully -- I appreciate your
23 comment, but I would not be presenting something that I considered
24 pointless if it's -- it's fundamental to the fact of the allegations
25 against the participation of my client in this process.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please proceed. I'm not --
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: -- as presently advised going to stop you from
4 doing it.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: The film is Exhibit 1D206. It's an excerpt, in
6 fact, from Prosecution P771 and P771 is the BBC documentary, "The Fall of
7 Milosevic." We have a transcript which is 1D205 and that's at tab 43.
8 Now, according to your directions, we have had this transcript reviewed by
9 CLSS, and I can state to the Court that it's been approved by CLSS. There
10 are Albanian, French, and Italian speakers. Those are the sections that
11 have been reviewed --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: It can't be 43.
13 MR. O'SULLIVAN: 42, sorry.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: 42. Thank you.
15 MR. O'SULLIVAN: 42. And you'll see there that the shaded
16 portions are the speakers who are not speaking English and that has been
17 reviewed by CLSS. I can say that the subtitles in the video are accurate.
18 And I'd ask that the video be played.
19 [Videotape played]
20 "Narrator: After two weeks of hard bargaining the foreign
21 ministers arrived for the final session. They summoned each delegation in
23 "Madeleine Albright: The foreign ministers all sat at a long
24 table as if we were in judgement or something. And first Thaqi was
25 brought in with a couple of other members of the Albanian delegation.
1 "Hashim Thaqi: [No interpretation]
2 "Madeleine Albright: The question was basically: Do you agree
3 with the framework, yes or no. And we were expecting a yes, or I was.
4 "Robin Cook: He needed further improvements, and of course, the
5 improvements we wanted were ones that we knew were unnegotiable, they were
6 impossible to get agreement on. And eventually I had to say to him, look,
7 the real -- the bottom line here -- the real question is: 'Can you say
8 yes to this package.'.
9 "Veton Surroi: [No interpretation]
10 "Lamberto Dini: [No interpretation]
11 "Hashim Thaqi: [No interpretation]
12 "Madeleine Albright: He kept kind of moving around the issue and
13 when he wouldn't say 'yes' I remember taking off my earphones and putting
14 them down on the table in just pure exasperation.
15 "Lamberto Dini: In particular she didn't like my insistence -- [No
17 "Madeleine Albright: I thought that the way that the language had
18 been constructed provided what in diplomacy we call some creative
20 "Lamberto Dini: [No interpretation]
21 "Madeleine Albright: And Dini got more and more insistent and
22 said: 'Are you willing to give up independence?'
23 "Veton Surroi: [No interpretation] --'This is what I told you --
24 I told you so.'.
25 "Hubert Vedrine: [No interpretation]
1 "Lamberto Dini: [No interpretation]
2 "Narrator: For the cameras, Mrs. Albright stuck to her usual
4 "Madeleine Albright: The Serb delegation bears the lion's share
5 of the responsibilities for the difficulties we have experienced today.
6 "Narrator: But in private with Hashim Thaqi she took a different
8 "Madeleine Albright: I said, Look, I don't understand what just
9 happened in there. You have let us down. Ah, it is an impossible
10 situation now. How could you do this? We expected you to be a leader.
11 "Hashim Thaqi: [No interpretation]
12 "Madelaine Albright: You could see that he was just shocked. I
13 mean, he looked like a high school student that I had dressed down.
14 "Hashim Thaqi: [No interpretation]
15 "Narrator: The Kosovo Albanians were given three more days. They
16 wanted to sign, but they were still under pressure from the gunmen back
17 home. For 72 hours, they did not leave the castle or go to bed. As the
18 deadline approached, the delegation was still arguing. Then the American
19 negotiator went to their room.
20 "Chris Hill: I said, Guys, we're there now. We've got five
21 minutes now to really decide this thing.
22 "Veton Surroi: [No interpretation]
23 "Chris Hill: I said, So are you going to sign this thing or are
24 you not? At that point, Surroi spoke up.
25 "Veton Surroi: [No interpretation]
1 "Narrator: Veton Surroi had a brain wave. The document they were
2 being asked to sign said, 'In three years an international meeting would
3 consider a final settlement for Kosovo and the will of the people would be
4 taken into account.' Surroi suggested they could sign it if Mrs. Albright
5 accepted a letter stating that the will of the people would be tested in a
7 "Veton Surroi: [No interpretation]
8 "Narrator: Thaqi was trying to read the draft on his translator's
9 computer screen.
10 "Dukagjin Gorani: And I have Jim O'Brien and Jamie Rubin behind
11 telling me: 'Hurry-up, man, hurry-up, he can read it later.'
12 "James O'Brien: And Thaqi is saying, 'maybe you can change that.'
13 And I said, 'No, no, you can't change.' And I began to step in front of
14 him and sort of bump him back away from the computer. I want it done.
15 "Dukagjin Gorani: And Thaqi becomes tremendously nervous and
16 says, you're not leaving this chair until I get both wordings in both
18 "Hashim Thaqi: [No interpretation]
19 "Dukajin Gorani: O'Brien just takes the sheet of paper, knowing
20 that if the paper remains a few more minutes in Thaqi's possession he
21 would probably change his mind.
22 "James O'Brien: I said, 'Jamie here's a copy - you're going to
23 announce this.'
24 "James Rubin: I thought that I'd better first check with the
25 Secretary of State and I snuck into the conference room and whispered in
1 her ear what had happened and she said, 'go out and announce it.'
2 "Narrator: The letter was addressed to Mrs. Albright so she was
3 able to accept the referendum compromise without consulting her
5 "James Rubin: Then I really started to get my blood pumping and I
6 began running through the hall in that crazy castle and out through the
7 gates, and into the town square, to finally tell the reporters something
8 good. 'Very briefly, the Kosovar Albanian delegation
9 have voted in favour of this agreement - pending consultations with the
10 people of Kosovo.' The Albanians had chosen peace - and deferred
11 independence- and the Serbs had not. And, now, there was the clarity that
12 the world needed in deciding whose side they should be on.
13 "Narrator: With a referendum in the bag Thaqi won over the
14 commanders back home. The delegation returned to Paris for the signing
15 ceremony. Milosevic stayed home, claiming foul play."
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
17 Q. Now, Ambassador, you've told us that at the time you had not seen
18 this letter that the Kosovars addressed and sent to Mrs. Albright. Did
19 you see it subsequently?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. At tab 41 -- where was it you saw the letter then?
22 A. I do not recall the exact time.
23 Q. But, again, would it be shortly after the conference, does that
24 sound right?
25 A. Pretty much after the conference, yes.
1 Q. Now, it's tab 41, 1D18, page 467 -- 467. You see it on the
2 left-hand side of the page letter from the delegation of Kosovo to US
3 Secretary of State Albright, 23 February 1999. And I'm looking at the
4 second paragraph: "We want to convey to you our understanding on two
5 points. First, we acknowledge your view that the agreement allows and
6 does not preclude a referendum in Kosova which will demonstrate the will
7 of the people in Kosova and which will be conveyed to the international
8 meeting to be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for
9 Kosova, as called for in Article 1 (3) of chapter 8."
10 Now, isn't this letter just a mirror image of the letter that the
11 EU and the Contact Group and Russian Federation has vetoed as
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, you said you knew about this letter after the conference, and
15 I'm asking you -- and you told me this was a transparent process. Why did
16 you say it was transparent if you knew this letter was out there?
17 A. I'm talking about the three negotiators. I'm talking about the
18 process, the Rambouillet process, I'm not talking about activities that
19 were outside of our realm. We had a very clear mandate what we needed to
20 do, but we were not there to reign in individual foreign ministers. We
21 did not do this with Madeleine Albright and we did not do this with the
22 other ministers including the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov.
23 Q. Fair enough. We're sitting here in 2007, Ambassador, and I'll be
24 more specific. Knowing what you know now and what you've seen, you would
25 agree with me that there was a side letter, a side agreement, coming from
1 the Secretary of State of the US and that this process was not transparent
2 was this was never made public, was it?
3 A. First of all, it is -- obviously was made public in this
4 documentation; and secondly, we -- this was not part of our mandate. We
5 had -- this is also not part of the Rambouillet process. This never went
6 into the official documentation of the -- of the Rambouillet Accords. So
7 therefore, I'm not in control of -- of maybe some of the side letters of
8 any of the foreign ministers present there.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petritsch -- well, before I address anything to
10 you, so far I remain unconvinced that that has done anything to advance
11 our knowledge of matters that could not have been done simply by the
12 questions that you're asking and by reference to the documents. Now, if I
13 can address a particular point to Mr. Petritsch.
14 Part of the process we've heard was a threat on behalf of the
15 United States that failure to sign could result in bombing of Serbia. If
16 the back letter or side letter was an essential element in securing the
17 agreement of the Kosovo Albanian delegation and thus pinning ostensibly
18 in the public eye blame for the collapse of the Serb will to sign and thus
19 leading to the bombing of Serbia, you will see that it might be argued
20 that the ultimate process, not the way in which you did it, but the
21 overall process contained an element that wasn't transparent.
22 THE WITNESS: Let me remind you, Your Honour, that we're talking
23 of the 23rd of February, and that was the date that both delegations, the
24 Albanian and the Yugoslav delegation, provided us with a written
25 information that we were asking from them. And that is to continue after
1 a hiatus of two to three weeks to negotiate the implementation. And that
2 was also expressed in the Contact Group's statement of 23rd of February by
3 the foreign ministers where it is clearly stated that the civilian and the
4 military implementation parts need to be negotiated after the resumption
5 of on the 15th of March. Undersigned by all the foreign ministers of the
6 Contact Group. So that was the important thing. On the 23rd, nobody was
7 blamed that the process is faltering --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: But --
9 THE WITNESS: -- not even the Yugoslavs.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm not understanding at this stage is the
11 idea that you -- well, the impression you were under that you were -- had
12 achieved a commitment by the Kosovo Albanian delegation to the further
13 process, which you would not have obtained but for that side letter.
14 THE WITNESS: This is --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you --
16 THE WITNESS: This is now pure speculation. I don't know. But
17 the fact is that they agreed, that they agreed to what we -- what we had
18 proposed and that they informed us they would continue to negotiate.
19 We're talking about something which, of course, is much further off. This
20 is the 23rd of February and there both sides agreed to continue on the
21 15th of March and, very specifically, on the implementation issues of
22 these accords.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. O'Sullivan, how much longer will this
1 cross-examination last?
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, it's rapidly nearing its end, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Please continue.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I would refer everyone to IC126, which is the
5 table that I distributed this morning that lists the contents of the
6 Rambouillet Agreement over the period of 6th February, 18th February, and
7 23rd February.
8 Q. And, Ambassador, you -- I believe you have that document in front
9 of you, do you?
10 A. Which one?
11 Q. The table. Perhaps the usher can give it back to you. It's
13 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Put it on the ELMO.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've got it here.
15 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
16 Q. All right. I'm now dealing with the right-hand column, and you
17 see there that the final text of the agreement 23 February now includes
18 chapters 2, 5, and 7, the implementation chapters; correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 MR. O'SULLIVAN: The Rambouillet Agreement is P474, Your Honour,
21 but I am proposing Exhibit 1D98, which is also the Rambouillet Agreement,
22 but it includes a cover letter. So I'm not trying to clutter the record
23 with two versions or two copies -- identical versions -- two copies of the
24 Rambouillet Agreement, but the important point in 1D98 is the cover letter
25 which is at tab 43 of the hard copy materials.
1 So for the sake of clarity, 1D98 is the cover letter and the full
2 text of the Rambouillet Agreement. That's in the e-court system which you
3 have at tab 43 as just the cover letter.
4 Q. Ambassador, what you're looking at -- do you have that at tab 43?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What you have there is the cover letter signed by the troika dated
7 23 February 1999, 9.30 a.m. Do you see that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And here you are sending the integral Rambouillet Agreement, all
10 nine chapters, including chapter 4A, and the second paragraph says: "The
11 final proposal takes account of the views expressed at the Rambouillet
12 meeting. Russia does not associate itself with chapters 2 and 7. The
13 co-chairman and negotiators are ready to receive your response no later
14 than 1.00 p.m. today." And we see that Ambassador Mayorski signed it and
15 he wrote in his hand "except chapters 2 and chapters 7." Correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, the table IC126, if you look at the
18 right-hand column I've also put the pagination of my exhibit 1D98
19 preamble, one page, the framework, page 2 to 6, chapter 1, pages 7 to 25,
20 and so on. It's an 81-page document, as you can see by looking at the
21 bottom of that right-hand column.
22 Q. So it's an 81-page document, Mr. Ambassador, and chapters 2 and 7
23 together amount to 47 pages. Over half the documents are tabled at 9.30
24 in the morning, not approved of by Russia, and you're asking for the views
25 of the parties by 1.00 the same day. Is that correct?
1 A. No.
2 Q. What's incorrect about that?
3 A. It's not correct. The implementation chapters, as we had already
4 stated over the past two days, were handed over on the 18th of February --
5 Q. Let's stop there --
6 A. It's explicitly --
7 Q. Let's stop there --
8 A. That is explicitly mentioned in one of my dispatches.
9 Q. Let's look at that.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. Because I explicitly challenge you on that, Ambassador, that is
12 incorrect, and I'll show it to you; all right?
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. You were interviewed by the Prosecutor of this Tribunal on the
15 27th of February, this year, a couple of days ago. And you said this in
16 your statement a couple days ago.
17 "The implementation and military sections, including the annex B,
18 were handed over to the Yugoslav side on the 18th of February, 1999. I am
19 not from a NATO country and Christopher Hill focused primarily on the
20 implementation issues, including the military component. My understanding
21 is that he handed it over to them at that time."
22 So the first point I want to make is that it's your understanding
23 based on what Ambassador Hill told you?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. All right. Let's look at P563. That's your dispatch of the 19th
1 of February at 1300. That's at tab 37. Do you have tab 37? Do you have
2 that, tab 37?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. That is P563. Here's what you wrote at the top of that page:
5 "Annexes 1A, military and police" -- sorry: "Annex 1A, military,
6 and 2, police were transmitted to the Kosovar delegation on the afternoon
7 of 18 February. Opinions still outstanding, apparently because
8 translation not yet complete." There's no mention there of it being
9 translated to the Serb delegation, is there?
10 A. Not --
11 Q. Yes or no.
12 A. Not in this dispatch, but that was clear, as I expressed before,
13 that it was Chris Hill who handed it over to the Yugoslav side, and they
14 rejected to formally accept it.
15 Q. Let's look at the second page of this dispatch. Middle of the
17 "On 18 February, annex 5: "Civilian implementation was finally
18 agreed within the Contact Group and with the OSCE. It empowers both the
19 OSCE and the EU to engage in civil implementation. It will be put to the
20 Kosovar side today, 19 February."
21 No mention of it going to the Yugoslav side, correct or not?
22 A. I'm sorry, this is a wholly different story. This is an internal
23 discussion between the European Union and the OSCE, who is going to lead
24 the civilian implementation mission; that has nothing to do with the --
25 what you just insinuated.
1 Q. And we also know from your testimony, that on the evening of the
2 19th of February, that's the Friday, members of the Kosovar delegation met
3 outside the castle with Wesley Clark to discuss these very points;
5 A. You have mentioned this before.
6 Q. And you agree?
7 A. I learned about it, yes, there was a meeting there.
8 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 1D97. 1D97 at tab 44. 1D97, tab 44. Do you
9 have that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. This is a letter sent by Professor Markovic, head of delegation,
12 to Mr. Vedrine and Mr. Cook. Let's look at it. 22nd of February.
13 "Today's meeting with a part of the delegation of the Government
14 of the Republic of Serbia was announced as a meeting of experts for the
15 exchange of information about the comments on the agreement on
16 self-government in Kosovo and Metohija. However, this meeting was used
17 for an attempt to hand our delegation for study papers which have not been
18 adopted at all in the Contact Group."
19 I put it to you, sir, that this shows that the documents which
20 have not been approved by the Contact Group are, as the letter -- your
21 cover letter shows on the 23rd, chapters 2 and 7. And this --
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. -- letter suggests that they were tabled -- or handed to the
24 Yugoslav side on the 22nd of February, not the 18th so --
25 A. That's not correct. I beg to differ. They were handed over on
1 the 18th, very clearly, sir. But there is another issue. I just want to
2 remind you that I, throughout this testimony, I said that this Rambouillet
3 process was divided into two parts. The first part was to finish up in
4 Rambouillet the political part, negotiating, getting the formal
5 approvement of the two sides and the Contact Group and so on and so on.
6 The implementation issues 2 and 7 and 5, by the way also, they were
7 already scheduled to be dealt with after the interruption for three weeks
8 and then starting on the 15th of March, we would have taken these to
9 discuss and to negotiate it. That is the reason why Mr. Mayorski
10 indicated this in this cover letter. There's a very logical reason to it.
11 And since this was not yet approved and harmonised in the Contact Group,
12 foreign ministers' meeting, it could not have been presented as a
13 harmonised proposal. But we were only looking and that is expressed
14 clearly in the letter of the 23rd by the Yugoslav side that they are ready
15 to continue to talk about -- to negotiate about the implementation part of
16 the -- there is no -- no -- nothing whatsoever what are trying to
17 insinuate has -- is of value in this context.
18 Q. Well --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petritsch, when they were handed over, as you
20 say, on the 18th, what happened?
21 THE WITNESS: They -- and this is also indicated in one of my
22 dispatches that they so to speak -- they took it, but they said we
23 formally -- what we want to know you formally now that we do not accept
24 it. This is not that we have received -- this is -- we do -- we have not
25 formally received it, so we are not going to deal with it. That was, by
1 the way, the reason why, after the 18th, we moved closer and closer to the
2 fact that we will have to interrupt and then have a second meeting in
3 order then to concentrate -- to focus on the implementation issues.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: So --
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
6 Q. I want to ask you --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: So why was your communication of the 22nd of
8 February confined to saying that these chapters had been given to the --
9 sorry, the communication was the 19th, was it. Why was it confined to
10 saying that these had been given to the Kosovar delegation?
11 THE WITNESS: Because this was -- are you asking me --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
13 THE WITNESS: Because we reported what was there something that
14 the -- the military part, the implementation part is very important for
15 the state clearly. Yeah. And we can only negotiate with the state such
16 Status of Forces Agreement. A non-sate actor, as I've pointed, in this
17 case, the Kosovars, do not have a role in this. And to them it was
18 provided one day later on the 19th for information purposes. That was
19 also the reason, obviously, for the meeting with General Clark that
20 Mr. O'Sullivan just referred to.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Mr. O'Sullivan.
23 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
24 Q. I would just read in this context a sentence from P979, that's at
25 tab 30, but I'm just going to read the sentence to --
1 A. Where is this?
2 Q. This is P979, tab 30. It's the statement of the Contact Group of
3 29 January, 1999. The one where they summon the parties to Rambouillet.
4 A. Oh, January, yes.
5 Q. The last sentence in paragraph 4 says: "It," the Contact
6 Group, "required that the parties accept the level and nature of
7 international presence deemed appropriate by the international community."
8 Now, Russia forms a part of the international community, doesn't
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. An important one?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And they have not agreed to this annex 2 and 7, had they?
14 A. Not yet.
15 Q. And you want a response by 1.00 in the afternoon?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And we see a letter --
18 A. A response to the question: Are you ready to go on with the
19 negotiations starting on the 15th of March? That is to be a bit more
20 broad in explaining what this all is about. This was not about accepting
21 something which was not yet negotiated, which was not yet agreed in the
22 Contact Group. So you are focusing on something which does not have
23 relevance in this context that we are talking about and this is the 23rd.
24 I'm sorry.
25 Q. I beg to differ with you. We saw the letter of the 22nd where the
1 delegation says, we are not -- these are not papers. They are not
2 approved by the Contact Group.
3 A. Clearly.
4 Q. It's a meeting convened by the Contact Group.
5 A. That's exactly what I said.
6 Q. Which is?
7 A. That the articles or the chapters 2 and 7, also 5, were not agreed
8 yet in the Contact Group. This is the implementation part, and therefore,
9 consequently, the resumption of the conference on the 15th of March was
10 devoted to this and we wanted to get a positive nod from both sides to
11 agree to this process.
12 Q. Now, in spite of all this, P625 is a letter that Professor
13 Markovic sent to you on the 23rd, that's at tab 45, where he's stating the
14 position of the delegation, that they are prepared to discuss the scope
15 and character of an international presence.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. That's in the fourth paragraph. In the third paragraph he
18 says: "All elements of self-government at the time of the defining of the
19 agreement have to be known and clearly defined."
20 A. Exactly.
21 Q. Correct. But you, yourself, have said that this represents a
22 positive, constructive approach by this delegation; correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. At this point I have to remind you of something which I -- which
25 you've said, which I challenge as well. And I digress for a moment.
1 P2792 is your interview with the Prosecutor, the one that you had in May
2 and June, 1999?
3 A. 1999, yeah, mm-hmm.
4 Q. And there you -- and we've established that Mr. Milutinovic
5 arrived approximately on the 11th of February, end of that first week;
7 A. Mm-hmm. Yeah.
8 Q. You said this to the Prosecutor: "Milutinovic was not part of the
9 Rambouillet delegation and his arrival marked the end of any constructive
10 effort to find the political solution."
11 Now, you misspoke there; didn't you? That's not correct?
12 A. That was a reference to the resumption of the conference on the
13 15th of March when basically Mr. Milutinovic took over and was the
14 spokesperson of the Yugoslav delegation. Mr. Sainovic, who up till then
15 and Mr. Markovic did a job throughout the Paris leg of the conference.
16 These two gentlemen never ever spoke. It was always Mr. Milutinovic who
17 spoke. And that was after the decision, obviously, was taken on the part
18 of Belgrade. And I would say in parenthesis, "Obviously, I would suggest
19 by Mr. Milutinovic [sic] that it's the end for a constructive engagement."
20 We are going to continue now with an obstructive approach and that was the
21 task of Mr. Milutinovic in the Paris leg of these negotiations.
22 Q. I believe there's a mistake in the transcript at line 22, page 86,
23 I believe the Ambassador said Mr. Milosevic not Milutinovic?
24 A. Where?
25 Q. Line 22?
1 A. It says here when --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you're right, Mr. O'Sullivan. The
3 reference in line 22 was to Milosevic.
4 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Correct.
5 Q. You said Milosevic and there's a mistake in the typing.
6 A. Okay.
7 Q. So to be clear, then, your position is that Mr. Milutinovic was
8 constructive during the Rambouillet period?
9 A. In Rambouillet, the -- he was not -- as I said, he came later on,
10 but he was really engaged and fully also as part of the delegation only in
12 Q. Now, you've said that there were three letters that day presented
13 to the troika by the Serbian delegation?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. E-court 1D18, page 466, tab -- for you, tab 46. We have all three
16 letters there. Tab 46, e-court 1D18, page 466 of e-court. Do you have
17 that, Ambassador? Tab 46.
18 A. 46. Yes.
19 Q. If you look at the bottom right-hand portion of that page, number
20 33 is the letter that we've been looking at.
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. The letter at 1600 hours. And what I want to emphasise here is
23 that this -- this letter in the middle paragraph says: "All elements of
24 self-government at the time of defining the engagement have to be known."
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, the first letter --
3 A. Just to put it -- making reference to the political part which was
4 already negotiated at the time.
5 Q. Correct, correct. Now, the reason I want to show you the other
6 two letters, and particularly the first letter, which is number 31 on that
7 page, which is the lengthiest one. There the delegation has not included
8 a -- any reference to a continuation on the scope and character of the
9 presence -- of negotiating that part; correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. There's no -- I can tell you there's no reference to that in that
12 first letter --
13 A. Exactly. This was the reason why in my meeting with Mr. Sainovic
14 I politely pointed out that this would be no -- amounting to a no, and
15 thus the fail of the conference. So Mr. Sainovic then immediately went
16 back and then they produced a new letter at 1430 and then this one -- this
17 second letter was followed by a third letter that you have just referred
18 to without actually our instigation because the second letter already
19 contains the key word of "implementation and the continuation," but still
20 we got a third letter.
21 Q. Now, the reason I'm directing you to this first letter is because
22 it does spell out in some detail the delegation's position on what has
23 been accomplished --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- and what's left open, in regards to the political framework.
1 If you look at -- if you go -- we don't have to look at all the bullet
2 points and I certainly won't. We see a list of bullet points, nine bullet
3 points, setting out where the delegation says that there is agreement.
4 However, there are some -- in the next paragraph, after the bullet points,
5 there are a number of matters throughout the rest of this letter regarding
6 the constitution, the decision making in the Assembly, the President of
7 Kosovo and Metohija, the judicial system, constitution, property, et
8 cetera, which needed refinement and further improvement; correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. So the Contact Group was fully aware of the position that the Serb
11 delegation took in relation to the political components. There was
12 general agreement, and here the areas for future discussion from their
13 perspective are spelled out; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. The second letter I will not --
16 A. May I -- I'm sorry, Your Honour. May I comment on the first
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Yes, please.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
20 Well, yes, I think this was a very detailed letter, pointing and
21 spelling out what was achieved and where this is agreement. So -- and
22 then the -- the second part of the letter goes into spelling out where
23 there is no agreement yet. Now, what are these examples? The example
24 are -- is, for example, the expression "constitution." The Yugoslav/Serb
25 side maintained, throughout the conference, the expression "constitution"
1 is reserved for a sovereign state, so therefore, it should not be used in
2 this context. That's a linguistic and a legal issue which you can of
3 course discuss forever. I'm sure within -- we would have been able to
4 find a solution within -- at the end. Again, I have to remind you,
5 nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed. So therefore, that is one
6 of the points.
7 The second point is president of Kosovo. They did not like the
8 expression "president" for the president of Kosovo. They wanted something
9 else, chairman or something like this. So these are issues that of course
10 you can discuss for hours on end and you will not reach a solution unless
11 there a compromise. And I'm confident, if these would have been the only
12 problems, we would have very successfully succeeded and concluded the
13 negotiations there. So this is not really a valid point that the -- the
14 Yugoslav side was not -- was not basically agreeing that there is
15 agreement on the political side.
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
17 Q. My point is quite the opposite, is that there is basic agreement
18 from the Yugoslav side and that these are points of refinement which need
19 further discussion?
20 A. Absolutely, but as I said, this was not contrary to the general
21 gist of the discussions and on the 23rd to say in -- generally, you have
22 to agree with this, then say yes; and then to the second point, which is
23 the continuation of the negotiations about the implementation chapters.
24 But clearly we can re-visit issues, contentious issues like whether you
25 call it president or chairman or constitution or basic law and something
1 like this. This is not a big problem. So therefore, you are right. Yes,
2 there was a basic agreement.
3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I'm nearly completed. I would just like to
4 finish a couple of follow-up questions.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we -- well, within reasonable range of 20 past,
6 are you going to finish? Because if so, we'll go on until you finish.
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I can finish in ten minutes.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
10 Q. You're aware that the FRY was a federal state with a federal
11 constitution, with a Serbian public constitution, federal laws, republic
12 laws, and this sovereign state had to harmonise any agreement it was going
13 to agree to on a part of its territory, giving it substantial autonomy and
14 self-government. So these are all legitimate concerns --
15 A. Absolutely --
16 Q. -- that are spelled out in this letter --
17 A. We very much appreciated this and took this into consideration.
18 Q. And you were told also in meetings that you had, and you say this
19 in Milosevic -- in your statement, P2792 page 4, you were told in
20 relation to implementation, that more time was needed?
21 A. Absolutely.
22 Q. So you were aware of two things, that further, specific refinement
23 that are legitimate for a federal state to want to discuss in relation to
24 the political component were necessary and more time is needed to discuss
25 implementation; correct?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And yet, when you come back to Kleber in Paris, the Serb
3 delegation is told, No, you're only here to discuss implementation. No
4 discussion on the political framework; correct?
5 A. That's not correct. May I explain again? You, of course, give
6 now the three weeks. The prime factor was a very important one now at the
7 end of Rambouillet for both sides. The KLA part of the Albanian
8 delegation -- Kosovar Albanian delegation was panicky about the -- how
9 will the KLA reach their commanders and this -- how will they react to the
10 dismantlement of their organisation. That was the one point there. And
11 on the other hand, of course, you had the problem in -- on the Yugoslav
12 Serbian side, how do we now explain to our citizens that there is going to
13 be a military component in this agreement. And that was very appreciated
14 by us. This is a difficult part for any government to convince the
15 people, to convey to them, that this is something that we will then sign
16 up to. And the Contact Group foreign ministers, therefore, asked the
17 three negotiators to travel to -- both to Belgrade and to Pristina in
18 order to discuss the remaining open points, the ones that you just
19 mentioned from the political part, and of course also implementation
20 issues. How is this going to go? How are we going to organise it? And
21 so on. So the three weeks were used by us for intensive meetings and
22 dealings with these issues.
23 Q. And when you came back for the three days in March, in Paris, and
24 the Yugoslav delegation wanted to discuss the political component, they
25 were told, No, it's final; correct?
1 A. It was -- we said, We first need to do the -- what was agreed at
2 the end of Rambouillet, the implementation issues, and once we have
3 successfully finished the implementation issue, that was on the agenda for
4 the second meeting, we would of course be ready to go back -- to come back
5 to the political thing and then -- but for the time being, we are not
6 going to do this. This is for practical reasons. We need to finish. And
7 whether it's called president or chairman does not bear any relevance in
8 regard to the implementation issue.
9 And only if we successfully finish negotiations about --
10 concerning the implementation issues, the issue of president or chairman
11 will be relevant. If we fail this issue - and as we now know we failed -
12 this issue will not be of relevance. Why waste time on something that can
13 be decided at the very end in a very short period of time? That was the
14 reasoning that we clearly conveyed through the Contact Group, ourselves
15 directly to both sides. Because, of course, also the Kosovar Albanians
16 wanted something else here and there and so on. We said, No, this is
17 finito. We need now to move on what we agreed on the 23rd and these are
18 the implementation chapters.
19 Q. Now you've reversed everything. Now you're saying implementation
20 comes before the political part. Earlier, you were saying the political
21 part must be --
22 A. No, I'm sorry --
23 MR. STAMP: That is misrepresenting --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I agree with you, Mr. Stamp. What the witness's
25 position on this is quite clear, Mr. O'Sullivan, and you can make
1 submissions on it in due course if you think he has contradicted something
2 he said earlier.
3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, perhaps -- I have very little but
4 perhaps we should take a break -- maybe we should take a break if it's
5 important for the interpreters.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it is, but we have another witness to have in
7 mind today and I've already tried to establish whether additional time
8 will be available for that if necessary, and hopefully it can be arranged.
9 So your time is not limited and we can have the -- that's subject to
10 everyone being willing to cooperate on that. But --
11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, I have two brief areas, that's it.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: If you wish a break now, we'll take it. But I
13 thought if we completed you, we would then be able to judge the rest of
14 the day's timing better. But if it's going to be more than a couple of
15 minutes, then we'll need to come back.
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Well, let's come back.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, can I have some indication of how much
18 cross-examination there will be from other counsel? Who has questions?
19 Mr. Fila, do you?
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Certainly less than half an hour, Your
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Half an hour, a lot less than half an
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not more than that: 20 minutes, 15?
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Let us not bargain on this. 20
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you've had one of them already.
4 Mr. Cepic.
5 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Roughly, 15 minutes. Maybe
6 up to 15 minutes.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And that is it as I understand it; is that correct?
8 Mr. Stamp, is there much re-examination?
9 MR. STAMP: So far, not much.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: And is it clear that witness -- the next witness
11 requires to give evidence orally and be cross-examined? Is that an
12 essential part of that witness's evidence?
13 Mr. Lukic.
14 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. We definitely have to cross-examine
15 that witness and I can say now that we will not accept the approach that
16 that witness took in Milosevic trial when she refused to answer further
17 any questions. So if the Prosecution wants to put that witness on the
18 stand, we expect her to answer every and single of our question.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but how long is that likely to take,
20 Mr. Lukic?
21 MR. LUKIC: Probably 45 minutes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's plain, that to achieve the completion of
23 both witnesses we'll require both time than would be available, if we
24 finished at quarter to 2.00. We can go on for one more session after that
25 with an appropriate break, which would be at least three quarters of an
1 hour. I hope that there would be willingness to do that with that
2 particular witness. We initially had in mind the possibility that we
3 could go even further, depending on what happened this morning, but that's
4 not now going to be conceivable. So hopefully we can go that far in view
5 of the sensitivity that is felt by the witness, rightly or wrongly, I
6 think we should respect it nevertheless and try to get through her
8 MR. LUKIC: We are ready to stay as long as possible. Probably my
9 colleagues would stay -- wouldn't object to that.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you. Well ...
11 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ackerman, I understand that you have some
13 opposition to state to this. Just before you begin, I don't think we need
14 to detain Mr. Petritsch. Meanwhile, he can have his break. We'll be
15 resuming -- well, you'll be told when we'll resume once we complete this
16 debate. If you could, meanwhile, go with the usher, please.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honour.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
20 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I haven't spoken about time for a long
21 time --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: No, but can I make my position clear --
23 MR. ACKERMAN: I think your position is clear and I'm preparing to
24 withdraw my objection because it seems to have something to do with
25 getting a witness taken care who, otherwise, would be here for a long time
1 and I sympathise with that, so I'll gut it up and stay with you.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm grateful for that. Thank you.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we will resume at 1.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Judge Kamenova has had to depart for urgent
8 personal reasons unexpectedly, and therefore we will continue without her;
9 we consider that to be in the interests of justice, bearing in mind the
10 stage we've reached with this evidence.
11 [The witness takes the stand]
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you.
15 Q. The final document I'd like to look at with you is P2658, which is
16 in e-court only, 2658. Ambassador, this is the final report that you
17 prepared on the negotiations. You've seen this before with both Mr. Stamp
18 and me.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Can we go to the top of the second page?
20 THE WITNESS: Sorry, which tab is this?
21 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
22 Q. It's not a tab. Look at your screen, Ambassador.
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. Top of the second page you report this in that first bullet point.
25 "In the final analysis, the negotiations verged on failure. Such
1 a failure had to be avoided at all costs, not only for co-chairman Cook
2 and Vedrine, but also and especially for Albright, who had invested her
3 whole prestige (her critics noted that her presence for days on end and
4 the stubborn resistance of Thaqi made her participation 'trivial')."
5 Now, you reported -- this report accurately reflects your view on
6 the fact that, especially for Mrs. Albright, her prestige was on the line;
8 A. Well, everybody's prestige of course was on the line and since
9 Secretary Albright was actually not a formal part of the -- of any of the
10 negotiating teams or the co-chairs, as by the way Mr. -- President
11 Milutinovic on the Yugoslav side, it was clear that by her high-profile
12 interventions that her prestige was connected with this.
13 Q. And I guess it would be fair to say and you would agree that she
14 assured her prestige by accepting the side letter from the Kosovar
15 Albanian delegation; correct?
16 A. This I -- you would have to ask her. I do not know.
17 Q. And on page 1 of this same document, please.
18 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Can we go down a bit, please.
19 Q. There's a -- the second-last bullet point which is on the screen
20 in part 1, the one that begins: "Strong European components..." Do you
21 see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. "Strong European components in the negotiations (venue,
24 co-chairmanship of Cook/Vedrine, EUSE)" --
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. "Towards the end, in particular, however, the USA tried to take
2 over the negotiations (Hill's trip to Belgrade, presence for days on end
3 of Secretary of State Albright in Paris and Rambouillet); prominence of
4 the significance of PR," which you've told us is public relations;
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Well, Ambassador, you wrote to your foreign ministry, failure had
8 to be avoided at all costs. We've heard Mrs. Albright say and Veton
9 Surroi confirm this in this courtroom that if the Albanian sign, they
10 Serbs do not, then NATO will bomb. And if all this happened, then there
11 would be clarity and the world would know whose side to be on. Isn't that
12 what this is all about?
13 A. Let me again remind you that this is a report about the first leg
14 of the negotiations and it reflects the first part of the Rambouillet
15 process. So there, failure had to be avoided under any circumstances is a
16 bit of a phrase, of course, but it just said that we had to go the extra
17 mile in order to achieve this result in Rambouillet by getting from both
18 sides the go ahead for the second round.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I have no further questions.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. O'Sullivan.
21 Mr. Fila.
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Fila:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Excellency, my name is Toma Fila
24 and I am Defence counsel for Nikola Sainovic and I am going to keep my
25 word, and I'm going to use up even less time than I said although --
1 anyway, what the Court allowed me.
2 Excellency, I would just like to dwell on page 7 of your statement
3 and I will only restrict myself to questions related to Mr. Sainovic.
4 Paragraph 1 on page 7 of your statement in the English version, that is
5 what we are going to deal with now. In it you said that at one moment
6 towards the end of 1998 Sainovic was appointed the Envoy of the FRY in
7 Kosovo. I would like for you to have a look at a document, that is 2D8.
8 A. It's not here yet.
9 Q. Well, it will be there, but I'm just asking you so we don't waste
10 any time. When you see the document, please answer this question very
11 briefly. Is that what you were saying that had been sent, once you see
12 the document, that is. That is the decision, yes, the decision on the
13 formation of the commission of the federal government for the cooperation
14 with the OSCE mission. The government of the FRY appoints Mr. Sainovic
15 the chairman of that commission. That is paragraph 3.
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Is that the document that you meant?
18 A. Right. -- [In English] No, actually, what I referred in my report
19 was - if I would have it in front of me then I could quote more
20 precisely --
21 Q. Not your report, not the report. Sorry for interrupting you.
22 Your statement to the Prosecutor, page 7, paragraph 1, the statement you
23 made to the OTP, that is what I'm talking about. We're going to deal with
24 your reports later, but you've just had a look at this. Is that what you
25 had in mind? Do you have your statement in front of you now?
1 A. I have it -- I have it in front of me, but I was not referring to
2 this specific commission of the federal government for the cooperation
3 with the OSCE mission for verification in Kosovo. My information at the
4 time was that since the summer of 1998, Mr. Sainovic was in charge of
5 Kosovo. Yeah. This document I cannot recollect, but I assume that that
6 was a consequence of the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement, that this
7 commission was formed. Correct?
8 Q. I wanted to deal with something else, but we will go back to what
9 it was that you just started just now. If you look at paragraph 2 of this
10 decision, do you see that the task of this commission was to coordinate
11 the political security and logistical aspects of the functioning of the
12 OSCE mission, so that would have been Sainovic's role; right?
13 A. Yes. In this context, obviously, because it's in writing here.
14 Q. Now, we are going to talk about what you started speaking of a few
15 moments ago. Could you please look at 2D16 now, dated the 7th of October,
16 1998. That is the document you're going to see right now and that is
17 supposed to support your position, namely, that even before this
18 appointment, he was made in charge of Kosovo. So I would like you to look
19 at this document now and does this really show what his line of work was?
20 You have it now, and what I want to ask you is: Regarding the content of
21 this document, does it correspond, more or less, to your telegram, the one
22 that was sent with regard to this?
23 A. I would have to read it, but it seems to cover this same meeting,
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. And what specifically are you now referring to? What should I
2 comment on?
3 Q. No, no, nothing --
4 A. [Previous translation continues]...
5 Q. I just wanted to ask you whether this is what you meant when you
6 said that he was in charge of Kosovo, that he had this task. So he had
7 the authority of the Government of Yugoslavia to discuss Kosovo. You will
8 agree with me on that. I'm trying to cut this time as short as possible
9 for you.
10 What I want to ask you now is: Is it your assessment that this
11 meeting -- show that he was useful to you at this meeting because that is
12 my conclusion on the basis of the fact that you invited him for dinner
14 A. Let me say that as a matter of rule, all the meetings, as opposed
15 to other meetings with other representatives of your former government,
16 all the meetings with Mr. Sainovic were positive in the sense that it
17 was -- these were always decent meetings, based on mutual respect. There
18 I'm including the meetings -- the frequent meetings which we had in
19 Rambouillet, and therefore it was, of course, of use for me and I also had
20 the impression that Mr. Sainovic was listening and trying to respond. You
21 need to keep in mind October 7th, that was at the height of the October
22 crisis prior -- a week prior to the agreement between Milosevic and
23 Holbrooke. So it was a very good atmosphere personally and was something
24 which I still remember.
25 Q. All right. Do you remember that there was also a meeting sometime
1 around the 29th of December, this same year, 15 ambassadors were there and
2 you headed that group. This was a meeting with him and that meeting was
3 useful, just like you mentioned a few moments ago about the other one.
4 A. Yes, Mr. Sainovic, of course, always -- as this is the de voir of
5 any functionary to -- he put forward the government position, but it was a
6 useful meeting again in a very decent atmosphere, considering the fact
7 that we were in the middle of real deep crisis in Kosovo.
8 Q. Thank you for these kind words, Mr. Ambassador. Now I'm just
9 going to ask you something else and we're going to be even quicker. You
10 mentioned in your statement paragraph, 6 on page 7 in the English version,
11 the incident that had to do with the soldiers that were taken prisoner
12 and, on the other side, the KLA soldiers when you said that you vested
13 your personal authority in having this done. And you say, if I understand
14 this correctly, that Sainovic was the negotiator to whom you conveyed this
15 and then this happened and then he said to you that it was the president
16 who had decided on that, he probably meant Milosevic. Do you agree with
17 me that Sainovic could not have made a decision on this but it was
18 Milosevic who had to make the decision? Is my understanding of what you
19 said correct?
20 A. Yes, but I'm sure that Mr. Sainovic proposed to Mr. Milosevic to
21 decide in a positive way on this, and in this way again it was a
22 constructive - how should I say? - it was a constructive move on the part
23 of Mr. Sainovic.
24 Q. Now I would like to show a document to you, 2D16 -- no, that's not
25 it. Sorry. [Microphone not activated].
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] 2D15, that's the document.
3 Q. If you take a look at this, it has to do with a meeting in Vienna.
4 You see the date, the 7th of October, 1998. No, no. Yes. Let's just
5 see it.
6 If you remember, it has to do with Mr. Sainovic's visit to Vienna.
7 The date is the 5th of January, 1999. At the end of the document you
8 can see who the attendees were and you were there as well. Can this
9 meeting also be characterised as a useful meeting?
10 A. Yes, as far as I remember.
11 Q. You remember it, yes? Various principles were referred to there.
12 The Trial Chamber can read this for themselves. We can see that it has to
13 do with human rights and respecting the human rights of all in Kosovo, not
14 to have any out-voting and so on and so forth. When we look at this
15 document, I come to the conclusion that a high degree of agreement was
16 reached between you and Mr. Sainovic regarding the resolution of the
17 crisis, that is to say through political means and peaceful means. Do we
18 agree on that?
19 A. I agree with this in regard, again, to the date. That was prior
20 to -- to the massacre of Racak or the Racak incident, and up till then we
21 still had a lot of hope that we -- it would be able -- it would be
22 possible to reach a peaceful agreement based on KVM and the instruments
23 that were in place.
24 [Defence counsel confer]
25 MR. FILA: [Microphone not activated]
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Petritsch, you know what gentlemen we are, the Serbs, so the
4 rest of your time is on me.
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No further questions. Thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.
8 Mr. Cepic.
9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Petritsch.
12 A. Good afternoon.
13 Q. I'm Djuro Cepic, attorney-at-law, one of the Defence counsel for
14 Vladimir Lazarevic, and I have a few questions for you.
15 First of all, my first question has to do with part of your
16 statement that you gave to investigators of the Office of the Prosecutor
17 of this Tribunal in 1999. Do you perhaps have this statement in front of
18 you or do we need to have it on e-court?
19 A. It's not here yet.
20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could the registrar please provide
21 P2792 on e-court, page 6 of the English translation, the one-but-last
22 paragraph. The English original, to be more accurate.
23 Q. Mr. Petritsch, in the one-but-last paragraph, the second sentence,
24 you say that during the March meeting in Paris you received reports that
25 Serbian and Yugoslav forces were active in Kosovo. Military action had
1 taken place in and around Vucitrn and a military offensive was already
2 underway in Kosovska Mitrovica.
3 Mr. Petritsch, can you tell me who it was that you received this
4 information from?
5 A. [In English] These were in -- this was information which we
6 received from intelligence sources.
7 Q. Can you tell me what intelligence sources?
8 A. I cannot be more specific on this, but it's -- the way it is said
9 here stands correct.
10 Q. Mr. Petritsch, if I were to say to you that the verifiers of the
11 Kosovo Verification Mission were on the ground in Vucitrn touring other
12 areas and that that is not as is stated in your statement, or rather, that
13 it is in contrast to that report, would you allow for the possibility of
14 this report that you refer to being incorrect?
15 A. Since I do not know the KVM report, of course I cannot answer your
17 Q. If I were to say to you - and we heard the testimony of high
18 representatives of the KVM here who were on the spot, in Vucitrn - if we
19 have different reports here that say that in Mitrovica there weren't any
20 clashes or conflicts, would you allow for the possibility that what I've
21 been saying is correct?
22 A. You have to allow me to --
23 MR. STAMP: Excuse me.
24 THE WITNESS: -- to answer this --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, please.
1 Mr. Stamp.
2 MR. STAMP: The question is rephrasing the previous question, but
3 it's -- calls on the witness to speculate about something he doesn't know
4 about, about KVM documentation. He has already said where he got his
5 information from, which is the base of his knowledge and the base of his
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petritsch, were you going to add anything
8 significant or were you going to say that there's a limit to what you can
10 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. It's -- unfortunately, I cannot
11 contribute anything to this question because I'm unaware of those sources
12 that were quoted by Mr. --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 THE WITNESS: -- Cepic.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am referring to sources
17 that we heard in this courtroom during the course of this trial, primarily
18 the KVM --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not the issue.
20 MR. CEPIC: I will continue.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: We can look at these as contrasted with the
22 evidence of Mr. Petritsch. All he's saying is he doesn't know what the
23 contents of these reports were and I suppose he, like me, in this
24 situation would say anything's possible, but that doesn't help advance the
1 THE WITNESS: I agree.
2 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, during the Paris negotiations did
4 you perhaps receive any reports about the KLA, starting with urban
5 terrorism in Kosovo, planting bombs in towns where there were several
6 casualties, the 13th of March in Mitrovica, to give a specific example and
7 not to give any further examples. We haven't got much time.
8 A. Now, with referring to your specific example that you have given
9 now, of course the 13th of March was prior to the resumption of the second
10 part of the conference, but nevertheless, yes, we were very much aware
11 that this is not a one-sided exercise, that both sides clearly are in
12 part, at least, when it comes to the Kosovar Albanian side, resorting to
13 force. That was the reason, by the way, why we had to rush and sometimes
14 be a bit rough, also, with the negotiating team because we feared that
15 there would be a relapse into conflict.
16 Q. Precisely in that period during the Paris negotiations, did you
17 perhaps receive OSCE reports from Kosovo that it was the KLA that
18 intensified attacks against civilians, the police, and the military during
19 the negotiations and during the course of the negotiations? I'm referring
20 to Rambouillet and Paris.
21 A. I do not recall the specific source, whether it was KVM, OSCE, or
22 something else, but in general, that is when I recall my feeling at the
23 time was that the situation on the ground is deteriorating and that we
24 need to speed up and come to a conclusion in these negotiations then,
25 particularly in the second half in Paris.
1 And may I add here one episode. We were sitting in Paris
2 negotiating and Mr. Milutinovic, as I said, has taken -- had taken over
3 the lead of the Yugoslav delegation and we were involved in sort of
4 totally useless --
5 Q. Mr. Petritsch, sorry for interrupting, but with your permission, I
6 asked you about sources from the OSCE -- or rather, the KVM. I asked you
7 whether you received reports from them, so then let's not waste time. If
8 you don't have information from there let's --
9 MR. STAMP: [Previous translation continues]...
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: I'm asking if the witness could finish his answer.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: It didn't seem, though, it had anything to do with
13 the question with respect and --
14 THE WITNESS: I don't insist on --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: No. And equally, Mr. Cepic, unless this is leading
16 to something that you think the witness can tell us about, we know there's
17 evidence about the KLA's actions around March, and all you're getting is
18 answers from the witness that merely say I don't know or both sides were
19 at it together, but if it's coming up to something significant, please
20 carry on.
21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] No, no, Your Honour, by your leave, I
22 just wanted to hear whether --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Go ahead.
24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] -- Mr. Petritsch had that information.
25 That's it. I have no further questions regarding that topic.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: There is a point, though, to be made, though, on
2 this in general that whether he heard about KLA activity or not may not
3 really have any significance at the end of the day. I mean, I thought
4 perhaps you were coming to some point of significance in his -- in the
5 role he played because he had heard of KLA activity. I think your source
6 of that evidence is elsewhere.
7 Anyway, move on to your next point, please.
8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 I would like to ask the registrar for P2793, the transcript of
10 Mr. Petritsch's testimony in the Milosevic trial. 7240 is the page I
12 Q. Mr. Petritsch, my colleague Mr. Fila touched upon your mediation
13 with regard to the prisoners in January 1999. I would be interested in
14 the following: You stated during your testimony on this particular
15 page --
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could you please scroll down. Thank
18 Q. Line 22, that's where it starts -- that it was early January 1999
19 a group of VJ soldiers were taken hostage by the KLA and in turn a group
20 of KLA people were then taken by the VJ and there was a situation where
21 you were asked to help and mediate the release of these two groups.
22 I would be interested in the following: How did you come about
23 this information that the Army of Yugoslavia had taken a group of people
24 who were KLA members for this exchange, as you had stated?
25 A. Well, that was quite a celebrated case at the time that the KLA
1 had taken hostage a group of Yugoslav soldiers and then that there were,
2 of course, efforts underway on the part of the international community in
3 order to defuse --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: We know a great deal about this already.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I think there's a particular question being asked,
7 which is what's your source of the information that the VJ acted in
8 retaliation by taking hostages?
9 THE WITNESS: I didn't say retaliation. It was --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no.
11 THE WITNESS: It was incurred that it was just -- I would say the
12 time-sequencing was such, and I found out through our contacts with the
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 Mr. Cepic.
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. And what would you say to me, Mr. Petritsch, if I were to put
18 something to you that was confirmed from several sides in this courtroom
19 that these KLA members who were exchanged through your mediation are
20 actually KLA members who were arrested on the 14th of December, 1998, on
21 Mount Pastrik at the border between Yugoslavia and Albania in a border
22 incident? Meanwhile, the VJ soldiers were kidnapped on the 8th of
23 January, 1999, that is to say considerably later in respect to the first
25 A. I can only convey to you what I have learned. It might as well be
1 the case as you have just described it, but this is not the main point.
2 The main point is that we tried to negotiate with both sides to get -- and
3 it was explicitly said by the Yugoslav side, not in an exchange, but there
4 was a flexibility on the part of the Yugoslav authorities, particularly
5 Mr. Sainovic to say okay, let's try --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: May I interrupt again.
7 THE WITNESS: -- let's try and then --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: May I interrupt you. Mr. Cepic's line is rather
9 different --
10 MR. CEPIC: [Indiscernible]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: -- from the other -- his interest is entirely
12 different from the other two counsel who cross-examined you.
13 THE WITNESS: I know.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: And he's much more concerned about the actions, not
15 the diplomacy which followed.
16 THE WITNESS: I know, but I can only --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: And we have heard a lot about the exchange from
18 people who were involved also.
19 THE WITNESS: And I can refer, of course, and report on the
20 diplomatic side on the --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed.
22 THE WITNESS: -- not on the military side.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Petritsch. No further questions.
1 A. Thank you.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.
3 No one else has questions in cross-examination.
4 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Re-examination by Mr. Stamp:
6 Q. Now, at various points of the cross-examination you were asked
7 about ostensible efforts made and you were shown documents indicating that
8 invitations were set out by Dr. Markovic and sometimes by Mr. Milutinovic
9 in 1998 to the Kosovar Albanian side, so to speak, to convene meetings and
10 at one point you said that there were reasons - and you referred to
11 reasons on various occasions - as to why the Kosovar Albanian side could
12 not be expected to attend. And I think you referred to, without finishing
13 your answer, the backdrop of political and the security situation in
14 Kosovo --
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. -- where it could not be expected in those circumstances that
17 there would be these types of bilateral meetings the Yugoslav authorities
18 ostensibly were convening. Could you fully explain why in the political
19 security and historical setting that occurred.
20 A. Well, basically this was done during the time when on the one hand
21 we saw these declarations and the ostensible offer to negotiate and to
22 meet, and on the other hand the security operations on the ground were
23 ongoing and in particular, of course, it was also a reflex of the fact
24 that after the massacre in Milosa in -- where the Jashari family was
25 basically wiped out, there of course, was a total refusal on the part of
1 the Kosovar Albanians really to get involved, although later on Rugova
2 tried, because he was the one who went the extra mile to try, and of
3 course, but on the militant side, on the side of the rebels, there was
4 simply no readiness to allow the political establishment, so to speak, to
6 That was the problem. And this was very clear to everyone who was
7 involved in it, that this is not the right way to find -- to find
8 something that we wanted, and this is a meeting. And we suggested time
9 and again to the Yugoslav side, Please find other venues to forge a --
10 such a meeting, because we were, of course, supportive of such a meeting.
11 But just by announcing you're going to get an invitation and then you get
12 an invitation, that is -- was at the time not the way to handle. This you
13 can do with friends, but in a conflict should have deployed different
14 diplomatic means in order to reach this desired meeting.
15 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move now to the statement that you
16 recorded here in Exhibit P562 about what Mr. Milutinovic said. Can I just
17 ask you, this document, this e-mail dispatch, you had told us briefly how
18 they were created. I'd like you to answer this specifically: Who would
19 have written this dispatch, and that's 562.
20 A. Can I again have the number?
21 Q. P562.
22 A. P562. Yes, I've got it. That was written by Mr. Kickert and
23 approved by me. Usually that happens that there is a draft and then I go
24 over the draft and make some corrections, if necessary, stylistic or
25 otherwise, sometimes it's too long or something like this, because we
1 wanted to be precise, but of course, it's fully under my authority that
2 this has been written.
3 Q. Now, it refers to -- to the meeting this the chateau on the 19th
4 of February --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- and at the heading it says "re: FRY Kosovo Rambouillet
7 negotiations at the 20th [Realtime transcript read in error "28th"] of
8 February at 0600 hours."
9 Can you recall - and if you can't, just say so - approximately how
10 long after this discussion with Mr. Milutinovic would this document have
12 A. Well, it's difficult for me to tell, but I would suggest that that
13 must have been more towards the evening.
14 Q. Of?
15 A. Of the 19th.
16 Q. Do you recall what time in the day it was that you had this
17 discussion with Mr. Milutinovic in the chateau?
18 A. Well, as I said, it was in --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: That's been answered. There's a mistake in the
20 transcript. It's the 20th rather than the 28th of February that should
21 have been recorded.
22 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask you a question I should have -- I meant
24 to ask you earlier and, I'm sorry, I didn't. What language did
25 Mr. Milutinovic use when he made the remark?
1 THE WITNESS: English.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: And what language did Stambuk use when he made his
4 THE WITNESS: Also English.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 I should say, Mr. O'Sullivan, if you want to come back on that,
7 you'll be allowed to.
8 MR. STAMP: In respect to the language, Your Honour?
9 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry?
10 MR. STAMP: In respect to the language?
11 JUDGE BONOMY: In respect of it, yes, since I've asked a question
12 here that he might wish to --
13 MR. STAMP: Not that I'm objecting.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Only on the matter.
15 MR. STAMP: I asked him that in chief.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry. Did you ask him about Stambuk as well?
17 MR. STAMP: No.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. So he's had his opportunity. All
20 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry, if I'm asking a question which has been
21 answered before. There has been a lot of material and I think I might
22 have forgotten the answer about the time when he spoke with
23 Mr. Milutinovic at the chateau on the 19th.
24 Q. Can you recall approximately --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: He said a moment ago, approaching evening.
1 THE WITNESS: Late afternoon/early evening, so approximately --
2 but I cannot be absolutely sure, but somehow when I recall the scenery, so
3 to speak, then it must have been more towards the evening.
4 MR. STAMP:
5 Q. Thank you. How long after the meeting between General Clark and
6 the Kosovo Albanian delegation did you discover that this meeting had
7 taken place?
8 A. This I don't -- I don't recall. I'm sure it must have been not
9 too much later, a couple of hours or something like this.
10 Q. Very well. There were quite a few foreign ministers at
11 Rambouillet, including the -- Mr. Ivanic from Russia --
12 A. Ivanov.
13 Q. Thank you. Ivanov. Mr. Milo, I think, his name is, from Albania,
14 and of course was from France, Britain, the United States. And you said
15 that there were side letters -- or there was an issue raised in respect to
16 side letters. Did you have any control or did yourself or any member of
17 the troika of mediators have any control over the meetings that these
18 foreign ministers could have with various members of the two delegations?
19 A. No, of course not. The Contact Group foreign ministers felt free
20 to meet with whomever they wanted to meet, in particular, the two
21 co-chairs, since they were the political -- politically responsible for
22 these negotiations and all the others, Mr. Ivanov, Mr. -- of course,
23 Secretary Albright. We spoke at length about Mr. Fischer from Germany,
24 representing the EU Presidency. And that was basically the format. The
25 Contact Group foreign ministers took the liberty to speak to anyone they
1 choose to speak or we made proposals who should speak, who should approach
2 one of the two delegations, or individually speak like to Mr. Milutinovic
3 or to Mr. Sainovic or to Mr. Thaqi or Mr. Rugova and so on.
4 Q. Now, these side letters, how would you assess their value in terms
5 of binding force in comparison to what you hoped to achieve, achieve the
6 ultimate final agreement between the two parties?
7 A. Well, I think what's important is that the means that were
8 employed outside the troika format and not agreed within the troika was
9 one thing. The other thing was - and this is what counted and was formal
10 and binding - what the troika did and said and what was of course also
11 approved by the Contact Group.
12 Q. You were shown a video, and I don't intend to go over the video
13 with you unless you need to, but the transcript for the video is among the
14 documents that you were given. It's in just --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Tab 42.
16 MR. STAMP: Thank you.
17 Q. It's tab 42, yes. Whether I may ask you and you could consult the
18 tab if you want to answer. Were you a party to and that is present and
19 participating in any of these meetings and discussions that is referred to
20 in the video?
21 A. No, I was -- I mean, as this is expressed here, this was an
22 episode that these -- this documentary, I guess it was this BBC
23 documentary, dealt at length with, but it was this aspect of, so to speak,
24 document in minute detail how the Kosovar Albanians acted, so to speak, in
25 these negotiations in this very -- at this very point in time.
1 Q. Well, the video refers to various meetings and discussions between
2 members of the American team, team of the United States, and Mr. Thaqi and
3 Mr. Surroi. Were you present and participating in any of these?
4 A. Not in the specific one, but in general, yes. I had of course
5 also contacts with all those that you just mentioned.
6 Q. Yes.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Were you not present at the final session meeting?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course, I was present.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: But that's the one -- that's the one of the
10 contacts there that you were actually a witness to?
11 THE WITNESS: I was there of course at the formal Contact Group
12 meeting of the foreign ministers, but in this documentary, there was, of
13 course, also the issue of how within the Kosovar Albanian group --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no. Yes, I understand that.
15 THE WITNESS: Okay.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: But when the Albanian representatives who were
17 described as three were brought in --
18 THE WITNESS: Yes --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- you were there --
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course, I was present there.
21 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honours. I have nothing
22 further in re-examination.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 Questioned by the Court:
1 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Excellency, while going through one of the
2 documents on the e-court, I saw one of your reports which suggested that
3 you had been meeting Mr. Milutinovic at different places, but your first
4 meeting with him in Belgrade, where you spoke also, led to a bit of
5 acrimony because you reminded him of The Hague Tribunal or talking of The
6 Hague Tribunal. Now I was wondering, why did you think of The Hague
7 Tribunal at that time in your Belgrade meeting of October. And then later
8 on, you said that Mr. Milutinovic has been talking about things pertaining
9 to this issue whenever he met you. Could you kindly dilate and clarify
10 this position. I'm thankful.
11 A. Thank you, Your Honour. Now, correction, that was not
12 Mr. Milutinovic whom I addressed, but Mr. Milosevic in his capacity as
13 president of Yugoslavia, and Mr. Milutinovic was present and in his
14 then-capacity as Yugoslav foreign minister. And you are now referring to
15 my -- when I presented my credentials to President Milosevic, and in
16 this -- in this short speech, I also referred to cooperation between the
17 necessity for the cooperation between Belgrade and ICTY. And then later
18 on in the meeting, in the sort of private meeting that usually takes place
19 after the presentation of the credentials, then Mr. Milosevic came back
20 and sort of -- but there I do not recall what he said, but clearly it was
21 not something which was welcomed by Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milutinovic, to my
22 knowledge, did not react at the time to my speech.
23 JUDGE CHOWHAN: But, what was the necessity at that time talking
24 about this Tribunal while you went for a very formal function or
25 presenting your credentials? I mean, what was in the back of the mind?
1 A. That was the necessity that was expressed invariably in all the
2 meetings with Yugoslav officials that, in order to fully re-establish
3 diplomatic relations between the international community and Yugoslavia,
4 Yugoslavia needs to play by the rules. And one was, of course, was
5 cooperation with the ICTY.
6 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petritsch, that completes your evidence.
9 Whatever else might be said about it, it was extremely interesting to
10 listen to. We are grateful to you for returning to the Tribunal to give
11 evidence again, and you're now free to leave.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Stamp, we have available to us, if we
16 choose to use it, about an hour or so this afternoon.
17 MR. STAMP: Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the general agreement that we could try to deal
19 with the evidence of the witness in about an hour? It would depend on the
20 chief being fairly brief. Do you have much, Ms. Moeller?
21 MS. MOELLER: No, Your Honour. I'll be very brief.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's see if we can do that and return here at five
23 minutes to 3.00. We'll have an hour's break just now. Obviously, that's
24 the normal routine when the interpreters are stretched and we need to use
25 the same interpreters this afternoon I understand, so we need to give
1 roughly an hour's break. So we'll return at five minutes to 3.00.
2 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.54 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 2.58 p.m.
4 [Closed session]
11 Pages 10966-10995 redacted. Closed session
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.23 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th day of
7 March, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.