1 Monday, 19 March 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, you have a matter you wish to raise.
6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Just very
8 The next witness after Mr. Phillips is Mr. Coo, and I wanted to
9 ask the Tribunal, bearing in mind that no decision has been made on the
10 scope of testimony of Mr. Coo, that regardless of when the decision is
11 made, the two give us notice, perhaps informally, about the gist of the
12 decision because our cross-examination expectations range between five
13 hours and five minutes depending on your decision. And I do believe that
14 we need this in order to be able to prepare documents for his testimony.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: You know which one we would prefer, Mr. Visnjic.
16 Mr. Ackerman has already suggested making written submissions
17 where we initially anticipated dealing with this matter orally. Can you
18 advance knowledge on that? Is there to be a written submission or are we
19 to deal with it orally?
20 MR. ACKERMAN: It was filed late last night. CLSS has it. I have
21 asked them to file it as quickly as possible this morning and that there
22 is some urgency with respect to it, so I think you'll have it by 10.30 at
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that a joint submission?
25 MR. ACKERMAN: I understand a number of think my colleagues are
1 going to join it, and I don't think there will be any other submissions.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: If the witness we are about to hear occupies the
3 day, then later in the day we'll look at that written submission and we
4 will probably be able to deal with it first thing tomorrow. If that means
5 a brief gap while you regroup, then that can be arranged.
6 MR. ACKERMAN: I think when you see it, Your Honour, you'll
7 realise that looking at it might be a fairly intensive proposition because
8 it is quite comprehensive. I think it's as much as 45 pages long.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: I can tell you that we have spent a fairly
10 significant time already looking at the latest version, and we may find
11 that it may not take as long. We're not starting from square one.
12 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm aware of that. That doesn't surprise me at
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, you also have a matter to raise?
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, unrelated to Mr. Coo,
16 and I don't want to interrupt you when the witness is already in the
17 courtroom, I have an objection to the use and tendering of Exhibit P632.
18 It's an order that is not signed, not stamped, and there is no reference
20 I think that this document has not been authenticated at all.
21 It's been typed out. Nobody signed it. And at the beginning of the
22 document, where there is a place for the reference number, there is no
23 such number. So this is not in any logbook or anything. This is all I
24 have to say.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I would like to join in. I fail to
2 understand the context in which two more documents are used, P928 and
3 P1000, because I simply fail to understand what these documents have to do
4 with the testimony of Michael Phillips. So this is all I have to say on
5 this topic. Thank you.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter, can you deal with these, please?
7 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, Mr. Stamp will be taking
8 the witness. However, I can respond to the question, however. P1000 is
9 making indications regarding the promotion of Pavkovic, and the use of the
10 VJ within the interior of Kosovo that seemed to be against many of the
11 statements made by the Serbian authorities to the KVM, amongst other
12 international organisations. So it would be focusing primarily on the
13 last few pages.
14 As to P928, specifically on page 14 of it, there are some
15 implications with regards to Sainovic's power over MUP forces and VJ
16 forces, and we're focusing on those two aspects. Each have been admitted
17 into evidence previously; however, those would be the two focal points we
18 would be addressing with this witness in the event that the testimony
19 requires it.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Does he have personal knowledge of the documents,
21 or are you simply looking at these as something that has a bearing on the
22 witness' evidence?
23 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, they will be used in much the same way
24 that P1000 was used with John Crosland when he testified, merely showing
25 what the document is indicating is consistent with what he was seeing both
1 in his meetings as well as what he saw on the ground.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: And your comment with P632?
3 MS. CARTER: We're foregoing that document, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, I think we have to look at these in the
5 context in which they're raised in the course of examination of the
6 witness, and Mr. Bakrac and you both have the assurance that P632 will not
7 be used.
8 I think we can now invite the witness into court.
9 MR. STAMP: Before we do, I think, for the record, I should
10 indicate that the provider, the United States Government, is represented
11 here in court by Ms. Denise Manning and Mr. William Horrigan.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.
13 [The witness entered court]
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Phillips.
15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to
17 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be placed
18 before you.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
20 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,
21 and nothing but the truth
22 WITNESS: MICHAEL PHILLIPS
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
24 I expect that you will be examined by a number of counsel here
25 today. I can't tell you for sure how many. All I can tell you is that
1 the first will be for the Prosecution, and that is Mr. Stamp.
2 Mr. Stamp.
3 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Examination by Mr. Stamp:
5 Q. Good morning, Mr. Phillips.
6 A. Good morning.
7 Q. Can you starting by stating your full name.
8 A. My name is Colonel Michael D. Phillips.
9 Q. Thanks. In November 1998, where were you posted and what was your
10 occupation then?
11 A. In November 1998, I was assigned at Pacific Command in Honolulu,
12 Hawaii, and on the 4th of November I reported to Pristina in Kosovo.
13 Q. In what capacity did you go to there?
14 A. Working directly for Ambassador William Walker.
15 Q. And what role did you have in relation to the work for Walker?
16 A. I was his Chief of Staff, which encompassed working with our
17 operations people in OSCE to develop operational strategies to deploy the
18 OSCE verifiers into the field.
19 Q. And can you tell us briefly what function that entailed?
20 A. It entailed planning, it entailed strategy, it entailed working
21 with the FRY and MUP liaison officers.
22 Q. Did you have to carry out functions that involved observing events
23 as they occurred on the ground?
24 A. Yes, sir, we did. We deployed to the field approximately three
25 days a week to four days a week on the average.
1 Q. How long were you posted in Kosovo in that capacity?
2 A. From the 4th of November to about the 20th of March, upon the OSCE
4 Q. And you said you deployed about three times a week to visit places
5 in the field. Places like where? Can you give us an idea of where you
6 would visit?
7 A. To Malisevo, to Suva Reka, Podujevo, various locations where there
8 was activity. Whether it be Serb activity, KLA activity, or MUP activity,
9 we would try to go to those locations and observe the situation on the
10 ground. And the purpose of those deployments was to look at the
11 compliance of the OSCE agreement signed by Mr. Holbrooke and
12 Mr. Milosevic -- or agreed to by Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Milosevic. I don't
13 think Mr. Milosevic signed the agreement, actually.
14 MR. STAMP: Could we have a brief look at the Exhibit 658. This
15 is the agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission.
16 Q. I won't trouble you to go through the document before us,
17 Mr. Phillips. We already have it in evidence. But could we just have a
18 look at a provision at page 2, the bottom of page 2, going on to page 3 in
19 the English version.
20 And the last sentence of page 2 indicates that: "The Kosovo
21 Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the
22 maintenance of -- of the cease-fire by all elements. It will investigate
23 a course of cease-fire violations. The mission personnel will have full
24 freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times."
25 Was that the purpose of your variation expeditions, observing
1 activities in the field in Kosovo?
2 A. That was one of the purposes, yes, sir.
3 Q. And were you allowed free access during your mission in Kosovo?
4 Did the situation remain the same at all times in terms of access?
5 A. Yes. We were not allowed unfettered access at all times.
6 Q. Can you explain that a little bit more. What was the situation
7 when you arrived there, and did it change?
8 A. When we arrived there, we generally had the freedom to move
9 throughout Kosovo with little restriction. As the mission progressed into
10 December 1998, January 1998, the restrictions on our travels became more
11 pronounced by roadblocks, and it was often briefed to us by the Serbian
12 police that the reason that there were roadblocks. And the reason we
13 could not go to a particular village that we wanted to go to was they
14 could not guarantee our safety, and therefore we were prohibited from
15 moving around with unfettered access.
16 Q. Did you hold meetings with representatives of the Serbian
17 government to try to iron out the issues that you had?
18 A. Yes, sir, we did, on several occasions, usually on a weekly basis.
19 We would meet at the government building in Pristina with Serb officials.
20 Q. Can you tell us who were the senior Serb officials that you would
21 meet with weekly?
22 A. Mr. Nicolae Sainovic, in Pristina; retired General Loncar;
23 Mr. Lukic, who --
24 Q. Which Mr. Lukic is that? What is his first name, do you know?
25 A. I don't recall his first name, but he presented himself as the
1 chief of the MUP or the commander of the MUP in Pristina. And there was
2 an interpreter or two; Mr. Skoric was also present; and there was an
3 interpreter, female, by the name of Gordana who was present.
4 Q. And on the KVM, who would be present at that meeting, apart from
6 A. Ambassador Walker; DZ, who was our chief of operations, a British
7 two-star general. I refer to him as "DZ." I cannot pronounce his full
8 Polish surname. Ambassador Walker would have an interpreter with him, who
9 was also a Serbian individual. Once in awhile we'd have one of the
10 mission area coordination centre commanders with us from -- on occasion,
11 depending on the incident that we were seeking help from.
12 Q. You said that these parties met approximately once a week. Did
13 this frequency of meeting once a week continue right through your mission?
14 A. No, sir, they did not.
15 Q. Well, what was the change, if you can tell us, please.
16 A. As we moved through the Podujevo time period, the December 25th
17 period, 1998, up through the events leading to Racak in January, really
18 after the Racak event, our meetings on a weekly basis ceased at that
19 point. Leading up to that point, they were not comfortable meeting; they
20 were hostile in nature, uncooperative in nature; and they begin to break
21 apart from December 15th up through the middle of January.
22 Q. Now, in these meetings, about how many times was Mr. Sainovic
24 A. He was present at each of the weekly meetings, with the exception
25 of the final meeting just before the Racak incident. We'd ask to meet
1 with him and could not contact him, and instead we met with Mr. Loncar.
2 He met with us late in the evening of, I think it was, the 15th of
4 Q. And about how many meetings did you have with Mr. Lukic present?
5 A. He was present at most of the meetings; certainly up through, I
6 would say, all the meetings except the one at Racak on the 15th of
8 JUDGE BONOMY: The event at Racak was on the 15th of January.
9 Does that affect your recollection of the date when you had this last
11 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're saying the meeting was after the event
13 occurred at Racak.
14 THE WITNESS: Racak occurred, and we asked to meet with
15 Mr. Sainovic and we were unable to meet with him, could not be located;
16 and, instead, we met late that evening on the 15th with Mr. Loncar.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: In the government building in Pristina?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
20 Mr. Stamp.
21 MR. STAMP:
22 Q. Can I take it the first meeting you had with Mr. Sainovic present.
23 How was he introduced?
24 A. He introduced himself as a personal representative of
25 Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo.
1 Q. And did he tell you anything about what his role was?
2 A. He would be involved in all the political aspects and assist the
3 OSCE in setting up its mission, and provide any assistance we needed to
4 get the mission up and running.
5 Q. And when you first met with Mr. Lukic, how was he introduced to
7 A. That he was the personal representative of Mr. Milosevic in
8 Kosovo, as the chief of police, chief of the MUP.
9 Q. Now, you -- did you come to an assessment of who was in charge of
10 the Serb side that attended these meetings on the basis of what you
11 observed at these meetings?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Who was?
14 A. Mr. Sainovic.
15 Q. What did you observe that caused you to make this assessment?
16 A. Well, he was -- he sat at the table directly across from
17 Mr. Walker. He did most of the talking. He gave guidance and direction
18 to the other members on the other side of the table, to either lift a
19 roadblock, allow access to a barracks. I mean, he was clearly in charge
20 of providing guidance to his folks, left and right of him, at our
21 conference table. And also of note was that none of his team would sit
22 down until he sat down.
23 Q. Did he give you any undertakings in respect of how the KVM mission
24 would be treated?
25 A. Early on we were told that he was there to assist us in any way
1 that they could, and our very first meeting with him was quite good, I
2 thought. It was upbeat. We felt we were not going to meet any
3 cooperation problems or obstacles.
4 In fact, I remember Mr. Loncar and Mr. Walker had known each other
5 during their time in Eastern Slavonia. It was a very warm, friendly
6 relationship. Mr. Walker was certainly upbeat, having seen an old friend
7 again. And, of course, over time that turned out not to be the case.
8 Q. What do you mean when you say that, "turned out not to be the
10 A. Well, the relationship that Mr. Walker enjoyed with Mr. Loncar in
11 Eastern Slavonia, per Mr. Walker to me, was the same relationship that he
12 enjoyed in Kosovo with Mr. Loncar. It was more, I would say,
13 uncooperative in its nature. It was a very defensive sort of
14 relationship. Whenever the OSCE would bring issues to Mr. Loncar or to
15 Mr. Sainovic, it was throughout the period of the OSCE deployment, and it
16 just grew to be more uncooperative in its undertaking.
17 Q. Okay. You told us just now that you were told that Mr. Sainovic
18 was there to assist the KVM mission. Did he or anyone tell you what he
19 would or could do to assist the mission?
20 A. Well, we were told that in order to allow the OSCE mission to come
21 up to speed with the numbers, the number in the OSCE agreement was that
22 2.000 verifiers were going to be allowed to enter Kosovo; and to help
23 expedite the deployment of those vary fires, they were going to set up a
24 consulate office in Kosovo, Pristina proper, and that consulate never got
25 established, even at the direction of Mr. Milosevic who at one time
1 already said that it was established.
2 It slowed the process of the verifiers coming into the country to
3 execute the mission mandates of the agreement. So we did not find a
4 cooperative nature of establishing that consulate to allow the verifiers
5 to get in the country in a timely way.
6 Q. Was this the only situation, or were there other situations in
7 which you were told that something would be done to facilitate your
8 mission and it was not done?
9 A. There were minefields that we had asked to be cleared so our
10 verifiers could get to various locations in and around Kosovo, and we were
11 on occasion told that they would look at that and clear those minefields
12 so the safety of transportation to the verifiers could be guaranteed. The
13 minefields were never cleared; they were never located and provided to
14 us. We had asked for baseline information on the numbers of troops and
15 numbers of police, numbers of weapons. We were never provided that
16 baseline information. Just a couple of examples.
17 Q. Who did you ask for the baseline information and who told you that
18 the minefields would be cleared?
19 A. We asked for the baseline information from Mr. Sainovic, from
20 General Loncar, and from Mr. Milosevic himself, that we needed that
21 baseline information.
22 Q. And who told you that the minefields would be cleared?
23 A. Mr. Sainovic told us he would look into the minefields to see
24 about getting those located and/or cleared so we had unfettered access in
25 some of the regions. Our larger concern for the minefields being cleared
1 was to bring the displaced Albanians back out of the hills to -- and get
2 them back into their homes. So we were worried about the location of
3 those minefields that had been planted along mountain passes and down in
4 the valleys of Kosovo.
5 Q. The failure on the part of the Serbian government side to live up
6 to their undertakings or to cooperative, as you put it, based on your
7 knowledge and observations in the field, was the failure due to an
8 inability, a material inability, to effect those undertakings or to an
9 absence of will to do so?
10 A. I think it was an absence of will to do so. My observation of
11 that situation was the more obstacles that were provided that the OSCE had
12 to confront, it prohibited them from actually executing their mission and
13 not able to undergo the evaluation of compliance of the agreement. It was
14 an obstacle that was pretty obvious to us that was established to slow us
15 down, because the mission, once the agreement was signed, moved very fast
16 with fairly sizable numbers to bring them in.
17 You know, the other obstacle was getting our cars registered so we
18 could get the vehicles into Kosovo, to allow us to roam Kosovo with
19 relative freedom. We couldn't get those -- those cars in on time as
20 well. They were hindered at the border.
21 MR. STAMP: I've been asked to pause by the stenographer.
22 I would like us to bring up Exhibit 928.
23 Q. I would just like to look at one passage in Exhibit 928 and ask
24 you one question about it.
25 MR. STAMP: If we could go to page 14 of the English version.
1 Q. These are minutes of a meeting of the General Staff of the FRY.
2 Now, I take it that you would not know about these meetings or this
3 document. I just want to have a look at one part of the document and ask
4 you how, if it does, would that bear on your experience of dealing with
5 the Serbian government side, in particular Mr. Sainovic.
6 One general is commenting that --
7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I have not heard the witness say
10 anything that might indicate that something like this should be put to
11 him. I have not heard anything like that from this witness, what you're
12 about to read now, that he said something in connection with this. If
13 this is the broad context, the witness should say something about it and
14 then this should be put to him to see if it corresponds to what the
15 witness said. But I have not heard the witness say anything of the kind
16 and for this reason I object.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, we've heard evidence from the witness
18 about a number of things and his assessment of what was going on. In
19 anticipation, no doubt, of the Defence case, Mr. Stamp now wishes to put a
20 part of this document to him to see how it fits with his experience on the
21 ground. We see no objection to that course of action and we shall allow
22 Mr. Stamp to proceed on that basis. Obviously, if he does something
23 inappropriate in the course of doing so, we will hear from you further.
24 Mr. Stamp.
25 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
1 Q. We see here that one general is saying that, to quote: "I think
2 it is a priority to ensure that not even Sainovic or any other Sainovic
3 can solve these problems by lightly deciding to use the units," and he's
4 referring here to army units.
5 Does this accord or does this not accord with your assessment of
6 Mr. Sainovic's authority in relation to the use of army units in Kosovo?
7 A. I'm not sure I understand the question exactly.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Nor do I, I must say.
9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, Mr. Fila, that question is not related to
11 the evidence we've been hearing so far and I understand your objection. I
12 think Mr. Stamp has to formulate another question.
13 MR. STAMP: Very well, Your Honour.
14 Q. You told us earlier that you observed in meetings where
15 Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Loncar were present that Mr. Sainovic would give
16 directives in respect to how the activities of the Serbian forces should
17 be conducted. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And having regard to the passage I just read from that document,
20 do you -- how does your experience of these meetings and what you saw
21 occurring on the ground --
22 MR. STAMP: The question is not yet asked.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: This is a question of --
24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. What you have just said was never
25 stated by the witness. Sorry.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, the passage that you're highlighting is
2 open to interpretation and it's open to us to compare that passage with
3 what the witness has said. But asking the witness, in the way you are
4 intending to do at the moment, to comment on this passage as somehow or
5 other being equivalent or similar to his experience is not an appropriate
6 question. It's not for him to make that judgement. Already -- I think
7 you've already told us that this document is an exhibit in the case.
8 MR. STAMP: Yes, it is evidence, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: You're highlighting a passage that you wish us to
10 look at which we will in the context of the evidence the witness is
12 MR. STAMP: Very well, Your Honour. I'll -- I'll move on.
13 Q. You spoke earlier about displaced persons. Can you tell us
14 briefly what was the situation in respect to the displaced persons that
15 you observed within Kosovo during your time there on the mission.
16 A. One example that I observed was in the village of Malisevo. It
17 was a village that had been literally completely burned to the ground, and
18 all of its residents had fled to the hills during the winter months. The
19 town was besieged with heavy MUP activity, and one of my jobs was to work
20 with the MUP and our liaison officers to try and get the MUP out of
21 Malisevo, so we could bring back displaced people that lived in that
22 village back to their homes before they froze to death in the mountains in
23 the winter.
24 And my recollection of that time-period, there were a couple
25 thousand displaced people as a result of that village being attacked and
1 burned and mortared. And one of our missions was to try and repopulate
2 that village and rebuild that village.
3 Q. When was this? When did you make your observation?
4 A. This would have been in November of 1998.
5 Q. Now, did you bring to the attention those observations to the
6 Serbian authorities?
7 A. Yes, sir, we did.
8 Q. To whom?
9 A. It was presented to Mr. Sainovic, and it was presented to
10 Mr. Milosevic, both in November.
11 Q. What was the response and attitude of Mr. Sainovic, in particular,
12 in respect to the issue of the IDPs?
13 A. My observation of the response was that I would tell you that they
14 were certainly concerned about the displaced people, but they also saw
15 them as terrorists and was a village that while it had no Serbs in it or
16 no Albanians in it was still heavily fortified with MUP police. And we
17 couldn't understand what they were there for, what they were protecting,
18 and what they were securing.
19 There was no reason for them to be there, and Mr. Sainovic, I
20 recollect, felt that it would be unsafe to pull the MUP out of there
21 because terrorists, in his words, would filter back into the village and
22 confront Serbian security forces once again. It was a key village, fairly
23 close to Pristina. I think for the Serbian security authorities probably
24 thought that that was a strategic location for them that needed to be
25 secured, which is why the MUP stayed there.
1 Q. Can you recall what, if anything, Mr. Sainovic said about the IDPs
2 in general in Kosovo?
3 A. I can't recall anything specific.
4 Q. In your discussions with Mr. Sainovic, what language was used?
5 Can you remember what language did he use?
6 A. He used both English and Serbian. He seemed to understand English
7 well, although he had an interpreter there, but he seemed to have an
8 understanding of English and spoke some English.
9 Q. Did he express himself in respect to the Albanian population in
10 general in Kosovo?
11 A. Well, he certainly wasn't pleased with their activities from a
12 perspective, as they referred to it, as terrorism --
13 Q. Albanian population, Albanian people, did he say anything in your
14 presence about Albanian people?
15 A. That they didn't belong in Kosovo that. It was the Serbian
16 homeland and the cradle of Serbian civilisation, and felt that it belonged
17 to the Serbian people and that the Albanian people had no desire to
18 co-exist with them.
19 Q. When did he say that?
20 A. In one of our meetings in the November -- November time-frame in
21 the early part of our mission.
22 Q. You were attended also at various meetings in which Mr. Lukic was
23 present. Based on what you observed, what was your assessment of his
24 authority in relation to the forces -- armed forces in the FRY -- I beg
25 your pardon, in Kosovo.
1 A. What was his relationship with the --
2 Q. What was your assessment of his authority in respect to the armed
3 forces in the FRY, in particular the MUP?
4 A. I'm not certain of his exact authorities, but I am certain that
5 they had a relationship that was of a coordination-type relationship.
6 From my observations in the field, the way the MUP and Serbian military
7 forces worked together, there was clearly a relationship there.
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MR. STAMP:
10 Q. You said you also met with President Milosevic. About how many
11 times did you meet with President Milosevic?
12 A. I believe it was three times.
13 Q. Do you recall a meeting on the 15th of December, 1998?
14 A. I recall meeting on the 24th of November --
15 Q. -- with Mr. Milosevic?
16 A. -- with Mr. Milosevic. And I believe the 15th of December was
17 with Mr. Holbrooke and I believe General Clark, the best I can recollect.
18 MR. STAMP: Could we pull up Exhibit 396, please. Could we move
19 briefly to the next page and to the final page. No, no. The page before
20 that where there's a signature, please. Could you go back, please.
21 Q. The document before you -- well, do you know what it is? It's --
22 I shouldn't -- withdrawn.
23 This is a letter dated the 23rd of November, 1998, signed by
24 Ambassador William Walker, who proposed this letter?
25 A. Mr. Walker signed the letter. I helped draft that letter.
1 Q. And it's addressed to Mr. Slobodan Milosevic. Was this letter
2 presented to President Milosevic?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Were you present at that time?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. When was this meeting?
7 A. This was in November, I believe, November 24th.
8 Q. Very well. Who else was present at that meeting?
9 A. Which side?
10 Q. Start with Mr. Milosevic's side.
11 A. Mr. Milosevic was present, Mr. Sainovic was present, and
12 Mr. Milutinovic was present. That's what I recall at that meeting. On
13 were you side it was Ambassador Miles, Ambassador Walker, and myself.
14 Q. Now, who arranged that meeting, and what was the purpose of that
16 A. The purpose of the meeting was we were having some trouble with
17 cooperation, and Ambassador Walker felt it was necessary to deliver a
18 letter in writing that outlined the nature of the agreement and the
19 cooperation that we were looking for from the Serbian authorities.
20 Q. And the requests made in that letter, I think, speak for
21 themselves, but how did Mr. Milosevic react to these requests that were
22 made by Mr. Walker in the letter and verbally?
23 A. Well, he was very loud, upset that -- he felt that he was
24 providing a high degree of cooperation. It was the view of the OSCE that
25 he was not providing a high level of cooperation. We had asked for a
1 number of things. We had asked for the consulate to be established. We
2 asked for a medical evacuation helicopter by the Swiss. We had asked for
3 body-guards to be armed. And while those wishes were entertained in
4 Kosovo with Mr. Sainovic, they were later brought to Mr. Milosevic, and
5 he felt that any security that we required would be provided by the MUP or
6 the Serbian security forces.
7 Any helicopter support that we required for medical evacuation
8 would be provided by the FRY helicopter support. And that he claimed that
9 the consulate was, in fact, established in Pristina and the fact was it
10 never was established, so his information was wrong on that account.
11 Q. The letter indicates that action ought to be taken in respect to
12 heavy weapons, check-points, observation points, police patrols, border
13 security operations, and a variety of other matters. Were these, what I
14 just mentioned, discussed at the meeting with Mr. Milosevic?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And from your observations as to how the meeting was conducted and
17 what was said, did you make an assessment as to who was responsible on the
18 Serbian side for making decisions in respect to the use of the armed
19 forces in Kosovo and who was responsible to implement decisions?
20 A. I -- my observations told me that Mr. Milosevic was responsible
21 for security force decisions, that Mr. Sainovic was to implement them in
23 Q. You said present at the meeting was also Mr. Milan Milutinovic.
24 Where did he sit at that meeting in respect to Mr. Milosevic?
25 A. Right next to Mr. Milosevic.
1 Q. Did he say anything at that meeting, or did you observe anything
2 about how the meeting was conducted on their side that led you to make an
3 assessment as to his role?
4 A. Mr. Sainovic did not say very much. There was one --
5 Q. I'm asking about Mr. Milutinovic --
6 A. I'm backing to that.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. Mr. -- When he spoke to Milutinovic, it was never in English,
9 although Mr. Milosevic spoke good English. So I never understood what was
10 being said there; but after Mr. Milosevic would speak to Mr. Milutinovic
11 they would have whatever discussion, which I didn't understand, and then
12 Mr. Milutinovic would turn to Mr. Sainovic and say something. But I have
13 no knowledge of what was being said there.
14 Q. What was the basis for your assessment that Mr. Sainovic was
15 responsible for implementing decisions?
16 A. The basis of the decision was just the way Mr. Milosevic would
17 lean over and speak. On occasion he would say that -- he would ask
18 Mr. Sainovic to look into a situation for him. He would suggest to remove
19 a roadblock, things of that nature. The OSCE often complained about
20 roadblocks that prohibited them from getting into different villages and
21 different areas to perform their mission; and when we brought that either
22 to Mr. Milosevic or to Mr. Sainovic, clearly guidance was given from
23 Mr. Milosevic for Mr. Sainovic to execute. Sometimes those roadblocks
24 were removed quite promptly, other times they were not.
25 Q. Let's move on from that meeting in particular and speak about the
1 meetings generally. Did you bring to the attention of the Serb side any
2 complaints that you had from your observations in respect to the use of
3 armed forces and the conduct of armed forces that -- the police and the
4 army in Kosovo?
5 A. Yes, sir, we did.
6 Q. To which persons, if you can remember?
7 A. We brought that information to Mr. Sainovic in our weekly meetings
8 and Mr. Milosevic in -- I don't recall exactly what meeting. I believe it
9 was probably the third meeting with Mr. Milosevic; it would have been in
11 Q. And when you brought those observation and complaints to
12 Mr. Sainovic's attention at the weekly meeting, do you know where
13 Mr. Lukic was?
14 A. Mr. Lukic was in those meetings.
15 Q. What was the reaction of the -- of the Serb government officials,
16 in particular Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Lukic?
17 A. When we would bring forward the issue of excessive force as a
18 result of KLA activities, it was -- their reaction was very defensive in
19 nature, always pleading that they had to protect the Serbian people
20 because the OSCE mission was not protecting the Serbian people. Our
21 concern was -- was that the KLA was using small-calibre weapons in some
22 cases, and there were MUP police officers that were killed by sniper
24 And the result of that would result in heavy Serbian or MUP combat
25 action that was, in our view, of an excessive nature based on the result
1 of the way that the KLA was going about their activities with -- with
2 force. It was met -- the small-arms fire by the KLA was met with
3 artillery rounds by the Serbian forces.
4 Q. Can you elaborate a little bit more on what you mean when you say
5 that their reaction was defensive, very defensive in nature.
6 A. Defensive in nature that the Serbian authorities, Mr. Sainovic,
7 Mr. Loncar, would claim that what they were doing was perfectly
8 authorised. It was -- it made sense; it was a way that they had to
9 respond to the terrorists that they were trying to defeat. They tried to
10 justify their level of force as a retaliatory measure on the KLA activity,
11 if that helps.
12 Q. Very well. The level of force which you just referred to, did you
13 make actual observations of those forces in the field?
14 A. Did I personally?
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. I think on the few occasions, yes, I did.
17 Q. Were these -- these units were from what parts of the armed
18 forces, do you know?
19 A. Well, they were a mix. They were both MUP and the VJ. Podujevo
20 was a good example of that kind of situation where small-arms fire from
21 the KLA was met with heavy fire, tank fire, and that sort of thing,
22 artillery rounds from the VJ.
23 Q. You say that they were mixed. When you observed the forces in
24 operation, did you make an observation as to the level of -- well, I don't
25 want to ask a leading question. Let me ask you this: What do you mean
1 when you say that they were mixed?
2 A. Wherever the VJ was, the MUP were; wherever the MUP were, the VJ
3 was nearby. I observed VJ and MUP talking together. I observed VJ
4 repositioning MUP observation points and locations, Podujevo, one case in
5 Malisevo. So that -- that's my observation.
6 Q. Well, let's speak about Podujevo. When did you go to Podujevo?
7 A. Approximately December 25th, 1998, on Christmas Day.
8 Q. Why did you go there?
9 A. The VJ had been up there for some time, for several days,
10 conducting training activities, as we were told. They were very near
11 Albanian-populated areas. It clearly was a KLA stronghold that they were
12 looking at. The training, in my view, was kind of a way to deploy a large
13 number of VJ troops and MUP to position up there. My observation was it
14 was an attempt to draw fire and allow VJ and MUP action against the KLA in
15 a particular stronghold that they had been located in.
16 Q. Did you observe if and how the VJ and the MUP operated together?
17 A. I did.
18 Q. What did you observe?
19 A. I remember one of the observation points where we had a VJ Serbian
20 tank. Those men were dressed in green camouflage-type uniforms. The MUP
21 was dressed in their typical blue uniform. The -- I'm not sure if he was
22 a company commander, but the individual who was obviously in charge of
23 that location for the VJ and the individual in charge for the MUP would
24 converse and talk. That individual would go back and reposition some of
25 his men as a result of that conversation. Our interpreters and myself
1 were never allowed to be close to those conversations, but we would see
2 the actions as a result of those conversations.
3 And the MUP was located along the road leading up into Podujevo
4 directing some of it traffic, some of it VJ vehicles. So there was kind
5 of a -- certainly a command and control component to the MUP activity, and
6 it appeared to me that the senior commander on site there the
7 responsibilities belonged to the VJ.
8 Q. While you were at Podujevo, did you observe the MUP and the VJ or
9 the VJ in contact with the civilian population there?
10 A. You mean the civilian population, both Serbian and --
11 Q. The Albanian, Kosovar Albanian civilian population there?
12 A. I did not observe Serbian authorities in contact with Albanian
14 Q. Okay. Did you take photographs of the armed personnel that you
15 saw there?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 MR. STAMP: Could we have a look at Exhibit 2586. This is a
18 series of photographs.
19 Q. This one, this is the first photograph, and it's K0577160. What
20 is depicted there? First, did you take this photograph?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. What is depicted there?
23 A. It's a picture of a Podujevo, December time-frame, VJ and MUP.
24 Obviously, this was a period of contact with the KLA, and I would tell you
25 sometimes it was difficult to tell. There were blue uniforms and green
1 uniforms. We felt that sometimes what we thought were MUP, the next day
2 appeared as VJ in a different uniform, both in Pristina proper and at some
3 locations of deployed sites. They appeared to be mixed.
4 Q. Do you remember what these persons in particular were doing at the
6 A. We were receiving -- they were receiving small-arms fire from an
7 apparent KLA stronghold, and they had just basically taken cover. And I
8 remember, this was several years ago now, but if I remember they were
9 trying to reposition forces to try to protect their own location.
10 MR. STAMP: Could we move on to the next photograph. Well, could
11 we stop there.
12 Q. Whose writing is this?
13 A. This is my writing.
14 Q. This is for the record --
15 MR. STAMP: Could we go back to the writing. This is page
17 Q. This writing was ostensibly scanned in to have been -- to indicate
18 that it was at the back of the photograph.
19 Does this writing represent what it depicted in the photograph
20 which you just saw?
21 A. No. The writing that belongs to the photograph that I wrote about
22 was attributed to a woman whose husband had just been killed in front of
23 his home, and she was leaving her home with two weapons on each shoulder,
24 quite upset. And it's apparently been transcribed on the back of the
25 wrong picture, but I know the photo because I remember very well the event
1 that happened. It struck me as a very emotional event.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Does this look like a mistake in scanning this
3 material into the system?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir, this is my mistake.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's written on the wrong photograph by you?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And can I take it that what you've written relates
8 to the death of a Serb?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 MR. STAMP: Could we move on to the next page; that's the next
13 Q. Did you take this photograph?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. What does it depict?
16 A. This depicts Serbian security forces down between these trees
17 here, and they were taking small-arms fire from KLA stronghold. And the
18 Serb forces were -- or entering this area to establish an observation
19 point and firing points.
20 Q. Can you identify the Serb forces or the Serb force assets that you
21 see in the photograph?
22 A. I believe the individuals on the ground were Serb. There was some
23 MUP that were up there. As I say, it was several years ago, but there
24 were Serb forces up there that were well-armed and certainly returning
25 fire on the KLA side. I believe the APC carried out at the end is a MUP
2 MR. STAMP: Could we move to the next photograph, please.
3 Can we stop there.
4 Q. This is whose writing?
5 A. This is my writing.
6 Q. And that's K0577163. Does it describe what was -- what you saw in
7 the previous photograph?
8 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
9 Q. Can you read it for us just to ensure that --
10 A. It says: "27 December 1998, Kosovo, shooting three kilometres
11 west of Podujevo, Serb funeral convoy protected by militia or MUP on the
12 road from Obranca to Podujevo." And by "militia," I'm referring to the
13 MUP that were following the funeral convoy.
14 MR. STAMP: And could we move on to the next photograph in that
16 Q. Now, who took that photograph?
17 A. I took that photograph.
18 Q. And what does it depict?
19 A. It's a VJ location, VJ soldiers and equipment that they were
20 deployed with.
21 MR. STAMP: And quickly, the next one.
22 Q. Did you take this one?
23 A. I took this one as well, yes, sir.
24 Q. And what's in it?
25 A. It's -- I can't remember if that was a tank or heavy artillery
1 piece in there, but it was stuck, essentially, in the heavy mud and they
2 had taken up position, had been there for some time with Serbian forces
3 kneeling down because it was small-arms fire coming in their direction. I
4 believe this also was up in Podujevo during December 1998 time-frame.
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MR. STAMP: Could we move to the second photograph after the next,
7 that is one P -- sorry, the one at page K0577167. Well, we are at 68.
8 This is K0577167.
9 Q. Did you take this photograph?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. And what is depicted here?
12 A. This was a -- a search of a -- it was a home of some type. I
13 believe this was the Serbian police that were conducting this particular
14 search, the MUP.
15 Q. Where was this?
16 A. It was near Podujevo, but not in Podujevo proper. Probably a
17 couple kilometres. I refer to all these pictures as Podujevo because
18 that's generally where we were that day and there was a lot of
19 house-to-house searching going on because of the KLA activity located in
20 the -- off of a hill up in Podujevo, kind of down in a valley area.
21 Q. Very well. Thanks. We have spoken about the coordination of the
22 VJ and the MUP in respect to Podujevo, but can you tell us generally
23 speaking from your field-work did you make any observation in respect to
24 the timing, the timing of the deployments of the VJ forces in respect to
25 the deployments of the MUP forces?
1 A. My observations stem from a couple of locations. As I walked to
2 work, I had to walk by the VJ headquarters that was in Pristina; and in
3 the morning I could see them -- vehicles parked outside the headquarters,
4 heavy vehicles, APCs, small vehicles that were loading up troops and where
5 the Pristina OSCE headquarters was located there was a MUP headquarters
6 there and I could see and hear at the same time the MUP loading up into
7 trucks and APC carriers and whatnot. Typically what I saw was the VJ
8 would go out first, and then -- about 30 to 45 minutes ahead of the MUP
9 and then the MUP would go out behind them in the same direction. And on
10 occasion the OSCE verifiers tried to follow and sometimes we could follow
11 and other times we couldn't, the roadblocks were such that we could not
12 continue. Generally when we saw both components go there was some sort of
13 trouble in one of the villages, there had been some shelling and some
14 firing and some sort of exchange of fire would take place and of course
15 part of our role was to make sure that the cease-fire stayed in effect.
16 So we were, as verifiers, concerned about that and immediately tried to
17 find out what the mission was, what their purpose of deploying out was,
18 and we couldn't always get that answer in a timely fashion.
19 Q. Did you go to -- well, I'll put it this way. On the 16th of
20 January at about 7.00 in the morning did you go anywhere for observations,
21 16th of January, 1999?
22 A. Yes, sir. At about 7.00 Ambassador Walker and I arrived at Racak,
23 in the village of Racak.
24 Q. Now, in respect what we were just speaking about, the deployment
25 of armed forces, what did you observe there?
1 A. When we arrived at Racak, we were called out by our centre
2 commanders that were located in Stimlje, that there had been a fairly
3 heavy exchange of gun-fire up on the village at Racak. And about 7.00
4 Ambassador Walker and I arrived, and there was several -- a lot of MUP on
5 the road leading into Stimlje, throughout Stimlje, not much in Racak
6 proper. And as we got into Racak we would see, behind us up on the
7 hill-side, VJ, and they had been up there for themselves a few days
8 conducting training. And we walked into the village of Racak, the first
9 thing that we saw was a decapitated Albanian man in his late 60s, early
11 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: We're into territory we don't need to enter, Mr.
13 Stamp. Thank you.
14 MR. STAMP:
15 Q. The last question I have about your observations at Racak. You
16 said you saw - and I'm just speaking about what you said in respect to the
17 forces acting together - you said you "could see VJ up on the hill behind
18 us." What do you mean by VJ? What could you see? Could you just tell us
19 what could you see when you say VJ, and what were they doing.
20 A. We could see tanks located up on the hill and artillery pieces up
21 on the hill.
22 Q. Did you see them do anything?
23 A. They didn't fire on the village while we were there, so I didn't
24 actually see them fire, no, sir.
25 Q. Very well. Now, you discussed with us earlier on several meetings
1 that you attended at which Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Loncar was present. Based
2 on what you observed in respect to the relationship between the two of
3 them, did any one of them or both of them have any authority over the
4 activities of the VJ in Kosovo at the time?
5 A. I would tell you that Mr. Sainovic, whenever he was presented by
6 the OSCE with the concern about Serbian security forces' behaviour, he
7 would turn to Mr. Loncar or turn to Mr. Lukic and ask a question, What
8 about that behaviour?
9 So it implied to me he had some authority over those activities by
10 the sorts of questions and concerns that he had, which each of those
11 representatives from both the MUP, Mr. Loncar with the VJ.
12 MR. STAMP: That, Your Honours, is the examination-in-chief of
13 this witness.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
17 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, can I request that we take the break
18 a little this morning -- can I request that we take an earlier break, that
19 we take the break now.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Why?
21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Just to review the notes and some of the things
22 that have arisen during this direct.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you any idea, at the worst, how long the
24 cross-examination will be?
25 MR. O'SULLIVAN: In total?
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. The trouble with breaking now is it knocks
2 out the schedule so far as interpreters' breaks are concerned. As you
3 know, we're tied in to these breaks. But if we're not going to need the
4 last half-hour or so of the day, then it won't be a problem.
5 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, for my part, I think I have 30 to 40
6 minutes. Maybe if everybody else could give an estimate we'd know.
7 MR. FILA: One hour.
8 MR. SEPENUK: I'll probably have a half an hour, Your Honour, but
9 that again depends on Mr. -- I think we're going by order of the
10 indictment for the cross. So it could be less, it could be more depending
11 on the questions from the first two Defence counsel.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well -- sorry, Mr. Lukic -- Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: I'm looking at probably at least an hour.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Just give me a moment to think about this.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Mr. Phillips, I have a question.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
18 JUDGE CHOWHAN: In the meanwhile we save time. About the
19 authority of Mr. Sainovic, you observed that whenever there was a question
20 he looked at General Loncar and Mr. Lukic. He only looked or he expected
21 a reply or he gave them instructions upon the complaints?
22 THE WITNESS: He would look and ask the question, What do you know
23 about this, essentially, and/or give them guidance to find out why they
24 weren't -- why the OSCE verifiers were not provided access to particular
25 barracks. So he was inquisitive in getting the concerns we as the
1 verifiers answered from either his MUP security commander or from his VJ
2 liaison officer, which was Mr. Loncar.
3 JUDGE CHOWHAN: No more than that? No reprimand?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
5 JUDGE CHOWHAN: No directions? No orders to them, Do this, do
6 that this way next time?
7 THE WITNESS: Sometimes there were -- there was guidance provided
8 what he needed to get an answer for but never a reprimand.
9 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Okay. Thanks a lot.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well, Mr. O'Sullivan. We'll take the break
14 We have to have breaks at various stages, Mr. Phillips so that
15 those who are working intensively behind the scenes get a chance to
16 regroup and we have to take one of these just now. If you leave the
17 courtroom with the usher he'll show you where to wait. It's very
18 important that during these breaks you have no discussion with anyone. I
19 mention this to you in particular because there are representatives of the
20 provider of this material in court and it's important that you have no
21 discussions in particular with them during any of the breaks.
22 Could you now please leave the courtroom with the usher.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE BONOMY: And we will resume at 10.55.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you. Your Honour, we'll proceed by the
6 order of the indictment.
7 Cross-examination by Mr. O'Sullivan:
8 Q. Good morning, sir.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. Sir, we received from the Prosecutor notes of an interview
11 conducted between you and representatives of the Prosecutor's office in
12 Washington, DC, between the 14th and the 16th of March, 2001. I'd like to
13 ask you just a few questions about that. You sat down with two
14 representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor, and is it correct to say
15 that the interview was conducted on a question-and-answer basis, they
16 would ask you questions and you would provide information you had in
17 response to those questions?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And at the time in 2001, did you make your best efforts to be
20 complete and provide information to the best of your recollection?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And would it be fair to say and would you agree that your
23 recollection of events was fresher and better in 2001 than it is today?
24 A. Well, I don't think I can make a judgement on that. I thought my
25 interview with the Prosecutor in the month of March was probably better
1 than my interview with the Prosecutors in 2001.
2 Q. My question is a little different. I mean, with the passage of
3 time- and there's nothing sinister about this- I'm just suggesting to you
4 that your recollection in 2001 in which you experienced in 1998 and 1999,
5 would probably be fresher and more accurate and better than it is today,
6 eight years or nine years later. Would it be fair to put it that way?
7 A. I can't make a judgement on whether it is or it isn't. I just
8 remember what I remember.
9 Q. Okay. Today in your testimony you claim that on 24th of November,
10 1998, you attended a meeting with Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Milutinovic, Mr.
11 Sainovic, Mr. Walker, and Ambassador Miles. Do you recall saying that?
12 A. I do.
13 Q. There is absolutely no account of that meeting on that date with
14 these people in your 2001 interview. Are you aware of that?
15 A. No.
16 Q. How do you explain that?
17 A. There was a meeting in November with Mr. Milosevic in 1998, I am
18 pretty certain it was November 24th.
19 Q. And you were interviewed by the Prosecutor of this Tribunal last
20 July, July 2006; correct? That's the information we have from them.
21 A. It could have been, I was interviewed a couple of times.
22 Q. Does that sound right, last year?
23 A. Roughly yes.
24 Q. And we received a summary from that interview because we were not
25 allowed to see the actual notes, and nowhere in that summary, nowhere in
1 that summary from last year, do you mention a meeting on the 24th of
2 November, 1998, with these six people including yourself. How do you
3 explain that?
4 A. All I can tell you is that on November 24th there was a meeting,
5 and whether I answered a question to that account during those interviews
6 I can't recall, but I'm very certain of the meeting with Mr. Milosevic;
7 would never forget it.
8 Q. On that day with those people; correct?
9 A. Pretty certain.
10 Q. Is that your position?
11 A. Pretty certain.
12 Q. Well, I'm looking at the notes from March 2001 which we received
13 from the Prosecutor, and on the 24th of November you said that you were
14 having dinner in the government building of Pristina, and it was attended
15 by Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Walker, Mr. Loncar, General DZ, and you. That's
16 where you said you were on the 24th of November, 1998, in Pristina.
17 A. I certainly could have had that date wrong.
18 Q. I'm suggesting to you that you have the meeting wrong and, in
19 fact, my position is you never participated in the meeting where
20 Mr. Milutinovic was present. Do you accept that?
21 A. I can tell you that I participated in a meeting in November where
22 Mr. Milosevic was present; Mr. Sainovic was present; I'm certain
23 Mr. Milutinovic was there.
24 Q. You seem less than certain, sir, about Milutinovic being there.
25 A. Well, I'm certainly checking myself against the dates that you
1 present to me. I want to be very accurate here, but to the best of my
2 recollection that's the way it went down.
3 Q. Well, tell me where and when, if it wasn't the 24th, which I say
4 it's not, where and when did the meeting where you participated where
5 Mr. Milutinovic was present, where and when did that take place?
6 A. The meeting that I had with Mr. Milosevic that Ambassador Walker
7 had with Mr. Milosevic and I was present was November 24th.
8 Q. I'm asking you, give me the time and place -- or the date and
9 place where you say you participated with the meeting with Mr.
10 Milutinovic, because I say you never did.
11 A. I can't give you a date and a place. I know that I met with
12 Mr. Milosevic in what was his white house, his building.
13 Q. So you do not recall -- you cannot give me a recollection of a
14 meeting that you had with Mr. Milutinovic; is it fair to put it that way?
15 A. I never had a meeting with Mr. Milutinovic; I had a meeting with
16 Mr. Milosevic.
17 Q. Right. And Mr. --
18 A. And I participated in the meeting. I didn't have the meeting. It
19 wasn't my meeting.
20 Q. You participated. And I'm suggesting to you that you never
21 participated in a meeting where Mr. Milutinovic was present. Do you
22 accept that?
23 MR. STAMP: For the fourth time. THE WITNESS: No, I don't.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, Mr. Stamp?
25 MR. STAMP: It's asked and answered about three times.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think it's been answered very definitively,
2 and I think it can be pursued by Mr. O'Sullivan if he wishes to do so.
3 THE WITNESS: I can tell you it's a possibility that he was not
4 there. It's been eight years, like you said. My notes are what my notes
5 say, and I relied on my notes at that time.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: The problem, Mr. Phillips, from what we're hearing
7 is your notes don't say anything.
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm doing my best to remember what
9 happened in that time-frame.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: So it doesn't help to fall back on the notes
11 because they don't tell with this apparently, and that doesn't help us.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I have no further questions.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, I have a number of questions.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Fila:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon -- good morning, Mr. Phillips, my
19 name is Toma Fila and I represent Mr. Sainovic. I will be asking you some
20 questions about your testimony today. You mentioned General Loncar and
21 you said today that he was a retired general.
22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I would like Defence Exhibit 2D9 to be
23 shown to you. I'm sorry that we will be going through the same batch of
24 exhibits all over again.
25 Q. So while we're waiting for this document, let me tell you that
1 General Loncar was never a four-star general, as you indicated, and that
2 he was a member of the coordination body of the federal government, the
3 government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 So perhaps now you can have a look at the screen because the
5 document has now appeared on it.
6 A. I see the screen.
7 Q. You can see here that this was signed by the president of the
8 Yugoslav government, Momir Bulatovic. Does this correspond to what
9 General Loncar was actually doing, I mean, the way it is described here in
10 this document?
11 Okay. We'll return to that later when we see where Sainovic was.
12 But you said today --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: This document, Mr. Fila, is a supplement to another
14 one; is that correct? And the first 11 members of the commission
15 appeared --
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I will get to that.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't appear to me that the witness has said
18 anything that really impacts on that document at all.
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, because I have to show him the
20 previous document.
21 Could we then look at 2D8. This is the document that actually
22 precedes the one that we have on the screen now.
23 Q. Please have a good look at this document. This document is the
24 document that precedes the one we've just seen. So as you can see, this
25 is a coordination body and its name is the Commission of the Federal
1 Government for the Cooperation with the OSCE mission; and in a decision of
2 the federal government - again, this decision is signed by the federal
3 Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic - the members and the president, the
4 chairman of this commission are appointed and the chairman of the
5 commission is Mr. Nikola Sainovic.
6 If you look at this document, you will see what the commission
7 actually does. Please have a look at Article 2, Article 3; and if you
8 look at the next page, you will see the signature and the date when this
9 decision was actually made. As you can see, this is the 19th of October,
10 1998. It was signed by the Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic.
11 Mr. Phillips, does this actually -- is it consistent with what you
12 talked about regarding Nikola Sainovic's powers in Kosovo, saying that
13 General Loncar was a member of this commission and that many others were
14 on that commission, too?
15 A. I don't think I said that Mr. Loncar was a member of that
16 commission. I'm not familiar with that commission, but I will tell you
17 what I read here is consistent with what Mr. Sainovic was performing for
19 Q. Thank you. That was, in fact, the gist of my question. So if you
20 see that Loncar was a member of this commission, then you will agree with
21 me that it is quite natural that the chairman of the commission outranks a
22 member of the commission?
23 A. That makes sense to me.
24 Q. Of course. The next thing that I would like you to focus on is to
25 see that this authority is given by the federal government and not by
1 Slobodan Milosevic, who is not mentioned at all in this whole document,
2 although he was the president at the time.
3 But would you agree with me that this body, the coordination body,
4 that is established by the Yugoslav government, that the chairman of this
5 commission then is responsible to the Government of Yugoslavia? Does that
6 make sense to you?
7 And that is why he has to report to the Yugoslav government and to
8 get his tasks from the Yugoslav government and relay them to you and so
9 on. Does that make sense to you?
10 A. Yes, sir. It makes sense.
11 Q. Naturally. So you will agree with me that when you say that
12 Sainovic had to consult with somebody in Belgrade, that it did not refer
13 only to Milosevic but the federal government because he had been appointed
14 by them.
15 A. Yes, sir. I would agree with that.
16 Q. Now let me ask you, when Mr. Stamp asked you a question, you said
17 that Sainovic was Milosevic's personal envoy, you said that twice, and you
18 said the same thing about Mr. Lukic. Does this indicate to you that
19 Mr. Sainovic was not a personal envoy of anyone, but that he was there as
20 a representative of the federal government, as the chairman of the
21 Commission for the Cooperation.
22 What does it mean to you, "personal envoy"? Do you think that all
23 these people were personal envoys of Milosevic? If you do, then that's
25 A. Sir, the only thing I can speak to on that is just how it was
1 introduced to me at those initial meetings with Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Loncar,
2 Mr. Lukic. I was introduced to them. They introduced themselves to us,
3 and Ambassador Walker, as a personal representative of Mr. Milosevic. It
4 is nothing more or nothing less than that. Right or wrong, or whatever it
5 has to do with of the commission, that's just the way it was introduced to
7 Q. But you can see that this document does not really say that. Do
8 you allow that what is stated in this document, that it is actually
9 correct and that he was, in fact, a representative of the federal
11 A. I certainly do believe that Mr. Sainovic was a representative of
12 the government.
13 Q. Thank you. Let us move on. This may look to you as some kind of
14 legal wrangling. You are an officer. It is much easier for your, but we
15 have a saying that a general is worse than your mother-in-law. So that is
16 why it is clear for us to be clear. You mentioned in one part of your
17 statement Mr. Sainovic. Do you know where Mr. Sainovic was born?
18 A. I don't believe it was in Kosovo, but there was a discussion with
19 Mr. Sainovic when we first met with him that his heart is in Kosovo and
20 that he hangs his hat in Kosovo and that made the comment that he was born
21 in Kosovo, but I understand that he was born in Serbia proper. But that
22 was a discussion early on in him professing how much he loved Kosovo.
23 Q. What I want to tell you, let me explain, in the notes in your 65
24 ter summary -- in fact, the notes from your interview in Washington, it is
25 stated that you said that he was born in Kosovo and that he travelled to
1 Kosovo every weekend because he missed it. This is stated in the notes
2 that you -- that we have from one of your interviews. But I merely wanted
3 to point out to you that he was born in Borovo, he was not born in Kosovo
4 at all. He doesn't have any family there. I'm just trying to bring your
5 attention to the fact that words are very important. He was in fact born
6 in Bor.
7 A. I can agree with you on that, sir, but as you say words are very
8 important and I would tell you that I never said he came to Kosovo on the
9 weekends because he missed it. I never said that anywhere in my notes or
10 anywhere in my testimony.
11 Q. Well, it does in paragraph 1 of your notes, the notes from your
12 interview in Washington. I don't want to use them as an exhibit, but that
13 is what it says here. You can look at that. You have the heading, the
14 first meeting with Sainovic, that's the last paragraph on page 2 and first
15 paragraph on page 3. It says here that Sainovic knew Kosovo well because
16 he had been born there. Somebody wrote that down. I see now that you say
17 that you did not say that but this is what it says in the notes --
18 A. No, you're misinterpreting me. I never said he missed Kosovo
19 which is why he came back on the weekend. I'm referring to you -- I'm
20 referring to you that he came to Kosovo Friday, Saturday, and Sunday to
21 work with the OSCE mission, and I'm telling you that these are not my
22 assessments or my assumptions where he was born; this is what I was told
23 in these meetings.
24 Q. I agree with what you say today. I agree that this is, indeed,
25 correct, but the notes contain something else. So what you're saying now,
1 that's correct. So we don't have a problem here at all.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, we do have a problem because the
3 particular phrase you used is the one that the witness will not accept
4 that he said and I certainly can't find it in the notes either.
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] These are the notes made by people who
6 interviewed him in Washington --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but it doesn't say --
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] -- On the 14th and 16th --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't say in the one I've got, at least I
10 haven't found it, that he travelled to Kosovo every weekend because he
11 missed it. And it's these words alone that the witness is taking
12 exception to.
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Well, okay, but this is immaterial. It
15 says here that he was born in Kosovo Polje and so on and he was not. I
16 simply wanted to stress how important words are --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes --
18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] -- That's why I'll move on.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: You resolved the problems you were concerned about
20 and what you left trailing was a comment attributed to the witness which
21 he did not make and that has also now been clarified so we can move on.
22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
23 Q. On the 9th of December, 1998, you had a meeting with Mr. Sainovic.
24 If you recall, can you tell me whether the following is correct, that
25 Sainovic suggested on that occasion that the Kosovo Verification Mission
1 should use the entire Serbian health care system. It's on page 4 of your
2 notes. The heading is: "Meeting with Sainovic on the 9th of December."
3 A. I'd like to refer to my notes on that, but was that in my 2001
4 or my 2006 deposition or interview?
5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's the 2001 document I think, page 4.
6 THE WITNESS: May I look at my notes here, sir?
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 JUDGE BONOMY: My "notes," what are you referring to?
9 THE WITNESS: The interview in 2001.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: This is -- who made --
11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] We'll show it --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment.
13 Who made this record of the interview?
14 THE WITNESS: This was a record that was done at the US State
15 Department in 2001. It would have been -- the OTP at the time would have
16 been Mr. Milbert Shin.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you happy, Mr. Fila, that the witness refers to
18 that document?
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No, no, I have no objection at all.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
21 You may refer to it if -- or do you not have a copy in front of
23 THE WITNESS: I've got a copy, sir, it may take me a few minutes
24 to find it here.
25 MR. STAMP: May I just --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.
2 MR. STAMP: -- This -- may I just consult with my colleague?
3 [Prosecution counsel confer].
4 THE WITNESS: You say it was page 4, sir?
5 MR. STAMP: May I just -- if we are going to refer the witness to
6 that part of the interview notes but, could it be done in closed session?
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And the reason for that?
8 MR. STAMP: These -- the interview notes themselves were not made
9 available for disclosure to the public at large. They were -- the
10 disclosure of these notes was restricted to use by the Defence if --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: But it's not even -- hold on. It's not the Defence
12 that are using them, it's the witness that wants to refer to them.
13 MR. STAMP: I know, Your Honour --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: There's no need for this to be on a screen where
15 it's going to be publicised.
16 MR. STAMP: I ask if we are going to refer to it in the sense
17 where we are reading from it then it be done in closed session. But my
18 friend is indicating that we won't be reading from them.
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: All that's happened here, as I understand it, is
21 that the witness has sought leave to refer to the document so he gives an
22 accurate answer. I don't think Mr. Fila proposes reading from it. So
23 let's see how we get on.
24 THE WITNESS: All right, sir, I found the statement that you're
25 referring to and you're asking me is that an accurate statement?
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. The statement -- the statement is -- is accurate and is a result
4 of us asking for Swiss medevac helicopters, and the reply was that our
5 medical health care system here in Kosovo is good and you should be able
6 to use that with great trust.
7 Q. All right. Keep your notes in front of you. Would you agree with
8 me that on that occasion Sainovic offered Mr. Walker escorts or
9 body-guards from the Serbian MUP, if you recall?
10 A. Yes, sir, I do recall that and he did.
11 Q. Very well. Is it correct that Mr. Sainovic offered Serb
12 helicopters for the purpose of medical assistance to members of the
13 verification mission?
14 A. Yes, sir, he did.
15 Q. All right. Today you said that you discussed this issue with
16 Milosevic and that he issued the definite decision, that it was actually
17 he who made the decisions on the consulates, helicopters, and so on. Is
18 that correct?
19 A. I think he was facilitating those decisions on behalf, which, as
20 the commission states, was part of his mandate for logistics and support
21 for OSCE, yes, sir.
22 Q. You won't need your notes any longer. I don't need them to be
23 read out, and I don't want to use them as an exhibit. Simply -- it was
24 simply to jog your memory.
25 Did you meet Mr. Ciaglinski, a lieutenant-colonel who testified
2 A. I know him, yes, sir.
3 Q. On page 6890, lines 17 to 24, Mr. Ciaglinski said that the Kosovo
4 Verification Mission, and I quote: "Could not use a helicopter similar to
5 those used by the Army of Yugoslavia to attack the KLA, which was a
6 well-known model. It's true that we were offered it, but we were unable
7 to accept it for reasons of our security and safety, as well as the
8 security and safety of our verifiers. It's very difficult to tell when
9 it's a foggy day whether the helicopter had a white cross on it or whether
10 it's being used to attack."
11 So would you accept this assessment made by Lieutenant-Colonel
13 A. Yes, sir, I would.
14 Q. Thank you. Another witness, General Maisonneuve, testified here
15 on -- on page 11085, lines 21 to 24, and page 10086 [as interpreted],
16 lines 3 to 4; that's the testimony of the 3rd of March, 2007, where said
17 that he had two men in his security who were Albanians and who told him
18 they were about to join the KLA.
19 I don't know how many Albanians were in your security there, but
20 would you accept it was logical for Yugoslavia to agree that such persons
21 should not be issued with weapons, I mean, persons who were Albanians and
22 who wanted to join the KLA?
23 A. It's logical to me that I would not want to issue weapons to
24 members who wanted to join the KLA, yes, sir.
25 Q. Very well. At one point you said that the request of the Kosovo
1 Verification Mission for visa facilitation had not been accommodated, and
2 there are various things here that you told Mr. Sainovic. But don't you
3 think it's logical, in view of the structure that you stated, that as the
4 president of the coordinating body for cooperation with you, he could only
5 transmit those requests to Belgrade.
6 This has to do with consulates, visas, cars, and the other
7 problems you had. In other words, would you agree with me that Sainovic
8 could not solve these problems personally when you complained to him about
9 them, and that that's why the replies arrived only a few days afterwards?
10 I don't know if I eve been clear enough.
11 A. I don't know if he could have solved them personally, but he was
12 certainly the individual who told us that we would have those made
13 available to us, have the consulate made available to us to expedite the
14 visas for the verifiers arriving into Kosovo.
15 Q. Yes. And then Mr. Walker's letter was sent to Mr. Milosevic with
16 the same request. Is that correct?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. And you expected Milosevic to be able to deal with this issue
19 rather than Sainovic; otherwise, you wouldn't have written the letter. Is
20 that correct?
21 A. We wrote the letter because we weren't getting any action and our
22 verification team was slow to arrive, and we were looking for a more
23 expeditious manner of cooperation to get that consulate established.
24 Q. Yes, I understand that. But why did you apply to Milosevic?
25 A. Because we were not getting any action from Mr. Sainovic or in
1 Kosovo from any other source. We highlighted this to Mr. Milosevic as an
2 area of support we required, and -- because nothing was happening to our
3 request to the personal representative, in this case was Mr. Sainovic.
4 Q. And you expected Milosevic to solve this; is that correct? He was
5 the only one who could solve it?
6 A. We did expect him to be able to solve it, yes, and he told us that
7 it was already established. So we assumed he had solved it, but in fact
8 it was never established.
9 Q. It wasn't.
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. When answering questions from His Honour and from Mr. Stamp, you
12 said that when you spoke at those weekly meetings if the problem had to do
13 with the army, Sainovic would look at Loncar; if it was about the MUP, he
14 would look at someone else.
15 Let's first clarify one point. Apart from these weekly meetings,
16 did your representatives have daily meetings with Colonel Kotur, for
17 example, and other officers, the MUP and the army, lower level?
18 A. I was not present at those meetings. I understood they took place
19 with our liaison officers because they did report back to Mr. Walker
20 regularly, so I can assume that they did have those daily meetings at
21 those levels, yes, sir.
22 Q. Thank you. According to what you saw now regarding Mr. Sainovic's
23 powers as the head of the commission, if he were to ask Loncar as the
24 representative of the army or someone else who was in charge of the MUP,
25 he had to cooperate with them to solve the problems that you were facing.
1 When you said you had a military problem, he would look at the
2 person in charge of military matters because he was evidently not kept
3 up-to-date on that. Is that correct?
4 A. Could you repeat that question, sir.
5 Q. I'm trying to follow on from what His Honour Judge Chowhan asked
6 you. Wouldn't it be logical that if there was the president of a
7 commission who was supposed to help you and you presented a problem at the
8 weekly meeting that had to do either with the army or with the MUP, for
9 him to ask the army what the problem was about or for him to ask the
10 police what the problem was about because that was what he was supposed to
11 be doing. Is that correct?
12 A. It would make sense that he would ask the army or the police what
13 was happening, yes, sir.
14 Q. Yes, that's what I was trying to get at, because the information,
15 of course, was crucial for cooperation with you. How could he cooperate
16 with you if he had no idea what was going on. Isn't that correct?
17 A. It is my observation and opinion that Mr. Sainovic knew full well
18 what was going on in Kosovo. That's the only way I can answer that
19 were -- certainly he knew what was going on.
20 Q. Yes. And he received the information from representatives of the
21 army, the MUP, the politicians, and so on, because that was actually his
22 job description, wasn't it, as the president of the commission, to be
23 informed about all this?
24 A. I can't speak to what his job entailed. I see the commission was
25 established. I see his position in there, but I don't know what the flow
1 of information was for him or who reported to him or how all that was put
2 together there. All I can speak to is the issues we brought before him to
3 be solved in our weekly meetings with him.
4 Q. And then he would look at one or the other of them and receive
5 information from them, that's how you described it, whether Loncar or the
6 MUP or whatever. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes, sir. For example, when we wanted to visit a barrack, we
8 couldn't get into the barracks. We would bring that problem back to that
9 meeting, and he would turn to Mr. Milosevic and ask, Why couldn't they get
10 into the barracks -- or turn to Mr. Loncar, Why couldn't they get into the
12 Q. Sainovic?
13 A. Yes, Mr. Sainovic would turn to Mr. Loncar and ask, Why couldn't
14 you get into the barracks?
15 Q. Okay. Let's move on. You mentioned Malisevo and the problems
16 concerning Malisevo. Would you agree with me that the problem of Malisevo
17 was resolved on the basis of a joint initiative of the SRJ and the Kosovo
18 Verification Mission, and it was solved by reducing the number of members
19 of the MUP and strengthening or stepping up the numbers of the members of
20 the Kosovo Verification Mission in Malisevo. This helped to defuse
21 tension and enable people to return. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. Thank you. Are you aware, because this has been mentioned by
24 others, that Sainovic advocated personally that this same model be applied
25 in other places in Kosovo because it proved to be successful?
1 Mr. Petritsch mentioned this.
2 A. I don't recall any discussion on that example. I would tell you
3 that Mr. Sainovic was helpful to try and get the Malisevo problem solved.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, remind me what you're referring to by the
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
7 Yugoslavia. It's hard for us, too, Your Honours, to remember what our
8 name is. Every time we go home, we find we are smaller and our name has
9 changed. So when I come back from this trial, I don't know what the name
10 will be.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: It's usually translated as FRY, of course, but
12 you've clarified it. Thank you.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
14 Q. Could we now deal with your personal notes very briefly. We'll
15 start with your dinner with Mr. Sainovic on the 24th of November, 1998.
16 Do you need to have the notes before you, or do you want me to put them on
17 the screen? Very well. Let's -- no. Let's look at 2D17, please.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, hold on, Mr. Fila. What is 2D17?
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Part of his notes.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Did --
21 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I will be extracting a single sentence.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on.
23 These notes are obviously downloaded into the system. Does your
24 point apply to them as it applied to the interview notes?
25 MR. STAMP: Some parts of them, Your Honour. We would have to
1 deal with them on a case-by-case basis, but this one is not one.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: So you would have to be careful, Mr. Fila, to
3 ensure that the ones that are put on the screen are not subject to any
4 Rule 70 restriction.
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] These are just two sentences, and they
6 are not subject to such restrictions.
7 Could we please take a look at 2D17.
8 Your Honours, the Prosecutor has all this. If they wish, at any
9 point, to go into closed session, then that's no problem. Could this be
10 shown, please. Next page.
11 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In this exhibit there is a question. Mr. Walker asks Sainovic why
14 there are fewer Albanians who want to live in Yugoslavia, and Mr. Sainovic
15 says most of the people in Kosovo believe they can arrive at a political
16 solution. This is what I wanted to show you. Have you found it?
17 A. Yes, sir, I see it on the screen.
18 Q. What I want to ask you is the following. In this passage, does it
19 go to show what I believe it can show that Mr. Sainovic was in favour of a
20 political solution, because he said that the greater part of the people in
21 Kosovo believed they can arrive at a political solution.
22 Would that show his being in favour of a political solution?
23 That's what I wanted to ask you.
24 A. Sir, in all due respect, I can't make a judgement on what
25 Mr. Sainovic was thinking here. I just recorded the moment of his
1 comments, you know, his words, "The greater part of the people in Kosovo
2 believe they can arrive at a political solution." What that tells me is
3 that he was hopeful that there could be some sort of a solution.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. The next thing I wanted to show you - and if Mr. Stamp feels we
7 have to move into closed session, we will - that's 2D18, a meeting with
8 Mr. Sainovic on the 9th of December, 1998. In e-court it's page 12 -- 1
9 and 2. I don't think it falls under Rule 70, I don't think.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: No, just continue with this one, Mr. Fila. Thank
12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Could you please find it, and Sainovic says here that security is
14 the primary concern and that details should be discussed. It has to do
15 with your security, and it deals with health care and making a list of
16 joint efforts to ensure the best possible health care. These are your
17 notes, and later I'll put questions to you about them. And then it says
18 that the best possible solution should be offered, and that an entire
19 system was on offer from helicopters to the entire hospital system.
20 He says, "We're ready to offer this tomorrow in Pristina, Prizren,
21 Pec under all weather conditions. We can offer you better than one
22 helicopter in unfamiliar terrain. Our doctors can come and visit any
23 hospital and exchange information on health care, so let's organise the
24 best possible plan."
25 And then he goes on to say: "I appreciate your honest discussion.
1 Let's ensure the best possible health care system. There is a potential
2 risk in flying in all weather conditions. We can give you a medical plane
3 that can fly you to Germany, England, or other places; if not, let's
4 discuss this."
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Please turn the page.
6 Q. Have you found it, sir?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And now I have a brief question for you. Would you have noted,
9 could this be construed as the wish by the Yugoslav side or Mr. Sainovic
10 to find a solution to providing assistance, medical assistance, to members
11 of the KV, that Sainovic is flexible because he really wants this thing to
12 be solved? Would you agree with me now that I have read back to you what
13 you have noted?
14 A. I'm not sure, sir, and forgive me, I know you read an awful lot
15 there, but I'm not sure of the question you want me to answer. If you're
16 asking me if Mr. Sainovic was making a concerted effort --
17 Q. The offer, the offer.
18 A. Yeah, the offer is absolutely correct. I remember that
19 conversation. Mr. Sainovic was offering many things from the FRY, and our
20 problem with being able to accept it was security. We felt that it would
21 jeopardise both the FRY -- or the Serbian people and would jeopardise the
22 safety of KVM as well, if we accepted it.
23 Q. Was this a sincere offer, in your view? This is what I would like
24 to know. When Sainovic offered you all this, was he sincere? Did he
25 really want the problem to be solved, in your view?
1 A. I believe he was sincere and I believe he did want it to be
3 Q. Thank you. Let's move on. In the same conversation, and now
4 we're talking about Exhibit Number 2D18, the same exhibit, Sainovic said
5 that the Ambassador Miles [as interpreted] and the head of the US-DOM were
6 prepared to establish a constant presence and I was told of people coming
7 back. This pressure cannot go on for more than two weeks because they
8 will be dissolving.
9 General DZ -- but the mayor of Malisevo said that the presence of
10 international KDOM would give him confidence to bring his people back and
11 also keep the force safe. And finally Sainovic says: "With joint efforts
12 we can make a difference in the most difficult of situations."
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page, please.
14 Turn to the next page.
15 Q. I have read this out because it arises from this that both you and
16 Sainovic, i.e., the government of Serbia or Yugoslavia, believe that the
17 solution to the problem of Malisevo could be found in the cooperation
18 between the international factors and Yugoslavia and that this could be
19 achieved by the reduction of the MUP presence and the stepping-up of the
20 international presence. And this is precisely what Sainovic suggested,
21 that was his proposal?
22 A. I don't disagree with his proposal.
23 Q. You also stated that Sainovic reacted because of the funds from
24 western Europe that were used to procure KLA with weapons, but according
25 to his knowledge those funds had been defrosted, they were frozen, but --
1 and you can find it on the same page of the same document. And then Mr.
2 Walker said this: "I will speak to the international community about
3 preventing the purchase of arms. Bank assets need to be refrozen and Mr.
4 Walker says also: "I don't want the KLA buying more better weapons. I
5 will do something about this." And he also says: "Money, arms, people
6 cannot happen without organised support. We will do everything in our
7 power to stop the flow of arms. It is not in our interest to arm the KLA,
8 despite statements in the press about President Clinton wanting to topple
9 Milosevic. I will do what I can to find out about this."
10 Do you and Mr. Walker adhere by the statement that western money
11 was used to arm the KLA and that this wasn't good? So do you still agree
12 what you noted on that day, because this is very important for our
14 A. Yes, I agree with the notes there.
15 Q. In your next note there's a meeting with Mr. Sainovic on 18
16 December, 1998. This is Exhibit 2D19, e-court page 2.
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I don't know what Mr. Stamp has to say
18 to this. Okay. So we can still remain in open session.
19 Q. You said that Mr. Byrnes said this. Did you find it? Do you have
20 it on e-court. Let's just wait for a moment until the document is brought
21 up on the screen. Do you see it now? Mr. Byrnes says, second page, he
22 says this: "On police information, all is going well. However, we need
23 information one day earlier: With respect to cooperation with police, I
24 am very pleased it has been good."
25 And the most important thing is this: "I have felt very secure
1 with the MUP and protection of the Army of Yugoslavia."
2 Do you agree with Colonel Byrnes, that he as the personal advisor,
3 i.e., the head person of the KDOM, felt secure under the protection of the
4 MUP and the Yugoslav Army and that he did not need any other protection or
5 that you, as a whole, did not need any other protection?
6 MR. STAMP: It's just the way that the question is phrased that
7 I'm objecting to. I don't think he can comment on how Colonel Byrnes
8 felt, but perhaps the question is really directed towards whether or not
9 he is recording what Colonel Byrnes said.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the question is seeking the impression of
11 the witness himself because it goes on to say that he did not need any
12 other protection or that you as a whole did not need any other protection.
13 So it's your impression of that situation that you're being
14 asked to recount.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
16 This is Mr. Shaun Byrnes, not Colonel Byrnes because he was not a
17 military man. Is this the same Byrnes that we are referring to? The only
18 Byrnes that I know is Mr. Shaun Byrnes from the state department and you
19 referred to him as a Colonel Byrnes. I don't know a Colonel Byrnes.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
21 Q. Shaun Byrnes. I didn't say "colonel," I said Shaun Byrnes.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: The spelling of that name is B-y-r-n-e-s?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
1 Q. I found this in your notes. You noted that whoever said that
2 actually said it?
3 A. Well, I'm not disputing that, I just want to make sure that I'm
4 referring to the right individual as you place him.
5 Q. It's the same individual.
6 A. In regards to his feelings on the MUP and VJ protection, I have no
7 reason to dispute that he felt safe. I certainly -- you know, I was
8 fairly accurate in my notes with him. I know he roamed Kosovo with his
9 team before OSCE was established with little problem. I'm assuming that
10 he felt safe.
11 Q. Thank you. Then in your notes we find the meeting on the 14th
12 January 1999 with Mr. Sainovic. This is 2D20 page 1.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Can we have this on e-court. I see it
15 Q. And it says in this document -- can you find the place where
16 Sainovic is speaking. He says: "Glad to be back at table; glad our
17 people were present at VJ site; communications were good, trust was
18 upgraded, nobody tried to test anybody, tensions were high, and we worked
19 well together. If we cooperate we can do more. If we do more we'll have
20 to do less and have fewer problems.
21 "We are pulling forces out of Podujevo.
22 "We need to protect the rights of civilians, they must have the
23 freedom of movement, et cetera. Malisevo is a good example where KVM
24 presence is making a big difference. A local police officer speaks both
25 languages is in place there. We must now follow the Podujevo and Malisevo
1 and Orahovac examples. Podujevo is a critical point now, and the security
2 situation must be followed very closely.
3 "We are trying to start new initiatives. I have met with Mr. Hill
4 twice and went to Vienna once. Our foreign minister went to Spain. We
5 are emphasising the importance of the political process.
6 "In Podujevo, a lot of families left Kosovo. Only a political
7 dialogue can take care of this. In both places the KLA and the VJ must
8 seek a political solution.
9 "We want to work on the main elements of agreement and,
10 Mr. Walker answers --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Time for a question, Mr. Fila. There's no need to
12 read all of this. If the witness confirms it's an accurate record, then
13 we can read it ourselves.
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree. Thank you very much.
15 Q. You will agree with me that these notes show that the atmosphere
16 of the meeting was very good. This meeting took place after the soldiers
17 were liberated, if you remember, and the Yugoslav side wanted to make
18 up -- make the most of this opportunity to step-up the political dialogue.
19 And Mr. Walker, as you can see, shares this evaluation to a large extent.
20 Did this meeting show a sincere wish on part -- on the part of
21 Sainovic to resolve the situation through a political dialogue, that
22 political means should be used to deal with the issues?
23 A. My answer has got some complexity to it based on the timing, and I
24 would like an opportunity to work through this for just a moment. This
25 was on the 14th of January. This meeting was a rather warm meeting.
1 There was some elation about getting the VJ released. A current
2 underneath that was getting the KLA soldiers released. There was some
3 particular concern by Mr. Sainovic not to want to link the release of the
4 KLA of a fear to show weakness in the government and being easy on the
5 terrorist situation there.
6 If you recall, Racak occurred on the 15th of January, the next
7 day, and our observation was that the Serbs needed to make a point, an
8 example, at Racak that while we had release of the VJ that they would not
9 be easy on the KLA and what have you. So, you know, coming nine days
10 later, I believe, was the release of nine Albanians, nine KLA Albanians.
11 But the two or actually linked, and so it was -- it was more complex than
12 what the notes are explaining here.
13 Q. But the notes show optimism that prevailed at that meeting, and
14 there was optimism that there could be a political solution. I
15 apologise. Not only that, but also that a political solution is the only
16 possible solution. Isn't it true that this could be inferred from your
17 notes, and that this was the atmosphere of the meeting?
18 A. Yes, yeah.
19 Q. And, finally, something you said when we spoke about Sainovic's
20 place of birth, which is not important. You also spoke about what Kosovo
21 is, and you also explained that in answering Mr. Stamp's questions. Based
22 on everything you told us, based on Sainovic's behaviour, I would like to
23 ask you whether you have maybe mixed something up. The Serbian position
24 is that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, and I'm sure that Sainovic
25 must have told you this because this is a fact.
1 But what exactly did he tell you about the Albanian population
2 that resides on Kosovo? Did he tell you that Kosovo did not belong only
3 to Albanians, that it could not be independent? Would that be what
4 Sainovic meant? Can you please try and recall what exactly he told you
5 when he was speaking about finding a solution, a political solution, to
6 the issue of Kosovo.
7 And please try to make sure you use the right words because that's
8 very important.
9 A. I would tell you Mr. Sainovic was sincere about arriving at some
10 sort of a co-existence strategy for both the Serbian population and the
11 Albanian population to co-exist together. I hope that's clear enough for
13 Q. Clear enough and I am very grateful, and I have no further
14 questions for you, sir.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
16 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Sepenuk:
18 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
19 A. Sir.
20 Q. I'm Norman Sepenuk, and I'm an attorney for General Ojdanic.
21 First of all, I don't think the record's clear what branch of the service
22 you were in when you were serving as Chief of Staff for Ambassador Walker.
23 Was it the air force?
24 A. Yes, sir, the US Air Force.
25 Q. Okay. And are you still a member of the US Air Force? Are you
1 currently in active duty?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And what's your current position?
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
5 MR. SEPENUK: That's not permitted?
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think we need to go into that.
7 MR. SEPENUK: I'll withdraw that. Fine, I withdraw that.
8 Q. I'm going to ask you -- as I understand it, you were Chief of
9 Staff to Ambassador Walker during the period that we're talking about, and
10 that you kept substantially verbatim notes of meetings you had with the
11 general -- with the ambassador and other people; correct?
12 A. Yes, sir. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. And the notes covered a period -- what period? Just tell
14 us the period covered by the notes.
15 A. I had approximately ten notebooks that covered approximately
16 October to July 3rd.
17 Q. October 1998 to July 3rd, 1999?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And we do have copies of your notebooks until February 18th, 1999,
20 and they cut off after that. Is there any particular reason for that,
21 that we don't have the remainder of your notebooks? There's a period
22 of -- you say the notebooks went to what period, March?
23 A. I took notes up until I left the area after we evacuated, March
24 20th. There were a couple of notebooks that went missing. I know for one
25 of certain and that was a notebook from the meetings with Mr. Milosevic.
1 That notebook disappeared. I have no idea why, where, who, but I can't
2 answer the question why they ended on February 18th.
3 Q. As far as you know, you did take notes during the period February
4 18th through March 20th?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. And --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: The date of the meeting that you say a note -- of
8 the notebook has gone missing.
9 THE WITNESS: One of my meetings with Mr. Milosevic.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know which one?
11 THE WITNESS: I can't recall exactly which one. I want to say,
12 sir, it was a December piece, but one of the notebooks I had was gone.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 Mr. Sepenuk.
15 MR. SEPENUK: There is this one-month period that we don't have
16 and perhaps the Prosecution at the break we can confer about it because
17 I'm not sure why we don't have it.
18 THE WITNESS: I don't know why either.
19 MR. SEPENUK: Unless there's an answer now, Your Honour.
20 MR. STAMP: We've given everything we have. We collected the
21 notebooks that he had available and we disclosed them under the Rules.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: If -- if --
23 THE WITNESS: I could tell you, sir, that there was a point where
24 I ran out of paper and I was writing on the backs of maps and that sort of
25 thing and certainly I would not turn those things over.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: As you know, Mr. Sepenuk, it's a matter you can
2 raise with the Rule 70 provider, and if it emerges that there is other
3 material and it's permissible to use it then we've indicated what action
4 could be taken in these circumstances.
5 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. So, Colonel, I would like to go over some of the entries you made
7 in your notebooks and I'm going to speak very slowly so that if there is
8 any problem at all with any of the entries, Mr. Stamp will have an
9 opportunity to make that known and we can take care of that situation as
10 it arises.
11 So I'd like to start with the very early part of your notebook,
12 that's an entry for November 14th, 1998, it's 3D545 --
13 MR. STAMP: The difficulty now, Your Honours, is that it's
14 impossible to determine whether or not the extract which Mr. Sepenuk wants
15 to refer to is something that is permissible to be shown outside of this
16 courtroom because he has just put in the exhibit a whole batch of
17 material. It is not restricted to a page or two pages that is relevant,
18 as was done by the previous cross-examiner --
19 MR. SEPENUK: No, as a matter of fact this is -- this is about
20 three lines on one page --
21 MR. STAMP: Well --
22 MR. SEPENUK: That's all it is, Your Honour.
23 MR. STAMP: Well, we have about 30 pages for that exhibit.
24 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, but I excerpted only one very small part of
25 that, Your Honour.
1 MR. STAMP: The problem is that that is not what is going to be in
2 e-court as an exhibit and e-court will have a whole batch of pages which
3 could involve telephone numbers, material which clearly could not be
4 published outside of this courtroom.
5 MR. SEPENUK: And, Your Honour, if --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: There is a way of dealing with it if you just hold
7 on for a second.
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE BONOMY: The exhibits that have been used so far have not be
10 shown on the feed to the public, and therefore there is no risk that
11 inadvertently something will appear on a public screen. And if counsel
12 does as he has said he will do, which is deal with each one slowly, you
13 will have an opportunity of directing our attention to anything that
14 should not be exhibited. He started by referring there to the date, and
15 that would normally be some guide, I imagine, to whether it is something
16 that ought not to be exposed.
17 MR. STAMP: Very well, Your Honour.
18 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
20 MR. SEPENUK: And it's 3D545 and to make it more specific it's
21 3D01-2880. That's the specific page number.
22 Q. And this purports to be a discussion with Ambassador Hill and tell
23 us briefly who Ambassador Hill was?
24 A. Ambassador Hill --
25 MR. STAMP: Before, can we --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Stamp.
2 MR. STAMP: -- Confer.
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MR. STAMP: We have no objections.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Carry on, Mr. Sepenuk.
6 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. And, Colonel, just briefly, who was Ambassador Hill?
8 A. At the time he was the ambassador to Macedonia, and also -- I
9 guess the best way to describe him was kind of a Special Envoy for Kosovo.
10 Q. And he was active, was he not, at the time in trying to get the
11 Serb forces and the KLA together and work out some sort of an agreement or
12 at least the Serbian government --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And the --
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And again, you are taking notes about this meeting. You are there
17 with Ambassador Hill and with Ambassador Walker; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Okay. And in this excerpt you say: "The KLA wants to dominate
20 the political landscape and use guns to do it."
21 And who said that?
22 A. Ambassador Hill said that.
23 Q. Okay. And were you aware that the KLA had threatened to kill
24 anyone who signed any agreement sponsored by Ambassador Hill. Were you
25 aware of that?
1 A. I don't recall the specifics. I remember something about it. I
2 wouldn't dispute that.
3 Q. General DZ actually submitted a statement in which he stated that.
4 A. Yeah, it sounds familiar to me. I can't be precise but --
5 Q. You don't dispute it?
6 A. No, sir.
7 Q. Okay. And again in your notebook, 3D545, page number is
8 3D01-2885, a very short excerpt again. And I'll pause here in case
9 there's any problem.
10 Where you stated, and again this is Ambassador Walker speaking,
11 and it says: "Assertive verification is the right turn for KVM -- not
13 And do you recall that discussion?
14 A. I recall that statement, yes.
15 Q. Right. And do you -- what did Ambassador Walker mean, to the best
16 of your knowledge since you worked so closely together, by the term
17 "assertive verification"? What was he getting at there?
18 A. He wanted his verifiers to be aggressive in the sense of getting
19 into the village, talking to people, talking to the mayors, talking to the
20 leadership, to get a real ground truth of what was happening in the
22 Q. And speaking of assertive verification, do you count General
23 Drewienkiewicz, General DZ, as someone who also subscribed to that view?
24 A. Yes, sir, I would.
25 Q. And in your notes at 3D545, specific page number at the bottom
1 2901, which I refer you to, you said: "General" --
2 MR. STAMP: Can we pause?
3 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, please. Second paragraph.
4 Q. Do you see that there in the second paragraph: "General DZ was a
5 hard-nose, no-nonsense Brit." Have you picked that up, sir, second
7 A. I have, sir, but I've been asked to stand-by for a moment.
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Sepenuk, life's too short for us to
10 proceed this way. The original order made was that reference to
11 documentary material which had been disclosed confidentially would be made
12 in closed session. You know how anxious we are to avoid closed session,
13 but it may be that it's the only practical way of dealing with this
14 without extending the session to double its normal length.
15 MR. SEPENUK: Right. Thank you. Unless I'm missing a point, this
16 material seems absolutely benign to me. I don't understand what the
17 problem is, frankly, but -- and perhaps the OTP can --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: But it does, I think, fall within the category of
19 confidential material, doesn't it? It was disclosed to you under Rule 70.
20 MR. SEPENUK: It was disclosed under Rule 70, yes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: So it's covered by the order if there's insistence
22 upon it --
23 MR. STAMP: And the problem is that it's outside of the 65 ter
24 summary so we have to check every time, but Your Honour has already
25 addressed that. But we could do so.
1 [Prosecution counsel confer]
2 JUDGE BONOMY: We know that it's open to us to review the
3 transcript and make it public after the session is over, so I think to
4 expedite this we shall go into closed session as long as Mr. Sepenuk is
5 cross-examining on confidential material, and then we shall review the
6 transcript with a view to making it public thereafter. We shall resume
7 open session when we are no longer dealing with these confidential notes.
8 [Closed session]
11 Pages 11896-11958 redacted. Closed session
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.36 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day of
25 March, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.