1 Wednesday, 8 August 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Professor Markovic.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: I hope you're well today. We will now continue the
9 examination by Mr. Zecevic.
10 Mr. Zecevic.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, before we
12 start we have been able last night to find the web site of the Ministry of
13 Defence of FRY concerning the Law on Defence which is at tab 63, P984
14 here, and we had the problem about the second paragraph. Now, the
15 document is in Serbian, but out of -- from the web site it clearly shows
16 that there are three paragraphs in this law and we can distribute this to
17 the Judges, to Professor, and to our learned friends from the OTP so maybe
18 Professor can comment, if it pleases the Court.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems sensible to do this, Mr. Hannis, and
20 perhaps give it an IC number and mark it for identification.
21 MR. HANNIS: That's fine, Your Honour, I'll have an argument at
22 some point in time before you consider admitting it into evidence about
23 when that was published on the web site and when it got to be three
24 paragraphs, if it was always that way or only since yesterday --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Hopefully that investigation will be continued by
1 Mr. Zecevic and should be clarified but relevant. But when we've got the
2 Professor here, we should hear the evidence subject to its admissibility
3 being determined in due course. So in a sense -- not just in a sense, it
4 would be a wider reservation than simply marking the document for
5 identification. We will reserve the question of the admissibility of the
6 answers given to questions about this document until the matter is either
7 resolved or in the course of our final deliberations.
8 So have you copies of this for us?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I have copies.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC133, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Did you say tab 69?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: No, it's at tab -- Your Honour, tab 63, P984,
14 Article 4, second, I think --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, could I have one copy for me.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think even I can see the point just from
18 looking at the document.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, just a brief comment by Professor will do I
21 WITNESS: RATKO MARKOVIC [Resumed]
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's precisely as I assumed
25 yesterday, which means in performing the duties described in paragraph 2
1 which consist of eight items,"The president of the republic shall issue
2 orders, commands, and decisions," this is what I assumed the case was
4 It says here: "In performing all of the duties described in
5 paragraph 2," and paragraph 2 has a total of eight items.
6 MR. ZECEVIC:
7 Q. So, Professor, paragraph 2 begins with the following words: "In
8 his command of the army, the president of the republic shall ..." and then
9 follow eight items?
10 A. Yes, "... and in performing all of these eight duties, the
11 president shall issue orders, commands, and decisions."
12 Q. Which is paragraph 3?
13 A. Yes, which is paragraph 3.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, do you wish me to pursue this matter
16 any further?
17 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't. I'm satisfied with --
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- that explanation of the document. What
20 Mr. Hannis has to say about it, we'll consider in due course.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Of course. The -- just for the record, the web site
22 from which this was taken is on the upper -- upper part of the first page.
23 Thank you.
24 Yesterday Your Honours requested us to provide the constitutional
25 decision to which Professor Markovic was referring to. Now, unfortunately
1 we have been unable to find that particular decision because the
2 registry -- the Official Gazette registry concerning the decisions of the
3 Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia for 1991 has like seven pages. And out
4 of the description we couldn't really decide which document was -- which
5 constitutional decision was actually the one which Professor was referring
6 to. And of course there was no time for us to read through all of them.
7 So what I -- what we are suggesting is that we provide a copy of
8 the registry which we have over here, register -- Official Gazette
9 register for the 1991 concerning the decisions of the Constitutional Court
10 so Professor might be able during the -- one of the breaks to reflect --
11 refresh his memory and give us the particular decision that we have to
12 provide to the -- to the honourable Trial Chamber and to him as well.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: That's an excellent suggestion, Mr. Zecevic.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: If usher could -- we have prepared the copies for
17 our colleagues from the Prosecution and the registry and for Professor.
18 Thank you very much.
19 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, this is the register of decisions.
20 You will be able to take a look at it during one of the breaks, and then
21 perhaps after that you could give us your comment concerning that, or
22 rather, your suggestion as to which one of all of those decisions could be
23 the one that we referred to yesterday.
24 Professor, during Prosecution case a certain number of regulations
25 was admitted into evidence, regulations adopted in the period prior to the
1 1992 constitution, to be more precise, between 1988 and 1992. In
2 paragraph 85 of the indictment, the Prosecution claims that in early 1989
3 the government of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
4 commenced a process which was aimed at taking away or revoking the
5 autonomy of Kosovo. I suppose that this pertains to the Government of
6 Serbia, not SFRY. This must be some kind of a mistake. So to revoke the
7 autonomy that Kosovo had pursuant to the 1974 constitution.
8 So, Professor, could we look at tab 72, 1D125. This is a document
9 which is known as the blue book. The date it was published is 11th of
10 March, 1977. The Presidency of the SFRY set up a working group, a body,
11 which assessed the constitutional and legal position of Serbia in
12 relation --
13 MR. ZECEVIC: I have it -- it is probably me, the -- 5, row 8, the
14 Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, not of SFRY. It's page 5,
15 line 8.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, this is tab 72?
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Tab 72, yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: We don't have a page 5 in English.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, it's transcript page 5, 8 -- row 8,
20 where it says "Presidency of FRY -- of SFRY," and it should
21 read: "Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia." It's page 5, row
22 8 of the transcript, that is what I was referring to.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation].
25 Q. So the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia established
1 a working group which assessed the constitutional and legal position of
2 the Socialist Republic of Serbia and autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and
3 Kosovo, that were within its composition in accordance with the decisions,
4 or rather, in accordance with the solutions adopted in the 1974
6 Professor, at the very beginning on page 1 of this document, which
7 is also the first paragraph of translation, it says that the Presidency of
8 the Socialist Republic of Serbia at a session held on the 16th of January,
9 1975, put forward an initiative to assess the issues of the constitutional
10 organisation of the republic, particularly focusing on the implementation
11 of functions that are of interest to the republic as a whole.
12 Professor, on the 16th of January, 1975, how much time had elapsed
13 at that time since the 1974 constitution on that date.
14 A. If I remember well, the 1974 constitution was adopted in April,
15 that means that this was less than a year after the constitution entered
16 into force.
17 Q. The reason for such an initiative of the Presidency was based on
18 what, very briefly, please?
19 A. The reason was in a contradictory position of autonomous provinces
20 which existed only within the composition of one out of six republics. So
21 those were the autonomous provinces within the constitutional system of
22 one of the units of the Federation. Autonomous provinces existed within
23 Serbia and were represented in the Federation independently, outside of
24 Serbia, as though provinces were also subjects of the Federation. In
25 addition to that, the level of autonomy of a province was almost identical
1 to the level of autonomy of a republic so that the Republic of Serbia,
2 when it came to its rights and duties within the SFRY, could exercise its
3 rights and duties only outside of the territory of autonomous provinces;
4 that is to say, the territory of Serbia proper, excluding autonomous
5 provinces. This is why an issue of equality was raised of the Republic of
6 Serbia in relation to other republics of the Yugoslav Federation.
7 Q. This material is quite voluminous, and we extracted only certain
8 relevant portions of that material here. I think this is a book numbering
9 about a hundred or so pages, correct, Professor?
10 A. Yes, this is the so-called blue book which was not available to
11 the public for quite a long time, because you can see on page 1 it says
12 "strictly confidential," and in that book, if one looks from this point of
13 view, a critical view of the constitution, both of Serbia and the
14 Federation, it takes a critical view of this issue, to follow-up on your
15 previous question.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you should elicit from the witness an
17 explanation of exactly what the blue book is, then it might put it in --
18 or put what's being said in context for us.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: By all means, Your Honour.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you heard Judge Bonomy's question,
21 didn't you. Can you please explain what in actual fact the blue book was.
22 A. It is a criticism of the constitutional position, a critical
23 analysis of the constitutional position of the Republic of Serbia within
24 the constitutional system after 1974. This critical analysis was
25 conducted by a working group comprising two university professors of
1 political sciences at the time, Professor Najdan Pasic and
2 Professor Radislav Ratkovic. There were a number of state officials
3 involved as well. Specifically, I remember Mr. Veljko Markovic and
4 Mr. Milivoj Draskovic, the then-republican secretary for legislation.
5 Within the framework of this critical analysis, a comprehensive
6 view was provided over dozens of pages in a very documented way of
7 Serbia's constitutional position. Certain conclusions were drawn based on
8 this. One of those, as far as I remember - I'm not sure if it is, in
9 fact, included in your presentation - is that Serbia's constitutional
10 position within a federation, that due to its very nature is an expression
11 of the rights of the Yugoslav peoples to self-determination, jeopardizes
12 the right of the Serbian people to the their own self-determination.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Professor, that's sufficient for present
14 purposes. Let's concentrate now on the questions that Mr. Zecevic has for
15 you. Thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, we have highlighted some of the
18 conclusions here. I'm now looking at page 3 of the document that we have
19 prepared. Specifically I'm talking about paragraph 3 of the relevant
20 translation. In the blue book itself the page number is 89, the page
21 numbers are in the upper right corner of the page. Specifically I'm
22 talking about paragraph 2. It begins: "These unresolved
23 contradictions ..."
24 Could you please comment on the three or four contradictions being
25 specifically referenced on this page and the next page, page 90.
1 A. Specifically it reads here that the constitutional position of the
2 Republic of Serbia resulted in the creation of three different and in
3 congress legal systems within the Republic of Serbia growing further and
4 further apart, drifting further and further apart. There was one legal
5 system in one of the provinces and another in the other province and yet a
6 third system in the Republic of Serbia itself, which was not itself as
7 structured as an autonomous province. But this entire territory is within
8 the Republic of Serbia, where we see three parallel legal systems being
10 The next thing is tendencies towards territorial isolation --
11 self-isolation exclusivity, not positioned to free self-managed
12 integration. The provinces enjoyed all the attributes of statehood.
13 Their constitutional executive and judicial authorities. Therefore, they
14 were self-sufficient entities. As a result, within the Republic of Serbia
15 itself, you had two states within a state in manner of speaking. Serbia
16 itself had the status of a state, yet within its own body it had other
17 states that were the autonomous provinces, which resulted in a splintering
18 of Serbia's economy and jeopardised Serbia's internal domestic market.
19 The fact that the provinces had a state-like character led to
20 substantial differences in their respective education systems, exclusivity
21 in media operations, cultural, sporting, and other activities, those were
22 exclusively within the territorial limits of the provinces. The very fact
23 that the autonomous provinces were represented within the Federation as
24 independent units, that is, independent from the Republic of Serbia, and
25 not within Serbia's own representation, cast a shadow on the
1 possibility -- on the ability of Serbia as a republic to express its own
2 positions and interests in the same way that the remaining five republics
3 were able to, the remaining five republics that were members of the
4 Yugoslav Federation. These are the conclusions of this analysis. There
5 is one missing, one which we find at the very end of the blue book.
6 This was a multi-national federation which was an expression of
7 the self-determination of all of Yugoslavia's people, but it was the
8 self-determination of the Serbian people that was at stake here, the
9 Serbian people as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia as a
11 Q. Professor, briefly, if you could, please, explain why they were
12 set up. What was the reason that the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina
13 and Kosovo were set up within the Republic of Serbia?
14 A. The first reason is historical background, the next reason would
15 be the ethnic context, and the third reason would be the peculiarity of
16 these areas in terms of their economies, their peculiarity in relation to
17 the Republic of Serbia as a whole. When the autonomous provinces were set
18 up, and they were first established in 1945, they were created for these
19 very reasons. From day one they were part of the Republic of Serbia, and
20 out of all the republics of the former Yugoslav Federation, the Republic
21 of Serbia was the only republic to have within its body, as it were, two
22 autonomous provinces.
23 Q. Professor, you talked about the ethnic make-up. How important a
24 factor was that? To what extent did that affect the creation of the
25 autonomous provinces? I'm talking about the ethnic make-up of the
1 autonomous provinces, of course.
2 A. In both these autonomous provinces, there were ethnic minorities,
3 and these were represented to a large degree the Albanian minority in the
4 case of Kosovo and Metohija and the Hungarian minority in the autonomous
5 province of Vojvodina, in addition to which there were other minorities.
6 However, some people back where we come from have an erroneous view of
7 what the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija and is supposed to mean.
8 It is not the Albanians in Kosovo's territory enjoying this
9 autonomy, but rather the entire population of Kosovo and Metohija, which
10 is a mixed bag in terms of its ethnic make-up, if I may put it that way.
11 There is -- there are a number of different ethnic minorities in Kosovo,
12 in addition to which the area is very peculiar in terms of its history.
13 Therefore, the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija is not something that only
14 involves the Albanian ethnic minority, nor is this supposed to be a
15 solution to their position within Kosovo and Metohija. It is the entirety
16 of these peculiarities that I have now addressed that constitutes the
17 reason for Kosovo and Metohija to enjoy autonomy within the Republic of
18 Serbia itself.
19 Q. Everything you are now saying about Kosovo, needless to say,
20 mutatis mutandis applies to Vojvodina, does it not, regardless of the
21 ethnic make-up of Vojvodina's population, where the Serbian people
22 constitute a majority, right?
23 A. Yes, that's right. But even there we see a number of ethnic
24 minorities. What's more, there are more ethnic minorities in Vojvodina
25 than in Kosovo and Metohija.
1 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I just wanted to have a clarification for my
2 purposes. Now, Yugoslavia had federal units and Serbia also had these
3 autonomous provinces, which according to yourself were quite independent.
4 Now, why couldn't Yugoslavia have these also as independent
5 federal units, having the same status as the rest? Why then have it
6 within Serbia? Could there be any reason for that?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reason is that back at the time
8 when they were first established, they happened to be in the territory of
9 the Republic of Serbia. Another reason is that the Yugoslav Federation,
10 in its very nature, was an expression of the right of all of Yugoslav's
11 peoples to self-determination, the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the
12 Montenegrins, the Bosnians, the Macedonians. It wasn't possible for the
13 Serbs to exercise their right to self-determination multiply, that is in
14 Vojvodina or among the Albanians because the Albanians were not a Yugoslav
15 people. This is the reason that the Yugoslav Federation comprised only
16 the republics, or rather, only those federal units that were expressions
17 of the right of all of Yugoslavia's peoples to self-determination.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated]
19 I'm sorry.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, all of these ethnicities, in fact, had
21 their own original states, don't they?
22 A. We called them nationalities at the time because the expression
23 "minority" had a number of negative connotations. It goes without saying
24 that they all had their home countries, their home states. The Albanian
25 minority, for example, had Albania, a neighbouring state at the time, a
1 neighbor state of the SFRY, and the same thing applies to the Hungarian
2 ethnic minority. Again, there was a shared border between the
3 then-Federation of the SFRY and Hungary.
4 Q. Thank you very much, Professor.
5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Might I ask a question?
6 Professor, I'd like to know what factors would determine whether a
7 particular group within Serbia became a constituent people as opposed to a
8 minority group.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Purely ethnic factors were at work
10 and were decisive. What was required was an ethnic group that belonged to
11 the south Slavic group. These groups were joined together in a state
12 federation. At first it was called the FNRY and then later it was called
13 the SFRY, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was this
14 ethnic character that provided a bench-mark for the establishment of the
15 Yugoslav Federation. This is unequivocally addressed in a 1943 decision
16 adopted at the 2nd Session of the so-called AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist League
17 of Yugoslavia's National -- the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia's
18 National Liberation. This was some sort of a provisional parliament that
19 was established during the war of liberation against fascism. The
20 decision was then taken that once the war was over Yugoslavia would be
21 established in the form of a federation comprising on an equal footings
22 all of the Yugoslav peoples, and then these groups are listed as I have
23 listed them before. These would have republics, and these republics would
24 constitute the federal units of the federation.
25 The first constitution after the country's liberation, that is,
1 after the Second World War, the constitution of the Federal National
2 Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted in 1946. In terms of both norm and
3 constitutional right, this decision was adopted at the 2nd Session of the
4 AVNOJ, A-V-N-O-J. For as long as the Yugoslav Federation existed, this
5 decision lay at the very foundation of the Federation. This is the
6 founding idea, if you like, of the Yugoslav Federation.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Professor, to go back to the blue book. You have already
11 explained to us what conclusions the working group reached, and if I
12 understand it correctly, the only way for that situation which was
13 established in 1977 over a three-year period, or rather, three years after
14 the 1974 constitution was adopted, for that situation to be brought into
15 line with the situation in the other members of the Federation, the only
16 way to do that was to amend the Constitution of Serbia. Is that correct,
18 A. Yes, to amend the Constitution of Serbia, and certainly also to
19 amend the Constitution of the Federation. Because in the blue book it was
20 the representation of the autonomous provinces in the Federation bypassing
21 the Republic of Serbia that was criticised. They were represented
22 directly as if they were the subject of the Federation, whereas the 1974
23 constitution contained an express provision, stating that they did not
24 have that property, they were not federal units; and yet they were
25 represented in the Federation as if they were federal units.
1 Q. Professor, the amendments to the constitution of 1974, the federal
2 constitution, that of the SFRY, when were they adopted?
3 A. The amendments to the constitution were adopted in two waves. The
4 first time was when the principle of collective work, decision-making, and
5 responsibility was established, and the second time was in 1988. So the
6 SFRY constitution of 1974 was amended twice. The first time eight
7 amendments were adopted, and on the second occasion there were about a
8 dozen. I don't know the exact number, about a dozen amendments. There
9 were quite a few amendments to the 1974 SFRY constitution.
10 Q. The amendments to the constitution of the SFRY, which were adopted
11 in 1988, in relation to the situation described in the blue book was
12 amended, or rather, the situation was amended, it was changed?
13 A. I don't understand what you mean by this expression.
14 Q. Well, the federal constitution was amended in order for it to be
15 brought into line with the actual situation which was that these two
16 autonomous provinces could not independently --
17 A. The amendments to the constitution of the Federation did not
18 impinge on the constitutional position of the autonomous provinces within
19 the Federation. The position of the autonomous provinces within the
20 Republic of Serbia were changed in the amendments to the Constitution of
21 Serbia in 1989, and these amendments were adopted after the federal
22 constitution had been amended.
23 Q. The amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia in
24 1989 were needed, and if I'm correct that this was recognised already in
25 1977, based on the conclusions in the blue book. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes, the blue book is an official document. It was not available
2 to the public, but as for scholarly circles, scholars criticised these
3 solutions severely from the point in time the amendments of 1971 were
4 adopted to the 1963 SFRY constitution. And throughout the period in which
5 the 1974 constitution was in force, scholars criticised sharply the
6 position of the autonomous provinces in the constitutional system. A
7 number of periodicals issued by the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in 1971
8 were banned because they contained criticism of the 1971 amendments, and
9 these amendments laid down the main ideas on which the constitution of
10 1974 was based.
11 Q. Professor, the amendments to the constitution of Serbia of 1989
12 referred in the same way, in an identical way, to the position of both
13 autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, in the same way. Isn't that
15 A. Yes, because the position of the autonomous provinces had to be
16 dealt with in a uniform manner. They don't have different statuses. They
17 have exactly the same status, both within Serbia and within the
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, before the Constitution of the Republic
20 of Serbia was amended, what changes had to be made to the Constitution of
21 the SFRY?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The changes introduced in 1978 had
23 to do primarily with the economic system, liberalizing the property
24 regime, and they did not impinge on the status of the autonomous provinces
25 within the Federation.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm interested in was what was -- what changes
2 had to be made to the SFRY constitution before the Constitution of the
3 Republic of Serbia could alter the state -- or could be amended to alter
4 the status of the autonomous provinces?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Constitution of the Republic of
6 Serbia was changed to alter not just the status, but to redistribute the
7 powers, the competences between the autonomous province and the republic.
8 It did not go into the subject matter of the federal constitution, and the
9 Serbian constitution could do that because it fell within the domain of
10 the constitutional power of the Republic of Serbia. So even after the
11 amendments of 1989, the autonomous provinces had exactly the same status
12 within the Federation. There had only been a redistribution of powers
13 between the provinces and the Republic of Serbia, and the most attention
14 was paid and the greatest amount of criticism was levelled at the
15 amendment which --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a separate matter. Mr. Zecevic started this
17 passage of his examination by putting it to you that what had to happen
18 was that the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia had to be amended, and
19 you corrected him and said that it was the SFRY constitution and the
20 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia that had to be amended. I now
21 understand you to be saying that anything that was done to affect the
22 status of the autonomous provinces was exclusively in this instance within
23 the competence of the Republic of Serbia, which is how he put it
24 initially. Now, have I got that right?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, the Constitution of
1 Serbia cannot regulate the status of the autonomous provinces in the
2 Federation, because that is regulated by the federal constitution. The
3 Constitution of Serbia on the other hand --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: If you just stop there. Prior to 1989 were any
5 amendments made in the Constitution of the Federation that affected the
6 status of the autonomous provinces?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 Mr. Zecevic.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Professor --
12 A. However, in these tabs somewhere you have the conclusions of the
13 Federal Assembly of 1989 commenting on these amendments to the
14 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. So the federal organ, the Federal
15 Assembly, commented on the constitutional changes in Serbia.
16 Q. Professor, I'm just coming to that, so let's go step by step,
18 Professor, adopting the amendments to the Constitution of Serbia
19 was first done in both provinces and then in the Assembly of the Republic
20 of Serbia; is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Could you now please look at tab 73, 1D751. These are the
23 conclusions of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY of the 3rd of March, 1989,
24 and, Professor, I have to explain, as we don't have a translation into
25 English yet, it hasn't arrived yet, I just have to explain what this is
2 A. Let me correct you. The conclusions were made on the 1st of
3 March, and they were published in the Official Gazette on the 3rd of
5 Q. Thank you. These conclusions were reached after the Presidency of
6 the SFRY by its decision introduced special measures on the territory of
7 the autonomous province of Kosovo because of the unrest in that province
8 in the course of February 1989. First let me ask you, according to the
9 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the
10 Presidency was authorised to introduce special measures on the territory
11 of the SFRY. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes, yes. That was its constitutional power.
13 Q. These conclusions of the Assembly of the Socialist Federative
14 Republic of Yugoslavia of the 1st of March, as you indicated, refer
15 precisely to these special measures introduced by a decision of the
16 Presidency. Is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. In the preamble of this document, it says the following: "For the
19 purpose of protecting the constitutional order, public law and order,
20 personal security and the security of property, and the security and
21 safety of all citizens and socially owned property, and the fastest
22 possible normalising of the deteriorating situation in the socialist
23 autonomous province of Kosovo, the Assembly of the SFRY, pursuant to
24 Article 153, the rules of procedure," and I won't read the rest, "of the
25 1st of March, 1989, hereby adopts the following conclusion.
1 "1. The Assembly of the SFRY supports the special measures,
2 which the Presidency of the SFRY, within the scope of its constitutional
3 competencies has taken, in order to preserve and protect the territorial
4 integrity and constitutional order of the SFRY, to secure public law and
5 order, the freedom to work and live, and to normalise the overall
6 situation in the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo."
7 JUDGE BONOMY: What is your question?
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm just wondering, Your Honours, should I read all
9 three paragraphs and then pose the questions or should I maybe ask
10 Professor to comment on the paragraphs? It's just -- I'm just doing --
11 I'm reading this because of the -- we don't have a translation. That's --
12 that is the only reason.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: These don't speak for themselves, they require
14 comment, do they?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, some of them do, yes.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Well, if you can identify the parts
17 that require comment and ask him about them, that would be helpful.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Professor, since we will eventually receive the translation and
20 the Judges will be able to read the conclusions under 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, I
21 would like for you to comment the conclusion under item 10 of this
22 document. 1 and 10, I apologise. So the one I have just read out and
23 conclusion under item 10.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Professor, read conclusion 10, first of all,
25 to us and then give us your comments on both number 1 and number 10.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Maybe I should read, Your Honour, so
2 it's --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't matter, but somebody should read 10 so
4 that we know what it says, and then the Professor can comment on both of
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 [Interpretation] Conclusion under item 10: "The Assembly of the
8 SFRY points out that the amendments to the SFRY constitution that have
9 been carried out were aimed at enabling the implementation of the reforms
10 of the economic and political system and that these amendments made no
11 changes to the basic principles of the 1974 SFRY constitution.
12 The Assembly of the SFRY believes that the adopted amendments to
13 the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the amendments
14 adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, that these
15 amendments provide the necessary unity and common spirit of all socialist
16 self-management forces in Serbia which are in accordance with the
17 positions taken at the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of
18 Yugoslavia. These amendments are important not only for the Socialist
19 Republic of Serbia and socialist autonomous provinces, but also for
20 ensuring the constitutional concept of the Yugoslav Federation and
21 stability of the entire country and do not affect the status of the
22 socialist autonomous provinces established by the Constitution of the
23 SFRY. In order to ensure the necessary unity and common spirit or
24 fellowship in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the procedure of amending
25 the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia needs to be concluded
1 as soon as possible." End of item 10.
2 Q. Professor, would you please give us a brief comment of item 1 and
3 item 10 of the conclusions of the 1st of March, 1989.
4 A. In item 1, the Assembly of the SFRY supports the special measures
5 introduced by the Presidency of the SFRY, and they say that the Presidency
6 has introduced those measures within its constitutional powers. This
7 conclusion is especially important when one has in mind the nature of the
8 then-existing constitutional system. At the time Yugoslavia was a
9 socialist country. The principle of division of power was not in force
10 there; rather, the unity of power was the principle applied, whereas the
11 Assembly is defined in the constitution as the highest organ of power in
12 accordance with the principle of the unity of power which existed in the
13 then-Soviet Union and other socialist countries. So there is no division
14 of power there, but rather unity of power. So the Assembly is defined as
15 the highest organ of power and self-management.
16 The importance of this support lies in the fact that it stems from
17 the SFRY Assembly, that is to say the highest organ of power. This is
18 what I have to say in relation to item 1.
19 As for item 10, it presents the position of the SFRY Assembly.
20 Once again, in its capacity as the highest organ of power. In its
21 position in relation to the amendments to the SFRY constitution and the
22 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, it says there that the amendments
23 of the SFRY constitution, according to the conclusions taken by the
24 Assembly, enable the implementation of the reforms of the economic and
25 political system and that these reforms, even though fundamental, do not
1 affect the basic principles of the 1974 constitution.
2 And then, speaking of the amendments to the Serbian constitution,
3 and they refer to the amendments to the constitution that we mentioned
4 just a bit earlier, the 1989 amendments, they were passed by the Assembly
5 of the SFRY, and the Assemblies of two autonomous provinces
6 [as interpreted] had to express their agreement with them. If we put
7 aside the ideological element, namely, that they were in line or in
8 accordance with the positions taken at the 13th Congress of the League of
9 Communists of Yugoslavia, what is important from a legal point of view is
10 that the Assembly says that these amendments do not affect the status of
11 the socialist autonomous provinces established by the federal
13 This means that the SFRY Assembly, as the highest organ of power,
14 believes that the amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic
15 of Serbia of 1989 do not affect, do not change, in any way the position of
16 the socialist autonomous provinces established by the constitution. This
17 is why the SFRY Assembly refers, or rather, urges that the procedure for
18 amending the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia be concluded
19 as soon as possible.
20 What remained to be done is that these -- that the Assemblies of
21 two autonomous provinces expressed their approval of the amendments to the
22 Serbian constitution, because that was the procedure for amending the
23 Serbian constitution as established in its constitution of 1974.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: In the transcript, line 11 of that page, I think it
2 should be the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: I would say Serbia, but we can ask Professor to
5 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, when speaking of the amendments to the
6 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, and you said that they referred to
7 the amendments to the constitution that we mentioned just a bit earlier --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, it is as it should be because they
9 referred to the -- yeah, it should be 1988 amendments --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well you can't have it all ways, Mr. Zecevic, and
11 it does need to be clarified. The way it reads at the moment is
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one moment, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you said: And then when speaking of
15 the amendments to the Serbian constitution referring to the amendments to
16 the constitution that we have explained just a bit earlier, that is to say
17 1989 amendments, they were adopted by the Assembly of the SFRY?
18 A. No. They were adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic
19 of Serbia.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm sorry for the
23 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, when you gave your comment on item ten
24 of the conclusions, could one based on that conclude that in 1989 the
25 amendments to the Constitution of Serbia did not infringe upon the
1 autonomous rights of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Metohija?
2 A. Absolutely, that's correct. That's a very clear conclusion that
3 the Assembly of the SFRY reached. They state that these amendments do not
4 affect, do not change, the position of the socialist autonomous provinces
5 established by the SFRY constitution.
6 Q. Thank you, Professor. That means that neither Kosovo nor
7 Vojvodina were stripped of autonomy, but rather that a redistribution of
8 competencies was done between the organs of autonomous provinces and the
9 Republic of Serbia, correct?
10 A. Yes. And those fell within the jurisdiction of the Republic of
11 Serbia which had an equal status with other federal units within the
13 Q. Thank you for this explanation, Professor. Could you now look at
14 tab 5, please, P855, which is the Constitution of Serbia of 1990.
15 A. I have found it.
16 Q. Would you please comment Article 47 of the Constitution of Serbia;
17 it deals with citizenship.
18 A. Yes, Article 47 deals with citizenship of the Republic of Serbia.
19 "A citizen of the Republic of Serbia shall have citizenship of
20 the Republic of Serbia. A citizen of the Republic of Serbia may not be
21 deprived of his citizenship, exiled, or extradited."
22 This means that there is a legal relationship between an
23 individual and the state embodied in the citizenship, which grants
24 protection to citizens. Then it follows on to say that: "Citizenship
25 shall be acquired and terminated in the manner established by law," which
1 means that it is not the constitution that regulates how a citizenship can
2 be acquired and terminated. The constitution simply defines what
3 citizenship is and what is the scope of protection granted to a citizen of
5 Q. Thank you, Professor. Could we now look at tab 6, please, which
6 is P856, the translation is 1D139. This is the Constitution of the
7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 17, please.
8 Were you able to find this?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The Constitution of FRY, Article 17. We saw earlier how the
11 citizenship of the republic is regulated, but there was also the
12 citizenship of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, correct?
13 A. Yes. There is a dual citizenship that normally exists in a
14 federation, that of the federation and of the federal unit. Based on the
15 citizenship of the federal unit, each citizen is normally a citizen of a
16 federation as well.
17 Q. What about paragraph 2?
18 A. Paragraph 2 of Article 17 specifies precisely what I just said.
19 Paragraph 3 indicates the scope of protection that of Yugoslav -- that a
20 Yugoslav citizen enjoys, and we can see that that scope of protection is
21 identical to the one that a citizen of Serbia enjoys. That is to say that
22 a citizen of Yugoslavia cannot be deprived of his citizenship, deported
23 from the country. In Serbia we had the word "exiled," and then a Yugoslav
24 citizen cannot be extradited either. That's also contained in the Serbian
1 Q. Thank you, Professor. Paragraph says that: "Yugoslav citizenship
2 shall be regulated by federal law." Is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can you now please go to tab 71, 1D226, this is the Law on
5 Yugoslav citizenship, tab 71. Have you got that, Professor?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This is the Law on Yugoslav Citizenship. We saw the paragraph of
8 the constitution referring to this federal law. Article 1 says: "Yugoslav
9 citizenship may be acquired in the following ways," and then it lists the
10 conditions enshrined in this law?
11 A. Yes, that is very much the same thing that the constitution
12 suggests, how citizenship is acquired and how citizenship may cease and
13 that is regulated by the law.
14 Q. In Article 3 the possibilities are listed how citizenship may
15 cease. Can you comment on that, please?
16 A. There are three textbook situations, if you like, one is release
17 from citizenship, there is also the possibility of renunciation, and the
18 third possibility is by international treaties. The important thing is
19 that citizenship may cease or be revoked only if a person is already a
20 citizen of another country, a foreign country, or at least if there is
21 proof or certain indication that this person will acquire foreign
22 citizenship. A person cannot be left without a home country and without
23 citizenship just because his Yugoslav citizenship ceases.
24 Q. Professor, I want to know about something else. Both release and
25 renunciation imply that the person in question must make an explicit
1 request or statement in order to renounce from Yugoslav citizenship or be
2 released from it. Is that not right?
3 A. Yes, that follows from Article 19 and Article 24 of this law.
4 Citizenship cannot cease, cannot be revoked, without explicit request and
5 without a Yugoslav citizen making this explicit request, submitting this
6 explicit request, to be stripped of citizenship.
7 Q. The third manner in which this may come about -- well, I don't
8 think there is any need to comment on this now. This is by international
9 treaty, right?
10 A. Yes, ratified and confirmed.
11 Q. Professor, bearing in mind what you have now told us, the fact
12 that cessation of citizenship by renunciation or by release must be
13 explicitly, unequivocally requested by the person in question. Well,
14 there is one exception to this rule, paragraph 34 of this law -- Article
15 34. If you would please be so kind as to comment on that, sir.
16 A. It reads: "Release from or renunciation of Yugoslav citizenship
17 shall not be granted during a state of war within that is, a request -- no
18 request shall be granted during a state of war or the imminent threat of
19 war or a state of emergency."
20 So while irregular circumstances prevail within Yugoslavia -- for
21 as long as irregular circumstances prevail, Yugoslav citizenship shall
22 continue in both these cases. We're talking about release and
23 renunciation, and we have realised by now that these are the two basic
24 modes for Yugoslav citizenship to cease.
25 Q. The only third way seems to be by international treaty, right, so
1 there are a total of three ways, aren't there?
2 A. International treaties are not something that this law is supposed
3 to deal with. International treaties are international treaties.
4 Q. Professor, if I understand you correctly, as far as Article 34 is
5 concerned, even if there is an explicit request to renounce on Yugoslav
6 citizenship, a person shall not be -- no person shall be granted this
7 request during any of these three irregular situations, so to speak. Is
8 that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Very well. Professor, information concerning Yugoslav citizenship
11 is kept in citizens' registers, right?
12 A. Yes. These books are public, and they are considered to be public
14 Q. So let's imagine the following situation. A Yugoslav citizen
15 leaves Yugoslav territory, loses their ID papers, their passport, for
16 example, or their passport is seized, let's try to assume that for a
17 second, they do not lose their Yugoslav citizenship just because something
18 like that happens, right?
19 A. No, they do not lose their citizenship. The same applies to an
20 ordinary citizen, a man in the street, who simply loses his ID. He simply
21 gets a new one issued. That's all there is to it. Passports are lost
22 sometimes. Passports are lost all over the world on a daily basis. That
23 doesn't mean that people cease to be citizens of their country.
24 Citizenship can only cease on the conditions established in the relevant
25 law. There are three such situations, as we have seen: Renunciation,
1 release, and international treaty.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Let's now move on to something
3 else, please. Could you please go to tab 9. This is the Constitution of
4 the SFRY, it's the 1974 constitution.
5 A. Fine.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Just bear with me, Your Honour.
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] This is P1623.
9 Q. One of the values enshrined in the constitution or that the
10 constitution was based on was the idea of associated labour and the right
11 of workers to self-management. Wasn't that crucial, sir?
12 A. Yes, this was one of the essential, crucial, features of the 1974
13 constitution. Its very name betrayed the social system that it stood for,
14 I'm referring to the socialist. The country was called the Socialist
15 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the essential features, one of
16 the milestones, of this system, this organisation, was precisely the
17 subject of your question.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Professor, if you could please briefly
19 comment on Article 46 of the 1974 constitution. Just a minute, please.
20 Let us try to depict this against a wider backdrop. The concept of
21 property in the then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia placed
22 socially owned property first, right?
23 A. Yes, that was the prevalent form of ownership, some sort of social
24 monopoly, if you like.
25 Q. All right. So through the work of its various bodies, the state
1 protected socially owned property, right?
2 A. Yes. Socially owned property and the right of workers to
3 self-management were essential features of the economy of the
4 then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
5 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Can you please now briefly
6 comment on Article 46.
7 A. This article is part of a chapter of the constitution discussing
8 the country's economy, economic set-up, its social and economic structure,
9 if you like. What is at stake here is the preservation of these two
10 fundamental values of the country's social and economic set-up. Article
11 46 is part of this chapter, and it must be interpreted in this context,
12 against this background of specific articles and institutes. There is a
13 mechanism that is described here that is used for the protection of the
14 right of workers to self-management as well as the protection of socially
15 owned property.
16 Q. Can you now please comment on 129 and 139, Articles 129 and 139.
17 These address the protection of socially owned property and the right of
18 workers to self-management. This is, you might say, an elaboration of
19 Article 46 of the constitution, right?
20 A. Yes, that's right. The basic principle of all these institutes is
21 Article 129, paragraph 1 of Article 129 which reads: "The self-management
22 rights of the working people and social property shall enjoy special
23 social protection."
24 Article 130, if you like, operationalises this form of social
1 "Organisations of self-management were the basic form of
2 organisation in this sort of society. If in an organisation of associated
3 labour another self-managing organisation or community self-management
4 relations have become essentially disrupted or if serious harm has been
5 caused to social interests or if an organisation community does not fulfil
6 its statutorily established obligations, the assembly of the community
7 socio-political shall have the right, and this is the Municipal Assembly
8 under the rules, under condition and by procedures specified by Statute to
9 dissolve the Workers' Council, which is the organ of self-management in
10 this case, and call for new elections for the members of this body to
11 dissolve in this organisation of associated labour self-managing
12 organisation or community its executive bodies, and to recall the business
13 boards, the individual business executive and workers holding executive
14 posts nominate provisional bodies having statutorily defined rights and
15 duties" --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- "or temporarily to" --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, we can all read this when we've got
19 other time to do it. It's your expert views that we're really seeking and
20 just to clarify one thing, you're commenting on Articles 129 and 130 and
21 not as said on line 22 and page 31 twice, Articles 129 and 139. Is that
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 130.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 Now, have you a question on this, Mr. Zecevic, that you would care
1 to --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one question, Your Honour.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, based on this law there was particular
4 state organ, the ombudsmen for self-management who would initiate
5 proceedings in cases such as the ones we have just been reading about when
6 they occur in a body of associated labour, and this is what Article 131
7 talks about, right?
8 A. Yes, this is about the rights of self-managing workers and about
9 socially owned property. This entire mechanism was established in order
10 to be able to implement a principle from Article 10, which says that the
11 entire economic system of Yugoslavia as a whole must be based on free
12 associated labour and socially owned means of production and on
13 self-management by the working people. So these are the two fundamental
14 components expressing the very essence of how Yugoslavia was organised
15 along economic lines: Socially owned property and self-management. 129,
16 130, and 131, these articles establish the basic mechanism for protecting
17 these two fundamental values inherent to how the country was organised in
18 a purely economic sense.
19 Q. Just very briefly, please, we only have five minutes left, tab 74.
20 P1848, this is the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the
21 relevant articles are 143 and 144.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what's the question?
23 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, Your Honour, just to confirm that this is a
24 completely the same as the --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, well that's not clear from what you've -- I
1 assume that was the question --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, but, Your Honour, this is a -- we need to
3 establish because there is a federal level then the republican level, and
4 then the level of --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not the fact that you're going to another
6 constitution I'm concerned about; it's focusing questions on it. It
7 appeared as though you were simply inviting the Professor to read out
8 Articles 143 and 144.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, no, I was not at all.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: No.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I was just laying down the foundation.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Professor, 142, 143, and 144, Constitution of the Socialist
15 Republic of Serbia. The title also contains the protection, self-managing
16 protection of socially owned property. This is something that was taken
17 from the federal constitution. There is no need to comment, really,
18 because the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia had to be
19 consistent with the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of
20 Yugoslavia, right?
21 A. Yes, these solutions were simply taken over from the federal
22 constitution, the solutions from the federal constitution were used.
23 Q. In order for these constitutional solutions to be implemented,
24 there had to be laws envisaging ways to protect socially owned property
25 and the modi and modalities of operationalised protection of socially
1 owned property and the rights of workers to self-management. Is that
3 A. Yes, that's precisely what these laws were called.
4 Q. Can we please look at the oldest, or rather, the earliest of these
5 laws? I'm talking about tab 75, 1D130. This is the law on temporary
6 measures for the social protection of self-management rights and socially
7 owned property. It was passed by the Assembly of the socialist autonomous
8 province of Kosovo on the 27th December 1977. It was published in the
9 Official Gazette of the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo on the
10 28th of December, 1977. The relevant articles are 1, 3, 8, and 25.
11 However, Professor, all I am looking to elicit from you now is a very
12 general comment. This law operationalises the constitutional protection
13 of socially owned property and self-management rights of workers in the
14 area of the autonomous province of Kosovo in 1977. Is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you very much.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, it would be a time -- it would be
18 appropriate to have a break now.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: We've reached the time for the break again,
20 Professor, so could you please accompany the usher from the court, and he
21 will again show you where to wait; and we shall resume at 11.15.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Recess taken at 10.44 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, we have looked at tab 75, 1D130. Now
3 please turn to tab 76, that's 1D455. This is the law on amendments to the
4 law on temporary measures to the social protection of the self-management
5 rights and social ownership. The law was adopted by the Assembly of the
6 socialist autonomous province of Kosovo at its session of the 30th of
7 December, 1986, and it was promulgated in the Official Gazette, or rather,
8 it was published in the Official Gazette of the socialist autonomous
9 province of Kosovo, number 52 of the 31st of December, 1986. The articles
10 we will be referring to are 1, 4, 7, 12, 14, and 20. I do not wish to go
11 into the content of these articles. This law amends some provisions from
12 the previous law we have looked at and mostly adds to them. This law was
13 also adopted in order to make operational the protection of the
14 constitutional values of socially owned property and the self-management
15 rights of workers in the territory of Kosovo. Is that correct, Professor?
16 A. Yes, because Kosovo as an autonomous province had its independent
17 legislative power and, just like the republic, it was duty-bound to
18 further develop the institutes contained in the federal constitution.
19 This was therefore done, both in the law and the amendments, these
20 amendments we now see to the law.
21 Q. Professor, both these laws, as we see from the Official Gazettes,
22 were enacted by the Assembly of the socialist autonomous province of
23 Kosovo. Is that correct?
24 A. Yes, because that was the only organ of the province that had
25 legislative power.
1 Q. And both these pieces of legislation were enacted before the
2 amendments to the Constitution of Serbia of 1989. Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, one can see that when one looks at the time-line, the
4 chronology. This law was adopted in 1986 and the amendments were adopted
5 in 1989.
6 Q. But the previous law we were talking about?
7 A. Well, that was enacted as early as 1977, but you're asking me now
8 about the law on amendments. The law on temporary measures for social
9 protection of self-management rights and socially owned property was
10 enacted in 1977, whereas the law on the amendments to that law were
11 enacted in 1986 and in 1989 the Constitution of Serbia was amended.
12 Q. So we may conclude that these two laws, the law of 1977 and the
13 one of 1986, were enacted in accordance with the then-valid procedure
14 which was in force at the time in compliance with the Constitution of the
15 socialist autonomous province of Kosovo, with a view to implementing the
16 provisions of the federal constitution. Is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you, Professor. Could you now look at tab 78, 1D -- excuse
19 me, please. I do apologise. Tab 76, we should take them in the proper
20 order, 76 -- oh, sorry, we've seen that one. 78 then, 1D133. This is the
21 same law, or rather, it's a law on provisional measures for the social
22 protection of self-management rights and socially owned property of the
23 socialist autonomous province of Vojvodina. It was enacted on the 21st of
24 March, 1990, and published in the Official Gazette of the socialist
25 autonomous province of Vojvodina, number 9, of the 31st of March, 1990.
1 We will be referring to Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, that's it, 2, 5, 6, 7, and
3 So I assume this is an identical case. A piece of legislation is
4 being enacted in the Assembly of the province on the protection of
5 institutions and values from the constitutional text, the constitution of
6 federal state. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And finally tab 77, 1D458. This is the law on temporary measures
9 for social protection of self-management rights and social ownership of
10 the Republic of Serbia. And it was enacted by the Assembly of the
11 Socialist Republic of Serbia and published in the Official Gazette of the
12 Socialist Republic of Serbia, number 49, of the 28th of October, 1989.
13 And we will be referring to Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 11.
14 This law was enacted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of
15 Serbia now, with a view to implementing the provisions of the Constitution
16 of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974. Is that
17 correct, Professor?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Professor, in all these laws, including the constitutional basis,
20 the state by means of its organs is protecting social ownership and the
21 self-management rights of workers. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes. And we have explained the reasons, because these were the
23 foundations of the economic order of the whole country.
24 Q. The organ initiating these measures was the social attorney of
25 self-management, and this organ existed at the republican level and
1 likewise at the level of the socialist autonomous provinces?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Professor, in these laws we have seen the measures taken, the
4 measures that you spoke about from the constitutional text implied
5 dismissing the executive organs of companies, of management organs, the
6 bringing of new persons, fresh persons to these positions, and so on?
7 A. Yes. These measures limited self-management because
8 self-management had been violated, or rather, abused, as had socially
9 owned property.
10 Q. All these measures that were enacted, according to the text of the
11 legislation had as their aim protecting the self-management rights of
12 workers and socially owned property which was in the care of the state.
13 Is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The purpose was not to discriminate or to be used as tools of
16 discrimination of anybody; is that correct?
17 A. The only motive for taking these measures, as follows from the
18 constitution and the legislation, is the protection of socially owned
19 property and the self-management rights of workers using means of
20 production which are socially owned.
21 Q. Thank you, Professor. Let's go back to the Constitution of the
22 Republic of Serbia of the 28th of September, 1990, that's tab number 5,
23 P855. At the very start of our conversation I think the day before
24 yesterday, or Monday in any case, we spoke about the significance of the
25 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of the 28th of September, 1990,
1 which signified a break with the postulates of the previous constitution
2 and the foundations of the then-social and economic system. Is that
3 correct, Professor?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If that constitution of Serbia abolishes self-management, courts
6 of associated labour, the leading role of the League of Communists, and
7 introduces, or rather, puts all forms of ownership on an equal footing,
8 guarantees private ownership, introduces a market economy, introduces a
9 multi-party parliamentary democracy, a free market, the independence of
10 the judiciary, and civil freedoms. I think I've listed everything more or
12 A. Yes, that constitution signified a radical break with the previous
13 social and state order, and this was also expressed in the name of the
14 Republic of Serbia. The ideological description of "socialist" was
15 dropped and the state was simply called the "Republic of Serbia."
16 Q. Thank you, Professor. Due to this change at the very beginning of
17 our conversation on Monday, we mentioned that certain regulations ceased
18 to be in force. Among the regulations which ceased to be in force are the
19 ones we have just been talking about, those on the protection of social
20 ownership and the self-management rights of workers. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes, for the simple reason that these were no longer categories in
22 the constitution in force.
23 Q. Also the organ of attorney of self-management stopped -- ceased to
24 exist. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. To illustrate this, please look at tab 79, 1D136. This is the law
2 on the cessation of validity of the law on taking temporary measures for
3 the social protection of self-management rights. Provisional measures for
4 the social protection or self-management rights and socially owned
5 property. And it lists, or rather, it states that on the 31st of December
6 these measures and these regulations will no longer be valid, and this
7 includes those of the socialist autonomous provinces of Kosovo and
9 MR. ZECEVIC: I just need to add something to the transcript, page
10 41, 11, it's 31st of December, 1991, that is the date I was referring to.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. [Interpretation] So these laws we have been discussing were in
14 force in Kosovo - I'm referring to the laws on the protection of socially
15 owned property and the self-management rights of workers - they were in
16 force from 1977 and then in 1986 they were amended. And as of the 31st of
17 December, 1991, they -- their legal force was terminated?
18 A. Yes, that follows from Article 1.2, referring to Kosovo and
20 Q. Thank you. And the same case obtained -- the same thing obtained
21 in the case of the regulations of the socialist autonomous province of
22 Vojvodina in paragraph 3 and also similar legislation in the Republic of
23 Serbia under point 1?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. In Article 2 it says that the provisional measures that had been
1 taken pursuant to these laws shall be in force no longer than the 31st of
2 December, 1991, correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Unless the Assembly revoked them earlier?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. The same goes for the provisional measures in relation to
7 organisations and communities in the territory where special circumstances
8 emerged. They were to cease to exist on the 31st of December, 1991, as
9 well, correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. So the territory where special circumstances arose was the
12 territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo, correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So all of these measures that we have just mentioned and that were
15 discussed by a number of witnesses here ceased to be applicable as of the
16 31st of December, 1991, correct?
17 A. Yes, that stems from Article 3 of this law.
18 Q. Could we now please look at tab 80 --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that.
20 Professor, can we take it also that this is an illustration of one
21 of the impacts of the amendment of the constitution of the Republic of
22 Serbia, so that the body now dealing with these measures in all three
23 areas of the republic is the republic that's -- is the Serbian republic
24 itself, and there's no longer jurisdiction in the provincial Assemblies to
25 deal with these matters?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This means that social property
2 no longer enjoys special social protection - that was the reason why the
3 special form of protection was established - but rather, that all types of
4 ownership were put on an equal footing. The other element was that
5 self-management was no longer a category of the 1990 constitution. So
6 these two features of the economic order pursuant to the previous
7 constitution ceased to exist in the 1990 constitution because that
8 constitution introduced economic reforms, free markets, free
9 entrepreneurship, and so on and these old features were no longer
10 contained in the new constitution and they ceased to exist both in Serbia
11 and in autonomous provinces.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may be of assistance Your Honour, because it is
13 obvious that ...
14 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry I didn't hear that.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: I said if I may be of assistance, Your Honour,
16 because it is obvious that Professor didn't understand your question.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, I understood that throughout the earlier part
18 of this evidence the various laws you referred to were implementing the
19 federal constitution, and now we have a situation where the provinces do
20 not appear to be able to control this aspect of the law, it's a matter for
21 the Republic of Serbia Assembly and not for their Assemblies.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I did that just to save the time
23 because if you remember I was referring to the federal constitution and
24 then immediately after that to the Serbian constitution which had the very
25 same provisions, Articles 142 --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: -- 3 and 4.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: And we didn't went into that. So when they were
5 implementing the federal -- the provisions of the federal constitution,
6 they were automatically implementing the provisions of the Serbian
7 constitution as well.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but --
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: -- the body which had jurisdiction for the province
11 of Kosovo to make this law, to implement the constitution, was the Kosovo
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, the --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Now we're seeing that it's the Republic of Serbia
15 Assembly which is recalling these orders so that must be because the
16 constitutional amendment in 1990 removed from the Assembly of Kosovo the
17 power to do this and put that power in the hands of the Assembly of the
18 Republic of Serbia. And I was seeking clarification of that. Now, the
19 witness --
20 MR. ZECEVIC: I understood --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness says that's not the case and perhaps
22 he can explain it further.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Professor, would you please explain this. Have you understood the
1 A. Yes, I did understand it this time around. Pursuant to the 1990
2 constitution, the provinces no longer had legislative power. They were
3 able to issue decisions. Their Assemblies were able to issue decisions
4 but no longer legislation, just like they no longer had power to adopt
5 constitutions, they also no longer could adopt statutes as the highest
6 legislative enactments.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Does this satisfy it, Your Honour?
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 Mr. Zecevic.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Professor, tab 80, please, which is 1D137, and this is the Law on
12 the Termination of Work of the Social Attorney for Self-Management, we're
13 interested in Articles 1 and 5. This law terminates the organ that was
14 meant to initiate procedures to protect social ownership and
15 self-management rights of the workers, correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And in this particular case in Article 5, it says that this law
18 will apply to the laws of Vojvodina and Kosovo, correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. And now the last item, tab 81, Professor, which is
21 1D138. This is the law amending, the law invalidating, the law on
22 temporary measures for the social protection of self-management rights and
23 social ownership or socially owned property. This law simply extends the
24 deadline by which these laws were supposed to cease to be applied, so
25 instead of the 31st of December, 1991, these laws that we have mentioned
1 earlier were meant to cease to be applied by the 31st of December, 1992,
2 correct, Professor?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So definitely after the 31st of December, 1992, there no longer
5 was a possibility to introduce temporary measures in order to protect
6 social ownership and self-management rights of the workers in the entire
7 territory of Serbia, including autonomous provinces of Kosovo and
8 Vojvodina, correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you, Professor.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, this has brought us to the end of the
12 expert testimony of Professor Markovic. There is just one issue which
13 Your Honour raised concerning the ministries -- concerning the ministries
14 established in Serbia in 1991, this is at tab 17, 1D456. If I -- if I
15 correctly remember, Your Honour was posing a question about why if,
16 according to Professor, these were just so-called reserve authorities or
17 reserve authorities of Republic of Serbia, why were the ministries, in
18 fact, established in 1991 but ceased to exist by amendments of the Law on
19 Ministries in 1993 after the constitution of the Federal Republic of
20 Yugoslavia was brought up. Now --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: That related to the Ministry of Defence, the
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry for International and
23 economic development.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, exactly. Three ministries which are within the
25 competences of the federal state.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Now, I have done a research and maybe I can jog the
3 memory of the Professor, if it pleases the Court, by just stating certain
4 facts which might jog the memory of the Professor, and then he can give
5 the explanation.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, do you remember the question put by
9 His Honour Bonomy concerning the Laws on Ministries of the Republic of
10 Serbia of the 5th of February, 1991, and later amendment to this law when
11 these three ministries ceased to exist in 1993. Do you remember that?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Professor, the Trial Chamber put a question inquiring why these
14 ministries were established in Serbia if such ministries already existed
15 at the level of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a federal
16 state. I would like to ask you now, do you remember when the Republic of
17 Slovenia held its plebiscite and declared its independence and sovereignty
18 as a republic, do you remember that?
19 A. Certainly, I remember that. At the time I was a judge of the
20 Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, and what they did was assessed in
21 terms of its constitutionality by the Constitutional Court.
22 Q. Do you remember the date?
23 A. You're asking too much, in view of my age. I can't remember the
24 exact date, but I remember the event. As I said, I was a member on the
25 Constitutional Court, and I know that we reviewed the constitutionality of
1 this. As for the date, it's a difficult question.
2 Q. Professor, 23rd of December, 1990, does this ring a bell? Could
3 this possibly be the date?
4 A. There was a whole series of enactments adopted by the Republic of
5 Slovenia, and they were followed by enactments of Croatia. And they
6 represented gradual secession from the Yugoslav Federation. All of those
7 enactments were assessed for their constitutionality by the Constitutional
8 Court of Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Thank you, Professor. Do you remember that also in December of
10 1990 Croatia -- the Republic of Croatia adopted its constitution?
11 A. Yes, just as the Republic of Slovenia did in September of 1989,
12 they adopted amendments to their constitution, and in it they established
13 the priority of their constitution and laws in relation to those of the
14 Federation. They said that in the territory of Slovenia the federal
15 constitution and federal laws could be applied only if they were not
16 contrary to the Constitution of Slovenia and laws of Slovenia. So they
17 turned the principle upside down, the basic legal principle that is
18 enshrined in every federation, which is the principle of the primacy of
19 the federal law over the law of a federal unit. Slovenia did something
20 that was quite contrary to that. They established the primacy of their
21 law in relation to the law of the Federation.
22 Q. Professor, at any rate these Slovenian constitutional amendments
23 from 1989 were contrary to the solutions adopted in the SFRY constitution,
25 A. Yes, certainly, and that was established in the decision of the
1 Constitutional Court.
2 Q. Professor --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry --
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: It wasn't clear in all of that what was the date of
6 the adoption of the Slovenian constitution.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Professor, amendments to the Slovenian constitution that you just
9 mentioned, which were in contravention of the federal constitution because
10 they gave primacy to the Constitution of Slovenia over the federal
11 constitution were from 1989?
12 A. Yes, September of 1989. All of the republics, including the
13 Republic of Serbia adopted amendments to their constitutions in 1989
14 because the Federation had amended its constitution in 1988 by way of
15 amendments. So these amendments to the republican constitutions was a
16 consequence of the fact that the federal constitution had been amended.
17 And the republican constitutions had to be brought in compliance with the
18 federal one. Slovenia used this opportunity to start gradual secession
19 from the Federation, which was implemented through a series of enactments
20 adopted by the Republic of Slovenia.
21 Q. So these amendments were adopted Slovenia before the 1990
22 constitution was adopted by Serbia. Is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In December 1990, Croatia too, the Republic of Croatia, adopted
25 its own constitution, right?
1 A. Yes, I remember that.
2 Q. Both after and before on the 5th of October, on the 5th of
3 October, 1990, Croatia passed a law on the structure of its republican
4 administration, which is the equivalent of our Law on Ministries, thereby
5 establishing its foreign office and its defence ministry, Ministry of
6 Defence. Do you remember that, sir?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. The ministries were set up in Serbia in February, or rather, a law
9 was passed, 1D456, tab 17, the Law on Ministries that was adopted in
10 February 1991 in the Republic of Serbia is a reflection of what occurred
11 in Slovenia in 1989 and in Croatia in October 1990. These republics,
12 likewise, had assumed the federal competences and applied them to their
13 own republican level. They established their own state laws, you might
14 say. Is that right, Professor?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So what we see here is some form of duality between the republican
17 bodies on the one hand that were still operating in Slovenia and Croatia
18 and afterwards in Serbia, and on the other the federal bodies start --
19 were not functioning but continued to exist and continued to do so until
20 some time around April 1992, right?
21 A. Yes, that's right. There was a danger of secession and total
22 disintegration in Yugoslavia, and the danger continued to exist until 1992
23 for as long as the 1974 constitution was still in power and until such
24 time as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted
25 in 1992, April 1992.
1 Q. After which, after which these ministries that we have mentioned,
2 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry
3 of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries ceased to exist in Serbia
4 since they were under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of
5 Yugoslavia. Is that right, Professor?
6 A. Following this, amendments were introduced to the Law on
7 Ministries, establishing that these three ministries should cease to
9 Q. This is tab 18, 1D142, Official Gazette 1993, number 67.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, if -- I hope this was sufficiently
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic. We have one comment to
13 make on exhibits so far.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Obviously we'll follow the practice that we've been
16 following throughout the trial, which is to admit exhibits when they are
17 introduced in some form in the trial to the extent that they are relevant
18 to the evidence. And that will apply to any that you have referred to
19 which are not already exhibits in the case.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: However, there are at least two, I think, for which
22 there were not translations. Is that correct?
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, it's pending, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But these will have to be identified at
25 lunchtime today so that you can tell me exactly which they are, and we
1 will specifically provide for them being subject to translation. They
2 will not be admitted until the translation -- Mr. Hannis --
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Your -- definitely, Your Honour, I think I can do
4 that even right now. It is document under the tab 19, 1D750.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Which is a law on conducting foreign affairs within
7 competencies of the federal administration organs and organisations,
8 Official Gazette 56 of 1981, item 601; and the second one is the document
9 under tab 73, 1D759 [sic] which are the conclusions of the Federal
10 Assembly of SFRY, item 131, published in the Official Gazette of SFRY
11 number 13 for year 1989. Those are the two documents which are -- I
12 said -- it is just for the transcript it's 1D751, not 759, tab 73, 1D751,
13 page 52, line 13 of the transcript says 9.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would like to make some submissions
17 concerning some of the documents, but I too have to review my list. There
18 are where I think there are only partial translations, and I may have an
19 issue there. And there are one or two where, I think, where there's a
20 question about provenance because they're not Official Gazettes. They're
21 documents without a signature or a seal. There are more of those that
22 relate to his factual evidence, I think, rather than his expert testimony
23 so that will come, but I wanted to preview that for you.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's helpful but you can understand why it
25 would have been quite neat to deal with the exhibits so far since we are
1 now on to a different aspect of the evidence. So if it's possible after
2 the break at midday for you to clarify whether any of the documents
3 involved in the expert evidence are subject to what you've said, then we
4 can clear this matter up hopefully. And until then, it's sufficient to
5 mark for identification 1D750 and 751 and we have already done so in
6 relation to IC133.
7 Please continue, Mr. Zecevic.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Just bear with me one
9 moment, please.
10 May I?
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: May I, Your Honours, if the binders have been
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
16 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, on the 5th of August this year you
17 gave a 92 ter statement, which bears the following number 1D753, this
18 statement is in relation to the facts and documents that you were
19 presented with and listed in annex 1 of the statement. Do you remember
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You're familiar with these facts and documents. In your statement
23 you briefly explained each of the documents shown to you. Is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Your statement is truthful and is based on your knowledge and
1 convictions. Were you asked the same questions about these documents
2 again, you would provide identical answers in relation to each and every
3 one of them, right?
4 A. Yes, that's right.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, we would be seeking to ask that
6 Professor's 92 ter statement, 1D751, be admitted, except -- 1D753, I'm
7 sorry, be admitted except for the Politika newspaper documents, which I
8 can list right now, which are -- which we are not seeking admittance of.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]
10 MR. ZECEVIC: It is ...
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I suggest that I follow the list which
13 is in your binders or -- because the list which is attached -- the annex
14 which is attached to the statement is a bit different. Now --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's leave this and do it after lunchtime,
16 if that's a simple way of doing it. You can present a list to the court
17 deputy and we'll --
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- deal with it that way.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, do your comments that you made a
22 moment or two ago apply to some of the other documents referred to in this
24 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, and I think what I can do after
25 lunch is advise you of the ones that I have a particular objection to.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please continue for the moment, Mr. Zecevic,
2 with any questions you have to ask about this document or any other
3 matter, and we'll return to the formalities later.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, I appreciate it, Your Honour.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you became a member of the cabinet of
6 the Republic of Serbia back in 1994. Is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can you please look at tab 1, 1D385, the date is the 18th of
9 March, 1994. This is a decision on the appointment of the president and
10 vice-president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the
11 republic's ministers. This was a government in which you were deputy
12 prime minister in 1994, I'm talking about item 3, we see your name right
13 there. Is that right, Professor?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. This was published in the Official Gazette, right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. This is a decision of the Assembly?
18 A. Yes, that is because we were appointed by the Assembly.
19 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. This document shows that you were
20 deputy prime minister, right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. How many deputy prime ministers were there?
23 A. There were a total of five deputy prime ministers, as you can see
24 by reading this decision.
25 Q. Professor, given the way the government was structured at the
1 time, did each of the deputy prime ministers have special duties and
2 responsibilities, different from those of other deputy prime ministers?
3 A. They weren't ministers pure and proper. They had a direct
4 relationship with the prime minister, and their duties and
5 responsibilities were distributed by the prime minister. For example, I
6 was in charge of legislation and the legal system.
7 Q. So you stuck to that throughout your time in office, that's what
8 Prime Minister Marijanovic had told you to do, and that's what you did
9 from the moment you were appointed deputy prime minister to the
10 termination of your time in office in 2000, right?
11 A. Yes, first up until 1998 when this government was disbanded and
12 then a new cabinet was appointed. Again I became deputy prime minister
13 and again the government was headed by Mr. Marijanovic. I was given the
14 same responsibilities in this new cabinet. I was in charge of legislation
15 and the legal system of the Republic of Serbia.
16 Q. Thank you very much. During the time of this second cabinet in
17 1998, in March 1998 more specifically, you were given a certain
18 responsibility by the prime minister. Can you please explain specifically
19 what this responsibility was about?
20 A. Excuse me, which tab should I be looking at?
21 Q. Well, first of all, try to think back and see if you can remember
22 what the responsibility was.
23 A. Which responsibility and what date?
24 Q. March 1998.
25 A. Yes, back in March 1998 the prime minister, or Serbia's government
1 if you like, gave me the responsibility of involving myself in talks with
2 the leaders of Albanian parties and associations, or rather, I was tasked
3 with heading a government delegation which included the following
4 ministers: Ratomir Vico and Andrija Milosavljevic and Ivan Sedlak.
5 Q. Professor, can you please look at tab 3, 1D078, this is an
6 announcement made by the government on the 11th of March, 1998. It talks
7 about a conclusion that was adopted on its session on the 10th of March.
8 Is this what you have been talking about, sir?
9 A. Yes, this is just it. This is an announcement which made public
10 the substance of these conclusions. I headed this delegation of Serbia's
11 government, the Government of the Republic of Serbia. The delegation
12 comprised another three ministers, those that I've mentioned, and we were
13 supposed to talk to the leaders of the Albanian parties. And this was
14 about resolving certain practical matters concerning the life -- the
15 everyday life of people in Kosovo and Metohija.
16 Q. Professor, back in 1996 do you remember if the government set up a
17 special group to implement the agreement on the return of Albanian pupils
18 and teachers to schools in the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija?
19 A. Yes, I do remember that. The group was set up to have normalise
20 teaching in schools and universities, to help normalise teaching in
21 schools and universities, Ratomir Vico, Goran Percevic and
22 Dobroslav Beletic were ministers who were involved in the work of this
24 Q. Professor, please look at tab number 2 1D --, or rather, P714.
25 This is the Official Gazette of the 12th of September, 1996. The document
1 bears the number 933, it's a decision. Is that the decision you were
2 referring to, Professor?
3 A. Yes, it is, and it is precisely these members Ratomir Vico, who
4 was a government minister; Goran Percevic, who was a federal deputy; and
5 Mr. Dobroslav Beletic was a scholar.
6 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, when on the 10th of March you
7 were tasked with, or rather, you were tasked by the prime minister of the
8 Republic of Serbia, the late Mirko Marijanovic, with leading this
9 delegation for negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians that you talked
10 about, had you ever dealt with these issues before that point in time? I
11 mean talks with the Albanian leaders about solving the issues of the
12 continued functioning of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija?
13 A. No, never before that had I been given any tasks connected to
14 Kosovo and Metohija. This was the first time I was given a task in that
16 Q. Professor, at this point in time, are you aware that any kind of
17 negotiations took place between the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians and
18 some members of some political parties in Serbia in the course of 1996 and
20 A. I don't know what talks you mean.
21 Q. At the time when you were appointed to chair that delegation, were
22 you aware that any kind of talks were being conducted with the leaders of
23 the Kosovo Albanians in 1996 and 1997?
24 A. I did not participate in any such talks. As I said, the first
25 time I was given such a task was on the 10th of March, 1998.
1 Q. But had you heard about any such talks?
2 A. Well, probably there were talks of that kind because Kosovo and
3 Metohija was an area which was in political terms very full of unrest,
4 ever since the early 1980s.
5 Q. Professor, do you know a certain person called Mr. Tanic?
6 A. Well, I heard about him in the media. He was very prominent. I
7 think he was the spokesman of a political party, the Civic Alliance and
8 especially New Democracy. I met him only once when we had lunch with the
9 German ambassador, the ambassador of Great Britain was also present at
10 that lunch hosted by the German ambassador. And that was my only physical
11 contact with him. I saw him once in person. Before that I had seen him
12 on television because he was very prominent in the media.
13 Q. Professor, did you ever participate in any negotiations with the
14 Kosovo Albanians together with Mr. Tanic?
15 A. Absolutely not, no, never. He was never given any tasks by the
16 government. He was not a public official, and I repeat I met him
17 physically only once when the German Ambassador, Mr. Gruber, invited us to
19 Q. Does that mean that you never consulted him about negotiations or
20 anything like that, that you coordinated positions with him?
21 A. No, no, why would I? I never had any kind of contact with him.
22 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, after you were appointed the
23 leader of that delegation on the 10th of March, 1998, what steps did you
24 take? What did that delegation of the Government of the Republic of
25 Serbia do first?
1 A. Well, first that delegation convened a meeting in Pristina, or
2 rather, it scheduled a meeting and it was supposed to meet representatives
3 of the Kosovo Albanians, thus opening the so-called political process and
4 begin solving the issues affecting the daily life of citizens in Kosovo
5 and Metohija. The meeting was scheduled. A public announcement was
6 issued. Invitations were sent out to the private addresses of the leaders
7 of the Albanian political parties, and I think it was supposed to be on
8 the 12th of March, 1998. However, they never showed up at the meeting.
9 Q. Just go slowly. So, Professor, the first meeting you scheduled
10 was on the 12th of March, 1998, in Pristina. You arrived but they did not
11 show up?
12 A. Yes. The delegation arrived, but I have to say that at the time
13 that this delegation was being established, the government called on every
14 party in the National Assembly to give one representative from their group
15 of deputies to participate in these talks, with a view to affirming the
16 unified approach of the National Assembly to the solution of issues in
17 Kosovo and Metohija. The community of Hungarians from Vojvodina
18 responded, and they sent their representative so that this gentleman went
19 there together with the government delegation.
20 Q. Tell me, Professor, the reason for this government communique,
21 which we saw in tab 3, 1D078, of the 11th of March, and the decision of
22 the prime minister to appoint you and your other three colleagues to this
23 delegation was motivated to the best of your knowledge by what?
24 A. Well, in the course of my research I had dealt for a long time
25 with issues of territorial autonomy in the world, and I have published
1 many papers on that topic. I studied especially autonomy in Italy and
2 Spain, the then-USSR, so that probably it was because I had a scholarly
3 interest in the subject matter of territorial autonomy, and I knew the
4 subject. Mr. Andrija Milosavljevic and Ratomir Vico were conversant with
5 the conditions of living in Kosovo and Metohija.
6 Mr. Vico was a minister who had already been tasked with
7 conducting negotiations about normalising teaching in Kosovo and Metohija
8 and Mr. Sedlak who was himself a member of a national minority was the
9 minister in charge of human and minority rights in the Government of the
10 Republic of Serbia. And I'm sure that this was the motive why the prime
11 minister proposed this team to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians.
12 Q. Well, Professor, thank you for your response, but I wanted to know
13 what the motivation of the cabinet was, of the prime minister.
14 A. You mean for the negotiations themselves, well that was to find a
15 peaceful way through political negotiations, to solve the problems on
16 Kosovo and Metohija, because at that time armed conflict was already
17 escalating in Kosovo and Metohija and this was an offer to solve
18 everything in a civilised, peaceful manner through political negotiations
19 of all the interested subjects. The international community had also
20 appealed to the Republic of Serbia to act in this way.
21 Q. Professor, if I understood you correctly, the government's policy
22 was to take political measures, to engage in negotiations, in order to
23 solve the situation in Kosovo at that time?
24 A. Yes. One can see that from the persistent attempts made by this
25 delegation, even at the cost of physical maltreatment.
1 Q. We'll come to that later.
2 A. Well, we went there dozens of times. We persistently attempted to
3 have the whole matter discussed in a peaceful, political way.
4 Q. Professor, that was the position of the government in March 1998?
5 A. Yes, on the 10th of March, 1998, in the first half of March 1998.
6 Q. You were the deputy prime minister until the year 2000. This
7 political standpoint of the government, was it ever changed in that
9 A. No. This position, this standpoint of the government, was not
10 changed. This is also evident from the fact that the government, and
11 later on the National Assembly, agreed to the negotiations in Rambouillet
12 and in Paris and the government appointed a state delegation to negotiate
13 in Rambouillet and Paris. The government always gave priority to
14 political means for the solution of burning issues, issues of daily life
15 in Kosovo and Metohija.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I see the time -- oh, I'm sorry. I'm
17 obviously anxious to ...
18 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, after you went to that meeting on the
19 12th of March where the delegation of the Albanian representatives did not
20 show up, did you go there again on the next day, the 13th of March?
21 A. Yes, we went there on the following day. I looked it up, and
22 those were -- those days were Thursday and Friday of that week. And then
23 on the following week we went on every working day, and we scheduled the
24 meeting in the same place at the same time every day and informed the
25 leaders of the Albanian political parties. This was in Pristina, of
2 Q. So you went there on the 12th and the 13th, which were a Thursday
3 and a Friday, and then on the following Monday, the 16th, and from that
4 time on you went there every day?
5 A. Yes, I even recall the address, Vidovdanska 2, because I had gone
6 there so many times, but every time the leaders of the Albanian political
7 parties failed to turn up at those meetings, they failed to show up for
8 them. Later on there were representatives of other ethnic communities who
9 participated in that --
10 Q. Professor, just take it easy, we'll go in chronological order.
11 A. All right.
12 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember the declaration of the
13 President of the Republic of Serbia of the 18th of March, 1998?
14 A. Yes, I do, and that declaration was made in order to encourage
15 political dialogue, to support a peaceful and political solution of the
16 problems in Kosovo and Metohija. So apart from the government calling for
17 negotiations and also the president of the republic called on the
18 representatives of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija to participate in
19 these talks.
20 Q. Professor, please look at tab 5, 1D079.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is that the declaration you mentioned?
23 A. Yes. And it says in paragraph 2: "I appeal to the leaders of the
24 political parties of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija
25 to start a political dialogue without delay and without conditions and as
1 the president of the Republic of Serbia, I'm willing to be the guarantor
2 of such talks on the basis of territorial integrity and sovereignty and
3 Kosovo and Metohija within the framework of Serbia."
4 Q. Thank you. Professor, Professor, how do you understand this
5 willingness of the president to guarantee the talks between your
6 delegation and the representatives of the Albanian minority and the
7 delegation of the Republic of Serbia?
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I was just waiting for the transcript.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Go ahead, Professor.
10 A. Well, I understood it as follows. The president of the republic
11 guaranteed that whatever was agreed would be implemented. And as this
12 declaration is a rather extensive text, it states what the president of
13 the republic expects from these talks. It says that the Federal Republic
14 of Yugoslavia is a European country committed to European values and
15 principles, that he is convinced that the future of the citizens in Kosovo
16 and Metohija is not an ethnic, religious, and cultural division and
17 isolation, but in mutual linking up and living together. So the president
18 expressed the spirit in which these talks should be conducted, and he
19 expressed his willingness to guarantee the implementation of whatever was
21 Q. Thank you, Professor.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, you told us yesterday about the very
23 limited powers of the president. Under what power would he be able to
24 guarantee the success of the talks?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this is not really a power.
1 This is a moral position that he took. The president of the republic, who
2 was elected directly by all of the citizens, guaranteed that the agreement
3 would be implemented. He represents the state of Serbia and symbolises
4 its unity, and it is in this capacity that he spoke. Naturally, he did
5 not have any specific powers in relation to this. This is all on the --
6 was said on the moral grounds. The negotiations were of political nature.
7 It was the representatives of government and leaders of Albanian political
8 parties that negotiated. There were no state organs involved.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Professor, upon the return from Pristina on the 20th, on those
12 seven occasions when you went to meetings starting on the 12th, none of
13 the Albanian representatives showed up, correct?
14 A. Only two members of Albanians ethnic community showed up, but they
15 were not leaders, they were not members of the majority political
16 parties. Those were Mr. Faik Jashari and Mr. Sokol Qusha. However, they
17 were not members of these majority political parties who had the support
18 of the majority of Albanian citizens, members of the Albanian ethnic
19 community, rather they were leaders of smaller political parties.
20 Q. When you're referring to leaders of larger political parties, you
21 are primarily referring to the late Dr. Rugova?
22 A. Yes, absolutely. They had the dominant position in the political
23 life in Kosovo at the time. That was the dominant political party.
24 Q. Thank you. Tab 6, 5909 [as interpreted], is the decision that you
25 have already mentioned. This is the second cabinet where you served as
1 deputy prime minister and Mirko Marijanovic once again was the prime
3 A. Yes, and in that government I had the same tasks as in the
4 previous government.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: That's document 1D909.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour, P909, P909.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: It's been recorded as 5909 but it's P.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: P5000.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: No, P909. Thank you.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. [Interpretation]
11 Q. Professor, on the 31st of March there was a declaration or a
12 statement issued by the government on Kosovo, do you remember that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. That's tab 8, 1D082. Could you please comment on this government
15 appeal. As far as I can see, this is again an appeal to Albanian leaders
16 to come to the meetings and negotiations?
17 A. Yes. This is a repeated call issued by the government after a
18 series of unsuccessful trips of the members of its delegation. They're
19 stating here that in the world the declaration of the president of Serbia
20 was welcomed, and once again they issue a public appeal to hold a direct
21 and unconditional dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic
22 minorities. Because other ethnic minorities other than Albanian also
23 asked to be involved in this political process.
24 It says there that an indispensable method of resolving all issues
25 in Kosovo and Metohija was the method of applying political mechanisms in
1 order to achieve European standards on human rights and freedoms but also
2 to respect the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities. And here the
3 government elaborates on its views concerning these talks. This is a
4 somewhat longer statement of the government. If it's been translated into
5 English, there's no need for me to convey the content.
6 Q. Absolutely. Professor, did you start sending out written
7 invitations, written notices, to attend to the Albanian leaders?
8 A. Yes. In order for them not to use a pretext or an excuse that
9 this was a public invitation and not an invitation sent to private
10 residences, then letters were also sent containing invitations to private
11 addresses; namely, to Ibrahim Rugova, Demaqi, Krasniqi, and some others.
12 A number of persons, all of them listed in this statement in the last
14 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor --
15 A. I have a correction, by your leave. It says here: "The
16 composition of the delegation." Given that the cabinet had some changes,
17 this is March of 1998 and there were some changes in the cabinet, and they
18 were reflected in the composition of the delegation as well, meaning that
19 Professor Milovan Bojic as a deputy prime minister was included, as was
20 Mr. Tomislav Nikolic, also deputy prime minister. And Mr. Milosavljevic
21 Sedlak and myself were there just like we were previously. As for the
22 president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he appointed his special
23 representative, and that was deputy prime minister of the federal
24 government, Professor Vladan Kutlesic. So the delegation was expanded
25 significantly, and in addition to the delegation there was also a Special
1 Envoy of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2 Q. Just another question, Professor, before we break. Professor
3 Vladan Kutlesic was who, if you can just tell us briefly.
4 A. Professor Vladan Kutlesic at the time was deputy prime minister of
5 the federal government.
6 Q. And he's a professor of what?
7 A. Later on he became, and today he's -- actually today he's no
8 longer, but he became professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, and
9 recently he changed his job and now teaches at the Megatrend University.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I see the time now, so again.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Time now for the lunch break, Professor. Could you
12 again please leave the courtroom with the usher, and we will see you in an
13 hour at quarter to 2.00.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.46 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I believe it was the wish of the Trial
19 Chamber to deal with the -- to deal with 1D753, the Rule 92 ter statement
20 of Professor Markovic --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, first -- yeah -- well, Mr. Hannis said he
22 would make certain submissions about this which we can look at, but one
23 thing you said you would do is clear up --
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: -- the question of the Politika articles.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours. We will not be seeking to tender
2 the paragraph 17 of the statement of Professor Markovic. Paragraph 17 is
3 on the page 12 -- it starts on the page 12 and continues until page 13.
4 And all the Politikas are listed there, except 1D046 which is Politika of
5 19th November, which by mistake is included in this list, but it's already
6 been admitted previously during the Prosecution case through Witness
7 Petritsch. So this document has already been admitted.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: So you don't need to have it admitted again?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: No, definitely not.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. We will use the original --
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah. And all others listed under the paragraph 17
12 we will not be seeking to tender these into the exhibits.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you going to be referring at all in the oral
14 examination of Mr. Markovic --
15 MR. ZECEVIC: No, Your Honour --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to any of these?
17 MR. ZECEVIC: No, Your Honour, no.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: And so far as the -- well, I better hear from
19 Mr. Hannis first of all. Thank you.
20 Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I -- having gone through the list now, a
22 number of items that I had marked as having some concerns about from the
23 original 65 ter notification are not on the list, so pretty much all of my
24 problem exhibits have gone away. I don't know if we mentioned
25 Exhibit 1D748 which is number 80 on the list of fact exhibits with the red
1 binders, which is still pending translation, that's the only issue I have
2 with that one. And I think we've addressed all the others.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the rule is clear that even if a document is
4 referred to in evidence but has not been translated into English, it will
5 not be admitted unless it's specifically raised, for example, on the basis
6 that enough is translated in the course of the interpretation here for it
7 to be unnecessary for any more translation to be done on it. But in the
8 absence of that sort of determination, it's up to the party presenting it
9 to get it into English before it will be admitted.
10 What exactly is annex A, Mr. Zecevic?
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Annex A is a list of all the documents, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this just the index for the binders?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, that's just the index for the binders.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: These are the ones being referred to?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: That's right, that's right. And actually, his 92
16 ter statement has 17 paragraphs, and we are not seeking to tender the
17 paragraph 17, which is referred to on page 12 and 13 of his 92 ter
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, what's effectively being done here
20 is the incorporation into the oral evidence of Professor Markovic of all
21 these documents other than those referred to in paragraph 17, all those
22 documents which are mentioned in his 92 ter statement. I take it that on
23 the face of it they look authentic as far as you're concerned, and in the
24 end of the day it's all going to be a question of interpretation.
25 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 So far as the documents referred to in his evidence as an expert
3 are concerned, there are no others that you have any concern about, apart
4 from the three which had not been translated?
5 MR. HANNIS: I believe that's correct, Your Honour. So I was
6 going through making notes when he testified, and looking at the list I
7 don't think there was anything. There are a couple I have questions
8 about, but I don't have questions about authenticity.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: In that situation -- I'm sorry.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Your Honour, but there
12 is one other issue I think I should raise with the Trial Chamber or
13 actually inform the Trial Chamber about. It's at tab 63 of the laws and
14 regulations exhibits. It's the Law on VJ, P984, which we have a problem
15 with Article 4 on the paragraphs, is it a paragraph 2 or 3 or 1 and so.
16 And we have produced today the web site.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Now, I understood the reaction by my learned friend,
19 Mr. Hannis, from the Office of the Prosecutor that he might be having an
20 issue with that. So what we have done in the meantime is we have
21 contacted the legal committee of the National Assembly of Serbia, which is
22 the only body or organ that can provide with the authentic explanation of
23 all the laws which have been brought up in the National Assembly.
24 However, due to vacation issue, they will not be meeting before
25 the 25th of August. So I would assume that after the 25th of August we
1 will have an official explanation on the Law on VJ and the particular
2 Article 4 that we are having here as an issue by the -- or legal committee
3 of the National Assembly of Serbia.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that IC exhibit will remain marked for
5 identification until you make a joint submission filing --
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to the Trial Chamber, or in the event of you
8 being unable to make a joint one that you raise it because the onus will
9 be on you to remove it from that status.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honour. Thank you very much. I
11 just wanted to inform the Trial Chamber.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: So in these circumstances, the general rule we've
13 applied will apply to all the exhibits that have been referred to in the
14 course of the evidence so far by Professor Markovic. They will be
15 admitted to the extent that they are relevant to issues raised in the
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we please have the witness back.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, how are you feeling?
23 A. Tired.
24 Q. I believe you on that one. Professor, about the declaration of
25 the Government of Serbia concerning Kosovo dated the 31st of March, 1998,
1 we spoke about that. Do you remember Resolution 1160 of the Security
2 Council of that date?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Would you please look at tab 9, P0455.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [No interpretation]
6 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, would you please go slowly because we
7 have been asked by the interpreters to wait for the document to appear on
8 the screen before commenting on it.
9 Professor, see on page 1 we have Resolution 1160, which notes the
10 declaration of the president of Serbia, or rather, the declaration of the
11 president of Serbia on the situation in Kosovo. On page 2, the Security
12 Council invites sides, that is to say Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
13 leadership of the Kosovo Albanians, to do certain things and to undertake
14 certain measures, correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Would you please give a brief comment to items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
17 and 8 of the resolution in light of -- in light of what the Government of
18 Serbia did up until the 31st of March when you were appointed a member of
19 that delegation for negotiations, so what the government did before this
20 resolution was issued, just briefly, please.
21 A. In this resolution, the Security Council calls upon the government
22 in Belgrade to offer a true political dialogue to the leadership of Kosovo
23 Albanians. This resolution was adopted on the 31st of March, 1998, and
24 the government in Belgrade had offered a political dialogue to them prior
25 to that, back on the 10th of March. And on the 12th we already travelled
1 to Pristina. It is further stated here that a political solution to the
2 issue of Kosovo through dialogue without an alternative, then they call
3 upon the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians to condemn all terrorist
4 action. Then they welcome the decision to implement the agreement on
5 education. We spoke about that agreement. Back in 1996 the government
6 had established a negotiating team.
7 Then they call upon all countries in order to establish peace and
8 stability in Kosovo to either stop or prevent any shipment of arms to the
9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and its citizens from
10 their territory. So everything that this resolution mentioned is
11 something that the Government of Serbia had already done. What is also
12 important for me, looking at this resolution, is the qualification given
13 in the preamble, where it says that they condemn all terrorist operations
14 on the part of the KLA. So from the highest international forum there was
15 a message sent about the KLA using terrorist methods.
16 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, the text of the resolution and
17 what the resolution invites parties to do and what it requires parties to
18 do is something that the Government of Serbia had already been doing two
19 weeks before the resolution was issued, correct?
20 A. Yes, correct.
21 Q. Professor, following that in April you travelled to Kosovo several
22 times again, attempting to meet with the leadership of Kosovo Albanians,
24 A. Yes, that's how it was.
25 Q. Do you remember, Professor, whether you travelled to Pristina on
1 the 7th of April for talks there?
2 A. Yes, I went on the 7th of April as well.
3 Q. On the 7th of April, was it the entire delegation that travelled
4 or how was it?
5 A. The president of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic,
6 travelled on the 7th as well as the entire delegation established by the
7 Government of Serbia, again with the same objective. We believed that
8 such a strengthened delegation of Serbia would perhaps produce a better
9 response among the leaders of Kosovo Albanians, the leaders of political
10 parties, and that this would give an impetus to political dialogue.
11 Q. Professor, do you remember that on that occasion
12 President Milutinovic gave a statement?
13 A. Yes, I do remember.
14 Q. Would you please look at tab 10, which is 1D083.
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have that document in
17 e-court, please. 1D83.
18 Q. Professor, is this the statement we have just been talking about?
19 A. Yes, that's the statement issued by President Milutinovic on the
20 7th of April, 1998, in Pristina.
21 Q. Will you please read the last line of the first paragraph, which
22 begins with: "Coming here today ..."
23 A. "Coming here today, I wanted to underline the significance we
24 attach to such talks."
25 Q. Would you please explain what is meant here.
1 A. Well, as I said in the answer to the last question, as the
2 delegation had now been strengthened with the arrival of the president of
3 the Republic of Serbia, it was thought that this would be an impetus, that
4 it would encourage the leaders of the -- the political leaders of the
5 Albanians to respond to the invitation to talks. And the president, who
6 according to the constitution, personifies the republic, embodies state
7 unify, is here underlying the significance attached to these talks,
8 demonstrating that the official state of Serbia seriously wants talks.
9 So not only are representatives of the government present, but
10 also the president of the republic. And this testifies to the fact that
11 Serbia seriously wants talks because it's sending its highest state
12 official to them.
13 Q. Thank you. In his statement the president repeats a wish -- in
14 fact, he repeats his position, saying that the future of Kosovo does not
15 lie in closing up and division, but on the contrary, in openness. And he
16 expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that the Albanian
17 representatives have again failed to show up. Is that correct, that they
18 failed to show up?
19 A. They did not show up, and in spite of the fact that there was such
20 a strong delegation which had been ignored, the president points out
21 that -- that Serbia remains willing to engage in dialogue, and he is
22 willing to meet them at any time in Belgrade.
23 Q. Thank you --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: What notice was given to the Albanians of the
25 meeting on the 7th of April?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were always notified, from the
2 time when they complained that the invitations were not arriving at their
3 home addresses but that they were being invited only through public
4 announcement. From that point in time onwards, they were always invited
5 personally and the invitations were sent out to their home addresses. The
6 list of invitees has just been mentioned. It's a broad circle of Albanian
7 political leaders whom we mentioned before the break, and they received
8 not only this general public invitation, but also personal invitations
9 sent to their home addresses.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you any idea when the invitation was made,
11 both publicly and privately?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I couldn't answer that because it's
13 a technical issue I did not deal with, but I believe the invitations were
14 sent out in time. The town is in the same country. It doesn't take so
15 long for the post office to do its job, and probably there was a secure
16 mechanism of delivering these invitations. I know that there had to be
17 signatures, they had to sign receipts that they had received the
18 invitation, especially Mr. Rugova, he had to sign receipts every time, or
19 rather, his Chief of Staff had to sign a receipt.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I take it that you're speculating about how the
22 personal invitations might have been delivered?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm not speculating, because
24 Mr. Veljko Odalovic showed me a receipt signed by the chief of
25 Mr. Rugova's cabinet, Mr. Merovci, a receipt stating that he had received
1 the invitation. Mr. Veljko Odalovic showed me that signed receipt.
2 However, as head of the delegation, I was not in charge of these technical
3 matters. So I don't know what method was used to send out the
4 invitations. It was my job to -- to direct the talks.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Your suggestion is, though, that it was done by the
6 post office, and I wondered whether that was speculation.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What the technology was, I don't
8 know, what the method was used -- what method was used, whether they were
9 sent by post, through the post office, or some other methods, that I don't
11 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
12 Mr. Zecevic.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation].
14 Q. Professor, very briefly, I would like to take you back to tab 8,
15 1D82. This is a statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on
16 Kosovo and Metohija. Page 2, the last two paragraphs, which I think
17 explain what technical methods were used to send out the invitations.
18 A. Yes. In the statement of the 31st of March, 1998, the
19 representatives of the political parties of the Albanian minority are
20 invited to attend a meeting seven days from today. That was the 7th of
21 April, 1998, in Pristina in Vidovdanska number 2, the building of the
22 republican government at 1200 hours. So seven days before the meeting was
23 scheduled, they knew there was to be a meeting, but in addition to this
24 public invitation the Government of Serbia sent out written invitations to
25 the representatives of the political parties of the Albanian minority and
1 public personalities, and then they list all the people.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. I have your answer.
3 Mr. Zecevic.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Professor, talking about letters, after the 7th of April did you
6 go to Pristina an another occasion in April?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you remember the date?
9 A. Not the specific date. I'm afraid I might be wrong if I try to
10 tell you the date, but in April, May, and August we went there to have
11 meetings with Mr. Fehmi Agani who failed to show up yet again.
12 Q. Professor, do you remember whether you went to Pristina on the
13 16th of April, 1998?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. And none of the Albanian representatives showed up; although as
16 you said, they had been informed both by public and written invitations
17 about the meeting?
18 A. Well, both public and private, personal, invitations. I signed
19 those invitations. I signed those invitations to all of them.
20 Q. Thank you. Professor --
21 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry to intervene. Forgive me for
23 Now, obviously these were very seriously meetings and were also
24 asquel [phoen] to what the Security Council had stated. Was it enough to
25 send these letters through transmissions by post? Because usually people
1 intervene. There are mediators, there are people who try to bring parties
2 together, and they are put in for purposes of persuasions and calling
3 people for meetings. Is it in your knowledge, sir, that such method was
4 employed or was it just perfunctory sending notices as it was being
5 suggested through the post office only? That is what I thought if you
6 would like to say anything on this. Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say once more I'm not sure
8 the post office was used, it's just my assumption. But possibly it was
9 not sent through the post office. Possibly all these invitations were
10 sent through Mr. Veljko Odalovic, and he may have delivered those letters
11 personally to the addressees through his people. I don't know what the
12 methods, physical methods, of delivering the letters were. But if
13 somebody is sent a polite invitation --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Markovic, we know your position on this. What
15 the question relates to is quite a different matter, and that is whether
16 in the context of this important issue, you wouldn't expect some mediator,
17 negotiator, or some intermediary to be acting to arrange the meeting
18 rather than you as the leader of the delegation deciding when the meeting
19 would be, sending out these invitations, and expecting everybody to turn
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know what
22 intermediaries you mean. These are people who live in the same country.
23 They lived in one and the same country. Pristina is in the Republic of
24 Serbia. Albanians were citizens of the Republic of Serbia. So what sort
25 of intermediaries would be needed? I don't understand. The government
1 and the president of the republic were going there to meet them. They
2 could have proposed a place and a time that suited them, but evidently it
3 was their intention not to talk directly without intermediaries to the
4 Government of the Republic of Serbia and its delegation.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 Mr. Zecevic.
7 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Yes, learned Professor, you had signed the
8 invitations, you had gone there also. And then when they didn't show up,
9 did you thinker of bothering to inquire whether things were served,
10 whether somebody should be sent to them as an emissary? Obviously they
11 were a different group. Within the same countries people negotiate
12 through intermediaries or to emissaries or special messengers or common
13 friends. It's not that people do it only in the international arena, it's
14 also within. Even in the same house, somebody comes in. So I was
15 wondering why this sort of attitude was shown, nobody bothered to check or
16 remind them or persuade them or send somebody to them. After all, this
17 was a very important matter, and what I hear from this declaration, this
18 statement of the president, he was all serious about it. Then somebody
19 had to implement this then. Why wasn't it done and nobody cared whether
20 they were coming or not, who was served, who did not serve, what further
21 steps be taken.
22 Was all this a perfunctory exercise or a meaningful is a question
23 which would arise in our mind, and we shall be grateful if you very kindly
24 throw some light on it because you were the actor, the main participant,
25 and nobody else will be able to tell us this. I'm grateful for your
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that there is testimony by
3 Mr. Fehmi Agani that they always received those invitations, but that they
4 deliberately did not want to respond to them. So it was not a matter of
5 the technology of delivery and the physical receipt of the invitations,
6 but rather of a political standpoint that they did not want to attend
7 these meetings because that would amount to an admission that Kosovo and
8 Metohija was a part of the Republic of Serbia. It would be tantamount to
9 a recognition of the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, the issue was not
10 that they had not received the invitations, but that it was their firm
11 standpoint that they would not attend those talks.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, although that doesn't answer the question, I
13 think we should move on.
14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Professor Markovic, you said you signed
15 invitations and notices. How many days' notice would have been under
16 those invitations and those notices? That's my first question. Can you
17 recall that?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that can be seen from the
19 government statement. It was done seven days in advance.
20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: My next question to you is this: In the normal
21 course of things, if you post a correspondence or a letter, such as your
22 notice or invitation, from the destination where these would have been
23 posted, how long would it have taken in the post to get to the varied
24 destinations that the notices were sent out to? That's another question I
25 wanted to know. In the post or via the post.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, according to my personal
2 experience, you would receive it the next day after it was posted.
3 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And other than the post, in the system that was
4 being employed for delivery of notices for those that were not -- if they
5 weren't posted, how long would your internal delivery system take to make
6 delivery of correspondence, as a general rule? Is it that it would remain
7 in the system for a few days or would there normally be immediate delivery
8 or how would it be carried out? If you don't know, you can say you do not
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think I can remember what
11 happened. The chief of the Kosovo district was Mr. Veljko Odalovic. I
12 think that the invitations were sent to him, and he with his team
13 personally organised the delivery of the invitations to the addresses of
14 the invitees. I know that Mr. Odalovic showed me the signature of
15 Mr. Rugova's chief of cabinet, confirming receipt of the invitation, but I
16 don't have it with me of course now. Mr. Odalovic may still have it, I
17 don't know.
18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much, Professor Markovic.
19 Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Professor, you sent these letters to everyone that they were
22 addressed to in the same way, right?
23 A. Yes, in the very same way.
24 Q. If I understand you correctly, some of them turned up. I think
25 you mentioned two specific names of members of some Albanian political
1 parties, but not the key Albanian political parties. So two minor
2 politicians responded to these invitations.
3 A. The best illustration of the fact that the invitations were
4 received was the fact that Mr. Faik Jashari and Mr. Sokol Qausha regularly
5 turned up. The same could be said of the representatives of the Roma
6 national minority and the Egyptian national minority as well as the Turks,
7 Guber Hasabovic [phoen] and Zenel Abedin Kures [phoen]. The same thing
8 applies to the representatives of the Gorani, they all received their
9 invitations and they all turned up for the meeting, which means that there
10 was nothing wrong with the delivery system.
11 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Do you remember if you personally
12 sent a letter in April 1998 to Ibrahim Rugova?
13 A. Indeed, I did send a letter to Ibrahim Rugova and Fehmi Agani.
14 Q. Do you remember the date?
15 A. I'd be hard-put to remember the exact date, but one thing that I
16 do know for certain is I sent letters to those persons.
17 Q. Can you tell us what the letters were about, letters that you sent
18 to Mr. Rugova and Mr. Fehmi Agani?
19 A. Might I be shown the letters before I start commenting? It's very
20 difficult to keep all of these things in mind.
21 Q. This is tab 11, 1D18, 3, 4, and 9, the page in e-court is 349,
22 this is paragraph 6, your letter dated the 26th of April, 1998, do you
23 recognise it sir?
24 A. Yes, I do, it's quite an extensive letter that I sent to
25 Mr. Rugova. I outlined the basic elements for talks, for a dialogue. I
1 restate my conviction, which was that of the state of Serbia as well, that
2 violence is not acceptable for achieving -- is not a viable tool for
3 achieving political aims. I also specify what I believe this dialogue
4 should comprise, the dialogue between the state delegation and the
5 representatives of all national minorities, all ethnic minorities, in
6 Kosovo and Metohija, including, needless to say, the majority Albanian
7 community. There is an English translation; therefore, I will not now
8 recount the substance of this letter.
9 Q. In this letter, Professor, you refer to a meeting that was
10 scheduled for the 28th of April, the 28th of April, 1998. Is that not
11 right, sir?
12 A. Yes. That was precisely what I proposed to Mr. Rugova.
13 Q. Professor, the 28th of April, 1998, in Pristina. What about that
14 meeting, did the representatives of the Albanian party turn up?
15 A. The 28th of April, if memory still serves -- well, I can't
16 remember. There were 16 or 17 such invitations and futile visits to
17 Pristina on our part. It wasn't more than once that we managed to meet
18 representatives of the Albanian political parties. It was in the
19 headquarters of the Kosovo and Metohija literary association, writers'
20 association, and the talks were headed for the Albanians by Fehmi Agani
21 and by myself on behalf of the Serb side. I'm afraid I might get the
22 dates wrong, but we did go 16 or 17 times to meet them. And it wasn't but
23 once that we managed to actually meet them.
24 Q. What about the date of the 22nd of May, the headquarters of the
25 Pristina writers' association, does that ring a bell, sir?
1 A. Yes, yes, it was in May. I do remember that. There were a large
2 number of foreign and domestic journalists from all sorts of media. It
3 was more a ceremonial meeting. These were no substantial talks between
4 the two parties. At the same time, this was the one and only time we ever
5 met during all of these efforts that we made to open a political dialogue
6 to have a proper political dialogue with the representatives of the
7 Albanian community.
8 Q. Professor, you said that the meeting took place on the 22nd of
9 May, was attended by the late Fehmi Agani. Do you remember who else was
10 there on behalf of the Albanian side?
11 A. Mr. Veton Surroi, Blerim Shala, Mahmut Bakalli, Mr. Kelmendi,
12 these are some of the persons I remember as being there, but you must bear
13 in mind the fact that this was all nine years ago.
14 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Do you remember the meeting
15 between President Milosevic and President Yeltsin in Moscow in June 1998?
16 A. I remember that a declaration, a joint declaration, was announced
17 that resulted from that meeting -- that was reached at that meeting. It
18 was signed in Moscow, and all I remember is what I read about this in the
19 media. I wasn't personally involved in this meeting in any way.
20 Q. Do you remember the substance of the joint declaration signed by
21 President Yeltsin and President Milosevic?
22 A. Yes, I do remember the substance. It reflected the positions of
23 our government. It prioritized a peaceful solution for resolving open
24 issues by political means.
25 Q. This declaration lifted any sort of restriction on diplomatic
1 emissaries of foreign countries in terms of their diplomatic contacts in
2 Kosovo. Isn't that a fact?
3 A. Yes, that was one of the requests that were made in that
5 Q. Unhindered access was guaranteed to all of Kosovo's different
6 areas to humanitarian organisations, including the International Red
7 Cross. Isn't that right?
8 A. Yes, that's one of the things stated in the declaration. I do
9 remember that clearly.
10 Q. Most importantly, do you remember that the Federal Republic of
11 Yugoslavia expressed its readiness to welcome OSCE to Serbia?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Professor, we have now conducted a brief analysis of
14 the substance of this declaration. In essence, did it reflect the
15 position and the policies pursued by Serbia's government at the time?
16 A. It reflected not only the policies and the position of the
17 government, but of all the political players in Serbia at the time. This
18 was a position that had been agreed upon by all in sundry in Serbia.
19 Everyone believed that this was the only way to go about all these open
20 issues in Kosovo.
21 Q. Professor, do you remember that you wrote a letter to Fehmi Agani
22 in August?
23 A. Yes, it was in August that I called on Mr. Fehmi Agani to attend
24 talks, the intention behind this being I wanted to try talking to a
25 specific person. We were colleagues. He was a university professor as
1 well as I was, and I believed that a sense of academic solidarity between
2 the two, especially since I was the one going to Pristina, that would
3 prompt Mr. Agani to respond to my invitation and to have an informal talk.
4 Q. Professor, can you please go to tab 17, 1D061. Is this the letter
5 that you wrote and is this the public announcement that you made
6 subsequently, the letter you wrote to Professor Agani as tab 17?
7 A. Yes, it is. On page 1 you can see exactly what I was asked
8 before, what the channels were for sending in signatures. This was the
9 information stated, the name of the sender, the reference, when the letter
10 was received or an invitation. On the previous page Mr. Fehmi Agani says
11 explicitly: "We received your letter" -- no, I'm just trying to answer
12 the question that I was asked before, when I was unable to state anything
13 with certainty. So the letters were received.
14 Q. [Microphone not activated]
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Professor, let us please take this one step at a time. There are
18 a number of technical matters that we need to resolve now. This is one of
19 those documents that we have no English translation for. Please try to
20 focus on your letter dated the 17th of August, 1998. Could you please
21 read it and --
22 A. The letter is a simple one. I address him as: "Dear Professor
23 Agani," as a gesture of solidarity.
24 "In relation to your letter dated the 17th of August this year, I
25 am glad to be able to express my satisfaction that you, too, want our
1 talks to resume as soon as possible. Let it be that way.
2 "Therefore, I propose that we meet as soon as tomorrow, Tuesday,
3 the 18th of August, at 1400 hours, in Pristina at Vidovdanska Street
4 number 2. I'm expecting your reply. Sincerely," on behalf of Serbia's
5 government, I signed this.
6 Q. So that's your letter?
7 A. Yes. That's my letter and my signature.
8 Q. If you turn to the next page, there is a public announcement which
9 contains the text of the letter which you have just read back to us,
11 A. Yes, that's right.
12 Q. Professor, you invoke here a letter sent to you by Professor
13 Agani. Can you please go to tab 16, 1D064. We do have a translation for
14 this one.
15 A. I answered this letter that same day.
16 Q. And?
17 A. And I scheduled talks for the next day. I was the one who
18 travelled from Belgrade to Pristina. Mr. Agani was in Pristina already.
19 Q. Professor in his letter -- Professor Agani talks about the
20 mediation of Ambassador Hill, who is in constant contact with both
21 Belgrade and Pristina. That's what Mr. Agani claims in the very last
22 sentence of the letter?
23 A. Yes, that's true.
24 Q. What about your letter written on that same day, what about your
25 agreement to meet him? Does that not indicate that you had absolutely no
1 problem whatsoever with the fact that this meeting should be mediated by
2 ambassador --
3 MR. HANNIS: I would object --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, please, it's a very leading question.
5 We're now into matters of fact.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, what was your position regarding this
8 proposal made by Mr. Agani in his letter dated the 17th of August?
9 A. I welcomed his initiative to have talks. I also proposed for us
10 to meet the next day in Pristina.
11 Q. In your letter you made no mention of Ambassador Hill's mediation.
12 What were your feelings about his mediation?
13 A. First of all, Ambassador Hill was not ambassador in the Federal
14 Republic of Yugoslavia. He was ambassador to Macedonia. He had attended
15 talks before. He wasn't seated at the table specifically, but he was
16 there for the Pristina talks when we held talks in the writers'
17 association in Kosovo and Metohija, the meeting that I referred to a while
18 ago. I didn't deem it necessary to refer to Ambassador Hill specifically.
19 I didn't understand why Ambassador Hill of all people should be
20 the one to mediate these talks between Mr. Agani, as a representative of
21 Kosovo and Metohija's Albanians on the one hand, and me as a
22 representative of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on the other.
23 Q. Professor, some moments ago we discussed the meeting that occurred
24 on the 22nd of May, the meeting with Fehmi Agani, Blerim Shala,
25 Veton Surroi, Mahmut Bakalli, Mr. Kelmendi, a meeting that took place in
1 the headquarters of the writers' association of Pristina?
2 A. Right.
3 Q. I asked you who attended the meeting. It's probably only now that
4 you remember Ambassador Hill being there, right?
5 A. Yes, but he wasn't with us at the table. He wasn't a participant
6 in these talks. He was in the same meeting, but not at the same table.
7 Q. Can you explain this a bit further so it doesn't appear that I'm
8 putting leading questions. Would you please explain the role of
9 Ambassador Hill in that meeting held on the 22nd of May, if you know.
10 A. I will tell you, and I'm certain that my recollections are quite
11 accurate. I went with an entire delegation, the second composition of the
12 delegation. And in the hallway Mr. Veton Surroi addressed me and asked me
13 whether I would agree to talk to Mr. Hill in one of the rooms of the
14 writers' club. I refused that and I said that we came to talk with the
15 delegation of Kosovo Albanians, not with Mr. Hill. That was the entire
16 substance of that meeting. So I did not see Mr. Hill on that occasion,
17 but I suppose that he was there, given that Mr. Surroi was offering me to
18 meet with him.
19 Q. Professor, can you tell us what was discussed on the 22nd of May
20 with the Albanian representatives in that meeting, the one that you
21 referred to just now.
22 A. The talks were not particularly meaningful. There were some
23 general platitudes about how a political dialogue was needed, how it was
24 important to resolve daily problems that civilians encountered. So this
25 was more of an overture to future talks rather than talks on specific,
1 concrete matters. There was really nothing to remember from that meeting.
2 There was nothing of substance that took place there.
3 Q. Professor, on that occasion on the 22nd of May, was there any
4 discussion of a new meeting of another date?
5 A. In principle, yes. We did not schedule a particular date, but in
6 principle we both expressed readiness to discuss these issues even though
7 the logistics and modes of these future talks were not discussed.
8 Q. Professor, on the basis of those talks, did the delegation of the
9 Government of Serbia go to Pristina again for talks on the 5th of June?
10 A. The delegation of the Government of Serbia, once again travelled
11 to these talks for the same reasons, counting that there was some progress
12 and that the talks would finally be launched. However, that was not the
13 case. The talks did not take off except for the talks with other ethnic
14 minorities in Kosovo, and the representatives of those two minor Albanian
15 political parties. Only they were the ones who came; the others did not.
16 It was my understanding that the Albanians - and when I say
17 "Albanians," I'm referring to leaders of majority political parties -
18 conceived these talks as exclusively talks between Serbs and Albanians as
19 though there were only Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo and no other
20 ethnic communities, such as Turks, Gorani, Egyptians, and so on. It was
21 our platform that we should take as a starting point the equal status of
22 all ethnic communities and not accept that position, that there were no
23 other ethnic communities in Kosovo but Albanian and Serbian ones.
24 Q. Thank you. Professor, now let us go back to your correspondence
25 with Professor Agani. He wrote a letter to you, you replied to him, and
1 then on the 18th of June you travelled to Pristina. Did Professor Agani
2 appear then?
3 A. He did not, and I waited for him for an exceptionally long time,
4 for several hours, following which I returned to Belgrade.
5 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember the resolution of the
6 Security Council dated the 23rd of September, 1998, number 1199?
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one thing, Mr. Zecevic. Did you mean the 18th
8 of August?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I'm sorry, it was my mistake.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: That's in 93, line 8.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you should ask the witness again then,
15 since you may have been thinking --
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Professor, I misspoke when I asked you about the meeting with
18 Professor Agani. I referred to the 18th of June, but since you exchanged
19 those letters on the 17th of August, as you have already testified, you
20 scheduled a meeting with him for the 18th of August, correct?
21 A. Yes, and I travelled on the 18th of August. I realised that you
22 made a mistake, but I also realised that that was a slip of the tongue.
23 Q. Thank you. Professor, my question centred on the UN Resolution
24 1199, which is tab 18 here, P0456. Are you familiar with the content of
25 this resolution, are you not?
1 A. Certainly I am. I was still an unsuccessful head of the
2 delegation for negotiations with Kosovo Albanians at the time, so
3 naturally I followed all of these events.
4 Q. Professor, please look at page 2 of the resolution, last
5 paragraph, where the Security Council calls upon the authorities and the
6 Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter into dialogue. The delegation that
7 you headed and the government, were they ready to enter the dialogue with
8 the Kosovo Albanians as the Security Council Resolution requested you to
10 A. Yes, absolutely. The government was ready and it based its
11 position on the part of the resolution which says that the Security
12 Council once again confirms the commitment of all member states to the
13 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
14 Yugoslavia. That means that it was precisely that position of the
15 Security Council that we used as a basis for insisting on these talks. In
16 this resolution, the Security Council once again calls upon the
17 authorities of FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately
18 into meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international
19 involvement, and to a clear timetable leading to an end of the crisis and
20 to negotiate a political solution to the issue of Kosovo.
21 Therefore, in this resolution they guarantee the sovereignty and
22 territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was a
23 very strong encouragement for the Government of Serbia to persevere in
24 their insistence to hold negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians.
25 Q. If I understood you correctly, the text of this resolution, item 3
1 on the second page, the last paragraph, was quite acceptable to the
2 Government of the Republic of Serbia and the delegation led by you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Professor, I see that you highlighted or emphasised the part of
5 the resolution that speaks of the commitment of all member states to the
6 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
7 Yugoslavia. That's on the previous page.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Would you please explain why you emphasised this, why you referred
10 to this.
11 A. Well, I did that because as early as its first statement, its
12 first announcement on the 10th of March, 1998, the government as well as
13 the president of the Republic of Serbia in his declaration on the 18th of
14 March, 1998, they both showed willingness to solve the issue of Kosovo and
15 Metohija within the framework of the Republic of Serbia in compliance with
16 the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of
17 Serbia. So in all of those appeals, that was the interpretation of the
18 political dialogue. That is to say we were not considering the change of
19 status of Kosovo and Metohija. And it was not supposed to become an
20 independent state, rather the talks were aimed at establishing what scope
21 of autonomy Kosovo wanted; that needed to be established.
22 Q. Based on your experience and based on those infrequent contacts
23 that you had with the representatives of Kosovo Albanians, tell us what
24 was their position on that issue?
25 A. Well, you have to distinguish between the Kosovo Albanians who
1 came to talk with our delegation who had the same aims, who had the same
2 intentions, as representatives of all other ethnic communities. So in the
3 talks that we had with them they expressed the same efforts, the same
4 convictions. And I suppose that the leaders of the majority political
5 parties of Kosovo Albanians wanted something quite different.
6 Later on we -- it became evident in Rambouillet. They did not
7 want to sign the ten basic principles of the Contact Groups, precisely
8 because one of those principles insisted on territorial integrity and
9 sovereignty of Yugoslavia.
10 Q. Thank you, Professor.
11 Professor, in September the National Assembly of the Republic of
12 Serbia adopted a decision on the temporary Executive Council of the
13 province of Kosovo. Do you remember that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. That's tab 19, P907. Would you please explain this to us, since
16 this was proposed by the government, and you were the deputy prime
17 minister of the government.
18 A. Well, yes, this decision of the government was an expression of
19 the willingness to organise a cabinet in order to solve the daily -- the
20 problems relating to the daily life in Kosovo and Metohija. So this
21 temporary Executive Council of the province of Kosovo and Metohija was
22 precisely a reflection of such intentions on the part of the Republic of
23 Serbia; namely, efforts aimed at solving daily problems encountered by the
24 population of Kosovo and Metohija regardless of their ethnic background.
25 Q. So if I understood you well, that was the reason why the
1 government proposed to the National Assembly to pass a decision forming
2 the provisional Executive Council of the autonomous province of Kosovo and
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Thank you. Professor, in 1998 did you meet with Ambassador Hill?
6 A. Yes, I did. I met with Mr. Hill as well as Mr. O'Brien, who was a
7 legal expert. Mr. Hill was not a lawyer. I met with them concerning the
8 drafting of an agreement or perhaps a plan, perhaps I should call it a
9 plan for self rule, in Kosovo and Metohija. Mr. Vladan Kutlesic was
10 always a participant in such talks on our side. At the time he was deputy
11 prime minister of the federal government. Both of us are constitutional
13 Q. Would you please explain the process to us. This was the draft
14 proposal or plan for self rule in Kosovo. Would you tell us how this
15 transpired, how frequent these meetings were, over what period of time,
16 and so on.
17 A. Well, these meetings took place all the way up until 1999, if I
18 remember well. The composition of delegations was always the same. In
19 those meetings, Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien, or rather, to those meetings
20 Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien would bring in their proposals for this plan or
21 agreement on self-administration of Kosovo, we would give our comments,
22 and then they would go with our comments to Kosovo and Metohija and then
23 come back to us to convey to us whether the Kosovo Albanians accepted or
24 not the suggestions given by us.
25 There were -- I can't tell you how many versions of this plan for
1 self-administration in Kosovo and Metohija. There were a lot of them. I
2 know that I wrote an article for Politika concerning one of the last
3 versions of this agreement, and as I was able to establish later, many of
4 those ideas or solutions were later integrated into the draft agreement in
5 Rambouillet, especially annex 1 or chapter 1 which was entitled
6 "Constitution for Kosovo and Metohija."
7 Q. Professor, was President Milutinovic involved in the talks with
8 Chris Hill?
9 A. Yes, President Milutinovic was involved in those talks as well,
10 quite actively so. However, the wording of the provisions was something
11 that Mr. Kutlesic and I mostly dealt with it on our side, and it was
12 Mr. O'Brien who did that on the US side.
13 Q. This contact with Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien and the exchange of
14 drafts which, as you say, were taken to Kosovo in order to be discussed
15 with the representatives of the majority political parties of Albanians,
16 was that the kind of mediation that we discussed a bit earlier? Is that
17 what you saw under this mediation role?
18 A. Yes, that's what I understood under their mediation role. This is
19 what the mediation boiled down to, namely, that the draft plan which was
20 most likely produced by Mr. O'Brien would be given to us to comment upon
21 them, and then they would take our comments to Pristina, obtain the
22 opinion of Kosovo Albanians concerning them, and then convey that to us.
23 So they were facilitators, they were mediators in these
24 non-existing contacts between Mr. Milutinovic, Mr. Kutlesic, and myself on
25 one side and Kosovo Albanians on the other side.
1 Q. Professor, you did not have any contact with the representatives
2 of the majority Albanian parties in Kosovo, as I understood, because of
3 their refusal to show up for talks; is that correct?
4 A. Apart from the date you mentioned, the 22nd of May, 1998, I think
5 we never had any other contact with them. This includes the meetings in
6 Rambouillet and Paris. In Rambouillet there was one instance of physical
7 contact, but it was not a dialogue. It was a monologue by each side in
8 the presence of Madeleine Albright.
9 Q. Professor, regardless of the mediating mission of Mr. Hill and
10 Mr. O'Brien, as the delegation of the Serbian Assembly, you continued
11 making attempts to invite the representatives of the majority Albanian
12 parties for talks, did you not?
13 A. Yes, we did, because throughout this time we felt that direct
14 contacts and direct talks were the most fruitful way to find a solution
15 rather than talking through mediators who, let it be said, knew very
16 little about the history of the problem, all the manifestations of the
17 problem in the present, and who were not familiar with the spirit of our
18 legal system either because these were people coming from a completely
19 different legal system. The legal terminology was quite different. These
20 were the reasons for the misunderstandings we had in our contacts.
21 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember that you sent a letter to
22 Mr. Agani in early October 1998?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Would you please look at tab 22, 1D063. Is that your letter?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Could you please briefly comment on this letter because -- well,
2 especially on the last paragraph of this letter.
3 A. Well, in the letter for the umpteenth time, the conviction is
4 expressed of the advantages of dialogue and solving all outstanding issues
5 by political means in the interest of all the citizens and national or
6 ethnic communities living in Kosovo and Metohija, and in the passage
7 before the last it says that I'm asking Mr. Agani to consider this an open
8 invitation, and I say that I hope we will soon have an opportunity to
9 agree on a time for the continuation of the talks. In other words, to
10 determine the date ourselves. However, this also remains simply a voice
11 calling in the desert, crying out in the desert, without any response.
12 Q. When you said that you asked Professor Agani to consider this an
13 open invitation, an open-ended call, does that mean that you were willing
14 to meet him and talk to him at any time, anywhere?
15 A. Yes, the second sentence states that and clarifies it.
16 Q. Thank you. Professor, you remember a conversation -- well, you
17 were aware that President Milosevic had talks with Mr. Holbrooke in early
18 October 1998, and these led to an agreement. Do you remember that?
19 A. Yes, I know about that.
20 Q. The Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was presented to the cabinet.
21 Do you remember that?
22 A. Yes, it was. The president of the republic, Milan Milutinovic,
23 informed the cabinet of the content of those talks and that agreement.
24 Q. And did the cabinet accept the agreement achieved between
25 President Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke?
1 A. Yes, it did and it established 11 points for the solution of the
2 unresolved issue of Kosovo and Metohija.
3 Q. Thank you. Professor, are you aware that this fact was something
4 that Yugoslavia informed the Security Council about?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Would you please look at tab 27, 1D204. Our then charge d'affaire
7 in the mission to the United Nations in New York, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic,
8 signed the letter; do you see that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. This letter contains the 11 points you mentioned which the
11 Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted, does it not?
12 A. Yes, they are set out in order.
13 Q. And it also contains a certain timetable or schedule containing
14 the dates by which certain agreements were to be achieved and some sort of
15 preparatory documents prepared, does it not?
16 A. Yes. Dates are mentioned. You see, it's all in English. There's
17 no need for me to explain it.
18 Q. Professor, that schedule mentioned here, of which the Security
19 Council was notified, was also adopted by the government, was it not, on
20 the same date?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Professor, tell me, to the best of your knowledge did
23 the government implement this agreement, or rather, these 11 points which
24 it adopted in October 1998?
25 A. I don't understand what you mean by "implement." What do you
1 imply by that?
2 Q. Well, carry out.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Professor, even after all of this you continued going
5 to Kosovo, yes or no?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Were you in Kosovo with President Milutinovic on the 5th of
8 November, 1998?
9 A. Yes, I was. That was the second time President Milutinovic was
10 going to Kosovo and Metohija with the delegation.
11 Q. Will you please look at tab 31, 1D40 --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D045.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Do you remember the communique and the statement made for the
15 public by President Milutinovic at the time?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is it the one you have before you?
18 A. Yes, precisely so.
19 Q. In paragraph 2, as we see, President Milutinovic is still
20 referring to a firm agreement for the solution of all issues by political
22 A. Yes. He expressed the standpoint in the declaration of the 18th
23 of March of 1998.
24 Q. Now that you've said this, Professor, do you know whether
25 President Milutinovic ever changed this standpoint?
1 A. No, never.
2 Q. Thank you. On page 2 President Milutinovic in the passage before
3 the last of his statement explains how the authorities and all of the
4 Republic of Serbia sees the OSCE mission. Can you comment on this and was
5 this the way you saw it also and was this is the position of the
6 government, the cabinet?
7 A. Yes, that was the reason why the OSCE mission was accepted, in the
8 interest of finding out the truth about the events in Kosovo and Metohija
9 and to deal with and get rid of media harangues, as is stated here, to
10 present the truth to the world, eliminate rumours, speculation, and
11 organise media incitement and the like.
12 Q. Thank you, Professor. You said at the very outset that this was
13 the second time that President Milutinovic went to Kosovo together with a
14 delegation. Do you remember how many times in total President Milutinovic
15 went to Kosovo with a delegation?
16 A. As far as I can remember on one more occasion and that had to do
17 with the signing of the so-called Pristina declaration.
18 Q. Professor, tell me, what in your view was the reason why
19 President Milutinovic went to Kosovo with the delegation for the meetings
20 with the representatives of the majority Albanian parties?
21 A. The reason was the one I've already mentioned. The high state
22 official, the head of state, directly elected by the citizens, even though
23 he had no strong effective constitutional power, wished by his presence to
24 indicate the significance attached by the state to those talks to
25 encourage and motivate the representatives of the majority Albanian
1 parties for political dialogue and by presenting his ideas on what
2 starting principles to adopt for the talks to contribute to the beginning
3 of a dialogue. And these efforts are all evident in the president's
4 declaration, his statement which sets out all these ideas, saying that
5 closing themselves into a cultural and ethnic ghetto was not a solution.
6 Q. You mentioned the third occasion on which President Milutinovic
7 went to Kosovo. Please take a look at tab 33, 1D622, and this is his
8 introductory statement at the talks with the representatives of national
9 communities in Kosovo and Metohija, Pristina, 18th of November, 1998. Do
10 you remember that meeting?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. Do you remember the president's keynote speech?
13 A. Yes. In his keynote speech the president again expressed his
14 basic ideas, which were, so to speak, the red thread, a constant in his
15 views on the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.
16 Q. In any case, this boiled down to the need for a political solution
17 which was indispensable?
18 A. Yes, precisely so. That was the starting point in President
19 Milutinovic's ideas.
20 Q. Please look at 1D623, these are the concluding remarks by the
21 president. Do you remember his concluding remarks at that same meeting?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember that President Milutinovic
24 too sent letters to the Albanian leaders, in a bid to in a way encourage
25 them, stimulate them, to attend meetings with the delegation, do you
1 remember that?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Do you remember who he sent those letters to, the political
4 leaders or also prominent members of the Albanian community in Kosovo?
5 A. He sent letters to both, he sent letters to the political leaders,
6 the political leaders of the Albanian ethnic community, Mr. Qausha,
7 Hyseni, Demaqi.
8 Q. Therefore, both the government and the president did their best.
9 How can we understand this? An attempt was made to talk to the Albanian
10 leaders at all costs, or perhaps there's a different interpretation that
11 you would suggest?
12 A. This was an effort that was made to encourage those most prominent
13 among Kosovo's Albanians. For example, Mr. Qausha has an academic
14 reputation, not merely a political one. An attempt, as I said, to talk,
15 to use their authority, to use their reputation in order to contribute to
16 political talks and in order to stop armed clashes throughout Kosovo.
17 Q. Can you please look at tab 36, Professor, 1D066, are these the
18 letters that we have been mentioning, the letters to Qausha, to Demaqi, to
20 A. Yes, these are the very letters. Their substance is identical.
21 They were just sent to different persons, and I explained why these very
22 persons. These are important persons in the Albanian ethnic community.
23 These are not just politicians. Their importance is not solely political.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: I think it's time, Your Honours, for a break. I
25 definitely need one I can tell you -- I can assure you that and Professor
1 too, I believe.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Professor, that's it for today. The usher
3 will escort you from the court, and we'll continue tomorrow at 9.00.
4 [The witness stands down].
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.30 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day of
7 August, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.