1 Monday, 20 August 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, your next witness.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the next witness is Dragan
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 WITNESS: DRAGAN MILANOVIC
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Milanovic.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you make the solemn declaration to speak the
16 truth which reading allowed the document which will now be shown to you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila will now examine you.
21 Mr. Fila.
22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Examination by Mr. Fila:
24 Q. Would you please tell us your name and profession?
25 A. I'm Dragan Milanovic. I have a degree in electrical engineering.
1 I was born in 1951 in Niksic. I completed elementary school in Tuzla, in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; high school in Bor; and the Faculty of Electrical
3 Engineering, at the university in Belgrade.
4 Q. Please remove that piece of paper from the desk. You shouldn't
5 have anything on that table. Mr. Milanovic, what did you do from 1995
6 until 2000? Where did you work?
7 A. I worked in Elektroistok; that is to say, that is my first and
8 only company for as long as I worked in Yugoslavia, rather, in Serbia. I
9 started in Elektroistok in 1975 as a trainee. During my career, I was
10 promoted all the way up to technical director. This is a company that
11 deals with the transmission of electric energy throughout the territory of
12 the Republic of Serbia. It is organised in five - how should I put
13 this? - regional centres.
14 Up until 1998, the end of the summer, that is, I was director of a
15 plant in Bor; and after that, from 1998 to 2000, I was director of
16 Elektroistok; that is to say, this company for power transmission in
17 Serbia, that is to say, the technical director for that for all of Serbia.
18 Q. At the time of the NATO strikes, were transformer stations and
19 plants NATO targets?
20 A. Yes. Practically, transmission plants, that is to say,
21 transmission lines and transformer stations, were the only target as far
22 as the electric industry is concerned. NATO did not bomb power plants.
23 But as for transmission - and that is really the blood circulation, so to
24 speak, of the entire system - that is what NATO bombed, particularly in
25 May, from the 2nd of May up until the end of May. There were more than
1 nine attacks in two stages.
2 Q. Thank you. What about the transformer station in Bor? Was it
3 also bombed?
4 A. Bor has four transformer stations. One is a system-based one of
5 400 kilowatt, and within it is the regional dispatch centre for regulating
6 electric energy in the area. That is Bor 2. In addition to that, there
7 is a transformer station which has to do with distribution; that is to say
8 for general consumption. That is Bor 1.
9 In Krivelj, there is this transformer station for the mining
10 industry oriented toward the Krivelj mine, and transformer station Bor 3
11 which is - how should I put this? - in the centre of the foundry of Bor,
12 and its basic purpose is for consumers within the RTB Bor, the mining and
13 foundry complex of Bor. That had been bombed, too.
14 Q. When?
15 A. It was bombed on the 15th of May around 2200 hours the first time.
16 After that, within four, five-day intervals, it was bombed another two
17 times, so it was practically bombed until it was levelled to the ground.
18 We needed four months only to clear the rubble.
19 Q. Where did you happen to be when the transformer station Bor 3 had
20 been hit, as you had put it?
21 A. Around 8.00, in the evening, I had come from Nis where I had been
22 working all day, where I was organising work in eliminating the effects of
23 the bombing of the transformer station of Nis 2, which is the biggest one
24 in the Balkans. It was bombed with fibre optic shells, and the warehouse
25 of Jugopetrol was bombed on that day. It's 50 metres away from this
1 system-based transformer station that I referred to. Some transmission
2 lines were hit then as well.
3 So Bor had a great many problems in terms of providing power to
4 all our consumers, and they asked me to come from Nis so that we could
5 analyse what the situation was on the ground so that we'd see what it to
6 do. So I arrived from Nis around 8.00 in the evening. I arrived in Bor,
7 and I was at Bor 2 when this strike took place against Bor 3 at 2200
9 Q. That's not the one that was hit, right?
10 A. No, no. I'm saying this is the system-based transformer station,
11 within which the dispatch centre is, and we were all analysing things as
12 to what could be done if yet another transmission line was to be hit.
13 This system-based trance former station is about ten kilometres away from
14 this other station, Bor 3, that had been hit and that is supposed to
15 provide electricity for the RTB Bor.
16 Q. And why was it you exactly who was working on this there and in
17 other places in Serbia?
18 A. In terms of my position and my knowledge, I was technical
19 director. I had a great deal of experience in maintaining and developing
20 the network. How should I put this? I'm familiar with the soul of the
21 Serbian network. Wherever there were serious problems - and there were
22 quite a few at that - I intervened with my teams throughout Serbia; that
23 is to say, from Vojvodina all the way to the Albania-Macedonian-Bulgarian
25 Q. How did you find out that Bor 3 had been hit? You said you were
1 ten kilometres away.
2 A. Bor 3 has two feeds from the Bor 2 station. We were sitting there
3 and working, and we heard an explosion from far away. At the same moment,
4 the alarm went off on Bor 2. I looked at the board, and I saw that these
5 two transmission lines that were the feeders of the transformer station
6 were no longer functioning. It was obvious that something terrible had
8 Q. And then?
9 A. At the same moment, I got into the official car, and I went to Bor
10 3 where I saw that the person who was manning the station had been hit.
11 His arm had been wounded. I took him to hospital. In the meantime, he
12 came to. I handed him over to the doctors. The wound was not that bad.
13 Then, with Ljubo Spasojevic, who was the local director, I went to the
14 transformer station, the transformer station that had been hit, to see
15 what the proportions of the damage were.
16 When I realised what the damage was -- the extent of the damage
17 was, and when I thought what the possible solution might be, I went to RTB
18 Bor and I was sure that I would see the management of the system there.
19 It's a well-known thing in Bor when something happens within the RTB Bor,
20 all the management of the entire system, starting with the foreman
21 upwards, they quickly assemble to see what should be done in order to
22 redress the damage.
23 Q. And who did you find there at the management building of the Bor
25 A. In the management building of RTB Bor, that is to say, of the
1 foundry and refinement, I first saw that the lights were on in the
2 director's office and that there were people there. I went there and
3 Nikola Sainovic came up. He came in his car.
4 Inside we found, well, roughly, I think, about 20 people. The
5 general director of Bor, Ninoslav Cvetanovic; then there was the director
6 of a factory, Mirko Grcic; then the director of the foundry, Veselin
7 Savovic; then there was the director of the mining sector, Blagoje
8 Spasovski; then there was the desk officer for protection, Dusko Nikolic;
9 Ljubo Spasojevic, the local director for transmission, was with me. That
10 is to say, there were about 20 people there.
11 Q. You said that then Nikola Sainovic came roughly at the same time
12 you did in his own car. Did he drive it on his own?
13 A. On his own.
14 Q. Without an escort?
15 A. He drove his own car.
16 Q. Were you surprised to see him there on the 15th of May, 1999?
17 A. No, I wasn't surprised. Nikola Sainovic has close ties to Bor.
18 He was born in Bor. He grew up in Bor, and that is not only
19 characteristic of him being attached to Bor. It's a general
20 characteristic of all of us who spent part of our lives in Bor. We are
21 attached to Bor.
22 Now, Nikola Sainovic is in a bit of a special situation, even in
23 comparison to me. He has a weekend cottage there. He has a mother who is
24 well advanced in age, so he wants to keep her out in the fresh air. He
25 held some very high offices outside Bor; but irrespective of that, he'd
1 always go back to Bor, and he'd find his own peace there, as he puts it.
2 Q. And what were the positions he held in Bor?
3 A. Well, you know, I'm afraid I'm going to make some mistakes because
4 I really do not belong to that world. I know that he was chief of the
5 local party. He was the local party chief, then he was president of the
6 municipality, then he was -- well, I know more about this now. He was
7 director for the development of RTB Bor, and that is where we had an
8 excellent cooperation. I met him there as an engineer.
9 Then, I think -- no, it's not that I think. I'm sure. Well, I
10 don't know whether there was something in the meantime, but I know for
11 sure, at any rate, that he was Minister for Energy in the government of
12 Serbia. After that, he was Prime Minister of Serbia, and after that the
13 Deputy federal Prime Minister.
14 Q. He was a Member of Parliament as well, wasn't he, I assume, for
15 that area?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, can you help me with what exactly is RTB
19 Bor? When the installations in Bor were described, I think it was simply
20 that these initials were used. It's a mining and foundry complex, is it?
21 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes, mining and foundry complex of Bor.
22 The witness is an engineer and he worked there, so he can give you the
23 best possible explanation as to what it's all about.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: So it comes under the same umbrella as
25 Elektroistok, or is it different from Elektroistok. I think you need to
1 clarify the distinction between these for us.
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Milanovic, can you explain to the Chamber what Elektroistok
4 is, where you worked, and what RTB Bor exactly means?
5 A. The mining and foundry basin of Bor, RTB - I mean, that's the
6 abbreviation that stands for it - that is a copper manufacturer from the
7 actual copper mine to the final product, all the way up to the final
9 Elektroistok, on the other hand, is part of the power industry of
10 Serbia. It includes all the power plants that make power. There is a
11 single company only that deals with the transmission of power, of electric
12 energy, and there are seven or eight companies for -- for the distribution
13 of power; that is to say, that these are two completely independent
15 I worked in the power company, or rather, in the electric energy
16 industry dealing with power transmission.
17 Q. And the transformer station of Bor 3 was within the RTB Bor
18 complex; right?
19 A. Yes. Physically, it was located within RTB Bor, and it was
20 supposed to provide electricity for the consumers within RTB Bor. In
21 terms of ownership, it belonged to Elektroistok, or rather, the company
22 for transmission, for power transmission, of the Republic of Serbia,
23 because at this transformer station we were practically selling power to
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much, Mr. Fila.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you know where Nikola Sainovic had come from?
3 A. Well, Sainovic was in jeans and he looked sleepy to me, so I
4 thought that he had come from his weekend cottage. Well, this is what I
5 thought and this was my impression, and that proved to be true. As we
6 were walking into the room, we walked in together into this conference
7 room. Mirko Grcic, the director of one sector in Bor, said, "Are you
8 coming from the lake?" And he said, "Well, yeah." And he said, "When did
9 you come?" And he said, "I've been here for a few days now."
10 Q. "From the lake means," from his weekend cottage?
11 A. Yes, that's where he has his weekend cottage.
12 Q. Do you remember whether he said when he had to leave?
13 A. No, I don't.
14 Q. Did you speak or agree anything about the president of the
16 A. You know, this foundry section of Bor has -- is organised around
17 hot technologies for melting copper, and that's why these -- the purpose
18 of these meetings is to take adequate measures to reduce the damage that
19 would be the consequence of a power failure. And that was the principal
20 topic of the discussions. I tried to introduce another topic to stop, or
21 rather, not to activate, not to use that procedure any more because there
22 was an ecological threat for the entire region.
23 But they were very busy with their own problems, which compressor
24 should be switched on, which should be switched off, et cetera. So, on
25 that evening, I didn't have the chance to speak about what I wanted to
1 discuss. And when we started discussing what to do next, then they called
2 a meeting on the following day, at 10.00 of the following morning, at the
3 municipality president's office. There were many problems again, and I
4 had to go to Novi Sad on the following day. So I left for Belgrade on the
5 spot, and the local director, Ljubo Spasojevic, went to that meeting.
6 Q. When you said they agreed to meet at 10.00 at the municipality
7 president's office, does that include Nikola Sainovic?
8 A. Yes. Nikola Sainovic; the director of the mining basin, Ninoslav
9 Cvetanovic; and the municipality president, Ilija Tanikic; and the other
10 managers of the various sections of the mining basin.
11 Q. You said, a minute ago, that you returned to Belgrade immediately,
12 and did anyone contact you on the following day around noon on behalf of
13 the municipality president -- or rather, from Zebic.
14 A. No, not from Zebic, from Bor. Yes, the municipality president
15 Ilija Tanikic called me. He was a nervous guy.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Just stop in advance of that question,
17 Mr. Milanovic. Mr. Fila will now ask you any additional question he
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
20 Q. When he called you, was Mr. Sainovic present then?
21 A. I suppose so because they had agreed to meet, but I don't know the
23 Q. Did they require you to activate that transformer station, too,
24 and you refused?
25 A. Yes. Well, refused would be too harsh a word, but my idea was not
1 to activate the trance former station because the bombers would be back.
2 And I never gave instructions, and I discreetly or tacitly didn't allow
3 that transformer station to be activated again.
4 Q. But irrespective of that --
5 A. But after the second wave, and especially third wave of bombers,
6 there was nothing left to activate. As I said, we needed four months just
7 to clean up the debris.
8 Q. Let's now tackle another topic, which will also be the last I'll
9 ask you about. During the bombing, you described what you were doing with
10 regard to the transmission network, and you said that NATO bombed with
11 using these special kind of bombs and that their targets were transformer
12 stations. About the damage done, did you contact Nikola Sainovic
13 regarding that during the war in any way?
14 A. Well, precisely speaking, he contacted me. After each bombing -
15 and these were mostly night-time bombings after 9.00 p.m. until dawn - and
16 after these massive attacks, the consequences of which were power failures
17 and blackouts in all of Serbia, he called me on my mobile phone and he
18 wanted to know. That's what impressed me always, and that's why I
19 answered his calls, because I usually didn't answer phone calls at the
21 He was interested in whether people had been wounded or whether
22 there were casualties. He didn't ask for details, but he was interested
23 in our forecast with regard to when we could put the plant in function
24 again and which parts of Serbia had been left without power.
25 Q. Can you answer the following: How much time had elapsed after the
1 bombings and when he called you?
2 A. Mobile phones, 15 minutes before the bombing and half an hour
3 after the bombing, did not function. So there was -- the network crashed.
4 So he would call at least half an hour after the bombing. As to from
5 which phones, I'm not sure from which phones he called me, but I know that
6 in my phone's memory I had his home number. And I have already said that
7 due to my many obligations and to the -- to all the communication with
8 regard to putting the system back into function, I didn't answer all
10 I can show you the phone and the entry in my phone read "Saja."
11 And I still know the know the number, and I would answer his calls and
12 tell him what he wanted to know.
13 Q. Was that a Belgrade number?
14 A. Yes. 011, et cetera.
15 Q. And that is his home number?
16 A. Yes, his home number.
17 Q. That's what you said, but it wasn't recorded. Can you tell us in
18 rough terms how often that happened during the bombing, once, twice, ten
19 times, several times, whatever?
20 A. You mean how often he called me?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. As a rule, he called every time after each bombing. There were
23 some nine attacks. Possibly, he failed to call at one time or another,
24 but I don't remember.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you remember the -- whether Nikola Sainovic
1 consulted you at any time with regard to the graphite bomb attacks against
2 the power lines?
3 A. Well, he asked me - I don't remember exactly when it was - a day,
4 two, or three after the first attack with the fibre optics, and that
5 attack was on the 2nd. On the 4th or 5th of May, he asked me on the
6 phone, so it was a very brief conversation. And they -- the weapons used
7 were new. That was a new type of weapon, and it is used for the
8 production of radar screens. And this time it was used to cause short
9 circuits in power plants and installations.
10 And then he wanted to know what we were doing about that, and I
11 answered we remove -- that we removed it mechanically. And I couldn't
12 tell him on the phone with who he were working on the development of a
13 chemical means to turn these fibre optics into -- into non-conducting
15 Q. Thank you. And let me put you one last question. How long have
16 you known Sainovic?
17 A. For 41 years, since 1946 -- sorry, 1966. I came to Bor from Tuzla
18 at the time. I was in second form of secondary school, and he attended
19 technical school at the time.
20 Q. How would you characterise the man, professionally and as a
22 A. That's a tough one. There are two aspects to that. I met Nikola
23 Sainovic as an engineer. We've known each other for 41 years, and we
24 socialised and we met each other in town. But for the first time I met
25 him as an engineer was when he was the director of development at RTB Bor.
1 He was an engineer at the time. And I was pleasantly surprised by his
2 profound technical knowledge and even more by his very pragmatic technical
4 At the time, he started something which nowadays is very topical
5 throughout the world, and that is rational power consumption, power
6 economy. And he consulted me with regard to that because we were already
7 engaged in activities concerning the transmission network, and he had a
8 clear vision for that to grow into a section that would deal with the
9 management -- with managing the entire system. And his first step toward
10 registering and recording power consumption had been done. He was an
11 excellent engineer. It's too bad that he was lost for the profession.
12 And the second aspect, you've already asked me what he had done.
13 He was -- he held a number of high positions.
14 With regard to his characteristics as a person, it may be best if
15 I gave you two examples so that you can draw your own conclusions. He was
16 held in high esteem in the environment where he had spent most of his
17 life, but he was also known for the following: It was impossible for him
18 to hire anyone -- anyone if that wasn't strictly in line with the rules,
19 and he wouldn't have a child inscribed in school against the rules.
20 And my opinion was that it wasn't -- that wasn't a good thing,
21 that he was wrong. And he answered to me, "You know, Dragan, the first
22 child I would admit against the rules would not be -- would not only be
23 bad for that child, but it would be even worse for another child who could
24 not be admitted because this kid was admitted against the rules." That --
25 that's what his personality was like.
1 And something else that I must mention. Those were hard times in
2 Serbia, the embargo, the transition process. They were really hard times,
3 and he was one of the very few people who never had crooks around him.
4 And "crooks" is the term used in civilised countries; and in countries in
5 transitions, you call them tycoons. He never had that sort of people
6 around him.
7 He was a very moral person, very ethical, and he was very
8 demanding toward his fellow workers with whom he communicated.
9 Q. And with regard to his humanitarian work?
10 A. He was not only known for not employing anyone against the rules
11 or admitting anyone to school against the rules. He was also known not
12 only in Bor, but in all of Timocka Krajina, the region surrounding Bor.
13 Whenever he learned that someone was ill or having problems, a child or
14 someone's mother, et cetera, it was certain that that person would be
15 placed in the best hospital and would be provided the best medical carry
16 available. That was a logical consequence of his entire personality.
17 I cannot characterise it as love towards Sainovic on the part of
18 the inhabitants, but they respected him greatly.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Milanovic. Thank you for coming here and thank you
20 for these nice words, and now you are the Prosecution's witness?
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.
22 Mr. Stamp.
23 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:
25 Q. You were asked about the role and functions of Mr. Sainovic, and
1 you said that you might make mistakes because you don't really belong to
2 that world. Do you know what his roles and functions were in regard to
3 events in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?
4 A. I have no idea. I don't have the faintest idea. I'm an engineer,
5 a professional.
6 Q. You also said that you never knew him to have -- to associate with
7 tycoons and crooks. Do you know whether he's been charged with any
8 criminal offence in Serbia?
9 A. I really don't know whether he was charged. I haven't been in
10 Serbia for two years now. And after the October events, or in other words
11 after the democratic transition of power, there was a massive hysteria
12 about everything that meant -- that had any significance on the
13 technological professional world, and there were also stories in the
14 papers about the head of customs. I remember a man called Zebic, and the
15 name of Nikola Sainovic was also mentioned.
16 I can only say what -- what I heard, and I'm not sure about the
17 source of that information.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you very much, sir.
19 MR. STAMP: I have nothing further, Your Honours. Thank you very
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
22 Mr. Milanovic, that completes your evidence. Thank you for coming
23 here to give it. You're now free to leave the courtroom.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, your next witness.
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my next witness is
3 Zivadin Jovanovic, the former federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
4 former Yugoslavia, and that's likely to take quite some time.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 WITNESS: ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Jovanovic.
10 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to
12 speak the truth by reading allowed the document which will now be shown to
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
15 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated. You will now be
17 examined by Mr. Fila.
18 Mr. Fila.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Fila, please.
20 Examination by Mr. Fila:
21 Q. [Interpretation] Please try to sit comfortably. This will take
22 some time.
23 For the record, please state your name.
24 A. I am Zivadin Jovanovic.
25 Q. Tell us about your state and party positions, the positions that
1 you held back in 1998 and 1989 -- 1998 and 1999.
2 A. I was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
3 Yugoslavia in those years. As for my party positions, I was chairman of
4 Council for International Cooperation Committee of the Socialist Party of
6 Q. When did you become minister in the federal government?
7 A. In January 1998. I remained in that position until November 2000
8 Q. Did you have a diplomatic career before then?
9 A. I am a career diplomat. I had worked in diplomacy with almost no
10 interruptions since 1964.
11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what was the situation in Kosovo and Metohija in
12 the spring and summer of 1998?
13 A. The situation was very difficult. There were terrorist activities
14 by a terrorist organisation known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. These
15 activities were continuing and were growing in intensity by the month.
16 The legal [as interpreted] channels were used to bring weapons into Kosovo
17 and Metohija, as well as equipment. The terrorists were attacking members
18 of the authorities; such as the police, the army, members of state
19 services and members of public services and utilities, such as the post,
20 the schools,, regardless of the ethnicity of the victims.
21 Q. Were there abductions and killings, too?
22 A. Yes. You might say that the abductions and the killings were more
23 or less a daily occurrence.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, just one moment. Line 10, I think the
25 sentence should read "illegal channels," rather than the "legal channels."
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That's right, illegal.
2 Q. Did you get the binder, sir?
3 A. Not that I can see.
4 My apologies. It's an omission on my part, but it's all in my
5 birth certificate, Your Honour.
6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, can you please open tab 1 and look at document
8 As you see, this is a federal document, document of the federal
9 government, and the date is the 25th of March, 1998. So what you're
10 supposed to tell us is this: How did this document come about, and what
11 is it?
12 A. This document shows the positions of the federal government that
13 they sent to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the federal
14 government had reviewed the activities of Yugoslavia's diplomacy with
15 regard to Kosovo and Metohija, and this is something that I presented to
16 the federal government at a previous session.
17 The document shows clearly the method used by the government in
18 its work in the sphere of foreign affairs and foreign relations. It shows
19 that a report on diplomatic activities is submitted to the federal
20 government by the federal minister. The federal government then considers
21 the report and adopts certain positions and certain decisions based on
22 which the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs then acts.
23 In terms of substance, this document says that there is now a more
24 objective approach by international players to problems in Kosovo and
25 Metohija, and that opportunities are being created for further
1 constructive action on the part of Yugoslavia's diplomacy. Furthermore,
2 the document clearly shows that it was the policy of the federal
3 government for all problems to Kosovo and -- in Kosovo and Metohija to be
4 dealt with, at least as far as Yugoslavia's official policy was concerned,
5 by dialogue and political means alone.
6 Q. Who was prime minister at the time?
7 A. Mr. Radoje Kontic.
8 Q. And later Momir Bulatovic became prime minister; right?
9 A. Yes, that's quite right. Later on, Mr. Momir Bulatovic became
10 prime minister.
11 Q. You were a high-ranking member of that cabinet. Could you please
12 tell us what your position is on this: What was the position of the SFRY
13 government in -- with regard to international integration processes? Were
14 they ready to take up commitments in order to join all these processes and
15 be part of the whole system?
16 Before you answer, please look at 2D55, and that's at tab 2 for
17 you, sir.
18 What sort of a document is this? Who did you send this letter to
19 and why? The letter is at page 2 of this document.
20 A. While I was federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
21 Republic of Yugoslavia, the government strategy was to reintegrate the
22 country, to reincorporate it into all of Europe and world organisations in
23 which the former -- in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia saw its
24 own interests mirrored.
25 Let me remind you that, at the time, Yugoslavia was under
1 suspension in terms of its membership rights in both the UN --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: If you don't mind, I wonder if you could try to
3 confine your answers to the particular questions you're being asked. This
4 is going to be a very long passage of evidence without really reaching
5 anything as yet that may be of significance to us.
6 And we also have difficulty with the tab itself, Mr. Fila, because
7 what I have at the moment is a letter in French. Was it sent in French?
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I'm just asking the witness to explain
9 what it is, that's all.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell us, though. We don't have the
11 English. Can you tell us if there's a reason for that? Have we to work
12 in French on this occasion?
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The English exists. At least I
14 requested a translation, but the CLSS told me that French, too, was an
15 official language and that they wouldn't translate from French into
16 English. So all we can do is for me to learn English and for you to learn
17 French, I suppose.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: So we can proceed in this instance in French.
19 That's your proposal, is it?
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. But what I can do is ask the
21 witness to read the first paragraph, and he can explain what it's about.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I don't see any other solution.
24 MR. STAMP: The 2D55, that we have both in my binder and in the
25 binder we just received from the Defence, is a one-page document. Now, I
1 hear that we're speaking about page 2 of the document. It's also a
2 document in English. So we have for here 2D55, a one-page document in
3 English, which I think my friend has the answer to.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] What you see in English is the cover
5 letter, but document itself is in French.
6 Can we please have the following document brought up in e-court,
7 2D55, and then we'll see.
8 This is the document, and it's in French. It says: "I have the
9 honour of sending to you on behalf of the government of the Federal
10 Republic of Yugoslavia the requested admission to the Council of Europe,
11 and I would like to ask you to invite the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
12 in compliance with Article 4 of the Statute of the Council of Europe to
13 join the Council of Europe."
14 It is the meaning of this document to show the efforts being made
15 by Yugoslavia to reactivate its membership in various international
17 Is it fine now? May I press on?
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this document is our country's request to become a
21 member of the Council of Europe; right?
22 A. Yes. And this displays the desire on the part of our country to
23 do just that. In my capacity as federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
24 on behalf of Yugoslavia's government, I sent this letter to the
25 Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, followed by my request for the
1 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be admitted as a member to the Council
2 of Europe.
3 The letter says that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is able to
4 take up any responsibility that would stem from its membership in the
5 Council of Europe. It is also specifically emphasised that the Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia will sign and ratify the Council of Europe
7 convention of -- on human rights and the framework convention on minority
8 rights. The letter was dispatched on the 18th of March, 1998. A short
9 while after, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- or rather, its Federal
10 Assembly ratified the Council of Europe convention on minority rights.
11 Another thing you can tell based on this is that the Federal
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as far as this request is concerned to be
13 admitted to the Council of Europe, and as far as the convention on
14 minority rights is concerned, the government forwarded these to their
15 field office in Pristina in Kosovo and Metohija, which continued to exist
16 and work throughout.
17 Q. As terrorist activities intensified in the spring of 1998, how was
18 that reflected on the foreign policy position of Yugoslavia at the time?
19 Just pause between my question and your answer. Yes. Now go ahead.
20 A. Of course, the intensification of terrorist activities in the
21 province of Kosovo and Metohija aggravated and complicated the
22 international position of the country. Pressures were on the rise from
23 different quarters, and also there was a growing need on the part of the
24 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to objectively portray the situation as it
25 was to its partners in the international field.
1 Primarily, an effort was made on an international level to
2 understand the fact that all the problems in Kosovo and Metohija are
3 derived from separatism and terrorism from Albanian terror structures.
4 Q. What about the Security Council of the UN? Did it adopt a
5 resolution cautioning your country about something?
6 A. Yes. The Security Council adopted several resolutions in relation
7 to Kosovo and Metohija: Resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203, and, finally, 1244.
8 Q. Very well. We'll get to that. Mr. Jovanovic, did you take part
9 in the Milosevic-Yeltsin talks in the autumn of 1998? And you will tell
10 us how it happened that these talks took place and how they evolved, if
11 you were present.
12 A. Yes. The talks between President Milosevic and President Yeltsin
13 were held in Moscow, if I remember correctly, on the 15th of June.
14 Q. Could you please stop at this point. Open tab 3, 2D -- 2D371,
15 please, and then proceed.
16 A. As far as I can remember, these talks took place at the initiative
17 of President Yeltsin. I think that President Yeltsin, in this particular
18 case, acted on behalf of the international community, which expected an
19 increased international presence in Kosovo and Metohija.
20 In this document, in the joint declaration, it is very important
21 to see that the two heads of state reaffirm the principled position on the
22 necessity of preserving the territorial integrity and respect for the
23 sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that they call for a
24 resolution to existing problems through political means on the basis of a
25 full equality of all citizens and all ethnic communities.
1 Q. Is there a commitment there to resolve everything through
2 political means?
3 A. Yes. The first subparagraph particularly refers to that; namely,
4 that existing problems would be resolved through political means,
5 respecting the equality of all citizens in all ethnic communities in
6 Kosovo and Metohija; and, in the next subparagraph, that that would be
7 achieved through continuing dialogue, without delay, between the state
8 delegation and the delegation of Albanian political parties. That kicked
9 of with the meeting between President Milosevic and the leader of the
10 Kosovo Albanians, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova.
11 Q. Is there anything here that refers to full freedom of movement?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That the FRY is prepared to start talks with the OSCE?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And the most important thing that I would like to -- the most
16 important thing for me here is will there be any constraints for foreign
17 diplomatic representatives, in terms of seeing for themselves what the
18 situation was like?
19 A. Since Yugoslavia encountered certain problems, in terms of
20 understanding problems in Kosovo and Metohija, the Moscow statement
21 accepts international presence through the OSCE; that is to say, the
22 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was Yugoslavia's
23 interest to have the international community gain direct knowledge through
24 its direct representatives on the ground as to what actual reality was, to
25 gain an objective picture, especially in terms of what the causes were in
1 Kosovo and Metohija; that is to say, of the problems existing there.
2 Q. All right. What was envisaged here, that there would be no
3 restraints in terms of the presence of international observers there?
4 A. Full freedom of movement was envisaged there for the international
5 representatives and a full openness of the Yugoslav Serbian side to
6 cooperation. This stemmed from Yugoslavia's aspiration to normalise, as
7 soon as possible, its status and its membership in the Organisation for
8 Security and Cooperation in Europe, where its membership rights had been
9 suspended from 1992.
10 Q. Very well. What did that mean in relation to international
11 presence in Cyprus [as interpreted], in terms of numbers and so on and so
13 A. It meant that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted several
14 hundred diplomatic representatives of other countries in Kosovo and
15 Metohija. The only restriction was that these should be diplomatic
16 representatives who had previously been accredited as such in Belgrade.
17 Q. Just a moment, please.
18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in the transcript, it
19 says "Cyprus," and it should be "Kosovo." So could that please be
20 corrected in the transcript. It says "Cyprus."
21 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, was there an increased presence of international
22 diplomatic representatives in Kosovo?
23 A. Yes. Soon after the Moscow statement, there was an accelerated
24 presence of foreign representatives in Kosovo and Metohija. They were
25 welcome under the name of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, KDOM?
1 Q. That's right, KDOM. Could you please look at the document in tab
2 4, 2D367. It has to do with the actual numbers of people present. How
3 many people were there?
4 A. This is a document that shows that, on the 10th of July, 1998,
5 less than a month from the Moscow joint statement, there were 18
6 diplomatic representatives of the United States of America in Kosovo and
7 let's, 13 representatives of the Russian Federation, four representatives
8 of Austria, two representatives of Italy, four representatives of Sweden,
9 two from Great Britain, one from the Netherlands, one from Norway, one
10 from Canada.
11 Q. Did this number grow eventually?
12 A. I wish to indicate that this was just the momentary situation as
13 far as the number of foreign diplomats was concerned in Pristina. From
14 day-to-day it changed; and probably on that day, the day that the report
15 refers to, it was much bigger, if one were to take into account presence
16 in other towns and villages in the province. However, there was a rapid
17 increase in the number in any case, and very soon it ranged in the
19 In addition to these foreign diplomatic representatives in the
20 province of Kosovo and Metohija, there were about 400 representatives of
21 the foreign media from all over the world.
22 Q. Could you tell us now what it was that these foreign diplomats
23 were doing in Kosovo and Metohija?
24 A. On the basis of the reports that I received from the office of the
25 federal Foreign Ministry in Kosovo and Metohija, I can conclude that
1 foreign diplomats from KDOM primarily had intensive contacts with the
2 representatives of political parties of all the ethnic communities;
3 primarily, the Albanian community, and also with representatives of the
4 local authorities, as well as the representatives of Serbia and the
5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
6 Q. All right. In August 1998, did an even bigger number come?
7 A. Yes. In August 1998, there was an abrupt growth in the number of
8 foreign diplomats in Kosovo and Metohija, and it is my personal opinion
9 that one of the reasons was that the United States of America practically,
10 in that summer of 1998, made a decision to recognise the terrorist KLA as
11 a liberation movement, because high representatives of the American
12 administration started to have public contacts and dialogue; that is to
13 say, relationship of partnership with the representatives and commanders
14 of the terrorist KLA.
15 Q. All of these diplomatic representatives, the hundreds you refer
16 to, did they tour Kosovo and Metohija 24 hours a day? Did they go all
17 over, yes or no?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, let us go back to your own line of work. The situation in
20 Kosovo, as you described it just now and as it was, how did it have an
21 impact on the activity of the federal government and the Ministry of
22 Foreign Affairs?
23 A. First and foremost, the federal government had to discuss problems
24 and questions related to Kosovo and Metohija at its own sessions, at the
25 sessions of working bodies as well, because the situation required that.
1 Then --
2 Q. What situation? Sorry.
3 A. The situation of terrorist activity on the rise all the time in
4 Kosovo and Metohija. The permanent increase of attacks that ended
5 tragically, then kidnappings, and so on and so forth.
6 Q. And what about the international community? Did it step up its
7 own interest in what was going on?
8 A. Yes. Yes, certainly. In addition to KDOM, that is to say,
9 diplomatic representatives of other countries and international
10 organisations - and their presence was growing in Kosovo and Metohija all
11 the time - Kosovo and Metohija was increasingly being visited by high
12 representatives of foreign governments.
13 Q. Please pause there.
14 A. The federal government, bearing that in mind, stepped up its own
15 presence there, its direct presence, in addition to the presence of the
16 Foreign Ministry.
17 Q. Please, what was all of this like? What did you, as the Foreign
18 Ministry, decide in relation to Pristina?
19 A. In May 1998, I, as federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, decided
20 to open an office of the Foreign Ministry in Pristina, of the Ministry for
21 Foreign Affairs, that is; and soon after that, offices of the Foreign
22 Ministry in Ranilug, in Kosovska Pomoravlje, and Kosovska Mitrovica.
23 That was necessary both in order to help foreign diplomatic
24 representatives and the representatives of foreign governments who visited
25 Kosovo and Metohija, as well as in order to give professional assistance
1 to the representatives of the local authorities who had not had any
2 experience, of course, in maintaining international contacts, especially
3 such frequent ones as in Kosovo and Metohija at that time.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Jovanovic please have some
5 water, a glass and a pitcher? I don't know why it's not there. Oh, I beg
6 your pardon. Sorry.
7 Q. How did that outpost function?
8 A. The outpost, or outposts to be precise, because there were three
9 of them - our ministry had three such outposts - functioned in accordance
10 with the instructions of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the
11 minister himself. Nobody else but the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12 was authorised to give instructions for work to these representative
13 offices of the Federal Ministry. They did what I have already described
14 and reported on their activities to the Federal Ministry of Foreign
15 Affairs on a daily basis.
16 Q. Did they report to any other persons?
17 A. They didn't report directly to anybody else, but the head office,
18 that is, the Federal Ministry, decided who else in the federal
19 administration or other structures needed to be familiarised with these
21 JUDGE BONOMY: You said that there were three outposts. Now we
22 seem to have four names. Pristina was one, Kosovska Mitrovica, Kosovsko
23 Pomoravlje, and there is one represented in the transcript as Ranilug.
24 Can you help me identify the three that you are referring to?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ranilug is the -- is the seat or the
1 head office of Kosovsko Pomoravlje, which is the region.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Fila.
3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Apart from what you have said, did the federal government do
5 anything else about strengthening its presence in Kosovo?
6 A. Yes. The federal government established a commission --
7 Q. Before that, did the federal prime minister do anything?
8 A. Yes. The federal prime minister decided to dispatch or to send
9 the vice-pm, federal vice-pm, Mr. Nikola Sainovic, to Kosovo. The reason
10 for that being the wish to demonstrate a responsible political attitude to
11 the international community, by sending somebody to the field where the
12 international community was massively present, and that someone was a high
13 government official.
14 The second reason was to demonstrate in this fashion the interest
15 on the part of the federal government in cooperating with international
16 community and its organisations where the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
17 was in a restricted position.
18 Q. Was that the beginning of negotiating processes, such as Hill?
19 A. Could you repeat?
20 Q. Had the negotiating process already begun by that time with
21 Mr. Hill and others?
22 A. Yes. Negotiations were in process with the representatives of the
23 international community, especially with Ambassador Christopher Hill,
24 about a political solution for Kosovo and Metohija.
25 Q. Are we referring to the summer of 1998?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Tell us, Mr. Jovanovic, which position Mr. Sainovic had in the
3 federal government?
4 A. Mr. Nikola Sainovic was chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee
5 of federal government. That was his permanent position, and it is in this
6 capacity that he chaired that committee. And that committee, which was a
7 standing committee, was drafting proposals for federal government that had
8 a foreign policy aspect and that were put on the agenda of the -- the
9 federal government.
10 Q. Was that the time of Mr. Kontic?
11 A. Yes. Mr. Sainovic was vice-prime minister and chairman of the
12 foreign policy committee of the government during the -- while Mr. Kontic
13 and Mr. Bulatovic were in office.
14 Q. Do you know whether he had any responsibility during the
15 negotiations in the framework of the Dayton Accord?
16 A. Yes. I would like to inform the Court that my relations with
17 Mr. Sainovic were strictly official, and that is why I have known him
18 since the time when I was assistant federal minister. Because starting
19 from 1995, he was intensively involved in all activities regarding the
20 implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accord.
21 In that capacity, I escorted Mr. Sainovic on the occasions of two
22 visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was also present on the occasion of
23 talks in 1996 with him, when the first delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 visited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They were about a hundred
1 Q. Do you -- have there been any other international activities on
2 his part? Do you know anything about his international activities with
3 regard to China, Russia, Arab countries, Israel?
4 A. Yes. Mr. Sainovic, who was responsible for foreign policy and
5 foreign economic relations in the federal government, often went on
6 official visits to other countries or international organisations, be it
7 as the head of the Yugoslav delegation or as an escort to the Yugoslav
8 president when he visited other countries.
9 I was in China with him when he -- or rather, when President Zoran
10 Lilic visited China. He was the -- in charge of the talks who were --
11 that were held parallelly with China during that visit. He also visited
12 countries on several continents, primarily European countries. He visited
13 the EU, and he was accepted everywhere as a highly qualified and
14 responsible person.
15 The results for our country and its policy were very good.
16 Q. So you know that he also visited Arab countries, et cetera?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mr. Kovacevic, did you take part in the work of the Foreign Policy
19 Committee of the federal government; and if so, since what time? Who
20 chaired that committee? What was -- how did that committee work, and
21 which topics were dealt with?
22 A. Yes. I did take part in the Foreign Policy Committee of the
23 federal government, but not the all the time, because the committee sat
24 every Tuesday because our government was in session on Thursdays. And I
25 also had obligations abroad. That's why I was absent occasionally, but
1 then the deputy federal minister would substitute me.
2 As I said, the committee sat every Tuesday. There was an agenda,
3 and those sessions were chaired by the vice-pm and the head of the foreign
4 policy committee, Mr. Sainovic. Members of the committee would be there
5 and, occasionally, there were also other people invited to the session,
6 depending on the nature of the subject matter discussed.
7 Based on the law -- or rather, that committee was established
8 by -- under a law, and the way -- but it didn't take independent
9 decisions. It only prepared the positions of federal government
10 concerning individual topics.
11 Q. All right. So that it was the government that decided based on
12 the proposals of the committee.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do answer one more question for me. What was the -- what were the
15 relations between that committee and the SMIP, which was where you were
16 the boss?
17 A. The relations were such as were required for the regular
18 functioning of the institutions of this system. It was a -- these were
19 relations of cooperation where everybody had their authority and their
20 mandate without anyone interfering in the business of the other. There
21 have never been problems in our cooperation.
22 Q. Did you and Mr. Sainovic also have such a relationship? How would
23 you characterise it?
24 A. I have already said that our relations were official, but it was a
25 normal cooperative relationship.
1 Q. All right. So you cooperated. In the summer of 1999 [as
2 interpreted], how did you cooperate?
3 A. I --
4 Q. A correction needs to be made. I said "the summer of 1998." So
5 how did you cooperate at the time?
6 A. We attended the meetings of the Foreign Policy Committee or the
7 sessions of our federal government. That was one aspect of the
8 cooperation. Another aspect was a technical cooperation. In between
9 sessions and meetings when Mr. Sainovic felt he needed to consult us, we
10 would have a meeting either in my office or his.
11 Q. Can we conclude that due to the fact that his position and his
12 obligations were of a foreign policy character, and you also work in the
13 field of foreign policy, did you -- you had to cooperate and your
14 activities were complementary?
15 A. It is normal for officials, members of government, who cover such
16 wide areas as foreign policy, it is normal that they cooperate. In this
17 long-standing cooperation with Mr. Sainovic, I -- my overall conclusion or
18 impression was that he was a serious politician and a person who
19 responsibly deals with every task assigned to him.
20 Q. Does it mean that he worked in accordance with the instructions
21 received from federal government?
22 A. My mandate was defined by the law, and I was autonomous to a
23 degree, but I was also tied by the strategy and the decisions of
24 government. Mr. Sainovic was responsible for foreign policy in that
25 government, and it is natural that he worked exclusively based on the
1 decisions and positions and the set policy of federal government.
2 Q. What kind of relationship existed between vice-pm Sainovic and the
3 outpost of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pristina?
4 A. There were no problems in that relationship. Everybody did their
5 work; and, at the same time, cooperation was normal. The outposts
6 assisted in preparing the meetings that Mr. Sainovic had in the field,
7 either with representatives of the foreign diplomatic mission KDOM or with
8 representatives of members of foreign governments or international
10 The outposts also reported to the Federal Ministry of Foreign
11 Affairs of these activities in the field. When necessary, those outposts
12 provided logistical and professional, that is, diplomatic assistance, to
13 Mr. Sainovic. He did not give instructions to those outposts because the
14 heads of the outposts were responsible exclusively to the Federal
15 Ministry; that is, me.
16 Q. What was the state's reaction to the escalating terrorist
17 activities in Kosovo and Metohija in the summer of 1998?
18 A. It goes without saying, I suppose, that it did what any
19 responsible country would do when facing the problem of terrorism. The
20 state had no choice but to defend law and order. It had to defend the
21 constitution. It had to make sure that all citizens were safe in Kosovo
22 and Metohija, and it had to apply force in combatting terrorism.
23 On the other hand, the state used diplomacy in a bid to explain to
24 international players how serious the problem of terrorism had become. It
25 also had to seek understanding for its policy of dealing with the Kosovo
1 and Metohija problem by political means.
2 Q. Did the state try to negotiate with the Albanians?
3 A. Yes, it did; however, not with the terrorist faction. It tried to
4 hold talks with their political parties, rather, their representatives,
5 the political parties of the Albanian national minority.
6 Q. What about the summer of 1998? As far as you know, was an
7 anti-terrorist operation launched at the time?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. How did it end and when?
10 A. The anti-terrorist operation was ended by crushing the terrorist
11 cells and by stifling any activity, terrorist activity, on the part of the
12 Kosovo Liberation Army all together.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this may be a good time
14 for our break since I'm now about to move on to a different subject
15 altogether, the work of the Federal Assembly, that sort of thing.
16 Therefore, I don't think I could possibly deal with that sort of thing in
17 two minutes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.
19 Mr. Jovanovic, we have to break at this stage. That break will
20 about for about half an hour. The usher will take you from the courtroom
21 and show you where to wait while we have this break. Thank you.
22 We shall resume at 11.15.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.15 a.m.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, could you please go to tab 5, document 2D67.
5 A. These are the conclusions of the Federal Assembly, dated the 5th
6 of October, 1998. This is about the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo
7 and Metohija. This also contains a platform to deal with these issues.
8 Q. Was there anyone who previously adopted these conclusions and then
9 tabled them to the Assembly?
10 A. The Assembly adopted these conclusions at the proposal of the
11 federal government.
12 Q. Adopted them how?
13 A. At a joint session of the Council of Citizens and the Council of
14 the Republics, and they were adopted by a unanimous decision.
15 Q. Could you please look at paragraph 2, or item 2, of these
17 A. Yes. Item 2 comprises the basic elements necessary to deal with
18 the problems in Kosovo and Metohija. They are as follows:
19 "Dialogue as the only way to peaceful and democratic settlement of
20 the problems in Kosovo and Metohija.
21 "Respect for the territorial intaking by of the sovereignty of the
22 Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
23 "A solution harmonised with the constitutions of the Republic of
24 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and international standards
25 in the area of human and civil rights and the rights of members of ethnic
2 "Full equality for all citizens and all ethnic communities ..." --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: We can read this, Mr. Jovanovic. We really need your
4 personal knowledge on particular issues which Mr. Fila will focus; indeed,
5 not only can we read it, but we've seen it before.
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Item 3, please don't read it, Mr. Jovanovic. We can read it
8 ourselves; therefore, it shouldn't being a problem. But tell us the
9 meaning behind item 3, the conclusion in item 3.
10 A. The meaning is a warning about the final objective of terrorism in
11 Kosovo and Metohija, which is political terrorism, and is aimed at
12 breaking up the political and territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
13 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
14 Q. What about the last item?
15 A. The last item states that "the security forces took measures in
16 the proportion necessary to isolate and eradicate terrorism in Kosovo and
18 Q. Look at item 5, for example. Does the document actually say that
19 the anti-terrorist operation eventually led to a defeat of the terrorists?
20 A. I don't understand the question.
21 Q. Please look at the first two words in item 5. Does it not state
22 that the terrorists were defeated?
23 A. Yes, that's quite right.
24 Q. Could you please go to item 11 now, please. What is the Federal
25 Assembly supporting in item 11?
1 A. The Federal Assembly supports the proposal of the federal
2 government and of the Russian Federation, to invite the OSCE to come to
3 Kosovo and Metohija and start monitoring the situation from close up.
4 Q. So much for that document. Could you please tell us what the
5 international position was of our country, Yugoslavia, in the autumn of
6 1998, specifically in the month of October?
7 A. The position was an exceptionally difficult one. Terrorism had
8 come back to life and had escalated. There was also intense pressure and
9 open threats being made to the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
10 Yugoslavia by certain countries, and by NATO specifically.
11 Q. What were these threats about? What did they say would happen?
12 A. There was an open threat of armed aggression against the Federal
13 Republic of Yugoslavia. That is when the so-called "act order" was
15 Q. How did this crisis draw to a close?
16 A. By political agreement between President Milosevic and the envoy
17 of the American president, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, on the 12th of October,
18 1999 -- 1998.
19 Q. What was the role of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
20 overcoming this crisis and in dealing with the threats at that you
21 mentioned in October 1998? What did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do
23 A. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs stepped up its diplomatic
24 activity in relation to all the key international players, by emphasising
25 the commitment of the federal government to a peaceful and political
1 solution to the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija. This it said should be
2 achieved by dialogue, by equal rights for all citizens and all ethnic
4 Another thing that was emphasised was the danger and unacceptable
5 nature of any threat, especially that of armed aggression, since threats
6 of that nature are contrary to international law, contrary to any peaceful
7 solution of any problem, and eventually contrary to the Charter of the
8 United Nations.
9 Q. Did you do anything about this personally? Did you get in touch
10 with the OSCE?
11 A. Following the agreement between President Milosevic and Richard
12 Holbrooke, I, on behalf of the federal government, signed an agreement to
13 establish an OSCE verification mission with the president of the OSCE at
14 the time. This was the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Geremek.
15 Q. Could you please look at 2D78. What is that about?
16 A. This is about a session of the federal government, at which I
17 submitted a report about the report of the Secretary-General, the UN
18 Secretary-General, concerning the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. One
19 thing I would like to point out is that this was a preliminary analysis on
20 my part.
21 Q. Was the proposal adopted at this government session, the proposed
22 agreement with the OSCE, the one that you had signed?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you now please go to tab 8, P432, and tell us what this is
1 A. This is a copy of the agreement on the verification mission. I
2 signed this and Mr. Geremek signed this, too.
3 Q. So this is what you've been telling it us about; right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Could you now explain what the motives were for the Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia to conclude an agreement of this nature?
7 A. The first and fundamental principal motive was to ensure a
8 diplomatic presence in Kosovo by an international agency so that the
9 international community could see for itself what the situation was in
10 Kosovo and Metohija. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had no reason to
11 conceal anything concerning the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. Quite
12 the contrary in fact.
13 Yugoslavia wanted the international public to get an unbiased idea
14 about what was happening in Kosovo and Metohija. The other thing was to
15 open some form of cooperation with the international community. That was
16 the intention of the federal government to deal with the problems in
17 Kosovo and Metohija.
18 The third thing was to express an interest on the part of the
19 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in normalising its rights as a member of
20 the OSCE through this cooperation.
21 Q. Would you look at the preamble to this agreement, please, the
22 agreement on the OSCE verification mission.
23 A. The preamble states the basic principles and the initial positions
24 expressed by the parties to the agreement, respect to the principles of
25 the UN Charter and of the Helsinki final act. The other principle
1 mentioned is for all problems to be solved based on the equality of all
2 citizens and ethic communities, to respect the sovereignty and territorial
3 integrity of all states in the region, and to consistently implement
4 Resolutions by the UN Security Council.
5 Q. There is really no need to go through the specific wording. We
6 just need your comment. Do we see official name of the province being
7 used in this document?
8 A. Yes. This is the only international document using the name of
9 Kosovo and Metohija as it was under the constitution, the province of
10 Kosovo and Metohija.
11 Q. All right. Could you now go to section 1, item 5, please.
12 A. In this item, the two parties agree that the KVM would replace
14 Q. And there would be some integration; right?
15 A. Yes. KVM would absorb KDOM.
16 Q. Was that ever carried through?
17 A. Never, never carried through.
18 Q. Could you please look at paragraph 6 now. What is it that the
19 government of -- takes upon itself to do?
20 A. Proceeding from the fact that this is a diplomatic mission, and in
21 keeping with the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, the safety and
22 security of the KVM and its members shall be guaranteed exclusively and
23 only by the government of Yugoslavia.
24 Q. Please look at the first part in paragraph 8.
25 A. Page 2?
1 Q. That's right. The government of Serbia will receive the OSCE
2 mission. What does that mean?
3 A. Paragraph 8 reaffirms the joint desire of the signatories of this
4 international agreement; namely, that the members of the verification
5 mission will enjoy all rights and carry out their obligations in
6 accordance with the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations.
7 Q. What does that mean?
8 A. That practically means that every member of the verification
9 mission would be treated as a foreign diplomatic representative.
10 Q. Thank you. We know the rest. Could you please -- oh, well, all
11 right. I've dealt with all of that.
12 Could you please look at the second part now, and then there's a
13 paragraph 1 there as well. It refers to reports to the OSCE, to the
14 Security Council, and other organisations. It says: "The verification
15 and implementation of the Resolution," and so on and so forth. That's how
16 it starts. Have you found it?
17 A. Sorry. Over here I have --
18 Q. Look at the Serbian version; don't look at the English version.
19 A. Sorry, but in the English version --
20 Q. No. The Serbian version.
21 A. But it's not in the right order.
22 Q. Page 3 of the English version, that's for the Court. It's page 3
23 of the English version.
24 A. All right.
25 Q. The beginning of the sentence is "to verify compliance," et
1 cetera. Have you found it?
2 A. Of page 3?
3 Q. Of the English version?
4 A. English version. What was the paragraph number?
5 Q. 1, the beginning of the sentence.
6 A. Yes. Yes.
7 Q. Wait a minute. We know how to read. We see what's there. Does
8 it say here that reports would be submitted -- well, to who will the
9 reports be submitted? That's what matters.
10 A. This provision envisages the obligation of the KVM to send its
11 report to its headquarters in Vienna, that is to say, the OSCE, but to
12 submit them along parallel lines to the government of Yugoslavia.
13 Q. Did they submit at least one report to you?
14 A. No, never. Not a single KVM report was ever submitted to the
15 Yugoslav side.
16 Q. Do you know why?
17 A. There was never any explanation, but there were requests from the
18 Yugoslav side. Inter alia, I asked Knut Vollebaek, the chairman in office
19 of the OSCE, and he promised me to look into the matter. He said that the
20 Yugoslav side would be receiving reports, but that never happened.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at part III, paragraph 1 now.
22 The name of part III is "Specific terms of reference."
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And what is stated there?
25 A. Inter alia, this envisages that the KVM would have freedom of
1 movement throughout Kosovo and easy access.
2 Q. What does that mean? How do you interpret that? What is that?
3 A. I'm not a language expert; but as a party, as a signatory to this
4 agreement, my understanding was that this means freedom of movement
5 throughout the territory of the province.
6 Q. All right.
7 A. And access to various localities, that no parts of the territory
8 were off limits.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in the transcript --
11 oh, it's been corrected. Part of the witness's answer was recorded as a
12 question, but now it's been corrected.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'd like to ask you something else now in relation
15 to this. It does have something to do with this. In international
16 practice, according to your many years of experience, is there any
17 difference between freedom of movement and access and arms control?
18 A. Of course, there's a difference, and these are completely separate
19 categories. Freedom of movement is a concept that is used frequently in
20 all international documents; whereas, arms control is regulated by special
21 sui generis agreements because, among other things, it requires
22 specialists for the field of arms control, and it requires special
23 procedures that are regulated very specifically in very specific
24 international documents.
25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, as one of the two signatories, you are one of the
1 signatories and the other one is Mr. Geremek - and we haven't had the
2 honour of hearing him - could you tell me whether in this agreement of
3 yours between you and Mr. Geremek? Is there any reference to arms
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by "arms control"?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just gave an answer
9 to the question put by the Defence whether there is a distinction between
10 freedom of movement and arms control.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand you've answered that question. What
14 I'm asking you is what is "arms control"? What do you mean by that
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that there are different
17 international documents about arms control in the fields of classical,
18 nuclear, and other arms. I know that there are also specific agreements
19 on regional arms control in the territory of the former SFRY, and I know,
20 as a layperson, that this control can be exercised by specialists,
21 according to specially regulated procedures. And I know that, in my view,
22 this control cannot be carried out by civilian persons and unqualified
23 diplomats, for instance.
24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Perhaps we are going to get there now. Please look at 21011.
1 A. Tab number?
2 Q. 11 -- 12.
3 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Sorry to interrupt. Now something like NPT,
4 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, would you take it as an arms control treaty?
5 Is it in that nature that you're talking?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am just stating that
7 such agreements do exist. On the basis of the experience I have, I know
8 that arms control is a complex process that requires special knowledge and
9 special procedures. As for the content of these procedures, I am not
10 familiar with them.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Sir, let me try to be of assistance. Mr. Jovanovic, you and
14 Mr. Geremek, did you talk about arms control at all, about entering
15 barracks, counting cannons, guns, what have you? Did you discuss that at
17 A. Of course, we did not.
18 Q. Please now look at tab 12. The document is 2D11. It exists only
19 in the English language. Could you please interpret it for us. Could you
20 please tell us what this is all about.
21 A. This is an agreement. It is the Agreement on Subregional Arms
22 Control that was signed in Florence. It shows that a special protocol was
23 signed pertaining to arms control only.
24 Q. In the FRY; right?
25 A. All countries of the subregion, including the Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia. As for the implementation of that agreement, there were never
2 any problems, not on any side, including the Federal Republic of
4 Q. Was this agreement also signed under OSCE auspices?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Could you please look at the last page of this document, and we
7 can see who signed the agreement.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. My question is: Does this agreement envisage the possibility of
10 inspecting arms in the region, including the FRY, at any point in time,
11 whenever necessary?
12 A. This agreement was fully implemented. For years it has been
13 archived now as something that has already been carried out.
14 Q. To the best of your knowledge, did the Federal Republic of
15 Yugoslavia abide by this agreement?
16 A. Yes. As for the attitude of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
17 vis-a-vis this agreement, there were never any objections from any side.
18 Q. Do you know about inspection requests --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Stop, please. There was a question there not
21 At page 49, line 1: "My question is: Does this agreement
22 envisage the possibility of inspecting arms in the region, at any point in
23 time, whenever necessary?" And there's no answer to that question. What
24 would your answer be to that question?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The agreement signed in Florence in
1 1996 was fully carried out. Every one of the signatories fully met its
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you not understand my question, Mr. Jovanovic?
4 It was Mr. Fila's question, not mine, but the question was: Did the
5 agreement envisage the possibility of arms inspections being carried out,
6 at any point in time, whenever necessary?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
10 Q. As for inspection requests, and even unannounced inspections, in
11 accordance with this agreement, were they all carried out?
12 A. In the implementation of this agreement, all requests put forth by
13 the parties, the signatories, were accepted and carried out in good faith.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: We're obviously at cross-purposes here. I would
15 find it very difficult to know what is the relevance of the implementation
16 of an agreement in relation to Bosnia, in relation to the case we're
17 dealing with here. It's an entirely collateral issue.
18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That's the way it would be if it
19 pertains to Bosnia, but it pertains to Yugoslavia. If you look at the
20 document, that means that the verification of all the armed forces of
21 Yugoslavia was carried out, as well as the in the other regions. It's a
22 subregional agreement. It applies to the entire subregion. There were
23 unannounced checks, inspections, in barracks and other military
25 According to this agreement signed in Florence in 1996, it meant
1 that there would be arms control and there would be checks as to whether
2 we had an atomic bomb or what have you not. So that applies to Yugoslavia
3 and to the entire subregion. It will pertains to all countries of the
4 region, all countries of the former Yugoslavia, the SFRY.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know, Mr. Jovanovic, whether inspections
6 were carried out in Kosovo in terms of this agreement?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, announced or
8 unannounced, inspections could be made at any point in time, by any one of
9 the parties, in any part of the territory of any one of the signatories;
10 that is to say, that inspections could be carried out in the province of
11 Kosovo and Metohija as well.
12 However, I hope that you will understand me. I'm not a specialist
13 in arms control, and I really would not be the right person to talk to in
14 relation to specific subjects from this area.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
16 Mr. Fila.
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
18 Q. My last question --
19 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I apologise. But you can tell us about the
20 purposes and the rationale behind this; no?
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Please continue, Mr. Fila.
22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
23 Q. My last question from this field.
24 A. Am I supposed to answer --
25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, no, no. Since we've been dealing with your
1 agreement, with Geremek, that's what we're going to talk about throughout.
2 How do you assess some requests by some verifiers that the
3 Geremek -- that according to this Geremek-Jovanovic agreement, they carry
4 out verification of arms in Kosovo and Metohija because they had -- or
5 rather, did they have the right to that or not according to your
7 A. The agreement that I signed with the chairman in office of the
8 OSCE, Mr. Geremek, does not contain in any one of its provisions any
9 grounds for arms control or the control of military equipment in any part
10 of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: How did you envisage verification of the forces and
13 weapons to be carried out?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not understand
15 the question in terms of what provision it applies to.
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I intend to go on dealing with this
17 agreement. I'm going to continue along those lines.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: If you look at section III, the specific terms of
19 reference, in paragraph 1, what you agreed on was the verification of the
20 maintenance of the cease-fire.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That was agreed upon, and
22 that was one of the objectives of the agreement.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Did the cease-fire involve the withdrawal of any
24 forces from Kosovo and a limitation on the number of forces that should be
25 in Kosovo?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my negotiations with Mr. Geremek,
2 and in the agreement, there was no mention of that.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Had that already been agreed by someone else?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not aware of that, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Maybe it would be useful for me to repeat this once again. Did
8 you and Mr. Geremek discuss arms at all, the control of barracks, the
9 counting of soldiers? Did you deal with military matters at all? Because
10 it says here that you -- that the parties abide by the cease-fire. That
11 means that if someone shoots, what happens?
12 A. Please, the text of the agreement that was signed is clear,
13 precise, and fully self-explanatory. The agreement clearly shows what the
14 issues were that we as foreign ministers discussed and what it was that we
15 agreed upon.
16 Q. Let's move on. Please look at tab 8. P432 is the number of the
17 document. It's the same tab that you have there. Now I'd like to look at
18 section 4, paragraph 2.
19 What is envisaged here?
20 A. The minister and the chairman in office of the OSCE, that is to
21 say, Mr. Geremek, and I agreed --
22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, the Judges are conferring.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Please continue, Mr. Fila.
25 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 and then subparagraph 2. It says: "It
2 will be allowed," et cetera. What does this say?
3 A. There is a provision stating that the Federal Republic of
4 Yugoslavia agrees to accept a diplomatic civilian mission consisting of
5 2.000 persons with diplomatic status.
6 Q. Something else is written after "2.000."
7 A. Civilian diplomatic representatives who are to be treated in
8 accordance with the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic relations, and it is
9 stated specifically that none of the members can be armed.
10 Q. So who would be responsible for their safety and security then?
11 A. The parties to the agreement agreed that as far as safety and
12 security is concerned of this civilian unarmed mission that it would be
13 guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the receiving country.
14 Q. To the best of your knowledge, how many verifiers arrived in
15 Kosovo and Metohija in total?
16 A. Their largest number was 1.300 just before their withdrawal from
17 Kosovo and Metohija.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at paragraph 6 of section IV.
19 A. This is a provision pertaining to equipment that the diplomatic
20 mission would use.
21 Q. It envisages what?
22 A. Vehicles, communications, and other equipment, along with local
23 staff for administrative work.
24 Q. All right. Did you find anywhere in this agreement something
25 stating that they have the right to use their own helicopter?
1 A. There is no need for me to look. There is no such provision.
2 Q. Thank you. Nevertheless, weren't we asked that the mission should
3 be allowed to use a helicopter?
4 A. Yes. The position of the federal government was that, in case a
5 helicopter should be needed, the government would place its own helicopter
6 with crew at their disposal.
7 Q. And why were they not given one then?
8 A. There are two reasons: One, this is not in line with the
9 agreement; two, because it is safer and more practical to have helicopters
10 from the host country flying over its territory, and thus to guarantee for
11 the safety of the flight.
12 Q. Thank you. Did they accept that?
13 A. No.
14 Q. So we can see that there was some demands which, according to you
15 and also according to the language of the agreement that you signed, were
16 not covered by the agreement: Entering barracks, counting tanks,
17 helicopter personnel, arms, et cetera. Why did they make such demands?
18 A. This could be best explained by those who made such demands. As
19 for me, I think that such demands were commented extensively in the media
20 and tensions were raised, in my opinion, unnecessarily, because this
21 wasn't about a different interpretation of the provisions of the agreement
22 signed but about demands going beyond the agreement.
23 While this was reported about extensive in the media, in the field
24 the terrorism was thriving.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: If you look again, please, at section III and
1 paragraph 1, could you read the first sentence, please? Just read it out.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The verification mission will
3 travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by
4 all elements."
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Jovanovic, there is a reference there to a
6 cease-fire. What were the terms of the cease-fire?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot provide an answer to that
8 question, because simply I don't know.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: How, then, can you interpret the rest of that
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The inspectors, the verification
12 mission, shall have the right to receive reports and probably draft their
13 own reports about the cease-fire, and they can move freely throughout
14 Kosovo at any time.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Thank you.
16 Mr. Fila.
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you may have forgotten something. Did -- was your
19 agreement with Geremek was based on the agreement between Milosevic and
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was anything agreed in that sense?
23 A. Yes. It was agreed that the mission, verification mission, in
24 Kosovo and Metohija should be continued, and this is reflected in this
1 Q. Thank you. So do you agree that your agreement is a continuation
2 of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement?
3 A. Yes. It's an implementation of that agreement in its specific
5 Q. Do you agreement with me when I say that you, as one of the
6 authors of this text, is in a position to interpret it and to interpret
7 your purpose?
8 A. Obviously, the signatories are in a position to interpret the
9 agreement, but I repeat that the issue is not different interpretations of
10 the agreement but demands going beyond the agreement.
11 Q. Being here --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Did the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement lead to a
13 determination of the number of VJ forces and MUP personnel in Kosovo, or
14 was that some later agreement?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not present at the talks
16 between Milosevic and Holbrooke. With Prime Minister Bulatovic, on the
17 11th of December, I was in Antalya at the South-East European Summit. But
18 I know that agreement was reached about the establishment of a
19 verification mission, and I talked about that and eventually signed an
20 agreement with Minister Geremek.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, did one of your witnesses actually
22 present us with a copy of the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement?
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. We were unable to find it, so we
24 couldn't show that it really exists as a signed agreement, but you can
25 trust me that I did everything I could to find it.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: And you apparently don't know the terms of that
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know for sure that the -- the
4 signing of the agreement about the verification mission in Kosovo and
5 Metohija was agreed upon; and as Minister of Foreign Affairs, I spoke
6 about the content of that agreement with Minister Geremek and signed this
8 JUDGE BONOMY: But you can't tell us anything about the question
9 whether there was agreement reached on numbers of forces and the terms of
10 the cease-fire?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried to explain that at the time
12 when President Milosevic and Ambassador Holbrooke had their talks, I was
13 outside Yugoslavia at the South-East European Summit.
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes. We understood that, but the Judge
15 wanted to know something else.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I understood that, but how was it you could go
17 ahead and enter an agreement with Geremek without knowing the terms of the
18 Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm responsible for the activities
20 of diplomacy, and that is included in the agreement that was signed. In
21 other talks -- or rather, I didn't take part in other talks; and out of
22 respect toward this institution, I do not dare to give interpretations
23 based on second-hand knowledge.
24 I read about the political agreement on a peaceful solution was
25 reached, and that a verification mission should be established, which
1 later on, indeed, was the case.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Do you know, Mr. Jovanovic, that General Perisic and General Clark
5 also signed something based on that agreement about -- something about
7 A. I was informed that some agreement was signed, but I was the not
8 involved so I could not talk about that first-hand, the way I can about
9 facts where I immediately took part.
10 Q. Let us return to other things then. So demands were made for
11 things that were not covered by the agreement, and -- but they did not
12 provide reports as they were -- as they should have under the agreement;
13 is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Did they, at any given time, want the agreement to be amended,
16 enabling them to carry personal arms and using their own helicopter, et
17 cetera? Did you ever receive such requests?
18 A. No.
19 Q. And let us now move on to legal matters. Who was it on the
20 Yugoslav side provided interpretation of the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement,
21 in the case of discord regarding the scope of the agreement?
22 A. The signatories are authorised to interpret the agreement.
23 Talking about Yugoslavia, this is the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
24 and federal government, but I have already said that interpretation was
25 never an issue. The issue were demands going beyond the agreement.
1 Q. Your statement that these were demands going beyond the scope of
2 the agreement, is that your personal opinion or is that also the position
3 of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
4 A. That was the position of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5 and also my personal position.
6 Q. And the position of the government?
7 A. That position was also verified and confirmed by federal
9 Q. Please take a look at tab 9, document 2D81. Tab 9. Let me now
10 first point to a -- to a translation error, because it says it's a
11 document dated 16th of May 1998. In fact, it's a document dated 16th of
12 October. Please bear that in mind.
13 This is a document that you forwarded to federal government. What
14 can be concluded from this?
15 A. This document shows the procedure of work at federal level, and
16 the relations between the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
17 federal government. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the
18 signed agreement to the federal government, requesting the government to
19 forward that document to all other line ministries for the purpose of
21 Q. Was implementation slow or fast?
22 A. This shows that the document was submitted to federal government
23 on the day it was signed, from which it follows that Yugoslavia as a state
24 was -- took a great interest in a fast implementation of the agreement.
25 Q. Please look at page 2 of the document.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I would like to -- what I would like to
2 show to the witness is on the first and only page of the English
3 translation, and it's the last two -- last two paragraphs of the English
5 Q. What does the Federal Ministry suggest in this document?
6 A. As reflecting our responsible attitude towards the implementation
7 of this agreement, our ministry proposed to federal government to urgently
8 establish a Commission for Cooperation with the KVM, and the chairman of
9 that commission should be the vice-pm, Mr. Nikola Sainovic. This is also
10 proposed here.
11 Q. Why did you think -- when I say "you," - I don't mean you
12 personally; I mean the minister and the whole Ministry of Foreign
13 Affairs - why did you think that this was necessary?
14 A. The answer is also contained in page 1 of the document, from which
15 it could be seen to who the agreement was forwarded. For the purpose of
16 coordination and more efficient cooperation, we needed a commission
17 composed of the representatives of all services charged with the
18 implementation of the agreement.
19 Q. Did the rules of procedure of government have -- play any role in
21 A. Yes, but it is also important that under the law two types of --
22 two types of bodies in government are envisaged by the law: Standing
23 bodies and provisional bodies such as the Commission for the Cooperation
24 with the KVM, which I proposed here.
25 Q. Why did you think that Mr. Sainovic should have chaired that
1 commission? Why did the ministry hold this position?
2 A. Because vice-pm Nikola Sainovic was the representative of federal
3 government with the greatest experience in international cooperation,
4 disregarding the Foreign Ministry; because he was accepted as the partner
5 of foreign governments and international organisations; and because I
6 wanted to show to the international community what -- how great an
7 importance the government attributes to cooperation with the KVM.
8 Q. Could you please go to tab 10, 2D8. What is this?
9 A. This is the decision of the federal government to set up a
10 Commission for Cooperation with the KVM. You can see
11 that the chairman is Mr. Nikola Sainovic, and you can see who the members
12 are -- or rather, the relevant ministries represented in the work of this
14 Q. Does that mean your proposal was accepted?
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. If you look at line 1 of the new page, the
16 reference to "KLA," I think, should be "OSCE."
17 MR. FILA: Okay. Okay.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Can you please go to tab 11, 2D9, and explain
19 what it's about?
20 A. This is a decision of the federal government to supplement the
21 composition of the Commission for Cooperation with the OSCE, the OSCE
22 verification mission.
23 Q. You've said this a number of times already, so please be brief.
24 Can you tell us what the position was of the Federal Republic of
25 Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia that the OSCE mission that just
1 arrived in Kosovo?
2 A. It was one of constructive cooperation. The general mood was for
3 the mission to succeed as envisaged in the agreement.
4 Q. Both Yugoslavia's and Serbia's interests coincided in this case;
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Could you now please go to tab 14, document 2D318.
8 A. Yes. This is the established form for recording important
9 agreements reached with any international representatives.
10 Q. Thank you. If you go to paragraph 1, what does it say? How would
11 you define that? Is this the policy of the federal government?
12 A. These are talks at a very high level, high-level talks, during
13 which the deputy prime minister puts forward the fundamental elements of
14 the government policy to deal with problems in Kosovo and Metohija. He
15 also talks about what the prerequisites are for a solution.
16 Q. Can you please go to tab 15 now, 2D87. Can you look at the
17 assessments in the last paragraph, please. Have you found that document?
18 A. No, not yet.
19 Q. Right. Tab 15.
20 A. That's fine.
21 Q. And the exhibit is 2D87.
22 A. Tab 15 is the -- all right. I apologise. This is a report of the
23 OSCE technical mission at a time when the verification mission was just
24 about to be launched.
25 Q. So what is the assessment? Is it a positive one or a negative
2 A. It's favourable one.
3 Q. In relation to?
4 A. In relation to the preparation and the conditions offered by the
5 federal government to the mission and its work.
6 Q. Can you now please go to tab 16, 2D321.
7 A. This is a document about the substance of the talks between Deputy
8 Prime Minister Sainovic and Wolfgang Petritsch, the Austrian ambassador.
9 Q. What is the position expressed by Mr. Petritsch, in relation to
10 assessment of the situation previously put forward by Mr. Sainovic?
11 A. Petritsch's reaction is favourable, his reaction to the
12 assessments presented by Mr. Sainovic and the talks themselves. When the
13 talks were drawing to a close, he also asked the federal government to
14 continue to demonstrate understanding for the ECMM mission in Kosovo and
16 Mr. Sainovic did not instantaneously meet Mr. Petritsch's request,
17 but he did say that he would confer with the Foreign Ministry, the federal
18 Foreign Ministry, and that he would probably later be in a position to
19 make public their position.
20 Q. So what was their position?
21 A. It was a reserved one, which you can see on the face of this
22 document. The problem being parallel action by a number of different
23 missions during the existence of the verification mission. It was our
24 belief that all of these different missions would be absorbed into the
25 OSCE operation, including the ECMM mission.
1 Q. So your position was different, right, from the opinion expressed
2 by the Foreign Ministry?
3 A. The Foreign Ministry position and my private position, if you
4 like, was this: Regardless of any other interests involved -- or rather,
5 regardless of the desire for there to be just a single mission in Kosovo,
6 this being the OSCE mission, the federal government should still agree to
7 have these two missions go on in parallel, as it were: The ECMM and the
8 OSCE. This was the position of the federal ministry, and the government
9 accepted this; therefore, the ECMM, led by the German ambassador,
10 Mr. Hartwig, continued to operate in parallel with the Kosovo Verification
12 Q. Thank you. Could you please go to tab 17 now, 2D105.
13 A. Tab 17, you said; right.
14 Q. Yes, that's right. 2D105 is the document number.
15 A. Just a moment, please. Which section?
16 Q. Halfway through paragraph 1, where the moves of the Yugoslav side
17 are mentioned, what does that tell you? Could you first read it and then
18 comment, sir.
19 A. Excuse me, are you talking about the notes of the meeting between
20 Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Petritsch.
21 Q. No. 2D105 is the Foreign Ministry local office in Pristina,
22 confidential meeting between Skoric, deputy head, and Riccardo Sessa, the
23 Italian ambassador. Could you go halfway through the first paragraph. It
24 talks about the moves made by the Yugoslav side.
25 A. This talks about the constructive approach taken by the Yugoslav
1 side towards the international community. In this specific case, we are
2 looking at the requests made by the Italian ambassador, Riccardo Sessa.
3 It is stated here that there is a continued great readiness to work
4 together with the Kosovo Verification Mission.
5 Q. Same document, paragraph 3, please.
6 A. What we see here is the Italian ambassador, Mr. Sessa, expressing
7 his surprise at the statement made by the OSCE president, Mr. Geremek, to
8 the effect that March 1999 will be decisive for the crisis in Kosovo and
10 Q. Can you tell us where Geremek got this information?
11 A. What we see here is his own colleague, the Italian Ambassador
12 Sessa, disagreeing with him, clearly realising that the statement made by
13 Geremek was counter-productive. And this statement came at the very start
14 of the Kosovo Verification Mission. Bearing all this in mind, I can only
15 agree with the reaction expressed by the Italian ambassador.
16 Q. All right. Could you please go to tab 18 now?
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there some other evidence of this statement
18 being made or is that it?
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No, just that. This is the only thing
20 we have.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] What we believe is indicative is that
23 they say March, of all months. I think that might start us thinking.
24 Q. Could you now please go to tab 18, 2D106.
25 A. Yes. This is a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
1 Pristina, to the effect that Ambassador Walker, head of the Kosovo
2 Verification Mission, was requesting a meeting with President Milosevic.
3 This shows you the technical side of how meetings were organised between
4 the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission and the state's highest
5 ranking dignitaries.
6 Q. What you mean is that the local offices of the Foreign Ministry
7 were used for this purpose.
8 A. Yes, certainly. That was perfectly within their remit.
9 Q. Could you go to tab 19 now, please, 2d119. This is another note
10 on talks between Ambassador Veljic from the under-chiefs of the Federal
11 Customs Administration at the Pristina airport. What is this about?
12 A. This is how technical administration and other issues were dealt
13 with, and that's what the document shows, issues that needed dealing with
14 in order to facilitate the Kosovo Verification Mission arrival in Kosovo
15 and Metohija. Another thing that one can see is that all of the agencies
16 having anything at all to do with the presence of the Kosovo Verification
17 Mission are parties to these talks.
18 Q. Right. Could you please go to tab 20 now. That's Defence Exhibit
19 2D323. Have you found that, sir?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Please go to page 2, please, paragraph 1 specifically. This is
22 paragraph 1 on page 2 of the English.
23 A. Excuse me, paragraph 2. You mean the second paragraph down the
24 page on page 2?
25 Q. Yes, but please look at the first paragraph in Serbia. And in the
1 English document, the paragraph I'm talking about is on page 2.
2 A. This is a document about a meeting between Mr. Nikola Sainovic and
3 the head of the Belgrade OSCE office, Mr. Pellnas. The office was
4 established in line with the agreement, and what brought this meeting
5 about what a protest by a representative -- the deputy prime minister of
6 the federal government to the head of the OSCE mission about the wounding
7 of policemen on the 20th of -- on the 12th of November, 1998.
8 Q. So what did Mr. Pellnas say about this? What was his general
9 attitude about this protest?
10 A. Mr. Pellnas, in general terms, expressed his understanding and his
11 regret about the incident. He realised that the protest was more than
13 Q. Very well. Can you please go to tab 21 now; Defence Exhibit
15 A. This document is one of the communiques about a whole series of
16 talks that Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic held with the American
17 ambassador, Chris Hill. They talked about the political solution to the
18 crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.
19 What we see reiterated here is the generally known position of the
20 federal government that the situation could only be dealt with by renewing
21 political dialogue and not by any other means. It is underlined that
22 everyone, and particularly the most influential international players,
23 must condemn terrorism in no uncertain terms.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you please go to tab 22.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the date on this accurate, the 28th of July?
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: So this is out of sequence from the rest of the
3 material, is it?
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No, no. Just this one. Just this one,
5 and the next one will re-establish the continuity.
6 Q. Could you please go to tab 22 now. This is 2D363. This document
7 is in English.
8 A. This is another communique, a press release, about one of the
9 meetings from a series of talks that Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic held
10 with the American ambassador, Chris Hill.
11 Q. The month is November; right?
12 A. The 27th of November, 1998. But there were many such meetings
13 that were held.
14 Q. And Sainovic appears to be saying what?
15 A. You can see that Mr. Sainovic and the federal government are
16 concerned that too much tolerance is being displayed vis-a-vis the
17 terrorist activities. One thing I wish to underline is that in the
18 period, between October and December 1998 alone [Realtime transcript read
19 in error "December 1998"], there were over 500 terror strikes in Kosovo
20 and Metohija, and we are talking about only as many as two months of the
21 Kosovo Verification Mission being present in the area, yet there were over
22 500 terrorist strikes.
23 Q. Thank you. Could you go to tab 23 now please. This is Defence
24 Exhibit 2D196, item 2, please.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: What was the period you stated for over 500 terror
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, over 500 terrorist
3 strikes occurred in October, November, and December 1998.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the beginning of October.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: The transcript simply reflected December for some
7 reason, and I thought I heard October to December. Thank you.
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Have you found tab 20, sir?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Would you go to paragraph -- or item 2, paragraph 2, and the first
12 paragraph on page 2. Sainovic appears to be saying something about the
13 normalisation, about restoring normal relations. Can you explain what
14 that is about. This is the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 of the
15 English version of the report.
16 A. First and foremost, I wish to draw your attention to the kind and
17 level -- the nature and legal of these talks. What we see here is deputy
18 prime minister and the vice-president of the European Commission talking.
19 The federal policy is here reaffirmed about the need of restoring
20 relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the one hand and
21 the EU on the other. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an integral
22 part of Europe.
23 Q. Could you please go to tab 24. This is Defence Exhibit 2D169.
24 This is a document about Ms. Sadako Ogata's visit to Yugoslavia. Could
25 you please go to the second paragraph and tell us what Ms. Sadako Ogata
1 said about this visit.
2 A. This document was drafted by the Foreign Ministry for the benefit
3 of the federal government. In addition to other things, it shows that
4 Ms. Sadako Otaga toured quite a number of different places in Kosovo and
5 Metohija. She subsequently arrived at the conclusion that the number
6 displaced persons had decreased, and that one could not speak of a
7 humanitarian disaster.
8 Q. The date on this document, can you tell us the date on this
9 document, sir?
10 A. The 5th of January. Her visit had taken place between the 20th
11 and the 22nd of December.
12 Q. Thank you very much.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe it is now time
14 for our lunch break.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, we will break for an hour at this
16 time. Again, would you please go with the usher, and we will see you
17 again at 1.45.
18 [The witness stands down].
19 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.45 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Have you rested?
25 A. Yes. Thank you.
1 Q. Now, one physical effort after this break, please look at tab 25,
2 Exhibit number 2D9, I believe, and please look halfway through the second
3 paragraph. What is this about -- Sorry. It's 2D15. 2D15.
4 A. This is a document about the talks of Nikola Sainovic with the
5 speaker of Austrian parliament, Hans Fischer, and the vice-pm of Austria,
6 Wolfgang Schussel, held on the 4th of July 1999. The paragraph you're
7 mentioning says that both partners agreed on the necessity of finding a
8 political solution that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity
9 of Yugoslavia. They also agree that it is necessary to urgently launch
10 negotiations certainly before coming spring.
11 Q. Thank you. Is this a high-level of conversation and do the other
12 participants accept his position?
13 A. Yes, certainly. This is a high-level conversation. The speaker
14 of parliament receives officials of comparable level, and the Austrian
15 vice-pm, Wolfgang Schussel, is the partner to the vice president of
16 president -- sorry, vice-pm of Yugoslavia. Mr. Schussel is now prime
17 minister of Austria.
18 Q. Did they agree on the issues?
19 A. They agreed on the principles underlying a solution to the Kosovo
20 Metohija problem, and these principles are on now and needn't be repeated.
21 Q. Please look at the top of page 2 of this document. It -- it is
22 also at the top of page 2 of the English translation. What does Sainovic
23 state here?
24 A. In this part of the conversation, this part of the document, the
25 principles of solving the Kosovo and Metohija problem are pointed out:
1 Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty and the principle of
2 the equality of all the ethnic groups and all citizens irrespective of
3 their ethnic affiliation.
4 Mr. Sainovic went to visit an influential country, a member of the
5 European Union, and in which country there -- several international
6 organisations have their headquarters, including the OSCE. He went there
7 to seek the support of such an influential country to a political solution
8 and support for and an urgent continuation of dialogue.
9 Q. Did he get that support?
10 A. This document shows that the reactions of the high officials of
11 Austria were positive, and that they even promised they would strive to
12 win over the representatives of Albanian political parties to accept that.
13 Q. Please go to tab 26 now; Exhibit 2D181.
14 A. This is a document about my conversation with the Minister of
15 Foreign Affairs of Norway and the then new chairman in office of the OSCE,
16 Mr. Knut Vollebaek, who had taken over that position in January 1999.
17 Q. Please take a look at paragraph 1 on page 1. It's also paragraph
18 1 of the English version. Could you comment, please. What do you speak
19 about here?
20 A. Two objectives -- there were two objectives of Yugoslav policy:
21 One, for -- that the OSCE mission in Kosovo be successful; and secondly,
22 that the position of Yugoslavia and the OSCE be normalised.
23 Q. Please go to page 2, paragraph 2. It is paragraph 3 on page 2 of
24 the English translation. My question is: Does this contain any remarks
25 about or objections to the activities of the KVM?
1 A. Yes. Mr. Vollebaek asked for a flexible attitude of the Yugoslav
2 side regarding demands about using a Swiss helicopter in Kosovo and
3 Metohija, and to allow personal weapons for bodyguards of the KVM, also,
4 granting the permission for the operation of a radio station.
5 Q. And what was your attitude?
6 A. My position was that we wanted cooperation with the OSCE,
7 understanding and good relations, but a prerequisite for all of that is
8 honouring the agreement between Yugoslavia and the OSCE. The demands put
9 forward by Mr. Vollebaek went beyond the agreement that was reached, and I
10 asked him to reconsider the offer of the Yugoslav government to put at
11 their free disposal a helicopter of the Yugoslav government.
12 I was saying to him that this was best for the mission because our
13 crews were familiar with the area and capacities could also be
14 strengthened, if necessary. I said to him that we had to bear in mind our
15 goal; namely, to provide a helicopter for transportation in urgent
16 situations, and the Yugoslav side was willing to do so, regarding the
18 About weapons for bodyguards, I reminded him that it was very
19 difficult for us to give up the principle that the Yugoslav government
20 guaranteed for all KVM members, including Mr. Walker, and that there was
21 no need to insist on this and create problems where there are no problems.
22 There is a general rule applying to diplomats, and this was a
23 diplomatic mission, and that rule is that security is guaranteed by the
24 host country and not by countries or organisations that send diplomats
1 As for the radio station, I must say I was surprised by this
2 request. At the time in Kosovo and Metohija, there was a practically
3 unlimited number of radio stations and printed media, especially in
4 Albanian. These printed media had an overall annual circulation of two
5 million, and it was not in keeping with the nature of the mission to have
6 an own public media.
7 Q. Was it part of the agreement between you and Geremek to allow them
8 to use their own radio stations?
9 A. No. They were allowed to use means for communication, internal
10 means of communication, and between them and their headquarters in Vienna.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, what did you say was the circulation
12 of the printed media?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The circulation of the printed media
14 in Albanian was two million per annum, the total, and none of these media
15 were funded or under any influence of the authorities. On the contrary,
16 all those were mildly speaking oppositional media, media that publicly
17 advocated activities directed against the state.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: It was just that it seemed such a low figure that I
19 thought I should clarify it, but it was what you apparently said the first
20 time as well.
21 Mr. Fila.
22 THE WITNESS: [In English] Your Honour, I would like to draw
23 attention that circulation of media in Serbia are relatively low,
24 comparing -- compared to those in West European countries, and in Kosovo
25 and Metohija in particularly. As I mentioned, those were exclusively
1 private medias.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 Mr. Fila.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And let me tell you -- or rather, let me ask you, how many --
6 what's the rate of illiteracy in our country.
7 A. [Interpretation] I'm not an expert in that field, but illiteracy
8 is, unfortunately, much higher than in Western Europe, but I cannot
9 mention any precise figure because I would be wrong.
10 Q. Please look at the third paragraph on page 2 of this document.
11 Mr. Vollebaek is informing you about something here. It's the fourth
12 paragraph in the English translation.
13 A. I'm looking at the Serbian text.
14 Q. In the Serbian version, it is page 2. Vollebaek speaks about --
15 A. Yes. Vollebaek thanked the representative of the federal
16 government for his -- for their attitude, for their restrained attitude,
17 after the kidnapping of eight VJ members, saying that the KVM would become
18 operational only in January 1999, which, in my opinion, was rather late.
19 And this -- it was a detrimental deferring of this, their mission,
20 because the KVM was only established three months after the signing of my
21 agreement with Mr. Vollebaek. There was pressure exerted on the Yugoslav
22 side, and we were urged to sign the agreement as soon as possible. But
23 once the agreement was signed, we were confronted with an unreasonably
24 slow completion of the mission.
25 Q. Was it our fault for -- that they were organising so slowly?
1 A. Clearly, the Yugoslav party isn't to blame for that in any way.
2 The statement of Mr. Vollebaek can be understood in such a way that the
3 OSCE was unable to complete their mission by -- or rather, to make the
4 mission fully operational in late January. And as late as March,
5 two-thirds of its staff were not yet in place.
6 Q. Now let us, please, look at page 2 and -- which is toward the end
7 of the English version.
8 A. Let me point toward the wish of Yugoslavia at the time to live up
9 to all its obligations as agreed and signed, but our expectations to be
10 treated as an equal signatory was frustrated, which can be seen from this
11 document. No reports that were sent from the OSCE mission to OSCE
12 headquarters or any other parties were forwarded to the Yugoslav
13 government, although that was an explicit obligation under the agreement.
14 Q. Did Mr. Vollebaek, at this meeting, complain to you about weapons
15 in barracks or anything of the kind?
16 A. No.
17 Q. So he only asked for helicopter weapons and a radio station?
18 A. His requests were recorded faithfully, and I believe that he
19 received the only possible reactions to that.
20 Q. He required nothing else from you?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Please -- now please go to tab 27; Exhibit number 2D330. It's a
23 decision of federal government, so please comment.
24 A. Before each international visit, be it a visit of Yugoslav
25 representatives to foreign countries or international organisations or
1 visits of the representatives of foreign governments or international
2 organisations to Yugoslavia, the federal government always defined its
3 position with regard to that.
4 These positions contained our objectives and the instructions for
5 these talks. This is such a position which was being prepared on the
6 occasion of the visit of Nikola Sainovic, a federal deputy prime minister
7 to Sweden and he Denmark.
8 Q. Please look at item 3 on page 4. What did Mr. Sainovic have the
9 authority to do?
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Could we have this on e-court, because the
11 document -- is the document simply this one page letter?
12 I was expecting something lengthy, Mr. Fila. I think it's my
13 mistake. Just please continue.
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No, it is my mistake, Your Honour.
15 Q. Go to tab 28, please. The Exhibit number is 2D183. This is the
16 proposal of the negotiating positions before that visit.
17 Now please go to page 4, item 3, and what kind of talks did
18 Mr. Sainovic -- was Mr. Sainovic going to have?
19 A. The federal government precisely defined the framework in which
20 Mr. Sainovic had the liberty to move on the occasion of his visit to
21 foreign countries; and, in this case, the first objective set by
22 government is condemning terrorism and putting the KLA on the list of
23 terrorist organisations.
24 There is no need for me to read out the rest, but what's most
25 important is that our objective was to win over influential countries in
1 the world, especially in Europe, to cut money lines and the lines of
2 supply in terms of weapons for the terrorists. And this proposal was
3 accepted by the Security Council, which in nearly all its resolutions and
4 communiques demanded that all members of the UN stop the training,
5 funding, and arming of the terrorist KLA.
6 Moreover, the Security Council, in one of its resolutions,
7 expressed a deep concern and sorrow that this is not fully respected by
8 all UN members.
9 Q. Please now go to page 5, item B. What was Mr. Sainovic expected
10 to do in accordance with government decisions?
11 A. This is also about his visit to two very influential European
12 countries, EU members and members of the OSCE, which meant that we
13 expected support for the renewal of our rights as members of international
14 organisations, especially the OSCE, and he was supposed to ask his
15 interlocutors in these two countries to deploy their contingents of
16 inspectors in accordance with the agreement, Jovanovic-Geremek.
17 Q. The purpose was the manning of the mission?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now please go to tab 29.
20 A. This is a document --
21 Q. Just a minute. Exhibit number is 2D228. What is this about?
22 A. This document is a protest lodged by the government of Yugoslavia.
23 This protest note was sent to the Kosovo Verification Commission and to
24 the OSCE in Vienna, and it's about certain incidents at the Djeneral
25 Jankovic border crossing, because certain equipment was found that
1 wasn't --
2 Q. No need to go through that. What did you believe the Kosovo
3 Verification Mission had done by carrying weapons and goods that had not
4 been declared and bringing them into the country?
5 A. We believed this constituted a violation of the Jovanovic-Geremek
6 Agreement, because items were found that were not in compliance or in
7 keeping with the civilian and diplomatic character of the Kosovo
8 Verification Mission.
9 Q. Did that constitute a violation of the Vienna Conventions, too?
10 A. Of course, it did. There is no rule in international relations
11 that allows diplomats to carry weapons or, indeed, the sort of equipment
12 contrary to what should normally be the position of a diplomat or the
13 civilian nature of their mission.
14 Q. Just another thing: Was this the only such situation, or did this
15 recur a number of times?
16 A. There were several such situations that occurred. This is just a
17 single incident. It's more of an example than the overall picture, if you
19 Q. Thank you. Go to tab 30, please; Defence Exhibit 2D217. Have you
20 found it, sir? Tab 30.
21 The document bears the date of the 13th of February, 1999, does it
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you please go to the introductory section of the document.
25 Who is it that's arriving, what is this about, and so on and so forth?
1 A. First of all, the 13th of February was the time when negotiations
2 were in progress to achieve a peaceful political solution. This was a
3 time when public threats were made of armed aggression by NATO against
4 Yugoslavia. This was also time of very intense terrorist activity over in
5 Kosovo and Metohija.
6 Q. One can see that an official visit took place on the 9th and 10th
7 of February; right?
8 A. Precisely.
9 Q. What can you tell us about that?
10 A. Needless to say, this is just one illustration of a whole series
11 of political and diplomatic initiatives in progress in Belgrade at the
12 time. This is a visit of the foreign minister of a friendly country. He
13 was welcomed at the highest possible level. In addition to the president
14 of Yugoslavia and the president of Serbia, he was also received by the
15 president of the Assembly and even Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic.
16 In Montenegro, he was received by the President of Montenegro. This
17 clearly shows the sort of welcome that was extended by Yugoslavia to
18 visiting foreign dignitaries.
19 Q. So he was received by a number of different high-ranking state
20 officials. Is this typical of the way Yugoslavia treated these visiting
21 foreign dignitaries at the time?
22 A. This was no exception. It was more a rule, really. More or less,
23 the same thing applied to Mr. Vollebaek's visit. It wasn't quite the
24 same, but again he met everyone that he wanted to meet and talked to them,
25 although the visit itself had been different because he came as the
1 president of the OSCE.
2 Well, this shows us Yugoslavia's commitment to use evolved
3 diplomatic means an international dialogue to contribute to solving the
4 problem of Kosovo and Metohija. Another thing that this document tells us
5 is what the positions were of the Greek government. Fundamentally, they
6 were identical to those expressed by the Yugoslav government, especially
7 as far as a peaceful political solution was concerned, but also as far as
8 the principles were concerned, the only principles that such a solution
9 could possibly have been based on.
10 As you can see, if you look at the document, Minister Pangalos
11 expressed his full support of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
12 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. He was also in
13 favour of a peaceful solution, and by no means in favour of a military
15 Q. What about the fact that various domestic dignitaries were
16 receiving those people; Milosevic and those in Montenegro, too? Does that
17 show something that the atmosphere that prevailed among the Yugoslav
19 A. That's how the system worked in both Serbia and Yugoslavia.
20 That's how the political system worked. This is an expression of respect.
21 This is also tantamount to compliance with the certain mechanical
22 processes that cannot be restricted or exhausted by simply talking to
23 individual foreign dignitaries. One must talk to all the representatives
24 of all the relevant political agencies, institutions, and structures.
25 Q. And these institutions existed, and they did their job, didn't
2 A. Yes, that is true.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, Greece was at that time a member of
4 NATO; is that correct?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: NATO decisions are taken unanimously, are they?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a former minister of a country
8 that was itself not a member of NATO, I'm not familiar with the
9 decision-making process that applies to NATO countries. I believe you
10 will find that easy enough to understand. However, I am deeply convinced
11 that the positions expressed by Minister Pangalos during his visit to
12 Yugoslavia were sincere, and in no way did these positions run counter to
13 the inherent principles of Greece as a Balkan country.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Page 2, paragraph 3, the bottom of paragraph 3. This paragraph 3
17 on page 2 of the report itself in the English version.
18 What is Greece's stated political position as far as the
19 resolution of the Kosovo issue was concerned on the eve of the Rambouillet
20 talks, in a manner of speaking, since the dates are the 9th and the 10th?
21 A. As I said before, the positions of Serbia and Yugoslavia on the
22 one hand, and those expressed by Greece often the other, quite regardless
23 of the fact that Greece happened to be also a member of certain
24 international organisations which Yugoslavia and Serbia at the time had no
25 access to, were nevertheless quite close, and I believe they had remained
1 that way. They were close if not essentially identical.
2 Separatism in Kosovo and Metohija, and I hope that is beyond
3 dispute, does not merely jeopardise the sovereignty and integrity of
4 Serbia or what was at the time still Yugoslavia, but also those of other
5 Balkan countries, including Greece.
6 Q. In that same paragraph, we see the same fundamental political
7 position espoused by Greece restated. What do they say about Kosmet and
8 the border?
9 A. The dilemma I keep facing is this: Should I go to the substance
10 of this document, Should I use it to back my words, or should I assume
11 that the substance is familiar to everyone. It goes without saying that
12 we see here the positions espoused by Greece: A political, peaceful
13 solution for the Kosovo and Metohija, the need for dialogue, and the need
14 for reasserting international borders plus autonomy for Kosovo and
15 Metohija within the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of
17 Q. In February 1999, despite the fact that they were a member of
18 NATO, the Greek foreign minister put forward these positions that you have
19 now elucidated for us; is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's quite right.
21 Q. Could you go to paragraph 4 or item 4 halfway down the first
22 paragraph. This was our position -- or rather, your position. The
23 following sentence, Mr. Jovanovic, starts with "We repeated," and so on
24 and so forth. Can you comment on that, please?
25 A. In January 1999, an important meeting of the Contact Group was
1 held in London, establishing a set of ten principles to deal with Kosovo
2 and Metohija. These principles were did not entirely take into account in
3 the best possible way the interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia, despite
4 which the Yugoslav government and the Serbian government decided to accept
5 and recognise these ten principles.
6 Throughout this entire process, the government advocated their
7 implementation, and it stood up to any attempt to twist their meaning
8 during the actual implementation and use them for something else. That
9 was not in the spirit of the original principles.
10 Q. Could you please go to item 2 on page 6. This is the second
11 paragraph on page 6 of the English. What is Pangalos saying there? What
12 is he proposing for the FRY?
13 A. Minister Pangalos stated a very clear position here: Any
14 negotiations on Kosovo and Metohija -- no negotiations on Kosovo and
15 Metohija must lead to independence. He proposed that the Yugoslav
16 government state this in no uncertain terms during the Rambouillet talks.
17 On the other hand, Minister Pangalos expressed his unreserved support and
18 understanding for Yugoslavia's efforts to renew it's membership rights in
19 all international organisations, in which Yugoslavia at the time was
20 suspended or its status was suspended.
21 Q. What was the position on the sanctions?
22 A. It goes without saying that Mr. Pangalos called for a suspension
23 or abolition of all kinds of sanctions. If I may just remind you that the
24 sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by a Security Council decision back in
25 1992 were abolished by a Security Council resolution back in early 1996
1 after the successful conclusion of the Dayton-Paris Accords. Following
2 that, some countries, and particularly the United States, kept what they
3 referred to as an external wall, a barrier of sanctions.
4 Although I have every respect for these countries, I must now say
5 that those sanctions were illegal, simply because they were not in line
6 with the previous resolution by the Security Council on abolishing the
7 sanctions or lifting the sanctions. Likewise, other types of sanctions
8 had been introduced. In our assessment, and as far as I can see in
9 Mr. Pangalos's assessment as well, those sanctions were not appropriate.
10 Q. I understand. Were these sanctions imposed by the UN and the
11 Security Council, or was this something done by the US of their own
13 A. No. At the time Security Council sanctions had been lifted, with
14 the exception of the ban on importing weapons into the territory of the
15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 Q. We have wrapped this up now, and let us open the Rambouillet
17 chapter. Did the federal government had a role to play in the Rambouillet
18 and Paris talks?
19 A. Sir, minister -- I'm a former minister.
20 Q. Well, once a minister, always a minister.
21 A. Well, the government did have a role to play in the
22 Paris-Rambouillet talks, as it did in the political discourse at the time,
23 generally speaking.
24 Q. Who set the political platform for these talks?
25 A. The platform was set by the federal government; nevertheless, the
1 platform had been closely coordinated with the government of the Republic
2 of Serbia.
3 There is one thing I wish to say. The international community
4 remained adamant at all times that the problem of Kosovo and Metohija
5 should be approached from the federal level rather than from the
6 republican level.
7 Q. So what about the federal level? Who were the federal
8 representatives at Rambouillet?
9 A. The federal government appointed two of its deputy prime ministers
10 to participate in the talks; the first being Nikola Sainovic and the other
11 being Professor Vladan Kutlesic. Sainovic was appointed because he was
12 the person most privy to diplomacy and various international activities
13 concerning the problem of Kosovo and Metohija. Further, he was the one
14 with the greatest number of international contacts, and he was also the
15 chairman for cooperation with the Kosovo Verification Mission. On top of
16 this, he was the president of the foreign policy commission of the federal
18 Dr. Vladan Kutlesic, on the other hand, was appointed because he
19 was a scholar, a law expert, and had himself been involved in a number of
20 different talks with the international players concerning Kosovo and
22 Q. What about the Foreign Ministry, or rather, you on his behalf?
23 What about people from the Foreign Ministry? Did you provide the
24 logistics to the Serbian delegation that was on its way to Rambouillet?
25 A. The Foreign Ministry placed at the disposal of the Yugoslav
1 Serbian state delegation in Rambouillet all of its professional technical
2 and human resources, and I'm not just talking about the staff at our
3 embassies in France. This also included a whole number of top-notch
4 diplomats from some of the neighbouring countries; such as Switzerland,
5 Belgium, and a number of other countries.
6 In addition to this, a working group was dispatched from Belgrade,
7 comprising top-notch professionals, lawyers, diplomats, and clerical
8 staff, including no less than 20 persons. Throughout the talks, they
9 remained at the disposal of our state delegation in both Rambouillet and
11 Q. The mandate is generally known. We've looked at the Assembly
12 decision a number of times, so it's not my intention to tire you with that
13 now, sir, but let me phrase this differently. What was the only issue
14 that our delegation at Rambouillet was unable to discuss?
15 A. The only issue that our delegation had no authority, power, or,
16 indeed, ability to discuss was the territorial integrity of the country.
17 All other aspects leading to a peaceful political solution were fair game,
18 and they had carte blanche to negotiate all such elements; although, in
19 all fact, no negotiations at all took place there at the time.
20 Q. We'll get to at that later. Will you please go to tab 31. This
21 is Defence Exhibit 1D18, page 414 in e-court, item 111. What is this
22 about, sir?
23 A. These are the ten principles of the Contact Group, which
24 constitute a basis and a framework for a peaceful political solution for
25 Kosovo and Metohija. As I've mentioned before, these were agreed at a
1 meeting of the Contact Group that was held in London. You can see the
2 date for yourself; the 30th of January, 1999.
3 Q. What follows is really important. Were these negotiable
4 principles or non-negotiable principles to be accepted by each of the
5 parties before the start of talks?
6 A. Based on the positions stated by the Contact Group - and we know
7 what its composition was - these were non-negotiable principles.
8 Q. So we, as a country, were invited to negotiate based on these
9 principles; is that right?
10 A. Yes, that's right.
11 Q. Negotiations got off the ground - we've heard about that - but
12 there's something else I want you to tell me now. Throughout the course
13 of these talks, did you know that Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic
14 ever came to Belgrade for the duration of the talks; although, the rule
15 was that in one was to leave the castle premises? Did he do this at
16 anytime; and if so, what was the reason for that?
17 A. I do know that Mr. Sainovic, at one point, came back to Belgrade
18 during the actual talks. I spoke to him, as did Milosevic and Bulatovic.
19 The Rambouillet talks had been bogged down. Our delegation had been asked
20 to state its positions and to accept certain solutions that were not in
21 keeping with the ten principles of the Contact Group. My understanding
22 was Mr. Sainovic was in Belgrade, having previously received permission of
23 the co-chairmen of the conference, or at least that's what he told me at
24 the time.
25 Q. What was the stumbling-block? Did our people actually sign those
1 ten principles? Someone said at the request of Robin Cook, I'm not sure
2 if that's true; whereas the, Albanians refused to signed the principles.
3 Was that the stumbling-block?
4 A. It is crystal clear that what was at stake here were the vital
5 interests of the country. No aberration would have been allowed from the
6 previously agreed platform that had been defined jointly by the government
7 of Yugoslavia and the government of Serbia. There were emphatic attempts,
8 however, to place our state delegation under pressure and force their hand
9 to accept principles that were contrary to the ten principles of the
10 Contact Group and that were, needless to say, contrary to the political
11 platform envisaged for the talks. There was the danger that one might
12 stray from these principles.
13 Our state delegation came forward with the following initiative:
14 They suggested that the ten indisputable principles be signed. The state
15 delegation felt that this was some form of guarantee that the other
16 sections of the agreement would be kept, more or less, within the limits
17 of these ten principles.
18 Q. What conclusion did you reach at those meetings? Did you decide
19 that the talks should continue or halt? What did you do? What did you as
20 a -- as the Foreign Minister do?
21 A. There were two conclusions that the talks should go ahead, and
22 that the diplomats for their part should step up their activities at the
23 international level in order to ensure support and understanding from
24 influential international players, especially in terms of compliance with
25 the ten principles set forth by the Contact Group.
1 Q. Did you receive any assurances that the matter would go no
3 A. Yes, that is understood. None of our collocutors in any of these
4 various international institutions spoke against the ten principles. That
5 much is certain.
6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, was that the reason for Mr. Sainovic flying back to
8 A. Yes, indeed.
9 Q. Could you now please go to tab 32 and look at P474. What sort of
10 document is this?
11 A. I'm sorry, I'm facing some technical difficulties here. I'm
12 trying to turn this around.
13 Are you talking about 542, 543, so on and so forth?
14 Q. Tab 42. P474 is the exhibit number.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. This is a document in English. What does it say?
17 A. This is the text of the so-called provisional agreement on peace
18 and self-determination in Kosovo, otherwise known as the Rambouillet
19 agreement, dated the 23rd of February, 1999.
20 Q. Is this the draft agreement that our delegation was asked to
21 accept and sign?
22 A. This is quite a voluminous document, and I can't now confirm that
23 it contains everything, all the sections of the agreement, but I should
24 assume so. And these were the demands made by the international players
25 for the Serbian delegation to sign, the Yugoslav Serbian delegation.
1 Q. Before your arrival, this document was extensively discussed in
2 this courtroom. I will ask you, Mr. Jovanovic, to comment on some
3 provisions only. Please take a look at annex 7.
4 A. Give me the page number, please.
5 Q. It is page 24, and in the book it's page 588. It is annex 7, and
6 it also has a sub-annex B. Can you tell us what it says? Annex 7,
7 supplement B, and on -- item 8.
8 A. Did I understand you well that it is page 588 in the English
9 version and item B?
10 Q. Yes. Supplement B, item 8.
11 A. This text is very clear. It says that, "NATO troops, their staff
12 or personnel, vessels, equipment," et cetera, "should be granted unlimited
13 access and movement through all of Yugoslavia, including the right to use
14 airspace and the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of
16 In accordance with this, these provisions, NATO would be entitled
17 to stay on the territory of -- of FRY and any part of its territory,
18 without limitations in time or any other limitations. They would also
19 have the right to hold military manoeuvres and exercises anywhere they
20 wanted. They could also use any facility during the -- their entire stay
21 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
22 Q. With no limitation in time; is that right?
23 A. Yes. There were no limitations in time; no legal or
24 constitutional limitations whatsoever.
25 Q. Please now go to page 68, item 5 in the English version, P474. It
1 is page 24 in e-court, and it's page 589 in the book.
2 Please take a look at item 15. What is -- what should NATO also
3 be allowed to do in our country?
4 A. Here, in this item, you mentioned NATO shall be allowed, without
5 limitations, to use the entire electromagnetic spectrum of Yugoslavia for
6 their forces. I'm a layman when it comes to electromagnetic spectrum, but
7 still I understand that to mean that the legal proprietors and users can
8 be deprived of their rights to use part of the spectrum, including the
9 army, the police, emergency services.
10 So all of these would -- would be in a position to lose access to
11 electromagnetic -- to portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, without --
12 without payment or without limitation in time, et cetera.
13 Q. Now please look -- go to page 25 in e-court or page 590 in the
14 book. It's item 21.
15 What powers is NATO accorded here?
16 A. NATO has no rights, but would like to have them. This item states
17 that NATO shall be authorised to detain citizens of the Federal Republic
18 of Yugoslavia without answering to anyone, which under international law
19 is known as surrender, because when a foreign national in any country has
20 greater rights than the citizens of that country, this is -- this is
21 described as surrender.
22 Q. Have you ever heard of such rights accorded to NATO anywhere else,
23 to go about arresting people in England, Greece, or anywhere?
24 A. It goes without saying that such demands are contrary to all, not
25 only to all legal norms and standards, but also to all standards of
1 contemporary civilisation, and that there is no sovereign country in the
2 world where NATO has rights that come even close to these. And Yugoslav
3 was exerted pressure -- was exerted pressure upon to sign or accept such
4 an agreement.
5 Q. Please now go to page --
6 A. With your permission, Your Honours, I would like to add one
8 Such provisions in this so-called Rambouillet agreement were in
9 fact an ultimatum, and it was a demand to occupy all of Yugoslavia, not
10 only part of it, and this is completely unacceptable. So all of
11 Yugoslavia would -- would basically be occupied. So this text is a sad
12 testimony of something that, in my opinion, should never have happened or
13 be written.
14 Q. Does -- did any citizen of Yugoslavia under the constitution or
15 any -- any legal act have the right to sign anything like this?
16 A. Clearly, nobody had the right to sign such a humiliating document.
17 Any educated person in the world is -- is able to come to the conclusion
18 that no country in the world would under any circumstances possibly agree
19 to this.
20 Q. You remained in your position even after the fall of Milosevic
21 for a certain time. Was such -- was this document ever offered or
22 proposed to any subsequent government after Milosevic?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Now please go to tab 33, Exhibit 2D221. What is this?
25 A. These are the positions of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1 regarding the so-called military presence [Realtime transcript read in
2 error "prisons"], and this position was sent to the federal government by
3 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on page 94, line 6,
5 what is said here military "prisons," that's not what the witness said.
6 He said military "presence."
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Is it clear, from this document, that NATO would enter only K and
10 M, and only then would it go elsewhere?
11 A. Yes. It can be seen from this document that Yugoslav diplomacy
12 reacted to statements in the media and elsewhere about the necessity to
13 admit NATO military forces to Kosovo and Metohija. The ministry thought
14 the time had come for -- for the clarification of this issue, and that's
15 why it submitted these positions to the government.
16 Q. And in the meantime, the demands -- the demands had been extended
17 to an occupation of the entire country, isn't it?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what is your opinion of the Rambouillet talks with
20 regard to the ten basic principles of the Contact Group and onwards?
21 A. I believe that there were no real talks in Rambouillet. Anyway,
22 that was a show, the purpose of which was to depict Serbia and the federal
23 Republic of Croatia [as interpreted] as a -- as an uncooperative party.
24 And these talks on Rambouillet were actually a pretext for the preparation
25 of the aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] A correction of the transcript. It
2 says Federal Republic of "Croatia," but it's actually Federal Republic of
3 "Yugoslavia," with all due respect for everybody.
4 Q. The documents that were put forward for signing could not be
5 accepted, as you said. Then why were they offered to us at all?
6 A. I believe that I have answered this question in part. An excuse
7 was sought for the military campaign of NATO against Yugoslavia, and I can
8 say that in some chapters of the so-called Rambouillet agreement or about
9 some chapters there were no talks at all, no negotiations, nor were those
10 chapters introduced in the negotiation process. And those were chapters
11 2, 5, and 7 of the agreement containing the very provisions about -- of a
12 military and security character.
13 So this so-called Rambouillet agreement was only disclosed to the
14 Yugoslav Serbian side in small portions at once, and these are methods
15 that are -- that are not used in serious talks.
16 Q. Please go to tab 24, Exhibit number 2D241. Sorry, it is tab 34.
17 Exhibit number 2D241. I'm referring to the last paragraph of page 6 of
18 the English version and its continuation on page 7?
19 A. What is the reference to the Serbian text.
20 Q. It's paragraph 2 in the Serbian text. Please comment what this
21 document is about.
22 A. This is a very unusual, a very strange position put forward by
23 Mr. Joschka Fischer, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, who asked
24 that Yugoslavia sign the agreement as a whole; because if they -- we
25 failed to do so, it will have to negotiate directly with the USA, which
1 will not end well for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2 In my opinion, this is a blunt and inappropriate threat of a
3 highly esteemed European country against a smaller and weaker but still
4 sovereign country.
5 Q. And what was Mr. Van den Broek's position with regard to this?
6 A. Mr. Van den Broek was saying that this was Yugoslavia's last
7 chance; and if this opportunity is missed, he announced a possible
8 break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is unclear what he
9 meant by the possible break-up, but it is possible that -- that such
10 threats are uttered before an imminent aggression by NATO.
11 It remains unclear why it would be dangerous, according to
12 Mr. Fischer, if Yugoslavia were to negotiate with the USA. Does that mean
13 that having talks with the most influential country in the world is
14 dangerous per se?
15 Q. Did Van den Broek say anything about minority rights here?
16 A. Mr. Van den Broek put forward an idea which is unheard-of in
17 international relations and in the practice of international relations;
18 namely, that a sovereign, independent country is expected to respect the
19 right of an ethnic minority to self-determination. There is no such
20 practice in international relations, because the Albanian minority at that
21 time, and today still, has a country where the Albanians are a minority.
22 That's Albania.
23 And the ethnic Albanians in Serbia, in accordance with the
24 framework convention of the Council of Europe, have the status of an
25 ethnic minority in the ethnic -- sorry, in the Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia and now in Serbia.
2 Q. Now please go to tab 35 and take a look at Exhibit number 2D242.
3 What is this?
4 A. These are the minutes from the -- from a session of the federal
5 government when I informed the government of the results of the meetings
6 concerning Kosovo and Metohija and Rambouillet and Paris.
7 Q. Please look at the last page of the -- the announcement by the
8 co-chairmen. This is the supplement. What does it say? What kind of
9 document is this, and what is it about? You see that it's dated Paris,
10 19th of March, 1999.
11 A. The co-chairmen of the meetings in Paris and Rambouillet stated on
12 March 19th, among others, that negotiations are -- would be postponed, and
13 that the meetings would not be continued unless the Serbs accept the
15 I have already had the opportunity to state that there were no
16 agreements in Paris or Rambouillet. There were texts but not agreements.
17 And the sentence in this announcement of the co-chairmen, in other words,
18 not the entire Contact Group, is in fact an ultimatum to Serbia and
20 This is contradictory in itself because it says that talks would
21 not continue unless the Serbs declared that they accept the agreements.
22 Now the question is: Why continue talks if it is supposed and, in fact,
23 what is demanded is that agreements are accepted? Because once agreements
24 are accepted, there's no point in negotiating or continuing talks.
25 Q. Please take a look at item 4 - you've covered it already - and
1 item 5.
2 A. About item 4, I can say that this is an insinuation. The two
3 co-chairmen in an inappropriate way state -- make statements here. It
4 says "unless the Serbs declare." Which Serbs? We're talking about the
5 state delegations of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
6 And the text in parentheses here is probably meant to mean that
7 the entire Contact Group agrees with this; whereas, it was very clear that
8 the Russian representative and the Contact Group never accepted the entire
9 text that was offered, nor did he sign it when the representatives of the
10 political parties of the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija did, and so
11 did the representative of the USA.
12 Q. Please now take a look at item 5. What does the -- what does this
14 A. This is another threat against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
15 and Serbia. It is somewhat differently phrased from the act order of
16 NATO, but it's basically the same thing.
17 It says: "Consultations with our partners and allies will start
18 in order to be ready to act."
19 Will they also consult Russia as a partner, we could ask, or are
20 everybody else partners except for some members of the Contact Group?
21 Q. All right. But there's also item 6: "Warning the authorities in
22 Belgrade not to launch any military offensive in the field and not to
23 prevent, in any way, the personal freedom of movement and the activities
24 of the KVM."
25 Would this be a breach of obligations agreed to? How does this
1 fit into the context of a bombing or is this a pretext also?
2 A. You can see that this -- what kind of games, inappropriate games,
3 are played at high levels. The decision of withdrawing the mission from
4 Kosovo and Metohija is presented as a measure, the objective of which is
5 their security and safety. But there was no reason for such warnings,
6 because even though there was an overt threat of aggression against Serbia
7 and Yugoslavia, there had been no measures on the -- that would jeopardise
8 the security of the KVM.
9 Q. These were stated by Mr. Cook and his colleague?
10 A. The KVM was able to move about Kosovo without any difficulties and
11 without any danger from the side of Serbia and Yugoslavia.
12 Q. And the signatories of this document are Mr. Hubert Vedrine and
13 Mr. Cook; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. This brings us to the end of this topic. We're about to broach
16 our last topic. Do you know anything about Mr. Nikola Sainovic's
17 activities after the outbreak of war in Kosovo and Metohija?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What exactly do you know?
20 A. Ever since the beginning of NATO's aggression, Mr. Nikola Sainovic
21 had the important task of establishing, developing, and promoting a
22 dialogue with Ibrahim Rugova, who was the most well-liked and respected
23 politician from the Albanian ranks in Serbia. He did establish dialogue,
24 which was in itself a highly complex and arduous task.
25 Rugova himself had reason to be reserved about any such
1 initiatives given the extremism that was rife in the environment in which
2 he lived and worked.
3 Q. Can you date these activities for us, roughly speaking?
4 A. I think this happened sometime in April 1999, amid NATO's
6 Q. So that is perhaps early May 1999.
7 A. Yes, it's quite likely. I don't remember the specific date, but
8 there must be documents showing the exact dates, and I don't think
9 anyone's challenged those documents.
10 Q. Do you know if he went back after this?
11 A. Yes. Nikola Sainovic, in a way, had experience in international
12 dialogue and international relations, generally speaking; but, originally,
13 he is an economist. He comes from East Serbia and, originally, he was a
14 well-respected economist.
15 Throughout the aggression, he was helping with protecting and
16 relocating certain facilities and factories that were dangerous to their
17 environment or that were potentially dangerous if they were bombed or
18 targeted, and that could have possibly led to even greater disasters than
19 those originally caused by the aggression itself, and that was why he was
20 put in charge of these jobs. It is self-explanatory that this was both
21 necessary and useful.
22 I know that he was involved in protecting the Baric chemical plant
23 near Belgrade and some other plant as well.
24 Q. Could you please go to tab 36 and look at 2D365.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Briefly, what was this?
2 A. There. I wasn't wrong. The meeting took place on the 5th of
3 April. Nikola Sainovic and Ibrahim Rugova met in Pristina. They agreed
4 on two points.
5 Q. We can all read that.
6 A. That there should be a political process to resolve the problems,
7 and that one had to work together to bring back refugees and displaced
9 Q. Thank you. Will you please go to tab 37, document 1D36. This is
10 an announcement or a communique. Please comment briefly.
11 A. This is a joint statement by the federal government and the
12 government of the Republic of Serbia, the interesting thing being it was
13 adopted at two separate meetings or sessions. This is based on
14 Milosevic's and Sainovic's meetings with Ibrahim Rugova.
15 What we see here is the two essential principles being repeated:
16 The need for a political agreement and the need for return of political
17 refugees and displaced persons.
18 Q. Is not the demand made here that one should start a dialogue, and
19 so on and so forth. Well, that's all right, I suppose. Let's leave it at
20 this. It says what it says. We can all read it for ourselves.
21 Mr. Jovanovic, based on what you know and based on your close
22 cooperation with Mr. Sainovic in terms of your work, international
23 relation, and everything else you've been talking about, did you ever find
24 out that Sainovic, in any way, throughout NATO's aggression was in any way
25 involved in organising the defence forces in Kosovo and Metohija, be it
1 army or police?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Do you think he could possibly have had the time to do anything
4 like that given his numerous other tasks and his involvement elsewhere?
5 A. We've talked about that. It's self-explanatory, isn't it? We did
6 say that, for a while, Sainovic had more to do in terms of international
7 relations; but when NATO's aggression began, his duty was to open,
8 promote, and develop political dialogue with the Albanian side, first and
9 foremost, with Ibrahim Rugova. The documents clearly show that he was
10 indeed successful.
11 Q. To deal with the consequences.
12 A. Yes, to deal with the consequences and to protect the plants,
13 which if targeted might have caused disasters that were nearly
15 Q. My next question: Throughout 1998 and 1999, do you ever hear of
16 the term "Joint Command" being used or, indeed, later?
17 A. No, never.
18 Q. What about later when the indictments was being published, did you
19 hear that term being used?
20 A. The only time I came across the term was in the actual indictment
21 and after the trial here before this Court here got underway.
22 Q. What about your information about the functioning of the army of
23 Yugoslavia? Did they keep within the chain of command? Were there any
24 interferences, any complaints, any objections being raised about this?
25 A. I was a member of the government, and I was in charge of foreign
1 relations which was specific area. I attended a great number of meetings
2 before NATO's aggression, during NATO's aggression, and after. My
3 assessment is unequivocal. All the constituent elements of the
4 constitutional system acted in a harmonised way and perfectly in keeping
5 with the constitution and the law.
6 The degree of efficiency displayed in our defence against NATO
7 would have otherwise been impossible. The aggression lasted for as long
8 as 80 days. This would not have been possible had not all of the
9 country's elements been active and had they all not played their role
10 successfully in this.
11 Q. My last question to you, and let me please express my gratitude
12 for you having to come to testify in my case, something about Sainovic's
13 political views on Kosovo and Metohija: What were his political views on
14 Kosovo and Metohija throughout the years that he spent working with you?
15 A. With all due respect, I think your question is superfluous. It
16 should be crystal clear, based on everything I am saying today, that
17 Mr. Sainovic was always in favour of dialogue, in favour of a peaceful
18 political solution, in favour of a solution that would above all preserve
19 the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, yet at the same
20 time would secure the highest possible level of self-government for the
21 citizens of Kosovo and Metohija.
22 Throughout our years of cooperation, I never once noticed a single
23 aberration on his part from this constructive political position that he
24 always espoused, which is respect for all citizens of Serbia and the
25 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as all having equal rights.
1 Q. Thank you very much, sir. This concludes my examination-in-chief.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.
3 Dealing with exhibits, I think you've taken us to Exhibit 37, and
4 then there are another six.
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] These are documents for the next
6 witness. We'll be using these documents with the next witness.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And two, I think, have not -- two of the earlier
8 ones have not been referred to specifically in the course of the
9 presentation. Number 7, which is 2D78, but I think it simply is a cover
10 for number 8; is that correct? So if it hasn't been admitted already, it
11 can be admitted on that basis.
12 And number 27, there was some confusion, I think at that stage in
13 the evidence. It turned out you were, in fact, referring to number 28,
14 and we did deal with 28. And it may be that 27 is simply a supplement to
15 28 and can be admitted on that basis.
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrovic is about to explain this.
17 I'm sure he's better able than I am to deal with that.
18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by your leave, tab
19 2D78, this is the agenda containing the proposed agreement that the
20 witness mentioned. This is a separate document showing what the
21 procedural aspects were of adopting the agreement that the witness
22 mentioned. It is an entirely autonomous document in relation to tab 8,
23 P432, which is the text of the agreement itself.
24 This is -- the previous document is more by way of an explanation
25 to explain the procedure that the federal government adopted for this
1 agreement that the witness later signed with the Polish Foreign Minister,
2 Mr. Geremek. I'm talking about 2D78. May that please be admitted as a
3 separate document?
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. And then what about 2D330? That's tab 27.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Petrovic, please.
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] 2D330, tab 27, this is about the
7 decision of the federal government about a meeting that was held on the
8 14th of January, where the principles were set out for Mr. Sainovic's
9 talks. The principles or the outline can be found at tab 28. This is
10 2D183. Again, we are looking at two separate documents.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Tab 27 can be admitted, that is 2D330, in light of
12 its association with tab 28.
13 The document in French, which was tab 2.
14 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm just going to tell you that that will be
16 admitted, not marked for identification. It was adequately presented and
17 doesn't need further translation.
18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: So it's clear that all of these exhibits in the
20 binder up to number 36 -- or to 37, I think, are admitted.
21 Well, I gather our sitting tomorrow will be confined to the
22 morning; therefore, from 9.00 until 1.45. It's not proved possible to
23 make any other arrangement.
24 Mr. Jovanovic, we have to terminate our proceedings for today at
25 this stage, and we will continue tomorrow at 9.00, so you have to be back
1 here ready to recommence at 9.00.
2 As I say to every witness who comes here in that situation, you
3 must have no communication whatsoever with any person about the evidence,
4 either the evidence you've given or the evidence you may yet give.
5 There is no barrier on you communicating with anyone you like
6 about whatever you like as long as you do not overnight and before
7 returning here discuss any aspect of the evidence.
8 Now, would you please leave the courtroom in the company of the
9 usher. Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And we shall resume at 9.00.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.33 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 21st day
15 of August, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.