1 Wednesday, 17 October 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Judge Kamenova has a very urgent personal
6 commitment which will occupy her for the first session, but she will be
7 back with us after the first break. We've decided it's in the interests
8 of all and the interests of justice to continue in her absence; she's
9 happy with that.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Radinovic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: The cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic will continue
14 in a moment. Please bear in mind that the solemn declaration to tell the
15 truth which you gave at the beginning of your evidence continues to apply
16 right through your time with us giving evidence.
17 Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
22 Q. Good morning again, General and Professor Radinovic. I would like
23 to take up where we left off, which I believe was with Exhibit 5D1175
24 which we had started to talk about, the "odluka" map for the Voksa action,
25 if I can have that back up on the screen. And while we're waiting for
1 that, sir, generally speaking, can it be said, as you indicated for
2 "zapovests" or decisions or orders that the "odluka" itself is also an
3 act of command by the commander who is preparing it or drafting it?
4 A. Yes, you could say that, but it's very rarely that such document
5 is drafted. It's usually part of the order, it's called schematic and
6 it's an attachment.
7 Q. Am I correct in the case of an involvement of two or more units
8 simultaneously all of the commanders of these units receive respective
9 copies of the "odluka" map and "zapovest" which they then use to instruct
10 their units on the role in the planned combat action?
11 A. No, no, you're not right.
12 Q. [Previous translation continues]... What do they receive in the
14 A. The schematic of the decision, "odluka," is drawn on the map so
15 that the superior can approve it; once it's approved, it's used as a basis
16 for planning action. But maps don't have to be made for subordinates,
17 subordinates make their own maps.
18 Q. At which level or which organ prepares the "odluka" maps, or sema
20 A. Working maps, as a rule are kept in commands from regiment,
21 brigade, and up, and they can be kept in the commands of independent
22 battalions. And others, excuse me, make different sketches, improvised
23 drawings of the terrain.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... 1175 which we now have in
25 front of us. Am I correct that the --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, before you proceed with that, your very
2 first question this morning was whether the "odluka" itself is an act of
3 command. Now, did you mean the question to refer to the "odluka" itself
4 or to the map?
5 MR. IVETIC: I meant the "odluka" map, I apologise, so I guess I
6 should ask that again of the witness to make sure that we're clear.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think he did understand it because I think
8 that's how he understood the question.
9 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: But I'm confused because of the apparent lack of
11 relationship between the two.
12 MR. IVETIC: Yes, I meant the map, so if we need the witness to
13 clarify --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I think he's assumed that as well.
15 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: So please continue.
17 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
18 Q. Now, General Professor, if we look at 5D1175, am I correct that
19 the portions are colour-coded on the map to distinguish between MUP and VJ
21 A. Let me have a look. I don't see this very well.
22 MR. IVETIC: If we can maybe zoom in on the middle left portion of
23 the -- of the map, that might make it easier for the witness, and just up
24 a little bit.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me see the legend.
1 Yes, yes, you can see it on the sketch that MUP forces are shown
2 in blue and the army in red.
3 MR. IVETIC:
4 Q. And if I can direct your attention, sir, am I correct that the
5 blue on this map is actually the UCK or OVK, the KLA, positions?
6 A. Judging by the disposition, I would say yes. But on the legend,
7 if you can raise it --
8 MR. IVETIC: [Previous translation continues]... A little bit to
9 get to the bottom of the map.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right, yes. We see here that the
11 forces of the 5th Detachment of MUP, blocking forces, I said they were
12 blocking forces; the legend says that they are the forces of the MUP. I
13 don't think this was done well.
14 MR. IVETIC:
15 Q. Maybe it isn't showing up on your monitor but the first part of
16 the legenda says [no interpretation] and it shows a green-blue line with
17 stripes on it. Is that the part of the legend that you're referring to
18 relating to the MUP forces?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And if you look on the map just above you see an orange set of
21 lines around the KLA forces representing the battle group 72 and battle
22 group 125-2; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, I would like to look at Exhibit P1613 with you for a moment,
25 and this is a "zapovest" dated 27 August 1998, and the upper left-hand
1 corner specifies that it originates from the Komanda MUP-a, command of the
2 MUP, and is labelled as a military secret, taking a look at this document.
3 And if need be we can pause to have you look at the remaining page of it.
4 Does this "zapovest," or order, comport to the form of a "zapovest" from
5 the Army of Yugoslavia?
6 A. Well, this first paragraph looks like a first paragraph of a
7 military "zapovest," order, because it speaks of the enemy. I can't see
8 the rest, though.
9 Q. If we can go to the -- go specifically to page 4, item number 7 of
10 this document, it should be the same in both the English and B/C/S
11 according to my notes. And we see there under logistical support, I think
12 on the English it goes on to page -- to the top of page 5 as well, so we
13 might have to move the English for the English-speaking persons. Am I
14 correct that the "zapovest" in question provides instructions for the VJ
15 units in providing support to the MUP in this action, including the use of
16 various types of munitions being authorised?
17 A. Logistical support relies on garrisons, and in garrisons, in
18 depots, weaponry is also in storage to support the MUP.
19 Q. If you look at the last paragraph of this order and last page
20 which is entitled: "Command and communications," once we get there.
21 MR. IVETIC: It's the second-last page in English, I apologise,
22 the translation does not follow the B/C/S completely.
23 Q. And, sir, if we look at again the last paragraph of the order we
24 see it says: [Interpretation] "Command forces from the forward command
25 post in the area of Djakovica through the brigade commander."
1 [Previous translation continues]... [In English] Knowledge and
2 information of this of the operations of the VJ, are we talking about
3 an -- when talking about an IKM, is that a military term and a military
5 A. It's a place that the commander puts forward in order to command
6 his units. It's a point from which command is exercised. Part of the
7 command is located there so the command can function.
8 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Signed and stamped the
9 command of the Pristina Corps by the then-commander of the Pristina Corps
10 General Pavkovic. Is -- in your opinion, is this a document originating
11 from the command of the MUP or the command of the Pristina Corps?
12 A. First of all, I have to tell you I'm seeing this document for the
13 first time, but based on this one cannot conclude where it originates
14 from, whether from MUP or the command of the Pristina Corps because there
15 are two indications, one where it is filed, and the second who it is
16 signed by. Both of them speak to the origin, so I'm confused by this
17 document and I've never seen it before.
18 Q. Have you ever heard of the existence of an organ called the
19 Komanda MUP-a at any level?
20 A. I heard of other organs of command, not the MUP command.
21 Q. If we can move to Exhibit 6D731, this is a document originating
22 from the command of the 15th OKBR in Bijelo Polje dated August the 14th,
23 1998. First of all, is the organ sending this document as well as the
24 recipient BG15/3, are they both VJ organs?
25 A. Yes, it's a combat group of the 15th Armoured Brigade.
1 Q. And if we focus on paragraph 2 of this order, I believe it's on
2 the first page of both the B/C/S and the English, we see that BG15/3 is
3 tasked with the 8th "odred" of the MUP to attack from the direction of
4 Cesta, et cetera. This would be another example of the VJ being tasked to
5 provide more than merely logistical and fire support to the MUP in an
6 action; is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. IVETIC: And if we can turn to the last page of this document,
9 and again specifically the last line before the signature and seal of
10 Colonel Cirkovic, of the VJ, it says I believe we'll see shortly in the
11 B/C/S that the overall command of this anti-terrorist action is at the
12 level of the Pristina Corps command from its IKM and that they command and
13 lead all forces.
14 Q. That would comport with your earlier conclusion that the VJ cannot
15 be commanded by a MUP officer; is that correct?
16 A. Of course the Army of Yugoslavia was not commanded by a MUP
18 Q. And --
19 A. The gist of this document is in paragraph 4, you can look it up.
20 Q. All right.
21 MR. IVETIC: Let's move back to -- page 1 I believe it's section 4
22 if I'm not mistaken. I don't have the document in front of me to verify
23 that, but I think we can get there quickly.
24 Q. Is that the part you wanted to refer to, General?
25 A. If you can just bring it closer up.
1 MR. IVETIC: [Previous translation continues]... Bottom section
2 of the B/C/S document, please. It's already focused on the English
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see it now.
5 MR. IVETIC:
6 Q. And what did you wish to point out to us with respect to this
8 A. Here in section 4, decision, I have decided, we see point 4.1,
9 fourth line down: "Objective of the attack: To support MUP forces in
10 destroying," et cetera. So the basic task of the units is to support MUP
11 forces, and that's why the commander orders it and signs it.
12 Q. And I think that's it for this document. If we can move still to
13 1998, Exhibit 3D697, and first of all I would ask since this is a
14 different form of document I would ask that the first page be shown, and I
15 would ask if you can tell us what kind of a document this is. Please bear
16 with me, General, we'll get the document up in a second. It takes some
17 time sometimes for the documents to load. This one is a larger one.
18 Now, General Professor, if you look at the first page of this
19 document which we do have in B/C/S, does this appear to be a
20 post-operation analysis done in October of 1998 by the 3rd Army relating
21 to the relation of assignments on the territory of Kosovo-Metohija?
22 A. That's what it looks like.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MR. IVETIC: Now if we can move and focus on section 2.2 on the
25 next page of the document in both the B/C/S and the English, it's at the
1 bottom in the B/C/S if we can focus on the bottom three paragraphs. And
2 it's going to be actually the next page on the English it would appear,
3 page 3 of the English. It's going to be the middle of the page.
4 Q. If you could take a few moments to review this portion of the
5 report and tell us in summation the activities of the units specified as
6 well as their interaction with one another, if this shows again that the
7 MUP and the VJ jointly operated during these assignments on the territory
8 of Kosovo and Metohija.
9 A. Are you asking me to read the whole page or a certain portion?
10 Q. 2.2 [no interpretation]?
11 A. 2.2 implementation of tasks, 2.2, so it is a list. The first task
12 is to secure the state border, then goes an explanation, and the second
13 task is to engage forces in the territory.
14 Q. [Previous translation continues]... 3 and 4 on the next page talk
15 about the participation of MUP and VJ units. I would like to move ahead
16 to attachment 3 of this document which is on -- at the end -- I think the
17 third- or fourth-to-last page of this exhibit to ask about the specific
18 personnel involved in these actions to see about the -- if we can shed
19 some light on the methodology of this report. In -- while we're waiting
20 to get there, General, in your report you rely upon certain statistics
21 about the number of personnel from the MUP and the VJ that were utilised
22 in these anti-terrorist actions in 1998; am I correct, the total number of
24 A. Yes, and it's not even that precise. These are rough data.
25 Q. If we can take a look at attachment number 3, we have it on the
1 English and we're getting it on the B/C/S. First of all, with respect to
2 the SAJ and the JSO -- we're not on that part of the attachment yet on the
3 B/C/S, but I'll -- I think I can start with my --
4 A. Well, I see no other picture.
5 Q. [Previous translation continues]... The introductory part of my
6 analysis while we wait for the document to come up on the screen in B/C/S.
7 When talking about the MUP having one SAJ and one JSO unit in its
8 structure, would that be fair to say was the case in both 1998 and 1999,
9 was there one SAJ unit and one JSO unit in the structure of the MUP as
10 evident from their very name themselves [B/C/S spoken], we're talking
11 about a structure existing one unit each, would you agree with that, as
12 you stated in your report?
13 A. [No interpretation]
14 Q. I apologise, again we're trying to locate the appropriate page in
15 the B/C/S. There we have it now, sir. Hopefully now, General, you can
16 see the [B/C/S spoken] consisting of a chart listing the personnel
17 involved from both the MUP and the VJ for these actions in 1998. Now,
18 first of all, as far as the methodology of this chart is concerned, the
19 methodology behind the creation of this chart is concerned, if we look at
20 the columns for the SAJ and the JSO which are in the middle of the
21 document, we see that the number of units involved in these actions for
22 the SAJ is reported as eight and for the JSO is reported as three. Now,
23 given that we're in agreement that there's only one unit of each of these
24 formations, for purposes of this chart can we conclude that where the same
25 unit participated in multiple operations that same unit was counted
1 multiple times for each time that it participated in operation. Would you
2 agree with that?
3 A. Well, I'm not sure that what you are suggesting as an answer is
4 correct. There was a unit for special operations, JSO, as one unit,
5 whereas special anti-terrorist units existed in several places, in
6 Belgrade, Novi Sad, Pristina, and there was a number of them. So I would
7 be more inclined to accept this as correct rather than your suggestion.
8 Q. All right. How many JSO units were there?
9 A. One.
10 Q. And on this chart it shows three JSO units were engaged in
11 operations. Would you agree that that tends to indicate that the same JSO
12 unit was counted multiple times?
13 A. All these were parts of that unit. One of the groups of that unit
14 would be involved in each of these operations because if these are minor
15 operations, then the JSO doesn't have to be used as a whole.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Could participate in more
17 than one operation?
18 A. It cannot participate in more than one operation if they were
19 close in time, one after another, then the unit would have to be separated
20 into different groups and used along several axes.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Is it possible that the same
22 units participated in multiple operations?
23 A. It's possible that they participated in multiple operations
24 because we don't have the timing of the operations here.
25 Q. Okay. Now, am I correct that as part of your expertise you don't
1 have precise knowledge as to the number and placement of MUP personnel in
2 Kosovo-Metohija in 1999, that was not part of your analysis?
3 A. No, it was not a part of the analysis to determine precisely the
4 strength, but I know roughly and I stated it in my report, which kind of
5 units, where, how, et cetera.
6 Q. Okay. Now, just to finish up 1998 and move on to another topic,
7 yesterday you mentioned General Perisic as the commander of the army ought
8 to know the utilisation of his forces. If we look at 3D757, this is --
9 and specifically page 5 of the English and page 6 of the B/C/S, I believe
10 here we have General Perisic talking about the VJ in the operations in
11 1998, saying that they had the leading role in these operations, the
12 "nosela aksija" [phoen] a term you've used. Now, I would ask you -- we
13 have to wait again for the documents, sir, I apologise, it's page 5 of the
14 English and page 6 of the B/C/S. It's at the bottom -- the bottom -- the
15 second-to-last paragraph on the B/C/S that's visible now, don't go down,
16 it's right in the middle of the page now. [Interpretation] The VJ carried
17 out all tasks fully, professionally, and play the main role in operations
18 against sabotage groups."
19 [In English] General, all the documents we've gone through,
20 particularly General Perisic's comments here, could you agree with me that
21 your conclusion we started off our discussion with in your report at
22 paragraph 90 that the MUP played the leader -- and the MUP leadership
23 played the lead role in these anti-terrorist actions, that that is an
24 oversimplification of a complex situation that will would need to be
25 analysed based upon each particular operation, each particular task in
1 each operation. Would you agree with me in that regard?
2 A. Well, I would agree with you only in part that it is important all
3 of this be analysed from one detail to the other, but in that case my
4 report would have been 5.000 pages long, not 200, and I would have had to
5 spend far more resources on that. As for the level that I was working at,
6 I think that that was unnecessary. I did not deal with a multitude of
7 details contained in your question. However, when I claimed that the
8 anti-terrorist operation was carried out in coordination by the army and
9 the police and that the prevailing role was played by the MUP forces, that
10 is quite certain, although General Perisic in this summary document that
11 reviews what had been done states that the army played the decisive role
12 where the combat activities, or rather, where combat operations were
13 involved in dealing with terrorists. When the army and the police meet in
14 the same area, then it is the military officer who is in charge and who
15 brings this together. That is the way it is according to the law and
16 according to military doctrine, because they are better-versed in such
17 things than the police. Because for the police, combat action is not
18 their primary task although they are trained for that, but this is not
19 their primary activity. So when planning and implementation of combat
20 activity is required, then it is only natural that it is commanders and
21 officers at lower levels that deal with this.
22 Q. [Previous translation continues]... The Law of Defence. We have
23 a copy of the Law of Defence at P985, and I would like to start our
24 discussion relating to Article 16 of the Law on Defence this is page 2 of
25 the B/C/S version and page 3 of the English version of P985; and looking
1 at Article 16 which in summation says that the Army of Yugoslavia is the
2 organizer of the armed struggle and shall unite all participants in the
3 armed struggle and command all combat activities, I believe that relates
4 to what you have just said. And I would ask you with respect to Article
5 16, as an expert, can you tell us if your understanding of Article 16 is
6 that automatically upon the declaration of a state of war the VJ assumes
7 the role of uniting and commanding all friendly forces engaged in combat
8 activities. And I think this is something that you have discussed at
9 paragraph 151 of your report, if I'm not mistaken.
10 A. Article 16 of the law is geared towards the role of the army in
11 defending the country from an external enemy, external aggression.
12 However, regrettably, we - I mean Yugoslavia and Serbia - were waging a
13 so-called internal war, there wasn't an external enemy, I'm talking about
14 1998, not 1999, and --
15 Q. Go ahead finish first.
16 A. And, in a way, it could be perplexing if 1998 were to be projected
17 within Article 16 and the role of the army. Obviously it does not pertain
18 to that reality. Article 16 certainly pertains to 1999.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear the witness.
20 MR. IVETIC:
21 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Correction or clarification?
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one second. I wonder if you could speak more
23 directly into the microphone, please, Mr. Radinovic to assist the
25 And Mr. Ivetic, my paragraph 151 has nothing to do with this. Was
1 that the correct reference?
2 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
3 MR. IVETIC: 151, at least on my copy at page 117 says that the
4 basis for that order is in Article 16 of the Law on Defence which is the
5 article we're looking at right now.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it's the page number that's the problem, 117,
7 that's my mistake.
8 MR. IVETIC: There might be two paragraphs about that, I'm not
10 JUDGE BONOMY: There are, thank you.
11 MR. IVETIC:
12 Q. Now, with respect to combat operations that would fall under
13 Article 16, Article 16 would also apply to the relations between the MUP
14 and the VJ, is that correct, as far as combat operations are concerned?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Okay. Now if we can look at Exhibit P1981 briefly, I think we can
17 do that one in one question if I phrase it properly. This is a "zapovest"
18 of the command of the 549th Motorised Brigade of the VJ dated 23 March
19 1999, and if we look at section 4 of this document, which is the section
20 you have told us is the one to look at for purposes of analysis of the
21 units involved, I think we will see again that the VJ commander is giving
22 instructions to his units to work together with the MUP units. Given that
23 this order predates the order on resubordination, can we conclude that
24 Article 16 is being employed of the Law of Defence for purposes of giving
25 these instructions? Would it be logical?
1 A. I don't know what you're asking me. I am not asserting at all
2 that the MUP and the army did not act together. That's not what I said in
3 my report. That's not what I'm saying now. The question is only what the
4 relationship involved is. Is it cooperation, coordination, or command?
5 It's not one and the same thing.
6 Q. Well, let's turn to resubordination as the next topic. You in
7 your report give reasons for the issuance of the various orders on
8 resubordination, specifically at paragraphs 152 and 153, including the
9 fears of a NATO ground invasion and the strained relationship between the
10 Republic of Montenegro and the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
11 which led to an effort to try and have the MUP of Montenegro subordinated
12 to the command of the 2nd Army as you state. Now, would you agree with me
13 and my interpretations of your conclusions as set forth in paragraph 157
14 of your report that the VJ did not have the same problems with the MUP of
15 Serbia that it had with the MUP of Montenegro over the imposition of
16 Article 17 of the Law of Defence on resubordination?
17 A. Well, I agree with you that it did not have the same problems like
18 with the MUP of Montenegro, because the MUP of Montenegro obstructed the
19 army's efforts in defending the country. The MUP of Serbia did not do
20 that, on the contrary.
21 Q. With respect to paragraph -- paragraphs 144 to 145 of your report
22 and paragraph 148 of the same, when dealing with Article 17 of the Law of
23 Defence and the order of the president of the FRY on resubordination of
24 the MUP --
25 MR. IVETIC: I'm sorry, I see Mr. Stamp on his feet.
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.
3 MR. STAMP: I think probably this is the same thing, P1981 is from
4 the record in e-court a document which is under seal. On the face of it I
5 can't imagine why, but I think it might have in it the name or names of
6 protected persons.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we've moved on to --
8 MR. IVETIC: We've moved on and we didn't look at the document in
9 its entirety.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: -- So the position is noted and we shall proceed to
11 the next matter.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
13 Q. Sorry, General, let me start again. At paragraphs 144 to 145 of
14 your report and at paragraph 148 you discuss Article 17 and the order of
15 the president of the FRY regarding resubordination of the MUP, and you
16 state that it relates to only units carrying out combat actions or combat
17 operations, "borbeni dejstva" this is also something that General Kosovac
18 confirmed. Would you therefore agree with me that resubordination under
19 Article 17 of the Law on Defence did not apply to all other jobs and
20 functions of the MUP, such as traffic control, criminal investigations,
21 crime prevention, issuance of identity documents, et cetera, and that
22 these functions remained under the purview and authority of the MUP and
23 its subordinate SUPs and OUPs?
24 A. Yes, I fully agree with you.
25 Q. And another thing that General Kosovac testified about was that
1 there was some confusion regarding the implementation of resubordination,
2 and I'd like to take a few minutes to review two documents with you that
3 we have already introduced into evidence the first is 6D117, which is an
4 order from the VTO, Vojno-Teritorijalni Odred, from Istok which -- in
5 which the VTO commander attempts to -- if we can have the document --
6 there it is.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, if I may just interrupt a moment to
8 note that Judge Kamenova has now joined us on the Bench, and I do that for
9 the record.
10 Please continue.
11 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. This is an order from the VTO Istok where the commander of the VTO
13 attempts to take over control of various functions in the municipality,
14 including placing the commander of the SUP subordinate to him. Would such
15 an action be in compliance with the spirit and letter of Article 17 or
16 President Milosevic's order on resubordination, specifically items 1 of
17 this order and item 2 and sub-item 4 under item 2 of this order, if you
18 can briefly skim through those?
19 A. It is barely legible. Could it please be zoomed in a bit because
20 there's also ... Could you please lower it a bit, a bit more -- actually,
21 could you scroll up, sorry.
22 MR. IVETIC: [Previous translation continues]... I think that's
23 what the General was asking for.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd like to see the beginning of the
25 document, right, yeah. Yes, that would do. Look at this, commander of
1 the 69th Military Territorial Detachment in the preamble invokes the order
2 of the supreme commander. This is inconceivable in military
3 communication, that the commander of the detachment invokes the order of
4 the supreme commander. He should only invoke the order made by his
5 superior officer. This shows you what the quality of this document is.
6 It certainly does not pertain to the order of the 18th of April on the
7 resubordination of forces in terms of what this commander is asking for;
8 that is to say, it's not that the MUP secretariats should be
9 resubordinated for carrying out their regular work, what was referred to
10 in the original order was combat operations.
11 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Number 1 of the order appears
12 to attempt to place all republican and opstina leadership under the
13 command of the VTO Istok. Would you agree that that too is an over --
14 going overboard as far as Article 16 or Article 17 of Law of Defence are
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And just briefly, I think since it's a related document 6D125,
18 which is an order from the Vojno-Teritorijalni Odred, VTO, of Pec, and
19 again if you could take a few moments to review that document, do we again
20 have a situation where the commander of this VTO is not in compliance with
21 the Law of Defence and is going overboard in terms of what he is seeking
22 from various organs in the "opstina" level, including the SUP?
23 A. Obviously he didn't understand. He does not understand the
24 question. He does not understand the problem. He is asking for things
25 that he is not entitled to.
1 Q. Okay. Now, if I can just ask you about one more hypothetical
2 example. Does the Article 17 of the Law of Defence and the order of the
3 president of the FRY resubordination, does it oversee the assistant
4 ministers of interior and the chiefs of all SUPs in non-combat areas
5 sitting at the command of the army level and resubordinating themselves to
6 the commander of the army, for instance, the 2nd Army, which was not in a
7 combat zone for the most part?
8 A. That does not mean that these police officers should sit with
9 military commanders, even if it has to do with areas of combat operations.
10 Q. Now, at paragraph 158 of your report you base your conclusion that
11 the MUP of Serbia did not comply with the order of the FRY president on
12 resubordination. You base this upon a combat report of the 3rd Army dated
13 20 April 1999. Now, we have heard testimony that the Supreme Command
14 Staff did not send any orders to the Ministry of the Interior, I think
15 you've also stated that somewhere in our report. And if we look at the
16 order of the 3rd Army on resubordination, it only goes to the commander of
17 the PJP. Now, if we can look at Exhibit P1267, this is the order at the
18 level of the Pristina Corps command, and I think reading it you'll see
19 that it comes the closest to complying with the spirit and letter of
20 Article 17 of the Law of Defence where -- because it limits itself to
21 units and formations in combat actions. Now if we look at this document,
22 it is dated the 20th of April, 1999, and in its text it says that the
23 order on resubordination is to be implemented by the 25th of April, 1999.
24 Would you agree with me that based upon this document the April 20th,
25 1999, combat report of the 3rd Army becomes moot insofar as the MUP hadn't
1 yet received any order on resubordination, in fact had until the 25th of
2 April to implement it?
3 A. Well, I cannot accept what you are offering to me as an answer for
4 a simple reason. The order of the president, or rather, the supreme
5 commander and chief of the VSO dated the 18th of April, and this is dated
6 the 20th of April, that means that they still haven't received the former.
7 It is certain that the order was not carried through and the army
8 commander is right when he asks for that to be carried out. Now, whether
9 it was possible to do that within that time-frame is something that we can
10 debate now, but obviously that is not the way it was carried out and it is
11 not surprising at all that he asked for this on the 20th, to have this
12 order carried through.
13 Q. Well, General, the order from the president of the FRY, which you
14 have I believe reproduced the text of in your report at item 2, says that
15 the chief of the Supreme Command Staff is to undertake actions to realise
16 the order. And we've heard testimony from several persons at the level of
17 the Supreme Command Staff that no such actions were taken by the Supreme
18 Command Staff. Does that change your opinion as to whether we can
19 conclude that the MUP received the order on resubordination prior to the
20 20th of April, which is the date of this document from General Lazarevic
21 of the Pristina Corps, advising the MUP of the resubordination -- he's
22 advising the MUP staff of the resubordination and giving a date of April
23 the 25th for its realisation. Would you agree with me that the combat
24 report of the 20th of April by the 3rd Army is not the complete picture,
25 given this document?
1 A. Sir, as for the command report of the commander of the 3rd Army
2 dated the 20th of April in which the commander asks for the realisation of
3 the order of the supreme commander on resubordinating the MUP forces is
4 something that I understand as insight into the situation on that day, the
5 20th of April, and no doubt that it hadn't been carried through on that
6 date, the 20th of April. You put several questions as you were speaking.
7 You asked me whether the Supreme Command Staff had taken all necessary
8 measures for the realisation. They did everything that was within the
9 realm of their responsibility, and the commander of the Pristina Corps is
10 not supposed to issue an order on the resubordination of MUP forces in
11 Kosovo. It should be done by the vertical chain of the MUP, from the top
12 to the MUP units in Kosovo or the staff in Kosovo. So the units of the
13 MUP should have gotten this order down their own chain, that they will be
14 resubordinated in combat operations to army units, that is, then
15 coordination is organized, then things are coordinated, and then they're
16 done properly. The commander of the VSO saw that that was not happening
17 and he asked for that to be carried through, and it is not the obligation
18 of the chief of the Supreme Command Staff to send orders to the minister
19 of the interior. He is not subordinated to him. He did not have that
20 kind of obligation. It's not surprising that he didn't send an order to
21 him, and why the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not
22 send it through his lines of command and control. And whether he did it
23 at all, I don't know, obviously not since the resubordination did not take
25 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm losing the thread of this, I'm afraid,
1 Mr. Ivetic, because we're jumping around I think from issue to issue.
2 Mr. Radinovic, if an order of the general nature of the one that
3 was made here about resubordination of MUP forces is made by the supreme
4 commander, how should that be relayed to the Ministry of the Interior?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The supreme commander has his
6 military office, military cabinet, that serves him in terms of all kinds
7 of communication with organs that are outside the army. The order that he
8 issued was supposed to be addressed to the Government of Serbia, and then
9 the Government of Serbia to the minister of the interior, the minister of
10 the interior down his vertical chain of command to units in Kosovo and
11 Metohija. That is the way it was supposed to be done. I assume --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: On a separate question now, in this document on the
13 screen, if you look at paragraph 5 there is a reference to the 25th of
14 April, and the point Mr. Ivetic is, I think, making to you is that it's
15 hardly open to the commander of the 3rd Army to complain about failure to
16 act on an instruction about resubordination on the 20th of April when
17 apparently the deadline for doing this was the 25th of April. Now, what's
18 your comment on that?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I assume that the commander of
20 the 3rd Army was in contact with the MUP officers and that he knew that
21 they had not received any orders on resubordination. So, in fact, there
22 was no resubordination and that is why he appealed to the Supreme Command
23 Staff to have this carried through.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: And there's a bit of speculation involved there,
25 obviously, on your part. But where in that scenario does this date of the
1 25th of April fit in?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an order issued by the
3 commander of the Pristina Corps, who is subordinate to the command of the
4 3rd Army.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, but he's part of the 3rd Army, and
6 presumably the complaint by the commander of the 3rd Army is because -- is
7 made because things are not working further down the line, and this is an
8 example of an order made further down the line which gave a different
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the way I understand it as
11 follows: This was not done by the 12th [as interpreted], so a new
12 deadline was set up to the 25th. I have no other explanation to give.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that explanation any more than speculation?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's not much of an
15 explanation, but I have no other explanation to give. There's no other
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC:
19 Q. Just to close out one more area on this. The order of the FRY
20 president is Exhibit 3D670, you cite to it in your report and actually
21 cite the text of it at paragraph 154 of your report on page 118. If we
22 can have that exhibit, 3D670, up on the screen just briefly, I would like
23 to focus on item 2 of the order and obtain the witness's comments relating
24 upon reading that directive. Could you focus on the directing in
25 paragraph 2 of this order which states that the chief of the Supreme
1 Command Staff will regulate by his order all other matters arising from
2 item 1 of this order, item 1 being the invocation of Article 17 on the Law
3 on Defence. Would you agree with me that this order places an obligation
4 upon the Supreme Command Staff to order -- to effectuate orders to
5 implement Article 17?
6 A. Yes, but within the scope of its competence, not beyond it.
7 Q. Okay. And item 3 of this order indicates the chief of the Supreme
8 Command Staff should send requests to civilian government organs and other
9 defence bodies. Those would not normally be subordinate to him, would
11 A. No, they wouldn't be. This is not an order, it's a request. He's
12 requesting that such and such be done. He's requesting this of the organs
13 of civilian defence, of the civilian authorities, those who he feels ought
14 to support the action.
15 Q. And Article 1 -- pardon me, item 1 of this order deals exclusively
16 with the MUP, with the units of the interior; is that correct?
17 A. Yes, yes, the units of the MUP.
18 Q. And item 2 incorporates item 1 as being the basis for the
19 instruction from the president of the FRY?
20 A. Yes, it's an order, or rather, item 2 of this order, the chief of
21 the supreme defence staff shall regulate through his order all other
22 matters arising from item 1 of this order, so everything that pertains to
23 the army. If you look at item 3, that's his request to others who are not
24 part of the army.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: The problem for me with that, Mr. Radinovic, is the
1 answer you gave earlier that the responsibility for that communication lay
2 with the military cabinet of the president rather than with the normal
3 military command structure.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the supreme commander,
5 when communicating along the vertical chain of command with the army, has
6 his Supreme Command Staff. It's not necessary to explain that here
7 because it's been mentioned so often, and the Supreme Command Staff covers
8 this kind of communication fully. However, it does not cover
9 communication with other government organs; this is done through the
10 military cabinet.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that. So why does paragraph 3 here
12 put the obligation on the chief of the Supreme Command Staff to send his
13 request to the civilian government organs?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Item 3 which mentions the civilian
15 authorities and organs refers to what these organs should provide for the
16 best possible operation of the army, so this refers to various forces,
17 various resources at the level of the state which should be acting in
18 unison in order for the action to be as efficient as possible. And these
19 requests for everything that is necessary to support the action, the
20 supreme commander ordered the chief of the Supreme Command Staff to take
21 measures to achieve this.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
23 Just one matter to deal with in the transcript. Page 24, line 11,
24 the date the 12th should, in fact, be the 20th.
25 Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 Q. Now, if we can focus on the time-period after the 25th of April,
3 1999, am I correct that there were anti-terrorist actions undertaken
4 jointly by elements of the MUP and the VJ after that date?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And just for the sake of clarity, anti-terrorist actions of the
7 nature undertaken in 1999 would be considered combat actions under the
8 military definition of that term; isn't that correct?
9 A. Anti-terrorist actions, yes, conditionally speaking because it's
10 on the borderline between military and police operations, and therefore
11 without analysing each particular case it's very hard to say what
12 predominates. Is it a fight against terrorism or is it a fight against
13 armed groups in combat operations. However, in principle I would agree
14 with your statement, these are primarily combat operations.
15 Q. I apologise. We're waiting for the transcript to catch up. Now,
16 with respect to these actions, they were undertaken pursuant
17 to "zapovests" and "odlukas" prepared by the VJ commanders at the -- in
18 their areas of responsibility; isn't that right?
19 A. If Article 17 is complied with and all the orders, then the answer
20 is yes; if not, then the answer is no. There is information, and this can
21 be seen in the documents as well, that the resubordination did not
22 function properly, which doesn't mean that at the lower level there was no
23 coordination, of course there was.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Documents that I have as a
25 sample of some of the actions post-dating the 25th of April. If you look
1 at the "zapovest" for the action Sekac [phoen] which is -- which is -- one
2 moment, I have to find the number for that, I somehow skipped that, P2011,
3 and we're going to be looking at part 5 of the order, which is the
4 instructions to the units, which is on page 2 to 3 of the B/C/S, the
5 bottom of 2 and the top of 3. And I believe it's the same in the English,
6 I'll find out as soon as the document comes up on the screen.
7 Looking at the --
8 MR. IVETIC: Maybe we better start at the first page to do this in
9 a logical manner.
10 Q. Looking at the first page, can you identify the source of
11 this "zapovest," the organ that is promulgating it?
12 A. The command of the Pristina Corps from the forward command post.
13 Q. And the date is the 20th of May, 1999?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And we see that the location is Djakovica.
16 MR. IVETIC: If we can now turn to page 2 of the B/C/S, the
17 bottom, and the witness will need to be shown pages 2 and 3 of the
18 document, the [B/C/S spoken], item 5, and on the English I think it's
19 actually going to be page 3 rather than 2, based on what we had come up on
20 the screen just a few moments ago. Well, it looks like it's actually
21 going to be the next page in the English, there we go, tasks of the units
22 beginning on page 4 of the English and leading over on to page 5.
23 Q. Would you agree with me, sir - and you'll take the time to glance
24 through this section - that the "zapovest" gives very precise instructions
25 to both VJ and MUP units that were to be involved in this action?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Okay. And if you look at the last page of the document, I think
3 we can confirm that it was, in fact, signed by Colonel Milan Kotur, an
4 officer within the Pristina Corps during the relevant time-period.
5 MR. IVETIC: I think it's the second-last page of the English
6 since the last page is blank.
7 Q. And with respect to the item on command and communication, can you
8 conclude whether the command post identified is a VJ or a MUP structure?
9 A. It's within the Army of Yugoslavia, the VJ.
10 MR. IVETIC: Now, if we could turn to P1503 and we'll look at the
11 first page of this document briefly. This is, I believe, the "zapovest"
12 for the action in Prekaz dated May 27th, 1999.
13 Q. And again, is this document originating from the Pristina Corps
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. And if we look at the title of the document, do we see that it's
17 being directed to the MUP, albeit the Komanda MUP, which you testified
18 about earlier you did not hear of such an organ existing?
19 A. That's correct, I never heard of it.
20 MR. IVETIC: And again if we could turn to section 5, the
21 instructions to the units, this is at page 3 of the B/C/S and hopefully
22 page 3 of the English, although for some reason we didn't have luck on the
23 last document -- page 4 of the English I'm told.
24 Q. Can we agree that this document also gives instructions for both
25 MUP and VJ units for the undertaking of this combat operation?
1 A. Yes, yes, the brigade commander is issuing tasks.
2 Q. And if we turn to the last page of the document and look at the
3 last line of section 14 we see, once we get there I think we'll see --
4 well, I think the second-to-last page in English is necessary because it
5 cuts off the paragraph in the half, but I think we'll see that the
6 document identifies that the command of the 37th Motorised Brigade is in
7 charge of leading this operation. And I think you would agree that that
8 would comport with the proper level at which resubordination would take
9 place, as set forth in paragraphs 148 and 149 of your report. Isn't that
11 A. Item 14 talks about joint action between elements of the combat
12 organization in the Prekaz area and the command of the 37th Brigade shall
13 organize this. So the brigade is planning the combat operation and its
14 commander is responsible for cooperation. He has to organize the
15 cooperation. Joint action and cooperation is not one and the same thing.
16 Q. With respect to the next document I would like to go through, I
17 think it's 6D712.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Before -- just before you move on --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Line 14 it should be:
20 Coordinated action, not joint action.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, well that helps to remove the confusion, I
22 think. Thank you.
23 Mr. Ivetic.
24 MR. CEPIC: [Microphone not activated]
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.
1 MR. CEPIC: [Microphone not activated]
2 I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Page 30, line 16, joint action and
3 cooperation is not one and the same thing, but I think that the witness
4 said: [No interpretation] [In English] Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said: Coordinated action, joint
6 action, and command, not the same thing.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 MR. IVETIC:
9 Q. But, General, we're in agreement that the operation was planned by
10 the commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade?
11 A. Yes. He was -- he received orders to plan the operation. He was
12 ordered to plan the operation.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, the next document we have is 6D712, a "zapovest"
14 and "odluka" --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry to intervene again, at line 13 there one of
16 the things you said was item 14 talks about joint action between elements
17 of the combat organization in the Prekaz area and the command of the 37th
18 Brigade shall organize this. That's an accurate translation of what you
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. The next document 6D712 we don't have an
24 English translation for, so I'll try to be brief on it and touch on the
25 points and have the witness confirm. This is this -- once we get it up on
1 the screen this will be the "zapovest" for Drenica 1, and I would focus
2 the attention on the first page, first of all, once we get that up on the
3 screen -- oh, it is up on the screen.
4 Q. With respect to this document dated May the 28th, again the source
5 or originating organ for this order is the command of the Pristina Corps,
6 and it is directed to the MUP or at least the Komanda MUP, according to
7 the title of the document; would you agree, sir?
8 A. I can't see. To the command of the MUP for -- I can't see what it
9 says here, it's not legible. Can you read it if you have the original
10 copy --
11 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Does that appear to be the --
12 okay. Thank you.
13 A. Yeah, yes, for all --
14 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
15 A. -- Units.
16 Q. -- Of -- well, actually, I think we've gone through several
17 documents already to short-circuit this. Since we don't have a
18 translation, I would submit that item 5 likewise has similar language to
19 the last two orders, identifying tasks for both MUP and VJ units. And I
20 think once the document is translated it will -- that part will speak for
21 itself. And I would like to then move to the "odluka" map, which is the
22 last page of the exhibit, and I think that's just in the B/C/S -- in
23 the -- it's not in colour since we've been having some difficulties of
24 getting colour copies of maps from the Government of Serbia, but hopefully
25 we can make some use of the map itself in its black-and-white form.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Where the original map still exists, and the
2 indications have been given earlier in this case that they do, then the
3 originals really should be produced. These are very important documents
4 in this case.
5 MR. IVETIC: I've requested them several months ago from the
6 Government of Serbia, and I'm still trying to work on that and effectuate
7 that, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps what has just been said may be communicated
9 to them because the absence of the originals impairs our work.
10 MR. IVETIC: I will do my best to make sure they are apprised of
11 that, Your Honour.
12 Q. General Professor, if we look at this map from 1999, this action
13 for the Drenica activities, does it comport to the same format for the map
14 of 1998 that we saw, that is to say that the organ responsible for drawing
15 up the map is identified at the bottom right and the organ approving the
16 action is identified at the upper left of this map? And if we need to
17 zoom in on a portion, please let me know, I'd be more than happy to
19 A. I can see it.
20 Q. And am I correct in what I've just said?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And in both cases the organs involved are VJ organs, is that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And this map, if we look at the formations listed --
1 A. I see the 37th Motorised Brigade, the 15th Armoured Brigade.
2 Q. If we look at the bottom -- just above the legenda, we see a
3 notation for the 252nd Okupla [phoen] Brigada, and if you zoom in on that,
4 I think, the subscript indicates that the 122nd Intervention Brigade of
5 the MUP is also part of this action.
6 MR. IVETIC: Left, to the left, please, the left side of the
7 document should be showing.
8 Q. There, General, at the lower left corner of the screen before you
9 I believe we have an indication that the MUP unit is involved; is that
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And then if we go to the right-hand side under the tactical group
13 of the 252nd, I think we have the -- that's the upper right, there we go,
14 TG in Cyrillic 252, we have the either the 50th or the 30th "odred" of the
15 PJP; is that correct, sir?
16 A. 30th.
17 Q. And would you expect, although we don't have this in colour, based
18 on your knowledge and experience, would you expect the forces and their
19 basic tasks to be colour-coded on the map based on the custom and practice
20 of preparing maps for actions in the VJ?
21 A. Yes, yes, that's what I would expect.
22 Q. Thank you. Now, I promise I was going to try and short-circuit
23 this and I have one more area to go to so I would like to just propose,
24 and I'm sure that the other counsel will correct me if I'm wrong, but
25 Exhibits P2014 and 6D707 are two other similar documents relating to
1 actions after the 25th of April, 1999, and I think we have a translation
2 of one but not of the other. But the item 5 of those speaks I think for
3 itself as to the units that are given instructions. And I will represent
4 to you, sir, and I think it's clear that the MUP and the VJ units are
5 instructed in that section.
6 Given the documents that we've gone through, would you agree with
7 these are all combat actions planned by the VJ and at least overseen and
8 commanded by brigade commanders of the VJ relating to activities of the VJ
9 and the MUP, as stated in the "zapovest"?
10 A. In this particular case, yes.
11 Q. Now, if we can just briefly turn to some of the documents -- the
12 few documents that talk about complaints relating to interaction between
13 the MUP and the VJ, are you familiar with 3D692, which is a report dated
14 the 25th of May, 1999, by General Velickovic arising out of the control
15 inspection of the Pristina Corps? Are you aware of such an inspection
16 taking place in 1999?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Okay. Once we get that document on the screen I'll ask for page
19 4, item 11 in both versions. And, General, while we're waiting for that I
20 will reveal what I'm asking you with respect to this. In this -- in this
21 report there is a complaint against the MUP in relation to salaries and
22 privileges enjoyed by the MUP that the VJ conscripts were upset about.
23 Now, am I correct, sir, that insofar as you did not deal in detail with
24 the MUP in this report, that you are not in a position to state any
25 conclusions relating to the laws and regulations relating to compensation
1 of the members of the MUP?
2 A. No, I did not deal with that.
3 Q. That's what I assumed. And in any event, Article 17 does not
4 relate to salaries, equipment, et cetera, of respective forces, either the
5 VJ or the MUP; is that correct?
6 A. No, it doesn't. That's correct.
7 Q. You say no, does that mean that Article 17 does not deal with that
8 or ...
9 A. Precisely so. You asked me whether Article 17 deals with salaries
10 and my answer was no.
11 Q. If we focus for a moment on Crisis Staffs. Based on your
12 knowledge --
13 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I still have ten minutes or more of
14 questions, but I see we are at the one-and-a-half point.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: In light of that, we'll break now, Mr. Ivetic.
16 Mr. Radinovic, we need to have a break at this stage for a number
17 of reasons. Could you leave with the usher and we'll see you again ten
18 minutes to 11.00.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Hello again, General Professor Radinovic. Before we turn again to
1 this exhibit we have on the screen, I wanted to ask you the question I
2 started before the break that we had. If we focus for a moment on Crisis
3 Staffs, based on your knowledge and expertise, am I correct that Articles
4 16 and 17 of the Law of Defence do not subordinate the MUP to Crisis
5 Staffs at the local level?
6 A. I'm sorry, I tried to follow, but I didn't.
7 Q. Let me try and simplify it. Based upon your knowledge and
8 expertise of Articles 16 and 17 of the Law of Defence, these articles do
9 not mention or involve so-called Crisis Staffs, "Krizni Stabovi," in the
10 subordination of the MUP at the local level?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Okay. Now if we can return to this Exhibit 3D692, the report of
13 the control carried out by General Velickovic, and if we can focus on item
14 11 which is now visible on both the B/C/S and the English on the screen,
15 it indicates one of the findings being there as: "There is no single
16 command over all the forces in the zone of responsibility. All contacts
17 with the units of the MUP, Ministry of the Interior are established by
18 agreement, which is often disobeyed, especially at the lower levels."
19 Now, if we can look at item 12 which is just below item 11 on the
20 same page, would you agree with me that the aforementioned problems or
21 weaknesses are being experienced by, including various brigades, the 354th
22 Brigade of the VJ?
23 A. Yes, the 37th, the 354th, this is about consequences on brigades.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... At 5D506, this is a report
25 that predates this report dated the 27th of April, 1999, from the command
1 of the 354th Brigade. And I would like to obtain your comment on item
2 4(B) of this document, which should be on the first page once we get it up
3 on the screen. Again, General, I ask your patience while we get the B/C/S
4 up on the screen.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I'd just like to perhaps request some
7 guidance from you. How would you prefer that those of us who can't read
8 B/C/S deal with these documents when there's no translation? I might have
9 questions I want to ask about what's contained in these documents, and I
10 know they can't be instantly translated for us. I don't bring this
11 witness back at some future date, it makes no sense to me. I just don't
12 know how you want us to deal with it, but I think there's some unfairness
13 in it and I think there may well be something in this document I want to
14 ask the witness about it. I don't know. It's a problem, I just don't
15 know how to deal with it.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I think -- I understand the problem, Mr. Ackerman.
17 I think one saving grace may be that it's not an exhibit of the sixth
18 accused and that it's likely to crop up in the case of the fifth accused,
19 by which time it hopefully will have been translated. What do you have to
20 say on this, Mr. Ivetic?
21 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, we have been having difficulty
22 getting our own documents translated, since CLSS is of the opinion we are
23 sixth accused and I'm sure the fifth accused is in the same position, they
24 are giving priority to prior defendants to translate documents. We have
25 been trying to obtain an independent translator to assist with our
1 documents we have problems with the registry now who first approved and is
2 not wanting to approve that. So we are trying to work that out. I don't
3 know what else to say --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought you had that arrangement?
5 MR. IVETIC: We thought so as well, Your Honour. It's not as
6 clear as it was--
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you never been using your own independent --
8 MR. IVETIC: We have been using for our independent and now the
9 registry is refusing to compensate for the services of the independent, so
10 we're trying to work that out with the registry, but there are problems, I
11 think, with everyone in terms of getting documents translated, given the
12 way that the -- the number of the documents involved and the capacities of
13 CLSS. As always, I look to the Trial Chamber for guidance on this. I am
14 going to be asking the witness about exhibit -- about this exhibit,
15 specifically paragraph 3(B), and if need be I can read into the record the
16 entire paragraph. That's one way.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the present document can be dealt with that
18 way, but this ties in with another matter which is currently exercising
19 the minds of the Trial Chamber. It's counter-productive to spend a lot of
20 time trying to work out exactly who is at fault in relation to every
21 element of translation, but I think it's enough for us to say that we're
22 not entirely satisfied that every accused has been making every effort to
23 cooperate with the requests made by CLSS. And the further we go in this
24 case, the more significant that failure to cooperate is likely to be.
25 Now, we've invested a lot of time ourselves and a measure of our own
1 credibility in seeking cooperation from CLSS, and we are very gratified at
2 the response we've had in doing that. But I think it's fair to say that
3 when they've made requests of some counsel here, they have not always had
4 full cooperation from counsel.
5 So against that background there are two matters that are
6 currently issues, and the first is the motion by Lazarevic to amend the
7 Rule 65 ter list to include documents not previously included, and this
8 may well be one of them. A number of these have not been translated.
9 Now, the time is up for the Prosecution response to this and their
10 complaint is they can't make a meaningful response without having the
11 English translations. The inclination of the Bench would be, therefore,
12 to reject all the untranslated documents and leave it to the Lazarevic
13 Defence to make a further application once they've been translated. The
14 problem with that is highlighted by the current situation. If this
15 particular document, 3D506, is one of these, then obviously we have to
16 deal with it separately as an individual case as it arises in court. The
17 other difficulty is that the Prosecution may have comments to make about
18 the ones which have, in fact, been translated and haven't submitted any
19 response as yet.
20 Now, Mr. Stamp, do you have any opposition to any of the Lazarevic
21 documents which have actually been translated into English?
22 MR. STAMP: Actually, we are not in a position to state whether or
23 not we have any objections to those. We only got the CDs for all of these
24 documents yesterday, so we have not been able to review --
25 JUDGE BONOMY: But that motion was filed on the 3rd of October.
1 MR. STAMP: Indeed, but we only got the CDs with the documents
2 yesterday, so we have not had an opportunity to review these documents.
3 And in fact, we had intended to ask today for an extension of the time to
4 respond until Friday so that we could have an opportunity to have a look
5 at these documents we just received.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, you are -- Mr. Cepic, you undoubtedly
7 are not entirely innocent in this whole debate, and I don't want to enter
8 into a counter-productive exchange about that. But this is an example of
9 the problem. So since the Prosecution are not in a position to respond,
10 then what we will do is extend the time for them to respond, and since
11 they only got the documents yesterday that could be up to a fortnight, but
12 what time do you wish?
13 MR. STAMP: On Friday I think --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: So a week would be sufficient --
15 MR. STAMP: This Friday.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: But a week would be sufficient for your purposes?
17 MR. STAMP: Indeed.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I'm giving you warning at this stage that the
19 ones that haven't been translated by then may well be rejected by the
20 Bench, and you may have to make another application. And the later you're
21 making these applications, the less likely they are to be granted. That's
22 just a general statement, it's not a commitment of the Bench to any
23 response or any decision in relation to these documents.
24 So if we extend that time until a week from today, that gives you
25 a bit more time to deal with your translations, Mr. Cepic, and it enables
1 the Prosecution to make an informed response.
2 The other matter that is related to this is an Ojdanic motion for
3 admission of documents from the bar table which has just been filed on the
4 16th of October, and that includes 75 untranslated documents. Now, the
5 Bench's inclination, Mr. Sepenuk, in relation to these is to reject them
6 and leave it to you to make another application as and when they're
7 translated. And when you close your case in the -- probably sometime this
8 week, that can be done as it was in relation to the other two accused,
9 subject to the determination of any outstanding issues in relation to
10 documents and the that these had been tendered initially would fall --
11 would mean that they fell within that category.
12 So without making any final decision on that until you've time to
13 check how long the translations are going to take, I give you an
14 indication that unless they're going to be fairly -- they are fairly
15 imminent, then we are likely to reject these and -- so that time's not
16 wasted in a lot of administrative to-ing and fro-ing over things, that are
17 entirely in your hands. Now, could you try to let us know later today, if
18 possible, or first thing tomorrow when it's likely that these will be
20 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, Your Honour, we'll do that.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 So the only formal order we make at this stage is to extend the
23 time for the response to the Lazarevic motion that was filed on the 3rd of
24 October until next Wednesday and expect the Prosecution to respond in
25 relation to the ones for which they have translations. We understand the
1 position in relation to the ones for which you don't.
2 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Apparently next Wednesday's a holiday, so it will
4 need to be next Tuesday in that case, that's the 23rd.
5 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave, I'll be
6 very brief. I feel it incumbent upon me to respond to what has been said.
7 The greatest part of the exhibits of our Defence team was submitted in
8 good time, in June, that is about 1.000 and over exhibits --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic, this is not getting us anywhere.
10 MR. CEPIC: Thank you.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: You know you did not respond as quickly as you
12 ought have done to the request to prioritize. If you had done there still
13 may be a problem, I'm not going to dispute that, because of the volume
14 involved. But it's impossible to work out what would have happened if you
15 had been as quick as you ought to have been in relation to the responses.
16 I see no reason, though, to go into that because no decision is going to
17 be taken to exclude documents at this stage. If that question ever
18 arises, you'll have your chance to make appropriate submissions in
19 relation to your position. Thank you.
20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: So we can return now to the evidence.
22 Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
24 Q. General Professor, if we look at paragraph 3(B) of this combat
25 report of the 354th Combat Brigade, the part dealing with the police is
1 the second paragraph, which begins: [Interpretation] "Our units -- on the
2 territory of Podujevo municipality there have been no activities of any
3 aviational, though intensive reconnaissance is going on. In a small area
4 there is a large number of refugees" --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please stop until we finish
6 interpreting the paragraph.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Relate to the PJP not
9 following the orders of the Crisis Staff in Podujevo. Sorry.
10 MR. IVETIC: [Interpretation] "In the territory of Podujevo
11 municipality there have been no activities of any aviational, though
12 intensive reconnaissance is going on. In a small area there is a large
13 number of refugee which necessitates better food supplies. The treatment
14 of the Siptar population by the VJ is fair. In the area of responsibility
15 of our unit, there are deployed PJP units that do not comply with orders
16 and decisions of the Crisis Staff of the Podujevo Municipal Assembly. We
17 need information who is responsible for them and who commands them."
18 [In English] That's a bit more than I actual said, but I don't
19 think it matters, it gives a bigger picture in front of the general.
20 Q. Again, based on your understanding of the operation of the Law of
21 Defence, Crisis Staffs ought not to have any role under Article 17 in
22 issuing orders to the PJP of the MUP, would you agree with that?
23 A. Yes. But if you allow me, I want to add.
24 Q. Sure.
25 A. Crisis Staffs should have been informed when such units or any
1 other armed unit arrived. The Crisis Staff, in principle, should be aware
2 what that unit is and to whom it is subordinated; if they didn't know
3 that, it's no wonder they're asking. It's true what you said, the command
4 staff of such units was not duty-bound to report to the Crisis Staff.
5 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Same holds true.
6 A. Whoever it is.
7 Q. Thank you. For the sake of the transcript, 45, 11, I think we all
8 heard that I said that we're talking about the PJP, the JSO but the same
9 holds true for the same and the answer is whoever it is. So I think that
10 clears up the record.
11 General, we have several other documents of a similar nature that
12 I'm not going to go through with you, we'll probably submit them from the
13 bar table once we have translations. I'd like to now move briefly to
14 another topic, your report deals specifically with the structure of the
15 MUP at paragraphs 81 to 87 of your report you discuss the MUP. And in
16 paragraph 82 you state that the Ministry of the Interior has two
17 departments, public and state security, and within the departmental
18 administration of these departments were secretariats of the interior,
19 also known as SUPs, also departments of the interior, also known as OUPs.
20 First of all, would you be surprised or would you agree with me
21 that the -- that the RDB, the State Security Service, did not have any
22 connection to SUPs and OUPs, but rather had CRDBs, centres of the state
23 security department in very -- and detachments of state security
24 department in various locations?
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. So paragraph 82 as written is a little bit confusing. Now, with
2 respect to the RJB, the -- pardon me, the public security department --
3 A. I only roughly dealt with the MUP, I didn't go into detail.
4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Now, with respect to the RJB
5 you mentions SUPs and OUPs, and in fact you don't mention [Interpretation]
6 Police station [In English] or their relationship to SUPs or OUPs. Would
7 you agree that that the structure of the MUP is a topic that you did not
8 have sufficient knowledge about to form an expert opinion for purposes of
9 this report and that the information presented is a simplification of a
10 very complex ministerial organ?
11 A. By definition I accept any critique of whatever I have authored,
12 including yours. Of course I have no ambition of saying that I have
13 encompassed everything, but I don't think your conclusion is quite
14 justified. I didn't speak of the five operative administrations of the
15 MUP or the other accompanying administrations or about the units of PJP.
16 I only mentioned what I thought sufficient to explain the command
17 competence of General Ojdanic. I did not deal with the MUP as such, but I
18 appreciate your comment that I'm not an expert in the MUP and I'm not
19 competent to judge every one of its elements.
20 Q. I'm just making sure -- I think the transcript is completed. With
21 respect to what you have written about, you have just mentioned the
22 existence of the MUP staff in Pristina in paragraph 86. Would you agree
23 with me that you were not able to offer any opinions as to the functioning
24 of this organ or its interaction with other MUP structures based upon the
25 information contained in your report?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Okay. And likewise, you have also mentioned -- you have a diagram
3 at two places, on pages 124 you have a diagram that places the state
4 security department under the MUP staff for Kosovo. Would the same --
5 would the same fact apply to this representation -- well, strike that.
6 Let me ask you a different question.
7 Would you agree with me that the -- based upon your knowledge of
8 the MUP, the state security department is separate and apart from the
9 public security department of the MUP or do you not know?
10 A. Those are two sectors.
11 Q. And -- and with respect to the -- sorry.
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. CEPIC: [Microphone not activated]
14 Your Honour, with your leave, page 46, line 25, witness said: I
15 did not deal with the MUP as such, but I appreciate your comment that I'm
16 not an expert in the MUP and I'm not competent to judge every one its
17 elements. And he added: [Interpretation] But I can speak to what I'm
18 testifying about.
19 MR. IVETIC: And that's why I'm going through the precise
20 paragraphs that the witness mentions the MUP in clarifying --
21 MR. CEPIC: Thank you.
22 MR. IVETIC: -- The extent of his knowledge about it.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. Sorry, General, if we can return to the chart on page 124, the
1 diagram mistakenly places the state security department under the MUP
2 staff, which was an RJB organ. Would you agree that you cannot, based
3 upon the information you have, form an opinion as to the -- as to its
4 nature, that the RJB would be in charge of the RDB in essence?
5 A. You are only partially right. I can tell you how I drew that
6 conclusion that underlies this diagram. You have the founding act of the
7 MUP staff for combatting terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and there is a
8 whole series of those documents dating from 1996 to 1998. In this
9 founding act, there are tasks of the staff listed, the staff for
10 combatting terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. And you will see that one of
11 their tasks was to plan, organize, supervise, and control the forces
12 involved in anti-terrorist combat in Kosovo and Metohija and the units
13 that were brought into Kosovo and Metohija. It is quite certain that
14 units for special operations took part in anti-terrorist struggle, and it
15 is beyond any doubt that as part of that anti-terrorist struggle they were
16 under the control of the MUP or at least should have been. I see no other
17 way to explain it than the way I explained it. Of course the sector of
18 state security does not fall under the sector of public security, that's
19 quite clear. But that's why the staff of the MUP was established for the
20 anti-terrorist struggle, in order to plan, organize, and control all the
21 forces involved in that struggle. For instance, the -- whether the staff
22 controlled the JSO, I don't know, I didn't deal with it and I have no
23 information how it functioned on the ground.
24 Q. Sorry, I had to wait for the translation and the transcript. So
25 essentially your conclusions are based solely on the decision on the
1 formation of the staff, and you do not know how and to what extent that
2 was actually realised in reality on the terrain; is that correct?
3 A. I did not have combat reports of units for special operations, so
4 I could not establish that. I concluded this on the basis of the founding
5 document and the establishment of the staff and giving the staff a mandate
6 in this founding document.
7 Q. Thank you, General Professor, I have no further questions for you.
8 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
10 Mr. Ackerman, do you have questions?
11 MR. ACKERMAN: Yeah, very few, Your Honour. It won't take very
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:
14 Q. Good morning.
15 A. [No interpretation]
16 Q. I'm John Ackerman, I represent General Pavkovic in this case. I
17 assume you have your report in front of you and it might not be important
18 whether you do or not. I want to ask you about --
19 A. It's in my bag.
20 Q. If you need to refer to it, please feel free. Page 117 you're
21 talking about, it's paragraph 159 of your report, I believe. And you may
22 want to look at it if you can get it out of your bag and look. It may
23 help you answer my question?
24 JUDGE BONOMY: If it's paragraph 159, it's on page 119 of my copy,
25 Mr. Ackerman. Perhaps that's done with printing. I think the best way to
1 deal with this to avoid confusion is to refer to the paragraph numbers.
2 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, that sometimes gets confusing --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it does but there are two sections and two
4 lots of paragraphs.
5 MR. ACKERMAN: We'll get it, Your Honour.
6 Q. It's paragraph 159 and the footnote is 205, and I'm interested in
7 the comments you make in the footnote where you say this:
8 "Not only was this no longer featuring in the combat report of the
9 3rd Army, but the 3rd Army commander did not complain to the president at
10 the meeting held on 4th or 5th May at which he and General Lukic
12 I'd like to know the source of your information about this meeting
13 that happened on the 4th or the 5th of May with General Pavkovic,
14 General Lukic, and apparently Milosevic.
15 A. At this moment I really cannot recall the source. In the
16 transcript from evening briefings, maybe -- well, I cannot remember.
17 Q. Do you recall that General Ojdanic was present at this meeting?
18 A. Well, I assume that General Ojdanic should have been present at
19 the meeting, but I'm telling you, really, at this point in time I cannot
20 recall. And during the course of the afternoon, I'll look it up. In my
21 hotel room I have some more papers, and then I'll look it up and tomorrow
22 then I can tell you, if you don't mind.
23 Q. That would be very helpful. You can just let us know tomorrow if
24 you find anything out about it. You'll remember the document 3D670,
25 that's the 18 April Milosevic resubordination order. I don't think we
1 need to look at it again. What I want to ask you is: Do you have any
2 knowledge that anybody within the MUP organization ever received a copy of
3 that order?
4 A. I do not have any knowledge.
5 Q. In the course of your investigations into these matters, did you
6 ever find one document where the MUP reported to the VJ as if they were
7 actually subordinated to the VJ?
8 A. No.
9 Q. I'd like you to look at another document, it's P2594, and I want
10 to look at paragraph 45 of that document.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, that document is under seal.
12 MR. ACKERMAN: That's what I was just getting ready to ask about,
13 I think it is. So what do we need to do, go into private session?
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I think for security sake we should go into private
16 session while we deal with this document.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Yeah.
18 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: The document number for the exhibit now being deal
9 with is P2600.
10 MR. ACKERMAN:
11 Q. I don't know if you -- I know you did, you had an opportunity to
12 review this document in preparing your report because you refer to it in
13 footnote 206 of your report, in fact you refer to this paragraph. The
14 paragraph is a bit long, but it describes the progress of the efforts to
15 resubordinate MUP to the VJ. And this is General Vasiljevic's statement
16 where he talking about that process. He talks about the order of
17 Milosevic which was ordered, he talks about Pavkovic's complaint in
18 writing that the subordination had not occurred, that as a result of that
19 Ojdanic went to Milosevic, and Milosevic said MUP would be confronted but
20 that he shouldn't be too concerned because the problems with
21 resubordination were more to deal with Montenegro than Kosovo. And then
22 he says this: "I'm aware of this exchange as Ojdanic showed me his
23 personal notes on the matter."
24 Did you also get a chance to see those personal notes and confirm
25 that what General Vasiljevic is saying here is correct?
1 A. No.
2 Q. All right. Finally I'd like you to look then at another document,
3 it's 4D0299. And during the examination of Mr. Ivetic there was some
4 confusion, I think, or at least some question about the dates regarding
5 these resubordination orders and when it was decreed that MUP should
6 actually resubordinate itself to the VJ. So what I want you to look at is
7 General Pavkovic's order, which was based upon General Ojdanic's order in
8 that regard. And I suggest to you that nowhere in that order does
9 General Pavkovic set out a date by which that resubordination should
10 occur, does he?
11 A. Was that a question?
12 Q. Yes, that was a question.
13 A. The date is not mentioned by which the resubordination has to be
14 carried out.
15 Q. So that when General Lazarevic issued his order saying that there
16 should be a resubordination of specific MUP units by the 25th of April, it
17 makes sense, doesn't it, that he was referring to a resubordination that
18 had to occur under the terms of Article 17 of the Law on Defence for an
19 upcoming action that would be taking place on the 25th of April?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. All right. In paragraph 180, this is a completely different
22 subject now of your report, you talk about the training that members and
23 officers of the VJ would go through in the international law of war and
24 other things. And one of the schools you talk about is called the School
25 of National Defence, which is the highest level providing advanced
1 education to commanding officers. And you tell us that that School of
2 National Defence is for training these high-level commanding officers for
3 commanding strategic groups, operations units, and for work in the General
4 Staff and the Ministry of Defence, correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So work of a highest-level -- assignment of a highest-level
7 commanding officer to the Ministry of Defence was not an unusual
8 assignment for someone in the higher ranks of the VJ, was it?
9 A. I didn't understand your question. I really am sorry.
10 Q. Assignment of a superior officer, a highly advanced officer, who
11 went through this School of National Defence, an assignment of them to a
12 position with the Ministry of Defence was a serious assignment, it was
13 a -- it was one of the jobs that these high-ranking professionals in the
14 army were assigned to on occasion, wasn't it?
15 A. In the organization and formation of the Ministry of Defence, it
16 is envisaged by establishment what job vacancies should be filled by
17 officers who completed highest military schools.
18 Q. And the assignment of someone to the Ministry of Defence is not a
19 demotion or putting them out to pasture or anything like that, is it?
20 A. No, on the contrary. Well, I was in the Ministry of Defence too,
21 and I did not consider that to being a demotion or having my role
22 marginalised in any way.
23 Q. Thank you. In paragraph, another subject now, 233 of your report
24 you're talking about paramilitary organization and activity and its
25 prevention. And in there you talk about -- I'll just read you the -- it's
1 at the end of paragraph 233.
2 "In addition today but not so reliably during the war, it is
3 known that certain armed groups of former paramilitary units became part
4 of the MUP and operated in Kosovo and Metohija, such were the Skorpioni
5 and Arkanova."
6 And then you say this: "Members of these units are being tried
7 before the special court for war crimes in Belgrade for crimes committed
8 in Podujevo."
9 I want to ask you if you are aware as you sit here today that one
10 of those persons, Sasa Cvjetan has actually been convicted by that court
11 and sentenced to a 20-year prison sentence for killings that he was
12 involved in with that unit in Podujevo? Were you aware of that?
13 A. Yes, I know that from the public domain in our country.
14 Q. Thank you. Now I want you to look at Exhibit P01811, please.
15 Now, this is a document dated the 31st of May, 1999, it's from the
16 Ministry of the Interior and it's called: "A decision on the
17 establishment of the ministry staff for the suppression of terrorism."
18 Have you ever seen this document?
19 A. [No interpretation]
20 Q. I think you said yes.
21 A. Yes, yes.
22 Q. Can you explain this document to us? Does this look like a -- a
23 MUP that is subordinated to the VJ or is this a MUP that is not
24 subordinated to the VJ or does this have anything to do with that issue?
25 A. This document has nothing to do with resubordination of the MUP to
1 the Army of Yugoslavia because it was done with a view to having a
2 separate organ for planning, organization, and supervising the
3 anti-terrorist struggle of the forces of the Ministry of the Interior.
4 Q. So what does this document tell us with regard to the issue of
5 resubordination? Does it show that the MUP and VJ were each operating
6 within their own separate chains of command? Is that what this suggests
7 to us?
8 A. This document only indicates that a staff was established, nothing
9 more than that.
10 Q. All right.
11 MR. ACKERMAN: That's all the questions I have, Your Honour.
12 Thank you very much.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
14 Mr. Stamp, do you wish to start or do you wish to leave it until
16 MR. STAMP: If I could, with your leave, leave it until tomorrow I
17 would be grateful.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 Questioned by the Court:
20 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Well, Professor General, I have a few queries to
21 make for purposes of clarifying my own mind about the issues which have
22 come up in our report and through your testimony. Now, I feel that the
23 issue of resubordination of MUP has been so much confused, firstly because
24 we do not know whether the orders given by the president or the supreme
25 commander with respect to the resubordination issue, whether these --
1 resubordination issue, whether these permeated below to MUP for purposes
2 of compliance or not. And we see that MUP is functioning together with VJ
3 in some areas. And we also see some correspondence at the lower echelons
4 being exchanged between MUP and VJ or coming -- originating from VJ or
5 sometimes from MUP in the language of the army. And then we also see that
6 you have made some omissions in your report with respect to the placement
7 of MUP forces alongside VJ during the combat period.
8 Now, I think it was essential for the report that you had
9 discovered why this was -- why there was such a confusion and what was
10 happening, because after all a letter of the president seems never to have
11 been officially received, and why there was no action over that. I mean,
12 analysis on this was very essential and I would therefore request you to
13 please argument your report with this answer so that this may clarify
14 certain positions. I'm very grateful for your patience.
15 A. Your Honour, Judge, there are quite a few subquestions involved in
16 our question, so I'm afraid that I may omit to answer some of them. So
17 please do bear with me.
18 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.
19 A. First of all, the MUP and the army are, no doubt, two separate
20 systems and every one of them has their own chain of command and their own
21 line of functioning, as it were, where they mind themselves at the same
22 task and the struggle against terrorism was the same task for the army and
23 the police except that every one of these systems does this in accordance
24 with their own equipment, training, their level of training. Even if
25 there had been no orders, people, commanders, commanding officers, people
1 in the field, on the ground will establish some kind of cooperation,
2 coordination, et cetera. As you could see, quite a few documents were
3 shown to me here that this was actually the case, at brigade level and
4 even in the case of the Pristina Corps. That is one undeniable fact.
5 Also this cooperation between the army and the police in
6 combatting terrorism started significantly before the month of July. We
7 even have records stating that it began at the very beginning of 1998, as
8 a matter of fact. There was coordination actions in concert between the
9 army and the MUP even before the 28th of July, because according to the
10 rules of service the army is authorised to react to terrorist strikes on
11 the basis of self-defence. So the General Staff and military officers are
12 duty-bound to react to all acts of terrorism.
13 So there is one group of facts that can be established, namely,
14 that at these levels down there, there was coordination, cooperation,
15 coordinated action, regardless of whether there were orders coming from
16 above or not because necessity made it incumbent on them to cooperate.
17 There is also another group of facts, it seems to me that it was
18 established beyond any doubt that the highest order from the very top,
19 from the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for the
20 resubordination of the MUP, namely, those parts that are in the areas
21 where combat activities are carried out, this did not go down the vertical
22 chain of command of the MUP, to the MUP units. We have quite a few
23 documents from the system of command of the army to that effect and also
24 from the reports of the control concerning the situation on the ground,
25 also from evening briefings, collegium meetings, there's quite a bit of
1 information confirming that; that is to say there is no doubt about that,
2 that this order did not get down the MUP chain of command. Now, why it
3 did not arrive, I really have no answer to that. I think that it had to
4 have arrived. And I think it is the military cabinet of the head of state
5 that went astray there. They should have submitted this to the Government
6 of Serbia, and then the Government of Serbia to the minister of interior,
7 and then they down their own chain of command. I can only state that that
8 was not done and it should have been done.
9 Now, have I omitted to answer anything else? I'm here --
10 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm grateful for your clarifications, but
11 obviously when military and MUP were cooperating because of, as you said,
12 national necessity, that's one thing. That is an obligation which was
13 being felt and which was being -- I mean, fulfilled. But the problem
14 really arose when there were incidents of indiscipline, when there was
15 insubordination coming from certain areas of MUP and so on and so forth.
16 So if the order had permeated or would have been followed up, perhaps it
17 would have been the law then because of the presidential decree. But why
18 this happened in such a situation where MUP and VJ were, as you said in
19 your theory, were required to coordinate? But do you think it was a
20 sabotage or it was something purposeful that this document never reached
21 and just -- it went away like ether, thank you, volatile like ether, I
22 mean. Thanks a lot, General. Could you kindly comment on that?
23 A. I don't think it was sabotage of any kind. This is really
24 speculation now. I mean, I have no arguments for this, but I think that
25 rather it is a question of bickering between the two systems in the
1 following way: The MUP never wanted the army to command them and it was
2 the other way around, too. So I can understand it from that point of
3 view, that it was this kind of bickering that did not allow the system of
4 resubordination to function fully. However, there is yet another thing
5 that I would like you to bear in mind in this context. Even if the
6 resubordination had been fully been carried out, it does not pertain to
7 the overall activity of the MUP, but only the participation of the MUP in
8 the combat activities carried out by the military in the field
9 specifically, and that lasts for as long as the action lasts. When the
10 action is over, then the resubordination is suspended. So resubordination
11 does not pertain to the entire time of the war, but only when combat
12 activities are carried out and only within the framework of these combat
13 activities. However, most of the MUP remains completely outside this
14 subordination, even if the order had arrived. So if your question implies
15 what the effects were of the lack of resubordination, it can only pertain
16 to conduct within combat activities, not outside that. All the
17 consequences that could have occurred outside combat activity would have
18 taken place even if the resubordination had been carried through on orders
19 from the head of state who acts in accordance with Article 17 of the Law
20 on Defence that specifically states what this pertains to, combat
21 activities that are organized and commanded by the army.
22 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thanks a lot, but the question again would be that
23 we quite understand that of course MUP was required to be a subordinate of
24 VJ only for a specific purpose, to fight -- to join in the combats against
25 terrorism, and we have the constitutional backing also for that and there
1 is also the presidential letter. Then why bickering? Why was there
2 indiscipline amongst these two discipline forces? Because if it is a
3 presidential decree and if there is a constitutional authority for that
4 purpose, then everybody should be bowed their heads to that. Why was
5 there indiscipline? Why was this happening? Did you analyse this? Why
6 at all was there such a situation in such a tense time, when as we go to
7 your theories there was need for a national consensus on things? Thank
8 you, General, could you say something on that.
9 A. I was unable to deal with the causes of this. All I was able to
10 deal with within the tasks sent to me for this expert report was whether
11 it occurred or not. My duty ended there. The entire problem can be
12 discussed at length in order to attempt to arrive at an answer to the
13 question of why this happened. I didn't deal with that question, but from
14 the large number of documents at my disposal I realised that it did not
15 happen overall, only at the lower levels.
16 JUDGE CHOWHAN: But then I feel that this report is destitute of
17 certain essential facts which would have been very useful has the analysis
18 been that complete even it could have been done briefly and we have not
19 been able to find the cause and the effect reflected in the report. And
20 my feeling is that this report is destitute of such essential information.
21 Why was that left out? I mean, that's very surprising when you were
22 looking at various causes. Thanks a lot, sir. I'm most grateful for your
23 comments on my questions, I'm most grateful.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Radinovic, why do you think the order was made
25 at all?
1 A. I think the order was made with the best of intentions, to unify
2 the efforts of all the defence forces and the MUP and the army are the
3 most prepared to carry out the tasks that had to be carried out in Kosovo
4 at the time, so this was an effort to unify all the action taken to defend
5 the country and in order to bring about a closer link between the army and
6 the MUP in combat activities. I'm not saying this would have solved all
7 the problems, but it would have been better if it had happened. And of
8 course under the constitution this was also bound to be issued by the
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's my question. Are you saying it was
11 bound to be issued by the president? Once a state of war had been
12 declared, did Articles 16 and 17 not apply automatically?
13 A. Articles 16 and 17 ought to have been applied automatically, but
14 orders had to be issued to all systems to carry out resubordination. This
15 had to be solved by certain documents of command; without those, there
16 would be no resubordination.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's assume that Milosevic had every issued any
18 order on this and General Lazarevic had decided that a particular combat
19 operation required cooperation between the MUP and the VJ, with the MUP
20 having the most directly involvement in the operation but the VJ providing
21 support. Is he not automatically entitled, if he has instructions for
22 such an operation, to engage the MUP forces under his command?
23 A. Yes, but the appropriate MUP unit would have to receive an order
24 from its own chain of command to be resubordinated to the army in that
25 operation; without such an order, it would not be resubordinated.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: But that could, in theory, happen without Milosevic
2 ever making any order as long as the MUP organs were cooperating with the
4 A. Regardless of the fact that resubordination was not carried out in
5 full, I did not reach the conclusion that the MUP did not cooperate with
6 the VJ. We are drawing a distinction here between cooperation,
7 coordination, and command. Article 17 and the order of the president of
8 the FRY meant that the MUP commanders who were in the areas of combat
9 operations should be resubordinated to the military commanders, receive
10 orders from them, and answer to them. That's a higher degree of
11 cooperation than if cooperation is carried out by agreement.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you saying then that the fact that the order
13 was made by Milosevic removed the need for the resubordinated MUP organ to
14 receive an order through its own chain of command? In the example I've
15 given you, assuming the Milosevic order was made, would that then entitle
16 General Lazarevic to give direct orders to MUP without them first of all
17 receiving instructions in relation to resubordination from a superior MUP
19 A. A MUP unit would not be subordinated to General Lazarevic without
20 first receiving an order from its own superior. It will cooperate and
21 coordinate, but it will not be resubordinated unless it receives a
22 specific order from its own chain of command.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: And how would that normally be arranged?
24 A. The minister of the interior issues an order to the MUP staff or
25 to its superior body, he issues a written order whereby his own forces
1 which are in the areas of combat of the army are resubordinated to the
2 army commanders. And that order is sent down the chain of command until
3 it reaches the unit commanders, and in that case General Lazarevic and
4 army commanders are authorised to issue orders to MUP units.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that a general order that applies throughout the
6 period of the conflict?
7 A. The order is a general order applying throughout the duration of
8 the conflict, but the resubordination relation does not hold throughout
9 this period but only for particular actions. The moment the action is
10 complete, the MUP unit is no longer under the authority of the military
11 commander until the need arises for a new anti-terrorist operation or, for
12 example, a fight against NATO forces in a ground operation which seemed to
13 be meant.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you've got to excuse our direct experience of
15 military matters, Mr. Radinovic, but that doesn't really clarify it for
16 me. The NATO conflict lasted 78 days. Would the Milosevic
17 resubordination order apply of every MUP unit assuming it had been relayed
18 by the minister of the interior to units, would it have applied throughout
19 the 78-day period or would there have been stages when renewal was
21 A. As regards that level of command, it would have applied throughout
22 the entire period of the war. The president of the state would not have
23 had to renew the order, nor would the minister have had to do so, it
24 wouldn't have been done at the highest levels. But the command bodies on
25 the ground, organizing, planning, and carrying out the actions would have
1 to bear that in mind. And every time the need arose for police forces to
2 participate in combat operations waged by the army, they would have to
3 order their units to join in and to be resubordinated. The operative
4 orders at the lower level would not apply throughout the 78 days of the
5 war because in those 78 days the police forces had different duties to
6 carry out, not just participating in military actions.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, this is the part I'm afraid I fail to
8 understand, and it may be that questions from Mr. Ivetic or Mr. Ackerman
9 would help me. But resubordination is meaningless if, in fact, the army
10 commanders cannot directly command MUP forces without further intervention
11 from some higher MUP organ, and that I do not at the moment understand.
12 Can you assist, Mr. Ivetic? You're not obliged to. You're
13 simply --
14 MR. IVETIC: I'm trying to think of a question that would perhaps
15 have this witness answer it. I can't on the top of my head I do have a
16 correction on the transcript page 64, line 14, the superior organ, he
17 mentioned the RJB. That is the only advice I can at this point in time.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: You're saying he did mention the RJB?
19 MR. IVETIC: Correct, the superior organ being the RJB, the Resor
20 Javne Bezbednosti I think is what he said.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 A. May I continue, Your Honour, and try to provide an explanation?
23 JUDGE BONOMY: If you can help me, please do.
24 A. I'll do my best, Your Honour. The high levels issue orders
25 covering long -- longer period of time, and these orders at that level
1 need not be renewed. They simply order resubordination, which means that
2 in each particular action where resubordination is necessary the
3 lower-level commanders are authorised to carry out the resubordination.
4 But the police units which are supposed to participate in operations under
5 the command and control of the army have to receive an order to carry this
6 out each time. Sometimes these actions would last half a day or even
7 less, and for each and every action they would have to receive an order to
8 at such and such a time in such and such a place be placed under the
9 command of the Pristina Corps until the task was completed. As soon as
10 the task was completed, they would go back to their regular duties until
11 there was a new action, and this would be repeated every time.
12 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I have a question, General, to ask here. When the
13 NATO action started, did the president of Yugoslavia address the nation
14 and pass certain orders, like presidents do in the event of an emergency?
15 Did he explain certain things? Did he address the nation or didn't he?
16 A. No, he did not address the nation, but the nation was fully aware
17 of all this. This had been imminent for quite some time and the nation
18 was quite aware of it. There were plans for the use of the army, there
19 was a war plan, there were plans of engagement, and for these initial
20 operational plans, no special order was required. The use of the army in
21 possible war situations had been planned, and various scenarios of the
22 imposed war were considered for months beforehand.
23 JUDGE CHOWHAN: The president did not address the nation during
24 the entire crucial period? Didn't he address the nation at all explaining
25 things? No?
1 A. Well, I'm talking about the beginning of the war, no, he did not.
2 Well, he did address the nation from time to time, of course, and the
3 public followed his activities as head of stated and in the peace
4 negotiations, of course.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: You were assisting me and I return to the point I
6 was -- sorry, Mr. Ackerman, you wished to intervene there.
7 MR. ACKERMAN: Just -- I think maybe to clarify something, Your
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I complete what I was trying to do there.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, certainly.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Because I hadn't finished what I was asking. I
12 think I'm getting clearer now. You're saying that at the Lazarevic level,
13 once the task was completed if he wanted to engage MUP forces again there
14 would require to be a further order, that's an internal order within the
15 MUP structure, requiring them to be resubordinated to the Pristina Corps.
16 Have I understood that correctly?
17 A. At the Lazarevic level, no, because that's a high level and for
18 him, the order he received from his army commander was sufficient. The
19 commander of the 3rd Army ordered that MUP units be resubordinated to him
20 and that was enough for him but it was not enough for the MUP units that
21 were supposed to participate in the actions. They did not get orders from
22 their own superiors to be resubordinated to him.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: My reason for asking the question that way was in
24 your answer you said but the police units which are to participate in
25 operations under the command and control of the VJ have to receive an
1 order to carry this out each time. Sometimes these actions would last
2 half a day or even less, and for each and every one they would have to
3 receive an order to at such and such a time and in such and such a place
4 be placed under the command of the Pristina Corps until the task was
5 completed. As soon as the task was completed they would go back to their
6 regular duties until there was a new action.
7 So I wrongly assumed that you were talking about the commander of
8 the Pristina Corps level when you said that. So tell me at what level the
9 resubordination would be for a task and would have to be rearranged for
10 the next task, at what level would that kick in?
11 A. At the level at which the action was being carried out.
12 Throughout the war the Pristina Corps never carried out a corps operation
13 involving all the forces of the whole corps.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Could that then apply at brigade level?
15 A. Yes.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: How would the brigade commander go about arranging
17 for an instruction to be given to the appropriate MUP organs that they
18 were to be resubordinated to him for a particular task?
19 A. In the area, it's the same area where the MUP units and the army
20 units are, they are in the same area. And according to the action
21 envisaged he planned his own forces and he planned those police forces who
22 were in the area. And he issued them with tasks in line with their
23 equipment, training, purpose, and their combat and other abilities. But
24 the order to the commander of the police unit which was supposed to
25 participate in the action had to be issued to him by his own superior, he
1 had to be told by his own superior that he should be resubordinated to the
2 army commander. Otherwise, subordination in combat actions is not a
3 permanent category because this was only a minor, although very important,
4 part of their duties.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: The logic of this, I'm afraid, defeats me. There
6 must be a point in the MUP structure where the VJ officer is commanding a
7 MUP officer to give directions to his inferiors. How is it he does that?
8 Does he ask them kindly to do it so the control of this is in the hands of
9 MUP officer, or does the army officer have the authority to say, Look, you
10 tell those in the following units that they have to follow my orders for
11 this operation? How is that done?
12 A. It's done according to the system of coordination. The MUP staff
13 at Kosovo and the Pristina Corps had to coordinate. They would agree on
14 their mutual relations, and at these mutual coordination meetings they
15 would decide which MUP units would participate in combat activities. I'm
16 sure that's how it was.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: But surely, Mr. Radinovic, that gives the ultimate
18 power to the MUP staff to say, Get lost, we'll do it our way?
19 A. Unfortunately, yes [as interpreted].
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, now we're getting to it I think.
21 Mr. Ackerman, is there anything else you want to ask about?
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think maybe perspective could be
23 important. The Milosevic order was issued on the 18th of April, so that
24 would have been the beginning of the effort to resubordinate the MUP. The
25 18th of April was the 26th of those 78 days, and by that time the vast
1 majority of the crime base in the indictment had already occurred. So
2 we're talking about a fairly minimal number of crime-based events that
3 happened after the 18th of April, and I think getting it in that
4 perspective might help a little bit.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: I agree entirely, but I still have in my mind an
6 earlier answer that Article 16 and 17 apply automatically, you don't
7 actually require an order from the president to trigger this whole system,
8 all you need is a declaration of war.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, there's evidence - and I can't tell you the
10 documents right now - where there's complaint that -- there's refusal to
11 resubordinate and things like that on behalf of certain MUP units. I
12 think the thing that might be difficult to get our minds around is that
13 these kinds of things happened at a very low tactical level, this is out
14 in the field where the battle is going on and who is commanding the action
15 in the field. You have two commanders in a field, a MUP commander and an
16 army commander or do you have one commander commanding both forces. When
17 you have a resubordination one commander commands both forces. The
18 understanding that I have is that never happened in this situation, but it
19 never happens at a level up as high as Lazarevic, you're two or three
20 levels above the tactical level at that point.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it -- Let me ask Mr. Radinovic just finally
22 to clarify it.
23 Assume that Milosevic had never made that order and a brigade
24 commander decided that he wanted to have the assistance of MUP forces to
25 carry out a particular task and he got the cooperation of the MUP staff,
1 am I right in understanding that Articles 16 and 17 would allow him then
2 to have the MUP forces resubordinated to him for that task on the basis of
3 an order issued by the MUP staff to their inferior units?
4 A. Yes, that would have been quite enough.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
6 Well, I think that's as much as we can do today.
7 MR. IVETIC: One correction in the transcript, line 70 -- pardon,
8 page 70, line 17, the witness said: Unfortunately, yes, if the order
9 didn't reach them and the last part of that did not make it into the
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Mr. Radinovic, we will need to stop there for today and tomorrow
13 morning at 9.00 we'll start with the cross-examination by the Prosecutor.
14 It would obviously be helpful if you would undertake the further research
15 you said you would in the course of this afternoon, and in fact perhaps
16 the --
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's in my notes, certainly.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: The first thing to do tomorrow will be to tell the
19 results of that research before we begin the cross-examination by
20 Mr. Stamp . Meanwhile, please bear in mind that even though you are doing
21 research and you are making further inquiries for your own purposes, it's
22 vital that you do not have any communication about the evidence with
23 anyone in the case. No one's entitled to speak to you about the evidence,
24 and you're not entitled to speak to anyone about the evidence while you're
25 in the witness box. So until your evidence is complete you may talk to
1 people about things other than the evidence.
2 Now, could you please leave the courtroom with the usher and
3 return ready to recommence at 9.00 a.m. tomorrow.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.18 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 18th day of
7 October, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.