1 Friday, 19 October 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Radinovic.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: The cross-examination by Mr. Stamp will now
10 Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp [Continued]
15 Q. Good morning, sir.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Yesterday you referred to the collegium meeting in which the --
18 there was discussion about the 47.000 armed Serb civilians. In that
19 meeting, Dusan Samardzic, who was the former commander of the 3rd Army,
20 said -- and this is page 23. I don't know if you need to see it. I'm
21 just going to read it. Because you indicated that you had gone through it
23 "It was my order, and we organised the whole thing for the
24 defence of Serbian villages. Commanders at all levels have been sent out.
25 They're armed and they have two combat sets of ammunition each. Their role
1 and assignment is to defend their villages and participate together with
2 army units in any operation in the immediate vicinity. We have to carry
3 out military and police operations. It can't be done in any other way.
4 And at this moment, they are -- there are enough army and MUP members to
5 do their part of the job, if it should come to that."
6 General Samardzic seems to be speaking about arming Serb
7 villagers, and you suggested yesterday that the 47.000 armed Serbs
8 included MUP reservists, civil protection personnel, civil defence
9 personnel, Territorial Defence personnel. Isn't that inconsistent with
10 what the general said that he did?
11 A. That is not inconsistent with what the general said. I had in my
12 hands a document - I think it was from May 1998 - this document orders the
13 arming of civilians, but members of the reserve force of the Army of
14 Yugoslavia and the military territorial units. So in that document, we
15 can see that these are military conscripts who are being issued with
16 weapons and equipment in case that proves to be impossible in a situation
17 when there are war operations.
18 Furthermore, you have documents of the Ministry of the Interior in
19 which information is provided about members of the civil protection, civil
20 defence, the system of reporting and monitoring, and the coding and
21 communications units.
22 All these categories, including reserve police units, are being
23 armed as civilian population. So from civilian population, they turn into
24 military conscripts.
25 In addition to that, there is an order issued by the chief of the
1 defence department of Pristina, Colonel Petar Ilic, in which he issues an
2 order. Once there was this spontaneous self-organisation of the
3 population, in order to prevent any mistakes in this process, he orders
4 the chiefs of his military offices that the arming of the civilian
5 population should be done in an organised fashion; namely, arms should be
6 issued only to those who do not have wartime assignments in units of the
7 military, in military territorial units, in units of the civil defence --
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter can no longer hear the witness
9 because of background noise from somebody's microphone.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just -- just a moment, Mr. Radinovic. There's a
11 problem with interpretation. Could you just go back a little in your
12 answer there about two or three sentences and continue. Thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I hope I get the right spot
14 where it was that I was interrupted with this noise.
15 This order issued by Colonel Ilic pertains to the arming of the
16 civilian population outside the military deployment of the army of the
17 units civil defence, civil protection units, the civil -- the system of
18 reporting, and the coding and communications units of the Ministry of
19 Defence. So it is only in this situation that we are dealing with the
20 civilian population in the literal sense of the word.
21 Now, these are facts that can be established on the basis of
22 documents that the Prosecutor probably has, as well as the Defence,
23 because I had them available to me when I was working on my report.
24 What I'm going to say now is my own analysis and my own
25 assessment. If we are talking about the non-Albanian population - and
1 obviously we are - if we know that in Kosovo and Metohija at that time, at
2 the time that we are discussing here, there were between 200 and 250
3 thousand non-Albanians; also, if world standards of maximum mobilisation
4 rates of the population, bearing in mind the population of military-age
5 population within the demographic population in general, the rate is
6 between 10 to 12 per cent - and Germany was even up to 15 per cent - then
7 this figure of 47.000 certainly could not pertain to armed civilian
8 population in the literal sense of the word; that is to say, outside the
9 wartime assignment of the units that I spoke about. Therefore, in my
10 analysis, in my assessment, bearing in mind the personnel levels of the
11 Pristina Corps, the personnel levels of the military territorial units,
12 the units of the reserve police, and the forces of the Ministry of the
13 Interior, including the civil protection and civil defence, the reporting
14 system, and the coding system, I reached the figure of between 4 to 6
15 thousand at a maximum; that is to say, civilians who could be used as
16 village guards and possibly in that context that we called "armed
18 So this figure that I mentioned is on the basis of my own
19 analysis. What I said earlier on is based on figures and facts only.
20 Q. [Microphone not activated]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: The figure of up to 15 per cent, 10, 12, or 15 per
22 cent, is that a figure relating to formal mobilisation of the population?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is the overall demographic
24 strain that a population can take, in terms of the army and mobilisation,
25 and so on. If we take into account that there is a percentage of women,
1 children, the elderly, and so on. So we are really talking about men who
2 are of military age, between the ages of 18 and 60, that is.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: But it doesn't follow that that would be the
4 percentage of the population who are male and between the age of 18 and
5 60, does it?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid I don't understand what
7 it is that you are asking me now.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Can you give us a figure for the -- a rough
9 figure for the percentage of the population that are male between the ages
10 of 18 and 60?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that would be the percentage
12 that I gave you, between 10 and 15 per cent of the population. That is
13 the population that is able-bodied, military age. The 15 per cent of the
14 250.000 mentioned was supposed to man everything that I referred to. And
15 as a matter of fact, these wartime units could not be manned only from
16 Kosovo but quite a few had to be manned on an extraterritorial basis. I
17 simply cannot accept this figure of 47.000 armed civilians without
18 including military conscripts.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Forget arming just for the moment and just looking
20 at the population as a whole, what percentage of the population, in
21 general and rough terms, is male and between the ages of 18 and 60?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I already said; it's about 15 per
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 Mr. Stamp.
1 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Wouldn't the MUP be responsible to arm its own reservists or its
3 own established structure?
4 A. Yes. I mean, yes. The MUP was -- well, I'm -- I'm talking about
5 the figure of 47.000. 47.000.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. That is the figure that could not have been manned, so to speak,
8 from the -- among the civilians who did not have a wartime assignment.
9 Q. Very well. We've heard that now.
10 A. Of course this can be challenged, but quite frankly, this is my
12 Q. Yes, I understand you to be saying that. What I'm asking you is
13 about the MUP. You told us yesterday that the 47.000 would have included
14 MUP reservists. And I think you're telling us now that the MUP would have
15 been responsible to arm its own reservists or its own established system.
16 Wouldn't the civilian protection and the civilian defence units be armed
17 through their organisation in the Ministry of Defence?
18 A. I think that that had been discussed here already, but I'm going
19 to repeat this. Weapons for the civil defence and civil protection units,
20 for the reporting and observation units and the communications and coding
21 units, is kept in military storage and military warehouses, depots,
22 precisely earmarked that these are weapons that can be taken only at the
23 request of the officers of those units, but it is stored and guarded in
24 military facilities.
25 Q. What type of weapons would civil protection personnel be issued
2 A. Only personal defence weapons.
3 Q. What type of weapons would civilian protection -- sorry, civilian
4 defence personnel be issued with?
5 A. Civilian defence personnel would be issued with sidearms, rifles,
6 ordinary, semiautomatic, automatic.
7 Q. And I think you said in your report - but you could just let me
8 know without having to go there - that these would not be assigned --
9 ought not to be assigned combat tasks?
10 A. No. No. Combat assignments would not be assigned. They are used
11 for guarding facilities of special importance, in civilian terms; then for
12 securing settlements; but not combat units. They can get assignments from
13 battalion commanders in the field; however, only within that mandate. So
14 in the sense of control, yes, the battalion commander can control them.
15 The one carrying out combat tasks, combat activities at such-and-such a
16 territory, but the task issued to them can only be within the mandate of
17 civil defence units.
18 Q. General Samardzic, a former commander of the 3rd Army, in
19 discussing his distribution of the weapons, said that they were armed with
20 two sets of combat ammunition each. Their role and assignment is -- is to
21 defend their villages and participate together with army units in any
22 operations in the immediate vicinity.
23 Why -- why would civilian defence units, civilian protection
24 units, MUP reservist units, be issued with combat ammunition and task
25 unestablishment with assisting -- with defending villages and assisting
1 the army in operations?
2 A. Well, it was an internal war. It was an inter-ethnic war in which
3 at every moment -- well, you know what it's like when you have settlements
4 with a mixed population and when the non-Albanian population was a
5 minority. It was very easy to have a pogrom of that population, and that
6 did indeed happen.
7 Q. Very well.
8 A. It was only natural to have settlements protected, defended from
9 attacks by the Siptar terrorist forces.
10 Q. At the -- could we have a look at P929, please. 928. Forgive me.
11 This is the collegium minutes for the 28th of December. And I think you
12 indicated that you had read these minutes. I'm afraid I can't find for
13 you the page I'm going to read in English. I can't find the B/C/S
14 corresponding page, but this is page 9 of the English.
15 We have General Dimitrijevic saying, in respect to Kosovo and
16 Metohija at this collegium: "I am thinking of a figure of about 60.000
17 armed Serbs that can be mobilised outside the control of -- of the
18 official organs."
19 And you -- you recall reading General Dimitrijevic saying that at
20 the collegium?
21 A. Yes, I do recall, but now I don't have the text in front of me, so
22 I cannot see it exactly, but there is no reason for me not to believe you,
23 because I do remember that.
24 Q. What -- well, who would have armed these 60.000 Serbs that he's
25 speaking of?
1 A. Well, as far as I understood this, he did not say that they were
2 actually armed but that they could be armed; whereas, I think that they
3 could not be armed. I disagree with Dimitrijevic on that, because he
4 didn't do his math right. But, okay, that is his opinion.
5 Q. Very well. So your position is based on a -- a demographic
6 assessment, I take it.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You saw some combat orders. I have a list of them, but to save
9 time, perhaps I might need to show you - in which VJ units were ordered to
10 engage in operations and to be reinforced and deployed with armed
11 civilians. They refer to the armed -- armed non-Siptar population. You
12 saw those orders or any orders of this nature?
13 I just ask you in the interest of time, because I don't want to
14 have to go through these orders. They have come before the Court many
16 A. No, but it's not the way you put it. That is not what is written
17 there. It is not stated that it should be reinforced, because reinforcing
18 units with armed non-Siptar population would imply that they were being
19 added to units as combat personnel, and that is not contained anywhere in
20 the orders issued by commanders, that these units are being issued tasks
21 of combat units.
22 Q. Very well. My mistake. What I'm saying is that they there were
23 orders in which VJ units would be mobilised or deployed for combat along
24 with what was described as the armed non-Siptar population. You saw
25 those orders, or shall we look at a couple of them?
1 A. Yes, but not to go into combat with them. This armed non-Siptar
2 population should carry out its tasks within its missions, and that is
3 only the protection of facilities that are meant for general purposes, for
4 civilian use, and to protect the population and settlements, not to carry
5 out other combat activities.
6 Q. We'll look at one them, and I represent to you that there are many
7 in similar terms to this.
8 Could I have a look at 20 -- P2015, page 2 -- well, we've -- page
9 1, just to identify it. This is an order of the 23rd of March, 1999 from
10 the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, strictly confidential number
12 If we could go to page 2 there. And I think I can see item 2 on
13 top of your page, also at the top of the English page, and it speaks of
14 Pristina Corps assignments, and it says: "With reinforcements and armed
15 non-Siptar population from Kosovo and Metohija, the Pristina Corps is
16 assisting the MUP in crushing and destroying STS in the zone of
18 This does refer to the armed non-Siptar population so-called
19 protecting - what is it? - protecting civilian facilities, I think you
20 said. This implies their -- their being involved in crushing.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So let me ask you this: When they were employed or engaged --
23 A. No. No, no, they certainly would not be engaged in this
24 destroying. Try to find the right pages and see whether they go out there
25 to destroy. This formulation has a purpose of its own. It's not
1 engagement yet. This is just an indication that there is armed non-Siptar
2 population this the area of responsibility, and only when we see what
3 their task is can we give comments.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean, whether they're being used
6 for the right purpose or not.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the task not what's set out immediately
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the task of the corps. Well,
10 yes, yes, the task of the corps, but not of that population. Because the
11 order issuing authority is probably going to order that population what it
12 is that they're supposed to do. What I expect to see in paragraph 5 is
13 what their task is going to be.
14 MR. STAMP:
15 Q. The question I was about to ask is this: If and when armed
16 civilians are engaged or act along with VJ units, wouldn't the members or
17 the -- the armed civilians be under the effective control of VJ
19 A. If they are re-subordinated to him, yes. If they are not
20 re-subordinated to him, then no.
21 Q. When armed civilians are re-subordinated -- all right. Let's not
22 enter the re-subordination debate at this point in time.
23 If armed civilians who are trained by the VJ and armed by the VJ
24 are engaged in tasks in coordination of the VJ, to whom are these armed
25 civilians responsible? What organisation is responsible for them?
1 A. When civilians are armed, regardless of whether they are
2 conscripts or not, they become an integral part of the forces of the
3 Ministry of the -- of Defence; that is to say, that when they receive
4 weapons, they become part of the civilian defence, regardless of -- that
5 is what they were envisaged as in terms of establishment in advance. They
6 are commanded by the officer of the civil defence organ. If it's a unit,
7 then the unit has its commanding officer, who is subordinated in the
8 vertical chain of command.
9 As for that, you have the order of General Manastirac [phoen], who
10 was chief of the regional defence organ for Serbia and Pristina was
11 subordinated to him, and his document -- I can't remember the exact number
12 now, but I did quote it in his paper -- he says that he explicitly forbids
13 civil defence unit commanders and members to respond to anybody's orders
14 but those coming from the Ministry of Defence. That is explicit. And I
15 assume that it is binding on civil defence units that were in the zone of
16 this --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters could not hear the end of the
19 MR. STAMP:
20 Q. I'm sorry. In any case, general, when we're talking about civil
21 defence units now, we are talking about what you referred to as armed
22 non-Siptar population as a distinct group from civil protection and civil
23 defence, and I remind you -- if we could look at what you said yesterday.
24 Just a minute. Yesterday at 17269, line 19 and thereafter, you
25 said that this group of 47.000 armed civilians that General Samardzic
1 mentioned at the collegium should be seen as including all the members of
2 the reservists, army resist, the territorial units, the reserve forces
3 units were mentioned, and the 47.000 units -- 47.000 also includes units
4 of civil protection and civil defence and what is colloquially referred to
5 as the armed non-Siptar population.
6 So I don't want us to be speaking about all those other units that
7 you claim make up the 47.000. I want to speak of -- we're talking about
8 the armed non-Siptar population which is referred to in these orders,
9 which were armed by the VJ. What organisation did they command when they
10 were acting with the VJ?
11 A. I said that earlier. If we're talking about civilians who do not
12 have a war assignment in the military or the police, then they belong to
13 the Ministry of Defence forces, regardless of whether before they were in
14 the establishment of the formations of the civilian defence and other
15 forces, so they're always part of the Ministry of Defence. As soon as
16 they get weapons, they become members of the civilian defence and are
17 placed under the command of the system of command of the forces of the
18 Ministry of Defence. This is what I wanted to say. This is what I meant
19 to say yesterday, today. This is what I've always thought.
20 But in order to answer this question of yours, can we please look
21 at paragraph 5 of this document, where it should state what the units --
22 what the non-armed -- that the armed non-Siptar population's tasks are.
23 That would be the simplest way of doing it to see which tasks they are
25 Q. We could look at paragraph 5, but I could mention now that the
1 armed Siptar star population are not mentioned -- is not mentioned there.
2 But let us move to paragraph 5.
3 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Sorry for the interruption. I apologise for this.
4 Now, really the -- you have to kindly help us understand the ground
5 realities, because what is happening in the fields at the war zone, at --
6 because the Ministry of Defence will not be having personnel or -- like
7 the VJ or the commanders or somebody to control the forces on the ground.
8 So where these people get inducted to do -- they cannot get every little
9 order from the Ministry of Defence, because Ministry of Defence has a
10 different role altogether. The bureaucracy there is very short. It's
11 actually the field situation.
12 Would you kindly help us in understanding what really happened on
13 the -- in the field situation vis-a-vis these non- -- these armed
14 non-Siptar population.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the defence ministry
16 has its own command line. The ministry is at the top. Then there are
17 sectors: The sector for civilian defence, the sector for the military
18 economy. The sector for the civilian defence has sub-organs or regional
19 organs for the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
20 In Serbia it has a sector for the province of Kosovo and Metohija
21 and the province of Vojvodina. The administration -- defence
22 administration of Pristina, which was the regional organ, in order to
23 conduct the defence in the province of Kosovo, has its own regional organs
24 in the depth. These would be sections, departments, defence secretariats,
25 and so on.
1 In all of the territory, each of those regional organs would be
2 commanding the units of the defence ministry. It -- these are not large
3 units. You've seen in the documents which were introduced through General
4 Farkas when he testified here, these are numbers around 3.700 in the
5 civilian protection and in the civilian defence, 3.800 something like
6 that, then something in observation, and monitoring, a crypto-protection.
7 So it's around 6.000, and this is deployed throughout the whole territory.
8 These are small groups that are being used to guard villages, village
9 guards, patrols in order to guard schools, hospitals, milk factories,
10 bakeries. These facilities that are being used to supply the civilian
11 population. These are the kind of assignments that they perform.
12 They receive assignments from their superiors along the chain of
13 command of the forces of the Ministry of Defence. When a military
14 commander of a battalion of the army finds himself in that area where
15 civilian defence unit is, he has the right to oversee it. He's authorised
16 to monitor it, to see how it's performing its special task, but he cannot
17 give them an assignment.
18 So this is the simplest story that I could tell you, and I don't
19 know if that is satisfactory.
20 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you very much. You did elucidate. But the
21 question is: Why arm them, then? Because they were performing Social
22 Services, like any other -- any other factor with respect to the civil
23 defence: Fire extinction, hospitals, things like that. Why -- why arm
24 them and what is then meant by "mobilisation"? I just need your help for
25 that. Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because there was a very intense
2 inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Metohija underway in which civilians
3 were also casualties and where the population was mixed. There was a
4 mutual conflict, settling of accounts, revenge, facilities are destroyed,
5 there are attempts at looting, seizure. And, of course, in those
6 situations, those facilities are protected, and for that protection local
7 population is usually used to patrol villages, to prevent the appearance
8 of gangs or self-proclaimed soldiers, fighters. Anything can happen in the
9 war, especially in mixed communities, and that is the experience in the
10 wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999. That's
11 why it was necessary for the civilian protection units. The civilian
12 protection is an entirely different system. It's supposed to deal with
13 the technical effects of natural disasters, floods, earthquakes, and other
15 JUDGE CHOWHAN: In that case, shouldn't they be the part of MUP,
16 or given over to MUP, because they were performing such duties?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not an expert on the MUP, but
18 MUP has a different mandate. It deals with security questions. It
19 monitors and controls traffic, prevents crimes; it deals with problems of
20 determining the identity of unknown persons; the tasks that are usually
21 performed by any police in the world. Civilians are not trained for those
22 kinds of tasks. This is something that has to be done by specials --
23 specialists or professionals who were trained for those sorts of tasks.
24 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.
25 MR. STAMP:
1 Q. When --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry. You are suggesting the civil protection and
3 civil defence groupings that are being described in part here
4 as "spontaneously self-organising," these are the sort of specially
5 trained people you're talking about?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Your Honour, I was talking
7 about -- I was asked by His Honour about assignments in the field, if
8 they -- the protection of facilities should be carried out by police
9 forces, and I said that policemen have to go through special training for
10 those kinds of assignments. So perhaps I made a slip. This is what I
11 meant. Units of the civilian protection and civilian defence I did not
12 consider to be a spontaneous form of self-organisation of people for
13 purposes of defence. What I meant was the armed population that did not
14 belong to the civilian defence, the civilian protections, or other
15 elements of the system.
16 In the course of 1998, this spontaneous self-organising did occur,
17 and in order to avoid the consequences of that self-organising, organs of
18 the Ministry of Defence ordered that this should be done in an organised
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Judge Chowhan started that series of questions by
21 asking you what the situation was like on the ground. I'm afraid I'm as
22 ignorant now as I was before your answer started. Who actually commanded
23 these people on the ground?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you're thinking of armed
25 non-Siptar population? Is that what you're thinking of?
1 JUDGE BONOMY: The ones who chose to lift arms because of the
2 situation, who commanded them?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were under the command of the
4 organs of the Ministry of Defence, the section of the Ministry of Defence
5 in the territory where they were.
6 In the field itself, there are the lowest command organs of the
7 Ministry of Defence.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: I -- I still don't understand. Are you -- we are
9 at -- you are at odds with -- with senior army officers who talk about
10 possibly 47.000 or even 60.000 such people, but let -- even assuming your
11 small number, which is part of the 6.000 that -- that you've given us,
12 if -- if they decide the situation merits using the arms which apparently
13 they have in their homes, how -- how are they organised for any particular
14 task? Who commands them? How do they know who it is that -- that's in
15 charge if they're the ones that have decided spontaneously to group
16 together for the purpose of facing up to terrorist activity?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document that I mentioned
18 explicitly orders that while arming civilians, senior officers should be
19 appointed, the senior officers of the village guards and the patrols, and
20 they are executing immediate command. They have their superiors within
21 the system of command of the Ministry of Defence.
22 This is a system of control that begins -- that goes from the top
23 to the down, just like there is the command system in the army from the
24 top down. This exists in the MUP as well. These are three systems that
25 are a whole. They go from the top to the bottom.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 Mr. Stamp.
3 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 Q. Could we look at P2015 again. And to save some time, you know, we
5 don't need to go to 5 because 5 sets out tasks for the Pristina Corps,
6 what they're supposed to --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: If you don't go, I'll be going there, Mr. Stamp.
8 MR. STAMP: Very well.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Because the witness is telling us that the tasks
10 for these civilians -- or civil defence or civil protection will be set
11 out in paragraph 5. So we need to see what these tasks are.
12 MR. STAMP: Well, let's move to paragraph 5, but -- and that is on
13 page 3 of the English.
14 Q. What I want to ask you first is that where I read in paragraph 2
15 earlier the assignment of the Pristina Corps is given as being with
16 reinforcements and armed non-Siptar population from Kosovo and Metohija,
17 the PrK is assisting the MUP in crushing and destroying the STS in the
18 zone of responsibility. And in paragraph 2 it also gives a task of the
19 Pristina Corps. It would not be necessary to set out specific tasks for
20 the armed non-Siptar population because a commander of the VJ over the
21 rank of battalion, under Article 63 of the Law of Defence, is empowered to
22 order the civilian -- the armed non-Siptar population to do special tasks.
23 A. I'm afraid that you did not formulate that correctly or read it --
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Formulate it. I will. I
1 A. Before.
2 Q. Under Article 63 of the FRY Law on Defence, a battalion commander
3 is empowered to assign a special task to armed members of the civilian
4 population. And when they --
5 A. It doesn't say that. I -- I don't have the -- actually, I do have
6 the law with me, and it does not say that definitely that the battalion
7 commander would use civilians for special assignments. That definitely is
8 not how it was. It would be best to see that article.
9 Q. In Article 63 the guards patrolling the units of the special
10 defence shall be commanded by state organs responsible for state defence
11 ask protection. An officer of the Army of Yugoslavia who is in a position
12 of battalion commander or higher may issue special tasks --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Stamp, please slow down.
14 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry.
15 Q. "An officer of the Army of Yugoslavia holding a position of
16 battalion commander or higher may issue special tasks concerning the
17 defence and protection of the civilian population and material sources to
18 units from paragraph 1 of this article and control them in the area of his
20 So would you agree with me that these units --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.
22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in order to avoid
23 further discussions which I think will not lead us anywhere, P985, page 6
24 in B/C/S, should be shown to the witness.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's a matter for Mr. Stamp how he conducts
1 his cross-examination. Mr. Visnjic, you know you'll have your opportunity
2 to re-examine if there's anything misleading occurs.
3 Please continue.
4 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think there's been a
6 confusion, because that article was not interpreted correctly to the
7 witness, so at least if something is being quoted to him, it should be
8 interpreted correctly.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: You're saying something inaccurate occurred in the
11 Is that what you're saying?
12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the interpreters do
13 not have the document, so they are translating or interpreting on the
14 basis of what Mr. Stamp is saying. But we're talking about a law. We
15 have a double-translation of a -- an article from the law, and I think
16 that would lead us to a situation that will take half an hour to clarify,
17 so that is why I am saying that we should look at the original and then we
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sure that what Mr. Stamp has
20 read is not stated in the article itself. I apologise. Excuse me.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: We will come -- we will now come to that in a
23 Before we do, to avoid coming back to the document that's on the
24 screen at the moment, Mr. Stamp, can we ask the witness to look through
25 Article -- or paragraph 5 of this order and to identify for us where the
1 tasks are allocated to the armed non-Siptar population.
2 Could you do that, please. It may mean turning a page, I think.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see it.
4 Article 5, where the assignments are issued to subordinate units,
5 does not contain an item that would refer to the civilian population,
6 which means that the commander organising the activities and is executing
7 the order did not get those civilians as his subordinates and he's not
8 obliged to issue assignments to them. They are working within their own
9 mission, what they would usually be doing: Patrolling, protecting the
10 village, facilities, what they would usually be doing. And then within
11 those assignments, the battalion commander can tour the units and check if
12 they are doing them properly. That's all. But he cannot change the
13 actual assignment that they're doing.
14 If the commander who drafted this order had believed that the
15 armed group was subordinate to him, then he would have to issue it an
16 assignment. Explicitly he would have to state their assignment.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 Now, Mr. Stamp, if you're going to pursue the question of the Law
19 on Defence, then I think we should have the Article 63 on the screen.
20 MR. STAMP: Yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: If you wish to complete this matter first, then
22 please do so.
23 MR. STAMP:
24 Q. Well, Witness, when the order provides for the task and assignment
25 of the Pristina Corps simply with reinforcements and -- and armed
1 non-Siptar population from the KiM, the Pristina Corps is assisting the
2 MUP in crushing and destroying the STS in the zone of responsibility, I
3 suggest to you it is not necessary to give specific tasks in a military
4 document in paragraph 5 to civilian units because these units could be
5 commanded by any officer of a VJ -- of the VJ over the rank of a battalion
6 commander pursuant to Article 63 of the Law of Defence. That's the
7 first -- the first part of the question, if I may -- may break it up: It
8 would not be necessary or appropriate to give specific orders in paragraph
9 5 of a military document to civilian units. Isn't that correct?
10 A. No, that is not correct. I assure you that any document of a
11 command or an order, if you look at it - and I've seen thousands in this
12 case - if you take an example and find any document which says "order of
13 the commander for specific actions, attack, assault, march, defence," if
14 he does not issue in Article 5 an assignment to each segment that is
15 subordinated to the first degree, if you find something like that, then
16 I -- I will strip my general's rank. This is the ABC of the profession.
17 Any commander in the army knows that.
18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Of civilian groups on the
19 ground, the civilian groups on the ground are commanded -- this is the
20 next question: Is it correct that pursuant to Article 63 of the Law on
21 Defence civilian units on the ground can be given tasks by any commander
22 from battalion commander up if they are in the zone of responsibility? Is
23 that correct?
24 A. No, that is not correct. That is not what it says in Article 63.
25 It says something else.
1 Q. P985. And it's page 9 of the English. It's --
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 MR. STAMP:
4 Q. Wouldn't you agree with me, General, that at least when it came
5 to --
6 A. I don't have the article. I don't have Article 63.
7 Q. Perhaps counsel could have --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Page 6.
9 MR. STAMP: Page 6. Thank you.
10 Q. Wouldn't you agree with me - and that's all I'm asking - is that
11 at least when it comes to the units of the civilian defence, that a VJ
12 commander of battalion rank or higher may issue to them tasks once they
13 are in the zone of responsibility under that law?
14 A. Literally it says here that it -- they can issue this but not that
15 they always do that. And you also missed the part that follows, that an
16 officer of the Army of Yugoslavia holding the position of battalion
17 commander or higher may issue, from paragraph 1 of this article, special
18 tasks concerning the defence and protection of the civilian population and
19 material resources to units from -- and control them in the area of his
20 responsibility but only in the sphere of these assignments, the
21 assignments from the sphere of civilian protection and defence and
22 material resources. They cannot be used for other types of assignments.
23 Q. Well --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp did in fact, certainly in English,
25 accurately refer to these limitations. That may have been a difficulty in
1 translation. I don't know. But he -- he didn't misrepresent the position
2 to you.
3 MR. STAMP:
4 Q. So isn't it the situation that when an order, for example, from
5 the corps commander is sent for operations in the field and the task of
6 the Pristina Corps is to support the MUP, in association with the
7 so-called armed non-Siptar population, then on the ground at battalion
8 level where the operations are conducted the battalion commander, who has
9 specific orders, may control these units and issue orders for special
10 tasks to these units in the course of the operations on the ground at that
11 level. So the order need not specifically task them, civilians, in
12 paragraph 5. That is all I'm suggesting to you.
13 A. You're not right on that. You are absolutely not right on that.
14 If the superior officer - say, the commander of the Pristina Corps - dealt
15 with one of his brigade commanders, giving him the task of controlling
16 parts -- or rather, something that is called the unarmed non-Siptar
17 population, then that commander is duty-bound to order that in his own
18 order to his battalion commanders. That is quite certain. That's the way
19 it is. It cannot be any other way.
20 If he is given something, then what is given to him has to be used
21 in the prescribed manner; meaning that if the Pristina Corps has this
22 population under its control, then, according to -- then in paragraph 5 he
23 has to be given the task that he has to carry out, and that is how the
24 battalion commander can exercise control over that. That is what I've been
25 saying all along.
1 Q. That is --
2 A. As for abuse, I'm not talking about that now. I'm talking about
3 the system dealt with this. Units that are subordinated -- all units that
4 are subordinated have to receive their tasks from their superior officer.
5 That is the principle of subordination and singleness of command, and it
6 is within that task that they are controlled.
7 Q. Let's have a look quickly at -- at paragraph 76 of your report,
8 page 27. That's part 1.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Radinovic, does that mean that to get the
10 answer to whether any task was assigned by the VJ, the Army of Yugoslavia,
11 to the armed non-Siptar population here, we would require to see an order
12 from someone in the Ministry of Defence in the command structure of the
13 armed non-Siptar population?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as for this task,
15 according to the system, one knows exactly what it is that they are doing.
16 A patrol is not supposed to be given a task every time. They patrol a
17 certain area, a certain street, a certain neighbourhood. They guard a
18 facility or a bridge or a flyover or whatever. However, if they are being
19 subordinated to the army, then the army has to order in paragraph 5 what
20 it is that they are supposed to do.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. So we don't need to see the order from the
22 Ministry of Defence in relation to re-subordination. We can simply
23 accept, according to you, that if there's nothing in Article 5 of the
24 order, then they were not under the control of the Army of Yugoslavia.
25 That's your position, is it?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were not re-subordinated to the
2 Army of Yugoslavia. "Re-subordination" means that they become part of its
3 composition, that they receive tasks from them, and that they are
4 controlled within that context, and then they are -- they are duty-bound
5 to send reports as the others are supposed to give them orders.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Note: Could all microphones
7 please be switched off except for the speaker's microphone. Thank you.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 Mr. Stamp.
10 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Sorry, Mr. Stamp, I have --
11 General, I shall feel very grateful if you remove one of my
12 confusions. I quite understand that every army has it reserve force.
13 These are people who are ex-army officials who retire and then they remain
14 on the role to meet any emergency or meet any wartime situation.
15 I've also learned from your discourse that there were also MUP
16 reservists available. And all this assortment of people, reservists from
17 both these forces, constituted the non-armed and non-Siptar population.
18 Obviously army should be having some rules about its ex-servicemen, who
19 remain indeed reservist position, and there should be some rule about it.
20 And it's my understanding - I'm no expert - that obviously they will be
21 channeling everything through the army, which is VJ in this case, and the
22 MUP would be doing likewise, and the police, in that case.
23 Now, if all these people were reservists, then they are drawn from
24 these two, you see, reserves and then they are getting together. Now,
25 keeping this background, if we read Article 63, then this talks of guards,
1 spectrals, units of civil defence. Don't you think that the use of the
2 reservist is something distinct from the use which is mentioned here in
3 63? And the reservists shall be governed by the rules and regulations of
4 their alma mater; that's either the VJ or the MUP? I thought I should
5 have this clarified, because you said that reservists were not such people
6 who were just raw hands drawn from the -- from the public just at random
7 and given arms. They were reservists. So as an expert, I think if you
8 kindly can remove this confusion, I shall feel very grateful. Thanks a
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obviously I didn't explain this
11 right. I had hoped that I did succeed, but it seems that I didn't.
12 The army as a system, the police as a system, the civil defence as
13 a system. So these are subsystems of one system of defence that is called
14 that. So the army has part of its personnel that does its military
15 service; that is to say, conscripts doing their military service. Then
16 there are professional officers and NCOs and civilians working in the
17 army, and most of the units are manned from the reserve but with the exact
18 names and surnames involved in the wartime units.
19 Once mobilisation is declared, then they come to the mobilisation
20 sites and then they are deployed in their respective units. Before that,
21 they were trained in these units. They know that these are their wartime
23 During 1998, as for part of the reserve force of the military,
24 they were issued with weapons without mobilisation in order to prevent
25 conflicts or to deal with the conflicts that had already cropped up and
1 that were underway, as a matter of fact.
2 The same was done by the police. The police activated their
3 reserve forces when they deemed that necessary.
4 The civil defence -- as for the civil defence, as for their
5 leaders who are professionals or who are permanently employed, they're all
6 civilians. It is only when a war occurs or if there is some kind of an
7 emergency, then civil defence units are mobilised. So they are the only
8 ones, the ones from the civil defence, that are civilians in the classical
9 sense of the word. They respond to the call-up of their chain of command.
10 So those are these three separate chains.
11 In addition to what I've said just now, we also have the category
12 of arming the population that does not belong to any one of these
13 categories. We've been saying all along that there is this category as
14 well. That category can appear only in terms of these obligations that
15 we've been discussing; that is to say, only at a locality where they will
16 do something that the control system of the Ministry of Defence asks them
17 to do, but once they receive weapons they become part of the Ministry of
19 Have I succeeded now?, in terms of improving everyone's
20 understanding of this?
21 JUDGE CHOWHAN: And all this then becomes a pool, you mean? Not
22 that they work in a distinct and separate way. They become a pool, is it?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That group has its own leader, gets
24 its own leader. They do not become part of civil defence and civil
25 protection units that are envisaged by establishment. A separate group is
1 formed that has its own leader. It can be a person, an officer with a
2 rank or without a rank but somebody who leads them. And the commander of
3 the military unit mentioned in Article 63 carrying out activities there
4 can appear and ask that commander, "What is it that you are doing?"
5 Exercise some kind of control. Give some kind of advice. If necessary,
6 make some suggestions, and so on. This is the essence of what I've been
7 trying to explain here.
8 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated]
9 Q. Sir, you said --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Sorry.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Just two -- two matters you might clarify at this
14 stage. The -- this may be a -- an interpretation question again, but you
15 say the groups that -- that arise spontaneously, a separate group is
16 formed that has its own leader. It can be a person, an officer with a
17 rank or without a rank, but somebody who leads them.
18 How is that leader either identified or chosen?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps this would be best
20 understood if we could obtain the document, if we could see it on our
21 screens. The document concerned is I think from June 1998, the order of
22 Petar Ilic, the chief of the defence administration of Pristina on arming
23 the non-Siptar population. Perhaps it would be best if we could see that,
24 and then I could explain it on that example.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I don't know the details of that,
1 Mr. Radinovic, and it would be surprising if you as an -- if you as an
2 expert couldn't explain the answer to what I think is a fairly simple
3 question: How is the leader of such a group that decides action is
4 necessary, how is he either chosen or identified?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's either someone who had
6 already been there that is appointed. It is usually people who are quite
7 old, over the age of 65. And one knows exactly who is who. And in that
8 order, the chief of the administration gave instructions that every group
9 be appointed a leader, to appoint a leader who is going to lead that
10 group. One knows -- these are locals who know one another. You know who
11 en enjoys what kind of -- what kind of a reputation, who served in the
12 military or police before, who was in that line of work. People know each
14 JUDGE BONOMY: And my other question is slightly detached from the
15 line that we've been following but may be relevant to it. We've had
16 evidence, as you know, about the movement of senior army officers out of
17 executive positions in the army into the Ministry of Defence for various
18 reasons. Is it possible that the line of command of the civil protection
19 or civil defence might be headed up by a person who was a VJ officer
20 assigned to the Ministry of Defence for a special task?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, quite certainly an officer
22 who -- well, you know, he still -- he's still an army officer, but he is
23 just serving in the Ministry of Defence in a position that, according to
24 establishment, required a military officer.
25 For example, the civil defence assistant was an officer, a
1 general. The heads of regional organs were also officers, and they were
2 authorised to command and control and they were trained for that, which is
3 not to say that civilians can't be involved in this either, but they have
4 to go through certain preparations and certain training.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Your evidence about three separate lines of command
6 or chains of command is quite clear, but one of these chains of -- or two
7 of them effectively could be said to have connections with the Ministry of
8 Defence, and there would appear to be the potential for overlap in -- in
9 headquarters. Can you tell us who in 1998 and 1999 was in charge of civil
10 protection and civil defence in the Ministry of Defence?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Before he was appointed of the
12 security administration of the General Staff, this post was held by
13 General Geza Farkas, as far as I know. He was assistant federal minister
14 for the so-called civilian sector. The sector for civil defence. That's
15 what it was called.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 Mr. Stamp.
18 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Q. To return to the order referring to the non-Siptar population. I
20 had suggested to you that there was no need to make specific orders in --
21 to civilians, to send a specific order to the civilians engaged in
22 paragraph 5 -- or section 5 of this order. That would be done by the
23 battalion commander on the ground. And you are saying that specific
24 orders that have to be sent to the units and therefore paragraph 5 showed
25 that the civilian units or the civilian population was not used.
1 Can I ask you then: Why refer to them in paragraph 2? Why say
2 that the assignment of the Pristina Corps is to support the MUP with
3 reinforcements and armed non-Siptar population?
4 A. I did not claim that they were not used. They were used within
5 their specific tasks, as established by the mission of the civil defence
6 and civil protection units. What I claimed was that in Article 5 when
7 they were not ordered what to do, they were not subordinated to the
8 commander of the military unit. But apart from that, even when they are
9 not subordinated to them, when they carry out tasks within their own
10 system, the battalion commander can control them, in terms of whether they
11 are carrying out their tasks that they were given within the mission.
12 When they are in that zone, that is my assertion. I am not saying that
13 they weren't doing anything.
14 Q. And their -- their mission is to protect civilian facilities.
15 Would you consider that, protecting civilian --
16 A. Facilities and settlements from attacks of the Siptar terrorist
17 forces where they were encircled.
18 Q. And if we could look quickly, because time flows, at paragraph 76
19 of your report - that's page 27 - and paragraph 77. I'll just read the
20 first sentences, two sentences of paragraph 76: "The files of the
21 Tribunal also referred to the category of armed and non-Siptar Albanian
22 population as an armed group. The question arises of what that is about
23 and which category of persons was represented in this armed group and who
24 was responsible for their arming and accordingly to whom the organisation
25 was subordinated subordinate -- was subordinated."
1 I'll repeat that part for emphasis: "Who was responsible for
2 their arming and accordingly to whom that organisation was subordinated."
3 That is how the arming of civilians of non-Siptar ethnic origin came
5 And -- have you found it? Paragraph 76 is in the first section,
6 section 1.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And paragraph 77 - I'll just read onto the record the last
9 sentence of that - "So it is clear that these people -- these are people
10 outside the category of conscripts and war -- with wartime assignments in
11 some elements of the defence and security system and that they would when
12 armed become part of the overall forces of the Federal Ministry of
14 And I think that is your drift. It's not the VJ who is
15 responsible for these people. It's really the Federal Ministry of
16 Defence, where I am suggesting otherwise.
17 I'd like us to look at P1415, bearing in mind what you have said,
18 particularly about the arming of the -- the non-Siptar population and
19 accordingly to whom that organisation was subordinated.
20 If you recall, while the document is coming up - I'll just put
21 this in context - that General Samardzic, the former commander of the 3rd
22 Army, at the collegium minute was saying that he armed them with combat
23 weapons, 47.000, and he armed them for a purpose, to support the VJ.
24 General Samardzic was not speaking about civil defence and civil
1 And 1415, is it up?
2 It's an order of the 26th of June, 1998, and it is signed by
3 Major General Pavkovic, who was at that time General Samardzic's direct
4 subordinate. He was then the commander of the Pristina Corps.
5 I'd like to look at some aspects of this document. He's
6 saying: "Pursuant to 3rd Army command, strictly confidential order of the
7 26th of June, 1999 [sic] and the aggravated political and security
8 situation in Kosovo and Metohija, and in order to defend and protect
9 citizens from the Siptar terrorist groups, I hereby order."
10 So he refers to an order that he got from the 3rd Army from
12 1: "Organise and carry out technical preparation for distribution
13 of weapons and ammunition to military conscripts assigned to war units of
14 the Pristina Corps."
15 "Distribute automatic rifle, semiautomatic rifles, light
16 machine-guns, sniper rifles, and necessary communication equipment
17 according to the orders of unit commanders to military conscripts,
18 regardless of specialty."
19 "On the basis of the list, call up small groups to arm the
20 barracks or organise distribution of weapons in Serbian and Montenegrin
22 "Devote special attention to security measures, secrecy and
23 camouflage discipline in carrying out this task."
24 In 5: "Unit commanders will organise their competence training in
25 the handling and storage and maintenance of the issued weapons."
1 "After completing the distribution, prepare and organise
2 inhabited places for -- for defence."
3 If we could turn to page 2 of the English. And this is on the
4 bottom of page 1 on the B/C/S.
5 "Form units in each village according to military structure: In
6 squads, platoons and companies. Appoint a commander, deputy and assistant
7 for each unit. Organise the defence of settlements so that each
8 settlement has sentry, patrols, ambushes, duty units, an intervention
10 And it goes on: "Place an active superior officer in charge of
11 each settlement to directly control the preparation of units and remain
12 there until the organisation of defence is fully completed and the unit
14 He forbids using volunteers in paragraph 8. In paragraph 10 he
15 says: "The deadline for distribution of weapons is until 1800 hours on
16 the 1st of July, 1999 [sic] and readiness for defence of settlements is by
17 1800 hours on the 3rd of July, 1998."
18 This is dated the 26th of June, I remind you.
19 Firstly, who commanded these village units that are armed in
20 secrecy by the VJ? Because I suggest to you that this is what Samardzic
21 was talking about at the collegium and this is what General Pavkovic did
22 in accordance with General -- General Samardzic's orders. Who commanded
23 these units?
24 A. The system of military command commanded these, because these are
25 the reserve compositions of their units. These are not classical
1 civilians. They are not the kind of civilians that we have been
2 discussing. These are military conscripts with wartime assignments in the
3 units of the Pristina Corps and the military territorial units -- or
4 rather, the 202nd logistics base, which is a military unit. So that is
5 not the category that we've been discussing here, you know.
6 Q. Are units based in villages?
7 A. No, these are units armed by the army, its own combat units, but
8 they were deployed in villages to protect the villages from attacks by
9 Siptar terrorists. Siptar terrorists attacked Serbian settlements or
10 parts of the settlements where the Serbs were in a minority.
11 Q. It does not say "place the units in the villages." It says "form
12 units in each village." These are units formed from the men of the
13 village, aren't they?
14 A. By military conscripts of combat units of the Pristina Corps.
15 These were soldiers who were from the reserve forces of the army of the
16 Pristina Corps that the commander, according to the approval of the army
17 commander, mobilises and issues weapons to, and they then become part of
18 their units. That is the establishment composition.
19 Q. But you see, we have had evidence in this case - and I think in
20 your report as well - that in mobilising for the VJ, the reserve units, A,
21 it is not done in secrecy; and B, the VJ attempted to mobilise people from
22 all ethnicities. Here we see a mobilisation in secrecy and a mobilisation
23 in -- for Serbs and Montenegrin villages. This was not a typical
24 mobilisation of VJ reservists, was it, General?
25 A. Well, the conflict in Kosovo was not normal either. It's an
1 inter-ethnic conflict, and of course it's different from a -- a classic
2 conflict between two states. This is an internal conflict between two
3 ethnic communities, and the army had to protect the ethnic community that
4 was under threat and the one that was under threat was the ethnic
5 community that was in a minority.
6 Q. But --
7 A. The minority ethnic community was protected.
8 Q. Yes. But you are missing the direction of my question. I'm
9 suggesting to you that even your report - and we have had a lot of
10 evidence of this - indicates that official mobilisation of reservists was
11 not based on ethnicity. Here we see arming of persons in villages,
12 training for seven days, appointing commanders of these units in the
13 villages, done in secrecy and on the base of ethnicity. This is not
14 typical mobilisation of the VJ reservists, is it? Simple: Is this
15 typically the way the VJ mobilises its reserves?
16 A. No, that is not typical. It's atypical. But it's an enforced
17 way. When the army has to replenish its ranks without declaring a state
18 of emergency or without a public mobilisation. This is a partial
19 mobilisation, and it's secret in order not to spread panic among the
20 civilians and in order not to inflame the conflicts even more. That is why
21 the commander ordered that this be done secretly, without announcing it to
22 the public, in order not to alarm the public.
23 Evidently this is a composition of the combat units of the
24 Pristina Corps. This is what I am asserting.
25 Q. I don't want to be involved in -- in argument in all the details
1 of what you're saying, but you seem now to be saying that this arming of
2 men in the villages was to prevent -- was to --
3 A. I'm not arguing.
4 Q. -- Was not to alarm the civilian population, that is why it was
5 done in secret. Yet in many places in your report - and we have had -- I
6 think we have heard this before - you -- it is said that the arming of
7 civilians in Serb villages was to give the villagers a sense of security
8 because of the dangers of the -- the terrorists. Now you are telling us
9 it is done in secret because you did not want to alarm the villagers?
10 A. No, we're talking here about two types of arming: One is issuing
11 weapons that was quoted in this document, that is, the issuance of weapons
12 to military conscripts who have a wartime assignment in units that issued
13 the weapons to them. That is issuing weapons to the reservists, not to
14 the reserve units. There are no reserve units as such. There is a part
15 of the composition, the permanent composition, and that is replenished
16 from the reserves, and this is what we were talking about.
17 As to how they would be deployed, that is the prerogative of the
19 Q. General I interrupt you --
20 A. According to his assessment of the security situation.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry. I interrupted you
22 and now, focus on my question. All I just put to you is what appears to
23 be an inconsistency. You just said that arming VJ conscripts in secret
24 was done not to spread alarm among the villagers. That's VJ conscripts.
25 Whereas, you have said in your report and in the past that arming
1 civilians in the village was done publicly in order to make them feel
2 secure. That's all I'm putting to you. Is that not an inherent conflict?
3 A. We're not talking about issuing weapons to villagers. This is
4 military conscripts that are being issued with weapons. It's not the same
5 thing. These are two categories of armed --
6 Q. Very well.
7 A. -- Persons.
8 Q. I take it your answer that to arm the conscripts, it might cause
9 alarm. Very well.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, is it convenient to interrupt at this
11 stage or ...?
12 MR. STAMP: Yes. I -- I will now try to move on more quickly. I
13 think that is appropriate, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you any idea of --
15 MR. STAMP: Half hour.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. We need to break again, Mr. Radinovic, for
17 about 20 minutes. Could you again leave the courtroom with the usher and
18 we'll see you at 11.00.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
24 MR. SEPENUK: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. Just one very obvious
25 correction to the record. On page 36, line 16 and on page 37, line 14,
1 Mr. Stamp inadvertently referred to the dates as being 26 June 1999 and 1
2 July 1999. And it really is 1998. Simply for the sake of the record.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for that.
4 Mr. Stamp, please continue.
5 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Thank you, Counsel.
7 Q. I think you said the document refers to partial mobilisation of
8 reservists, armed reservists. I would just represent to you that the
9 document does not refer to reservists and it does not refer to
10 mobilisation. It uses a term "military conscripts."
11 Military conscripts, sir, are persons who have to do national
12 service when they reach a certain age; is that correct?
13 A. Well, yes and no. A military conscript is one who has already
14 served his -- he's done his army service and is in the reservists and also
15 someone who has yet to do his army service. The obligation starts from
16 recruitment through military service up to serving in the reserve forces,
17 all the way up to the age of 60.
18 Q. If you look at paragraph 8 of this order, I'd like to point out
19 something which I suggest would be another situation indicating that this
20 is not referring to reservists or conscripts in the typical or regular
21 way. It says: "I forbid formation and engagement of any volunteer
22 units, except those comprising local village inhabitants."
23 Volunteer units in total who were at least officially forbidden in
24 the VJ, weren't they, at the relevant time?
25 A. Yes. Volunteers, yes, but not volunteer units. Volunteers were
1 deployed in the various units, and then they became military conscripts,
2 like everybody else.
3 Q. Yes, volunteer units, which is what the section was referring to.
4 And I think you've answered that.
5 You -- in your report, if I may move on.
6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
7 MR. STAMP:
8 Q. At paragraph 99 -- sorry, paragraph 91, where footnote 53 is... I
9 think I -- sorry, this is, correct, paragraph 91 of the English, page 32,
10 footnote 53.
11 Look at the paragraph and the footnote. I think you have it
12 before you. I won't read it, but I'll just ask you: Is my -- are you
13 saying here that the plan Grom 98 is a basis on which the offensive in the
14 summer and autumn of 1998 was conducted? That's anti-terrorist offensive.
15 A. This is a directive issued by the chief of the General Staff for
16 the participation of the army in that anti-terrorist operation. The fight
17 against terrorism had been ongoing before that, but this directive issued
18 by the chief of the General Staff refers to engagement in a anti-terrorist
19 operation. So this is the only directive we have. There had been orders
20 in the system of command for the use of units in the fight against
21 terrorism and to support the MUP previously, but this is the only
22 directive covering this issue overall.
23 Q. And the -- the directive 4D137, is at the 28th of July, 1998. I
24 think you have that in your report.
25 I'd like you to look quickly at 4D101. This is an order of
1 General Pavkovic dated 23rd of July, 1998, and it speaks of implementation
2 of the second stage of the plan to eliminate terrorism in Kosovo and
3 Metohija provides for the engagement of organs of the Ministry of Internal
4 Affairs and necessary units of the PrK from the battle group in the area."
5 So this is one of the orders in the command system for the
6 engagement of units in the plan to combat terrorism, is it?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you see it predates -- it speaks of a second stage and it
9 predates the Grom directive.
10 And if you look -- could look briefly at P1419. And this is an
11 order of the 1st of August, 1998 of then-Pristina commander
12 General Pavkovic, in which he requests approval to launch the third stage
13 of the plan and said it was decided at a meeting of the Joint Command for
14 Kosovo and Metohija held on the 31st of July between 1830 and 2000 hours
15 in the district in Pristina to launch the third stage of the plan on the
16 2nd of August, 1999 [sic].
17 And we have another document I'd like to show you. It may be not
18 necessary. This is P2166. And I -- I believe you indicate that you had
19 seen the document before. It's -- it's the minutes of what is called the
20 operations interdepartmental staff for the suppression of terrorism in
21 Kosovo and Metohija, dated 2nd of December, 1999.
22 Have you seen this document before? I believe you indicated that
23 you have. You haven't?
24 A. No, no, I haven't.
25 Q. I'm sorry. It's a rather long document, and I don't think we have
1 time to go through all of it.
2 If you see on the front page, these are the minutes of a meeting
3 chaired by President Milosevic attended by President Milutinovic, Deputy
4 Federal Prime Minister Sainovic, General Perisic, General Dimitrijevic,
5 General Samardzic, General Pavkovic, General Djordjevic of the MUP, and
6 Major General Lukic of the MUP, among others.
7 And at that meeting, Pavkovic, if you look at the bottom of page 1
8 of the B/C/S, which is the top of page 2 of 2 English, General Pavkovic
9 speaks -- and I quote now - "Speaking on behalf of the Joint Command for
10 Kosovo and Metohija, General Pavkovic reminded the members of the
11 operation staff that the plan for suppressing terrorism in Kosovo and
12 Metohija have been carried out in five stages with an overall duration of
13 45 to 55 days. Implementation of the plan commenced on the 25th of July
14 and the activities were completed by the 29th of October."
15 So here we have -- if and if you go on to other part I refer to is
16 page 7 of the English, which is also page 7 in the B/C/S version, in which
17 Major General Lukic submitted a report on the work of the Joint Command
18 for Kosovo and Metohija devoting special attention to the highly
19 professional successful cooperation between the army and the police
20 commands and units in performing the following tasks, and he refers to the
22 And he also at page 8 of the B/C/S but the same page in the
23 English, he -- at the end of his report, General Lukic agreed with the
24 assessments and positions set out by the command of the VJ of the Pristina
25 Corps, General Pavkovic.
1 At paragraph 161, I think it is, of -- of the report. May I just
2 check this. No, it's -- it is not paragraph 161. Yes, it is paragraph
3 161, but I think it is in part -- part 2.
4 Paragraph 161, page 120 of the English, you speak about
5 probably -- you say "probably" -- it indicates apparently that you are
6 speculating here -- "the relations between the MUP and the VJ was for the
7 most part based on the principle of cooperation and coordination and that
8 there might have been some ad hoc set-up coordinating body," and I think
9 earlier in answer to questions from Judge -- Judges Chowhan and Bonomy
10 about what happened on the ground, how could things coordinate on the
11 ground, you said you did analyse that in your report, what we see here
12 that you speculate -- or you say probably this was the situation.
13 The question is this: When you have persons of the level of
14 General Pavkovic and General Lukic making reports about joint operations
15 on the ground in Kosovo to the command of the VJ -- well, firstly, to
16 President Milosevic, President Milutinovic, Deputy President Sainovic, and
17 the commanders of the VJ, wouldn't you agree with me that that
18 coordinating body would have had effectively on the ground binding
19 authority over the units involved on the ground even if there was no
20 formal subordination of the units?
21 I shouldn't say "binding authority." I should say "effective
22 control." I think that's a bit -- sir, let me rephrase that. Where the
23 chief command of the police in Kosovo, General Lukic; commander of the
24 army in Kosovo, General Pavkovic, reports to people of that rank in the
25 country about the coordination on the ground in Kosovo, wouldn't the body
1 that commanded them and that coordinated their activities have effective
2 control over these units on the ground even if there was no formal
3 subordination of these units to that body?
4 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I would ask for Mr. Stamp to identify
5 where he is getting the phrase "chief command of the police in Kosovo" for
6 Mr. Lukic. Time and again we've had to address this issue because of the
7 issues of translation and the misuse of words. The title for Mr. Lukic
8 was "Rukovodilac Staba MUP-a," which has a certain meaning, and that
9 meaning is not as a chief, which would be a "nacelnik," or as a commander,
10 which would be a "komandant" or "komandir." So I would object to this
11 question on the grounds that it's misrepresenting facts asking and,
12 therefore, asking the witness to speculate on matters that are not in
13 evidence in the manner that Mr. Stamp is presenting them.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, give me the English for the first of
15 these expressions that he used.
16 MR. IVETIC: "Rukovodilac," if you might recall from our 98 bis
17 submissions, I presented the dictionary definition, of this which was
18 director or organiser or head.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I imagine "head" will do for Mr. Stamp's
21 MR. IVETIC: Correct.
22 And as a -- as a further correction, he indicate who is was
23 present. I believe this document indicates that the Minister of the
24 Interior, Stojilkovic, was present; the assistant minister,
25 Obrad Stevanovic; and the deputy minister and head of the RJB, Mr. --
1 General Djordjevic were also present, at least on the RJB side. I don't
2 recall if any RDB personnel were also listed as being present.
3 But I think we have to -- if we're going to ask for speculation,
4 we have to least try and minimise the speculation by specifying exactly
5 the parameters upon which the speculation is based. And if this document
6 is the bases for the speculation being sought by Mr. Stamp, I think he
7 need to accurately reflect what's in here instead of twisting it, as I
8 submit the Prosecution has also done in the past, take things out of
9 context and twisting them to get a further twisted speculation that does
10 not help anyone in this case get any closer to the truth-seeking that
11 ought to be prevailing in this case.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic there, are two separate issues here.
13 There's the exact role played by Mr. Lukic and there is the question
14 whether this meeting -- or the -- the -- the reporting was coming from the
15 top brass of the police and the top brass of the army. Now, if we take
16 that general global description of the personnel as the most senior
17 officials for the army and the police, do you accept that approach?
18 MR. IVETIC: If Mr. Stamp accurately reflects within his
19 documents. So far he has not mention the leadership of the police except
20 for mentioning Mr. Lukic and implying that Mr. Lukic is the leadership of
21 the police. That's the crux of my objection, that he's misrepresenting
22 both the evidence that is through this exhibit and the evidence that's
23 been presented and led in this case through other exhibits and other
25 So I -- I think that if -- if he's going to ask such a convoluted
1 and compound question, I think he needs to break it down and stick to what
2 is actually presented here to -- to have this -- this exercise have any
3 meaning that could lead us to have any kind of result that would be of
4 benefit to the Trial Chamber in reaching its ultimate determinations.
5 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, when I referred to -- to the names of
6 the person who attended, I said inter alia to encompass all of the other
7 persons present. At that time, the document was in front of the witness
8 with the names of all the person who is attended, so he could see it.
9 As far as he said about twisting the Prosecution, the Prosecution
10 twisted, et cetera, I'm not going to be engaged in that sort of exchange.
11 I wouldn't indicate it that way. I will just say this: The -- no, I -- I
12 don't think I'll get into that.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can take it and Mr. Ivetic can take it as
14 well that we do not consider that the formulation of questions by you in
15 the context of this cross-examination has at any stage amounted to
16 deliberate twisting or misleading of the -- twisting of the evidence or
17 misleading of the witness about the evidence. The question of just how
18 accurate the formulation of the question is is -- is quite another matter.
19 But the way we see this question at the moment is that it relates to the
20 general situation of the senior officials in army and police reporting to
22 Now, it might be best, in view of what's happened, that -- for you
23 to rephrase the question in as concise a form as you can.
24 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Q. General, I think you probably understand the question, but I
1 will -- see, where you have a situation where the leaders of the army and
2 the police are reporting to the -- to the top echelons of the state about
3 the coordinated -- coordinated engagement of the police and the army in
4 Kosovo, then as an expert wouldn't it be that this coordinating body would
5 have had effective control of those units in Kosovo even if there was not
6 an official document re-subordinating these units to the coordinated body?
7 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] By your leave, I think one point
10 should be clarified. Paragraph 161 of the witness's report presents two
11 alternatives. The expert provides two options.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: That's -- that's not a matter for you to intervene
13 on at this stage. If in some way your client is prejudiced by the way
14 this is approached, you will be given an opportunity of further
16 Is the question clear in your mind, Mr. Radinovic?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you then answer it, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I have not seen this document
20 before, so I cannot base my answer on the document, but in answer to the
21 question as to whether "coordination" implies a conclusion on effective
22 control, my opinion is no, it doesn't. "Coordination" means exactly what
23 it says. There is a body coordinating the activities of two subsystems
24 working on the same task. When the tasks of each side are coordinated and
25 it's established who should be doing what and what they should be doing
1 separately and what they should be doing together, then each system
2 controls its own part. There can be no effective control by someone over
3 forces that are not under his command.
4 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated]
5 Q. Very well. I agree that there can be no effective control if they
6 are not to some degree under your control. However - and I ask you this
7 for your opinion as an expert - if the people in charge of these two
8 units, two different chains of command, are reporting on the success of
9 the units to the top echelons of the state and the army and the police,
10 isn't it reasonable to conclude, sir, as an expert that the ad hoc
11 coordinating body that you say probably existed, in paragraph 161 of your
12 report, had effective command-and-control competencies on the ground?
13 A. No. No. No, it could not have effective command-and-control
14 competencies by any means, because that would imply a well-developed
15 system of command and control. It would mean that there was a system of
16 reporting in existence. Because how could they exercise control unless
17 they received daily reports and issued daily orders. And evidently --
18 Q. Without --
19 A. Or rather, in this material, I do not have grounds to conclude
20 anything else except for what I've said. Of course, I am basing my
21 conclusion not only on what you asked me just now but on everything that I
22 studied for my report.
23 Q. I see. But in the circumstances -- circumstance that I have
24 described, even without formal re-subordination and a -- and formal
25 reporting up and formal reporting down, wouldn't this coordinating body
1 have de facto control if that coordinating body or the leaders of that
2 coordinating body were reporting to the leaders of the police, the army,
3 and the state? Wouldn't it have de facto effective control on the ground?
4 In your opinion.
5 A. Each military commander individually has the control of -- of his
6 system and his unit, and the police official has the control of his, but
7 the coordination body does not imply that complete control is established,
8 because this is simply not possible. Coordination is the lowest level,
9 the lowest level of establishing any types of relationships between the
10 different systems. I understand that here we're talking about two
11 separate systems, and since they are in the same area, they find
12 themselves in the same area and often are performing the same tasks, then
13 coordination was quite a natural procedure. "Coordination," this means
14 that -- and "coordination" means that the military commander and the
15 police officer would find themselves in that coordinating body and that
16 they would mutually inform each other about what was being done, and they
17 would review what would need to be done in the future and then everyone
18 would need to do their part of the job, without effective control that you
19 are talking about. That simply is not possible like that.
20 Q. I am not sure if you focused on what I asked, but I have to move
21 on for time. You said, in respect to the reporting chain, that
22 General Ojdanic was diligent in ensuring that there was timely and
23 accurate reporting, that he devoted exceptional attention to that. Did
24 you see in various collegium minutes in 1999, General, at those meetings,
25 telling General Ojdanic that a lot of the reporting that he was getting,
1 primarily from the 3rd Army, was inaccurate or alleged to be inaccurate?
2 Did you see reports of that nature?
3 A. You said "General Ojdanic," and you're talking about inaccurate
4 reports. I assume we are actually talking about General Dimitrijevic.
5 Q. Yes. I'm saying General Dimitrijevic --
6 A. Yes, I saw that.
7 Q. Yes, Andjelkovic raised it at one time in a different collegium
8 meeting that there might be misleading reports coming from the 3rd Army,
9 and this was before the 24th of March, 1999. So you saw that.
10 Do you know of any steps General Ojdanic took to correct the
11 situation in respect to reporting from the 3rd Army prior to the 24th of
12 March, 1999?
13 A. I know that there was an inspection carried out in early May 1999
14 that was personally handled by General Ojdanic, march. And he personally
15 wanted to see what the situation was in the field. And then there were
16 plenty of orders that required specific reporting of data that had been
17 checked, of accurate data. The general was quite generous in his demands.
18 Q. Do you know if any disciplinary steps were taken in respect to the
19 commander of the 3rd Army or any investigations were conducted in respect
20 of the 3rd Army in respect to these allegations?
21 A. From the material that was available to me, I did not conclude
22 that there was a sufficient reason to initiate anything in the sense that
23 you are going. There was no grounds for the Chief of Staff of the Supreme
24 Command to undertake any disciplinary measures in relation to the command
25 of the -- of the commander of the 3rd Army.
1 Q. Well, I think I can assume from that answer that you are saying
2 that notwithstanding these reports from his colleagues at the collegium,
3 General Ojdanic did not take any steps to indicate -- to investigate the
4 3rd Army command and the reporting from the 3rd Army. Your answer is "no"?
5 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, his answer is not "no." He
6 answered it and told him exactly what steps he took. He sent an
7 inspection team down there and issued certain orders. So Mr. Stamp can't
8 go back and say "your answer to my question is no." It was not "no." It
9 was yes. He did take specific steps and found there was nothing to
10 discipline about.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.
12 MR. STAMP: This is not even appropriate. But I am speaking about
13 investigation. I just asked the witness about investigations and the
14 answer he gives appears to be reasons why there are no investigations.
15 And I just want to confirm on the record whether or not his answer means
16 no, there were no observations. What concerns is to -- to is put a
17 comment which was not necessary even in making the objection.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the problem is caused by the earlier answer
19 at line 7 of page 54, where there is reference to an inspection carried
21 MR. STAMP: Yes. Yes, there is reference to an inspection. I'm
22 asking about investigation.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Continue.
24 MR. STAMP: .
25 Q. I take it from your last answer, Witness, when you said that there
1 were, in your view, no grounds for an investigation, you are saying that
2 there were no investigations, as far as you know.
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Let the witness answer, Mr. Ackerman. You can
5 clarify the position if there's something inappropriate emerges.
6 Please answer that question, Mr. Radinovic.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From what I know, there were no
8 investigations in the classic sense. There were no investigations in the
9 sense of what I would understand to be an investigation. But there were
10 controls, inspections, tours, reports. Quite enough relevant sources
11 about -- in order to be able to assess what was being done there.
12 MR. STAMP:
13 Q. Thank you very much, General.
14 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honours, for your kindness
15 in indulging me.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
17 Questioned by the Court:
18 JUDGE BONOMY: There is one answer that you could perhaps clarify
19 for us. You -- when you were saying that you knew there was an inspection
20 carried out in early 1999 and you went on to say there were plenty of
21 orders that required specific reporting that had to be checked of accurate
22 data, the -- you then said: "The general was quite generous in his
23 demands." At least, that's the English translation. Is that what you
24 actually said?
25 A. Yes, he was generating a lot of requests that called for accurate,
1 correct, and precise reporting in. In Serbian, you would use the term
2 "exacting" perhaps.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Thank you.
4 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, from what I recall -
6 and the witness said in paragraph 56, line 22, he said "no," and then he
7 explained what he meant. So his answer did not begin with a "yes" but
8 with a "no," and then he went on to explain. But I think that this was
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I -- I think we've got the picture. Thank
11 you, Mr. Visnjic.
12 There are a number of areas in which you may be able to help us,
13 Mr. Radinovic. We have heard a great deal about a body called the
14 collegium. Can you tell us, please, what the -- or who the collegium
15 comprised. Who were its members?
16 A. The collegium comprised first the subordinated assistants or heads
17 of the sections or independent administrations. In order to avoid
18 confusion, what are independent administrations? These would be the
19 administrations that were not in sectors but were directly connected to
20 the Chief of the General Staff or the chief of the staff of the General
21 Command; that was the security administration, for example, the
22 intelligence administration. These were the -- the independent
23 administrations that had direct connections to the chief of the staff. So
24 this would be the innermost leadership part. So the collegium was a body,
25 but it can also imply a method of work; meaning that when this body made
1 of the innermost assistants is -- discuss the most essential and crucial
2 questions that have to do with the working of the army.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: We've also heard evidence that the individual
4 members would arrange for a deputy to attend on their behalf if -- if they
5 were unable to attend. Is that your understanding?
6 A. Yes.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell us whether collegium meetings would
8 normally always involve everyone falling into the category you've
9 mentioned or whether, depending on the agenda, it would be a more
10 restricted group which would meet.
11 A. I don't know the factual state of affairs in order to be able to
12 give you a direct answer, but what I think is --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. I -- I think it's better if you -- if you
14 don't tell us just what you think or speculate about, because I think from
15 memory, your own direct experience of the General Staff is limited to the
17 A. 1984. Yes, the 1980s, the direct experience. But I was a member
18 of the collegium of the Federal Ministry of Defence, so perhaps that
19 experience is not to be discarded.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Not to be discarded, but we've heard from so many
21 people who were directly involved in these meetings, that I think it would
22 be unwise to press you further on the factual position.
23 During the -- the collegium met on a regular basis during
24 peacetime. From your researches, can you tell us how frequent these
25 meetings were? And that's prior to the 24th of March, 1999.
1 A. Once a week most frequently. Sometimes even more. As needed.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: During the conflict, there were apparently daily
3 meetings. They've generally speaking, been referred to here in evidence
4 as "briefings." How do these compare with meetings of the collegium?
5 A. These are two methods of work. Most often what would happen was
6 that both the collegium and the briefings would be attended by the same
7 people, but the collegium was a method of work that was occasional, once a
8 week or more frequently, as needed; while the briefings were a method of
9 work that occurred on a daily basis. There would be a briefing on the
10 situation every day, on the situation in the army units.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: As far as you can tell from your research, did the
12 same personnel attend each briefing?
13 A. For the most part, yes. I'm not sure that it would always be the
14 same people, but generally, yes, it would be.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: And can you tell us if definitely there were
16 collegium meetings during the conflict?
17 A. Yes. Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Bearing in mind that there were daily briefings
19 during the conflict, what was it that was discussed at collegium meetings
20 during that period?
21 A. At the collegium meetings -- the collegium meetings usually
22 reviewed general questions that were of importance not only for that day
23 or the specific situation in the military but also that had some lasting
24 significance and were of a general nature. For example, personnel
25 matters, appointments, the problem of material financial provisions.
1 Let's say when there were reviews, the collegium which preceded
2 the directive of the 9th of April regarding the engagement of the army. So
3 whenever there was a need to review an important question of lasting
4 significance was something that was done at the collegium. The briefings
5 usually would deal with the situation on the front.
6 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
7 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if we could have on the screen 3D728 and
8 page 3 in the English, where it sets out those present at the meeting.
9 Now, we need to go to the bottom of the page and find the
10 equivalent in the B/C/S.
11 You may have to see more of this document. Are you familiar with
13 A. This was one of the briefings, judging by the type of document, I
14 think it was a briefing.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, the part that's on the screen indicates the
16 presence of President Milosevic and President Milutinovic, and he probably
17 hates it every time he sees this, but Second Lieutenant Sainovic.
18 Now, how -- how often -- that indicates obviously a civilian
19 political presence at this meeting. How often was there such --
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, can you clarify for me where it is and when it
22 is that Milosevic, Milutinovic, and Sainovic were present.
23 A. If you look just below where it says "Colonel General Ojdanic," it
24 says -- there are two dashes, one of them says "in the course of the
25 evening, corrections of directives compared to ours," meaning the version
1 that they already have.
2 The second dash: "Submit the draft plan for study. The briefing
3 willing be at 0900 hours with the Supreme Command present."
4 And then the "present" paragraph refers only to those who were
5 present at the briefing; meaning that the briefing regarding the plan
6 would be attended by the deputy of the operations and staff affairs, chief
7 of the operations administration, chief of the Supreme Command Staff,
8 Air Force General Smiljanic, so those who would be able to provide
9 additional explanation to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Command,
10 if needed, would be present.
11 So what was being reviewed here was the plan of -- for the
12 engagement of forces. So these people were not present at the briefing,
13 but the civilians were supposed to be briefed on the topic that was
14 discussed at the briefing.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: And that was to take place at 9.00 the following
17 A. Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one intervention in the transcript the witness
20 said 61, 6: "Submit the brief will be at 900 hours at the Supreme
21 Commander." That's what he said.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
23 However, what we have here is a meeting at which a number of the
24 senior military personnel would meet together with senior political
25 figures. Now, you -- you told us yesterday that there were daily
1 briefings of the Supreme Commander by the chief of the General Staff or
2 the -- the Supreme Command Staff. And this -- this looks like one of
3 these meetings. Is that correct?
4 A. No, this is more than that. This is more than the daily meeting
5 where the Chief of the General Staff would brief on the military -- on the
6 combat report of the army. What this was --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: That helps me to formulate the question, which is:
8 How often, as far as your researches discovered, did meetings of the
9 nature of this intended meeting at 9.00 take place? In other words,
10 meetings of similar groupings of military -- senior military and senior
11 political figures.
12 A. Rarely.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, can you be more precise than that?
14 A. This is the only one that I identified. I didn't see any others.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
16 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Were you invited when you were preparing your
18 report to consider at all a term which has cropped up often in this
19 case, "the Joint Command"?
20 A. Explicitly, no. I received a general -- I will answer, if you
21 permit me.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... Well, I -- I
23 really want to be cautious about what I ask you about this. I -- I want
24 your comment on one particular issue. It's obvious from what you've
25 already said that you've heard of the expression "the Joint Command." I'm
1 correct in that?
2 A. [No interpretation]
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Right. Now --
4 A. You concluded correctly, yes.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: This is very much a question for your expertise and
6 experience as a senior military officer. If you received a document which
7 contains suggestions from a more senior officer, would that be a -- a
8 format of document you would understand, expect to receive?
9 A. Yes.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: And you have in your career received such
11 documents, have you?
12 A. Yes.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness who spoke most recently about this,
14 General Curcin, said he had only ever seen one, the particular one which
15 was presented in the case, but they are a regular feature of military
16 life, are they?
17 A. This was not something that was a regular feature.
18 In the army, the most frequent form of communication are orders,
19 reports, information, commands. Suggestions are not something that occur
20 very frequently. It's -- it's something that is done infrequently.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: If you were to receive such a document, or indeed
22 any other more formal document of the type you've just described, and that
23 document made it clear that it was linked in some way to something
24 called "the Kosovo and Metohija Joint Command order, strictly
25 confidential, number 455-148 of 15 April 1999," would that cause you to
1 ask questions about that source document or linked document?
2 A. Yes.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you expect any senior military officer faced
4 with a document saying that to -- to ask himself what exactly that was?
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Why?
7 A. Well, because in that document what appears is -- well, in that
8 document, what is invoked is some order that he did not issue. And it's
9 addressed to his subordinate.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, could we then have on the screen, please,
13 Could you assist us by -- by giving your opinion on -- on how you
14 see that -- these two documents fitting into the command structures that
15 you've been describing to us? And by "the two documents," I mean the
16 suggestions document, which is P1487, and the link, the joint command
18 A. Well, believe me, it would be hard for me to establish a link
20 I have seen this document. I did see this document. The document
21 that this suggestion refers to is one with a number that, as far as I
22 know, from the abundance of documents that I've looked at and analysed,
23 are derived from the staff of the Pristina Corps. 455 is the number that
24 comes from that corps.
25 So my conclusion is that this is a document and this is a
1 reference to a document that was technically, at least, created and
2 registered in the logbook or the operations logbook of the command of the
3 Pristina Corps.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: That --
5 A. That is what I infer or conclude on the basis of what is written
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And that immediately raises the question: In the
8 Pristina Corps, what was the Joint Command?
9 A. The Joint Command? Well, actually, irrespective of that, how we
10 answer the question, whether it existed or whether it did not exist - I
11 don't think it existed, but I have arguments to support that - but anyway,
12 no matter what kind of an answer that give to that question, the document
13 was created in the Pristina Corps why they called it "the Joint Command" I
14 really don't understand. I cannot answer that question. Why a name was
15 given to something that it cannot bear, not according to any rule of
16 military doctrine. That, I do not know.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: My particular concern about this is -- is the
18 matter I raised at the outset with you. I appreciate the limitations on
19 your ability to deal with this organisation, whatever it was, and my
20 concern is this: That we have heard evidence from a very large number of
21 generals in the Yugoslav Army who have been asked about the
22 expression "Joint Command" and they've given us the impression that it was
23 neither here nor there what this body was. The -- they -- they weren't
24 alerted in any particular way by this use of the expression "Joint
25 Command" to think, What on earth is this? Has somebody made a mistake?
1 Should we inquire about it?
2 Does this make sense to you that all these officers should just
3 dismiss this as of no significance?
4 A. That there was coordination is something that we've been convinced
5 of in many cases. It really was --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not sure that you're answering my question.
7 I -- I want to focus on this question: What would you expect the reaction
8 of a senior army officer to be to seeing this expression? Because of the
9 word "command" in particular but also because it's said to be a "Joint
10 Command," which is something you've dismissed, you yourself have also
11 dismissed as just not existing within the system.
12 A. I understand this to mean that a suggestion is made to this body
13 that coordinates the activities of the MUP and the army in order to have
14 this coordinated activity organised in the best possible way. That is how
15 I understand this. The Chief of the Supreme Command Staff knows that
16 there is a coordinating body that coordinates the work of the MUP and the
17 army. And, since in this document that he had seen, he found some things
18 that he thought were not right, he is making a suggestion in terms of what
19 should be done in order to have this activity carried through properly.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you haven't answered my question. And I --
21 I will come back it to, but what is it, then, that was the coordinating
23 A. Well, these are people who were there on the spot, who were
24 discussing matters coordinating the work of the MUP and the army. In the
25 field and on the ground, where there was coordinated activity.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you're not telling us that there is a -- a
2 body that is actually coordinating activity in Kosovo.
3 A. No, this coordination between the MUP and the army. The MUP and
4 the army. These are officers of the MUP, officers of the army. It is
5 probably some of the politicians on the ground. So it's that coordination
6 that is established on the ground. This type of coordination existed at
7 all levels, even down at brigade level.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Who are the politicians on the ground who are
9 involved in this?
10 A. Well, probably the people who were down there on the ground: The
11 president of the executive council, then this -- well, in this other
12 document before I saw Minic, the president of that -- that council of
13 citizens. So it is officers of the MUP, officers of the army, and at a
14 joint meeting they familiarise each other with each other's activities and
15 they reach agreement on what the most efficient way to proceed would be in
16 the following period, and then everybody does his own work. Those who
17 made -- or rather, the person who made the suggestions sees that something
18 went wrong in the activity that was conceived and he's trying to do
19 something about it. That is how I understand it.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're -- you're referring back now to the
21 document Mr. Stamp showed you towards the end, which was the
22 interdepartmental staff minutes. Is that what -- is that what you're
23 talking about now?
24 A. I am mentioning this document that he showed me by way of an
25 illustration. It can look like coordination.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: But -- but what's clear is it doesn't have in it
2 the words "Joint Command." Now, I'll go back to the question I was asking
3 you, which is whether you would expect senior officers in the Yugoslav
4 Army who saw the word "Joint Command" or the -- the expression "Joint
5 Command" to dismiss it as an expression of no significance, that they
6 didn't need to make any inquiry about the nature of. Does that -- does
7 that make sense to you in a -- in a --
8 A. No, it doesn't make any sense. I assume that they knew exactly
9 what this was all about.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Now --
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Just -- just to be clear, although I think you may
13 have answered this already: This document that's still on the screen
14 involves suggestions down the chain of command, rather than up the way.
15 That -- that is also normal, is it?
16 A. Well, it's not a frequent occurrence, but yes, it is done,
17 especially if two systems appear in the same, well, activity. The Chief
18 of the Supreme Command Staff makes a suggestion here but only to the
19 commander of the 3rd Army, although he invokes this document of the
20 so-called Joint Command, he gives suggestions to his subordinate. And he
21 sends suggestions to the command of the 3rd Army, not to a Joint Command.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Turning to something else now. The reporting
23 system to the General Staff during the conflict involved daily reporting.
24 Was the system prior to the conflict similar or was reporting then on a
25 less-regular basis?
1 A. In peacetime and in wartime, reporting takes place on a daily
2 basis. In peacetime, operations reports were sent; and in wartime, combat
3 reports were sent, daily reports.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I think in -- in fairness to you, to ensure that --
5 and indeed to the other witnesses in the case, and to ensure that you have
6 the whole picture, you should see P1878. This is the linked order that
7 was numbered 455-148.
8 Can you just glance quickly at each of the pages. There are about
9 five pages. It's difficult to read. Yes, it's small.
10 A. Could it please be zoomed in.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay.
12 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
13 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll quickly print a hard copy for you so you can
14 read it quickly. I don't want you to read all the detail. Just to get
15 the -- the format in your mind. And a hard copy will be given to you for
16 that purpose.
17 Now that you have that, we could put back on the screen P1439. I'm
18 sorry? Oh, sorry. Sorry. I've given you the wrong number there. Sorry,
20 It's just in case you want to make any other comment about how
21 these two fit together within the appropriate military structures that
22 you've been describing.
23 A. Apart from the letterhead, the name "Joint Command," all the rest
24 that is written in the document was done precisely in accordance with how
25 combat documents are created and all the wording is very correct in
1 keeping with military terminology and military doctrine.
2 As for the structure and the formulations, I would have no
3 objections. I just have this dilemma, why it's called "Joint Command" and
4 why in the signature it says "Joint Command" when it all pertains to the
5 Pristina Corps. Quite simply that, is --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you read paragraph number 13, the second
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Note: We do not have the text in
9 front of us.
10 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, that's -- it seems to the layman, which in
12 these matters we are, to be a straightforward statement that some
13 organisation called the Joint Command is in charge of all the forces
14 involved in this operation. Why should we not read it that way?
15 A. Well, because in order for something to be a command, it has to
16 correspond to that name. It has to have -- it has to receive reports from
17 someone. It has to be seen that this someone is subordinated to them.
18 Also, they have to have their logbook, because these documents are kept
19 according to a special procedure in operations logbooks, not like just any
20 element of official correspondence. These are documents that are kept
21 permanently. There should be a signature. There should be a stamp. This
22 cannot be the stamp of a Joint Command, and not the number either.
23 I do apologise.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: What about -- what about the possibility that the
25 command structure just wasn't working; it was being bypassed?
1 A. No, I don't think so. We have hundreds of documents that show
2 that the commander of the Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army were functioning
3 precisely as prescribed.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --
5 A. The Supreme Command is receiving reports from the army. There are
6 no reports from a Joint Command. There is not a single order addressed to
7 the Joint Command. Quite simply, quite simply that is something that to
8 the best of my knowledge did not exist as a command.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Now could you look, please, at P1439.
10 Now, you'll see that the paragraph numbered 1 starts with the
11 words "contrary to your orders." Do you see that?
12 A. Yes.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: And if you could then go down to the second
14 paragraph under number 2, that starts with "on my return." Could you read
15 that just slowly to me, please.
16 A. "Upon my return from the briefing to the Joint Command for Kosovo
17 and Metohija on the 19th and 20th of September, 1998, with a decision on
18 the establishment of the rapid deployment forces, I acquainted you with
19 that personally over the telephone."
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, how -- how do you read this situation?
21 A. As for what is called "Joint Command" here, well, as it is being
22 called, I said why I think that this does not exist as a Joint Command.
23 The corps commander is addressing the army commander and informing him
24 that at this meeting of this body a decision was made to create a rapid
25 deployment force and he is asking for support there too.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: But he's -- he seems to be acting contrary to the
2 orders he has had from his own superior, which is the way you've told us
3 the system must always work; you must always get your orders from the man
4 who's in your chain of command.
5 A. Well, on the basis of this, one can conclude that the commander of
6 the army did not allow the establishment of the rapid deployment force
7 although it was decided at the coordination meeting.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: But does it not look as though General Pavkovic
9 just went ahead and did it?
10 A. Well, he probably proposed that because the combat groups that had
11 been established earlier were engaged in other tasks and there would be a
12 need to intervene and there aren't any appropriate forces for that; hence,
13 his request to have that kind of force created.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what is then your understanding of the
15 expression "the reporting session of the Joint Command," bearing in mind
16 you've told us there's no evidence of any reporting system?
17 A. Well, I quite simply understand this to mean that they met at a
18 meeting - that is to say, officers of the army and the police - and this
19 number of politicians who were there then, and that they were talking
20 about who was doing what and what should be done, and that it was agreed
21 there that a rapid-deployment force would be established. Obviously the
22 commander of the 3rd Army did not accept that, as one can see from this
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we also see from this document that he was
1 A. Well, you cannot see that this was annulled, but since he raises
2 the question again, certainly the army commander did not accept this. Or
3 rather, I assume that he did not accept this, but I'm not sure. It cannot
4 be stated with certainty on the basis of this document. But since he is
5 asking for this, the assumption is that it was not accepted. Had this
6 been a Joint Command, then the army commander would not have refused that.
7 He'd have to carry it out.
8 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
9 JUDGE BONOMY: It's time for a break, I think.
10 Mr. Visnjic, are you likely to have extensive re-examination?
11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: I still have a number of questions, though, and
13 will occupy a significant part of the remaining time.
14 Mr. Stamp, for you does anything arise out of this?
15 MR. STAMP: Not for the moment.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: And Mr. Petrovic, anything arise for you?
17 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe the answer
18 is yes, there will be questions from our side, I believe.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: I think so. One of us will have...
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: We have to have a break for half an hour and we'll
22 resume at 1.00. Could you meanwhile leave the courtroom again with the
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Radinovic, in paragraph 65 of your report --
4 now, it's paragraph 65 of the -- certainly the English section is page 90,
5 where you're dealing with the question of the Supreme Command Staff's
6 position in the chain of command.
7 Do you have paragraph 65?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: You refer there to -- you refer to command
10 responsibility and control responsibility. What's the difference between
12 A. "Control" is a broader term than "command." "Control" implies the
13 process, functions of planning, organising.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 A. And in the broader sense, command is part of control,
16 but "command" is a narrower term and it implies the right to issue orders
17 and implies the strict duty of subordinates to execute those commands. So
18 that is "command."
19 "Control" is a broader term, and it does not have such a strict
20 command function in the same way that "command" has. Although, they are
21 often used as synonyms, but they are not.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.
23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for
24 interrupting you, but I would just like to draw attention to a problem
25 that may appear later when we analyse.
1 The witness uses the term here "rukovodjenje," which is translated
2 into English as "control." In Serbian there is another term, "kontrola,"
3 which is narrower than the term command "komandovanje," command. So I
4 don't want later while analysing the transcript to have any
5 inconsistencies. So we have the situation here that two terms in
6 Serbian - one is "rukovodjenje," the other term is "kontrola" - are
7 interpreted or translated into English as the same word.
8 This happened yesterday also in the transcript, and today I would
9 like possibly to have a certain revision of the transcript so that in a
10 way we can differentiate that in the event that we cannot find an adequate
11 term in English.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that will be considered. The Chamber can
13 reflect on that after today by looking at that part of the evidence and
14 Mr. Haider will remind us about that at the beginning of the week.
15 Can I turn now to a concept you referred to as "the operations
16 centre," and you talk also of "the operations duty team." Is the
17 operations centre a place or a body of people?
18 A. It's a place and a group of people that works at that place.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: And what is the difference between the personnel of
20 the operations centre and the operations duty team, or are they the same?
21 A. They are not the same thing. Operations centre, in the
22 organisational and personnel terms, is part of the operations
23 administration of the General Staff or the first administration of the
24 General Staff; and that is a body or a point, location, that functions
25 continuously, and it serves for the operational connections of the system
1 of command from top to bottom. So from the brigade to the General Staff,
2 operations centres are established and the General Staff have -- has its
3 own operational centre, which is part of the operations administration.
4 Now, operations duty. Operations duty is organised at all these
5 levels that I mentioned, from the brigade up to the General Staff, whereby
6 the -- we have operations duty officers in brigades and at higher levels
7 we have operations duty teams. In the General Staff, the operations duty
8 team is led by the officer the rank of a general, so that in the
9 professional sense he could cover what is important for the military.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: And --
11 A. And -- excuse me. The operations duty team is not part of the
12 operations centre. It's -- it uses the resources of the operations
13 centre, but in personnel terms it's not part of it. It changes. Most
14 frequently the leader of the operations duty team is one of the assistants
15 of the Chief of the General Staff or of the section or department within
16 the General Staff.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: I think it follows from what you have said that the
18 operations centre of the General Staff simply became the operations centre
19 of the Supreme Command Staff when war broke out.
20 A. Yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Does it also follow from what you've said that
22 there's an operations duty team at each of the command posts throughout
23 the command structure? Or in fact, it doesn't. Sorry, you did make it
24 clear. There's an operations duty team in the command post of only the --
25 the higher levels; is that correct?
1 A. Yes. Yes.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. And --
3 A. But at all levels of the army, from the brigade, then -- that's
4 where they all have the operations duty officer.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I'm -- I've caused this confusion myself. From
6 brigade level downwards - is that what you're saying? - it's only a -- a
7 duty officer and a team is above that level?
8 No. Could you explain again, please.
9 A. No. Beginning from the brigade upwards, you have the operations
10 duties. In the brigade, you have the operations duty officer and then
11 upwards, corps army General Staff, you would have the operations duty
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Now, you've been asked a number of
14 questions about the personnel who form the fighting force. Excuse me. And
15 we find an element of confusion in some of the expressions used. And --
16 and one today that you use but give a very wide definition to was
17 conscript. Now, tell me again what a conscript was in the Yugoslav Army.
18 A. A military conscript is a person subject to military duty. And
19 now I have to explain what military duty is. The military duty
20 encompasses recruiting of young men who are from 17 years old. These men
21 are entered into the military records as recruits. Recruiting, as part of
22 the military duty, implies the selection and classification, medical
23 checks, assessment of physical abilities, psychophysical tests, so getting
24 a -- a psychological and physical profile of a young recruit. And this is
25 also something that includes education, affinities, qualities, and that's
1 how young men are recruited for specific services and arms of duty.
2 When they become 19 or when we have young men who are studying,
3 then when they reach 27 years of age, they are summoned to serve their
4 military term of duty. That is the next segment of military duty, to
5 serve their term of office.
6 When they serve they -- their term, the soldier is entered into
7 the records of the reserve forces, and he's assigned, according to his
8 military specialty that he has been trained for, he's entered into the
9 records of the appropriate military units according to their specialty.
10 And occasionally they're invited for professional training of the reserve
11 forces. That is also part of the military duty and, of course, that also
12 implies the duty to respond to the mobilisation call, as needed. So that
13 would be the whole of the military duty, what that term implies.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: At what age do they undergo the basic training?
15 A. From 19 to 20, depending on how long the military term of duty is.
16 Now it's six months. Before that it used to be a year. So this is done
17 between the ages of 19 and 20.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: We've heard occasional reference to professional
19 soldiers. Were there professional soldiers in the Yugoslav Army?
20 A. Yes. These would be professional officers, commissioned and
21 non-commissioned officers. These would be civilians serving in the
22 military and soldiers serving under contract, so soldiers, people whose
23 only job that was, who have a contract and are carrying out their duties
24 as professional soldiers. Unfortunately, that number is quite small. We
25 are still not in the position to replenish our army with professional
2 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the latest age at which a conscript could
3 be mobilised?
4 A. 60 is the latest age, but it depends on the type of unit. Of
5 course, elite units would not be replenished with older people, but they
6 would be replaced differently.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Was 60 the -- the rule in 1998 and 1999?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: We've had a number of references in evidence to
10 operations known as Grom and some numbers associated with these. And I
11 think you have given evidence about these as well.
12 I wonder if you could have a look, please, at P1221.
13 This -- you haven't got it in your language yet. Yes.
14 This document refers to something known as Operation Grom or
15 Thunder between 29th May 1998 and 20th of June, 1998. Now, that seems to
16 be something different from the Operation Grom which had parts 1 -- a
17 phase 1 and phase 2 in July. Do you know anything about this particular
18 Operation Grom?
19 A. I know of Operation Grom that was mentioned in the General Staff
20 directive of the 28th of July. I don't know about this one here that is
21 specifically mentioned here.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: And there are other documents dated earlier in
23 July, the 22nd, which make reference to the plan for combatting terrorist
24 forces. Are you aware of those documents?
25 A. No. No, I didn't see that.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you look now, please, at P939.
2 Now, this is a -- a minute of the collegium. And if you could go
3 to page 35 in the English. I can't, I'm sorry, give you a B/C/S page.
4 But in this - I can simply narrate it to you just now - in it
5 there is reference by Colonel Vlajkovic to the disengagement of units in
6 Operation Mac, M-a-c, followed by the word "Sword" -- sorry, I've
7 pronounced that wrong, the Operation Mac, and then it's followed by the
8 word "Sword," which may be a translation of Mac, so in English, Operation
9 Sword. Does that mean anything to you?
10 A. Yes.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: What was that?
12 A. That was an operation that was planned at the time when eight
13 members of the army were kidnapped when the Siptar terrorist forces
14 carried out the kidnapping and the General Staff was planning a measure in
15 case the negotiations failed to --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... That fits
17 in -- that fits in with other information and does clarify the position.
18 And on the subject of names, just one other question: In a
19 document in August 1998, which is P1423, there is reference to a unit
20 called the Brazil Unit. Does that mean anything to you?
21 A. No. It's an exotic name of some police force or special group,
22 but no. No.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: The -- the actual sentence in the -- it's a
24 report -- says: "The MUP force engaged consisted of the 1st and 2nd MUP
25 Detachments, the SAJ, and the Brazil Unit." It means --
1 A. I really don't know. I don't know that there were Brazil units in
2 our police. No, I don't know about that.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Where a MUP unit is re-subordinated to a VJ unit
4 for an operation, was it the responsibility of the MUP -- the VJ commander
5 to deal with the punishment of any member of the MUP who committed a crime
6 in the course of the operation?
7 A. A MUP unit is subordinated to the military commander for specific
8 combat tasks, only that part of the unit that is taking part in the combat
9 action, and that unit is subordinated, just like any other unit would be.
10 But if it is established that a member of the police unit carried out a
11 criminal act, then that case would be reported and it would be resolved
12 within the MUP control system, not the military commander's duty. It
13 would end at that point when they reported to the MUP senior officials
14 that this matter needed to be investigated. He's not authorised to take
15 measures when we're talking about attached units.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: But you're saying here an obligation, at least to
17 draw the matter to the attention of the MUP authorities.
18 A. Yes. Yes.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: What about the other element of preventing a crime?
20 If -- if the VJ commander has reason to think that a crime may be
21 committed by one of the forces subordinated to him and one of the MUP
22 forces, what is then his responsibility?
23 A. There is the potential possibility for that kind of inappropriate
24 behaviour, both on the part of the members of the military and the members
25 of the police, and the commander is obliged to do everything possible to
1 prevent something like that from happening. That means that he needs to
2 issue orders, to supervise, to react. If he knows that something like
3 that was done or if that is within his range, that he's able to act. And
4 if a unit is subordinated to the military unit, everything that he is
5 obliged to do in relation to his unit, he is obliged to do in relation to
6 the MUP units, other than them being charged with criminal responsibility.
7 That is not in his domain.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there now anything arising that you wish to
11 examine further on, Mr. Stamp?
12 MR. STAMP: No. I'm having something checked --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. If following any questions by Mr. Zecevic or
14 Mr. Petrovic then you -- you wish to raise anything, then you need to draw
15 that to my attention.
16 Mr. Zecevic.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: We have no questions, and neither does --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic?
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't have questions
23 JUDGE BONOMY: I could have gone another 15 minutes.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman. Sorry.
1 MR. ACKERMAN: I just wanted to -- just for the record, Your
2 Honour, when you were going through the questions you asked about the --
3 the suggestions series of documents, there's a third document in that
4 series that I think is important to understanding that whole drama, and
5 that's 4D420, which the witness was not asked to explain if -- I don't
6 know whether you want to go into that or not. I don't want to, but I
7 think the Chamber should at least be aware of the existence of that
9 Just to remind you, that's a document I raised with Curcin. It's
10 Pavkovic's response to that suggestions document from Ojdanic where he
11 explains that it wasn't received and couldn't be implemented because it
12 was a MUP operation, in any event.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. No, I'm content, Mr. Ackerman, with the
14 questions that have been raised. Thank you very much, though.
15 Mr. Visnjic.
16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Just to add, Your Honours, that
17 document is footnote 206 in the expert report of General Radinovic.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
19 Well, Mr. Radinovic, that completes your evidence. Thank you for
20 coming to give evidence and for the assistance you've given us. You're now
21 free to leave the courtroom.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic -- Mr. Sepenuk.
24 MR. SEPENUK: Yes. Your Honour, Mr. Visnjic has kindly assigned
25 to me the privilege of ending General Ojdanic's case, which we now do,
1 subject, of course, to the motions regarding the exhibits, to the Court's
2 ruling on exhibits. There'll be two brief motions filed today, again with
3 reference to the exhibits.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Well, everything should be before us by the
5 end of today. And subject to anything you've raised by then, your case
6 will be closed.
7 I'm curious about one matter, just in case there is any oversight
8 here. At one stage you promised us a handwriting expert. "Promise" is
9 setting it too high.
10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did, and we shall
11 work on it.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --
13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And it's probably going to be a
14 joint witness.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Joint with whom?
16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Well, probably a few Defence teams,
17 and perhaps even the OTP.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: But it -- my understanding of this is it's an issue
19 between you and Mr. Ackerman. And if I've got that right, I assume he
20 would not be part of the joint criminal enterprise.
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] You have to ask Mr. Ackerman that.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if -- if -- the issue, as I understand it,
23 is -- is in relation to documents that he is concerned about. And if you
24 have a -- a joint position, you don't need a witness. The only reason you
25 would need a witness would be if there was something you couldn't jointly
1 declare to us as accepted by everybody in the case.
2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as I understand
3 things, we still haven't got a joint position on this. But, of course,
4 that is subject to further debate.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you seeking therefore, Mr. Sepenuk, that the
6 case is closed subject also to that issue?
7 MR. SEPENUK: And others, Your Honour. There are other joint
8 witnesses; for example --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes.
10 MR. SEPENUK: -- We have an expert witness with relation to the
11 testimony given by Patrick Ball. So obviously our case remains open
12 subject to that testimony.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: And there are two expert witnesses that we know
15 MR. SEPENUK: Yes.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: But there is a difference in a situation where we
17 don't know about a witness, albeit he's an expert. So you're asking us to
18 qualify the closure of your case by reference to the possibility of a
19 witness who will speak as an expert about handwriting. Is that correct?
20 MR. SEPENUK: Mr. Visnjic is the handwriting expert, Your Honour.
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour. And in that
22 context, I just wish to remind you that we submitted a request to the
23 government of Serbia for, I hope, this time a comprehensive written
24 version of the reports on evening briefings. So I'm waiting for that and
25 perhaps some more subsequent evidence, and we will address the Court in
1 due course when we get such material.
2 So I assume that there will be some other uncertainties in the
3 future, but this is something that we will certainly go on working on.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 Now, Mr. Ackerman, do you have any comment to make about that --
6 these qualifications? Because I -- I think I'm right in thinking that you
7 are the person affected by this.
8 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I -- I think that's probably true.
9 The -- the position of the Pavkovic Defence is -- is not that the 25th May
10 report from General Pavkovic was seen by Ojdanic. It's that we sent it
11 that day. Whether he saw it or not is of no interest to us.
12 If that solves the problem, then we don't have to have a
13 handwriting expert. I'm not sure it does. But we don't make any
14 contention that it was in front of his face, just that we made that
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Their contention is that he never saw it. I don't
18 have any problem with that contention. He probably didn't.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: But what's also raised as a possibility is that at
20 some later stage in this case a handwriting expert gives evidence that
21 would have an impact on this issue.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, if the purpose of that evidence is to -- to
23 tend to prove that General Ojdanic never saw the document, we agree with
24 that. I'll -- I don't have any contention that he ever saw it. Only that
25 it was sent at the time that it -- that we said it was sent.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. So am I reading you correctly as saying
2 that you do not oppose the motion that Mr. Visnjic and Mr. Sepenuk have
3 put to us to qualify the closure of the case in the way indicated?
4 MR. ACKERMAN: No. And if they want to bring a handwriting
5 expert, I will probably enjoy cross-examining him.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, well.
7 Mr. Stamp, have you any problem with the qualifications to the
8 closure of the case?
9 MR. STAMP: No, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 Well, this is a convenient time to adjourn. The case for the
12 accused Pavkovic will commence on Monday, and my understanding is that it
13 will commence with evidence and without an opening statement, and that
14 will be at 9.00 a.m.?
15 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: 9.00 a.m. On Monday.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.38 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day of
19 October, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.