1 Thursday, 8 November 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, please continue.
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon all.
7 Your Honours, before I proceed I should like to raise a question
8 briefly. And at the -- I want to do that at the very outset in order to
9 allow for checking. As I have no contact with the client, there is
10 something that I thought I observed yesterday in connection with his
11 health, so if it is possible I should like to tell you about it in closed
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We shall go into closed session or
14 private session, rather.
15 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, we had hoped that we would be able to
23 sit for longer hours next week each day; however, in view of what you've
24 said we shall abandon the plan to try and arrange that next week but will
25 continue to look for other opportunities. As far as tomorrow is
1 concerned, it seems to us that Mr. Lazarevic himself has offered the
2 solution which is that if he should feel unwell, he should draw that to
3 the attention of the Bench and we will deal with it as it and if it
4 arises. Otherwise, we shall proceed on the same schedule as we had
5 planned, which was to try to sit for five hours tomorrow.
6 So please continue now with the cross-examination.
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Examination by Mr. Bakrac: [Continued]
11 Q. [Interpretation] General, yesterday prior to the adjournment we
12 spoke about how the Pristina Corps command was taking measures for
13 stepping up combat-readiness. At this point I should like you to tell us
14 what was the possibility of manning the Pristina Corps with military
15 conscripts from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?
16 A. As for the recruitment plan for the Pristina Corps, with
17 conscripts belonging to the reserve ...
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry for interrupting you, Mr. Lazarevic. Please
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The recruitment plan for manning war
22 units of the Pristina Corps with military conscripts of the reserve force
23 envisaged that from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija the recruitment
24 should be carried out with about 11.000 conscripts and from outside the
25 Kosovo territory to engage about 14.000 military conscripts; namely, this
1 indicates that there was not enough possibilities to man the corps from
2 the basic zone -- actually, it could only provide under 50 per cent of the
3 required number. And the superior command proceeded in a planned fashion
4 to man the Pristina Corps on the basis of what was referred to as the
5 ex-territorial principle.
6 Q. Thank you, General. At the level of the General Staff of the
7 Yugoslav Army, did there exist a plan for the defence of the country?
8 A. Yes, absolutely. These were special plans to be used by the
9 Yugoslav Army at a certain point in the past used to be called war plans.
10 And concretely speaking about the engagement of the 3rd Army and the
11 Pristina Corps for the relevant period, 1999, the basis of that plan was
12 the Grom 3 plan.
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, for the transcript this
14 plan is Exhibit 3D690.
15 Can we have Exhibit 3D696 brought up in e-court, please.
16 Q. General, can you recognise this document and can you comment on
18 A. I know this document. I know about it from this trial, but what
19 is ordered in the document is something that I'm familiar with from the
20 time prior to the war, about the 10th of March, when the General Staff of
21 the Yugoslav Army ordered the 2nd Army and sent this to the 3rd Army for
22 their information to organize concerted action between these two armies,
23 specifically between the 2nd Army and its Podgorica Corps and the Pristina
24 Corps, with a view to closing off routes between Montenegro and Kosovo and
25 Metohija via the Rugova gorge where there was a heightened spillover of
1 heavy terrorist forces. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army of
2 Yugoslavia, General Ojdanic, ordered that the concerted action plan should
3 be realised and specifically says in item 2 that the command of the
4 Pristina Corps should participate in that task. That order is from about
5 the 10th of March, it is not quite legible here in the heading, the year
6 being 1999.
7 Q. Here in item 2 they refer to the plan of coordination. Is that
8 what we referred to yesterday when we said plan of coordination or
9 concerted action when you say that one had not been prepared?
10 A. Yes, you are quite right. For the army units that were not in a
11 mutual system of subordination and superiority, a plan of mutual
12 coordination is prepared in terms of tasks, objectives, place, and time,
13 and normally the superior command to both -- orders to both structures,
14 issues orders to both structures, and gives them the basics, the
15 fundaments, of the plan.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lazarevic, what's the relationship between the
17 document on the screen and Grom 3?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Grom 3 as a
19 special-purpose plan at the level of the Yugoslav Army from the level of
20 the General Staff down to brigade level within the framework of the
21 Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army partly referred also to the air force and
22 the anti-aircraft defence and the 2nd Army, not the entire Yugoslav Army,
23 that is. And it implies the defence of the country's integrity against
24 attacks by the multi-national brigade of the NATO forces from Macedonia
25 with the simultaneous armed rebellion --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand all that. What's the relationship
2 between that plan and this document, if any?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do want to confirm that there is a
4 relationship because this corridor was observed between Kosovo and
5 Metohija and Montenegro and on towards Albania, a corridor for the
6 introduction of heavy terrorist forces from Albania. The General Staff
7 observed that and the chief ordered that these two structures, the 2nd
8 Army and the 3rd Army, are -- either Pristina Corps and the Podgorica
9 Corps should seal off that route in coordinated action. This is a
10 concretization in practice part of the Grom plan.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Mr. Bakrac.
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Q. General, we're still on this topic and I should like to ask you:
15 How was the use of the units of the Pristina Corps plan at the level of
16 the 3rd Army, was there any order, command, or plan in that connection as
18 A. If I may be sufficiently precise, Grom 3 at the level of the
19 General Staff ended around the 16th of January, 1999, and according to a
20 certain methodology and procedure, the 3rd Army drew up its own plan for
21 the defence of the integrity of the country - this was Grom 3 - but for
22 the 3rd Army, around the 27th, that is ten days later.
23 Q. General, let's see that document in e-court and then we can
24 comment on it.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can I see 5D245, please.
1 Q. General, is this the plan for the engagement of the Pristina Corps
2 issued by the command of the 3rd Army?
3 A. To be more precise here, this is an order issued by the 3rd Army
4 command on the 27th of January, 1999, it's a state secret, it's part of
5 the Grom 3 plan and it's an order for the use not only of the Pristina
6 Corps but of the 3rd Army in preventing the forceful introduction of a
7 NATO brigade, its routing, and the destruction of the forces of the armed
8 rebellion. To be completely precise, the Grom 3 plan contained apart from
9 this central order which was the fundamental document, a large number of
10 other documents as well, but this is the basic and fundamental document
11 for the Grom 3 plan at the level of the 3rd Army. And within the scope of
12 this order, the place, role, and tasks of the Pristina Corps are
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we see the end of that document, please.
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we will come to the end.
16 It's a document consisting of more than one page. I will ask the General
17 to comment on an item in the document.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, let's take a look at item 5 where tasks are assigned to
21 the units and can you comment on that, please. It's on page 5, it's page
22 5 and item 5, and then there's 5.1, the Pristina Corps. Can you see item
23 5, General, and can you comment on it, please? Are these tasks for the
24 units of the Pristina Corps?
25 A. Based on the directive of the Chief of the General Staff, the 3rd
1 Army commander issued orders to all the units under him, and in item 5.1
2 to the Pristina Corps as follows: In the first phase engage the regular
3 forces and armed non-Siptar population in Kosovo and Metohija with
4 reinforcements, and these are three combat groups listed here, with
5 anti-aircraft defence measures, continue strengthening the depth security
6 of the state border and prevent an attack by a multi-national brigade of
7 NATO from Macedonia, secure roads, block terrorist and sabotage
8 strongholds in Kosovo and Metohija, and prevent their linking up with
9 NATO. He stated that the armed non-Siptar population should be used only
10 for certain purposes, to secure military facilities and roads and to
11 defend populated, built-up areas. That's the first stage.
12 The second stage with stronger reinforcements for the Pristina
13 Corps consisting of several brigades and with mobilisation carried out,
14 neutralise the NATO forces should they penetrate deeper into the territory
15 of Kosovo and Metohija and suppress the armed rebellion.
16 Q. General, could you clarify a point, please. We'll soon come to
17 the order issued by you, we'll see that later, and the armed non-Siptar
18 population is mentioned there also. Can you tell us how you understood
19 this order, and we shall see later on whether any tasks were assigned and
20 so on.
21 A. In my assessment, both then and now, the 3rd Army commander relied
22 in doctrinal terms on the rules of combat and the instructions for combat
23 and also on the Law on Defence, according to which apart from the army on
24 the territory of Kosovo and Metohija other forces can be engaged and these
25 are forces of the Ministry of Defence, the civilian protection, and civil
1 defence. And in my orders I respected this, I complied with the order I
2 received, but also as the corps commander within the scope of what was
3 permitted by the instructions, I gave slightly different tasks to the
5 Q. We'll come back to that, General, but for now I'd like you to tell
6 me, if you know, whether the Albanian population agreed, whether it wanted
7 to enter the civil defence. Because here it says the armed non-Siptar
8 population. You explained now what this referred to, but I would like to
9 know whether while you were down there they wanted to take part.
10 A. As far as I know, apart from isolated cases - and now I'm
11 referring to the Albanian population in particular but also other
12 non-Siptar inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija, those belonging to the
13 Turkish, Muslim, Gorani, and Roma ethnic communities - participated in the
14 defence of the country.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lazarevic, you ground your answer in the rules
16 of combat and the Law on Defence. Do these documents use the
17 expression "armed non-Siptar population"?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that term is not used,
19 as is stated here, but the term "population" and engagement of the
20 population in armed struggle and other non-armed forms of resistance is
21 used and is provided for, both in the Law on Defence and the rules of
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Have I misunderstood you as stating that these are
24 identifiable groups called civil defence and civil protection?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Law on Defence provides for the
1 following: Citizens, as defined in the Law on Defence, whereas in the
2 rules of combat they're defined as the population, but I am going back to
3 the Law on Defence. Citizens may be organized, armed, and included in the
4 defence of the country within the scope of the Ministry of Defence, and
5 they can be sent to units of civilian defence and -- civil defence and
6 civilian protection. And that's what I was referring to a little while
8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we'll come to that also
9 and we will have exhibits, and then we can further clarify if need be as
10 regards the civil defence and the civilian protection.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 Q. Mr. Lazarevic, please be kind enough -- so kind as to comment on
14 item 11, that's on page 12, the last page, because His Honour did want to
15 see the last page. Item 11, as regards command, what was envisaged here?
16 Who was to be in command according to this order?
17 A. In item 11, command and communications, what is stated is the
18 following: The army command with its command post in Nis and forward
19 command post in Pristina, the Kosovski Junaci barracks will be in command.
20 I want to say that the forward command post on the 2nd of February had
21 already been set up in Pristina.
22 Q. After issuing this order or after this order was issued, did the
23 3rd Army command issue any further orders in order to prevent surprises
24 and maintain the level of combat-readiness according to this order?
25 A. Yes. According to the same principle, just as the Chief of the
1 General Staff issued other orders also, the 3rd Army command monitored the
2 situation. And apart from this fundamental special-purpose plan it issued
3 a number of specific orders for specific tasks, making operational this
4 plan we are now talking about.
5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now have in e-court 5D249 --
6 Q. For you to comment on. Do you recognise this document? It's a
7 document of the 3rd Army command addressed to the Pristina Corps and other
8 units. Please can you comment on this document.
9 A. This is an order issued by the commander of the 3rd Army,
10 General Pavkovic, only a few days after this initial order from the Grom 3
11 plan, that is, the 1st of February. And he orders the taking of measures
12 to prevent surprises in the area of the 3rd Army, focusing on the area of
13 the Pristina Corps, because there was a high concentration of NATO forces
14 in the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean.
15 Q. Sorry for interrupting you.
16 A. He explains in the preamble what can be expected from these
17 forces, and then in item 1 he orders that dispersion of military assets
18 should immediately begin, dispersion from warehouses and depots.
19 Q. Can we now move on and comment on item 3, which is on page 2 of
20 this document.
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2, item 3.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With a view to preventing
23 insupportable losses from the first air-strikes, the army commander
24 ordered that fortification of the units should immediately continue in the
25 second degree of protection; he's referring to the forces along the state
1 border towards Macedonia and Albania in the system of securing and
2 defending the state border.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. To avoid confusion we see an abbreviation here at the end where it
5 says SAJ, what does SAJ mean responsible corps and SAJ commands?
6 A. Well, the ones responsible are the command of the Pristina Corps
7 and independent army units. The engineers regiment, and this has to do
8 with obstacle, the construction of obstacles.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Please look at items 4 and 5, please.
10 A. This is now something that makes more specific the general plan,
11 Grom 3, and the army commander here is ordering at the corps level that a
12 plan be drafted for the defence of the border and the closing of axes
13 along which terrorist forces might be infiltrated. And now we see that
14 the army commander is no longer referring to securing the state border,
15 although it's early February, but the defence of the state border. He's
16 ordering that this plan be drafted within 15 days. The deadline is the
17 15th of February, 1999.
18 In item 5 he orders that at the level of the Pristina Corps
19 command a special plan be drafted for blocking and destroying the forces
20 of the armed rebellion in the Drenica, Lab, and Malisevo sectors in
21 coordination with units of the MUP. These are four operational KLA zones
22 where there was the highest concentration of those forces. They had 8 to
23 10.000 [Realtime transcript read in error "eight to ten members"] members
25 Q. General -- I apologise.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, can you help us by identifying what
3 particular issue all this detailed evidence goes to that you feel makes it
4 necessary to go through it bit by bit in this way orally in court.
5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I want to show you now -
6 and you will see later on from these plans - we will come to the plans and
7 the orders of the Joint Command quite soon, or rather, those that bear the
8 heading the Joint Command so that you might be able to understand those
9 orders and also to see how the chain and the system of command functioned
10 regarding all those important issues. We felt that it would be necessary
11 for you to look at the whole process, how plans were transferred from one
12 level to another in the chain of command. And we will try to give you an
13 explanation about the orders that have been tendered by the Prosecution,
14 but I think they can be used in order to be able to understand this whole
15 issue of the Joint Command, how the chain of planning and ordering
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That makes it much easier now to follow
18 when it's clear what the objective is at the end, and therefore you should
19 continue as you think appropriate.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. General, sir, there is an error in the transcript page 12, line
22 24, it says in the transcript eight to ten members and it should read 8 to
23 10.000 members.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. General --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please speak into the
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You said four operative zones --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: We have the problem we had yesterday of not
7 speaking into the microphone. You seem locate yourself where there isn't
8 a microphone -- perhaps in the second and third sessions today you would
9 sit in the seat to your left if that's possible so that you're speaking
10 into a high microphone. There's a difference in height, you'll see, in
11 these microphones, and if you were sitting further to your left you would
12 be speaking into that. Even if you move your lectern a little just now,
13 it will probably make a difference. Thank you.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
15 Q. General, do I have to repeat the question or were you able to
16 understand what I was asking you?
17 A. Yes, I understood you.
18 Q. But -- I'm sorry. Yes, but I hear now that the interpreters were
19 not able to hear the question. At any rate, you said that this was a plan
20 for the destruction of the terrorists in four operational zones, and we
21 see here that it says Drenica, Lab, and Malisevo. Can you please clarify
23 A. Well, this is not a mistake. These are three areas where there
24 was a major build-up of forces, and four operational zones of the KLA were
25 situated there and they had 8 to 10.000 members. Three areas, four
1 operational zones within those three areas.
2 Q. Yes. I just wanted to make that clear. Could you please look at
3 paragraph 12 and comment on it, that's page 3 in this document.
4 A. In item 12 the commander of the 3rd Army orders that preparations
5 be carried out for a rapid call-up and reporting of personnel from the
6 reserve with certain important critical specialties, primarily to be
7 recruited into the anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units. So this is a
8 preparatory task.
9 Q. General, let us move on now to the planning of the use at level of
10 the Pristina Corps command. So what was the sequence of the orders at
11 those later stages? Perhaps it would be easier if we could have a
12 Prosecution exhibit, P2808 up on our screens, and then you can comment on
14 A. You asked me about the sequence for the planning process. It was
15 the sequence that was envisaged in the decision and the order of the 3rd
16 Army commander. In the Pristina Corps on the 7th of February, a full Grom
17 3 plan was drafted for all the corps units, and what we see here on our
18 screens is the implementation of the task from a previous order of the 3rd
19 Army commander.
20 Q. That was supposed to be completed by the 15th -- General, could
21 you please wait for me to finish the question and for the interpretation
22 to finish.
23 A. In a special order dated the 1st of February, 1999, the 3rd Army
24 commander ordered that plans be drafted in the corps, that a plan be
25 drafted, for the destruction and routing of terrorist forces in the area
1 of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo. Acting in accordance with this
2 item in that order, the corps command did draft its own order and a larger
3 number of documents that were appended to the order.
4 Q. General, could you please look at paragraph 1, the enemy. I think
5 that here we have the answer to my question about the four operational
6 zones. Could you please just comment on paragraph 1 and then we will move
8 A. In paragraph 1 of this order, the corps command and I as its
9 commander -- we provide as precise information as possible to our
10 subordinate units about the strength, the composition, and disposition and
11 the objectives of the actions of the terrorist forces in the territory of
12 Malo Kosovo, Drenica, Malisevo, and Salja, as well as Bajgora. To be
13 quite specific, or rather, even more accurately than was done by the 3rd
14 Army commander, we define and describe in even greater detail the enemy
15 forces that the corps will have to handle, so to speak, that the corps
16 would have to deal with.
17 Q. Fair enough. General, I would now like us to move on to page 3,
18 that's paragraph 2, task of the Pristina Corps.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues]... The general
20 answers, I believe the part of his answer in page 16, line 16 and 17, has
21 not been recorded. He said that the corps will have to handle -- that the
22 corps will have to deal with in case it happens. I believe it can be
23 clarified, either by witness or by audiotape.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Is there any need for me to revisit
1 this with the witness or --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think so, Mr. Bakrac. Thanks.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I agree with you. Thank you, Your
5 Q. General, could you please look at paragraph 2, task of the
6 Pristina Corps, and could you please read this sentence.
7 A. With the permission of the Trial Chamber, I would like to say that
8 paragraph 2 in accordance with the rules of combat is copied from the
9 order of the superior command. Whatever the army commander set as a task
10 for the corps, the corps command is not entitled -- does not have the
11 right to make any changes. And it is stated here that the corps with the
12 reinforcements that are enumerated here and with the armed non-Siptar
13 population in Kosovo and Metohija will carry out an attack in the zone in
14 accordance with the map. The task is in coordination with the forces of
15 the MUP of the Republic of Serbia to block, rout, and destroy the Siptar
16 terrorist forces in the general sector of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and
17 Malisevo, and at the same time they were to defend the state border and
18 the various axes in Kosovo and Metohija to cut a long story short.
19 Q. General, what I would like to know, General, is whether you
20 issued -- you said that it says here the armed non-Siptar population. Did
21 you issue any specific tasks to any specific units in any of your orders?
22 I mean a unit, a formation, of the armed non-Siptar population, was any
23 specific task ever given with the exact designation of the unit?
24 A. With the permission of the honourable Trial Chamber, I would like
25 us to look at paragraph 5, and I will begin my answer as we wait for it to
1 appear on our screens. Because the army commander did not specify, did
2 not define in detail those forces, the civil defence detachments or local
3 guards in specific locations in his order, what I did is in paragraph 5
4 where I as the commander regulate the tasks that are to be issued to the
5 subordinate units, I didn't give any such tasks to my brigades. So I
6 didn't issue any task to any of my brigades regarding the use of the armed
7 non-Siptar population, as was the term that was used in this order.
8 Q. General -- well, we have paragraph 5 here on our screens, tasks of
9 the units. You gave us an explanation. But I wanted us to go back to
10 something that precedes paragraph 5, the preceding paragraph talks about
11 readiness. Could you please explain to us what were the provisions for
13 A. Well, this is a very important part of the corps commander's
14 decision, which is again based on the decision of the army commander. For
15 the first tasks, the tasks to secure and defend the state border and to
16 secure the military facilities in the corps area, the readiness is stated
17 as immediate. So units have already been engaged in those tasks and they
18 have to continue. So there is no discontinuation. The only thing that
19 may happen is that these forces are reinforced. Now, as for that specific
20 task that was given, breaking up the strongholds of the terrorist forces
21 in those three locations, this was to be stipulated in a special order and
22 the code was Munja, lightning.
23 Q. Could you please tell us what does it mean D plus four -- three to
24 four days, that is once the signal, Munja, lightning, was received?
25 A. Well, it was not known when the signal would be received, the
1 signal word lightning, or special order was to be issued. But I think
2 that we will find the specific answer to this question at one point. I
3 don't know whether the Trial Chamber would allow me to point out that in
4 paragraph 5 all the corps units from the first tactical groups down to all
5 the brigades, you will see that none of the brigades was issued any tasks
6 for the use of the civil defence and civilian protection units which are
7 termed in -- both in my order and in the order issued by the 3rd Army
8 commander the non -- the armed non-Siptar population.
9 Q. General, we don't have to go item by item because I am sure that
10 Mr. Hannis will bring up anything that you did not mention, so we can move
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please just look at page 12
13 of this same order dated the 16th of February. Just --
14 Q. Could you please just look at paragraph 10.3, or rather, the third
15 paragraph from above, third paragraph down from the beginning of the page.
16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could you please just scroll the
17 document up a little bit. I do apologise. In English that would be page
18 27 down at the bottom of the page, so to assist the Trial Chamber. No,
19 no, that's the next page, 28, in English. And then the next one, 29.
20 That's page 29 -- no, page 30, Your Honours.
21 Q. General, during the execution or during the conducting of combat
22 operations, can you read us -- for us that paragraph.
23 A. "During the conducting of combat operations, expressly prohibit
24 the uncontrolled entry of unit members into populated areas, looting of
25 property of the local population, violations of the provisions of the
1 international law of war, the displacement of weapons and military
2 equipment belonging to the enemy of bodies, and entry into enemy shelters
3 prior to the arrival of specialist organs."
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 14 in the B/C/S
6 Q. Can we comment item 10.7.1 which is technical support.
7 A. In this item, in keeping with the rules of combat, units are
8 define the expenditure of ammunition in combat sets for the execution of
9 specific missions, and it can be seen that the approved use of small arms
10 ammunition is two combat sets and for the heavier or, so to speak, for the
11 artillery it is from 0.5 to one combat set. And for tanks, which is
12 actually the ammunition were combat vehicles, 0.5 combat sets is the
13 quantity which is allowed, meaning that in the execution of this task we
14 expect to clash with the strongest armed rebellion forces, but the use of
15 ammunition ordered is very restrictive. And I should like to ask the
16 Trial Chamber to clarify the meaning of the concept of combat set because
17 we will be encountering this later. And the best way to do it is on the
18 basis of the first dash, the combat set for a rifle is the number of
19 bullets that a soldier carries on himself, meaning that a combat set per
20 soldier is 150 bullets or rounds. If two combat sets are allowed, that
21 means 300 bullets for the execution of the tasking in question has been
22 approved per soldier. As regards weaponry, each piece of artillery
23 weaponry or tanks has a certain number of shells or projectiles from 12,
24 16, 30, to 42.
25 Q. And, General, are there any rules or any norms that define the
1 number of combat sets that is allowed or customary? I'm no expert on the
2 matter, so would you kindly explain.
3 A. This is a special military science, separate branch and doctrine,
4 which regulates -- in detail, prescribes in detail the ammunition to be
5 used for the destruction of specific targets, depending whether they are
6 fortified or not, and the planned expenditure of ammunition or lethal
7 assets. But I shall stop on this particular occasion at this. There will
8 be more occasion to explain this in more detail.
9 Q. Yes. Let us revert to our basic topic. Would you please now take
10 a look at item 10.7.6, that is at page 15 in the B/C/S version. In the
11 English it is 39.
12 Can you read item 4 and explain it for our benefit.
13 A. Did I understand you well, 10.7.6 is the item you said?
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. This is an item dealing with logistical support.
16 All prisoners which defines that all detainees should be taken to
17 what is referred to as the collection point of -- points for prisoners of
18 war, and after having been questioned by the authorised competent organs
19 of the MUP -- of the military security, they should be handed over to MUP
20 organs for further processing.
21 That is normally the substance of international conventions
22 defining the treatment of captured persons or prisoners taken during
23 combat activities. Having said this, I should like to add on this
24 occasion as well that throughout the war in the territory of Kosovo and
25 Metohija and in the zone of the corps, although this is prescribed by
1 combat rules there was not set up a single collection point for prisoners
2 of war but they were evacuated outside the zone of the combat -- of combat
3 operations in order to save them.
4 Q. Yes, we shall be coming to that, General. There is a document
5 which deals with that.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lazarevic, on this question of prisoners of
7 war, can you give us an idea of the numbers of prisoners that were taken
8 between the -- say the middle of February and the middle of June and
9 shipped out, as you say, to other areas?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the combat reports of the
11 Pristina Corps command, I recall a number of 215 captured members of the
12 armed rebellion forces that -- who were taken prisoners primarily in
13 defending the state border, who were handed over to the organs of the
14 Ministry of the Interior. But right now I'm not speaking about the number
15 that was taken prisoner by the forces of the Ministry of the Interior.
16 And by your leave, I should like to say that I know that the total number,
17 including 1998 and 1999, was over 1500 captured and arrested members of
18 the terrorist forces who were released from prison in the year 2000.
19 Although final sentences had been rendered in regular trials in respect of
20 most of them.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: So is the provision that we're looking at here
22 related to the question whether you may have taken NATO prisoners of war?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Distinguished Bench, this refers to
24 all of them. As far as I can recall, there were three NATO members who
25 had been taken prisoner during the armed conflicts. Some were on the
1 boundary between the zones of the Pristina and the Nis Corps, and they
2 were also evacuated outside the zone of combat. And shortly thereafter
3 they were released.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- During Jackson's mission.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm trying to understand the concept of a prisoner
7 taken in combat. I understand that you might want to prosecute KLA
8 activists as terrorists or for the various crimes they committed, but was
9 there a category of prisoner of war that applied to KLA combatants?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the 24th of March, 1999, when
11 the state of war was declared, the category of prisoners of war also
12 referred to KLA members and there were captured KLA members that were
13 tried by military courts. And we have heard here from one witness, I
14 believe, who was not exactly knowledgeable, but I do have reliable
15 information -- perhaps some evidence shall be led to that effect that
16 there were prisoners of war who were KLA members.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: And it's the number of those that I was asking you
18 about. How many KLA prisoners of war were taken?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By the Pristina Corps, 215 as far as
20 I can remember.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought you had qualified that and said that
22 these were taken by the Ministry of the Interior.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. What I
24 said was this -- I do not include in this number because I don't know how
25 many were taken prisoner by the forces of the Ministry of the Interior.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: I now I understand. I think I misread the answer.
2 Why were the 215 handed to the Ministry of the Interior?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At this point, Your Honour, I have
4 two explanations. First, the Pristina Corps couldn't - and we shall see
5 also that the 3rd Army could not under conditions of such heavy aerial
6 bombing and from a distance, too - it could not set up camps and
7 collection points for prisoners of war because in particular in the area
8 of Kosovo and Metohija it was absolutely insecure, and I would say that it
9 would have been inhumane, we just had no conditions, no possibility to
10 create such collection points. That is on the one hand.
11 On the other, a number of the KLA members who were taken prisoner
12 at -- in a specific area, normally with arms and in uniform and in combat,
13 but where there were no difficult consequences for the members of the army
14 with prior so-called security processing they would be handed over to the
15 Ministry of the Interior. The gravest cases, those who directly
16 endangered the lives of army members or killed army members, were
17 retained, were kept, and were put on trial before military courts rather
18 than civilian ones.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will try to -- this
21 is a voluminous material and we are proceeding gradually and have sought
22 to systemize our subject matter. There is evidence that it was requested
23 that a collection centre for prisoners of war be set up, there is evidence
24 to that effect, and perhaps we shall be able to locate it during the break
25 and present it to you while this topic is still on.
1 Q. I just want the transcript to accurately reflect what you said.
2 You said they were handed over to the MUP, and as I understood you MUP
3 then handed them over where, to whom?
4 A. Well, as far as I could gather and as far as I know, they handed
5 them over for further processing to the civilian judiciary system.
6 Q. Thank you. General, we have gone a bit away from our basic topic,
7 and let us wrap up this document. Please look at item 11, commanding and
8 support -- and communications, sorry, and can we have your comment and
9 that is the last page in last item --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you move on, what you're saying is you may
11 have information about the names of the 215 prisoners and we'll be able to
12 trace their fate through the system? Is that what you're hoping to give
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours. There is evidence
15 the Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army did not have a prison for war
16 prisoners. That is the evidence --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: No, they passed them to the MUP and the MUP passed
18 them to the civilian authorities is what we've just heard from
19 Mr. Lazarevic, but do you envisage being able to provide the records to
20 show what happened to them?
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the sixth Defence will
22 be probably able to do that. I don't know who is in question. What I
23 asked Mr. Lazarevic was whether he knew what the MUP did then with the
24 prisoners, what was the further procedure with the persons who had been
25 handed over to the MUP.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Item 11, command and communications,
3 regulates who will and from what place command if this order is to be
4 realised, the command post of the corps in peacetime and the rear command
5 post in Gracanica and the forward command post in Pristina in the Film
6 city area. This is the regular, the usual customary way of doing this.
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Please explain this particular sentence. I believe that you
9 commented on it yesterday. You have the sentence which begins with a
11 A. The plan of communication coordination with the air force and
12 anti-aircraft defence and the MUP forces should be regulated through a
13 communications order. This means that another component, another
14 structure which is not within the system of subordination with the corps,
15 such as the aircraft defence, anti-aircraft defence and MUP forces, and
16 the air forces of the Yugoslav Army are, then coordination or
17 communications plan is drafted through which coordinated action with these
18 components is actually carried out. All this is defined in a special
19 order which is called order for communications.
20 Q. General, we shall now move on. You also saw reference to a
21 special signal in it. Did the command of the 3rd Army issue directly
22 before the war any order or an order that could be perceived as such, in
23 that sense?
24 A. I recall that on the day an imminent threat of war was declared,
25 the 23rd of March, 1999, the army command issued a special order - when I
1 say "special," one can understand it as an executive order - for the
2 beginning of the defence of the integrity of the state of the territory of
3 Kosovo and Metohija.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we have in e-court 5D1294.
5 Q. Please take a look at the document and tell us whether this is the
6 one you've just referred to and could you comment on it, please.
7 A. Yes. This is the order issued by the commander of the 3rd Army in
8 which he orders that in case air-strikes begin on any part of the
9 territory of the FRY all the units engaged in the previous plans,
10 according to the previous orders, are to be activated for the defence of
11 the does he go to of the country in order to prevent the infiltration of
12 NATO forces and the aggression by terrorist forces from Albania and
13 Macedonia with ground forces or -- I don't see the following items, but
14 probably the engagement of corps forces to break up the terrorist forces
15 in the depth of the area of responsibility of the corps.
16 Q. Yes, that's in item 1.6. And now we can move on and look at
17 another document before the break. General, are you aware - and I will
18 call for a Prosecution document, P1990 - that the Ministry of the Interior
19 also planned for the conflict, or rather, for participating in the defence
20 of the territory for terrorist forces?
21 A. I know that when the corps command drafted the order to neutralise
22 the terrorist forces in those three major locations, the organs -- the
23 operative organs of the corps command achieved coordination with the
24 people dealing with planning in the MUP in order to have coordination and
25 coordinated action. I didn't see the plan, but I know for certain that
1 there was coordination.
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please now scroll down.
3 Q. It says here that the staff was planning three actions in
4 Podujevo, Dragobilje and Drenica. Is this what you were just referring
6 A. Yes, mopping up the terrorists in the Podujevo, Dragobilje,
7 Drenica areas. These are the locations: Lap, Drenica, Malisevo,
8 Dragobilje, those are the three locations.
9 Q. Well, that was about to be my next question. Now, are these the
10 three locations mentioned in your order of the 16th of July [as
12 A. Yes, those are those three locations.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: It may be I'm misunderstanding something here,
14 Mr. Lazarevic, but you said that the operative organs of the corps command
15 achieved coordination with the people dealing with planning in the MUP in
16 order to have coordination and coordinated action. I did not see the
18 Is that not something you would normally see?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Possibly it's a misinterpretation.
20 I wish to remind Your Honours that the initial order of the army commander
21 and my order was that in cooperation with MUP forces, the task of breaking
22 up the armed rebellion forces on three location was to be carried out.
23 Following that task, the operative organs in the corps command dealing
24 with planning, I remember well, contacted the people, the individuals
25 dealing with planning in the MUP, but the order issued by the MUP organs
1 is something I did not see. I -- that's what I was referring to when I
2 said I didn't see that document, but I know that there was coordination in
3 preparation for the carrying out of this task.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Would there not be a document which reflected the
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is a very good
7 question. Yesterday or the day before I said that apart from the item in
8 which the order that there should be coordination is issued, it was left
9 up to the lower levels of command to implement that cooperation. As you
10 saw in the previous document, through an order for communication,
11 coordination is achieved and the rules of combat say that special
12 cooperation plans have to be drawn up; however, such special cooperation
13 plans were not drafted. Instead, what was drafted was something replacing
14 such a coordination plan, and we will see it very soon and that really is
15 a problem that you have in understanding certain documents.
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, before we get too far along, at page 28,
17 line 11, it says 16th of July. I thought we were talking about February.
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I wish to thank my learned friend. I
19 was about to intervene. My colleague is right, my learned friend is
20 right, I asked about the 16th of February, whereas it says the 16th of
21 July in the transcript.
22 I think that now is a convenient moment for a break.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 We shall resume at five minutes past 4.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Your Honour, I wish to ask for your leave to complete the picture
5 and make it completely clear. The first order from January issued by the
6 General Staff is something I only mentioned for the record, but in order
7 to have a full picture of everything we have been talking about, it might
8 be a good idea for the General to comment on it. So we will now ask for
9 3D690 on e-court.
10 Q. General, this is a directive issued by the General Staff of the
11 Army of Yugoslavia dated the 16th of January, 1999.
12 MR. BAKRAC; [Interpretation] Please let's look at page 4 in B/C/S
13 and it's page 8 in English. It's page 4 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.
14 English page 8, B/C/S page 4, and it's item 3, tasks. It's page 5 in
15 English. I do apologise. Yes, now we have both the B/C/S and the English
16 versions on the screen. And where it says tasks and under 3.1 it says 3rd
18 Q. Can you comment on that, please.
19 A. In the directive issued by the Chief of the General Staff in this
20 item specific tasks are issued to the 3rd Army according to stages,
21 there's the first stage and the second stage. In the first stage taking
22 measures to protect from air-strikes by NATO forces, prevent introduction
23 of a NATO brigade from Macedonia into the area of Kosovo and Metohija. At
24 the same time, close off all the axes making it possible for terrorist
25 forces to act from Macedonia and Albania, make sure that roads are
1 passable primarily in the Pristina Corps area --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... Read all this
3 in the way you suggested before. We're familiar enough now with the theme
4 as you've explained it, so it's not necessary for Mr. Lazarevic to read
5 all this to us.
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. The first and the second stage were in coordination with the
8 forces of the air force and the -- air force defence where terrorist
9 forces are to be prevented from coming in from Albania, was this later
10 translated into an order to the Pristina Corps as we saw a little while
12 A. Yes, that's the principle. As a corps commander, I cannot alter
13 the task given to me by the army commander, so yes.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: We've been over all this, Mr. Bakrac. Please let's
15 move ahead. There's a limit to how much you need to spell out to us about
16 chains of command and how they work.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, we'll move on. The plan that had been drafted previously
19 for the engagement of units in combat, your plan of the 16th of February,
20 1999, did it automatically enter into force or were some other activities
21 undertaken in the Pristina Corps command?
22 A. There's nothing automatic in the implementation of tasks of this
23 importance in the defence of the country. There have to be ever more
24 specific orders for specific parts of the plan. I recall that a day or
25 two before a state of war was declared there was specific planning in the
1 corps command pertaining to how the task of the 16th of February would be
2 implemented, and there it said according to a separate plan.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 5D276 up in
5 Q. It appears to be your document and could you please comment on it.
6 General, you have in front of you this document. Could you please comment
7 on it.
8 A. This is a document from the Pristina Corps command dated the 22nd
9 of March, 1999. This is my concept in my capacity as the corps commander.
10 This is how on the basis of the order of the 3rd Army commander, based on
11 the Grom 3 directive and his special decision, how to conceive the
12 destruction of the terrorist forces in those three locations. And
13 assessing the overall -- the current situation of the manning level of the
14 corps, I suggested to the army -- 3rd Army commander not to implement this
15 task in full but only in part because the corps did not have enough
16 forces, and it is -- it can be seen from this document that I propose that
17 the terrorist forces be neutralised only in Donja Drenica, not in the
18 whole area of Drenica, as the plan envisaged; not in the whole of Lab, but
19 only in the upper part of Lab; and the Malisevo location was left out
20 completely. The procedure now was as follows: I presented this concept
21 of mine to the 3rd Army commander. He was at the command post of the
22 Pristina Corps at the time. I was also presented to his operations
23 officers, and only once he verifies this concept of mine or amends it,
24 then a specific order is drafted for the execution of a combat task.
25 Q. If we look at page 2, the last sentence, could you please comment
1 on it. It says here a request was sent to the MUP for the use of
2 engagement of their forces and coordination was -- a coordinated action
3 has been organized with them.
4 A. Now we come to the specific explanation of the previous question.
5 In the planning of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist activities,
6 the corps command had coordinated actions with the MUP forces in their
7 turn in their own plans they envisaged the neutralisation of terrorists in
8 these locations. And I notified the army commander that this coordination
9 had been achieved.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me, please. Your Honour, there's some kind
11 of a conflict between the transcript and the document. The transcript
12 says with regard to the last sentence in the document that a request was
13 sent to the MUP for the use of engagement of their forces. The document,
14 on the other hand, says MUP submitted a request to have their forces
15 engaged. I don't know which one of those is the right translation of
16 the -- of the actual situation, whether the request was made to MUP or MUP
17 made the request.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
19 Mr. Lazarevic, can you clarify that, please.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly. We saw from the previous
21 document that MUP planned in parallel independently from the 3rd Army
22 command and the corps command --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not as complicated as that, Mr. Lazarevic.
24 Just tell us who made the request. Was it the VJ or the MUP?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here that MUP submitted a
1 request for the coordination of coordinated action.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 Mr. Bakrac.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me now that
5 we're talking about this document. In the heading of this document it
6 says "concept," and this word is missing from the English translation.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Lazarevic, we will now call up an exhibit that you've already
10 seen here, and I would like you to comment on it.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 5 -- P1966,
13 Q. When we were talking about the previous document, you spoke about
14 upper Lab and lower Drenica. Is the Malo Kosovo area related to any of
15 these locations?
16 A. Upper Lab is part of Malo Kosovo.
17 Q. General, we've seen this document a few times and we will be
18 commenting on the addendum to the decision. Could you please explain to
19 us who drafted this document and what is this document all about.
20 A. Since the 3rd Army commander accepted my concept or my proposal
21 for the implementation of the combat task, the operational organs at the
22 corps command started the planning process for the implementation of this
23 task. In light of the previous experience from 1998 in the planning of
24 the coordinated actions with the MUP forces or support to the MUP forces,
25 the operations officers in the corps command in the heading of this memo,
1 they wrote the Joint Command for KiM and they recorded this document in
2 the log-book of the Pristina Corps, and this order for the routing and
3 destruction of the terrorist forces only in the Malo Kosovo area, so not
4 in all the three locations, this order was then sent to the corps units
5 for the purpose of the execution of the combat task.
6 Q. The tasks were then issued only to the Pristina Corps units; is
7 that so?
8 A. Yes, and you can see that in item 5 on one of the pages of this
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please first look at item 4,
11 decision, that's on page 2 of this document.
12 Q. Just before item 5 it says: "Readiness for the routing and
13 destruction of STS," and then there is a blank day, blank hour. Can you
14 please explain that.
15 A. At the time when this document was drafted, it was impossible to
16 determine with any accuracy the time when the task was to be executed.
17 That is why the readiness is not specified. This is not an executive act,
18 an executive document. It was impossible to act on it because readiness
19 was not defined. As such, it is a kind of a preparatory order for a
20 forthcoming task.
21 Q. You mentioned item 5. I don't think that we have to go through
22 all of it, but could you just tell us briefly the units -- unit tasks,
23 could you tell us something about the tasks that were envisaged for these
24 units. Item 5 begins on this page and then continues on to the next page.
25 A. In item 5, as far as I can remember, a task was issued to combat
1 groups of individual brigades. I don't know whether there were four or
2 six of them in total, and their task was in coordination with the MUP
3 forces to actually implement this order.
4 Q. You say in coordination -- in a coordinated action with the MUP
5 forces. How was this coordinated action between MUP and the army, how was
6 it actually done?
7 A. This coordination was done at several levels. The first level was
8 the corps command, and let me tell you right away that there was also the
9 army command at the corps command with the organs from the MUP staff that
10 deal with the planning of forces for combat. And I would like to add that
11 the MUP staff in Pristina was not alone. There were some deputies or
12 assistants to the minister of the interior who also participated in that.
13 The coordination was also done at the level of the brigade commanders and
14 the level of the MUP detachments or the secretariats of the interior.
15 Through the exchange of information about the engagement, the execution of
16 the task, the communications, agreements about liaison officers to be
17 posted, and planning that at a certain place and at a certain time the
18 representatives of the police and the army would come together to the
19 combined post, combined command post that we were talking about where they
20 would command and control their respective forces.
21 Q. General, could we now move to the addendum to this decision, that
22 is P1967 --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that I have a number of questions to
24 try to clarify the situation here.
25 Mr. Lazarevic, what's the relationship between this document and
1 the previous one, that was your proposal or your concept?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document stems
3 from the concept since the army commander agreed with my concept or
5 JUDGE BONOMY: You've told us that there are efforts, presumably
6 through meetings or other communications, at various levels to arrange
7 coordination. What about at your level, who did you meet in the MUP to
8 arrange to coordinate your activities?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I personally as the
10 corps commander did not have any coordinated actions with anyone. I did
11 not call anyone for consultations or discussions or preparations. This
12 was done by the operations officers in the corps command, and their
13 opposite numbers in the MUP, in the police.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: What about the commander of the 3rd Army?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 3rd Army commander was at the
16 Pristina Corps command post in Pristina by that time in its peacetime
17 location, and to my knowledge at that time he did not have any particular
18 communication at that time because in 1998 the coordination system, the
19 system of coordination between the army and the MUP, was already well in
21 JUDGE BONOMY: This document that we're looking at came from the
22 Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. What was that?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that's the question
24 that we've been trying to find an answer to all this time. This is a
25 document from the Pristina Corps command for the combined execution of the
1 tasks with the MUP forces. The title of the document in the heading is
2 not appropriate. I state that quite categorically. It is not in
3 accordance with the rules of combat. As I explained yesterday, the
4 term "combined command" and "combined command post" are used in the rules
5 of combat. This term was first used in 1998, and the operations officers,
6 both in the 3rd Army and in the Pristina Corps, continued to use this term
7 which, Your Honour, refers only to situations where coordinated action had
8 to be carried out with the MUP forces. It was not used in any other
9 situation. And the purpose of this term was to suggest to the subordinate
10 units that this task was to be carried out in coordinated action with MUP
11 or by supporting the MUP.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I see the last page of this document, please,
13 on the screen.
14 Mr. Lazarevic, you'll see the final words of this document,
15 that: "The Joint Command shall command and direct all forces during
16 combat operations from the Pristina area," then it's signed Joint Command
17 for Kosovo. So who's in command of this series of combat operations?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document refers to
19 a specific operation, one action, and item 13 regulates coordinated action
20 and what you have read out is written in the last sentence of this item,
21 and that mean what I sought to explain over the last two days, namely,
22 that there would be combined commanding of the army and police. The
23 term "combined" was replaced by the term "joint," i.e., Joint Command.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, the Joint Command is a singular expression
25 and it applies to all forces during combat operations. And what we would
1 like to do is identify what this Joint Command is. I, for one, don't
2 understand what you're actually saying to me at the moment, I have to
3 confess. If you can help me understand it, fine, but I don't at the
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I fully appreciate why
6 it is that you fail to comprehend what I'm saying. I shall try once
7 again, but please do bear with me and try to remember what I explained
8 yesterday when I talked about combined commanding. Namely, combat
9 rules --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand what you were trying to say yesterday,
11 Mr. Lazarevic, but can I take it that you approved of this use of the
12 expression "Joint Command"?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This term, joint command of the army
14 and the police in the execution of combat tasks, was already in use in the
15 course of 1998 and is still being used now. But please, when you look at
16 this document, it exclusively speaks about the tasks of the Pristina Corps
18 JUDGE BONOMY: So does the last sentence: "The Joint Command for
19 Kosovo shall command and direct all forces," apply only to the Pristina
20 Corps forces?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. It refers to the
22 Pristina Corps forces; but using this clumsy designation it also indicates
23 that MUP shall have its own command, detachment command, that shall
24 command its own forces, and that is this combined commanding.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: With the greatest of respect to you, Mr. Lazarevic,
1 and applying basic common sense, it does exactly the opposite because the
2 previous sentence to that makes it clear that the -- the job is to
3 organize coordinated action with MUP forces and to introduce the concept
4 of a Joint Command seems to me to cause confusion or state the very
5 opposite of what paragraph 13 so far has said. So that's why I don't
6 understand what you're saying.
7 However, perhaps, Mr. Bakrac -- it's important that you understand
8 that I don't understand, and Mr. Bakrac, perhaps, can endeavour to
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps the following
11 documents shall help clarify matters. Before we deal with this question
12 of the combined command post can we take a look at the supplemental
13 decision P1967.
14 Q. And would you please comment on it and then we shall move on. This
15 amendment to the decision, the heading of which is again joint KiM
16 command, refers to the previous order for -- related to Malo Kosovo; is
17 that correct?
18 A. The previous order with -- which does not specify the readiness,
19 so according to the previous order which did not specify the level of
20 readiness, they could not proceed with the execution of the task. So this
21 is an abridged order which is called a decision. It has the same heading,
22 it has a number, a subnumber, which is related to the previous document,
23 but this document now defines the actual time of the execution of the task
24 concretely. And we should see page 2 in order to see the further course.
25 Q. The task units -- the unit tasks are on the second page, but the
1 readiness is indicated on this page, right, it is at 6.00 on the 24th of
3 A. Yes, I know that it is so and now I see that it is so. Readiness
4 to break-up and destroy Siptar terrorist forces at 600 hours on the 24th
5 of March, 1999.
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 2.
7 Q. Here the specific tasks of all the units are indicated; am I
9 A. These are the concrete tasks for the -- of the units to support
10 the MUP forces in the execution of this specific task.
11 Q. Concrete tasks for your units, right?
12 A. Yes, absolutely.
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to the very last
14 page, please.
15 Q. General, the KM in the region of the village of Lausa, what does
16 that stand for?
17 A. The command post shall be in the sector of the village of Lausa
18 during the execution of this task, and that is by a combat group of the
19 Pristina Corps.
20 Q. And at the bottom, can you see to whom this document was sent?
21 A. It was sent to the 15th Armoured Brigade, to the 125th, to the
22 tactical group 211, and to the 354th Infantry Brigade comprised within the
23 Pristina Corps.
24 Q. Had it been sent to anyone else, would that have had to be
25 indicated here?
1 A. Yes, certainly.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Was the previous document, 1966, in fact signed by
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The previous document, Your Honour,
5 is not signed, and all -- such documents are without signature except for
6 this one which is currently on the screen.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, these are the copies we have, but what about
8 the original at the time the document P1966 was issued, was it signed by
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I did not sign a single one,
11 Your Honour, except for this one document which is on the screen.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And why is that?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because such documents with such a
14 heading, which I must say is inappropriate, which replace both the
15 coordination plan and order were not signed by anyone in either 1998 or
16 1999 because such documents were to serve to subordinated brigades as
17 guidance documents; and in addition to these documents they also received
18 other documents with a heading of the corps command and signed by the
19 corps commander.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Excuse me for saying that I'm further confused, and
21 this needs to be clarified. You made a proposal or concept on the 22nd of
22 March which we saw, and there was then the Joint Command document of the
23 22nd of March. Your proposal or concept had been accepted. Is there a
24 document from the 3rd Army commander accepting your concept?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There exists such documents, Your
1 Honour. I don't know specifically about this activity, but it is enough
2 for the army commander to sign the map. However, the corps command was
3 also inclined to opt for these concepts of ideas given in this way, in
4 written form.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let me ask the question a different way.
6 When the commander of the 3rd Army approved your concept, how did he do
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He heard my proposal. With the
9 proposal I also carried a map, and he actually approved my concept on the
10 map itself. And sometimes he would write a couple of sentences stating, I
11 approve your concept, proceed with the execution of the task. But please
12 understand that the army commander was physically present with me
13 throughout this entire procedure. We were in the same room.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Following that, you issued -- or let me start that
16 Following that, there was created P1966, the 22nd of March
17 document, which you say is -- was unsigned in its original form. Who was
18 that issued to?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Pristina Corps command.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by the Pristina Corps command?
21 You're issuing the document as the commander of the Pristina Corps, as I
22 understand it. So when it goes to the Pristina Corps command, who do you
23 mean by that?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I say "the Pristina Corps
25 command," I mean the entire command, the commander, the organs which draft
1 the specific documents. The documents that we are discussing now are
2 drafted completely by the operations organ of the Pristina Corps command.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Did this document have a map attached to it?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a rule, each of these documents
5 would have a decision map attached and these -- but on these decision maps
6 it was not written "Joint Command," but "decision of the commander of the
7 Pristina Corps."
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Was there such a map attached to this document?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In respect of this action I cannot
10 be a hundred per cent sure because I do not have the document available,
11 but, Your Honour, I hope that in the further course of these proceedings
12 we will have occasion to see such documents, such maps which accompanied
13 this type of documents.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: If there was no such map, how would anyone
15 receiving P1966 be able to determine that it was authentic?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These documents, as well as all
17 other documents, would be delivered by official mail to the subordinated
18 command in -- under specific cover or in a specific envelope in which the
19 sender's address would be indicated; or the liaison officer from the corps
20 command would, as courier, physically take it; or the commander of the
21 brigade would come to the corps command to receive these and a series of
22 other documents; or, fourthly -- and fourthly, there would be preparations
23 executed for the realisation of this task. And the commander of the
24 brigade would easily realise what this was. He knew exactly what it was,
25 to whom it referred, what kinds of documents these were, and what he was
1 to do.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I take it from all that you've said that if we
3 are looking at documents in 1998 and 1999 which bear on the face of them
4 to be from the Joint Command for Kosovo but are not signed, there's every
5 likelihood that they are authentic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, these documents are,
7 from the aspect of the command of the Pristina Corps, are authentic. They
8 were created where I have indicated, they were filed in the log of the
9 command, and they were sent to the units of the Pristina Corps. And I
10 assure you that the commanders who received those documents could come and
11 say what these documents were and what they meant for them, including the
12 other documents that were attached to them.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 Mr. Bakrac.
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Microphone not activated]
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. You've explained exactly to whom this was addressed. Please just
19 tell us now, in the army is it possible to amend the decision issued by a
20 higher command, a superior command, or is it practically impossible?
21 A. An amendment to a decision can only refer to one's own document or
22 a document issued by a subordinate command. A document issued by a
23 superior command may not be amended or modified in any way.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we have in e-court 5D463.
25 Q. General, this is a daily combat report issued by the command of
1 the 125th Motorised Brigade. It's not long. It can be read all the way
2 to item 5, but please read and comment on item 5, activities of the units.
3 A. Your Honours, this is a combat report issued by the 125th Brigade
4 which participated with some of its forces in the execution of the task we
5 are talking about. In item 5.1, the combat group, combat group 1, has
6 been engaged pursuant to a decision by the Pristina Corps commander to
7 destroy the terrorist areas in the area of Donja Drenica. In item 5.1.4,
8 combat group 4, I'm reading the last sentence, is participating in
9 coordinated action to destroy the terrorist forces in the area of Bajgora
10 and Malo Kosovo. The brigade commander, therefore, however clumsy that
11 document may look to us, understood that it was a decision issued by the
12 command of the Pristina Corps, and he acted on it. He is here informing
13 me that he is acting on my decision.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 5D1357 on
15 the screen. It's a combat report of the corps command to the 3rd Army.
16 Q. Could you comment on it, please. What is this about, with special
17 reference to item 4, please.
18 A. This is a combat report of the corps command of the 25th of March
19 addressed to the 3rd Army command. I can't see item 4 very well. If
20 you're referring to situation in the territory.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. I'm reporting to the army commander that in the course of the day
23 combat operations were conducted to break-up and destroy terrorist forces
24 in the general areas of Orahovac, Podujevo, and Drenica.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we have 5D1358, please.
1 Q. Item 5 on page -- well, before that. The date is the 26th of
2 March, 1999, and it's a combat report of the Pristina Corps command to the
3 3rd Army?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Let's look at page 2, item 5, activities and situation in the
7 A. In the combat report of the Pristina Corps command I inform the
8 army commander that according to the plan of the Pristina Corps command,
9 the units in combat groups are successfully implementing the tasks to
10 destroy terrorist forces in the Drenica area. Pursuant to the decision
11 and plan of the corps command.
12 Q. And the next page, item 8. Do you see here that the focus of
13 activities for the following day and so on?
14 A. Yes. The focus of activities for the following day, if you look
15 at the fourth line, is breaking up and destroying terrorist forces in
16 accordance with the Pristina Corps command plan.
17 Q. Thank you, General.
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P1999.
19 Q. General, this is an analysis of the activities of the 549th
20 Motorised Brigade, and I would like us to comment on page 2. Let's turn
21 to page 2. On page 2 above where it says conclusion, that's the last
22 paragraph, but three paragraphs above that could you please read slowly so
23 the interpreters can follow.
24 A. "Command of the envisaged forces was unified -- was combined --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- "through joint" --
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that your
3 translation differs from the Serbian version which is why I asked the
4 General to read this slowly.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, he had better read it again because he wasn't
6 allowed to complete it.
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] It was not interpreted.
8 Q. Could you read slowly from the beginning.
9 A. "Command of the envisaged forces was combined by the Joint Command
10 of the forces of the MUP and the Army of Yugoslavia."
11 JUDGE BONOMY: That seems to come to the same thing, Mr. Bakrac.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] This is a problem with translating
13 the word "objedinjeno." Could we say by the combined Joint Command [In
14 English] MUP and VJ.
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter suggests that this be referred
16 to CLSS.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Each of the translations suggested so far comes to
18 the same thing. There's a Joint Command of the MUP and the VJ.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation].
20 Q. We'll now go back to some other activities of yours in the course
21 of February, before the beginning of the aggression. In some situations,
22 did the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia ask for specific reports
23 on certain events; and if it did, why?
24 A. To the best of my recollection, there were several situations
25 where the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia asked the corps command
1 directly to deliver a separate report on certain events in the corps area.
2 I can only speculate as to why.
3 Q. Well, let's look at 5D251.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you accept that it was within the authority of
5 the Chief of the General Staff to ask for a direct report?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, yes, and as the
7 subordinate commander in the 3rd Army I was duty-bound to inform him that
8 I had received such a task, and this was not unusual and there was nothing
9 odd about it. And a report could be sought directly from the corps. The
10 date is the 23rd of February, 1999 --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Just let me complete the questions I have. Would
12 the Chief of the General Staff have authority to give you direct orders?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The superior has the right to issue
14 a certain order to the second level of subordination, but if he does not
15 inform the first subordinate, that is, me, I am duty-bound to inform my
16 first superior of such an order. So, yes, he does have that right.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: There may be a translation problem with this
18 answer. You said the superior has the right to issue a certain order to
19 the second level of subordination. Now, you would be the second level of
20 subordination; is that correct?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
23 Mr. Bakrac.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you comment on this document and why this was sought?
1 A. On the 20th of February, 1999, there was a large-scale attack in
2 the general area of Suva Reka by terrorist forces on part of the 549th
3 Motorised Brigade, which was engaged in reconnaissance of the area for the
4 dislocation of material reserves. The OSCE mission was there when the
5 attack took place. The attack went on for a few hours. I informed the
6 command of the 3rd Army in my regular daily report. As far as I can
7 recall, the liaison team or the signals team of the 3rd Army, the liaison
8 team of the OSCE mission also sent a report to the General Staff about
9 this; however, it's possible if I may be allowed to make assumptions a
10 little bit, bearing in mind that we have seen some documents from the
11 collegium of the Chief of the General Staff where there was some ideas
12 about such events and some thoughts about them, whether the Chief of the
13 General Staff decided directly to ask for confirmation of these events by
14 asking for a report from the corps commander -- well, maybe yes. And this
15 is my report wherein the first item, I inform him that nothing happened in
16 Vucitrn. The army did not engage in any activities. I then go on to
17 explain what happened concerning the attack in Suva Reka. And in item 3
18 an incident that had taken place between the OSCE mission and the unit
19 that was in the border belt, where that unit did not permit the OSCE
20 mission to enter without the liaison officer.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Why do you think a direct report was sought?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at that time I did not
23 know that; but as I sit here, I now make this assumption by your leave on
24 the basis of what we've heard and the evidence that we've seen about the
25 meetings of the collegium of the Chief of the General Staff where some
1 members of the collegium gave their own interpretations of the
2 developments in the corps area of responsibility, explaining that they
3 obtained this information from some other sources. And the Chief of the
4 General Staff then went to the corps commander for confirmation to get the
5 first-hand information. But this is what I'm speculating now on the basis
6 of what I saw in some of those documents.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Sounds rather convoluted, Mr. Lazarevic. Are you
8 saying that you think the Chief of the General Staff maybe suspected he
9 wasn't getting the whole story, or am I reading too much into your
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would rather be inclined to say
12 that he had some information that did not tally with what is written here
13 in this text, but let me assure you, I know that information of this
14 nature was contained in other documents, quite specifically in the
15 documents from the liaison team with the OSCE mission in the 3rd Army,
16 about these very same events.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 Mr. Bakrac.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. What measures did the Pristina Corps command take in order to
21 carry out the tasks it had received, given the conditions and given that
22 it had its peacetime forces?
23 A. These were measures that pertained to the implementation of the
24 tasks received from the General Staff via the 3rd Army command, but with
25 the application of certain work methods by specifically defining the
1 implementation of those tasks in periods briefer than seven days and
2 through written orders.
3 Q. In order to maintain and improve the combat-readiness, did you
4 have any meetings with your subordinate commanders or did you have any
5 collegium meetings before the combat operations actually started?
6 A. The corps command in this period when it was not war, or peace,
7 decided to work directly with the subordinate commands -- commanders in
8 the form of briefings at the corps command. All of them were there to
9 analyse the security situation and the combat-readiness in units. At
10 those meetings, specific tasks were defined that applied to a period of
11 time shorter than seven days.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, lest we should go into
13 all of the documents that contain those tasks, let me just for the record
14 note the exhibits -- Defence exhibits that we will -- that we're referring
15 to, that's 5D252, 5D260, 5D272.
16 Q. General --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. -- Did you ever at those briefings and at those collegium meetings
20 with your subordinate commanders plan any activities targeting the
21 civilian population?
22 A. No, we did not. And I hope that once the Trial Chamber has
23 inspected those documents, the orders that pertain to the very beginning
24 of the war and the period immediately before the war, will see that these
25 documents regulate the improvement of the combat-readiness in strictly
1 peacetime conditions, documents that specify key tasks, and there is not a
2 single word about what you were asking me about, about any plans that
3 might refer to any crimes.
4 Q. General, in light of the seriousness of the situation on the eve
5 of the NATO air-strikes, did you issue any orders instructing the military
6 personnel, restricting the movement of army personnel in uniform outside
7 of the barracks, or anything of the sort? Or let's just look at Exhibit
8 5D277, it appears to be your document. Could you please comment on it.
9 A. This is order, this is my order, an order by the corps commander.
10 It was signed by the Chief of Staff because I was probably not present
11 there, warning the subordinate commanders on the day before the imminent
12 threat of war was declared that because of the increased terrorist attacks
13 that have grown more frequent, measures should be taken that active-duty
14 personnel and the corps personnel in public places should not go out,
15 should not appear in public, in uniform, which in a way, if somebody were
16 to look at it from outside, it is humiliating. You're ordering your
17 subordinates not to wear uniforms, but the gist of this warning, the gist
18 of this order, is that the appearing of corps personnel in uniform might
19 cause the conflicts to escalate, might cause further attacks on the army
20 and the violence could spiral out of control even sooner.
21 Q. We see that in item 3 you insist on full discipline.
22 A. Well, in virtually every order - and I hope that I will have the
23 opportunity to go through some other orders - but in this order
24 disciplined performance or carrying out of this order and other orders is
25 something that is insisted on and reports are sought on the execution of
1 those tasks.
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would now like to
3 move on to a different topic, so perhaps this might be a convenient time
4 for a break.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we can break now and we'll resume at five
6 minute to 6.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 5.56 p.m.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
11 Q. General, we've seen and heard here that the OSCE mission on the
12 20th of March, on the eve of the bombing left Kosovo and Metohija. Can
13 you tell us as the corps commander whether the KLA exploited this
14 situation in the field; and if yes, in what way?
15 A. Well, this was a dramatic time on the eve of the aggression. The
16 attacks by the rebel and terrorist forces throughout Kosovo and Metohija
17 doubled in intensity. These attacks targeted the military, the police,
18 and the civilians. I remember quite clearly, in particular in the Drenica
19 area in Metohija, and as far as I can recall now in just four days after
20 the withdrawal of the OSCE mission there would be 15 to 20 attacks daily,
21 on the average. Around 15 persons were killed and over 30 people were
22 injured in those four days. The storm was looming on the horizon and it
23 was quite clear that the war would break out. This could be seen from
24 those terrorist activities.
25 Q. Did the KLA - and there is some operational intelligence and some
1 combat reports - use the M-77 uniforms of the Army of Yugoslavia; and if
2 yes, how was that possible?
3 A. This is not operational intelligence. This was a widespread
4 practice. Terrorist groups wore the army uniforms and the army insignia.
5 They did not wear just the M-77 uniforms which are older, but also M-89
6 uniforms. There were numerous reports from the units that sustained such
7 attacks, and as far as I can remember as the corps commander I personally
8 issued warnings. I remember that the General Staff and the army commander
9 warned about this phenomenon.
10 Q. And how was it possible, sir, that those uniforms were used?
11 A. Well, the problem -- it is not a big problem to procure a military
12 uniform or a uniform resembling a military uniform. I remember that in
13 January 1999, the military district command, it is subordinate to the 3rd
14 Army, gave us information that there were over 5.000 military uniforms,
15 that the former military conscripts of Albanian ethnic background failed
16 to return to the army. So this was one source of such uniforms. We heard
17 in this courtroom evidence from Prosecution witnesses that they had
18 military uniforms in their possession. Also, in various markets it was
19 possible to obtain those uniforms in illegal ways. So this was not such a
20 big problem.
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I would like to refer the Trial
22 Chamber to 5D184 and 5D947. We would proceed more quickly if we would now
23 not open each and every document dealing with those issues.
24 Q. As the NATO air-strikes began, were just some parts of the Kosovo
25 and Metohija territory targeted by the KLA, the attacks on the
1 authorities, state institutions, and so on?
2 A. The whole of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was affected by
3 the armed rebellion. I would say that there was not a single village, a
4 single town, a single settlement where there were no attacks on the
5 institutions of the state, the security forces, civilians, primarily
6 non-Albanians, but also on Albanians who did not join those paramilitaries
7 formations of the KLA.
8 Q. Did you in the corps have information that NATO forces were
9 planning a ground attack, first on Kosovo and Metohija and then on the
10 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
11 A. We in the corps command received intelligence from the 3rd Army
12 and directly from the General Staff, but we also had our own intelligence
13 and operational information. And it was our very, very considered
14 assessment that there was a great certainty that there would be such a
15 ground aggression by NATO forces on the area of responsibility of the
16 Pristina Corps.
17 Q. Were there reports - I mean your operational reports - that
18 established a link between the start of the NATO attack and the
19 large-scale movement of the civilian population?
20 A. There were operational reports and intelligence reports, but there
21 was also the situation on the ground, right from the first day of the
22 aggression against the country, that was the 24th, and even perhaps a day
23 before when it became quite clear that there would be the aggression
24 against the country.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have on our screens
1 Exhibit 5D692.
2 Q. This is information number 113. It is a telegram sent by the
3 chief of the intelligence information, General Krga, and in item 2 on page
4 1, the last paragraph just before item 3, the last paragraph in item 2, I
5 would like you to comment on this paragraph and I will be asking you some
6 questions related to the military doctrine in this context.
7 A. This intelligence report from the General Staff indicates that the
8 General Staff has intelligence, that NATO air force had targeted the
9 Siptar facilities and refugees in order to force them to leave the
10 territory of Kosovo and Metohija in as large numbers as possible, in order
11 for NATO to be able to fire on the security forces in Kosovo and Metohija
12 as indiscriminately as possible. And as quoted here, "to prevent the Army
13 of Yugoslavia from using the civilians as human shields."
14 Q. Sir, let us leave aside intelligence report. What I want to know.
15 You said that you are a career military officer, that you've been -- that
16 you were a military officer for 32 years. In military tactical sense, in
17 the sense of the military doctrine, was it reasonable to move out the
18 civilian population and to expose one's own forces to NATO air-strikes
19 without, as is said in this intelligence report, any reserves in terms of
20 the ability to target civilians?
21 A. In the sense of military doctrine, this would be extremely risky.
22 It would be extremely unacceptable and dangerous, but I want to tell the
23 Trial Chamber that the corps command, together with the army command,
24 discussed this issue in light of the threats that we had received through
25 the foreign media, from NATO officials and statesmen, from some countries
1 that Kosovo and Metohija would be turned to dust, and that as many
2 civilians as possible would move out. And the army commander, as far as I
3 can recall, phoned the General Staff to see whether something could be
4 done through the state authorities from the standpoint of humanitarian
5 concerns to prevent the moving out of the civilians.
6 Q. Where was the focus of NATO attacks in Kosovo and Metohija? What
7 did they target primarily?
8 A. The focus of NATO's air campaign and remote strikes was the border
9 area towards Macedonia and Albania, over 250-kilometre front, which was
10 between 20 and 25 kilometres deep, where they had daily isolating of the
11 battle-field, as it was referred to. This was exceptionally heavy
12 shelling and strikes with every conceivable, available, lethal asset of
13 this greatest, biggest world military group.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we have 5D1336 shown on the
16 Q. Could you -- this is a map, this exhibit is a map, and could you
17 please comment on it. You say, General, in the -- the objective was
18 isolating the battle-field. Can you clarify this military term for us,
19 and there are many of us who are not quite sure what that means, are not
20 familiar with such terms.
21 A. Isolating the battle-field means that on the area in question
22 everything which is found there is destroyed and neutralised without
23 discrimination as regards objectives. This is -- this involves military
24 and civilian objectives, everything which stands in the way of a land
25 intervention -- of the land intervention that was being prepared from the
1 areas of Albania and Macedonia.
2 Q. Can you now take a look at this map and explain to us. It seems
3 that all the NATO aviation attacks are located there, but they are also
4 blue and rectangles and triangles, can you tell us what this is about.
5 A. This is an overview map of the shelling by NATO forces in Kosovo
6 and Metohija. According to the reports of the Pristina Corps and the 3rd
7 Army, there were over 2.000 aerial strikes on the territory of Kosovo and
8 Metohija, with 37 per cent of the strikes targeting civilian facilities,
9 civilian targets, and the red triangles mark civilian targets and the blue
10 ones the military and police or, in a word, military targets. Normally
11 you could not have drawn in 2.000 attacks or strikes in this map, and not
12 even that figure is quite accurate. At the command post of the 3rd Army
13 there was a special group of officers, including officers from the air
14 force corps, and they maintained these figures as precisely as they could.
15 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I just want to put something
16 on the record. This does not appear to be on my list of exhibits in the
17 notification. It's the second one today. It may not be a big issue, but
18 if I got it in a supplemental notification, I'd like to be informed.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: It may, indeed, be a big issue, Mr. Hannis. The
20 suggestion is 37 per cent of air-strikes targeted civilian facilities.
21 Now, you -- it's difficult to tell that from the -- in fact, you can't
22 tell it from the map, but it may be a prelude to some detailed information
23 about what these 700 or so facilities were.
24 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, for exhibits that I wasn't given
25 notification of, then I would insist on a little more foundation as to
1 what this is because it's the first moment I'm seeing it.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, can we lay a foundation for this
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I omitted to inform my
5 learned colleague, Mr. Hannis, and we received an explanation of this
6 document a while ago from the -- from General Lazarevic, namely, that the
7 group at the command post, the forward command post, maintained records as
8 far as it could according to the information it gathered and the combat
9 reports, the sites and localities of NATO strikes. But let me say at the
10 outset or in advance, rather, we do not have precise figures about these
11 600-plus civilian facilities. We can obtain them a bit later,
12 subsequently. There does exist a white paper on it, I believe. My
13 colleague Visnjic knows more about this.
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me just add that I
15 announced this document in my schedule for the cross-examination so that
16 there should be no problem for the Prosecution, and of course I do not
17 object to colleague Bakrac using it in his examination.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I still think it would help, Mr. Bakrac, if we
19 discovered how this was compiled and who compiled it.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I don't know that, Your Honours. We
21 can ask the General if he knows it.
22 Q. General, you heard a question of Their Honours, of the -- His
23 Honour. Who actually compiled this, do you know what the origin of this
24 document is?
25 A. I know quite reliably. I have seen a document numbering tens of
1 pages which was generated at the forward command post of the 3rd Army
2 during the war, which includes all military and civilian targets
3 throughout the territory of the 3rd Army that were targeted by NATO
4 aviation strikes and remote shelling. This overview which is not quite
5 clear on the right-hand side, this rectangle actually indicates exactly
6 the towns and the municipalities, the targets in these towns and
7 municipalities, how many civilians, troops were targeted, et cetera. So
8 that is the basis upon which this map was created. I don't know whether
9 that document which is quite voluminous has very many pages is in the case
10 file, but if it is necessary, and if so instructed by the Trial Chamber, I
11 personally know how that document can be obtained quite quickly --
12 relatively quickly.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, in connection with this map, as the corps commander were
16 you aware of NATO's use of banned ammunition, radioactive ammunition, and
17 cluster bombs in Kosovo and Metohija?
18 A. I was aware of that, I was aware of that as the corps commander,
19 and so was every member of the corps. And unfortunately, also numerous
20 civilians, namely, that NATO had used everything it had apart from a
21 classical nuclear bomb, but radioactive ammunition, yes, and to a very
22 large extent too.
23 Q. As the corps commander, in fact, that you were aware of this fact,
24 did you take any measures?
25 A. I should like to say to the distinguished Chamber that already in
1 mid-March appraising the situation and this -- assessing this very
2 certain use of these terrifying weapons, we ordered that special ABH units
3 should be prepared, units of the atomic, biologic, chemical defence --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Would counsel please not overlap with the
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we call up 5D268, which is the
7 relevant order and then you can continue talking about the measures taken
8 and why they were taken.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a document of the corps
10 command signed by the Chief of Staff of the corps, and this is information
11 which was received from the General Staff which was being passed on to all
12 units along with instructions as to how to proceed if radioactive
13 ammunition is used, but you stopped me in midsentence. I wanted to say
14 that we in the corps, on the basis of this document but also on the basis
15 of our own evaluation and appraisal, we decided already before the war to
16 form a reconnaissance and observation elements of atomic, biological, and
17 chemical defence units which would following each air-strike reconnoitre
18 the locations that were targeted, that were struck, effect dosimetric
19 control of the location, mark the location, warn both civilians, the
20 civilian population, as well as the security forces not to approach the
21 area and, if possible -- possible for the location to be decontaminated,
22 and I should like to say that tens of scores of locations were controlled
23 and inspections under air-strikes involving private facilities, socially
24 owned facilities, and military facilities which were controlled for
25 radioactive radiation following the strikes.
1 Q. General, we heard General Petkovic's testimony here. He was the
2 chief of the ABH defence, and there was something controversial. I
3 believe that the Presiding Judge also asked him whether there was any data
4 about the use of cluster bombs and other bombs in the period end March and
5 beginning of April. Do you know whether cluster bombs were used already
6 at the end of March and beginning of April?
7 A. I'd like to say this. I personally know that -- because at the
8 end of March the general area of the corps command post and several
9 adjacent villages were targeted by a large number of cluster shells which
10 we defused in order to prevent the civilian population and troops from
11 getting hurt.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we have Prosecution Exhibit P2297
13 up on the screen, and this is the war log of the 52nd Battalion of the
14 military police. The date is the 31st of March, 1999. The page number is
15 K05208757 --
16 THE INTERPRETER: But the interpreter is not quite sure of that.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] It is page 3 in the English version.
18 Q. Until we get the English version, look at the 31st of March and
19 read the first page out for us. Was this what you meant when you said
20 that you were personally aware of that happening and that it was in the
21 command zone?
22 A. Yes, that is the period I referred to, and I specifically spoke
23 about this region, about this sector. On the 31st of March, during the
24 night, the position of combat vehicles was targeted in the lower part of
25 the Kisnica village where a cluster bomb fell, there were no consequences.
1 Let me tell you, a cluster bomb contains 450 banned cluster bomblets in
2 it, of which one-third or even 50 per cent remain active for ten years or
3 even more, and if activated by anybody via a sensor, the consequences are
4 disastrous. That was in the immediate vicinity of the command post.
5 Q. General, at the very beginning of the war, were there also
6 civilian targets hit by NATO strikes?
7 A. Unfortunately from the very outset of the air campaign, of the
8 bombing campaign, a large number of targets in both rural and particularly
9 in urban communities, such as Pristina, Djakovica, Prizren, Urosevac, and
10 let me not enumerate them all.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now have Exhibit 5D980 up on
12 the screen, and until it is shown on the screen, I should like to say that
13 this is a regular combat report of the command of the military district
14 dated the 5th of April, 1999, addressed to the command of the 3rd Army at
15 the forward command post.
16 Q. Please comment on item 1, the first paragraph, or rather, the
17 second paragraph and the third paragraph -- and the third paragraph.
18 A. The targeted area was the military district of Gnjilane, the
19 village of Koretiste, and the Binacka Morava factory, Kosovska Mitrovica,
20 the mining facility of Stari Trg, and the bridges and tunnels on the
21 section of the road Gazivode-Ribarice, and the military district of
22 Pristina, the monastery of Gracanica, the depot or war reserves of the
23 command of the military district, that is a military target, the
24 Jugopetrol storage, that's a civilian facility, and the Kosavski Junaci
25 barracks. In the Pec military district they repeat, at the Gubavac hill
1 was targeted and the military district of Prizren, the suburban
2 settlements in Pec, Suva Reka, and Dragas. And of the larger towns and
3 settlements in Kosovo and Metohija -- actually, from the larger towns and
4 settlements in Kosovo and Metohija, there was continued moving out of the
5 population, the Siptars were moving towards Macedonia and the Serbian
6 population towards Nis and other towns.
7 Q. So we can see from this combat report that it says there is
8 continued moving out of both the Albanian and the Serbian population; is
9 that right?
10 A. It is true. Everybody fled every which way wherever they could.
11 Q. What was the procedure, or rather, did the Pristina Corps take any
12 measures in order to render assistance when NATO strikes also targeted
13 civilian targets?
14 A. With the permission of the Trial Chamber, I should like to say
15 this, under conditions when we didn't even know how many soldiers had been
16 killed and where, all the corps units exerted maximum efforts in earnest
17 in order to help the civilian population after every strike and after
18 every such calamity, starting with the urgent -- the most urgent rendition
19 of assistance to the survivors, their evacuation to military medical
20 facilities or to civilian medical facilities. And to make a long story
21 short, all conceivable measures including blood donations. I personally
22 ordered my commanders to cease all other activities, and with special
23 forces that had been structured beforehand join in the rendition of
24 assistance to the -- all those who were the victims of such strikes.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lazarevic, are there combat reports that
1 reflect that action?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Distinguished Presiding Judge, there
3 do exist numerous reports, especially of brigade commands and the corps
5 JUDGE BONOMY: But are there no -- this is a combat report of
6 whom? This is -- this is from the Pristina Corps, is it?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, distinguished Presiding Judge,
8 this is a combat report of the military district of Pristina to the
9 command of the 3rd Army on the 5th of April.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: So what you say is there will be other combat
11 reports which do actually indicate the sort of action being taken that
12 you've just described? Obviously it wasn't required in this case, but
13 there will be other examples; is that the position?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, there were such
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was just about to
18 assist. We'll come to a part of my cross-examination where we shall
19 see -- of my examination-in-chief where we shall see what the Pristina
20 Corps undertook and what steps it took to look after civilians, but we
21 were trying to take things step by step and show all the possible reasons
22 why the civilian population left the province, and this can be seen from
23 some combat reports. We'll come very soon to these reports and the
24 specific measures taken.
25 Q. General, what was the overall task of the Pristina Corps and were
1 there any priority tasks?
2 A. The Pristina Corps in wartime found itself at the strategic focus
3 of the defence of the country at a front stretching over 250 kilometres
4 with the general task of defending the integrity of the country from
5 aggression. The priority tasks within that overall task were the
6 following: Protecting manpower, material resources from air-strikes and
7 from attacks by the armed rebels; prevention of further penetration of the
8 aggression forces into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; thirdly,
9 efficient combat control of the territory, which was to make it possible
10 for the other subjects of defence to efficiently become included in the
11 defence of the country; the fourth priority task was successive
12 mobilisational and operative deployment for the implementation of this
14 Q. How were the corps forces engaged and in what echelons? Was there
15 a plan in March and April?
16 A. The forces of the Pristina Corps, both according to the Grom 3
17 plan, that is, the peacetime forces, were concentrated and focused on
18 defending the state border. Just before the beginning of the war and with
19 the beginning of wartime operations special orders arrived for the
20 strengthening of those forces, and in early April there was another
21 complex plan for the defensive operation carried out by the corps known as
22 Grom 4. This plan was basically the central plan throughout the 78-day
24 Q. That is a plan issued by the command of the Pristina Corps; is
25 that correct?
1 A. Yes, that's the plan I've been talking about. Such a plan existed
2 at the level of the 3rd Army and also at the level of the General Staff,
3 but this time it was the Pristina Corps command that first drafted the
4 plan; after that, it was the 3rd Army and the General Staff because this
5 was a priority.
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that's 5D175.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] An order of the command of the
9 Pristina Corps for defence.
10 Q. And now let's look at the first page, after that the third page,
11 item 2, tasks of the Pristina Corps.
12 A. This is an order of the corps commander for defence, it's a state
13 secret, Grom 4 and in the first item the aggressor forces are described,
14 as are their intentions, goals, and possibly method of action.
15 Q. Now, please look at item 2, the tasks of the Pristina Corps and
16 comment on that very quickly.
17 A. This task, as I've already explained, was copied from the order
18 issued by the 3rd Army commander, and the gist of it is that in
19 coordinated action with the MUP forces and the forces of defence, further
20 penetration of the aggression forces into Kosovo and Metohija were to
21 be -- was to be prevented. So the aggressor forces had to be stopped at
22 any cost, and then with the additional engagement -- with additional
23 engagement, these aggressor forces were to be expelled from the territory
24 of FRY. And in this passage, the one before the last, the armed
25 non-Siptar population is mentioned again, and that's the part that did not
1 alter from the previous order. A command post is designated in the
2 Kisnica area, and this was immediately -- not just the command post, but
3 the entire village was subjected to attacks with cluster bombs.
4 Q. Now, please look at item 4.1, third paragraph.
5 A. Are you referring to the paragraph beginning with: "With part of
6 the forces ..."?
7 Q. Yes, and please comment why this says so.
8 A. Well, in this item my decision refers to the defence of the
9 country in the corps area, and the paragraph in question says:
10 "With part of the forces secure the territory and prevent a
11 spillover of terrorist forces from the Pecinje district Montenegro and the
12 Raska-Polinlje district into the Pristina Corps area of responsibility."
13 This implies that the corps is not only an 251-long-kilometre
14 front facing Macedonia and Albania protecting the country and not only is
15 it neutralising the armed rebellion within the territory of Kosovo and
16 Metohija, but it also must prevent on the right and left flank the
17 spillover of terrorist wing, the spillover of terrorist forces from
18 Pecinje district and other places.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Now let's look at 217 on page 14 --
20 12.7 on page 14.
21 Q. The last sentence before this.
22 A. Yes, I understand. In all the combat documents of any nature,
23 including the most general and basic war plan, this is a plan for the
24 defence of the country, there is an order, there is a decision. In all
25 situations consistently respect all the provisions of the international
1 laws of war and, let me add, a large number of special orders were issued
2 almost every other day as to how the provisions and rules of conduct
3 should be applied, both of humanitarian law and the international law of
5 Q. Well, we'll come to all those special decisions, but, General,
6 item 13, command and communication, that's on page 15. Yes, we see that
7 corps command post has been provided for, also a forward command post.
8 Can you comment on this?
9 A. Yes. The command post of the corps in the area of the village of
10 Kisnica, that's an abandoned mine. Then there is a rear command post in
11 Gracanica and a forward command post that was still not operating. There
12 was a command group in Djakovica, but very soon it would become a forward
13 command post when the chief of the corps went to head this group. That's
14 why there is a blank space here.
15 Q. General, let's look at the last page. It seems that in this plan,
16 Grom 3, coordinated action with the air force, the anti-air defence, and
17 the MUP forces has been provided for and envisioned?
18 A. Let me correct you. This is not Grom 3. This is Grom 4, but you
19 are right. Coordinated action with the air force and the anti-aircraft
20 defence on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and with MUP forces is
21 regulated in the order for communications. And with Their Honours' leave,
22 because the Presiding Judge asked me a question as to whether this
23 coordinated action was regulated anywhere, let me say that this order for
24 communications is an integral part of this entire order, as are a number
25 of other orders, and I think it even has an exhibit number. But all I
1 want to do is point out that this large -- this capital N refers to the
2 order for communications.
3 Q. General, in the indictment there is mention of forces of the FRY
4 and Serbia --
5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I see my colleague Mr. Zecevic on his
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Page 71, 14, I believe the witness says order for
8 communication which defined the -- which defined this or something along
9 these lines. Maybe witness can be asked again to verify that.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, you may wish to clarify this.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Microphone not activated]
12 Q. [Interpretation] You heard my colleague. Can you clarify,
14 A. I was going to confirm once again that with the order for
15 communications, the communications of coordinated action are concretely
16 being regulated with the air force, anti-air force defence, and MUP.
17 Q. Thank you, General. I will repeat my previous question. In the
18 indictment there is mention of the forces of the FRY and Serbia. Can you
19 tell us what defence forces were engaged in Kosovo and Metohija in 1999,
20 when the war started?
21 A. I will risk generalizing the Law on Defence and the actual
22 situation on the ground, and I will mention the three main structures of
23 forces in the defence system which were engaged during the war on the
24 territory of Kosovo and Metohija. These were the forces of the Army of
25 Yugoslavia, the forces of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of the
1 Republic of Serbia, and the forces of the Federal Ministry of Defence of
2 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So I'm not speaking of any other
3 forces or subjects of defence here, and in accordance with the Law on
4 Defence, citizens, organizations, and organs, federal, republican, and so
5 on and so forth.
6 Q. As for the Army of Yugoslavia now allow me to reformulate my
7 question. Who organized, prepared, and commanded the units of the civil
8 defence and civilian protection?
9 A. The preparation, organization, training, equipping, and use of the
10 forces of the civil defence and civilian protection on the territory of
11 Kosovo and Metohija was carried out by the competent organs of the
12 Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and these
13 competent authorities were the following: The administration for defence
14 in Pristina and the regional organs of that administration within the
15 districts and municipalities.
16 Q. Who commanded these forces during the war?
17 A. These forces were commanded from the top of the Ministry of
18 Defence through the administration for defence of the Republic of Serbia
19 and then down the chain, which I mentioned the administration of defence
20 in Pristina, and then the regional or district ministries of defence.
21 Q. Would you be so kind as to comment a Prosecution exhibit, P1339.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could it be placed on the ELMO,
24 JUDGE BONOMY: You referred just now to the administration for
25 defence of the Republic of Serbia. What is that?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, within the civil
2 defence as an institution at the level of the Federal Republic of
3 Yugoslavia and within the scope of the Ministry of Defence, there are two
4 administrations at the level of the member republics. There is an
5 administration for defence at the level of the Republic of Serbia and
6 another administration for defence at the level of the Republic of
7 Montenegro. May I continue?
8 JUDGE BONOMY: That's sufficient. Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.
9 Mr. Bakrac.
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, could you please look at this exhibit. Does it show that
12 the civil defence, or rather, could you please read paragraph 1 and
13 comment on it.
14 A. By Your Honour's leave, the very stamp of this memorandum, the
15 heading, the letterhead, to be more specific in answer to your previous
16 question, the federal ministry of defence, the district organ in the
17 Republic of Serbia, this is what it says there, this is this organ at the
18 level of the Republic of Serbia, and this organ issues orders to the
19 administrations for defence in the territory of Serbia. In paragraph 1 it
20 is -- it says:
21 "I hereby order that all organizational units of the Federal
22 Ministry of Defence, district organ for the Republic of Serbia, to receive
23 orders exclusively from the seat of the district organ for the performance
24 of all the duties and tasks in the area of the defence of the country."
25 This is signed by the head of this organ, Colonel Manastirac,
1 later General Manastirac.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean that this organ is part of the
3 Government of the Republic of Serbia?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid, Your Honour, that I
5 cannot be very specific here. I'd rather say that this was a part of the
6 ministry of the defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but it has
7 a detached administration, both at the level of the Republic of Serbia and
8 on the level of the Republic of Montenegro, as can be seen from this stamp
9 here where you have the Federal Ministry of Defence and the district organ
10 in the Republic of Serbia.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Mr. Bakrac.
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Do you know the strength of the civil defence?
15 A. I must admit that as the corps commander, I really didn't have any
16 relevant data about this particular body. To tell you the truth, Your
17 Honour, apart from knowing one of the chiefs in Pristina, I was not aware
18 of their structure, of their organization. On the basis of the documents
19 that I've seen in the course of this trial, I've been able to ascertain
20 that their establishment strength was over 9.000, and recently I've been
21 able to see a document originating from the Ministry of Defence indicating
22 that their strength was even greater than that. So I really don't know
23 how many people they engaged during the war, how many people they
24 mobilised and armed.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we are not referring to
1 the exhibit number now. We will be using it in the course of our case.
2 This was not announced to the Prosecution. It has not been translated
3 yet. We will be using it later, and the exhibit number is 5D1368. This
4 is a document speaking about the strength of the civil defence.
5 I see that it's one minute to 7.00. By courtesy of my colleague
6 Mr. Ackerman I, received information that the list of prisoners, of
7 captives, has been admitted into evidence as an exhibit, the number is
8 4D509, it is an exhibit of Mr. Pavkovic's Defence, and perhaps now this
9 would be a convenient moment.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, it's not admitted into evidence, it's
11 just in e-court, but it's the list that you were inquiring about earlier,
12 a list of prisoners.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 We shall then adjourn now and resume at 11.00 tomorrow in this
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Friday, the 9th day of
18 November, 2007, at 11.00 a.m.