1 Wednesday, 21 November 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Following the decision that was made on Friday in

6 relation to the interview and the record of the interview of

7 Mr. Lazarevic, the Chamber has been considering whether there are any

8 implications that should be addressed. And we have concluded that there

9 is one further step that ought to be taken. Rule 43(vi) seems to us to be

10 in very simple, mandatory terms.

11 "The tape," that's the record of the interview, "shall be

12 transcribed if the suspect becomes an accused."

13 Now, this case is -- doesn't fit exactly the time-scale of Rule

14 43, but plainly the provisions must apply to the situation of an accused

15 who is interviewed following his indictment, just as it applies to the

16 situation of an accused who was originally interviewed as a suspect. And

17 when you look at the simple language there, it doesn't raise any issues of

18 translation, it doesn't say anything about the language; it simply says

19 the tape shall be transcribed, which means everything on the tape. And

20 that means that the transcript in this case should have consisted of the

21 whole of the tape-recording.

22 Now, if the Prosecution intend to rely upon the transcript or at

23 least the interview, intend to rely on the interview at all, then it has

24 to be transcribed in its entirety. And even if the Prosecution do not --

25 decide that they do not intend to rely upon it, if the accused insists

1 then it has to be transcribed in its entirety.

2 Now, none of this affects the decision we've taken, that this was

3 already exhibited, used in the trial, and is part of the evidence;

4 however, we do now order the Prosecution to have the balance of the tape

5 transcribed. I suspect Mr. Hannis is not in a position to say anything

6 about how long that will take, and I do know that it could take some time;

7 however, we take the view that everything else needs to be dropped to deal

8 with this and it has to be done within a very tight time-scale.

9 Should the provision of the transcript result in the need to

10 review anything that's occurred so far in the trial, then we will review

11 the situation and grant any necessary relief. For example, Mr. Bakrac

12 might point to something in the transcript in B/C/S that somehow or other

13 has alerted the accused to an issue that hasn't been adequately presented

14 to the Tribunal, and we would have to consider whether some relief ought

15 to be granted. But again, we will impose a pretty tight time-scale on

16 that, to ensure that we introduce what's necessary under 43(vi) as quickly

17 as possible to avoid it having any other implications for the trial.

18 The specific order will be made tomorrow in the light of you

19 having time to reflect on what we are saying and for Mr. Hannis, in

20 particular, to consider the implications that this may have on the

21 transcription facilities available. But we would expect to be told that

22 this can be done pretty quickly in all the circumstances.

23 There's also in this case, apart from any of the issues that arise

24 about interpretation, the obvious discrepancy between the position of

25 Mr. Lazarevic and four of the other accused whose interviews have been

1 transcribed in full. And it's only right that there should not be seen to

2 be any distinction among them.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you for this

6 clarification, and I think I still owe you something. Pursuant to your

7 order, I still have to request a corrected translation of -- I had to get

8 a corrected translation of 5D194, paragraphs 2 and 3; this has been done

9 and I believe it's been uploaded into e-court. Now, I can deal with that

10 either in re-examination or we can do something now, but I complied with

11 your order and I received information that this has already been done and

12 it should be in e-court with Exhibit 5D194.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you aware of it, Mr. Hannis?

14 MR. HANNIS: Not specifically --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you should have time to consider whether

16 there is any comment you wish to make. If, having done that, there's

17 nothing you wish to say, then we can deal with this orally, but we'll

18 postpone it until you've had an opportunity to consider the position.

19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Your Honour, if I may, just one comment

20 on what you raised. I had intended to bring up with you a related

21 translation issue regarding the three upcoming witnesses. I know we

22 discussed this yesterday, but I was advised again today that we still have

23 a number of those that weren't translated. Mr. Bakrac explained to me

24 that yesterday he was only talking about Lazarevic being completed. I

25 propose perhaps -- I'll go back and see if perhaps the transcription of

1 this interview can be done in-house.

2 The other possibility is the interpreter who interpreted for that

3 interview I understand now works at CLSS, so it might be easier if she

4 were the one assigned to do it and I'll inquire to see if that's a

5 possibility as well.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I would invite you to avoid in any way inhibiting

7 CLSS capacity to deal with other issues that arise at the moment for us.

8 Your point about the translations -- translation of exhibits is noted, and

9 that's going to have to be dealt with as and when it arises.

10 Mr. Lazarevic, sorry about that, but it was necessary in your

11 interests and in the wider interests of ensuring a fair trial for everyone

12 here to address that issue. I'm sorry to have interrupted the

13 cross-examination, but that can now continue.

14 Mr. Hannis.

15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

16 WITNESS: VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

19 Q. Good afternoon, General. I think the last thing I had asked you

20 about yesterday was a Supreme Command Staff --

21 A. Good afternoon --

22 Q. -- order about getting VJ commands and units out of schools. I'd

23 like to show you now Exhibit P1462. I think this is what you made

24 reference to. You said you hadn't seen the Supreme Command Staff order

25 but you did see one from the 3rd Army. And is this the one that you were

1 referring to dated the 13th of May from the 3rd Army command?

2 A. Yes, yes. I'm familiar with this order because I complied with it

3 with regard to the subordinate units.

4 Q. And I note that this says that: "Since NATO is firing at schools

5 which VJ commands, units, and institutions are accommodated, I hereby

6 order immediately relocate."

7 So isn't it correct that at least some of those "civilian" targets

8 that NATO was hitting at were things like schools in which VJ commands and

9 units were located, right?

10 A. This document from the army command that refers to the chief of

11 the Supreme Command Staff, I understood it to refer to the whole of the

12 territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I did not understand

13 it to refer specifically and only to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

14 But the corps command, as soon as this order was received, issued an order

15 to its units to the effect that if there are any elements deployed in

16 those civilian facilities, which they are, school buildings, to move out

17 of those buildings.

18 Q. All right. Thank you. Next I want to show you Exhibit 5D372.

19 General, this is a -- an order from you dated the 22nd of April, 1999, and

20 it's entitled "moving the VJ -- VTJ, military territorial units, from

21 inhabited places."

22 Based -- do you have that on the screen? I'm sorry.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Based on the date of that, can we infer that prior to the 22nd of

25 April those units -- at least some of them had been located in inhabited

1 places?

2 A. In the examination-in-chief I explained that the military

3 territorial units carry out tasks within larger inhabited areas in such a

4 way that as -- within the framework of larger-scale tasks, they secure

5 military facilities. So my answer is that parts of those units were

6 performing their functions in larger towns, securing military facilities

7 and other facilities that are important for the defence of the country.

8 Q. And we see in item number 3 in your order, the second sentence

9 says: "Do not allow civilian refugee groups to remain in the zones of

10 defence of brigades."

11 When you're talking about the zone of defence of a brigade, how

12 big an area are you talking about?

13 A. These areas vary in size, the surface areas differ, depending on

14 the actual unit, but this refers to sectors of deployment of the

15 units, "rejoni" so close to the sectors of deployment of the brigades, to

16 provide assistance if there are any civilians so that they are not out in

17 the open air, those refugees to assist the civilian authorities and the

18 police, to find some accommodation for them that would be more

19 appropriate. And these are areas 20 by 30 kilometres, sometimes 60

20 kilometres, 10, 15.

21 Q. Okay. And I know in your direct that we saw I think a couple of

22 other orders of yours where you were trying to make provisions for the

23 civilians and instructed subordinate units to in certain situations try to

24 move them out of areas of anticipated combat with the terrorists or the

25 KLA, correct?

1 A. Terrorists and the security forces, because the KLA terrorists did

2 not fight each other, that was the interpretation that I got. So let me

3 just correct that. But the essence, the gist, of my orders was the

4 following: Wherever possible, to assist this population, lest they should

5 find themselves in cross-fire, under cross-fire, lest they should be used

6 or abused, perhaps that would not be done on purpose, but they should not

7 at any rate find themselves in the area where there are intensive

8 conflicts between the security forces of the FRY and of the terrorist

9 forces in Kosovo and Metohija.

10 Q. All right. And is it correct that in the first weeks of the war,

11 the VJ was also engaged in constructing dummy positions, if you understand

12 the term, to mislead NATO into bombing artificial assets, if you will?

13 A. Yes, as part of operational, tactical, and technical camouflage

14 deception measures, all kinds of measures were used, dummy targets, decoys

15 were set up, any number of those technical and tactical measures.

16 Q. And in one of those other orders of yours I saw an instruction

17 that the civilians should not be placed in areas where the VJ was

18 deployed; that's right too, isn't it?

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we please look at

20 this order in order to be able to see the context of this question? My

21 colleague Mr. Hannis refers to some other order and draws some

22 conclusions, yet we don't know what is actually in the order. I think it

23 would be only fair if we were able to see, if Mr. Lazarevic were able to

24 see this order that Mr. Hannis is referring to.

25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't want to look at it. If he

1 doesn't remember, he can tell me he doesn't remember; if that's not

2 correct, he can tell me. But I have limited time here and I don't want to

3 look at that.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, please proceed.

5 MR. HANNIS:

6 Q. Do you remember, General, did you have some orders to that effect

7 or not?

8 A. I know very well that I issued orders, that combat positions in

9 accordance with the combat plan of certain units at the battalion level

10 should be relocated in order for the civilian population to be able to go

11 back to their original places of residence. I know that, and I'm

12 particularly referring to the Lab and Podujevo areas. Secondly, I don't

13 recall the exact order in which I purportedly prohibited the placement of

14 civilian population nearby, but I know that I did warn a number of times

15 that security measures should be taken to prevent any risks, any

16 endangering of the safety of the units in positions and in their sectors,

17 that's true. And thirdly, in one of the orders right at the beginning of

18 the war, I think the date is the 25th of March, I indicated or I referred

19 to Article 70 of the Law on Defence, envisaging that commanders at the

20 level of a regiment or a brigade may restrict the freedom of movement of

21 the civilian population close to their sectors of deployment. But in my

22 examination-in-chief I said that as far as I can remember no brigade

23 commander had ever implemented this order; quite the contrary. They

24 assisted wherever they could, they directed the civilian population to

25 prevent any situation in which they could be targeted, either by NATO

1 air-strikes or terrorists. So all my orders and warnings went in that

2 direction.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Conflict with the terrorists

4 and legitimate concerns that KLA or KLA sympathizers could be amongst any

5 group of Kosovo Albanian civilians, I take it that you had concerns about

6 those groups of civilians being located in or around the places where the

7 VJ had command post or where their units were located in populated areas.

8 Isn't that true?

9 A. Well, it's a general military issue, a question of doctrine, but

10 to give you a specific answer, Mr. Prosecutor. The main command post

11 where I spent most of my time as the commander is in the immediate

12 vicinity of Albanian population, that's in the village of Badinovac

13 [phoen] and the village of Kisnica, that was the fact throughout the war.

14 And it never occurred to anyone to evacuate to other sectors away from the

15 corps command. The army command was located there too. So I accept that

16 as a matter of general principle that is so. There is a grave danger and

17 many of the commanders asked for instructions. The medical battalion that

18 was in the centre of Podujevo treating Albanian civilians reported to me

19 several times that they said that they were afraid that they would be

20 targeted by some attacks; fortunately, that never occurred but that would

21 be the briefest possible answer I can give you.

22 Q. General, if your instructions were to not permit the civilians to

23 be in areas of VJ deployment and that they should be moved out of areas

24 where combat with the KLA was about to or might be about to take place, if

25 they were not to be in the -- I forget what the term was I used at the

1 beginning - the zones of defence of the brigades, I suggest to you in

2 Kosovo at that time, that doesn't leave many places for those civilians to

3 be, does it?

4 A. Well, this question is quite long, so I would like to ask the

5 Trial Chamber's permission to -- I would like to say that I did not say in

6 my response that civilians could not be in the zones of the units; quite

7 the contrary. I ordered that special elements be set up to protect these

8 people if they ever found themselves close to the sectors. So that is the

9 gist of my answer. And now as to how many civilians there actually were

10 in Kosovo and Metohija, I can only say that as far as I know some larger

11 towns had even more inhabitants than before the war, Gnjilane, Podujevo,

12 Prizren, and those were the reports that I had been receiving. There were

13 many people in Pristina, too, so that was the knowledge that I had at the

14 time. Now, as for the actual number, I really don't know it.

15 Q. You were aware, though, that huge numbers of civilians had left

16 Kosovo in the first two weeks of the war, right? You couldn't help but

17 know that?

18 A. I was aware of the fact that many people had left Kosovo and

19 Metohija because it was a battle-field, and this caused serious

20 consequences for everyone concerned. People were leaving in all

21 directions, in the -- and in one of my reports I reported to the army

22 commander, so he was aware of that, and he reported further up. So this

23 is not something that we were not aware of. This caused us some concern.

24 As far as I can remember, I said that this was a humanitarian concern and

25 it was also a concern from the standpoint of military doctrine.

1 Q. Can we have a quick look at Exhibit P2930. I don't know if this

2 is the document you referred to, but it's a Pristina Corps regular combat

3 report dated the 31st of March.

4 MR. HANNIS: And if we can scroll down, I'm not sure where the

5 reference is.

6 Q. You may have seen this shown to another witness, General, but it

7 talked about MUP and military territorial units channelling Siptar

8 refugees to the Albanian border.

9 MR. HANNIS: I think we may have to go to the next page in

10 English.

11 Q. Do you recall that?

12 A. I first have to answer that I did not refer to this report. This

13 is not a combat report from the Pristina Corps command, but from a command

14 group that was in Djakovica at the time because the forward command post

15 had not yet been set up. So this is not in Djakovica, it's in a village

16 of Mazre. As far as I was able to see, that's a couple of kilometres away

17 from the Albanian border. And I saw this here, this document was shown on

18 one or two occasions to witnesses.

19 Q. My misstatement, General. But do you recall having seen such a

20 report? You said you sent it to the -- you sent a report about that to

21 the 3rd Army.

22 A. Yes, but not based on this report. It was based on the report of

23 the brigade commanders in whose areas the border crossings were. At the

24 time this report could not have reached the corps command; it couldn't

25 have reached the corps command in the following ten days, because in the

1 night between the 27th and the 28th Djakovica and the communications

2 centre were destroyed in the NATO air-strikes. The forward command post,

3 or rather, command group was established on the 9th of April, and it could

4 not send reports to the corps command in written form.

5 Q. Let me go then to one of the reports from a brigade commanders,

6 this would be P2046. General, this is a regular combat report from

7 Colonel Dikovic of the 37th Motorised Brigade dated the 28th of March,

8 1999. And the last item under 9.3 before his name he says:

9 "In the forthcoming operations in the Vocnjak village sector, we

10 expect to encounter shelters with several thousand civilian refugees. We

11 request instructions."

12 Do you recall having received this report or having been advised

13 of the contents of this report about those civilian refugees?

14 A. I cannot confirm at this point in time whether this is how it was

15 reported, but I do know about these events. I know that he requested the

16 treatment of civilians in the area of combat activities; and if I may be

17 allowed to say this, as far as I can see, this report was not signed by

18 Nikovic, one of his commanders signed it. And the way I understand this

19 officer here is the following: This was a combat group, it wasn't yet a

20 brigade in the beginning of the war. And in his assessment, because in

21 item 4 at the beginning it says that terrorist forces are firing on army

22 units from that village, so he expected there to be conflicts and he

23 feared that this would lead to refugees fleeing. And he said that he did

24 not have the strength to protect the civilian population from those

25 hostilities. He couldn't help them or get them out of the area of combat

1 activities, and if I may add, this is a unit or part of a unit with no

2 combat experience as yet. And yesterday we saw how on the 7th of August

3 the commander of the 15th Brigade informed the corps command in 1998 when

4 activities against terrorist forces were interrupted if civilians were

5 observed or humanitarian organizations or diplomats in the immediately

6 vicinity. Through the centre -- through the intelligence centre he

7 received a reply that firing should be stopped and fighting should be

8 interrupted in order to avoid imperilling the life of civilians.

9 Q. You heard evidence in this trial from some of the survivors of

10 what we've called the massacre at Izbica, and so you're aware that there

11 are allegations that that took place on the 28th of March, right?

12 A. We have heard testimony here that between the 25th and the 28th or

13 29th of March, there were testimonies.

14 Q. And do you know that Vocnjak village is approximately 2 kilometres

15 or less south of Izbica?

16 A. I cannot confirm that off the top of my head. It's possible. One

17 can see that precisely on a map. It's the area of Gornja Drenica.

18 Q. Well, if we can take a moment to look at P615 at page 17. And

19 I'll be looking to enlarge on the right one-third of the page and halfway

20 down in that right-hand column. Okay. That's good.

21 General, do you -- can you see Izbica on that map?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you'll see below that, almost directly south, Vojnik, yeah?

24 A. Yes, it says Vojnik here.

25 Q. That's the nearest village to Izbica shown on that map, isn't it?

1 A. On this map it is. I want to say to the best of my recollection

2 there's no place called Vojnik, it's Vocnjak. I have never heard of a

3 village in Kosovo and Metohija called Vojnik.

4 Q. Is there a document reflecting the reply from the Pristina Corps

5 to this request for instructions on what to do about those civilians? We

6 haven't seen that yet, have we?

7 A. Well, I might say that we have seen at least five or six

8 documents, which at the very beginning of the war defined with precision

9 the way the civilian population is to be treated, at least five or six

10 documents or orders as to how to treat civilians, how to take care of

11 them, how to assist them.

12 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt, General. I understand that we've seen

13 some of those general instructions, but I'm asking have we seen a document

14 that shows the specific reply to this specific request from

15 Colonel Dikovic about what to do about the expected several thousand

16 civilians that he thought they were going to come across in the Vojnik

17 village area. Have we seen such a document?

18 A. As far as I can remember, we have not seen a response to this

19 combat report. I can assess how this question was answered, and we will

20 have an opportunity probably --

21 Q. I'm sorry. I'm going to have to try and cut you off more often

22 today I think because I'm trying to get done as soon as possible. Thank

23 you, General. The next one I want to show you is a P2024. This is

24 another regular combat report from a different subordinate brigade, the

25 125th Motorised Brigade, and this one is dated 27 April 1999. It appears

1 to be a telegram.

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. HANNIS: And in English we have to go to the second page.

4 Q. It's on the first page for you, General, it's about ten lines up

5 from the bottom, and the English says: "During the day at 0800 hours, a

6 column of Siptar civilians was formed on the following axis," and further

7 on: "We believe they want to pull out from the sector of operations of

8 our forces in the general area of the Ramoc facility."

9 And this relates, does it not, to the action, the so-called Reka

10 action, that was going on in that area west and north-west of Djakovica at

11 that time?

12 A. Well, in specific terms as regards this date and this movement of

13 civilians at the time of those activities, K-73 testified about that.

14 That was in a part of the 125th Brigade, I assume it refers to that.

15 Q. That's right, General. Thank you. Now, I want to go one more

16 time to what you probably perceive as one of my favourite topics, the

17 Joint Command. Exhibit P2166 is the document we've talked about before

18 with other witnesses in this case. If we could have that up on the

19 screen.

20 And, General, I can give you a hard copy because this one's

21 several pages.

22 This is the minutes of the meeting of the operations

23 inter-departmental staff for the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo on the

24 29th of October, 1998. Do you recall having seen this one and having

25 heard it discussed here with a number of witnesses?

1 A. Yes, I remember that several witnesses spoke about this and

2 answered questions about it.

3 Q. And the reason -- well, one of the reasons I show it to you is

4 that I guess I have a question for you. Do you have reason to doubt the

5 authenticity of this document? Do you have any personal knowledge that

6 leads you to believe it's not authentic?

7 A. I don't know how I can confirm or deny this. I see that there's a

8 stamp there, that it comes from the archives, according to the protocol

9 and the format of this document, it seems to be regular. I did not hear

10 until my arrival in the Detention Unit of anybody referred to as an

11 operations inter-departmental staff at the high state level. I did not

12 have any knowledge of the existence of such a body, but from the technical

13 standpoint, I'm not an expert, but it appears to me to be -- to be a

14 record, minutes which have their registration number, date, signature,

15 that's a technical issue.

16 Q. Okay. And you've seen the list of the people attending that

17 meeting. You personally know or are acquainted with most of those people,

18 right?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. And you've seen the minutes and you've seen that every -- almost

21 everyone attending this meeting or at least everyone who speaks makes

22 reference to the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. And

23 General Pavkovic, your immediate superior, is the one who made the

24 presentation speaking on behalf of the Joint Command, right?

25 A. I don't understand. The Prosecutor is drawing my attention to the

1 last passage on page 1 in the Serbian language. I don't understand these

2 to be General Pavkovic's words, but rather, the words of the person taking

3 the minutes where he says "I'll speak on behalf of the Joint Command," if

4 that's what you're asking me about. The way I understand it, the person

5 who was taking the minutes was the one who spoke in those terms about

6 General Pavkovic. These are all statements, if they were statements or

7 contributions to the discussion, but they are not in quotation marks. So

8 these are not direct quotations, it's just somebody's notes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Is -- are they not supposed to be the words of

10 Milosevic?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood the

12 question to concern General Pavkovic, saying that he was speaking on

13 behalf of the Joint Command, and that's what I focused on --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The English to which your attention is -- the

15 English of the passage to which your attention's being drawn is a summary

16 of what Milosevic said introducing the session, and the last thing he said

17 was General Pavkovic would then present the proposals of the Joint

18 Command; is that not correct?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I see it now, it's in the

20 paragraph before the one I was looking at. I wasn't sure what paragraph I

21 should focus on, I didn't get precise instructions, but I says

22 General Pavkovic will present the proposals of the Joint Command, but I

23 cannot confirm that these are the words of the president of the FRY, maybe

24 they are but --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Hannis will now ask you the question he's

1 working up to.

2 MR. HANNIS:

3 Q. Well, General, we see at the last page that these minutes were

4 compiled by Lieutenant-General Slavoljub Susic, did you know him? It's on

5 the very last page.

6 A. After the war as far as I can recall, I saw him on one occasion

7 but I didn't know who he was or what post he held. After the war,

8 however, I think I did have an opportunity and I know who the person is,

9 yes.

10 Q. And in the list of attendees on the first page his name is the

11 last one mentioned and it says Lieutenant-General Dr. Susic. Do you know

12 what kind of doctor he was? He appears to have some special title.

13 A. I don't know, really. Probably something to do with military

14 science. I really don't know.

15 Q. And, General, don't you expect that in a meeting of this nature,

16 involving President Milosevic, President Milutinovic, the president of the

17 Federal Assembly, the top generals in the army and top police officials,

18 don't you expect that the person chosen to take the notes would be

19 somebody who could do a fairly good job of taking notes?

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I believe this really calls for

22 speculation. We know that Mr. Susic is heading the military cabinet of

23 FRY.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: There may be the answer, Mr. Hannis.

25 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I'd like this witness to agree

1 with me that you wouldn't have a slob take the minutes of this kind of a

2 meeting.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the answer is the person taking the minutes

4 would normally be expected to be the one doing so because of the position

5 he held. If the witness doesn't know, he doesn't know whether he's a slob

6 when it comes to taking minutes or not.

7 MR. HANNIS:

8 Q. Well, General, I would ask you to look at these minutes and

9 wouldn't you agree with me that they appear to be quite detailed and

10 rather precise?

11 MR. IVETIC: I'm going to object to that, Your Honour -- he's

12 asking the General to indicate that they're precise, how can he without

13 speculation know that they are precise or not. The document is what it

14 is. That's all he can establish if he hasn't been there.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS:

17 Q. Would you agree with me that these minutes are quite detailed?

18 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no, no, please deal with the objection. The

19 objection was that they were quite detailed and precise, so it extended to

20 both.

21 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I change my question for now to

22 just detailed. But I would suggest that we've heard evidence from this

23 witness and others talking about the Joint Command notes and the problems

24 with those; by contrast, I think this witness could give us some sort of

25 opinion about whether these notes were as good or better than what we've

1 seen in the Joint Command meeting.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, perhaps you would rephrase the question to be

3 appear to be quite detailed.

4 MR. HANNIS:

5 Q. Would you agree with me, General, that these minutes appear to be

6 quite detailed?

7 A. Well, I'm leafing through it now, trying to recognise something

8 precise. As far as my knowledge of the situation on the ground goes,

9 there's a lot of information here which I cannot recognise from the

10 viewpoint of numbers, large numbers, maybe this was actually said at the

11 meeting concerning the terrorist forces and the numbers of casualties and

12 those taken prisoner. Well, there's a lot of things written down here,

13 whether it's precisely noted down or not -- well, it's 16 pages long. A

14 lot of effort has been put into it. But what concerns me is that I do not

15 know of the existence of such a body, an operations staff. I don't know

16 about something like that. I didn't hear about it at the time. Here I

17 see that this staff issued orders and decisions, that it was chaired by

18 the president of the state, that there were officials there from the army

19 and the police. I knew that the corps commander with the army commander

20 and the Chief of the General Staff sometimes went to see the president,

21 but it's only here that I've seen such documents and come across minutes

22 like these. So these are minutes, it was not a stenographic record, as I

23 can see from what it says here. And I can neither confirm nor deny that

24 this is correct, what it says here.

25 Q. Well, General, on the first page we have the note that opening the

1 session President Milosevic informed the members of this group that

2 General Pavkovic was going to present the proposals of the Joint Command.

3 So there's our first reference to the Joint Command, and following that,

4 still on the first page, it says: "Speaking on behalf of the Joint

5 Command for Kosovo and Metohija, General Pavkovic reminded," there's a

6 second reference to Joint Command. And then we see General Pavkovic

7 talking about the plan to suppress terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and

8 you were aware that there was such a plan, you told us about that there

9 was a five-phase plan. This is page 3 in your B/C/S copy, I believe,

10 right? There was such a plan to suppress terrorism?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. And he lists some seven tasks in connection with that plan.

13 Number 2 was organizing, equipping, and coordinating the operations of the

14 MUP and VJ to oppose terrorist forces. That's something that you know was

15 done, correct? Prior to October 29th of 1998?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And number 7, that's on page 4, it talks about disarming all

18 Siptar villages which are known to be armed. You know that's something

19 that was being done between July and September of 1998 because you were

20 involved in that, were you not?

21 A. I couldn't accept that this corresponds to what I was saying and

22 what I participated in. I spoke about the border belt where the army was

23 in charge, where not even a hunting rifle could be brought in without

24 approval, without a licence, let alone establishing terrorist bases. As

25 for the rest, I didn't speak about that because it was not within the

1 competency of the army. And if I may be allowed to comment on this

2 further, on my understanding of this, my knowledge from that period is

3 that members of the Albanian national community voluntarily returned

4 without any consequences, no legal or judicial consequences, they returned

5 the weapons to the forces of public law and order, primarily the forces of

6 the MUP, in large quantities. And these illegal weapons, these

7 illegitimate weapons were collected. That's what was done. And what I

8 see here --

9 Q. Are you trying to use up my time? You were involved in disarming

10 Siptar villages, right? Maybe you were only in the border belt, but you

11 were involved in that in 1998. That is something that was done pursuant

12 to the plan to suppress terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.

13 A. No, that's not correct.

14 Q. What is not correct?

15 A. That's not correct. It's not correct that I participated in

16 disarming armed Albanian villages.

17 Q. You were involved in it because you were at the forward command

18 post of the Pristina Corps command, you attended meetings of the Joint

19 Command where you talked about those operations going on. So I say you

20 were involved in it to that extent, were you not?

21 A. I understand the exchange of information between the military and

22 the police in quite a different way regarding where measures should be

23 taken to take away illegally -- illegal weapons, especially in the border

24 belt. And I understand the meeting of the Joint Command in a different

25 way than was put by the Prosecutor. Thirdly, as far as I understood the

1 interpretation, there was a mention of operations conducted to disarm

2 armed settlements.

3 Q. In the Joint Command meetings you attended, did you not talk about

4 villages in which the surrender of arms was going to be undertaken that

5 day or the following day?

6 A. Yes, I talked about the necessity of the police, together with the

7 military, to enter the border belt villages, to negotiate, to talk to the

8 people there so that they would return illegal weapons, since such weapons

9 were not supposed to be there inside the border belt. Well, one shouldn't

10 have them anywhere, let alone the border belt.

11 Q. Okay. Could you go to the bottom of page 5. This is still

12 General Pavkovic talking about what was done under the plan. At the

13 bottom my English translation says: "Eighth, large quantities, over 150

14 tonnes of weapons and ammunition were confiscated and handed over in the

15 course of implementing the plan" - I'm on page 5 of the English - and next

16 I think you have to turn the page, General, to page 6. It says: "93

17 Siptar villages were disarmed, 31 in Djakovica municipality."

18 Is that consistent with your knowledge and information about what

19 was done in connection with the plan in July through September of 1998?

20 A. To the best of my knowledge, based on the combat documentation

21 that I could see back in 1998, when preparing for defence states that the

22 villages in a large number of municipalities voluntarily - and I reiterate

23 voluntarily - returned whatever weapons they had to the MUP organs. There

24 were announcements via local radio stations calling for them to surrender

25 their weapons without any consequences. That is the knowledge I have

1 pertaining to that period.

2 Q. Do you have a quarrel with the translations? My English says: "93

3 Siptar villages were disarmed." It doesn't say anything about whether

4 that occurred voluntarily or forcibly. I take that to mean that their

5 weapons were turned in.

6 A. I'm talking about what I knew based on the documentation I could

7 see based on the reports, which stated that villages voluntarily handed

8 over their weapons first and foremost to MUP organs --

9 Q. General, I'm not saying it wasn't voluntary and this document

10 doesn't say it wasn't voluntary.

11 A. You are correct. I do not dispute that. However, I'm telling you

12 what I know about it, that's how I understood your question. The same is

13 in the Serbian, disarmed, if that's what you mean.

14 Q. Okay. And in Serbian does "disarmed" have a connotation that it

15 was done other than voluntarily? I don't understand why you're arguing

16 with me about this.

17 A. I guess we're arguing about the word "disarmed." Perhaps in your

18 view this includes coercion, force, that it had to be done, that was the

19 meaning of "disarmed." However, "handed over" or "returned" --

20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, excuse me. Just a simple

21 objection. Mr. Hannis should simply repeat his question. He didn't ask

22 General Lazarevic what the document says, but rather what he knows about

23 it. If you look at the question -- well, that's what we heard. I don't

24 know what your intention was. That's the thing.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: It's Mr. Lazarevic who has insisted on answering

1 the question by reference to the document. The question that was put was

2 to quote what's in the -- this document and then say: Is that consistent

3 with your knowledge and information about what was done in connection with

4 the plan in July through September? Now, what's wrong with that question?

5 And is Mr. --

6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Nothing's wrong with the question, but

7 he was replying to the question. Mr. Lazarevic had never seen this

8 document before. He cannot know what is contained in something he never

9 saw, and he wasn't present at the meeting. That's what I wanted to say a

10 minute ago. We had three witnesses who were present at the meeting and

11 were not asked any questions about it. He's talking about what he knew.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, he's not being asked about what happened

13 at the meeting. He's asked about whether -- what did happen at the

14 meeting is consistent with his own personal knowledge, and he has insisted

15 on explaining that by reference to documents. Now, whether Mr. Hannis

16 wants to then explore that further is a matter for him, but there's

17 nothing wrong with the question that's been put.

18 Please continue, Mr. Hannis.

19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on.

21 Mr. Bakrac.

22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise. Maybe

23 there is a misunderstanding. When you say "referred to the document," but

24 he didn't refer to this document but rather to combat documentation from

25 1998 in general. He didn't mean this specific document --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I know that --

2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] -- but the combat documentation from

3 that period. It was my understanding that we were discussing this

4 document alone.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila's objection is he shouldn't be answering

6 it by reference to other documents; he should be answering it by reference

7 to his own knowledge, and indeed that's what the question tries to obtain.

8 Mr. Hannis, please continue.

9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

10 Q. General, a little farther down on page 6 there's a reference:

11 "9th item, 287 of our soldiers were put out of action, 62 from the

12 VJ, and 225 from MUP. 79 of our soldiers, 22 from the VJ, and 57 from MUP

13 were killed while the plan was being implemented."

14 Is that consistent with what you knew about the extent of losses

15 to the VJ during July to September 1998?

16 A. I am familiar with the information for 1998 in general, but as to

17 this specific number I can't tell you anything. I know there were 45

18 soldiers killed and 196 wounded in that year; however, as far as this

19 period goes, I don't know.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you actually saying that you're not familiar

21 with the figures for damage sustained to personnel through the

22 anti-terrorist operations in the summer of 1998?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Personally, back in 1998, I did not

24 conduct any analysis of the implementation of tasks. Towards the end of

25 that year, I know that we made an analysis, but it was an analysis for the

1 whole of 1998. I didn't analyse any casualties for this specific period

2 of two or two and a half months.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm talking now of general experience, and it's

4 related to the last 20 years or so. But my impression is that the public

5 are very well-informed of casualties in warfare throughout the world where

6 they have an interest, and it therefore comes as a bit of a surprise to me

7 that the man in charge at the border doesn't know how many casualties

8 there were during a particular operation. So can I take it that senior

9 officers in the army at that time would not be absolutely up-to-date on

10 the deaths and serious injuries being sustained by their men during

11 particular operations?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect, Your Honour,

13 it is a very sensitive matter, at least in the interpretation I received,

14 hopefully wrongly, I heard -- well, there were casualties at the border, I

15 saw people being killed, but I thought -- I wasn't asked about that. Here

16 we are talking about two and a half months and the number of soldiers

17 killed in the area of Kosovo and Metohija. I cannot confirm whether this

18 figure was precise or not. I had my own data concerning the border. I

19 know who was killed when throughout the year, but I did not deal with this

20 analysis, I did not attend any meetings pertaining to this period

21 analysing the situation.

22 And as I said, or rather, I quoted a very precise figure to you

23 which pertains to the whole year.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you able to give us the figure for the border

25 belt for the period that the report relates to, July to September?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could tell you that precisely, but

2 after the break I would have to go through my notes. I don't want to

3 confuse either you or myself. I have data by months and by intensity, the

4 number of wounded and killed and missing for that matter.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

6 MR. HANNIS:

7 Q. I'm sorry, General, I would like to ask you to go back a page for

8 a minute then, page 5. And General Pavkovic is talking about the losses

9 suffered by the terrorists during these operations. Do you find that

10 under the seventh item?

11 A. I see it.

12 Q. He mentions the number of 32.594, and he breaks that down by

13 saying 3500 were killed. And farther down he says 560 were liquidated in

14 special operations conducted by State Security Service. Can you tell us

15 what the difference is between killed and liquidated in this context?

16 A. I see that at the beginning of item 7 there is a mention made of

17 available information and evaluations --

18 Q. General --

19 A. -- which leads me to conclude that these figures are evaluations.

20 I'm trying to be precise --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lazarevic, you're not being asked to comment on

22 the figures yet. You're being asked what the difference is between being

23 killed and being liquidated. Mr. Hannis is limited for time, you must

24 concentrate on the individual questions that he's asking you and answer

25 these questions, please.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't understand this, Your

2 Honour. I don't understand these two bullets, what they mean. I don't

3 understand what liquidated and special operations conducted by the State

4 Security Service means.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Previous translation continues]...

6 MR. HANNIS:

7 Q. Okay, General --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the answer may be, Mr. Hannis, it's the

9 same word in Serbian in both passages, and there is no difference.

10 And I apologise if there's been a confusion in your mind,

11 Mr. Lazarevic.

12 MR. HANNIS:

13 Q. And then --

14 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Zecevic.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I just noticed that there

17 is a misinterpretation on this page under 7, the last word. In Serbian

18 it's "terrorist" -- the first paragraph of -- when it says seventh, it's

19 underlined and the last word is in English is "September" and in Serbian

20 is "terrorist." So I would suggest just for the clarity of this document

21 that Mr. Hannis returns this to the CLSS for a proper translation because

22 it's obviously not corresponding one to the other.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, does the Serbian say 32.594 terrorists up to

24 30th September?

25 MR. ZECEVIC: No, it says up to 3609 terrorists, I don't know what

1 that means, that is a fact, but that's what it says.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: So September is not referred to?

3 MR. ZECEVIC: No, it doesn't say 30th September at all. It says

4 36.09 terrorists --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: But that -- I see --

6 MR. ZECEVIC: And from the English text you might get the wrong

7 conclusion, which is not contained in the Serbian original. That's only

8 thing what I wanted to draw the attention.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems unclear -- it seems unclear, Mr. Hannis,

10 what that passage actually says.

11 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, with regard to one point, it's been my

12 experience that in translating dates if it's 36.09 and I think there's a

13 question mark whether the 36 should be 30, but 09 is typically translated

14 with the name of the month in English. That's what we see on documents

15 that are 06091998, will be translated 06 September 1998. I think that's a

16 standard practice in CLSS. But I don't know of the existence of the last

17 word being terrorist.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have a suggestion to

20 make. Perhaps Mr. Lazarevic can read it out loud and it will be as clear

21 as day; very simple.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Possibly.

23 Mr. Lazarevic, would you read from the word "seventh" to the end

24 of that sentence, please.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Seventh, based on available

1 information and evaluations carried out during the implementation of the

2 plan, losses, for various reasons, by the terrorists or on the terrorist

3 side are 32.594 to 36.09," I think there is another dot

4 there, "terrorists."

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you --

6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we should use some common

7 sense, and it's clear that the fifth digit is missing. It's very simple.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: So you say that it should be 36.090 or something

9 like that, is it?

10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Well, it says that the losses were

11 32.000 to something of terrorists, then it has to be a figure. It says

12 based on evaluations carried out. This is an evaluation, an assessment,

13 and the assessment is 32.594 to 36.000-something. It's between or

14 from/to. That's why the difference there. It's not a date.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, it may be that having the translation

16 revised does not necessarily answer all outstanding questions, but

17 nevertheless that should be done.

18 MR. HANNIS: I will, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

20 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Aleksic on his feet.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

22 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise, another

23 objection concerning this portion. To us attorneys at law in Serbia, they

24 say that we're extremely poor in math, but by adding these figures up you

25 do not arrive anywhere near the figures mentioned and to me it is highly

1 illogical.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That may be because whoever was at the meeting is

3 even worse at math than the Serbian attorneys, but we can hear more of

4 that in due course.

5 Mr. Hannis.

6 MR. HANNIS: Well, I do have a disagreement about the math. I

7 think if you add all the numbers you will come close to it. And what

8 Mr. Fila said it may be a range, that may be correct as well because you

9 will see the second item is 5 to 6.000 terrorists, another one is 8500 to

10 9500, another entry is 6000 to 6500 so if you add the low end and the high

11 end you may come up with a number very close to what Mr. Fila suggested

12 But be that as it may we will get that --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: That means that the missing number is 4.

16 MR. HANNIS: 36409 is that what you're saying?

17 JUDGE BONOMY: No, 36094, which would be 3 and a half thousand --

18 is it 3 and a half thousand of a difference? And that may be a thousand

19 out as well because there are 2.500 -- oh, no, 3.500 in the range. So

20 it's 3.500 of a difference it's 36.094.

21 MR. HANNIS: Yeah, I think that's correct.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Back to the law, Mr. Hannis.

23 MR. HANNIS: Yes, thank you.

24 Q. General, below the 560 were liquidated it says: "In addition to

25 the above-mentioned losses a total of 1.344 were put out of action in

1 operations on the state border ..."

2 So this is an area that you can perhaps help us with. It says:

3 "666 liquidated," I don't know if that's the same word for killed.

4 Is that consistent with what you knew about the number of terrorists

5 killed during the implementation of this plan -- this says between 25 July

6 and 25 September 1998?

7 A. I can be rather more precise concerning this item when talking

8 about the border. My knowledge, should I be given permission to state

9 what I find in my notes, mention a figure for the entire year at the

10 border there were between 4 and 500 casualties on the terrorist side,

11 again I repeat that this was an assessment, and captured or taken prisoner

12 or detained, since it was not a state of war --

13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the number of those

14 detained.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- However, I refer to the entire

16 1998.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: What was the number for those detained?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My knowledge for the entire year at

19 the border is around 600 -- 400 to 600. I cannot be precise, but I can

20 locate that in my notes, too.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

22 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, a part of the answer, 33, 14, was not

23 recorded in the transcript. I believe the witness said that as for the

24 wounded ones, it was always an assessment because we couldn't find out

25 precisely how many. But he says, I can find -- I can find that in -- the

1 assessment I can find in my notes.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

3 MR. HANNIS:

4 Q. General Pavkovic -- General Lazarevic, are your numbers only for

5 the state border with Albania? Does it include the state border with

6 Macedonia?

7 A. Macedonia as well.

8 Q. And from where were you receiving that information? Who provided

9 that information to you?

10 A. The brigade commander who was in charge of securing the border

11 in-depth and securing the border belt.

12 Q. So one possible explanation for the differences between the

13 numbers you told us and the numbers that are listed or noted down in this

14 minutes as being reported by General Pavkovic is that General Pavkovic

15 reported higher numbers, exaggerated numbers? That's one possibility,

16 right?

17 A. I don't know whether these are his words, whether the figures from

18 the table are his, whether he exaggerated anything. By your permission,

19 Your Honours, I also saw a document from the 3rd Army command. We saw who

20 the author was, and he paints the picture in completely -- in a completely

21 different way. The figures there are 10- to 15-fold less than these. I

22 don't know whether the army command was wrong or maybe General Pavkovic

23 put forth other figures at this meeting I'm now put in a position to

24 explain something which I can't. Had I been in that meeting, I would have

25 remembered a thing or to and I could assist you. But as far as I know,

1 and this was a Prosecution exhibit dated the 2nd of October, it was a

2 report from the 3rd Army Command referring to this very issue.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, is it a convenient time to interrupt

4 you?

5 MR. HANNIS: It is, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

7 We shall rise now and resume at five minutes past 4.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

12 Judge, I would tell you I have received that translation of 5D194

13 and I have no objections to it.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We shall allow the new translation to

15 be substituted for the previous.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

17 Q. General, you were just saying that some of those numbers

18 attributed to General Pavkovic were not consistent with the numbers as you

19 knew them to be. I would direct you to page 12 of the B/C/S, it's the

20 very top of page 12 in the English, and for you it's probably is little

21 more than halfway down. And in English it says: "In General Perisic's

22 view" -- I'm sorry, I'll wait for you. It's three paragraphs up from the

23 reference to President Milutinovic. Do you find that?

24 A. Yes, I have. President Milutinovic, and then just in front of

25 what -- before what he says.

1 Q. Yes. And it says: "In General Perisic's view, 'the situation in

2 Kosovo and Metohija does not correspond to the way it is depicted by

3 certain members of the Joint Command.'"

4 Two things about that, it appears we have a statement put in

5 quotation marks, which suggests those are the actual words of

6 General Perisic, and he's referring to the Joint Command, right? That's

7 what quotation marks would mean in a document like this.

8 A. I know that you put quotation marks when words are being quoted.

9 I don't know whether the italics in the original mean that. In Serbian

10 orthography there are quotation marks and they are used when you are

11 quoting somebody. Here what is being put by Mr. Prosecutor -- I see two

12 other marks in the sentence below this one that may indicate that this is

13 a quotation, but I cannot be sure if that is indeed so.

14 Q. The other question I have about that is that I suggest to you this

15 may be a reference to what General Pavkovic has said earlier in the

16 meeting regarding his summary of the plan for combatting terrorism as

17 carried out between July and September 1998. Don't you think that's what

18 he's referring to or --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, is that something Mr. Lazarevic is in any

20 better position to deduce than we are, Mr. Hannis?

21 MR. HANNIS: Well, only to the extent that he has a personal

22 belief that the numbers are incorrect, based on his own personal

23 knowledge, where you and I might not share that same knowledge.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: So the point you're putting is does he think this

25 is a reference to the inaccurate presentation of the figures?

1 MR. HANNIS: Yes.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, could you please deal with that,

3 Mr. Lazarevic.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My knowledge based on the documents

5 that I had an opportunity to review contemporaneously at the relevant time

6 and in my preparations for the defence, and now I'm referring specifically

7 to the documents related to this two-and-a-half month period from the 3rd

8 Army is completely different from the information that is presented here

9 in terms of the casualty figures of -- for the terrorist forces.

10 MR. HANNIS:

11 Q. And that document of the 3rd Army was prepared by whom?

12 A. I understood Lieutenant-General Tomislav Mladenovic, who testified

13 in General Pavkovic's defence, to say that he personally had drafted this

14 analysis as the operations officer of the 3rd Army. I understood that to

15 be the effect of his testimony.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Again, I have no problems with

18 Mr. Hannis's questions, but I have a problem with the interpretation. As

19 long as we have this on our screens, you see here your initial -- the

20 initial word in the English translation has the quotation marks "in

21 General Perisic's view," and then we have the quotation mark. If you look

22 at the Serbian language - and the Judge sitting next to you knows that

23 language - there is nothing of the sort, there are no quotation marks.

24 And then there is another passage where you have some other kind of

25 markings, that's the fourth paragraph in Serbian, yes, it says: "We have

1 to do everything," and so on, and there are some marks in Serbian, and in

2 your translation there are again quotation marks. And that is why

3 Mr. Hannis puts it to the witness that this is a quote, because there are

4 quotation marks in English but not in Serbian.

5 I don't apologise, Mr. Hannis, for interrupting you, but I'm doing

6 that because now we have this document on our screens.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: You will see, Mr. Fila, if I'm reading the right

8 paragraphs that there is different script used for the parts which are in

9 quotation marks.

10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That's -- that is so in one location,

11 but that does not mean that there are quotation marks there. This is

12 something that somebody inferred. You could just put those words in

13 italics in the English version, and if you look two passages down there is

14 no italics. We just see some markings there, they look like arrow points,

15 and then it just goes on.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, are both passages that you have

17 taken issue with not in italics?

18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] They are, yes, but this is just an

19 inference on the part of somebody that the italics mean that this is a

20 quote. In Serbian, that's not -- that's not so; that may be so in

21 English, but it's not so in Serbian.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: This is a matter also in which you can make

23 submissions in due course. Please proceed on the basis you're proceeding,

24 Mr. Hannis.

25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. General, I'll try to speed this up. In addition to

2 General Pavkovic and Mr. Milosevic being attributed to having used the

3 term "Joint Command" and what we just saw regarding General Perisic, I

4 will tell you that at page 7 of the English and the B/C/S we have

5 General Lukic attributed to as using the term "Joint Command." We also

6 see it for Mr. Minic on page 10 of the B/C/S, page 9 of the English. We

7 see it in connection with Mr. Milutinovic on page 12 of the English and

8 the B/C/S; and Mr. Sainovic on page 13, in both the English and the B/C/S.

9 Do you think General Susic made a mistake ten times by writing down "Joint

10 Command"?

11 A. As far as I can remember, I did not speak about any mistakes by

12 General Susic in what he wrote down on the basis of what the Prosecutor

13 just listed, I can see that if it is indeed the way it is written here,

14 that more people were using this term. And I as an officer at that time

15 understood this term in a particular, very specific way, and on page 16,

16 if you read those conclusions, I'm quite sure that I was correct in my

17 understanding of the Joint Command at that time because if this is what

18 the president of the state says, so he's not adopting the conclusions of

19 the Joint Command but those of the MUP staff leader and of the Pristina

20 Corps commander. And to this day, this is the way that I have understood

21 it as I sit here, that when the army and the police carry out some

22 specific actions down there, that somebody use that term, and this term

23 appears to have been used, as is indicated here, both by the Chief of the

24 General Staff, the president of the state, and other people too.

25 Q. Yes, I don't know if you mentioned that the presentation by

1 Mr. Minic, president of the Chamber of the Federal Assembly, that was also

2 adopted, correct? That's what it says at the same place you saw the

3 references to the reports by Lukic and Pavkovic.

4 A. Well, I have no reason to disbelieve that this is what is said

5 next to Mr. Minic's name, but let me repeat once again. I understand that

6 whenever they refer to it, when they use this term, that they're talking

7 about the combined operations and combined engagement of the army and the

8 police in Kosovo and Metohija in the effort to fight terrorism.

9 Q. Which they all agree is called the Joint Command, right,

10 Mr. Milosevic included?

11 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, that is, I think, crossing the line and

12 asking -- we've been doing this exercise for some time now and I've tried

13 to resist jumping up, but I do not believe that the Prosecution can ask

14 this witness to speculate and conclude what several individuals concluded

15 or had the same idea, et cetera, that is sheer speculation and is improper

16 questioning and I think we're approaching a point where the Prosecution

17 has exhausted his real questions and is going into this fantasy world.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

19 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

21 MR. HANNIS: -- More speculation than my question was.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Your question, though, has by this witness been

23 answered a number of times. He's stated what his understanding is, and

24 this assertion is in the context pure argumentation.

25 MR. HANNIS: All right, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: So let's proceed.

2 MR. HANNIS: I will move on then to P2016.

3 Q. General, this is a combat report from you to the 3rd Army command

4 and the Supreme Command Staff dated 25 April 1999.

5 MR. HANNIS: And we need to go to item 2.1 which is on the first

6 page of the B/C/S, but we need to go to the top of page 2 in the English.

7 Q. This regards activities, effects, consequences and others and it

8 says: "Operations of combing the terrain and breaking up STS continue in

9 line with the decision of the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija."

10 This is in your combat report to the 3rd Army and the Supreme Command on

11 25 April 1999. So if this is a nonexistent body, why are you referring to

12 actions in line with the decision of the Joint Command?

13 A. Out of more than 120 combat reports generated during the war, I'm

14 sure that this is one or perhaps even one and only report in which a

15 mention is made of the term "Joint Command." For a very simple reason

16 that as far as these actions are concerned that were carried out together

17 with the police, orders had been prepared bearing the letterhead and the

18 title of the Joint Command. The duty officer in the operations centre of

19 the corps that day has in front of him on his desk that order, because

20 he's following the situation, and he made this reference, saying this is

21 being done in accordance with this order for Rugovska Klisura, Rugova

22 gorge, and whatever action was being carried out at the time. And we saw

23 the Prosecution exhibit indicating that there were 15 or 16 such

24 documents, and this is the simple explanation. And by your leave, Your

25 Honours, let me say that I am reporting to the Supreme Command Staff and

1 the army command, probably in the last part of this report it is indicated

2 that everything is carried out in accordance with the -- with my decision,

3 the decision of the corps commander. I can't see it now, but I know that

4 this is the format of all those reports.

5 MR. HANNIS: Can we look next at Exhibit P2042.

6 Q. General, this is a daily operational report to the Pristina Corps

7 command and also to the 2nd Army for information. It comes from

8 Colonel Dikovic of the 37th Motorised Brigade on the 23rd of March. And

9 if you'll go to item 15, conclusion, it's on page 2 of the English.

10 "Pursuant to the decision of the Joint Command for Kosovo and

11 Metohija, strictly confidential number 455-54 of 22 March 1999," and

12 that's one we looked at yesterday, he describes what the 37th has done.

13 That Exhibit was P2031, 455-54. So the order he got must have contained a

14 reference to the Joint Command as well as your 455 number in order for him

15 to be reporting back and making reference to both of those, correct?

16 A. Yes, that's right. We saw this document yesterday, 455-4 [as

17 interpreted] and with this title, and that's why the reference is made.

18 He's reporting to me as the commander, not the Joint Command.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MR. HANNIS: Could we look next at P2017.

21 Q. And, General, this is a combat report from the 3rd Army command to

22 the General Staff dated the 29th of April, 1999, and it's under item 2.1,

23 so we need to go to page 2 of the English. And for you it's on page 1,

24 three lines up from the bottom. It says -- or actually four lines it

25 should start I guess.

1 "Measures were under" --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but I

4 don't want line 21 -- but what is missing there is 455-54, not just 4, but

5 that's important because then we can know what the reference is, to what

6 document.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

9 Q. It says: "Measures were undertaken to block the above sectors and

10 carry out tasks in line with the Joint Kosovo and Metohija Command

11 decision." And this is from the 3rd Army command to the Supreme Command

12 Staff, so General Pavkovic is also aware of the existence of the Joint

13 Command and making reference to it in a combat report; isn't that right?

14 A. Well, I am bold enough to say that this is not so. I'm saying

15 that because I don't want to offend anyone, but that really is not so.

16 And if I am allowed to read the context of item 2.1, the first sentence is

17 the army commander is reporting to the Supreme Command Staff that the

18 corps units are carrying out tasks related to my decision. So I am in

19 command of those units. And then whoever is drafting this report is

20 saying that in Malo Kosovo, since there is an order that is entitled an

21 order from the Joint Command, it is in existence, and the -- it is said

22 that a task will be carried out in accordance with this order that bears

23 the title of the Joint Command, but this is very important. The first

24 sentence just -- the first sentence after item 2.1 is very important.

25 Q. Were you finished?

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. Well, one possible explanation for what you just said is that

3 General Pavkovic was a member of the Joint Command. This wording then

4 would be consistent with that state of facts, wouldn't it?

5 A. As far as I know - and I'm sure this is so - we showed practically

6 all the documents that have this letterhead of the Joint Command, we saw

7 those documents, we saw what they are, what log numbers they bear, and I'm

8 absolutely sure that this is the -- what the reference is to.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

10 A. And then he would otherwise have said that this is carried out in

11 accordance with his order.

12 Q. General, can you not answer my question yes or no?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 [Microphone not activated]

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 MR. HANNIS:

18 Q. The reason I pushed you a bit about the Joint Command is because

19 of what you went through in 2001 suggests to me that of all the people

20 we've seen so far you seem to be the most aware of the possible problems

21 created by somebody like the Joint Command.

22 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at Exhibit 5D475, please --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you move to that, Mr. Hannis, just one piece

24 of clarification arising from this.

25 You've explained to us a number of times that "Joint Command" was

1 an expression used as a form of shorthand guidance to those who needed to

2 be told that they had to coordinate their efforts with the MUP. Why would

3 Pavkovic, do you think, refer to the Joint Command in a report to the

4 Chief of the General Staff or chief of the Supreme Command Staff?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is my assessment

6 that the duty team that drafted this report had in front of them the map

7 or the order with the name of the Joint Command, and they are telling the

8 superior command that the units would be engaged in that area in

9 accordance with that order.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

12 Could we have 5D475.

13 Q. General, you'll be familiar with this document. It's dated 12

14 March 2001, it's from you to the chief of the staff of the army, who at

15 that time was General Pavkovic, correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And in this document you're asking him to request the president of

18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who at that time was Mr. Kostunica,

19 correct?

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. You were asking to be relieved of your duties as the

22 then-commander of the 3rd Army, and it relates to the formation of a

23 temporary Joint Command to control the joint forces of the VJ and police

24 in a part of south Serbia at that time, right?

25 A. Yes, but let me be quite specific. This is not a Joint Command.

1 The term used in Serbian is "zdruzena komanda." It is not the same term

2 "zajednicka komanda," that we had been using so far, so this is a

3 different term. It's a new term.

4 Q. But an old concept?

5 A. Well, it's difficult to understand both terms because they're not

6 defined anywhere. We're trying to understand them any which way we can.

7 Q. Well, tell me, isn't your problem with this is that you see this

8 body, whether we call it the Joint Command or the "zdruzena komand," your

9 problem is you see it as interfering with the regular chain of command in

10 the army, it creates a duality of command. That was your complaint and

11 the reason that you were asking to be relieved of duty, right?

12 A. Yes, this is my reason, because the Law on the Army is being

13 violated. Somebody who has not been authorised is now to command army

14 troops that are headed by me. I'm the commander of the 3rd Army, and this

15 constitutes a precedent and I was not prepared to take part in that.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MR. HANNIS: And if we could look at Exhibit 5D153.

18 Q. This is a document from the following day, 13th of March, 2001,

19 it's from the Chief of Staff, who was then General Pavkovic, and it's

20 entitled: "Order to engage the VJ in the joint security forces of the FRY

21 in the Republic of Serbia." And the order by Pavkovic appoints members of

22 a coordinating body. And some of the names that we'll see in this

23 document include witnesses that we've seen here before, General Obradovic,

24 now and 2001 General Krzmanjelic [phoen], now-General Curkovic and this

25 says it's based on Article 6 of the Law on the Army and an order of the

1 7th of March of the president of the Federal Republic. What was your --

2 what was your complaint about this? It appears to be in accordance with

3 the law. It makes reference to the order signed by the president in

4 Article 6 of the Law on the Army and the Rules of Service.

5 A. I am not challenging the fact that the president signed this, but

6 what he signed is not in compliance with the law. And if you turn the

7 page I will indicate what I as an officer understood that I could not

8 participate in.

9 Q. Okay. Well, I'll leave that to Mr. Bakrac, if he wants to go to

10 that. I need to speed ahead a bit and go to the next exhibit. I think it

11 contains part of what you want to say, that's 5D150, from the 16th of

12 March, 2001. This is a document from you, General, to General Pavkovic

13 personally. And it's a briefing on a meeting on the 15th, item number 2

14 regards the formation of the joint security and operations group forces.

15 Now, in this don't you explain to General Pavkovic why you have a problem

16 what's being proposed concerning these joint security forces. In item 1

17 you talk about the dualism in the command system.

18 A. Well, that's the whole point of the problem. I was the commander

19 of the 3rd Army and the coordinating body of the Government of Serbia,

20 which included politicians, the police, one or two officers, were to

21 command part of the forces of the 3rd Army. If I may be allowed to say, I

22 asked and I went to a meeting in General Pavkovic's office where there was

23 an entire collegium of the General Staff even before this, where I

24 explained that Article 3 of the Law on the Army was being violated.

25 Command can be in accordance with single command, and the coordinating

1 body for the south of Serbia cannot be superior [Realtime transcript read

2 in error "Serbia] to the Army of Yugoslavia.

3 Q. And what happened after that meeting? Did you resign or did you

4 continue on with the 3rd Army?

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, 48, 7, the witness says "cannot be

7 superior to this Army of Yugoslavia," and not "Serbia."

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 MR. HANNIS:

10 Q. General, do I need to repeat my question?

11 A. I understood your question. I still remember what you asked me.

12 My answer is I didn't offer my resignation. This doesn't exist in the

13 army, but I demanded, unless the Law on the Army was respected, that the

14 president of the country replace me from my duty. He did not agree to my

15 dismissal or my replacement. First he asked me why this was done and he

16 signed, and the Chief of the General Staff in document later on wrote a

17 specific proposal, the decision was changed, and the coordinating body did

18 not command those forces, rather, the command of the 3rd Army, that is, I

19 as the commander of the 3rd Army did that.

20 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to Exhibit 5D151.

21 Q. And, General, this is the next document I found in connection with

22 this subject and it's dated the 14th of May, 2001. It's from

23 General Pavkovic as the Chief of Staff to President Kostunica. It's

24 entitled: "Analysis of the latest events," talking about the joint

25 security forces and actions that had been taken out in south Serbia.

1 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to item number 4, which

2 is "proposals," it's on -- I need page 3 of the English. I'm not sure

3 where it is on the B/C/S.

4 Q. You see that, General, under number 1 the proposal is to:

5 "Resubordinate the command of the joint security forces to the 3rd

6 Army to avoid dual command and ... put command back within the legal

7 framework according to the structure: President of the republic-General

8 Staff-3rd Army command," and under the 3rd Army would be the ZSB. What

9 does that stand for? Is that the joint security forces?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. And command over police forces would remain with the

12 coordinating body which comprised representatives of the VJ, police, and

13 the joint security forces command. Who were the members of the joint

14 security forces command? You don't have to give me names, but give me --

15 were they police, were they civilians, were they military? What were

16 they?

17 A. In the first version it is the army and the police without

18 civilians and civilians in the coordinating body and representatives of

19 the police and the army. I say in the initial stage until things were

20 restored to normal by us.

21 Q. And this body, this command that you had problems with in 2001,

22 that was originally created on the proposal of General Pavkovic, correct?

23 A. I don't know, sir, at whose proposal that was done. I received a

24 summons, so to speak, from the Chief of the General Staff to set out for

25 Belgrade one Saturday in March, for him to inform me on the spot what the

1 president's orders were and what would happen. I then expressed my

2 military disagreement, saying this was wrong. I asked that this

3 president's -- this order of the president's be changed. It had already

4 been signed. They had started to implement it, but in written form I

5 responded and asked to be replaced from my duty for as long as that

6 decision of the president's had not been cancelled.

7 Q. So you don't know who proposed it?

8 A. I really don't know. By Their Honours leave, I can only

9 speculate, I can guess, but -- all right?

10 Q. With regard to the Joint Command meetings in 1998 we saw in your

11 testimony that nobody ever gave you an order, no civilian gave you an

12 order during those meetings, but you don't know whether any of the

13 civilians attending those meetings gave any orders or instructions or

14 directions at the meetings you were not present at? You couldn't know,

15 right?

16 A. I couldn't know something I didn't see, something I did not

17 receive precise information about, no, I couldn't know that.

18 Q. Yesterday I touched on this briefly about your whereabouts on the

19 29th of April. We saw the document where you were in the area of Lozica

20 village and saw the 37th Motorised Brigade. And in Exhibit P2026 we have

21 a regular combat report of the Pristina -- of the 125th Motorised Brigade.

22 Would you take issue with me, General, if I told you that in that report

23 they indicate the commander and the Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps

24 were in the brigade from 0900 to 1200 hours today, that is, the 29th of

25 April? We can bring up the document if you want to see it, but I don't

1 know if you need it.

2 A. I think it's not necessary. I spoke about this yesterday. I

3 spoke about what part of the front this happened in and if this is the

4 report of the 125th Brigade. This refers to what I spoke about yesterday.

5 Q. General, I want to ask you a few questions about the armed

6 non-Siptar population --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what's the actual answer to that question,

8 Mr. Hannis?

9 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, in an early answer in his direct

10 testimony he indicated that on the 29th he had visited I think both

11 elements of the 37th and the 125th Brigade.

12 Q. Isn't that correct, General?

13 A. Yes, a small part from the 37th Brigade which I found around the

14 village of Lozica, I happened to run into them, and went to the front line

15 between Decani and Pec and the 125th Brigade.

16 Q. And can you give us any more precise location as to where you

17 visited part of the 125th. You say the front line between Decani and Pec.

18 Can you narrow it down any more for us?

19 A. The first working point, so to speak, was close to Pec, the area

20 of deployment of parts of the armoured battalion. And then east of that

21 position part of the artillery unit for a few kilometres, and then the

22 third point was the forward command post of that brigade in the Decani --

23 in the area near Decani.

24 Q. Okay. You've probably heard one of the other witnesses earlier in

25 this case talking about a meeting of the General Staff which is in Exhibit

1 P938 -- I'm sorry, 931 on the 2nd of February, 1999. If we could go to

2 e-court, I need page 23 of the English and the top of page 21 in the

3 B/C/S.

4 And General Samardzic and General Ojdanic are talking here.

5 General Ojdanic says: "I've heard there are 50.000 armed Serbs."

6 General Samardzic says: "Judging by the number of weapons issued

7 now, it's 47.000 ..."

8 Ojdanic says: "What are the war assignments ..."

9 And Samardzic says: "It was my order, and we organized the whole

10 thing for the defence of Serbian villages, commanders at all levels have

11 been sent out, they're armed and they have two combat sets of ammunition

12 each. Their role and assignment is to defend their villages and

13 participate together with army units in any operations in the immediate

14 vicinity."

15 So were you aware of this order of General Samardzic for these

16 armed Serbs to participate with army units? Would these be some of those

17 non-Siptar -- some of the armed non-Siptar population that we see

18 references to in the Joint Command orders?

19 A. The first time I saw this document was here in the courtroom, and

20 what I know about something like this is what I saw here for the first

21 time from this document. I don't know what General Samardzic is referring

22 to at all. I'm a hundred per cent certain that the command of the

23 Pristina Corps in 1998 and 1999 had neither the legal nor the de facto

24 possibility nor was it involved in arming the civilian population. And

25 the army commander did not have the right to issue weapons either. It was

1 exclusively within the competence of the minister of defence. I see what

2 it says here, but in my view it's in the sphere of the impossible.

3 Whether he did something before that as the army commander without my

4 knowledge, well of course I allow for the possibility. I don't know what

5 General Samardzic did before.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: You gave a date there, Mr. Hannis, of the 2nd of

7 February. That can't be the date.

8 MR. HANNIS: 2nd February 1999.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: General Samardzic?

10 MR. HANNIS: Yes, he's no longer the 3rd Army commander at that

11 time, Your Honour, and he's a member of the General Staff.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: So what was his role then? Sorry.

13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I forget his precise title.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

15 MR. HANNIS: He is listed as the Yugoslav Army inspectorate.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 MR. HANNIS:

18 Q. So are you saying the head inspector for the army did something

19 illegal or inappropriate in connection with arming those Serbs? Or are

20 you saying he's not telling the truth to General Ojdanic? What are you

21 saying in your answer that he didn't have the right to issue weapons?

22 A. What I'm saying is that one cannot see from this text when it was

23 done. I'm also saying that my knowledge from 1998 and 1999 says that

24 nobody from the Pristina Corps issued a single rifle to somebody who was

25 not a military conscript, a member of the corps. And I don't know whether

1 General Samardzic as the army commander in 1997 and the period before that

2 did something in connection with that. And what I know about the law is

3 that only the Ministry of Defence can issue orders concerning the

4 equipping, both of the army and the civil defence and all the structures

5 in the defence system.

6 Q. Okay, General.

7 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at Exhibit 5D175.

8 Q. This is an order from the Pristina Corps commander for defence.

9 It has number 455-123. The English has the date of 6 April 1998, but

10 that's obviously a typo because in the original even I can see that it is

11 1999. And we know that you weren't the commander in 1998. Do you

12 recognise this document?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to page 3 of both the English and

15 the B/C/S.

16 Q. I want to ask you a question about item number 2 which is

17 entitled: "Pristina Corps task."

18 The second paragraph says: "Task: In coordination with the

19 Republic of Serbia MUP and other defence forces, rely on fortified ground

20 features and populated places ..."

21 What are the other defence forces being referred to there? Who

22 would that be?

23 A. The other defence forces are the civil defence, the civilian

24 protection, the organs of the organization of the republics, the federal

25 state, legal subjects, and everything envisaged by the law in this

1 connection.

2 Q. Okay. And two paragraphs down from that your order says: "Use

3 armed non-Siptar population to secure military features and features of

4 special importance for the defence of FRY, the roads - and for defence of

5 populated places."

6 It doesn't say anything about: Coordinate with the Ministry of

7 Defence. It just says: Use the armed non-Siptar population, so you had

8 the authority to do that or you apparently thought you had the authority

9 to do that the way this is written. Isn't that right?

10 A. That's not correct. I explained during the examination-in-chief -

11 and if I may be allowed to clarify why that's not correct - I did not

12 think about this, either at the time or today. This is a task copied from

13 an order issued by the commander of the 3rd Army, which I could not alter,

14 and my understanding was that the army commander simply issued the task in

15 harmony with his assessment, that if an opportunity should present itself,

16 the forces of the Ministry of Defence can be engaged in the defence of the

17 country; and if this should happen, a special order on the resubordination

18 of specific forces would arrive. The only thing I did was reduce what I

19 received as a task, and I did not pass it on to any other units.

20 Q. Well, General, sometimes it seems you add to the task and

21 sometimes you subtract. How do you make that decision about whether

22 you're going to keep what you got from the 3rd Army as is or whether

23 you're going to change it? It's a matter of your discretion, right?

24 A. My decision is my decision and my responsibility. As I did not

25 receive any specific information as to what forces these were, in what

1 locations, I did not get a list, I did not get an order on

2 resubordination. So I simply left this out, I omitted to give such tasks

3 to my units, and this decision was verified by the army commander who

4 agreed with my understanding of this issue and my decision.

5 Q. Well, then if you're just copying what you got from the 3rd Army,

6 then wouldn't you agree with me that the 3rd Army commander had the

7 authority to direct the use of the armed non-Siptar population or else he

8 thought he did.

9 A. The army commander, in view of the doctrinal principles, the Law

10 on Defence and the Rules of Combat has the right to count on all the

11 forces in the defence system in his area. And in those general terms, he

12 mentions this in his decision. However, for an actual factual engagement,

13 he did not have the authority without the resubordination of part of those

14 forces to the army by the minister of defence. It is exclusively the

15 minister of defence who has the power to resubordinate the forces of the

16 civil protection and civil defence.

17 Q. Okay. Well, then let's go to an earlier order of yours, P2808,

18 we've looked at this before, this is 455-1 on the 16th of February, 1999,

19 at page 8 of the English, and there's a reference about the armed

20 non-Siptar population.

21 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, can we scroll up. I'm having trouble

22 finding the reference.

23 Q. And this is -- General, for you, you'll see about five paragraphs

24 up from item number 3 it says:

25 "Later on secure the passibility of the major roads and full

1 control of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Engage armed non-Siptars

2 to secure military facilities and communications and to defend places with

3 non-Siptar population."

4 This is your order for anti-terrorist operations, and you are

5 directing the engagement of armed non-Siptars, right?

6 A. No, that's not right, no.

7 Q. Stop. You said no. Let me ask you about this. Why does it

8 say "defend places with non-Siptar population"? You don't have concern

9 about defending the Siptar population, do you?

10 A. Up to the pogrom, it was not the Albanian population that was

11 threatened by the forces of the armed rebellion. That's the gist of this

12 sentence and decision by the army commander, which I copied in the task.

13 I cannot change it, I couldn't change it, and it is in compliance, both

14 with the law and with military doctrine.

15 Q. You say you couldn't change it. I thought you told us before that

16 you sometimes added things and you sometimes left things out. So can you

17 change it or not?

18 A. No, I couldn't change item 2. Item 2 is a task which is to be

19 copied, coming from the superior. In item 4, where I decide, that's where

20 you can see whether I add or take away something.

21 Q. Okay.

22 MR. HANNIS: And could we look at Exhibit 3D676.

23 Q. General, do you want a break?

24 A. I do apologise. At 5.00 I was supposed to take some medicine and

25 I asked the guard because I know one of them has this medicine. It's not

1 indispensable, but I think they've brought my medicine with me. They

2 changed the guards and they didn't leave the medicine.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: It appears to be being attended to, Mr. Hannis,

4 please continue.

5 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

8 Q. General, I believe Mr. Bakrac asked you about efforts to get the

9 Albanians in Kosovo to be a part of the defence, to be engaged in the

10 military territorial detachments. And we've got an exhibit here which is

11 5D183. If we could put that up on the screen for you, it's the 10th of

12 April, 1999. This is a document from you regarding organization and

13 mobilisation changes. You're issuing an order, I believe it's to the

14 Pristina Military District command to establish the 9th Military

15 Territorial Detachment. And in item 3.1 you say:

16 "The ... Military District Command small replenish the military

17 territorial detachment with not yet assigned conscripts predominantly of

18 Siptar and other ethnicities ..."

19 And.

20 "The commanders shall be professional military personnel of

21 Siptar ethnicity ..."

22 First of all, did that ever get accomplished before the end of the

23 war?

24 A. It did not.

25 Q. Okay. And my next question is: 3.5 says: "A report on the

1 formation of this detachment is to be submitted to me by 5 August 1999."

2 So it seems like this was not an urgent matter for you, General.

3 Why such a late date for reporting on the formation -- the 5th of August

4 turned out to be well after the end of the war.

5 A. This is clearly a typo if that's number 8 there. This is a third

6 document in a row and was merely being transited via the corps commander,

7 which is me, from the army commander to the corps, and I merely forwarded

8 it down to the district commander. This is a mistake. If you look at the

9 previous two documents from the army staff to the corps commander, that

10 this is a typo. We heard the military district commander say that he was

11 trying to implement this task during that period, but that he was

12 unsuccessful.

13 Q. Well, I have a question about the original document on the copy I

14 have, General. I see what appears to be a typewritten signature or at

15 least your title and part of a stamp, but I do not -- it's been cut off

16 when it's been copied I guess. I don't see a signature, I don't see any

17 delivery information. How do you know that this document actually ever

18 went out?

19 A. I know it because I know the events themselves. I know when I

20 received the order from the army commander. You can see in the heading

21 that I refer to that order and the order of the staff and the Supreme

22 Command. And two days after resubordination I order it to the military

23 district commander. We heard a Prosecution witness speak about that. He

24 couldn't implement that without receiving an order from me first.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, what we'll do is take the break now

1 since the issue of medication was raised, that can be dealt with, and we

2 can resume at quarter to 6.00.

3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 --- Recess taken at 5.14 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. General, yesterday we had talked about your report dated the 24th

9 of May, 1999, about the failure regarding the resubordination of the MUP.

10 I want to look now at Exhibit P2809, this is dated the 25th of April,

11 1999. I can hand you a hard copy with the assistance of the usher. And

12 you'll see it has your signature and seal on the second page, and it is

13 numbered 455-183. It's entitled: "Engaging MUP forces in the Pristina

14 Corps zone." And here you make reference to the order of the 3rd Army

15 command number 872-94/1 of 20 April 1999. One question I have, we talked

16 yesterday about the numbering of these documents in the Pristina Corps,

17 and we saw your original order regarding subordination of the MUP that

18 followed on from the 3rd Army order described here has the number 455-172

19 along with another what I say is an unrelated document. And your 24 May

20 1999 report about the non-subordination of the MUP has the number

21 455-172/2. It seems to me it's logical, General, that this document

22 actually should be 455-172/1, shouldn't it? Because it specifically

23 pertains to that 3rd Army command order and that's what's referenced in

24 your original 455-172 on this topic and what's in the 24 May report.

25 Wouldn't you agree with me about that?

1 A. I would agree with the Prosecutor under the condition that at the

2 corps command I had an entire team of people who deal with official

3 correspondence and I would also have been -- had to have been able to

4 follow the procedure, otherwise we see many typos and omissions, such as

5 the one we just saw when the months were mixed up, and therefore this

6 mix-up with the numbers is possible as well. There are many documents

7 similar to this one, but they do not bear the 172 designation, which makes

8 things all the more difficult.

9 Q. Okay. This document in number 1 says in the last sentence: "Other

10 forces and institutions continued to remain under the jurisdiction of the

11 MUP."

12 What are you referring to there? Do you mean other groups in MUP

13 other than the PJP and MUP territorial units? Are you referring to the

14 SAJ, the JSO?

15 A. I must confess that the Prosecutor's question is the right one to

16 ask, since in item 1 I'm ordering something in general since I don't know

17 what the manoeuvring units of the PJP there were or the territorial units

18 for that matter. I didn't have their numbers, designations, and I don't

19 know where they were at. As for the other forces, I had in mind the

20 secretariats of the interior at the time, which had the authority to

21 regulate law and order, the issuing of documents, and other regular tasks.

22 I was unfortunately very imprecise in formulating this, but at the time I

23 had no other way.

24 Q. But you had some understanding. It seems the PJP was something

25 that should be involved in this, is that because of information you might

1 have learned in your earlier meeting with General Pavkovic,

2 General Djordjevic, and General Stevanovic that you told us about before?

3 A. No, not in that sense. I had some previous experience in 1998

4 that the manoeuvring units of the police and territorial detachments were

5 engagement in suppressing terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. I would like

6 to apologise, but I haven't finished my previous answer. Those units

7 would include the SAJ under the formulation as it stands and as I was

8 ordered. That would also include the JSO, although it is not specifically

9 mentioned, as is the case with the SAJ. I didn't know their whereabouts

10 at the time, I don't even know whether they were in Kosovo and Metohija.

11 I couldn't be specific and put JSO in there.

12 Q. Item number 2 says: "Coordinate command and defence and other

13 combat operations at the level of the ZJT," which is translated here as

14 combined tactical units, "and in keeping with the already-issued decisions

15 and the plan of engagement of combined contingents."

16 Has this plan of engagement of combined contingents been a

17 document that's been exhibited here? Is that one that we've seen earlier

18 in your evidence?

19 A. No. In addition to the order there was a plan per brigade zones,

20 stating where -- which of the brigades should locate a police unit and

21 establish contact. This joining at the beginning refers to other plans

22 and operations.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues]... engagement drafted, written

24 up?

25 A. When this order was being drafted in attachment number 2 to this

1 order.

2 Q. Okay. Item number 3 says: "Include the new military territorial

3 detachments and armed civilians."

4 Which armed civilians are you referring to here in item 3?

5 A. In the Serbian text it says "armed population in the zone." You

6 go back to the initial story, or rather, the initial order of Grom 3, the

7 civilian defence.

8 Q. All right. I have a question regarding item number 4. It talks

9 about military conscripts from RJ. What does RJ stand for? It's

10 translated here with a question mark as "reserve units."

11 A. No. In a war all units at the level of regiment and brigade are

12 called "ratne jedinice," war unit, and then we have lower-ranking units.

13 RJs begin with the level of brigade, this is a general term.

14 Q. And are those war units VJ units or military territorial

15 detachments? What are those war units? To whom do they pertain?

16 A. I must say that the war units were part of the VJ, but war units

17 were also the military territorial detachments. This is imprecise.

18 Military territorial units are also VJ and RJs certainly are as well,

19 those are the brigades I referred to. Military territorial units were

20 part of the military districts of Pristina or Nis, which is outside

21 Kosovo.

22 Q. It says here that you should take those who have been temporarily

23 engaged in MUP reserve units by a separate order dating from 1998. So

24 these are individuals who have been in the MUP reserve and now you're

25 directing that they be brought into the army in the war units, correct?

1 A. My precise answer would be that a part of the military conscripts

2 from the war units of the army was engaged, or rather, included into

3 performing police tasks, be -- by them being transferred to the police

4 service without the military defence offices knowing or by being

5 temporarily transferred to the police units. But military districts

6 cannot do that on their own. They all had to be returned to the army as

7 such.

8 Q. Do you know what the separate order dating back from 1998 was and

9 who had issued that order?

10 A. I truly cannot be precise at this moment as to what order exactly

11 it was. I remember that an order was signed by the Chief of Staff of the

12 army, General Simic, he appeared here as witness. And in mid-1998 as the

13 Chief of Staff, he warned the military district of Pristina on the need to

14 deal with the problem of any military conscripts from the army that are

15 part of police units.

16 Q. The commander of the Pristina Military District at this time in

17 April 1999, was that Colonel Pesic who testified here?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And did he comply with this order forthwith, as directed in item

20 4? Did he manage to get those conscripts back from MUP reserve units and

21 into VJ war units?

22 A. I must say that the deadline set here was unrealistic, but it all

23 points to the fact that this task was a very serious one to implement,

24 since we had problems with replenishing the Pristina Corps. The entire

25 military administrative procedure had to be resolved, the issues therein,

1 that is. As to whether he managed to carry out this task completely, I

2 truly don't know. Work was being done, there are reports in existence,

3 but I don't know what the figure was. I knew that some people were

4 outside war units and I demanded that it be dealt with ASAP.

5 Q. Maybe I've oversimplified here, but this seems sort of analogous

6 to what we were talking about at the start of the day when MUP had

7 equipment loaned to it by the VJ and you don't know if or when the army

8 got it back. And here it seems like you have personnel that have sort of

9 been loaned to the MUP and you don't know whether or when you got it all

10 back, right?

11 A. There were no loans. You cannot loan a human being. The issue at

12 hand is that the military territorial organs did not have proper records,

13 and there are such documents in existence from which you can deduce how

14 many Pristina Corps members were outside their home units. I truly cannot

15 remember now, but I believe that was also admitted.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I waited for the witness

18 to complete his answer. My learned friend Mr. Hannis said two hours, and

19 that was his calculation as of last night so as to equal that to the

20 length of examination-in-chief, but we are now past three hours of his

21 cross-examination. I don't know whether any limits have been set or

22 whether Mr. Hannis may go on.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now would certainly not be the moment to interrupt

24 him; however, if you are going to significantly exceed what we would

25 normally expect you to confine cross-examination to, you should really

1 justify it, Mr. Hannis.

2 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm fully intending to end before the

5 end of the day, and I know I have exceeded two hours but there were a lot

6 of interruptions and translation issues, et cetera. If I may ...

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE BONOMY: In view of the importance of the witness and the

9 evidence, we consider it appropriate that you should be allowed to

10 continue on the basis that you suggest, that is, that you're likely to

11 finish by the end of today.

12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

13 Q. If we could go to the second page of this document in both --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that.

15 Can I ask you, Mr. Lazarevic, I maybe don't fully understand this

16 document, but was this issued in the context of your serious efforts to

17 implement the resubordination order?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, this was trying to

19 put things into practice pertaining to the corps.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And in paragraph 1 it refers to engaging the PJP

21 and MUP territorial units, and then it goes on to refer to other forces

22 and institutions. So the first part of this is a clear statement that you

23 envisage your subordinates endeavouring to take command of the PJP and the

24 MUP territorial units?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct. Territorial units

1 of the MUP are also detachments.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: And you also envisaged them taking control of the

3 armed civilians, that's the civil defence as you've described it?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not quite. I'm asking them to

5 include within the system of control of territory those units. This would

6 understand combined efforts in keeping with the Law on Defence to use all

7 defence elements. Control includes command, which can take place only

8 provided resubordination was ordered.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 Mr. Hannis.

11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

12 If we could go to page 2 of both.

13 Q. General, at the bottom we see it says: "Sent to all subordinate

14 commands, the VoK Pristina command and the MUP staff." We don't see any

15 kind of delivery information as we've seen on some of the other documents.

16 Do you know why that is?

17 A. Information on who the document was delivered to -- well, you can

18 only see that on the telegram, if it went through the station for

19 encryption. This was sent by couriers rather than through the encryption

20 service.

21 Q. All right. Above your signature line we see enclosed, number

22 1, "locations of MUP detachments in the zone of the brigade on a map."

23 Where did you obtain your information about where the MUP

24 detachments were located? Who had given that to you?

25 A. The operative organ of the corps command tried to have a map to

1 accompany this order. They tried to do that via brigade commands or

2 contacting directly some of SUP chiefs by whatever means they had at their

3 disposal. I remember that the map was attachment number 1 and 2. We

4 tried to locate those brigades with the use of that map so that we could

5 contact them more easily.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues]... several individuals in the

7 MUP in order to create the map?

8 A. I think that's how the operations officer got this information.

9 Q. And enclosed --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: That question was incomplete because of overlap.

11 What was the question?

12 MR. HANNIS: My question was --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I didn't hear it.

14 MR. HANNIS: -- did you obtain that information from several

15 different individuals in the MUP.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, it's been answered.

17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

18 Q. Number 2 enclosed is: "Plan of engagement of the joint units with

19 their activities and task." [Realtime transcript read in error "staff"] .

20 From what I've read above, General, it sounds like is this some

21 sort of blank form or table to be filled in or was this a plan where you

22 already had listed task?

23 A. I remember, it's a pity that it is not now attached to this

24 document, but I remember the text part where the brigades are listed as

25 joint units, as joint tactical units, and in the right -- on the

1 right-hand side of that sheet it was a landscape paper. It says: Tasks,

2 combat control of the territory, and then it says also whether a brigade

3 is deployed in the border belt. So you have in a text form all the tasks

4 of that brigade, and also it is specified how those tasks can be carried

5 out, primarily to achieve combat control of the territory. There are five

6 or six tasks, if I remember correctly, they're all listed there.

7 Q. So had you or somebody in the Pristina Corps command already

8 filled in that information on this plan that was attached to this document

9 when it was sent out?

10 A. Yes, this is not a specific plan that is related to any combat

11 action. This is just an instruction of sorts, how those brigades should

12 combine those operations or activities within their areas.

13 Q. Okay. I understand. Thank you?

14 JUDGE BONOMY: If we could look just briefly at the transcript

15 line 23 on page 68, it should be tasks and not staff, that's the last word

16 in that line.

17 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour, that's my slur probably.

18 Q. General, we talked before about your 24th May 1999 report about

19 the failure of MUP subordination. You told us at page 18237 on the 14th

20 of November that "the immediate reason for me to report to the commander

21 of the army about this in writing is the oral and written report of the

22 commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade."

23 I think I had asked you before if we had seen that document in

24 evidence so far, and I don't believe we have. I've looked for documents

25 from Colonel Dikovic that might talk about that around that time, and I

1 will tell you that I've only been able to find two that speak to MUP

2 forces other than the one we looked at regarding the elephant to kill a

3 fly comment.

4 On the 25th of April in Exhibit 5D1088 we have a report and

5 proposal from Colonel Dikovic, if we could put that on the screen for you,

6 and we'll need to go to page 2 of the English and scroll to the bottom of

7 the B/C/S. In item number 2 Dikovic says:

8 "With regard to engaging MUP forces in the zone of responsibility,

9 we think and propose to engage the main forces of the MUP and combat

10 monitoring and control of the territory in the flanks of the zone ..."

11 And I'm skipping to the next paragraph.

12 "By the same token, we think that the engagement of the MUP organs

13 (particularly the units of variant II) so far has been inappropriate and

14 inadequate relative to the strength of their forces (there are about 600

15 members of the MUP in the zone of responsibility of the Brigade). The

16 reason for this is that at the check-points where they are located they

17 secure only themselves and not the territory and they have been

18 appropriately called squatters ..."

19 Is this the report that caused you to write your 24 May complaint

20 or report to General Pavkovic?

21 A. No. This is a report from a brigade commander relative to the

22 previous document that I authored. He received my order, my map, and the

23 engagement plan. He carries out this order, he complies with it; and in

24 his combat report, he proposes how those forces should be involved, should

25 be engaged. So this has nothing to do with that document.

1 Q. The only other reference I was able to find from the 37th is

2 document 5D1085, if we could put that up.

3 And, General, this is a 13 May 1999 regular combat report closer

4 in time to your report. It's to the Pristina Corps command from the 37th,

5 Colonel Dikovic, and under item 2.1 he mentions an action in Ovcarevo, and

6 Obrinje being re-planned and to coordinate with Colonel Stefanovic from

7 Pristina Corps command, representatives of the 122nd Detachment of the

8 PJP, someone from the artillery group and representatives of the 7th

9 Infantry Brigade were briefed on the plan, et cetera, and there's no

10 complaint here about the MUP. So that could not have been what triggered

11 your writing a report on the 24th. Is there any more specific information

12 you can tell us about when you got a written report from him about that?

13 A. I tried to be quite specific yesterday in the time between the

14 20th and the 23rd of April. I'd rather say that it was between the 20th

15 and the 22nd.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please clarify the date. It

17 is not clear now whether he is referring to March or the 23rd.

18 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry. Let me back up.

19 Q. You say it was between the 20th and the 23rd of April that you had

20 the disturbing report from Colonel Dikovic?

21 A. I do apologise, it's May. I have to apologise if I said "April."

22 Q. [Previous translation continues]... In your report the 24th of

23 May, you talk about MUP tolerating criminal activities undertaken by its

24 members against the Siptar civilian population: Murder, rape, looting,

25 robbery, aggravated theft. Now, I want to relate that to something that

1 you had told us about before concerning the problems in the 175th Brigade

2 that you told us a little bit about. You and General Pavkovic had gone on

3 an inspection tour around the beginning of May. Do you recall that?

4 A. Yes, I remember. I think it was the 1st or the 2nd of May.

5 Q. And eventually that commander was removed from his position,

6 right?

7 A. Yes, he was removed from his position as the brigade commander.

8 Q. I would like you to look at Exhibit 5D382 for a moment. This is a

9 27 April 1999 official note from Major Miroslav Panic. Did you see this

10 document before today? Did you see it when you were preparing to testify?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. At the end on page 2 of both the English and B/C/S he explains --

13 he has explained part of what he has done to investigate some of the

14 allegations against the commander and others and concludes that he

15 believes there are no grounds to dismiss the commander. Do you see that

16 at the very end?

17 A. Yes, I can see that.

18 Q. Did anything happen to Major Panic at or around the time that the

19 commander of the 175th was replaced? Was he replaced as well, do you

20 know?

21 A. Yes, yes, yes. He was also replaced.

22 Q. In item 5 up above his signature he talks about the 26th of April

23 where the security organ of the 175th detained a couple of individuals who

24 had set a house on fire, a house belonging to an unidentified Siptar, and

25 those guys had been wearing camouflage uniforms and carrying automatic

1 rifles and had introduced themselves as volunteers from the 175th Brigade.

2 It says even though they were from the village of Klokot they will be

3 handed over to the investigating judge on the next day. Do you know

4 anything about that particular case? Were those two individuals

5 volunteers from the 175th?

6 A. No, those were not volunteers. Those were locals, those two, and

7 there are four others who are listed here, civilians. They were arrested

8 by the army after they were found in the commission of those acts.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues]... camouflage uniforms and

10 carrying the automatic rifles, how did you find out that they were

11 civilians or are you basing that just on what you read here?

12 A. Well, this is what it says literally here, but I know that the

13 security organ of the corps dealt with that, dealt with all those issues

14 in Kosovsko Pomoravlje this phenomenon, those civilians who were roaming

15 around committing those crimes and wherever possible the army dealt with

16 those problems together with the SUP in Gnjilane.

17 Q. Well from what we've seen in other documents and what we've heard

18 about the number of weapons that were allegedly issued, could these two

19 guys be part of the armed non-Siptar population? Those are Serb names,

20 aren't they, they're not Siptars?

21 A. Well, yes, they would be ethnic Serbs based on this, but for

22 somebody to be a member of the armed non-Siptar population, that actually

23 referred to the civilian protection, civil defence. And as for these two,

24 I can't tell whether they were members of those structures. But at any

25 rate, they did not conduct themselves in accordance with the rules for

1 members of the civil defence as civil defence members were supposed to

2 comport themselves.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues]... so from what we read from

4 this they were not members of the VJ?

5 A. They were not.

6 Q. But it appears they were arrested or detained by the VJ, right?

7 A. Well, they were at -- they were stopped at the check-point and --

8 because they were wearing some sort of uniform and they were

9 misrepresenting themselves. When they were questioned by the authorised

10 organs, they were police officers who were there at that check-point and

11 they have the power to carry out those preliminary investigative actions,

12 they arrested them.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues]... says the security organ of

14 the 175th brought into detention these two guys. There's no mention of a

15 check-point, there's no mention of the MUP?

16 A. Well, if we go back to the beginning of this official note, it --

17 the check-point in Klokot is mentioned. And in this very sentence here,

18 the last-but-one, this check-point in the village of Klokot is mentioned.

19 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, for clearing up the sake of confusion I

20 believe the evidence is talking about military police, which are obviously

21 not part of the MUP.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, does that assist?

23 MR. HANNIS:

24 Q. That's right, isn't it, General, you're talking about military

25 police, not MUP?

1 A. No, no. In one context I mentioned there were other reports where

2 the military police organs and the MUP in that area tried to prevent those

3 civilians, those locals or whoever that was, from committing crimes.

4 There are such reports from brigades.

5 Q. Yeah, but, General, there's nothing in this nothing document that

6 suggests anything but it being the VJ, in particular the security organ,

7 that brought these two individuals into custody, into detention, right?

8 A. I'm talking about the procedure for -- whereby those people were

9 stopped at the check-point in the village of Klokot, and item 3 at the

10 very end, towards the end, this is mentioned there. And the first on

11 front page we can see that. So they were stopped at the check-point, and

12 then the security organ took them in for questioning, whatever the

13 procedure is, and they were handed over to the investigative organs.

14 Q. Well, that's item 3, and item 4 is talking about information about

15 alleged rape cases, and item 5 is something different, right?

16 A. I'm referring to item 5, I'm sorry, yes, item 5.

17 Q. Okay. And in the last part of item 5, it says the same day four

18 named individuals were brought into detention by the military police for

19 having looted abandoned Siptar houses. So here the military police are

20 arresting civilians for having looted civilian houses, Siptar houses,

21 right?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Okay. If we could look at Exhibit 5D991 I have a couple of

24 questions on that, General. This is a 13 May 1999 document from the I

25 think the military district command. It's an interim combat report to the

1 command of the Pristina Corps. I want to look at paragraph 3 and it talks

2 about an incident in which a member of the military territorial detachment

3 was wounded apparently in the course of a discussion or an altercation

4 with someone who's described as a drunk MUP member. And it says that MUP

5 member was taken into custody and handed over to the MUP organs.

6 I gather then that someone from either the military territorial

7 detachment or from the VJ are the ones who took him into custody?

8 A. The military police within the military district brought in this

9 police officer, who was drunk and he caused this incident, and handed him

10 over to the police organs. And they also arrested the civilian who had

11 been torching houses and he was also handed over.

12 Q. And in the last paragraph we see a reference that members of the

13 military territorial detachment arrested a civilian, it looks like a Serb

14 civilian, who had been setting houses on fire. And it indicates he will

15 be turned over to the MUP organs and a criminal report will be filed by

16 the military police, right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So from these two documents it appears that the military police

19 can arrest civilians who commit crimes against the Siptar civilians, such

20 as looting their houses. It also appears that they can arrest a MUP

21 individual, in this case he committed a crime against a military

22 territorial detachment individual, but it looks like they have the power

23 to at least detain and arrest those people. Isn't that right?

24 A. Well, there can be no dilemma. If someone attacks a member of the

25 military, that person would be arrested regardless of who they are.

1 That's quite natural and normal. As for the thing at the end, members of

2 the military territorial detachment arrested a citizen. It is not -- it

3 doesn't say here that the military police arrested this man. Those were

4 members of a unit who saw civilian committing a crime, and they performed

5 a citizen's arrest in a way, so to speak. The unit does not have the

6 right to arrest the detachment, 180th detachment. It doesn't say here

7 that the military police arrested him. He was caught, so to speak, by

8 those people, and he was handed over to the police.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues]... The security organs that

10 arrested those individuals in the last document we looked at for burning

11 Siptar houses or looting Siptar houses, was that also a couple of examples

12 of citizen's arrest by military police?

13 A. Well, yes, it is.

14 Q. Then my question to you is if that could be done and indeed was

15 done at least on these two instances, why wasn't it done if army members

16 were on notice and aware that MUP members were committing murder, rape,

17 robbery, theft against Siptar, Albanian, civilians? Why wasn't that done?

18 A. I see two things from this. One thing is when a person is found

19 in the commission of a crime, then every citizen may act in accordance

20 with the law and need to either report or not. The military did what it

21 did, it operated in its own way. And the second thing is if you get some

22 information, to check something. And according to the report in this

23 specific case, the report that I sent to the army commander, the security

24 organ went out to check all this information, both within the brigade and

25 also from the department of the interior in Glogovac.

1 Q. Where do you see that the security organ went out to check out all

2 that information in your report? Is there a security organ report about

3 that investigation?

4 A. Well, I started saying that in my examination-in-chief and then I

5 was interrupted. I was told not to say what was done in accordance with

6 this report, and I am telling you that three teams headed out on three

7 issues: The resubordination had not been completed yet, the clear-up [as

8 interpreted] operations, and the information about alleged crimes by the

9 police.

10 Q. And my question is: Is there some report reflecting that the

11 security organ went out to investigate those alleged crimes by the police?

12 Is that a document that's been shown in this case in your evidence?

13 A. The document was not shown. I hope that we will soon be able to

14 hear first-hand from the people who were dealing with that and who were

15 actually acting on the order to check this information.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

17 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour, it might not be a big issue,

18 but 17 -- 78, 15, the witness said the "assanation" not the clean-up

19 operations, because we've been hearing "assanation" for some time, so --

20 it's 78, 15. So they went for three different tasks, one was

21 resubordination has not been completed; the "assanation" of the

22 battle-field, and the information about the alleged crimes of the police.

23 That's what the witness said.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the difference between that and clearing up?

25 MR. ZECEVIC: I wasn't wondering if that doesn't sort of

1 suggesting something different than "assanation" because we have been

2 using "assanation" throughout the whole trial, that's the only reason why.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Thank you.

4 Mr. Hannis.

5 MR. HANNIS:

6 Q. General, I ask you these questions because you've told us and we

7 see many of your documents to support your position to show how concerned

8 you were about caring for the civilians during this conflict, and I say to

9 you, sir, that all those orders and all those words are all very good and

10 well, but when it came down to really helping those civilians, when you

11 had information that they were the -- being the victims of crimes, serious

12 crimes, murder, rape, robbery, by MUP individuals, it doesn't look like

13 you did very much. You wrote this one-page vague report with some

14 wide-sweeping allegations, send it to Pavkovic -- or handed it to

15 Pavkovic, he was that close to you, and you didn't do anything else. Do

16 you really think that shows your desire to take good care of the

17 civilians, particularly the Siptar civilians?

18 A. In the report I did not get information that was specific enough,

19 that is why the report is the way it is, but that's why I sent three teams

20 out into the field to deal with those problems. And I actually make a

21 claim that is completely contrary to what Mr. Prosecutor is putting to me,

22 that to the best of our abilities, as much as it was possible in the chaos

23 of war, we did everything we could to assist the civilian population in

24 Kosovo and Metohija. We provided protection, medical treatment, rescue.

25 Q. All right, General. The last thing I want to ask you about is the

1 plan or no plan on the 12th of November in response to a question from

2 Mr. Bakrac at page 18129, line 6, you said: "Before this Trial Chamber,

3 speaking under an oath, as I have been for several days now, I can

4 categorically state that there was no plan that the corps command or its

5 subordinate units knew of or participated in or got from their superiors,

6 so absolutely not."

7 I note that you specifically said there was no plan that the corps

8 command or its subordinate units knew of. It seems to me, sir, that

9 allows for the possibility that there may have been a plan known of by

10 others higher than you. Isn't that true?

11 A. The Serbian language is what it is. The Prosecutor has made use

12 of the expression I used, so perhaps my imprecise way of expressing

13 myself, but I have to repeat that really and truly I neither heard of the

14 existence of any plan nor did I see or learn about it at any level. In

15 the wartime chaos, as the Prosecutor is suggesting, that level was far

16 away from us. And if I may be permitted to say so, I'm convinced that at

17 no level was it possible for such a plan to exist from the aspect of my

18 understanding of the defence of the country at that time.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues]... that at the very beginning of

20 the war, the 24th of March, 1999, the intelligence that the army had was

21 that you did not genuinely expect a land invasion by NATO forces for some

22 period of time, perhaps for at least a couple of weeks. You knew enough

23 about the situation to know that they probably wouldn't be able to mount

24 such a massive undertaking for some short period of time, two weeks, maybe

25 a little longer. Isn't that right?

1 A. The documents from the relevant period which have been seen in

2 this courtroom indicate that it wasn't quite like that, and that in our

3 assessment we believed that by the 5th of April, at the latest, a ground

4 operation would be launched. So at the end of March I already ordered the

5 closure of all axes and a total defence, and we showed that here, defence

6 from total aggression. That was my understanding of the problem in late

7 March and the threat of a ground operation and we have shown documents

8 about it.

9 Q. If we talk about the 5th of April, we're talking about maybe 12

10 days. Some window of opportunity, if you will, General, between the

11 beginning of the bombing and when you might expect a ground invasion, and

12 we heard the evidence from Witness K-73 who is the fellow that you and I

13 talked about before who gave you a heel click and a nod before he left the

14 courtroom and he told us about hearing from General Pavkovic shortly

15 before the bombs started falling that once that happened and there's some

16 dispute about exactly what the wording was I think in his statement, he

17 said that Pavkovic said, First thing we need to do is get the Albanian

18 from our back. I think on cross-examination he said he wasn't sure

19 whether it was get the Albanian from our back or get the KLA from our

20 back. But isn't that true in those first days, week and a half, 10, 12

21 days, that the focus of the Pristina Corps was on routing and destroying

22 as much of the Siptar terrorist forces of the KLA as they possibly could?

23 Wasn't that one of your primary focuses during those first days?

24 A. No. My best reply as regards that activity was that at that time

25 only 4 to 5 per cent of the overall manpower of the corps was engaged for

1 that activity. The rest were defending the border, and that is the best

2 indicator of where the focus of defence was.

3 Q. General, I respectfully have to disagree with you. I think the

4 documents in the evidence from the other individuals, I would include

5 Exhibit P1990, which is a MUP meeting on the 17th of February, where it's

6 talked about this window of opportunity before a ground invasion happens.

7 And your main effort was to try to get rid of as many of those guys as

8 possible so that you could use all your other resources to fight NATO when

9 the expected land invasion came. And as part of routing and destroying

10 those Siptar terrorist forces, that included getting rid of their support

11 base, burning houses and driving out the civilians that provided them food

12 and logistics and shelter. Isn't that right, that's what happened?

13 A. Absolutely not.

14 Q. Okay, General. Thank you.

15 MR. HANNIS: I have no more questions, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

17 Now, there was an earlier indication of a desire to further

18 cross-examine the accused.

19 Mr. Visnjic, your basis for doing that?

20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tried to find an

21 appropriate term. My -- I thank you for giving me the floor. My basis is

22 the examination of my colleague Mr. Ackerman, in the course of which he

23 put some matters to the witness which the witness did not mention during

24 Mr. Bakrac's examination-in-chief. When I tried to raise the issue, my

25 colleague Mr. Ackerman gave me to understand how he saw the rule that had

1 been introduced. So if you will allow me to respond to that.

2 The impression has been gained from what my colleague Mr. Ackerman

3 said here, that I deliberately waived the right to my, or rather, set

4 aside my right to cross-examination in order to follow his

5 cross-examination, thus changing the order. Firstly, as I understand the

6 right to cross-examination, this is my right to check every new

7 circumstance that appears in the courtroom in the best interests of my

8 client. In this case, where we have several accused, the

9 cross-examination can sometimes relate not to checking what the witness

10 has said but getting additional information from the witness when a

11 certain defence case is being presented. I'll give you a typical example

12 of this. For example, if I decide in my Defence case not to call a single

13 witness, knowing there will be other witnesses called after my Defence

14 where I will be able to put my case. In that case, my colleague,

15 Mr. Fila, would never have the chance to check what I was trying to show

16 through those witnesses. Because if this rule is accepted as absolute,

17 the rule would not allow him to follow me and check certain statements.

18 In this particular case, the question of anticipation has been

19 raised, Mr. Fila's anticipation as to whether, based on the list of

20 evidence I present, what questions I will put, and what line of defence I

21 will try to present through those witnesses.

22 We have two additional problems here, one is the time needed for

23 that kind of anticipation, and you will see that in the case of ordinary

24 witnesses whose testimony is very brief, unlike that of General Lazarevic

25 here, we get information about the evidence at the time they make the

1 solemn declaration. If they are examined for an hour or two, my colleague

2 Mr. Fila must be ready right away to deal with a huge number of exhibits,

3 to peruse them, and to establish precisely what the case put by each of

4 us, including the Prosecutor, will be.

5 In this particular case, the testimony of General Lazarevic, my

6 colleague Mr. Ackerman announced 59 documents in a mail of the 6th of

7 November, 2007. However, on the morning, the very morning, when he

8 started his cross-examination he withdrew that mail. And in another mail

9 of 11th of November, 2007, which was sent at 8.00 p.m., and which I only

10 saw on the 12th of November in the morning, he stated a completely

11 different list containing some dozen documents or so.

12 During his cross-examination of the witness he asked him about two

13 documents that I wished to cross-examine the witness about. The first of

14 these is P1459, that's a document which had not [as interpreted] been

15 placed on the first list provided by Mr. Ackerman, and therefore I was

16 unable to prepare for that document. The second document is P1725, which

17 is a document which was actually on the list, it's a letter from

18 General Pavkovic to the Supreme Command Staff dated the 4th of June, 1999.

19 And I wish to demonstrate that this latter document is a typical example

20 of the kind of problems we run into when the Defences follow one another.

21 This document, P1725, has not been checked through a single witness of the

22 Pavkovic Defence.

23 On the 26th of October, 2007, on pages 17663 and 17666, we

24 cross-examined a witness of the Pavkovic Defence, General Stojmirovic in

25 connection with this document, it was done by my colleague Mr. Sepenuk,

1 attempting, since he was a person who was one signatories of this

2 document, to get some information from him. Now, we have a document which

3 is now being put to General Lazarevic, who is asked to comment on it.

4 Your Honours, I think it's my right in connection with document

5 1725 to cross-examine the witness, and especially in connection with

6 document P1459, which was not announced on the list for my colleague

7 Mr. Ackerman's cross-examination. Both documents have been mentioned,

8 they were mentioned on the transcript of the 13th of November, 2007, pages

9 18173 to 18178. It's an entire set of questions concerning the reporting

10 of the 3rd Army to the Supreme Command Staff on information relating to

11 the non-resubordination of the MUP and the control or inspection that the

12 Supreme Command Staff carried out at the time in the units of the Pristina

13 Corps.

14 I've spoken at some length, but I wanted to make use of this time

15 at the end of the day and I hope I have not exhausted the interpreters.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: P1459 was intimated at some stage, was it, that was

17 on --

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, and withdrawn that

19 very morning when the witness was supposed to answer the cross-examination

20 of my colleague Mr. Ackerman and myself.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: I've perhaps not followed this accurately. The --

22 1459 you said was not on the first list?

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, it was on the first

24 list but not the second, which cancelled out the first one. The second

25 list was dated the 11th of November at 8.00 in the evening. The first

1 list was on the 6th of November, I don't have the time here.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: 1459 was not on the first list; is that correct?

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, 1459 was on the first

4 list of the 6th of November, 2007 --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: The translation at 85, 1, that it was not on the

6 first list --

7 MR. VISNJIC: Oh, I'm sorry.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: So it was on the first list. So I now don't have a

9 clear picture of the facts.

10 MR. VISNJIC: Oh, I'm sorry.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: And what happened to it after that? You knew about

12 it all along, right. And 1725 was on the list is the translation here as

13 well, 85, lines 3 and 4.

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'll try to be precise.

15 There is the first list which was sent on the 6th of November, 2007.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] The second list was sent on the 11th

18 November, 2007.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but when did P -- when was P1725 first

20 referred to?

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] P1725 is on both lists.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And P1459 was not on the second list?

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Correct and the second list begins

24 with the words: "Please disregard the previous e-mail sent regarding the

25 documents for use by the Pavkovic Defence team -- [In English] We intend

1 to use the following documents during the cross-examination

2 [Interpretation] and then there follows the list including that document,

3 P1725.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: On what day was the cross-examination by

5 Mr. Ackerman?

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I think I was meant to start on the

7 12th. The mail was sent on the 11th in the evening.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: It must have been the 13th.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I think he started on the 12th and

10 continued on the 13th.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: So by the time P1459 was referred to, it was not on

12 an active list of exhibits that would be used in the Ackerman

13 cross-examination; is that the position?

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Correct.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. And your motion is confined to this

16 issue of -- that's -- that involves these two exhibits?

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour, and that's

18 what I would like to ask the witness about.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what is it that was asked that you say

20 requires further examination by you? Is it just quite simply the

21 suggestion contained in these or which may be supported by these that

22 information was being submitted to the General Staff?

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness was asked

24 about P1459, he was asked whether he was familiar with those documents, or

25 rather, that document. And I would like to elaborate further. I would

1 like to find out more about what the witness knows about the document,

2 it's on page 18177.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: You can only justify that at this stage if

4 something has occurred since you had your opportunity to cross-examine

5 which requires you to deal with; in other words, the case against you has

6 somehow or other been strengthened. Because these exhibits are known to

7 you, whether Ackerman intends to ask questions about them or not, and if

8 your decision at your turn is to take -- to ask no questions about them,

9 then that's it unless something had subsequently happened that prejudices

10 your position in some way.

11 Now, what is it that happened to prejudice your position?

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Now I have been prejudiced because

13 the witness confirmed first that he knew about this document, and I

14 believe that it is my right to ask him further questions about the

15 following: When did he see in document first, in which circumstances he

16 saw this document first, who showed him that document, and some other

17 questions related to the questions -- the answers that will be given to

18 the previous questions.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

20 Now, Mr. Aleksic, what do you wish to say on this?

21 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I find myself in

22 an unenviable position, but I will answer my learned friend Mr. Visnjic.

23 First, as regards the second exhibit, P1725, that Mr. Visnjic said

24 was not admitted into evidence, he is not correct in this regard -- yes,

25 well, if it is -- well, it was admitted into evidence on the 5th of

1 October, and it's a different story as to what was happening with this

2 document.

3 As regards the first document, I would agree with you that this

4 document is well-known to all of us, and I believe that from the

5 cross-examination by my colleague Mr. Ackerman there were no new facts

6 that arose from his cross-examination. And the question in the

7 examination of some of Ojdanic's defence witnesses was whether it was

8 received by the General Staff. The question was not how this document was

9 drafted. And I don't believe that the witness answered any of the

10 questions in this regard. So I don't think that there were any new things

11 that arose from the cross-examination, any new information that arose from

12 it.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Do I take it from that submission that you oppose

14 Mr. Visnjic's motion?

15 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am co-counsel and I

16 have to follow the instructions of my lead counsel, and he's absent at the

17 moment. Yes, I do oppose it, of course.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

19 Now, Mr. Hannis, is there anything on this you wish to say?

20 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, you seem anxious to say some more.

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, sometimes it is very

23 difficult to anticipate, even if you have a document on the list you don't

24 know what the witness would say with regard to that document. I could now

25 give you an example used by Mr. Hannis today regarding the alleged

1 air-strikes on schools. From that question that he asked, the witness

2 could have given ten different answers to that question. And now if you

3 think that we should be able to anticipate all those answers, I think that

4 given the time restraints and the number of documents that we have in

5 front of us, I believe that this is really quite difficult.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: With respect, Mr. Visnjic, I think you're

7 misinterpreting what I said to you. What I said to you is that your right

8 to further cross-examine arises where something occurs after you have

9 finished that prejudices your position and that you cannot be expected to

10 have foreseen. And there might even be situations in which the latter

11 part of that is not required, but here the documents in question are

12 exhibited and the issue for us is whether something occurred after you

13 made your decision not to cross that prejudices your position. And we

14 shall have to reflect on that and make a decision.

15 Now, is there anything else you want to say before we complete

16 this?

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, well a very simple

18 reply. I could not have known that General Lazarevic would confirm

19 whether he was aware of that document or not. This is something that I

20 could not have anticipated at the moment when Mr. Ackerman asked that.

21 For the document P1459 that was not announced at all or for the document

22 P1725 which even a witness testifying in Mr. Pavkovic's Defence was not

23 able to confirm that he remembered that document at all.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you saying that Mr. Lazarevic said that he was

25 aware of P1725?

1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, he was asked questions,

2 questions about this document at pages 1874 [as interpreted] through 1877

3 [as interpreted] and he made certain comments about this document. I

4 would have to now find the specific reference to see whether he made those

5 comments on the basis of any knowledge that he obtained about this

6 document later or whether he had contemporaneous insight into this

7 document, whether he had seen the document at the time, at the relevant

8 time. That's all.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: The only note I have is that he said that it

10 reflected what had been said in Velickovic's report.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour, but there

12 is a series of events between Velickovic's report and the issuance of this

13 document that I would like to question the General on, and there are two

14 documents issued by the General Staff that are related to this.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you see the problem already, don't you, that

16 no doubt Mr. Ackerman will want to deal with the two documents that you

17 decide to introduce?

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] These are exhibits, they have

19 already been exhibited.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if they're already exhibits, they're already

21 there and you're not prejudiced.

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but one of those pertains

23 directly to an order issued by the 3rd Army to General Lazarevic, and I

24 want General Lazarevic to confirm that he had received it or had not

25 received it.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you'll have to identify these to me, please.

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, these are 3D694 and

3 3D700.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. We'll tell you the outcome of this

5 tomorrow morning.

6 Mr. Bakrac, do you have any idea how long your re-examination will

7 be?

8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have to go through

9 the examination today to see whether there is any re-examination arising

10 from that, but I hope that I will be able to complete my re-examination in

11 the first two sessions.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry, General, at this late hour I'm causing

14 problems for everybody, but very little question about -- there's just a

15 little clarification I'm seeking from you. What is the role of the

16 inspector, General, in the army, because I thought it had to deal mainly

17 with discipline. Do you defer with this, this understanding which I have?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do not agree with

19 you. It is a far broader authority that the inspection of the General

20 Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia has. It has the right and duty to

21 monitor, control, inspect every element of combat-readiness, from command

22 to logistics. And discipline is just a small segment of command. So

23 command, mobilisation, security, morale, logistics, there is inspection of

24 every element according to certain rules and regulations.

25 JUDGE CHOWHAN: But it's merely inspection and report on the

1 readiness of the army and the way things were being done on that account,

2 nothing more, is it? I mean, like as a corps commander you could go for

3 combat, but they couldn't order anything like that?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They could not issue orders, but

5 their assessment of the overall combat-readiness predominated in the

6 assessment of the combat-readiness of a unit, that was the only aspect.

7 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm very grateful you've educated me on this, but

8 tell me whether General Samardzic, when General Samardzic was the

9 inspector general, which period, and this is my last question.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the best of my recollection,

11 after the 15th of January, 1999, and throughout that period when he handed

12 over his duty as commander of the 3rd Army to the new commander

13 General Pavkovic, the 15th of January, 1999, onwards.

14 JUDGE CHOWHAN: For how long about?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't reply with precision,

16 throughout all of 1999 at least. As for 2000, I'm really not sure.

17 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thanks a lot.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, thank you to everyone for their patience

19 allowing us to hear these additional submissions and that additional

20 question. We shall resume tomorrow at 9.00 rather than the previously

21 anticipated 2.15.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.17 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 22nd day of

24 November, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

25