1 Friday, 18 January 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Zivanovic.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: The cross-examination by Mr. Hannis will continue

9 in a moment. Please bear in mind that the solemn declaration to speak the

10 truth which you gave at the outset continues to apply to your evidence

11 until it's completed.

12 Mr. Hannis.

13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 WITNESS: DRAGAN ZIVANOVIC [Resumed]

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

17 Q. Good morning, General.

18 A. Good morning.

19 Q. I'd like to start off this morning showing you an exhibit, it's

20 number P1421, 1421, it will be up on your screen in a moment, General,

21 it's a 7 August 1998 order on further engagement of the army forces in

22 Kosovo, and it's from the 3rd Army commander, General Samardzic. I see on

23 your screen we have the second page, and we see that it did go apparently

24 to the 125th Brigade by telegram.

25 MR. HANNIS: And now if we could go to the first page of the

1 B/C/S.

2 Q. General, do you recall receiving this order?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In paragraph 2 it makes reference to: "According to the approved

5 decision, army units are to be engaged as support to the MUP ..."

6 Do you know what that's a reference to? Do you know

7 what "approved decision" General Samardzic is talking about there?

8 A. It's the decision that he approved for the benefit of the corps

9 commander. I know that the army commander or his Chief of Staff spent

10 some time in Pristina at the Kosovo's heroes barracks sometime during

11 1998. This used to be the forward command post of the 3rd Army, and he

12 met the corps commander on a daily basis to hand out assignments to him.

13 Q. In item number 3 it talks about the ZTJ, the Joint Tactical Units.

14 Can you explain to us what they are and how that differs from the battle

15 groups or the combat groups?

16 A. This means combined tactical unit, and it has the rank of an

17 independent battalion in a brigade. And a combat group is a temporary

18 unit that is set up within these combined tactical groups in order to lend

19 support or to provide -- to secure the state border down the depth.

20 That's the first thing. And secondly, there was that approved decision by

21 the Supreme Defence Council and there were orders by the 3rd Army and

22 support was lent by these units to the MUP based on those decisions in

23 certain actions.

24 Q. Okay. I need a little further help from you. We see in a number

25 of the Joint Command orders, Pristina Corps command orders, and your own

1 125th Brigade orders references to BG-1, I think up to as high at one

2 point in time as BG-6 within the 125th. Is that right? Did you at one

3 time have as many as six combat groups?

4 A. Yes. Just before the war broke out I had six combat groups.

5 Q. Now, were your combat groups part of this -- of a joint tactical

6 unit; and if so, what was the rest of the composition of a joint tactical

7 unit?

8 A. Combined arms tactical units had their own type of establishment

9 and organization. Combat groups are set up by using units, regular units,

10 including both officers and NCOs and also from this combined set-up from

11 these tactical units. They usually have the rank of a reinforced company.

12 They are smaller units than a battalion or a division perhaps, and the

13 most -- the best trained elements of a battalion or a division are used to

14 organize these combined arms tactical units. I'm not sure if this is a

15 sufficient explanation for you, sir, if you want me to go on.

16 Q. I'm still a little confused. Let me try and break it down this

17 way. Within the 125th you had, as we said, up to six combat groups. What

18 was the -- generally speaking, what was the composition of a combat group

19 within your 125th? Approximately how many men and how many and what kinds

20 of vehicles and weaponry did they consist of?

21 A. If you allow, let's consider the example of Combat Group 1, which

22 was about 220 strong. It had a motorised company comprising about 160

23 men. This motorised company contained three firing platoons and there was

24 a support platoon as well comprising recoilless guns for artillery weapons

25 and a platoon of 82-millimetre mortars with four individual weapons. It

1 also has a platoon of 120-millimetre guns, two of those, and there was

2 also -- there was a 120-millimetre howitzer battery as well as a

3 logistical platoon, a rear platoon, if you like. So that would be its

4 composition.

5 Q. Okay. Thank you. That helps. Now, the joint tactical units

6 referred to in this order, what were they composed of? Were they composed

7 of one or more battle groups? Would they contain only battle groups from

8 one brigade or would they cross brigades? And did they contain anything

9 other than VJ components?

10 JUDGE BONOMY: I must say I'm understanding this the other way

11 around, Mr. Hannis, that the tactical units are the more permanent ones

12 and the combat groups are the more temporary ones, so it's a -- part of

13 the tactical unit might be used to form a combat group but not the other

14 way around. However, if that's wrong, no doubt the witness will tell us.

15 MR. HANNIS: I'm hoping he will explain because in item number 3

16 here it seems to read the other way to me, but I'm sure the General can

17 help us understand.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll certainly do my best. A

19 combined arms tactical unit is a part of the permanent organizational

20 set-up. I can't remember specifically now, but it has both a wartime and

21 a peacetime establishment which cannot be changed without a decision by

22 the General Staff. Specifically the 125th Motorised Brigade, under its

23 peacetime establishment, had a command. As for units, it had two

24 motorised battalions. I'm just stating this one example of Kosovska

25 Mitrovica where there was one of them and then another one was in Pec, it

1 had an armoured battalion in Pec. It had a howitzer division in Kosovska

2 Mitrovica, it had an anti-armour division in Kosovska Mitrovica, and so on

3 and so forth. Well, okay. Now, if you wish to set up a combat group what

4 you have is this, combat groups are elements or units that are set up

5 pursuant to a decision on special measures of ongoing combat-readiness.

6 Now I'm introducing another term, special measures of

7 combat-readiness. The meaning behind this is to take a certain number of

8 men from the 1st Battalion that is stationed in Kosovska Mitrovica and use

9 these as a basis for setting up Combat Group 1. Naturally what is

10 attached here is elements from the howitzer battalion, from the rear

11 battalion, and then all of that, and what this is used for, these

12 best-trained men who had completed top-level training, they are used for

13 interventions along axes that are at particular risk, especially along the

14 state border. And there is nothing else here apart from this military

15 set-up that is involved.

16 MR. HANNIS:

17 Q. Well, I guess I'm still not clear, and I would ask you in your

18 next answer if you could speak a little more slowly I think for the

19 interpreters you went pretty fast on that last one.

20 A. [In English] Okay.

21 Q. Within the Pristina Corps, how many joint tactical units were

22 there in 1998 during peacetime?

23 A. [Interpretation] I can't give you specific figure, but I can list

24 them for you, if you like.

25 Q. Please.

1 A. The 125th Brigade; the 549th Motorised Brigade; the 243rd

2 Mechanised Brigade; the 15th Armoured Brigade; the 52nd Mixed Artillery

3 Brigade; the 52nd Artillery Rocket Brigade, anti-aircraft defence. I'm

4 not sure if I'm forgetting something. That should be it.

5 Q. Well, that sounds then as though a brigade is considered a joint

6 tactical unit. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes, that's right, that's right, but that's what I said at the

8 outset, didn't I? Something that has the rank of a regiment or possibly a

9 brigade.

10 Q. All right. Thank you. Let me go then to page 2 of this document

11 in both the B/C/S and the English. In item number 7 General Samardzic

12 says: "I forbid units to be used contrary to this order.

13 "If orders are received to use units contrary to this order, unit

14 commanders who receive such orders shall immediately inform the second

15 superior officer and act according to his orders."

16 First let me ask you, General, in this context: Who would be your

17 second superior officer?

18 A. In this context my second superior officer, superior to me, would

19 be the undersigned commander, Colonel-General Dusan Samardzic, 3rd Army

20 commander.

21 Q. Okay. And at this time your first superior officer was

22 General Pavkovic, correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Is this -- is this a standard provision in orders like this? It

25 seems unusual to me.

1 A. This isn't frequent, that much is certain; but it's perfectly in

2 keeping with the rules. You can't challenge your second superior or third

3 superior, in this case the Chief of the General Staff. They are

4 authorised to exercise command over individual units and men. The Chief

5 of Staff [as interpreted] called me personally using our communications

6 equipment in order to hand out specific assignments to me directly.

7 Q. Well, part of the reason I --

8 MR. CEPIC: Excuse me, just one correction in transcript. When

9 the witness mentioned -- I'm sorry. Your Honour, may I?

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

11 MR. CEPIC: Thank you. Seventh page, line 5 and 6 when the

12 witness mentioned "Chief of Staff" he mentioned it of General Staff not

13 just the Chief of Staff, because we have in armies, in corps also Chief of

14 Staff, just to distinguish, please. Thank you.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. HANNIS:

17 Q. General, the reason I ask, item number 8 indicates that: "This

18 order is to be delivered to the Pristina Corps commander,"

19 General Pavkovic, "personally and then to the commanders of the directly

20 subordinated units of the Pristina Corps ..."

21 Prior to this date of 7 August 1998, are you aware, had

22 General Samardzic had any kind of problems with General Pavkovic using the

23 subordinate units contrary to the manner that General Samardzic wanted

24 them to be used? Just yes or no.

25 A. It can't be a simple yes or no I'm afraid. I don't know that he

1 had any problems. As far as I know, General Pavkovic did not use his

2 units in a way that was contrary to the regulations.

3 Q. And in 1998 or 1999, before the war, were you aware of any

4 concerns at the level of the General Staff of the army about how units

5 were being used in Kosovo? Did you ever hear about that?

6 A. No. It wasn't down to me as a brigade commander to deal with

7 matters such as these, so I never heard anything about that. There is no

8 hearsay in the army, you see. You have orders, you have reports, you have

9 an official exchange of notes and letters.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Zivanovic, that can't possibly be right in

11 view of the terms of this paragraph that we're looking at: "I forbid

12 units to be used contrary to this order.

13 "If orders are received to use units contrary to this order, unit

14 commanders who receive such orders shall immediately inform the second

15 superior officer and act according to his orders."

16 Why on earth would you put that in a document unless somebody had

17 been breaking the rules or you anticipated that the rules would be broken?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, this is

19 a perfectly usual document by the 3rd Army commander. He's perfectly

20 authorised to do this. Secondly, if he forbids the use of a unit without

21 his approval, I don't need to know whether General Pavkovic in fact

22 requested authorisation from General Samardzic to use Combat Group 1 from

23 the 125th Brigade. You see, this document was delivered to the corps

24 commander personally, and it was -- it said: "To the attention of the

25 following," which included us. If we had any need to use this combat

1 group, I would have called up the commander of the Pristina Corps; and I

2 would have asked his permission. I suppose the corps commander would have

3 requested the permission of the army commander and then the same thing

4 happens the other way around.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Let me try to understand this completely. Have you

6 on other occasions seen a provision identical to or very similar to

7 paragraph 7 of this order?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you ask me, this is perfectly

9 fine, paragraph 7, it's fine. I don't remember --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Please answer my particular question. It may be

11 that he was entitled to put that in. He's probably entitled to put in it

12 whatever he wants in view of his position. What I want to know is whether

13 you've seen a document of this nature with that sort of provision in it

14 before?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 Mr. Hannis.

18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

19 If we could go back to page 1 in both the B/C/S and English.

20 Q. I've got another question for you, General. You'll see in the

21 introductory paragraph it says: "On the basis of analysis of the army

22 units' engagement in Kosovo so far," and then it goes on to talk

23 about "pressure from the international community and to regulate more

24 specifically the engagement of the armed forces in accordance with the

25 stands of the state and military leadership, I hereby order:"

1 And number 1 says: "From now on, reinforced army units engaged in

2 Kosovo ... are to be used to secure the state border and military

3 facilities of special importance ..."

4 Reading that all together with number 7 and number 8 that we just

5 talked about, it sounds like something different has been going on prior

6 to the 7th of August, 1998, and that's why General Samardzic feels a need

7 to issue this order at this time. Would you agree with that?

8 A. This is a legitimate assumption, but I'm not sure where it was

9 exactly that we exceeded our authority or did anything wrong.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me go now to another exhibit P --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you do that.

12 Mr. Zivanovic, when you said earlier that the Chief of the General

13 Staff called you personally using your communications equipment to hand

14 out specific assignments, was that in relation to this document or was it

15 in relation to some other matter?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A different matter altogether.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

18 Mr. Hannis.

19 MR. HANNIS:

20 Q. Just out of curiosity, General, what was that other matter and

21 when did that happen?

22 A. This happened on several occasions. The other matter would have

23 been an order or a request to preserve manpower, to take special care of

24 preserving manpower and equipment, to take control of particularly

25 dominant facilities such as Volujak above Klina in order to prevent any

1 manoeuvring by the terrorist forces, and there may have been other details

2 involved that I can't quite remember now.

3 Q. All right. Thank you. On those occasions when you were contacted

4 directly by the General Staff, would you report that to General Pavkovic,

5 that you had been contacted from that level?

6 A. Yes. Whenever a superior officer who is above Pavkovic issues an

7 order to me, I inform my own direct superior, General Pavkovic in this

8 case.

9 Q. Thank you. Next I want to show you P1422. This is also dated the

10 7th of August, 1998, and this is from General Pavkovic and it goes to the

11 subordinate units on the last page. I will tell you, you can see it goes

12 to the 125th. Do you recall receiving this order? It lists a number of

13 things.

14 A. Yes, I received this, but maybe you could show me the last page,

15 you will see whether it was sent to me as well.

16 Q. Sure.

17 MR. HANNIS: Could we show page 2.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

19 MR. HANNIS:

20 Q. All right. Now, if we go back to page 1, the introductory

21 paragraph says in part, General, that:

22 "The latest operations carried out by units of the corps in

23 coordinated action with units of the Serbian MUP in curbing terrorism," it

24 says: "An analysis of the achievement of the tasks showed that some units

25 overused combat equipment," and it talked about "a large number of houses

1 were destroyed and torched," and mentions the complaints of the

2 international community. So as a consequence, General Pavkovic is issuing

3 this order, in item number 2, forbidding torching of houses; and in item 3

4 he says: "I again warn unit commanders and prohibit the taking of

5 personal property from abandoned houses, as was the case in the 125th,

6 549th," et cetera.

7 Prior to August 7th, General, had there been some problems in your

8 subordinate units with looting?

9 A. It wasn't about large-scale looting. There were problems in

10 Brovina and Molic. The road was blocked on the outskirts of Junik, and we

11 reviewed our soldiers and officers. We ascertained that some of them had

12 in their possession certain items that had been picked up in those houses

13 along the way, so we returned those items, and I initiated disciplinary

14 proceedings against those persons. And after that, an order came on what

15 exactly to do next.

16 Q. And isn't it correct that during the rest of 1998 and in 1999,

17 before and during the war, that there were many instances of looting by VJ

18 personnel?

19 A. I said yesterday how many cases I had prosecuted, about 30 cases

20 of theft. There may have been cases that had slipped our attention, but

21 whenever we knew that something had occurred, we would always press

22 charges.

23 Q. And I'm not trying to single out your unit. This was a problem

24 throughout the army, right? Your unit wasn't exceptional in terms of

25 being bad for looting. This was something that happened in all units,

1 correct? Or do you know?

2 A. Yes, but all I'm talking about is my own unit, Mr. Hannis. I'm in

3 no position to talk about, for example, Mr. Jelic's unit and whether there

4 were cases of theft there. I suppose he's in possession of that sort of

5 information, and I suppose that he eventually pressed charges.

6 Q. Okay. Let me go now to another document, Exhibit P1426. General,

7 I can actually hand you a hard copy of this one, it's a telegram. Maybe

8 it's easier to read the hard copy. This is dated the 8th of August, 1998,

9 and it appears to be a telegram from you to the Pristina Corps command and

10 the forward command post in response to an order from the Pristina Corps

11 command about engagement of MUP units in late July 1998 and early August.

12 Do you recall sending this report to the Pristina Corps command?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And from reading this it appears that some of your combat groups

15 worked with various PJP detachments, the 3rd, the 4th, the 7th, and

16 something called the Brazil Group, right?

17 A. Yes. My combat group supported these detachments and the Brazil

18 Group.

19 Q. Now, can you tell us what the Brazil Group was or who comprised

20 the Brazil Group. I know at the very end of the telegram there's a

21 description, if that helps.

22 A. The Brazil Group was a special anti-terrorist unit. That was the

23 information I had at the time. It was one of the best-trained units

24 within the Ministry of the Interior.

25 Q. Well, now you said "special anti-terrorist unit," is that the SAJ,

1 S-A-J, as we refer to it here?

2 A. Yes. That's how I saw them and that's how they introduced

3 themselves to me.

4 Q. In this document, though, they're referred to as JSO, Special

5 Operations Unit.

6 A. Well, I see it says that here, JSO. The operations officer

7 compiled the report. I just gave him the guide-lines, the bullet points.

8 This is a telegram sent to the communications means using Morse code.

9 Q. And I know you talked briefly about this in your testimony in

10 Haradinaj. I think the reference is transcript pages 9375 through 9378,

11 and at that time you explained that you were sure that the Brazil Group

12 was a SAJ unit and not JSO. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, yes. That's what I said and I abide by that. That was an

14 anti-terrorist unit, a special anti-terrorist unit of the MUP.

15 Q. Now, it's my understanding the JSO is from the state security side

16 of the Ministry of Interior, whereas the SAJ is a part of the public

17 security side. Is that your understanding?

18 A. Yes. Later on I made that distinction. At first I myself wasn't

19 aware of all the structures that existed.

20 Q. Now, I understand that the JSO sometimes is referred to by some

21 people as it -- as the Red Berets. Were you familiar with that?

22 A. I never saw them wearing red berets, except on a film when in 2001

23 they protested in Belgrade. In the course of 1998 and 1999, they wore

24 normal uniforms with caps the same colour as the uniform.

25 Q. Okay. And did you ever hear them referred to as Frenki's,

1 stemming from the fact that Frenki Simatovic was a commander?

2 A. Yes, I did. That was something I wondered about when I was given

3 the task of contacting them personally when they were in the area or

4 through my liaison officers, when they were in the Decani area. I didn't

5 know who Frenki was nor have I ever seen him.

6 Q. Who gave you the task of contacting them?

7 A. It must have been the corps commander. They were in my peacetime

8 area of responsibility.

9 Q. And approximately when was that, that you were tasked to contact

10 them?

11 A. I think it was in April 1998.

12 Q. Did you have contact with any JSO personnel in 1998?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can you tell us how many times and under what circumstances?

15 A. I think three times, three times, twice in the area between Decani

16 and the border and once in Drenica on the Likovac axis, I think.

17 Q. And what were the circumstances? Were you supporting them in any

18 actions they were carrying out?

19 A. Yes, my combat group provided support for them.

20 Q. Did you ever see any JSO in Kosovo in 1999?

21 A. In 1999 I did not have any contact with them, any personal contact

22 that is.

23 Q. Okay. Did you hear about them being present in Kosovo in 1999?

24 A. I did. I think they were there.

25 Q. Thank you. Did you see or hear of any paramilitary groups in

1 Kosovo, first of all, during the pre-war period between the summer of 1998

2 and March 23rd of 1999, such as Arkan's or Seselj's, Skorpions, Phantoms?

3 Any of those did you come across?

4 A. No.

5 Q. How about in 1999 after the war started, after the NATO bombing

6 started, between March and June 1999?

7 A. No, I didn't hear of them nor did I see anything like that in my

8 area of defence.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. On page 1 of that telegram - I'm not sure if

10 it's on page 1 of the B/C/S - where it mentions that the Brazil Group was

11 106 men. It says: "They carried out deep wedging and burning operations

12 on all axes ..."

13 Do you find that? I think it's near the bottom of page 1.

14 A. Yes, yes, I see that.

15 Q. Can you explain for us what "wedging and burning" is?

16 A. In the Haradinaj case I explained what it means, wedging and

17 burning, and I drew a diagram. I will attempt to reproduce my explanation

18 now. What it means is that in the area occupied by Siptar terrorist

19 forces or a building [as interpreted] occupied by them, the special

20 anti-terrorist unit manages to drive a wedge in with the support of people

21 at the side and -- or over heads, and thus manages to take the building or

22 area. The wedge is about 10 or 15 metres deep, and the support -- between

23 10 and 50 --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- metres deep, and the support

1 provided means that there is at least one bullet covering every square

2 inch. That's what burning through means. It's a term invented by the

3 commander of the combat group, my commander of the combat group.

4 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, with your leave, just one correction in

5 transcript, page 16, line 20, the witness said "prostorija," which doesn't

6 mean building.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: What does it mean?

8 MR. CEPIC: Area, it means area. It is the military term, area.

9 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

10 MR. CEPIC: Ground area or land area.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, thank you.

12 Mr. Zivanovic, the English records you as saying:

13 "What it means is that in the area occupied by the Siptar

14 terrorist forces or a building occupied by them, the special

15 anti-terrorist unit manages to drive a wedge ..."

16 Did you refer to a building?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether I

18 said "building." I did say "area," meaning an area of land. The

19 wedging-in was not something that was desirable in a built-up area because

20 then there would be huge losses from surrounding buildings.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 Mr. Hannis.

23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

24 Q. On -- could you go to page two of that document, General. It

25 mentions that the Brazil Group --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: There's one other expression in the transcript I

2 find odd.

3 You're recorded as saying that: "The support provided means that

4 there is at least one bullet covering every square inch ..."

5 Now, I'm surprised at a Serb talking about square inches. Could

6 you tell me again what you said once the wedge was driven in, the support

7 provided means there is at least one bullet covering what area?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said "decimetre," square

9 decimetre, a length of 10 to 50 metres every decimetre, that's 500. Every

10 decimetre has to be covered by at least one bullet.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean -- what do you mean by one bullet?

12 Do you mean one person? If everybody fires together, the area covered by

13 one of your -- or one of their men would be that area? It's an expression

14 I don't really understand.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to explain, Your Honour.

16 It means that one fighter, one soldier of mine or a member of the MUP can

17 fire from an automatic rifle 20 bullets. With those 20 bullets, he can

18 cover half a metre in width. So to cover 50 metres, you would need a

19 hundred men to be firing simultaneously; but you can't use just one

20 bullet, you have to keep holding the line until the men are through. Is

21 that clear now?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: That is clear now. Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.

23 Mr. Hannis.

24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

25 Q. That sounds like a very lethal process for anyone in the area

1 that's being wedged and burned, correct?

2 A. Yes, it's supposed to be lethal. It's also lethal for those who

3 are crawling towards that area, who are defending themselves from Siptars,

4 from the terrorist forces.

5 Q. Okay. Page 2 makes reference to the Brazil Group using multiple

6 rocket-launchers. Can you describe for us what those are. Are we talking

7 about something that's mounted on a vehicle? This is not some kind of

8 hand-held weapon, right, this is a big weapon?

9 A. No. I saw that they had an improvised thing. You would put it on

10 a trailer. It was hauled on a trailer. They had rocket-launchers with

11 four to -- or eight barrels, I can't remember which exactly now. I think

12 it was four barrels, and it was not within the army standards, it didn't

13 meet army standards.

14 Q. Okay. And in item 1.4 it says in the last sentence: "The only

15 prohibited equipment used were the 122-millimetre howitzers."

16 Why was that prohibited equipment? That was something that had

17 been ordered not to be used without special permission from the commander

18 of the 3rd Army, right?

19 A. That's correct. That's why it was banned. After this analysis, I

20 held Major Bacevic responsible for using that, the commander. I was

21 responsible to General Pavkovic, and I had to make a statement; and I

22 suffered certain consequences.

23 Q. What is the range on the 122-millimetre howitzer?

24 A. The howitzers we had in the brigade had a 17-kilometre range with

25 a full charge, but usually it was less. In this case they were used at a

1 range of 4 kilometres to provide support to the special anti-terrorist

2 units in the area so they could pierce through. They were -- one platoon

3 was used in the open -- in the open, out in the open.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Salvo, not platoon. Interpreter's correction.

5 MR. HANNIS:

6 Q. Item -- the last item, number 4, you mentioned that one of the

7 biggest problems in coordination between MUP units and our -- was between

8 MUP units and your combat vehicles "because MUP members have not been

9 trained to work with" them "and are afraid of potential consequences."

10 Could you explain that for us, what kind of vehicles are you

11 talking about?

12 A. A combat vehicle is either a 90-millimetre self-propelled weapon

13 or a tank.

14 Q. Okay. Could I show you -- let me show you three different

15 photographs or exhibits with photographs and ask you if you can help us

16 with that. Exhibit 1325 -- P1325, first of all.

17 I take it, General, you were familiar with all the various combat

18 vehicles, transport vehicles used by the JNA in 1998 and 1999, correct?

19 A. Yes, unless I've forgotten, but we'll see that now.

20 Q. All right. At this photograph we have four different vehicles

21 numbered 1 to 4. Can you tell us what each one of them is and who used

22 them, whether it was the VJ or the MUP or both.

23 A. Well, the first picture is taken only from the side. It would be

24 easier to recognise if it was taken from the back also. Let's leave it

25 aside for the moment. Number 2 is a command vehicle used only by the

1 army. It's a command transporter. It's used by the army for the

2 battalion commander or division commander and in reconnaissance units.

3 This sort of vehicle has the brigade commander and communications

4 equipment in it. 3 is an M-60 armoured personnel carrier and the special

5 police units in Kosovo and Metohija also had that, the permanent MUP units

6 in Kosovo and Metohija, the PJP that is. And I don't know whether in the

7 243rd Mechanised Brigade they had those or not, but I don't think they

8 did. Picture number 4, that's a so-called Praga, and both the special

9 police -- the PJP units and the army had that. And as for number 1, I

10 think it's an infantry combat vehicle, M-80, and only the army had those.

11 Q. Number 2, is there a designator for that vehicle? Is there an

12 abbreviation for that or an acronym?

13 A. Yes, KOT, command armoured personnel carrier, I think that's what

14 it is, or a reconnaissance car, IA.

15 Q. And number 4, the Praga, what kind of weapon is that that's

16 mounted on it?

17 A. It's a two-barrel cannon 30-millimetre cannon, and it's intended

18 to fire at targets in the air; but it can also be used to target targets

19 on the ground.

20 Q. All right. Thank you.

21 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to the next page of this exhibit.

22 MR. IVETIC: For the record before we go to the next page, picture

23 3 does appear to have a sign on the front indicating "Derventa," which is

24 not in the Republic of Serbia or Kosovo for that matter, it's relating to

25 one of the other wars on the premises of the former Yugoslavia.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 MR. HANNIS:

3 Q. Okay, General, on this page could we do the same process, numbers

4 5 through 8, if you could explain what it is and tell us what is was

5 called, what acronym was used with regard to each of those vehicles.

6 A. Picture number 5, it's an M-84 tank. Picture number 6 is a T-55

7 tank. Picture 7 is a Pinzgauer; it's used to transport personnel. And I

8 think number 8 is also a Pinzgauer with the canvass, tarpaulin, down. And

9 it could also be a TAM T-7 with the canvass taken down.

10 Q. I take it that only the army had the tanks that are shown in

11 pictures 5 and 6?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. As for the --

14 A. Number 7 and 8, both the army and the MUP had those, the PJP that

15 is.

16 Q. And I think there's one more page of vehicles.

17 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at the next page of this exhibit.

18 Q. Can you help us with these, General?

19 A. I'm not sure about number 9, I don't know the precise name.

20 Number 10, I think it's either a police armoured combat vehicle. Number

21 11, I'm not sure, I didn't see those around. And number 12, I think

22 that's a reconnaissance car or an amphibian, perhaps, vehicle because I

23 can see that it has those holes at the side, propellers.

24 Q. All right, General, thank you. Next I'd like to show you Exhibit

25 P1597, only two more photos, General.

1 MR. HANNIS: If we can rotate that 90, thank you.

2 Q. Can you tell us what kind of vehicle that is?

3 A. I think it's a Praga. I've already mentioned the Praga; I don't

4 remember what number it was.

5 Q. Okay. And I think you told us that both the MUP and the VJ had

6 Pragas in 1998 and 1999?

7 A. Yes, some units within the PJP, yes, they did.

8 Q. And next P1598, last one. Can you tell us what that is?

9 A. I think this is M-84 tank.

10 Q. Are you able to tell from this photograph what kind of uniforms

11 those men are wearing? Are those VJ uniforms or police uniforms or can

12 you tell?

13 A. Well, if the colours are right, this does not look to me like an

14 army uniform, it's darker.

15 Q. And who had uniforms like that?

16 A. I don't remember such light blue camouflage uniforms. I know the

17 MUP had blue uniforms, but this is something in between ours and theirs.

18 When I say "ours," I mean army, between army and police uniforms.

19 Q. I have a question -- just a general question. I see they're

20 wearing what appear to be --

21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you allow me, an

22 objection in principle. Are we allowed to know the source of this

23 photograph, where and when it was taken? Because we have had certain

24 experience so far with photographs on which we saw five-pointed stars,

25 that is, the JNA before 1991; we had vehicles marked "Derventa" or with

1 licence plates "Derventa," and Derventa is not at all on the territory of

2 the former Yugoslavia?

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, can you help Mr. Cepic, please?

4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't have that information to hand,

5 but I don't think it's pertinent for the purposes that I'm asking these

6 questions --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: It's pertinent for someone who might want to

8 challenge what you're doing.

9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he can look at a uniform from any era

10 and say it was like uniforms in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: On the other hand, if you have information about

12 the source of this photograph, then it does enable Defence to carry out

13 other investigations that they might wish to do. So I think you ought to

14 do what you can to assist Mr. Cepic.

15 MR. HANNIS: My case manager is working on that right now, Your

16 Honour.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

18 MR. HANNIS:

19 Q. And if I may I'd like to ask a general question then about the

20 ribbons. You see these men have white and red ribbons on their shoulders.

21 I understand that sometimes that was done during combat to avoid the

22 problem of friendly fire. First of all, is that correct in 1998 and 1999

23 in Kosovo?

24 A. I answered yesterday that we did not use ribbons in my brigade.

25 We had passwords and code-names for that purpose, but now after the

1 intervention of Mr. Cepic and your question and on the basis of this

2 uniform that I cannot identify, I am beginning to think that this is a

3 picture made at a tactical drill in peacetime that the army performed and

4 they found some suits used as designators. Such were used in peacetime at

5 drills with lethal charges.

6 Q. And I understand you had told us before that your unit did not use

7 such identifiers during combat actions. Are you --

8 A. No, no, and I'm not aware that others did.

9 Q. But you're not aware that other VJ units and/or MUP units in other

10 areas may have used ribbons identifiers like that during combat actions in

11 1998 and/or 1999?

12 A. Not that I know. I don't know of any document from the corps

13 command ordering these identifiers to be used.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you never heard of that happening among either

16 the police or the army?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not in the war.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

19 MR. HANNIS:

20 Q. Let me ask you a couple more questions about the Brazil Group.

21 During 1998 and 1999, did you, General, use radio call-signs or

22 code-names?

23 A. Yes, code-names.

24 Q. Do you recall what code-name was used in connection with the

25 125th?

1 A. In which period?

2 Q. First of all, in 1998.

3 A. Ibar.

4 Q. How about in 1999?

5 A. Barut.

6 Q. Thank you. I'd like to show you Exhibit P1052. Do you recall

7 what the radio call-sign was for the Pristina Corps, the Pristina Corps

8 command or the forward command post in 1998?

9 A. I don't know. I'm not sure, maybe Kosmos.

10 Q. Okay. I'm afraid our English page and our B/C/S page don't match

11 up. The matching page for that B/C/S page I believe is the third page in

12 the English. Yes.

13 General, you see this? This is described as a communications plan

14 and it has listed Battle Group 1 of the 125th with the code-name of Ibar

15 40. Is that consistent with your memory of the code-names -- the

16 code-name used by Battle Group 1 in late 1998?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And there are references to three MUP units and the Joint Command.

19 Do you recall seeing or hearing that code-name "Pastrik" used in 1998?

20 A. I recall the code-name Pastrik, but this correspondence plan of

21 the army is not for the period. It could be a correspondence plan, a

22 work-plan, for exercises, jamming, radiogoniometry, and other exercises.

23 And when you see the sentence "Pastrik," nobody will answer. It's a

24 general term for the administration station. You can call Pastrik all day

25 and nobody will respond.

1 Q. Let me ask you this: When did your unit work with the Brazil

2 Group? Was it only in July and August of 1998?

3 A. I think so. July I'm not sure about, August I don't remember. I

4 worked with them. I think it was somewhere end July/beginning of August.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to the next page of the B/C/S. And I

7 think the corresponding English page is page 1. Yes.

8 Q. General, you see this one, and next to the --

9 A. I see it.

10 Q. Next to the last on the list is SAJ and then (F) with a code-name

11 Brazil. Would this not be referring to the Brazil Group that you worked

12 with in July and August 1998?

13 A. Possibly. I am not disputing what is written, but you see that

14 there's a SAJ, Special Anti-Terrorist Unit. But what this F in quotation

15 marks means, does it mean that these are Frenki's men, I don't know that.

16 What matters to me is SAJ, Special Anti-terrorist Unit. I don't remember

17 this work-plan for the station, and I'm telling you that there should be

18 an indication for the period from/to, and there should be some more

19 information at the bottom of the page.

20 Q. Well, we don't appear to have that information on this page, but I

21 see that we have Battle Group 1 for the 125th with a call-sign Ibar 80.

22 That's the code-name that battle group used in July and August of 1998,

23 isn't it?

24 A. No, it's not the first, it's the third combat group. Yes, among

25 other things, they used such a name but it also used other code-names. We

1 changed them almost every day.

2 Q. Changed them from Ibar or changed the number?

3 A. We changed it to Ibar. I was administrative Belgrade 13. He was

4 depending on the commander, if it was an armoured battalion commander I

5 called him Medved, bear, 80, because he was on the skinny side.

6 Q. All right. Could we go to the third page --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not understanding this. Is this important,

8 Mr. Hannis? Because if it is, I'm not understanding these numbers. If

9 they are important, we need to be clearer. Does Ibar last for a certain

10 number of months or a period of time, is it only the figures that changed.

11 Your question wasn't answered.

12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, when I asked him what code-name he used

13 in 1998, he said Ibar; in 1999 he used another one Barut. So I take it

14 from that Ibar is the code-name for 1998.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I have these answers, but we've just heard that the

16 code-name was changed almost every day and you asked: Changed them from

17 Ibar or changed the number. And the answer was: "We changed it to Ibar.

18 It was administrative Belgrade 13."

19 If you're happy with that, that's fine, you move on; but I'm now

20 confused after being clear.

21 MR. HANNIS: All right.

22 Q. General, for how long a period was the code-name Ibar used and

23 associated with elements of the 125th Motorised Brigade in 1998? Are you

24 telling us it was only used for a day or two, or wasn't it in fact used

25 throughout 1998?

1 A. I don't know. I didn't go into such details. There were

2 technical people who dealt with that. I believe Ibar was used for over

3 half a year, but Ibar means administrative station, the part of the hub

4 that is below the command in the basement where the servers are. So it's

5 a stationary communication centre, and that's the one that has the name

6 Ibar. And every server in the command has its own identification with

7 number. You cannot call out "Ibar," nobody will respond. It has to be

8 Ibar 58, for instance.

9 Q. All right. And one other answer you gave with regard to the SAJ,

10 you suggested the possibility that F might stand for Frenki's, but I

11 understood from what you told us before SAJ was part of the public

12 security side of the Ministry of Interior and Frenki Simatovic was on the

13 state security side with the JSO. Isn't that right?

14 A. I made that distinction later for myself. SAJ is MUP and what did

15 we say, JSO is the State Security Service, DB.

16 Q. All right. And MUP as I understand it includes both the state

17 security side, the SDB, and the public security side, the SJB. Isn't that

18 right? Ministry of the Interior includes both of them, no?

19 A. I'm not sure that such distinction, such a division existed in

20 1998/1999. I believe the state security was elsewhere.

21 Q. All right. Let me show you the last page of these communication

22 plans --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Before moving on.

24 In view of your lack of knowledge of the distinction within the

25 Ministry of the Interior, were there times when you may have been

1 confusing a special anti-terrorist unit with a JSO unit?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. When we get to know each other

3 before an action in which we support that unit, they would introduce

4 themselves. And it is clearly said here, I am such and such a person and

5 I am a special anti-terrorist unit or a part thereof. Maybe on my side I

6 had some doubts, but when they introduced themselves that was cleared up.

7 I don't believe they would hold themselves out to be something they were

8 not.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: So we have no explanation for the F in that case?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what I said. I believe that

11 this might be -- imply Frenki's men, but all I'm clear about is SAJ,

12 special anti-terrorist unit.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

14 MR. HANNIS:

15 Q. And the reason that you're sure that the Brazil Group was an SAJ

16 unit rather than a JSO unit is because you met them personally and they

17 told you they were SAJ; is that right?

18 A. Yes, yes, he told me. I believe he was the deputy or something.

19 Q. That's the only source of your information about whether they were

20 SAJ or JSO?

21 A. At that moment, yes. Later on I met more of them, I met Zika, the

22 commander, his name was similar to mine and I knew for a fact that that

23 was indeed the SAJ.

24 Q. And do you know Zika's full name?

25 A. Trajkovic, I believe.

1 Q. And now I would like to show you the last page of these

2 communication plans, page 3 of the B/C/S. Okay. And on this one,

3 General, we'll see listed two subordinate units of the 125th, item number

4 4 and item number 7, respectively the 4th battle group -- or the 4th

5 Combat Group and the 2nd Combat Group with call-signs Ibar 90 and Ibar 70.

6 That's correct, isn't it, those are the code-names they used in

7 July/August 1998?

8 A. Yes, but again I have to say that this work-plan of the

9 communication centre is not defined in terms of time, so I can't tell you

10 whether it's June, July, or August. We frequently performed exercises,

11 drills, with those stations to avoid detection of our communication and

12 correspondence plans. They changed almost daily, but you have this one

13 for one day and we keep going around in circles with it.

14 Q. And number 2 we see a code-name, Pastrik 13, for the forward

15 command post of the Pristina Corps. Is that a code-name that you

16 associate with them in the summer of 1998?

17 A. Well, it was ten years ago. I cannot tell you whether Pastrik 13

18 was the commander or the Chief of Staff or the operations officer. I

19 believe it was the commander, but I'm not sure.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MR. HANNIS: I'm going to move away from that, Your Honours.

22 Q. Now, General, I would like you to help us, if you can, with a term

23 that we've seen in many decision and orders from 1998 and 1999 by Pristina

24 Corps and the 3rd Army regarding actions to support the MUP in dealing

25 with terrorism, and that term is "armed non-Siptar population." You saw

1 that term used in a number of orders that you received, didn't you, do you

2 recall?

3 A. Yes, I saw it in those documents that went from the 3rd Army

4 through the corps and down to us.

5 Q. And oftentimes those orders were couched in terms that said

6 something like this: The Pristina Corps with reinforcements and armed

7 non-Siptar population in Kosovo and Metohija shall conduct and attack in

8 the area of responsibility or shall support the MUP ...

9 Who or what were the armed non-Siptar population in Kosovo and

10 Metohija?

11 A. It will take an explanation if you want to know how I understand

12 it. I hope you will not interrupt me if I start from the documents

13 governing the concept of All People's Defence and social protection which

14 defined what exactly "armed population" is. The instructions according to

15 which we worked in those years dealt with that term "armed population,"

16 and there was a unit in the former SFRY, the JNA, now the Army of

17 Yugoslavia [as interpreted], which had the obligation to use that term and

18 to include it in tasks for units, that's one explanation.

19 Another explanation, if you put armed non-Siptar or Siptar

20 population or let it be Dutch population in the tasks for units which is

21 paragraph 5 going on by items 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, et cetera, you have to

22 define "armed Siptar or non-Siptar population." Unless it's defined, it's

23 an empty phrase without meaning. I suppose that in these documents this

24 reference meant units of civilian protection and civil defence. I hope

25 I've succeeded in explaining it a bit.

1 Q. Well, let me ask you, were there no Siptars in Kosovo in the

2 civilian defence or the civilian protection? Were both those bodies made

3 up entirely of non-Siptars?

4 A. No. There were Siptars on the list in units of civilian

5 protection and civil defence. There were some on the records for the Army

6 of Yugoslavia, too, but they did not respond to call-ups. They did not

7 want to receive weapons, and that's why perhaps this term was used "armed

8 non-Siptar population" because they did not dare respond I would say to

9 call-ups. They did not want to receive weapons.

10 Q. Well, is it your evidence, it is your understanding, that armed

11 non-Siptar population in the context of these orders meant only the civil

12 defence and civil protection?

13 A. I'm saying that's my understanding, and I suppose that even those

14 people who were not in the civil protection and civil defence. Let's say

15 that somebody is in Priluzje village far from Kosovska Mitrovica and there

16 are only one or two persons there who have weapons, what are you going to

17 do with them? Are you going to leave them in the lurch?

18 Q. Were you aware that in 1998 some tens of thousands of Serbs in

19 Kosovo were furnished weapons? And I'm not talking about soldiers, just

20 civilians. Were you aware of that?

21 A. I don't know the exact number. I know some were armed. I

22 personally armed military conscripts, those who come to our brigade, 125th

23 Brigade, in response to a call-up. And the procedure was strictly

24 prescribed for issuing weapons, training, control, returning weapons, et

25 cetera. As for those auxiliary organs, I believe there were around 10.000

1 armed persons in civilian protection and civil defence. I don't know the

2 exact number, but I believe this is approximately the figure.

3 Q. Did you personally engage in arming any Serbian civilians who were

4 not conscripts and coming into the army?

5 A. No, I would not have that right; if I did that, I would be

6 criminally liable.

7 Q. Did you engage with local authorities in Kosovska Mitrovica

8 regarding planning for the defence of populated areas in 1998 or 1999?

9 A. No, I didn't work together with them on that. There were local

10 bodies that were in charge of that. There were other bodies that were in

11 charge of that. I had a million other problems to face.

12 Q. Okay. No subordinate officer of yours was delegated to work with

13 the municipal authorities in Kosovska Mitrovica regarding defence

14 planning?

15 A. No, no. The brigades and the combined arms tactical units lost

16 that role. You know in which case I would have been responsible. If

17 there was an occupation system in place, for example, but we never carried

18 out an occupation, an act of occupation. Why would we occupy our own

19 territory? For example, if I had crossed to Albania, to the Troje

20 sector, that would have been an act of occupation because that was someone

21 else's territory, just to name an example.

22 Q. Okay. Let me move on and show you another exhibit, P1434.

23 General, this is an order from the Pristina Corps command signed by

24 General Pavkovic dated the 19th of September, 1998, to support the MUP in

25 breaking up terrorist forces in the general Cicavica sector. We don't

1 have delivery information on this, but could you take a look at this and

2 tell us if you recall receiving such an order or if you remember this

3 action?

4 A. I remember that, but could I at least see all the items, 5.1, 5.2,

5 to see if my name is mentioned.

6 Q. Certainly, and I have a hard copy, it may make it easier because

7 it's several pages.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you do recall having seen this?

10 A. Yes, I do, I do, I do.

11 Q. If you could go to item number 3, it's page 5 of the English; I'm

12 not sure which page in the B/C/S. If you could would us, we could put

13 that on the screen for the others. I see we've already got it up. I

14 believe it's page 3 for you. Item 3.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. It talks about the task of neighbouring units, and it talks about

17 what MUP forces will do. The second paragraph says: "In addition part of

18 the Serbian population in the Serbian settlements shall cut off the right

19 bank of the Sitnica river and prevent terrorist forces from crossing ..."

20 Do you recall whether the Serbian population was actually employed

21 that way during this action, or was that outside the area that you were

22 dealing with?

23 A. I don't recall that the Serb population was used in this way, but

24 if that's what item 3 says, "neighbouring units," this means that this is

25 outside the purview of the Pristina Corps. And I think this is just an

1 empty phrase.

2 Q. If you could go down to item 4 where it says: "I have

3 decided ..." And under "objective" the second sentence says: "Engaging

4 territorially-based MUP forces and the Serbian population, throw a wide

5 cordon around Mount Cicavica, break up and destroy any terrorists

6 discovered along the axis of attack and along the road."

7 Do you recall whether the Serbian population was engaged with

8 territorially-based MUP forces and setting up a cordon around Mount

9 Cicavica?

10 A. With all due respect, let me say I do not recall that. Secondly,

11 we were in no position to do this with the Pristina Corps and the MUP, let

12 alone the Serb population or whoever's referred to there. This is a

13 megalomaniac mission for someone who is believed to have no more than

14 three armed men; therefore this is just another one of those empty

15 phrases.

16 Q. Well, General, I'll tell you we have evidence in this case at a VJ

17 collegium where General Samardzic advises General Ojdanic that some

18 40-plus thousand Serbian civilians in Kosovo have been armed. We're not

19 talking about just two or three people. Were you aware of that?

20 A. As I said, I assume that there were about 10.000 armed men in the

21 district bodies, civil protection and civil defence, so that's definitely

22 more than three of those, that it was someone else altogether who took

23 decisions on their use, someone from the defence ministry not the army

24 itself. And the third assignment that you see here, item 3 in relation to

25 neighbouring units, General Pavkovic or his operatives wrote exactly what

1 I assume the army commander's order to have stated. I suppose now we're

2 about to see whether he handed out any specific assignments to those,

3 specifically in item 5 or perhaps not.

4 Q. Well, in item 5 let me ask you specifically about elements of the

5 125th. Item 5.1 has a task for the Combat Group 1 to support an attack by

6 the 3rd Detachment of the PJP and the JSO and a PJP company from Pec. Do

7 you know what JSO unit was involved in this action? Did you personally

8 have any dealings with them?

9 A. No. I had no contact with them at the time, so this is the 3rd

10 Detachment of the PJP Pec unit. So we were securing support for them in

11 the second line, but behind; and the JSO, if they were there, were on the

12 opposite side, the other end, but that's what I assume. I don't remember

13 all these details. Perhaps I just simply wasn't that, that being the

14 reason I can't remember.

15 Q. Okay. Thank you, General. I'm finished with that one for now.

16 I'd like to show you next Exhibit P3049. And so you know, this is a

17 document from March 19th, 1999, before the NATO bombing began. And let me

18 ask you while that's coming up, what was your understanding about the

19 October 1998 agreement regarding the OSCE-KVM mission in terms of

20 anti-terrorist operations or actions? Was there an obligation on the part

21 of the Serb authorities to advise the observers before going out and

22 engaging in those actions? What was your understanding about that?

23 A. According to the agreement that had been reached, the Pristina

24 Corps had three units out there, and all those men that were believed to

25 be necessary to secure the state border in depth. When there were drills,

1 as I said yesterday, we were under an obligation to talk to the OSCE

2 liaison officer and announce any of our drills an hour ahead of time so

3 that they could monitor this. No restrictions were imposed on us in terms

4 of what exactly we did in terms of drills, but there were other things

5 that were involved. For example, if one wanted to monitor the situation

6 along the state border, the OSCE mission itself was under an obligation to

7 announce their arrival at least 24 hours ahead of time for them issuing

8 activities, the paramount reason for them each to do this was their own

9 safety.

10 Q. Okay. I'll give you a hard copy of this document, and you'll see

11 this is one of those Joint Command orders that's not signed. And in item

12 4.4 you'll see a task listed for the 125th. Do you recall receiving this

13 order?

14 A. Yes, I do. I received this order. This is a document produced by

15 the corps command.

16 Q. Okay. And as I said, it has no signature. It has the

17 typewritten "Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija" at the end and in item

18 number 12 it says: "The Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija from the

19 Pristina sector shall command and control all forces," right?

20 A. I'm sorry, I didn't quite catch your last statement.

21 Q. That says that the Joint Command was going to command and control

22 all forces during those combat operations. That's what it says, right?

23 A. Yes, that's what it says. This is something that was always

24 copied each time a document like this was produced.

25 Q. Okay. And the task for the 125th was not in the border belt area,

1 right, it's near the town of Srbica, far in the interior of Kosovo?

2 A. Yes, that's right. It's deep inside Kosovo and Metohija, as you

3 say, but this task strikes me as illogical now. It says the 125th

4 Motorised Brigade, meaning in its entirety. So I'm beginning to have some

5 misgivings. I'm no longer sure that I saw this document. I was expecting

6 it to say something like: 125th, and then open brackets (with BG-1, BG-2)

7 that sort of thing. I'm not sure if it was amended at any stage, I mean,

8 this document.

9 Q. Do you recall your unit or subordinates of your brigade

10 participating in an action like the one described in this document in or

11 around March 20th of 1999?

12 A. Yes, the date on this one is the 19th of March by the so-called

13 Joint Command, meaning the Pristina Corps, and then I transformed it into

14 an order and task of my mine. I believe we started carrying this out at

15 the beginning of the aggression. This was part of the preparations. This

16 was all in order to block the road and to fend off the terrorist forces

17 along the Kosovska Mitrovica-Pec road. I didn't travel that road. Can

18 you imagine what that situation is like? A brigade commander who can't

19 travel the road with his own unit, it's an embarrassment, isn't it?

20 Q. And at the very end it says: "Readiness for combat action, 0600

21 hours on the 20th of March," indeed this was an action that was carried

22 out before the NATO bombing began, wasn't it?

23 A. I don't remember that it began, if that's what it states, and it

24 should have been that way but it could have been postponed. I would need

25 to look at combat reports to know exactly. I'm not saying that's when the

1 aggression began, I'm saying it's a possibility.

2 Q. Okay, thank you.

3 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, is it time for the break?

4 JUDGE BONOMY: That would be convenient, Mr. Hannis.

5 We have to break here, as yesterday, Mr. Zivanovic, this break for

6 half an hour. Could you please again leave the courtroom with the usher.

7 [The witness stands down].

8 JUDGE BONOMY: And we shall resume at 11.15.

9 --- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.

10 --- On resuming at 11.15 a.m.

11 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, I'd like

12 some guidance from the Court. By my calculations, I've reached the point

13 used on direct examination and cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic. I have a

14 considerable amount of material I would like to cover with this witness,

15 and I'm asking the Court's indulgence to allow me what may be another

16 hour.

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 MR. HANNIS: If you're not inclined to do that, then I'll try and

19 adjust accordingly with what you're willing to give me.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: This, Mr. Hannis, I think over the piece the

22 Prosecution has shown significant restraint in the use of time during the

23 Defence phase of the case, and you probably have time in the bank over the

24 piece and therefore we consider such a request to be a reasonable one in

25 principle. So far as this particular situation is concerned, it does seem

1 to us that you have been proceeding expeditiously throughout the

2 cross-examination and it has been a focused cross-examination; and

3 therefore, we are willing to grant some indulgence, but we'd like you to

4 finish in about three-quarters of an hour or so, say five past 11.00,

5 something of that nature. If you still feel the need to continue at that

6 stage, please ask us again.

7 MR. HANNIS: I will, Your Honour. Thank you.

8 Q. General, I have a question for you concerning these action orders

9 that were issued by the Joint Command with tasks for you. They typically

10 list a command post from which the operation or the action is going to be

11 commanded, and that's usually in the last item number 12 or 13. That's a

12 standard feature of all such orders, is it not?

13 A. Yes, it is. Normally it was the corps command post.

14 Q. And as a brigade commander, a commander of a subordinate unit,

15 receiving these orders, is it important for you to know where that command

16 post is or is that just extra information that doesn't really matter that

17 much?

18 A. It didn't matter that much to me, but it mattered to my command

19 organs. I would order them to go to the command for correspondence and

20 for the production of plans. I would speak to the commander. I

21 communicated with the commander wherever he happened to be, in Pristina,

22 in Djakovica, in Mitrovica, and so on and so forth, by radio.

23 Q. Okay. Well, then maybe you can help me with one issue. I'd like

24 to show you first of all Exhibit P1966. I'll hand you a hard copy. This

25 is dated the 22nd of March, 1999. It's another one of these unsigned

1 Joint Command orders for routing the Siptar terrorists in the Malo Kosovo

2 area. Do you recall having received this order? It has a task for your

3 Combat Group 4 in item 5.2.

4 A. Yes, I received this one.

5 Q. And you'll see in item number 13 -- well, I'm sorry. Let me go to

6 item number 11 first under command and communications. It says: "The

7 Pristina Corps command post shall be in the building of its peacetime

8 location," correct?

9 A. Yes. It's clear then that this is a document produced by the

10 corps command and not some Joint Command that didn't exist. Can I please

11 have item 13 because I don't have it. It must be on page 4 or page 5.

12 Q. I'm sorry, we omitted the last page.

13 MR. HANNIS: If I could have the usher's help.

14 Q. All right. Now, General, I'd like to hand you a related document,

15 this is P1967, and I think you mentioned this in your direct testimony.

16 This is also dated the 22nd of March, 1999, and you'll see it has strictly

17 confidential number 455-56/1 and you'll see it's entitled: Amendment to

18 the Decision. This appears to be an amendment to the one you were just

19 looking at; would you agree?

20 A. Yes, that's what it seems to be.

21 Q. And this one is actually signed by General Lazarevic and it

22 indicates that it was delivered to the 125th on the last page, right?

23 A. Yes, that's right. That's right. It says in code to 125th and

24 other units, but you see that it was signed by the corps commander on the

25 left-hand side, which means the document was signed in order to be sent in

1 an encrypted form. It wasn't signed on the right-hand side, which would

2 be the usual course of action to take. I suppose this amendment was

3 encrypted before it was sent, and I assume that's why General Lazarevic

4 signed it.

5 Q. And my question is: This amendment appears to have only item

6 numbers 4 and 5 in it, right? There's no item 1 through 3 and no items 6

7 through 13.

8 A. That's right, because of the urgency. If there was an amendment

9 to be made to a decision, it had to be done quickly.

10 Q. And there's no need to put in the things that are not being

11 changed. You only need to put in the parts that are different, that are

12 being changed, being amended, correct?

13 A. As a matter of principle, yes.

14 Q. So reading these two together, the original order and the

15 amendment, isn't it true that the command post for this action is as

16 stated in the original document under item number 11, the Pristina Corps

17 command in its peacetime location?

18 A. It's only logical that it remained the same as in the decision

19 that it refers to.

20 Q. Okay. And you would have no reason to believe that the command

21 post for the overall action was in the village of Lausa, as is listed on

22 the last page in the amendment, because that command post refers to the

23 354th in item 5.4, does it not?

24 A. That's right, the 354th Infantry Brigade.

25 Q. Thank you. I want to move now to -- well, do you see what your

1 task was, task for your subordinate unit was in item 5.2?

2 A. Yes, yes, I see that, but may I just check for any discrepancies

3 in relation to the original document?

4 Q. Certainly.

5 A. Yes, that's the discrepancy or the difference is actually quite

6 considerable.

7 Q. Okay. But with regard to the task that is in the amendment, is

8 that the task that your subordinate unit carried out, do you recall?

9 A. The amendment predates the previous document in as far as the

10 items that were eventually delivered are concerned. Combat Group 4

11 carried out this particular task; it was not a difficult task. The

12 previous order contained the more difficult task.

13 Q. I didn't understand what you say about predates. On my copy both

14 the amendment and the original order are dated the 22nd of March. Isn't

15 that what it shows on your document?

16 A. Yes, yes, that's right, but you probably didn't understand what I

17 was trying to say. I am saying that the older task for my unit was the

18 one that was in the amendment. It preceded the other one, and this was

19 the one that now took effect.

20 Q. Okay. Thank you.

21 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at exhibit 5D463, please.

22 Q. And, General, you'll see this is I think a combat report from your

23 125th.

24 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go down to the bottom of both pages.

25 Q. Does this reflect in item 5.1.4 that: "Battle Group 4 has been

1 engaged within the blockade," and that was the task described in those

2 two -- in that document you were just looking at?

3 A. That's true. This combat group or some of its elements were in

4 the Stari Trg area before. This is a radio relay hub. It was a military

5 installation.

6 Q. Thank you. Next I want to show you another one of your combat

7 reports, 5D465. This is from the 3rd of April. It relates to a different

8 action, but my question is not about the action per se. Do you recognise

9 that? I'm sorry, I said "the 3rd of April," but I think -- I guess it's

10 the 4th.

11 A. Yes, I recognise this.

12 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to the second page of both the B/C/S and

13 the English.

14 Q. And in item number 5 you have a recommendation for the command

15 where you say: "I recommend not sending volunteers to the units before

16 they are tested by a psychologist and a security check is carried out by

17 the security organs."

18 Did you make that recommendation because prior to this date you'd

19 had some problems with volunteers?

20 A. Yes, I had faced problems with a volunteer in two different

21 places. In one of these places what was -- with a single volunteer and in

22 the other place it was with three volunteers. It was in the Babaj Boks

23 sector while secures the state border. One of them climbed an electricity

24 post in order to repair the power lines up there, and he fell down and was

25 killed as a consequence. Just above the village of Streoc where we were

1 also securing the state border in depth, three volunteers clashed and

2 killed each other. Those were the problems that I faced, and that's why I

3 requested this.

4 Q. Do you know if your recommendation was followed up on?

5 A. Of course. The first round of vetting was done in the recruitment

6 centres where volunteers were welcomed, in this case in Bubanj Potok and

7 in Medja. The second round of vetting occurred -- they started in

8 Pristina, which they normally didn't. The last, final round of vetting

9 for my brigade specifically was done where my men were receiving these

10 volunteers. I had a psychologist working for me as well as a doctor,

11 several doctors, who were in charge of the first round.

12 Q. General, do you recall one of your subordinate units being

13 involved in an action around the middle of April 1999 in the Rugova area

14 in connection with the hydroelectric plant?

15 A. Yes, this was the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion from the 58th Light

16 Infantry Brigade. This was a regular military unit.

17 Q. Okay. Were you aware that the order for that particular action

18 had passed through the attention of General Ojdanic at the Supreme Command

19 Staff and that he had actually made some suggestions about that action?

20 Were you aware of that or did you see any of those documents?

21 A. If I may explain, this document by the Supreme Command Staff is

22 something that I saw as I was being proofed. I didn't know about this at

23 the time, but I did have an order, a document, from the corps commander,

24 the corps command to lend support to the forces at Rugovska Klisura and to

25 the effect that a request had been sent to the 3rd [as interpreted] Army

1 commander to use some units of the 3rd Army along the Cakor pass, Bjeluhe

2 and Kuciste. And the date was the same as the one when the order was

3 delivered.

4 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Zecevic on his feet, Your Honour.

5 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, it's line 47 and 6 and 7,

6 he's referring to the 2nd Army, just for clarity.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that correct, Mr. Zivanovic?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received a document to my

9 attention from the corps commander --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: It's a simple translation question. Were you

11 talking about the 3rd Army commander or the 2nd Army commander?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both. The commander of the Pristina

13 Corps sent a document to the 3rd Army command in order to ask through the

14 General Staff for the involvement of another army along this axis. Am I

15 being sufficiently clear now, Your Honour?

16 JUDGE BONOMY: And the other army was part of the 2nd Army?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, part of the 2nd Army.

18 This is the Podgorica command post.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

20 Mr. Hannis.

21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. General, the next topic I want to ask you deals with the air

23 force, with the Yugoslav air force. How long after the start of the NATO

24 bombing on the 24th of March did it continue to be active and have

25 aircraft flying, do you recall?

1 A. Well, you're really pressing me hard, aren't you, Mr. Hannis?

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think

4 General Zivanovic is, after all, an infantry officer and that was his job

5 at the time. He was in a brigade. He wasn't at the General Staff, he

6 wasn't part of the air force; therefore, I don't think he can say anything

7 about this. I don't think any answer obtained would be relevant. Thank

8 you.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: It hasn't prevented many army officers telling us

10 about NATO action, Mr. Cepic. There's no reason why an army officer on

11 the ground should not be able to tell us something about the use of the

12 air force; after all, it's often used in combination with the army.

13 Mr. Hannis, please proceed.

14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

15 Q. I'm not trying to pin you down to a precise date and hour, but can

16 you give me an approximate week or month? Were they still flying in

17 mid-April?

18 A. I don't know exactly. I don't know. I asked the corps commander

19 to have support in the Kosare area, and I never got it.

20 Q. Okay. And when was that? Was that on --

21 A. When the land and air battle took place, when it started, as of

22 the 9th of April and onwards.

23 Q. All right. Let me show you Exhibit P2033. I can hand you a hard

24 copy, General. And this is a regular combat report from your 125th on 28

25 March 1999. If you could go to the last -- last page, I think, item

1 number 9, page 4 of the English, item number 9 says: "Do not send our

2 aircraft when there's been notification of NATO aircraft flying over

3 because this causes alarm among the units. We recommend that our aircraft

4 fly over in the early hours of the morning."

5 This was dated the 28th of March, so your planes were still flying

6 as of the 28th, correct?

7 A. No, no, they weren't flying. It would have been a good thing, but

8 this was announced on an hourly basis from the operations centre of the

9 corps command. This was something that was announced. Our planes are

10 about to take off, our planes are about to arrive, and they never did; and

11 then I passed the information along down to the last soldier just in case

12 our planes eventually came to keep them from firing at our own planes.

13 This was a huge problem that I was facing, and that is why I said this

14 later on. So --

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the last part

16 of the witness's answer.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you repeat the last sentence of your answer,

18 please; the interpreter did not understand that.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So please say when they can really

20 take off so that we might know, I suppose.

21 MR. HANNIS:

22 Q. Well, that's not what it says. It says: "Do not send our

23 aircraft when there's been prior notification ..."

24 That sounds to me like they have been flying. Are you saying they

25 were not?

1 A. What I'm saying to you is that at least in my area there were no

2 planes in the air, none of our planes. I'm certain about that. I

3 received an air-raid alarm on the evening of the 23rd, and I never

4 terminated this simply because NATO planes were flying overhead all the

5 time.

6 Q. Okay. Let me show you next Exhibit P2038, this is four days

7 later, another regular combat report, and I'll trade you -- hand you a

8 hard copy of this one, and if I could have the others back.

9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

10 Q. And, General, if you'll go to item number 4 just above your

11 signature, it's on page 2 of the English it says: "We kindly request that

12 commencement and termination of air-raids be signalled only by the one

13 person on operational duty and not by several persons which causes

14 confusion, especially if our air force is engaged."

15 That suggests to me that your air force up until that point had

16 been flying; is that correct?

17 A. It is absolutely not correct. The context is entirely different.

18 If you want me to explain, I'm glad to do that.

19 Q. No, I have your answer and maybe Mr. Cepic will ask you something

20 on re-direct. I need to move along, General, and I'd like to show you

21 next Exhibit P1246. And I'll hand you a hard copy of this one because

22 it's several pages. This is dated the 4th of April, 1999, it's your order

23 regarding hygiene and sanitation measures in battle-fields. You recall

24 issuing this order?

25 A. Yes, this is my order, it was signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vidosav

1 Sekulic.

2 Q. And item number 2 says: "Hygiene and sanitation measures in the

3 battle-fields of the zone of responsibility of the 125th shall be

4 organized and carried out by all units of the 125th, the organs of the

5 MUP, in cooperation with the organs of authority (military prosecutors,

6 organs of authority in the municipality and others)."

7 And item number 7 which is on page 6 of the English, and I'm not

8 sure which page of the B/C/S, I think it's page 7 of the B/C/S, would you

9 have a look at that. It says: "The commanders of combat groups in the

10 zone of responsibility ... the PKPo," can you tell me what that acronym

11 stands for?

12 A. Assistant commander for logistics.

13 Q. Okay.

14 " ... the chiefs of the MUP in the zone of responsibility ... as

15 well as the chiefs of the Kosovska Mitrovica and Pec districts, together

16 with the presidents of the municipalities, shall be responsible to me,"

17 meaning you, "for the implementation of this order."

18 So it appears that for purposes at least of battle-field

19 sanitation and hygiene, you take the view that the MUP and the municipal

20 authorities are answerable to you, correct?

21 A. That's what this particular document reflects, but it was written

22 by the assistant commander for logistics using the standard format

23 contained in the instructions to comprise all of the various bodies. When

24 I saw this several days later, I dispatched him to go and apologise to

25 those people because I had no authority to order anything to district or

1 municipal chiefs. But certainly sanitation work was to be performed.

2 Q. Did you issue any written document withdrawing what you had said

3 here in item 7?

4 A. No. That was oral information received from

5 Lieutenant-Colonel Zecevic. He issued it to everybody face-to-face, he

6 told everyone, that is, but I was already at the border at that time.

7 Q. Okay. Next I want to show you --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know why the standard formula for these

9 orders did envisage the MUP and the municipal authorities being answerable

10 to the VJ?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that was the idea of All

12 People's Defence, social protection, and the place and role of everyone

13 was envisaged in the system of defence.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. General, next I'd like to show you Exhibit P1448. I'll hand you a

17 hard copy of this one. It's also dated the 4th of April, 1999. This is

18 from General Pavkovic at the 3rd Army command with instructions about

19 security arrangements. Do you recall having received this order? It

20 talks about setting up check-points.

21 A. First of all, I did not receive this document of the 3rd Army. It

22 was the corps command that received it. Probably the corps command then

23 issued an order to me, which I would like to see.

24 Q. Well, General, I'm sorry, I don't have an order from the Pristina

25 Corps. Do you recall receiving an order to that effect about setting up

1 check-points?

2 A. I received an order and I myself acted on that order and issued

3 orders that two mixed check-points should be set up, and as I said

4 yesterday one was in the area of Ibarska Slaina, a village on --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the other one was on the

7 administrative border between Kosovo and Metohija and Montenegro.

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the entire reply.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was only to check military

10 personnel passing through -- I apologise to the interpreters.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: What's been recorded is that you received an order

12 and you yourself acted on that order and issued orders that two mixed

13 check-points should be set up, one in the area of Ibarska Slaina --

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ibarska.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry -- and the other one in the municipality of

16 Kosovo and that was only to check personnel passing through.

17 Now, do you need to add to that answer? Has anything been omitted

18 that's important?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The second was not on the territory

20 of Kosovo but on the territory of Savine Vode, which is on the

21 administrative border between Kosovo and Metohija and the Republic of

22 Montenegro, and I have nothing else to add.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 Mr. Hannis.

25 MR. HANNIS:

1 Q. Thank you, General. I think we're both fast talkers and I know

2 I'm trying to speed up, but we'll both try and slow down for the

3 interpreter.

4 Item number 2 in this order in the middle it says: "By engaging

5 MUP organs, brigade commanders are to restrict civilian movement in their

6 zones."

7 Do you recall if the order on this topic you received from the

8 Pristina Corps had this provision, about engaging the MUP to restrict

9 civilian movement?

10 A. I see this document issued by the 3rd Army command. I don't

11 remember this being in the corps command document. It might have been,

12 but not in a single situation did we limit the movement of civilians.

13 Checking roads was done or monitoring roads was done by the traffic police

14 of the MUP.

15 Q. All right. And in item number 7 it talks about Pristina Corps

16 command issuing temporary stay permits to military personnel and

17 civilians. Do you know if that was done?

18 A. It was probably done for the members of the command. I did that

19 for the members of my command of the 125th Brigade. Without such a pass,

20 a soldier could not go through the check-point on Ibarska Slatina and the

21 other one and Savina Vode; and if he did, he would have to leave his

22 weapons behind, if he was going on leave. And on his way back, he would

23 take the weapons back and then rejoin the unit.

24 Q. Thank you. Next I'd like to move to Exhibit P2022. I'll hand you

25 a hard copy with the assistance of the usher. General, this is dated the

1 21st of April, 1999, from your command. It's a regular combat report and

2 it talks about in -- on page 3 of the English and the last item number 7

3 for you it says: "Get the Pristina MUP staff to send an order to their

4 subordinates regarding resubordination to the units of the VJ."

5 We see this as just a day or so after that order had come down.

6 Do you know, was your request followed up on by the Pristina Corps

7 command?

8 A. Excuse me, what order? My order or this request of mine?

9 Q. No, your request. Do you know if the Pristina Corps did send

10 an -- or did do something to try to get the Pristina MUP to have their

11 subordinates resubordinate to you?

12 A. I don't know whether there's a Pristina MUP. It's just a Pristina

13 municipality. The commander told me that he had forwarded the request to

14 the commander of the 3rd Army, and then further than that it was not

15 within my purview.

16 Q. You never saw that actually happen, did you, MUP being

17 subordinated to the VJ?

18 A. On the 20th of April when I received the order on resubordination,

19 I called the MUP chiefs or the detachment commanders and I told them what

20 I expected from them. They said, All right, but we have to get orders or

21 documents from our own structures, from the MUP. To the best of my

22 knowledge, they never received those; and therefore the MUP unit was never

23 subordinated to me.

24 Q. All right. As a practical matter on the ground, in the field, in

25 joint actions you carried out with the MUP from the beginning of the war

1 and before there was even talk about such an order, throughout the end of

2 the war in June was it a problem for you in carrying out these joint

3 actions or coordinated operations, not having a piece of paper that said,

4 MUP is subordinated to VJ? Didn't actual cooperation work successfully in

5 the field?

6 A. In the course of the war operations there was situations where

7 this was a problem for me, and then through the chief of security in the

8 brigade and other persons I tried to reach an agreement with the

9 detachment commanders as regards those tasks which were of common

10 interest. And when they agreed, I would incorporate that in my order; if

11 they did not agree, I was unable to incorporate it in the order.

12 Sometimes I may have told them, We will do this for your information so

13 that you'll know where we'll be.

14 Q. Did you ever have occasion to complain in writing or orally to

15 General Lazarevic about problems with MUP, either not coordinating with

16 you on actions or problems with MUP committing crimes against civilians in

17 your area of responsibility? Did that ever happen? Did you ever complain

18 to General Lazarevic about that?

19 A. I think I did complain in conversations with him, orally. I did

20 not really observe them committing crimes. It was more that they did not

21 carry out certain tasks which were in my interest to be complied with.

22 The Siptar terrorist forces from the Jablanica area were active and this

23 got [as interpreted] in my way on the Kosare axis.

24 Q. All right. Let me move now because I'm near my time-limit. Can

25 you tell us what and where is the general area or sector that's been

1 referred to as Reka? Perhaps it would help if I could show you a map, I

2 think, P615 at page 17 in e-court.

3 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, while we're waiting, in 57, 1, I

4 believe the witness said that: Went in my way in defence on the Kosare

5 axis because he was keeping the defence line on Kosare axis.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, and actually I think I need to go to page

8 21 in e-court.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It made the defence of Kosare more

10 difficult; that's what I meant to say.

11 MR. HANNIS: If we can go to the upper two-thirds of this page,

12 yeah.

13 Q. General, does this map include the area that you referred to as

14 Reka? You'll have to help me out because I'm not sure. And do we need

15 to -- do we need to zoom in?

16 A. It's here, but could you zoom in, please. Yes, we do need to zoom

17 in, yes.

18 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may assist, the

20 upper right-hand side of the document.

21 MR. HANNIS:

22 Q. We see Junik here. Can you orient me to Reka starting from Junik?

23 Is Junik part of the -- what you call the Reka area?

24 A. Could we zoom in a little more and move it to my left? No, the

25 other way, the other way.

1 Q. We're at the edge of this page of the map. Djakovica is on the

2 next page of the map. Do you need to have that to help orient you?

3 A. It's all right. I can see it now. That's the part that goes from

4 Djakovica across Pacaj, Racaj, Seremet, and Junik is not part of this.

5 Q. Okay. Would you be able to draw it on this map for us, a rough

6 outline of the Reka area, using the pen like you did the other day?

7 A. There's a line here which I don't understand what it represents

8 but -- well, it's like this here.

9 Q. All right.

10 A. It should be black.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you.

12 MR. HANNIS: Could we give that an IC number, Your Honours?

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC166, Your Honours.

15 MR. HANNIS:

16 Q. General, were some of your subordinate -- well, some of your

17 subordinate units were participating in an action around the end of April

18 referred to as the Reka action, correct?

19 A. Two units of mine participated in the blockade on the

20 Smonica-Berija-Nivokaz axis. Whether the action was called Reka, well I

21 don't know. I never received a document. It may have been referred to in

22 that way orally.

23 Q. Okay.

24 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at Exhibit P2024, and I'll hand you a

25 hard copy of this one.

1 Q. General, this is a regular import from your 125th dated the 27th

2 of April, 1999, and if you could go to item number 2 it -- well, first of

3 all, I guess in item number 1 you'll see a reference to: "During the day

4 at 0800 hours," do you see that, I think it's the second paragraph from

5 the bottom in the B/C/S.

6 "During the day at 0800 hours a column of Siptar civilians was

7 formed on the following axis: Seremet village, Pacaj village," and

8 further on. "We believe they want to pull out from the sector of

9 operations of our forces in the general area of the Ramoc facility."

10 Can you tell us what the Ramoc facility was? I see on my map what

11 appears to be a village named Ramoc just north of Korenica. Do you know

12 what that refers to?

13 A. Whether it's a village or a facility -- well, if it had been a

14 village I would have used the letter "S," probably to stand for Selo,

15 village, but I can't recall right now, it escapes me, it eludes me. I

16 might remember later on. I think it's a village.

17 Q. All right. And then in item number 2 it says, second sentence:

18 "Part of the forces is engaged in mopping up the terrain from

19 Siptar terrorists in the general area of Reka, in keeping with your

20 decision."

21 What decision was that of -- and this is addressed to the Pristina

22 Corps command and the forward command post? Was that a written decision

23 or an oral decision or do you recall?

24 A. I do recall. The task was issued orally by the Chief of Staff of

25 the Pristina Corps to me. I engaged two companies in the blockade and

1 sent an officer to Djakovica to report to one of the organs of the -- of

2 the command post which was detached.

3 Q. Okay. And refresh my memory, who was the Chief of Staff of

4 Pristina Corps on 27 April 1999?

5 A. As if you didn't know, he was then a colonel, Veroljub Zivkovic.

6 Now he's a retired General.

7 Q. Thank you. Frankly, General, I've had some problem getting your

8 name and his name and General Dikovic. I get all three names mixed up.

9 Would you go to item number 6 the last sentence in that item is page 3 in

10 the English. This is the commander's decision for the next day it says:

11 "Part of the forces to continue mopping up the general area of Reka in a

12 concerted action with the MUP."

13 Do you recall that was your decision on the 27th of April, 1999?

14 A. That's what it says here, but my unit or units, the two units, did

15 not enter the Reka facility. They only held the blockade.

16 Q. All right.

17 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honours, I see I'm near the time-limit you

18 gave me originally. I think I need about 10 or 15 minutes to complete

19 everything.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: You had actually significantly underestimated how

21 much time you'd actually used, Mr. Hannis. So another ten minutes would

22 simply bring you back to where you would have been if you had got it right

23 the first time --

24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to finish.

1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. General, I want to show you P2025 which is another combat report

3 and this is from the next day. I'll hand you a hard copy with the help of

4 the usher. This is the 28th of April, and this is your document, correct,

5 you see your name at the bottom? Yeah? I'm sorry, I need to have an

6 answer for the record.

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Thank you. Item number 2 on page 2 of the English, page 1 for

9 you, second sentence says: "Some forces have been used to clear the

10 terrain of Siptar terrorists in the general Reka sector, as per your

11 decision."

12 Which part of your forces were doing that?

13 A. This refers to those two companies which were on the

14 Smonica-Seremete-Nivokaz axis only engaged in the blockade not in any kind

15 of searching or mopping up.

16 Q. Well, this -- your telegram says: "Some forces have been used to

17 clear the terrain ..." It doesn't say: Some forces have been used to

18 maintain the blockade.

19 A. Excuse me. When you say "clearing the terrain," it means I'm

20 blocking, others are searching. That's how it was done jointly according

21 to the orders.

22 Q. Okay. And where were those two companies from again? What was

23 their designation?

24 A. One company was in the defence area of the 1st Motorised Battalion

25 of my brigade, 125th, in the Smonica sector, and the other one was the

1 so-called volunteer company, one platoon of those who volunteered to

2 engage in the blockade from the howitzer division, another one from the

3 armoured, and a third from the armoured unit. I didn't have -- or

4 battery. I didn't have other forces, and it was very difficult up there.

5 Q. And where were you -- at the time you were writing these combat

6 reports, where were you physically located?

7 A. Physically I was in Rasa e Kosares and this report was written by

8 my desk officer in the operations sector, and that's why there was

9 sometimes problems in the wording because he didn't have a radio station,

10 so he couldn't hear everything; and he wouldn't know everything I was

11 doing.

12 Q. So where were he physically located writing up these combat

13 reports?

14 A. Physically he was in the command post in the suburbs of Decani

15 because the NATO forces didn't know where I was, otherwise they would have

16 done me in.

17 Q. Okay.

18 MR. HANNIS: Could we have another copy of the map at P615, page

19 21.

20 Q. General, I'm going to ask you to look at a map again, that same

21 area we looked at before, when you drew the Reka area for me. And you'll

22 help me out, does that map show where you were located, the border point

23 Rasa e Kosares where you were, is that on this map? I see Kosare.

24 MR. HANNIS: Can we enlarge the upper half of this page and scroll

25 down so we have Decani at the top. Yes, thank you.

1 Q. Is the location where you were at on this map?

2 A. Yes, yes. If you want me to pin-point it, please ...

3 Q. Yes, could you put your initials and draw a circle around it at

4 the approximate location where you were on the 27th, 28th, 29th of April.

5 A. [Marks]

6 Q. Okay. And -- thank you. You've drawn a circle and then it

7 appears to be an initial above it. Then could you draw another circle

8 where your operations officer who was writing these reports was located.

9 You said in the suburbs of Decani, approximately.

10 A. I cannot draw it in precisely because I need a smaller scale.

11 Q. If you could just put a number 2 and draw a circle around it in

12 the approximate area -- okay.

13 A. [Marks]

14 Q. All right. Now, if -- do you recall that in late April

15 General Lazarevic came and visited your brigade, do you remember that?

16 A. I remember that night. I can explain to you exactly where he was.

17 Q. Well, let me ask you a couple questions. Did you meet with him

18 personally during that visit?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And where did you meet with him?

21 A. I met him in Pec.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I escorted him along the route that he requested. Shall I say

24 which?

25 Q. Sure.

1 A. He was within my disposition up to noon in the area between Rasici

2 village and Bijelo Polje. He toured part of the tank unit, and then in

3 this area where this mark of the command post and then above this, a

4 kilometre to the west above Decani in the area of the positions of the

5 artillery rocket unit of anti-aircraft defence, and in this place where I

6 drew the command post, then he returned back to Pec. Colonel Zivkovic

7 went back to Djakovica, and I went to my unit, up to Kosare.

8 Q. Okay. Let me show you next then --

9 MR. HANNIS: And could we give this an IC number?

10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC167, Your Honours.

11 MR. HANNIS:

12 Q. Let me show you next Exhibit P2026. If I can have the usher hand

13 you this one. This is a combat report from your 125th dated the next day,

14 the 29th of April, 1999. And if you could go to item 2, it's on page 2 of

15 the English, and it's the second paragraph, the second sentence I think.

16 It says: "Operation or action Reka was completed on 28 April," and then

17 it mentions the 1/1 mtb and the DOB company, the volunteer

18 company "participated in the operation from among our units," and that's

19 what you told me about before, right? Are you finding that?

20 A. I'm sorry, I haven't. Could you point it out.

21 Q. It's on the first page of B/C/S, I think, item number 2, and it's

22 the second paragraph, it talks about the remaining brigades are

23 fortifying, settling up obstacles, et cetera. I may have highlighted it

24 in orange. Do you see it says: "Operation Reka was completed on the

25 28th ..."?

1 A. I see it.

2 Q. And it says it was completed successfully.

3 If you could go down then to the next paragraph do you see where

4 it says: "The Commander and Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps were in

5 the Brigade from 0900 to 1200 hours today."

6 Right?

7 A. I can see that, but in the first sentence you directed me to it

8 doesn't say "completed successfully," it says only "completed."

9 Q. Okay. The last sentence in that paragraph seems to say: "The

10 operation was completed successfully," do you see that?

11 A. I can see. I stand corrected. I was just looking at the first

12 line.

13 Q. Okay. So was General Lazarevic then in the Decani area between

14 0900 and noon on the 29th of April?

15 A. General Lazarevic together with the Chief of Staff and myself,

16 that was in the suburb of Decani, the command post that I drew on the map.

17 He was there from 11.15 to 12.00, and then I saw him off when he left to

18 go back to Pec.

19 Q. Okay. Do you know approximately how far is Decani from Glogovac?

20 Can you give me an estimate in terms of either kilometres or hours to

21 drive?

22 A. Depends how you go, from 90 to 112 kilometres -- sorry, 20

23 kilometres. If you go through Pristina, that's 120 if you go across

24 Vucitrn.

25 Q. Okay. If I could show you Exhibit 5D384, I have a question for

1 you. I can give you a copy. It's just one page. This is a document

2 dated the 29th of April from General Lazarevic alerting subordinate units

3 to a security problem, if you will. And at the beginning he says: "At

4 around 0900 hours on 29 April 1999, I personally came across a part of the

5 37th ... which was crossing a brook near Lozica village..."

6 Now, the only Lozica village I came across is between roughly

7 between Glogovac and Malisevo, and if that's the case how could

8 General Lazarevic be there at around 0900 and be in Decani with your unit

9 at 0900? You don't have any idea about that, do you?

10 A. I have no idea how a person be in two places simultaneously, but

11 you can maybe guess that this is a typographical error and that it should

12 have been 1900 hours, not 9.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I stand behind what I said, he was with me.

15 Q. Okay. I --

16 A. Please, one more thing. There is a report in combat report you

17 cannot --

18 Q. No, I'm not -- General, don't get me wrong. I'm not necessarily

19 challenging you about that. Finally, I have three last questions. You

20 told us how you taught strategy, and let me ask you a question related to

21 strategy. We had evidence from one witness that a few days before the war

22 he attended a meeting where General Pavkovic was talking about the NATO

23 bombing was going to start within a few days and that one of the first

24 things the army needed to do was - and there's some dispute about the

25 exact wording - was to get the Albanians or to get the KLA off their back,

1 off the army's back.

2 Now, strictly speaking from a strategic point of view, didn't it

3 make sense for the VJ to get all of the Albanians or as many of the

4 Albanians as possible out of Kosovo before you were going to have to

5 engage in the expected land invasion by NATO and NATO allies? Strictly

6 speaking from a strategic point of view, wouldn't you agree with that?

7 You don't want to have to fight NATO when you've got Albanians, some of

8 whom are going to be either KLA or KLA supporters in your midst and behind

9 you. Do you agree with that or not?

10 A. I cannot answer you with a yes or no. You will have to allow me

11 to explain. First of all, militarily speaking, it's correct to rout or

12 repel or crush Siptar terrorist forces. Second, it's not true that it's

13 desirable to throw out Siptar or Albanian civilians. The danger for us is

14 a bit less when the population is close to us, not in as much as we would

15 want NATO aviation to hurt them too, but the danger is less. I know that

16 you are insinuating that there was some crime of deportation, but that's

17 not true.

18 Q. Okay. And two last questions, and this relates to some

19 open-source material, magazine or newspaper articles that I had read or

20 seen. One is about -- well -- I'm sorry, I'm not trying to embarrass --

21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have an objection in

22 principle to newspaper articles. I wanted to question a Prosecution

23 witness Merovci on newspaper articles, and I was not able to. Newspaper

24 articles do not have particular significant that are not of a nature that

25 would provide valuable information unless the authors come themselves to

1 testify.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Cepic, you know that that's not the

3 position that we've taken in the case. I cannot remember the

4 circumstances relating to Merovci, but you do know the significance or

5 otherwise of the use of a newspaper article in a question depends on the

6 contents of the article; and therefore, depends on the particular

7 circumstances.

8 Mr. Hannis, the start of that question rather suggests that the

9 reference to newspapers or magazines was quite unnecessarily.

10 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, it's just the good-faith basis for

11 my asking the question.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think you should proceed to ask the

13 question and see if there's an objection to the question unrelated to your

14 reliance on newspaper or magazine articles.

15 MR. HANNIS:

16 Q. I understand you have a close family member who is a member of the

17 MUP; is that correct?

18 A. That's correct. I'm glad that he's a member of the MUP and he can

19 control me quite well, he can keep tabs on me. Yes, that's my wife.

20 Q. And when did she first become a member of the MUP?

21 A. 1984.

22 Q. Was there any -- any official cooperation between you and your

23 wife in terms of actions in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?

24 A. No, no, unfortunately. I would have liked it if we had been

25 together at the time, but we were not.

1 Q. And I won't ask the question about whether MUP was subordinated to

2 VJ in your household. Let me ask you the last question then. There have

3 been -- have you been named as a person to be questioned or investigated

4 in connection with an investigation of army members allegedly involved in

5 assisting General Mladic? You'll have to answer out loud.

6 A. Yes, yes, I was. There are proceedings going on before the

7 district court in Belgrade, but unfortunately I was not informed of that

8 by my wife. I learned about it from newspapers. Although I don't know

9 Mladic. I was corps commander, and I could only have guessed that he had

10 moved around that peacetime zone of my corps. I hope that's the answer to

11 your question.

12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I do have one answer for you and

14 Mr. Cepic concerning the photo that was at issue before. I'm advised it

15 was part of evidence seized from the Orahovac MUP and was presented to the

16 OTP by a KLA member on 23 August 1999 in Skopje.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

18 In relation to what, Mr. Fila?

19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] In relation -- two questions in

20 relation to two exhibits regarding resubordination. I will spend only two

21 minutes or three, perhaps.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

23 MR. HANNIS: No objection.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: All right, we'll see to that.

25 Mr. Fila.

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] You'll see. I'll go quickly.

2 Further cross-examination by Mr. Fila:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, the Prosecution showed you one document with

4 a heading "Joint Command" and then an annex to that document written by

5 General Lazarevic, P1966 and P1967. You said both were documents of the

6 Pristina Corps?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now I just want to ask one thing. That first document, is it from

9 some superior command, superior to the Pristina Corps? If it had been

10 from a superior command, would General Lazarevic have been able to modify

11 it or write an annex to it?

12 A. Certainly not.

13 Q. P1428, please now. That's a document signed by Colonel Lazarevic

14 as Chief of Staff. P1428. Could we have it on the screen, please.

15 That's the document which has no reference to Joint Command, neither in

16 the heading or at the bottom. It's signed by the Chief of Staff, then

17 colonel, Lazarevic. Is this an order?

18 A. This is a decision. It is to be executed through specific tasks

19 in the form of an order.

20 Q. Here in point 2 it says: "Tasks for units," and all that follows

21 are tasks?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. So those are orders?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now in point 6 it says --

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Can we see item 6 on page 4.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One more page further.

3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] There you have it.

4 Q. It's the same order from the Chief of Staff signed by

5 Vladimir Lazarevic, and if you will agree with me it is hereby ordered to

6 the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija to command together with the

7 forward command post of the Pristina Corps.

8 A. If the Joint Command existed, then Lazarevic wouldn't have been

9 able to issue orders to it. It means that those are his superior [as

10 interpreted] officers, his officers.

11 Q. Let me now ask you --

12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The record is wrong --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think I understood that last answer.

14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Well, you can't understand it the way

15 it's on the record. We're going to correct it now. The witness said

16 those were his subordinate officers.

17 Q. Could you confirm?

18 A. Yes, I said if it had been the so-called Joint Command, then he as

19 Chief of Staff, Lazarevic, would not have been able to order this to these

20 people. Those were his officers that he was entitled to command, his

21 subordinate officers.

22 Q. My last question: Do you remember that at that time --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: I still don't understand the point, Mr. Fila,

24 certainly in the English version. It does seem to me these are all just

25 points of argument, but if you think there's an answer to be gained from

1 the witness that will help please try again.

2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I tried twice but the translation or

3 interpretation is wrong.

4 Q. Could you try it a third time?

5 A. Those were his subordinate officers that he, Chief of Staff,

6 Colonel Lazarevic, had the right to command.

7 Q. Accordingly, when this is written here it is implied that those

8 were subordinate officers, not superior officers --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: You mean subordinate officers would make up the

10 Joint Command, so is that what you're saying?

11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Right, that the witness is saying that,

12 not me, the witness, because Colonel Lazarevic is not able to issue orders

13 to somebody above him. That's the point.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're now suggesting the Joint Command for

15 Kosovo comprised subordinate officers?

16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I'm saying that something like that

17 never existed nor did such a body exist, but what is written here has to

18 be interpreted --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: All of this is matter for argument. It's not

20 something that needed to be explored in the exceptional situation of

21 allowing you further cross-examination of the witness. I don't think it's

22 helpful to do this.

23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I'm not exploring. I'm asking him what

24 that means, and the witness answers my question. What is the meaning of

25 what is written here? Command over combat operations will be executed by

1 the Joint Command and he's giving an explanation, some kind of

2 explanation, and I believe you will hear it.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's try again and hear what the explanation is.

4 What is the explanation you're now trying to give us for this?

5 Because you've already told us what you think Joint Command is, but it

6 would appear that you're being invited now to deal with it specifically in

7 the context of this document.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if it reads "combat

9 operations will be commanded by the Joint Command," I assert that Joint

10 Command did not exist because if it had existed Colonel Lazarevic would

11 not have been able to issue them orders. And since he did issue tasks -

12 and I'm talking about this "Joint Command" - then it is a group of his own

13 staff from the forward command post who are subordinate to

14 Colonel Lazarevic and who are monitoring activities, conveyed all that to

15 Colonel Lazarevic, so that he's able after that to make decisions.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, let's go back to the beginning, to the first

17 page of this document.

18 So you're saying that this, the Joint Command referred to in this

19 document, is different from the Joint Command that may be meant when

20 there's a heading "Joint Command" on the document; is that right?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is purely a corps command

22 document. In the last paragraph Joint Command is mentioned. I believe

23 it's a matter of copying and pasting on the computer because this is a

24 purely corps document. The Joint Command has no place in it. Am I clear?

25 JUDGE BONOMY: No, because you've already told us what you believe

1 Joint Command to mean. Are you saying that the earlier description you

2 gave us is of a Joint Command that's different from the Joint Command in

3 this document?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It should be different, but this was

5 just copied. This is a purely corps command document; whether different

6 or not, I am interpreting it as it is in this decision, in this document,

7 and I've stated that explanation two or three times.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I have no further questions about this. Just one more thing. Do

11 you know perhaps that at this time, the date of this decision, at the

12 forward command post the Chief of General Staff, General Perisic, who was

13 visiting and inspecting?

14 A. I believe he had come to inspect, and I recall expecting him to

15 come to my unit in those days.

16 Q. So the Chief of General Staff was there at the forward command

17 post you mentioned with his entourage of generals and others. In the

18 indictment of the OTP, it says that this Joint Command included a large

19 number of civilians in 1999 they knew only about Nikola Sainovic, they

20 don't know about the others, they will probably find out by the end of

21 this trial. If they had all been there and commanded units, would

22 General Perisic have failed to observe that?

23 A. He certainly would have observed that civilians were in command if

24 they had been.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The answer is not recorded. He said:

2 There's no question of any civilians.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the answer that's been given is different

4 than that.

5 What was your answer to that question?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He certainly would have noticed, no

7 question of any civilians.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Fila, that last point is certainly one

9 that was not appropriate for further cross-examination at this stage. If

10 you had wanted to deal with matters of that nature, they should have been

11 dealt with at the appropriate stage when you could have cross-examined the

12 witness. This is not a matter that you were only alerted to by the

13 cross-examination by Mr. Hannis. So please be cautious about the areas in

14 which you seek the privilege of further cross-examination to avoid an

15 unfair trial in situation where you're making that request after the

16 completion of the Prosecution cross-examination.

17 Now, Mr. Aleksic, do you have a similar motion to make?

18 Please sit down, Mr. Fila.

19 Mr. Aleksic.

20 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I am not requesting

21 your leave to cross-examine the witness. Bearing in mind that the name of

22 my client was mentioned several times yesterday and today, I would like to

23 draw the attention of the Trial Chamber only to some exhibits which are

24 already in evidence. I don't want to present arguments, I don't want to

25 ask questions of this general, just give the numbers of the exhibits to

1 the Trial Chamber. I need two minutes for that.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: If these exhibits are already part of the case,

3 then you can deal with them in your submissions in due course. There's no

4 need for this to take up time in court. And if you feel the particular

5 need to notify us, then you can make a written filing to that effect.

6 Thank you very much.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic, do you have re-examination?

9 MR. CEPIC: Yes, Your Honour, I have many questions. But before

10 we go to break, with your leave, just one correction in transcript page

11 75, line 6 or line 10 the answer is: He certainly would have; but I think

12 the witness, I'm certainly. Just one correction and after the break I

13 would like to examine this witness.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The matter's dealt with in line 10 when he was

15 given a second opportunity to --

16 MR. CEPIC: Okay, yes.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you saying that that's wrong or are you

18 accepting that --

19 MR. CEPIC: Yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry?

21 MR. CEPIC: Yes, he clarified. He clarified later. Thank you,

22 Your Honour. I apologise for interrupting.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 MR. CEPIC: In that relation. Thank you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: We have to break again, Mr. Zivanovic, this time

1 for an hour. Could you again go with the usher, please.

2 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]

3 [The witness stands down]

4 JUDGE BONOMY: And we shall resume at 1.45.

5 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.46 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 1.44 p.m.

7 [The witness takes the stand]

8 JUDGE BONOMY: It will just be a moment, Mr. Zivanovic.

9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, while we're waiting for that may I just

10 announce that I've been assisted by an intern, Shaban Biesley [phoen] the

11 last day and a half.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

13 Now, Mr. Cepic, your re-examination.

14 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour --

15 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I'm blaming my watch. I

16 never blame myself, Your Honour. My watch, and it truly is, and

17 Mr. Ivetic can verify that. You know, I've never been late for court in

18 my entire life, this is the first time, and I sincerely apologise to the

19 court and to my client, General Ojdanic.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Sepenuk.

21 There will be a whip around for a new watch for Mr. Sepenuk.

22 Mr. Cepic.

23 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour, one more time.

24 Re-examination by Mr. Cepic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] General, it's me again, and we'll have enough

1 time. Let us start from the very end. My learned friend Mr. Hannis

2 mentioned the proceedings in Belgrade. You explained that you had

3 occupied the position of the commander of the Belgrade corps. Since

4 General Mladic was mentioned, was there a General Zivanovic in the Army of

5 Republika Srpska subordinated to him?

6 A. Yes, I suppose it was a case of mistaken identity. There is a

7 Zivanovic, I believe, Milorad.

8 Q. At any rate, it's not you?

9 A. No, I'm not the one.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 A. I remembered, it's Milenko Zivanovic.

12 Q. My learned friend Mr. Hannis asked you about check-points and you

13 answered that you had set up check-points manned by the MUP and the army.

14 Did you set up complete check-points for both the MUP and the army or only

15 for the army?

16 A. Those were joint check-points of the MUP and the army at the exit

17 from Kosovo and Metohija.

18 Q. And who was answerable for what?

19 A. Part of the soldiers and policemen at a check-point were

20 responsible only for checking the passage of military personnel and

21 nothing else.

22 Q. And who sets up check-points, one body or both bodies separately?

23 A. It's the same location as far as these two check-points are

24 concerned. The MUP patrol controls the other part according to its own

25 regulations, and we control only the army part, the army component,

1 military vehicles, soldiers on foot, et cetera.

2 Q. So I'm proceeding from the end. Towards the very end my learned

3 friend Mr. Hannis asked a number of questions in relation to your

4 activities on the 27th, 28th, and 29th April. He asked you, and that's on

5 page 63 of today's transcript: Where were you in those three days, to

6 which you drew a position on the map at the location Rasa e Kosares. I am

7 interested in the 29th. You mentioned that General Lazarevic had arrived

8 from Pristina on his way to Pec or on the road to Pec. Tell me, when did

9 General Zivkovic come?

10 A. He came from Djakovica to Pec.

11 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] To clarify one point regarding a

12 place, I have a map. Unfortunately we cannot use the Kosovo atlas for

13 this without a complete map, so I would like this map placed on the ELMO

14 to clarify one thing that Mr. Hannis concentrated on in his

15 cross-examination.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Sorry, Mr. Cepic --

17 MR. CEPIC: I'm sorry.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Just for clarification, at page 79, line 12, you

19 asked the question: "Tell me, when did General Zivkovic come?"

20 And the answer is: "He came from Djakovica to Pec."

21 Was that what you had wanted, the direction that he came from is

22 what --

23 MR. CEPIC: My question was: From where, from where--

24 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Okay.

25 MR. CEPIC: -- Where he was.

1 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Okay.

2 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, if you need additional clarification, I

3 can ask additional question if it is necessary for the Trial Chamber.

4 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I think it should now be clarified.

5 MR. CEPIC: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you, Your

6 Honour.

7 Q. [Interpretation] General, we found a map. This road that you

8 marked, Pec-Pristina, on which you said General Lazarevic travelled, look

9 carefully and try to find a place called Lozica.

10 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could we stretch the map so as to see

11 Pristina and Pec, open it wide. Still a bit more. Can we zoom in a bit

12 more -- [In English] zoom out. [Interpretation] I would like to see the

13 end points, Pec and Pristina, and after that we would zoom in to see it

14 more clearly.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Zoom out further so that we can see the whole of

16 the map, we can see the edge at both sides. Will it not go any further?

17 No. We're at our technical limit, Mr. Cepic.

18 MR. CEPIC: With your leave, could we fix the map on the ELMO,

19 please.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: How do you mean fix it on the ELMO?

21 MR. CEPIC: Yes, that's okay. Just a little bit on the right side

22 and we will see the Pec also. We see the Pristina in the upper -- right

23 upper corner. Opposite side, please.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Move it to the right so Pristina is right on the

25 edge of the screen. Further, you can go another couple of centimetres, a

1 bit more. That's it. Thank you. Still not enough.

2 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. We saw the main route.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] If we can move the map a but further

5 to the right, there is Pec. Thank you very much.

6 Q. General, could you follow the main road and try to find a place

7 called Lozica?

8 A. If we saw that Pristina is there, this is a road that goes from

9 Pristina to Pec, and here is Lozica here by the road from Pec via Dolac.

10 Q. Could you put a little circle around it on the ELMO?

11 A. So Pristina, Kosovo Polje, there's the road that goes to Pec and

12 crosses here and reaches Pec. This place here is Lozica, right here. If

13 the scale is 1:200.000, then it's 35 kilometres or 30 kilometres.

14 MR. CEPIC: Could we zoom in, please, Lozica village area of

15 Lozica, please.

16 Q. [Interpretation] Is there a brook that we can see around Lozica?

17 Just around Lozica is what I'm interested in.

18 A. There's this brook here that we can see, and it flows into Lozica

19 village.

20 Q. Thank you, General. At an optimum speed driving, how much time is

21 it from this place to Pec?

22 A. From this place to Pec, when the road is nearly empty, it's 15, 20

23 minutes.

24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] We don't need this on the ELMO any

25 more.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: And how long did you say it took to go from Pec to

2 Pristina?

3 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, with your leave, I asked him for the

4 distance between the village of Lozica to Pec.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I understand that. I'm asking a different

6 question.

7 How long would it take to go from Pec to Pristina?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in view of the car

9 General Lazarevic had at the time, he would have needed 40, 45 minutes,

10 and that is 70 kilometres or thereabouts.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 Mr. Cepic.

13 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Could we have on our screens IC166, please.

15 Q. [Interpretation] General, this line of blockade by your forces,

16 where was it, if you could show me, and the disposition of terrorist

17 forces in the environs, I mean the 27th and 28th of April, 1999?

18 A. Is this red? The line of blockade here is Smonica -- no, no, I

19 don't need the blue to denote us.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: [Interpretation] It's good for your wife.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Smonica, here is Berija, Nivokaz,

22 that's the line of blockade by the two platoons I mentioned.

23 THE INTERPRETER: By two companies, correction.

24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. In that area, could you please draw in to the best of your

1 recollection the terrorist forces in blue?

2 A. I'll try. It's along this entire road. That's where the Siptar

3 terrorist forces were located. I believe they were even in this place

4 called Seremet.

5 Q. General, strategically speaking, and yesterday I asked you about

6 it as did Mr. Hannis today we're talking about river valleys, you said

7 that from Kosare your line of defence -- if your line of defence had been

8 broken in how much time would the terrorist units link up with?

9 A. From Kosare-Junik-Djakovica line they would -- it would take them

10 two hours if they were going on foot.

11 Q. Thank you. Could you draw that line, too, in blue from Kosare to

12 Reka?

13 A. [Marks]

14 Q. Since you used to teach strategy, would you say that this

15 configuration of terrain allows for a rapid advance?

16 A. Of course it does because it goes downhill all the way from

17 Djakovica.

18 Q. Now, the movement of the population was described in your report,

19 P20 --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic, I must say, I don't understand this now.

21 I thought you were talking about the breaking of the line of defence. The

22 line of defence is between the terrorist forces and the border, and this

23 blue line that's been drawn is behind the area, the Reka area, where the

24 forces were. Could you explore that more. I don't understand what that

25 blue line means.

1 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I will. Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. General, strategically, militarily speaking, would you explain why

3 you drew the line this way, not through the villages marked below. Was

4 that a possible line of attack?

5 A. Mr. President, by one axis it's impossible for several thousands

6 of attackers to go. They would go Tropoje, Morina, and they would

7 encompass all this area and they would link up -- the wedge would be in

8 Djakovica and outside Djakovica so that the entire area of Reka would be

9 encompassed. So this is the front line of attack, and I will now draw, if

10 you wish, where my positions were on the border.

11 Q. Would you do that, General --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: It must be my fault. I thought you were blockading

13 the terrorists in the Reka area from getting to the border. Is it the

14 reverse, you're blocking the border to prevent people from there joining

15 up with the terrorists in Reka?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I was not blocking

17 the border; I was performing defence by relying on the very state border,

18 defence of my country, whereas terrorists were in the area of Reka. And

19 the objective of this attack from the Republic of Albania, Siptar

20 terrorist forces, parts of the Army of the Republic of Albania with the

21 support of NATO was to link up with the Siptar terrorist forces that were

22 behind my lines in my defence area. I hope I was clear now.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. It's the opposite from what I thought

24 that you were describing earlier. It must be my mistake.

25 Mr. Cepic.

1 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] General, did these Siptar terrorist forces in the

3 Reka area, were they located behind your back?

4 A. Yes, because if you look in this part here, that's where my forces

5 were and that's the forward edge from here, Morina border post.

6 Q. Mark it with a 1.

7 A. 1 is Morina border post. This part here is the 1st Motorised

8 Battalion. This is one of its companies, 2nd Company, 3rd Company here.

9 Q. [No interpretation]

10 A. This is the area of defence of one battalion. You see where the

11 terrorist forces are, behind the area of defence of the battalion, and

12 they are jeopardizing this segment here.

13 Q. To provide a full picture as long as we are on the drawing

14 board --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the drawing board would leave anyone reading

16 this transcript now totally lost. I don't know how anyone who takes up

17 the transcript is going to be able to understand where any of the lines

18 have been drawn. We've now got three more lines at the border. We were

19 working with just one line of blockade where the 3 is. I don't know what

20 the dotted line, blue line, along the bottom is. I understand the point

21 that the witness is making in general, but putting individual units in

22 particular locations and showing movement is not something I'm at all

23 clear about now. Unless the very particular location is vital to your

24 point, it would have been far better to have the witness just describe

25 what was happening and describe it more fully than has happened so far. I

1 think we should scrap this plan and start again, Mr. Cepic, but it's a

2 matter for you.

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 I would like a clean map in that case.

5 Q. General, on this map I would just like you to draw the attack.

6 General, please draw in the Reka valley terrorist positions, lines of

7 attack from the Republic of Albania against the territory of the Federal

8 Republic of Yugoslavia, and the forces of defence --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Do we need to know more than that the terrorists

10 were in the red area that we've got there along the line of the road? Do

11 we need any more than that? If we do, please do it; but if we don't,

12 let's not complicate the picture.

13 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I think the

14 General was quite clear in the examination-in-chief speaking of these

15 matters and this clarifies, at least for me, the situation in that

16 territory in those days.

17 Q. General, just for the record, explain succinctly what happened

18 there on the 27th and the 28th, the attack from Albania and the

19 possibility that the integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of

20 Yugoslavia would be put in danger. Briefly, please.

21 A. Constant attacks, a frontal attack from the Republic of Albania on

22 the Kosare-Junik axis placed my brigade in a delicate position. There

23 were respective Siptar terrorist forces in the area of Reka, which is from

24 Djakovica through the valley down to Junik, as I marked here. There was a

25 danger that my forward end would succumb that the aggressor might break

1 through my defence line in the broader area of Rasa e Kosares and join up

2 with the Siptar terrorist forces in the valley of Reka drawn here. If

3 that happened, I would have failed to perform the task [Realtime

4 transcript read in error "telephone conversation] I had received from

5 General Lazarevic.

6 Q. Thank you, General. Just one --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment, Mr. Cepic, again. One of the

8 things you said, Mr. Zivanovic, was that the terrain allows for a rapid

9 advance because it goes downhill all the way from Djakovica.

10 Now, Djakovica downhill in what direction?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry if I made a slip of the

12 tongue. I said from the Kosare border post it goes downhill towards

13 Djakovica.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, that makes sense now. You see, you understand

15 why we're finding this difficult that we have to take it -- if it's to be

16 as detailed as this it has to be taken slowly and clearly.

17 All right, Mr. Cepic, please continue --

18 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, just for the same sake of

19 clarity, 87, 6 and 7, in the -- the witness I believe said 87, 6, that

20 join up with the terrorist forces in the valley, and he wasn't mentioning

21 any telephone conversation with General Lazarevic but the order from

22 General Lazarevic.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

24 Mr. Cepic.

25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. General, just those two units from your forces that you mentioned

2 in response to a question from Mr. Hannis. What was their function in

3 that area where they engaged in active combat? Did they move or not?

4 A. The unit that was in the area of Smonica, Stupce as it's -- sorry,

5 Stuble was a company from the 1st Motorised Battalion that was engaged in

6 defence, its front facing the Tropoje marking on this map. As for the

7 volunteer company, that is what I explained a minute ago, that was put

8 together by using manpower from three other units was above Junik and

9 towards Djocaj village. I additionally dispatched that unit and told them

10 to leave this line, Stuble, and continue on to the blockade at Nivokaz.

11 Q. Were they performing any active operations or were they ...

12 A. Their task was to block the area along this line. If there were

13 any terrorists on the move and trying to cross the line, they were to

14 engage them, no more than that.

15 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now let's move on to something else.

16 Mr. Ivetic asked you about that map this is 676 in e-court, could

17 that map please be displayed on our screens. [In English] 6D676, please.

18 [Defence counsel confer]

19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, sir, you've seen this map before. Can we just go through

21 it briefly. Why do we see the MUP forces marked on the map?

22 A. Because I got them in that document by the corps command. It said

23 that Combat Group 3 should lend support to the MUP forces, the 8th

24 Detachment, and the Djakovica Company.

25 Q. Did you draw any maps for the benefit of the MUP?

1 A. No, that was not the established practice. We all did our own

2 maps.

3 Q. Thank you. P2113, please.

4 This is your order, sir. Mr. Hannis was showing you this order

5 yesterday. Please go straight to item 2 of this, paragraph 2, it says:

6 "Prepare and plan every operation of the unit beforehand ..." And

7 before that it states --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Cepic please speak up and speak more

9 clearly for the benefit of the interpreters.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic --

11 MR. CEPIC: I'm sorry --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: -- you'll need to speak up if you're going to be

13 talking away from the microphone --

14 MR. CEPIC: I apologise.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: -- so the interpreters can hear.

16 MR. CEPIC: I apologise, Your Honours, and I apologise especially

17 to interpreters.

18 Q. [Interpretation] General, can you please look at item 2 of this

19 order dated the 7th of July, 1998. Does this not confirm your words to

20 the effect that each command within its own chain ...

21 A. Yes. Each command does its own work, does all of its maps and

22 decisions.

23 Q. Thank you very much, General. Yesterday you were asked by my

24 learned friend Mr. Hannis something about 1998, and you said that at the

25 forward command post of the Pristina Corps in Djakovica in 1998 there was

1 Colonel Lazarevic. What precisely was his duty at the forward command

2 post?

3 A. Pursuant to an order by the corps commander, he was in charge of

4 the control over the forward command post team at Djakovica. In terms of

5 his function, he was the Chief of Staff and the deputy Pristina Corps

6 commander too.

7 Q. Thank you very much. My learned friend Mr. Fila and yesterday my

8 learned friend Mr. Hannis showed you OTP Exhibit P12 -- 1428. This is an

9 order on the Slup and Voksa action dated the 14th of August, 1998.

10 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, my learned friend Mr. Zecevic just told

11 me that in the previous document which is under the number P2113 he found

12 one mistake, so I would like to ask my learned friend to clarify that,

13 please.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I'm sorry, just for the sake of

16 clarity, according to the Serbian text paragraph 2 it says: "It is

17 approved by the commands of MUP and VJ ..."

18 And in the English text it says: "Command of the MUP and the

19 Yugoslav Army ..."

20 I believe the distinction is -- because there is obviously in the

21 Serbian original it refers to more commands, so the MUP and the VJ as a

22 separate entities and separate commands. According to the English text,

23 it might be understood as one command which compromises [sic] MUP and the

24 VJ. And the Serbian text clearly says "K/DE," [B/C/S spoken] meaning

25 plural. Thank you.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

2 Please proceed, Mr. Cepic.

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. This is Slup and Voksa. You've seen the order twice already. Can

5 we please have Defence Exhibit 5D1175.

6 General, sir, do you see this decision map in front of you?

7 A. Indeed I do.

8 Q. Can you please tell me who signed it and who approved it, this

9 decision?

10 A. It was approved by the 3rd Army commander. At the time this was

11 Lieutenant-General Dusan Samardzic, and it was signed by the Pristina

12 Corps commander, General Nebojsa Pavkovic.

13 Q. Thank you very much, General. Now 5D1174, can we have that called

14 up, please.

15 [Microphone not activated]

16 MR. CEPIC: I'm sorry.

17 Q. [Interpretation] General, do you recognise this document?

18 A. I do, but I really can't say. This is a forward command post of

19 the 3rd Army after all.

20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we have page 3 in the Serbian,

21 please.

22 Q. You see the date on that document, the 14th of August, 1998?

23 A. Yes, yes, of course I do.

24 MR. CEPIC: [Previous translation continues] ... third page,

25 count 5 I need. Next page in English, please.

1 Q. [Interpretation] Can you please look at BG-15-3 support MUP

2 forces. Are these all the same places? I hereby decide, is that

3 something to do with the map, the decision map that we looked at?

4 A. Indeed.

5 Q. Thank you. General, sir, or rather, can we please go to the last

6 page of the Serbian text, the B/C/S, to see who signed this document and

7 who took the decision.

8 You recognise these names, sir, don't you, the ones who signed

9 this document?

10 A. Yes, I do. You can tell that the decision was taken by

11 Colonel-General Dusan Samardzic, and then it reads: "The telegram may be

12 sent ..." This is signed and stamped by the Chief of Staff,

13 Lieutenant-General Miodrag Simic. This is a document that was dispatched

14 by the forward command post of the 3rd Army based in the Kosovo Heroes

15 Barracks in Pristina.

16 Q. Thank you very much, General. Just one last question about this

17 topic. Is this a regular chain of command? Is this a document that was

18 produced by a regular army procedure or is this some sort of a Joint

19 Command or some third party?

20 A. This is the most regular procedure possible.

21 Q. Thank you very much, General. Can we please have P2023.

22 Before that document appears I would like to say that my learned

23 friend Mr. Ivetic asked you a number of questions too. Also when this

24 document was on the screen, he read this document back to you and he asked

25 you questions about this. The forces of the 73rd MUP Detachment were

1 under your command. And if you look at item 2 where it says Rugovska

2 Klisura and then just underneath.

3 A. Yes, I see that.

4 Q. All right. My question is: What about those forces? Were they

5 at any point resubordinated to you?

6 A. This is a document that is a result of inertia, if you like. It

7 was drafted by default and based on a Pristina Corps command on the

8 resubordination of MUP units to a combined arms tactical units. These

9 forces were not in actual fact resubordinated to me.

10 Q. Thank you very much, General. Mr. Ivetic was asking a number of

11 questions and making several references to your zone, inside your zone.

12 So this zone what I want to know about who is in charge of public order

13 and the safety of persons and property in this zone, and what are the

14 duties of the army in these terms inside their zone?

15 A. "Zone" is a very broad concept. You organize positions and

16 sectors for defence inside a zone. The military are responsible for the

17 situation in those sectors, and the sectors are a much narrower concept

18 than a zone. All the main areas and especially all the principal roads in

19 Kosovo and Metohija during the war were under the authority of civilian

20 bodies or bodies of local self government and the MUP.

21 Q. Thank you very much, General.

22 Can we please now have a document that Mr. Ivetic showed you

23 yesterday, I'm talking about Exhibit 5D794. Since this was not a document

24 that was produced by the 125th Brigade, I will be asking you to read it in

25 full, please.

1 Maybe we should scroll the document further down, so please tell

2 us.

3 A. Yes, yes, please. Next page, please.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: How many pages are there on this document?

5 MR. CEPIC: I think three, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Why is it necessary for the witness to read it all

7 in re-examination?

8 MR. CEPIC: Just to ask because --

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've got as far as "intelligence

10 support." I think I get the gist of this document.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Please allow Mr. Cepic to tell me why this needs to

12 be read in full.

13 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just in order to clarify

14 what Mr. Ivetic asked yesterday about this document and the possibility of

15 resubordinating MUP units to forces of the VJ, and this witness was not

16 given a chance to see the entire document although he was, in fact, asked

17 questions about it.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: And were you unhappy with the answers to these

19 questions?

20 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Well, I would require some

21 clarification, just for the sake of completeness. [In English] Just one

22 question, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

24 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, you've had a look. Can you tell me

1 who this order is being issued to based on the face of this document. Is

2 it to some police forces, just to speed things up?

3 A. This is an order by the commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade

4 being issued to his own units, an order; and he's talking about his

5 neighbours.

6 Q. Is there any sort of task that is being handed out to the 125th

7 Brigade or police units or any other unit in this document?

8 A. It is not possible for the commander of the 7th Brigade to hand

9 out any assignments to units of the 125th Brigade. This is not something

10 that had been agreed upon and there is no original document produced by

11 the corps command.

12 Q. Thank you, General.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: That wasn't the question. The question was whether

14 in this document any assignments are given to units of the 125th or to

15 police units.

16 Now, does the document bear to give any such tasks?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So the answer to the question you were asked was

19 quite different, and we know that you've claimed repeatedly that the

20 commander of one brigade can't order other soldiers who are not

21 resubordinated to him or order members of the MUP. We've heard this

22 repeatedly in this court, but then when you look at the documents they

23 appear to say other things, Mr. Cepic. Now why you think re-examination

24 is going to help resolve this I have no idea.

25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as I understand,

1 at least when I read this document, no assignments were handed out to the

2 125th Brigade or the PJP units. It just says, Support the actions of

3 these two units, that's 5.1 --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: If you're unhappy with the answer that

5 Mr. Zivanovic gave to my question, then you have to explore it further

6 because he said that there are tasks given to these bodies on the face of

7 the document. You can make your own submissions at the end of the case.

8 If you want any more from him, then ask him the questions.

9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Q. General, sir, what about this order, this document that you have

11 in front of you, do we see any sort of assignment being handed out in it

12 to the 125th Brigade or any of the PJP units?

13 A. This document anticipates what some elements of the 125th Brigade

14 and the PJP should do, but this was never elaborated on, at least not as

15 far as my armoured battalion was concerned.

16 Q. Thank you very much, General.

17 General, you mentioned about 1998, the summer of 1998, that you

18 received several orders from the Chief of the General Staff. Just for the

19 sake of clarity, who was at the time the Chief of the General Staff and

20 who did you receive that from?

21 A. I received it orally through our communications equipment. The

22 person in question was Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic.

23 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have Exhibit P3049.

24 Thank you.

25 Q. General, sir, my learned friend Mr. Hannis showed you this order

1 dated the 19th of March, 1999. So can we have item 10 of this order,

2 please.

3 MR. CEPIC: Could we have back page in English and the last page

4 in B/C/S, please. Count 10, please.

5 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, what is item 10 in reference to?

6 A. It's about command and communications, as per usual.

7 Q. And what does this abbreviation mean, "KM PrK in peacetime

8 location.

9 A. It means Pristina Corps command post at its peacetime location

10 which means its usual building in Pristina.

11 Q. Is that where command was exercised from as reflected in this

12 document?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have P1967 now. Thank

16 you. Last page of this document, please.

17 Q. General, sir, just to speed things up a little, you saw this

18 document during the cross-examination by Mr. Hannis. Do you think we

19 should go through it to see what the units were, all of them who were

20 handed out assignments or do you perhaps remember this?

21 A. I remember that the 125th in part and the 354th Brigades were

22 involved for the most part.

23 Q. All right. Look at this last sentence here: "Command post in the

24 Lausa sector." Have you ever been to that location, sir?

25 A. This is the command post of the 354th Brigade in the village of

1 Lausa. I've never been there myself. This is Lausa and it's in Malo

2 Kosovo.

3 Q. Was this perhaps the command post for all the forces --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that question. That's a blatantly

5 leading question in the middle of re-examination, Mr. Cepic. Please

6 confine yourself to open questions at this stage. It's now doubtful

7 whether the answer that will be given will be of any value to us.

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Sir, do you perhaps know whether the entire area in which these

10 activities by units took place can actually be seen or taken in from that

11 position?

12 A. Were I to be shown a map perhaps I could provide that answer.

13 Since, as I said, I've never been there, I can hardly say, can I?

14 Q. Thank you.

15 General, you were shown a document by my colleague Mr. Hannis,

16 it's P1246. While we are waiting for the document to come up on the

17 screen, when replying to his question you spoke about the carrying out of

18 the concept of All People's Defence and social self defense when

19 explaining the document in connection with sanitization. Here it is now.

20 General, you said from when this concept was in force this idea of

21 All People's Defence and social self defence, was it carried out in

22 practice later on in -- after -- in 1999?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Thank you, General. Who was exercising power on the territory and

25 who was authorised on the territory of Kosovska Mitrovica and Pec?

1 A. In wartime it was the organs of local self management and other

2 organs whose duty it was to ensure public law and order, that is the units

3 and secretariats of the MUP, or rather, the judiciary as well, the

4 prosecutor's office, and so on.

5 MR. CEPIC: Just one second, Your Honour, just to check my drafts.

6 Q. [Interpretation] General, I have no further questions for you.

7 That was my last question. Thank you for your responses.

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that was all. Thank

9 you.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zivanovic, that completes your evidence. Thank

13 you for coming here to give evidence again. You, no doubt, hope that's

14 the end of the road as far as you're concerned. I can give you no

15 guarantees, but perhaps it is. Anyway, you're now free to leave the

16 courtroom with our thanks.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 [The witness withdrew]

19 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]

20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Our next

21 witness is Colonel Milan Kotus.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Kotur, interpreter's correction.

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Kotur.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

2 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to

3 you.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

5 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: You will be examined by Mr. Bakrac on behalf of

9 Mr. Lazarevic.

10 Mr. Bakrac.

11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. If I may ask

12 the usher to lower the ELMO because it's in the way, it's obstructing

13 communication.

14 WITNESS: MILAN KOTUR

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 Examination by Mr. Bakrac:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, please be so kind as to state for the

18 record your name and your place and date of birth.

19 A. My name is Milan Kotur I was born on the 23rd of September, 1947,

20 in Indjija. That's a northern province in the Republic of Serbia.

21 Q. Please be so kind as to tell us briefly what your education is and

22 something about your career.

23 A. I completed the highest military schools, and as for my career I

24 served in ten garrisons, Samobor, Zagreb, Varazdin, Koprivnica, Leskovac,

25 Kursumlija, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Leskovac, and Novi Sad. And

1 then I retired with a rank of colonel. I'm now retired.

2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kotur. Tell us, what were your main duties in the

3 Army of Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999?

4 A. In 1998 and 1999 I was the chief of infantry in the Pristina

5 Corps.

6 Q. Were you the chief of infantry throughout 1998?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. In what garrison were you and where were you quartered when in

9 1998 you performed this duty?

10 A. I was quartered in the Pristina garrison.

11 Q. Until what date? Did you leave Pristina to go somewhere else; and

12 if you did, where and why?

13 A. In 1998, we went to Djakovica to the forward command post, where

14 we stayed sometime until the 23rd of October of the same year.

15 Q. You are speaking in the plural, but I asked you about your

16 yourself. So who did you mean by "we"?

17 A. I was referring to the forward command post command where most of

18 the officers headed by Colonel Lazarevic were located.

19 Q. And when did this forward command post begin functioning and until

20 when were you there at that command post?

21 A. Well, in late April 1998, that's when it started functioning, and

22 I remained at that forward command post until the 23rd of October of the

23 same year.

24 Q. On the 23rd of October, 1998, did you take on any other duty and

25 what did you do from that point on if you did?

1 A. As of the 23rd of October I still remained chief of infantry in

2 the Pristina Corps, but in addition to this, I also performed the duty of

3 team leader in the Pristina Corps for relations with the Kosovo

4 Verification Mission.

5 Q. It's late in the day and it's Friday. The interpreters are

6 managing to catch up, but could you please make a break between question

7 and answer, a brief pause.

8 When you became a team member for cooperation with the OSCE

9 mission, where were you stationed?

10 A. When I became team leader for relations with the Kosovo

11 Verification Mission on behalf of the Pristina Corps, I was stationed in

12 the Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija.

13 Q. Until what date were you in the team for cooperation with the

14 OSCE -- well, first of all, let me ask you this: Until when were you team

15 leader of the Pristina Corps for cooperation?

16 A. I was the team leader of the Pristina Corps for cooperation with

17 the Kosovo Verification Mission until the 10th of March, 1999.

18 Q. After this date did you continue being a member of the team for

19 cooperation with the Kosovo Verification Mission?

20 A. Yes, I did. I remained in the mixed team which was created for

21 relations with the Kosovo Verification Mission after the 10th of March,

22 1999.

23 Q. Mr. Kotur, we will go through some documents now, and we'll come

24 to this topic in greater detail. Before we begin looking at documents,

25 could you, if you can, describe in general the relationship of

1 representatives of the Army of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Verification

2 Mission. What was the attitude of the Pristina Corps, to put it more

3 precisely, towards the Kosovo Verification Mission in general terms?

4 A. The Kosovo Verification Mission was formed pursuant to the

5 approval inter alia of the federal government, and the body had diplomatic

6 status. All the members of that mission had protected diplomatic status.

7 Our attitude toward that mission was one of respect, it was very correct,

8 and it was our desire and intention for the problem of Kosovo and Metohija

9 to be resolved by peaceful means.

10 Q. Colonel, could we now take a look at an exhibit, our time is

11 limited, and I have selected several documents from which we shall be able

12 to see what your attitude toward the mission was and vice versa. We'll

13 try to depict this for the Trial Chamber. So I'll draw your attention now

14 to a document referring to an incident which was referred to in this

15 trial.

16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we look at 5D1387 in e-court.

17 Q. Mr. Kotur, please look at item in B/C/S. It's at the bottom of

18 the page.

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a little bit.

20 Q. This is a document issued by the federal Ministry of Foreign

21 Affairs. Tell me, please, are you familiar with this document?

22 A. Yes, I am familiar with the document.

23 Q. Under 3 it says: "C." What does that mean?

24 A. That is a verifier, Mr. Ciaglinski.

25 Q. Can you explain what this is about, what the gist of this

1 paragraph is to avoid reading it out loud. We can all read it for

2 ourselves, but just tell us what it's about.

3 A. Well, according to a report from the Siptar terrorist army and the

4 media in Kosovo and Metohija, Ivaja and the villages around it were

5 alleged to be a ghost town or ghost village which had been burnt to the

6 ground and everybody there killed, that it was all looted, and that all

7 this was done by it Serbian forces. Colonel Ciaglinski here is informing

8 me that General DZ was Mr. Walker's operations assistant had been in

9 Kacanik and Ivaja and established that there had been fighting there, that

10 there was shooting, and that some houses were damaged, but there was no

11 plundering. Instead, certain houses were searched, and he considered this

12 to be normal procedure. Therefore, the situation is not even remotely

13 such as described, so there is a witness on the ground who can refute the

14 KLA allegations.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kotur. You testified in another case here in this

16 Tribunal. I think that a report was shown to you from a blue book and it

17 seemed that there had been a suggestion that this report from the federal

18 ministry had been doctored or was incorrect.

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] So can we now look at an OSCE working

20 document. It's a Prosecution exhibit, 5680 [as interpreted]. It's a

21 working document for the period from the 26th of February to the 4th of

22 March, 1999.

23 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, in the transcript I see the number is

24 referred to as 5680. That's not a Prosecution exhibit number. Maybe it

25 was misspoken or mistranslated.

1 THE INTERPRETER: P680.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] P680. It seems the interpreters were

4 correct, but the transcript may contain a typographical error. The

5 document we see is the correct document.

6 Q. Mr. Kotur, to expedite matters, on the first page where it says

7 KLA and Djeneral Jankovic, it says in the OSCE report that: "It would

8 seem that over a hundred KLA members crossed the border and combined with

9 the said militia while encouraging the locals to leave."

10 A. I don't see that.

11 Q. It's towards the bottom of the page, could we scroll down a bit,

12 in B/C/S and let's move to page 2 of this document. Look at paragraph 1

13 where it says: "Euronews reported that a Serb offensive had started, this

14 was accompanied by images of Serbian vehicles on the move and local people

15 with sad expressions on their faces. The village of Kacanik has been

16 described as a ghost town, whereas the verifiers have stated this was

17 untrue and the first reports coming from the region seem to imply that

18 there had been a massacre."

19 This working document of the OSCE, does this correspond with what

20 we saw in the previous report?

21 A. Yes, it does correspond with what Mr. Ciaglinski told me and what

22 is contained in the previous report.

23 Q. Are you aware --

24 A. No, no, no. I may have mistaken the paragraph. Paragraphs I was

25 looking at the wrong paragraph. Oh yes, all right, all right, now I see

1 it. No, no I was right. It says that it's untrue that it was a ghost

2 town. I wasn't sure I had read it correctly.

3 Q. Please look at the last paragraph on the same page.

4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we just scroll down a little bit,

5 please, in order for the last paragraph in B/C/S to appear on the screen.

6 Q. We see here some activities of the KLA in the Podujevo area. Can

7 you comment on that, please, what is this about?

8 A. KLA forces in the Podujevo area succeeded in launching an attack

9 in the town itself successfully winning over the Serbs, unlike only

10 reactions and defence as previously while they killed the Serbs there to

11 the last man. They killed two people going to work in the town of

12 Podujevo. They were not inactive. They didn't react only when they were

13 attacked. It wasn't just a response to an attack. That's what's referred

14 to here.

15 Q. If I understand correctly, what is suggested here is that the VJ

16 was only responding to attacks and defending itself.

17 A. They say: "Unlike merely responding and defending themselves they

18 also attacked and killed."

19 Q. And the Army of Yugoslavia?

20 A. The Army of Yugoslavia responded only when it was provoked or

21 attacked.

22 Q. Colonel, can we now move to page 4 where there is a paragraph

23 concerning the Army of Yugoslavia. Let's look at the last paragraph where

24 it says "VJ," Army of Yugoslavia. In this paragraph it says: "The forces

25 of the VJ in Kosovo have strengthened their training" --

1 A. Can we zoom in, please?

2 Q. "Have significantly stepped-up their training on the territory of

3 the entire region, and although there are more VJ troops on the ground

4 than after the October agreement, estimates speak of 15 combat teams.

5 Their actions are minimalist and this can only be compared with the KLA

6 provocations, possibly a reflection of the KLA activity."

7 It seems that the army's actions are minimalist, that the army was

8 simply responding to KLA provocations. But please tell us whether there

9 actually were 15 combat teams deployed there who were beyond the scope of

10 the agreement?

11 A. No, there were never 15 teams deployed that were not part of the

12 agreement in Kosovo and Metohija.

13 Q. Could we now move on to another document now that we're discussing

14 this topic and then we'll come back briefly to this exhibit. Could we now

15 take a look at Prosecution Exhibit P2772, MM9, that's a sketch of these 15

16 teams, or rather, combat groups allegedly deployed in the area outside the

17 scope of the agreement. And as team leader, could you please describe

18 this document.

19 A. I still don't have that on my screen.

20 Q. It's about to come up. Just a minute, please. This is MM9 and

21 the page number is 20075691. In e-court it's page 85, I think.

22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we turn this around, please, and

23 zoom in slightly so that we see the entire map on our screens. The

24 left-hand page is irrelevant. Please zoom in just slightly.

25 Q. Sir, can you comment, please. Start with the square on the

1 right-hand side where it says Stimlje and take it from there.

2 A. Under the agreement on Kosovo and Metohija, the Pristina Corps was

3 allowed to have three groups across the area, and these groups were in

4 Stimlje and Dulje. That was one group in two different locations. The

5 other group was in the Volujak area. And the third group was in the

6 Lapusnik area, or rather, the rear of that group was in Komorane, it was

7 also one and the same group in two different locations. So these were the

8 three combat groups that were allowed to be in the area under the

9 verification agreement. Under the verification agreement, all combat

10 groups that were within the border belt protecting the state border

11 remained and were not subject to this verification.

12 Q. Colonel, let me interrupt you there for a second. Can you please

13 notice or can you tell us how many points there are on this sketch that

14 refer to what you have been telling us about, the combat groups that were

15 securing the state border and were within the border belt which was not

16 contrary to the terms of the agreement?

17 A. I'll tell you about what's outside the agreement and everything

18 else was under the agreement. That is the easier approach. The group

19 that was not within the agreement was the group at Vucitrn. The next

20 group, Podujevo. I don't know about Bajgora. We didn't have a group over

21 there. I'm not sure what it is that's marked. I think - I'm looking at

22 the location - it could be a firing range, Crnusak [phoen] right next to

23 Kosovska Mitrovica. If you take into account the firing range, Kosovska

24 Mitrovica, Bajgora, Vucitrn, and Podujevo. Podujevo, well, this is

25 probably the Slatina airport if that's what's drawn here, but I can't see,

1 I can't know for sure. So those are the three groups that are marked here

2 that were outside the agreement in a manner of speaking and everything

3 else was perfectly in keeping with the terms of the agreement.

4 Q. All right. Those in keeping with the agreement, securing the

5 state border, can you explain how these three groups were there that were

6 not in keeping with the terms of the October agreement. Were they outside

7 the agreement or is it just that the agreement did not envisage them to be

8 there?

9 A. They weren't envisaged in the agreement, but we have a number of

10 memoranda, whatever they were called at the time, and one of these

11 documents says that we in case of danger, danger to our country or in

12 order to protect our roads, were allowed the right to react. What I see

13 here, the 10th of March, 2000, the year is 2000, I'm not sure if that's

14 the date when the groups were there or it's something else because I see a

15 stamp there. If indeed it's the 10th of March, 2000 -- it can't be 2000,

16 can it --

17 Q. Please pay that no heed.

18 A. Yes, but I want to know on which date this disposition of groups

19 was represented.

20 Q. I think in February, February or March 1999.

21 A. In February and March 1999 the situation in Kosovo and Metohija

22 became more complex. Given what the situation was, the operative

23 situation of the Pristina Corps, our conclusion was that we were facing

24 odds that weren't favourable at all and this was one of the reasons that

25 we received -- that we admitted several thousands of young and

1 insufficiently trained soldiers. They had not been sufficiently trained

2 because their training programme was no more than two and a half months

3 long and these soldiers were not sufficiently trained to perform their

4 basic military specialty. We had to take them outside the barracks in

5 order to train them. The training proceeded in the following way: There

6 was a combat group that was in the area, and this occurred at the Batlava

7 airport, which is an airfield that was used for flying amateur planes.

8 This is an area that was used every year, and every year in this area we

9 trained men.

10 Q. Let's try to hurry things a long a little bit. Tell me about

11 Vucitrn, is something, a place called Bukos there?

12 A. Yes, indeed there is.

13 Q. So what was that, can you explain that, please?

14 A. Bukos is where a group went in order to be trained, a group of

15 young soldiers, likewise and the Crnusak firing range where they had their

16 practice. I see that one of the barracks in Djakovica was marked here,

17 this is no combat group, it's the Djakovica barracks. There are two

18 barracks -- rather, the Djakovica garrison has two different barracks

19 locations. One of them is in the town itself in Djakovica and the other

20 is to the west of the town. I see that the one in the actual town was

21 shown as a combat group, but that is not consistent with the actual

22 situation. So the sketch is erroneous in that regard.

23 Q. If my understanding is correct of what you're suggesting, sir, as

24 for those that were outside the agreement we have these three locations

25 with three training grounds, if you like. Under the agreement were you

1 entitled to perform training and drills at these locations?

2 A. No, and the members of the verification mission -- yes, we did

3 have the right and the members of the verification mission said this was a

4 very normal thing for us to do and anything else we might have done in

5 February and March at that time would have been abnormal.

6 Q. Let's go back to P680 briefly. And thank you very much for your

7 previous answer, Colonel. Page 5 in the B/C/S.

8 Colonel, sir, we see an incident discussed here along the

9 border --

10 A. Can we just zoom in slightly.

11 Q. This was something that was experienced by the OSCE mission. It

12 was the SRJ customs that held them back at the Djeneral Jankovic border

13 post.

14 A. Yes, I see that's what it says.

15 Q. Do you know about this incident?

16 A. Yes, I know about this incident.

17 Q. What about the customs office, do those people over there have

18 anything to do with the VJ?

19 A. No, nothing whatsoever. There was not a single border crossing

20 where there were customs offices and the military too. There were just

21 the customs office and the police, but no military whatsoever.

22 Q. In the lower half of the page it says that it had been agreed for

23 the border post chief to be replaced. What about the border post, does

24 that have anything to do with the customs people?

25 A. No, nothing whatsoever. The border post is a place where soldiers

1 securing the border post are put up. This is nothing to do with the

2 customs people, not the actual persons who are there nor the installation

3 itself.

4 Q. Do you know what the proposal was for, who was to be replaced?

5 A. Let me just have a look.

6 Q. A reference there to Mihalj Kertes?

7 A. Yes, I'm just looking. A meeting between General DZ and

8 General Loncar has cleared the air of the event, although this is not to

9 say that the issue will not occur again. It is agreed that the chief of

10 the border post has been replaced. This is nonsense. There was no

11 agreement nor could there have been an agreement for the border post chief

12 to be dismissed, only the customs chief. This was a nationwide change in

13 attitude and not confined to Djeneral Jankovic and certainly

14 [indiscernible] we will not have changed his opinion, and so on and so

15 forth. I think if this had been agreed for the replacement of the border

16 post chief, I think this is entirely untrue.

17 Q. What was Kertes' position at the time?

18 A. He was a manager -- the manager or whatever it was called at the

19 time of the federal customs in the country at the time.

20 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel.

21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now please go to page 6.

22 Q. We have this section entitled: "Summary of events prior to the

23 28th of February." It's about the fact that it seemed that the KLA had

24 entered the area on a large scale, they had joined up with the police.

25 There were between 120 and 160 men involved, the locals heard shooting

1 from the village of Stremce, and this village was nearly and entirely

2 sealed off because of heavy snow fall. The KLA told those living in the

3 area to move out. Are you familiar with this particular piece of

4 information in relation to this area and do you have any information about

5 any other areas.

6 A. This is one of the areas in which the KLA ordered their own

7 population to leave in order to give rise to some sort of a humanitarian

8 disaster, in order to end the world's pity and sympathy. It's clear

9 enough if you look at the conversation that took place between Ciaglinski

10 and myself and the book that you mentioned. You can tell that this was

11 one of the methods they employed, and what they wrote there was actually

12 what they succeeded in and that was their chief motive. They wanted to do

13 just that, they wanted to apply these methods and this doesn't just apply

14 to Kacanik, it applied throughout Kosovo. They did this wherever they

15 thought they could get away with that, and whatever they thought they

16 stood to profit from the use of these methods.

17 Q. Let's wrap up this document because we're nearing the end of the

18 day. The very end of this document, sir, page 7 where it reads:

19 "Assessment of the OSCE mission" and then just underneath: "The

20 KLA are exploiting the media."

21 I will read a portion of this to you. Please just comment whether

22 you had this sort of information --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: One speaker at a time,

24 please, thank you.

25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we move the page up in the B/C/S

1 so that the witness is able to follow.

2 Q. "Knowing the power of the media, the ethnic Albanians will work

3 towards their own good and will do everything they can to get the world's

4 sympathy. The poor situation of internally displaced persons remains

5 their most power weapon. Therefore, one can only expect other things to

6 start happening in relation to the movement -- the large-scale movement of

7 people. Each scenario must be studied and" --

8 A. Please pull up the Serbian version.

9 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is paragraph 1 in

10 the English.

11 Q. Can you see that now, Colonel?

12 A. Yes.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: One speaker at a time,

14 please. Can the speakers please be asked to not overlap. Thank you.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, there's no interruption between

16 question and answer here. You really have to not speak at the same time

17 as Mr. Kotur.

18 Now, what is your question?

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I see that the witness

20 got a different page altogether, but we're passed the mark in terms of

21 time already, and I believe we can press on next Monday with this --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Complete what you're going to do with this

23 document. You're at --

24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Page 7, please, in the B/C/S. I see

25 that in the English we have the right page.

1 Q. Can you please look at where it says: "Assessment," the last

2 paragraph underneath, yes, that's right, the bottom of the page. Further

3 down, please just a little in the B/C/S.

4 You see that, sir?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you read that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I read the document. What about this assessment of the OSCE

9 mission, were you familiar with this at the time and did you have the same

10 information at the time?

11 A. This appears to be our assessment, not theirs, but they didn't

12 share this with us, they didn't say that.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kotur, this is an OSCE document and you're

14 being asked whether you -- your experience was consistent with what's

15 being assessed by them that the Albanians would exploit the media to their

16 advantage.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree with that. That was my

18 assessment too. That was our assessment too, such as the one reflected

19 here.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I think this is a convenient time for

22 us to --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you finished with this document?

24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Indeed, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

1 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] That's it for me.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kotur, I know that you've not been with us for

3 long, but now is the deadline for these proceedings today and we must

4 bring them to an end until next week. That means that you have to return

5 to continue to give evidence on Monday. We have restored the original

6 arrangement for Monday so that we will be sitting at 9.00 in this

7 courtroom and be sitting from 9.00 until 3.30. It's important that

8 between now and then you have no communication with anyone about any

9 aspect of the evidence in this case. Your communications with other

10 people are unlimited so far as other matters are concerned, but absolutely

11 off limits is any communication with anyone else about any aspect of all

12 of the evidence in this case. So please bear that in mind and comply with

13 that direction over the weekend, make the most of the weekend, and return

14 here refreshed, ready to resume your evidence at 9.00 on Monday.

15 Meanwhile, please leave the courtroom with the usher. We're adjourned now

16 until Monday at 9.00.

17 [The witness stands down]

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not getting any ...

19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] [No interpretation].

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it should have been intimated to you. It

21 definitely has been changed to 9.00 on Monday morning.

22 MR. FILA: Okay. Thank you.

23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.37 p.m.,

24 to be reconvened on Monday, the 21st day of

25 January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.