1 Thursday, 7 February 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, everyone.
6 Mr. Lukic or Mr. Ivetic -- probably Mr. Ivetic I think, are you
7 able to advise us further in relation to the six PJP commanders
8 anonymously listed on your 65 ter list?
9 [The witness entered court]
10 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, it's my understanding that we have sent
11 out an e-mail identifying the names and the exact unit or detachment that
12 they were commanders of last night, so hopefully that should address all
13 six of them.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: So you do have the names?
15 MR. IVETIC: Yes, we do.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Thank you.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Stefanovic.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: In a moment the cross-examination by Mr. Stamp will
21 continue. Please remember what I said yesterday morning, that the solemn
22 declaration to speak the truth continues to apply to your evidence start
23 to finish.
24 Mr. Stamp.
25 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 WITNESS: RADOJKO STEFANOVIC [Resumed]
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp: [Continued]
4 Q. Good morning.
5 A. Good morning.
6 Q. Yesterday we were discussing your relationship with the MUP, and I
7 would like to briefly continue with that by looking at document P2014.
8 This is an order that you have been shown quite a few times. It's an
9 order in relation to the Drenica operation on the 25th of May. I take it
10 that you drafted this order?
11 A. Could I see the last page, please, then I'll be able to tell you
12 who made this. Yes, indeed, I'm one of the persons who were involved in
13 drafting this document.
14 Q. Yes, you were the -- you see on the front page there it says: "To
15 the command of the MUP." I take it that you wrote that as well?
16 A. No, I didn't write that myself but it was written by someone in
17 the organ for operations and affairs. The MUP is hereby called upon to
18 use one of its units to participate in this action.
19 Q. To whom was this document sent? To whom in the MUP was the
20 document sent?
21 A. I can't be specific right now whether it was actually delivered to
22 someone in person or whether someone was informed. This was normally done
23 by my deputy. Once the planning stage had been completed he would take it
24 upon himself to inform all those who were involved in an action.
25 Q. Well, who in the MUP did you intend to receive this?
1 A. This was meant to be like this: Someone from the MUP was to be
2 informed, and then this person was to inform his own unit of the fact that
3 an action had been planned, and then there would be coordination at the
4 tactical level between the brigade and the PJP detachment.
5 Q. Yes, but it's not simply someone. This is: "To the command of
6 the MUP." Who did you intend to receive it?
7 A. Mr. Prosecutor, sir, it was someone who was in the MUP staff who
8 was in charge of planning who was supposed to receive this, and all this
9 business about actions and about the involvement of units of the MUP.
10 Q. See, I'm sorry if I'm pressing because we -- with these
11 questions. Many of the questions I ask, I ask because General Lazarevic
12 indicated that you would be the one to know, and now you are telling me
13 you don't know who was the commander of the MUP that this document was
14 intended for. Very well. And you don't know where this command of the
15 MUP was located?
16 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, they do not have a command as such, but here
17 it was also done for the unit commands, the brigades. So they have an HQ,
18 they have their leaders, but their something [as interpreted] was in the
19 general Pristina area. I don't know where exactly they were located.
20 Q. Very well. You don't know.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we've heard of a body called the MUP staff
22 for Kosovo based in Pristina. Do you know of that body?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know who was head of it?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, General Sreten Lukic.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I mean, on the face of it this would be
2 intended for him, would it?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, his staff, maybe not
4 personally, but his staff, his unit that was going about this business.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: If the 3rd Army were to send a document like this
6 to the Pristina Corps, who would it be intended to go to at the Pristina
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was an established procedure
9 in the army, when mail is received, checked, if there was a document being
10 sent by the army command to the corps command, this would have been
11 received in an office, checked, and forwarded to the Chief of Staff.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And who would be regarded as responsible,
13 ultimately responsible, in the Pristina Corps for complying with the
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For receiving the order?
16 JUDGE BONOMY: For complying with the order.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The most responsible person in that
18 command would have been in charge with complying with that order,
19 implementing that order and any other order that was received.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't try to confuse the situation with
21 language. Who in the Pristina Corps would be ultimately responsible for
22 complying with the order, according to the principle of singleness or
23 unity of command, which has been emphasised by soldier after soldier
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the corps commander.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 Mr. Stamp.
3 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much.
4 Q. You were asked - if I could move on - a significant amount of
5 question about your -- about the VJ's subordination or non-resubordination
6 of the MUP during combat operations. I don't intend to ask -- go through
7 this again but to ask you one thing: You said that many times the VJ
8 provided artillery support but it would only be for units within the
9 combat disposition of the VJ artillery units. What do you mean when you
10 say "combat disposition"?
11 A. When we talk about the combat disposition of a unit, what we mean
12 is where forces are positioned, firing positions, support, observation
13 posts, command posts at a high level also the forces and equipment that
14 take up these areas and sectors, that's what we mean when we say "combat
16 Q. We have seen in many of the operations that we have had evidence
17 about -- or actions that we have had evidence about MUP units requiring VJ
18 fire support and being within the combat disposition of the MUP -- of the
19 VJ. I would like to ask you a hypothetical question.
20 Should something unexpected happen in any of these operations
21 where the VJ is blocking territory and providing fire support and the MUP
22 is confronting the KLA and it required an immediate decision, who would
23 prevail if there was disagreement amongst the persons in what you call the
24 combined command or the Joint Command that was leading this operation?
25 Which single person would prevail and make the decision?
1 A. At this combined command post, there are no superiors or
2 subordinates. All the representatives of the various commands are equal,
3 each in command of their unit. There are no distinctions. Everyone has
4 their own chain of command and they're all equal.
5 Q. What if an unexpected situation, for example, a KLA unit turned
6 out to be stronger than expected and turned around and attacked VJ and MUP
7 units, endangering VJ personnel and MUP personnel, that's the lives of
8 these persons, and then a decision had to be made, would someone have the
9 responsibility to make that ultimate decision?
10 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, that certainly wouldn't be my understanding.
11 For example, MUP unit is attacked, is facing problems that it can't deal
12 with on its own, it would send a request to an army commander, the
13 commander of an army unit, to lend some support, for example, firing
14 support, to give them support with a specific problem that may have
15 occurred during an action.
16 Q. What if there was no agreement, wouldn't Article 7 of the Law of
17 Defence apply? That is, a senior VJ person there would have to take
18 command -- Article 17.
19 A. No. First of all, I don't know that at any point throughout the
20 war there was any misunderstanding about this. There was always a lot of
21 mutual understanding and support between the VJ and the MUP, so I can't
22 speak hypothetically about this simply because it's meaningless unless
23 there is a particular action that we are talking about.
24 Q. You said you don't know throughout any point in the war there was
25 any misunderstanding about this, you mean, are you saying you don't know
1 through the war that there was any disagreement between the VJ and the MUP
2 in these joint combat operations?
3 A. No, that's a much broader question, the one you're asking me now.
4 I'm just focusing on a situation in which a problem occurs. Now, how do
5 they go about this? There is a request for support at a certain point in
6 time in order to overcome this problem and continue an action in a
7 successful manner. There was no reason for any misunderstandings to occur
8 between the two because they each had their own chain of command, and
9 that's how they were working, autonomously each along their own axis.
10 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry to intervene here. Just, General, I
11 shall feel grateful if you kindly answer my question. But you appreciate
12 the relevance of Article 17 of the Law of Defence in case such a situation
13 arises, although I'm quite astonished to see that such a situation will
14 never arise; after all, they are human beings, there is human nature
15 involved. But let's concentrate on the relevance of Article 17. You
16 agree with what is said in Article 17, will that emerge? Thank you very
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is what I'm
19 saying. In practice this never happened throughout the war. Therefore, I
20 can't speak about Article 17 of the Law on Defence in terms of whether it
21 was applied or when. There was no need to apply that particular article.
22 That's what I'm saying.
23 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you anyway.
24 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. You told us about the Drenica action which had to be replanned.
1 Apart from that situation, apart from that Drenica action, do you know of
2 any other situations where an operation or an action had to be completely
3 replanned, as occurred in the Drenica situation?
4 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, as far as I can remember, there were some
5 actions that had to be replanned because of overspill by certain terrorist
6 forces, so one had to go back to certain areas and re-plan things, and
7 it's Drenica that I have in mind above all and I don't mean Mount Drenica,
8 I mean the Drenica area, the sector.
9 Q. Do you know of any other action or operation that had to be
10 replanned because of problems with the MUP in the field?
11 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, I can't remember right now. If there's a
12 document that I could use to jog my memory -- as I am, I don't think I can
13 possibly remember.
14 Q. Yesterday I showed you P1468 and I think I showed you the wrong
15 part of this. I would like to show you that document again and ask you a
16 question about it, and this is to move on to another topic. And if we
17 could go straight -- these are the notes I showed you yesterday of the --
18 of meetings of the Joint Command.
19 MR. STAMP: And if we could go straight to page 137 of the B/C/S
20 and page 151 of the English. Well, we don't need to go to the English,
21 actually, if we could just go to page 137 of the B/C/S. So if we could
22 have page 137 of the B/C/S on one page and page 136 of the B/C/S. Could
23 we have page 136 of the B/C/S.
24 Q. Page 136 is a note or the notes for the 13th -- for the 14th of
25 October, 1998, and that's on your right and page 137 on your left is the
1 notes for the 21st of October, 1998. You can see that the writings are
2 different, the penmanship is not the same.
3 Now, what I asked you about yesterday is the one on your right,
4 the first one, the earlier one. I want to ask you about the one on your
5 left. Do you recognise the writing?
6 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, I can't distinguish. I can only confirm what
7 you suggested. It is obvious that the two samples were made by two
8 different hands.
9 Q. The one on your left, is this not the writing of your assistant,
10 Jesevic -- I may have the name correct, Jeftovic -- sorry, Jesevic --
11 A. You mean Tesevic?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. I can't say. I'm not sure whether this is his handwriting.
14 Q. Very well. Just a couple of questions. The air corps of the VJ
15 was operational during the war; is that correct?
16 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, at the beginning of the war but not any later
17 than that because there was no way for it to resist or stand up to a far
18 superior aggressor.
19 Q. Up until when?
20 A. I can't be certain because I don't know anything reliable about
21 it, but perhaps the first couple of days, from the beginning of the
22 aggression I reckon up until the end of March, but certainly not beyond
24 Q. You also spoke about units being brought into Kosovo from outside
25 Kosovo shortly before the war.
1 A. Yes, esteemed Prosecutor. Pursuant to orders from the General
2 Staff and the 3rd Army command, some of the units were brought to Kosovo
3 and Metohija, specifically Combat Group 37 from the 37th Motorised Brigade
4 of the Uzice Corps of the 2nd Army, BG-252 or to be more precise, the
5 mechanised battalion of the 252nd Armoured Brigade from the 1st Army; and
6 DO, a Combat Group from the 72nd Special Brigade, about 100 men from the
7 Nis Corps BG-21, the equivalent of a battalion, a combat group. I
8 apologise, there was also TG-211 from the 211th Armoured Brigade.
9 Q. You are aware that bringing these units into Kosovo at that time
10 would have been in breach of the October Agreement in respect to the OSCE
11 monitoring missions?
12 A. Esteemed Prosecutor, as far as I know, no unit outside the
13 Pristina Corps was brought there without the approval of the General Staff
14 or the 3rd Army command without notifying the OSCE mission.
15 Q. In the months of February and March of 1999 in your preparations
16 for combat in spring, did you contemplate that the KVM monitoring mission
17 would remain in Kosovo should NATO intervene?
18 A. Well, truth be told, that wasn't my job; I didn't spend any time
19 thinking about that. I was in no position to assess whether it would
20 still be there or not.
21 Q. You prepared P2809 [sic]. That is a Pristina Corps order the 15th
22 of February which covered many of the operations that were conducted,
23 particularly during the early part of the war, late March. And in the
24 order for those operations, did you not contemplate --
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that it's an
1 erroneous reference to the document
2 MR. STAMP: Sorry. Thank you, counsel, it's P2808, not P2809.
3 Q. In making these plans - and this is one that you drafted - did you
4 and the other senior leaders of the VJ not contemplate operations to jam
5 the communications of the KVM or the OSCE monitors?
6 A. Honourable Prosecutor, that is not right at all. Allow me to
7 explain. This order to crush and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in
8 the region of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo stemmed from the order of
9 the command of the 3rd Army, if I'm not mistaken, from the 27th or 28th of
10 January, where a task was given to plan anti-terrorist actions for the
11 mentioned areas, and especially due to the build-up of NATO forces in
12 Macedonia, specifically the multi-national brigade of NATO. This area of
13 Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo are areas that are suitable for
14 landing, and the planned action was to prevent a landing of the mentioned
15 multi-national brigade of NATO to take place.
16 Q. Very well. Let's look at page 27 of this order because I think --
17 I see from your answer here you are telling me it's not right to say that
18 you contemplated operations to jam the communications of the OSCE
19 monitors. Page 27 in English and that's page 10 to 11, the paragraph that
20 starts at page 10 and ends on page 11 in B/C/S.
21 And while we are getting there, can I indicate that it is 2808. I
22 notice that the transcript indicates P2828. It's P2808.
23 It indicates that you should conduct electronic jamming in
24 accordance with a special order and carry out electronic deception by
25 breaking into the communication systems of, among others, the OSCE
1 verification mission. So contrary to what you are saying, it is true,
2 isn't it, that in carrying out these operations against the KLA you
3 intended to interfere with the communications of the OSCE, who was
4 supposed to be monitoring your operations.
5 A. Yes, this is what it says basically in this paragraph, electronic
6 warfare. First of all, one should take measures against the Siptar
7 terrorist forces and what is coming from the Republic of Macedonia too.
8 Q. Well --
9 A. As far as I know, there weren't any -- excuse me.
10 Q. Sorry, I'm just focusing on the OSCE mission for the time being.
11 It is clear, sir, it is true that you did not want the OSCE monitors to
12 know what you were doing in these operations?
13 A. Honourable Prosecutor, as far as I know, the OSCE mission was
14 allowed and enabled to have a look at every unit, every position, all the
15 armaments, everything in every one of our units and everything that they
16 were interested in, all units, all sectors, et cetera. If you allow me to
17 say, during 1998 I was commander in Gnjilane, I was commander of a
18 brigade, and several times they came to see me and I made it possible for
19 them to see everything that they had asked to see.
20 MR. STAMP: I believe that is all I have, if I may just check
21 my ...
22 [Prosecution counsel confer]
23 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much. That is all I have for this
25 [Trial Chamber confers].
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, re-examination?
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very
4 Re-examination by Mr. Bakrac:
5 Q. [Interpretation] General, we will start with what we heard about
6 last, 28085 [as interpreted]. Could we please have a look at that, or
7 rather, 2808. Page 10, please, the one that we saw previously, and
8 immediately after that, page 11. In the Serbian version page 10, please.
9 Mr. Stamp showed you this sentence: "Electronic jamming should be
10 carried out according to a special order ..."
11 Was readiness envisaged for that or did this require a special
13 A. Yes. As stated here, in accordance with a special order, what was
14 supposed to follow was a new special order.
15 Q. Did a special order on jamming ever follow?
16 A. As far as I know, no.
17 Q. Did you have any information to the effect that the OSCE mission
18 was submitting information about your positions to the NATO forces?
19 A. Yes, we had such information. They used GPS systems to locate
20 various sites and facilities, which was later confirmed during the
22 MR. STAMP: If I can only say many times these -- what I think is
23 a grossly leading question is asked and answered even before one can
24 react. So if I can just ask if counsel wants to explore some territory,
25 he should try to keep the questions as open as possible.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
2 Mr. Bakrac, you have to bear that in mind, that the answer we've
3 just heard is pretty valueless in view of the terms of the question.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just read what is
5 written there and then I asked whether there was a special order. That is
6 what is written in this text. I do apologise.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not what the objection is to, Mr. Bakrac.
8 The objection is to the question at line 17: "Did you have any
9 information to the effect that the OSCE mission was submitting information
10 about your positions to the NATO forces?"
11 What you should have asked was: Can you think of any reason why
12 that provision was included in P2808? And then we would have had the
13 benefit of his spontaneous recollection, which would have been valuable
14 evidence. As it is, you've devalued the evidence that he's given.
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honour. We had
16 evidence about that. We can move on.
17 Q. Mr. Stefanovic --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: You are determined to have the last word on this,
19 Mr. Bakrac, which ill-becomes you in these circumstances. But if we have
20 plenty of other evidence on it, why on earth are you asking this witness?
21 Just please get on with it and deal with it properly.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. General, a question was put to you about Article 17 of the Law on
24 Defence, and if I'm not mistaken what it says there is that MUP organs may
25 be resubordinated to the Army of Yugoslavia. I would be interested in the
1 following, since a hypothetical question was put to you, who has the last
2 say? If there is resubordination, is that situation different, if there
3 is no resubordination or if there's only coordination, rather?
4 A. In a situation if there were no resubordination, then everything
5 is clear, then there are relations of command involved and then there is
6 no further dilemma with regard to other tasks and assignments.
7 Q. Thank you, General. My friend Mr. Stamp asked you on page 10,
8 lines 14 through 16, while preparing the spring offensive, did you think
9 that the OSCE would remain in Kosovo. My question was: Were you
10 preparing a spring offensive?
11 A. No; on the contrary. We were getting ready to thwart the spring
12 offensive of the Siptar terrorist forces. That was one of the tasks of
13 the command of the 3rd Army, or rather, the commander of the 3rd Army.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Stefanovic. Yesterday my colleague Mr. Ivetic
15 asked you about --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one -- before you move on. Are you referring
17 to the question at line 14 on page 10?
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, 10, 14 through 16, yes.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: The English question does not suggest that the VJ
20 were preparing a spring offensive. The question was: "In your
21 preparations for combat in the spring ..." which Is consistent with what
22 we understood the position to be, the intention that there would be a
23 spring offensive and to resist it. However, please continue.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. General, so what was shown to you was PD84 [as interpreted], the
1 combat report of the command of the Pristina Corps, and you were asked
2 about mixed check-points or joint check-points. Could we have a look at
3 5D376, please, and could we have a look at paragraph 1. 376.
4 Could you have a look at the first paragraph, please, and could
5 you give me your comments. This is a document of the Ministry of the
6 Interior dated the 13th of May, 1999. And does it pertain to the setting
7 up of joint check-points?
8 A. Yes. In order to deal with looting, et cetera -- should I read
9 this out or should I just give you my comments?
10 Q. Just give us your comments. We can read it for ourselves.
11 A. Well, on the basis of an agreement of the MUP and the commander of
12 the Pristina Corps, joint check-points were set up and patrols with a
13 basic joint task -- so the members of the army should stop and check VJ
14 members in vehicles while MUP members should stop and check MUP members
15 and vehicles.
16 Q. Now, since we are talking about the 13th of May, you read this on
17 the basis of an agreement between the head of the MUP staff for Kosovo and
18 Metohija and the commander of the Pristina Corps of the Army of
19 Yugoslavia. Could there have been an agreement at all or would it have
20 been resolved differently had there been resubordination?
21 A. Let me say once again, if there is resubordination then there is
22 no more functional relationship of discussion, agreement; there is
23 subordination, there is singleness of command.
24 Q. Thank you, General. Yesterday you were asked about another
25 document dated the 25th of April, and you said that it was an attempt to
1 operationalize that order, and you wanted us to look at the order.
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we then please have P1722,
3 that's an order from the 3rd Army command issued pursuant to an order from
4 the Supreme Command Staff.
5 Q. And could you please look at the first paragraph, and if you could
6 please comment and tell us whether this is the order that you were talking
7 about that you said it had been impossible to implement and that you had
8 actually attempted to operationalize.
9 A. Yes. This is the basic -- the original order regulating the
10 resubordination of the MUP.
11 Q. And in this order -- is the order issued only the effect that the
12 units should be resubordinated or is there more to it?
13 A. Well, it says here that the units and organs of the interior for
14 the purpose of having singleness of command in the execution of combat
15 missions, so everything is affected, units and organs. Although this is
16 perhaps not phrased in the most fortunate manner because the secretariats
17 are organs too, but the overall resubordination is what is meant.
18 Q. Now when we're talking about the resubordination, does
19 resubordination mean that only offensive operations, anti-terrorist
20 actions are to be carried out or does it also entail something else?
21 A. Well, if you're talking about this order --
22 Q. Well, no, I'm asking a general question, not relating to this
23 order, but what does resubordination entail, only execution of offensive
24 anti-terrorist actions?
25 A. Well, please give me a minute so that I can be as specific as
1 possible. After this order was issued, it was unclear to either party how
2 they should proceed. So after a few days at the corps command, we put
3 together and issued another order dated the 25th of April, where we tried
4 to be as precise and as specific as possible, so that only that the police
5 units may be employed only from time to time in certain actions fighting
6 the terrorist forces.
7 Q. General, you explained all that. What I am interested in is
8 whether resubordination, generally speaking, entails only the ad hoc
9 actions or something else too.
10 A. Well, I'm not quite sure. Could you be more specific. Are you
11 talking about the work in general or just combat actions?
12 Q. Well, what other kinds of work would resubordination entail?
13 A. Well, if an element or if a unit is resubordinated to a command,
14 then it is under an obligation to report to that command regularly on its
15 activities after some actions are carried out, to brief the command, to
16 report, to be in contact. So it is a complex activity. It is not just
17 you resubordinate somebody and that's the end of it.
18 Q. All that you said, does this entail also the combat control of the
19 territory holding the axes that were taken, undertaking ambushes and
21 A. Yes, precisely. If we're talking about combat actions, not all
22 the forces in a unit would attack to rout and destroy. There was some
23 units that would block some positions, hold certain sectors, ensure that
24 the roads were passable, provide support. So this entails all those
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I've missed something in your earlier
3 evidence from what Mr. Bakrac is saying.
4 Mr. Bakrac, what is the exhibit number for the order of the 25th
5 of April?
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could I please be given
7 just a moment. I have it here. Your Honour, that's P2809, so it's a
8 Prosecution exhibit.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we see that one, please, on the screen.
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may assist, in the
11 preamble there is a reference to the document that we've just looked at
12 dated the 20th of April, 1999.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: The part that I think -- well, I appear to have
14 missed from what Mr. Bakrac was saying is when you apparently have told us
15 before that after the 20th of April order was issued it was unclear to
16 either party how they should proceed. Now, how were you aware that the
17 position was unclear to both the MUP and the VJ?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in contacts at the
19 corps command that was definitely so, in contact with the various organs
20 in the corps command and also in the contacts with the MUP
21 representatives, who were saying, How should we implement this? So these
22 were just talks, conversations.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: This is -- these are conversations you had?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, and the other organs of
25 the command, the corps commander informed us about it. I mean the organs
1 of the command.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: But tell me, who was the most senior MUP person?
3 Give me a name that you spoke to and who discussed with you, How should we
4 implement this?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I talked with the
6 commanders of the police units, in light of the fact that we carried out
7 those actions, so I was in quite frequent contact with them. But as for
8 the officers in the staff, I really didn't have an opportunity to discuss
9 this with them.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, give me the name of a person that you
11 discussed this with.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I remember that I
13 talked with Colonel Brakovic several times.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what is difficult about the order and how to
15 implement it, paragraph 1? Where's the difficulty? It's in such simple,
16 clear terms, where is the difficulty?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I do apologise.
18 We're now not talking about this order, we're talking about the previous
19 order. This order is an attempt to provide some specific guide-lines as
20 to how this could be done.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm asking you about the situation between the 20th
22 of April and the 25th, and you have already told us - and apparently you
23 told us earlier and I have missed it - that it was unclear to either party
24 how they should proceed. Now, I would like to know what it was the MUP
25 people you talked to after the 20th of April and before the 25th of April
1 said was difficult about implementing this 20th of April order. I want
2 meat on the skeleton.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there are two
4 reasons. The first basic reason is that MUP did not receive any orders
5 from the ministry, from their superiors, about this resubordination; and
6 second, if you allow me, second, it was not clear, this initial order was
7 not clear as to what should be resubordinated and what shouldn't be. What
8 methodology should be applied for this resubordination if it ever
10 JUDGE BONOMY: The first reason you give is a quite different
11 reason from the one that you're giving at the moment. So let's lay that
12 aside. We've heard it before, we know that that's the main theme for the
13 non-effect of this order. But on the second point, it was not clear as to
14 what should be resubordinated. It couldn't be clearer, Mr. Stefanovic.
15 "The units and agencies of internal affairs shall be
16 resubordinated to the Pristina Corps and Nis Corps in the execution of
17 combat missions."
18 Now, what's difficult to understand about that?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the difficulty lay now -- that
20 we discussed in our conversations is whether the services in the
21 secretariats issuing passports, controlling traffic, and so on, I'm not
22 familiar with their organs, their services, whether all that should be
23 resubordinated to the army. So that was the essential problem.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: And are these part of combat operations? I mean --
25 combat missions? This is simple language we're talking about here. I
1 mean, these are obviously not part of a combat mission.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, absolutely. That's
3 not a combat element at all.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Tell me, was there a power struggle between the VJ
5 and the MUP at this time?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, well, I didn't know
7 that. I was not aware of that and I don't think that there were any
8 misunderstandings in -- that there was no struggle, as you're talking
9 about. There was just this stand that they took that there was no order
10 on resubordination.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a separate matter, Mr. Stefanovic. That's
12 not the explanation you've given today for this difficulty, and I'm trying
13 to find out what was the specific nature of the problem that the MUP
14 officials you spoke to saw in implementing this order and I've yet to hear
15 any from you.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, let me try and do
17 that once again, to be quite specific. They considered that the overall,
18 the -- all of the organs and services of the police could not be
19 resubordinated to the army because it was simply impossible. It was
20 unclear how this could be done at all. So that's where the problem was.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: And this was never discussed, as far as you are
22 aware, above the level of unit commanders of the MUP?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, no. I didn't know
24 whether anyone discussed that at a higher level, when or indeed what might
25 have been discussed.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 Mr. Bakrac, please continue.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Q. Mr. Stefanovic, you told us in your examination-in-chief
5 yesterday, or rather, the day before yesterday, you gave us names of
6 people that you coordinated with in planning actions.
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please look at P1811.
8 Q. It is a document from the Ministry of the Interior. You see in
9 front of you the decision to establish a ministry staff for fighting
10 terrorism. It is dated May 1999, and we can see here Lieutenant-Colonel
11 Milenko Arsenijevic. Is this the person that you were referring to that
12 you said that you had --
13 A. Yes, yes, that's the police officer Milenko Arsenijevic.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now look at page 2 of this
15 document. And could we look at item 2.
16 Q. You were asked by my colleague Mr. Ivetic about the planning,
17 whether you did any planning for the MUP and so on. Now, was one of the
18 tasks of the staff, as envisaged in item 2, to plan, organize, and manage
19 the work and the -- to employ the organizational units of the ministry and
20 the units attached to it in their engagement on the suppression of
21 terrorism in the territory of the -- of Kosovo and Metohija?
22 A. Yes, that's what this article says.
23 Q. So who is doing the planning for the units of the Ministry of the
24 Interior, as far as their actions were concerned --
25 MR. IVETIC: I think the other question was okay but this question
1 goes a little bit too far without showing a foundation for how this
2 witness would know --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, thank you, Mr. --
4 Mr. Bakrac.
5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I withdraw that.
6 Q. General, sir, if you look at paragraph 3 -- if we look at
7 paragraph 3 as far as the work of the staff is concerned, who is the head
8 of staff responsible to for that?
9 A. The way it reads here, to the minister whom he reports to on
10 everything that done, any measures taken and any results.
11 Q. Thank you, General.
12 You were asked yesterday about some maps, some questions about
13 some maps by Mr. Ivetic. We see that the axes of the MUP and the
14 positions of the MUP were marked on those maps as well as the positions of
15 the VJ. Were any other positions marked on those maps, sir?
16 A. Those were decision maps, diagrams, and only the VJ, the MUP,
17 support units, and neighbours were marked on those maps, no one else.
18 Q. What about the enemy?
19 A. Yes, well, that is the paramount thing, isn't it, in terms of
20 planning? You can't plan without knowing where the enemy is.
21 Q. Did you plan also in relation to the Kosovo Liberation Army, since
22 you actually marked them on your maps?
23 A. I don't know -- well, it's impossible, simply impossible.
24 Q. Thank you, General.
25 General, sir, can we please have P2591. This is an exhibit that
1 Mr. Stamp was showing you. This is entitled: "Analysis of the 37th
2 Motorised Brigade," which is a brigade that you discussed.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at general
4 weaknesses and flaws and then there are these bullets, number 4, please.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see that.
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. We see that it says: "According to our assessment in Kosmac and
8 Cicavica, the number of the units and men involved in relation to the
9 results that were achieved was not adequate, or rather, the activities
10 covered a large area with relatively negligible effects in terms of
11 crushing the Siptar terrorist forces."
12 So my question if we look at this particular bullet point and the
13 analysis, you have large-scale forces and negligible effects in terms of
14 destroying the Siptar terrorist forces. Would that be an example of
15 disproportionate use of force?
16 A. No, I don't think you could term it that way and I don't think
17 that is actually what is being implied.
18 Q. How would you interpret that, large-scale forces and a minor
20 A. There are a lot of different factors that affect this situation,
21 it's a very complex area, it's a wooded area. The enemy's familiar with
22 the ground. They are fortifying their positions. They are using guerilla
23 tactics and it's very difficult to crush and destroy terrorism. We've
24 known that for a long time and unfortunately this is proving true now
25 again over the last couple of years.
1 Q. General, I only have a couple of questions left for my
2 re-examination. Mr. Stamp showed you P2808 and the register number was
3 455-1 or the file number. And he asked you about the register and about
4 the topics that were covered and whether each topic was assigned a
5 number. My question: 411 [as interpreted], is that exclusively in
6 relation to fighting the Siptar terrorists or were there other documents
7 that were covered by that number?
8 A. There were other documents that were covered by that number too.
9 Q. What about this file number? If we look at the number, can we
10 tell immediately which organ is in charge of that?
11 A. Yes, each organ at the corps command had a certain number of
12 documents and these registers and numbers that went with those.
13 Q. If I said 455 to you, which organ would that be?
14 A. That is the operations organ in the corps command.
15 Q. Thank you very much, sir. Speaking of this document, P2808, in
16 order to dash right through it, I don't think there's any need for us to
17 bring it back on the screen. I'll ask you a very simple question. What
18 about this clause about armed non-Siptar population, where was that taken
19 from in order to be used in this particular document?
20 A. This is an order by the Pristina Corps commander and this clause
21 in paragraph 2, tasks for the corps, was taken from an order by the 3rd
22 Army commander.
23 Q. Were you allowed to change that clause in any way?
24 A. No, we weren't.
25 Q. More about that, 5D1284, our next exhibit. First of all, item 2,
1 paragraph 2. Paragraph 2, it says "tasks," or rather, "task." Can you
2 please read the first sentence and tell me whether this, in fact, shows
3 that there is resubordination or perhaps something else.
4 A. "The 243rd Mechanised Brigade with BG 2.2, Combat Group 2.2,
5 Combat Group 21, the 57th Border Battalion without the 2nd Border Company,
6 the 60th Military Territorial Detachment Vitina and a Fagot anti-tank
7 guided missile system battery shall take up positions in the area of
8 responsibility and organize defence of the following task: In coordinated
9 action with the 175th Infantry Brigade and 549th Motorised Brigade and
10 armed non-Siptar population through decisive defence of the state border,
11 prevent raids of NATO forces along the following axes ..."
12 Q. Does this not show that this armed non-Siptar population was, in
13 fact, resubordinated?
14 A. No.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I mean, it's just another series of leading
16 questions, Mr. Bakrac.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour. I meant
18 no ill. I really didn't. I have two more questions left. I will do my
19 best to make my next question a not-leading one.
20 Q. General, can you please look at 8.4, page 9, and please tell us
21 what the abbreviation stands for. The top of the page, please, 8.4.
22 There is an abbreviation there. Can you please tell us what it
24 A. At 8.4 we see an abbreviation, that's right, and its expansion
25 would be: Anti-nuclear, chemical, biological security.
1 Q. All right. Now my question: Who in the defence ministry would be
2 looking into issues to do with decontamination, which particular body?
3 A. Civil protection, forces of the defence ministry.
4 Q. Thank you. And now 5D300, please.
5 Do you recognise this document?
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 2 displayed
7 as well. This is the federal defence ministry, local organ, Pristina
8 defence administration. Page 2, please.
9 Q. It says head of administration, Petar Ilic. Do you know and what
10 was his position?
11 A. Yes, yes, he was administration head for defence, organ of the
12 federal defence ministry, in Pristina, yes, that's right, administration
13 head in Pristina, which is in Kosovo and Metohija.
14 Q. Which forces was he in charge of?
15 A. He was in charge of civil protection and civil defence forces.
16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just to save time, we
17 also have 5D301, corroborating this.
18 Q. And my question is this: These civil protection, civil defence
19 units are units of the defence ministry. Who was in charge of arming them
20 and who was in command?
21 A. The federal defence ministry was in charge of that, and they were
22 their superiors through their own local organs, branch offices,
24 Q. Thank you very much, General. My very last question is related to
25 3049, it's a document, P, P, it's an OTP document, P3049. My learned
1 friend Mr. Stamp yesterday was showing you paragraph 3 and he put
2 something to you about this armed non-Siptar population. He suggested
3 that this was a minor action to lift the blockade of a road. We're
4 waiting for the document to turn up. Can you please look at paragraphs 3
5 and 4 and tell me whether this is just about lifting the blockade of a
6 particular road or is this a more comprehensive action.
7 Paragraph 3: "I hereby decide ..." Please, paragraph 3 and 4 of
8 item 3: "I hereby decide ..." So what Mr. Stamp said, this was only about
9 lifting the blockade of a certain road, is that true?
10 MR. STAMP: I did not say that's only about lifting a blockade. I
11 said the primary task was to clear a road.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Well, that's it, I suppose. General, sir, Mr. Stamp has just put
14 in a reaction. Can you tell us whether clearing the road was, in fact,
15 the primary task.
16 A. No, you can tell if you look at this that stage 1 is supposed to
17 go on for one day, crush the Siptar terrorist forces in Lebane
18 village-Glavnik village, Prvi Tunnel-Stari Trg, and in the following
19 sectors Cica Glava, Carevica, Vasiljevo, and the next task would be to
20 clear the road and get to the line Gornje Prekaze-Prelovac.
21 Q. Thank you very much, General. If we could please go back to the
22 previous page. General, is there any assignment that is being given to
23 the Pristina Corps in item 2?
24 A. No, we don't see any in this order.
25 Q. Is that the reason why we don't see the phrase "armed non-Siptar
1 population" here?
2 A. Precisely.
3 Q. Thank you very much, General.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
6 JUDGE BONOMY: It should not go unsaid that you ended as you began
7 on yet another leading question.
8 Questioned by the Court:
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stefanovic, when it came to issuing weapons to
10 the civil defence and civil protection, where were these weapons issued
11 from; in other words, where were they stored?
12 A. We're looking at forces of the federal defence ministry, civil
13 protection and civil defence units and local offices of the ministry were
14 in charge of providing weapons for them and I'm sure these weapons were
15 stored in storages or warehouses, storage facilities.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Controlled by the Ministry of Defence or controlled
17 by the VJ?
18 A. As far as I know, Your Honour, this was under their control.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: So your evidence is that the Ministry of Defence
20 had a stockpile of weapons to issue to people in civil defence and civil
22 A. Yes, that was their responsibility.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand it's their responsibility from your
24 evidence. I just want to be absolutely clear that they also had physical
25 control over the weapons before they were issued.
1 A. No, that's not what I meant. Physical control, they certainly did
2 not have. They certainly didn't have forces to provide security for the
3 warehouses, but the weapons were theirs and under their control. As for
4 physically where they were in some storage facility, that I cannot say at
5 this point in time.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: You know, my first question to you on this subject
7 was: "When it came to issuing weapons to the civil defence and civil
8 protection, where were these weapons issued from; in other words, where
9 were they stored?"
10 A. Your Honour, Mr. President, in the storage facilities where
11 military equipment and weapons are stored.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And my next question was: "Controlled by the
13 Ministry of Defence or controlled by the VJ?"
14 Now, it's a very simple question, and your answer was: " ... this
15 was under their control," which meant I had to go further.
16 Now, for the avoidance of any doubt on this subject: Under whose
17 control were the weapons, under whose physical control were the weapons
18 before they were issued to members of civil defence and civil protection?
19 A. Your Honour, Mr. President, it was in separate facilities,
20 facilities that were singled out. It was under the physical control of
21 the army and the police probably -- well, it couldn't be anybody else,
22 they don't have physically the forces to provide security for that.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: And how did the police come to have any involvement
24 in this?
25 A. Maybe I wasn't quite clear. Maybe they had something in their
1 warehouses too. I'm talking about the army. I don't know what the
2 situation was in the police.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps it's a translation problem, but if it is
4 I'm surprised that no one has leapt up to tell me. Your answer is
5 recorded in English as: "It was under the physical control of the army
6 and the police probably," and that's why I asked you how the police come
7 into this. Now, can you explain that, please?
8 A. Your Honour, Mr. President, I said "probably." I'm not sure about
9 that. Maybe, maybe yes, maybe no. I do apologise. I wasn't very
10 specific on that.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stefanovic, that completes your evidence.
12 Thank you for coming here to give evidence. You're now free to leave the
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that was our last
18 witness, and we hereby complete our evidence.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: As in the other cases, I think subject to tidying
20 up the situation in relation to exhibits, and you will require to review
21 your exhibits and submit one final motion for admission of any outstanding
22 exhibits from the bar table for us to consider. Now, when will you do
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we will do that as soon
25 as possible. I will look into this with our assistants. You know why?
1 Because we need to check what the situation is with untranslated exhibits,
2 and when I receive information on that I will address you - of course if
3 you allow me to - in order to --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I think at this stage we need to have a specific
5 time for you to submit this motion, and it should be submitted even if
6 certain exhibits have not been translated and you can make clear which
7 ones have not been translated and you can then file each as it is
8 translated. We will of course take account of how long that takes.
9 It's -- there's no open-ended provision here for you to arrive with your
10 translations; they have to be done pretty quickly.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, experience has taught me
12 that it's better for you to give me a dead-line rather than to have me set
13 a dead-line for myself, so ...
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, somebody's learned something from this
15 trial. That dead-line then will be the end of next week, and even if an
16 item is not translated it must be included in that. You have this one
17 final opportunity, and one only, to submit documents that you wish us to
18 consider. The reason that the end of next week is of some significance is
19 because we've also instructed Mr. Visnjic to get his translations sorted
20 out by then as well so that we can spend some time resolving this now when
21 we have time, rather than later when we will not have so much time.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you. At least for
23 once I was right, I would have given a shorter dead-line. Thank you.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: So we note that the case for the fifth accused
25 rests, subject to a motion for admission of exhibits from the bar table,
1 which will be submitted by next Friday, which is the 15th of February.
2 I think the best plan now is that we take the break at this stage
3 and we resume at 11.00 -- oh, sorry, yes, my mistake. We will resume,
4 yes, at ten past 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Before the presentation of evidence begins,
8 Mr. Lukic, there is one matter that we've been discussing which I would
9 like you to give some thought to. In the case of each of the other
10 accused, we've allowed time after the close of their evidence to tender
11 exhibits to tidy things up. Now, it may well be at the end of your case
12 there will be some exhibits, that that situation will be unavoidable, but
13 for the vast majority of your exhibits it should be possible to have them
14 tendered to us much earlier than that. The reason in your case is
15 obvious, because we are -- we are anxious to get to the point of
16 decision-making as soon as possible in the interests of everyone. We do
17 not want people in custody unnecessarily, and therefore our objective is
18 to be as expeditious as is consistent with fairness.
19 So we will invite you to give some indication a bit later on about
20 how much time you would need to tender a comprehensive motion if you are
21 intending to do so, and we will make an order about that. It's not of
22 immediate concern, and therefore we can get on with the evidence just now,
23 but sometime before the end of this month I think the position should be
24 made clear to all concerned.
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. So who is your first witness?
2 MR. LUKIC: Our first witness is Dragan Paunovic.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, I just need one clarification from you.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
7 MR. LUKIC: Before the witness starts. We provided this witness
8 with a binder of documents - there is nothing written on those documents -
9 if something goes wrong with the system, and if you think that he
10 shouldn't be using that, I mean hard copies, we should advise the witness
11 not to or whatever you decide, but we provide -- we think that it's --
12 sometimes can speed up the process.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: I agree with you entirely, I see no problem with
14 that, as long as they are clean copies identical to what's in e-court.
15 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, that's the case.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's helpful, it actually even avoids the
17 interruption when the usher has to transport the documents across the
18 courtroom. It's a helpful move. Thank you.
19 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. -- oh, no, we're not at the
21 afternoon yet. Good morning, Mr. Paunovic.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good day, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to
24 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. May I start now?
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: You will now be examined by Mr. Lukic, counsel for
8 the accused Mr. Lukic.
9 Mr. Lukic.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 WITNESS: DRAGAN PAUNOVIC
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Examination by Mr. Lukic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Paunovic.
15 A. Good day.
16 Q. Could you please state your name for the record and could you tell
17 us briefly about your career.
18 A. My name is Dragan Paunovic. I was born on the 12th of November,
19 1970, in Kraljevo, the Republic of Serbia. I completed the secondary
20 police school, and I've been a member of the Ministry of the Interior
21 since the 3rd of July, 1989. I had different duties within the Ministry
22 of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, and I would like to point out
23 some more significant ones. I was deployed in the police administration
24 of the Ministry of the Interior on the 1st of November, 1998, and I was
25 assigned chief of the secretariat of the Ministry of the Interior in
1 Kraljevo on the 27th of February, 2001, and I held that position until
2 November 2003.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please call up in e-court
6 Q. As we're waiting, you have it in front of you. Tell us, please,
7 when did you join the PJP units of the milicija, which later became the
8 PJP units of the "policija," police, when did that happen?
9 A. As for the PJP, I first joined them in 1993, which coincides with
10 the actual establishment of these units.
11 Q. Could you now please have a look at this exhibit, P1508.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What kind of a document is this, please?
14 A. We see a here document a which was called basis for the formation
15 of special police units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of
17 Q. And the document is dated?
18 A. The 1st of August, 1993, and it was adopted by the Ministry of the
19 Interior, the public security sector.
20 Q. On page 2 under (b) we have a heading: "Purpose, tasks,
21 conditions, and mode of use of PJMs."
22 Could you tell us what these basic tasks are, these basic security
23 tasks conducted by the PJMs?
24 A. As for the members of the special police units, professional and
25 responsible members of the police were selected for these units, those who
1 had outstanding professional capabilities. Their age was up to 35, or
2 rather, up to the age of 45 for officers. Tasks of the members of the
3 PJMs were numerous, and I am particularly going to refer to the ones
4 mentioned here which fully reflected the nature and role that they had at
5 the time. What I can particularly highlight on the basis of my experience
6 is the engagement of special police units in maintaining stable public
7 order and dealing with any disruptions in public order.
8 Number 2, bring into custody persons who are crime suspects, and
9 when there is a danger that they will use fire-arms and endanger innocent
10 civilians, that is to say, other citizens.
11 Q. Can we conclude -- and the other tasks as envisaged in this
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 These parts of the police, were they specially trained in
16 comparison to the regular police force?
17 A. Yes. In addition to the fact that they were chosen on the basis
18 of their high moral and professional qualities, members of the PJMs, or
19 rather, PJPs were also trained for different types of activities that they
20 undertook. They were particularly trained for situations when there were
21 disruptions in public law and order, situations that had to do with
22 bringing into custody dangerous crime suspects, and exercising control
23 over situations where there was a danger of threats of sabotage.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at 3 -- page 3 under (v) now,
25 control and command, in PJMs --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, is there some subtle distinction between
2 the initials PJP and PJM?
3 MR. LUKIC: At the beginning it was milicija, that's what's M.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, so the units remained the same and the title
6 MR. LUKIC: I'll ask the witness.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Paunovic, you heard what His Honour was interested in. Was it
10 just the name that changed? Did everything else remain the same
11 functionally and structurally when the name was changed from milicija,
12 police into policija, police?
13 A. Your Honour, that's the same in terms of their characteristic and
14 tasks and function, these were the same units; the only thing that was
15 changed was the name.
16 Q. Is it --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: When was that?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think this happened sometime in
19 1995 or 1996, but I'm not entirely certain about the date.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
21 Mr. Lukic.
22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. At the time did the overall structure of the MUP change its name
24 from milicija to policija?
25 A. [No interpretation].
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the witness's
3 JUDGE BONOMY: What was your answer to that question? It was
4 missed by the interpreter.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. The
6 answer was: That's right.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I asked you to go to the section marked as (v), control and
10 command, that's page 3, in the PJM.
11 MR. LUKIC: In English it's (c) because it's alphabetic
12 discrepancy. In Cyrillic, v comes after b; in Latin, c.
13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Paunovic, who was in a position to order PJP
14 or PJM units to be assembled and to get involved on a task?
15 A. As for the assembling of PJP units, or rather, issuing an order
16 for their involvement, this was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
17 minister of the interior or another person authorised by the minister of
18 the interior.
19 Q. Who is in command of PJP units?
20 A. PJP units or detachments of those PJP units were under the command
21 of detachment commanders of these PJP units and officers of lower-ranking
22 units within those detachments, lower ranking in terms of organization,
23 for example, companies. PJP detachment commanders were responsible to PJP
24 commanders [as interpreted].
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Just for the transcript, it was
2 misrecorded, the plural was used in the other part.
3 Q. Can you please again say who the PJP detachment commanders were
4 responsible to?
5 A. The commanders of PJP detachments, which implies that there were
6 more of those detachments, were responsible to the PJP commander.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And what did the commander command? Was that a
8 unit or was it some other component?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, are you asking me about
10 the detachment commander or the overall PJP commander?
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm confused about the distinction between a
12 unit and a detachment. Can you explain that?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I say "unit," I'm using this in
14 a general sense, generic sense. When I say "unit" I mean both company and
15 detachment; it could mean either one of those. I am trying to avoid
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, you can understand that we will need
18 some more elaboration on the command structure.
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Just to make it clear, in the Serbian -- there is some discrepancy
21 in English obviously, since the English language does not distinguish
22 between "komandir" and "komandant," both are interpreted as "commander,"
23 so this gives rise to some ambiguity. From the bottom level up, all the
24 way up to the minister, what is the command structure of these PJP units?
25 A. Yes, if I may, Your Honour. The structure was as follows. The
1 basic units of the PJP units were platoons. These numbered up to 25
2 members. The platoons, as a rule, would comprise three squads of up to
3 ten police members or less. Several platoons of the police, three to
4 four, sometimes even six, would make up a PJP company. A PJP company had
5 its commander and deputy commander. Several companies of the PJP would
6 make up a PJP detachment. There was several such detachments. These
7 detachments had their own command structure comprising the detachment
8 commanders and his assistants. Their number was determined based on the
9 size of a detachment in the sense of its strength. All of the police
10 detachments would answer to one "komandant," the "komandant" of all PJP
11 units, who is in the Ministry of the Interior.
12 Q. And who did he answer to?
13 A. He answered personally to the minister of the interior.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for clarifying that.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a pleasure, Your Honour.
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. In order to show how certain relationships worked within the
19 police, can you tell us what the discrepancy was in the salary of a member
20 of a PJP, for example, on the one hand, and the sort of salary that they
21 would have received as a regular police officer.
22 A. For as long as members of the PJP units were carrying out the
23 duties that were assigned to them, there was a discrepancy in relation to
24 their regular salary, what it would have been, in the sense of an
25 increase, the amount being no more than 0.42 per cent.
1 Q. Thank you. Mr. Paunovic, you can speak slowly but without the
2 interruptions. The important thing is for us to make a pause between my
3 questions and your answers, since we're using the same language. I know
4 it's more difficult like this to interrupt your own train of thought.
5 A. I understand.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, there isn't a translation issue in line
7 2 of page 43, it is 0.42 per cent, is it, less than one-half per cent?
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. I was surprised as well. I
9 clarified this with the witness before.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have Exhibit 6D681
13 brought up in e-court.
14 Q. Mr. Paunovic, have a look, please. Do we see there who is
15 dispatching the PJP to Kosovo and Metohija on a mission?
16 A. Yes, based on this document we can clearly see that the Ministry
17 of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, or rather, the minister who
18 previously authorises these sector head is dispatching members of the PJP
19 so that they might carry out security missions.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have, please, 6D682.
21 Q. If we look at this document, does it show who is dispatching PJP
22 units to Kosovo and are there any discrepancies in relation to the
23 previous document or does the procedure appear to be the same?
24 A. The procedure is entirely identical in terms of who dispatches the
25 unit and who is responsible for it. I think the only difference between
1 the two documents is their destination.
2 Q. We'll not be opening up all the documents but just for the record
3 the following documents were envisaged: 6D683, 6D684, 6D685, 6D686,
4 6D687, 6D291, and I think that should do, at least as far as this topic is
6 Mr. Paunovic, based on what you know, how long were the shifts
7 when units or parts of units were dispatched to Kosovo and Metohija?
8 A. The time a unit would spend on a security mission that it was
9 dispatched to would depend on the nature of their mission. In most cases,
10 however, it would be up to 40 days.
11 Q. Do you know how many police members were in Kosovo and Metohija
12 after the signing of the agreement with the OSCE and before the start of
13 the air-strikes?
14 A. We were informed by our superior officers of everything that was
15 going on that had to do with our work and the way we went about our work.
16 I remember that at the time there was the so-called Vienna Agreement which
17 allowed for the presence of up to 10.000 policemen, that was before the
19 Q. Was that agreement upheld? Was the figure mentioned complied
21 A. There were general instructions in an order from our superiors to
22 uphold all the provisions and clauses of this international agreement and
23 the commitments that we undertook. Therefore, as far as the area of
24 responsibility of my unit was concerned, this was fully complied with. I
25 assume the same situation prevailed in other units elsewhere.
1 Q. Thank you. Would you please tell us what your status was when,
2 for example, you were sent on a mission as a PJP member?
3 A. As a member of a PJP unit that was dispatched on a certain
4 mission, my unit and other units were to provide support and assistance to
5 whichever secretariat had territorial jurisdiction over a certain mission
6 in the Ministry of the Interior whereby -- I mean the police. And they
7 were entirely responsible for carrying out any missions in that particular
8 area. We would, as a rule, be attached for better efficiency.
9 Q. When you were sent to Kosovo in 1998, did the chief of the SUP in
10 the territory where you were sent, was he in a position to issue any
11 orders to you?
12 A. I as the company "komandir" or deputy company "komandir," not,
13 that was not the case.
14 Q. But did it ever happen to you that you received any orders from
15 the MUP staff, the MUP staff in Kosovo?
16 A. Well, absolutely not for the same reasons that I explained
17 earlier. I received my orders from my "komandir," commander.
18 Q. Thank you. We said that the police personnel who were members of
19 the PJP received additional training, so could we please have Exhibit
20 P1215 on our screens.
21 So could you please tell us who issued this document and what is
22 the date on it.
23 A. The basic document was issued by the Ministry of the Interior and
24 it is entitled: "Activities of the police members in case of armed
25 attacks." And it was issued by the head of the public security sector in
1 the Ministry of the Interior, and the cover letter from the police
2 administration and the MUP that we can see precedes this very document
3 forwarded this document to the units that are listed here in the text, and
4 this was done by the assistant minister of the interior,
5 Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic.
6 Q. So was this sent to people so that they take some action and also
7 for their information?
8 A. Yes, information, analysis, and then implementation in the field.
9 Q. Thank you. Was there any difference in the training of various
10 groups within the PJP, do you know anything about that?
11 A. In light of the fact that the members of the PJP were engaged in
12 various tasks that I mentioned above, and that included tasks related to
13 public law and order, bringing into custody perpetrators of dangerous
14 crimes, and also fighting terrorist and sabotage activities, members of
15 the PJP did receive training for each of these tasks separately, in order
16 to be as well-prepared as possible to perform them up to the highest
17 possible standard.
18 Q. And was there any additional training in the PJP for those units
19 that were colloquially termed "OPG" [Realtime transcript read in
20 error "OUP"], do you know anything about that?
21 A. Yes, I do know something about that. I know that in early
22 December 1998, or rather, in January 1999 --
23 Q. I do apologise, just for the transcript, transcript
24 records "colloquially termed OUP," in fact it should read OPG, that's
25 operational pursuit groups?
1 A. Yes, operational pursuit groups.
2 Q. Thank you. So from 1997, in what PJP unit did you serve and what
3 duties did you perform there?
4 A. I was the deputy company commander that was made up of police
5 personnel from the secretariat of the interior in Cacak and Kraljevo. My
6 company belonged to the 35th Detachment, headquartered in Uzice, and it
7 was under the command of Lieutenant-General Branko Prljevic. He was the
9 Q. He was lieutenant-colonel, not lieutenant-general, is that right,
10 because --
11 A. Yes, that's right, he was a lieutenant-colonel, not a
13 Q. What duties did you perform in the actual fact?
14 A. As I've already indicated, I was the deputy company commander and
15 I was answerable for a part of that company, those people who had come
16 from the Kraljevo secretariat of the interior, which was where I served
18 Q. You explained to us the strength of the company.
19 A. May I --
20 Q. So how many people were there in your company?
21 A. My company - and I think that the other companies, too - would
22 number 100 to 110 police officers at the most.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please now have Exhibit 1D401
25 in the e-court.
1 Q. What is this document, Mr. Paunovic, or rather, what is the
2 regulation or the ordinance that was published here in the Official
3 Gazette that we see here in front of us?
4 A. This regulation is entitled: "Rules on the police uniform and
5 insignia." It was issued pursuant to Article 19 of the Law on Internal
7 Q. And can we see from this document who actually passed this
9 A. Yes, we can see it quite clearly, that was the minister of the
11 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us what uniforms were worn by
12 PJP units in certain periods of time, if you can remember?
13 A. Police personnel wore uniforms that were strictly regulated, their
14 type was strictly regulated, and they were adapted to the weather and the
15 actual tasks.
16 Q. And could you please tell us what the colour was?
17 A. It depended on the field conditions, but the dominating colours
18 were camouflage blue and camouflage green patterns worn in the field.
19 Camouflage blue was primarily used in built-up areas, and the camouflage
20 green pattern in the field.
21 Q. I do apologise. If you haven't concluded, please continue.
22 A. All types of uniforms had visible, clearly visible, insignia
23 indicating that the personnel belonged to the Ministry of the Interior of
24 the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Serbia flag, and other emblems
25 that made it very easy to distinguish police personnel from other
2 Q. Apart from the basic parts of uniform, did PJP members have any
3 additional parts of uniform that were regulated?
4 A. I think that this regulation and other regulations clearly defined
5 the additional uniform parts and equipment to be used by PJP members. I
6 would like to single out in particular protective vests, combat vests,
7 protective helmets, helmets with protective eye plates, and other
9 Q. In 1998 was there a practice that was introduced for PJP members
10 to use ribbons of various colours as a marking and why was this done?
11 A. At the beginning the terrorist activities that were launched in
12 Kosovo and Metohija involved members of the terrorist units who used as
13 their tactics dressing up as army and police personnel. And dressed in
14 army and police uniforms, they would commit various crimes and atrocities
15 in an effort to create an impression that those were committed by Ministry
16 of the Interior personnel. On the other hand, it was very dangerous for
17 the Ministry of the Interior personnel too. If you allow me, I can give
18 you an example, a striking example, in which a police officer, a
19 policeman, by the name of Perovic, and he was in fact an officer in the
20 police in the Pec secretariat of the interior, he lost his life in an
21 action in which the terrorists, members of the terrorist organizations,
22 used police uniforms.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 6D667 in
25 e-court --
1 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry, I'm not clear whether these ribbons
2 were used. I mean, I'm not finding that out for the answer, and why was
3 this done? I mean, that's ...
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I explain?
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. The question you were answering was whether
6 there was a practice of using ribbons of various colours, but you didn't
7 actually tell us whether there was. All you did was tell us about a
8 terrorist atrocity.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand your question and
10 I will answer if you allow me, Your Honour. I was talking about the
11 reason, the motive, behind this fact that members of the regular police,
12 or rather, their leadership decided to use additional items, i.e.,
13 ribbons, to make a clear distinction between the regular police units and
14 the terrorist groups that wore police uniforms as a rule when they
15 perpetrated their crimes. And now motivated by this unfortunate incident
16 in Pec and probably other crimes that had been committed, the leadership
17 of the PJP decided that the police personnel should distinguish themselves
18 from others and identify themselves in other ways by using those ribbons,
19 and they would wear them on their right or left shoulder in accordance
20 with the plan that was adopted.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Paunovic, thank you for your explanation. We have in front of
23 us the document number 6D667, and could you please tell us what is this
24 document and what is the date on this document.
25 A. This is the plan for marking the MUP and VJ units in the periods
1 between the 25th and the 31st of July, 1998, where for each date it is
2 designated in which manner the MUP and VJ members are to wear those
3 ribbons, the colour is also designated, in order to be able to distinguish
4 themselves from the other unlawful units and to identify themselves. So,
5 for instance, we see in item 2, that's the 26th of July, 1998, it was
6 indicated that -- it was designated that on that day a red ribbon should
7 be tied to the left shoulder-strap and a white ribbon to the right
8 shoulder-strap. The very next day and in the days that followed, the
9 model changed.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have in e-court
11 Exhibit --
12 Q. And could you please keep this document in front of you and we
13 will have P1596 on our screens, please. We see it here now, we see the
14 photograph. On the basis of the table that you have in front of you, can
15 you tell us when this photograph was taken?
16 A. I notice that the members of the police who are on this photograph
17 wore on the day when the photograph was taken a white ribbon on the right
18 shoulder, or rather, a red ribbon on the left shoulder, on the basis of
19 which I conclude that the photograph was probably taken on the 26th of
20 July, 1998, when according to the plan of marking the MUP and VJ units it
21 was stipulated that the members of the police should wear red ribbons on
22 the left shoulder and white ribbons on the right shoulder.
23 Q. Thank you. What about the colour of uniform? In this photograph
24 it is camouflage blue. Does that tell us something about the year when
25 this was taken? Let's distinguish between 1998 and 1999.
1 A. Yes, I can confirm the year of 1998, when the uniforms also
2 correspond to the said time-period, 1998.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the colour of the uniform of the man lying
5 on the front of the photograph?
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Could you explain that through the uniform and additional gear,
9 A. Most of the members of the police in this photograph -- or may I
10 say all of those who are standing and who are crouching in the second row
11 and also one policeman who is lying on the ground, they're all wearing
12 camouflage blue uniforms with additional gear, namely, a protective vest
13 or a bullet-proof vest. I take the liberty of saying that there were
14 three members of the police, there is a difference, one of the policemen
15 is different. He is wearing a green camouflage combat vest.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you saying that these are not all police
17 officers or policemen?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I am saying that these are
20 JUDGE BONOMY: It's just there's a reference in the English
21 translation at one point to saying that there are three members of the
22 police, but it's maybe -- it's maybe corrected by you saying one is
24 Is this your own company that we're looking at?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should we start from the end then?
1 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no, is this your company? No.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not my company.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: From considering the document which we were looking
4 at, do you know which VJ units were the subject of the plan?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that I cannot give you a
6 relevant answer to this question. I assume that it's all the units of the
7 Army of Yugoslavia.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: We've had senior officers of the army say that this
9 never happened with soldiers. Are you actually aware of seeing soldiers
10 in the field or in urban areas with ribbons on their shoulders?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I saw members of the army who
12 wore ribbons.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 Mr. Lukic.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Paunovic, just in order to clarify, you were in Kosovo and
17 Metohija only in 1998 and you do not know, or rather, do you know anything
18 about the wearing of ribbons by the Army of Yugoslavia in 1999 or are you
19 only testifying about 1998?
20 A. I can only testify on the basis of the events that I took part in
21 and that fall in the period from the 15th of July, 1998, until the
22 beginning of October 1998.
23 Q. Thank you. Just in relation to this photograph, I think that
24 there is something that remained unclear, although you did try to
25 explain. His Honour Judge Bonomy asked you about the man who was lying
1 down and who was closest to the camera, and you -- and what is he wearing
2 that is green and is that part of police gear or police equipment?
3 A. In this photograph I see two members of the police who are lying
4 on the ground. One of them is lying directly on the pavement and the
5 other one is reclining on him. Only this member of the police who is
6 lying directly on the pavement has a combat vest of a member of the police
7 that is used with another type of uniform. And in this case I assume that
8 he was wearing it because such combat vests were not made in camouflage
10 Q. Thank you.
11 A. Otherwise they do constitute part of the gear worn by the members
13 Q. Thank you. What about the personal appearance of policemen, was
14 that something that attention was paid to in the period of 1998 when you
15 were in Kosovo and Metohija?
16 A. Throughout the implementation of tasks, starting from the officers
17 from the secretariats of the Ministry of the Interior who sent us out on
18 our assignments, and then there were soldiers -- there were officers of
19 the Ministry of the Interior and our command of the detachment, they all
20 gave us compulsory instructions confirming our obligation to wear uniforms
21 and the rest of our gear in accordance with the documents regulating that.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please call up in e-court
24 Exhibit 6D768.
25 Q. Whose document is this, sir, Mr. Paunovic?
1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We need the bottom of the document,
2 actually, in order to be able to discuss this, we need to see number 1.
3 Q. Whose document is this and what's the date?
4 A. It's a document of the Ministry of the Interior, or rather, the
5 staff of the Ministry of the Interior dated the 7th of July, 1998.
6 Q. In paragraph 1 what is stated that people should take care of in
7 terms of their conduct?
8 A. Yes. It is the clear instruction stated in that paragraph, that
9 it is indispensable to ensure full control over the members of the
10 ministry every day, demanding that they carry out their tasks
11 professionally and responsibly.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 A. Which was an obligation that we conveyed to our subordinate
14 officers, or rather, this is an obligation of which every member of the
15 Ministry of the Interior was made aware of.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] 6D989 is the document that I'd like to
17 have called up in e-court now, please.
18 Q. Since you have the document in front of you we can start and you
19 can tell us about this. What kind of a document is this?
20 A. Here we see a document which is called: "Rules on the armament of
21 authorised officials and employees with specific duties," adopted by the
22 minister of the interior on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior
23 regulating arms of the members of the Ministry of the Interior, the type,
24 nature, et cetera.
25 Q. In practice, did people comply with these rules?
1 A. Yes. In practice there was strict compliance and members of the
2 police could not have any other weapons or equipment except for what was
3 envisaged in this document.
4 Q. Thank you. In the police units, Mr. Paunovic, did you have
5 vehicles that you got from the army; and if so, where and when did you get
6 them, if you know?
7 A. I think that the provisions of a certain agreement, the Vienna
8 Agreement, if I may say, the armies of the republics of the former FRY --
9 Q. Vienna or Dayton Agreement?
10 A. [No interpretation].
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not hear the answer.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Well, thank you, it's based on --
14 A. I assume that the Vienna Agreement is based on Dayton Agreement.
15 So members of the armies of the former republics of the SFRY were allowed
16 to hand over part of their equipment to the police units, which is what
17 these units actually did. As far as I know from that time, there was a
18 control body also consisting of representatives of the armed forces of all
19 the republics of the former SFRY that verified the implementation of this
20 decision on the ground.
21 Q. Do you know whether --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: That answer doesn't really make any sense, with
23 respect. What do you mean by the armies of the former republics of the
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I?
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. All the former republics
3 of the SFRY, the newly established states then, had their respective
4 armies and equipment that was used by the said armies. When the armed
5 conflicts were over in the territory of the SFRY, I assume that it was the
6 Dayton Agreement and the accompanying agreements that envisaged inter alia
7 reductions in personnel levels of armed forces and the equipment used by
8 each and every one of the armed formations of these states.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I for one do not follow this, Mr. Lukic. If
10 you want to explain it further -- I can't believe that the weapons held by
11 Croatia or Slovenia would have any relevance to the MUP in Serbia, but if
12 I'm wrong about that, it would need to be spelled out clearly because I
13 find it difficult to see which is the relevant former republic of the
14 SFRY. Maybe it's --
15 MR. LUKIC: The only connection --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Maybe it's Bosnia, I don't know.
17 MR. LUKIC: The only connection is that by this agreement it was
18 decided that some armament can be transferred from the armies to the
19 police, so I think that's what this witness is trying to tell us.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but --
21 MR. LUKIC: But definitely for sure that the armament of Croatia
22 or Bosnia never ended up in Serbia.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: But at the stage we're talking about, Serbia is
24 part of a federation and the federation has control of the army. So are
25 you saying that that federation was handing over some of its weapons to
1 the police?
2 MR. LUKIC: I'm saying nothing. I can ask the witness.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no, no. This is what I'm not following, so it
4 needs to be clarified.
5 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. [Interpretation] I am sorry, Mr. Paunovic. Sometimes some things
7 that are clear to you require additional clarification for us who are
8 outside that. So could you please explain to Their Honours what it is
9 that we were trying to explain through this question.
10 A. Of course, if you allow me. I am sorry if I will be speaking at
11 too great a length, but I will try to be as specific as possible. When I
12 interpreted the provisions of the agreement, I meant the decision of
13 principle that existed, not at any point in time did I claim - and I am
14 strictly against that - that any equipment or weaponry from other
15 republics landed in the hands of the members of the police of the Republic
16 of Serbia. What I'm saying is that in accordance with the provisions of
17 that agreement, members of the Army of Yugoslavia transferred part of
18 their equipment to the members of the Ministry of the Interior of the
19 Republic of Serbia.
20 Q. Thank you. Just one additional question. Was the Croatian army,
21 for instance, allowed to transfer a part of its equipment to the MUP of
23 A. Well, I assume that that is so pursuant to the same provisions.
24 Q. Thank you. And now as for these vehicles that were obtained from
25 the Army of Yugoslavia, were they modified in any way, do you know?
1 A. Well, in most of the cases we were forced to reinforce the
2 vehicles and to put additional protection on those vehicles, in light of
3 the fact that the structure of those vehicles as it was did not provide
4 the adequate level of protection against the rounds and explosives used by
5 terrorist groups.
6 Q. And could you please tell us, how did you reinforce them, how did
7 you do that? How did you strengthen those vehicles? Did you personally
8 take part in any such efforts?
9 A. Well, since this had to do with security and safety of the police
10 that were under my control, I did take some initiative personally and I
11 asked the employees in a factory where I worked to weld additional steel
12 plates on to the vehicles that we used and also special impregnated rubber
13 that then protected us against large-calibre rounds and against mines and
14 explosive devices that were used.
15 Q. Thank you. Anti-terrorist actions in 1998, were they carried out
16 together with the army and why?
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you move on to deal with that question, just
18 for the sake of being completely clear about this. Included in the
19 equipment which was transferred by the VJ to the MUP, was there weapons?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can testify about the
21 vehicles that I received, not about the weapons.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, do you say you don't know?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I know about the
24 vehicles that I received.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Paunovic, let me repeat my question. Were
3 anti-terrorist actions --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm very sorry, Mr. Lukic. There is one other
5 matter just to be completely clear about this.
6 You've told us about reinforcing the vehicles. Did you also
7 change the colour of the vehicles?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that vehicles were just
9 reinforced by using those steel plates and impregnated rubber.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: So you did not change the colour?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, in our case we did not do that.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: What colour were they?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were green, for the most part
14 they were green.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
16 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Let me repeat for the third time. Were the
18 anti-terrorist actions in 1998 carried out together with the army and why?
19 A. In early 1998 the terrorist groups that we targeted in our
20 activities were very well-equipped. They had various types of equipment,
21 and they used various types of equipment to reinforce their positions or
22 fortify their positions, which made it impossible for the police to carry
23 out the tasks they had been given using the equipment that they in turn
24 had at their disposal, so that without the VJ troops and without their
25 equipment, their hardware, we were unable to carry out the tasks that we
1 were set. If I -- if you consider that this is relevant, I can perhaps
2 describe the kind of equipment that we found after we carried out some
3 anti-terrorist actions just to illustrate what we were facing.
4 Q. Yes, please do go ahead.
5 A. In some anti-terrorist actions, or rather, once they were over, we
6 would find modified passenger vehicles, such as Golf cars, Wartburg cars.
7 The parts of the vehicle behind the driver and the passenger seat were
8 removed in order to create space where machine-guns were then mounted,
9 large-calibre machine-guns, heavy machine-guns, and other weapons,
10 recoilless rifles and in some cases mortars, too. Those vehicles had been
11 modified in other ways too for use in the field. They were equipped with
12 chains so that they could move over rough ground, off road. As for their
13 colour, they were mostly painted camouflage green and there were also some
14 reinforcements put in to protect additionally the -- those who drove.
15 Q. Let me just clarify one thing for the record. It says bestrzajni
16 recoilless rifles in the transcript. What was the term that you used?
17 A. I used the term recoilless gun or recoilless rifle, which
18 indicates that this is a large-calibre weapon.
19 Q. Did members of the KLA use mines and explosive devices?
20 A. Yes, quite a few members of both the police and the army lost
21 their lives to mines or explosive devices.
22 Q. Did they build fortified facilities in the territory that you
23 passed with your unit?
24 A. In almost all cases once the anti-terrorist actions were over, we
25 would come across fortified facilities that were abandoned and were
1 already derelict because we had been there, and those were fortified
2 bunkers, connecting trenches used for the communication between those
3 bunkers, and bunkers in villages, and there were also other ways to
4 fortify their command posts or positions where their members were
6 Q. Thank you very much. Now let me ask you something. I don't know
7 whether you know from your personal experience how the KLA members used
8 the civilian population.
9 A. Yes, I know that members of the terrorist units treated brutally
10 both the Albanians and the police. The Albanian people were abused in the
11 following way. Albanian civilians were used in a number of ways, and I
12 can describe.
13 Q. Yes, please do go ahead.
14 A. One, in light of the clothes worn by ethnic Albanian women, those
15 were wide trousers and wide skirts, females were used to conceal some of
16 the equipment and also weapons. The police personnel refrained from
17 searching women unless female police officers were present, and in a
18 number of cases it was -- this practice was abused and some equipment,
19 weapons, were removed from areas in this manner.
20 The second method that was used in fact field and that we found to
21 be quite striking was reflected in the presence of teenagers and women
22 accompanied by children moving through the areas where police were
23 deployed and they were gathering information about the police in that area
24 and relayed the information to those who had forced them to do that.
25 There was yet another method that was quite striking. Immediately
1 before anti-terrorist activities would begin, a certain number of women
2 with children, with children, would suddenly leave the areas that we were
3 supposed to enter and by their hysterical behaviour tried to confuse the
4 police members there and to postpone the launching of the anti-terrorist
5 actions, probably their intention was to buy some time for the terrorist
6 groups to enable them to leave the area that was the focus of the interest
7 of the anti-terrorist actions.
8 I can give you other methods, but I think that this is quite
10 Q. Let me ask you just this: Did you see any men carrying children
11 in their arms?
12 A. Well, it would happen after the end of some anti-terrorist actions
13 that I would come across groups of civilians and one could notice the
14 unnatural behaviour. You would see men who appeared to be of military
15 age, fit for military service, carrying children in their arms and their
16 mothers or other women who were present there were not carrying children.
17 Q. Did you have any personal knowledge or were you able to learn
18 whether the children carried by these men were not actually their
20 A. Well, I can testify about an event in the village of Lodza near
21 Pec where an Albanian woman approached the man who was carrying her child
22 in his arms and took the child away because that was her child and she
23 wouldn't allow her family to be manipulated in any way.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think it is now time for our break.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Paunovic, how many women were in the PJP?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In combat units of the PJP there
3 were no women, but there were women serving in the regular police units
4 and they were carrying out other tasks. And we would then call them in
5 those situations when searches of female persons had to be carried out;
6 and when it was not possible to do so, we never searched those women at
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. We need to have a break at this stage,
9 that will be for an hour. Could you please leave the courtroom with the
10 usher, and we shall see you again at quarter to 2.00.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.47 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
16 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Paunovic, may we continue?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. My mistake, I started a question and then I never finished it.
20 Were you a member of the PJP all the time or did you do some other work
21 from 1993 when you joined until October 1998?
22 A. Well, I actually carried out other work all the time, regular
23 police work in fact, at various posts. And now as for the work in the
24 PJP, I only did that when the PJP unit got together to carry out those
25 specific tasks.
1 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you a specific question
2 regarding some actions that you took part in, and I would now like to ask
3 you what the preparations for an action looked like.
4 A. Could you please be more specific. Do you mean operational
6 Q. Before anti-terrorist actions, who talked to whom and so on?
7 A. Well, depending on the nature of the mission we were given, before
8 every anti-terrorist action, we carried out the necessary preparations.
9 The elements of those preparations are as follows. From my detachment
10 commander we received detailed instructions about the number, type,
11 character of the task and the axes along each of the units participating
12 were to take, to move along, and the assessment of the forces and
13 equipment or assets of the terrorist units that we faced. In situations
14 where we carried out our actions together with the Army of Yugoslavia
15 units, we received instructions from military officers, those that were
16 issued to our superior officers in accordance with the chain of command
17 and were in turn relayed to us.
18 An element of the preparation for the task was familiarization
19 with topographic maps where our positions and the axes of movement were
20 marked and so were the other elements that maps of this nature must
22 Q. As far as you know, who made the maps that you used in the course
23 of anti-terrorist actions?
24 A. The symbols that were marked and other elements that contained
25 those maps lead me to believe and to conclude quite conclusively that they
1 were made by members of the VJ because we did not have the requisite
2 capabilities or knowledge to do that.
3 Q. Once you received your task, what happened then?
4 A. Once the task for my unit was defined, I further elaborated the
5 task with the units subordinate to me and their officers in accordance
6 with our capabilities, or rather, if it was possible with other members of
7 the police. The motive behind it was to explain as accurately as possible
8 the nature of the task and what was expected of each and every police
9 officer regarding this task.
10 Q. What were your targets once you launched an anti-terrorist action?
11 A. We opened fire only on those targets from which fire was opened on
12 our units or other citizens who happened to be in that area or if they
13 endangered them in any other way.
14 Q. As for terrorists, did they destroy the facilities where they were
15 before retreating? Were you able to see that for yourself?
16 A. In most cases in the preparation stages of our anti-terrorist
17 actions, we would encounter situations where some facilities had been
18 booby-trapped, where mines had been laid on some roads and other devices
19 were placed there in order to make them impassable as obstacles. And
20 quite often on open ground the brush and the wheat would be set on fire,
21 and that slowed down the advance of the police.
22 Q. In the action at Banja, in the direction of mine, did they set
23 fire to something else apart from the wheat-fields?
24 A. Well, this was a peculiar action. Immediately before the action
25 we were forced to postpone it because a large area, a large wheat-field,
1 was set on fire, and then we came across some houses and barns that had
2 been set on fire too. They were on the outskirts of this village, right
3 behind this wheat-field that had been set on fire.
4 Q. And how -- what did the search of the terrain look like once you
5 pushed the terrorists back? How did the police move? What would happen?
6 A. Once we entered a certain area, either built-up area or not
7 built-up area, the police would carry out a search operation of the
8 terrain in order to locate the equipment, weapons, and other hardware used
9 by terrorist groups and to ascertain that no terrorists had been left
10 behind or that there were no civilians there who might need some
12 Q. In your actions, did you use vehicles or did you walk?
13 A. As we prepared for the action, up until the very moment when the
14 action was launched, if security allowed that, we would use vehicles to
15 transport the personnel up until the point where it was no longer safe to
16 do so.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 A. And then we were forced to move in accordance with the rules of
19 tactical combat movement, in other words, on foot.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 6D700 up on
22 Q. And I would like to ask you to look at this document from the
23 Pristina Corps. The date is the 24th of September, 1998, if you could
24 look at page 3 of this document. I'm interested in item 5.1, the title
25 is: "Tasks."
1 Are you familiar with this axis of movement and did you, in fact,
2 participate in this action?
3 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, since we don't have a translation of
4 this document, I wonder if the witness could read out the relevant passage
5 into the transcript just for the purpose of clarity.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
7 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I was just informed there is
8 no translation for this document, then I'll ask the witness to do so.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Could you please read this paragraph where you
10 recognise the axis of movement.
11 A. Well, I read.
12 "BG 125-1, MTBR to be engaged to provide support to MUP to crush
13 the DTS," I assume that that would mean sabotage and terrorist groups --
14 Q. Forces.
15 A. Yes, forces. Should I go on?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. "BG-125-1 to be engaged on the axis village of Likovac, village of
18 Donje and Gornje Obrinje, village of Trdevac with the following task: To
19 support the attack of the 3rd OD PJP, JSO, and a PJP company Kosovska
20 Mitrovica, crush the sabotage and terrorist forces and take control of the
21 following sectors: The village of Likovac, the villages of D. and G.
22 Obrinje, and then continue or press on with the attack and in concerted
23 action with BG-15-2 and BG-243-2 take control of the village of Trdevac,
24 and then inflict the greatest possible losses by not allowing them to pull
25 out from the encirclement."
1 Q. Did you take part in this action?
2 A. Based on this paragraph, or rather, from this paragraph I know of
3 the village of Likovac and that more or less corresponds with the date
4 when I was there, the 24th of September, 1998.
5 Q. And what was the designation of your detachment?
6 A. I suppose that would be the 3rd OD PJP.
7 Q. And, in fact, what was the designation?
8 A. It was the 35th Detachment of the PJP.
9 Q. Thank you. On this occasion did you encounter any civilians
10 nearby as this action was carried out?
11 A. No, not in the village of Likovac.
12 Q. And did you come across any discarded weapons and equipment of the
14 A. Yes. In that village we found quite a lot of weapons, weapon
15 parts, and equipment that had been discarded.
16 Q. And in the course of this action, did you see or hear of any
17 massacres against civilians that were perpetrated?
18 A. No, but what I did notice is that when the action started six
19 members of a company from Kosovska Mitrovica, police members, they were
20 killed, either by mines or explosive devices or by snipers.
21 Q. Thank you. Generally speaking, who took part in anti-terrorist
22 actions in the fight against the KLA?
23 A. Members of the police or members of the PJP and of the territorial
24 police units from that area, both the active and the reserve force, and
25 the Army of Yugoslavia when it did participate.
1 Q. Did you ever see any village guards involved in these actions,
2 local police forces, formations that were not part of the PJP or the VJ?
3 A. No. Only members of the Ministry of the Interior were there,
4 members of the PJP, because those were the units specially trained for
5 these activities.
6 Q. And the VJ, right?
7 A. Yes, needless to say the VJ too.
8 Q. I'll try to avoid asking leading questions.
9 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for
10 interrupting my learned friend, but there's one thing that didn't make it
11 into the transcript. The witness said: Yes, needless to say the VJ too,
12 when they were involved.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Was anyone involved in the action apart from the units that were
16 marked on the action maps?
17 A. No, no one else.
18 Q. Did you at any time while carrying out an action notice the
19 involvement of any paramilitary or parapolice units?
20 A. No.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 6D692.
22 Q. Can you please look at page 1, item 8 of this document sir. I
23 will read it out loud. This is a document from the Pristina Corps command
24 dated the 7th of August, 1998, item 8 reads: "Combat group 15-3 supports
25 the attack of the first MUP detachment in crushing the sabotage and
1 terrorist forces along the following axis:
3 Do you recall on or about that date, or rather, after that date
4 you were involved in this action? Do you recognise this axis of movement
5 that is described here?
6 A. If I look at the date of this document, if I look at the date of
7 this document, I recognise this location called Lodza and I recognise the
8 axis of BG 15-3 under item 8 because I certainly was in that village.
9 Q. What we see here is the 1st MUP Detachment. At the time your own
10 was the 37th, right?
11 A. The 35th. My detachment remained the 35th Detachment throughout.
12 Q. Thank you. On that occasion did you see any police generals in
13 the area?
14 A. Of all the situations that I faced on the ground, there was just
15 this once in a village called Radoste or Gedza which was behind Djakovica
16 that I noticed General Obrad Stevanovic and I never observed any other
17 high-ranking officers in the area.
18 Q. Did you ever hear about anyone issuing an order to kill civilians
19 or to wreak mass destruction against civilian property or did you perhaps
20 yourself ever issue such an order?
21 A. No, I never issued such an order nor did I ever hear anybody else
22 issue such an order. Quite the contrary, in fact. Throughout I was
23 receiving orders which I always passed on to my subordinates to the effect
24 that our role and our mission was to preserve the safety of persons,
25 civilians, and property on the ground, be it Albanian or another
2 Q. It's police officers that we are looking at, members of the PJP.
3 Do you think they need to have a thing like this explained to them or is
4 this something that was part of their training?
5 A. Most police members who were in my unit, the unit that I was in
6 charge of, had completed a two- or four-year police course, police
7 school. The principle of safe-guarding lives and property is a
8 fundamental moral undertaking to each of those who attend it, the police
10 Q. Do you remember any situations where you came under fire from an
11 area that had plenty of civilians in it?
12 A. I think it was in Lodza of all places. At one point during an
13 anti-terrorist activity, at a certain distance we observed a rather small
14 group of civilians and soon after realized that we were under fire from
15 that direction. We were unable to clearly identify the source of this
16 firing which put our lives at risk. On the other hand, we were facing a
17 group of civilians. Therefore, we decided to take shelter behind some
18 buildings up there that could be used for the purpose and to wait for the
19 firing to stop before we got on with any of our activities, regardless of
20 what else was happening on the ground. The intention behind all of this
21 was to make sure that we in no way put at risk the lives of those
22 civilians that we came across.
23 Q. Thank you. Let us try to sum this up. What was the goal of all
24 the activities undertaken by the police and the VJ within the framework of
25 their anti-terrorist actions?
1 A. As the name itself suggests, anti-terrorist activities were aimed
2 at eliminating terrorist activities. In areas where there was no
3 terrorist activity, there was no need for any sort of counter-terrorist
4 activity by the VJ or, indeed, the police.
5 Q. Do you perhaps know whether in the summer of 1998 there were any
6 terrorists in cities?
7 A. I do know that most of their activities focused on non-built-up
8 areas in the summer of 1998, the nearby woods or vacant areas,
9 non-built-up areas. I'm not sure if this matters or not, but their
10 favourite choice was blocking roads connecting towns in Kosovo and
11 Metohija, whereby they made sure that people couldn't get on with their
12 lives as usual in terms of travelling from one town to another. There
13 were a number of cases in which we were forced to clear the roads
14 connecting some of these towns.
15 Q. All right. Based on your personal experience, and you were in the
16 area yourself, was it necessary to have anti-terrorist actions back in
17 1998 in order to make sure that people could get on with their lives?
18 A. Not only was this necessary. I firmly believe that this was our
19 responsibility and not just to make sure that people could get on with
20 their lives but also in order to safe-guard their right to life.
21 Q. Did you know exactly which specific areas members of the KLA were
22 holding in the summer of 1992 [as interpreted] before the launch of these
23 anti-terrorist activities?
24 A. You're asking me about 1998, right?
25 Q. Yes, that's right, it must be a misprint.
1 A. Based on my work on the ground and based on information I received
2 from my superiors, or rather, my officers in the summer of 1998, most of
3 the non-built-up areas throughout Kosovo and Metohija were entirely in the
4 hands of these terrorist groups. As for what I myself experienced while I
5 was in the area, the entire area behind Kosovska Mitrovica and between
6 Kosovska Mitrovica and Pec where one finds the villages of Srbica and
7 Rudnik and then from those villages towards such villages as Klina, which
8 is consistent with the area that is very often colloquially described as
9 Drenica. So all of this area was fully under the control of these
10 terrorist groups.
11 Q. Do you know that as these anti-terrorist actions were in progress
12 there were any high officials of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia staying
13 in Kosovo? Do you know if someone was perhaps spending all of their time
14 there and do you know if perhaps there was someone else who would
15 occasionally show up in Kosovo?
16 A. I told you in one of my previous answers the one high-ranking
17 officer that I noticed at the time. As for any others, I mean
18 high-ranking officers of the MUP or the VJ, I can only assume that they
19 would travel to the area in order to tour their own units that had certain
20 areas that they were responsible for.
21 Q. Just another question. Do you know about this incident involving
22 a Red Cross vehicle, the International Committee of the Red Cross, during
23 the action at Likovci, and do you know about this vehicle stumbling upon a
25 A. My officers did tell me that heavily fortified terrorist units in
1 the area had laid mines and explosives that were meant to wreak havoc on
2 members of the police and the VJ; as a result of this, an ICRC vehicle was
4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Paunovic. For the time being these were
5 my questions, and now you will be examined by one of my colleagues from
6 one of the other Defence teams or perhaps cross-examined by the
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.
9 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Aleksic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Paunovic. I only have a
12 handful of questions for you. First of all, tell me what the commander of
13 your company in the 35th Detachment was called.
14 A. The commander of my detachment was Mr. Branko Prljevic.
15 Q. Thank you. You've told us that already. I was asking about the
16 commander of your company because you said that you were deputy
17 commander. The company was from Kraljevo, from Cacak, so yes, can you
18 tell us that?
19 A. Of course I understand what you mean, and of course I do apologise
20 for misunderstanding your question the first time around. The commander
21 of my company was Kresimir Krasic.
22 Q. Maybe this is something that I missed. How many companies were
23 there that were part of the 35th Detachment in addition to yours?
24 A. I can't tell you exactly, but I assume five or six.
25 Q. Thank you very much. I'd like to ask you now a number of
1 questions about some documents that Mr. Lukic has been showing you.
2 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have 6D692 brought up
3 for our benefit. Thank you.
4 Q. You have a hard copy in front of you so my question is: When is
5 first time you set eyes on this document?
6 A. I assume that I saw the document as I was being proofed for the
7 execution of this activity.
8 Q. Is it your testimony that this is a preliminary order by the corps
9 command? At the bottom of the document you have the addressees or the
10 potential addressees. Would I be right in saying that there is not a
11 single MUP unit on that list that was supposed to have this delivered to
12 them and can we not see an incoming stamp of the command of the 15th
13 Armoured Brigade, certifying that this document was actually taken
14 delivery of at the command of the 15th Armoured Brigade?
15 A. That's what I see on this document too.
16 Q. Oh, there is an interpretation of this. Am I right if I say that
17 this preparatory order, as stated in the heading, is indeed a preparatory
18 order and does the second paragraph say that the commanders of the units
19 that are being issued a task through this preparatory order should come to
20 the forward command post in order to receive this task?
21 A. I cannot give an answer with any certainty.
22 Q. I'm just asking you to read it.
23 A. Just tell me which part.
24 Q. Preparatory order is the heading, not the first sentence but the
25 second one: "On the 8th of August," et cetera, et cetera.
1 A. "On the 8th of August, 1998, at the forward command post in
2 Djakovica all officers and commanders of the brigades are to assemble
3 (125th and 549th mtbr) and commanders of BGs engaged in supporting MUP
4 forces (BG-52-Radonjicka Cuka, BG-549-3, BG-125-3, and the 52nd bVP) in
5 order to receive tasks ..."
6 Q. Thank you. Is there any mention of any officers of any PJPs who
7 were supposed to come and receive tasks from the command of the Pristina
8 Corps? Am I right if I say that there is no such thing and that this is a
9 preparatory order?
10 A. On the basis of this paragraph that I've read out, the only thing
11 I can notice is what I can quote, "that are being engaged in order to
12 support MUP forces," that is where I recognise the MUP forces.
13 Q. Thank you. My colleague Mr. Lukic asked you something about
14 paragraph 8 of this document, and you said that the first detachment of
15 the MUP was your detachment, although another document it was the 3rd and
16 in fact it was called the 35th. Isn't that right?
17 A. Yes. My detachment was the 35th Detachment throughout in terms of
18 the official nomenclature of the ministry, but if we look at the date and
19 the locality of Lodza that I am aware of and I assume that this coincided
20 with the activity that I took part in.
21 MR. LUKIC: I would object, although the witness answered, but my
22 question was whether he recognises the axis from this order, not whether
23 his unit was marked as the 1st. He cannot know in which way military
24 marks PJP units.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what the witness has said so far is that he
1 assumes that this is related to something he participated in because of
2 the reference to the locality of Lodza.
3 Is there anything else in paragraph 8 that suggests to you that
4 the MUP detachment referred to there is the 35th?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is only the location and the date
6 that is an association in my mind.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 Mr. Aleksic.
9 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Now I would like to ask for the following document to be called up
11 in e-court: 6D700.
12 Q. Mr. Paunovic, you had this in front of you and I have the same
13 question: When did you first see this order of the command of the
14 Pristina Corps?
15 MR. LUKIC: I would object to this one also. We need first
16 foundation whether he ever saw this one and then when he saw it for the
17 first time.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we know he's seen it, Mr. Lukic, it's already
19 been referred to in the evidence. So there's nothing wrong with this
21 MR. LUKIC: He confirmed only that he recognises the axis from
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but he's seen the document, he saw it today,
24 and if that's the first time, he can tell us that. That's all the
25 question is.
1 MR. LUKIC: Okay. I apologise.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.
3 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please answer. When did you first see this document?
5 A. I cannot say with any degree of certainty whether I first saw it
6 then or now, but according to the elements I see now, I recognise the axis
7 that I mentioned a few moments ago, the one in 5.1.
8 Q. I accept that you said this on the basis of the axis, but you see
9 there is a major difference whether you saw something for the first time
10 nine years ago or this week.
11 A. Yes, precisely, that is what I am saying now. I cannot claim with
12 any degree of certainty that I actually did see it nine years ago.
13 Q. Okay. Thank you. Am I right yet again when I say that Mr. Lukic
14 quoted 5 and 5.1 to you, tasks, namely, that the 125th Motorised Brigade
15 of the Army of Yugoslavia was receiving a task and it consists of the
16 following, and you don't have to read it again. However, is this task
17 being issued to the 125th Motorised Brigade? Is that the unit involved?
19 A. On the basis of what I see, the task is issued to the 125th
20 Motorised Brigade that should be engaged in order to support the MUP
21 forces to --
22 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you something that is not
23 related to documents. Today during your testimony you said on page 65,
24 lines 15 and 16, in response to one of the questions put by Mr. Lukic that
25 you received detailed from your commander of the 35th Detachment of the
1 PJP. In relation to that I would like to ask you: How is it that you
2 received these tasks? Was it verbally? In writing? What was the
3 procedure involved of planning from your level to the platoons, that is?
4 A. In most cases I received tasks from my detachment commander
5 verbally, with the support of documents that he had and that could have
6 been given to me as an officer of a lower organizational unit. These
7 documents were excerpts from topographic maps and possibly, possibly,
8 certain descriptive documents.
9 Q. Thank you. On the same page you say, in continuation, when the
10 units of the Army of Yugoslavia took part in some actions, officers of the
11 VJ gave instructions to your superior officers and then they would pass
12 that on to you. What is the source of this knowledge of yours?
13 A. In planning the action that was taking place on the outskirts of
14 the built-up area, the town of Podujevo, facing the mountain of Bajgora, I
15 was present myself at the command post of the officer of the Army of
16 Yugoslavia together with my detachment commander, which is where the
17 military officer was issuing instructions to my detachment commander and I
18 was present and I was listening to all of that. After that my detachment
19 commander spelled out in more specific terms the tasks that he received.
20 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell me if you can remember who this
21 officer of the Army of Yugoslavia was or from what brigade he came if you
22 don't know his name and surname?
23 A. What I can remember is that his rank was that of
24 lieutenant-colonel, that I assume that he led an armoured mechanised unit
25 because I noticed quite a bit of armoured mechanised equipment in the
1 area, which is not to say that indeed he was in charge of that kind of a
2 unit, and I think that his last name starts with a P, now was it Petkovic
3 or something like that ...
4 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now I would just like to call up yet another
5 document, 6D667. Since you have the document before you, do you know what
6 the source of this document was?
7 A. When you say "source," do you mean who it is that issued this
8 document? On the basis of what I see here, I cannot see who issued this
10 Q. Just one more question. And when was it that you first saw this
11 document as it is?
12 A. I cannot assert that it's this document, but I saw similar
13 documents in 1998 on the ground. My officers and the detachment commander
14 showed me such documents, and on the basis of such documents I made note
15 for myself in order to take further measures in my units.
16 Q. In relation to that, just one more question. On page 50 today,
17 lines 10 through 20 you talked about the incident in Pec and what the
18 reason for these ribbons and then you said the decision was made by the
19 leadership of the PJP for such and such a reason and in accordance with
20 the plan that was adopted. That means that the leadership of the PJP if
21 not this one adopted similar documents?
22 A. I assume that that is the case because I received instructions and
23 documents from my own superior officer.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions of this
1 witness, Thank you, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I have a
4 question questions as well.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Bakrac:
6 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. I am Mihajlo Bakrac,
7 attorney-at-law, Defence counsel for General Lazarevic. A few moments ago
8 when answering the questions of my learned friend Mr. Aleksic you spoke of
9 a particular action when you yourself were present and you said that this
10 had to do with the mountain of Bajgora. In order for the transcript to be
11 clear, what year was this when this action was carried out?
12 A. When I'm talking about the action that I participated in, it was
13 carried out in 1998, I think in the month of September, August or
14 September 1998.
15 Q. Thank you, sir. You said that you heard an officer, commander of
16 the Army of Yugoslavia, issuing instructions to your commander. Is that
17 an order?
18 A. What I remember now is that the officer of the Army of Yugoslavia
19 was speaking in an instructive fashion to my superiors. I cannot assert
20 that it was an order.
21 Q. Thank you. You said that you received maps for anti-terrorist
22 actions for which you assumed on the basis of the markings on the map that
23 they were compiled by or prepared by VJ officers. Can you explain to us
24 on the basis of what it is that you make this assumption?
25 A. I can assume that and I did assume that on the basis of the
1 following elements: Number one, how the area surrounding a particular
2 location was marked, and later on on the same map it's explained in a
3 legend, where the enemy positions were marked, or rather, the positions of
4 terrorist groups were marked in certain colours and in terms of the
5 thickness of particular lines and so on. If necessary, I can go on.
6 Q. Thank you. Why would that be characteristic of the Army of
7 Yugoslavia? Does MUP mark these things differently?
8 A. The MUP practically doesn't have topographic maps at all and
9 doesn't use topographic maps.
10 Q. When you say "almost does not have them," what does it
11 mean, "almost," yes or no, do they have them? Do they not have them?
12 Please decide on one of these possible answers.
13 A. I did not have them in the course of my own work.
14 Q. Excellent. You said unequivocally on page 70, line 7, that
15 sometimes you participated in actions with the Army of Yugoslavia in
16 actions where they took part in too. You will agree with me that on the
17 basis of this it is unequivocal that you had actions where you
18 participated in anti-terrorist struggle on your own, right?
19 A. In certain activities in certain axes, since my company was very
20 small, I did take part in some of these actions on my own in some
22 Q. Who drew your maps then?
23 A. We received sections of maps from our superior command, but it
24 probably received it -- the full maps.
25 Q. From who?
1 A. From the army I suppose.
2 Q. From the army that didn't participate, is that what you're trying
3 to tell us?
4 A. No.
5 Q. What then?
6 A. What I'm trying to say is the following: In light of the size of
7 my unit which was part of a company, I participated in some anti-terrorist
8 actions, lower-intensity actions, as part of a broader, more comprehensive
9 action that involved other MUP and VJ personnel, but in my small, narrow
10 area of action there was no need for the Army of Yugoslavia to get
12 Q. Are you now trying to tell us that your company never did take
13 part in any anti-terrorist actions without the Army of Yugoslavia,
14 although you did say something different at page 70, line 7, so you have
15 to clarify, which is it then?
16 A. Yes, I will do that gladly, but please present me with clear
18 Q. Are you trying to tell us that your company never participated in
19 an anti-terrorist action without the participation and support of the Army
20 of Yugoslavia?
21 A. No. What I said is that a part of my company --
22 Q. Just a second. Please don't repeat what we've already heard. I'm
23 asking you about your company. Are you now telling us that your company
24 never participated in an anti-terrorist action independently without the
25 participation of the Army of Yugoslavia?
1 A. No, I'm not claiming that.
2 Q. Excellent. Now my question is: When your company did participate
3 without the participation of the VJ, so the company, not your small part,
4 who did your maps for you then?
5 A. In those actions and in more complex actions where larger units
6 participated, we received sections of maps where elements or symbols were
7 marked; and our personnel, the MUP personnel, did not make those markings
8 because they were not trained to do so.
9 Q. But whom did you get the sections from?
10 A. From my company commander and my company commander received it
11 from his detachment commander.
12 Q. I have just one question for you. How were you able to read those
13 maps when you were unable to mark them? Is it possible for one to be able
14 to read the map although one is unable to mark it?
15 A. Yes, well, it's quite simple to do so because we have the legend
16 in the lower right-hand corner and it is possible to recognise the
17 elements that are plotted on to the map.
18 Q. Detachment commander Prljevic or your company commander Krasic,
19 did they have military training?
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the question.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, could you repeat that question, please.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Sir, the company commander Prljevic and, or rather, detachment
24 commander Prljevic or company commander Krasic, were they graduates of the
25 military academy?
1 A. Based on my personal knowledge, I know that Lieutenant-Colonel
2 Prljevic did graduate from the military academy.
3 Q. Sir, thank you.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for this
5 witness, Your Honours.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry to bother you with a bit of a query.
8 Now, on page 83, in line 21, if you kindly read the question -- you can --
9 oh, "You said unequivocally on" -- this is what I'm reading -- "On page
10 70, line 7 that sometimes you participated in actions with the Army of
11 Yugoslavia where they took part in it too. You will agree with me that on
12 basis of this it is unequivocal that you had actions where you
13 participated in anti-terrorist struggle on your own, right?"
14 Answer, you gave the answer at 84, line 2: "In certain
15 activities, in certain axes, since my company was very small, I did take
16 part in some of these actions on my own in some situations."
17 Now, kindly elaborate, what do you mean on your own? I mean, was
18 it a voluntary act or -- and this was without any instructions to you from
19 your detachment commander or your head? How could you do it on your own,
20 because obviously you were a discipline force and I couldn't understand
21 that. If you could very kindly help me with that. Thank you very much.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, I will
23 explain. In all situations I participated as part of a joint, organized,
24 and planned and prepared action in the execution of an anti-terrorist
25 action. When certain anti-terrorist activities were carried out, given
1 the axis that was assigned to me, that was my task, and it was a high-risk
2 axis, my company carried out those actions in coordination with other
3 members of other police units and army units. In other situations the
4 task of my company or of my element of this company would be much less
5 risky in terms of the danger that was involved than the tasks that were
6 given to other police units, such as, for instance, securing a certain
7 road or a route from one location to another where the anti-terrorist
8 action had already been completed and where there was no terrorist
9 threat. In those circumstances, it was enough to merely deploy the
10 members of my unit. There was no need to have support from other units,
11 be it the police or the army.
12 And now I can give you some other situations if it's necessary or
13 perhaps you're satisfied with the examples that I've provided, Your
15 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Thank you.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: These situations that you've described, did they
17 involve extract maps?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, are you referring to
19 the last situation that I described or the other situations where my unit
20 participated without any support?
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Any of them.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, when the task was a
23 simple one and when it involved -- when it was a low-risk task such as
24 securing a road, there was no need for us to have extract maps with all
25 those elements marked on them, while in other situations when we were
1 involved in complex security tasks but which were low intensity tasks in
2 line with the strength of the unit under my command, we always had the
3 extracts of those topographic maps that covered the relevant axis.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 Ms. Kravetz.
6 You'll now be examined by the Prosecutor, Ms. Kravetz.
7 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Cross-examination by Ms. Kravetz:
9 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Paunovic. I want to pick up from what you
10 were just discussing now in response to questions from the Bench. You
11 were saying, if I understood you correctly, in complex or high-risk
12 situations you would carry out anti-terrorist actions in conjunction with
13 other police units and VJ units. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. When VJ units were involved in these actions, would their role
16 typically involve providing fire support to your company so you would be
17 able to carry out the tasks that were assigned to you?
18 A. Yes. The role of the Army of Yugoslavia was to provide fire
19 support, that was in accordance with the rules, and they provided this
20 fire support to eliminate certain fortified positions, such as the bunkers
21 and other fortified facilities, because we didn't have the weapons that
22 were needed to destroy such facilities.
23 Q. So when you're speaking of fire support, what you mean is that it
24 would be support that would require the use of tanks and artillery by the
25 VJ unit, correct?
1 A. I can't say anything about the artillery because I did not see any
2 artillery, but I did see armour of the Army of Yugoslavia.
3 Q. Now, you spoke a little bit earlier about conducting search
4 operations, searching of the terrain. When these tasks -- when you had to
5 carry out these tasks in built-up areas, would the role of the VJ then
6 would be to provide the fire support prior to your company entering the
7 built-up area. Is that how it operated in practice?
8 A. No. The task was set up as follows. The police personnel within
9 the framework of their establishment unit, in compliance with the rules of
10 tactical combat movement, would approach built-up areas and they would
11 encounter one of the two situations. The first situation was when we
12 encountered no resistance from the location we were heading to, and we
13 could simply pass through the streets of that town or village or to carry
14 out searches of certain areas or houses in accordance with the law. So
15 that was the first situation, when there was no resistance.
16 The second situation was when we did encounter resistance, and if
17 the resistance took the form of small-calibre fire we tried to locate the
18 sources from which this threat was coming and to eliminate it by deploying
19 our own weapons, but the weapons were always of the same power. To
20 illustrate this, we would use the same calibre weapon to eliminate the
21 threat. If somebody fired at us from rifles, we would fire at them from
22 our own rifles.
23 Q. Okay. And if I understood you correctly, these searches in
24 built-up areas including house-to-house search operations?
25 A. No. Actions that involved searching the terrain normally implied
1 searching open areas within those towns and villages, such as streets,
2 roads, and squares. Detailed search operations were only conducted when
3 the circumstances were right, and when I say "circumstances," I mean those
4 actually defined by the appropriate laws.
5 Q. Okay.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: What was the corresponding power against which you
7 used the armour of the VJ?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there were a number of
9 situations in which we came across fortified positions with communicating
10 trenches. Those were concrete bunkers dug deep into the ground with
11 concrete wood and other obstacles, and all of these were connected in the
12 same way, by using a system of communicating channels or passages. Such
13 strongholds were used to open mortar fire on our units.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 Ms. Kravetz.
16 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you.
17 Q. You spoke earlier about an occasion when you recall seeing a VJ
18 commander who was involved in an operation with your company giving
19 instructions to your company commander. In these actions that involved
20 different units from the VJ and the MUP, would the overall commander of
21 the action be the VJ commander of the unit involved? Would he be the one
22 coordinating the action?
23 A. I can't provide a reliable answer simply because my unit was a
24 rather small unit and a less-important one. Therefore, I received most of
25 the tasks from my superior. Aside from the situation that I just
1 mentioned in which I was actually present there with my own commander, who
2 was receiving instructions from VJ officers.
3 Q. Was it generally the case then that your commander would receive
4 his instructions from the VJ commander when involved in joint operations?
5 This was generally the case?
6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, I'll ask the witness to leave if you're
8 going to make a positive objection here, because I do not want the witness
9 prompted. Do you wish to maintain an objection?
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do wish to maintain an
11 objection, because I think this question has already been answered and
12 that's all I wanted to say.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's been explored by you with one particular
14 question, and it's open to the Prosecution to explore the matter further
15 on that basis alone. Ms. Kravetz has not so far departed from the answer
16 you got. She's referred to: "... Your commander would receive his
17 instructions from the VJ commander ...," which is the position the witness
18 has stated throughout.
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Indeed, Your Honour, but I mean I'm
20 not sure if the witness should be asked to leave, but what I mean is -- I
21 don't want to appear to be leading the witness or prompting him what to
22 say. Perhaps it would be a good idea for him to leave for a second, no
23 more than that.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Paunovic, there is a point of law has arisen
25 here. I wonder if you could briefly leave the courtroom while we deal
1 with this.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may, I think the
5 witness said that he doesn't know and that he was only present once, a
6 single time, when his commander received instructions from an army
7 officer, and then he's being asked to confirm that this was a common
8 situation. He's being asked to agree that this was a common thing, if my
9 interpretation of the English is correct, that this was an ongoing
10 practice. If you look at what precedes this, he said: No, I'm aware of a
11 single situation where my commander received instructions, and then it is
12 being put to him that he should now confirm that this was the established
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Kravetz.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I believe this point is not clear. I
16 know my colleague Mr. Bakrac explored it during his cross-examination, but
17 I'm trying -- all I'm trying to establish is if the witness is aware of
18 whether what he witnessed on that occasion was the general practice of how
19 these joint operations were carried out. And I don't believe that what
20 I've asked or what I've put to him is in contradiction with the answers he
21 gave when he was being cross-examined by my colleague Mr. Bakrac.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, I was asking about
23 that one action, Bajgora, that one situation, was it an order, was it
24 instructions. That was all I was asking.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness in examination-in-chief gave a very
1 general answer that when acting together with the VJ we received
2 instructions from military officers that were issued to our superiors and
3 relayed to us. And when Mr. Aleksic explored it he asked on the basis of
4 that answer as a general proposition, and in response got the specific
5 details relating to the event at Podujevo facing the mountain of Bajgora.
6 As matters stand at the moment, the evidence is clearly open to the
7 interpretation that this was a general way in which matters were
8 conducted, and indeed, Ms. Kravetz, that might well have been the
9 conclusion one would draw so far, but your question might clarify it to
10 the advantage of the Defence. It certainly would not be inappropriate for
11 you to ask that question and we shall therefor repel that objection.
12 Bring the witness back, please.
13 It's a matter for you, of course, whether you want to ask the
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE BONOMY: In the circumstances, however, I think you should.
17 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Mr. Paunovic, do you recall the question or should I put it again
19 to you? What I had asked earlier was whether what you had witnessed on
20 that occasion, I think you were referring to an action that took place in
21 the outskirts of Podujevo, if you are aware of whether what you saw there,
22 a VJ commander issuing instructions to your company commander, whether
23 this was the way in which these sort of joint actions generally proceeded?
24 A. All I can speak of is that particular action and what my
25 interpretation of that was, but I can't extrapolate.
1 Q. Thank you. Very well. I'll move on to a different topic. I
2 don't know if you were asked this during your testimony here today, but
3 when you were deployed to Kosovo in July of 1998, which municipality in
4 Kosovo were you deployed to?
5 A. I went to Kosovska Mitrovica.
6 Q. Okay. And you told us earlier that when PJP units were sent on
7 mission they would normally be attached to the SUP of -- that had
8 territorial jurisdiction over the area where they were deployed; that's
9 correct, you recall saying that earlier?
10 A. That's right. That's what I said.
11 Q. And in your case your company would have been attached to the
12 Kosovska Mitrovica SUP during your deployment in Kosovo, correct?
13 A. Or to be more precise, my detachment was so that my detachment
14 commander was in communication with the appropriate officers from the
15 Kosovska Mitrovica SUP, and through instructions I received orders from my
17 Q. You spoke earlier about the OPGs, do you recall speaking about
18 these units, the OPGs?
19 A. That's right.
20 Q. And the OPGs, am I right, were specially trained members of the
21 PJPs which were formed to carry out certain specific actions?
22 A. In principle I agree with what you're saying because that is the
23 same thing I heard, but I have no direct experience of these units because
24 at the time I was carrying out my actions, these units were not yet in
1 Q. Okay. Do you know when they came into existence, when they were
2 formed, these OPG units?
3 A. I assume in December 1998 or possibly early 1999, but this is a
4 mere assumption on my part and I don't know for sure.
5 Q. Okay. Very well. You were asked during your examination-in-chief
6 about the uniforms you wore during your deployment, and I just had a very
7 small question in relation to that. You spoke about the use of combat
8 vests, and I wanted to know the combat vests that you wore in 1998 as part
9 of your uniform, did they have the words "police" written on the back of
11 A. I'm doing my best to remember. I could describe the vest for you,
12 if you like. I think it did actually say "police," but believe me I'm
13 just not 100 per cent positive right now.
14 Q. Okay. And before when the PJPs were called PJMs, did the uniform
15 include a badge or a sort of patch with the word "milicija" written on it?
16 A. I believe that for a time or for as long as the official name for
17 members of the uniformed component of the Ministry of the Interior was
18 still "milicija," we did have patches that were worn on the left upper
19 arm, and just above the patch there was the word "milicija." When the law
20 changed and when as a result the name was changed from "milicija"
21 to "policija," the patches were changed too and now they said "policija."
22 Q. Okay. And this occurred sometime prior to 1998, this change from
23 PJM to PJP?
24 A. That's right.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Do we know more precisely when?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'd really be hard-put
2 to say.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
4 MS. KRAVETZ:
5 Q. You spoke in your evidence about vehicles that you received during
6 your deployment in Kosovo. Did your company or other PJP companies that
7 were operating in Kosovo at the time use APCs as part of -- to -- during
8 their actions?
9 A. No, we didn't have those.
10 Q. And you were asked also about weapons. I don't know if you have
11 given precisely the type of weapons you were issued when you were deployed
12 in July 1998. Do you recall which type of weapons you were issued with?
13 A. Do you want the whole list or just the largest calibre that I
14 actually had in my unit?
15 Q. I was just thinking of the largest calibre weapons that you were
16 issued with.
17 A. The largest calibre that my unit had was the so-called PKT
18 machine-gun M-84, I think.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. It was a 7.62-millimetre. I may have got one of the details
21 wrong, but that was the calibre.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: What vehicles did you have?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, do you want me to list
24 each and every vehicle that we had or just the largest type?
25 JUDGE BONOMY: No, the types, the various types of vehicle.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We had Lada Niva, all-terrain
2 vehicles; we had Mitsubishi Pajero; and Land Rovers. As for larger
3 vehicles, we had TAM lorries 110, that was the type, the make.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 Ms. Kravetz.
6 MS. KRAVETZ:
7 Q. I had asked you earlier about the SUP that you were attached to.
8 It was generally the case that all PJP companies were attached to a SUP in
9 Kosovo, correct?
10 A. Please understanding that I can only talk about my detachment. It
11 was resubordinated to the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP and that implied that my
12 company was part of that as well.
13 Q. So you're not aware of the situation regarding other PJP units
14 that were operating in Kosovo at the time, if they were also attached to
15 the SUP in the area where they were operating?
16 A. Yes, the principle was the same and it applied throughout.
17 Q. Okay. During the conduct of operations, would you generally
18 communicate with the SUP chief in the area where you were deployed to
19 inform him on the progress of the action that you were taking, that you
20 were undertaking?
21 A. Given the fact that I belonged to a unit that was a detachment and
22 the entire detachment was resubordinated to a local territorial unit of
23 the Ministry of the Interior, the role of my detachment commander was to
24 consult and communicate with the territorial secretariat. It wasn't my
25 place because I was only the company commander, which was a lower-level
2 Q. So as a company commander during the course of an anti-terrorist
3 action, would you then be reporting directly to your company commander to
4 inform him of the progress made during the action? Is that how it would
5 work, you would report directly to your company commander?
6 A. Yes, that's right. Your description is very good. I reported to
7 my detachment commander, detachment commander would then proceed in
8 keeping with the subordination system.
9 Q. And if I understood you correctly, then he would relay the
10 information up to the SUP chief of the area where you were operating, the
11 one that you were at -- the SUP chief of the area where you were attached
12 or deployed?
13 A. Again, and I do apologise, I reported to my commander, the company
14 commander, and then the company commander to the detachment commander, and
15 the detachment commander then used this information in order to relay them
16 to the local secretariats or whoever, I really don't know, because that
17 was at a far higher level above my head.
18 Q. Okay.
19 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I don't know if this is a good time to
20 interrupt because I want to move on to a different topic.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: It will be.
22 I would like, first of all, to try and clarify something, though.
23 I have you noted as saying in your evidence-in-chief that although you
24 were attached to the SUP in the area where you were based, the head of the
25 SUP could not give orders to the PJP nor could the MUP staff in Kosovo
1 give orders to the PJP. Is that what you said?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is what I said, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: How does that fit in with resubordination?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was the leader of a low-ranking
5 unit, a company. I received instructions from my detachment commander.
6 Therefore, if the -- if a police unit from the territory wanted any
7 instructions, they would have needed to ask that of my detachment
8 commander and not me directly.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: But could the chief of the SUP give orders to
10 the "komandir" of the detachment?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know. I did not
12 personally witness any such situations.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Paunovic, that brings our proceedings for today
14 to an end, so you will have to return tomorrow to complete your evidence;
15 that will be at 9.00 tomorrow morning in this courtroom. Overnight,
16 between now and then, it is a strict rule that you must have no
17 communication with anyone about any of the evidence or any aspect of the
18 evidence in this case. You can talk about other things, but off limits is
19 any discussion on the evidence.
20 Now could you please leave the courtroom with the usher. We'll
21 see you tomorrow at 9.00.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.32 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day of
1 February, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.