1 Monday, 18 February 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, everyone. Regrettably Judge Chowhan
6 is unwell this morning, but having considered the position we think it
7 best to continue in the interests of justice and in everyone concerned.
8 [The witness entered court]
9 JUDGE BONOMY: That last passage was in the interests of everyone
11 Good morning, Mr. Deretic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: The examination by Mr. Ivetic will continue in a
14 moment. Please bear in mind that the solemn declaration to speak the
15 truth which you made at the outset of your evidence on Friday continues to
16 apply to that evidence today.
17 Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 WITNESS: MILOS DERETIC [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 Examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Deretic. Last Friday I believe we left off
23 after you had just told us about the various radio relays that were in
24 place upon which the Serbian MUP's radio communications were based and you
25 told us about the relay Goles being struck several days before the
1 Pristina SUP building was struck by NATO. If you could tell us the second
2 part of my question which looking at the transcript I did not get
3 answered, what was the immediate effect of the NATO strike against the
4 Goles radio relay as far as the radio communications and telephone
5 communications of the Serbian MUP are concerned on the territory of Kosovo
6 and Metohija?
7 A. Good morning, Mr. Ivetic. As for your question, I can say that
8 Goles was a very important centre or node, not only from the point of view
9 of the needs of the ministry and the communications of the ministry, but
10 also the entire telecommunications system that existed in Kosovo and
11 Metohija, that is to say that this was important from the point of view of
12 radio, television, and broadcasting TV and radio programmes from the point
13 of view of Telekom and the Telekom transmission system and also from the
14 point of view of the needs of the MUP and the Army of Yugoslavia. What I
15 know is the Telekom had its own radio relay node up at Goles where
16 transmission systems were organized towards the Metohija part of Kosovo
17 and Metohija and the Kosovo Pomoravlje. When the transmission facilities
18 at Goles were destroyed, it became impossible to have any kind of
19 communication towards the Pec area, Djakovica and Prizren areas, and also
20 Gnjilane. When I'm referring to these towns I'm referring to their
21 surrounding areas as well. Of course, the radio communications of the
22 ministry were also in that part that was covered by this locality and they
23 were rendered ineffective. So the damage was large-scale.
24 I think that even before the bombing of the SUP of Pristina took
25 place Goles was bombed, and I know that it was Goles this was bombed
1 Mokra Gora and Stari Trg and sometime after that the SUP in Pristina;
2 however, I don't have these exact documents.
3 Q. If I could ask you to clarify, you said with respect to radio
4 communications that the communications of the ministry were also in that
5 part that was covered by this locality and they were rendered ineffective.
6 Which locality or which municipalities radio communications were
7 affected or terminated by the strike on the Goles radio relay?
8 A. First of all, I would like to explain that by destroying the
9 Telekom transmission system, Telekom is the only land-line operator in
10 Serbia, I think that's a well-known fact, isn't it, but the telephone and
11 telegraph links, the entire system, the special telephone system and the
12 dispatch transmission system was organized in the following way: Telekom
13 transmission systems were used, so when they were destroyed there was no
14 longer any possibility to have dispatches sent to these towns and areas
15 that I mentioned a few moments ago. Also, telephone lines were dead,
16 especially when soon after that the SUP building was hit. Then this was
17 rendered impossible too. There were several repeaters that were used by
18 the MUP covering part of the territory of Pristina, the road from Pristina
19 to Urosevac, part of the road towards Pec, and that would be about it.
20 Q. And do you know how many times Goles was struck by NATO forces and
21 were any of the other repeaters that you testified about on Friday, radio
22 relays on other locations that you testified about on Friday, also the
23 targets of NATO air-strikes during the course of the war?
24 A. I don't have the exact records on this, how many times each and
25 every facility was hit, but I do know that during these strikes these
1 locations were constant targets. I said a moment ago that Mokra Gora,
2 Goles, and Stari Trg had been hit. This was sometimes in the second --
3 sometime in the second half of March. Already in the beginning of April
4 all these other facilities were systematically destroyed, one after the
5 other: Butovacki Breg, Mokra Gora, Cabrat, Cviljen. So in the first half
6 of April all the facilities were destroyed, although many of them had been
7 destroyed every time there were NATO air-strikes they were hit yet again.
8 So it's not only that the construction infrastructure was destroyed, it
9 wasn't only the pillars and the actual facilities, but it was the entire
10 infrastructure that was destroyed, the transmission lines with the
11 transformer stations, the reserve feed systems, roads, waterworks. Quite
12 simply, there were several locations that were dead and that was a dead
13 location. If I may add one more thing, up to the present day most of
14 these facilities had not been renovated, which means that the damage was
15 enormous and to this very day this affects the development of Serbian
16 telecommunications in general.
17 Q. Okay. Now could you tell us -- we've previously had evidence in
18 this case about the NATO bombings of the Telekom building in the centre of
19 Pristina. Can you tell us a little bit about this and its effect on the
20 communications system used by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior among
22 A. Well, the Telekom building in Pristina, telecommunications centre
23 2, as it was called, is in the immediate vicinity of the provincial
24 Executive Council building. It was the very heart of these transmission
25 systems that Telekom had organized for the territory of Kosovo and
1 Metohija. That is to say that in this building that is where all the
2 communications within Kosovo ended and then -- it worked both ways, from
3 those places to Pristina and vice versa. As these facilities were
4 destroyed, because we said a few moments ago that Goles caused an
5 interruption of links to Kosovo Pomoravlje and Metohija, so there was only
6 Urosevac and Mitrovica left where some kind of public communication could
7 take place including our own, the MUP communication. However, when this
8 facility was destroyed, this possibility ceased as well, totally.
9 Q. Thank you. Now you've talked about the attacks on the SUP
10 building, the radio relays, and the Telekom building. After that, what
11 form of communications was still available after those specific attacks
12 for the Serbian Ministry of the Interior located in Pristina?
13 A. We should say that from Pristina to the other part of Serbia there
14 was still the possibility of affecting some communications via optic
15 cables and systems that were carried through via that optic cable.
16 Pristina, Nis, and further on towards the rest of Serbia. As for the
17 communication between Pristina and other places within the province, there
18 was no longer any possibility of organizing any communications systems
19 there, those that the ministry could use for its own communications. In a
20 word, the only communication that was possible was via messenger, courier,
21 although that was unsafe too since there were air-strikes all the time and
22 there were attacks by Albanian terrorists. So it wasn't that simple for
23 couriers to reach Pristina from all these other places; however, this was
24 not within my line of work, the organization of courier messages.
25 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you've mentioned this optical cable. Did
1 that continue to be in existence throughout the war or was that affected
2 at any point in time?
3 A. Well, these optical cables that exist, as I've already said, made
4 it possible for there to be communications between Pristina and the other
5 parts of Serbia; however, there weren't optical cables from Pristina to
6 other places in Kosovo and Metohija. This cable was hit on one occasion,
7 too, so even that was interrupted.
8 Q. Let's take a moment to talk about the one instance where the
9 optical cable was bombed by NATO. Did you have occasion to be an
10 eye-witness to the after effects of that strike?
11 A. Yes. When I received the information on this misfortune, together
12 with the technical director of Telekom in Pristina, I went very soon after
13 this happened to the actual site with the intention of carrying out an
14 on-site investigation and analysis of the damages so that we would deal
15 with them and repair things as soon as possible.
16 Q. Can I ask you where this bombing of the optical cable took place
17 and if there were any civilian casualties as a result of this NATO attack?
18 A. This took place at the bridge near Luzane, that is to say the bus
19 travelling from Nis to Pristina full of passengers was hit on that bridge
20 and the bridge was hit as well as this installation, the optical cable
21 that went under the bridge. That's quite simply the way Telekom places
22 its cables.
23 Q. For the record and for information of the Trial Chamber, we'll be
24 submitting a document later. I don't think we have a translation at
25 present, 6D998, a report of the on-scene investigation conducted after
1 this NATO strike, which hit a civilian bus, the Nis Express, on the bridge
2 in the village of Luzane, 1 May 1999; and this report gives details about
3 the attack and about the civilian casualties, both ethnic Serb and ethnic
4 Albanian that were on this bus going from Pristina to Nis. Once we have
5 that translation, we'll submit from the bar table the documents so that we
6 don't have to go through all the gory details with this witness who came
7 to the scene after the fact -- after the attack but before all the
8 civilian casualties had been assisted by the Serbian authorities.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC:
11 Q. If we can move to another area, sir. Following the bombing of the
12 SUP building in Pristina, how often did the MUP staff and the secretariat
13 of interior in Pristina have to relocate during the course of the
14 continued NATO war?
15 A. Well, the locations used by the SUP of Pristina and the staff --
16 well, there were several of them, there were several locations that the
17 staff was at, and at the same time every day, or rather, every other day
18 they would change their location. Also, many organizational units of the
19 Pristina SUP behaved in a similar way because the fear from bombing was
20 great, the precision of NATO bombs that were hitting certain locations
21 within towns were depressing, if I can put it that way. It is with high
22 precision that they could hit any facility. The answer is that these
23 locations often changed where these organizational units were.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, with regards to the relocation sites that were
25 utilised by the MUP staff and with regards to the technology and
1 communications that were available at those locations, was there any
2 parity or comparison to the level of communications during peacetime in
3 regards to communications with the terrain?
4 A. Mr. Ivetic, this question is really not a serious one, is it? A
5 few moments ago we were talking about the terrible devastation that took
6 place over all the telecommunications systems. So really, I mean, the
7 answer can be that it was only the most basic telephone communications
8 that could be introduced and only in those parts of town where they still
9 existed. When the Telekom system that existed it was the telephone
10 exchange that was also destroyed, the only telephone exchange that existed
11 in the city of Pristina. By virtue of that fact, most of the city of
12 Pristina that was covered by this telephone exchange could not have any
13 kind of telephone communications because the cable lines were also
14 destroyed that ended up at the end users. So what we could do from the
15 communications department was to have one or two telephone numbers that we
16 would organize for each and every location where the MUP staff and the
17 organizational units were at that point in time.
18 Q. Thank you. The last area I'd like to ask you about relates to
19 Exhibit P1052, a document which has been used by the Prosecution in these
21 MR. IVETIC: I have a hard copy which I would like to have the
22 usher's assistance to give to the witness.
23 Q. Sir, this document is entitled as a plan of radio communications.
24 Can you tell me looking at this document first of all whether this
25 document originates from the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of
1 Serbia or not? Is this form a form used by the MUP?
2 A. This is certainly not a facility of the Ministry of the Interior
3 because, first of all, MUP does not write "military secrets" on its
4 documents, right? It says "strictly confidential" but not "military
5 secret." And also, I don't know who did the designation of units of the
6 Ministry of the Interior. They are not designated was in the proper way.
7 I'm also not aware of the call-sign Pastrik and also this participant,
8 Joint Command, I don't know who that is. Also this way of marking the
9 frequencies is not one that exists in the Ministry of the Interior, so at
10 this point in time I really don't understand how these links between the
11 organizational units of the MUP and these other users could be organized.
12 Q. If I could ask you to focus on the MUP units that are listed on
13 the first -- on each page, on the document, if you could leaf through the
14 three pages in front of you, and could you tell us are these coded
15 call-signs for these MUP units, are they what are in the business known as
16 1-, 2-, or 3-digit codings or encryptions?
17 A. Well, OD MUP probably means MUP detachment, odred MUP. There are
18 single-digit numbers in every one of these cases, except in this one case
19 where it says the tenth detachment of MUP. So there are a lot of
20 single-digit numbers and only one two-digit number.
21 Q. Now, does this information comport with your recollection and
22 knowledge of the radio call-signs actually utilised by the Serbian MUP in
23 1998 or 1999, that is to say did the call-signs used by the MUP have
24 single-digit numbers, as are reflected in this document?
25 A. First of all, MUP detachments were designated by two-digit or
1 three-digit number, the 21st, the 22nd, the 122nd, the 124th, and so on
2 and so forth. It was never a single-digit number. It was always two- or
3 three-digit numbers. As for the call-signs, we did use Sara, but I have
4 to explain something first, when we were talking about the plan of
5 intentions and using radio telecommunications, we said that according to
6 this plan that is adopted by the state, the MUP and the army use separate
7 frequencies. Since they use separate frequencies, frequency ranges, they
8 can use separate call-signs, although they do not belong to the same
9 units. So I believe that, for example, BG-243.mbr, that that's a
10 mechanised brigade. It says Sara-60. Now, Sara, Sara is the Prizren
11 call-sign of the SUP, that is to say that they used similar call-signs.
12 Then we've got Cegar too. Cegar is something I find familiar. I think
13 that it was used by the Nis detachment of the PJP.
14 Q. Thank you --
15 A. And -- yes?
16 Q. Right. Mr. Deretic, I thank you for your time.
17 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I conclude my direct examination of
18 this witness.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
20 To help me understand your last point, Mr. Deretic, are you saying
21 that because the VJ and the MUP used different frequencies, they also used
22 identical call-signs?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that that might have
24 happened. I did not have any insight into this and I don't know what
25 call-signs were used by members of the military; but I do know, for
1 instance, Sara is one of the regular call-signs that was used by SUP
2 Prizren, that is to say the Ministry of the Interior in Prizren. I don't
3 know what call-signs were used by the members of the army.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you have nothing at all to do with
5 communications between the MUP and the VJ?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there was cooperation there at
7 technical level in the sense of giving technical assistance. Quite
8 simply, I mean the MUP had a trained and equipped team that was involved
9 in the maintenance of repeaters, radio stations, and very often when our
10 colleagues from the technical services from communications we would help
11 them when they would call us. We would help them since there was quite a
12 bit of equipment at the same locations, there was a kind of cooperation
13 there and mutual assistance, too; that is to say that in the field of
14 technical matters in overcoming certain technical problems.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you, though, be familiar with the complete
16 list of MUP call-signs?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we had extracts -- I spoke
18 during my previous testimony about the rules on the regulation of radio
19 telephone communications in MUP, and that the basic directory of the
20 system is an integral part of those rules. This directory provides all
21 the call-signs for all organizational units of the ministry, and it is
22 only natural that I as a person who was involved in that line of work, I
23 did have this basic directory with all the call-signs of the regular
24 organizational units of the MUP.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: And was there no similar directory that you had
1 from the VJ?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, no. Those are strictly
3 confidential documents, and they are not given to other users.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
5 Mr. Ivetic -- sorry, Mr. Cepic.
6 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour. A couple questions.
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Deretic, good morning. My name is
9 Djuro Cepic, and I'm one of the Defence counsel for
10 General Vladimir Lazarevic, who also used to work in communications. You
11 spoke about separate systems, separate frequency ranges; you mentioned
12 also the locations of Butovacki Breg, Stari Trg, and Mokra Gora and you
13 said they were repeatedly destroyed during air-strikes. Are you aware
14 that there existed on those locations also military antennas, military
15 transmission systems?
16 A. Yes, I know that because those were so-called stationary hubs of
17 communications that the Army of Yugoslavia used in organizing their
18 communications for command and control.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you know that they were repeatedly destroyed during
20 the war?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Speaking of the call-signs and you said that MUP had a separate
24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we call into e-court 5D1427,
25 please. Unfortunately, we still don't have a translation.
1 Q. Mr. Deretic, will you please read this. What is this document?
2 A. "Temporary directory of the user of radio relay communications
3 Jablanica" -- sorry, "radio telephone communications."
4 Q. Who issued the document?
5 A. The Ministry of Interior.
6 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the second page.
7 Q. Just to clarify, you already said on page 114 on Friday, what
8 about regular channels? Please read the first three.
9 A. You mean the regular channels? Well, in the first column on the
10 left we see secretariats of internal affairs of Kosovo and Metohija; the
11 middle column are the channels used in VHF; and in the third column are
12 call-signs that the secretariats used within their regional networks.
13 Q. Read the first two.
14 A. SUP Pristina is at 58 VHF, very high frequency, and I used that
15 term, regional channel. So through this channel, 58, Pristina had
16 audibility and communications with its own departments of internal
17 affairs. The general call-sign of all members of radio communications
18 within SUP Pristina is Sitnica, of course with this general call-sign in
19 keeping with the numbering system there goes a one-digit, two-digit, or
20 three-digit numbers, and it can be extended to five digits. The same
21 applies to all secretariats.
22 Q. And read the second one to know the call-sign.
23 A. SUP Kosovska Mitrovica. Can you please scroll up. Thank you.
24 SUP Kosovska Mitrovica, regular channel 52, organized in very high
25 frequency, VHF, the call-sign of all members of the secretariat of
1 internal affairs in Kosovska Mitrovica is Ibar.
2 Q. Mention has been made of this name, Sara, can you explain for what
3 frequency range it was used?
4 A. SUP Prizren used the 46th channel in VHF, and the call-sign for
5 its users Sara. So within a similar system in keeping with the rules of
6 use of radio telecommunications a one, two, or three-digit number is added
7 to this call-sign Sara.
8 Q. And that has nothing to do with the army or its frequencies?
9 A. No.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you been recorded correctly as saying a one-
11 two- or three-digit number is added to this call-sign?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did say that. For instance,
13 the chief of SUP Pristina is Sitnica 1. Most of the other users have
14 three-digit numbers. In some cases a two-digit number is possible in
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Earlier you said something to us about there being
17 no one-digit numbers. What did that relate to? You said MUP detachments
18 were designated by two-digit or three-digit numbers. That's a different
19 situation, is it?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Another situation, for instance, is
21 the name of the detachment. You don't have the 1st Detachment of the PJP
22 or the 2nd Detachment; there is 121st Detachment or the 21st, that's why I
23 said the units of the MUP don't have one-digit numbers of units. This is
24 something different. This has to do with call-signs and radio traffic.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
1 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we get page 3 of this document.
2 Q. Could you please look, Mr. Deretic, at the bottom of the page and
3 read to us this subheading.
4 A. "Coded locations."
5 Q. Read a few of them.
6 A. 0 Duge Njive, 7 Kraljane, 8 Jablanica -- 18 Rznic, 32 -- sorry, 33
8 Q. Thank you. These numbers, numbered signs, in dispatches and
9 communications should indicate these geographic locations?
10 A. I don't really know about that, but it all depends on the way of
11 transmission of certain information. It's possible. Why not?
12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
13 Q. What is the heading here?
14 A. Coded call-signs, code tables.
15 Q. Read these headings that you see in bold and pick a number.
16 A. The subheadings are green, red, yellow, blue, white, grey, each
17 has one column below, and they contain codes for a certain situation that
18 a unit might find itself in. I said something about this on Friday. This
19 way of coding information, this list that contains combined codes,
20 combining colour and number, in view of the situation in our traffic,
21 frequent jamming and problems, this was used for a purpose. 0 combined
22 with a certain colour says we have people wounded; red 2, we are expecting
23 an attack; those are normal codes that I used even in many regular
24 actions. I as chief of administration within the base of the ministry -
25 and we are talking about the period after 2001, when we were organizing
1 security for football matches and similar actions - we used signs like
3 Q. This whole document and all these codes were only for the use of
4 the MUP, correct?
5 A. I suppose so. Can I just see the previous page again?
6 MR. IVETIC: If I could just assist for a second, this temporary
7 directory is available with a translation at P1071.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Which page?
11 A. This page, where the users are indicated. SAJ is an
12 organizational unit of the ministry. I don't know which of the users in
13 sector 2 or sector 1 it could be, I don't recognise this because I haven't
14 seen this document until now. Bozur, for instance, is a call-sign very
15 frequently used by police units. I suppose that this must be one of the
16 police units, Manir 1 and Manir 2 is not familiar, but it looks like a
17 format that the administration for communications defines when such
18 security-related actions are to be put in place.
19 Q. Mr. Deretic, did MUP have its own encryption system?
20 A. The encryption system was within the purview of the state security
21 sector, and if we talk about dispatches sent from Pristina within that
22 unified system at the level of the ministry that was organized for
23 transmitting dispatches, the public security sector transmitted dispatches
24 with a lower degree of confidentiality and are not, therefore, encrypted;
25 they go openly. Transmission of encrypted dispatches was within the
1 purview of the state security sector and the services in the state
2 security sector that were in charge of that, because the public security
3 sector did not have the appropriate equipment to send that kind of
5 Q. Mr. Deretic, would I be right if I said that you had not seen a
6 single dispatch in your practice sent to the Army of Yugoslavia or by the
7 Army of Yugoslavia to the MUP?
8 A. Why would I? Of course I did not. A dispatch with any degree of
9 confidentiality is handed directly to the person to whom it is addressed,
10 nobody else has the right to see it.
11 Q. Am I right in saying that the communication between the army and
12 the police did not go by way of dispatches?
13 A. I don't think it did. I think that in the organization of the
14 telegraph system the army did not have a connection to that system. It
15 must have been effected through letters, correspondence, not dispatches.
16 Q. You mentioned the use of the telephone network that relied on the
17 Telekom. Was it the case that a garrison commander trying to communicate
18 with the chief of SUP would use that kind of telephone network?
19 A. I'm sorry, it wasn't quite clear. Could you rephrase the
21 Q. The telephone network used by the MUP or the regular telephone
22 lines, is that something that a garrison commander in some town would use
23 trying to communicate with the chief of SUP somewhere else?
24 A. I said that the users of this network of the MUP were users who
25 were members of the Army of Yugoslavia -- the MUP of Yugoslavia, that is,
1 and such communication would need to have approval of the administration
2 for communications. On request, the competent administration would have
3 to approve it.
4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Honour. Could we call
5 5D2 -- that is, 218, 5D218.
6 Q. You spoke yesterday about the illegal radio station Free Kosovo.
7 This is a report from the command of the Pristina Corps. Would you look
8 at 1.2, the last paragraph.
9 A. Should I read it?
10 Q. It's a document from end April 1999. Yes, go on, read it.
11 A. It says: "The illegal radio station Free Kosovo continues to
12 broadcast lies about the successes of the so-called KLA in clashes with
13 the Army of Yugoslavia."
14 Q. This document is from late April 1999. Do you know maybe that
15 throughout the whole war period practically the radio -- this particular
16 radio station broadcast its programme?
17 A. I spoke on Friday about colleagues from the telecommunications
18 ministry whose work or duty it was to locate the precise location of this
19 radio station. From what I know, they never managed to do this, and the
20 reason was that the radio station that called itself Slobodna Kosovo, free
21 Kosovo, and broadcast a programme, we heard about what sort of a
22 programme, was a mobile station, it kept constantly changing its broadcast
23 location. I know this because I talked with representatives of those
24 services from the ministry for telecommunications. It was not stationary,
25 the facility, it was mounted on a vehicle and quickly changed its
1 location. The locations were not just a few kilometres apart, but they
2 were --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: You told us all this on Friday. Could you just
4 answer the question, please. Do you know whether throughout the war this
5 station continued to broadcast, yes or no?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if it was throughout
7 the whole war, but I know that it was never pin-pointed, so probably yes.
8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation].
9 Q. Mr. Deretic, thank you. I have no further questions for you.
10 A. Thank you.
11 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
12 questions for this witness.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.
14 Mr. Deretic, I'm sorry to go back to what I asked you about
15 before, but I remain unclear about this. When you were dealing with the
16 numbers of the detachments of the MUP, which I understand are all either
17 double- or triple-digit numbers, are you saying that a call-sign for the
18 detachment of the MUP must have double or triple digits in it?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The call-sign -- actually, I wasn't
20 calling about the PJP detachment call-signs, but just the insignia or the
21 markings of the detachment.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: The problem is that the matter was raised in the
23 context of call-signs. Now, it may be Mr. Ivetic will want to re-examine
24 on that and clarify, but I certainly am unclear about the point now. I
25 understand you simply to be referring to the actual designation number of
1 the individual PJP detachment.
2 You will now be cross-examined by the Prosecutor, Mr. Hannis.
3 Mr. Hannis.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:
6 Q. Good morning, Mr. Deretic. Did you hold any rank in the MUP?
7 A. Members of the technical services for a while were not treated as
8 authorised officials, so they had so-called post names. So in 2001
9 sometime we also received ranks so that in 2005 these ranks were abolished
10 at the ministry and for all the other organizational units.
11 Q. Okay. So did you have a rank in 2001 until 2005 but at no other
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In 1998 and 1999, did you wear a uniform to work or did you wear
15 civilian clothes?
16 A. Civilian clothes.
17 Q. You told us that --
18 A. I apologise, Mr. Prosecutor. At the time that I had a rank I also
19 wore civilian clothes. I wore civilian clothes throughout the whole time.
20 I didn't have any kind of uniform.
21 Q. Thank you. You told us that from the 1st of June, 1999, you
22 became a member of the MUP staff. Is it correct that prior to that 1st of
23 June, 1999, you were never a member of the MUP staff?
24 A. Precisely, until the 1st of June, 1999, up until then I was never
25 a member of the MUP staff.
1 Q. In June of 1998 we've seen a document from Minister Stojiljkovic
2 appointing a staff, which included a Captain Cankovic to be the assistant
3 head for communications. Did you take his place in 1999?
4 A. Yes. From mid-1998 and 1999, he was chief of communications at
5 the staff, and then from the 1st of June, 1999, it was me.
6 Q. Okay. Mr. Ivetic, I think, on Friday had asked you about whether
7 or not you had seen a document signed by General Djordjevic naming you as
8 a member of the joint -- of the MUP staff. Do you recall having seen that
10 A. Is that the document that was shown to me for the first time
11 during the proofing from my testimony -- actually, I never saw it before
12 that, that's the document that refers to me as the assistant or the chief
13 of communications for wire systems. Are you talking about that document?
14 Q. Yeah, and you told us you had never seen that before you came here
15 or you were preparing to testify, right?
16 A. Precisely, yes.
17 Q. Did you see the document which is Exhibit P1505 from the 16th of
18 June, 1998, which is Minister Stojiljkovic's decision creating a MUP
19 staff? Did you see that one during your preparations?
20 A. [No interpretation]
21 Q. Well, to save time, I'll indicate to you that that decision in its
22 text makes reference to the specific document in which you had been named
23 by General Djordjevic in 1998 as assistant head of staff for wire
24 communications; and the minister's document says it supersedes that one in
25 which you were named. Would you agree with me that that may be one reason
1 you never saw it, because it got superseded by the minister's other, later
3 A. Yes, I think that's how it was. The first decision referring to
4 me as the chief of communications is something that I never received. It
5 was not given to me. I assume that the other members who were mentioned
6 in the same decision did not receive the decision either. For me, this
7 was a completely unknown document.
8 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, on Friday in one of your answers you were
9 talking about the period before the bombing when police units in carrying
10 out actions worked with hand-held radios. And you mentioned that these
11 were only good up to a couple of kilometres, right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You went on in that answer to say that from Pristina such
14 communications could not be monitored, that Pristina could perhaps receive
15 information if the detachment commander possibly from some location used a
16 call station to call a radio user in Pristina. Can you explain that for
17 me? What's a call station?
18 A. It's not a call station, but it's actually a mobile, a mounted,
19 station. Kolska Stanica is a radio station that is installed or mounted
20 on a vehicle and that is where this name comes from, it's a mounted
21 station. So this station can broadcast with a stronger frequency, 10, 15,
22 20 watts, so it has a larger range than the hand-held station because the
23 hand-held station is of 3 or 2 watts, exceptionally it can be of 5 watts.
24 Q. Now, this station is mounted on a vehicle?
25 A. Yes. All official vehicles of the ministry or most of them, not
1 all of them, I can't say that, have radios installed, especially the
2 patrol vehicles. They have to have such stations, radios, installed, the
3 patrol police, those vehicles that are clearly marked as police vehicles
4 at that time all had radios in the vehicles, yes.
5 Q. And I realize it depends on weather conditions and terrain, but
6 generally what was the range for those radios?
7 A. The station range is something that is relative. In order to
8 explain that, I would have to go back to the frequencies, the range, the
9 way radio waves spread in the particular frequency. The dominant wave is
10 the direct wave, so for a radio communication to be achieved there must be
11 optical visibility between the receiver and the transmitter antennas. In
12 case such a radio signal encounters an obstacle, it reflects off it, and
13 you can be relatively close, but if you have a hill between two users, you
14 would not be able to hear each other. You can be farther away, but if the
15 configuration is such that it is a flat terrain without elevations,
16 without hills, then you can have communications. So it's a few kilometres
17 in the simplex method of operations when two stations are working in a
18 local area, and it would be more or less the manner of operation that
19 police members used in the field, the simplex method of operation using
20 hand-held radios.
21 Q. And under optimal conditions at the highest point for kilometres
22 around do you know what the effective range would be, with no obstacles in
24 A. This depends on the power of the hand-held radio, let's say 3 or 4
25 kilometres using the simplex method.
1 Q. Maybe I got confused, but the mobile mounted radio station,
2 that's -- is that a hand-held radio that you're talking about?
3 A. Hand-held radios are called transmission ones; vehicle-mounted
4 stationed are called mobile stations -- the hand-held radios are called
5 portable radios, portable because they can be carried.
6 Q. Okay. And what I've been trying to find out about is the range on
7 the mobile radios. Is that what we've been talking about?
8 A. The mobile, the mounted stations, it's the same case, the terrain
9 configuration had a significant effect on the quality of the communication
10 and no one can say for sure if it's 2 kilometres, 3, or 5. It's simply
11 something that has to do with the wave, the magnetic waves are
12 disseminated, the way they are carried and the type of the radio waves
14 Q. Okay. The reason I started asking this was because you said
15 Pristina could perhaps receive information if the detachment commander
16 possibly from some location used a call station to call a radio user in
17 Pristina, and I got the impression that meant the detachment commander
18 could be in contact with Pristina at some distance greater than 5
19 kilometres. Isn't that true?
20 A. Yes, it's possible. Only in that case then you use the
21 semi-duplex manner of operation. The whole time we were talking about
22 repeater devices and transmission locations, there were repeater devices
23 at these transmission locations, which enabled communications at a larger
24 distance. We were talking about radio networks and that we can secure
25 radio communications of the secretariat seat with the departments of the
1 SUPs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs branches. So in that case, the
2 staff could possibly communicate with them if the territory was well
3 covered by radio signals; if it wasn't, then they would have to do their
4 best and find a means.
5 Q. Okay. I think I became confused when you were talking about
6 simplex versus duplex or semi-duplex mode. Let me move on to something
7 else. At page 119 and 120 on Friday's transcript you mentioned that MUP
8 is not intended for war situations, and for that reason the concept of our
9 system of communication was such that the equipment was intended for
10 stationary conditions of work. And then you went on to say:
11 "So looking at it in that way, the MUP did not have the equipment
12 that was intended for wartime action or operation."
13 But in the MUP you must have had some sort of contingency plan for
14 emergencies or natural disasters or even war or rebellion, right, some
15 back-up plan in case your primary or stationary communications were
16 disabled or disrupted, et cetera, right?
17 A. Our radio systems were operative much before the actual staff came
18 about, and that was the infrastructure, the telecommunications
19 infrastructure that is being made available to members of the police, MUP,
20 and I say this with all authority, did have some equipment for that
21 tactical level for application in special actions. Our equipment was
22 installed and it was ready for use. We didn't depend on any activities,
23 we didn't prepare something new for the police. The radio network was
24 operational and whoever happened to be in a specific territory would use
25 that infrastructure. So in this way we worked in all the ministry
1 organizational units in the entire area of Serbia. That is why I said
2 that the MUP did not have any tactical communications that were meant for
3 wartime use. It was some peacetime configuration, let's put it that way,
4 of radio networks that was also used in wartime conditions.
5 Q. So when the war actually started and your primary communications
6 systems were destroyed and damaged, as you described, what methods did you
7 use to try and make up for this lack of capability?
8 A. The radio stations were used, but they were used in local works --
9 work in 2-kilometre range. So it was used at micro locations where
10 specific police units or members of the secretariat happened to be and so
11 on and so forth. The transmission of dispatch was possible and was
12 organized in such a way that it was conveyed via courier. The telephone
13 communications were used, the public communication, the telephone
14 communications service was used from Pristina outwards [as interpreted].
15 Nothing else was used. Sir, I said that the switchboard in the Pristina
16 SUP building was destroyed, and when we're talking about the equipment
17 that is not wartime equipment but was meant for stationary work
18 conditions, we did not manage to repair the switchboard until the end of
19 the war. Throughout the whole time, it was out of operation, and this
20 applied to some other equipment too. We didn't have an unlimited quantity
21 of equipment. The ministry had a certain limited quantity of equipment at
22 its disposal, and it was being destroyed at quite a rapid rate, so then we
23 reached the point where there was no longer any equipment left.
24 MR. IVETIC: Page 26, line 16, the witness said telephone
25 communications service was used from Pristina outwards towards Serbia.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 MR. HANNIS:
3 Q. After all this damage to your communications, in addition to using
4 couriers what other means did the MUP use to communicate reporting up to
5 superiors in Serbia and reporting to subordinate units in the field in
6 Kosovo? Was there anything else other than couriers?
7 A. I can say that the MUP even before the war had an organized
8 network of transmission and receiver equipment on the KT equipment system.
9 The KT system of communications was not really applied in peacetime
10 conditions because there was no need for that. It was possible using
11 trained radio telegraphers who were trained in the use of these devices,
12 they could also broadcast short written messages as well. But since in
13 the work of these KT broadcasters and receivers there are very powerful
14 broadcasters of 100-plus watts. It's not so easy to use the equipment
15 even the trained professionals using the equipment were concerned about
16 using or being near this equipment because the radiation could simply be
17 detected. So there was panic and fear in case the equipment was switched
18 off. The system could be used to just convey brief messages from one
19 location to another, something that was brief, essential, and possibly
20 very urgent.
21 Q. I may have missed it earlier. Can you explain to me what the KT
22 equipment is and the KT system?
23 A. It's a device that works on the frequency range from 3 to 30
24 megahertz. The range is called that because the radio waves are the
25 so-called short waves, so it's the short-wave system of communications,
1 Kratki Talasi, KT. So it's a classic device, something that radio -- ham
2 radio operators use, it is very similar equipment to that used by them.
3 Q. Thank you. Short-wave now is a term that I understand. I would
4 like to quickly show you an exhibit, this is P1993. I can give you a hard
5 copy because this is several pages and there's just one point I want to
6 ask you about. This is a meeting dated the 11th of May, 1999, the MUP
7 staff in Pristina, and there's a reference -- I think it's on page 5 of
8 the B/C/S for you. The commander named Colic from the 124th Brigade is
9 speaking, and I think it's the fifth bullet point up from the bottom of
10 his speech, and we're on page 12 of the English, Your Honours.
11 He says: "I gave three USW radio stations to VJ Commander Jelic
12 to use a month ago, and as this is PJP equipment I requested them back but
13 they've not returned the radio stations to date."
14 Are these short-wave radios or what does that USW refer to?
15 A. No, this is a so-called radio station that the police called a UKT
16 or it's actually ultra-high frequency. These short-wave system was not
17 acceptable -- accessible to the users, it was only at the secretariat
18 seats and the users who used it were the operators from the communication
19 system, the technicians. This short-wave system that we talked about
20 earlier was not accessible to the police, it was at the seats of the
21 secretariats, and these devices were used by communication workers from
22 the communication departments in the secretariats. We're talking about
23 classical stations, hand-held radios that are used by members of the PJP.
24 Q. Okay. So these ultra-high frequency radios that the commander
25 here is mentioning having loaned to the VJ are used in the field?
1 A. Yes. The very high or the ultra-high frequency, UHF and VHF.
2 These are hand-held radio devices that were used by members of the PJP.
3 Q. And I assume if they were loaned to the army, the army and then
4 PJP could talk to each other on them, right?
5 A. Most probably, most probably that's the case. I know that the
6 army did not have enough hand-held stations, and this is probably then
7 that cooperation that was organized between the detachments, the
8 companies, and the units of the army in the field.
9 Q. Because of the problems that MUP was having with communications,
10 did you in MUP get any assistance from the VJ in perhaps using some of
11 their equipment or their system, particularly to transmit or communication
12 between Kosovo and Serbia or Pristina and Belgrade?
13 A. From what I know, I really did not -- was -- didn't have
14 information about the damage during the war suffered by the Army of
15 Yugoslavia, but I know that a large amount of the equipment was destroyed,
16 so they didn't even have enough for themselves never mind enough to lend
17 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
18 Q. Mr. Deretic, in your job did you have anything to do with
19 monitoring, intercepting, or eavesdropping on communications of KLA or
20 NATO or any of that kind of thing or was that done by someone else in the
22 A. Our communications department does not have that within its job
23 description -- well, that we were following this, well, yes, we were
24 because we had to. The KLA members were on our channels more than they
25 were on their own. So in view of all the jamming that was there -- well,
1 yes in that part we did follow it because they were constantly using the
2 radio communications of the ministry both for jamming and for causing
3 certain verbal conflicts and so on and so forth. There were provocations,
4 taunts that were always present on our radio communications. From that
5 point of view, yes, I did follow that mode of communication.
6 Q. I certainly have no question that your communications system was
7 severely disrupted because of the deliberate bombing of communication
8 networks, but we've seen evidence in this case that, for example, there
9 were several meetings in Pristina of the MUP that included all the SUP
10 chiefs and the PJP commanders. And we've seen some daily reports going
11 from MUP staff up to the ministry which contained information that
12 appeared to be from the previous 24 hours in the hinterlands of Kosovo,
13 which seems to reflect that the information was being communicated. How
14 was that being done? Was it -- was that all via the couriers and
15 hand-held radios?
16 A. That could not be done through hand-held radios, only via courier.
17 This is certainly information that was of a confidential nature. To use
18 radio networks, I mean I've already said that our radio communications
19 were intercepted, jammed, eavesdropped on, so it was only the most
20 necessary communication that took place via that, but the confidential
21 material was sent via courier. I'm talking about the secretariat in
22 Kosovo and Metohija and communication that went to Pristina. From
23 Pristina and to MUP and to the rest of Serbia, well yes, a fax could be
24 sent, for instance, if nothing else because public communications were
25 operational, telephones too.
1 Q. Okay. What about the KT equipment and the KT system, could
2 certain confidential material of an urgent nature be sent via that system?
3 A. As far as I know, this equipment was used very rarely, perhaps two
4 or three times, for conveying some very short pieces of information for
5 the reasons I already mentioned. Even I as head of department had a
6 problem to make people who were trained to use that equipment to actually
7 sit and use that equipment because they were afraid of bombing.
8 Q. You say have already given me the answer to this next one where
9 above you said public communication were operational, telephones too.
10 Mr. Joksic from the RDB was here and testified about having provided a
11 telephone to Ibrahim Rugova in his house in Pristina so that he could be
12 in contact with some of the internationals like Mr. Christopher Hill in
13 Skopje and Macedonia. So is it correct that the telephones were still
14 working at least in some parts of Kosovo during the bombing so that you
15 could make calls to outside countries?
16 A. First of all, you said that Joksic said that? Is that right?
17 Q. Yes, and --
18 A. What Mr. Joksic said, that he had ensured that, well the reason
19 was, as far as I can remember, Mr. Rugova had a house somewhere at
20 Dragodan, I don't know the exact locality, but as the Dragodan hill
21 practically within Pristina. That part, that territory was covered by the
22 Telekom organization through the public network. They would install these
23 regional telephone exchanges, that's what they were called, so every
24 region or area was covered with a particular telephone exchange.
25 Vranjevac, Dragodan, other neighbourhoods like that were covered by this
1 telecommunications centre that was in UKT 2. When this cable
2 concentration went down, it was a big problem to make any kind of
3 telephone connection. I assume that Mr. Joksic said that he spoke to the
4 technical teams of Telekom to find some solutions to introduce a public
5 telephone number. They probably did that. I really don't know. And with
6 this kind of number there was communication towards Belgrade or further on
7 through international telephone exchanges to the world.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you. The last topic I wanted to deal with was
9 something I think Judge Bonomy asked you about. The PJP detachments I
10 think you told us had only double- or triple-digit numbers or designators;
11 is that correct?
12 A. That was the name of the detachment, its prefix had two or three
13 digits. So the digit's name is the 22nd PJP Detachment. What I'm trying
14 to say is that the number before the detachment designation was a
15 two-digit or a three-digit one.
16 Q. Are you talking about just during the war in 1999 or do you
17 include the pre-war period in 1999 and 1998 when you say that?
18 A. Well, all the time. The detachments had the same names, the same
19 designations, the 21st, the 35th, the 36th, as far as I know of course.
20 Q. Let me show you one last exhibit, this is our Exhibit P1434. With
21 the usher's assistance I'll hand you a hard copy. This is a VJ document
22 dated the 19th of September, 1998, from General Pavkovic, Pristina Corps
23 command. This is an order to support MUP forces in breaking up Siptar
24 terrorists in the Cicavica area. I wanted to have you look at two things.
25 First of all, if you could go to page 4 of the B/C/S.
1 MR. HANNIS: And this is page 8 of the English, Your Honours.
2 Q. Under item 5.2 we have a task for the 15th Armoured Brigade. Do
3 you find that, Mr. Deretic?
4 A. 5.2, 15th Armoured Brigade, to support the MUP forces to break-up,
5 is that right?
6 Q. Yes. And you'll see about two or three lines down: "The tasks
7 support attack by the 1st PJP Detachment ..." And if you go on to the next
8 heading: "Engage battle group 15.2," its task is to support attack by the
9 8th PJP Detachment. So we've got a couple of examples there of PJP
10 detachments referred to by single digits. Do you know why
11 General Pavkovic would be doing that, unless there were, indeed, such
13 A. In view of my work and all the obligations I had, I really would
14 not know how to answer this question, why it was marked in this way in
15 this case.
16 Q. Fair enough. If you could go to your page 8.
17 MR. HANNIS: And it's page 18 in the English, Your Honours.
18 Q. Under the heading command and communications, I've highlighted it
19 in pink there. The second paragraph says:
20 "Arrange communications according to the communications plan to be
21 drawn up by the chief of communications Pristina Corps and the MUP."
22 Now, in this kind of joint action who from the MUP would be
23 involved in arranging communications with the Pristina Corps chief of
24 communications, do you know? This is September 1998.
25 A. I know that I did not take part in the elaboration of this
1 communications plan, so I cannot confirm with any certainty who this was.
2 But I can say that PJP detachments had their signals people, their
3 communications people, who knew the organization of radio networks and who
4 knew what radio channels would be used. That could be done by the
5 commander himself. For example, he'd have a chief of communications in
6 the PJP. A communications man is a technician, an experienced engineer,
7 and every PJP had one, and they gave this technical support to every PJP
9 Q. Okay. Well, a couple -- a few things after that. First of all,
10 did you know personally the chief of communications for the Pristina Corps
11 in September 1998?
12 A. Well, I don't know -- well, I knew Colonel [Realtime transcript
13 read in error "General"] Mladenovic, who was chief of the stationary
14 communications node. Now, whether he was the chief of communications of
15 the Pristina Corps at the same time, I really don't know. I know that he
16 was in charge of these stationary nodes, that is to say these emission or
17 broadcasting locations where radio networks were organized and where radio
18 equipment was installed and so on and so forth. So I knew three or four
19 men there, him and a few of his associates, and when necessary I spoke to
21 Q. To save you going through the whole document I would tell you that
22 these tasks for the VJ asked them to support several different MUP units,
23 the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 8th PJP Detachments, a PJP company from Kosovska
24 Mitrovica, one from Pec, one from Djakovica, also the SAJ and the JSO.
25 Now, who from the MUP would be involved in arranging communications with
1 the VJ when you've got that many diverse and different elements of the MUP
2 involved? Wouldn't it have to be somebody higher than a communications
3 person from one of the PJP detachments, especially since you've got both
4 DB and JB units involved?
5 A. Well, perhaps maybe Milan Cankovic who had this technical details
6 [as interpreted], I mean in terms of coverage, maybe he made a suggestion.
7 But at any rate it was about the technical capacities, what radio channels
8 could be used.
9 Q. Okay.
10 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Cepic on his feet, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.
12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, it doesn't
13 say that Cankovic was chief of communications, and that is what the
14 witness did mention. We have another mistake in the transcript, page 34,
15 line 19, it's not General Mladenovic, it's Colonel Mladenovic, those were
16 the witness's words. Thank you.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: What's your point about Cankovic? I'm not
18 following that?
19 MR. HANNIS: I think he's saying the witness actually spoke the
20 words "chief of communications" and that wasn't reflected in the
21 transcript. I thought I heard that too, actually.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We note that. Thank you, Mr. Cepic.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Deretic, in September 1998 to your knowledge was he then a
25 captain, Captain Cankovic was the chief of communications on the MUP
1 staff, right?
2 A. From mid-1998 when General Lukic was appointed head of staff and
3 Miroslav Mijatovic deputy head of staff, he was on that staff and I think
4 he was there all the way up to the 1st of June, 1999.
5 Q. Thank you. One last question, with regard to code-names or radio
6 code-names, did you ever hear the code-name Brazil associated with the SAJ
7 in 1998?
8 A. I think that Brazil was the call-sign for the commander of the
9 JSO. Brazil is a call-sign or code sign that was used by the JSO. This
10 was the special unit of the state security sector, yes.
11 Q. And the commander of the JSO you're referring to, is that
12 Milorad Ulemek or Lukovic known as Legija?
13 A. Yes, most probably it was him.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. HANNIS: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Deretic.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.
19 Questioned by the Court:
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Deretic, are you able to say to what extent the
21 communications systems in Belgrade were damaged by NATO bombing?
22 A. I have to try to remember this. I think it was either the 4th or
23 the 5th of April when the building of the seat of the ministry in Belgrade
24 was destroyed. I know that on that occasion the telecommunications room
25 where the equipment was burned down completely. Of course, in view of the
1 fact that later on I was head of that department, I know full well what
2 was in that communications room in terms of equipment. That's also where
3 the main telephone exchange for the special telephone network was
4 destroyed. So in that way communication was disabled among the
5 secretariats within Serbia, mutual communication, because in the
6 organization of this network -- well, the MUP telephone exchange was the
7 main telephone exchange and all telephone communication went through
8 there. Also in the MUP another exchange was destroyed for transmitting
9 dispatches. So there was serious destruction. Many radio relay
10 facilities that the ministry used in the territory of Serbia, Rudnik,
11 Jastrebac, Crni Vrh, Iriski Venac, all of that was destroyed. So the
12 system of communications at the level of the ministry was also in a state
13 of full collapse.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Was the ministry's own special network within
15 Serbia restored?
16 A. Yes, but of course without Kosovo and Metohija.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: How quickly was that done?
18 A. Well, Your Honour, work is still being done on that. The
19 telephone exchanges are over 30 years old, the ones of the special
20 network. Their GT and Iskra telephone exchanges that were actually
21 inaugurated in 1986 and --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Deretic, I hope my question was properly
23 translated for you, it was this: Was the ministry's own special network
24 within Serbia restored? And you said: "Yes." And my second question is
25 very simple: How quickly?
1 A. Well, it was only sometime in 2001 that a telephone switchboard
2 was purchased, 2001.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: So throughout the remainder of the war are you
4 saying that within Serbia itself the MUP's own special network was not
5 restored, there were no communications through it?
6 A. Yes, with a temporary switchboard that was used as a makeshift
7 telephone exchange with a very small number of switches.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: So my question is: How quickly was that done?
9 A. After June 1999 when I came there, this telephone exchange was
10 operational. I don't know when it was installed, this temporary solution
11 with a smaller capacity telephone exchange and switchboard.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if you would look at an exhibit, please,
13 P1252. I think Mr. Hannis drew your attention to this, and if you look at
14 the ninth person referred to on that is Cankovic, and just take it from me
15 that you're number 10 for the moment because to see that we have to change
16 pages -- in fact, you can go on to the -- just hold it there as it is at
17 the moment.
18 Now, you'll see that this is a decision on the composition of the
19 staff, leaders and members of the staff of the MUP for Kosovo and
20 Metohija. And it's headed up by Major-General Lukic, and it includes you.
21 Now could we go to the second page, where you will see that you
22 are number 10, and you see there that the work was to begin on the 1st of
23 June, 1998, and that the personnel named, including you, were to remain in
24 the staff up to one year, and that's signed by Colonel-General Djordjevic.
25 Now could you look, please, at P1251. Sorry -- yes, just -- this
1 is my mistake, I'm sorry about this. Could we just go back to page 2 of
2 1252, it's still on in English. Could we go back also to the Serb. Page
3 2, please.
4 Can you read the date of that document?
5 A. I see a 098.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: And I think there's an 11, but the month is
7 missing; is that correct?
8 A. I can't see the month either.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I want you to -- we need to have a break now,
10 and I'd like you to hold that information in your head and we'll come back
11 to look at something else after the break.
12 Could you now leave the courtroom with the usher, and we will see
13 you again at 11.15.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.15 a.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Deretic, could you now look at P1251. Now,
19 you'll see that's a decision on the formation of a staff of the ministry
20 in Pristina, and you'll see in paragraph 2 the task of the staff is to
21 plan, organize, guide, and coordinate the work of the secretariats of the
22 interior and the border police station in performing complex and important
23 duties and assignments. And then the subject matter of these assignments
24 is set out, and if you go to paragraph 4, you'll see that it provides that
25 the composition of the staff, the leader and members of the staff, will be
1 laid down in a separate decision. And this one is also signed by
2 Djordjevic and is dated the 15th of May, 1998. And you will remember that
3 the previous one identified General Lukic as the staff leader and Djinovic
4 as the deputy leader and various other people as leaders for particular
5 subjects, including you as assistant head of staff for wire
7 Now, can you tell me what that body -- or whether you were in the
8 position set out in these two documents.
9 A. On Friday I said that I saw this document for the first time
10 during proofing, the lawyers showed it to me. I had not seen that
11 document ever before nor had it ever been handed to me. All the time
12 until the 1st of June I was chief of communications in Pristina, and in
13 keeping with my purview and the rules defining our duties and
14 responsibilities I performed my work.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: And remind me, where was Cankovic during that
17 A. Cankovic was part of the staff, he was on the staff as chief of
18 communications on the staff led by Sreten Lukic.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: And what were your dealings with him?
20 A. Well, I performed regular work on the maintenance and operation of
21 the system of communications. In my work I was answerable to the chief of
22 secretariat and the line administration within the ministry. I was in
23 contact with Cankovic when some equipment needed to be reinforced or
24 batteries had to be provided. In that situation when there were problems
25 with power facing various police units, I would request that equipment to
1 be supplied for various reasons. It is the ministry that deals with
2 supplies of equipment, namely, the administration for communications, and
3 it distributes this equipment to various units. So that was the nature of
4 our contacts. We reviewed various needs and requirements, requests had to
5 be made to the administration for communications within the ministry, and
6 that was our tactical logistics.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: How regularly were you in communication with him?
8 A. Well, you couldn't say that we were regularly in contact; contacts
9 were sporadic. I couldn't say now whether it was two or three times or
10 five times because the communications department was doing its job under
11 Article 45. Our job was to check on a daily basis how the system was
13 JUDGE BONOMY: In what period of time do you say you were in
14 contact with him between two and five times?
15 A. Well, within a month, 30 days, but I couldn't really say precisely
16 because those were not real meetings. He would drop by my office. It was
17 not a formal meeting. He would just point out a problem in the operation
18 of the system of communications or tell me that some back-up equipment
19 needed to be supplied such as batteries for vehicle-mounted or hand-held
21 JUDGE BONOMY: You only need to answer the question I actually ask
22 you, Mr. Deretic. Now, can you confirm to me that all the persons who
23 were on the -- who were named on the decision that I showed you were
24 members of the public security branch of the MUP or do you need to see it
1 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have a hard copy if that will assist.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please, if you could give him --
3 MR. HANNIS: You want just 1252 for now?
4 JUDGE BONOMY: 1252 for now.
5 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: It's a simple yes or no. Are they all members of
7 the public security sector?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Now would you look, please, at P1505. Now, you'll
10 see that this is dated the 16th of June, 1998, and is said to be a
11 decision to establish a ministerial staff for the suppression of
12 terrorism, remarkably similar title to what we have just been looking at.
13 You're not named this time, but you'll see that on the first page
14 Cankovic's name is there. Now, if we can go just quickly to the second
15 page so that you can see the signature, and you'll see this time it's
16 signed by the minister.
17 A. Yes.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: And the minister of course had authority over both
19 the state security and the public security sectors?
20 A. Correct.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: And --
22 A. And at that time the state security sector was within the
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Unlike the authority of Djordjevic, which extended
25 only to the public security sector; is that correct?
1 A. Yes, the chief of sector led the work of the state security
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but Djordjevic's responsibilities were
4 confined to public security; is that correct?
5 A. I suppose so. The chief of sector, public security, leads the
6 work of organizational units within that sector.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's go back to the first page of this order or
8 decision, rather. And just look at the names and tell me if it's fair to
9 say that they are a mixture of personnel from the state security sector
10 and the public security sector?
11 A. Yes, I can see that two members belonged to the state security,
12 that is to say they were not members of the public security sector.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: And which two are they?
14 A. David Gajic and Milorad Lukovic.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: And then if you go down to the end of the names and
16 you'll see a reference to the expanded staff and that was to include
17 chiefs of the SUPs and also chiefs of the branches of the RDB; is that
19 A. That's what's written here, but I have to stress again that I saw
20 this for the first time during proofing so I didn't know whether these
21 people from the state security were really on the staff.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Just please deal with the questions I ask you,
23 Mr. Deretic. And these also are a mixture of personnel from the public
24 security sector and personnel from the state security sector?
25 A. Yes, these two are.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, would you go now to paragraph 6 which is on
2 the second page, and do we see there that among the orders or decisions
3 that are superseded by this one, are the two documents that you looked at
5 A. Yes, I can see that this one from 11th of June, 1996 is among
6 them. I didn't remember the date of the other document you mentioned.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: I think it may be the translation that's given us
8 the wrong -- it's the 11th of June, 1998, and that's the document on which
9 you could see the 11 and the 1998 but you couldn't see the month, if you
10 remember. And it also involves the recall of the one of the 15th of May
11 which you say. Is that correct?
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It is indeed 1998.
13 A. Yes, this document I have in my hands.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much. That's all I recall from you
15 on these matters.
16 Mr. Ivetic, re-examination?
17 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour.
18 Re-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
19 Q. Why don't we start from the back and work our way forwards.
20 Mr. Deretic, Judge Bonomy asked you about the significance of the
21 signature of Minister Stojiljkovic. If we could have up again P1811, that
22 was the document from May 31st, 1999, by which you did become a member of
23 the MUP staff for Pristina and also signed by Minister Stojiljkovic
24 himself. The named persons in that document here we have the first page
25 and there are four more on the second page, if you could take a look at
1 these and when you're finished with the names on the first page if you
2 could tell us so that we can have the second page displayed to you.
3 And the question I have for you, sir, looking at these named
4 individuals who are named to the MUP staff, are any of these RDB personnel
5 or are they exclusively RJB?
6 A. They're all from public security.
7 Q. And just for completeness, if we go to the last page just to
8 confirm that it's signed by the minister since I don't have the hard
9 copy --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you do that, can you also confirm that
11 it contains the same reference as the previous one that you looked at with
12 me to the chiefs of the SUPs and the RDB centres and departments in
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's written in the decision,
15 in one of the paragraphs.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC:
19 Q. Sir, in your role as chief for communications under this order,
20 under this decision, from June 1st, 1999, onwards, did you have any
21 official contact with RDB personnel who were said to be members of the MUP
23 A. No. During that brief period I worked on the staff from the 1st
24 of June, I did not have any contact with members of the state security
1 Q. The other question I have was also related to a question by
2 Judge Bonomy at page 38, lines 14 through 17, when you were talking about
3 the temporary switchboard, the temporary telephone exchange that was set
4 up within Serbia itself and you said but not in Kosovo. And then in these
5 lines you said at 15th or 17:
6 "After June 1999 when I came there this telephone exchange was
7 operational. I don't know when it was installed, this temporary solution
8 with this smaller capacity telephone exchange and switchboard."
9 When you came in June 1999, where, sir, is this talking about --
10 where did you come to with respect to this answer? Where was the
11 temporary telephone exchange operational?
12 A. It was in Belgrade, and that temporary switchboard was used for
13 mutual communication between MUP members in the city of Belgrade.
14 Q. Now, I believe in questioning by my colleague Mr. Hannis you were
15 talking about the hand-held radios, the ultra-high frequency and very
16 high-frequency, UHF, VHF. Were these used by all police and not just PJP?
17 A. Yes, that's the range allocated to the ministry, according to the
18 plan of distribution. All units of the ministry in the territory of
19 Serbia used that range.
20 Q. And the last matter I'd like to clear up -- strike that. Two
21 matters I need to clear up.
22 First, with respect to the document that Mr. Cepic showed you, the
23 military document talking about the operation of the radio station Free
24 Kosovo during the course of the war, could you verify for me -- I can't
25 recall if you -- if the specific instance that you had was prior to the
1 commencement of bombings, the specific contact that you had with members
2 of the ministry of telecommunications? Was that before or after the
3 commencement of bombings by NATO forces?
4 A. It was before the beginning of air-strikes.
5 Q. And now the last area I'd like to clear up with you, I believe,
6 relates to confusion that might have been caused by my awkward wording of
7 the questions relating to the designations of the MUP units in P1052, if
8 we could for the moment have P1052 up on the screen again, just around the
9 same page.
10 If we look at -- oops, 1052, P1052. If we could look at this
11 first page now for the moment, sir. We see there in the third line it
12 says the 3rd OD, which would be the Serbian odred, MUP as I think you
13 said. Was there, in fact, any MUP or PJP detachment that had the
14 permanent name as the 3rd odred or 3rd Detachment?
15 A. In my prior testimony, that's exactly what I said, that
16 detachments did not have a one-digit number before them. It couldn't be
17 3rd, 5th, or 6, they were 35th, 37th, and I don't know any more, but it
18 was always a two-digit or three-digit number in the name of the
20 Q. And when you say that there was always a two-digit or three-digit
21 number in the name of the detachment, would that designation be permanent,
22 whereas the radio call-sign could be changed?
23 A. I didn't hear the interpretation. Could the interpreters repeat
24 this question.
25 Q. I'll help out. I'll read back my question.
1 And when you say that there was always a two-digit or a
2 three-digit number in the name of the detachment, would that name
3 designation be permanent, whereas the radio call-sign could be changed?
4 A. Yes, the name of the detachment was permanent.
5 Q. Okay. And Mr. Hannis showed you a military document from the
6 time-period showing certain named designations for PJP units of only one
7 number. I'd like to show you a police document, P1993, which I believe
8 Mr. Hannis had on his list if -- I don't recall if he utilised it, he
9 might have even utilised it. And I think on the first page we'll see --
10 looking down, sir, at items number 5 through 14 on the list of persons who
11 were present, are these the proper designations for the PJP units that you
12 were familiar with that would have been on the terrain in Kosovo and
14 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I have an objection to the form of
15 that question. The object I showed him, Exhibit P1434, was from September
16 of 1998. I think we need to distinguish that this is May 1999.
17 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, Mr. Hannis asked the witness to
18 draw speculations and conclusions of what is possible from a military
19 document. I think looking at a police document we have a much clearer
20 picture from a police witness, especially given his testimony.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, you showed him this document.
22 MR. HANNIS: I did, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, and it's dated the 11th of May, 1999.
24 MR. HANNIS: Correct, but the one I showed him to ask him if there
25 were PJP detachments with single digits was P1434 from September 1998.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but it's open to counsel to point to other
2 material which might have a bearing on the accuracy of the document that
3 you were looking at, Mr. Hannis.
4 We will repel that objection and allow you to proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
5 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Q. Mr. Deretic, my question was, directing your attention to lines --
7 pardon me, to items that are numbered 5 through 14 of participants, and
8 the question I had for you was: Do those two- and three-digit name
9 designations for PJP units -- I'm sorry, it goes all the way actually
10 through the 17, I didn't have the whole document on the screen. Those are
11 all two- or three-digit name designations for what PJP units? Are those
12 the ones you're familiar with, I guess I should say?
13 A. Absolutely correct. Those are the real designations, the real
14 names of PJP detachments, as they did in these items you mentioned.
15 Q. And in the course of your duties in 1998, had these name
16 designations for the PJP been any different according to the MUP
17 regulations would you have expected to be made aware of that?
18 A. These detachment names, as they are stated here in this document,
19 were there throughout the presence of those detachments in the area of
20 Kosovo and Metohija. I'm not aware of anything changing there. The same
21 names were used in the course of 1998.
22 Q. Just waiting for the transcript and translation. Thank you,
23 Mr. Deretic, I have no further questions for you.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Deretic, that completes your evidence here.
1 Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give evidence. You may now leave
2 the courtroom with the usher.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, your next witness?
6 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Our next witness is
7 Mr. Gavranic, Dusan.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Gavranic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to
14 speak the truth by reading aloud that document.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
18 You'll now be examined by Mr. Lukic.
19 Mr. Lukic.
20 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 WITNESS: DUSAN GAVRANIC
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Examination by Mr. Lukic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Gavranic.
25 A. Good day.
1 Q. In order to break the ice, can you please try to introduce
2 yourself to us briefly.
3 A. My name is Dusan Gavranic. I was born on the 25th of December,
4 1951. My father's name is Bozo and my mother's name is Ljubica. I am
5 married my wife's name is called Verica, I have three children, Slobodan,
6 Dusko, and Nemanja. I completed my elementary school in "Banacki
7 Despotovac," that's where I was born. I completed high school in
8 Zrenjanin and the faculty of philosophy in Belgrade. Upon completion of
9 my studies, for a while I played soccer professionally from 1975 until
10 1978 in Proleter Zrenjanin club which was a first-league club at the time.
11 I began to work as a professor in 1978 in the secondary traffic and
12 agricultural school in Zrenjanin. I worked there as a professor and also
13 a director until 1989.
14 From 1989 until 1992, I was vice-president of the municipality or
15 Municipal Assembly of Zrenjanin. On the 1st of April, 1992, I was
16 appointed chief of the Zrenjanin SUP, the secretariat for internal affairs
17 in Zrenjanin. On the 1st of January, 1999, I was sent to Kosovo to
18 perform the duties of the chief of the secretariat of internal affairs in
19 Gnjilane from my post as chief of the SUP in Zrenjanin. The chief of the
20 Gnjilane SUP -- I was the chief until July 1999, when I returned to
21 Zrenjanin, again as chief of the Zrenjanin SUP. I was at that post until
22 the 20th of March, 2001, and then I was appointed as the responsible
23 person for the department of driving tests and I carried out those duties
24 until the 21st of December, 2004, which was when I retired.
25 Q. Thank you very much. I would now like to ask you: Who appointed
1 you to all the posts that you were appointed to in the MUP?
2 A. All the duties I was appointed to by the minister or by the
3 decision of the chief of the public security sector.
4 Q. You're going to tell us now about the organizational structure of
5 the Gnjilane SUP, first of all, territorially and then structurally?
6 A. The secretariat for internal affairs in Gnjilane encompassed the
7 territories of four municipalities, Gnjilane, Vitina, Kosovska Kamenica,
8 and Novo Brdo. The secretariat seat was in Gnjilane, it had two
9 departments of internal affairs, Kosovska Kamenica and Kosovska Vitina as
10 well as a police station in Novo Brdo as part of its organization. That
11 is how it looked in the organizational sense; in the functional sense, the
12 secretariat comprised sections and departments. The Gnjilane SUP had
13 criminal police, police departments, traffic police departments, and also
14 common affairs department. The sections were section -- the section for
15 communications, border police, automatic data processing, I can't remember
16 if there were any other sectors.
17 Q. Was there a fire-fighting police sector?
18 A. Yes, that is correct, the fire-fighting sector was there as well.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the difference between a section or sector
20 and a department?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Odelenje" is a broader term. It's
22 a department, it could also have sectors as part of it; but there were
23 also independent sectors which were not part of a department.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
2 Q. [Interpretation] You said that as part of the Gnjilane SUP you had
3 two OUPs; is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Who were the chiefs, the number 1 persons, of these internal
6 affairs departments?
7 A. The Kosovska Kamenica internal affair department had Momcilo
8 Trajkovic as its chief; the Vitina OUP had Sefkija Hamza as its chief.
9 Q. Mr. Sefkija Hamza, what ethnicity was he?
10 A. Albanian.
11 Q. And the members of your SUP, did they include personnel of
12 Albanian ethnicity other than the chief of the internal affairs
14 A. Yes, there were not a large number but there were both at the seat
15 of the secretariat and also in the internal affairs department.
16 Q. And were there any members of the state security sector in your
18 A. No, these are two different departments.
19 Q. And did you cooperate with the state security sector chief and did
20 you know which organizational unit of this department existed in Gnjilane?
21 A. It was part of the State Security Service of Gnjilane and
22 Urosevac. The cooperation was such that it mainly comprised exchange of
23 data about security incidents and other information.
24 Q. I'm going to ask you something briefly about the PJP and then I'll
25 go back to this question. Was there an independent PJP company in the
1 Gnjilane SUP?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And the Gnjilane SUP territory, did it have any PJP company that
4 was sent to Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia proper?
5 A. No, there were no such companies sent from Serbia proper to the
6 secretariat territory. No, there were none.
7 Q. What about detachments?
8 A. No, no detachments either.
9 Q. I would like to ask you this now that had to do with the duty
10 service. Did your SUP at its seat have a duty service?
11 A. Yes, it did have a duty service at its seat, also the internal
12 affairs departments in Vitina and Kosovska Kamenica had duty services as
13 well, as well as the police station in Novo Brdo.
14 Q. And in any period after you came - and you arrived on the 1st of
15 January, 1999 - what were these duty operations services relocated?
16 A. Yes. After the war broke out and after the bombing, the duty
17 services were relocated, and they practically functioned in completely new
19 Q. Can you please tell us what these new circumstances were, how did
20 they function after relocation?
21 A. After the relocation, especially after the bombing of the Pristina
22 building when all the communications were severed, the duty service was
23 functioning with extreme difficulty, practically there were no telephone
24 or teleprinter or dispatch communications. So from that period onward,
25 and practically throughout the whole period of the war, the duty service
1 functioned via messenger or courier, so courier communications.
2 Q. And what did one shift of the duty service in the SUP seat have as
4 A. You had the communication chief, his assistant, also the police
5 officer at the reception, police officer who was securing the building,
6 and also two reinforced patrols all operated as one duty shift. So it was
7 about 12 people, approximately.
8 Q. I think that the term, the man who was at the head of all of that,
9 can you please tell us?
10 A. Chief or head or shift leader of the duty service, shift leader of
11 the duty service and the others were police officers.
12 Q. Thank you. And the duty service in the internal affairs
13 departments and police stations, was it organized in an identical way as
14 in the SUP?
15 A. Yes, it was organized in exactly the same way, both in the
16 Kosovska Kamenica and Vitina SUP departments, as well as at the Novo Brdo
17 police station; but the personnel was -- there were fewer personnel in the
19 Q. Can you please explain how the seat of the MUP in Belgrade was
20 reported to?
21 A. The reporting to the Belgrade seat was conducted via the duty
22 service, so the duty service of the SUP would pass on information to the
23 duty operations centre of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in Belgrade.
24 This information was received from the SUP departments and the police
25 station duty services.
1 Q. Along with reporting to the Belgrade staff, did you also inform
2 the staff in Pristina about these events?
3 A. The security occurrences and information were passed on both to
4 the Belgrade MUP seat and also to the Pristina MUP staff.
5 Q. Did you have to also report to civilian authorities?
6 A. Yes. When urgent information was required as one of the basic
7 types of reporting, then the information that had to do with the
8 secretariat, all the municipal and local authorities were informed, the
9 chief of the district, et cetera, as well as the Pristina and Belgrade
10 staffs, the same information was passed to all of them, especially if it
11 was something urgent.
12 Q. And what was the information that you sent to the head of the
14 A. The president of the municipality or the chief of the district was
15 informed, for example, about large fires, maintenance breakdowns, serious
16 traffic accidents with casualties, obstacles, barriers, or roadblocks.
17 This is something that is part of the rule books on information.
18 Q. Did you pass on any information about the bombing?
19 A. Yes, the bombing too. We reported to the municipal organs and the
20 district organs.
21 Q. Because this rule on information is not translated, I am not able
22 to show it to you. So we will just proceed without it. So according to
23 the rules on information or reporting, what were the forms of reporting
24 that the SUP had to carry out?
25 A. Three main forms: Urgent informing, daily reports, and interim
1 reports. Then you had urgent, daily, or periodic reports, which could be
2 monthly or annual reports.
3 Q. And did you stick to these rules?
4 A. Yes, all the secretariats abided by these rules.
5 Q. In order to understand the term "izvestavanje," reporting, in the
6 MUP we also need to understand the organization. So can we please look at
7 P1044 on the e-court, please.
8 Can you please tell us this first. What is the date on this
10 A. The document bears the date 19th of April, 1996.
11 Q. Do you recall that at the time there was a change in the name?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. The change was from milicija to policija, militia to police?
14 A. Yes, there was an organizational change. The term "policija" was
15 replaced with the -- the term milicija was replaced with the term
17 Q. Who sent this document?
18 A. This document was sent by the public security sector of the
19 Serbian MUP.
20 Q. Please, can you tell us to whom the document was sent?
21 A. The document was sent to the secretariat for internal affairs, all
22 organizational units at the seat of the ministry, to all organizational
23 units which are not part of the department, to all the ministry staffs in
24 Pristina and Prijepolje.
25 Q. We can see that it was being sent separately to the MUP staff, and
1 there were two at the time, one in Pristina and one in Prijepolje. Does
2 the staff belong to any group of the bodies cited in the first three lines
3 of the document?
4 A. No, you can see that from the document.
5 Q. Can we now look at the first paragraph under I?
6 A. "According to the rules of the internal organization of the
7 Ministry of the Interior adopted on the 5th of April, 1996, the following
8 organizational changes have been made ..."
9 Q. So what is the document that we see in front of us?
10 A. This is a document informing us which administrations, which
11 secretariats existed as organizational units, and it's provided for our
13 Q. So it has to do with organizational changes and not just the
14 change of names?
15 A. Yes, first of all it deals with organizational changes.
16 Q. Thank you. And what is stated under Roman I, Arabic 1?
17 A. The following organizational units have been established at the
18 ministry head office.
19 Q. We don't have to read them all.
20 A. And then we have the administration and the organizational centres
21 that were created.
22 Q. And what is in paragraph 2?
23 A. Paragraph 2 states: "For carrying out tasks within the competence
24 of the ministry, i.e., public security tasks, secretariats of the interior
25 for municipalities have been established according to local jurisdiction,
1 with main offices in ..." and then the offices are listed and they go to
2 number 33. So there were 33 secretariats in the territory of Serbia.
3 Q. And what sort of units are secretariats?
4 A. Organizational units.
5 Q. What do they cover?
6 A. The territory of municipalities, several municipalities, two or
7 more municipalities, depending on the size of the towns that they're in.
8 Q. Thank you. What about 1999, was there the same number of
10 A. Yes, 33.
11 Q. And now on the next page, page 2 under number 3, what is stated
13 A. The following organizational units have been established outside
14 the structure of the department:
15 1. College of internal affairs in Zemun;.
16 2. Secondary school of internal affairs in Sremska Kamenica.
17 3. Institute for security.
18 4. Department for systemic and legal affairs."
19 Q. Now let's look at Roman II and then paragraph 1 in that section,
20 what is that about?
21 A. Roman II, number 1 says:
22 "Departments of the interior and/or police stations shall report
23 all occurrences, developments and information of interest to security to
24 the secretariat of interior of which it is a part (from here on: The
25 secretariat) and the secretariat shall inform the ministry.
1 "Direct communication with the ministry or another secretariat
2 shall be established in extremely urgent situations and for message in
3 importance to security."
4 Q. Now, let me ask you something in relation to that. In practice
5 were reports written every day, regardless of whether something happened
6 or not or were reports truly sent only about occurrences that were of
7 security-related interest?
8 A. Reports were sent on occurrences that were of interest to
10 Q. If there were no such occurrences?
11 A. There were no reports.
12 Q. Thank you. Now please look at page 3. We need item 4. Does this
13 paragraph show who the police stations in charge of border crossing
14 control sent information to?
15 A. It reads as follows: "The stations in charge of border crossing
16 control send information directly to the authorised department in the
17 ministry and the secretariat on whose territory they are located," that is
18 to say that they have a direct functional link to the ministry, and they
19 also send these reports to the secretariat on whose territory they are
21 Q. What does paragraph 5 tell us now, is it characteristic only of
22 Kosovo and Metohija?
23 A. Paragraph 5 says that: "Secretariats of the interior in Pristina,
24 Kosovska Mitrovica, Urosevac, Gnjilane, Djakovica, Pec, and Prizren send
25 dispatches both to the ministry and the ministry staff in Pristina" at the
1 same time. It says practically that these dispatches are sent along
2 parallel lines with the dispatches that are sent to the duty operations
3 centre in Belgrade, that they are also CC'd to the staff in Pristina.
4 Q. Is that what actually happened in practice? Did you send these
5 parallel reports?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Now we have Roman III, and it pertains to
8 communication by way of dispatches. Could you please look at page 4 now
9 and paragraph 5 on that page. What kind of reporting is this about.
10 A. Paragraph 5 says: "When an organizational unit from the ministry
11 main office sends dispatches, it addresses them as follows:
12 1. SUP - to all (1-33) staff of the ministry - Pristina.
13 2 SUP in (the name of secretariat).
14 3. Border control police station to all and KPDG (plus the name
15 of the police station) number 1 is stated down here. It says staff of the
16 Ministry/Pristina but there is no number there.
17 Q. Do you know whether the staff was an organizational unit of the
18 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia?
19 A. As far as I know, the staff was not an organizational unit of the
20 MUP of the Republic of Serbia.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: What exactly is meant by that, Mr. Lukic, on
22 organizational unit?
23 MR. LUKIC: I don't know what I asked him --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: If you look at paragraph 4 it talks about
25 communication between organizational units being conducted in the manner
1 set out in this circular, which would suggest that everything in paragraph
2 5 is an organizational unit.
3 MR. LUKIC: You have four numbers here, and it's obvious that MUP
4 staff was informed only at the same time when SUPs are informed.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I understand that, but --
6 MR. LUKIC: And we will be dealing with that, with organizational
7 structure of MUP, and it would be clear that MUP staff is -- was not an
8 organizational unit inside the MUP.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: What does that mean, though, being an
10 organizational unit? It's a concept in the English language I don't
11 really follow.
12 MR. LUKIC: Maybe I could clarify it with this witness as --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: It may be a language problem.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Gavranic, what is an organizational unit of the Ministry of
16 the Interior? Can you help us with that?
17 A. Well, organizational units of the Ministry of the Interior were
18 territorial and functional organizational units primarily; that is to say
19 the territory of the Republic of Serbia is divided into secretariats that
20 are territorial organizational units. And from a functional point of
21 view, the territory of the Republic of Serbia is divided into
22 administrations, every one of them covers the entire territory of Serbia
23 for their particular line of work. For example, the crime police
24 administration in Belgrade covers problems related to the crime police and
25 their departments at the level of all of Serbia, if that was of
2 Q. I've already told you that the rules on reporting have not been
3 translated. It is 6D1323, that's how it's been marked in this case, and
4 in article 1 it refers to types of reporting. What kind of types of
5 reporting exist, Mr. Gavranic, within the MUP of Serbia? Can you repeat
6 that for us?
7 A. Within the MUP of Serbia there are --
8 MR. STAMP: Your Honours --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- Urgent, daily, and --
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Just a moment, my colleague has an objection.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.
13 MR. STAMP: Yes, I just raise an objection to the use of this
14 document --
15 MR. LUKIC: I'm not using the document; I just said so. I'm not
16 using the document. I don't need it on the screen.
17 MR. STAMP: Counsel's using a document in examination-in-chief
18 which, according to the orders of the Court, as I understand the issue he
19 should have notified us about in his notification filed last week, which
20 he did not. In addition to that, the document had not been translated. I
21 raise the objection primarily because as far as this witness is concerned
22 the majority of the documents that we have been notified about we were
23 notified over the weekend, mostly sometime last night. We have not made
24 objections when we have been notified quite late with some of the
25 documents or the document, but when the majority of the documents are not
1 notified to us in accordance with the Court order, it indicates that the
2 Defence is treating the Court order as meaningless; and therefore, I raise
3 this objection in addition to the obvious frustration and difficulties
4 that it puts the Prosecution under.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I would prefer to deal with that point in
6 the context of a particular document, and I'd be grateful if you would
7 raise it when that occurs, when a document that was notified late is
8 referred to. But here Mr. Lukic unwisely has twice now told us he's not
9 using a document because it's not been translated, and is then asking the
10 witness questions that could be interpreted as being questions about the
11 document. However, so far it looks as though the witness has been able to
12 answer these questions from his own personal knowledge and without
13 particular reference to the document.
14 It is not an entirely satisfactory situation, Mr. Lukic, but
15 please proceed with the questions on this particular issue. We'll deal
16 with the broader issue as and when it arises.
17 MR. LUKIC: Especially unsatisfactory for us, Your Honours,
18 because we have to deal with the witnesses without the documents. We
19 would rather have them in front of our witness, but because the court
20 service was not able to translate it in a timely manner --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, I deliberately avoided getting involved
22 in the issue over responsibility for this, bearing in mind you've had
23 something like - what is now? - approaching three years to prepare your
24 case. Let's not go down that road. Let's work with what we've got and do
25 our best to get through it. And if you particularly want to use
1 untranslated documents, then you should make an application to us and
2 identify the particular circumstances that have arisen to result in you
3 not having the document translated at this late stage and we'll look at it
4 on its merits.
5 MR. LUKIC: I'm just pointing the paragraphs for our use later on
6 because we could find the references in this document when it's
7 translated. So I'm not showing this document to the witness, and when I
8 said "paragraph 1" of this document, it just means that we would be able
9 to check later on when it's translated what's really in that document.
10 That's my only point I wanted to draw.
11 May I continue, Your Honour?
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Since my colleague Mr. Stamp objected at that
15 moment, we'll go back to what I asked you then. What types of reporting
16 is listed, and you said urgent and daily and what else was there?
17 A. Urgent, daily, and periodical reporting, those are the types.
18 Q. In Articles 7 through 10 of the instructions, urgent reporting was
19 dealt with, and I'm going to ask you what it refers to.
20 A. Urgent reporting for the territory of a SUP pertains to all
21 occurrences related to different fields of security. For instance, as far
22 as crime is concerned, and it's killings, theft, robbery, and so on; then
23 any kind of breakdown in law and order, traffic accidents resulting in
24 fatalities, traffic accidents involving several persons, foreign
25 nationals, then fires, explosions; I've already said roadblocks, strikes,
1 the stay and movement of foreigners; falsifications of different
2 documents, such as passports and IDs, and on.
3 Q. How did urgent reporting take place up until the bombing and how
4 did it take place after the bombing?
5 A. Urgent reporting primarily took place via telephone dispatches and
6 radio. After the bombing all of this practically became non-existent, I'm
7 talking about my secretariat where I was chief. So after the bombing when
8 the lines were down, urgent reporting primarily took place by way of
9 couriers, courier mail to put it that way.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have on e-court 6D852,
12 Q. You do have this document in your binder, don't you?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. What kind of a document is this in terms of page 1?
15 A. This shows that this document was sent by the Vitina police
16 station. It is addressed to the SUP in Gnjilane, the police department in
17 Gnjilane. It was signed by the commander of the police station. Further
18 on one can -- may I proceed?
19 Q. Please look at page 3 of this document now.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Who was reporting to who over here?
22 A. The SUP in Gnjilane is reporting to the Ministry of the Interior,
23 namely, the crime police administration and along parallel lines the staff
24 for the ministry of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija in
25 Pristina. This has to do with urgent reporting pertaining to the crime of
2 Q. Is it the same occurrence regarding which you received information
3 in Gnjilane, as you explained while looking at the previous documents?
4 A. Yes. It is the same thing. It is a killing in the village of
5 Kabas, Shefqet Mustafa was killed. And according to this information, I
6 mean this official note speaks of how this killing took place and what
7 information was available. This information was provided by
8 Svetozar Peric, chief, to the Belgrade MUP and the staff for Kosovo in
9 Pristina. So that is this functional way of reporting because the report
10 is sent to the crime police administration of the MUP.
11 Q. If it was a military conscript who had committed this crime, what
12 would you do then?
13 A. Well, I'm looking at this dispatch, page 3, in addition to the
14 description of the way it occurred, it is said that the usual procedure
15 was followed, the judge on duty, Drago Stoiljkovic, came on site. It says
16 the perpetrator is a military conscript, and therefore the military police
17 of the Army of Yugoslavia was informed and would proceed and take
18 appropriate measures against the said member of the VJ according to
20 Q. Did you have good cooperation with military bodies?
21 A. Yes, we did.
22 Q. Did they assist you in the follow-up when their members were
24 A. I can speak only in my own name. We had good cooperation when
25 suspects, perpetrators, were members of the military and a good number of
1 these cases were elucidated and prosecuted.
2 Q. What is the usual procedure when the first report of a crime comes
3 in to the duty service?
4 A. When a duty service receives a report that a crime is committed --
5 has been committed, let's say the most serious crime, murder, it sends a
6 patrol to secure the site. If there is no patrol available in the
7 vicinity of the site, then the duty service urgently sends a patrol from
8 the duty service itself. That patrol goes to the site to secure the site
9 and to meet the patrol that normally works in that sector. At the same
10 time, an urgent report is sent to the investigating judge on duty, and he
11 comes with his entire team; and from the moment of his arrival it is the
12 investigating judge who takes over the entire procedure.
13 Q. What is the next type of reporting after urgent?
14 A. It is daily reporting. A daily bulletin of incidents is made up
15 in the duty service listing all the incidents and events for the past 24
16 hours. Up to 400 hours, that is 4.00 a.m., the duty service must send
17 that bulletin to the duty operations centre in Belgrade, which receives
18 such bulletins from 33 different secretariats. And on the basis of all
19 these 33 it proceeds to draft the daily bulletin of the Ministry of the
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a second.
22 Can I just go back slightly on this. You said that the
23 perpetrator of that killing was a VJ military conscript --
24 MR. LUKIC: It's in paragraph 5.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: So you -- you would have nothing more to do with
1 the matter; is that the position?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the moment when the
3 investigating judge comes to the scene, he leads all further
4 investigation, he organizes the crime police from the SUP of Gnjilane to
5 assist him, and the whole procedure ends with the filing of a criminal
7 JUDGE BONOMY: The --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the police is concerned,
9 that is, the procedure ends with a filing of a criminal report. And if I
10 may add, that criminal report may later be qualified differently by the
11 prosecutor --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Filed where?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the prosecution office.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Which prosecution office?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Municipal or district. Since this
16 is a homicide, it would be in the district prosecutor's office in the town
17 of Gnjilane.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: What's puzzling me is one of your answers is
19 partially translated as follows, it says the perpetrator is a military
20 conscript, and therefore the military police of the VJ was informed and
21 would proceed and take appropriate members -- measures against the said
22 member of the VJ.
23 And what I'm trying to sort out in my mind is whether this
24 particular event was dealt with through the ordinary civil process or
25 whether it was dealt with by military justice. Can you answer that?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to explain. At the
2 moment when this incident occurred, nobody knew it was a military
3 conscript. When it was found out from operative sources that it was a
4 military conscript, the investigating judge has already done his work.
5 The criminal report was filed by the SUP to the prosecutor's office. What
6 happens later, whether the case was given to the military prosecutor, the
7 police doesn't know. And as to why we informed the military police,
8 that's because they have their own different procedures, such as
9 disciplinary proceedings. I don't want to go into the regulations
10 governing the Army of Yugoslavia, but I believe that is so.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: The reason I'm going back over this with you is
12 that in quite a number of examples that we see of crimes being committed,
13 my impression is that there is loads of room for the investigation to fall
14 between two stools; and here was one I thought we might nail, but no such
15 luck. So let's proceed.
16 Mr. Lukic.
17 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. [Interpretation] We stopped at daily reporting and that you had to
19 file your daily report by 4.00 a.m. the next morning to the base of the
20 ministry in Belgrade. I'd like to ask you, after the beginning of
21 air-strikes, was it always possible to file this daily report on time?
22 A. No, it was not because the system of communications was broken
23 down, was disrupted, the daily report was sent by courier depending on the
24 situation that day, sometimes the bulletin would be several days late.
25 Q. What did the duty operations centre of the ministry do with the
1 bulletins they received from you?
2 A. I think I've already said this, but I'll repeat. The duty
3 operations centre, once it receives daily bulletins from 33 secretariats,
4 proceeds to write a daily bulletin covering all of Serbia with all its
5 security-related events and incidents; and to whom this bulletin is sent,
6 that is something the chief of secretariat decides.
7 Q. We said there was urgent and daily reporting. What is the third
9 A. Periodical reporting, that would be monthly and annual. The
10 analytics department, once it had received all daily bulletins, prepares a
11 monthly bulletin and the same happens once a year, an annual analysis is
12 made, and again the chief of sector decides to whom this is sent.
13 Q. Did secretariats of internal affairs from Kosovo and Metohija have
14 the obligation to send their periodical reports to the MUP staff in Kosovo
15 and Metohija?
16 A. The periodical ones, no, only urgent and daily.
17 Q. In practice did you send those periodical reports to the staff?
18 We know now that you didn't have, but did you?
19 A. I can't remember. I can't remember whether the periodical report
20 was sent to them in practice. I don't think so.
21 Q. Thank you. After the air-strikes began, you said it was
22 technically no longer possible to send reports the normal way. You sent
23 them by messenger, by courier, that's from your end; but did you have
24 problems receiving reports from lower organizational units?
25 A. It was absolutely the same. When we were receiving reports from
1 Vitina, Kosovska Kamenica, or elsewhere, again we had to use courier
2 service and bulletins would come in late depending on the situation on the
4 Q. On the territory of your secretariat, do you remember when the
5 telephone and telegraph traffic stopped?
6 A. In the night of the 28th of March, the SUP Pristina was hit and
7 all telephone and telegraph lines were destroyed, several days later the
8 post office was bombed, and that was the moment when we in our secretariat
9 shifted to courier service. It was a very dangerous situation and fear
10 from air-strikes was great. At one point we in the police even threw away
11 our cell phones because they were emitting signals of mobile telephony and
12 that could be used for locating.
13 Q. I'd like to ask you now something about work-plans. Who made the
14 general work-plan for all organizational units in the entire territory of
16 A. The general work-plan was made by the Ministry of the Interior,
17 for the territory of the whole republic it would make a general work-plan,
18 and then organizational units would work according to that plan.
19 Q. Do you know which document governs this procedure?
20 A. That is stipulated in the rules of internal organization of the
21 MUP, and this work-plan is binding the secretariats to make their own
22 work-plans. They have to do this according to the format prescribed by
23 particular administrations, such as the crime police administration. They
24 get a list of points that have to be covered and every department of crime
25 police has to follow the format prescribed by the general crime police
2 Q. So the work-plans are made according to prescribed lines?
3 A. Yes. Lower-level work-plans are made for separate lines of work,
4 and if the administration in charge verifies, let's say, the work-plan
5 made by the Gnjilane department then Gnjilane was free to follow their
6 work-plan. If there were any corrections to be made, the draft work-plan
7 would be returned to the department and revised and then sent again.
8 Q. We'll continue on this topic, but now we have to take a break.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Gavranic, we have to break now for lunch, that
10 will be for an hour. Could you please leave the courtroom with the usher,
11 and we will see you again at 1.45.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.46 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Please continue, Mr. Lukic.
17 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Gavranic, we were talking about plans,
19 according to which organizational units of the Ministry of the Interior
20 worked. Could you please tell us what organ verifies the work-plans of
21 the organizational units of the Ministry of the Interior?
22 A. Verification is carried out by the administrations in charge, that
23 is to say the administration of the crime police, they verify the plan of
24 the crime police department in Gnjilane and so on and so forth.
25 Q. What is the role of the secretariat of the interior in that
2 A. The secretariat of the interior brings together these individual
3 plans of work, and it makes its own plan of work on the basis of
4 priorities that had been set by the administrations that are in charge.
5 Q. At the time when you were in Kosovo and Metohija, did the MUP
6 staff in Kosovo and Metohija adopt a plan or plans according to which
7 organizational units of the ministry worked?
8 A. As far as I know, no, it didn't in 1999.
9 Q. As for the work-plans, did you send them to the MUP staff for
11 A. No. The work-plans were sent for verification to the headquarters
12 of the responsible administrations in Belgrade.
13 Q. Were reports being sent on the implementation of the plan?
14 A. Yes, there are regular reports on the implementation of the plan,
15 as we said previously when we were talking about reporting.
16 Q. So who are these reports sent to on the implementation of the
18 A. These reports on the implementation of the plan are sent to the
19 administrations in charge in Belgrade, the one for crime, the one for the
20 crime police and then for the traffic police, and so on and so forth not
21 to go into all of them.
22 Q. Do these reports affect the general evaluation of the work of the
23 secretariats of the interior and the employees employed therein?
24 A. Yes, on the basis of the implementation of these plans. It is the
25 entire secretariat and every individual employed in the secretariat that
1 is assessed precisely on that basis according to the implementation of
2 these plans, and that is what the performance evaluation depends on for
3 individuals and secretariats.
4 Q. Your secretariat in Gnjilane, did it send plans -- reports on the
5 implementation of their work-plans to the MUP staff in Pristina?
6 A. Not in 1999, when I was chief, we did not send such reports to the
8 Q. Now I would like to call up in e-court 6D269.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you look at that, Mr. Gavranic, can you tell
10 us your understanding of the purpose of the MUP staff for Kosovo?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I experienced the staff as an
12 auxiliary organ that helped us, the secretariats, in our work in every
13 way. When we needed assistance in any way, when we needed consultations
14 to take place and things like that, especially in wartime. It was easier
15 to get to Pristina, for couriers to get to Pristina rather than Belgrade.
16 So my experience of it was it being an auxiliary body that helped us do
17 our work at the SUPs.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give an example of the assistance?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, for example, for instance, say
20 material resources, material technical resources that were lacking, if we
21 needed something like that, then we would send an urgent request through
22 the staff so that this be submitted to the secretariats. So everything we
23 asked for starting with these logistics or some technical equipment. I
24 mean, after all when the staff would ask for this it would be easier for
25 us to get it.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give me a specific example that actually
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, for example, we need
4 passports. We send a request for passports and we ask the staff if they
5 have some in their reserves; and if they did have any reserves, then we
6 would get this from the staff. If they had an instrument that had to do
7 with crime investigations, we would get that in relation to an
8 investigation regarding a particular case or crime.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm finding difficult to understand at the
10 moment is why there should be some body that's not a normal organizational
11 unit established to provide extra passports or a crime investigation tool.
12 These don't sound like bodies that -- things that need a body established
13 for the fight against terrorism to be involved. Is that a -- is that the
14 most important they did for you?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, and I was chief in
16 Zrenjanin for many years before that, there always was a staff in
17 Pristina. I mentioned a few ad hoc examples, just off the cuff, but the
18 staff had an analysis person who had better insight into the overall
19 situation with regard to all of these areas for which there are
20 secretariats. The staff brought all of this together, this entire subject
21 matter, and I believe that it helped a great deal thereby in terms of all
22 the reports that were made at the level of public security. That was our
23 experience of it, as an auxiliary body, really.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Gavranic, do you have before you document
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. In relation to this document, first of all, what's this all about?
5 A. This is a dispatch of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia dated the
6 18th of February, 1999, that was sent out to the organizational units of
7 the public security section in headquarters; to the SUP, all 33 of them;
8 the staff of the ministry in Pristina; the police stations, from 1 to 35;
9 to the RDB; and it was sent by the assistant minister, head of the public
10 security section, Colonel-General Vlastimir Djordjevic.
11 Q. SPP?
12 A. Stations of the border police, because they are directly linked to
13 appropriate administrations of the ministry.
14 Q. In 1999, did you work according to a plan that you had elaborated
15 on the basis of the programme of the ministry for that year?
16 A. Yes, we made this plan at the beginning of the year, and we
17 started working on the basis of that plan.
18 Q. The SUP of Gnjilane, in February and March 1999, did it receive
19 any dispatches from the minister and from the head of the public security
20 section saying what the priority tasks were in the coming period?
21 A. We did receive dispatches, I see that this was one of those
22 dispatches, as far as I remember we got two or three dispatches, and
23 priority tasks are set in these dispatches in accordance with the
24 circumstances involved.
25 Q. Does this dispatch have priority in relation to the plan that had
1 been previously elaborated?
2 A. Yes, it does. This dispatch significantly changes the plans on
3 the basis of which we were working. That is to say that this dispatch
4 sets the priorities in our future work and this is the 18th of February,
5 1999, this is a time of great tensions because of the Rambouillet talks
6 and the expected aggression. And I see that what is ordered here are
7 measures that are based on a plan or that leave aside the plans on the
8 basis of which we started working at the beginning of the year. As far as
9 I can see here, the priority tasks of the SUPs are spelled out here as
10 well as of the appropriate administrations.
11 Q. All right. Let us move on now and look at paragraph 1. It
12 says: "Update the defence plan, focusing on the plan of stand-by
13 measures, mobilisation plan, and plan of organizations preparations for
14 defence." And then it says further on: "Particularly update
15 establishment lists of active and reserve policemen, recruit to full
16 capacity, the 21st through 87th Detachments of the PJP," and so on.
17 Tell us, what's the defence plan actually?
18 A. This defence plan is one that every SUP had. The officer for
19 defence preparations within the police prepared that, so this person had
20 precisely what is mentioned here. What is requested here is that at this
21 point in time, in the month of February, this plan be activated, and
22 according to the plan on stand-by measures, mobilisation plan, and plan
23 for organizations preparations for defence. So the level of readiness of
24 the SUP was supposed to be upgraded on the whole and mobilisation was
25 supposed to be carried out and lists of reservists were supposed to be
1 updated; and then also one had to see on the basis of this plan what
2 facilities should be preserved in case of an aggression, is it the SUP
3 building, police stations, and so on. So these plans were plans that all
4 the SUPs had and they were elaborated by the officer that existed for
5 these purposes in every SUP.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please now call up in e-court
8 Q. Do you have the document in front of you?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who sent this dispatch and when, tell us, please?
11 A. This is a dispatch dated the 24th of March, 1999, it was sent by
12 the minister, Vlajko Stojiljkovic. This is a dispatch that was sent
13 precisely when the state of war was declared.
14 Q. What's the distinction between this dispatch and the previous one
15 dated the 18th of February, 1999, that was marked as 6D269?
16 A. Well, what I see here in the first paragraph is that the minister
17 does invoke this dispatch of the 18th of February, 1999, and then he says
18 even more specifically what the priority tasks of the SUP -- SUPs are.
19 And then he says in even more specific terms what the priority task is in
20 the further work of the secretariats of the interior at that point in
21 time, because after all it is the 24th of March, 1999, that is to say that
22 the aggression had already been carried out.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please call up in e-court
24 document 6D132.
25 Q. Who sent this dispatch, please?
1 A. This dispatch was sent by Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic on the 25th
2 of March, 1999.
3 Q. What's the difference now between this dispatch and the previous
4 two that were marked as 6D269 and 6D238?
5 A. Well, dispatch -- this dispatch in paragraph 1 invokes the two
6 previous ones, but it spells out even more specifically what the
7 priorities and priority tasks of the secretariats of the interior are. I
8 am trying to find it here, the minister instructing --
9 Q. Number 2.
10 A. Yes, mobilise reservists and so on and so forth. So it spells out
11 our priority tasks in even more specific terms. The bombing had already
12 started, it was already in full sway.
13 Q. So what was the point of these dispatches, all three dispatches,
14 in relation to the annual plan of the SUP of Gnjilane?
15 A. The essence of all three dispatches is in the following: They
16 completely leave aside the plan that we had had. According to that plan,
17 we continued doing police work but these were our priorities, this set the
18 priorities, and everything else was done only once all of these priorities
19 were taken care of.
20 Q. If you look at this dispatch or a similar one, did you ever
21 receive something like that in Kosovo and Metohija from the staff -- the
22 MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija?
23 A. No, we never received any such dispatch from the MUP staff in
24 Kosovo and Metohija.
25 Q. Now let us move on to disciplinary responsibility, and I am going
1 to ask you the following: Is disciplinary responsibility envisaged and
2 prescribed for members of the police?
3 A. Yes, disciplinary responsibility is prescribed for the members of
4 the police on the basis of the Law on the Interior, and I think that it is
5 also based on a decree and on the rule book for -- of conduct.
6 Q. P1737 is the relevant exhibit; the decree and disciplinary
7 responsibility in the MUP is P1016; and the rule book on the internal
8 organization of the MUP is 3, or rather, 6D1305. I'm not going to use
9 these documents for the time being, but I'm going to ask you what kind of
10 violations can there be of work duty?
11 A. There can be light infractions and more serious ones.
12 Q. I'm going to ask you to focus on this. You were chief before the
13 bombing started and -- I mean chief in Zrenjanin. From the 1st of
14 January, 1999, you became the chief in Gnjilane and you stayed there until
15 after the bombing started, you stayed in Gnjilane. So let us subdivide
16 this into two periods. Up until the beginning of April when a bylaw was
17 passed and a period before that. So now I'm going to ask you the
18 following: Before the beginning of the war, who takes measure in terms of
19 light infractions and who does it in the case of serious infractions?
20 A. At the level of the Gnjilane SUP for lighter infractions, measures
21 are passed by the chief of the SUP; and in the second instance it would be
22 the disciplinary court at the SUP level.
23 Q. After the bombing began at a specific time were there any changes
24 in this area?
25 A. Yes, sometime in early April a decree was published regulating
1 these matters, and it was different.
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to have Exhibit 6D133
3 on the e-court, please.
4 Q. Did the Gnjilane SUP receive a dispatch on the disciplinary
5 responsibility in time of war?
6 A. Yes, yes, it did.
7 Q. And is this this dispatch?
8 A. Yes, that is the dispatch.
9 Q. Who sent the dispatch?
10 A. It was sent by the assistant of the relevant sector of the
11 Ministry of Interior, Colonel Vlastimir Djordjevic.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Colonel-General
13 Vlastimir Djordjevic.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the last page of this
15 document on e-court, please.
16 Q. Do you recognise General Djordjevic's handwriting?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now we can go back to the first page, please.
19 Can you please tell us who were the recipients of this dispatch?
20 A. The dispatch was received by the secretariats of internal affairs,
21 organizational units at the head office of the ministry, the college of
22 internal affairs, secondary school of internal affairs, the disciplinary
23 court, and the higher disciplinary court.
24 Q. Is the MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija among the recipients?
25 A. No, you can see that it is not.
1 Q. This dispatch, does it explain, among other things, the
2 disciplinary responsibility topic?
3 A. Yes, this decree relates to the decree on wartime where
4 disciplinary responsibilities also clarify. The decree explains how to
5 pass measures relating disciplinary responsibility in these new
6 conditions, and the sentences or punishments were increased and those who
7 were deciding on the measures were changed. So there were different
8 people now responsible for passing the sentences and there was a different
10 Q. In the first paragraph we see the decree on internal affairs
11 during the state of war that was published on the 17th -- on the 7th of
12 April, 1999, and the actual decree bears the date the 9th of April,
13 1999 -- dispatch.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now turn to page 2.
15 Q. On the top third of the page there is a paragraph beginning chief
16 of the public security sector. Can you please read that paragraph?
17 A. "The chief of the public security sector has authorised the
18 leaders of the organizational units to pass decreed measures and
19 punishments for more serious infringements of work, duties, and
20 obligations," and this is being attached.
21 Q. [No interpretation]
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the question.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, specifically the chief of the
24 SUP now said in this new decree, which is mentioned in the dispatch, that
25 a punishment in the first degree for more serious violations, whereas
1 before these more serious violations were dealt with by the higher
2 disciplinary court.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 6D1342, please.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: What are you saying is the change here in relation
5 to more serious offences?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The change was only in who was
7 passing these measures. Now, before the dispatch and this decree for more
8 serious infringements the chief of SUP could not pass a punishment; it was
9 the disciplinary court at the level of the SUP. In the second instance,
10 because it's a two-step procedure, the higher court in Belgrade was
11 responsible. With this dispatch, the chief of the SUP who at that time
12 passed sentences for less-serious infringements was now authorised to pass
13 measures for more serious infringements of work duties in the first
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you see 6D1342 in front of you --
17 MR. STAMP: Your Honour, the objection I raised earlier applies to
18 this one, it also applies to the previous one for which we had late
19 notification. But this one is compounded by the fact that I can't find
20 the translation to this document. If we had had an earlier notification,
21 if it is a shorter document, I might have been able to get a slight
23 JUDGE BONOMY: When should these have been notified?
24 MR. STAMP: My understanding of the rule is that they ought to
25 have been notified on, at the latest, last Thursday.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, can you tell us what the position?
2 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. During the testimony of
3 Mr. Mijatovic actually this was raised, and I think it's stayed unclear
4 after his testimony. So we -- only after he finished his testimony I was
5 able to continue my work with this witness and try to clarify that field
6 or area for Your Honours and for everybody in the courtroom too. But I
7 understand the procedure, actually, disciplinary procedure inside MUP of
8 Serbia. So the fact is that really we sent it -- I don't know, we sent
9 two groups of documents, one on I think Saturday and one yesterday, and
10 it -- it is the late notice, we admit it.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there a translation for this one?
12 MR. LUKIC: We just checked. We don't have a translation for this
14 [Defence counsel confer]
15 MR. LUKIC: This one is only continuation of the previous one, so
16 it just gives more specifics.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: And what is it you intend to ask the witness about
18 this one?
19 MR. LUKIC: I just want to establish the sending, to whom, and to
20 read one paragraph, paragraph 2 on the first page.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE BONOMY: We will allow you to continue with reference to
23 this document, but it is unfortunate, Mr. Lukic, that this is happening.
24 And if necessary, we will grant indulgence to Mr. Stamp to enable him to
25 prepare adequately for cross-examination. Meanwhile, please continue with
1 the document.
2 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, I know that you don't like to talk about
3 this topic in details, but I was just informed that all our documents are
4 now rejected by the CLSS, except for the witness statements.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: That's something I find it very difficult to accept
6 as a bold statement, Mr. Lukic. There's no point in us debating it here,
7 I don't know the circumstances, but you can rest assured I will make
8 urgent inquiries into the circumstances and find out what the position is
9 and I will deal with it tomorrow.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Meanwhile proceed.
12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
13 Q. Mr. Gavranic, you have this document in front of you, 6D1342?
14 A. Yes, it's here.
15 Q. Who is send this document, please?
16 A. The document is being sent by the MUP of Serbia public security
18 Q. Who signed it?
19 A. It was signed by the assistant minister
20 General-Major Petar Zekovic.
21 Q. To whom is it being sent -- actually, let's cut it short. Let's
22 not spend too much time on this. Is the MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija
23 among the recipients?
24 A. No, it isn't.
25 Q. Can you please read the second paragraph, please.
1 A. "In the disciplinary proceedings for a serious infringement of
2 work duties and obligations, the disciplinary report is being submitted by
3 the direct manager, the chief of the department, the chief of the station,
4 the chief of independent sector, and so on to the head of the basic
5 organizational units (the chief of the headquarters at the seat the chief
6 of the secretariat director or other)."
7 Q. Just one clarification, please. We will continue. I think it is
8 quite clear in the transcript after all.
9 Who is authorised according to this dispatch for the -- these
10 infringements? Is it the same instance as in the previous dispatch and
11 can you just -- but it's explained in more detail?
12 A. Yes, it's the same as in the previous dispatch but it's explained
13 here in more detail.
14 Q. Now I would like you to look at 6D885.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] And can we please look at that on
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that on the same subject?
18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. You see the document in front of you?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What is the date on this document?
24 A. This is a document of the 2nd of September, 1998.
25 Q. Which SUP is it?
1 A. It's the SUP in Zrenjanin, the police department.
2 Q. At the time who was the chief of the SUP in Zrenjanin?
3 A. I was the chief of the SUP in Zrenjanin at the time.
4 Q. And what does this document deal with? Just tell us. You don't
5 have to read it.
6 A. This is a disciplinary infringement by a policeman from Zrenjanin
7 committed at the time he was sent to Kosovo and Metohija on assignments
8 with the PJP. The infringement was committed in Kosovo and Metohija and
9 the disciplinary proceedings were conducted by us in the Zrenjanin SUP.
10 Q. And what was the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings?
11 A. From what I can see here, it involved dismissal, and he did appeal
12 to the higher disciplinary court which actually upheld the decision on
13 dismissal from what I can see here. It was a serious violation of work
14 duties, and the measure that was passed for this was dismissal from his
16 Q. Thank you. For a person to be employed at the Ministry of
17 Internal Affairs, what sort of background check did have to be done?
18 JUDGE BONOMY: You're now moving -- if you're moving away, I would
19 like to understand this in simple language.
20 What was the change made in the disciplinary procedure in -- at
21 the beginning of the April 1999? Just tell us in simple language what
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's like this.
24 Everything stayed the same as far as violations of work duty is concerned,
25 but the disciplinary courts, or rather, those organs that were passing the
1 sentences were different. So broader authorisation or authority was given
2 to the chief of the SUP as of April. The disciplinary courts were always
3 two steps -- I apologise to the interpreters.
4 For lighter violations of work duties there is a dual procedure.
5 At the level of the secretariat the sentence at the first instance is
6 passed by the chief of SUP. If the worker appeals, then he's sent to the
7 disciplinary court that exists in the SUP. If it's a more serious
8 infringement then the disciplinary procedure at the first instance is
9 conducted by the disciplinary court at the level of the secretariat. And
10 then the higher disciplinary court kicks in if the worker appeals, and
11 that's at the level of the SUP in Belgrade. This decree then changed the
12 situation. Now, the chief of the SUP was authorised, so he no longer
13 passed measures for light violations but in the first instance for serious
14 violations of work duties and obligations. So his authority has been
15 broadened and the sentences were stricter. Excuse me, please.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: And who was the appeal to then?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The disciplinary prosecutor or the
18 actual employee could submit the appeal. The worker could always engage a
19 defence attorney, at any step he could do that. I mean, I didn't really
20 go into that much, but they could all lodge an appeal.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Were there still two levels of appeal?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, who were the people on these disciplinary
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The disciplinary court comprised -
1 and you can see that from the dispatches - of people who worked at the
2 Ministry of Internal Affairs. So at the level of the ministry the higher
3 disciplinary court included -- I saw generals and at the SUP level in
4 Gnjilane or Zrenjanin we formed a disciplinary court comprising the
5 employees at the Gnjilane or the Zrenjanin SUP. We would make up a trial
6 panel, a panel of judges.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Does it follow from what you've said, Mr. Gavranic,
9 that at the less-serious level the members of the disciplinary court were
10 your inferior officers, your subordinate officers?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. If we are talking about the
12 month of April and the decree, members of the disciplinary court within
13 the SUP were the second-degree body in charge of lighter violations of
14 duties in service. I was the disciplinary organ for --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I understand that. The point I'm making to you
16 I want to be clear about is, in their ordinary, everyday jobs, the people
17 who made up the lower disciplinary court were actually subordinate
18 officers of yours in the SUP?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean in the hierarchy, when they
20 are doing their regular jobs? In terms of hierarchy, when they are not
21 members of the disciplinary court they are subordinate to me; when they
22 are sitting in a panel, they are not, they are independent.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, some of us would find that difficult to
24 understand. Anyway, please -- I've now understood the set-up which seems
25 rather strange, but please continue, Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] These disciplinary courts have nothing to do with
3 criminal liability, do they?
4 A. No. Criminal liability is decided by regular courts. This is
5 disciplinary liability.
6 Q. Can two proceedings, disciplinary and criminal, be parallel?
7 A. Yes, and they do.
8 Q. I'd like to ask you something about finding employment with the
9 ministry. In order for a person to be admitted on a job at the ministry,
10 what kind of vetting did they have to go through?
11 A. To be accepted in a vacancy at the ministry, they had to undergo
12 vetting that was much stricter than anywhere else in the republic.
13 Medical examination in specialised institutions, information was asked
14 from the judiciary and courts, vetting was also done by the police
15 covering their territory concerning personal information. So the
16 requirements to be met before one is employed with the ministry were much
17 higher than elsewhere.
18 Q. What kind of units did this apply to?
19 A. All employees of the MUP, all employees of the MUP had to be
20 vetted in this way.
21 Q. We heard how you came to become the chief of SUP Gnjilane. What
22 did your predecessor inform you about as he was handing over his duties to
24 A. Before me this post was occupied by Colonel Vladica Milosavljevic,
25 who was going to retire. During hand-over, take-over, of duties he
1 informed me about the state of affairs in various areas, various fields of
2 activity for which the SUP was in charge. What was important to me was
3 that there were no terrorist actions in 1998 when he was chief; and
4 therefore there were no anti-terrorist actions. No units were sent to
5 Gnjilane from Serbia proper and there were no detachments active in the
6 area of SUP Gnjilane.
7 Q. When did the KLA appear in your territory, if they appeared?
8 A. According to my information, it was in the beginning of 1990 [as
9 interpreted] that the KLA made a more serious appearance, namely, in
10 Kosovska Kamenica. More precisely, from the information I received from
11 the state security sector, there was an operative zone established called
12 Karadak, an operative zone of the KLA involving two brigades, 171 and 172
13 Brigades of the KLA, but they were passive to begin with in that period.
14 MR. STAMP: May I just inquire, the record at page 93, line 5, the
15 date or the year is correct. I thought I heard something else in the
17 MR. LUKIC: Thank you to my learned friend.
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Gavranic, let's clear up one thing?
19 MR. STAMP: Is it correct?
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. When did the KLA appear in the territory of your SUP?
22 A. Beginning 1999, beginning 1999.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you know which brigades of the KLA began to act
25 A. I already said that --
1 Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I was looking for that error in the
2 transcript, and I missed your answer; you've given it.
3 Was it in Gnjilane that the regional centre of the OSCE was set
5 A. Yes. The regional centre of the OSCE headed by Richard Heaslip
6 with the deputy Mr. Crnjakov was set up, and there were coordination
7 centres in Gnjilane, Kosovska Kamenica, and Vitina; and they had offices
8 [Realtime transcript read in error "officers"] in three villages, one
9 purely Albanian, one purely Serbian, and one mixed. The Albanian village
10 was Pozaranje, Raniluk was a purely Serbian village, and Zitinja was a
11 mixed village.
12 Q. Were there any problems with their activities?
13 A. As for cooperation with the OSCE, I think it was very fair, very
14 correct. We met every Monday to exchange any information we had about
15 incidents, although their activity was sometimes inconsistent with the
16 mandate, their mandate, as we were informed of it. They were frequently
17 in the border belt on the Macedonian border, and this cooperation we had
18 had to do with reporting crimes and cross-checking information because it
19 often happened that ethnic Albanians were reluctant to report a crime to
20 us, and then an OSCE officer in charge of crime investigation would come;
21 and we would cross-check our information, and we would realize that
22 some -- we had missed something and then we would go on site to perform an
23 on-site investigation if we had been advised of the incident by the OSCE
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, the transcript reflects that OSCE had
1 officers in three villages, was it officers or offices?
2 MR. LUKIC: I think offices.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, thank you.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Gavranic, let's move to another subject. Could you tell us
6 something about inter-ethnic relations in the area of your secretariat in
7 early 1999?
8 A. In the first months of 1999 there was already noticeable tension
9 in the territory of our secretariat, as in the whole Kosovo and Metohija,
10 but there were no major disruptions between ethnic communities nor were
11 there any major crimes perpetrated at that time there were no killings,
12 rapes, and aggravated robberies. All I can remember is one terrorist
13 action against the clinic of Dr. Sadiku, a bomb was thrown from a car and
14 we filed a criminal report against an unidentified perpetrator. There was
15 tension, it could be felt, but there were not -- the incidence of crime
16 was not high.
17 Q. And who was the injured party by ethnicity?
18 A. An Albanian, Dr. Sadiku.
19 Q. Did OSCE representatives inform you they had to leave your area?
20 A. Yes, if it was an important matter. On the 19th in the evening
21 they requested a meeting, I mean the 19th of March, and they asked SUP
22 Gnjilane to provide them with safe passage as they leave. We agreed that
23 the next morning the patrols that would secure their evacuation should do
24 their job, and early in the morning on the 20th of March they left the
25 area of SUP Gnjilane.
1 Q. The events continued to develop as they did, but do you remember
2 when the state of immediate threat of war was proclaimed?
3 A. That was on the 23rd and 24th of March, 1999.
4 Q. What happened after?
5 A. The air-strikes began. The first bomb fell in Silovo village, and
6 that's why I remember it. It fell on the house of the chief of the duty
7 service, his entire family was there. It happened at 8.05 on the 24th and
8 then the air-strikes began on the whole Gnjilane and environs. Chaos and
9 panic reigned.
10 Q. Was it then that some units were deployed in your area and whose
12 A. Yes, when the state of immediate threat of war and the state of
13 war were proclaimed, VJ units were deployed across the area of the SUP of
15 Q. Can you list some installations and targets that were hit in the
16 first days of the war?
17 A. The barracks that was in the town of Gnjilane itself was bombed
18 relentlessly, but also some industrial complexes, construction businesses,
19 motorists' societies, businesses that were essential to the economic life.
20 Q. Was there bombing outside the town of Gnjilane?
21 A. I've already told you that the Army of Yugoslavia took up position
22 mainly outside population centres, so the positions of the VJ were bombed
23 but bombs also fell on population centres and that's why a large number of
24 residents started to flee in the first days of the war. That was what the
25 situation was like.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Gavranic, the bomb that fell on the house that
2 you say of the chief of the duty service and his family, were they killed
3 by that?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fortunately, no. The bomb passed
5 through the entire house and exploded in the back yard. His wife and
6 daughters were inside the house, and it was very fortunate that no one was
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you tell what the target was?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. That's a village
10 several kilometres away from Gnjilane, 2 or 3 kilometres away from the
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 Mr. Lukic.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Could we now call up in e-court 6D209.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have this document, 209.
17 6D209 you said?
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I think it's a map of Gnjilane. We have it on the screen now.
20 Could the usher please help you, give you a pen. Now I'm going to
21 ask you the following question: In your territory were there any
22 established MUP check-points when the bombing began.
23 A. When the bombing began, there were only at the very beginning a
24 few MUP check-points. But we were afraid that these check-points would
25 become a target for NATO bombs, so we oriented ourselves towards patrol
1 activities. However, for a short period of time they were there and from
2 time to time they were re-established but in a very discreet way, very
3 discreet way.
4 Q. Can you mark on the map, or rather, can you see this on the map,
5 can you see -- just a moment, please. Could you stop at this point?
6 MR. LUKIC: Can we have this map moved up or is it -- sorry,
7 sorry, that's fine. I see something completely different.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Gavranic, could you please mark these police
9 check-points for us at the beginning?
10 A. At the beginning of the war they were in the village of Klokot,
11 near the village of Klokot on the road, between Gnjilane-Urosevac. That
12 is one of the main roads. Then the road between Gnjilane and Vranje,
13 Kmetovci, so on the roads. It is mostly roads that were under police
15 Q. Could you please put number 1 next to your first dot and number 2
16 next to your second dot.
17 A. [Marks]
18 Q. Were there any others?
19 A. Well, there were but not check-points in a classical sense. These
20 were patrols that would stop there and control the movement of goods and
21 vehicles, but very discreetly because of this great fear of the bombing.
22 Q. Could you please take a different-coloured pen now or could the
23 usher help you and give you a different-coloured pen.
24 A. I don't know how to change the colour.
25 MR. LUKIC: May I ask for assistance, please, different colour.
1 It is.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Oh, you've changed it seems. So now can I ask
3 you the following: Were there any check-points of the Army of Yugoslavia
4 in your territory?
5 A. Yes, there were check-points of the Army of Yugoslavia too,
6 towards --
7 Q. Can you mark them?
8 A. They were very close to us, not in the village of Klokot but right
9 before the village of Klokot. It seems on the map here that Klokot is on
10 this main road, but it's not. It's further in-depth along the road to
11 Vitina and in Kmetovci, they also had a check-point, but again it is a bit
12 more on the side, that is where the check-point of the Army of Yugoslavia
13 is, as far as I know.
14 Q. Can you mark that?
15 A. Well, it's very nearby.
16 Q. And could you place numbers 3 and 4 there, Klokot 3 and the other
17 one can be number 4.
18 A. [Marks]
19 Q. Later on were joint check-points established?
20 A. Yes, joint check-points were established later.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could this exhibit please be given an
22 IC number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC188, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please call up in e-court
2 Q. You have it in front of you, Mr. Gavranic?
3 A. No, I don't. What was it 19 ...
4 Q. 89.
5 A. I have it.
6 Q. It is minutes of a meeting with senior police officials in Kosovo
7 and Metohija dated the 4th of April, 1999. Did you see this document
8 during proofing?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you see whether you attended this meeting?
11 A. I did attend in meeting.
12 Q. Could you please look at page 2 now, and I'd like to draw your
13 attention to paragraph 4. In paragraph 4 can you find your own name?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Could you tell us what it was that you reported about at that
16 meeting, you and your colleagues?
17 A. This was a meeting at the MUP staff on the 4th of April, so this
18 was a collegium meeting of the MUP in Pristina. We reported about the
19 state of security in the respective territories of our SUPs. Since it was
20 the 4th of April and since that was the first part of the bombing when
21 indeed there was fear, panic, many crimes were committed because passions
22 were aflame, and there was a lot of robbery, theft, killings; and we spoke
23 of what the situation was like at that point in time, and we talked about
24 the measures taken against the perpetrators. What the situation was in
25 respect of the population, that it started leaving the territory of the
1 secretariat, what the situation was regarding terrorists in the territory
2 of the secretariat, and so on.
3 Q. In which direction were people mainly going from your area?
4 A. At first, during those first few days of the bombing, for the most
5 part they went towards Serbia, women, children, irrespective of ethnic
6 background, women, children, old men, they all set off to Vranje first and
7 foremost. Some went to their relatives where they felt it was safe,
8 things like that.
9 Q. We see a reference to Vranje here as well, is Vranje in Kosovo
10 or --
11 A. No, no, Vranje it is in Serbia.
12 Q. You had information that some inhabitants were coming back to the
13 territory of your SUP from Vranje?
14 A. Yes, we were making some estimates at that point in time as to how
15 many people were moving out, how many people were going, how many people
16 were coming back, because it was the task of the police to encourage them
17 to stay on and to guarantee their safety and security, not to leave the
18 area, that everything would be fine in no time, and many people did indeed
19 come back. They would relocate their families but they would come back.
20 Because of the situation that prevailed, indeed there were a lot of
21 civilians, a lot of people on the roads.
22 Q. You as the SUP, did you regularly report on these occurrences?
23 A. Yes, that was the information that we discussed earlier on.
24 Q. When did civilians start leaving the village of Zegra and who were
25 they and why were they leaving?
1 A. Already during the first few days of the war the biggest migration
2 of civilians took place in the territory of the town of Gnjilane itself
3 and in the territory of the village of Zegra and the surrounding villages.
4 First of all, the Mucibaba mountain pass is up there and that was
5 taken up like the mountains towards Macedonia by the Army of Yugoslavia
6 and that was bombed the most. Those were the positions of the Army of
7 Yugoslavia that were bombed the most during those first few days, so there
8 was fear of bombing then there were multiple murders in the village of
9 Zegra. So the first refugees from the village of Zegra were actually
10 Serbs who arrived in Gnjilane because this was a mixed ethnic village, the
11 majority population was Albanian, and the Serb families moved out as they
12 feared revenge.
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 6D614 called up
14 in e-court, page --
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that --
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] -- 319.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Who's who in all of this is very difficult to
19 MR. LUKIC: We will clarify all those killings.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Please continue then.
21 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
22 Q. [Interpretation] We need the bottom of page 814.
23 A. Just a moment, please. Yes.
24 Q. What is 814 about, please.
25 A. Gnjilane on the 28th of March, 1999, aggravated theft under
1 Article 166; that's what I see.
2 Q. Can we look at the next page now, please, page 320, and would you
3 look at 815 through 821.
4 A. Yes. These are numerous crimes that were committed on the 28th of
5 March, aggravated theft and also there were cases of murder and arson.
6 Q. As for the persons mentioned here, were criminal reports filed
7 against them?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now I would like page 36 of this same exhibit, please.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just don't move just for a moment, please. These
11 are all aggravated theft unless -- there's one that we can't see.
12 MR. LUKIC: Those are all aggravated thefts. You're right, Your
14 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness said they included murder and arson --
15 MR. LUKIC: We're coming to that.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: We're coming that. Right. Thank you.
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] So now we need page 36, please,
18 paragraph 85.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. What was reported in paragraph 85?
22 A. On the 31st of March, 1999, causing public danger under Article
23 187 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, it is the crime of
24 arson, the injured party was unknown, and the perpetrators who were
25 arrested, Radancic Bojan, Petkovic Nenad, Marinkovic Sveta, Vuckovic
1 Svetomir, Denic Goran, and Radancic Dejan, all of them civilians. The
2 perpetrators were remanded in custody pursuant to Article 196 of the law
3 on criminal procedure. A criminal complaint was filed against the
4 identified perpetrators, and it was forwarded to the office of the
5 municipal public prosecutor in Gnjilane on the 3rd of April, 1999.
6 Q. What is the ethnicity of these persons who were arrested because
7 of theft at the end of March, and what is the ethnicity of these people
8 here who were charged with having committed the crime of arson?
9 A. Well, different ethnic backgrounds. There are Albanians and
10 Serbs, more Serbs as far as I can see here from these documents; but there
11 are people of different ethnic backgrounds involved.
12 Q. And now I'd like to deal with some other crimes and then we're
13 going to deal with the most serious ones.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we identify one committed by an Albanian,
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] For that we need page.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I mean among the ones we've seen so far.
18 MR. LUKIC: We need page 320. [Interpretation] We can see some
19 here, also just a moment, please. We've already reached 320.
20 Q. So can you see point 816?
21 A. Yes, the 28th of March, 1999, aggravated theft, Kajtazi Nehat was
22 the perpetrator a civilian from Vitina.
23 Q. What's his ethnic background?
24 A. Albanian.
25 Q. And now let us go back to page 36. We need number 87.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What kind of a crime is this, who is the injured party, and who is
3 the murderer?
4 A. On the 4th of April, 1999, the offence of murder was committed to
5 the detriment of Morina Nazim. Morina Ejup, a civilian of the village of
6 Odanovce, committed the offence. He was placed in detention pursuant to
7 Article 196 of the law on criminal procedure, and a criminal complaint was
8 filed and forwarded to the office of the district public prosecutor in
9 Gnjilane on the 7th of April, 1999.
10 Q. Did you tell us what the injured party and the accused person by
12 A. Both were Albanian.
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now show page 9, please, so
14 that we can discuss different kinds of crimes. We need number 21.
15 Q. Which crime was committed by whom against whom?
16 A. Kosovska Kamenica, 30th April, 1999, acts of indecency under
17 Article 108 of the Criminal Code of Serbia. The perpetrator was
18 Momcilo Jovanovic, a member of the reserve police force of the SUP in
19 Gnjilane, committed an act of indecency against Ismalji Emrije.
20 Q. Who were the perpetrator and injured party by ethnicity?
21 A. Perpetrator Serbian, injured party Albanian woman.
22 Q. What was done?
23 A. The perpetrator was -- had a criminal report filed against him and
24 was turned over to the criminal court in Gnjilane, he was remanded in
1 Q. We have to slow down a little. We have to turn to page 146, items
2 87 and 88.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do we have page 146?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Items 87 and 88, can you tell us -- 86 --
7 A. 87, Kosovska Kamenica --
8 Q. Could you take 86 first -- no, 87, that's your area.
9 A. 87 is Kosovska Kamenica, 7th May 1999, aggravated theft was
10 committed, as defined by Article 166 of the Criminal Code of Serbia. The
11 perpetrator was Sasa Arsic, member of the reserve police from the Gnjilane
12 SUP. He was a resident of the village of Berivojce in Kosovska Kamenica
13 municipality. He was remanded in custody under Article 196 of the Law on
14 Criminal Procedure. The injured party was not identified. A criminal
15 complaint KU 48/99 was filed against the perpetrator and submitted to the
16 municipal public prosecutor's office in Gnjilane.
17 Q. And item 88, please.
18 A. Gnjilane, 7th May 1999, again allege elevated theft under the aim
19 article, 166 of the Criminal Code of Serbia. Perpetrator was
20 Cvetko Petrovic, member of the reserve police with the Gnjilane SUP. He
21 was a resident of Bodrige village in Gnjilane municipality. He was
22 remanded in custody under Article 196. The injured party was not
23 identified. A criminal report was filed and submitted to the municipal
24 public prosecutor's office in Gnjilane.
25 Q. Page 147, please, item 94. Can we see what this is about? It's
1 end May 1999.
2 A. The crime is aggravated theft on 26th May 1999. The injured party
3 was Destan Mehmeti.
4 Q. Ethnicity?
5 A. Albanian. This crime was elucidated. The perpetrator was
6 Akagijan Dzemeilji from Gnjilane, again Albanian, member of the reserve
7 police force. He was remanded in custody and a criminal report was filed
8 with the municipal public prosecutor's office.
9 Q. Do you have that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. We can't see it on the screen yet, page 350. As far as I can see,
12 all these items are related to your area. What crimes are concerned in
13 all these items?
14 A. All of them are aggravated theft, Article 166 of the Criminal Code
15 of the Republic of Serbia.
16 Q. Was a criminal report filed in each of these cases?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. What is the ethnicity of all the accused here?
19 A. Serbs, civilians, as far as I can see.
20 Q. Thank you. We'll go back to the criminal offences, but to follow
21 the chronology we heard that air-strikes began. Do you know when it began
22 and do you know when the SUP in Pristina building was hit?
23 A. Yes, the night of the 28th March.
24 Q. When did you leave the building of SUP Gnjilane, if you left?
25 A. After the building of SUP Gnjilane [as interpreted] was destroyed,
1 all secretariats following a dispatch had to move and find another
2 location from which to work. Thus, the SUP in Gnjilane and the department
3 of internal affairs in Kosovska Kamenica and Vitina and the police station
4 in Novo Brdo, we all had to move to back-up locations that we frequently
5 changed throughout the war. Because the secretariats, the SUPs, were
6 regular targets during air-strikes.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, in line 23 there, was that a reference
8 to the building of the SUP in Pristina?
9 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Which SUP building was destroyed on the night of the 28th March?
13 A. The building of SUP Pristina.
14 Q. We speak too fast, both of us, and it's normal that this results
15 in mistakes. After you relocated from that building of SUP Gnjilane, did
16 the duty service continue to operate?
17 A. No. The jobs -- the functions of the duty service were quite
18 different in this situation, and in fact it ceased to operate because the
19 basic preconditions for its work no longer existed in Kosovska Kamenica,
20 Vitina, or in the police station in Novo Brdo.
21 Q. Very well.
22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up in e-court 6D335.
23 Q. Do you have this exhibit in front of you?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. I'm afraid we have no translation for this. I'll just ask you
1 what was this case about?
2 MR. STAMP: Well, I cease to object sometimes with these documents
3 because the witness is here, and he might as well speak about them while
4 he's here. But if the documents are untranslated could I request through
5 the Court that at least evidence is led as to the authenticity of the
6 document, what it is, before they go into the terms of the document.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, could you deal with that, please.
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Yes. Thank you.
9 Q. [Interpretation] On page 2 we see an official note. Could you
10 tell us where it was written, by whom?
11 A. This is an official note written on the 19th of July, 2001, on the
12 premises of SUP Gnjilane in Vranje related to an attempted murder, as
13 stipulated by Article 47/19 against Skender Seljimi from Zegra village,
14 Gnjilane municipality. On the 30th of March, 1999, at 1400 hours
15 Skender Seljimi from Zegra village, Gnjilane municipality reported to the
16 duty service that two members of the VJ perpetrated the crime of attempted
17 murder and robbery defined by appropriate articles of the Criminal Code in
18 his house. Upon receiving this report, members of the crime police
19 department of SUP Gnjilane brought into the SUP Stojan Markovic from
20 Grdelice and Dejan Jankovic from Leskovac, VJ members both. They were
21 remanded in custody under Article 196 on the Law on Criminal Procedure,
22 and on the 31st of March, 1999, a criminal report was filed against them
23 to the municipality prosecutor's office in Pristina Number KU 182/99,
24 follows the criminal report and all the rest.
25 Q. The injured party was what ethnicity?
1 A. Ethnic Albanian.
2 Q. Do you remember what was done after this, what was done with
3 this -- with these accused?
4 A. I remember the -- this incident in Zegra because it was typical
5 for the beginning of the war and that whole period in the area of SUP
6 Gnjilane. I think this charge was later changed, it was re-qualified
7 because the injured party died and court proceedings are not within the
8 jurisdiction of the SUP.
9 Q. Do you remember if this person was turned over to military
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you enjoy the support of the VJ prosecuting this and similar
14 A. In this initial period because of great problems in Zegra village,
15 we did have the support of VJ members, but the arrest was done by us.
16 Q. Bear with me a moment, please.
17 [Defence counsel confer]
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I'm trying to find a document that has been translated. I'd like
20 to call 6D69 in e-court. This is a case that's rather large, I mean the
21 file is rather large, 70 pages; so we won't go through them. But you say
22 that this case around Zegra is familiar to you. So tell us if you can
23 what happened the next day after that described incident, what happened in
24 the village?
25 A. In those last days of March, the 29th, 30th, 31st March, multiple
1 killings took place in the village of Zegra. After the first reports came
2 in about three murders, I believe it was at first, an on-site
3 investigation team went out, the investigation judge was informed and we
4 in SUP Gnjilane formed an operative group headed by the chief of crime
5 police. The job of that group was to deal with this and similar incidents
6 in the period that follows. We had knowledge that the perpetrators were
7 members of the Army of Yugoslavia. The investigating judge went out onto
8 the scene and performed an on-site investigation. The next day we
9 received another report of a multiple murder in the area of Zegra village.
10 Our response was the same. We formed an on-site investigation team and
11 informed the investigating judge, and according to our information, or
12 rather, based on our information, we made some arrests. We arrested a
13 rather large group of members of the Army of Yugoslavia, including
14 Vlado Zmajevic --
15 Q. I think you have some names on the screen in this document.
16 A. May I continue? Zmajevic -- Vlado Smajovic and others. These
17 arrests were very hard. I was helped by the garrison commander and the
18 arrests were made by the policemen of SUP Gnjilane. I'm saying it was
19 very hard because it was the initial chaos of war when everybody was
20 armed, everybody was dangerous, and we knew that if we don't react
21 appropriately to this first wave the existence of our SUP would become
22 pointless in the area we were covering.
23 Q. We still have little time before the break. Explain how the
24 arrest was made?
25 A. Upon learning of this crime, since it concerned members of the VJ,
1 I informed the superior whom I was able to locate at the moment and that
2 was garrison commander Ranko Milinovic. He asked me because he didn't
3 have the strength, and it was right at the beginning, those first few days
4 when military courts were still not operating. So I took a few reinforced
5 patrols of the police. I went to the site and in the usual police way, we
6 managed to bring in a large number of persons and identify the
7 perpetrators. We immediately remanded six VJ members in custody. We
8 informed the investigating judge and the prosecutor, and we informed the
9 military prosecutor's office.
10 Q. That's -- we just need a reference for the record regarding this
11 case in Zegra, it's 6D1127 and 6D810, but we're not going to open them
13 Could we now call up in e-court 6D333. Since we don't have the
14 translation, I'd like to ask you: Do you remember the murder of
15 Fitim Isufi in Zegra village?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I'd like to ask you in relation to all these incidents, in
18 addition to the particularly difficult conditions, that is, despite the
19 particularly difficult conditions, did the police go out to investigate on
21 A. Yes, even at the beginning of the war when the conditions were
22 impossible we tried to react to every report, regardless of who it was
23 about and whose jurisdiction it officially was. And I remember the person
24 you are mentioning now, it was a retarded person and we received a report
25 that his body was found somewhere in the first week of April in Zegra
1 village. Sometimes we had to wait for a couple of days before going out
2 to investigate because it was not safe to go into certain areas. It was a
3 mountainous area, and the lowest point was 500 metres above sea level.
4 Other areas were between 700 and 1200 metres above sea level. It was a
5 heavily wooded mountainous area, were dangerous for police work.
6 Q. Mr. Gavranic, I think that's all we can manage today. We'll
7 continue tomorrow.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
9 Mr. Gavranic, we have to conclude our proceedings for today at
10 this stage, and we shall resume tomorrow. That means you have to return,
11 I'm afraid, tomorrow to continue your evidence and hopefully complete it,
12 that will be at 9.00 tomorrow morning in this courtroom. Meanwhile, I
13 have to draw your attention to an important rule that we have, that you
14 must have no communication with anyone at all about the evidence in the
15 case between now and continuing your evidence tomorrow; and that applies
16 to any evidence in this case whether it's evidence we've heard or evidence
17 that may yet be heard. You can talk about anything else but absolutely no
18 communication whatsoever with anyone about the evidence.
19 Now could you please leave the courtroom with the usher, and we
20 shall see you again tomorrow at 9.00.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.33 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day
25 of February, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.