1 Monday, 19 May 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, everyone. Before we deal with the

6 evidence of the next witness, there's one thing we would like to clarify

7 with Mr. Hannis.

8 We've all throughout worked with photocopies of P1468, the notes

9 of the Joint Command meetings. There is reference in other documents

10 before the Trial Chamber to a bound book with a ring binder or spiral

11 binder. Do you have that book, Mr. Hannis?

12 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, I don't. I've been trying to track

13 that down since -- well, over the weekend to determine what the situation

14 is. I know in the -- what we call the MIF sheet, it used to be called --

15 I can't remember, the IF. It's the identification or information sheet

16 that's filled out when evidence is brought into the Tribunal, and it was

17 described as, I think, a blue notebook with a red binder, and I don't

18 know whether we actually received that or if that's how it was described

19 in the inventory that came with it when it when it was presented. As I

20 understand, Madam Del Ponte, who was the Prosecutor, received it from

21 Mr. Djindjic.

22 Now, I know with practically all the original documents that I'm

23 aware of that we get from Serbia, we don't actually get them. We're

24 allowed to look at them and make copies of them. I don't know if that's

25 what happened in this situation or not.

1 I know that when Mr. Djakovic was interviewed by Phil Coo in

2 2004, he was shown the -- the hard -- hard copy of the exhibit we have

3 been working with, which has the ERN K02284- -- 8412 to 8563, because in

4 his statement at paragraph 34 he says: "I have been shown by Philip Coo

5 a copy of an A4 document entitled Meetings Of the Joint Command For

6 Kosovo And Metohija." And there's a reference to the ERN number. He

7 says, "I recognise this as a copy of my notebook. This is absolutely my

8 hand writing. I could not be a hundred per cent certain whether anyone

9 took any pages from this. Having looked at it, I see that there's some

10 question marks beside some entires to mark where I missed a point or

11 could not fully understand."

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm aware of that, Mr. Hannis, but what actually

13 happens to the originals of evidence?

14 MR. HANNIS: The original evidence we have I understand are kept

15 in our evidence vault, and when we check in our evidence vault to see

16 what is there for what's our exhibit P1468, what we have is a Xerox copy.

17 Now, I've tried to contact Phil Coo over the weekend because he's my most

18 immediate link in the chain back to see if he can provide us any

19 additional information, but I haven't been able to actually speak with

20 him. He may be in later this morning. He's working at another Tribunal

21 now, Your Honour, not in this country, and that's -- that's where it

22 stands at the moment. I don't have any further information, but I'm

23 trying to find out.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

25 THE PROSECUTOR: And we do have a hard copy of what was in the

1 vault if you want it for the witness. I don't know if it's better than

2 what's in e-court. It's a printout.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: The next witness, then, will be Chamber witness

4 Milan Djakovic.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 WITNESS: MILAN DJAKOVIC

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Djakovic.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

11 speak the truth by reading aloud the document now shown to you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

13 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Questioned by the Court:

17 JUDGE BONOMY: First of all, may I thank you for responding to

18 the Chamber's invitation to give evidence here. It will come as no

19 surprise to you that your name has been mentioned on occasions in the

20 course of our evidence in a number of contexts, and the Chamber

21 considered it would be helpful to our consideration of the case to have a

22 further explanation from you of certain matters.

23 There are formalities at the beginning of the evidence that I'll

24 deal with first of all. Is your full name Milan Djakovic?

25 A. Yes.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: You're a retired general of the Yugoslav army?

2 A. Yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: When did you retire?

4 A. The 31st of December, 2001.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: And which specific rank did you hold?

6 A. Colonel general.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: What is your final position? Which post did you

8 retire from?

9 A. I retired from the post of deputy commander of the 1st Army.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: What is your date of birth?

11 A. The 23rd of October, 1948.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Since retiring from the army, have you had other

13 employment?

14 A. No.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: This case concerns principally 1998 and 1999. Can

16 you give us an account of the posts in the army that you held during 1998

17 and 1999, please.

18 A. In 1998, I was chief of the department for operations and

19 teaching in the command of the Pristina Corps from the 25th of December,

20 1997, up until -- up until around the 20th of January, 1999. After that,

21 I took up the position of the chief of department for operations and

22 training in the command of the 3rd Army, and I stayed on until the end of

23 the war, carrying out those duties, that is.

24 On the 4th of October, 1999, I was sent to the national defence

25 school or college in Belgrade where I stayed on until 1999 -- or, rather,

1 2000.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That's sufficient for my purposes at the moment.

3 When you were with the Pristina Corps, who was the commander of the

4 Pristina Corps?

5 A. The commander of the Pristina Corps was General Bojovic. When I

6 came for the first time, that is to say --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, I should have made it clear. In 1998 when

8 you were with the Pristina Corps, who was the commander?

9 A. In 1998, it was General Pavkovic.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And when you joined the 3rd Army, who was the

11 commander of the 3rd Army?

12 A. Also General Pavkovic.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you recollect when he moved from the Pristina

14 Corps to the 3rd Army?

15 A. Well, roughly before I was transferred to the command of the

16 3rd Army. That is sometime in February. I think it was February, or was

17 it the end of January, or February 1999.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: In both the Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army, did

19 you work closely with him?

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you look now, please, at P1468, which will

22 appear on the screen, but Mr. Hannis has volunteered to give you a hard

23 copy of the document. You actually may have your own copy there. Do

24 you?

25 A. No, no, but -- but I got one here when I came to The Hague two

1 days ago.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: And you have it with you in court, do you?

3 A. Yes. Yes, I have it here with me.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: It will be helpful if you use that document rather

5 than what's on the screen.

6 It's a copy of something else, as you can see. What is it a copy

7 of?

8 A. This is a copy of a notebook that I kept when I went to attend

9 meetings with the MUP organs, that is to say the organs of the Ministry

10 of the Interior.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: If you -- if you go to -- I'll need to give you a

12 page reference, which may be difficult in -- it will be impossible in the

13 Serbian version, which you have. If you could go to the entry for the

14 21st of October, 1999 [sic].

15 A. I have found it.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: At that point -- from that point onwards, were you

17 responsible for the notebook?

18 A. Well, in a way I was responsible because it's my notebook, and I

19 gave it to the assistant due to the engagements I had on account of the

20 assignments given to me by the corps commander.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Who was that assistant?

22 A. That assistant was Colonel Ratko Tesevic.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And what post did he hold at that stage?

24 A. He was the assistant chief of the department for operations and

25 teaching in the department for operations and teaching. That is to say

1 that he was my number-one assistant, as it were.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Was there a change in your own responsibilities at

3 that time?

4 A. Yes.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: What was that change?

6 A. Well, the change had to do with the arrival of the OSCE mission,

7 because I as the chief of department was primarily in charge of plans,

8 and I was assigned a task by General Pavkovic to prepare a new variant

9 for the arrival of the OSCE mission in relation to the withdrawal of

10 forces.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Who took over your post as head of operations and

12 training, or did you retain that post?

13 A. I retained that post.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: I think I've seen somewhere a reference to

15 responsibilities being handed to General Stefanovic.

16 A. I think it was in 2004 that I spoke and made an uncertain claim,

17 if I can put it that way.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness's microphone

19 is off.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: It's my responsibility for your microphone going

21 off. It was an accident. Please continue.

22 A. I mean, I did not over -- I did not hand over the notebook to

23 General Stefanovic, and that was a doubt that I expressed in 2004 because

24 General Stefanovic came considerably later to assume this duty, that is

25 to say, sometime in December, between the 15th and 20th of December,

1 1998.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you recognise the handwriting from the 21st of

3 October onwards?

4 A. Yes.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Whose handwriting is it?

6 A. That is the handwriting of Colonel Tesevic.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: After the 21st of October, did you continue to

8 have access to this book?

9 A. Well, I tried to remember after this conversation all the details

10 that were involved, so as far as I can remember on the 24th of October,

11 an order came from the army command in connection with setting up

12 archives in relation to all the documents related to combat operations in

13 1998. As I was completing my duties in terms of plans related to taking

14 in the OSCE mission, I talked to Colonel Tesevic, and when I assigned a

15 task to him in relation to archiving documents, I gave him an order to

16 put that notebook in the archives, as well, together with the other

17 documents.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you see it again after that?

19 A. That notebook?

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

21 A. The original. I never saw it again from that moment when he

22 brought it to my office and when I gave it back to him practically the

23 same instant.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know how it came to -- at least its

25 contents came to arrive in the hands of the Office of the Prosecutor

1 here?

2 A. No. I did not have the notebook, and I did not have the

3 possibility to get ahold of that notebook, and I didn't really have any

4 special need to do so or did anyone ask me to do it.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's been suggested that there are changes to the

6 handwriting in the book even during the period when -- when you had it.

7 It may or may not be a matter of any importance, but could you look at

8 the entry for the 25th of July, 1998. Sorry, it's my mistake. The

9 following day, the 26th of July.

10 A. No, it's my handwriting.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: You've got the 26th of July. You'll see there

12 that the first person who is recorded as speaking is General Pavkovic.

13 Do you have that?

14 A. Yes.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Then he's followed by another person. What was

16 the name of the other person?

17 A. Mr. Lukic.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, halfway through there is a -- just give me a

19 second until I see the English. Yes. Sorry.

20 There's a reference. I think it's to Weaknesses; is that

21 correct?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, under that, from that point on, is that also

24 your handwriting?

25 A. Yes.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, as you look at the page, you can understand

2 why someone might think the top half is written by -- the part for -- the

3 first part for Pavkovic down to Weaknesses is written by one person, and

4 the following part including what's attributed to General Lukic is

5 written by someone else.

6 A. I see that, but I'm sure, 100 per cent sure, that it's not

7 someone else. I know my own handwriting very well, and there's no

8 chance. I mean, there were these two variants that I wrote, but I don't

9 know. Perhaps there was an interruption in the meeting or something. It

10 is my handwriting, for sure.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, can we go back to -- just while we're at this

12 point in the notes, can we go back to the 25th of July, and that's

13 one-page back.

14 A. Yes.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Just give me a moment until the English appears on

16 the screen. Thank you.

17 Yeah, further up, please, so that we can see the entry attributed

18 to Gajo.

19 There's a reference to a person called Gajo. What's his proper

20 name?

21 A. His full name is David Gajic.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And the position he held?

23 A. As far as I know, his position was in the state security sector.

24 He was one of the assistant heads. I don't know whether he was directly

25 Mr. Stanisic's assistant, but I know that he was an assistant in the

1 state security sector.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Could you read for us, please, what is

3 said or -- what's said under his name there. Just read it aloud. Read

4 aloud what you've written.

5 A. Yes. "Terror continues with the activities related to the

6 bringing in of weapons through Gora and Has. New KLA staffs are being

7 set up."

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you help you there. What is Gora and Has?

9 A. Gora and Has are areas close to the Republic of Albania. Gora is

10 in the Dragas municipality, and Has is an area south-west of Djakovica in

11 the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and it extends into

12 the Republic of Albania. This whole area is called Has.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Please continue to read, thank you.

14 A. "Preparations are carried out in the villages in Baranski Lug.

15 "In Malisevo, the supplies of food and fuel are scant.

16 "In Djakovica, the situation is getting more complex in the

17 villages at the outskirts.

18 "The president of the DSK in Pec asked for a more realistic

19 demand to be put in.

20 "In the village of Ljeskovac, Prizren municipality, four groups

21 have been set up to attack the settlement of Tusus and Prizren.

22 "Terrorists from Suva Reka are linking up with the terrorists

23 from Stimlje.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Now, what do you mean by the --

25 A. You're welcome.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: -- the DSK in Pec?

2 A. That's the abbreviation for the Democratic Union of Kosovo. It

3 is their political organisation.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, you've told us that this is your -- these are

5 your notes in your notebook. What were you noting?

6 A. I took notes. The first time that I attended one of those

7 meetings, I didn't have an idea of what notes I would be taking, but as

8 the meetings progressed I noted down things that I thought would provide

9 me with some information and data that would assist me in the performance

10 of my duty at my post since in the command I was in charge of

11 implementing the coordination with the -- with various entities in the

12 field. That was my function, my post.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Two matters immediately arise from that. What

14 were the various entities in the field that you were responsible for

15 implementing coordination with?

16 A. I was responsible for all the entities that were in any way

17 working together with the Pristina Corps in the Kosovo territory,

18 including the entities and other structures outside of the territory of

19 Kosovo, but that was done only with the approval of the corps commander

20 and the superior command.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you list the most important ones, please.

22 A. Well, for instance, the ministry -- the organs of the Ministry of

23 the Interior, primarily the staff in Pristina; then with the

24 administration of the Ministry of Defence in Pristina, which was located

25 in the same building where the corps command was; then with the units of

1 the 3rd Army that were relocated to other areas in Kosovo that were

2 either stationed there or had been brought in; and with the units and

3 organs of the air force and air defence and the communications units to

4 the extent that I was able to do so, and that involved, also, other

5 organs from the corps command.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: The other matter that immediately arises is, how

7 did you come to attend your first meeting?

8 A. Well, with the organs of the Ministry of the Interior, we started

9 having meetings as early as in April and May 1998, meetings that were --

10 that involved the army and the Ministry of the Interior organs. I

11 attended a couple of such meetings before this meeting on the 22nd.

12 On the 22nd, General Pavkovic called me around 11.00 or 12.00.

13 It was in the morning, anyway, and the day before he had come back from

14 Belgrade, so on the 21st he came back from Belgrade, and on the 22nd he

15 invited me to his office, and he told me this: Djakovic, you might as

16 well accompany me to this meeting in the MUP. I asked him, what am I

17 supposed to do? And he said, I don't want to be there alone; you should

18 take a notebook and just jot down everything you think you might need.

19 I left his office, and I waited for the general summons. I

20 waited for him to call me to go with him to this meeting in MUP.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: So he invited you to go, and you went with him.

22 Now --

23 A. Yes.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: What was it that you recorded in the notebook?

25 A. At the first meeting. Are you talking about --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: At the meetings in general. I want you to tell me

2 what -- not the specific things that you wrote down but the general

3 nature of what you recorded at the various meetings that you attended

4 thereafter.

5 A. Yes. I understand. As those meetings progressed, after three or

6 four meetings, I already got a kind of a picture as to what I should jot

7 down, what I should record, and what would be of interest to me. So at

8 the first meeting, I started noting -- so we're talking about the 22nd.

9 The meeting was opened by Mr. Minic, so that's when I started making

10 those notes. I didn't write the part that was above that, if we're

11 talking about the 22nd.

12 From where it says "Memorandum" to item 8 where you see my name,

13 I jotted that down on our return to the command or the next day. I can't

14 remember now. It may have been the next day when I actually wrote that

15 down, and I wrote first of what Mr. Gajic said, his report, and then

16 everything that is written here.

17 At the meetings that followed, I mostly recorded the questions or

18 issues that related to the security, brief reports by Generals Pavkovic

19 and Lukic regarding the situation in the units of the Pristina Corps and

20 the units of the Ministry of the Interior, and comments made by other

21 participants in the meeting.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you record what was said at these meetings

23 accurately?

24 A. Well, I can say that they spoke quite fast, so I can't be 100 per

25 cent sure that I recorded everything verbatim. In particular, the

1 civilians, the political representatives of the Republic of Serbia and of

2 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because their terminology was

3 unfamiliar to me as a soldier, the political terminology. So I tended to

4 translate it into military-speak. So I may have done that as I made

5 those notes.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: How selective were you in what you recorded?

7 A. Well, I was rather selective except when it came to the data that

8 was obtained from the state security. I tried to get as much information

9 as I could because this information was very important to me. And

10 another thing, I had to put this information in order and to give it to

11 the security commander, Colonel Stojanovic, who is now the general, and

12 he was the chief of the security in the Pristina Corps. And General

13 Pavkovic also had to inform the army commander about the key information

14 provided at those meetings.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Before these meetings began to take place, did the

16 army have difficulty getting information from the state security?

17 A. Yes. Yes, to a considerable extent, and I remember I have to

18 establish a connection with a document that was brought in regarding the

19 exchange of communication a long time before this meeting, a long time

20 before the political representatives from Serbia and the Federal Republic

21 of Yugoslavia came. That's the operational report.

22 As far as I can recall, the first one was drafted on the 10th of

23 July, as far as I can recall. I did not see this first document, but I

24 think that the date is the 10th of July.

25 If you would allow me, I would like to explain how this came

1 about.

2 I explained to General Pavkovic that I had problems in making

3 assessments of the Siptar terrorist forces and that Colonel Stojanovic

4 had the same problems. He was responsible together with the chief of the

5 intelligence service with formulating the first item in the report, and I

6 asked him if through Lukic and Gajic he could make sure that information

7 flowed in that would make it possible for me and Stojanovic to put

8 together this first item in the order for the use of forces, and he said

9 he would try. And after a few days, I received the first report from the

10 Ministry of the Interior and from Mr. Gajic, and this practice continued

11 up until the end of the year or thereabouts.

12 Since I received -- after I received the report from them, I

13 drafted an internal document, and then as a favour to them I provided

14 information to them about the status of the army and the disposition of

15 the army units so that they could coordinate those activities when they

16 were drafting their plans, and this practice, again, continued up until

17 the end of the year.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: After Colonel Tesevic takes over, the name

19 "Gajo" -- let me start again. After he takes over, instead of the name

20 "Gajo" there appears the name "Goja" from time to time. Is that the same

21 person?

22 A. I didn't understand. What was the other name that you mentioned?

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Goja, G-o-j-a.

24 A. No. No, I don't know that name. It's probably the same person,

25 but Mr. Radovic accompanied -- Miro Radovic accompanied Mr. Gajic or

1 Gajo, so his name could be mentioned in places.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: What did you do with the record that you made at

3 each meeting after the meeting was over?

4 A. Well, after the meeting was over, I had a look at the notebook to

5 see whether there was anything of interest to me, and then I would give

6 the information to the security organs. I would give them the

7 information about what Gajovic and Radovic had said, so -- to the

8 intelligence service -- to the security organs so that they use it for

9 their activities. Colonel Djindjic [Realtime transcript read in error

10 "Djinovic"] also used it for quite a long time. He was the assistant

11 chief of security in the 3rd Army. He worked with Colonel Stojanovic. I

12 gave the notebook to him, too, and he jotted down some things from the

13 notebook, but it was in the office. I didn't allow -- allow anyone else

14 to use the notebook. Those who wanted to use the notebook that I allowed

15 them to use it, they could do it in my office, or I would simply relay

16 the information to them.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you distribute copies of the notebook or pages

18 from the notebook to anyone?

19 A. No. Up until the moment the notebook was put in the archive, I

20 never allowed anyone to make any copies of the notebook. Now, somebody

21 may have done that without my knowledge; I can't tell that, but I

22 personally never allowed that to be done.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

25 MR. ACKERMAN: 17, line 5 is Djindjic, not Djinovic.

1 Colonel Djindjic.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Djindjic, that's correct.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: If you could turn now to the outside cover of the

4 document you have there.

5 A. Yes.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you write the title there?

7 A. No. The title is computer-written at the Centre for Automatic

8 Data-Processing. I assume that it was Colonel Tesevic who asked somebody

9 to type this up.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: If you then go to the first meeting, the 22nd of

11 July, that's just over one page, can you read what it says at the top of

12 that page?

13 A. "Meeting of the Joint Command for KiM."

14 JUDGE BONOMY: So right from the outset, you were referring to

15 this as the Joint Command for Kosovo.

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Was that your idea?

18 A. Well, it's difficult now to give you an answer in just a few

19 words whether it was my idea or not, but that was not an idea that

20 cropped up at this meeting. It's an idea that dated from a period before

21 that. We called it the meetings of the Joint Command for Kosovo and

22 Metohija a long time before the political organs arrived in Kosovo, and

23 there are some documents to corroborate that. I remember there's a

24 document from the 6th of July, 1998. That was the first time that we

25 really wrote down on paper the meeting of the Joint Command. That was

1 the first time that the Joint Command was mentioned, and I myself put it

2 down here because I had left half of the page blank, and the next day,

3 together with General Pavkovic -- actually, I spoke to General Pavkovic,

4 and I asked him, what should I do about those meetings; how should I make

5 records of them. And he said, in the same way that you had -- have until

6 now. And that's how it remained. And after the second meeting, the

7 meetings were styled the sessions of the Joint Command because the

8 gentleman from the republic and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

9 referred to those meetings as sessions, and up until the very end this is

10 how they were styled, sessions.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Sessions is -- is a formal term for a meeting, is

12 it?

13 A. Yes.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: One of the problems for the Trial Chamber is that

15 there's a lot of formality in the name Session and Joint Command for

16 Kosovo and Metohija, and it's easy to -- to jump to the conclusion

17 without reading the content and hearing the evidence that this must have

18 been a body which directed activities. Was it such a body?

19 A. I don't think that this was a body that directed anything in

20 particular because I know how the chain of command functioned in the

21 army, and I have some knowledge about how it functioned in the Ministry

22 of the Interior, so no decisions were made here. And I really went

23 through all those records in detail, and there are no decisions, no

24 orders of any organs except for what General Lukic or General Pavkovic

25 are saying related to the decisions that they or their superior officers

1 made.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: When you left each meeting, did you know what

3 decisions would be taken in the formal command structure?

4 A. No decisions were made here. Decisions had already been made at

5 General Samardzic's, and I don't know whether it was General Lukic who

6 made the decisions in the MUP or whether he received decisions from the

7 minister of the interior in Belgrade, but the decisions were made on the

8 basis of the army commander and the plans that we submitted to the army

9 commander for his approval. No decisions were made here about the use of

10 the forces.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: What would you say was the principal purpose of

12 these meetings?

13 A. I've thought a long time about this, and I think that the main

14 purpose was the exchange of information. That's number one because based

15 on my analysis, about 35 to 60 per cent of all the meetings deal with the

16 security situation. The rest of the meeting was devoted to brief --

17 briefings by General Pavkovic and General Lukic about what the army

18 personnel and the MUP personnel had done in the course of that day, and

19 the rest was devoted to the comments made by other participants.

20 Mr. Sainovic, I have to say, took the floor on most occasions to

21 talk about foreign policy issues. Mr. Minic dealt with issues related to

22 the functioning of the local authorities, municipality/district level,

23 and Mr. Andjelkovic spoke about civilians protection issues.

24 Mr. Matkovic spoke about the economy.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: In light of that explanation, it is very difficult

1 for someone who is not a military person, like myself, to understand the

2 use of the term "command" to describe this body. Can you help me to

3 understand why it was called a Joint Command?

4 A. I can. The first document that we wrote where we refer to a

5 Joint Command is dated the 6th of July, 1998. That is an order issued by

6 General Pavkovic on the basis of an order issued by the army commander on

7 the prohibition of the use of units without approval of the army

8 commander.

9 Let me also mention that he did know of this term "the Joint

10 Command," and he attended some meetings of the Joint Command.

11 When I was first given the task after the meeting with members of

12 the MUP to regulate the question of relations between the MUP and the

13 army, quite simply it wasn't clear to me what it was that I was supposed

14 to put there because these were documents in a text, and when the general

15 said, "Put 'Joint Command,'" I then asked whether the documents would be

16 sent to the Ministry of the Interior, and he said, no; this only has to

17 do with us so that our organs know that these questions have been agreed

18 upon with members of the MUP.

19 So the first document is dated the 6th of July, 1998,

20 considerably before the representatives of the republican and federal

21 organs came to Kosovo.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but it's the -- it's the

23 expression "command." What was it commanding?

24 A. "Command" pertained to the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps.

25 That is to say that when we talked about the variant as to what we should

1 put in the text, I suggested to him another variant: Staff of the MUP

2 and the command of the Pristina Corps, and the general said, that's long;

3 how can we put all that down? So then through an exchange of comments,

4 we came to the conclusion, the two of us, that it would be best to put

5 "Joint Command" because that denoted the command of the MUP staff and the

6 command of the Pristina Corps, no one else. General Lukic and

7 General Pavkovic, no one else. And the commander of the army was aware

8 of that, too, and that is what he used as well.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: How frequently did it meet? In other words, is

10 that record complete, or are there pages missing from it?

11 A. Well, it is hard for me to know now whether there is a particular

12 page missing, but I do have some observations to make.

13 On the 24th of August, if you can -- no. No. The 24th -- just a

14 moment, please. The 24th of August.

15 I think -- I think that this was not completed. I have an

16 explanation that is possible in terms of why I did not do this up until

17 the end, and that is that I think that General Simic asked for me on that

18 evening, around 8.00 in the evening, as soon as the meeting started.

19 Through the duty officer in the operations centre, he asked me to explain

20 to him some questions related to the use of ammunition.

21 I informed General Pavkovic about that, and he said, go ahead and

22 see what that is all about, and I went out. I went to the operations

23 centre, and I spoke on the telephone to General Simic in relation to the

24 ammunition spent, and I spent quite a bit of time there because we had to

25 deal with some professional issues fully, and at the end we concluded

1 what the best way of reporting on the use of ammunition would be because

2 there were some controversial issues in that regard.

3 There was another meeting that I noticed that is another

4 interruption. So I assume that two or three times while these meetings

5 were held when I was there, I went out because the duty officers asked me

6 to come. Some did not manage to resolve problems that cropped up on

7 their own, so they would call me as chief of the department, and one or

8 two times perhaps I was - how to put this - late or I did not attend all

9 meetings fully. So five or six times in total, perhaps, there were

10 meetings where I did not fully participate or where I simply did not

11 attend.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Where did the meetings normally take place?

13 A. Well, usually they were held at the building of the provisional

14 Executive Council. That was in the centre of Pristina about 200 or 250

15 metres away from the corps command and the MUP Staff Command.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Did they ever take place anywhere else?

17 A. These meetings of this kind were held -- well, the first meeting

18 was held at the ministry building, as far as I can remember, the building

19 of the Ministry of Interior, meetings of this kind, whereas the

20 coordination meetings between the MUP organs and myself as the chief who

21 was responsible for further coordination were held at the building of the

22 corps command and at the MUP building. So most often, this was Colonel

23 Adamovic, one of colonel Lukic's assistant commanders.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: To what extent was the Grand Hotel in Pristina

25 used for the purposes of the army?

1 A. Well, the Grand Hotel is right next door to the military

2 building, to the military hotel, and the command of the Pristina Corps.

3 It was used at one point in time. That was on the 29th. I remember that

4 very well, when the MUP building was bombed, the building of the Ministry

5 of the Interior. That is -- well, it happened during the night, and we

6 were sleeping at the hotel, the military hotel, Sloboda. And during the

7 night, there was an explosion. We ran out onto the terrace, and we saw

8 the MUP building on fire. We sounded an alert at the command very

9 quickly, and we went out to the underground premises of the military

10 hotel and of the military centre and the underground rooms that are right

11 next door to the Grand Hotel. These are some trading companies or

12 something like that. I don't know. These are some halls. These are

13 rooms that are not really properly appointed. I mean, there were some

14 tables, chairs there, things that they didn't need and that they just

15 left down there.

16 If you allow me to say this, we stayed there -- or, rather, I

17 stayed there perhaps for another seven or eight days with a group of

18 officers. The corps command left after a day or two, once the question

19 of organising signals and communication was regulating and also the

20 messenger service, the courier service in the corps command.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Was there also a basement in the Grand Hotel?

22 A. There were some rooms where there were some tables, chairs, some

23 kind of furniture, boxes, whatever else was there. These are enormous

24 halls down there, underneath the hotel, that is.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: So a similar arrangement exists in both the

1 military hotel and the Grand Hotel. Is that the position?

2 A. Yes, yes, yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: And did the army use the basement of the Grand

4 Hotel?

5 A. I've already said that we used part of the staff, the assistant

6 staff, that is to say, the messenger service. That is where mail was

7 exchanged because we could not regulate the arrival of couriers straight

8 away to the command post. That is where we had an exchange of mail, and

9 I stayed there with three or four officers who were in charge of the

10 direct security for the military command, the military hotel, and the

11 army centre.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry I've repeated the question, but it was

13 to do with the way in which your answer was translated into English.

14 It's now -- it's now clear.

15 What about upper floors of the Grand Hotel? The first floor, was

16 it used for the purposes of the army?

17 A. No, no, no, never. There were ordinary soldiers there and this

18 group of officers, including myself, regulating these questions such as

19 the security of the building. Everything in the building of our command

20 was still there, in the basement of that building of ours, and the

21 communications centre remained there, and we could not relocate that, and

22 we were afraid that somebody might break into these military buildings,

23 and 40 or 50 soldiers stayed there, and a few officers, until all of this

24 was all sort of put in order, the general situation in this territory.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: What was your understanding of the role of

1 Mr. Lukic, General Lukic, of the MUP in Kosovo?

2 A. Well, I can just give my opinion on the basis of these few

3 contacts.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Your understanding, your impression of what

5 role he held.

6 A. Well, I think that General Lukic had powers to command units of

7 the Ministry of the Interior, primarily the PJPs. Now, what role he had

8 in relation to the Secretariats of the Interior, I don't know, because I

9 know that the minister had a direct link with the secretariats of the

10 interior. At least, that is what I heard from the members of the MUP.

11 Now, whether General Lukic -- well, I suppose he did because in

12 particular I had this conversation with him when he told me that he was

13 sending dispatches to secretariats of the interior; that is to say that

14 he had certain contacts with the secretariats of the interior as well.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Who apart from him from the MUP attended your

16 Joint Command meetings?

17 A. Well, General Djordjevic attended, General Obrad Stevanovic. I

18 think that Mijatovic was there, too, one of the assistants of General

19 Lukic. Well, probably one or two other people as well. Say five or six

20 people came to attend these meetings from the Ministry of the Interior.

21 If one person couldn't come, then somebody would come to replace him.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: We've had some evidence in this case that the

23 purpose of the Joint Command was to coordinate the activities of the MUP

24 and the VJ because of difficulties in relation to that caused by the MUP.

25 Is there any substance in that suggestion?

1 A. Well, partly. I would have to mention the first document that is

2 mentioned in relation to the difficulties involved, but not that it was

3 the MUP that was to be blamed but that the relations between the army and

4 the MUP had not been regulated. This is a document dated the 13th of

5 May. I remember that very well because the document has to do with

6 Security Day, the 13th of May, when Colonel Stojanovic at the request of

7 the army commander together with the operations organ wrote an evaluation

8 of the security situation primarily at the border, and in this evaluation

9 there was information about the strength of forces, their groups, their

10 grouping, and what is mentioned is that cooperation was not organised

11 with the MUP at a required level and the army commander is asked to

12 regulate this.

13 May I proceed? The army commander reacts practically within a

14 few days. He sends the chief of staff and a group of officers to the IKM

15 of the Pristina Corps in Djakovica, the forward command post, and

16 General Simic is involved in the activities of the interdepartmental

17 staff of the MUP in Pec as coordinator.

18 As for General Pavkovic, through an order he authorises him to

19 coordinate activities with the MUP on the entire territory of Kosovo.

20 The first major coordination or better coordination, if I can put

21 it that way, took place when the road between Pec and Decani was

22 deblocked by the order of the interdepartmental staff in Pec and in the

23 area where the MUP in part acted in coordination on deblocking these

24 roads leading to Prizren and Djakovica.

25 Later on, this cooperation went from strength to strength, and I

1 can say here that as the person in charge of this cooperation in the

2 command I did not have any problem of getting information from the MUP,

3 from the state security, and also with providing them with information

4 that was relevant to them and that had to do with the command of the

5 Pristina Corps. And I think that this cooperation got better and better

6 as the situation became increasingly complicated in the territory itself.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Did the meetings continue into 1999?

8 A. I've already said that I handed over my duty between the 20th and

9 25th of January - I don't recall the exact date - and I stayed for

10 another 10 or 15 days there at the command of the Pristina Corps, and

11 after that I went to Nis to assume my duties there. I did not attend

12 meetings any more with members of the Ministry of the Interior. I can

13 only recall the contacts that I had with them sometime on the 19th of

14 April, 1999, when General Pavkovic issued an order -- or, rather, the

15 order of the Chief of General Staff in terms of resubordinating the MUP.

16 And I saw General Stojanovic from MUP and a few other people, Vlahovic in

17 Pec, when I went there to investigate some situations regarding camps in

18 Istok.

19 Those are the two situations I can recall now. At any rate, I

20 ceased these contacts because I assumed other duties.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: You were no longer in the same position, but did

22 meetings of the Joint Command continue into 1999?

23 A. As far as I can remember, after October there were no such

24 meetings, and I did not hear from any members of the Pristina Corps, the

25 organs that were subordinated to me, that they ever went to meetings of

1 the Joint Command, and they did have meetings with members of the MUP.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, in 1999 there were orders issued under the

3 title "Joint Command." Can you explain that?

4 A. Well, I can give you my opinion that probably the colonel who

5 replaced me in that position probably -- well, continued writing that as

6 the title, "Joint Command for KiM," in order to have these documents show

7 that coordination between the MUP and the military was carried out. I

8 don't have any other explanation because these are documents that only

9 regulated coordination between the army and the MUP. I did see a few

10 documents because they were shown to me in 2004.

11 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you look now, please, at one of our

13 exhibits, 6D716. It will appear on the screen.

14 Just have a quick look at the page that's on the screen, and then

15 would you -- you'll be shown the last -- the last page of the document.

16 Do you recognise this document?

17 A. Yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: What is it?

19 A. This is a cliche, as we say, a cliche in terms of an order.

20 Well, not only of an order. It has to do with information on the

21 deployment of the MUP forces as for what the army had until then and what

22 it had summed up on the basis of information collected over the course of

23 one year. So that was all transformed into a particular form of order as

24 to what this kind of order should look like in tentative terms, but you

25 see here where it says "The operations zone of Lab," "the operations zone

1 as of Salja and Bajgora," all the units were referred to for which we had

2 information that they were operating in that area, that is.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Who were you giving an order to or drafting an

4 order for?

5 A. This is not an order. This is a form, a form of order as to what

6 the form or format of an order should be for units of the MUP or, rather,

7 MUP detachments. Because after all, we have to admit that the army was

8 more trained from that point of view in terms of writing such documents,

9 so we simply wanted to help, to help the members of the MUP so that they

10 can formulate these documents as -- as they should be formulated, in

11 tentative terms.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Who did you give it to?

13 A. This document was not logged, and it was not supposed to be

14 logged. It was supposed to be given to the MUP personnel so that they

15 could use it to produce documents that would more or less correspond to

16 the documents produced by the military, but they didn't have to accept

17 any of the information provided herein because this was just there to

18 help them see how an order should be formulated. Because you can see

19 here this document is not logged. It is just a format for a type of

20 document.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: You drafted it, I take it.

22 A. Yes.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Who did you give it to?

24 A. I gave it to the assistant of General Lukic, Mr. Adamovic.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: We have to have a break at this stage, General,

1 for 20 minutes or so. Would you please leave the courtroom with the

2 usher while we have the break, and we will resume at five to 11.00.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, it's

6 come to my attention that through some good detective work we've located

7 the original of P1468. Apparently, it was submitted in the Milosevic

8 trial and has been in the vault with the Registry. Mr. Hajder has now

9 obtained it and has personal possession of it at the moment. I would ask

10 that the Court direct that it temporarily be released from the Milosevic

11 case for use with this witness at this time.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: The document Mr. Hajder has put his hand on is

13 also plainly a photocopy. It's not the handwritten version that we would

14 like to see. It's blue, and if it did have a spiral binder it's missing,

15 and the contents are plainly photocopies.

16 So since these do not at the moment add anything -- well, one

17 thing we could ask the -- the -- just a moment. It might help, I think,

18 even from the point of view of its appearance to ask the witness about

19 the outside cover.

20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: We may be getting closer to the original version

22 of this, Mr. Djakovic. I'm sure we haven't actually got all the way to

23 it, but could you just have a look at this document, which was an exhibit

24 in the trial of Milosevic, and tell me if the cover bears any resemblance

25 to the cover of the original.

1 A. No. The cover was a hard cover of an A4 size notebook, and there

2 was nothing written of it at the time when I had the notebook in my

3 possession, up until the 14th of October, 1998.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

5 A. And --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Just return that now to the court usher. I don't

7 think there's any need for us to give it any official record number in

8 this case, and we'll return it to whence it came.

9 One of your answers towards the end of -- of the last session,

10 Mr. Djakovic, you could perhaps amplify for us. I asked you: In 1999

11 there were orders issued under the title "Joint Command;" can you explain

12 that, and you gave an explanation. Could you try to explain that to me

13 again, please.

14 A. Well, the only explanation I see is that this was an element of

15 coordination between the army and the MUP and that this was the reason

16 why the Joint Command for KiM was put there. I stressed in the earlier

17 part of my testimony that as for the MUP Staff Command and the Pristina

18 Corps command, I saw these two as the Joint Command because the initial

19 documents preceded by far this command that is allegedly mentioned here,

20 the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. So as far as I'm concerned,

21 the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps command formed the Joint Command

22 because we dealt together with any issues related to coordination or

23 concerted action.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I take it from that answer and the earlier one

25 that there were orders issued in 1998 under the title "Joint Command"?

1 A. There were excerpts from the decision of the commander. So those

2 that we did were excerpts from decisions of the commander, but that's not

3 an order. It does not have command authority. It is an excerpt for the

4 purpose of coordination, and it is a prerequisite for the commander's

5 decision to be actually implemented.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm just trying to identify an example of an order

7 from 1999 so that you can see what I'm talking about. Have a look on the

8 screen at P1878. Now, that's the sort of document I'm talking about.

9 Were there similar documents in 1998?

10 A. I -- well, as far as 1998 is concerned, I know that well because

11 I did most of the work as did my assistants, but in 1998 there was an

12 order from the Pristina Corps command, and excerpts from the decision of

13 the commander were done as the document meant to assist the coordination

14 with the MUP in order for them to be able to do their own documents. And

15 I can see that it says here "An order from the Joint Command for Kosovo

16 and Metohija," and the date is the 15th of April.

17 I have had an opportunity to look at this document before, but I

18 didn't quite get your question, the specific question relating to this

19 document.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: My question is whether a similar format of order

21 was used in 1998 with the heading "Joint Command."

22 A. Yes. Yes, but as excerpts from the decisions.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Excerpts from which decisions?

24 A. The decisions of the corps commander or army commander. In other

25 words, the Ministry of the Interior was given elements from the decisions

1 in order for it to be able to coordinate things that were within its

2 purview. So only those excerpts from the order were given to them that

3 related to the Ministry of the Interior, elements that they coordinated

4 too. And it is important to note here that in 1998 I did most of the

5 coordination with General Obrad Stevanovic regarding the PJPs and with

6 Colonel Adamovic, one of the assistants to General Lukic, and with

7 Mijatovic quite seldom, in fact, because he would mostly would refer me

8 to Colonel Adamovic.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: We may be talking at cross-purposes here.

10 Could we see the last page of this, please. There must be

11 another English page.

12 Now, this is a complete order signed by the Joint Command, it

13 would appear. Were there similar orders in 1998?

14 A. Well, I think that the Pristina Corps orders were signed by

15 General Pavkovic. As far as I can recall, from this decision by the

16 commander on the basis of previous arrangements with the MUP we would

17 extract the elements that pertained to the MUP and provided them to them

18 so that they could do their own plans. I know documents from 1998

19 bearing the signature of General Pavkovic, but excerpts were made for the

20 needs of the ministry.

21 I'm not sure now. I would have to look at a document.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's look at paragraph 4 of this one.

23 That's number -- section number 4. And the next page, please, also.

24 Yes. Just hold on until the witness has a chance to read that.

25 Just read it very quickly, just the format. The detail is not of

1 significance for present purposes.

2 And then can we take the English to the next page, please, so

3 that we can see 5.1, which at the foot of the B/C/S.

4 And --

5 A. Should I read it?

6 JUDGE BONOMY: No. We'll now turn over your page so that you see

7 the rest of paragraph 5.

8 Now, who is that order destined for?

9 A. As for this action at the Rugova gorge, I am familiar with it

10 because I was in Pristina at the time. Our 58th Brigade was stationed in

11 the Pec area.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you just tell me who this document would be

13 sent to?

14 A. This document would be sent to the Ministry of the Interior as an

15 element of coordination with the MUP forces that were designated to carry

16 out action in the Rugova gorge because the 58th Brigade was there only to

17 block the roads leading out from the Rugova gorge to Pec. That's what I

18 know.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Would it also be sent to the 125th Motorised

20 Brigade?

21 A. If there is anything that pertains to it, then for sure, yes, it

22 would be sent to the 125th if it had any impact on the actual execution

23 of this task. I would have to read the task that was assigned to the

24 125th to see whether it would be sent to it as well.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, go back one page, and you'll see it at the

1 bottom of the page.

2 A. Yes. Since -- yes, yes, I can see it. Yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I know that this is a repetition of an

4 earlier question, but it's for -- from the point of view of clarifying

5 the system that's operating, not the details of the particular activity

6 here. In 1998, were similar documents being issued to the MUP and to the

7 army units involved in actions such as this?

8 A. Well, similar, yes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: With the name "Joint Command"?

10 A. Well, there were some documents under the name of "Joint

11 Command." That was the basis for their action within the overall system.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Who would be responsible for sending out this

13 document to the MUP or giving it to the MUP, the one on the screen?

14 A. That would be -- you mean who was personally responsible.

15 Personally responsible would be the chief of the operations organ or

16 somebody -- one of his assistants.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: So the person who succeeded you in the Pristina

18 Corps. Is that the person?

19 A. Yes.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And would that --

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Would that be the person who was responsible for

23 sending it to the 125th Motorised Brigade?

24 A. Yes.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you know of the existence of a body called the

1 MUP staff for Kosovo?

2 A. Yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Was Adamovic part of the MUP staff for Kosovo?

4 A. I know from conversations that Adamovic was one of the assistants

5 together with Mijatovic, but the Adamovic that I knew from the MUP staff,

6 I think there was another Adamovic, but I don't know where he worked.

7 The Adamovic that I know worked in the MUP staff.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: And he is the one that you met in relation to

9 transmitting information to the MUP; is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Did he give you information about the strength and

12 location of MUP forces and so on?

13 A. Yes. I couldn't have done it without him and without other MUP

14 organs, so --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you hand him extracts from maps related to

16 actions that the VJ were planning?

17 A. In 1998, I provided excerpts from the decisions of the commander

18 as elements that they needed. We worked together, so they took part in

19 drafting those plans - Adamovic, General Obrad Stojanovic - through

20 decisions, which of the units would be used, and once this technical part

21 was over, they got the part that pertained to the MUP, and we took the

22 part that pertained to the military.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, the decisions were in -- made up of two

24 elements. There's the narrative in a document such as the one on the

25 screen, and there is a map, which sets out the project as well. Which of

1 these was it that was passed to the MUP?

2 A. Yes. Those are -- the MUP had both documents because those two

3 documents were inseparable. You couldn't have one without the other, and

4 they were the basis for the MUP to be able -- or, rather, for the

5 detachment commanders to be able to do their own assessments and to make

6 their own decisions in accordance with the actual situation. So the

7 detachment commander, after receiving the excerpts, needed four or five

8 hours at least to work on a document to be able to do his order and to

9 draw in the decision two levels down in accordance with the instruction

10 on keeping the working map. So he couldn't carry out combat action on

11 the basis of this document. This document was, rather, the basis for his

12 drafting documents for two levels down, battalion and brigade [as

13 interpreted].

14 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

18 MR. ZECEVIC: 38, 5. I believe the witness said battalion and

19 detachment, not brigade.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's exactly what we were discussing just

21 now.

22 By "detachment" --

23 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I assumed that. That's why I wanted to --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

25 By "detachment," are you referring to a MUP detachment?

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Would that be a PJP detachment?

3 A. Yes, the PJP.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: I want to ask you now something about the

5 reporting arrangements between the Pristina Corps, the 3rd Army, and the

6 Supreme Command Staff, and the reason I want to ask you about that is

7 because there were four locations involved. The 3rd Army had both a

8 command and a forward command post, and the Pristina Corps had a command

9 and a forward command post, and we've heard evidence, also, that there

10 was insistence at one time in 1999 that the Pristina Corps had to report

11 not only to the 3rd Army but also directly to the Supreme Command Staff.

12 Now, am I right in thinking that this is particularly within your

13 field of operation, the whole question of the reporting regime between

14 the Pristina Corps and the other elements of the army?

15 A. Yes, definitely, because the operations centre of the Pristina

16 Corps was under my command -- or perhaps I shouldn't say command, but

17 under my control directly.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: We're talking now about 1998. Is that -- is that

19 correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah. Where was it?

22 A. What do you mean? I didn't understand. Who was where?

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Where was the operations centre of the Pristina

24 Corps? Was it at the Pristina Corps command, or was it at the forward

25 command post?

1 A. The operations centre, the main operations centre, was located at

2 the Pristina Corps command, and the -- there was an operations centre

3 established at the forward command centre because for it to be able to

4 function normally it has to have this element, the operations centre, in

5 place. So there where General Lazarevic was at the forward command post,

6 that's where the reporting line was set up going in the direction of the

7 Pristina Corps, and you said yourself that at one point he provided

8 direct reports to the General Staff of the army about the situation at

9 the border. That was for practical reasons, to speed up the relaying of

10 the information, the flow of information.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: To avoid confusion, I'm thinking when I make that

12 comment about the position when he was the commander of the Pristina

13 Corps, which is 1999.

14 A. I don't know what's at issue here.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: No. When you -- we have to remember that

16 General Lazarevic over the period we're concerned about had more than one

17 post. He was the chief of staff of the Pristina Corps, then the

18 commander of the Pristina Corps. Now, when you -- when we talk about

19 direct reporting to the Supreme Command Staff, I'm talking about during

20 the wartime period. Are you saying that there was also an arrangement in

21 1998 to report directly to the Supreme Command Staff or to the supreme

22 defence -- the chief of --

23 A. Yes. Yes. Nothing was -- nothing changed because instead of

24 General Lazarevic, Colonel Zivkovic was sent to the forward command post.

25 He was the chief of staff of the Pristina Corps. So simply the reporting

1 system from Djakovica through Pristina, the 3rd Army forward command post

2 at the Kosovski Junaci barracks and later on in Gracanica all the way up

3 to Belgrade functioned in the same manner. There were no changes there.

4 The only thing that changed were the actual persons.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: So the Pristina Corps reporting was to the

6 3rd Army command in Nis; is that right?

7 A. Yes. Yes.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, in -- during the war where was

9 General Pavkovic most of the time?

10 A. From the moment General Pavkovic assumed his duties, his area of

11 responsibility was extremely large. It extended from the left wing of

12 the army, which was at the Danube River facing Romanian border and down

13 towards Bulgaria, Macedonia, and down to Albania, and there was a border

14 or boundary with the 2nd Army in the Sandzak area. So that was a huge

15 territory, and he was --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not my question. I'm sorry to interrupt

17 you, but my question was: Where was he located during the war, he

18 personally?

19 A. He was in Nis and in the field and in Pristina. So I can't now

20 tell you specifically where he was at any given moment, but once he

21 assumed his duties he spent more time in Nis, but then he went back to

22 Pristina after a while. So it was a large area, and he went all around

23 it.

24 I know that when we went to do the check of the Nis Corps I went

25 there for four days with the general, up to Bor, because once he assumed

1 his duty he had to go and visit and inspect the Nis Corps. It took us

2 four days to do that.

3 I went back to Pristina. He remained in Nis for a while, and

4 then he came back to Pristina too. So it's very difficult for me to say

5 it, where he was on any given day.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: My impression of the evidence, and this will

7 require detailed review in due course, but my impression of the evidence

8 is that General Pavkovic spent more time in Kosovo during the war than in

9 Nis. Is that a fair reflection of your understanding of the position?

10 A. Well, in general terms I would be more inclined to say that it

11 was equal because the area of Kosovo, if you look at the area where the

12 units were, this area was smaller, but there were more units there, and

13 the tasks were more complex. So I would say that it was divided equally.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The point I'm really interested in is whether when

15 he spent so much time in Kosovo or at the forward command post that he

16 might not be in a position to receive the reports when they were

17 submitted from the Pristina Corps to the 3rd Army in Nis.

18 A. No. I was at the forward command post of the 3rd Army in

19 Gracanica. As for the reports that General Stojimirovic had in Nis, that

20 he received there, those were the ones that we received at the forward

21 command post of the 3rd Army, and the General was aware of that. So when

22 he stayed in Nis, he had access to the reports of the Pristina Corps in

23 Nis, and when he was in Pristina he either had direct contacts with the

24 commander, or through the forward command post of the 3rd Army he had it

25 in Gracanica.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not entirely understanding this arrangement.

2 The -- let's go back to what you said about the normal reporting system.

3 Did I rightly understand that reporting was from the Pristina

4 Corps to the 3rd Army command, or have I misunderstood that? That's

5 correct.

6 A. Yes. Yes. Yes, that's correct.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what was the arrangement to relay Pristina

8 Corps reports to the forward command post of the 3rd Army?

9 A. Well, it's hard for me to give an answer now as to whether the

10 report went through Nis and whether we got it again, General

11 Stojimirovic's report, or whether it went directly. It is hard for me to

12 say now. I'm not sure. I'm not sure about that. But what is for sure

13 was that we had the report that was sent to the General Staff from the

14 3rd Army. That is to say that at the forward command post, we had the

15 information that had left the 3rd Army and was sent to the General Staff.

16 That we knew.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You were, in April 1999, put -- nominated as

18 chairman of a commission to investigate allegations about inappropriate

19 and arbitrary behaviour in Istok. Could you look please at P1721. This

20 is -- this is your report of the 14th of April, the commission having

21 been set up on the 13th of April, and this report is signed by you.

22 Who were the other members of the commission?

23 A. Well, there were about seven or eight members of this commission.

24 The ones I remember are General Stojanovic from MUP, from the Ministry of

25 the Interior, a general. Then -- then I think there was Lieutenant

1 Colonel Pesic. I didn't even know these people, but I remember in

2 respect of the document. And we were in contact with Vlahovic, Boro

3 Vlahovic, the chief of SUP in Pec. I think that's what his name was. We

4 were in contact with him. As for the members of the army, there was

5 Colonel Stojanovic, the chief of security. Colonel Pesic was supposed to

6 go, but he didn't for some reasons. Probably he had a previous

7 engagement. And that was the team that was there as far as I can

8 remember.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this your personal report or the report of the

10 commission?

11 A. Well, in a way, this is a report that mostly General Stojanovic

12 and I agreed upon as to how this report would be worded, but I signed it

13 as head of the commission.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that General Stojanovic of the MUP?

15 A. Of the MUP, yes. I think his name is General Stojanovic.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: From what you've said, there were two members of

17 your commission by the name of Stojanovic, one from the MUP and one from

18 the VJ. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes, yes, yes.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: It has been suggested to us that normally a report

21 of a commission like this would be signed by all the members of the

22 commission. Is that correct?

23 A. Well, in a way it is. It could be considered that way if this

24 were to be done officially on the basis of a commission depending on what

25 it is that you want to achieve. However, since we had established in

1 terms of the basic task, why I went down there and why the commission

2 went, there were no camps in the territory of Istok. I practically after

3 that --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, and we can deal with the

5 factual position separately. I'm just trying to establish the propriety

6 of the way in which this was carried out, and it might be better if I ask

7 you a different question.

8 How many of the commission specifically saw this and agreed with

9 its terms?

10 A. Well, all of those who were there.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: And who were they?

12 A. That means General Stojanovic, Pesic, Stojanovic from -- from the

13 military, and I. Practically the four of us.

14 As for the Pesic from the army, I've already said that he didn't

15 go at all.

16 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

17 JUDGE BONOMY: We've had a considerable volume of evidence about

18 the anti-terrorist operation in the summer into the autumn of 1998, and

19 we've had reference to a plan and stages of a plan, and I think we've had

20 evidence that there were three stages to a plan, and then we've had

21 evidence that there were five stages to a plan. Can you explain or

22 clarify this for us?

23 A. Well, a plan -- well, this original plan, this initial plan that

24 was done in accordance with the order of the army commander, at first it

25 had three stages. At first it had three stages, and then -- and then it

1 was expanded by another two stages, so it was five stages altogether.

2 As far as I can remember, the first stage was smashing the Siptar

3 terrorist forces in the border area that in July was around -- it wasn't

4 around. It was five kilometres. And it was the army that was the

5 mainstay.

6 The second stage was smashing the Siptar terrorist forces along

7 the road of Pec, Decani, Djakovica, Prizren -- or, rather, at the border

8 behind the border belt where the mainstay was the MUP, and the army was

9 there to provide support.

10 The third stage was smashing the Siptar terrorist forces along

11 the roads, the three roads leading from Kosovo to Metohija. The mainstay

12 was the MUP and support was provided by the army.

13 It was those three initial stages.

14 The fourth stage, as far as I can remember, was breaking up the

15 terrorist forces at their main strong holds, namely Drenica. Now it is

16 off the roads, so it's Drenica, Baranski Lug, Malisevo, Bajgora, Jezerce,

17 Kosmac, and that is where operations took place later in several stages

18 yet again because the terrorist practically came back to the same places,

19 and practically operations were repeated two or three times in the same

20 locations, so that would be the fourth stage.

21 As for the fifth stage, that is the period when I was given the

22 task by General Pavkovic in relation to the arrival of the OSCE mission

23 when we kept the border. The army was responsible for the border and for

24 in-depth security of the border with seven or nine combat groups. I'm

25 not sure now. I think it was nine. I think it was nine. Nine combat

1 groups and three company-level units at the critical points, namely

2 Kramovik, Dulje, and Iglarevo. Those were the three companies that the

3 army kept.

4 We didn't -- well, at Batlava, later on a unit from the 15th army

5 brigade was later sent to Lake Batlava. That would be it. And I know

6 that the MUP had about 30 points throughout the territory at that time

7 because we in the command drew that on the plan, and we marked our own

8 deployment and the deployment of the MUP forces in order to ensure

9 further coordination.

10 That would be it, this plan in five stages that is referred to,

11 that we had.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: You said which organ, whether it was army or MUP,

13 was responsible for each stage except the fourth stage. Was it the MUP

14 or the army that was mainly responsible for breaking up the terrorist

15 forces at their main strong holds, namely Drenica?

16 A. According to the decision, when General Pavkovic came back from

17 Belgrade on the 30th of May, when he went to Belgrade for the first time,

18 I remember that, and the second time was what I already mentioned, the

19 21st of July. Now, in the meantime whether he went, I don't know, but I

20 remember him going on those two occasions, that's for sure. I know that

21 after the decision made by the supreme council, he said to me that the

22 MUP would be the mainstay of the combat operations and that the army -- I

23 remember this. This is exactly what he said to me, that the army would

24 support in an adequate way. I remember that word. I remember him using

25 that word. So for the most part this had to do with the support of the

1 MUP except for the border area. In the border belt, I said that it was

2 the army that was the mainstay and that the army in accordance with the

3 decision of the Chief of General Staff and the army commander, was

4 deploying reconnaissance, police, and other units there and preventing

5 arms and ammunition from being brought in.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: 47, line 15. I believe the witness said that the

8 army would support in an adequate way.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is on the tape. That

11 is what the interpreter said.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Does the word or the name "Grom" have any

13 relevance in connection with these stages of this plan?

14 A. Yes. Yes. Because this part, the first three stages fully fit

15 into the decision of the Chief of General Staff in terms of Grom '98. I

16 know that full well because I worked on these documents together with the

17 command organs. So this completely fits in these three stages. Later

18 on, the second stage that is referred to in Grom, it was not carried out

19 practically in 1998. That is mobilisation. There should have been

20 mobilisation, but that was not carried out. In 1998. I'm talking about

21 1998.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Who devised the plan?

23 A. Which plan do you mean? The first one, this one, or Grom '98?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: I thought you indicated that Grom '98 was the

25 first three stages of this plan. Have I misunderstood that?

1 A. Three plus -- yes, you understood it right. Plus -- plus

2 mobilisation, the mobilisation that had been envisaged in case there was

3 a deterioration in the situation.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Who devised the plan which ultimately had five

5 stages?

6 A. That plan -- well, the command of the Pristina Corps got a task

7 from the army command when -- when General Pavkovic and General Samardzic

8 went to Belgrade. So that plan -- well, it was ordered up there for the

9 army to device this plan; I mean, for the army to work out the basic

10 postulates of that plan, and then command to the Pristina Corps when the

11 general came back, and he gave me a task that we start preparations for

12 preparing the idea-based solution of that plan. Once this conceptual

13 solution was worked out, then it was verified at the army command, at the

14 General Staff, and on the basis of that plan, later on Grom '98 was

15 devised in part. I'm saying that for the following reason: I'm know

16 that around the 15th of July, the 15th of July, this plan was submitted

17 to the General Staff, as well, the General Staff. As far as I heard,

18 General Smiljanic in the 1st department -- the 1st administration. The

19 general told me a copy had been made for the General Staff, and it was

20 there for their use, and on the basis of that Grom '98 followed.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know if the Supreme Defence Council decided

22 on the policy that this plan implemented?

23 A. I think so. I think the answer is yes. When General Pavkovic

24 returned from the meeting, that's what I heard from him.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know anything of the circumstances in which

1 Mr. Sainovic was given certain responsibilities in relation to Kosovo?

2 A. I don't know. I just know that Mr. Sainovic, on the 30th of May,

3 I did not have information to the effect that he attended the meeting in

4 Belgrade because when the general returned on the 30th of May, I asked

5 him who attended the meeting. I was interested, quite simply, to see who

6 attended, and he said, everybody, and I said, who is everybody, and he

7 said, as for our guys, General Perisic, General Dimitrijevic, Samardzic,

8 and I. As for the MUP, he says, the minister was there. Then he said

9 Rodzo was there, Obrad, and Luka. That's how he addressed General Lukic

10 and Obrad Stojanovic. And -- and as far as I can remember, he said to me

11 that Stanisic was also there. Now, Sainovic and Minic, I don't think he

12 mentioned them then. I don't think he did. It was only the second time

13 when on the 21st, when he returned and when we talked on the 22nd, then

14 he mentioned that Sainovic attended the meeting on the 21st of July.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not clear about certain elements of that

16 answer. When you said to me that you thought that the Supreme Defence

17 Council decided on the policy and that's what General Pavkovic said when

18 he returned from the meeting, is that a meeting that took place on the

19 21st of July.

20 A. No, no, no. I don't know who he got information from, but he

21 told me that the supreme council made a decision on adequate engagement.

22 I assume that it was with the army commander, who else, that he talked to

23 about this. It's probably from the army commander that he received this

24 information and that he got it from the chief of General Staff. I don't

25 know how he got this information.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: You then referred to the 30th of May. What --

2 A. Yes.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: What was your reason for referring to the 30th of

4 May?

5 A. That was the first meeting. I know when the general came back

6 from Belgrade with General Samardzic and the chief of General Staff, when

7 they went to see President Milosevic, first they went to the army

8 command, and he took the planned -- plan for the deblockade of roads, and

9 then that plan was taken to Belgrade to the chief of General Staff, and

10 then certain corrections were made there, and then with this plan for the

11 deblockade of roads, they went to see President Milosevic. That is how I

12 understood him.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you suggesting that -- that this may have been

14 the beginnings of what became the Joint Command, the coordination or

15 exchange-of-information body?

16 A. Well, in a way, I've said that on the 13th of May we had already

17 informed the army command that there was no good cooperation and

18 coordination with the MUP, especially at the border where the army was

19 receiving tasks, and they did not have good coordination because the

20 terrorists were getting in through the border without us being linked up

21 with the MUP. We asked for this problem to be resolved, for someone to

22 give an order to authorise someone. And then General Samardzic, as I've

23 already said, authorised General Simic and General Pavkovic as the

24 protagonists of cooperation and coordination in Kosovo and Metohija.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, this passage of evidence began with me asking

1 you what you knew about the circumstances which led to Mr. Sainovic

2 having certain responsibilities for Kosovo. Do you know what led to

3 that?

4 A. I don't know what kind of authority was given to Mr. Sainovic. I

5 can just talk about what I had heard, what he discussed. What kind of

6 authority he was given I don't know.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: We've been given a document which bears to record

8 answers that you gave in an interview with the Office of the Prosecution

9 here. I don't at the moment intend to explore the circumstances of that

10 with you, but just to ask you one thing about it. In -- in that

11 document, you talk about a decision by the Supreme Defence Council to

12 send Sainovic and the others down to Kosovo. Now, what did you mean by

13 saying that to the OTP?

14 A. That's not what I said to the OTP at all. As a matter of fact, I

15 think that the investigator didn't even ask me about that. The

16 investigator never asked me that. I'll tell you what the investigator

17 asked me, but it wasn't this. How could I know at that time whether the

18 supreme council had appointed him or President Milosevic? I could not

19 know that, and how could I know that? First of all, it is certain that I

20 never said that.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Without looking at what authority

22 Mr. Sainovic actually had, who did you understand gave him authority to

23 exercise certain functions in Kosovo?

24 A. Well, this is not something that I know or that I could know, but

25 I can tell you what issues he dealt with. That I can tell you. But as

1 to who gave him this authority, I don't know. I can share with you my

2 impression that I got on the basis of this exchange of information at

3 those meetings. I did get an impression, but first of all, I had not

4 been introduced to Mr. Sainovic at all, but I knew from the media that he

5 was the deputy prime minister, that that was the function that he had.

6 When he went down there, I simply provided his political

7 function. I did not give him or accord to him any kind of command

8 function because nobody told us at the meeting on the 22nd that somebody

9 was the commander, that this was the command, or anything. The --

10 immediately, the exchange of information started. And this was the

11 context in which I viewed Mr. Sainovic, as the man who was in charge of

12 the foreign policy aspect, and this is the only way in which I see him to

13 this day. Eight or nine years later, I don't know. And I'm sure that in

14 1998 he did not issue any orders, verbal or written, either to the

15 corps -- or, rather, I'm talking to the corps because that's what I know,

16 or to me personally or to General Pavkovic to do anything apart from what

17 was ordered by the 3rd Army commander.

18 This is what I can say, and I can give you some facts to

19 corroborate that. When General Lukic called for helicopters to evacuate

20 a pregnant woman and an injured police officer from Kijevo, he talked to

21 General Pavkovic asking him for the military to provide the helicopter.

22 So that was in July, as early as in July.

23 When General Pavkovic said that he had to consult the army

24 commander to see whether this could be done, the army commander did not

25 approve it, and when the briefing was done, when the exchange of

1 information was done, that's what Mr. Pavkovic said, and Mr. Sainovic

2 didn't say anything. They don't make any comments, and then General

3 Lukic said, fine, Pavkovic, we'll deal with that, and they sent their own

4 helicopter to evacuate the injured police officer and the pregnant woman

5 from Kijevo.

6 I recall this event quite clearly, and that led me to form an

7 impression. It's not that I thought that the army should not provide the

8 helicopter for the evacuation of those people from Kijevo because I

9 personally was sure that the helicopter should have been provided.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: I've lost track of that account, I think. You

11 said that Mr. Sainovic did not say anything, and then General -- and I

12 think you gave the name, said fine, we'll deal with that. Who did you

13 refer to, which general?

14 A. General Lukic.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Could you now look, please, at P2086.

16 Look at the next page so that you have an idea of what it is.

17 Do you recognise this document?

18 A. Yes. I have seen it before.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: And it bears to be a document produced by the

20 Joint Command. Was this something which emerged from the meetings of the

21 Joint Command?

22 A. No. No. It is partially connected to it because at one point

23 there is a mention of it, but it was mentioned quite some time before

24 that in communication between the army command and the Pristina Corps

25 command.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: If you could look, please, at the paragraph

2 number -- or the section numbered 2. You will see that that deals with

3 the role of the Ministry of the Interior and then the role of the army,

4 and then 2a, if you can see part of 2a -- oh, you haven't seen it yet.

5 I'm sorry.

6 A. No, I haven't.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's turn to the B/C/S page, please.

8 You'll see reference there to the MUP and then to the army, and

9 if you go -- if we go on to the next page, please, in both languages, and

10 there you'll see that section 2a deals with civilian protection. And if

11 you go to section 3, you'll see there the reference is to Municipal

12 Staff.

13 It's very much a document dealing with the roles of a number of

14 organs. What was the role of the Joint Command in devising this

15 document?

16 A. Well, leafing through my notes, I found at one place that

17 Mr. Minic repeats something that General Pavkovic said about an order by

18 the army commander to organise the defence of the inhabited areas through

19 a document dating from either late June or early July 1998, and then he

20 repeats what General Pavkovic said about this order for the mobilisation

21 and the defence of the inhabited areas. So this is the context in which

22 Mr. Minic mentioned this.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you have anything to do with drafting the

24 document?

25 A. No, not personally, but I do have an opinion. To this day, I

1 don't know how this document was done, how it was drafted, but this is a

2 document that certainly was not done at that time, in 1998, in June or

3 July, that's for sure. This is a document that could have been with some

4 of the operations officers.

5 This looks to me like a -- like a training exercise for how to do

6 the defence of inhabited areas. I first read it when I came to The Hague

7 from the beginning to the end, and to my mind this instruction was only

8 amended in such a way that just Kosovo and Metohija is mentioned.

9 Everything else can refer to Kosovo and Metohija, anyplace there or

10 anywhere in the state. So this is not a specific instruction. It's like

11 an instruction on how to operate a weapon. This is not a combat

12 document, and it is not binding on anyone. It does not oblige anyone to

13 perform any of the tasks that stem from this document.

14 For instance, if I were the recipient of this instruction, it

15 would assist me because I would then recall some elements that I may have

16 forgotten to do if I was in charge of defending an inhabited area. So

17 that would be the extent of the assistance that I would get from this

18 document, and I would not be obliged to do anything that is listed herein

19 or to accept it.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that not make it very strange that the cover

21 of the document is now headed "Joint Command for Kosovo"?

22 A. I know that we probably did have an instruction of this kind, but

23 the operations organ of the Pristina Corps did it. I think we had it

24 from one of our organs. I probably wasn't able to know all of it because

25 I was there for a year, but other organs, the administration of the

1 Ministry of Defence, for instance, probably had it because they needed it

2 more than we did at the Pristina Corps command. So that is my

3 understanding, that this instruction came from the defence ministry

4 administration for Kosovo. They may have made some amendments to perhaps

5 invoke some kind of a fictitious authority for those duties and

6 obligations to be taken more seriously because the problem of defending

7 inhabited areas and towns was a major problem. And the state security

8 organs were reporting to the -- to General Lukic, General Pavkovic, and

9 everybody else who attended those meetings. They were reporting this to

10 them.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Could you look now, please, at P1269.

12 Now, you see that this is -- has handwriting on it. Do you

13 recognise the handwriting?

14 A. This is not my handwriting. I couldn't really be certain. I am

15 aware of the document, and I think that I actually -- if you allow me to

16 look at the initials, I may have drafted this or written this document

17 when I read it through.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you did draft it. Your initials are on

19 it.

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: It's very much on the face of it a document

22 appearing to command both the VJ and the MUP and, indeed, talks about the

23 Pristina Corps commander resubordinating MUP units. What was going on in

24 this order?

25 A. Well, I remember when it was that I did it, when the general

1 mentioned those detachments, because he told me -- he gave me some

2 guidelines as to how I should draft this document, and he told me to

3 mention those detachments and those MUP units. And then I said, well, we

4 can't order them. You see that they don't accept our orders. And he

5 said, just write it down; I spoke to General Lukic; just write this down.

6 And this is what I did. I wrote this down, and it was sent to

7 General Lukic for his information, this document, personally for him, for

8 his information, because there are some tasks and some obligations that

9 the army and the MUP were supposed to carry out together.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just give us a moment, please.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll just complete this stage before we take a

13 break.

14 This -- this document on the screen has the numbers of specific

15 MUP units or detachments in it. What was the source of that information,

16 Mr. Djakovic?

17 A. You mean for the figures, who was the source?

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

19 A. Well, I received that from the MUP organs. So I personally --

20 when actions were coordinated, they would tell me specifically which

21 detachment was supposed to be used. So this was mostly done by General

22 Obrad Stevanovic. He mostly designated or decided which PJP unit would

23 be where. I think that at the time he had the authority to do so by --

24 from General Lukic. I don't know what their powers were, but I would be

25 told by him for the most part which detachment would go there when we

1 made the coordination and when we drafted various documents.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: A couple of problems with the transcript. Page 6,

5 line 12, the date should be 1998. Page 15, line 8, that has actually

6 been corrected. And page 29, line 21, the first word of the question

7 should be "who."

8 I can only apologise for exceeding my time limit, but that

9 concludes the examination that the Trial Chamber proposed to conduct at

10 this stage.

11 Do you have questions, Mr. Hannis?

12 MR. HANNIS: I do, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Do any Defence counsel have questions? At least

14 one nodding head.

15 If you wish to go out with the areas explored by the Trial

16 Chamber, then you should indicate the areas that you wish to explore so

17 that we can judge whether it's right in all the circumstances bearing in

18 mind who's calling this witness to allow you to do that. However, you

19 should feel free to cross-examine on any issue that has been raised in

20 the course of that examination.

21 Mr. Djakovic, we need another break at this stage. That will be

22 for half an hour. We'll resume at 1.00. Could you please leave the

23 courtroom with the usher while we have the break.

24 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

1 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, before I begin my questions I had a

2 question for the Court. Two matters. One relates to Exhibit P1468,

3 which you're well aware we have a number of translation entries where

4 it's indicated that the original is illegible to the translator. Now,

5 obviously this man is the author of this document probably could furnish

6 us a lot of help, but there are dozens if not scores of those. Sometimes

7 it's only one word, and in the context it may not mean much, but

8 sometimes it's a whole sentence or a whole section is, and because I

9 don't know what it is, I don't know whether it's important or how

10 important it is. Now, I don't makes sense for us to take up all our time

11 at 10.000 euros an hour or whatever it would be, but I wonder if there

12 might be some kind of procedure where the Court might direct this witness

13 at the conclusion of his evidence as assistance to the Court just to sit

14 down with a language assistant or maybe somebody from the Registry or the

15 court staff and just read those portions so they could be written down,

16 and then we would have an accurate record of what was written in his

17 notebook.

18 I propose that for your consideration. It's obviously not

19 something you need to decide today, but I put it out there.

20 The second thing, Your Honour, is Exhibit P2943 is the unsigned

21 statement that Phil Coo and two others from the OTP wrote up when they

22 interviewed General Djakovic in 2004. I may ask him a few questions

23 based on that document. I have a B/C/S copy, and I would propose to give

24 it to him at the end of the day so he can take it and read if he wants to

25 because I anticipate I'm going to take more than 45 minutes and go into

1 tomorrow. So I bring it up now rather than trying to scramble at the end

2 and bring it up as he's leaving the courtroom.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Mr. Ackerman.

4 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I haven't seen anything or heard

5 anything about time constraints with regard to this matter. I don't know

6 if we're operating under normal time constraints or what. It might be

7 helpful to know that.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I think Mr. Hannis has indicated informally that

9 he's going to use an hour and a half. He's certainly going into tomorrow

10 as you've heard.

11 MR. HANNIS: And that partly depends, Your Honour, on what you

12 decide about my proposal regarding P1468 because if you don't then I may

13 want to spend part of my time trying to identify the most interesting or

14 intriguing illegibles.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah. We could perhaps return to that tomorrow

16 when we've had a chance to think. I'm looking, for example, at the

17 moment at Rule 71 and wondering whether it might provide a device for

18 doing that.

19 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that's -- that's a procedure that might

20 apply and might ...

21 JUDGE BONOMY: If it's only a question of the witness amplifying

22 as best he can and only confirming where he can read the document and

23 that's fully recorded, it would not on the face of it give rise to any

24 unfairness unless passages were identified which might say something

25 specific against the case of an accused who might want to cross-examine

1 not the terms used but the -- the merits of the actual comment itself.

2 So it's -- it would need to be done before the witness left The Hague.

3 And the other alternative is for you to identify the ones that

4 really matter and to deal with them in the court.

5 MR. HANNIS: Yeah. And as I said, to some extent I can look at

6 some and say, well, that one doesn't matter because it's one word in the

7 context of what appears to be otherwise clear, but as I indicated there

8 some entries where there's an entire sentence missing or a bullet-point

9 entry, and that could be extremely important or not important at all.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll hear parties on this first thing tomorrow

11 morning once we see where you're going and once everyone's had a chance

12 to think about the issue.

13 Mr. Ackerman, it's difficult until you -- you embark on your

14 cross-examination to determine whether the time is being used in the

15 overall context reasonably. We're very reluctant to impose a restraint

16 in advance on this. What Mr. Hannis is proposing in broad terms seems

17 acceptable, and in light of that you might feel that your own case merits

18 a similar allocation of time. It would be difficult to argue with that.

19 But I can't give any more precise indication until I see just how

20 relevant and direct the questions are. You'll bear in mind that the

21 Chamber's questions were almost exclusively open questions of a brief

22 nature, and the tendentious elements of this witness's evidence may yet

23 be to come.

24 Mr. Hannis.

25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

2 Q. Good afternoon, General. You --

3 A. Good afternoon.

4 Q. You mentioned the post you held in 1998 and 1999 and told us that

5 you retired 31 December 2001. Could you tell me what post you held

6 between the end of the war in 1999 and your retirement?

7 A. Between the end of the war and my retirement, I was deputy head

8 of administration upon completing the national defence school. That

9 happened for three or four months, and then I was appointed chief of the

10 security administration of the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia.

11 After that, I became deputy head -- or, rather, deputy commander of the

12 1st Army, as I stated previously.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you. Early on this morning, you told Judge Bonomy

14 that the handwriting in the notes of the Joint Command meeting after the

15 21st of October were done by Colonel Tesevic, and you told us at page

16 7 -- or page 8, line 6, today that you talked to Colonel Tesevic and you

17 assigned a task to him in relation to archiving the documents and gave

18 him an order, put that notebook in the archives. Were you the one who

19 actually tasked him to attend the meetings and keep notes after October

20 21st?

21 A. Yes. Yes. He's my deputy, too, in the department, and it is on

22 that basis that he attended the coordination meetings.

23 Q. And you never gave that notebook to Colonel -- or

24 General Stevanovic -- Stefanovic?

25 A. No, no, never.

1 Q. You don't recall telling that to Phil Coo, an investigator from

2 the OTP who interviewed you in 2004?

3 A. I did not understand you. What was it that I said to Philip Coo?

4 Q. He indicates in what's Exhibit P2943, at paragraph 36, that you

5 said you gave the notebook to Colonel Radojko Stefanovic, and he then put

6 Colonel Tesevic in charge of the notebook. Does that refresh your memory

7 or not?

8 A. You are right. That is to say that at that time I expressed my

9 doubt. I wasn't sure whether that's the way it was because afterwards

10 when talking to Colonel Tesevic and Colonel Stefanovic, who came only in

11 December to this position, rather, he replaced me only in December, so

12 around the 20th of December he took over from me up until the 20th of

13 January. There were a lot of holidays in that period of time, so it went

14 on for almost a month. Then I had a break until the 20th of February,

15 and then I went to Nis to take over from General Mladenovic, which is to

16 say that it is correct that I had stated that, but I also stated that I

17 cannot remember with certainty.

18 He called me a second time, but I didn't have this information

19 even then because I did not have documents to that effect convincing me

20 either that I was right or wrong.

21 However, General Stevanovic definitely could not have had the

22 notebook in his hands because it was placed in the archives on the 24th,

23 and the documents were sent to the army on the 2nd of November, 1998, and

24 sergeant -- sergeant -- well, the sergeant in charge of the office handed

25 it over. This was at the army command. And the other one handed it over

1 to Belgrade after the new year. That was the route taken, as it were.

2 Q. Thank you. Judge Bonomy asked you early on a couple of questions

3 about the accuracy of your note-taking and whether you were taking a full

4 account. After the meetings, did you ever review your notes with

5 General Pavkovic to be sure that you had gotten the important points down

6 correctly?

7 A. No. No. No. The general never asked me to do that, and he

8 never used that notebook except when I was preparing for him an outline

9 to inform General Samardzic about security matters. I prepared similar

10 points for Colonel Djindjic --

11 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreter did not hear the first

12 name.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- and then he transferred this to

14 the army commander because the army commander personally expressed his

15 interest in terms of what this was all about, in the field of security

16 that is.

17 MR. HANNIS:

18 Q. How about during the meetings or after the meetings? Did you

19 ever ask any one of the speakers to clarify something you might have

20 written down, for example, Mr. Minic or Mr. Sainovic or General Lukic?

21 Did you ever --

22 A. No, no, no. I jotted down what I managed to jot down the way I

23 understood it, and basically it was for my personal use.

24 Q. And -- and when you weren't clear, you sometimes put a question

25 mark by an entry if you weren't sure you'd heard correctly, right?

1 A. Yes, that did happen, but only if it had a certain effect on

2 something that I thought would be a problem for me within my functional

3 duties, and perhaps sometimes I would discuss that with General Pavkovic

4 because I only contacted him about such matters. And sometimes when the

5 army commander would call me for approving plans, then I would discuss

6 that with him personally.

7 Q. The point I'm trying to make is I -- from my impression of you

8 during your testimony this morning, it seemed to me you're an

9 intelligent, articulate guy who takes his work seriously. So were you

10 comfortable that the notes you were taking were generally accurate and

11 reflective of what was said at those meetings?

12 A. Well, you know what? I tried to jot down what I could. However,

13 some things I simply omitted, what I thought that I did not need. I can

14 say that straight away, that I was least interested in the foreign policy

15 factor, if I can put it that way, because as the assistant for operations

16 and training, I didn't need that part at all. I was not involved in

17 politics at all, so I recorded very little of that when speaking of that

18 factor. When speaking of security as a subject matter, when the people

19 from state security were providing information, I didn't even write down

20 a lot of what General Pavkovic said because for the most part I knew

21 that, or I knew what General Lukic said. I was more interested, for

22 instance, when Mr. Minic said certain things in relation to the

23 functioning of the municipal authorities, the municipal staffs, then the

24 districts. Then often I was interested when Mr. Andjelkovic spoke about

25 civilian protection and things like that because after all, this did have

1 something in common with my own functional duties.

2 Q. Related to your duties, you mentioned at page 15, line 18, today

3 that -- what you called the operational report, and you said the first

4 one you drafted was on the 10th of July, and this -- and this --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- as I understand it, had to do in connection with your dealings

7 with -- with state security and trying to get information from them; is

8 that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I want to show you an exhibit. It's P2945. This is a -- this is

11 newspaper article, an interview with General Stojanovic -- or Colonel

12 Stojanovic, and I want to go to page 2 of the B/C/S. I think it's page

13 10 of the English.

14 In that newspaper article, he talks a little bit about the Joint

15 Command, and you'll see on that page the item number 2 that's inserted.

16 I don't know if we can blow that up so you can get a better look at it.

17 We need item number 2. Yeah. You can make it a little bit

18 bigger, perhaps.

19 It's dated the 11th of November, 1998, at the top. I will tell

20 you it's from the Pristina Corps Command Security Sector, and it's a

21 report to the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. Did you ever see

22 this kind of report from Colonel Stojanovic?

23 A. I can barely see this. It is unintelligible.

24 Q. Did he prepare -- did he personally prepare reports that went to

25 the Joint Command?

1 A. No. No, no, no. No. All his reports went through me. No one

2 could go apart from the operative organ because the operative organ is

3 the realiser of coordination with organs outside the military, and the

4 commander is responsible for coordination according to the rules of the

5 land forces.

6 Since I'm subordinated to the chief of staff, as for this

7 function of coordination, I carried that out within the command.

8 Stojanovic could go attend meetings with the MUP and the state security,

9 but only with regard to professional expert matters that had to do with

10 the use of equipment and methods of security organs. Since I was head of

11 the department, I knew that he had the authority to do that, and I knew

12 that he could freely contact the organs of state security and the MUP

13 organs with regard to specific security-related problems.

14 Q. Let me show you a similar or a related kind of document. It's

15 Exhibit P1197. This is another sort of report about security matters to

16 the Joint Command or from the Joint Command in late 1998. I'll ask you

17 to take a minute when it's on the screen and tell us -- I guess we need

18 to go to the second page of the B/C/S.

19 In my English translation, this is Joint Command, 20 November

20 1998, and it's described as an Operations Report. Just looking at that

21 first page, can you tell us, did you ever see reports like this in 1998?

22 A. These are reports that we wrote in the command of the Pristina

23 Corps. That is to say that on the basis of discussions that I referred

24 to previously, I asked General Pavkovic to try to look into the matter

25 with General Lukic and state security and see whether we could get their

1 information so that we within the command could carry through the

2 requests of the army commander and the corps commander, and the general

3 said that he would first discuss this with General Lukic and Gajic, and

4 then from the 10th of July he -- he provided that information in

5 handwriting. He obtained it. And I was fair because I gave them the

6 documents that pertained to the military, to them, so that they could

7 follow the overall situation in the territory.

8 Q. And is this the kind of report, then, that you wrote on the 10th

9 of July, an operations report like this?

10 A. That's it. This is it.

11 Q. Okay. And I see the number at the top, "Strictly confidential

12 number 1142-134." Is that number 1142 something that was related to the

13 Pristina Corps in late 1998?

14 A. It's our number. It's our number.

15 Q. And as I understand the numbering system with the VJ documents,

16 then that number 134 is the 134th document in this series related to

17 operations reports for 1998, right?

18 A. Possibly, but it is also possible that some document of a similar

19 nature may crop up. It doesn't have to be a daily report. This in

20 essence is a daily report, but sometimes during the course of one day

21 there would be two reports that would be similar. So I do not rule out

22 that possibility, say, that 110 and 111 would appear for the same date.

23 That is possible.

24 Q. Now -- but in general these were -- generally speaking, these

25 were daily reports, right?

1 A. No. These were summarised reports of the Ministry of the

2 Interior and of the state security as they provided them in the first

3 part. That is to say, they were copied verbatim. We didn't change a

4 word. And in the second part, it would be the report of the military.

5 And these reports put together that way joined up were sent to the

6 mainstays, and one copy would remain in the Pristina Corps for the sake

7 of analyses that we carried out afterwards. So this was proper working

8 material for us.

9 Q. Well, by my rough math, if you wrote your first one on the 10th

10 of July, 1998, and there was a single report for every day, by November

11 20th you would be on or at number 134, right? Because there's

12 approximately that many days between the 10th of July and the 20th of

13 November.

14 A. Possibly, but I do not rule out the possibility that on some days

15 there were no reports and that we didn't receive any because we wrote

16 reports on those days when we would receive reports from the MUP and the

17 state security.

18 Q. Now, who did you receive the information from in the MUP that

19 went into these reports?

20 A. I mentioned the names of the persons with whom I cooperated from

21 the MUP. Now, who did this within the MUP I don't know, but from Gajic

22 about state security and most often it was Adamovic from the MUP. Now,

23 who it was that did it there, it was probably an entire team. And I have

24 to say that this is not a combat document. It's not even an operative

25 document. This is only operative by way of content. It contains

1 operative information. However, not according to any rule, and for years

2 I was engaged in this kind of operative work. This kind of document is

3 not prescribed. It is also not prohibited in terms of communication

4 between certain entities.

5 Q. To whom was this report distributed?

6 A. So this report was always sent to the three mainstays, the MUP,

7 the DB, and the army. And while I was there until the 14th of October,

8 it -- these reports were not to send to anyone apart from the three

9 mainstays. And when Colonel Tesevic replaced me at that post, when he

10 managed the data, he -- that was our arrangement, if anyone were absent

11 for a longer period of days so as to miss a number of meetings, that this

12 should be sent to those people in the political structures. And as he

13 informed me later, he sent this to Mr. Minic. The reason he quoted was

14 because he had been absent from Kosovo for a period of maybe 10 to 15

15 days, and he missed maybe four or five meetings, and he sent this to him

16 by way of a reminder of some of the activities that were being carried

17 out at that time.

18 Q. Did other members or attendees of the Joint Command meetings

19 receive copies of these? Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Andjelkovic?

20 A. No, because they were for the most part present. They were aware

21 of these problems, and there was no need for anyone who was present there

22 to get this kind of a report or information because they had already been

23 told about all that.

24 Q. Fair enough. Thank you. You mention that to your recollection I

25 think the first time you used the term "Joint Command" in a document was

1 on the 6th of July, 1998, right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Have you seen the original of that document since 1998?

4 A. No, no. I couldn't have seen it. I saw a copy in the course of

5 my preparations, and I was actually trying to trace back the origins of

6 this name. I know how to go about it, so I tried to see how far it

7 dated, and I did have some assumptions. So the first date was the 13th

8 of May where cooperation and coordination with MUP is mentioned, and then

9 the next one is the 6th of July.

10 Q. Joint Command was mentioned at the 13th of May meeting?

11 A. No, no, not at that time, but in our assessment document, it is

12 sought that the cooperation and coordination with MUP should improve, and

13 then what followed was the order from the army commander authorising

14 General Pavkovic to coordinate some actions, activities with other

15 entities. MUP is not actually named as such. The term that was used was

16 "entities" in the same area.

17 Q. Before we go to that further discussion on the July 6th document,

18 one last question about this operation report on the screen. Who -- who

19 decided to title this "Joint Command"? Whose idea was that?

20 A. In this case it was my idea. On the basis of the conversation,

21 let's say, of the document dated the 6th of July, then the one that's

22 dated the 10th of July followed, I decided to put "Joint Command"

23 analogous to the previous document on those -- for this coordination

24 activity.

25 Q. Okay. Could we next look at Exhibit P2113. I don't know if you

1 might have seen this one before or not, General. It's from the

2 125th Motorised Brigade. It's dated the 7th of July, 1998, and you'll

3 see the commander of this brigade is issuing an order to subordinate

4 units where he says in item 1: "I prohibit the execution of any

5 operations by units and formations without the approval of the Joint

6 Command for Kosovo and Metohija and my own approval."

7 You will see in the first paragraph above that, he says "Pursuant

8 to the order of the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija strictly

9 confidential No. 1104-6 of 6 July 1998 ..."

10 That document 1104-6 is I think the one that you've been telling

11 us about, the first one that you wrote using the term "Joint Command."

12 Is that right?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. Do you know where that -- where the original of that document

15 might be?

16 A. In the archive. It has to be in the archive. The document has

17 to be in the archive. All the documents that are logged in must be

18 there.

19 Q. I think you told us in your testimony earlier that document had

20 to do with what -- how VJ units were to be used, or what was it about?

21 A. Yes, yes. That pertains to the prohibition of the use of the

22 army and MUP units without the knowledge of the Joint Command, but I

23 explained to you what I meant when I used the term "Joint Command." I

24 meant General Lukic and General Pavkovic, no one else, because no one

25 else in the chain of command could issue orders to the MUP units apart

1 from General Lukic and to the army units apart from General Pavkovic or

2 General Samardzic. So as far as I was concerned, there was no one else

3 that was meant by this term that I use here.

4 Q. But prior to sending out this order from the 6th of July, was

5 there any advance notification or explanation to subordinate units about

6 what the Joint Command was or who the Joint Command was, or did you just

7 send out that order on the 6th of July entitled "Joint Command"?

8 A. Well, some people contacted me knowing that I mostly did the

9 documents, the command organs that were subordinate to me, so some of

10 them contacted me. I wouldn't even rule out the possibility that the

11 commander of the 125th and of the 549th actually called me and asked me

12 what is this in reference of, and I explained to them that this was an

13 authorisation for them to coordinate some actions with the MUP. Without

14 this order on the coordination, they could not carry out any combat

15 actions in such a way, and that is why in this order it is explicitly

16 ordered. You can see here where there is the reference to the previous

17 order. It says: "Without the MUP staff and the command of the Pristina

18 Corps." So the two are separate, the MUP staff and the corps command.

19 So I wrote that advisedly so that they should know that there were two

20 levels of command involved in this coordination, the MUP staff and the

21 Pristina Corps Command.

22 And I think that Zivanovic contacted me, and I told him that if

23 he doesn't receive a document where it says "Joint Command" and that

24 coordination had been carried out, he could not move any of his units

25 regardless of who asked him to do so. And they knew that. They

1 respected that. Even the army commander issued a similar order

2 previously from the level of the army command about the prohibition of

3 the use of units without his knowledge.

4 Q. Colonel Zivanovic, or General now, Zivanovic was here and

5 testified at page 20508 and told us generally that when he received this

6 order he called you because he didn't know what this was about or what

7 the Joint Command was, and, General, he -- he told us that you explained

8 that the Joint Command for Kosovo referred to coordination at the highest

9 level and that in the future he, Zivanovic, would receive similar

10 unsigned orders from the Joint Command. Was that right? Is that

11 consistent with your memory of the conversation?

12 A. Well, for the most part. I know that I and General Zivanovic,

13 well, we are good friends, and I know that he would not have said

14 something like that had it not happened, but I mostly explained to all of

15 the people who were asking themselves what it was, those who received

16 similar documents, and I was telling them that in essence this was in

17 lieu of the coordination plan that we were supposed to do, that the

18 coordination was carried out in this manner, which was simpler and was

19 much better tailored to the MUP and to the army. That was the

20 explanation.

21 Q. Did that document, number 1104-6, of 6 July also go to the MUP?

22 A. No. No. There was no need. No, no. The one from the 125th.

23 You mean 1104-6. No, no, there was no need.

24 Q. I don't mean the one from Zivanovic but the one that he had

25 received from you, which I understand is --

1 A. No, no. I know. I know. No, there was no -- definitely it

2 didn't go there because I personally drafted it and I know that it

3 didn't. Because every time it went out, I put my initials and the

4 addressees on all my documents. In 99 per cent of the cases, you can

5 find the initials.

6 Q. Since it didn't go to the MUP, I'm having a hard time

7 understanding why it said "Joint Command." Why didn't it just go out

8 from the Pristina Corps Command if it's going to Pristina Corps

9 subordinate units? It seems like you're just creating needless confusion

10 by introducing this new term "Joint Command."

11 A. Well, excellent, yeah. No. No. Colonel Zivanovic, when he

12 showed the document with the words "Joint Command," the MUP received the

13 same document from General Lukic. And then when they realised that both

14 commands agreed about the duties of the two segments, then they start

15 implementing those activities. Without that, any member of any MUP

16 detachment or anything else couldn't accept any duties if he didn't know

17 that General Lukic and General Pavkovic had not agreed on the

18 coordination, not the two of them personally but their assistants in

19 appropriate departments. That was the essence of it.

20 Q. Okay. If I understand correctly, then you're saying there was a

21 similar kind of document that went from General Lukic out to subordinate

22 MUP units about not taking any action without approval of the Joint

23 Command?

24 A. I personally don't know if General Lukic did that, but I assume

25 that he should have regulated in some way how his organs would learn that

1 this was -- that this had been coordinated by his assistants. As I said,

2 that was General Stevanovic, Redja [phoen] Mijatovic, Adamovic, they

3 coordinated this with us so that they could know that this had been

4 coordinated and that they would receive support from the army because the

5 essence is in this: The army commander would not allow the army units to

6 move if this had not been coordinated fully regarding the support to the

7 MUP.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, we will have to interrupt you at this

9 stage.

10 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Can I clarify with Defence counsel

12 which counsel definitely will cross-examine? Mr. Aleksic, yes.

13 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that my

14 cross-examination will not take long.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] If I have any questions, I won't have

17 more than three to four, but I don't think I will have any questions,

18 unless Mr. Hannis springs any surprises on me.

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can see that I have

20 just a few questions.

21 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, we definitely have cross for this

22 witness.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Djakovic, we have to interrupt our hearing at

24 this stage because another case is heard in this courtroom this

25 afternoon, and we cannot, regrettably, continue. We will however, resume

1 tomorrow at 9.00 in -- back in this courtroom at 9.00 tomorrow when your

2 evidence will continue. It may well be completed tomorrow. I can't tell

3 you for sure.

4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, may I hand him a copy of the B/C/S

5 version of P2943 if he wants to look at it? I might ask some questions

6 from it tomorrow.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me what that is, Mr. Hannis.

8 MR. HANNIS: It's the B/C/S translation of his unsigned statement

9 to Phil Coo.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes. Yes.

11 You're being given a translation of the statement that it is said

12 the Prosecution took from you, and we would be assisted by you spending

13 at least some time between now and tomorrow morning reading that to

14 familiarise yourself with its terms.

15 Between now and tomorrow morning, it is vital that you have no

16 communication with anybody about the evidence in this case. You can talk

17 to people about whatever else you like, but you must not discuss the

18 evidence in this case, any aspect of it. Could you now please leave the

19 courtroom with the usher, and we will see you tomorrow at 9.00.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day

22 of May, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.

23

24

25