Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27493

 1                           Thursday, 26 February 2009

 2                           [Judgement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case

 7     number IT-05-87-T, the Prosecutor versus Milan Milutinovic et al.

 8             JUDGE BONOMY:  May we have the appearances for the parties,

 9     please.  Mr. Hannis.

10             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I'm Tom Hannis on behalf

11     of the Office of the Prosecutor, joined today by our case manager, Iain

12     Reid, Chester Stamp, Daniela Kravetz, April Carter, Patricia Neema,

13     Silvia D'Ascoli, Priya Gopalan, and Mathias Marcussen.

14             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

15             Mr. O'Sullivan.

16             MR. O'SULLIVAN:  Good afternoon.  I'm Eugene O'Sullivan, along

17     with Slobodan Zecevic, appearing on behalf of Mr. Milutinovic.

18             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

19             Mr. Fila.

20             MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Toma

21     Fila appearing together with Mr. Vladimir Petrovic and Mr. Mrkic for the

22     Defence of Nikola Sainovic.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

24             Mr. Visnjic.

25             MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  For

Page 27494

 1     Ojdanic team, Tomislav Visnjic and Norman Sepenuk are counsel, and Mr.

 2     Stevanovic and Mr. Hopkins, legal assistants.

 3             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. Ackerman.

 5             MR. ACKERMAN:  Your Honour, John Ackerman for General Pavkovic

 6     along with Aleksander Aleksic, Aleksander Vujic and Cathy MacDaid.

 7             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. Cepic.

 9             MR. CEPIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honour.  I'm Djuro Cepic,

10     Defence counsel for General Lazarevic.  Appearing with me, Mr. Milan

11     Petrovic.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

13             Mr. Lukic.

14             MR. LUKIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Branko Lukic along

15     with Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Zorko and Mr. Ogrizovic for General Sreten Lukic.

16             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

17             The Trial Chamber is sitting today to deliver its judgement in

18     the case of Prosecutor versus Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic,

19     Dragoljub Ojdanic, Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir Lazarevic, and Sreten

20     Lukic.  What I am about to read is a summary of the Chamber's findings in

21     that judgement; however, the authoritative account of those findings is

22     contained in the written judgement, which will be made available after

23     this hearing.

24             At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to

25     counsel, the Registry staff, the interpreters and court reporters, the

Page 27495

 1     Chamber's own staff, and all others who have contributed to the smooth

 2     and efficient conduct of this trial.

 3             The judgement is a lengthy document, reflecting the size and

 4     complexity of the case.  The trial proceedings began on 10th July, 2006,

 5     and concluded on 27th August, 2008.  During their course, the Chamber

 6     heard oral testimony from a total of 235 witnesses and admitted over 4300

 7     exhibits.

 8             The length of the trial and volume of evidence as well as the

 9     size of the judgement are in a large part a consequence of the number and

10     nature of the charges in the indictment.  The accused are charged under

11     every form of responsibility set out in Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the

12     Statute of the Tribunal for their alleged role in crimes said to have

13     been committed between 1st January and 20th June, 1999, in Kosovo by

14     forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia,

15     referred to as the forces of the FRY and Serbia.  Specifically, the

16     accused are alleged to be responsible for deportation, a crime against

17     humanity, that's Count 1; forcible transfer as other inhumane acts, a

18     crime against humanity, that is Count 2; murder, a crime against

19     humanity, and a violation of the laws or customs of war, Counts 3 and 4;

20     and persecution, a crime against humanity, that is, Count 5.

21             According to the indictment, the accused participated along with

22     others in a joint criminal enterprise to modify the ethnic balance in

23     Kosovo in order to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian

24     authorities over the province.  The Prosecution further alleges that the

25     purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was to be achieved through a

Page 27496

 1     widespread or systematic campaign of terror or violence against the

 2     Kosovo Albanian population, including the various crimes specified in

 3     each of the counts of the indictment.

 4             Under Count 1, the indictment sets out how the deportation of

 5     Kosovo Albanians was carried out in early 1999 from 13 municipalities

 6     across Kosovo and particular towns and villages in those municipalities.

 7     It should be noted that these descriptions also contain information about

 8     killings, property destruction, theft, sexual assaults, beatings, and

 9     other forms of violence, which the Prosecution alleges contributed to an

10     atmosphere of fear and oppression created by the FRY and Serbian forces

11     to facilitate the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population.  Under

12     Counts 3 and 4, a number of killings are alleged in various locations in

13     Kosovo.  Finally, under the fifth count, the indictment avers that the

14     forces of the FRY and Serbia executed a campaign of persecution against

15     the Kosovo Albanian population, including by way of murder, sexual

16     assault, and wanton destruction or damage of religious sites.  However,

17     the specific acts of deportation and forcible transfer described under

18     Counts 1 and 2 are not included in Count 5 as forms of persecution, as

19     the Chamber has pointed out to the parties during the course of the trial

20     proceedings.

21             At the time of the alleged crimes, Milan Milutinovic was the

22     president of the Republic of Serbia; Nikola Sainovic was a deputy prime

23     minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or FRY; Dragoljub Ojdanic

24     was the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army, known as the VJ;

25     Nebojsa Pavkovic was the commander of the VJ 3rd Army; Vladimir Lazarevic

Page 27497

 1     was the commander of the VJ Pristina Corps; and Sreten Lukic was the head

 2     of the Serbian Ministry of interior staff for Kosovo, referred to as the

 3     MUP staff.  The indictment alleges that each of the accused participated

 4     in the joint criminal enterprise, and that in these roles they exercised

 5     command authority and/or effective control over VJ and MUP forces

 6     involved in the commission of the alleged crimes.  They are also said to

 7     have planned, instigated, ordered, or otherwise to have aided and abetted

 8     these crimes.

 9             Following the Pre-Trial Conference held on 7th July, 2006, the

10     Chamber issued an order pursuant to Rule 73 bis of the Tribunal's Rules

11     of Procedure and Evidence, which had the effect of preventing the

12     Prosecution from leading evidence with regard to three of the crime sites

13     alleged in the indictment.  The parties are ordered at the end of the

14     judgement to make appropriate submissions in writing within two weeks,

15     regarding how to proceed in relation to these charges.

16             The judgement is divided into four volumes.  The first volume

17     sets out the law applicable to the case and the Chamber's findings upon

18     the political and constitutional structures of the FRY and Serbia, the

19     armed conflict that is the subject of the indictment, and the various

20     forces involved, and the diplomatic efforts to resolve that conflict.  In

21     volume 2, the Chamber sets forth its findings in relation to the crimes

22     alleged to have been committed from March to June 1999 in Kosovo by

23     forces of the FRY and Serbia.  In volume 3, the Chamber makes findings as

24     to the individual criminal responsibility of the six accused.  Volume 4

25     contains annexes to the judgement including an analysis of the evidence

Page 27498

 1     in relation to the more than 800 named murder victims listed in schedules

 2     to the indictment.

 3             I will start by discussing the Chamber's findings in relation to

 4     the commission of the crimes alleged by forces of the FRY and Serbia.  I

 5     note that in the judgement the Chamber refers to place names in Kosovo

 6     both in their Serbian and Albanian versions; however, I will only use the

 7     Serbian version while reading this summary.

 8             The Chamber finds that a political crisis developed in Kosovo in

 9     the late 1980s and through the 1990s, culminating in an armed conflict

10     involving forces of the FRY and Serbia and forces of the Kosovo

11     Liberation Army, or KLA, from mid-1998.  During that armed conflict,

12     there were incidents where excessive and indiscriminate force was used by

13     the VJ and MUP, resulting in damage to civilian property, population

14     displacement, and civilian deaths.  Despite efforts to bring the crisis

15     to an end, which included the introduction into Kosovo of an

16     international verification mission, the conflict continued through to and

17     beyond 24th March, 1999, when NATO forces began an aerial bombardment

18     campaign against targets in the FRY.  That campaign ended on 10th June,

19     1999, and the forces of the FRY and Serbia were withdrawn from Kosovo.

20     Sections of the judgement analyse the evidence in relation to the

21     ostensible efforts to negotiate between the Kosovo Albanians and the FRY

22     and Serbian authorities in 1998 and 1999, various international

23     agreements concluded in October 1998, and the situation as it developed

24     thereafter, as well as the involvement of international interlocutors to

25     resolve the crisis which led to a conference in Rambouillet, France, in

Page 27499

 1     February 1999.

 2             It is largely uncontested that significant numbers of people from

 3     Kosovo left their homes during the NATO bombing, many of whom crossed the

 4     borders into Albania and Macedonia.  Documentary evidence and witnesses

 5     brought by both the Prosecution and Defence confirmed this swift

 6     movement, primarily of Kosovo Albanians.  For example, a series of

 7     reports sent by the MUP staff to the MUP headquarters in Belgrade from

 8     24th March to 1st May, 1999, record the numbers of Kosovo Albanians

 9     crossing the borders in that period.  According to these reports, in the

10     first week of the NATO bombing, over 300.000 Kosovo Albanians crossed

11     into Albania and Macedonia.  By 6 April, that number doubled; and by

12     1st May, it had reached 715.158.

13             The Prosecution case is that these hundreds of thousands of

14     Kosovo Albanians fled the province because of the violent and coercive

15     actions of the forces of the FRY and Serbia, which engaged in a campaign

16     of terror and violence against the Kosovo Albanian population in order to

17     expel them from their homes and force them across the borders.  This case

18     was supported by the consistent evidence of many Kosovo Albanian

19     witnesses, along with some of the former VJ and MUP personnel brought by

20     the Prosecution.  However, witnesses brought by the Defence consistently

21     denied that there was any organised expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from

22     their homes, and many of them gave other reasons for the mass movement of

23     Kosovo Albanians across the borders into Albania and Macedonia, including

24     the NATO bombing itself and the actions of the KLA.

25             The Trial Chamber is mindful of the fact that in some parts of

Page 27500

 1     Kosovo, both within the 13 municipalities discussed in this judgement and

 2     elsewhere, people may have left their homes for different reasons, such

 3     as instructions from the KLA, the desire to avoid being present while

 4     combat between the KLA and forces of the FRY and Serbia was taking place,

 5     or, indeed, the fact that NATO was bombing targets close to where they

 6     lived.  However, despite the arguments by the Defence that these were the

 7     primary reasons for the massive movement of people within Kosovo and

 8     across the borders with Albania and Macedonia, none of the Kosovo

 9     Albanian witnesses who testified cited the NATO bombing as among the

10     reasons for their departure.  And in only one area of Vucitrn

11     municipality and another area of Suva Reka municipality did the Chamber

12     find that people were moving as a consequence of the actions of the KLA.

13     The Kosovo Albanian witnesses who testified about their own expulsion and

14     that of many others came from a broad cross-section of that community,

15     generally with no connection to one another beyond their victimisation,

16     and it is inconceivable that they could or would all have concocted such

17     detailed and consistent accounts of the events that they experienced and

18     witnessed.

19             Furthermore, NATO bombs struck targets across the FRY, with

20     Belgrade suffering the most destruction, according to the former

21     commander of the VJ air force and air defence, and yet people did not

22     leave Belgrade or other parts of the FRY in the massive numbers which

23     fled Kosovo.  The Chamber finds, therefore, that the NATO bombing was not

24     the reason for the mass displacement of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo.

25             While there was a continuing armed conflict between the KLA and

Page 27501

 1     the forces of the FRY and Serbia, at the same time as the NATO air

 2     campaign, the Chamber also does not consider that this conflict was the

 3     cause of the flight of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from

 4     late March to early June 1999.  The conflict between the KLA and the VJ

 5     and MUP commenced in mid-1998 and intensified through July, August, and

 6     September of that year.  While many Kosovo Albanians were displaced at

 7     that time, most stayed within the boundaries of Kosovo, and there was not

 8     the massive flood of people across the borders that began on 24th March

 9     1999.  The Chamber further recalls that, while the KLA was, at various

10     times and in various locations, a force to be reckoned with, its numbers

11     were small in comparison to the quantity of VJ and MUP personnel deployed

12     to Kosovo in March to June 1999, nor did it have the kinds of heavy

13     equipment that the state forces had access to.

14             The Kosovo Albanian witnesses who testified both about their own

15     experiences and that of their families, friends, and neighbours in the

16     few weeks between 24th March and the beginning of June 1999, gave a

17     broadly consistent account of the fear that reigned in towns and villages

18     across Kosovo, not because of the NATO bombing, but, rather, because of

19     the actions of the VJ and MUP and associated forces that accompanied it.

20     In all of the 13 municipalities specified in the indictment as sites of

21     deportation and forcible transfer, the Chamber finds that forces of the

22     FRY and Serbia deliberately expelled Kosovo Albanians from their homes,

23     either by ordering them to leave or by creating an atmosphere of terror

24     in order to effect their departure.  As these people left their homes and

25     moved either within Kosovo or towards and across its borders, many of

Page 27502

 1     them continued to be threatened, robbed, mistreated, and otherwise

 2     abused.  In numerous places, men were separated from women and children;

 3     their vehicles were stolen or destroyed; their houses were deliberately

 4     set on fire; money was extorted from them; and they were forced to

 5     relinquish their personal identity documents.

 6             The Trial Chamber therefore finds that there was a broad campaign

 7     of violence directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population

 8     during the course of the NATO air-strikes, conducted by forces under the

 9     control of the FRY and Serbian authorities, during which there were

10     incidents of killing, sexual assault, and the intentional destruction of

11     mosques.  It was the deliberate actions of these forces during this

12     campaign that caused the departure of at least 700.000 Kosovo Albanians

13     from Kosovo in the short period of time between the end of March and

14     beginning of June 1999.  Efforts by the MUP to conceal the killing of

15     Kosovo Albanians, by transporting the bodies to other areas of Serbia, as

16     discussed in detail in the judgement, also suggest that such killings

17     were criminal in nature.

18             I will briefly mention some of the Chamber's factual findings in

19     relation to the various crime sites.  At the end of March 1999, an

20     extremely threatening and violent environment was created in Pec in

21     western Kosovo - by that, I mean Pec town in western Kosovo - by police

22     and military forces burning houses, firing weapons, and abusing the local

23     Kosovo Albanian population.  A significant number of the town's residents

24     thus fled or were ordered out of their homes, some of them being directed

25     to go to Montenegro and others being sent to the centre of the town where

Page 27503

 1     they were put on buses and driven to the Albanian border.  When these

 2     Kosovo Albanians returned to Pec after the conflict, they found that many

 3     of their houses had been burned, although the houses belonging to Serb

 4     residents of the town were undamaged.

 5             In Decani municipality, immediately to the south of Pec, similar

 6     events transpired in the village of Beleg at the end of March 1999.

 7     There, the Kosovo Albanian residents were rounded up by police and VJ

 8     personnel, including reservists, in the course of which some men were

 9     killed.  A large group of predominantly Kosovo Albanian women and

10     children were detained and mistreated.  Some of the women were sexually

11     assaulted, and some men were physically abused.  The next day, most of

12     the people from the group were ordered to go to Albania, and those who

13     remained have not been heard from since.

14             South of Decani in Djakovica town, a prevailing atmosphere of

15     terror was created by police and VJ forces from the commencement of the

16     NATO bombing campaign.  These forces engaged in the selective looting and

17     burning of buildings, and MUP forces killed Kosovo Albanian residents of

18     the town, including a group of 20 women and children in a basement in

19     Milos Gilic Street at the beginning of April.  As a consequence, a large

20     number of Kosovo Albanians fled the town and travelled to and across the

21     Albanian border.  During their journey, their personal identity documents

22     were taken from them by VJ and MUP forces.  Kosovo Albanian residents of

23     villages in Djakovica municipality were also expelled from their homes by

24     army and police forces in April 1999, in particular during a joint

25     operation in the area known as the Reka or Caragoj valley at the end of

Page 27504

 1     the month.  In the course of that operation, a number of Kosovo Albanians

 2     were killed by members of the police and VJ, and the bodies of at least

 3     287 people who went missing from Meja and the surrounding area at that

 4     time were subsequently found in mass graves at Batajnica close to

 5     Belgrade.

 6             It is uncontested that a broad operation was conducted by the VJ

 7     and MUP at the end of March 1999 in an area covering parts of Prizren,

 8     Suva Reka, and Orahovac municipalities in south-western Kosovo.  During

 9     the course of that operation, on 25th March, 1999, Kosovo Albanian

10     villagers from Pirane, in Prizren municipality, fled their homes as a

11     consequence of the shelling of the village and the torching of houses by

12     VJ and MUP forces.  The same day, MUP and VJ forces attacked the village

13     of Celina in Orahovac municipality, looting and setting the majority of

14     houses on fire.  These forces terrorised the inhabitants of the village,

15     killing a number of people.  People from Celina who had fled their homes

16     and taken shelter in nearby woods were later rounded up and robbed of

17     their valuables and identity documents.  Some of them were physically

18     abused, and they were sent towards the Albanian border.  MUP personnel

19     also deliberately destroyed the local mosque on 28th March, 1999, a

20     Muslim holiday.

21             The same day as Celina and Pirane were attacked, nearby

22     Bela Crkva in Orahovac municipality was also attacked -- sorry, was also

23     targeted by VJ and MUP forces, which shelled the village and burned

24     houses, causing the inhabitants to flee.  During the course of this

25     attack, police forces brutally killed a number of men, women, and

Page 27505

 1     children who were hiding in groups in a river-bed.  The village of

 2     Mala Krusa to the south of Celina and Bela Crkva and to the north of

 3     Pirane was also surrounded by VJ and MUP forces on 25th March, 1999, and

 4     the MUP then entered the village, looting and setting houses on fire with

 5     the assistance of some local Serbs.  The Kosovo Albanian residents of the

 6     village went to hide in a wooded area and were later rounded up, the

 7     women and children being told to go to Albania.  More than 110 men were

 8     robbed of their valuables and identity documents, mistreated, and then

 9     shut in a barn and shot by local members of the police, after which the

10     barn was set on fire.  Only eight of them survived.

11             Around the same time, the residents of Dusanovo, a neighbourhood

12     of Prizren town, were expelled from their homes, beaten, threatened, and

13     robbed, and directed towards Albania.  Later, in April 1999, people who

14     had been displaced from Pirane during the operation and who were

15     sheltering in nearby Srbica were also ordered to leave the village and go

16     to Albania.

17             In the course of the operation at the end of March 1999, special

18     police forces were engaged in and around Suva Reka town.  On 26th March,

19     local MUP personnel targeted members of the Berisha family in the town,

20     killing 45 men, women, and children near their homes, as they fled past a

21     bus station, and after they had taken shelter inside a local pizzeria.

22     The bodies of the majority of these people were also later found in a

23     mass grave in Batajnica near Belgrade.  In the days following the

24     killings, the Suva Reka mosque was damaged, and many of the remaining

25     Kosovo Albanian residents of the town left their homes as the police set

Page 27506

 1     fire to houses, stole money and valuables, and ordered them to go to

 2     Albania.

 3             Kosovo Albanian civilians were forcibly displaced from villages

 4     in Srbica municipality in central Kosovo, at the end of March and in

 5     April 1999.  On 26th March, Turicevac village was shelled and its

 6     inhabitants formed a convoy and left in the direction of Tusilje to the

 7     east.  MUP and VJ forces then arrived in Tusilje, and another convoy was

 8     formed, which started moving towards Klina.  Around this time, a large

 9     number of displaced people gathered in a field on the outskirts of the

10     village of Izbica.  Police forces surrounded the group, ordering the

11     women and children to go to Albania and detaining the men.  They then

12     lined up and shot the men in two groups, killing at least 89 of them.

13     Around mid-April, a group of women held by VJ or MUP forces in the

14     killing of Kozica after it had been shelled was taken to Cirez.  At least

15     four of these women were sexually assaulted, and eight of them were then

16     killed by being thrown into three wells.  At the end of April, another

17     offensive took place near Baks close to Cirez.  In the course of this

18     attack, a large group of Kosovo Albanian men were detained and

19     mistreated.

20             As soon as the NATO campaign began, prominent Kosovo Albanians in

21     Kosovska Mitrovica town in the north of the province were targeted and

22     some killed by the police.  Kosovo Albanian houses were also burned by

23     the police, and a large number of Kosovo Albanians were expelled from

24     parts of the town.  Some subsequently returned to the town and then left

25     again at the beginning of April, travelling on buses to Montenegro.  In

Page 27507

 1     mid-April 1999, many Kosovo Albanians living or temporarily sheltering in

 2     Zabare and other nearby villages were forced to form convoys and leave

 3     Kosovo by MUP and VJ forces, which began to burn houses in the villages.

 4     Many of these people had to make their way on foot across Kosovo and

 5     south to the Albanian border, and they were robbed and further mistreated

 6     along the way.

 7             On 27th March, 1999, VJ and MUP forces burned houses and at least

 8     one mosque in Vucitrn town and expelled Kosovo Albanian residents from

 9     the town.  MUP forces also robbed and mistreated Kosovo Albanians in a

10     large convoy moving from villages in Vucitrn municipality towards the

11     south.  On the night of 2nd May, 1999, MUP forces killed at least two

12     people in the convoy, which was then directed to some nearby buildings,

13     where its members were held overnight.  The following day, one other

14     person from the group was killed, and the MUP directed the women,

15     children, and elderly people to continue on to Albania.  They detained

16     and mistreated the Kosovo Albanian men of military age for approximately

17     three weeks in Smrekovnica prison before forcing them to cross the border

18     into Albania.

19             In Pristina town, the administrative centre of Kosovo, the

20     pattern of expulsion of Kosovo Albanians was repeated.  Many people were

21     directly evicted from their homes, while others fled out of fear of the

22     violence around them caused by the forces of the FRY and Serbia.  The

23     expulsion from Pristina was carried out in an organised manner, with

24     hundreds of Kosovo Albanians channelled to the train station and onto

25     overcrowded trains that took them to the Macedonian border.  In the

Page 27508

 1     course of this operation, at least three Kosovo Albanian women were

 2     sexually assaulted by VJ and MUP personnel.

 3             Villagers and Zegra and Prilepnica in Gnjilane municipality were

 4     also forcibly removed from their homes.  In Zegra, the VJ, MUP, and other

 5     irregular forces, including local Serb civilians, drove out the Kosovo

 6     Albanian residents by way of threats, beatings, and killings at the end

 7     of March 1999.  Many of the displaced people made their way to Macedonia.

 8     When they returned to their homes at the end of the conflict, they found

 9     that most of the Kosovo Albanian houses in the village had been burned

10     and damaged to some degree, whereas the houses of the Serb residents

11     remained untouched.  Around the same time, the mosque in nearby Vlastica

12     was burned down by the VJ and local MUP reservists, while in Vladovo,

13     houses were looted and burned, and its residents also fled and travelled

14     to Macedonia, escorted by MUP and VJ forces.  The residents of Prilepnica

15     were ordered to leave the village, first on 6th April and again on 13th

16     April, 1999.

17             In Urosevac municipality, south-west of Gnjilane, villages were

18     also attacked in late March and during April 1999.  In Sojevo, VJ,

19     police, and other armed individuals working together with them burned

20     houses and killed several people, while the local residents were forced

21     to travel in convoys towards Urosevac town.  Some of these people

22     continued on by bus to the Macedonian border.  At the beginning of April,

23     approximately 1.000 displaced people arrived in Mirosavlje.  When

24     military forces then approached Mirosavlje, its inhabitants and others

25     sheltering there formed convoys and travelled towards Urosevac by bus and

Page 27509

 1     travelled south to and across the Macedonian border.  Also at the

 2     beginning of April, the village of Staro Selo was occupied by VJ forces,

 3     who stayed for a few days and then left, burning houses as they departed.

 4     Shortly thereafter, a group of VJ volunteers arrived in the village and

 5     ordered local men to dig trenches, confiscated vehicles, and extorted

 6     money from the inhabitants.  The villagers left their homes out of fear

 7     and walked to Urosevac town.  Many later boarded trains that took them to

 8     the Macedonian border.

 9             Finally in Kacanik municipality in the south of Kosovo bordering

10     Macedonia, Kosovo Albanians were expelled from the town and surrounding

11     villages from the beginning of the NATO air campaign.  VJ and MUP forces

12     attacked Kotlina on 24th March, sending the local women and children by

13     truck and on foot towards Kacanik town.  Other villagers who escaped

14     detection fled towards Macedonia at the time of the attack.  A few days

15     later, VJ and MUP forces entered Kacanik town and fired towards some

16     houses from positions in a local factory.  The following day, the

17     residents of this part of the town decided to leave their homes out of

18     fear of the MUP forces and travelled on foot to Macedonia.  In April

19     1999, VJ and MUP units entered the village of Vata and looted houses

20     there.  On 21st May, 1999, VJ and MUP forces attacked Stagovo, and on

21     25th May, Dubrava.  The residents of Dubrava decided to go to Macedonia

22     because they knew and feared what had happened in other villages.  The

23     women, old men, and children formed a convoy, while the younger men hid

24     in the woods nearby.  Several people were shot near Reka close to Dubrava

25     at the time of this attack, including a girl who died and a 12-year-old

Page 27510

 1     boy who was seriously injured.  In addition to the evidence pertaining to

 2     the specific crime sites set out in the indictment, the Chamber heard

 3     evidence going to the broad pattern of violence and intimidation of the

 4     Kosovo Albanian population from witnesses who were members of the VJ and

 5     MUP forces in Kosovo at that time.  For example, three former members of

 6     the VJ who testified under protective measures admitted that they were

 7     involved in the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from their homes during the

 8     NATO campaign.  Other witnesses from the VJ and MUP described their own

 9     participation in the killing of Kosovo Albanian civilians and other

10     criminal acts.

11             Applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in the

12     indictment to the facts found proved in relation to each of the 13

13     municipalities, the Trial Chamber finds that the crimes of deportation, a

14     crime against humanity; other inhumane acts, forcible transfer, a crime

15     against humanity; murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war and a

16     crime against humanity; and murder, sexual assault, and wanton

17     destruction of or damage to religious property, as forms of persecution

18     on ethnic grounds, were committed by VJ and MUP forces in many of the

19     locations alleged in the indictment.  However, there were a number of

20     allegations that were not proved on the facts or did not satisfy one or

21     more of the requisite legal elements, such as the execution of at least

22     17 people in Kotlina on or about 24th March, 1999; and the deliberate

23     destruction of several mosques, and these charges are dismissed.

24             The Chamber also notes that for some crime sites where there was

25     a large number of murder charges and the indictment listed the alleged

Page 27511

 1     victims by name in a schedule, the Prosecution did not provide convincing

 2     evidence that all the particular named victims were in fact among the

 3     dead, although the Chamber was satisfied that the killing of a

 4     significant group of people by the VJ and/or MUP forces took place as

 5     alleged.

 6             I will now briefly set out the Chamber's findings in respect of

 7     each of the accused.

 8             Milan Milutinovic was the president of Serbia throughout 1998 and

 9     1999, and much of the evidence brought by the Prosecution and his Defence

10     concerned the nature and extent of his powers in that position.  The

11     judgement sets out the Chamber's analysis of the pertinent provisions of

12     the Serbian Constitution and other relevant legislation, as well as the

13     witness testimony in relation to those provisions.  The Chamber finds

14     that as president of Serbia, Milutinovic did not have direct individual

15     control over the VJ, a federal institution.  His formal role in relation

16     to the VJ was as an ex officio member of the Supreme Defence Council, or

17     SDC, which comprised FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, along with the

18     presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, and which made strategic decisions

19     with respect to the VJ.  However, analysis of the records of SDC sessions

20     in evidence does not indicate the formulation or implementation of the

21     common plan alleged in the indictment.  Moreover, there is no direct

22     evidence of SDC meetings after the 23rd of March, 1999, the eve of the

23     NATO air campaign; although the Chamber is convinced that Milutinovic and

24     FRY President Milosevic continued to meet during the NATO campaign and

25     retained formal command over the VJ through the SDC or a similar body

Page 27512

 1     known as the Supreme Command.  The evidence does not indicate, however,

 2     that Milutinovic took part in the exercise of command over the VJ after

 3     23rd March, 1999.  The Chamber also finds that in practice it was

 4     Milosevic, sometimes termed the supreme commander, who exercised actual

 5     command authority over the VJ during the NATO campaign.

 6             In 1998 and early 1999, Milutinovic was involved in the

 7     negotiations involving representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community,

 8     and those brokered by the international community, to seek to resolve the

 9     Kosovo crisis.  Having analysed the voluminous evidence in relation to

10     all these negotiations, the Chamber is not satisfied that that evidence

11     establishes that Milutinovic had an obstructive attitude aimed at

12     ensuring their failure, as submitted by the Prosecution.  The evidence

13     led by the Prosecution also did not convince the Chamber that Milutinovic

14     had a close personal or professional relationship with Milosevic or that

15     he held a position of significant influence in the Socialist Party of

16     Serbia, the dominant political party at that time.  These allegations are

17     among several made by the Prosecution about Milutinovic's involvement in

18     events that have not been proved.

19             Milutinovic attended a number of meetings in 1998 and early 1999,

20     during which the situation in Kosovo was discussed, some of them in

21     Kosovo itself.  The Chamber finds that he was relatively well informed

22     about that situation and that he was aware that criminal acts had been

23     committed by VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo both in 1998 and early 1999,

24     mainly through his dealings with foreign diplomats, negotiators, and

25     observers.  However, he was also told by state officials that any crimes

Page 27513

 1     that had been committed in Kosovo were dealt with or were being dealt

 2     with.

 3             The Chamber finds that as the president of Serbia, Milutinovic

 4     had powers that could potentially allow for significant oversight of the

 5     work of the Serbian government ministries, most importantly, the Ministry

 6     of the Interior, but the evidence does not establish extensive

 7     interaction between Milutinovic and the MUP in the relevant period, and

 8     his de facto powers over the MUP were not significant.  He issued several

 9     decrees during the state of emergency that came into force on

10     23rd March, 1999.  However, for the reasons set out in detail in the

11     judgement, the Chamber is unable to draw any inferences adverse to him

12     from the evidence surrounding these decrees.

13             In addition to being a deputy prime minister of the FRY, Nikola

14     Sainovic was the chairman of the FRY Commission for Cooperation with the

15     OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, a body set up following the various

16     agreements concluded in October 1998 by the FRY and Serbian authorities

17     and the international community.  The indictment alleges that he was FRY

18     President Milosevic's personal representative for Kosovo and that he was

19     the head of a body called the Joint Command, which had authority over the

20     VJ and MUP forces deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and early 1999 until the end

21     of the NATO air campaign.

22             A significant amount of time during the trial proceedings was

23     devoted by the Prosecution and the Sainovic Defence to the issue of the

24     existence, powers, and functioning of the Joint Command.  This evidence

25     is detailed in volume 1 of the judgement.  The Chamber finds that a body

Page 27514

 1     known by some as the Joint Command did come into existence in mid-1998 in

 2     order to coordinate the activities of the VJ and MUP and other state

 3     bodies involved in the Kosovo conflict.  Notes of meetings of the Joint

 4     Command held between July and October 1998 taken by one of the

 5     participants were entered into evidence and gave insight into the nature

 6     of the body.  These notes reveal that Sainovic was an active participant

 7     in Joint Command meetings, as were the accused Pavkovic and Lukic, and,

 8     on occasion, Lazarevic.  Indeed, Sainovic issued instructions at the

 9     meetings, including in relation to matters concerning the activities of

10     the VJ and MUP.  There is direct evidence of only one Joint Command

11     meeting in 1999 in June, but military orders were issued with a Joint

12     Command heading in order to ensure the cooperation and coordination of

13     MUP forces with the VJ.

14             Sainovic also attended a number of other high-level meetings

15     concerning the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and was often present

16     in Kosovo, both in 1998 and during the NATO air campaign.  The FRY

17     president was instrumental in sending him to Kosovo from the summer of

18     1998 and in his appointment as the chairman of the Commission for

19     Cooperation with the Kosovo Verification Mission in October 1998, which

20     enabled him to continue liaising with VJ and MUP personnel in Kosovo as

21     well as the international observers there.  His dealings with and

22     influence over the accused Pavkovic, from the VJ, and Lukic, from the

23     MUP, therefore continued without interruption.

24             Sainovic met with Milosevic frequently during 1998 and early

25     1999, as well as speaking with him by telephone, and a number of

Page 27515

 1     witnesses gave evidence about the nature of the relationship between the

 2     two men.  On the basis of this evidence, the Chamber finds that Sainovic

 3     was one of the closest and most trusted associates of Milosevic, which

 4     led to him taking a leading role in both the Joint Command and the

 5     Commission for Cooperation with the KVM.  He was a powerful official in

 6     the FRY government, who not only relayed information to Milosevic and

 7     conveyed Milosevic's instructions to those in Kosovo, but also had a

 8     great deal of influence over events in the province and was empowered to

 9     make decisions.

10             Sainovic met with former Kosovo Albanian political leader Ibrahim

11     Rugova during the NATO air-strikes in a period when Rugova was

12     effectively being held under house arrest.  The Chamber does not consider

13     these meetings to have been a genuine attempt to negotiate a solution to

14     the Kosovo situation, but, rather, a campaign which involved threats to

15     the personal safety of Rugova and his associates, designed to show that

16     the FRY and Serbian authorities were meeting with Kosovo Albanians, in

17     the hope that this would lead to cessation of the NATO bombing.  Sainovic

18     knowingly and wilfully participated in this campaign.

19             The Chamber also finds that Sainovic was very well informed about

20     events in Kosovo, both in 1998 and 1999, and that he was aware that

21     criminal acts had been committed by VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo both in

22     1998 and 1999, including during the NATO air-strikes.  Sainovic failed to

23     use his extensive authority in Kosovo and his own initiative to ensure

24     the cessation of such criminal conduct.

25             Dragoljub Ojdanic became the Chief of the General Staff, the

Page 27516

 1     highest position within the VJ at the end of 1998, replacing Momcilo

 2     Perisic, who was removed by Milosevic.  Prior to this elevation, he had

 3     been the deputy Chief of the General Staff.  As Chief of the General

 4     Staff, Ojdanic was only subordinate to the civilian authorities in which

 5     overall command of the VJ was vested, namely the Supreme Defence Council.

 6     The Chamber is convinced that, as Chief of the General Staff, Ojdanic

 7     exercised command and control over all units and organs of the VJ.  He

 8     worked closely with the FRY president before and during the NATO air

 9     campaign, and exercised de facto as well as de jure authority over the

10     VJ.  He did not, however, have direct control over MUP forces engaged in

11     Kosovo, despite orders for the resubordination of the MUP to the VJ

12     issued in April 1999.

13             As Chief of the General Staff, Ojdanic attended SDC meetings and

14     was an active participant in the discussions held.  The evidence does not

15     establish that he participated in the body known as the Joint Command,

16     but he was aware of it and accepted its operation.  The Chamber finds

17     that Ojdanic was aware and approved of the breaches of the October

18     Agreements that occurred in late 1998 and early 1999.  In addition, he

19     was aware of VJ involvement in the arming of the non-Albanian civilian

20     population in Kosovo.  He also supported the appointment of VJ personnel

21     to high-level posts, who either supported the activities of the VJ in

22     Kosovo, such as the accused Pavkovic, or else simply raised no objection

23     thereto, and was aware of the removal of high-level VJ officers who

24     objected to the use being made of the VJ in Kosovo.

25             Leading up to and during the NATO air campaign, Ojdanic issued

Page 27517

 1     orders for the VJ to carry out operations throughout Kosovo, including in

 2     support of the MUP.  He also mobilised extra VJ units for deployment in

 3     Kosovo during the time-period when the majority of crimes found by the

 4     Chamber to have been committed took place.

 5             Through the VJ reporting system, Ojdanic was kept well-informed

 6     on a daily basis of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, both before

 7     and during the NATO air-strikes.  Specific information about the use of

 8     excessive or indiscriminate force by VJ and MUP units was conveyed to him

 9     in 1998 and 1999.  He was also aware that volunteers incorporated into

10     the ranks of the VJ during the NATO bombing had been involved in the

11     commission of criminal acts.  He did take some action in response to the

12     reports that he was receiving, such as issuing orders for adherence to

13     international humanitarian law, mobilising the military justice system,

14     and dispatching senior officers from the security administration to

15     investigate.  Nonetheless, he continued to order the VJ to participate in

16     military operations with the MUP in Kosovo.

17             In 1998, Nebojsa Pavkovic was the commander of the VJ Pristina

18     Corps, which had responsibility for the territory of Kosovo.  At the end

19     of that year, he was made commander of the 3rd Army, which encompassed

20     both the Pristina Corps and the Nis Corps.  In both positions, he had

21     de jure and de facto control over the units subordinated to him and a

22     central role in the planning and implementation of the activities of the

23     VJ in Kosovo in coordination with the MUP.  Indeed, the Chamber heard

24     convincing evidence that in 1998 he advocated a greater role for the VJ

25     in Kosovo and took the lead in proposing specific activities by the VJ

Page 27518

 1     and MUP.  He had direct access to FRY President Milosevic, who supported

 2     and adopted his proposals, despite protestations from others in the VJ.

 3     When he was commander of the Pristina Corps, Pavkovic clashed with his

 4     direct superior, the then-commander of the 3rd Army, and clearly had his

 5     differences with the then-Chief of the General Staff over the use of the

 6     VJ in Kosovo, both of whom were later removed from their positions and

 7     Pavkovic made 3rd Army commander.

 8             The Chamber finds that in 1998, Pavkovic was involved in the

 9     arming of the non-Albanian civilian population in Kosovo, and

10     simultaneous disarming of the Kosovo Albanians, despite his knowledge of

11     the divisions and animosity in Kosovo along ethnic lines.

12             As commander of the Pristina Corps in 1998, Pavkovic issued

13     numerous orders for the deployment of VJ units, often in joint operations

14     with the MUP.  He was informed of allegations of excessive or

15     indiscriminate force by the VJ and MUP in Kosovo, including through his

16     frequent participation in Joint Command meetings where the situation in

17     Kosovo was discussed in detail, and yet he continued to engage his units.

18             The Chamber also finds that as Pristina Corps commander and then

19     commander of the 3rd Army, Pavkovic was directly involved in breaching

20     the October Agreements at the end of 1998 and into early 1999.  Once

21     commander of the 3rd Army, he brought extra units into Kosovo to augment

22     the VJ, despite these agreements, and sent one particular brigade into

23     the interior of Kosovo in the face of a direct instruction from Ojdanic

24     not to.

25             In the lead-up to and during the NATO bombing, Pavkovic continued

Page 27519

 1     to issue orders, as 3rd Army commander, for the engagement of VJ units in

 2     Kosovo, including in areas where the Chamber has found that crimes were

 3     committed by VJ and MUP forces.  He also continued to work closely with

 4     the FRY president in this period.  He did not, however, have direct

 5     control over MUP forces engaged in Kosovo, despite orders for the

 6     resubordination of the MUP to the VJ issued in April 1999.

 7             In 1998 and 1999, Pavkovic was present in Kosovo the majority of

 8     the time.  Through his presence in Joint Command and other meetings in

 9     1998, the regular VJ reporting system, and his tours of VJ units deployed

10     across Kosovo, he had a detailed knowledge and understanding of the

11     situation on the ground and the activities of his and the MUP forces.

12     This knowledge extended to the commission of crimes by both the VJ and

13     MUP, including the forcible displacement of Kosovo Albanians, murder, and

14     sexual assaults.  Indeed, the Chamber finds that while Pavkovic knew

15     about criminal acts committed by VJ members in Kosovo, he sometimes

16     under-reported and minimised the serious criminal wrongdoing in his

17     reports sent up to the Supreme Command Staff.  Although he issued some

18     orders calling for adherence to international humanitarian law in the

19     course of these operations, the Chamber does not consider these to have

20     been genuine measures to limit the commission of crimes in Kosovo.

21             When Pavkovic became the 3rd Army commander at the end of 1998,

22     his former Chief of Staff in the Pristina Corps, Vladimir Lazarevic, was

23     appointed to replace him as commander of the Pristina Corps.  While he

24     held these positions, Lazarevic was based in Kosovo, first in Djakovica

25     and later in and around Pristina.  One of his duties when Chief of Staff

Page 27520

 1     of the Pristina Corps was monitoring the state border between Kosovo and

 2     Albania.  He also contributed to the implementation of joint VJ and MUP

 3     operations in that area in the second half of 1998.

 4             The Chamber finds that in 1998, Lazarevic was aware of the fact

 5     that criminal acts were being committed against civilians and civilian

 6     property during VJ and MUP operations in Kosovo.  He also knew that this

 7     had resulted in the displacement of a significant number of civilians.

 8             Following his appointment to the position of commander of the

 9     Pristina Corps, Lazarevic had de jure and de facto control over the units

10     subordinated to him, including regular VJ units, and from early April

11     1999, military territorial detachments.  He did not have direct control

12     over MUP units engaged in Kosovo.  The evidence proves that Lazarevic

13     significantly participated in the planning and execution of joint VJ and

14     MUP operations conducted from March to June 1999 in Kosovo, including in

15     places where the Chamber has found that crimes were committed.  He

16     continued to do so, despite his knowledge of the commission of such

17     crimes.  However, unlike Pavkovic, Lazarevic was not involved in or

18     necessarily aware of all the political decision-making that generally

19     took place in Belgrade, and did not participate in high-level meetings

20     there.

21             The central issue of contention during the trial concerning the

22     alleged criminal responsibility of Sreten Lukic related to the nature and

23     powers of the body called the MUP staff for Kosovo, of which Lukic was

24     the head.  The Lukic Defence brought a number of witnesses who testified

25     that the MUP staff was a body with logistical functions and no real power

Page 27521

 1     or authority over MUP forces deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.  This

 2     evidence starkly contrasted both the content of the decisions

 3     establishing the body which set out its tasks and many other documents in

 4     evidence which revealed the role played by the MUP staff in 1998 and the

 5     first half of 1999.  Some witnesses also ascribed a greater degree of

 6     responsibility for the various MUP forces in Kosovo to the MUP staff and

 7     to Lukic as its head than was suggested by the Lukic Defence.

 8             In the judgement the Chamber sets out in detail its analysis of

 9     all the evidence pertaining to the MUP staff and finds that it indeed had

10     a significant role in the planning, organising, controlling, and

11     direction of actions by various MUP forces in Kosovo.  The Chamber is

12     convinced that the MUP staff was a key body in both 1998 and 1999, with

13     substantial authority over units falling under the MUP public security

14     department, including special police units when they were deployed to

15     Kosovo, although it did not replace the chains of command within the

16     various MUP units and secretariats.  The MUP liaised with the VJ to

17     ensure full coordination of MUP and VJ activities in Kosovo and had an

18     important role in the planning of joint VJ and MUP operations.  It also

19     provided a link to the MUP headquarters in Belgrade to which it regularly

20     reported.

21             The Chamber is satisfied that as head of the MUP staff, Lukic was

22     endowed with significant authority over the MUP forces answering to the

23     MUP staff.  Indeed, he was understood to be the commander of MUP forces

24     in Kosovo by the foreign diplomats and observers with whom he interacted

25     in Kosovo, and he attended meetings with them on behalf of the MUP staff.

Page 27522

 1     He also regularly attended and participated in meetings of the Joint

 2     Command and other high-level meetings including in Belgrade.  The Chamber

 3     finds, therefore, that Lukic was a de facto commander of MUP forces in

 4     Kosovo from mid-1998 to mid-1999, as well as being the bridge between the

 5     actions of the MUP on the ground in Kosovo and the overarching plans and

 6     policies decided in Belgrade.  The evidence establishes that Lukic had

 7     detailed knowledge of events in Kosovo as they developed, as well as

 8     being informed of allegations of criminal conduct by MUP personnel there.

 9     However, the Chamber is not convinced by the evidence brought that Lukic

10     was involved in the concealment of these crimes through the clandestine

11     transportation of civilian bodies from Kosovo to other parts of Serbia.

12             Having briefly described the Chamber's conclusions concerning

13     each of the accused, I shall now turn to our findings in relation to the

14     joint criminal enterprise set out in the indictment and the accused's

15     alleged participation therein.

16             The most compelling evidence in support of the allegation that

17     there was a common purpose to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo in

18     order to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over

19     the province is the evidence establishing the widespread campaign of

20     violence that was directed against the Kosovo Albanian population between

21     March and June 1999 and the resulting massive displacement of that

22     population.  The campaign was conducted in an organised manner, utilising

23     significant state resources, and the Chamber heard evidence from numerous

24     witnesses about the fact that they were directed to leave Kosovo for

25     Albania or Macedonia and that they were forced to relinquish their

Page 27523

 1     personal identity documents, either as they began their departure,

 2     en route, or at the border.  These documents were never returned to them.

 3             Other factors which the Chamber has taken into account in

 4     reaching the conclusion that there was indeed a common purpose to use

 5     violence and terror to force a significant number of Kosovo Albanians

 6     from their homes and across the borders in order for the state

 7     authorities to maintain control over Kosovo are these:  The events

 8     leading up to the conflict, the arming of non-Albanian civilians in

 9     Kosovo and simultaneous disarming of Kosovo Albanians; the breakdown of

10     negotiations to end the Kosovo crisis at the same time as the October

11     Agreements were being breached by the FRY and Serbian authorities; and

12     the concealment of bodies of Kosovo Albanians killed by VJ and MUP

13     forces.

14             The Chamber is not, however, convinced that murder, sexual

15     assault, or the destruction or damage of religious property was within

16     the common purpose, and only considers whether these crimes were

17     reasonably foreseeable in the execution of the common purpose when

18     addressing each of the accused.

19             Being satisfied that there was such a common purpose among

20     high-level officials in the FRY and Serbia who were in a position to

21     execute it through the various forces under their control, the Chamber

22     has analysed whether or not each of the accused participated voluntarily

23     in the joint criminal enterprise, made a significant contribution to it,

24     and shared the intent to commit the crimes or underlying offences that

25     were the object of the enterprise.

Page 27524

 1             The Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Milan

 2     Milutinovic made a significant contribution to the joint criminal

 3     enterprise.  The Chamber does not accept that Milutinovic had a legal

 4     duty to act to prevent the events that transpired in Kosovo, arising from

 5     his oath of office alone in the absence of significant de jure and de

 6     facto powers.  In addition, it is not prepared to accept that his

 7     contribution by omission was significant, given Milutinovic's lack of

 8     authority over the forces that were committing the crimes in question.

 9     Moreover, the Chamber is unconvinced that Milutinovic shared the intent

10     to use criminal means, namely, deportation and forcible transfer, to

11     retain control over Kosovo by the state authorities.

12             The Chamber is satisfied that Nikola Sainovic had substantial de

13     facto powers over both the MUP and the VJ operating in Kosovo and that he

14     was the political coordinator of these forces.  It is convinced that he

15     made a significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise and

16     that, indeed, he was one of the most crucial members of that common

17     enterprise.  From all the evidence, the Chamber finds that it is the only

18     reasonable inference that Sainovic had the intent to forcibly displace

19     part of the Kosovo Albanian population, both within and without Kosovo,

20     and thereby to change the ethnic balance in the province and to ensure

21     continued control by the state authorities over it.  The Chamber also

22     finds that the murder of Kosovo Albanian civilians by VJ and MUP forces

23     executing the common criminal plan was reasonably foreseeable to

24     Sainovic, as was the destruction of or damage to religious property,

25     namely mosques.  However, by majority, the Chamber does not find that the

Page 27525

 1     commission of sexual assault was foreseeable to him.

 2             The Chamber finds that, although there is considerable evidence

 3     supporting the Prosecution's allegation that Dragoljub Ojdanic was

 4     supportive of the commission of crimes throughout Kosovo by VJ and MUP

 5     forces in a widespread and systematic attack targeting Kosovo Albanians,

 6     it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he shared the intent

 7     to ensure continued state control over the province by way of deportation

 8     and forcible transfer of a significant proportion of the Kosovo Albanian

 9     population.  However, by his continued actions in command of the VJ

10     forces subordinated to him, the Chamber finds that Ojdanic provided

11     practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to members of the

12     VJ who he knew intended to commit deportation and forcible transfer.  His

13     conduct had a substantial effect on the actual commission of these crimes

14     by VJ forces in some of the locations charged in the indictment.

15     However, the Chamber finds that Ojdanic did not have knowledge that VJ

16     forces had the intent to kill or sexually assault Kosovo Albanian

17     civilians or to damage or destroy religious property.

18             The Chamber has found that Nebojsa Pavkovic had substantial

19     de jure and de facto command authority over VJ forces in Kosovo in 1998

20     and 1999, and that he was in a position of influence, including through

21     his participation in the Joint Command.  There is no doubt that his

22     contribution to the joint criminal enterprise was significant, as he

23     utilised the VJ forces at his disposal to terrorise and violently expel

24     Kosovo Albanian civilians from their homes.  The Chamber also finds that

25     the only reasonable inference from all the evidence is that Pavkovic had

Page 27526

 1     the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian population in order

 2     to ensure continued control by the state authorities over the province.

 3     Moreover, the Chamber considers that in the circumstances, the commission

 4     of murder, sexual assault, and the deliberate destruction of or damage to

 5     mosques by the VJ and MUP forces executing his orders, were reasonably

 6     foreseeable to Pavkovic.

 7             The Chamber finds that, although there is considerable evidence

 8     supporting the Prosecution's allegation that Vladimir Lazarevic was

 9     supportive of the commission of crimes throughout Kosovo by VJ and MUP

10     forces in a widespread and systematic attack targeting Kosovo Albanians,

11     it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he shared the intent

12     to ensure continued state control over the province by way of deportation

13     and forcible transfer of a significant proportion of the Kosovo Albanian

14     population.  However, by his continued actions in command of the VJ

15     forces subordinated to him, the Chamber finds that Lazarevic provided

16     practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to members of the

17     VJ who he knew intended to commit deportation and forcible transfer.  His

18     conduct had a substantial effect on the actual commission of these crimes

19     by VJ forces in some of the locations charged in the indictment.

20     However, the Chamber finds that Lazarevic did not have knowledge that VJ

21     forces had the intent to kill or sexually assault Kosovo Albanian

22     civilians or to damage or destroy religious property.

23             The Chamber has found that Sreten Lukic had substantial authority

24     over MUP units deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and that he was

25     responsible for planning, organising, controlling, and directing the

Page 27527

 1     activities of the MUP in the province.  He also worked closely with the

 2     leadership of the VJ and other state bodies and participated in

 3     high-level meetings to discuss the situation in Kosovo.  On the basis of

 4     all of the evidence, the Chamber finds that Lukic was indeed an important

 5     participant in the joint criminal enterprise and made a significant

 6     contribution through his control of the MUP forces involved in its

 7     execution.  The Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference is

 8     that Lukic shared the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian

 9     population to ensure continued control over the province by the state

10     authorities.  It further finds that the murder of Kosovo Albanian

11     civilians by VJ and MUP forces executing the common plan was reasonably

12     foreseeable to Lukic, as was the destruction of or damage to religious

13     property, namely mosques.  However, by majority, the Chamber does not

14     find that the commission of sexual assault was foreseeable to him.

15             I have now twice referred to the issue of majority.  Judge

16     Chowhan has dissented on the issue of the foreseeability of sexual

17     assault to both Sainovic and Lukic.

18             In determining sentences to be imposed on the accused in this

19     case, the Trial Chamber has taken account of all material before it,

20     including material submitted to it in the course of this week.

21             Will the accused Milutinovic please rise.

22             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

23     you, Milan Milutinovic, to be not guilty pursuant to Articles 7(1) and

24     7(3) of the Statute of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment.  Pursuant to Rule

25     99(A) of the Rules, the Chamber ordered that you be released from the

Page 27528

 1     United Nations Detention Unit immediately upon the completion of the

 2     necessary modalities, without prejudice to any further proceedings that

 3     may follow Trial Chamber III's determination under the final paragraph of

 4     the judgement in relation to the three outstanding crime sites in the

 5     indictment.

 6             Please be seated.

 7             Will the accused Sainovic please rise.

 8             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

 9     you, Nikola Sainovic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment by

10     commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise pursuant to

11     Article 7(1) of the Statute.  The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a

12     single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment.  You will receive credit for

13     the time that you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

14     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the

15     Tribunal, pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to

16     the state where you shall serve your sentence.

17             Please be seated.

18             Will the accused Ojdanic please rise.

19             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

20     you, Dragoljub Ojdanic, to be guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment,

21     by aiding and abetting, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, and not

22     guilty of Counts 3 to 5 of the indictment, pursuant to Articles 7(1) and

23     7(3) of the Statute.  The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single

24     sentence of 15 years of imprisonment.  You will receive credit for the

25     time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of

Page 27529

 1     the Rules, you will remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the

 2     finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you

 3     will serve your sentence.

 4             Please be seated.

 5             Will the accused Pavkovic please rise.

 6             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

 7     you, Nebojsa Pavkovic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment,

 8     by commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise, pursuant to

 9     Article 7(1) of the Statute.  The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a

10     single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment.  You will receive credit for

11     the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to Rule 103(C)

12     of the Rules, you shall remain in custody of the Tribunal pending the

13     finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you

14     will serve your sentence.

15             Please be seated.

16             Will the accused Lazarevic please rise.

17             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

18     you, Vladimir Lazarevic, to be guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the

19     indictment, by aiding and abetting, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

20     Statute, and not guilty of Counts 3 to 5 of the indictment, pursuant to

21     Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute.  The Trial Chamber hereby

22     sentences you to a single sentence of 15 years of imprisonment.  You will

23     receive credit for the time you have already served in detention.

24     Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you will remain in the custody of

25     the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer

Page 27530

 1     to the state where you will serve your sentence.

 2             Please be seated.

 3             Will the accused Lukic please rise.

 4             For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds

 5     you, Sreten Lukic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment, by

 6     commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise, pursuant to

 7     Article 7(1) of the Statute.  The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a

 8     single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment.  You will receive credit for

 9     the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to Rule 103(C)

10     of the Rules, you will remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the

11     finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you

12     will serve your sentence.

13             Please be seated.

14             This hearing is now adjourned.

15                           --- Whereupon the judgement adjourned at 3.48 p.m.

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