1 Monday, 16 July 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 10.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 I'd like to put on the record that the Chamber has accommodated a
11 request by Mr. Harland for a later start today. That is the reason why
12 we're sitting from 10.00 until 2.45, so that we are able to finish
13 Mr. Harland's testimony today.
14 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Harland. Please be seated.
17 I would like to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn
18 declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony. Mr. Lukic
19 will now continue his cross-examination.
20 Mr. Lukic, you've got until a quarter to 2.00 this afternoon.
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]
25 Q. [Interpretation] Once again, good morning.
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. [In English] Can you turn on your microphone, please.
3 A. Great. And will I need the statement?
4 Q. Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: If the hard copy could be provided to Mr. Harland.
6 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thanks.
7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court
8 document 8163.
9 Q. And while we're waiting for it to come up, Mr. Harland, let me
10 just tell you that this is your document dated the 10th of December,
11 1994, since that is where we were left -- where we left off?
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continued]... I hear
13 nothing, Your Honour.
14 MR. LUKIC: Maybe channel 4, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Channel 4.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear me now? Can you hear the
17 interpretation now?
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continued]...
19 THE INTERPRETER: This will be the English interpretation.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Can you speak, please.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then we can proceed.
24 MR. LUKIC: Thanks.
25 Q. [Interpretation] This is one of your documents dated 10th
1 December 1994, and if we could just see page 3 of this document,
2 paragraph 3, from the top. This is where we left off on Thursday, and
3 you said - we see that at the bottom of paragraph 3:
4 [In English] "US and French officials have noted that UNPROFOR's
5 departure would give the international greater 'flexibility' in dealing
6 with the Serbs."
7 [Interpretation] Did that mean that NATO would be freer to target
8 Serbian positions?
9 A. It's not so much NATO and the United Nations as certain
10 nationalities, but certainly the United States and also certain
11 individuals were much more in favour of the use of force and felt that
12 the departure of UNPROFOR could facilitate that.
13 Q. In paragraph 156 of your statement - and that is the relevant
14 paragraph - you say:
15 "He openly said," referring to Milan Gvero, "that Serbs would not
16 respect the safe areas until they're demilitarised."
17 According to you, is this position of his appropriate or is it
18 wrong? What did you consider, you at UNPROFOR, what the Serb position
19 should be? What was your official position on that?
20 A. UNPROFOR was deeply divided. My counsel was that the principal
21 mandate was to deter attacks against the safe areas by all means
22 necessary, so demilitarisation should not be a requirement unless - as in
23 the case of Srebrenica and Zepa - there happened to be a bilateral
24 agreement to that effect; but it was a major debate throughout the
25 history of UNPROFOR.
1 Q. Let us now move on to paragraph 160. We're in January 1995 now
2 and you say:
3 "On 11 January 1995, Mladic, Delic, and Blaskic," these were
4 three generals of the three Bosnian armies; correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. They signed the agreement on the military implementation of the
7 cessation of hostilities agreement. And then in document - could we
8 please have it up on the screen -- actually, it's the same document but
9 we need page 7.
10 [In English] "Muslim-Croat relations took a few more small steps
11 forward this week. As before this seems not so much significant
12 commitment to the Federation as it does to accepting the present division
13 of territory and populations."
14 [Interpretation] These notes of yours, do they actually confirm
15 that everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in favour of partitioning the
16 territory and the ethnicities to move to the relevant -- to the
17 respective territories under the control of their own forces?
18 A. That was, in general, the position of the leaderships of the
19 three communities and had considerable support within the three
20 communities, though there were substantial minorities, mainly the urban
21 middle class, who still seemed to aspire even at this late stage in the
22 war to some sort of collective life.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I have difficulties in finding your quote
24 on page 7 of the document.
25 MR. LUKIC: In the first paragraph, "Federation issues," on top
1 of the page, Your Honour. The very first paragraph on the page.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is page 6 in e-court, Mr. Lukic, 6 out of
3 7 in e-court. I found it. Please proceed.
4 MR. LUKIC: Just to be clear, it's page 7 of the document. I
5 don't know how is it loaded in e-court. It's page 7 of the document.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Paragraph 167 of your statement, where you say:
9 "The Bosnians are reorganising, replenishing, and retraining and
10 very soon they will have an overwhelming force and it will become an
11 important factor in terms of personnel."
12 Can you tell us how Bosnians managed to arm themselves in spite
13 of the embargo? What channels did they use?
14 A. There was several and they changed over time. We were aware that
15 Iran was providing weapons through Croatia, with the knowledge of the
16 United States and others, and that those weapons were permitted to
17 transit through Croatian territories subject to a sort of tax. A certain
18 amount of those weapons would have to be passed on to Croat forces.
19 About this time, too, I believe that there were low-level air-drops into
20 Tuzla airport by supporters of the Bosnian government in the west and in
21 Turkey. So there were multiple channels. There were also some weapons
22 purchased locally.
23 Q. Thank you. What measures did UNPROFOR take in order to implement
24 the embargo and could it have done anything in that respect? Was it in
25 that position?
1 A. I don't think it was in UNPROFOR's mandate to prevent the
2 purchase or the supply of weapons. When there was a demilitarisation
3 agreement in place, there would often be an inspection regime agreed by
4 the parties for UNPROFOR and then there would be a role, like in theory
5 in Srebrenica.
6 Q. Who was it then who was supposed to implement -- to enforce the
7 embargo in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. Yeah. The Security Council, I think, had a sanctions regime and
9 it had a mechanism it had put in place outside of UNPROFOR to impose
10 sanctions of countries that violated. But in fact, of course, the
11 mechanism was never used, given that some members of the Security Council
12 were, of course, involved in the supply of weapons.
13 Q. That is my next question. The air-space was under NATO control
14 and UNPROFOR, as you say. There were low overflights. And that was one
15 of the ways that the weapons were distributed, including by Turkey, who
16 was a NATO member. Were there any other countries that you're aware of
17 that provided weapons by air?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I object to what appears to be
20 Mr. Lukic providing information or evidence to the Chamber with respect
21 to the whole first part of that question. He's moved on now to something
22 different, but --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 Mr. Lukic, if you say whether any other countries, where you have
25 testified more or less that it was Turkey, who -- that I think is not
1 appropriate. Is there any dispute about it, Mr. Groome?
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I would have to familiarise myself with
3 the evidence. I don't know that the Prosecution would dispute in terms
4 of this case, but of course I wouldn't want to agree to a fact unless I
5 could verify its accuracy myself.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
8 MR. LUKIC: The witness just mentioned Turkey and low flights
9 dropping armament in Tuzla area, so I was just repeating --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just see.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Harland, did you mention that Turkey dropped weapons above
13 Tuzla in low flights?
14 A. Yes, and I should clarify that our source was only the Bosnian
15 government 2nd Corps, the Tuzla Corps. We had direct observation from
16 our military observers of the flights, but obviously those who made the
17 flights didn't tell us who they were, though of course they were able to
18 get passed NATO monitoring, so there was that, and we were able to see
19 what type of aircraft they were and that they were dropping equipment.
20 But they did not co-operate with us. We raised the issue with NATO 5
21 ATAF, the NATO air forces, but they did not co-operate in providing
22 further information on that.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Lukic, the transcript on page 5 is not
24 entirely clear, but I can imagine that you've understood it that Turkey
25 was performing low-level air-drops. Please proceed.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Paragraph 168 you say another meeting was held
3 between the new commander of UNPROFOR, BH UNPROFOR, General Smith and
4 General Mladic on the 7th of March, 1995, in Vlasenica, when Mladic told
5 Smith that Bosnian Serbs intended to attack and significantly suppress
6 the three enclaves in Eastern Bosnia. So this was openly stated and it
7 was no secret?
8 A. I was not at that meeting, though other Serb leaders said the
9 same things to us.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Document 5726, please.
12 Q. This -- these are minutes from a meeting of the General Staff --
13 of the Main Staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We need page 2.
15 Q. Here we can see under item 5, paragraph 5, on top:
16 [In English] "Mladic questioned General Smith on the military
17 situation and the activities of BH within the Srebrenica pocket. General
18 Smith reported that he had not seen any weapons within the town and that
19 he had inspected the WCP."
20 "WCP" is weapons collection centre --
21 A. Right.
22 Q. -- or points?
23 A. Right.
24 Q. Yes. [Interpretation] You told us on the first day of your
25 testimony that the international community was open towards the Serbs.
1 Was General Smith truthful where he spoke here and uninformed about the
2 existence of these weapons or was he not telling the truth to
3 General Mladic?
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution objects to the witness
6 being asked to comment on the truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
7 witness in the case.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I think Mr. Lukic may ask whether this witness
9 is aware of any knowledge of the person speaking contrary to what he said
10 so -- but that's a factual question then.
11 Have you any knowledge about Mr. Smith having knowledge which did
12 not correspond with what he said?
13 THE WITNESS: General Smith actually told me the same, that
14 weapons were not visible in the town. I think most of the weapons were
15 deployed -- there were a lot of them, maybe 10- or 12.000 all together
16 deployed -- light arms mainly, deployed on the confrontation lines and --
17 rather than in the town. And when they were in the town, they didn't
18 show the weapons publicly. So strictly speaking, I believe what
19 General Smith has probably said is probably true, that he did not see
20 them in the town.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you. I will not ask for 65 ter 10594 to be pulled up, but
23 this is a document about a meeting, a regular monthly meeting, held on
24 the 25th of March -- 21st of March --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] 1995. And there is an acronym
2 mentioned in the document, CAC. Who was CAC at the time and what does
3 this acronym stand for? Was this Mr. Enrique Aguilar at the time?
4 A. Yes, it stands for civil affairs co-ordinator. It was my boss,
5 the chief political officer. This Aguilar had just replaced Andreev.
6 Q. On that day he stated that the international community could not
7 come up with a long-term solution to this conflict. Was that the general
8 position within UNPROFOR?
9 A. No. There was a growing view in UNPROFOR that the international
10 position of trying to secure a cease-fire first and then allow space for
11 negotiations was not working, and there was a view in UNPROFOR that force
12 would have to be applied to the Serbs to create an incentive also for
13 them to negotiate that long-term settlement.
14 Q. Isn't it correct that the Serbs themselves kept offering a
15 permanent, lasting solution to this conflict, and that the Muslim side
16 was the one that did not want a long-lasting solution, but rather just
17 temporary cessation of these conflict -- of this conflict. Isn't this
18 something that we've already established during your examination?
19 A. Yes. I think that was the problem in a way. The Serbs at that
20 point held about 70 per cent of the territory, and so they wanted to
21 freeze the situation there and that removed the incentive for them to
22 settle --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Isn't this a matter which has been dealt with --
24 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- extensively.
1 Mr. Lukic, there's no need to repeat evidence.
2 MR. LUKIC: But that's my next question --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay then your next question -- then please your
4 next question.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. The military pressure on the Serbs, was it supposed to be applied
7 not in order to end the war but rather so that they would cede the
8 territory that they were holding to the other side?
9 A. There was a growing view in UNPROFOR that those two were closely
10 connected, that force would be required in order that the Serbs would
11 lose territory and then have a greater incentive to settle for -- along
12 the agreed territorial lines of 51/49.
13 Q. Is it also correct that any or every agreement on a temporary
14 cessation of -- or cease-fire was used by the Bosniaks to arm
16 A. Certainly there was a progressive rearmament of the Bosniaks and
17 training and equipping over the whole three-year period. I think that's
18 why just about at this moment the Serbs changed from a strategy of
19 assuming that time was on their side to attempting a more rapid military
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have document 10111.
22 Q. And while we're waiting for the document to come up - and we need
23 the first page - let me ask you this: Is it correct that the Muslims,
24 and you've already partly confirmed that, were preparing for an offensive
25 in the spring of 1995?
1 A. Yes, I think it's correct that all three sides were going to try
2 to resolve the conflict militarily during 1995. Yes, we saw those
4 Q. Is it also correct that the international community did not exert
5 pressure on the Muslims at this time, as well as previously, in order to
6 find a solution to the conflict?
7 A. That had varied greatly over time. President Izetbegovic told me
8 that he regretted that he had been encouraged not to sign the
9 Cutileiro Agreement in 1992, which was generous to the Bosniaks. There
10 was pressure, some pressure, on him to sign 1993, which they did not,
11 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. They did agree to the Contact Group plan in 1994.
12 And by the beginning of 1995, they were subject to pressure to accept the
13 51/49 formula.
14 Q. In paragraph 1 of the document we have before us and paragraph 2,
15 there is mention of two major offensives launched by the Muslims against
16 Serb positions. And it says that the BH Army - that's in paragraph 2
17 under (a) - in both areas, and it is a reference to Vlasic and Greda
18 feature, used heavy artillery and mortars in preparation for the
19 commitment of a considerable number of infantry, in some cases with the
20 support of tanks. So this is the period when the Muslim forces had in
21 their position heavy weaponry, mortars of high calibre, and other major
22 pieces -- artillery pieces?
23 A. Yes, though still not in considerable numbers, and at this point
24 their military activity was still not closely co-ordinated with UNPROFOR
25 and NATO.
1 Q. However, in paragraph 171 of your statement you say:
2 "As the Serbs steered towards the military option, conditions in
3 Sarajevo deteriorated."
4 Would you agree with me now that what you said here in your
5 statement is not correct, that the Serbs were not making preparations for
6 military action and that all their actions were actually a response to
7 the Muslim offensives?
8 A. No, I don't think that's correct. What I said earlier was that
9 we had come to the conclusion that all three sides - Bosniaks, Serbs, and
10 Croats - were going to make an attempt to militarily resolve the war on
11 terms favourable to themselves. And this does record an uptake in Serb
12 military activity, even though there was also a parallel Bosnian
14 Q. At the same time when actions by the Muslim army were being
15 carried out against the Serb position, General Soubirou's forces were
16 simultaneously engaged in rapid actions; is that correct?
17 A. I'm not sure I understood the interpretation. Sorry.
18 Q. During this same period, i.e., the end of March 1995, was there
19 an operation launched by UNPROFOR rapid reaction units?
20 A. I can't remember.
21 Q. [In English] Okay. Fair enough.
22 [Interpretation] Also during that same period, the bulk of the
23 weapons in Sarajevo arrived under the Butmir airport, which was under the
24 control of UNPROFOR; is that correct?
25 A. The -- no serious amount -- no heavy weapons arrived into
1 Sarajevo because the only access was through the tunnel which was only
2 about this wide. But it's certainly true that small arms flowed
3 backwards and forwards in large numbers through the tunnel.
4 Q. When you say "about this wide," can you please tell us for the
5 record how wide it was if you know?
6 A. Less than 2 metres from the section I went through.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 Now, in paragraph 172 you go back to the issue of sniping. This
9 is April 1992 --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: April 1995.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have in e-court
12 document 10119.
13 Q. This document shows - and I'm talking about page number 3 in
14 e-court, where there is mention of an anti-sniping project, you mentioned
15 that as well on Thursday, and you made reference to the material that was
16 requested in order to construct barriers that would protect civilians.
17 Here we see on e-court page 4 that for the Bosnian side a total
18 allocation was approximately 3.000 metres of plastic sheet and for the
19 Serbian side, on the next page, we see that the allocation was 3500
20 metres of the plastic sheet. This demonstrates that the both sides
21 required on the Serbian side an even larger quantity of sheet in order
22 for them both to be protected from the other side?
23 A. That's correct.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Now can we see document 3507.
25 [In English] Give me one second.
1 Q. [Interpretation] This document is related to paragraph 175 of
2 your statement where you say that Karadzic stated the following:
3 "We believe we will have to put an end to the war by military
5 However, in -- what you noted in your document of the 22nd of
6 April, 1995, which is on page 2 of this document, fourth paragraph from
7 the top, you noted Karadzic as having said the following:
8 [In English] "'As for the military front, it is clear that the
9 Muslim side remains engaged in unsuccessful offensives. Our
10 counter-offensive is very moderate (in its intensity) and we are trying
11 to give the peace a chance until the end of current cease-fire. However,
12 we believe that we shall be forced to engage ourselves into a drastic
13 counter-offensive, i.e., to put an end to the war by military means. We
14 believe that the international community has to decide what it wants (to
15 achieve) here. If they want war, then they are doing the right thing.
16 All moves of the international community has been very productive in
17 terms of extending the war. If they want peace, then they have to turn a
18 completely new page ...'"
19 [Interpretation] Would you agree with me if I said that the
20 general position of President Karadzic was not war but, rather, peace and
21 that the war should have continued only in the form of a
23 A. I didn't see the date of this document, but certainly
24 Mr. Krajisnik told me, as did Colonel Indjic and as General Mladic seemed
25 to indicate to General Smith, that in the late winter or early spring of
1 1995, the Serbs had actually taken a decision to try and bring the war to
2 a military conclusion or at least to accelerate the militarisation,
3 perhaps unaware that the Bosnians and the Croats had done the same thing
4 at about the same time.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Witness, you were asked about the position taken
6 by Mr. Karadzic --
7 MR. LUKIC: Karadzic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- then to say that others said something which is
9 in line what you ascribed to Mr. Karadzic is, of course, not an answer to
10 the question. Please, if you want to answer the question, please do so.
11 THE WITNESS: I believe that by this time Dr. Karadzic was fully
12 committed to intensified military operations and that - as was often the
13 case - he was probably not telling the truth, but rather giving a pretext
14 for accelerated military operations.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. This is your interpretation of his words, but it does not reflect
17 what he actually said and what you noted down.
18 A. Actually, it certainly didn't reflect what he said, but I
19 actually didn't note this down. I see this document was drafted by
20 somebody else quoting his words.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
22 MR. GROOME: That was my objection, but the witness has
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 [Interpretation] We need page 4 of this same document, third
3 paragraph from the top.
4 Q. A minute ago we saw that the Muslims were armed -- arming
5 themselves, that they were reinforcing their manpower, and on this page
6 we can see in paragraph 3 that Dr. Karadzic again is saying the
8 [In English] "'The Muslims do not want to extend the Agreement
9 since they believe they are strong enough to defeat the Serbs. However,
10 after their offensives would be crushed they will probably be in favour
11 of extension (of COHA).'"
12 That's final peace, right?
13 A. That's Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, intermediate.
14 Q. "'We offer more than the extension of the COHA; we offer final
15 cessation of hostilities which would antecede the peace. We do not offer
16 temporary cease-fires which have been abused (in the past) by the Muslims
17 for re-deployment of their forces, arming themselves and other military
18 activities which are banned during a period of cessation of hostilities.
19 We demand permanent cessation of hostilities and renewal of the talks
20 aimed at definite political settlement.'"
21 [Interpretation] In your view, would you say that this statement
22 of Dr. Karadzic speaks about war again or did he speak about peace?
23 A. Dr. Karadzic's position throughout much of the war was: First
24 you freeze the confrontation lines, then you negotiate a settlement.
25 Here he is re-stating that long-held position which was shared by Britain
1 and France and many others.
2 Q. In the statement given by Mr. Enrique Aguilar on the 21st of
3 March, 1995, and then again in one given on the 25th of April, 1995,
4 given by Dr. Karadzic, can we trace a similarity in terms that the
5 international community did not have a solution to the conflict in
7 A. Yes, I think it's correct that the conventional view of the
8 international community, that first there should be a cease-fire and then
9 there should be a peace process, was a failed approach, as had been shown
10 through the earlier plans, and a different approach would be -- should be
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the sources exactly for the statement
13 given by Mr. Aguilar and --
14 MR. LUKIC: I mentioned it. It's document 65 ter number 10594.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, that's the same --
16 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- that you said you would not --
18 MR. LUKIC: Page 3, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Page 3.
20 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And is that --
22 MR. LUKIC: It's the end of first paragraph and the beginning of
23 the second paragraph.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. My problem is access to 65 ter numbers --
25 MR. LUKIC: I can tell you 65 ter number -- ERN number as well.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. LUKIC: It's ZA --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, even ERN numbers for the document.
4 MR. LUKIC: ERN number -- yeah.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Unless they are released, and we usually get access
6 to them --
7 MR. LUKIC: It's ZA 020179.
8 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have to later deal with that at a certain
9 moment because you're referring to documents to which we might not have
10 access at this moment in the system. Please proceed meanwhile.
11 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. [Interpretation] Let's go now to paragraph 181 of your statement.
13 I think that once again we can agree that in spite of the Muslim
14 offensives, the only threats that are being issued were against the Serbs
15 and the threats constituted air-strikes; is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. You go on to say: "The Big Squeeze" - that's bullet
18 point 2 in paragraph 181:
19 "The Serbs are tightening the noose around Sarajevo. The tunnel
20 and the road around the airport have been attacked; road access across
21 the airport is threatened; airport negotiations are going nowhere;
22 humanitarian aid is restricted; gas pressure has been cut; water and
23 electricity could be next."
24 We are speaking about the 13th of May, 1995. Can we please be
25 shown document 3511 and it is connected with my question.
1 Is it correct that on the day before, that is to say on the 12th
2 of May, a major offensive was launched by the Muslim army from Sarajevo
3 towards the Serb positions?
4 A. On the 12th of May?
5 Q. [In English] Yes.
6 A. I can't remember the exact date. There was a Bosnian offensive
7 out of Sarajevo going on about this time.
8 Q. I can't find it in the document. I can't find it in this
9 document and I'm sure it's there.
10 JUDGE ORIE: But is the date of the 12th, is that vital or --
11 because Mr. Harland said it was --
12 MR. LUKIC: It is vital because obviously it's just the response,
13 not the attack by Serbs. So we want to show that all Serb actions were
14 actually reactions.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then please find your source.
16 MR. LUKIC: Obviously I cannot right now.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Now, Mr. Lukic, I do understand that it's a weekly
18 situation report --
19 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- if you want what is written --
21 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- written on the 13th to be a direct response to
23 what happened on the 12th, then I would be a surprise because at least on
24 this page it's a weekly report which could extend from the 6th to the
1 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore -- again, if you want to demonstrate
3 that it was a direct response and that the date of the 12th is vital,
4 that seems to contradict what I see here as a weekly report.
5 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: But if -- please proceed [overlapping speakers] --
7 MR. LUKIC: Because the last day here I see 11th of May. That's
8 why. It started with 8th and ends with 11th. Probably I will find it
9 later on.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And you said the Muslim attack was on the 12th?
11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
12 Q. [Interpretation] In this document that we are looking at now, on
13 page 2 there's this subtitle: "The Big Squeeze."
14 You say:
15 [In English] "The Serbs are 'squeezing' Sarajevo, perhaps in an
16 effort to force the Bosnians to attempt a break-out from the city."
17 [Interpretation] By saying this, did you mean that the Serbs were
18 to blame for the Muslim offensives too? What did you mean by that
20 A. I think that -- there are several things. First, the Bosnian
21 government, whether or not that was known to the Serb authorities, I
22 don't know, had taken a decision - and we could see it unfolding - to try
23 to break the Siege of Sarajevo during the spring of 1995. The Serbs
24 simultaneously were applying military pressure and they were very
25 confident of their capacity to contain it, and so I think where UNPROFOR
1 had a concern is that all of these attacks you've listed, the shelling
2 around the water points in Dobrinja and so on, these were the killings of
3 civilians just going about their normal business and the cutting off of
4 the water and electricity. But yes, it is quite possible, in our view,
5 not certain -- we didn't claim it was certain, that the Serbs were
6 confident enough of their capacity to resist an attack out; that they
7 were increasing the pressure as much as possible, including by these
8 various killings of civilians, in order to accelerate what they knew
9 would be an unsuccessful Bosnian attempt to break the siege lines. And
10 in a way, they were right. The Bosnians did attempt to break out and
11 they did fail.
12 Q. The offensives were not launched by civilians. The offensives
13 were launched by the Bosnian military; right?
14 A. Yes, but the points you pointed me to, such as the mortar attack
15 kills ten, those weren't ten soldiers. If I remember rightly, they were
16 ten mainly elderly people trying to collect water in Dobrinja and
17 other -- UNPROFOR never considered air-strikes for purely force-on-force
18 military activity. It's only when the violence against civilians reached
19 an intolerable level.
20 Q. Can we then agree that in your document of 13th of May there is
21 no mention of civilian deaths. It only says that ten people were killed
22 by a mortar shell?
23 A. Those were civilians.
24 Q. Where can we find this piece of information, in which of your
1 A. Well, I'm testifying. We can probably go and get it. But I put
2 it in. In general I didn't record military casualties at all. We got
3 all the military casualties from the Ministry of Health and we checked
4 them. I didn't bother putting them into a weekly situation report unless
5 there were unusually large numbers or if they were civilians.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic and Mr. Harland, on page 2, mortar attack
7 on the tunnel, I read:
8 "There were more than 20 casualties. Eleven people were killed.
9 The casualties included both civilians and military personnel."
10 Could you -- were among the people killed, which is approximately
11 half of the casualties, were they civilians as far as you remember,
12 Mr. Harland?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you give us an approximate number, was
15 it half of the nine or the majority or a small number?
16 THE WITNESS: In this particular incident, no.
17 JUDGE ORIE: So you say civilians were killed, but you do not
18 know whether it was one out of the nine or more -- well, "civilians"
19 already is a plural --
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was -- the exact number at this distance I
21 don't recall.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Just for the sake of clarity, how come that I know that the
25 Muslim offensive started on the 12th of May? It has been mentioned in
1 paragraph 180 of your statement you say:
2 "I remember that on the 12th of May, 1995, or thereabouts a
3 Bosnian offensive was launched out of Sarajevo."
4 Therefore, I relied on your statement.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Lukic, again I have difficulties in
6 following you. If you say this document, on the 13th of May, clearly
7 indicates that whatever the Serbs did was always in response to ... and
8 you focus our attention to the 12th of May, then of course whatever
9 appears in this document before the 12th of May could not be a response
10 to what happened on the 12th of May. So I'm a bit confused about your
11 line of questioning, but please ...
12 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, do you want to say something, Your Honour?
13 Q. [Interpretation] The shelling of the tunnel mentioned, it is
14 clear namely that the Serbs knew that this tunnel was used to funnel
15 weapons into Sarajevo. Now, do you have any information showing that the
16 Serbs had information to the effect that the tunnel was used to funnel
17 weapons into Sarajevo?
18 A. Not specifically on the statement. The Serbs told us all the
19 time that they were generally aware of what was flowing in and out of the
20 tunnel. I believe they had sources.
21 Q. Can you agree with me - or perhaps you wouldn't - that the
22 BH Army soldiers in their presence and their weapons, their
23 installations, offensives, jeopardised the safety of the civilian
24 population in Sarajevo?
25 A. I would agree with that sometimes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. We used to protest that sometimes.
3 Q. You go on to say that in May 1995 the total zone of exclusion
4 collapsed, the TEZ. Both sides reclaimed their weapons, correct, and
5 began to use them?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 183 of your statement toward the
8 beginning, as it says -- as the report on Srebrenica states in paragraph
9 188, and this report is not in evidence, but you say:
10 "On the 22nd of May, Bosnian Serb forces removed two heavy
11 weapons from the weapons collection points near the city and Bosnian
12 forces withdrew weapons of their own, the fighting escalated."
13 As we've established, this is ten days after the major Muslim
14 offensive was launched. We see that this was noted on the 22nd of May,
15 whereas the offensive began on the 12th of May. Now, my question is
16 this: Do you have any information about other Muslim units in Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina, the units around Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac,
18 were also launching attacks in order to relieve the pressure on Sarajevo?
19 A. That's correct that there was a general effort. I don't think
20 the purpose was to relieve pressure on Sarajevo. I think they were also
21 trying to attack out of Sarajevo, but there was a general Bosnian
22 offensive going on in the spring of 1995.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, in this report on page 4 -- page 3, rather, my
24 apologies, the last paragraph -- in the last paragraph you say this:
25 [In English] "It is possible that the Serb objective is turn
1 Sarajevo into a real enclave ..."
2 [Interpretation] From this it is clear that up until this date
3 Sarajevo was not an enclave per se, not in the true sense of the word;
5 A. Connected by the tunnel and the airport, that's right.
6 Q. And the tunnel remained under the control of the Bosnian army all
7 through the end of the conflict; correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Thank you. In this same paragraph, 183, you go on to say:
10 "On the 24th of May, 1995, General Smith issued an ultimatum to
11 the Serbs with respect to their violations in Sarajevo and threatened
12 air-strikes -- threatened with air-strikes."
13 Can we agree once again that on this occasion General Smith did
14 not issue threats to the other party to the conflict; correct?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Thank you. And then you say that another dead-line was
17 established before which the parties had either to remove their weapons
18 from the total exclusion zone or place them in collection points. You
19 say the Serbs failed to comply, ignoring the ultimatum, and in response
20 NATO bombed certain Bosnian Serb military targets on the 25th of May.
21 Would you agree with me that the Muslims did not comply either and did
22 not hand over their weapons, did not deliver them to the collection
24 A. I can't remember at this date. That may be true.
25 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to move to June 1995, paragraph 195
1 of your statement -- 190, my apologies. We see here another offensive by
2 the Muslim forces and you say:
3 "On 16 June 1995 Bosnian forces began a series of attacks to
4 break out of Sarajevo."
5 And on this occasion, as previously, there was no request to have
6 NATO support against these Muslim forces; correct?
7 A. The threats were made against heavy weapons violations of the
8 total exclusion zone. The normal pattern - and this was a much more
9 serious offensive - was the Muslims had a numerical advantage and so they
10 used their light infantry, but they were at a disadvantage on heavy
11 weapons. When either side used heavy weapons, but the Serbs used heavy
12 weapons more, they had more and to compensate for their lack of people,
13 then they would be subject to threats by us and NATO.
14 Q. In other words, there was no request for NATO strikes against
15 Muslim forces?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Thank you. Now let's look at paragraph 191 --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, did I understand your testimony
19 well, also at earlier stages, that at no point in time there has ever
20 been a threat against Bosnian forces with NATO air-strikes?
21 THE WITNESS: General Rose, who was the commander in 1994, the
22 middle year of the war, considered it and he raised it as a possibility
23 with Dr. Ganic and I believe with General Divjak, but he knew that it
24 would not be approved up the hierarchy. So I think he did it more to
25 encourage the sides. There was no serious consideration of air-strikes
1 against the Bosniaks.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And therefore, certainly no threat? Threatening
3 means you tell someone if you do this I'll --
4 THE WITNESS: Well, they -- actually, they did. There were some
5 threats made, but I don't think there was any real intention to carry
6 through on those threats in early 1994.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
8 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Now I would like to move on to paragraph 191 of
12 your statement. We're still in June 1995 and I would like to call
13 document 17698. You state in this paragraph -- please bear with me. In
14 this document, in fact, that you're -- make a reference to in your
15 report, on page 2, the first and second paragraphs:
16 [In English] "Heavy fighting erupts in Sarajevo on Wednesday, as
17 both sides scramble to assert control of the BSA supply route."
18 BSA is Bosnian Serb army?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. "... both sides tried to assert control over the Pale-Lukavica
22 [Interpretation] That, too, is a route that was used by the
23 Army of Republika Srpska [Realtime transcript read in error "Bosnia
24 Herzegovina"], correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. So the Bosniaks are attempting with this offensive to cut --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it's general experience that if you read
3 that usually the speed of speech goes up. Could you please have a look
4 at whether everything you wanted to refer to appears on the transcript.
5 If so, please proceed; if not, please repeat.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. The transcript states that these were routes used by the Army of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that's on page 28, lines 19 and 20, so I will
9 have to repeat my question, Mr. Harland.
10 JUDGE ORIE: There may be a mistake there. I think you
11 clearly -- at least it was translated to us as used by the
12 Republika Srpska Army and that apparently was confirmed.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, at the same time, I'm looking at the
15 clock. I'd like to take a break of half an hour, but before we adjourn I
16 have one matter to raise but we can do that in the absence of
17 Mr. Harland.
18 Mr. Harland, would you already follow the usher. We'd like to
19 see you back in half an hour.
20 THE WITNESS: Thanks.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, we had some problem in - what was it? -
23 page 7 or was it page 8, and we are talking about exhibit -- about
24 document 8163. Now, the cause of the problem is that page 5 out of 8,
25 both in the handwritten numbering of the pages and the numbering of the
1 pages at the bottom of each page and the numbering of the Telefax
2 sequence, indicate that page 5 is missing. So apparently it's an
3 incomplete document because in all the numbering systems 5 is missing.
4 And it could well be that it was uploaded by the Prosecution.
5 Mr. Groome, would you please verify what caused a one missing
6 page in every numbering system of this document?
7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I see that when it was originally
8 processed by the evidence unit the numbers are consecutive. So I think
9 the thing for the Prosecution to do is go back in the vault and check the
10 original which I will have done sometime today if possible.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and then I think page 5 didn't play a role
12 apart from interrupting the numbering. We'll take a break and we'll
13 resume at a quarter to 12.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 11.48 a.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We see that the witness will be escorted into the
18 For the next witness the Chamber has some concerns about timing
19 and flexibility. Could you give us an indication already, Mr. Lukic,
20 what time you think you would need for cross-examination of the next
22 MR. LUKIC: The next witness? My colleague is signalling me that
23 he needs two hours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Two hours.
25 Which means that there's a reasonable expectation that we could
1 conclude the testimony of the next witness by tomorrow and then the
2 flexibility problem doesn't arise anymore.
3 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, while we're waiting for the witness to
6 come in --
7 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- may I just ask so that the Chamber can better
9 understand which way we're going, I just wanted to find out -- I find
10 your questions relate to the war rather than to war crimes with this
11 witness, and I'm just trying to find out where we're going with that.
12 MR. LUKIC: I think the war is part of our case as well,
13 Your Honour, so --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's just what I want to understand. Because my
15 understanding is I don't think that war itself is a crime or that war is
16 charged as a crime. What is charged -- the crimes that are committed
17 during the war.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: And the -- how I've understood your questions this
20 morning is that you're asking about what the army -- as an army does, as
21 a Serb army or as an ABiH army, not what the individuals do by way of
22 committing crimes or not committing crimes.
23 MR. LUKIC: I'm not sure that we can elicit that kind of
24 information from this witness, Your Honour, as something concrete. He
25 was head of a civil part of UNPROFOR, so he has a knowledge about general
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's correct. But from what you have been
3 reading from his statement he makes references to so many people killed,
4 some of them civilian, some of them soldiers, and that's it.
5 MR. LUKIC: I think that --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: So he does make reference -- he does refer to
7 crimes or killings that are taking place. We want to know whether -- are
8 those charged or not charged?
9 MR. LUKIC: We think if we show the context in which killings
10 appeared, then it would show that it's more in fightings than as
11 intention to kill a civilian or -- that's what we want to elicit from
12 this witness.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: I would like to see that happening. Thank you so
15 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.
17 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, we'll continue now. Apologies for
19 dealing with other matters when you entered the courtroom.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
22 Q. [Interpretation] I would now like to move on to paragraph 193 of
23 your statement. In this paragraph you mention a document, 65 ter 17698.
24 My apologies, 17675. In this paragraph in the document that you are
25 referring to, in the first paragraph you say the following:
1 [In English] "The Bosnian offensive which began last week petered
2 out very quickly -- apparently due to heavy casualties -- but is expected
3 to resume again in the near future."
4 [Interpretation] In other words, UNPROFOR too was aware that the
5 Bosniak side would relaunch and relaunch new offensives; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. And then in the next sentence, and we've already
8 established this, you say that the last of the UNPROFOR prisoners or
9 hostage was released. And we've said that's what it was. Now, did
10 UNPROFOR have information that after the release of the last hostage the
11 air-strikes against Serb positions would resume?
12 A. Air attacks were made at UNPROFOR request; that was how the
13 system worked. NATO didn't independently engage at all except in the
14 air, you know, air-to-air action.
15 Q. Thank you. Now I would like you to look at document 11477 and
16 this is related to paragraph 194 of your statement. When you state here
17 that you were shown documents, orders from Karadzic dated 13th and 17th
18 June 1995 relating to the release of hostages, it is obvious that in this
19 procedure General Mladic's name does not appear anywhere; correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. Thank you. Now on to paragraph 196 --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Any dispute about the name of Mr. Mladic appearing
23 in these orders?
24 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, not in document number -- or
25 65 ter number 11477. We agree, that's plainly visible from the document
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Therefore perhaps superfluous to ask.
3 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Paragraph 196 you say the following:
6 "The Serbs also wanted to pull out their weapons from those
8 Is it correct that the Serbs needed those weapons to defend
9 themselves from these Bosniak offensives and not for the purpose of
10 terrorising the civilians?
11 A. I think they served both of those purposes, yes.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Lukic, may I propose that you quote the
13 entire sentence and not only the part of the sentence to put it more
14 clearly on the record and to the witness.
15 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, my question covered actually the second
16 part of the sentence because in the sentence said that the Serbs took the
17 weaponry to continue their campaign against the civilians of Sarajevo and
18 to force the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make a political
19 agreement with them. So that's -- I think that my question actually
20 covered this part, but thank you anyways.
21 Q. [Interpretation] Now I would like you to take a look at paragraph
22 203 of your statement. In this paragraph you state the following:
23 "The Bosnian offensive that started last week very soon petered
24 out apparently due to heavy casualties but is expected to resume again in
25 the near future."
1 And then in this paragraph you go on to say:
2 "The point I think I was trying to make in this document was the
3 fact that the Bosnian offensive was principally of a military nature. It
4 was a failure but it was directed at the Serb military."
5 How did you draw that conclusion here in this statement, which in
6 my view has absolutely nothing to do with what you've noted down in your
8 A. So we would have observed fighting on the confrontation line.
9 The Bosnian army would attack with light infantry. Often they would
10 succeed initially. They would normally then be pushed back with heavy
11 casualties by Serbs with their heavy weapons, and then the Serbs would
12 resume this more or less indiscriminate shelling of the civilian
13 population and there would be further restrictions on gas, water,
14 electricity, and food, which of course was --
15 Q. [In English] I'm sorry, but that wasn't my question.
16 A. Oh, sorry.
17 Q. [Interpretation] How did you establish a nexus between the fact
18 that the Muslim offensive was petering out and this led you to conclude
19 that it had been directed against the military targets? I don't see any
20 connection at all.
21 A. No, no, that's a fact. We could see the Bosnian offensive taking
22 place from our observation points, and they would direct their fire at
23 Serb military positions. But the Serbs, in return, would direct their
24 fire at the population -- the civilian population at large. We could see
25 that all the time.
1 Q. Were you able to see from your observation posts that Muslims
2 were firing at civilians beyond the demarcation line?
3 A. The -- if it had happened, we would have seen it. And
4 occasionally when there was a mortar bomb that went further, the Serbs
5 would show it, in Grbavica, for example. But overwhelmingly Bosnian
6 military activity was directed to the immediate Serb military front line,
7 and the Serbs didn't even claim otherwise.
8 Q. Was that the reason why the Serbs had requested sniper protection
9 to be provided, in order to protect their military positions and targets?
10 A. No, no. There was certainly Bosnian sniper activity against Serb
11 civilians, not just in Grbavica but principally there. But we're talking
12 about these formed military offensives, which were always directed
13 against formed military units.
14 Q. Thank you. Now let's move quickly to July 1995, paragraph 213 of
15 your statement, paragraph 213. In relation to this paragraph I would
16 like to ask you the following. In July 1995, apart from a NATO air
17 force, were the Serbian targets fired at by UNPROFOR as well?
18 A. In July --
19 Q. [In English] 1995.
20 A. -- I know there was a very major bombardment by the UNPROFOR
21 rapid reaction force in August, but in July I can't remember. There was
22 also in May an action by the French by land against the Serbs, but I
23 can't remember in July.
24 Q. So in August. Now let me ask you this: Is it correct that the
25 plans for firing at Serb positions were jointly drawn up by UNPROFOR and
1 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. There was co-ordination between the initiative of Mr. Holbrooke,
3 NATO, UNPROFOR, and the Bosnian army, that's correct, and the Croatian
5 Q. Thank you. Now paragraph 217, and we need document 100638. This
6 is a weekly report on the situation in Sarajevo dated the 8th of July,
7 1995. We need page 2, and you say here in paragraph 5 towards the end --
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.
9 Q. You say UNPROFOR is still unable to confirm these numbers, and
10 you're talking about attacks on civilians, because it is unable to regain
11 free access to city hospitals. How often was UNPROFOR denied access to
12 the city hospitals?
13 A. In 1994 there was a problem when UNPROFOR believed that there was
14 mortar fire coming from in and around the main Kosevo Hospital facility
15 and we were excluded. And then there was a period in the summer of 1995
16 when we were not given access to the morgues to confirm casualty rates.
17 But -- so I'm not sure of the exact number of times, but it did happen
19 Q. Thank you. Can we please now move to paragraph 220 of your
20 statement --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'd like to ask one clarifying question.
22 If you had no access to the hospital, was that a matter of a day
23 or days or was it for a month or --
24 THE WITNESS: It could be several weeks at a time.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Several weeks at a time. Thank you.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
3 Q. [Interpretation] So paragraph 220 of your statement, this weekly
4 report -- this paragraph is predominantly pertaining to Zepa, and you say
5 that the Bosniaks had requested for their weapons to be returned to them
6 and that 127 pieces that had previously been surrendered to UNPROFOR were
7 returned, but the estimate was that it was of no significant military
9 Is it true that you reached this conclusion because you knew that
10 at that point the Bosniaks in Zepa had much more and better weaponry in
11 their possession?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. Thank you. And then you go on to say --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Just --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please indicate the portion
16 that he's reading. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you indicate which portion you're reading; and
18 if you read, do it a bit more slowly, Mr. Lukic.
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] It's the second sentence in paragraph
20 220, and it starts:
21 "During this period ..."
22 "During the period I was heavily preoccupied with an effort to
23 secure an international commitment to prevent the fall of Zepa."
24 Q. We have agreed that Zepa was not demilitarised?
25 A. It was meant to be demilitarised under a demilitarised agreement,
1 but in fact it held weapons.
2 Q. Then you go on to say as follows, that's towards the end of the
4 "Resolution 836 of 4th June 1993 extended the mandate of UNPROFOR
5 to enable it to deter attacks on the safe areas and to promote the
6 withdrawal of military forces other than those of the Bosnian government.
7 Neither resolution was successfully implemented."
8 In what way were these resolutions not successfully implemented?
9 A. Well, it was in the end not possible to deter attacks on them
10 because the Serbs never allowed sufficient troops, UNPROFOR troops, in
11 them to make that mission credible.
12 Q. [In English] One second. Now what about the other party, what
13 was it that they hadn't complied with?
14 A. Well, I think we had this conversation last week. My
15 recollection of Resolutions 817, 824, and 836 is that they do not put an
16 obligation on the Bosnian government party to withdraw, but that in the
17 specific case of Srebrenica and Zepa, there was a bilateral agreement
18 between the Bosnian government and the Serbs on demilitarisation, which
19 both sides violated.
20 Q. Let's go back to this issue. Article 3 of the agreement says
21 that each and every military or paramilitary unit must withdraw from the
22 demilitarised zone or surrender their weapons, the ammunition, mines,
23 explosives, and other combat equipment. Did this surrender happen in
24 full? Was everything surrendered to UNPROFOR?
25 A. But as -- but, sir, you do keep saying what was an obligation --
1 you started to ask me what was an obligation under the Security Council
2 Resolution, and then you quote an article from the bilateral agreement,
3 whereas my point in the statement was that the Security Council
4 Resolutions require one thing, which as far as I remember does not
5 include the withdrawal or cantonment of Bosnian forces. The bilateral
6 agreement, which I'm not even sure I mention in here, certainly did
7 require demilitarisation and I very openly always said that both sides
8 violated it. So if your question is not about the Security Council
9 Resolution, it's just about the bilateral agreement Article 3, I would
10 say, yes, it was violated.
11 Q. Since this agreement was signed on the 8th of May, 1993, in the
12 presence of General Morillon?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 Can we now have document 5681, and it is related to paragraph 222
16 of your statement. You say that civilian leaders in enclave began to
17 negotiate surrender terms with the Serbs; however, government authorities
18 in Sarajevo insisted that the negotiation -- negotiators were not
19 authorised. Is it true that the Sarajevo authorities by means of this
20 move wished for the fighting in Zepa to continue?
21 A. It is correct that the Bosnian government representatives, both
22 President Izetbegovic and Dr. Muratovic, told me that they did not accept
23 that the civilian authorities of Zepa had the authority to surrender the
25 Q. Thank you. And now paragraph 223 of your statement -- actually,
1 this paragraph is related to the document that we have on our screens.
2 Last paragraph on page 1 reads:
3 [In English] "Bosnian government forces have stated that UNPROFOR
4 troops in Zepa will 'share the fate' of the enclave, implying that they
5 will use the UNPROFOR troops as human shields in the event of a Serb
6 assault. They have overrun and disarmed a number of UNPROFOR observation
8 [Interpretation] We know from before that no request for
9 assistance was made to NATO with respect to this kind of actions of the
10 Bosniak army. But I'd like to ask you this: What happened to the people
11 at those observation posts?
12 A. There was a small Ukrainian unit I think in Zepa. They radioed
13 us to say that the Bosniaks were afraid that if the Serbs overran it they
14 would be massacred and they were holding them as a sort of human shield
15 against it. In the end what happened was the -- I believe the
16 civilian -- an agreement was managed so the civilian population largely
17 left unharmed. When the Bosniaks didn't agree to the military surrender,
18 General Mladic killed Avdo Palic or ordered his killing, and then -- or
19 at least they told us they had killed him. And then when they saw there
20 was no option, in fact the Bosnians escaped over the river to Serbia, I
21 believe, and they left the Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops unharmed, if I
22 remember correctly.
23 Q. Then on the next page of this document you say the following --
24 we'll go back to paragraph 1 on page 2.
25 Let's go back for a second to Avdo Palic. You said that
1 General Mladic killed him or maybe ordered his murder?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Who provided you with this information?
4 A. Actually, General Tolimir. We were asked whether we could bring
5 Palic to the Serb observation point for discussion under a flag of truce.
6 Palic agreed. He wanted to do that to help the civilians survive. And
7 then, in our presence, when Palic refused to surrender the military
8 component, they took him away. And when we asked to see him,
9 General Tolimir said, "He's dead." So ...
10 Q. How long was it between the time when you saw him and the time
11 when Tolimir told you that he was dead?
12 A. It was the next day.
13 Q. You don't know that after that he was transferred to Bijeljina to
14 the Batkovic military camp?
15 A. All I know is that -- what they told us, which is that he's dead,
16 and I understand that he is dead.
17 Q. Thank you. We are going to raise this issue with someone who has
18 more information. Thank you anyway.
19 First paragraph on the next page you say the following:
20 [In English] "We recommend that UNPROFOR propose an immediate and
21 complete demilitarisation of the Zepa safe area, to be implemented under
22 UNPROFOR supervision within 48 hours of agreement ..."
23 [Interpretation] Let me first ask you this: You believed that
24 demilitarisation of Zepa was possible to be completed within 48 hours; is
25 that correct?
1 A. Yes. It's a small place, not many people.
2 Q. But the truth is that demilitarisation had not been completed for
3 more than two years, despite the agreement; is that correct?
4 A. The 1993 demilitarisation agreement had not been implemented,
5 that's correct.
6 Q. Thank you. You knew that this part of the agreement wasn't
7 fulfilled because the Serbs complained to UNPROFOR about this not having
8 been done?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And until this date, neither UNPROFOR nor you personally did
11 anything with regard to this issue; is that correct?
12 A. No, that's not correct. So both sides were in constant standing
13 violation of the 1993 demilitarisation agreement. We constantly raised
14 it with both parties and both parties continued to be in violation. That
15 was one of the reasons that we, in the end, moved to a more direct use of
16 force policy.
17 Q. Yes, and this document exactly shows what proposals are concerned
18 here. You say that if the Bosnian government accepts the agreement and
19 the Bosnian Serbs refuse, Pale will be informed about the decision of
20 22nd April 1994, that their military positions and backup positions,
21 including fuel depots and ammunition depots, would be subject to NATO
22 strikes. So that was your proposal, unless the Serbs comply with and the
23 Bosniaks do comply with, we are going to bomb the Serbs; is that correct?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. In the next paragraph you say the following:
1 "Should the Bosnian government refuse to comply ..."
2 Basically what you are saying that you wouldn't be very happy
3 with that?
4 A. No.
5 Q. On this occasion, again you do not issue any threats to the
6 Bosnian side, any threats of NATO air-strikes; is that correct?
7 A. That's correct because we wanted the force to be principally used
8 against the Serb side.
9 Q. According to you, is this position an objective one and is that
10 position that you subscribe to?
11 A. It was factually, morally, and legally very complicated, but for
12 me the heart of the UNPROFOR mandate was to deter attacks on six safe
13 areas by all means necessary. We had discovered over a period of over
14 two years that it was impossible to deter those attacks by any other
15 means than force, but that the Serbs responded only and relatively well
16 to the use of force or at least to the credible threat of the use of
17 force. So yes, I believe it was objectively in line with my duty to try
18 to advise on the implementation of the UNPROFOR mandate.
19 Q. And this position of yours, objective, as you say, is visible in
20 all of your reports; correct?
21 A. No. I think, like others, I started from the view that we should
22 first negotiate a cease-fire; and then that would create space for the
23 great powers to mediate a final peace settlement. It was only in 1995
24 that a group, including myself, came to the conclusion that it would not
25 be possible to fulfil the mandate unless a more robust use of the
1 UNPROFOR mandate were made.
2 Q. Against one side alone, the Serbs?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think your point is clear, Mr. Lukic.
6 MR. LUKIC: I will continue.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Now could we have paragraph 225, please. And
8 this is related to document 65 ter 09322. And here you only talk about
9 the second document or just the first, rather, but I will put some
10 questions to you about the second document. Can we have this document on
11 the screen, please, that's 09322. This is another document that was sent
12 by you. And we need to see the second page.
13 And here again we find in the sixth paragraph from the top or the
14 second from the bottom where you say:
15 "At about the same time the Ukrainians in Zepa reported that
16 Bosnian forces had begun to attack their compound with small arms, heavy
17 machine-guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. I called the office of
18 Prime Minister Silajdzic immediately thereafter and warned him that such
19 an attack or similar attacks could only harm the interests of Bosnians,
20 especially in light of tomorrow's meeting in London."
21 We see that here you are also concerned about the international
22 interests of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo. Did you at any point
23 issue warnings of this type to the Serb side and could you show us the
24 document, if so? Well, you don't have to show it. You can just tell us.
25 A. No, my warning to Dr. Silajdzic was that if they kept shooting
1 at -- the Bosnian army kept shooting at UNPROFOR positions, it would be
2 much harder for us to argue in the London meeting for much more broad
3 authority to use force against the Serbs. So our argument was that it
4 was in his interest because we were hoping to get a much accelerated,
5 much expanded, authorisation to use force.
6 Q. Also in his interest?
7 A. Right. Correct.
8 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to move briefly to August 1995,
9 that's paragraph 229. You are talking here about the 28th of August,
10 1995, and the incident at the Markale market. First I would like to
11 remind you - and perhaps you will agree with me - that you, in fact,
12 confuse Markale I and Markale II because Markale II that you're talking
13 about here, there were no stalls at the market. The shell exploded
14 outside the market grounds. Would you agree that you actually conflated
15 these two events?
16 A. No. There were -- there were definitely -- there were definitely
17 casualties around the -- in the market area where had stalls.
18 Q. If you say so. We will deal with Markale I and II or perhaps
19 just one because there's only one Markale incident mentioned in the
20 indictment. However, I would now like to show you document 3830. The
21 document is dated 29th August 1995. It's an UNPROFOR document.
22 And under paragraph 3 it says:
23 "None of the UN observers [as interpreted] in the general area
24 along this portion of the separation line observed or heard any firing at
25 the time of the incident ..."
1 Would it be possible -- is it possible that not a single person
2 from the observation post would hear or see the fire -- the shots being
3 fired from Serb positions?
4 A. They would certainly be aware of the firing if it was close to
5 the confrontation line. If it was from deeper inside Serb territory, not
6 necessarily. This is not a document written by me.
7 Q. [In English] I know.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
9 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just to avoid confusion in the future,
10 I do note that the document -- the subject line is the 28th of August and
11 I believe Mr. Lukic has said the 29th of August so I don't -- the
12 transcript records him as having said that.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is dated the 29th.
14 MR. LUKIC: The 29th.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, very small, at least in the English
16 version at the top, it says date: 29th, and then subject 28th of August.
17 MR. GROOME: I see that now, Your Honour. I apologise.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
20 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. [Interpretation] I will put it to you now that such a claim is
22 actually running counter to the report prepared by the French observers,
23 that's document 65 ter 10243. And there's a lot of azimuth points being
24 mentioned there, so I won't torture you with that, but I would like to
25 ask you this: Do you know whether at this time -- or rather, do you know
1 that at this time a video that was shown here, ERN V0004749, two
2 tail-fins could be seen and they are marked with numbers 12 and 13,
3 whereas in the official version that perhaps you had occasion to see or
4 maybe not, there's only mention made of this trace evidence 12 and only
5 one tail-fin is mentioned. Do you know any of this? Are you familiar
6 with any of this?
7 A. I was in General Smith's office when the G2, that is, the
8 headquarters military intelligence people, it was an American colonel
9 called Powers [phoen], I think, and then there was a French sector --
10 actually, I think the French sector commander or deputy commander were
11 there and they were discussing it and several others. Not being a
12 ballistics expert I had no particular opinion, but the consensus among
13 the experts in the room was that it had come from Serb positions.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I don't think that that was the question put to you,
15 Mr. Harland.
16 THE WITNESS: What was the --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Why not answer the question? Mr. Lukic put to you
18 that there are apparently two versions of a video or two versions - we
19 haven't seen it - one with two tail-fins and the other one with only
20 one - Mr. Lukic, if I understood you well - were you area of the
21 existence of two different versions of video especially showing a
22 difference in the number of tail-fins?
23 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think I've seen any of these videos.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then a simple "no" would have done.
25 THE WITNESS: No.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
3 Q. [Interpretation] After the deaths of the civilians at Markale on
4 the 28th of August, 1995, new NATO air-strikes against Serb positions and
5 installations were ordered by NATO; correct?
6 A. No. The key was turned by General Smith, the UNPROFOR commander.
7 Q. Yes. And the air-strikes began already on the 29th of August,
8 1995, in the course of the night, if you recall?
9 A. I think -- yeah, maybe just into the night of the 30th -- into
10 the 30th -- I mean, just after midnight, I think.
11 Q. And in these air-strikes, NATO air-strikes, NATO had UNPROFOR
12 Rapid Reaction Forces support which shelled the Serb positions around
13 Sarajevo; is that correct?
14 A. Yes. There was a division of labour. UNPROFOR's artillery would
15 bombard the Serb artillery to prevent them from firing and NATO aircraft
16 would bombard Serb positions, yes.
17 Q. And all of this was in response to the conclusion, actually, that
18 the Serbs were responsible for the shelling of Markale the previous day.
19 That was the trigger, wasn't it?
20 A. That has been overstated. In -- that was chosen as the trigger,
21 but had that not been the trigger the operation would have taken place a
22 few days or weeks later or even earlier.
23 Q. But if Serbs -- in other words, Serbs had no way that they could
24 avoid these NATO air-strikes according to you; is that so?
25 A. Not unless they stopped fighting.
1 Q. Thank you. Now let's move to September 1995, paragraph 242.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, 242 is out in my
3 [overlapping speakers] --
4 MR. LUKIC: Yeah, yeah, I crossed it too.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then let's move on.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we see on our monitors 10242.
7 Q. My apology, I thought that you were the author of this document
8 and that's what I assumed, but obviously that is not the case so I won't
9 have any questions in relation to it. Let's move on to October 1995,
10 paragraph 271 of your statement. You've already mentioned this earlier,
11 that the international community had, in fact, empathised with the
12 Serb --
13 THE INTERPRETER: With the Bosnian side, interpreter's
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. And in relation to that I would like to ask you this: Did you
17 know Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg?
18 A. Yes. But I'm not sure I said that. Didn't I say that the
19 opinion was greatly divided in the international community?
20 Q. [In English] No.
21 A. But yes, I agreed with -- I knew Thorvald Stoltenberg.
22 Q. Yeah. Here it says no, that it's --
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. -- no division. [Interpretation] Did you work with him, with
25 Mr. Stoltenberg?
1 A. UNPROFOR advised a little bit the process on the so-called
2 Owen-Stoltenberg plan, but I never really spoke one-on-one with him until
3 after the war about this period.
4 Q. He said he defined a position that I believe is close to yours,
5 or rather, the position of the representatives of the international
6 community in Bosnia, and this is how he defined that.
7 [In English] "He knew from the first day of the war that in order
8 to be completely accepted and avoid criticism" --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Where does this come from, Mr. Lukic?
10 MR. LUKIC: This is open source. It's for Europe, Radio for
11 Europe, from 19th of April, 2012. He gives a definition, so if this
12 gentleman agrees with it or not, but I just want to put it to him with
13 your permission.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you can put it to him, but whether he agrees
15 or not with it is asking for opinion.
16 MR LUKIC: Of course.
17 JUDGE ORIE: But unless it's a factual statement, we'll listen
18 and hear what you further read.
19 MR. LUKIC: Well, it's not factual.
20 JUDGE ORIE: It's not factual?
21 MR. LUKIC: No.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then you're asking this witness whether he agrees
23 with an opinion expressed by someone else of whom he said he had never
24 spoken --
25 MR. LUKIC: I withdraw the question, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. We are close to a conclusion so please bear with me a little
4 longer. Could we see paragraph 294 of your statement. In the first
5 sentence here, the beginning of the first sentence, reads as follows:
6 "The Serbs controlled all the high ground around Sarajevo."
7 On the 15th of January, 2007, you yourself, testifying before
8 this Tribunal, said. This is page 28631 of the transcript in Slobodan
9 Milosevic -- in the Slobodan Milosevic case.
10 [In English] "Grbavica was controlled by SRK," so
11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, "but was surrounded on three sides by the ABH,
12 Hrasno, part of Hrasno hill in the west, the northern bank of the
13 Miljacka river, and Debelo Brdo," which is Debelo hill, "in the east were
14 held by ABH."
15 [Interpretation] And also on page 26963 you go on to say -- you
16 go on to talk about the hills that were under the control of the BH
17 Army - Colina Kapa, Mojmilo hill, Zuc hill, Hum hill. Is it correct that
18 it is in fact the truth that many of the high ground and the dominate
19 features around Sarajevo were held by BH army -- by the BH army?
20 A. There were some places where the Bosnians -- you mentioned Zuc,
21 where Bosnian positions were above Serb-inhabited areas or
22 Serb-controlled areas, but in -- the general topography was that
23 Sarajevo's on -- in the valley and most of the Serb forces. But you're
24 right, there were some areas where the Bosnians were above the Serbs.
25 Q. This is just in general, but the we will deal with this with some
1 other people, local people, from the area. This is all I had for you.
2 Thank you for answering my questions.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have completed my examination.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
5 Mr. Groome, could you give us an indication as to how much time
6 you'd need?
7 MR. GROOME: I think approximately 15 minutes, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: 15 minutes. Then -- Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, the only thing is tendering of evidence,
10 if you think it's a good moment now or after.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could do that now for the next five
12 minutes, then take a break of half an hour, and then after the break that
13 you'll start your re-examination, Mr. Groome.
14 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. And if I might just before the
15 witness is excused, there is a document that I would like the witness --
16 like to work with with the witness. It's 65 ter 20884. Mr. Lukic
17 cross-examined the witness on the document. It's a three-page document.
18 We might save some time, and Mr. Lukic does not object, if the witness
19 were allowed to look at it over the course of the break. And I have an
20 unmarked copy here that simply has the 65 ter number in the corner.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, some homework for the witness during the
22 break. Is that --
23 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay, then could the usher assist in providing
25 the witness with the document.
1 Now for the tendering of the documents, I think we don't need the
2 witness, would we?
3 Then, Mr. Harland, you may leave the courtroom. We'd like to see
4 you back at approximately 1.30. If I say "we," I have to adjust that.
5 Due to the change of the timing of today, I have personal commitments
6 which I cannot change. So I did understand that my colleagues would
7 consider it to be in the interests of justice to continue for that one
8 hour after the -- one hour and 15 minutes after the break, the two of
9 them. So that is already an explanation.
10 Mr. Harland, you received the document. Could you please
11 carefully read it and we'd like to see you back in a little over one half
12 an hour.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: My colleague informs me that the witness was
19 provided only with one page which is a little bit short for a three-page
20 document. You're -- I take it that --
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I understood, Mr. Groome, that he wanted to give
22 a three-page document to the witness.
23 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I saw only one page in his hand when he left the
1 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps --
2 MR. GROOME: It was -- I didn't see what he actually walked out
3 with, but if he walked out with what I handed the usher, it was three
4 pages. But we can check.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Let's move on to the exhibits.
6 Mr. Lukic.
7 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. We actually proposed 28 documents,
8 but we'll ask for only seven to be admitted.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please list them.
10 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I'll give you 65 ter and ERN number --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, 65 ter and then -- I think 65 ter would --
12 MR. LUKIC: Suffice.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, could you identify them.
14 If you add to that a brief description of what the document is,
15 then it might assist Mr. Groome.
16 MR. LUKIC: 65 ter number 11477.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, and that is -- yes, that would be a ...?
18 MR. LUKIC: It's order issued by Mr. Karadzic concerning the
19 release of UNPROFOR soldiers and UNMOs.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Dated? Because ...
21 MR. LUKIC: I have the number, not the date.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I think two were mentioned earlier, two
24 MR. GROOME: The Prosecution has no objection to that.
25 JUDGE ORIE: To either? Even if it would be one of them.
1 MR. GROOME: And Your Honour, just so the Chamber knows, anything
2 that's on the Prosecution exhibit list, the Prosecution will not take any
3 objection to Mr. Lukic tendering it.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, let's take it one by one. 11477,
5 Madam Registrar, would receive ... ?
6 THE REGISTRAR: This will become Exhibit D4, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: D4 is admitted into evidence.
8 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: Next one is 03507.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And is ...?
11 MR. LUKIC: It's fax from Aguilar containing a report concerning
12 a press conference given by Karadzic and press release of the
13 statement -- committee for co-operation with the UN.
14 MR. GROOME: No objection, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would that be D5?
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: D5 is admitted into evidence.
18 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
19 MR. LUKIC: Next one is 23773.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Is that on the Prosecution's exhibit list?
21 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then I take it that there's no objection,
23 Mr. Groome?
24 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, D6?
1 THE REGISTRAR: Becomes Exhibit D6.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
3 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
4 MR. LUKIC: 09986, UNPROFOR weekly.
5 JUDGE ORIE: On the exhibit list?
6 MR. LUKIC: On the exhibit list.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, my assumption that it would be D7
8 is ...?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: D7 admitted into evidence.
11 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
12 MR. LUKIC: Next one is 10012. It's also weekly.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Also on the Prosecution's exhibit list?
14 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
15 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, and no objection.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, D8?
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D8, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
19 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
20 MR. LUKIC: 03830. It's regarding 98th [sic] August 1995,
21 Sarajevo firing incident.
22 MR. GROOME: No objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D9, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
1 Next one, Mr. Lukic.
2 MR. LUKIC: 05681. It's a memo from Mr. Harland, 19th of July,
4 MR. GROOME: No objection, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D10, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
8 MR. LUKIC: That's all, Your Honour, we had.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest that associated exhibits of course have
12 been discussed on paper already that before they will be dealt with after
13 the examination.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, before you rise and perhaps before --
15 while you're still available, in speaking with Mr. Lukic there's been a
16 number of questions put to the witness regarding UN Security Council
17 resolutions and demilitarisation agreements. I've provided the Legal
18 Officer a chart of nine such documents that the Prosecution proposes to
19 tender through bar table and there are extra copies there. The Defence
20 objects to number 1 and number 4 on this list but will not object to the
21 admittance of all the others. So perhaps that's something that the
22 Chamber could discuss before you leave for the day and I'll formally
23 tender them --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Numbers 1 and 4. Number 1 is a United Nations
25 Security Council Resolution 713, if I understand well. What's the
1 objection, Mr. Lukic?
2 MR. LUKIC: It's not in official format, Your Honour. We have
3 those resolutions in completely different format.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. LUKIC: And we would request the official text and probably
6 that resolves --
7 JUDGE ORIE: So in itself there's no objection against
8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 if you get the original
10 MR. LUKIC: Well, let us answer that question after we see the
11 text in original format because this way we don't know if it's original
12 or not.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's on the record.
14 Number 4, UNPROFOR report, dated the 10th of April, 1993, that
15 it's here put as Wahlgren report concerning agreement on demilitarisation
16 of Srebrenica. What's the objection there?
17 MR. LUKIC: The objection, Your Honour, is that this is not the
18 agreement, actually, number 4. It's rather a transmittal correspondence
19 with some unknown comments from third parties. The actual agreement is
20 number 6 on this list --
21 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers]
22 MR. LUKIC: -- and we do not object to number 6 because there is
23 no reason to introduce a version of the same document with comments from
24 a third party.
25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I can consider our position over the
1 break. One of the reasons we put this on -- we're tendering this is
2 because it was a document that was used by Mr. Lukic in the
3 cross-examination, but I will re-evaluate that in light of his comments.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ORIE: And, Mr. Groome.
6 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Of course number 4 starts with Wahlgren report
8 about -- if you have the text on number 6 admitted into evidence, would
9 you still need that report for one reason or another?
10 MR. GROOME: If I could just have an opportunity over the break
11 to study the question.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I take it that it's of no use at this
13 moment to ask Mr. Lukic's position when that matter is not yet resolved.
14 We take a break and presumably you'll continue at 1.35.
15 --- Recess taken at 1.04 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.38 p.m.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: For the reasons that Judge Orie gave before we
18 broke, may the record please show, Madam Registrar, that the Chamber is
19 now sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis. Before we broke off, Mr. Groome,
20 you were going to resolve item 4 on your associated exhibits.
21 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. The Defence objection was that
22 item 4, which is 65 ter 09374, was, in fact, a duplicate of item 6, which
23 is 65 ter 28019. If I could ask my colleagues to please recheck those
24 documents. 09374 is a document signed on the 18th of April, 1993; and
25 the agreement signed that -- which is 65 ter 28019 is an agreement signed
1 on the 8th of May, 1993. So although they are similar documents, they
2 are not, in fact, the same document.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I understand this paper well, number 4 is
4 supposed to be a report about the agreement and number 6 is the agreement
6 MR. GROOME: That's not entirely accurate, Your Honour. There is
7 some element of a report on the front page of that, and the Prosecution
8 would have no objection to that being removed if that was the objection,
9 but if Your Honour looks at the third page in e-court of that you can
10 actually see that Mr. Mladic and other signatories actually signed this
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
13 MR. LUKIC: Yes, maybe I can cut this short. We don't have
14 objections now because we checked it is -- on the first page it wasn't
15 visible -- it seemed like 8th but it was 18th, the second document. So
16 those are different documents.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: So the objection is withdrawn?
18 MR. LUKIC: No objection.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: And also with respect to number 1?
20 MR. LUKIC: Number 1 --
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Was resolved before we went out for break.
22 MR. LUKIC: No, Your Honour, it's not.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's not resolved?
24 MR. LUKIC: No.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: What's the issue about it?
1 MR. LUKIC: As we stated, it's not the official text.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's not official. I beg your pardon.
3 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Okay.
5 Well, then, Madam Registrar, item 4 - what is that? - that's
6 09374, is that it?
7 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, Your Honour. You're speaking about item
8 number 4?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah.
10 MR. GROOME: That's 65 ter 09374. That's correct.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's right. And that would be admitted into
12 evidence. And may it please be given an exhibit number, Madam Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: This would be Exhibit P5, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: P5. Thank you so much.
15 I guess this is now your turn to re-examine the witness,
16 Mr. Groome? Is that -- am I right?
17 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. If I can just inquire, has number
18 6 or 28019 been already given an exhibit number? I wasn't sure if the
19 Chamber reserved its decision on that as well.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought you had indicated that the Defence was
21 objecting to only two from this list, 1 and 4.
22 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: So 28019, now being number 6, it's -- there's no
25 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I understand Mr. Lukic's --
2 MR. GROOME: I apologise, yes.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- nod. And shall we then ask the Registrar to
4 give all those remaining ones exhibit numbers outside court time?
5 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. The only -- if I could just
6 respond to the objection with respect to number 1, which is 65 ter 07243,
7 it is UN Security Council Resolution 713. It's the Prosecution's
8 position that simply because it's in a form that the defendant or the --
9 Mr. -- the Mladic Defence identifies as somewhat different doesn't mean
10 that the document itself is not authentic. And as the Chamber can see,
11 there are some official date stamps on it. But if the Chamber instructs
12 the Prosecution to try to obtain a copy that appears similar to other
13 Security Council Resolutions, we will of course do that.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed I think that's -- that was Mr. Lukic's
15 position. He's not querying the content, he's just saying once the
16 format is the usual format he's used to, we will jump that river when we
17 get to that.
18 MR. GROOME: Can I ask, then, that it be assigned an
19 identification number at this stage, Your Honour?
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you want a -- okay, MFI?
21 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: No problem.
23 Well, Madam Registrar, we'll give it an MFI number, and then the
24 rest can be given exhibit numbers outside courtroom. Is that okay?
25 THE REGISTRAR: So document 07243 become Exhibit D -- P6 marked
1 for identification, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, ma'am.
3 MR. GROOME: And, Your Honour, while we are waiting for the
4 witness to be brought back into the chamber, there was one other question
5 that arose earlier this morning that I'm prepared to report to the
6 Chamber about and that was with respect to 65 ter 8163. And as you
7 recall, this was the document in which there was some question about a
8 possibly missing page 5. We have checked in the evidence vault. We
9 received that from the UN in a scanned version, in other words, in a hard
10 drive. It was scanned in headquarters in the UN, so the scanned copy
11 that we have still does not have a page 5. We do not believe there's any
12 text missing, but we will take steps to inquire with UN headquarters to
13 verify that there is, in fact, no missing page.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Groome. Okay.
15 Is the witness being brought in?
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon, Mr. Harland.
18 As you might very well be aware, it's now Mr. Groome's turn to
19 re-examine you after Mr. Lukic's completion of his cross-examination.
20 Thank you so much.
21 Mr. Groome.
22 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Re-examination by Mr. Groome:
24 Q. Mr. Harland, I just have a few questions to clarify a few matters
25 before you're discharged as a witness.
1 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, could I ask that P1 be brought to our
2 screens. This is Mr. Harland's statement.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: May P1 please be brought up to the screen.
4 MR. GROOME: And could I ask that we go to e-court page 71 and 51
5 in the translation. If we could focus on paragraph 228.
6 Q. Mr. Harland, if perhaps you could see that you still have the
7 hard copy of your statement. If I could draw your attention to paragraph
8 228 of that statement. And my question to you regarding that is:
9 Earlier today at transcript page 41 you provided evidence with respect to
10 Avdo Palic. Can I ask you to read paragraph 228 and then assist us in
11 understanding your evidence earlier today on this point with respect to
12 paragraph 228.
13 A. Paragraph 228:
14 "By the evening of 27 July 1995 the civilian evacuation was over.
15 Serb authorities detained the local Bosnian commander, who was in the
16 presence of UN officials, and Mladic passed a warning to UNPROFOR saying
17 that if Bosnian fighters did not surrender by 1800 hours that day, they
18 would be attacked. The next day Mladic advised UNPROFOR that the local
19 Bosnian commander was dead. UNPROFOR, in the absence of an exchange
20 agreement between the parties was unable to further assist in an
21 evacuation process."
22 Q. That's all of the statement that I wanted to draw your attention
23 to. Can you please explain that or place what you said earlier today in
25 A. Colonel Palic, Avdo Palic, was the leader of the Bosnian army
1 defenders of the enclave of Zepa. When Zepa came under sustained Serb
2 attack after the fall of Srebrenica, fighting took place and Palic agreed
3 to negotiate with the Serbs to at least try to save the civilians from
4 the fate of Srebrenica. He voluntarily travelled in a civilian -- a
5 United Nations car -- actually, the car of two of my colleagues, to
6 Bosnian Serb positions. The Serbs were willing enough first to negotiate
7 the departure of the ethnic cleansing, the -- otherwise the evacuation of
8 the civilian population, but then when Palic refused to surrender the
9 fighters he was detained and then killed.
10 Q. Mr. Harland, today at transcript page 41, line 22, you were asked
11 who provided you with this information, that's the information that
12 Mr. Palic was deceased. You answered in part: Actually, General
13 Tolimir. And in this, if I'm reading correctly, it says: "The next day
14 Mladic advised UNPROFOR that the local Bosnian commander was dead."
15 Can you please explain those two statements?
16 A. Actually, both of them did that, both Tolimir and then later in
17 the day Mladic. But we were first informed I believe by Tolimir.
18 Q. Now if I can change the subject, Mr. Harland, at page 742 of the
19 transcript, Mr. Lukic asked you whether you agreed with him that the
20 weapons of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were of medium quality in terms of
21 quality, maintenance, and replenishment, to which you stated that you
22 agreed but qualified your answer that it was an amateur assessment. My
23 first question to you is whether your assessment was based on your own
24 observations or by reports of others?
25 A. Both. I visited the Serb lines around Sarajevo regularly,
1 certainly at least once a week. They had vastly greater numbers of heavy
2 weapons and vastly better and more ammunition than the Bosnians, but they
3 were clearly not at the standard of NATO forces with which I was working.
4 Q. Was there ever an occasion during your time in Sarajevo that you
5 became aware that a cessation of fire coming into Sarajevo was the result
6 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps not having sufficient operational weapons?
7 A. No.
8 Q. In several places during your examination by Mr. Lukic you used
9 the term "heavy weapons." Can I ask you to please tell us what is your
10 understanding of that term or how are you using that term.
11 A. We used it for weapons over 60-millimetres calibre.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, could I ask that we bring 65 ter 20884 to the
13 screens before us, and it is an intercepted conversation between
14 Mr. Karadzic and General Milovanovic, and this was the document that I'd
15 hoped you had an opportunity --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- to review over the break. Did you have an opportunity to read
18 the entire intercept?
19 A. I did.
20 Q. Can I ask you -- there seems to be some sense of urgency to
21 Karadzic's words and actions. Can you assist the Chamber by placing this
22 intercept into context?
23 A. Yes. The Serbs had undertaken a successful military operation
24 against the Bosnian army on Mount Igman overlooking part of Sarajevo. At
25 that point, as the Siege of Sarajevo appeared to becoming desperate, it
1 appeared that NATO was about to intervene and was to -- was going to bomb
2 the Serbs. And, in fact, in the transcript of the intercept it refers to
3 a similar warning having been given to Saddam Husein. And Dr. Karadzic
4 is urging General Milovanovic to very urgently comply with requests that
5 they withdraw from their positions on Mount Igman that they had taken.
6 Q. During the course of your evidence you have spoken, at least on
7 two occasions, about there being different times when there was tension
8 between Mladic and Karadzic. Can you recall any time during your tenure
9 in Sarajevo when Mladic consciously disregarded an order from Karadzic?
10 Were you aware of any such time?
11 A. Certainly this was an example of tension, but Mladic did sign the
12 papers in front of me agreeing to withdraw from Mount Igman, and they
13 were fully implemented. There was again tension around the 1994 weapons
14 exclusion zone around Sarajevo, but General Mladic did follow. I believe
15 in the very last weeks of the war there may have been -- there may have
16 been a further breakdown which led to General Mladic not receiving or
17 implementing fully orders he received.
18 Q. Can I ask you to be as precise as you can about this period that
19 you're now referring to, the weeks towards the end of the war.
20 A. The civilian authorities, Dr. Karadzic and his spokesman Jovan
21 Zametica; Professor Koljevic, they were principally concerned about the
22 emerging threat they saw from the Republic of Croatia in the west of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were, therefore, very unhappy. In July of
24 1995 they told us with the length of time that some of -- that operations
25 after Srebrenica were taking. Dr. Karadzic even made a public statement.
1 I forget the exact date, and on the other hand military representatives
2 we met at the time indicated that they would disregard the orders of the
3 civilian leadership if they didn't conform with the plans of
4 General Mladic.
5 Q. Are you able to be -- are you able to provide a month and year of
6 the time-period that you're speaking about now?
7 A. July/August 1995.
8 Q. And in your answer a few moments ago you said after Srebrenica
9 were taken, does that mean it was after the fall of Srebrenica?
10 A. It was, in fact, around -- yes, very shortly after the fall of
12 Q. Now if I can ask you a different, but related, question. Can you
13 recall any time during your tenure in Sarajevo when Karadzic circumvented
14 the line of authority that flowed from him and through Mladic because of
15 a disagreement over a course of action? In other words, did he ever go
16 directly to other members of the VRS and circumvent Mladic, to your
18 A. Apart from the document that you just showed me, which is him,
19 Karadzic, speaking to Milovanovic, yes, I do recall I think around a few
20 months later around -- during the fighting around Gorazde that Karadzic
21 told us that he was going to speak directly to field commanders to ensure
22 that they complied with NATO demands. And he even disappeared for a
23 while into a small room in the Hotel Panorama and said that he was
24 speaking to them.
25 Q. Again, if you're able to give us the month and year, that would
1 be appreciated.
2 A. Must be April of 1994.
3 Q. Now on the subject of sniping at page 763 of the transcript, and
4 in regard to 65 ter 09986, you will refer to page 3 of the document which
6 "BH snipers have been firing on UN personnel around UNPROFOR's
7 forward headquarters. Two Bosnian snipers have been firing not only at
8 UN personnel but also at local pedestrians in the vicinity."
9 Then you were asked:
10 "Is this the only recorded incident of this nature or could see
11 for yourselves on other occasions, that the Army of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina acted in this way?"
13 And you answered:
14 "Yes, there were other cases."
15 Can I ask you to look at page 297 in which you refer to two cases
16 of members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducting sniping and
17 ask you whether are these the two occasions or are these some of the
18 other occasions you were referring to?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, page 297 of?
20 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, paragraph 297 of P1.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] Thank you so much.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask you something else, Mr. Groome. Just
23 for the record, line 18 of 68, are these figures correctly recorded?
24 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour. It's page 763 of the
25 transcript that I was referring to.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what does the 3069 refer to?
2 MR. GROOME: And it was page 3 of the document. So there's two
3 typographical errors in that passage, so it should be "763" and "page 3"
4 of the document.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 MR. GROOME:
7 Q. Mr. Harland, have you had an opportunity to look paragraph 297 of
8 your statement?
9 A. Yes. Those were two incidents. I used to visit the French
10 facilities where they tried to track the source of sniper fire. It
11 wasn't always possible to tell where the firing point was. The
12 overwhelming -- I mean well over 95 per cent of casualties that could be
13 affirmatively identified -- for which a firing point could be
14 affirmatively identified, those casualties within the confrontation
15 lines, the firing point was from the Serb side. But there were some
16 exceptions and these are two which were confirmed.
17 Q. Now, at page 24 of today's transcript you were asked the
18 following question and gave the following answer.
19 "Q. Can you agree with me - or perhaps you wouldn't - that the
20 BH army soldiers in their presence and their weapons, their
21 installations, offensives, jeopardised the safety of the civilian
22 population in Sarajevo?"
23 Your answer:
24 "A. I would agree with that sometimes."
25 Can I ask you to elaborate and explain in a little greater detail
1 what you indicated or meant by your answer.
2 A. Sarajevo was a very densely populated area which was under
3 attack. The Bosnian government forces would put their weapons, including
4 mortars, very close to civilian residences sometimes and sometimes even
5 in the grounds of the hospital or adjacent. We would protest this, as it
6 gave the Serbs an excuse for the shelling. In general, I think they made
7 an effort to not place the weapons there but it certainly did happen.
8 Q. Okay. Now at page 767 of the transcript, Mr. Lukic questioned
9 you about paragraph 71 of your statement. That refers to a report dated
10 the 3rd of November, 1993, in which on the 27th of October almost 500
11 shells fell on Sarajevo with one -- within one hour in response to BH
12 mortar fire. You described this as an exceptional incident because it's
13 500 shells in a short period in one part of town, the old town. Are you
14 able to tell the Chamber the approximate size of the old town and
15 characterise the general density of that particular neighbourhood?
16 A. It is a, yeah, densely inhabited, relatively small municipality
17 at the eastern end of the valley of Sarajevo.
18 Q. Now, there is -- on several occasions there was discussion
19 between yourself and Mr. Lukic about the amount of territory that Serbs
20 held during the times of these negotiations and the figure you've given
21 evidence about was 70 per cent. You then also used the term - and you
22 did it at transcript page 11 and 12 today - of 51/49. Can I ask you to
23 explain what you're referring to when you use the term 51/49.
24 A. There were a series of proposals starting from 1992, before the
25 war actually began, to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three
1 ethno-religious cantons, one for the Serbs, one for the Croats, one for
2 the Bosniaks. As I mentioned, President Izetbegovic told me he had
3 regretted rejecting one in 1992 which had apportioned 44 per cent to the
4 Bosniaks. The -- he had -- he had rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg plan
5 after a vote of the Bosnian Assembly in September of 1993, I believe,
6 because it offered, I believe, 31 per cent of territory. He then said
7 that if the Bosniaks were to be apportioned 33 per cent of the territory,
8 which, combined with the holdings that would be allocated to the Croats,
9 would make 51 per cent for the Bosniaks and the Croats, he would accept
10 the deal. It then became a conventional wisdom in the international --
11 among the great power negotiators that if a territorial apportionment of
12 51 per cent for the Bosniaks and Croats combined could be obtained and
13 therefore a territory of 49 per cent for the Serbs, that it would be
14 possible to find a lasting peace settlement.
15 Q. Now if I can change the subject, at page T797 you mentioned that
16 you travelled to the village of Kravica. Can I first ask you, when was
17 it that you travelled to that village?
18 A. I went there at the -- first at the winter of 1995/1996, just as
19 the war was end -- it was in the context of -- actually the detention of
20 an American journalist I was trying to see whether we could get released.
21 Q. And did you make any observations while there during that visit
22 of -- that you considered important?
23 A. Yes. I -- among other things, I came to a cement agricultural
24 warehouse roughly the size of this courtroom, and for me it was a very
25 shocking encounter because I found on all six of the interior surfaces of
1 that building, all four walls plus the ceiling and the floor,
2 considerable amounts of human tissue, hair and skin and blood.
3 Q. Anything in addition to what you believe was human tissue?
4 A. Well, there were -- outside the building there were huge amounts
5 of the empty cartridges from gun-fire and there were blackened marks
6 around the windows where there had been explosions and inside the
7 building where there had been detonations. There were also black marks
8 on the wall or on the ceiling.
9 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, at page 764 of your evidence you were
10 discussing the fear that compelled the people to leave the place where
11 they lived and you said:
12 "I think among the people I spoke to in Sarajevo, it was a
13 general fear of getting killed that made people want to leave."
14 Can I ask you to be more specific, if you're able, did people
15 ever express killed by what or killed how?
16 A. Yes, and for the whole period that I was there, years, people
17 were extremely anxious about the constant indiscriminate firing of an
18 average of a thousand shells a day into the civilian centre of the city
19 plus the sustained sniper fire and they lived in terror of it, and most
20 of them in their right minds wanted to leave irrespective of nationality.
21 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, my final question to you is the following.
22 Last week you said that you had given further consideration to the
23 questions that Judge Orie had put to you regarding research your office
24 undertook with respect to who occupied certain areas. I do want to give
25 you an opportunity to return to that subject and provide any additional
1 thoughts if you so wish to. I'm not sure what it is that you want to add
2 to the earlier discussion of that matter, but you have an opportunity to
3 do so now if you wish.
4 A. On the distribution of territory, our point was not at all to say
5 which nationality of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had owned how
6 much land. It was simply to be able to demonstrate from the records that
7 were available to us that the maps that had been shown to us in Pale were
8 not correct, that certain areas that were uninhabited or which were
9 state-owned land had been ascribed to the Serbs. And indeed, when I came
10 to this courtroom, President Milosevic in an earlier trial showed me a
11 map in which all these uninhabited and state-owned areas were coloured
12 purple on his map which -- showing that they were somehow Serb land.
13 The only point I had been trying to make was that when we went to
14 Pale, usually to complain about the sustained indiscriminate firing on
15 the civilian population, we would be given facts, often bogus facts,
16 about what was really whose land and given some justification for it.
17 And my point was not to say that we wanted to enter deeply into this
18 logic, but simply that we had done enough research to be able to set
19 aside these for the real reasons for the attacks on the civilian
20 population that were going on.
21 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, I have no further questions of this
22 witness. Thank you.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just one question to you, Mr. Harland.
1 Questioned by the Court:
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: You mentioned a few minutes ago the number
3 thousand shells a day. Is that what you meant to say?
4 A. Yes, that's what I meant to say. We had two separate systems for
5 counting. We had the regular UNPROFOR battalion system and we had the UN
6 military observer system, and we counted on average a thousand a day,
7 most of them directed at the civilian population centres.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
9 Any questions arising from the questions by the Bench,
10 Mr. Groome?
11 MR. GROOME: Not from the Prosecution, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic? Thank you very much.
13 Mr. Harland, that brings us to the end of your testimony. Thank
14 you so much for taking the time to come and testify. You are now excused
15 and you may stand down. Travel well back home.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, you used certain documents during your
21 examination-in-chief which you kept on mentioning you intended tendering
22 but didn't tender at the time. I don't know whether they are in this
23 list that you have just tendered a few minutes ago or are they separate
24 from that?
25 MR. GROOME: They are separate, Your Honour, and I was going to
1 ask if I could address the Chamber on that now.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may, please.
3 MR. GROOME: So, Your Honour, the group of documents that I'm
4 speaking about now are the documents that are associated to Mr. Harland's
5 statement. There are many documents referred to in that statement and
6 the Prosecution seeks to tender 15 of them. I misspoke last week when I
7 said 14, but there are 15. And I am prepared -- unless the Chamber would
8 like me to go through them in any particular order, I am prepared to go
9 through them in the order that they appeared on that filing that the
10 Prosecution did on the 6th of July.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Perhaps if you stay on that filing.
12 MR. GROOME: And, Your Honour, my submissions I've e-mailed to
13 Mr. Lukic last week, so before I trouble the Chamber with detailed
14 submissions, if Mr. Lukic has no objection to some document, perhaps that
15 might be the most efficient way to proceed.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's do it that way.
17 Mr. Lukic.
18 MR. LUKIC: We do have some documents we don't object to,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: How many are those?
21 MR. LUKIC: I can give you the numbers so maybe we can --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
23 MR. GROOME: Perhaps I'll go through them one by one, Your
24 Honour, and I'll look to Mr. Lukic first to see if he objects. Would
25 that be okay?
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
2 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 10630.
3 MR. LUKIC: The Defence does not have an objection.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
5 May that be admitted into evidence and given an exhibit number,
6 Madam Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: 10630 will receive -- becomes Exhibit P7,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: P7. Thank you so much.
10 Yes, Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 10015.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic?
13 MR. LUKIC: Now if he does not hear the reasoning of Mr. Groome,
14 we might not have the problem with this document because the Defence does
15 not object to the introduction of the document, but we object to the
16 assertions that Mr. Groome had in this -- his written explanation. So --
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: So the document can go in and not [overlapping
18 speakers] --
19 MR. LUKIC: The document can go in.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 10015 becomes Exhibit P8, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. P8 is admitted into evidence.
23 Yes, Mr. Groome.
24 MR. GROOME: 10016.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic?
1 MR. LUKIC: We don't object.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
3 May it go into evidence, Madam Registrar, and be given an exhibit
4 number, please.
5 THE REGISTRAR: 10016 becomes Exhibit P9, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, Madam Registrar.
7 Mr. Lukic -- Mr. Groome.
8 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 15749.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Lukic.
10 MR. LUKIC: No objection.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
12 Shall we give it P10, Madam Registrar, and admit it into
14 THE REGISTRAR: 15749 becomes P10, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
16 Yes, Mr. Groome.
17 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 05356.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Lukic.
19 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: 05356 becomes Exhibit P11, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, Madam Registrar. It's admitted
23 into evidence.
24 Mr. Groome.
25 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 10240.
1 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
3 Madam Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: 10240 becomes Exhibit P12, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. It's admitted.
6 Mr. Groome.
7 MR. GROOME: 10638.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: Bear with me, Your Honour. 106 ... we don't have
10 this one.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You don't have that one?
12 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, perhaps if we could skip passed that
13 one and I'll speak with Mr. Lukic about that the next opportunity.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can be looking at that Mr. Lukic in the
15 meantime. Yes, Mr. Groome, Next one.
16 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 10030.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you have that one, Mr. Lukic?
18 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
20 Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: 10030 becomes Exhibit P13, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Admitted into evidence.
23 Mr. Groome.
24 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 28049.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: 08 --
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: 28049.
3 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
5 Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: 28049 becomes Exhibit P14, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. P14 is admitted into evidence.
8 Yes, Mr. Groome.
9 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 09986.
10 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
12 Madam Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: 09986 becomes Exhibit P15, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. P15 is admitted into evidence.
15 Mr. Lukic [sic].
16 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 10822.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
18 MR. LUKIC: Defence would object to this document, Your Honour.
19 It's -- for the following reasons. First the original of this document
20 is in English, yet it purports to be authored by General Milosevic. The
21 Serbian version in e-court is very clearly a translation of this English
22 document of unknown origin. So rather than a Serbian original, as we
23 would expect for official document of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,
24 and it does not have any signatures, stamps, or seals. So we actually --
25 and the system is not original document. It has to be cured first if you
1 want to admit it.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome.
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, can I ask that it be marked for
4 identification and I will investigate the provenance of the document and
5 report to the Chamber at the earliest opportunity.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
7 MR. LUKIC: No problem.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Registrar, can it be marked for
9 identification and be given an exhibit number?
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, with your leave, I would like just
11 to add that previous document 09986, which was assigned number P15, was
12 earlier already admitted as D7.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, can you confirm that?
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have P7 is a document dated the 15th
15 of October, 1993, and this particular document is dated the 3rd of
16 November, 1993, if --
17 MR. LUKIC: D7, not P7. I think it was said.
18 THE REGISTRAR: D7, Your Honour.
19 MR. GROOME: Oh, D7.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: D7.
21 MR. GROOME: That's quite possible. I'll defer to
22 Madam Registrar on that if I've made an error.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: D7 should be 65 ter 9986.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, and this is 9986.
25 MR. GROOME: I'm mistaken, Your Honour. I did not update my
1 records since Mr. Lukic's examination.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's actually admitted as your --
3 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers]
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- exhibit. That is [overlapping speakers]. So
5 shall we then withdraw the P15 number? Thank you very much.
6 THE REGISTRAR: And then we can assign P15 to 10822 to become P15
7 marked for identification, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Then P15 is admitted,
9 Madam Registrar. Thank you so much.
10 And, Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, 65 ter 03485 --
12 MR. LUKIC: Can I interrupt for a second, I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah.
14 MR. LUKIC: A bit confusion in my head because now we had P15
15 assigned to 10822.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mm-hmm.
17 MR. LUKIC: And it -- that one was marked for identification.
18 Can -- I think -- and you said it is admitted.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are right. So it's P15 MFI.
20 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we make that note, Madam Registrar, marked for
22 identification P15.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
25 And then, Mr. Groome, you were going to 0 --
1 MR. GROOME: 03485, Your Honour, was the next number.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: 03485.
3 Yes, Mr. Lukic.
4 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
6 Madam Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: 03485 becomes Exhibit P16, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. It's admitted into evidence,
10 Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: 65 ter 28050.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: 28050.
13 Yes, Mr. Lukic.
14 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
16 Yes, Madam Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: 28050 becomes Exhibit P17, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, Madam Registrar. P17 is
19 admitted into evidence.
20 Yes, Mr. Groome.
21 MR. GROOME: 28052.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
23 MR. LUKIC: We do object to this document, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Ground?
25 MR. LUKIC: It is not a document integral to the statement
1 insofar as the statement merely identifies the document and that Harland
2 drafted the same. It does not explain or discuss that document in any
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's the Prosecution's position that it
6 does meet the test for an associated exhibit. I would noted that it is
7 an agreement referred to as the airport agreement of the 11th of January,
8 1995, and signed by Mr. Mladic himself.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure, but what's your response to what -- his
10 objection, that it is not discussed in any detail and --
11 MR. GROOME: It is -- Your Honour, although there are some
12 portions of the statement that deal in greater detail with the documents,
13 this is referred to in the statement. There are observations made about
14 it, and one would be unable to understand what Mr. Harland is saying
15 about this particular document without having access to the document
16 itself. And that's why we submit that it meets the legal test for an
17 associated exhibit.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you give a reference where in the statement
19 of the witness he refers to that part?
20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I need a few moments to look that up.
21 If I can maybe address the Chamber then on that tomorrow.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you so much. Shall -- do you want to
23 MFI it?
24 MR. GROOME: I would ask that we do that, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, any objection to MFI-ing it?
1 MR. LUKIC: No, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, can we give it an MFI number please,
3 Madam Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: 28052 becomes Exhibit P18 marked for
5 identification, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the final exhibit the Prosecution is
8 just tendering as an associated exhibit is 65 ter 05726.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic.
10 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: No objection.
12 Madam Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: 05726 becomes Exhibit P19.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
15 Mr. Lukic, have you been able to check 10638?
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: What's your position?
18 MR. LUKIC: We were informed by the Prosecution that this
19 document will not be tendered, so that's why we haven't checked documents
20 the Prosecution will not tender and under number 2 it says 10638.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome.
22 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that is correct, and then we were
23 informed the Defence would use it in cross, but I will withdraw my
24 tendering of that -- the document at this time, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, not tendered. Thank you very
2 Is that all, Mr. Groome?
3 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, that is all of the associated
4 exhibits. The Prosecution is prepared to call its next witness, if that
5 so pleases the court.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
7 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Lukic?
9 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry for interrupting at this stage.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not a problem.
11 MR. LUKIC: I can see my learned friend across the cross [sic]
12 for -- Mr. McCloskey is ready for the next witness obviously, but we have
13 to raise with Your Honours something that probably we should go into the
14 private session.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
17 [Private session]
11 Page 918 redacted. Private session.
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, you indicated while we were still in
5 private session that you would file some written submissions.
6 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you do that for us, please -- not now,
9 MR. LUKIC: Sure.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: What I mean is please do file them.
11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
13 Anything else?
14 MR. GROOME: Not from the Prosecution, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not from the Prosecution.
16 Mr. Groome and Mr. Lukic, you noted what the Chamber said about
17 the scheduling from now on? Will you be able to make your comments or
18 objections should the need arise given what was said?
19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I can inform the Chamber now that the
20 Prosecution will take no objection and will defer to the Chamber's
21 judgement on it. The Prosecution would of course appreciate knowing a
22 final decision as soon as possible so that we can schedule the notified
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: The sooner we get the comments from the parties,
25 the sooner the Chamber will be able to make a final schedule.
1 Mr. Lukic.
2 MR. LUKIC: I have nothing further.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: You have nothing further.
4 So the Chamber will stand adjourned to tomorrow morning at 9.00,
5 Courtroom I; is that correct?
6 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, that's the schedule.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: So the matter is so adjourned. Court adjourned.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.30 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of
10 July, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.