1 Tuesday, 9 October 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.41 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar. Would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be a problem with the sound. Yes.
10 Now it's okay.
11 Yes. We have a late start. We earlier advised you, Mr. Mladic,
12 to use the toilet facilities not just prior to the start of the
13 proceedings. Today you arrived some -- anything between 30 and 40
14 minutes before the start of the proceedings. You waited until the very
15 last moment. The Chamber is not willing to delay the start of the
16 proceedings any further, so please be aware that you should use the
17 toilet facilities well prior to the start of the proceedings. It also
18 means that we'll not interrupt the examination of a witness by a late
19 entry into the courtroom. So if you have not used the toilet facilities,
20 then you'll have to wait until the first break in order to enter the
22 Then there was one preliminary. Mr. Groome.
23 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it just has to do with the scheduling
24 of the next witness, Mr. Wilson. He had some delays in his travel to The
25 Hague, but he is here now, although his luggage has yet to arrive. The
1 earliest the Prosecution would be able to call to testify would be
2 tomorrow at noon. Based upon the current schedule it seems that we may
3 finish with this witness before that. I was going to suggest to the
4 Chamber that if the administrative hearing that's scheduled for the end
5 of week, the Prosecution has provided the materials to the Defence and
6 the Chamber staff, so perhaps we might be able to use that time, although
7 I don't expect that will take much time.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Let me ask this: Mr. Wilson was scheduled for the
9 Prosecution for three hours, if my recollection serves me well?
10 MR. GROOME: I don't believe it was as long as that, Your Honour,
11 but I have it here.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, three hours.
13 MR. GROOME: Three hours, yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: It used to be two hours. Yes. So my recollection
15 serves me well. We were informed that the Defence would take six hours,
16 which makes it nine. On average we have approximately three and a half
17 effective time for examination for a witness, therefore, we might run out
18 of time if we only start -- it could fit, perhaps, just in this
19 time-frame. Nine hours is -- we're usually sitting four hours and
20 three-quarters of an hour a day, one hour less for breaks, three breaks
21 of 20 minutes, which brings us down to three hours and 45 minutes. For
22 two days three hours and 45 minutes is seven and a half hours. We need a
23 scheduled nine hours, so we should at least have one and a half hours
24 tomorrow, and it's even a bit risky to start at such a late moment.
25 MR. GROOME: I appreciate that, Your Honour. As we've indicated
1 for the last several months that the witness could only be here to
2 testify on the Thursday and Friday, we've -- we've taken every step
3 possible to move him forward into Wednesday given the time considerations
4 that Your Honour is raising now. But now with this delay in his travel,
5 there is a considerable amount of work to be done. It's being done this
6 morning, but Ms. Bolton's best estimate of the earliest possible moment
7 she could call him is noon tomorrow.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I just pointed at potential problems we
9 may face.
10 Then Mr. Ivetic, for the present witness you'll be able to
11 conclude today?
12 MR. IVETIC: Yes, that's my plan, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And would there be some time left then for the
15 MR. IVETIC: That was also my plan. I'll see if I can get it
16 going with the late start.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then could the witness be escorted into the
18 courtroom. Well, the late start, as a matter of fact, we are -- was ten
19 minutes of Mr. Mladic's time he used elsewhere and not available for
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Tucker.
24 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by
1 the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony that
2 is that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
3 truth. Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.
4 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
6 Q. Good morning again, Colonel. Yesterday we left off looking at
7 paragraph 16 of your statement and I'd like to begin again there, so if
8 we can have Exhibit P137 up in e-court and paragraph 16 of the same,
9 which is I believe in the fourth page in the English and also in the
10 B/C/S versions.
11 And now yesterday we dealt with the issues raised with the Serbs.
12 I'd like to now briefly deal with the issues that you report the Serbs
13 raised with UNPROFOR, and here at paragraph 16 we see that they were a
14 cease-fire throughout Bosnia, equivalence in humanitarian aid, and
15 halting the Republic of Croatia military involvement in Bosnia. You
16 confirmed for us yesterday at transcript page 3798 that the UNPROFOR BH
17 command had information to it -- available to it evidencing the presence
18 of troops of the Republic of Croatia on the territory of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. What was your understanding at the time? Was such a
20 presence of the Croatian Army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
21 accordance with or in violation of the various United Nations
23 A. We knew that the -- there were forces of the Republic of Croatia
24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it was reported to us. We did not have our
25 own people actually on the ground at those locations, and our
1 understanding was that this was in contravention to the -- to a Security
2 Council Resolution.
3 Q. Thank you, sir. Now I want to spend some time talking about this
4 issue relating to the Serb request for a simultaneous cease-fire
5 throughout Bosnia. If we look at paragraph 26 of your statement, and
6 that would be at page 7 of the -- of the exhibit in e-court, this is in
7 relation to the first meeting between General Morillon and
8 General Mladic, and you list four agenda items of General Morillon, and
9 the third is to seek a cease-fire throughout Bosnia.
10 Would you agree with me that at this point the Serbs and the
11 UNPROFOR BH command had the same objective; that is to say, a cease-fire
12 throughout the entire territory of Bosnia?
13 A. That was our understanding at the time.
14 Q. And would you agree with me, generally speaking, that the side
15 that was reluctant to enter into a general or universal cease-fire on the
16 entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Bosnian Muslim side?
17 A. The Bosnian Muslim side similarly to the Bosnian Serb side
18 proclaimed the desire for -- for peace throughout the area of conflicts.
19 There's a difference between what people proclaimed on both sides and
20 what they actually did on the ground.
21 Q. Okay. On this issue I'd like to revisit some of your testimony
22 from the Oric case.
23 MR. IVETIC: If we can have 1D368 up in e-court. And I believe
24 it should be page 2 of that document. This should be transcript page
25 5795 from the Oric case.
1 And, sir, just to give you an introduction, this is your
2 testimony from the Oric proceedings, and this is your answer to the
3 question that had been asked on the previous page:
4 "By this stage, had you and General Morillon had some experience
5 in trying to facilitate and assist in the negotiation of cease-fires in
7 And what we have here at the top of the page, line 1 -- I'm
8 sorry, it's the next page in e-court. I apologise. I must have had the
9 wrong -- what we have here at the top of the page is your answer to this
10 question which proceeds:
11 "Yes, we had been trying to negotiate cease-fires since we had
12 arrived in... Bosnia. There was a recurring theme to cease-fires, which
13 was that the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted a cease-fire or cease-fires
14 to cover all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words they wanted to
15 consolidate their gain and consolidate what they had taken, whereas the
16 Bosniak leadership declared that they wanted cease-fires. The reality of
17 the way they behaved was that whenever they were under pressure
18 militarily from the Serbs, they wanted local cease-fires, but then
19 contrived to try and break those cease-fires and provoke the Serbs."
20 Sir, would you agree with your prior testimony from Oric as being
21 correct on the topic of the Bosnian Muslim position as to cease-fire
22 agreements as witnessed by you during your deployment in Bosnia?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me that a particular strategy or
25 goal of the Bosnian Muslim leadership during the time period of your
1 deployment seems to be to try and provoke responses from the Serbs to try
2 and support their calls for a military intervention by NATO or some other
3 outside forces on their behalf?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. In that sense would you agree that the more dire or the more
6 desperate a situation seemed, the better the argument or chances for such
7 a military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslim forces?
8 A. Yes, that is certainly a possibility, certainly a conclusion one
9 could reach.
10 Q. Thank you, sir. And in terms of terminology, is a cease of
11 hostilities agreement basically the same thing as a cease-fire agreement?
12 A. We considered cessation of hostilities being rather more than a
13 cease-fire. A cease-fire was simply they stopped shooting at each other.
14 Cessation of hostilities goes rather beyond that with many other actions
15 to bring about a normalisation of the situation.
16 Q. Now I'd like to ask you, during the time period that you were the
17 military assistant to General Morillon, that is from October 1992 to your
18 departure in 1993, how many cease-fire agreements or cessation of
19 hostilities agreements do you estimate that you brokered?
20 A. I would have to go back through my -- my files in order to give
21 you an accurate answer. There were at least two or three general
22 cease-fires across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there were
23 numerous what I'll call local cease-fire agreements which were brokered
24 and none of them held.
25 Q. I think I can perhaps refresh your recollection. I do have some
1 of your testimony from the Perisic case at transcript 9232.
2 MR. IVETIC: This is at 1D369 in e-court and it's page 56 of that
3 document. Fifty-six in e-court. It should be starting at line 15.
4 Q. And the question that you were asked is:
5 "Just as a general matters, can you tell the Chamber in your
6 estimation how many cessation of hostilities/cease-fire agreements do you
7 think you brokered during the time that you were there?
8 "A. Many. How many? 10, 20, 30, I don't know. There were so
9 many of them and none of them were ever adhered to.
10 "Q. When you say none of them were ever adhered to would it be
11 fair to say that the both parties - and by that I mean the Bosnian Serbs
12 and the Presidency as you called it - broke those cease-fires?
13 "A. Yes. All -- in my view all three parties, the Bosnian
14 Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs broke cease-fire
15 agreements when it suited them."
16 Do you recall this testimony from the Perisic case and would it
17 refresh your recollection as to the number of cease-fire agreements and
18 the fact that all three parties routinely broke them?
19 A. As I said a little bit earlier, in terms of the global, as in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, wide, I think there were two or three in terms of
21 local cease-fires, there were, indeed, many, and all three parties broke
22 them when it suited them.
23 Q. Can you tell me in whatever terms you're comfortable with, that
24 is to say any qualifications you think are necessary, but to what degree
25 did the Bosnian Muslim infantry forces outnumber the Bosnian Serb
2 A. My guess, this was -- I don't have accurate figures, and I'm
3 trying to cast my mind back a long time now, which is something like 2 to
4 1 or 3 to 1.
5 Q. And would that take into account the Bosnian Croat forces and the
6 Croatian Army?
7 A. I couldn't -- I couldn't answer that accurately.
8 Q. Okay. That's fair enough. Yesterday at transcript pages 3755
9 through 3750 -- strike that. Let's -- let's back up. At paragraphs 21
10 and 26 of your statement, and that would be on page -- the bottom of page
11 5, leading on to page -- well, 7 is 26. You provided some evidence
12 relative to utility shortages in Sarajevo, and then yesterday at
13 transcript page 3755 through 3757, you told us about utilities in
14 Sarajevo, and yesterday you only talked of the Serb side. I would like
15 to present you with some of the testimony you gave in the Galic case on
16 this very same topic and see if we can add these details, as I didn't see
17 them in your statement nor in what you testified to yesterday.
18 First of all, am I correct that General Morillon and the BH
19 command of UNPROFOR took steps with the Muslim side to try and address
20 the issue of utilities in Sarajevo?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Okay.
23 MR. IVETIC: Now, if we could call up 1D367 in e-court, and this
24 should be the first page of that document in e-court, this will be
25 transcript pages 10029 through 10031 from the Galic case beginning at
1 line 12 on the first page. And here it's Judge Orie asking you about
2 this, sir, beginning at line 12:
3 "The last question is you have told us about one of the tasks
4 performed was to discuss issues of restoring utilities: Gas, water
5 supply, electricity. Could you tell us whether the parties were
6 cooperative if it came to restoring these utilities, whether both parties
7 behaved similarly or differently? Could you elaborate a bit more on
9 "A. Utilities were something which General Morillon considered
10 very important, and at the meetings at which utility repair was
11 discussed, both sides were entirely cooperative. These meetings were
12 very complex because you needed to bring to one place, at one time, both
13 technicians who had the right knowledge and a cease-fire that was agreed
14 by both sides, and the technicians needed to know a safe route through
15 the minefields in order to reach the area that they needed to carry out
16 repairs. When we looked at what happened on the ground the co-operation
17 which we received from the Bosnian Serb authorities was generally of a
18 high order."
19 Now, sir, I'd like to stop here and ask you: Do you stand by
20 your prior testimony in this prior case in Galic that the co-operation
21 from the Bosnian Serb authorities was generally of a high order?
22 A. I stand by what was said -- what I said at that time. There is a
23 difference between what people say in a meeting and what happens
24 thereafter, obviously.
25 Q. Okay. I'd like to continue with your answer then to this
1 question from the Galic case.
2 "The co-operation we received from the Bosniak local commanders
3 varied considerably, and it was our belief that in some areas where the
4 Presidency authorities had high control, things generally went well. But
5 there were other areas where the local commanders were radical, and from
6 the perspective of general discipline and obedience, were unreliable,
7 that all sorts of tricks were used in order to prevent the repairs from
8 taking place.
9 "Judge Orie: I'm trying to understand this. The supplies of
10 water, electricity, and gas, also served their own population. What was
11 the specific reason why they would play tricks which would result in not
12 restoring the supplies when their own population would suffer from it?
13 Do you have any explanation about that?
14 "A. I do have an explanation, and it is as follows: There were
15 elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to
16 take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that
17 could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by
18 the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia, which was not possible at
19 that time because of the arms embargo. Those people believed that the
20 only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the
21 situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community
22 would be -- would be willing to intervene. Therefore, it was not in
23 their interest to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. It
24 was not in their interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian
25 population improve. To put it more -- to put it bluntly, the more
1 suffering the better, because that played to the television cameras and
2 would ultimately lead to the pressure that they wanted in order to
3 achieve international intervention."
4 Sir, do you recall this testimony of yours that you gave in the
5 Galic case?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. And would you still agree that it is correct and truthful as to
8 the situation you testified about there, especially the problems from the
9 Bosnian Muslim side, with regards to co-operation?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Could I inquire? Is there dispute about the
12 truthfulness and accuracy and the correctness of this testimony?
13 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, Mr. President, there isn't.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Why are we spending time on matters which are not in
15 dispute? Agree with the Prosecution on the matter and then --
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, yesterday they spent some considerable
17 time presenting evidence of utilities. They presented evidence of
18 utilities in their statement which is different than what is said here,
19 which does not incorporate what is said here, so I have every right to
20 present matters within the witness's knowledge and ask him whether they
21 are far more complete than the answers that he gave yesterday.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that this is adding to what the
23 Prosecution presented, but still not in dispute. I mean, if you say you
24 have emphasised A, B, and C, D is important for the Defence, is there any
25 dispute about D? If there's no dispute about D, you agree with the
1 Prosecution that the testimony of the witness on matter D is accepted as
2 in accordance with the truth and then we can move on.
3 MR. IVETIC: And then Your Honour should present -- you present
4 the Prosecution with the opportunity to spend court time yesterday
5 presenting to the public their side and we are limited from presenting
6 our side which is just as relevant and is just as important to the
7 [Overlapping speakers] --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if you present an agreement with the
9 Prosecution on certain facts, the public will know about it as well. And
10 from what I understand is that here the Prosecution does not contest the
11 accuracy. I do understand that until now it has not been easy to agree
12 with the Defence on other matters, at least the progress made in
13 negotiations on agreed facts was not very impressive at this moment.
14 Now, I'm not saying who is to be blamed for that. But if there is a
15 matter which you believe to be true and the Prosecution believes to be
16 true, then that's obviously a matter you could agree on, present it to
17 the Chamber, the public will see it, and we don't have to spend time on
18 it in court. Please proceed.
19 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
20 Q. When you say that were elements from within the Bosnian
21 leadership that were looking for intervention, can you perhaps identify
22 any of the officials or give an idea of how high up they were in the
24 A. I think you mean within the Bosnian Muslim leadership.
25 Q. I apologise. I misspoke. I did mean the Bosnian Muslim
2 A. Our understanding was that they reached very close to the top.
3 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that these elements represented the
4 majority or controlling position in the Bosnian Muslim leadership?
5 A. I'm not in a position to be able to answer that.
6 Q. Fair enough. The situation that you have identified here in
7 relation to utilities, would you agree with me that this position of the
8 Bosnian Muslim -- of an element within the Bosnian Muslim leadership
9 continued throughout the time period that you were assigned in 1992 and
11 A. Yes, it did.
12 Q. Now, if we can just discuss one other point about the utilities
13 issue. Do you recall that the transfer valve or transfer station for the
14 natural gas was located at Mali Zvornik in Serbia proper?
15 A. Yes. I believe that was correct or that is correct. I certainly
16 recollect that there was a lot of discussion at one stage about this
17 site, that it needed repair and that it needed a specific piece of
19 Q. And one more thing. Did you have information at the time that
20 the provider of the natural gas was actually Russia, that is to say that
21 the -- it was not -- it was not a domestic resource of the Yugoslav
23 A. Our understanding was that the gas came from Russia, but the
24 pipeline led through Serbia through Bosnian Serb territory before it
25 ended up in Sarajevo.
1 Q. Did you in fact ever verify if the supply of gas had been
2 terminated due to issues of nonpayment of amounts owed to the Russian
3 provider of the natural gas?
4 A. There were a number of statements made to General Morillon about
5 why the gas pressure in Sarajevo was so low most of the time. That was
6 one of them, but General Morillon and his staff, we did not ourselves
7 investigate anything like that. We were too busy trying to prevent the
9 Q. You say a number of statements were made to you. Were any one of
10 those statements that in fact there were 300 million US dollars owed to
11 the Russian provider by the Sarajevo authorities for gas that had already
12 been provided?
13 A. I don't recall that fact.
14 Q. Now I'd like to move on to another topic. At several parts of
15 your statement you talk about the deployment of CanBat 2 -- the Canadian
17 MR. IVETIC: And if we could start at paragraph 26 of P137. That
18 would be the seventh page in e-court, I believe, in both versions.
19 Q. And I'd like to kinda go through with you the various parts of
20 your statement relating with CanBat to get the whole picture because it
21 keeps popping up and it needs to be clarified.
22 Now, this paragraph here, 26, first off, this was raised for the
23 first time at this meeting that General Morillon had with General Mladic
24 on 27 October 1992. Is that accurate?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. And now if we look at paragraph 28 on this same page, we see here
2 that General Mladic advised that the government of the Republika Srpska
3 would have to give an answer to this as he was not authorised, and that
4 he would give you an answer -- their answer at the next meeting.
5 Now, if we turn to the next page, that's paragraph 35, and we
6 have this letter that I guess had been written to Biljana Plavsic on the
7 same topic, what I want to know is this paragraph 35 relating to the same
8 meeting or a different meeting where CanBat 2 was raised?
9 A. General Morillon sent the letter to Biljana Plavsic separately to
10 the meeting with General Mladic which you referred to a minute ago.
11 General Morillon's approach was to come at the issue from as many angles
12 as possible in order to try and secure the deployment of this
13 Canadian battalion which was sat outside the borders of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the end, if I remember correctly, ended up
15 parked by the side of the road for about five months before eventually it
16 was permitted to come into Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. Now, in any event --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Is this an answer to the question, Mr. Ivetic?
19 MR. IVETIC: Not entirely.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The question, Mr. Tucker, was whether what is
21 written in paragraph --
22 MR. IVETIC: 35.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, 35, but we started with the -- paragraph 26, I
24 think. No, it was -- let me have a look.
25 MR. IVETIC: 26.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, 28, where you said Mladic also said that all
2 agreements made in Geneva -- no, it's that Mr. Mladic did not have the
3 authority to agree to the deployment of CanBat 2. And then at paragraph
4 35, your statement says that Mladic referred to a letter that
5 General Morillon had sent to Biljana Plavsic the same day regarding
6 securing the deployment of CanBat.
7 The question was whether these two things happened during the
8 same meeting --
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: -- or whether they -- yes.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. That was in the same meeting.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Please proceed.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Q. Now, I want to ask you about what you have recorded at paragraph
15 59 of your statement, which is page 13 in the English and page 13 through
16 14 in the B/C/S. And this is your evaluation that at this second meeting
17 where CanBat 2 was discussed, your evaluation was that by his words,
18 General Mladic was implying that he alone had the ability to decide on
19 CanBat 2's deployment.
20 Can I ask you if indeed you would permit that this could also
21 have been bravado on the part of General Mladic?
22 A. In my opinion, General Mladic was not a person who went in for
23 bravado without it being carefully calculated. General Mladic, our
24 understanding was, was very concerned at that time, particularly about
25 the attacks by Republic of Croatia forces in the Trebinje area. He also
1 had the issue of the -- the Sava valley, and that was really worrying
2 him, and he was trying to use that as a lever - so the deployment of
3 CanBat 2 as a lever - to try and get General Morillon to do more about
4 the presence of the Republic of Croatia forces and the pressure he was
5 under both in the south and the north.
6 Q. Indeed, if we look at paragraph 68 on the top of page 16 in
7 e-court, you're still describing the same meeting with General Mladic,
8 and you describe his behaviour as being bombastic. Would that not mean
9 again that the meeting was bravado more so than actual exclamation of his
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. The witness has
13 already answered the question. Mr. Ivetic has put it to him a number of
15 JUDGE ORIE: No. Mr. Ivetic at this moment is pointing at the
16 language used in the statement by the witness and is exploring the
17 consistency and he's allowed to do so.
18 Could you answer the question.
19 THE WITNESS: Sorry, I'm trying to find the question in the
20 previous --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'll -- if you look at paragraph 68, which
22 deals with the same meeting with General Mladic, and I'll read the
23 relevant part.
24 "In comparison with Mladic's bombastic behaviour at the meeting
25 on the 15th of November, at this meeting Mladic is back in his box."
1 That's the language you --
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, and what is the question about the language?
3 JUDGE ORIE: The question is whether -- well, perhaps you put it
4 to the --
5 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- the witness.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. Your reference to Mladic's bombastic behaviour at the meeting on
9 15 November. Wouldn't you then therefore agree that the views expressed
10 on the 15th of November were bravado or bluster on the part of
11 General Mladic?
12 A. They were factually, at least in our view, bombastic. What lay
13 behind the reasons why he was behaving in that manner is, of course, a
14 matter of opinion.
15 Q. In any event, you were not aware of the normative structure of
16 the VRS or the Republika Srpska government so as to understand the
17 authority and jurisdiction of each?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm not sure what my
20 colleague means by "normative structure," either with respect to the VRS
21 or the government. It seems to me to be rather vague.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I understood it to be the -- how responsibilities
23 and powers and authority was divided between government and the top of
24 the army.
25 MR. IVETIC: Yes. Constitutionally and by the legal statutes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you answer that question.
2 THE WITNESS: We understood that the army was under the command
3 of the president and the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and we knew
4 that because that is what Dr. Karadzic and -- described to
5 General Morillon at the -- at that first meeting which we were discussing
6 a few minutes ago.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. And when you said earlier that the -- that it was factually
9 bombastic, could you describe for us what exactly you mean by that?
10 A. What I mean is standing up at a meeting where we sat at tables
11 and talking loudly, shouting, waving his arms about, and gesticulating.
12 Q. Now, if we can turn to paragraph 67 of your statement.
13 MR. IVETIC: Page 15 in both the B/C/S and the English.
14 Q. Here we have a meeting between General Morillon and
15 President Radovan Karadzic, dated 20 November 1999, and again the issue
16 of CanBat 2 is raised. And Mr. Karadzic also verifies that this is a
17 matter to be decided in an Assembly session set for Monday. Am I correct
18 that in all other meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership, irrespective
19 of who was talking, they essentially confirmed what had been originally
20 told to you by General Mladic, that he did not have authority, that the
21 Assembly was the body that had authority over the deployment?
22 A. That is correct. It was only at that one meeting with
23 General Mladic when he made the statements that he and he alone could
25 Q. And I believe it's at paragraph 253 of your statement where you
1 talk about the UNMOs. Am I correct that they, too, could not be deployed
2 except upon obtaining the approval of the Bosnian Serb Assembly?
3 A. That is correct as well.
4 Q. And if we look at paragraph 76 of your statement, pages 17 in the
5 English and the B/C/S, this is now a meeting of 27 November 1992 in which
6 both Karadzic and Mladic are apologising for not -- for being unable to
7 convince the Assembly to let CanBat 2 to deploy but offering an
8 alternative compromise. And with respect to the alternative that was
9 proposed, it would have accomplished the same purpose, that is, getting
10 international eyes on the ground in Banja Luka. Am I correct? The
11 alternative was to have a Dutch or a Belgian --
12 A. Yes, I was just reading paragraph 76. Yes. That is -- that is
13 correct. That was the alternative offer, but the Dutch and Belgian
14 governments did not agree to that themselves, and they ended up being
15 located near where the British Battalion was based.
16 Q. And so it was not either Mladic nor Karadzic nor the national
17 Assembly of Republika Srpska that prevented this alternative from being
18 put in place already as of November 1992?
19 A. They prevented the Canadian battalion being deployed. They did
20 not prevent the -- the transport company from being deployed. The
21 deployment of the transport company was ultimately then decided by the
22 national governments.
23 Q. And when you say national governments, we're talking about
24 Belgium and/or Holland.
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek some clarification of this part of your
3 statement. There was an apology that the Assembly was not convinced to
4 agree to the deployment of CanBat 2. Now, at the same time, the
5 statement says that "but did give their agreement for..." Is that the
6 Assembly or is that Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic?
7 THE WITNESS: We did not know what the Assembly said because we
8 were not present. It was Karadzic and Mladic who told us that that is
9 what the Assembly had -- had decided.
10 JUDGE ORIE: So they conveyed the message --
11 THE WITNESS: They conveyed the message to us. We never had
12 communications direct with the -- the Serb Assembly. It was always
13 passed to us through mostly Karadzic, sometimes Mladic, and sometimes
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now the alternative, was that more or less
16 equivalent what you were seeking with the deployment of CanBat 2?
17 THE WITNESS: The location was equivalent. The issue was that it
18 was a combined Dutch and Belgian battalion, and I forget which one -- one
19 of the two governments did not agree for their transport forces to be
20 deployed in that area.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the deployment in itself, would the
22 government, both governments, have agreed would have been equivalent to
23 what your plans were with CanBat 2?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. Our concern was to have a balance between
25 where the UNPROFOR forces were deployed. In other words, some forces to
1 be deployed in Serb areas, some forces to be deployed in Muslim areas,
2 some forces deployed in Croat areas, in order to have eyes on the ground
3 and contact with local politicians, military, in order to have a balanced
4 picture and a balanced representation on the ground.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
6 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Might I say this, at the same time, now looking at
8 the clock, I might invite you not to proceed but rather that we take a
9 break first.
10 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom. We'll take a
11 break of 20 minutes and we'll resume at 10 minutes to 11.00.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
16 Perhaps meanwhile, Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber of course will
17 observe the official Tribunal's winter recess, meaning that the last
18 sitting day this year will be the 14th of December, and we are wondering
19 whether we should restart in view of the 7th of January. I do not know
20 whether you have any views about what you'd like the Chamber to do as far
21 as scheduling in the early days of January is concerned. Perhaps once
22 the witness -- could you give it some thought and then inform the Chamber
23 perhaps at the end of this session.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour. We
25 discussed the matter, and I will let you know at a later stage.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
2 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
3 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 MR. IVETIC:
6 Q. Now, Colonel, I'd like to move to another topic, and this is one
7 that you discuss at paragraphs 136 through 147 of your statement, and for
8 the need to refresh anyone's recollection, that's at page 32 of the same.
9 And it's the UNHCR aid convoys and the problems with the same. And if I
10 may say so, the general picture that you paint is one where the Serbs
11 wanted full timings, full manifests of the load, names of drivers, serial
12 numbers of guns, and then on the other hand you say that convoys were
13 delayed by Serb forces checking all containers and that you considered
14 this to be a deliberate obstruction. Is this an accurate general summary
15 of the picture in relation to aid convoys?
16 A. That was not a general description of all aid convoys. That was
17 a description of what was happening at a certain period of time with some
18 aid convoys.
19 Q. Could you perhaps provide some specifics for us?
20 A. That was around the time of January or February 1993, when
21 General Morillon went -- or tried to get to Gorazde but was held up and
22 prevented from -- from doing so. And there were a number of convoys, I
23 believe was Rogatica, or near Rogatica, that they were -- they were held
24 up, and we passed a convoy which was being searched in the way that --
25 that I described. In other words, every single can being opened and
1 every single item being off-loaded and checked. Around that time - I
2 can't recall if it was that specific convoy - but around that time there
3 were requests for all the details that I described just then.
4 One of the things which it may be useful to bear in mind when
5 considering these is that the communications which the UN had in Bosnia
6 at that time depended totally on INMARSAT communications. There were no
7 land-lines connecting any of the UN locations or sites, unlike on the
8 Bosnian Serb side, which had close to complete normal communications.
9 What this meant was that to fax one page over INMARSAT cost over $50 and
10 that was when you could get through. What I -- the reason I explained
11 this about the difficulty -- extreme difficulty that the UN had
12 communicating is that the -- its ability to co-ordinate the kind of
13 detail which we were being asked to provide was utterly impossible given
14 the communication means that we had at our hands, and the Bosnian Serbs
15 knew that.
16 Q. Okay. You have indicated that this was one time in January or
17 February of 1993. Could you then explain for me in paragraph 141 on page
18 33 of your statement your conclusion that:
19 "In order to contain the enclaves and exacerbate the conditions
20 in them, the Bosnian Serbs deliberately placed obstructions in the way of
21 almost all efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the enclaves."
22 Are we talking about one instance? Are we talking about all of
24 A. We're talking about almost all of them. When the Bosnian Serb
25 wanted to allow a convoy to get through, it got through, and there is
1 previous testimony about the conveys that did get through. When they did
2 not want the convoys to get through, then an entire panoply of reasons
3 and excuses were used to prevent them from getting through.
4 It was our belief that if they had wanted them to get through, it
5 would have been a simple matter to -- to get them through, but that it
6 did not suit their -- their aims to allow them to get through.
7 Q. Now let me put this to you and you can tell me whether you agree
8 with it or not, but another logical explanation for the foregoing - that
9 is the stringent requirements of the Serbs and the delays and the
10 examination of conveys - another logical explanation for this would be
11 that the Serbs were fearful of the UNHCR convoys being utilised for the
12 transport of weapons and military supplies to the Bosnian Muslim forces
13 in the enclaves and elsewhere. Would you not agree with that?
14 A. That was certainly a reason, an excuse which was given to us by
15 the Bosnian Serbs and many occasions, and I understand that on a small
16 number of occasions that actually was found to be -- found to be correct.
17 However, that does not provide in our view at the time anything like
18 sufficient reason for making people starve.
19 Q. Well, can you tell me in your view did the Bosnian Serbs have a
20 legitimate reason to be wary of aid convoys escorted by UNPROFOR, driven
21 by UNHCR, being used for the clandestine transport of weapons and
22 supplies by the Bosnian Muslims?
23 A. They in our view had a legitimate reason to be concerned but not
24 to stop them.
25 Q. Am I correct that the official position of UNPROFOR was that no
1 weapons should be allowed on aid convoys, and whenever you became aware
2 or had suspicions that weapons might be hidden, you searched them
3 yourselves, and if anything was found you would lodge a firm protest with
4 the offending side?
5 A. That is absolutely correct.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I would seek clarification of one of the
7 previous answers of the witness.
8 Mr. Tucker, you said, "I understand that a small number of
9 occasions that actually was found to be correct," about weapons being
10 transported in aid convoys. Could you give us an idea on -- on how many
11 occasions this happened, and also approximately about the size? Are we
12 talking about five rifles or about 500 machine-guns? Could you tell us.
13 THE WITNESS: Two specific examples that I know of and was
14 involved with was when some explosives were hidden in -- I think it was
15 oxygen bottles. It was gas bottles of some kind which were being
16 transported into Sarajevo for one of the hospitals, and I forget how
17 many, there was one or two gas bottles were found to have had explosives
18 in them rather than gas. That was one situation. That was around, I
19 think it was about January or February of 1993.
20 The second incident was in the Lasva Valley in about February
21 1993, when a UNHCR convoy to take aid into a Bosnian Croat area we had
22 received a tip-off that it had small arms underneath the sacks of flour,
23 and we immediately searched the convoy and found something like 20 AK-47s
24 and a couple thousand rounds of ammunition underneath the -- those are
25 two specific instances that I know of.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And you have the details of these two instances.
2 Are you aware of any other examples?
3 THE WITNESS: I was not aware of any other examples and was
4 not -- no other examples were reported through -- to me or to
5 General Morillon.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. I'd like to ask you, when you say these are the only two examples
9 that you are aware of, were these instances where the UNPROFOR themselves
10 searched the vehicles and found these weapons or where the Bosnian Serbs
11 found the weapons?
12 A. I believe, but this is going back a long time in memory, that the
13 explosives in the -- in the gas battles were found by the Serbs when they
14 halted a convoy and that the small arms were found by UNPROFOR.
15 Q. And so then am I to understand your testimony that you believe
16 there is only one occasion when UNPROFOR found weapons in convoys, or
17 would you like me to refresh your recollection?
18 A. To the best of my recollection now, those are the only two that I
19 can recall knowing about or having been reported. There were a number of
20 accusations by mainly the Bosnian Serbs of the usage of UNPROFOR vehicles
21 for transporting people around the battle-field, but I think that was
22 mainly in the Bihac area.
23 Q. I don't know if this was during your time, but do you also recall
24 that there was an incident in Sarajevo where a Mr. Hakija was actually --
25 was actually -- Hakija Turajlic in the beginning of 1993 was being
1 secretly transported in a UN vehicle and was found and was shot?
2 A. Yes. He was moved in the daily shuttle which took the cleaners
3 from Sarajevo to the airports, and he just joined the queue of cleaners
4 as if he were another cleaner.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just interrupt, sir.
6 MR. IVETIC: Sure.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, you're talking of people being
8 transported around the battle-field. What type of people are these?
9 Some type of soldiers, civilians, and -- or what was the purpose of
10 transporting these people?
11 THE WITNESS: The accusation from the -- or the allegation from
12 the Bosnian Serbs was that it was soldiers.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to as I promised earlier refresh your
16 recollection, and in doing so I'd like to turn to 1D369 and page 65 in
17 e-court of this document, which is the transcript from the Perisic trial
18 at T9241, lines 1 through 10. And, sir, this is your answer, and if you
19 could read along as I read to you:
20 "No, it was our position that no weapons should be allowed
21 through, and we -- whenever we became aware or had suspicions that
22 weapons might be hidden in humanitarian aid, we searched them ourselves
23 as well. And on a number of occasions, we found weapons and made the
24 strongest protest to whichever side was responsible for placing those
25 weapons in the humanitarian aid.
1 "Q. Okay. Well, as a matter of reality, the strongest protests
2 that were made, be they to one side or the other, as we've discussed
3 cease-fires, often fell on deaf ears; correct?
4 "A. Like most requests for humanity in that part of the world."
5 Does this refresh your recollection of there being actually a
6 number of occasions when UNPROFOR itself found weapons being transported
7 in convoys that it was -- humanitarian aid convoys that it was supposed
8 to escort?
9 A. My understanding is that we made a number of searches, but not
10 all searches found things. The two times that I specifically recall are
11 the two which I've described to you just now.
12 Q. Okay. And -- and for those two you said one was found by the
13 Bosnian Serbs. So I'm confused by this language here where you say "on a
14 number of occasions we found weapons."
15 A. I can't recall precisely whether the high explosives were found
16 by the Serbs or by UNPROFOR.
17 Q. Okay. If -- I would like to show you what has been marked as
19 MR. IVETIC: This is a video, and it has -- it has transcripts in
20 e-court in both languages, and I'm aware that the booths ought to have
21 been provided with the same, so in accordance with the standing order I
22 guess on videos we play it twice I presume.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And transcripts have been provided.
24 MR. IVETIC: It's my understanding that they were provided to the
1 JUDGE ORIE: I see nodding yes from at least some of the booths.
2 Yes, could it be played twice.
3 That's for technical reasons, Mr. Tucker, not -- first round,
5 [Video-clip played]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Could it be replayed, restarted with sound.
7 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. One moment. Your Honours, on my
8 end it says that the sound is turned on. I don't know.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we do not hear anything. That's the only
10 thing I can tell you.
11 MR. IVETIC: I know.
12 JUDGE ORIE: It's the same. Could we --
13 MR. IVETIC: Allow me to try ...
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
15 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if it assists, if Mr. Ivetic gives us
16 the DVD, Ms. Stewart can try to play it through our system and see if
17 that helps.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could the usher assist.
19 MR. IVETIC: We have given DVDs to the Registry and to the
20 Prosecution. I do have it on USB stick if that's easier. The file is
22 MR. GROOME: We have a copy now, I believe.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I do not know whether you received
24 training as well. Your Case Manager had, but apparently he's not here.
25 MR. IVETIC: I don't believe this was part of the training, Your
2 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. But whatever is there. How much time would
3 it take, Ms. Stewart, to play it?
4 MR. IVETIC: If it assists, I could perhaps go to further
5 questions -- oh.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 JUDGE ORIE: I hear -- now I don't see anything, although I hear
8 a track. Can we -- no. Let's -- if you -- the help of the OTP is highly
9 appreciated, but could you meanwhile continue, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: I will do that, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I think here we are. Could we start on from the
12 beginning so that we play the first round.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MR. IVETIC: This should be the end. If we could now go back to
15 the beginning and play it through a second time.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, just for your information, in order to
17 check the transcript, it's played twice so we'll now hear it with
18 translation. Please proceed.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] At a check-point in Ilidza in
21 trucks of the United Nations that had papers that they were transporting
22 humanitarian aid for the Muslims in Hrasnica, the Serb army uncovered
23 24.500 bullets. Today at Ilidza a convoy was stopped that had been
24 transporting humanitarian aid for Butmir and Hrasnica. During a routine
25 inspection conducted by members of the military police from Ilidza, it
1 was discovered that the containers carrying flour had a false bottom and
2 in this enclosed space there were tin boxes. This was enough reason to
3 doubt the regularity of the convoy. The members of the French battalion
4 escorting the convoy were unable to tell us what was contained in the
5 enclosed space under the containers. The convoy was stopped and
6 representatives of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and the police were called, and in
7 their presence an on-site investigation was performed.
8 "The containers were removed from the trucks and then with a
9 crane the top part of the container was separated from the platform to
10 which it had been fixed.
11 "Reporter: Mr. Popadic, from the on-site investigation that was
12 performed, can you tell us what was discovered in the trucks that were
13 transporting humanitarian aid for Hrasnica?
14 "Mr. Popadic: In the trucks that left for Hrasnica this morning
15 at 9.45, we discovered 12.7 millimetre ammunition, 5.000 rounds; 7.9
16 millimetre sniper ammunition, 19.540 rounds. These were found as you can
17 see under false bottom underneath the container. This is the second time
18 that in the zone of responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade we find weapons,
19 ammunitions among the humanitarian aid needed by the Muslim side.
20 "Reporter: Were you able to see whose ammunition it is, where it
21 is from?
22 "Mr. Popadic: All the ammunition was manufactured in Konjic and
23 air-lifted to the airport in Sarajevo, and after that taken by ground
24 transport this time driven by the French forces, which escorted the
25 detected amount of ammunition. We requested official information from
1 the gentlemen from the UN who were in charge but we were not able to
2 receive any, the explanation being that they were not authorised to
3 provide information. Off the record, the UNHCR representative claimed
4 they had nothing to do with trucks or containers and that they were only
5 in charge of the cargo transported in the containers while anything
6 underneath the containers was of no concern to them. The members of the
7 French Foreign Legion apologised saying that they were only escorting the
8 convoy. The UN police said it would investigate the incident and inform
9 us of the results in a timely manner. Who loaded the trucks at the
10 airport and where the ammunition was loaded remains a mystery.
11 "Reporter: What about airport checks and how many such conveys
12 have passed?
13 "Mr. Popadic: We don't know. However it is an indisputable fact
14 that UNPROFOR is unmasked for the umpteenth time transporting and
15 distributing weapons and ammunition for Muslims under the guise of
16 humanitarian aid."
17 MR. IVETIC: Thank you and my thanks to the Office of the
18 Prosecutor for assisting me with that technical aspect.
19 Q. Sir, first of all, where is Hrasnica located, if you recall?
20 A. You'll have to show me a map.
21 Q. Do you recall that that is near the Sarajevo airport?
22 A. I believe it is.
23 Q. Is this an incident that you know anything about; that is to say,
24 do you believe it was during the time period that you were in Sarajevo?
25 A. I don't recall an incident of the kind that you describe during
1 my time.
2 MR. IVETIC: And for the record, we as of yet have not been able
3 to get a date for this recording. It was used in the Tolimir trial also
4 without a date. We are trying to find the date for the same.
5 Q. Can you tell us this procedure that we saw here of the UN
6 officials assisting the Bosnian Serb authorities in doing the
7 investigation, taking photographs, et cetera, was that the standard
8 protocol that was in place?
9 A. At the time that I was in Bosnia, we were setting up operations.
10 What the standard procedure was, I'm not sure when that was actually
11 established. The UN police were brought in for a whole range of reasons.
12 That was one of them. What the precise protocol and procedures were for
13 doing it was not my responsibility or area of knowledge.
14 Q. In the incidents that you have identified that you do have
15 knowledge of weapons being transported in aid convoys, are you familiar
16 with the investigations that the UN performed and was anyone ever
17 disciplined or punished for the inclusion of those weapons in those
19 A. The two incidents that -- that I described earlier, I know that
20 the Muslim authorities were complained to by General Morillon. That's
21 the gas bottles. And with the -- the Croats' weapons, I know that
22 General Cordy-Simpson who is the Chief of Staff in Kiseljak called in I
23 think it was Colonel Kordic into account and told him that he would no
24 longer accept humanitarian aid from him in order to -- to pass it through
25 and that everything would have to be searched.
1 Q. Thank you, sir. And are you familiar with efforts on the parts
2 of the Bosnian Muslims to dig a tunnel under the tarmac of the Sarajevo
3 airport to use that for the transport of weapons, munitions, and
5 A. At the time I was in -- in Bosnia we heard rumours of such, but
6 we had no hard confirmation.
7 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Would you agree with me that under the
8 circumstances neither the UNHCR nor UNPROFOR had the type of control over
9 the aid convoys to ensure that no weapons were deposited as contraband
10 and that the same could effectively be hidden from both UNHCR and
12 A. Yes. That is -- that's a realistic statement of the situation.
13 Q. Now, as far as aid convoys to the enclaves are concerned, you at
14 paragraph 143 of your statement, which is again P317, and it's the top of
15 the 34th page in e-court of the English, you at that paragraph identify
16 another explanation given to you, namely: "That the local Bosnian Serb
17 population along the route were up in arms about something or beyond
18 their control and would not let convoys past."
19 Now, on this point would you agree with me that there was a lot
20 of animosity from the Serb community, especially around Srebrenica,
21 stemming from allegations of attacks conducted by Bosnian Muslim
22 Commander Naser Oric and his forces from Srebrenica on Serb villages on
23 the periphery of Srebrenica?
24 A. There was a lot of animosity from all population -- parts of the
25 population against the others for attacks carried out against them.
1 Q. Thank you, sir, but I believe you mentioned it later in your
2 statement. Mr. Oric admitted to you that his forces would, on a daily
3 basis, kill 5 to 15 Serbs; is that correct?
4 A. That is correct. That's what he told us.
5 Q. Okay. If we -- first of all, did you accept this alternative
6 explanation specifically for the aid convoys that were directed towards
7 the enclaves that was given to you by the Bosnian Serb authorities?
8 A. The Bosnian Serb authorities, when they wanted to get something
9 through, it got through. The example is the convoy to Srebrenica at the
10 end of November, which Karadzic and Mladic wanted to get through, and it
11 stumbled against the obstacle of local resistance of the kind you just
12 described, and they then got it to go round or got them to accept the
13 convoy to go through. I can't remember what the precise situation was.
14 My point is that when they wanted a convoy to get through, they
15 could get it around the objections of the local -- of a local village or
16 a local element of the population.
17 Q. If we look here at paragraph 146 of your statement. It's on the
18 same page near the bottom of the same. The last line of that paragraph
19 you testify and say:
20 "Local commanders along the route would also often make
21 additional demands or would harass the convoys."
22 Doesn't this seem to support the -- the complaints made to you by
23 the Bosnian Serb authorities in relation to convoys going to the
25 A. Of which complaints are you referring to?
1 Q. That the local population up in arms about things that were
2 happening locally were creating problems that were beyond the control of
3 the central Bosnian Serb authorities.
4 A. That certainly happened, but I restate my previous point about
5 when the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted something to happen, then it did
7 Q. And if we could then turn to paragraph 73 and 74 of your
8 statement, page 17 in the e-court version. And I believe this is the
9 convoy to Srebrenica that you talked about a few questions ago. And here
10 you are reporting that Dr. Karadzic at times was flustered,
11 General Mladic was embarrassed and angry, and they apologise for a
12 blockage at Bajina Basta. And you go on in saying that it was your
13 assessment that recalcitrant local Bosnian Serb commanders, probably
14 militia, were reluctant to let the convoy past.
15 First of all, would you agree with me that the reactions on the
16 parts of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic appeared to be genuine?
17 A. At that -- on that occasion, yes, indeed, they did appear to be
18 genuine. They wanted that convoy to get through because there was going
19 to be a meeting in New York at which Karadzic was going to be attending
21 Q. And would you also agree that this incident lends support to the
22 complaints made to you by the Bosnian Serb authorities that aid convoys
23 were being held up by local authorities who were up in arms about things
24 that were happening in their locality?
25 A. These difficulties with local populations were certainly a
1 reality and a factor. It was also in our view sometimes when the Bosnian
2 Serb authority did not want a convoy to get through, which was most of
3 the time, that that excuse was then used again as the reason why the tap
4 was being opened very slightly, but they never wanted the tap to be
5 opened fully. They controlled the tap and they controlled the amount of
6 aid that was allowed through, and they willingly used every possible
7 excuse they could think of in order to justify that.
8 Q. If we could turn to page 32 of your statement in e-court, and
9 it's paragraph 135 that I'd like to direct your attention to at present.
10 Here you are talking about the discovery of a mass grave containing 50
11 bodies of Bosnian Serb soldiers that had been killed by the Muslim
12 defenders of Kamenica and that General Milovanovic and Mr. Karadzic did
13 not want to release this info to the public for fear that the local
14 Bosnian Serb population would be creating future problems for future
15 convoys of aid if they were aware of this information. Do you see that,
16 sir, at paragraph 135 of your statement?
17 A. Yes. I -- I see that, and that is what -- I don't understand
18 what your question is.
19 Q. I haven't got to the question yet.
20 A. Oh, okay.
21 Q. I was just asking if you were able to follow thus far.
22 A. Yes, thank you.
23 Q. And first off can you verify that the defenders at Kamenica were
24 Bosnian Muslims? I added that but it's not reflected in your statement.
25 A. Yes, they were. They were being attacked.
1 Q. And does this show an instance where the Bosnian Serb
2 authorities, in fact, tried to avoid inflaming local Bosnian Serb
3 citizens in order to assist aid convoys to get through?
4 A. This was indeed an instance where they -- they were trying to
5 help. I refer back to the tap being opened very slightly.
6 Q. I'd like to move to Srebrenica briefly, and if we can look at
7 Exhibit D18 in e-court. Although this document is dated 30 July
8 1995 [sic], it talks about events in Srebrenica in the years prior, and
9 it is a report of the commander of the BiH General army staff Mr. Delic.
10 If we can turn to page 3 in the English and page 3 in the B/C/S original.
11 There is a paragraph there that begins:
12 "Three groups transported a quantity of weapons, equipment, and
13 communications equipment in the autumn of 1994. This method was very
14 slow and risky, so we sought a way to re-open the air corridor which
15 operated in the first half of 1993, when five tonnes of MTS, ten tonnes
16 of UBS had been transported, 20 soldiers, 29 passengers evacuated, and
17 six out of ten flights had been successful."
18 First of all, sir, you see here the translator's note that UBS
19 stands for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Are you familiar that
20 MTS is an abbreviation for materiel technical supplies, a military term
21 in the Yugoslav military parlance?
22 A. So what is the question?
23 Q. Are you familiar with the fact that MTS is an abbreviation for
24 military technical supplies, a military term for military supplies in
25 the Yugoslav army --
1 A. No, I was not.
2 Q. Okay. Fair enough. During the time period that you were in
3 Bosnia, that is to say until the end of March 1993, were you aware of an
4 air corridor being used by the Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica to
5 transport such items?
6 A. Yes. It was from Tuzla, that airfield into the enclaves, and
7 there was a white painted Hip helicopter -- or rather I saw one white
8 painted Hip helicopter. There might have been more.
9 Q. I apologise. I was waiting for the transcript to catch up.
10 Would you agree with me that such amounts of supplies, including ten
11 tonnes of weapons, ammunition, and explosives is a rather significant
12 amount if accurate?
13 A. If accurate, it is a significant amount. However, it is not a
14 significant amount in respect of the defence of an area the size of the
15 Srebrenica pocket. You would have needed far more ammunition than that
16 in order to be able to mount a robust defence of an area of that size.
17 Q. And in fact, Commander Naser Oric advised you that his forces
18 were conducting daily raids to get more supplies from the Bosnian Serb
19 forces; isn't that accurate?
20 A. That is precisely.
21 Q. If -- if we can move along, I'd like to address a matter that is
22 contained at paragraph 133 of your statement. Again, this is
23 Exhibit P317, and it will be page 31 in both the B/C/S and the English.
24 And here I believe you mentioned it briefly yesterday about a Bosniak
25 army offensive where, at least according to President Karadzic, 1.260
1 Bosnian Serb civilians had been killed in a particular area since
2 20 January 1992. You say that you had heard some reports about this but
3 were not able to verify the numbers. Would I be correct in concluding
4 that this offensive was alleged to be carried out by Naser Oric's troops
5 from within Srebrenica?
6 A. That was our understanding.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you refer to D18 as dated the 30th of
8 July, 1995. Is that a slip of the tongue or is that an error in the
9 transcript, because what I see in the document is 30 July 1996, or is
10 there a difference between the original and the -- let me have a look at
11 the original.
12 MR. IVETIC: There's not. They both say 1996. It's either a
13 slip of the tongue or an error and either way we need to correct it.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
15 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
16 Q. And for the record, here in this paragraph you identify reports.
17 Could you explain for us what source you had for these reports which are
18 not mentioned here?
19 A. These reports were statements to us by various members of the
20 Bosnian Serb leadership like, for example, as recorded in paragraph 133.
21 There were also some reports in international newspapers about an
22 offensive being carried out by the Muslims in that area, and I recall
23 there was one particular article, I think it was in something like the
24 Wall Street Journal, which talked about some Muslim forces having even
25 gone across the river in -- the Drina River into Serbia proper itself.
1 Those were the two sources. Or two types of source.
2 Q. And in fact, sir, did you have occasion to go to the exhumation
3 of certain bodies from this incident and to interview eyewitnesses?
4 A. General Morillon and myself were taken to the exhumation of some
5 bodies which was going on as we were there on the outskirts of Kravica.
6 We didn't actually speak with any eyewitnesses.
7 Q. And am I correct that you did prepare a report on this matter but
8 that as far as trying to collect legal evidence as to what had happened
9 in support of any subsequent prosecutions, that was not part of your task
10 and/or objective at that time?
11 A. It was not part of our task, and we did not have the means or the
12 wherewithal to do such.
13 Q. Irrespective of the actual number of victims, would you agree
14 with me that such an offensive conducted by the Bosnian Muslim forces
15 from within Srebrenica was rather significant in terms of its military --
16 in terms of the attack? This is a significant attack, not just a raid.
17 A. Our understanding from the information available to us was that
18 it was a fairly significant attack which needs to be placed in the
19 context of the plans which were written by the Bosnian Serb Army in
20 November to attack the other way.
21 Q. So are you saying, sir, that Commander Naser Oric conducted his
22 attack based upon orders from the Bosnian Serb military in November?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Would you agree with me that Commander Naser Oric conducted this
25 attack based on his own rationale and his own reasons and it was rather
1 significant and not related to any Bosnian Serb military plans?
2 A. His attack was related to the fact that a conflict had started
3 much earlier and was a reaction to that attack. Taken in and of itself,
4 that attack was indeed locally significant. Whether Oric started that
5 attack out of his own plans or whether he was ordered to do so from
6 Sarajevo, I obviously do not -- do not have information about.
7 Q. Do you know if any other UN organs ever responded to report that
8 you presented on this topic; this is to say, the alleged massacre of
9 Bosnian Serbs by the Muslim forces from Srebrenica?
10 A. We certainly reported it up to HQ UNPROFOR in Zagreb.
11 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to move to another area. At paragraph
12 299 of your statement, that's page 71 of the English, page 70 of the
13 B/C/S. You in your second explanation state that:
14 "Mladic was expressing frustration that the international media
15 and international condemnations focused on the highly visible attacks by
16 his artillery and heavy weapons, whereas the media were never present or
17 never noticed when the Bosniaks carried out infantry attacks which he
18 then had to defend using his heavy artillery because he did not have the
20 Do you concede that this is a legitimate gripe on the part of
21 General Mladic?
22 A. I'm not comfortable with the word "concede" and I'm not
23 comfortable with the word "legitimate." They should not have been
24 fighting and they should not have been attacking civilians in the first
1 Q. Would you agree with me that the fighting involved two sides?
2 The Bosnian Muslims based in Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serbs?
3 A. Yes, but who started fighting?
4 Q. Well, sir, in this part of your testimony, it would appear that
5 the Bosnian Muslims were the ones that started the fighting by -- that's
6 at least how I understand, by them carrying out infantry attacks. Am I
7 mistaken in your terminology?
8 A. In that location at that time, you are correct. There are
9 thousands of other events which also need to be taken into consideration.
10 Q. If I can -- if I can return -- well, strike that. In fact, sir,
11 would you agree that the Bosnian Muslim forces would often provoke
12 attacks by the Serbs in such a manner by making infantry offensives to
13 provoke counter-fire from the Serbs at times when they were seeking
14 something from the international community?
15 A. That did happen.
16 Q. And one such occasion would be what is described in paragraph 302
17 of your statement on page 72. Is that not correct?
18 A. I can't see --
19 Q. We'll wait for you. 302.
20 A. Yes, that is correct.
21 Q. And again we talked about it at the beginning of my examination,
22 but did you feel that this strategy on the part of the Bosnian Muslim
23 forces was aimed to try to obtain the military intervention of others on
24 their behalf against the Bosnian Serb forces?
25 A. That was our perception.
1 Q. Yesterday at transcript page 3785, you were asked about - and I'd
2 like to get more details about the incident where you describe at
3 paragraph 303 of your statement on the same page that we have now just a
4 little lower - the shelling conducted from the Kosevo Hospital by a
5 group of Bosnian Muslim mortars.
6 Am I correct, sir, that this incident occurred during a time
7 period when there was a relative lull in the hostilities in Sarajevo?
8 A. That I cannot specifically recall.
9 Q. Okay. Let me recall first for you what you said yesterday at
10 transcript page 375. The question was:
11 "Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker. Did you receive any information
12 concerning the shelling or artillery fire directed against hospitals in
14 "A. Yes, I did, and in particular around the two hospitals in
16 Don't you think it would be fair and more accurate to identify
17 that Bosnian Muslim forces staged mortar attacks from within
18 Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo?
19 A. No, I don't, and the reason is that I'm aware of a number of
20 times that both hospitals were hit by artillery fire and tank fire. I
21 know of one incident which is the one you refer to in paragraph 303.
22 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, are we at the time for the break?
23 JUDGE ORIE: We are approximately at the time for the break, and
24 we will take the break once the witness has been escorted out of the
25 courtroom. A break of 20 minutes, Mr. Tucker.
1 And we will resume at 10 minutes past 12.00.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 11.51 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: While the witness is escorted into the courtroom,
6 Mr. Stojanovic, could you briefly set out the position of the Defence.
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. We've
8 discussed it, especially when it was announced that the Karadzic Defence
9 has a similar request. We should adjourn on the 14th of December, before
10 the recess, and begin on the 4th of January. Our suggestion would be to
11 postpone the beginning of the recess by a week, because there is the
12 Orthodox Christmas in order to meet our obligations and duties as
13 Orthodox believers, and then it could be -- it could be made up for
14 between the 12th and the 21st.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, could you have one minute of patience.
17 We're dealing with another matter.
18 You'd like us to continue sitting in the first week of the
19 recess? That, unfortunately, is not possible for the Chamber.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let me just repeat. In January,
21 our proposal would be to make it Monday the 11th of January, after
22 Christmas, instead of the 4th of January.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Let me have a look -- I think, Mr. Stojanovic, when
24 I look at January of 2013, the first Monday is the 7th and the second is
25 the 14th. So when you're talking about the 4th and the 11th as being
1 Mondays, then that seems -- that's at least not our impression of what
2 January looks like in 2013.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, then our proposal would be
4 to begin on Monday, the 14th of January, if I'm not mistaken, instead of
5 the 4th of January, as the plan was originally.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Well, originally the plan was on the 7th, I think.
7 The 14th is Orthodox new year, and the 7th is Orthodox Christmas. I do
8 understand that you are -- Mr. Stojanovic.
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Bearing all the aforesaid in
10 mind, and I'll not talk about days of the week anymore to avoid
11 confusion, our proposal would be to begin on Wednesday, the 16th of
13 JUDGE ORIE: We would then lose seven days.
14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] As far as we are concerned, Your
15 Honour, our proposal would be to make up for these seven days, if
16 possible, as I mentioned, from the 15th -- or, rather, 16th December
17 until the 21st December, respecting, of course, the time of the Catholic
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As I said before, if you would have proposed
20 this at an earlier stage, we might have considered it, but at this moment
21 it's not possible to sit during this first week of the recess. The
22 Chamber will consider your proposal and may come with other suggestions.
23 At this moment, we'll now --
24 Mr. Tucker, we have already taken too much of your time.
25 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 Q. Colonel, before the break you had indicated that you only believe
3 you knew of one instance where the Bosnian Muslims had fired a mortar
4 from Kosevo hospital. I'd like to refresh your recollection and then
5 perhaps seek your comment regarding the testimony you gave at the Galic
6 trial at transcript page 10023 of the same.
7 MR. IVETIC: That's at 1D366, Your Honours, in the e-court, and
8 should be the first page of the same.
9 Q. And if I've given the correct page number, this should be the
10 answer that you, sir, are giving to Judge El Mahdi on his questions. And
11 it starts at line 3, and I begin:
12 "It is not something that I witnessed first-hand. It is my
13 belief and supposition from these various sources that firing by mobile
14 Bosniak mortars from within the grounds of Kosevo hospital was something
15 that happened a lot more than once. Whether it happened daily or once a
16 week or that, I cannot say. The only other thing that I can say is that
17 we, that General Morillon, tackled the head of Kosevo Hospital, asking
18 him why do you allow this to happen? Why do you not protest to the
19 Presidency or to the ABiH? And he denied any knowledge of that
21 Does this more accurately reflect your knowledge of the number of
22 times that the Bosnian Muslim forces had initiated shelling from
23 Kosevo Hospital?
24 A. No, it does not. The one specific instance that we have hard
25 evidence is the one that I've described to you. The rest were rumours
1 and stories and things for which we did not have hard evidence.
2 Q. Fair enough. Now, I'd like to continue on with the testimony
3 here, first of all asking the question of Judge El Mahdi:
4 "Yes. When you say from out of the hospital, you don't mean from
5 the hospital itself but from the surroundings of the hospital. It is not
6 from the hospital. The shooting did not come from the hospital itself or
7 from vehicles that may have been parked in the area of the hospital, the
8 surrounding of the hospital?
9 "A. Kosevo Hospital is not one single building. It is a whole
10 complex of buildings, and between those buildings there are parking
11 areas, grass areas. And when I say the firing was from Kosevo Hospital,
12 I mean it was from those areas between the buildings of Kosevo Hospital.
13 "Judge El Mahdi: Was it the only hospital in Sarajevo or were
14 there other hospitals in Sarajevo too?
15 "A. There were other hospitals in Sarajevo as well.
16 "Judge El Mahdi: As far as you know, were the other hospitals
17 also used in the same manner, that is to say, the surrounding -- that
18 firing would come from the surrounding area of those hospitals, or was it
19 only the case of the surrounding area of the Kosevo Hospital that firing
20 was carried out in the other hospitals too?
21 "A. I must answer in several steps. The first step is to say
22 that I have no knowledge of such firing from the proximity of other
23 hospitals in Sarajevo. Secondly, the other hospitals in Sarajevo were
24 very different types of building. Kosevo Hospital was the only hospital
25 which was spread out over quite a large area. The other hospitals were
1 solid, single buildings, with a small building next to it, maybe. So
2 they did not lend themselves to that -- to the kind of tactic. The third
3 thing is that the head of Kosevo Hospital was known to us as a radical
4 hard-liner and was someone who --"
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
6 MR. IVETIC:
7 Q. " ... and was someone who we believed would have certainly
8 supported this kind of tactic in the greater interest, as he saw it, of
9 supporting the Bosniak cause, whereas the directors of the other
10 hospitals were, in our view, much more medically focused and refused to
11 have anything to do with the kind of action that the director of
12 Kosevo Hospital, in our view, participated in."
13 Does -- does this accurately and fairly represent your knowledge
14 of the director of Kosevo Hospital being complicit in these attacks by
15 Bosnian Muslim mortars from his hospital?
16 A. It was not our knowledge. It was our perception that given his
17 beliefs that he might be involved in that, and we know of one incident as
18 already described of where that did happen. Whether he was complicit in
19 that obviously we do not know.
20 Q. Fair enough. And now just to finish up with the last three --
21 four lines, five lines of this examination from Judge El Mahdi. He asked
23 "And the other hospitals, as far as you know, were they also the
24 object of firing, or were they spared?
25 "A. I have no specific knowledge that they were either targeted
1 or spared. What I do know is that in reports of firing, it was always
2 Kosevo Hospital which came up, never the other hospitals."
3 And I'd like to ask you now here. When you're saying you have no
4 specific knowledge of these other hospitals being either targeted or
5 spared, does that mean that you did not have information that these
6 hospitals were targeted by incoming artillery fire?
7 A. We had no information obviously about what was being targeted,
8 because we never knew where they were aimed at. All we could observe was
9 where shells landed, and shells did land on the -- on the other hospitals
10 as landed in many places in Sarajevo as well.
11 Q. And do you perhaps recall the name of the director of the
12 hospital in Kosevo whom you had suspicions was a hard-liner?
13 A. I certainly can't remember it sat here. Whether it is in my
14 notes, I would have to go back and look.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could I seek clarification of part of an
17 It was read to you as your previous testimony that you said:
18 "What I do know is that in reports of firing, it was always
19 Kosevo Hospital which came up, never the other hospitals."
20 Reports of firing, were you referring to reports of fire outgoing
21 from Kosevo Hospital?
22 THE WITNESS: No. It was reports of fire coming in to
23 Kosevo Hospital from the Bosnian Serbs.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, a few lines further down you said:
25 "All we could observe was where shells landed, and shells did
1 land on the other hospitals as landed in many places in Sarajevo as
3 So I'm a bit confused about your saying reports always pointed at
4 Kosevo Hospital, and you explained that that was reports on incoming fire
5 on hospitals, and you say that the other hospitals were fired -- were hit
6 as well.
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. What I mean is that when Kosevo Hospital was
8 hit, we were informed by the -- either by somebody from the hospital or
9 by somebody from the Presidency, that's the Bosniak Presidency, that
10 Kosevo Hospital had been hit, whereas we didn't receive direct reports
11 from other hospitals being hit. We only heard about other hospitals
12 being hit through the UNMOs or through routine UN reporting.
13 JUDGE ORIE: So you're drawing the attention to the fact that the
14 hospital itself reported being hit, whereas other hospitals also being
15 hit did not report it.
16 THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
18 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Q. Colonel, are you familiar with General Abdel-Razek who was the
20 UNPROFOR Sector South commander from 21 August 1992 to 20 February 1993?
21 A. Yes, I know him.
22 Q. Okay. In regards to questions relating to the Bosnian Muslims
23 placing forces and/or mortars near humanitarian buildings, Mr. --
24 General Abdel-Razek at transcript page 3639 of these proceedings on the
25 5th of October, 2012, testified that he complained to Mr. Ejub Ganic
1 about this and said:
2 "I remember the answer from Mr. Ejub Ganic. He used to tell me,
3 Where should we go? We are fighting close to the city. I told him, You
4 have to go. You are creating lots of problems, and if I were on the
5 other side I would have retaliated to any firing, to any shelling, and
6 this is a problem."
7 Sir, would you agree with General Abdel-Razek that retaliatory
8 fire should have been expected from the positioning of any forces near
9 humanitarian buildings such as the hospital?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I object to the
12 question that Mr. Ivetic has put because I think there was rather
13 extensive testimony on this issue, and it was also the subject matter of
14 redirect examination in which General Abdel-Razek qualified his meaning
15 of the term "retaliatory" or "retaliation."
16 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then you can deal with that in re-examination
17 as well and deal with it with this witness.
18 At the same time, Mr. Ivetic, I had no opportunity yet to verify,
19 but I take it that you have done that, that you are not in any way
20 twisting the evidence General Abdel-Razek gave about retaliatory fire.
21 MR. IVETIC: I've only excluded the last sentence of that answer,
22 which is: "I hope that I answered your question." And that's transcript
23 page T3639. He answered again as "Regarding the PTT building --"
24 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
25 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you could answer the question, if you still
2 remember the question, Mr. Tucker.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes. I agree with what General Abdel-Razek said.
4 I would, however, add that when firing in retaliation, you do not fire at
5 an empty grid reference. You look at what it is you're firing at, and if
6 you see that you're firing at a hospital, then that should be pause for
7 thought for the people considering whether to fire retaliatory. But the
8 point that Razek -- General Razek said about it causing problems, that is
9 also of course correct.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, if you're talking about retaliatory fire,
11 what do you mean by it? You have already said that that is not -- you do
12 not fire at an empty grid reference. What would you then fire at if not
13 at an empty grid reference?
14 THE WITNESS: A grid reference is always on a map.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No, I do understand, but did you intend to say
16 that you would return fire to where the source of the fire -- of the
17 incoming fire was, or do you -- retaliation is, of course, a rather
18 complex term. How do you understand it when you read the answer of
19 Mr. Abdel-Razek, and how do you use that term yourself?
20 THE WITNESS: The way that General Abdel-Razek describes it, I
21 agree with his -- his statements. I would, however, add that myself as
22 an artillery officer, I've been engaged in the planning of artillery and
23 counter-artillery, and retaliatory fire is just that, is that you never
24 look at -- or whenever there's incoming, you have to look at whatever it
25 is you're firing at, and if you then look at the map and say, ah, that's
1 a hospital, that is something that should be taken into account.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: If, sir, as you look at where you're firing at and
4 you find it's a hospital and you can determine with certainty that that's
5 where the fire came from, what do you then do?
6 THE WITNESS: In the training that I received in the British
7 Army, we were not allowed to fire back, even though fire came from it.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: So do I understand you to say that a protected
9 institution that attacks is still protected?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Q. Colonel, am I correct that General Morillon, in complaining of
14 this tactic of the Bosnian Muslim mortars shooting from the hospital,
15 told Mr. Alija Izetbegovic that his forces were violating the Geneva
17 A. I believe he did and he complained to Ejub Ganic as well. And it
18 was not just about firing from the hospital. It was also from firing
19 from immediately next door to his headquarters in the residency in
21 Q. Thank you, sir. At paragraph 304 of your statement, and that's
22 page 73 in the English. It's -- sorry, Exhibit P317, and again it's page
23 73 in the English, page 74 in the B/C/S, and it's paragraph 304 that
24 we'll be looking at, sir. Okay. 304 is at the top in English.
25 Sir, in this paragraph that's now being magnified on the screen,
1 you identify knowledge of two incidents where it is believed that the
2 Bosnian Muslim forces fired on their own people. The second incident you
3 mention, is this the one more commonly referred to in the media as the
4 Markale 1 massacre?
5 A. I'm not familiar with the name Markale 1 massacre. What I know
6 it as is the first marketplace shelling.
7 Q. Okay. If I can direct your attention to something from the
8 Karadzic trial, and that's document 1D371 in e-court, page 89 of that
9 document. And while we wait for that, sir, I would like to brief you on
10 the fact that this is your testimony from the 18th of January, 2012, in
11 those proceedings, at transcript page 23309, and it's beginning at line
12 12 of the same, in the middle of the page, and I will quote for you, sir:
13 "Q. Is it true that you met in Germany with a British officer who
14 informed you that the shell at Markale marketplace came from Muslim
16 "A. When I was back in Germany after my time in Bosnia, I met by
17 coincidence a British Sergeant Major who was a specialist in crater
18 analysis and artillery intelligence who had been on the investigating
19 team looking into what I believe is referred to as the first marketplace
20 incident, and he said to me that he believed that the first marketplace
21 incident had been fired or had come from the Muslims."
22 Sir, does this accurately reflect the source of your knowledge
23 for this incident that occurred after you had left Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Yes, it does.
25 Q. And would you be able to provide the identity of the British
1 sergeant major, and if so, I would suggest we go into private session for
2 privacy concerns without knowing.
3 A. No, I don't recall the person's name, and because I wasn't making
4 notes, I didn't record it in my notes.
5 Q. Fair enough, sir. Then we can stay in open session.
6 At paragraphs 101 through 102 of your statement, that would be
7 page 24 in e-court of P317, you identify or talk about the attack on the
8 residency, that is General Morillon's headquarters and home, and you
9 identify that the crater analysis and other information you received
10 provided further evidence that it was a Bosnian Muslim unit or Bosniak
11 unit that was responsible for the firing and had fired upon the
12 residency. Am I correct that the Bosnian Muslims initially had tried to
13 pass blame on the Serbs?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Can you provide us any further details of what you or
16 General Morillon did to complain to the Bosnian Muslims after it was
17 determined that they had done -- that they had performed the attack?
18 A. General Morillon complained to President Izetbegovic and to
19 Ejub Ganic, and he made a public statement on -- at a press conference
20 which was held at the headquarters of Sector Sarajevo at the PTT building
21 and said that that is what had happened.
22 Q. Did the UNPROFOR BH command consider the residency to be a
23 legitimate target?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Yesterday, sir, at transcript page 3765 onwards, you testified
1 about your observations about the Serb shelling at Sarajevo, and at
2 paragraph 90 of your statement, which is, I believe, at page 21 of your
3 statement in e-court, you talk of terrorism by artillery with the purpose
4 to intimidate and break the will to resist.
5 Would you agree with me that the Serb artillery had superiority
6 over the artillery of the Muslims?
7 A. Overwhelming superiority.
8 Q. And would you say that the Serbs used overwhelming force by
9 artillery when responding to attacks?
10 A. In most cases, yes.
11 Q. Sir, in your years of service, have you ever had occasion to hear
12 of a United States Army policy or doctrine called shock and awe or
13 overwhelming force doctrine?
14 A. Yes, I have.
15 Q. Would you agree with the proposition that for overwhelming force
16 the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure, the
17 aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as
18 quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or
19 render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to
20 ourselves and to noncombatants as possible. The superiority of American
21 forces technically and operationally is crucial to successful
22 application. Would you agree that this is a fair summation of the
23 overwhelming force doctrine as applied by NATO and the United States
24 armed forces?
25 A. Whether it's applicable by NATO I'm not in a position to state.
1 I've certainly heard to it referred to by the United States. However,
2 there's a key point there, and that is to noncombatants, and that is not,
3 generally speaking, what we saw happen in Sarajevo.
4 Q. Isn't the concept behind overwhelming force to try and overwhelm
5 your opponent and therefore lessen the duration of the conflict so as to
6 lessen the amount of overall casualties to yourselves and to
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Do you consider the overwhelming force doctrine as applied by the
10 United States armed forces to be terrorism?
11 A. That is not for me to comment about.
12 Q. And yet you feel comfortable commenting about the Bosnian Serb
13 forces. Is that accurate?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Vanderpuye.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President. That's an objectionable
16 question. It's argumentative, and I think the witness has already
17 answered the question.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I didn't understand the question, as a matter
19 of fact.
20 "... you feel comfortable commenting about the Bosnian Serb
22 Well, the question was not whether the witness would under no
23 circumstance comment on the US forces but whether the overwhelming force
24 doctrine as applied by the United States armed forces to be terrorism.
25 Now, that is a very composite question. Apart from that, it is
1 asking for opinion. You could even consider that it's asking for expert
2 opinion to some extent, and you know, Mr. Ivetic, the position of the
3 Chamber is that if a witness of fact expresses any opinion, that it
4 should be clear on the basis of what facts he does so for the Chamber to
5 consider that testimony.
6 Would you say that the witness commented anywhere that the
7 Bosnian Serb forces were terrorists?
8 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. Paragraph 90.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Paragraph 90. Let's have a look. And then perhaps
10 explore the factual basis underlying the two. That is in respect of a
11 certain concrete situation, isn't it? And therefore if the witness has
12 given a general statement about the US forces, then to compare that with
13 a specific situation which is explained to the witness, that might not be
14 comparable, and therefore the question -- you would not comment on the
15 US, but you do comment on the Serb forces, is under totally different
16 circumstances. I do not mind if you want to further explore that, but
17 please not one general statement not linked to any concrete event to
18 where the witness expressed his views and what he would describe as
19 terrorism by artillery in a very concrete situation.
20 You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic. I take it that this will serve you
21 as guidance.
22 MR. IVETIC: It will, Your Honour, and I think we can leave it
23 with what has been said about this, and I will move to specific instances
24 from his discussion in the statement to ask about specifics of other
25 areas that I believe constitute expert knowledge, and then I should be
1 able to conclude by the end of this session with the witness as far as my
2 side is concerned.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, and apparently I do understand that
4 you do not make that comparison anymore about --
5 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- the general sweeping statement.
7 MR. IVETIC: Yes, I took your instruction to heart.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
9 MR. IVETIC:
10 Q. At paragraph 202 of the statement at page 3 -- of P317, that
11 would be page 47 to 48 of the same, you talk about cluster bombs as being
12 an appalling weapon that should never be used in civilian areas. Can you
13 confirm for me whether in fact NATO and British forces used such cluster
14 bombs in federal Yugoslavia in 1999, including at sites near civilian
16 A. I cannot answer that question.
17 Q. Fair enough. Then I move on. Colonel, yesterday you testified
18 several times about Cerska, and you have mentioned it at your statement
19 at paragraph 161 of the same.
20 MR. IVETIC: That's page 38 in the English and B/C/S for those
21 who have e-court open.
22 Q. I would like to clarify some of the matters relating to this
23 topic. First of all, I was a bit confused yesterday. Did you intend to
24 imply that Cerska was an example of a widespread campaign to displace
25 Bosnian Muslims, including the torching of homes?
1 A. The attack on -- Cerska was on the extremity of the
2 Cerska-Srebrenica-Zepa enclave, and it was the -- one of the early
3 targets in an ongoing campaign, and when Cerska was captured, then the
4 refugees who had fled to Cerska from previous ethnic cleansing in the
5 area to the south of Zvornik and in the area to the -- towards Sarajevo,
6 who had gathered in Cerska when Cerska was attacked, because they were
7 inside a surrounded area, had no option but to flee towards the centre of
8 the surrounded area, in other words, through Konjevic Polje and on
9 towards Srebrenica.
10 Q. What about the torching of homes? Is it your position that homes
11 were torched in Cerska?
12 A. I restate that I personally did not visit at Cerska. I was in
13 Konjevic Polje at the time. It was General Morillon who went up into
14 Cerska. General Morillon's report from Cerska was that Cerska itself had
15 been an area where there had been fighting, but that there had not been
16 in Cerska specifically the torching of houses, the burning of houses.
17 Q. And at paragraph 163 of your statement, you also indicate that
18 you had heard that a large number of houses at Cerska appeared to have
19 suffered battle damage but not many had suffered fire damage. When you
20 say battle damage, is this the same thing you described yesterday as
21 combat damage?
22 A. Yes, that is damage due to soldiers shooting at each other.
23 Q. And as you use that term or those terms, would that indicate
24 legitimate fighting had occurred, that is to say combat, which caused
25 this damage?
1 A. The damage in Cerska, the way that General Morillon described it,
2 was as a result of fighting.
3 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, here at paragraph 161 of your statement,
4 that's again on page 38, you say that the Bosniak commander at Tuzla told
5 you about the alleged massacre of civilians in Cerska. I'd like to
6 refresh your recollection with something from the Perisic trial.
7 MR. IVETIC: That's 1D369, pages 92 to 93 in e-court, and these
8 should be transcript pages 9268 and 9269. And I will only be interested
9 in the short part that starts at page -- at page 9268, line 12, and goes
10 on for the next five lines of the next page.
11 Q. And when that comes up, sir, we'll see what it is that I'm
12 talking about. And the question that was posed in this trial to you was
13 as follows from line 12:
14 "Q. It did indeed. In February you received some information, I
15 believe, from among others, President Izetbegovic and Ganic, with regard
16 to the massacre at Cerska and that massacre included relatively strong
17 allegations with regards to people being put in houses and burned, the
18 entire village was burned to the ground, that some 700 wounded or more,
19 and I'm not sure about the figure --
20 "A. That's correct.
21 "Q. -- were in that particular village and this needed your
23 "A. That's essentially correct.
24 "Q. Okay. And President Izetbegovic and Ganic made arrangements
25 with the - and I'm asking here - the war committee in Srebrenica to
1 facilitate or at least from their standpoint your entry into Srebrenica;
3 "A. I can't confirm whether they made arrangements, with whom
4 they made arrangements. They simply told General Morillon that they
5 would inform the people inside the enclave that General Morillon was
6 going to try and come into the enclave in order to see for himself what
7 the situation was."
8 Does this testimony of yours from the Perisic trial refresh your
9 recollection that indeed in addition to the commander at Tuzla that
10 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and Mr. Ejub Ganic also told you about the alleged
11 atrocities in Cerska.
12 A. The sequence of events was the other way around. It was
13 initially Alija Izetbegovic and Ejub Ganic who told General Morillon.
14 General Morillon then travelled to Tuzla, and then while he was in Tuzla,
15 he was told in more detail by the Bosnian Muslim commander in Tuzla.
16 Then General Morillon went into Konjevic Polje and visited Cerska.
17 Q. Would you agree with me that Mr. Ganic and Mr. Izetbegovic were
18 the source for many of the stories that were reported or heard by
19 General Morillon and yourself relating to atrocities?
20 A. Yes, that is correct, in the same way that General Morillon
21 listened to what was told to him by both the Bosnian Serbs and the
22 Bosnian Croats as well.
23 Q. Did you find it to be on multiple times that Mr. Ganic or
24 Mr. Izetbegovic would advise you of alleged atrocities that turned out to
25 be false when investigated, apart from Cerska?
1 A. There were certainly other events when the situation as described
2 to us by one side or the other, when we actually found out the details,
3 was different to the way it had been described to us.
4 Q. Did you consider Mr. Izetbegovic on Mr. Ganic to be members of
5 the faction within the Bosnian Muslim leadership that promoted
6 international armed intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and
7 against the Serbs?
8 A. I'm not in a position to -- to know that.
9 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Do you recall complaints being made by a
10 Mr. Akmadzic, who was the senior Croat in the Bosnian government at the
11 end of 1992, that Mr. Izetbegovic was no longer the lawful president of
12 Bosnia, having overstayed his tenure?
13 A. Yes, I remember that.
14 Q. Okay. Fair enough, sir. Now, I'd like to turn to paragraph 106
15 of your statement, which is at page 25 of the same in e-court, and that
16 would be P317 in e-court, and it's the same page in B/C/S, so page 25 of
17 P317. And while we wait for that, sir, I can preface my question by
18 telling you this is a paragraph where you give a very definite opinion on
19 the Bosnian Serb Army having a very efficient and comprehensive
21 And 106 is in the approximate middle of the page. And so, sir,
22 here the very definite opinion you give, would you agree with me that the
23 only source for this particular conclusion is the limited times during
24 meetings with yourself and General Morillon that General Mladic or one of
25 the other officers of the VRS tried to obtain information for you via
2 A. No, that is not correct. You are correct that in those occasions
3 that you describe that certainly helped us form that opinion, but it was
4 also the continuously built-up opinion of the various UNPROFOR battalions
5 in the execution of their -- their duties, and it was their reporting and
6 experience in the field that they believed that the Bosnian Serb Army had
7 efficient communications.
8 Q. Would you agree with me that you never witnessed the functioning
9 of the communication system available to the VRS during combat
11 A. No.
12 Q. I'd have to ask you to clarify.
13 A. As I say, no, I did not see them functioning during combat
15 Q. Thank you, sir. At paragraphs 111 through 112 of your statement,
16 and that's on the next page, page 26 in the English and also page 26 in
17 the B/C/S, you provide a set of conclusions about co-ordinated
18 concentrations of fire. Are these statements made in your capacity as a
19 fully trained and qualified artillery officer?
20 A. Yes, they are.
21 Q. Do you consider yourself to possess an expert's skill set of
22 knowledge on this topic?
23 A. At that time, yes, I -- yes, I did, as at that time I was a
24 trained artillery officer.
25 Q. Does that mean that you feel you are no longer possessing an
1 expert knowledge or skill set to opine about this topic?
2 A. What I mean is that almost 20 years have passed since I left the
4 Q. Okay. Am I correct that you have not consulted any written works
5 prepared by other experts on the area of structure, command and control
6 of the VRS in rendering this testimony at these paragraphs?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. At paragraph 230 of your statement, that's page 55 in e-court in
9 English and page 54 in the B/C/S, you state that:
10 "Again, the co-ordination and specialist knowledge that this
11 required means it can only have been ordered at the highest levels of the
12 Bosnian Serb Army."
13 Would you agree with me that in fact you concluded that this
14 shell at issue originated from Serbia? And if you need clarification, we
15 can also pull up paragraph 232. Perhaps in -- this is the incident on 24
16 March, 1993, sir.
17 A. What is the question?
18 Q. You state here that this incident shows that it can only have
19 been ordered at the highest levels of the Bosnian Serb Army. And my
20 question for you, sir, did not your expert analysis determine that this
21 shell originated from Serbia, and that is to say outside of the area
22 controlled by the Bosnian Serb Army?
23 A. I don't understand your question. I think you're mixing two
24 things. One is the statement about the co-ordination of massed artillery
25 fire which requires control at the highest level and authorisation for
1 the expenditure of ammunition, transport, soldiers, et cetera; then
2 secondly, you were asking about this incident in Srebrenica which was not
3 a mass of artillery fire. It was a small number of shells which were
4 fired. It is those small number of shells which were fired and which hit
5 the football stadium and the area around it, I believe around the 24th of
6 March. It is those shells that I believed were fired out of -- from the
7 Republic of Serbia.
8 Q. And then again, sir, I direct you to the last sentence of
9 paragraph 230 where you're talking about those shells, and you say:
10 "Again, the coordination and specialist knowledge that this
11 required means it can only have been ordered at the highest levels of the
12 Bosnian Serb Army."
13 A. The -- in order to hit the -- the football field in Srebrenica
14 and when the helicopters were trying to evacuate, you had to have people
15 observing that situation. You had to have people who could see where the
16 shells were landing, and that was on the Bosnian Serb territory. The
17 shells themselves seemed to have been fired from Serbia itself.
18 Q. Okay. Your analysis of the crater at paragraphs 231 and 232, 232
19 is at the top of the next page in e-court, do you consider yourself to be
20 a trained specialist or expert to render forensic ballistic evidence?
21 A. No, I do not.
22 Q. Can you identify if you took any photographs of the scene and the
23 craters you examined?
24 A. No, I had no camera with me. I had about half an hour at the --
25 at the location.
1 Q. How long does it traditionally take to perform this type of
3 A. It depends on the actual condition of the crater itself. If it's
4 a crater in what they would describe as good condition, then it can be
5 done in a few minutes. If they have to look around and find and search,
6 it can take several hours.
7 Q. How did you rate this crater?
8 A. Firstly as I said, I am not a trained crater analysis expert.
9 This one was a fairly messy one.
10 Q. Did you take any measurements?
11 A. I didn't have any measuring equipment. I described that the
12 hole -- that crater was very deep.
13 Q. Okay. Have you authored any publications on the topic of
14 forensic ballistic analysis or crater analysis?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Thank you, sir. At paragraphs 289 to 294 of your statement, and
17 that's at page 69 in the English and page 68 in the B/C/S, you discuss
18 margin of error in the use of artillery and accuracy testimony. Have you
19 authored any publications on the topic of margin of error in use of
21 A. No, I've not authored anything. However, that is part of the
22 standard training which in the British Army artillery officers --
23 everybody in the artillery undergoes. There's nothing specialist about
24 that knowledge. It is general artillery knowledge and part of standard
1 Q. Would you agree with me it is specialist as to other soldiers
2 that are not trained artillery officers?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And would it be specialist knowledge as opposed to the everyday
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you or did you consider yourself an expert in this field?
8 A. In that field, yes.
9 Q. Did you consult any manuals or reference materials in preparing
10 this part of your statement? And again we're talking about paragraphs
11 289 through 294.
12 A. No, not any manuals or reference materials. As I have just said,
13 that is -- what I describe is a standard part of artillery training.
14 Q. Did you personally draft these paragraphs yourself or were they
15 drafted by members of the Office of the Prosecution?
16 A. They were drafted by me.
17 Q. Okay. Was this entire statement drafted by you, sir?
18 A. It was.
19 Q. How many times prior have you testified in any capacity on the
20 margin of error in artillery?
21 A. I have conducted training of my own soldiers in that and other
22 aspects of -- of artillery.
23 JUDGE ORIE: The question was about giving testimony on that
24 matter, Mr. Ivetic --
25 MR. IVETIC: Correct.
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- because the answer is about -- and the relevance
2 of how often you testify -- there were areas where I have never testified
3 upon; still, I do know something about it. What -- I'm trying to
4 understand the gist of your question, what it brings us.
5 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours twofold: It gives us the bases
6 for the purported expertise of the witness and it proves my point that
7 this is improper expert testimony that was not subjected to Rule 94 bis.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now I understand it. You say the witness was
9 never called to testify on this expert matter. Is that how I have to
10 understand what is behind your question?
11 MR. IVETIC: That's one aspect of it and the other aspect is,
12 Your Honour, is that we have what is very clearly expert-like testimony
13 that is being presented in a statement that was drafted by the witness
14 and therefore should have been a Rule 94 bis analysis with all the
15 protections afforded thereunder.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. Please proceed.
17 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
18 Q. At paragraph 294 of your statement - and I apologise, I think
19 that is page 70 in both the English and the B/C/S, although I don't have
20 it noted for the B/C/S - you identify that the conclusions in the
21 following paragraphs were from the intelligence and operations branches
22 of the HQ BH command. Would it be correct to state that someone else
23 created these conclusions and reported them to you?
24 A. In general terms, yes, but not in one single -- one single
25 document. What I have done here is assemble into one very short
1 statement things that came up and were reported and were discussed and
2 were analysed, as you can imagine, at multiple times during the conflict.
3 Q. Fair enough. Could you identify for us who is this intelligence
4 and operations branch? What services are -- are --
5 A. Yeah. This was the intelligence and operations branches of the
6 HQ BH command main headquarters, which was in Kiseljak, which was under
7 the command of the Chief of Staff of BH command General Cordy-Simpson.
8 Q. And are we talking military intelligence from various domestic
9 armies, or are we talking intelligence services?
10 A. No. I mean the military intelligence as in the meaning of G2 in
11 the NATO terminology.
12 Q. From which countries?
13 A. From the countries who contributed soldiers to the headquarters
14 of UN BH commands. By memory, it would be the British, Dutch, Danish,
15 US. There were a number of other countries who contributed but it's a
16 matter of record to find out where they came from.
17 Q. Fair enough. And with regard to these paragraphs that are in
18 part based upon the work that these branches did, am I correct that you
19 were not an eyewitness to all of the events that are recorded here?
20 A. No.
21 Q. No, I'm not correct, or no you were not an eyewitness.
22 A. No, I was not an eyewitness to many events. These were reports
23 which were forwarded to -- for discussion at meetings that
24 General Morillon had and were forwarded to General Morillon in his
25 forward headquarters in the residency in Sarajevo.
1 Q. Thank you, sir. And you do not know the bulk of the materials
2 that were reviewed by these intelligence and operation branches in
3 reaching the conclusions in their reports, do you?
4 A. Some of them were reviewed, some of them were not. When there
5 were major incidents or major events which led to conclusions, then, yes,
6 those were reviewed in more detail.
7 Q. Okay.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm slightly in doubt what to do. You
9 said you would finish during this session. We are approximately at the
10 time where the session should have finished already. How much more time
11 would you still need.
12 MR. IVETIC: One more question, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: One more question. Please proceed.
14 MR. IVETIC:
15 Q. Sir, yesterday you testified about seeing houses and villages
16 that were -- that were destroyed in the Banja Luka area. Am I correct
17 that you first saw those houses in 1996 when you were redeployed as part
18 of SFOR and not in 1992 on 1993?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Thank you, Colonel, for your answers.
21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I apologise for going slightly over
22 but I have completed.
23 JUDGE ORIE: No. I'm not -- you're -- as a matter of fact,
24 you're staying well within the time-limits you indicated before -- the
25 Defence indicated before.
1 Could the Witness -- we take a break of another 20 minutes.
2 Could you follow the usher, Mr. Tucker.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 25 minutes
5 to 2.00, but could I already inquire, Mr. Vanderpuye, how much time you
6 would need.
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'm just going to take a quick
8 look at the transcript. I don't anticipate much at all. I have written
9 down just a question or two. I want to show him a transcript reference,
10 but I'll take a look at it during the break. It shouldn't be long.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So limited time. Then we'll find time then later on
12 to further discuss the scheduling for early January.
13 We take a break and we resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 1.14 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tucker, first Judge Fluegge has one or more
19 questions for you.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. I would like to take you back to a set
21 of questions put to you by the Defence this morning in relation to the
22 convoys and how they were checked and searched if necessary. You refer
23 to two occasions where there were some complaints. Who was usually
24 present during these checks on the spot and checking the convoys?
25 THE WITNESS: My understanding is that the checks were conducted
1 either by UNPROFOR soldiers or by UN police accompanied by UNPROFOR
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you aware that sometimes representatives of
4 the media were also present?
5 THE WITNESS: I can't confirm specific -- I believe that
6 sometimes they were, but which particular occasion, then, that obviously
7 I don't know.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And who would invite the media to take -- to be
9 present during these checks?
10 THE WITNESS: The couple of occasions that I heard about it, it
11 was arranged by UNPROFOR public communications or -- I forget what the
12 terminology was, but the people responsible for communications with
13 the -- with the media.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That is UNPROFOR. And have you any knowledge
15 about other entities who call the media to be present?
16 THE WITNESS: I don't know specifics, but I would imagine that
17 media could be called by one or other of the -- the warring factions,
18 authorities, or local -- or the media might even have just been -- been
19 there, because the locations that such searches would have taken place
20 were fairly limited, because there are only a few routes which were well
21 known along which the convoys were -- were moved.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for that.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Moloto has a question for you as well.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, you talked about combat damage to
25 houses, and you said General Morillon determined combat damage by the
1 fact that there were bullet holes in the walls of the buildings. My
2 question to you is: How did he determine that that was caused by combat
4 THE WITNESS: Obviously, we would not have been present when the
5 shooting actually took place, and it would be conceivable that somebody
6 could just shoot away at a building. Our supposition was that the amount
7 of damage that would have to have been caused in order to make it look
8 like combat, because most houses in Bosnia have got the odd hole in them,
9 so the odd hole is simply not relevant. It is large numbers of holes,
10 and -- and the use of high explosives. Yes, it is conceivable that
11 somebody could have done that deliberately in order to make it look as if
12 there had been fighting somewhere. Conceptually you are correct.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: So in fact, General Morillon's determination did
14 not exclude this possibility that in fact it could have been done
15 deliberately without any -- without any fighting, without any combat.
16 THE WITNESS: That is technically possible. If we're talking
17 about Cerska specifically, when General Morillon arrived in Cerska, when
18 he went up the narrow road that led from Konjevic Polje to Cerska, the
19 Bosnian Muslim front line soldiers said, "You can try and go through but
20 the Serbs will never let you." Morillon drove up the road, and when he
21 arrived at the outskirts of Cerska, he came across a couple of Serb
22 soldiers who were on guard. They were very surprised to see
23 General Morillon.
24 And when General Morillon was then introduced to the platoon
25 commander, a quite low-level soldier, the platoon commander was also very
1 surprised to see General Morillon. And the platoon commander was the
2 commander of a regular army unit of the VRS, in other words, not a
3 militia or a specialist unit, and was very professional in his conduct
4 towards General Morillon, and gave -- and spoke quite freely to
5 General Morillon in a way that gave General Morillon the impression that
6 what the platoon commander was saying was entirely consistent with what
7 he could see of the damage in -- in the area. And that we knew that
8 there had been heavy fighting there. We knew that the refugees had fled
9 from there, and we knew that there had been sounds reported of heavy
10 fighting in that area.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did you know whether heavy fighting was taking
12 place from within a house, within houses? Surely they could have been
13 fighting on a front line somewhere, not necessarily from within houses.
14 THE WITNESS: The front line was further -- was further forward
15 from Cerska, and as the front line was originally a number of kilometres
16 away from Cerska, and as the Serbs attacked, they came closer and closer,
17 and the evidence which General Morillon saw and which was consistent with
18 the reports from the refugees was that the Muslim soldiers had been
19 pushed back from the front line and had eventually resisted or their last
20 stand had been in the houses themselves, hence the -- hence the damage
21 there, and had then either been killed, captured, or had also withdrawn
22 back to Konjevic Polje.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: But all what you are telling us now isn't in your
24 statement. All we get from your statement is that the determination that
25 this was combat damage is made solely on the basis that these were bullet
1 holes in the buildings. That's the only evidence we have so far. Now
2 you're giving us a little more than you gave us in your statement. I'm
3 just -- I'm just concerned --
4 WITNESS: Yeah --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- that what you are telling us now is not
6 contained in your statement.
7 THE WITNESS: My apologies if -- if that. I could have written
8 500 pages of -- of --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not 500 pages. Five lines, five more lines would
10 have done.
11 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I have one question. A bit of a linguistic matter.
14 I earlier asked you about the way in which you used the word "retaliatory
15 fire." I'm not a native English-speaking person. I always link
16 retaliation to some kind of retribution. Now I've heard in this Tribunal
17 before the language of return, fire meaning that you return the fire so
18 as to eliminate the source of fire, rather.
19 When you are talking or when you are joining the language used by
20 others about retaliatory fire, would that be the neutral return fire with
21 the clear military purpose of eliminating the source of fire or would it
22 also have an annotation of revenge or ...
23 THE WITNESS: The military term is counter-battery. Retaliatory
24 fire or the use of -- the way that we used it in UNPROFOR was in the
25 first instance very specifically to fire back at where you were fired
1 from, and sometimes there was also an element of punishment, of
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And when you used the language here in
4 relation to the Kosevo Hospital where I think Mr. Abdel-Razek said that
5 if he would be in such a position he would use retaliatory fire, would
6 you consider this including the revenge element, or would you -- when you
7 said, well, I understand that he says so, would you also think of revenge
8 rather than the more neutral military term?
9 THE WITNESS: I can't comment on the way General Abdel-Razek
10 meant it. I would use it in those context with an element of the -- the
11 revenge, the punishment aspect.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that.
13 Mr. Vanderpuye, you have more questions for the witness?
14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, just one --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Just one.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: -- Mr. President, and it does actually follow on
17 what you've just asked the witness concerning what General Abdel-Razek
18 said. If you bear with me one second, I will get the quote that I wanted
19 to read to the witness.
20 Re-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:
21 Q. Mr. Tucker, in respect of this notion of retaliatory fire or
22 counter-battery fire, I just wanted to let you hear what
23 General Abdel-Razek said about that. He testified about this in the
24 Karadzic case as well on 20 July and reaffirmed it here, and what he said
25 was he had a conversation with General Galic about this, and he said
1 specifically this --
2 JUDGE ORIE: What's the source exactly, Mr. --
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: It's in the Karadzic transcript at page 5554,
4 and in this -- the transcript of these proceedings at page 3676.
5 Q. He said as follows --
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: May I proceed, Mr. President?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you quote from 5554 in Karadzic?
8 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, sir.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I always like to have an opportunity to follow it.
10 It's not uploaded?
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Was it public?
13 MR. VANDERPUYE: It was public testimony and repeated in these
14 proceedings as well.
15 JUDGE ORIE: If you would then give me one second, please, so
16 that we can see whether we can get it on our screens through the
17 internet. I openly state that if nothing is uploaded in e-court, I would
18 try to find it on -- is that quotation already in our transcript of
19 today, Mr. Vanderpuye? If that's the case, you'll forgive me not to be
20 able to remember all the numbers. I mean, are you quoting what has been
21 quoted already, or are you choosing a new quote?
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm quoting what's already been quoted 5th
23 October, transcript page 3676, from the witness' prior Karadzic
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and that had an 1D number?
1 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, sir. It's just in the transcript of the
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Yes. Please proceed.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. What General Abdel-Razek said in a conversation he had with
6 General Galic is he said as follows:
7 "You should not retaliate. I will accept that there are forces
8 that are positioned in certain places, but you should be wise. You
9 should not retaliate against areas where there are many civilians. You
10 can retaliate somewhere else along the front, but to attack areas where
11 there are civilians, this is a mistake. It brings major injuries, it
12 hurts us, it hurts public opinion, because in brief there are civilians
13 getting killed, and there are humanitarian facilities and hospitals that
14 are getting destroyed and unable to function. So they should move away
15 from shelling any civilian population centres."
16 And he reaffirmed that in his testimony. Is that consistent with
17 counter-battery fire or retaliatory fire as it was used in UNPROFOR
18 during your -- during the period of time that you were engaged in Bosnia?
19 A. UNPROFOR was not engaged in any counter-battery fire or
20 retaliatory fire.
21 Q. No, I'm asking whether it's consistent with your understanding as
22 it was used in UNPROFOR of retaliatory fire during the time that you were
23 engaged there?
24 A. But UNPROFOR did not use counter-battery. It was only the armed
25 forces engaged in conflict who engaged in retaliatory fire.
1 Q. What I'm -- maybe I can be a little bit more clear. What you
2 said in response to Mr. President's question was that you had an
3 understanding of what retaliatory fire was in UNPROFOR. Do you recall
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is what I've spoken to you or read to you about what
7 General Abdel-Razek said consistent with what understanding?
8 A. Yes, entirely. What General Abdel-Razek said, which you've just
9 read out to me, is absolutely proper, correct, and should be the case.
10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. Tucker. I have no further
12 Thank you, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.
14 Have the questions by the Prosecution or the question by the
15 Prosecution and the questions by the Bench triggered any need for further
16 questions, Mr. Ivetic?
17 MR. IVETIC: No, Your Honour, and I thank the Colonel again for
18 his testimony.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Tucker, this concludes your
20 testimony in this Court. I would like to thank you very much for coming
21 to The Hague.
22 No loud talking in court.
23 MR. IVETIC: If I might have a moment to consult.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand we are at the very end of the
25 examination of this witness. If Mr. Mladic at a very low voice would
1 like to consult with you on any matter related to perhaps further
2 questions, then --
3 MR. IVETIC: I'd appreciate that, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I see Mr. Mladic already wrote a little note.
7 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
8 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the general would also like to thank
9 the colonel for his testimony. That's all we have for the colonel.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
11 Then this concludes -- as I said before, this concludes your
12 testimony. I continue where I said I thank you for coming to The Hague
13 and for having answered the questions that were put to you both by the
14 parties and by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home again. You
15 may follow the usher.
16 [The witness withdrew]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic and Mr. Groome, about the scheduling
18 for early January. First of all, I'd like to express that -- the regret
19 that it is impossible in this Tribunal to grant both Christian and
20 Orthodox people sufficient time at Christmas to celebrate.
21 Unfortunately, it's impossible to meet the -- and to accommodate all of
22 us, and it may be understandable that because the Tribunal is based in
23 The Hague that the -- for staff, et cetera, that the emphasis will be on
24 the Christmas at the 25th and the 26th of December.
25 Now, in order to, nevertheless, accommodate to some extent, to
1 the limited extent possible, the Chamber has on its mind not to sit on
2 the 7th of May and the 8th of May -- January, I'm sorry. The 7th of
3 January and the 8th of January, and then to sit in the afternoon of
4 Wednesday, the 9th of February, and then for the -- oh, yes. I make
5 again a similar mistake. I apologise. I'm -- yes. No, no. I'm sorry.
6 I should focus on January and nothing else. So therefore then to sit in
7 the afternoon of Wednesday, the 9th of January, which might enable people
8 to come back in the morning hours and time still -- further to be
9 considered, and then in the week after that, not to sit on the 14th and
10 to sit on the 15th but then again starting in the afternoon.
11 This is what we have on our mind at this moment, but before
12 finally deciding on the matter, we would want to give an opportunity to
13 the parties to bring to our attention whatever they deem fit to do.
14 Mr. Groome.
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: About the videolink, we'll further have to explore
5 that, Mr. Groome. And would -- in that country, would the representative
6 of the Registry still be there the day after the 15th? I'm not
7 mentioning the --
8 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I don't know about -- whether the
9 Registry staff has any plans to be there. It's simply OTP staff. So
10 again we'll have to explore that further with the Registry.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then let's further explore that. Thank you
12 for your observations.
13 Mr. Stojanovic, I can imagine that it is not very satisfactory
14 but we find ourselves also in a position where we cannot -- unfortunately
15 we cannot meet everyone's wishes.
16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We understand that, Your Honour.
17 We would have only one request. If it could be not Wednesday but
18 Thursday afternoon, the 10th of January, because you understand if we are
19 coming from home, that means one whole day of transfer, which means that
20 we would have to leave our homes, to depart on the 8th. That is why our
21 preference would be for Thursday, the 10th. Monday is a big Orthodox
22 holiday for all of us, the patron saint's day for most of us, and that
23 means staying with our families.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, if we would then take the Wednesday
25 off, would you then -- I don't know whether you'll travel back or not,
1 but if we would sit on the 14th, would that cause you great problems if
2 we would start only on Thursday, the 10th of January? So one more day in
3 the first week, one day less in the second week?
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. It's
5 difficult for me to say because both of them are holidays. The decision
6 is up to you. We would be happiest if it could be as you said on the
7 15th in the afternoon and that we begin on the 10th in the afternoon, but
8 the decision is yours to make.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber would wish that we could meet all
10 wishes. We'll further consider the matter. But if the Chamber would not
11 be willing to lose more than three days, would you then prefer not to sit
12 on the 7th and the 8th and the 14th, or would you prefer not to sit on
13 the 7th, the 8th, and the 9th, and then to sit on the 14th?
14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] If that is the choice, Your
15 Honour, then we would prefer not to work on the 9th rather than the 14th.
16 Not to work on the 9th, to begin on the 10th, and if we have to make up
17 for that day, then to work on the 14th.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We will consider the matter and keep in mind your
20 Mr. Groome, I think you suggested to start tomorrow morning with
21 the -- with scheduling issues before the next witness would arrive. Do
22 you have any further information about the arrival of the witness and --
23 well, the witness has arrived, but the preparation of the witness? What
24 would be the earliest moment to start with the witness?
25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, my latest information has not changed.
1 I tried to get updated information over the last break but was unable, so
2 as far as I know it remains to be noon. We do have the matter of
3 tendering exhibits for this past witness, and there are two other issues
4 that I could productively raise with the Chamber. I'm not sure that it
5 would take all the way up until noon to deal with all of these matters,
6 but be that --
7 JUDGE ORIE: I'm a bit surprised that once the witness is excused
8 that we now hear about -- the Chamber has expressed its concern about the
9 associated exhibits and has not heard from the Prosecution any further on
10 the matter. So I do not know what your intentions are, but certainly
11 tendering all of the associated exhibits as you intended is not something
12 the Chamber does expect you to do.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution is prepared to make
14 submissions on the exhibits that we are tendering. Mr. Vanderpuye is
15 prepared to make that today or tomorrow morning, whatever pleases Your
17 JUDGE ORIE: One second. First Mr. Stojanovic.
18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one thing, Your Honour.
19 For the coming witness, we announced earlier six hours. Maybe it can be
20 of assistance that talking to Mr. Petrusic, who is proofing this witness,
21 we now hear that our new estimate would be four hours. This could
22 perhaps be useful to take into account for all of us to know that the
23 examination-in-chief would be shortened by two hours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: That is good to know.
25 THE INTERPRETER: The cross-examination, interpreter's
2 JUDGE ORIE: That is good to know, Mr. Stojanovic. At the same
3 time, we inquired yesterday with the Defence whether the six hours is
4 still accurate and then we received the message that it was, but -- or as
5 a matter of fact the message was that it was sufficient.
6 Then ...
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Vanderpuye -- perhaps first Mr. Groome.
9 How much time you think you would need with the witness which will be
10 called tomorrow?
11 MR. GROOME: Ms. Bolton informs me that she believes she will
12 require between 2.5 and three hours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And four hours for the -- that makes seven and a
14 half. That should fit into the days still available to us.
15 Mr. Vanderpuye, the Chamber very much would like you to tender
16 whatever you wish to tender at this moment, not to say that we would
17 immediately decide on the matter, but you may submit whatever you wish in
18 relation to the tendering of documents, associated exhibits, or
19 non-associated exhibits.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I think it would be
21 helpful to note, Mr. President and Your Honours, that at least as far as
22 I can determine from the Defence position or response to the 92 ter
23 motion, they appear to acknowledge and at least concede that the 41
24 exhibits of the 58 that are associated that are on my list to tender,
25 they appear to at least concede that these documents are discussed in
1 detail for the most part and either are written by the witness or concern
2 matters within his personal knowledge, and that's in paragraph 12 of the
3 Defence response to the Prosecution motion.
4 They take issue with -- I have seven documents in particular, one
5 of which is -- yes. They take issue with seven -- eight documents,
6 rather. And with respect to those eight documents, four of them concern
7 the annex to the final report of the UN commission of experts that is
8 referred to in the statement. These were documents that were shown to
9 the witness in the Galic case and to which he refers in his statement.
10 I'm prepared -- obviously I'm prepared not to tender those
11 documents. I don't know that they are necessarily essential to a
12 reasonable understanding of the -- of his -- of his evidence.
13 With respect to -- I can give you the numbers in particular, but
14 with respect to document, for example, 8424, I'm similarly disposed to
15 remove that from the tender list as well. And with respect to document
16 3432, this is a document that I am not tendering in any event, nor am I
17 tendering document 5807, which is the last of the documents that the
18 Defence appears to object to.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying to find 3432 on my list. Page 2.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes. It's shaded. It should be shaded.
21 JUDGE ORIE: It's shaded. You did not intend to tender them
22 anyhow, isn't it?
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: That's correct, Mr. President. Would you like
24 the numbers of the --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let me first before we -- I have to check.
1 You say -- let's first seek the position of the Defence on the matter.
2 There are two issues. The one is to take issue with a specific document
3 for specific reasons; and the second issue, and I would have to check,
4 that is the number of associated exhibits, and I think, as a matter of
5 fact, that the Defence did take issue with that.
6 Could I hear from the Defence. I'm checking at this moment
7 the --
8 MR. IVETIC: If I can begin answering while you're looking, Your
9 Honours, for purpose of the time. The -- my understanding was that
10 previously when the Defence had objected that the motions were not in
11 compliance with the guidelines that after a while we were told that to
12 not use that anymore as a -- as a bases, so I don't believe that in this
13 particular instance we've objected to the large number of exhibits as
14 being not in compliance with the guidelines.
15 We did identify, as counsel indicated, eight instances where we
16 had specific objections to specify documents. Counsel has dealt with all
17 of them except for number 19264, which is at paragraph 39 of the
18 witness's statement and for which we did have an additional objection
19 based upon the fact that he's merely reciting a paragraph from the
20 document into the record. The document is not offered by him and he does
21 not identify any prior knowledge of the document or personal knowledge of
22 the matters contained therein.
23 So those were the specific objections that we made to the
24 associated exhibits, and if counsel is removing the ones that he's
25 identified, then we're only left with the specific objection to number
2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, you'll find that on page 4 --
3 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: -- and I'm not tendering it.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see that it's only on the specific documents
6 that the Defence has -- has reserved its right to -- no, have complaint,
7 and that the request to have them admitted would be denied. So you have
8 limited your response there to that.
9 We'll consider it and we'll finally decide on the matter
11 Now at what time should we start, Mr. Groome? A brief -- if we
12 would start with the witness not later than 12.00, how much time you
13 think you would need.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I think the matters that I wish to
15 raise should only take about 15 minutes. I do have some recent
16 information from the -- from Ms. Bolton, although that doesn't change the
17 start time. The witness's bag with the clothes that he wanted to wear to
18 court doesn't arrive in The Hague until 10.00 tomorrow, so just simply to
19 have a time just to prepare himself to appear before the Chamber.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Now, in order to lose as little time as possible,
21 perhaps it would be good that we take half an hour in the first session
22 at 11.00, that we then take a break of half an hour, and that we then
23 start with the testimony of the witness starting at 12.00, which would
24 allow sufficient time, I take it, for the matters you wish to raise, and
25 then that we have full sessions on from 12.00, that is, one session of
1 one hour, one session of 55 minutes, and then 20 minutes' break between
3 MR. GROOME: The Prosecution is grateful, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Any comments on that? If not ...
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we adjourn for the day, and we will resume
7 tomorrow, Wednesday, the 10th of October, at 11.00 in the morning in this
8 same Courtroom I.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,
10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day
11 of October, 2012, at 11.00 a.m.