1 Thursday, 11 October 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 The Chamber is not informed about any preliminaries, therefore
11 could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
12 MS. BOLTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't seem to be getting
13 sound through my headphones.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If you push the volume button several times, then
15 slowly you will start hearing my voice.
16 MS. BOLTON: Could you keep speaking, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, just tell me. It's not pushing it, but it's
18 pushing it repeatedly.
19 MS. BOLTON: Yes. Thank you.
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Wilson.
22 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Wilson, I'd like to remind you that the solemn
24 declaration you gave yesterday is still binding; that is, that you'll
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: JOHN WILSON [Resumed]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Having said this, Ms. Bolton, are you ready to
3 continue your examination?
4 MS. BOLTON: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
6 Examination by Ms. Bolton: [Continued]
7 Q. Good morning, General Wilson.
8 A. Good morning.
9 MS. BOLTON: May I have P326 MFI [sic] up, please.
10 Q. While that's being brought up, General Wilson, you may remember
11 that yesterday the last document we were discussing was the record of the
12 discussions you had with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic at Lukavica
13 barracks on the 25th of May, 1992.
14 A. Yes, I recall that.
15 Q. And I had been asking you some questions yesterday before we
16 looked at that document about the arrangements that had been made for
17 your transportation that day, and you had told me if there had been any
18 firing upon you when you went to the barracks that day that it would have
19 been recorded in the document you created. And having had an opportunity
20 to review the document that's now before you during proofing, was there
21 any record of your having been shot at en route to Lukavica barracks on
22 the 25th of May, 1992?
23 A. I haven't re-read the document.
24 Q. I'll leave that issue then for now.
25 MS. BOLTON: Could we have 65 ter 20799A, please.
1 For the record, this is a document that's discussed at
2 paragraph 75 of the witness's statement.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
4 MS. BOLTON: Sorry, Your Honour, I'm just waiting for the
5 document to be brought up in English.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then I meanwhile take the opportunity to -- well, I
7 don't know who I'm correcting. But P326 is admitted into evidence. It's
8 not MFI'd. I'm referring to page 2, line 9.
9 MS. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Before you, General Wilson, you should see a transcript of an
11 intercepted conversation dated the 25th of May, 1992, where the speakers
12 have been identified as Ratko Mladic and an unidentified male.
13 A. Yes, I can see that, yeah.
14 Q. And if you would look part-way down the page you would notice
15 that there is a quotation from General Mladic which reads as follows:
16 "Be stubborn, observe, and make sure your men have had a good
17 rest. Put observers. If a single bullet is fired at you or at
18 'Jusuf Dzonlic' barracks or 'Marsal Tito' barracks or if a single soldier
19 is wounded either at the front or in the barracks, I will retaliate
20 against the town."
21 The other male replies:
22 "Yes, sir."
23 General Mladic states:
24 "Make sure that your soldiers are aware that Sarajevo is going to
1 The other male says:
3 And General Mladic is saying:
4 "Sarajevo will shake, more shells will fall on per second than in
5 the entire war so far."
6 Can you tell me how the position that General Mladic is quoted as
7 taking in this intercept on the 25th of May, 1992, compares with the
8 position he took during the meeting with you and Mrs. Plavsic that same
10 A. I would say it accurately reflects the statements that he made at
11 our meeting on the same day. He was showing some determination to carry
12 out such action unless the barracks were evacuated safely.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MS. BOLTON: Can I have page 2 of this document, please, in both
15 English and B/C/S. And if we could scroll down in the -- in both pages,
17 Q. At the very bottom of the second page in English General Mladic
18 is quoted as saying:
19 "We have the means and the bridges with which to cross the river.
20 I have blocked Sarajevo from four corners. The city is trapped. There
21 is no way out."
22 How does that statement correspond with the actual state of
23 affairs on the 25th of May, 1992?
24 A. The reality is on the 25th of May, the city was fully invested by
25 the Serb forces and it was virtually impossible to move in or out of the
1 city. Now, that statement there reflects the reality on the ground.
2 MS. BOLTON: Could I ask that be introduced as the next exhibit
3 MFI, please.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 Mr. Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 65 ter 20799A will be P327 marked
7 for identification. Thank you.
8 JUDGE ORIE: And keeps that status for the time being.
9 Please proceed.
10 MS. BOLTON:
11 Q. Yesterday you told us that the second barracks to be evacuated in
12 Sarajevo was the Jusuf Dzonlic barracks. Do you have any recollection of
13 the date or the approximate date when that occurred?
14 A. I believe it took place on the 27th of May, 1992.
15 Q. And could you tell us whether that evacuation went smoothly?
16 A. No, it was an absolute disaster.
17 Q. What went wrong?
18 A. The sides had been negotiating all day -- in fact, some of those
19 negotiations were taking place down at the Presidency. They arrived back
20 at the PTT building quite late in the day at about 4.30 and announced
21 that it had been agreed the evacuation could take place. There was no
22 plan. The barracks commander hadn't really been warned that the barracks
23 were about to be evacuated. It all seemed rushed and confused. I
24 counselled both sides at the time, saying it would be better to wait
25 until the next day, and they were determined that it should take place.
1 So at about 1800, I think, or 6.00 in the evening they went to the
2 barracks and started to get things organised there and it was mass
3 confusion. Trucks had been preloaded with weapons that it was agreed
4 should be left behind, some of the BH militias got into the barracks and
5 were searching the vehicles and were looting. The soldiers and a limited
6 number of civilians were unaware of what was required. Once again, at
7 about 8.00 at night I warned the parties a potential disaster existed and
8 that they should rethink the plan to evacuate the building that night.
9 They were determined to continued.
10 Eventually at about 8.30 and in dark they left the barracks, some
11 150-odd vehicles. The lead vehicle which was or which contained
12 Colonel Cadjo took a wrong turn. Colonel Cadjo thought that the agreed
13 route would be ambushed as it happened in the very first barracks
14 evacuation. So he changed the route with General Boskovic's approval,
15 but none of the militias on the ground knew that they were coming so
16 eventually they bumped into a number of different militia positions.
17 Firing took place. The convoy broke up. At least one soldier was killed
18 in the firing, a number were wounded. The vehicles were scattered all
19 over Sarajevo. Some vehicles got out successfully to Lukavica. About
20 30 vehicles lost the next day and about 30 people.
21 MS. BOLTON: May I have 65 ter 10733, please.
22 Q. And while that's coming up, what role did General Boskovic play
23 in evacuating that barracks?
24 A. General Boskovic was the senior JNA negotiator, and he was the
25 actual overall co-ordinator for the JNA during the evacuation. He was
1 supervising the evacuation. He travelled in the last vehicle out of the
2 barracks. Colonel Cadjo was in the first vehicle out of the barracks.
3 Q. And before you, you have -- you should see a document. Could you
4 tell us who authored this document?
5 A. No, I can't. It's a lieutenant-colonel. It might be one of the
6 staff officers in Sarajevo.
7 Q. All right.
8 MS. BOLTON: Could we turn to page 2 in both English and B/C/S,
10 Q. Do you recognise the document that's now before you?
11 A. I do. It's a record of a meeting held in the afternoon on the
12 29th of May.
13 Q. Sorry, the date on the top of the page is the 28th of May. Does
14 that correspond with your recollection or not?
15 A. Sorry, it's the 28th of May, the day after the evacuation of the
17 Q. And were you present at this meeting?
18 A. I was.
19 Q. General Boskovic is quoted on the page before us as saying:
20 "I'd like to say what happened yesterday. I was with Cadjo, and
21 as the agreement wasn't respected from the Serbian side Cadjo and I went
22 to the Presidency."
23 He goes on to explain later on that page that, at the very
25 "We had a definite route. Some people couldn't believe that they
1 were sure so they changed the route."
2 MS. BOLTON: If you could please turn to the next page in both
3 English and B/C/S.
4 Q. The top of the page he goes on to say:
5 "The convoy was broken on Stup's loop. We were attacked by
6 Serbian Territorial Defence (SDT) and Territorial Defence (TOBH) ..."
7 And he goes on to say if these soldiers were wounded and one was
8 killed. Does that correspond with your recollection of events?
9 A. It does.
10 MS. BOLTON: Could that be marked as the next exhibit, please.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And the exhibit, Ms. Bolton, I see text in the
12 English version which is not English but appears in B/C/S, isn't it?
13 First page -- the first page where you started.
14 MS. BOLTON: One moment, please.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could we go back to the first page. Unless you
16 could tell me what "werkexemplaar" means. You are using it, and
17 apparently I take it that you understand what the content is. It is
18 translated, so the parties -- it's Dutch. Please look at it for me at
19 this moment and I'm consulting with my colleagues. There's no reason not
20 to admit it. But please take care that you don't have third languages in
21 your documents.
22 Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 65 ter 10733 shall be assigned
24 Exhibit P328. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
1 One of the reasons, by the way, Ms. Bolton why I'm even
2 mentioning it is because there's text under it which I have difficulties
3 in finding in the original, as a matter of fact. That is the line in the
4 original with starts with "broj stranice," and I have no idea whether it
5 corresponds with the original language. Is it an explanation of the
6 Dutch language? Is it -- I have no idea, but it's -- certainly needs
7 some additional attention.
8 MS. BOLTON: Yes, we'll check the translation, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please. Then I still have to decide on admission.
10 P328 is admitted into evidence.
11 MS. BOLTON:
12 Q. Yes. So, General Wilson, we've been discussing then an intercept
13 where General Mladic is quoted as making some threats about making
14 Sarajevo shake, and you've told us about some threats that were made at a
15 meeting that you had with him, that if the barracks weren't evacuated
16 within three days that certain things would happen. Was the
17 Marsal Tito barracks evacuated by the 28th of May, 1992?
18 A. No, it wasn't.
19 Q. Was there shelling the night of the 28th of May, 1992?
20 A. Yes, it was.
21 Q. Could you please describe its intensity for us?
22 A. It, once again, was -- it was probably the biggest night of
23 shelling of the city from April, and it started I think in the evening at
24 about 1700, went through until early morning. It appeared that the whole
25 city was being engaged, not just particular areas, but there was an
1 emphasis of fire down in the old city, down in the city centre. And
2 there were literally thousands of rounds of all calibres, including
3 rocket-launchers, being fired into the city and distributed in such a way
4 that there appeared to be no particular targets involved, just a general
5 engagement of the city. And it was certainly -- it was the
6 second-biggest night I remember of my time down there of the shelling.
7 It was -- it was a really horrendous experience for the inhabitants of
8 Sarajevo on that particular night.
9 Q. Where was the -- where were the shells falling relative to the
10 confrontation line?
11 A. There appeared to be no relationship between the shelling and the
12 confrontation line. The city itself was the target. There was a lot of
13 firing around the PTT, but the weight of fire seemed to be going into the
14 old city.
15 MS. BOLTON: Could we have 65 ter 09964, please.
16 Q. You should see a document before you. There's a signature on the
17 top of the document. Do you recognise the signature?
18 A. It's my signature.
19 Q. And His Honour was asking a question earlier about the fact that
20 the work "werkexemplaar" appears to have been placed on the document at
21 some point. Do you know anything about that?
22 A. We had a Dutch signals company providing communications for us
23 from Sarajevo to the rest of the world. It may well be a security
24 classification or a priority of handling. I don't speak Dutch, so I
25 don't know, but it was stamped on there by a Dutch signaller.
1 Q. And this document subject matter is:
2 "Record of conversation with BiH and JNA delegations
3 29th May, 1992."
4 Could you tell us who authored the document?
5 A. I authored the document.
6 Q. At paragraph 76 of your statement you refer to a meeting you
7 attended on the 29th of May, 1992, with General Boskovic, Colonel Cadjo,
8 and Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic. Is this the meeting you were referring
9 to at that part of your statement?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. Can you tell us what General Boskovic had to say about the attack
12 the previous night?
13 A. General Boskovic and, indeed, Colonel Cadjo also wished to
14 dissociate themselves with the attack that was launched upon the city the
15 night before. They recognised the gravity and the severity of the
16 attack. They indicated they thought General Mladic was out of control,
17 that pressure had been put on him by JNA authorities to stop the attack,
18 and that he had ignored that approach.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Sorry to interrupt you, but could we on our screens
20 go back to the document rather than to the statement.
21 THE WITNESS: General Boskovic actually apologised on behalf of
22 the JNA for the conduct of General Mladic and he certainly wanted to have
23 nothing to do with any responsibility for the attack on that night.
24 MS. BOLTON:
25 Q. Now, the first -- the meeting apparently according to paragraph 1
1 started at 8.00 a.m. and there's an indication there as to who was
2 present at that time. Were you later joined by other participants?
3 A. Yes, I believe it was in the afternoon that the representatives
4 of the Presidency arrived, led by Mr. Doko.
5 MS. BOLTON: Could we have page 2 of this document, please. And
6 if we could concentrate on paragraph 5 in particular. Thank you.
7 Q. Could you tell us, sir, what occurred when the general -- sorry,
8 not general, Minister Doko and the other representatives from the
9 Presidency attended?
10 A. Yes, they brought a tape with them that they said the group would
11 be very interested in listening to. They subsequently played that tape.
12 It was a recording of General Mladic giving artillery fire commands and
13 orders on the night of the 28th, and you could -- it was given in -- the
14 tape and recording was done in Bosnian -- in Serbo-Croat, which I
15 don't -- or in Serb which I don't speak, so Colonel Cadjo translated for
16 me. And he said that General Mladic was directing fire at individual
17 target areas. He was ordering fire at his command; that means that you
18 can't fire unless he says so and you fire when he says so. And he was
19 orchestrating the calibres of fire that were being used from time to time
20 during the attack.
21 I must say that the group was somewhat dismayed collectively at
22 the contents of the tape, and there was much shaking of heads and dismay.
23 Q. Can I ask you what General Boskovic's reaction was to the tape?
24 A. Well, firstly he certainly thought it was General Mladic. He
25 recognised the voice as did Colonel Cadjo. And they, once again, wished
1 to dissociate themselves with the attack that was launched on the city
2 that night. He apologised for General Mladic's behaviour.
3 Q. Although you don't speak Serbian, did you recognise any voices on
4 the recording?
5 A. No, I can't say I can.
6 Q. And you indicated that Colonel Cadjo was providing some
7 translation to you. In paragraph 5, halfway through, we have an
8 indication starts with:
9 "The tape showed that General Mladic personally directed the
10 artillery attack on the city" and it says "(English transcript to be
11 provide). He selected targets including the Presidency, town hall,
12 police headquarters and children's embassy and directed fire away from
13 Serb populated areas. Fire was at his direct command and he directed the
14 cease-fire of light calibre weapons to allow 155 MM artillery and
15 multiple rocket launchers to engage targets."
16 The information there about what was being targeted, what areas
17 were being targeted and what buildings were being targeted, where did
18 that information come from?
19 A. That came from Colonel Cadjo's translation, his oral translation.
20 I can't recall what happened to the written translation.
21 MS. BOLTON: Could that document be admitted as the next exhibit,
22 please, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ?
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 09964 shall be
25 assigned Exhibit P329.
1 JUDGE ORIE: P329 is admitted into evidence.
2 MS. BOLTON: Thank you.
3 Could I please have 65 ter 22234. Sorry, there should be an
4 English translation as well. The Court's indulgence.
5 Thank you.
6 Q. You should now see before you, General Wilson, a series of
7 transcripts from intercepted conversations, and I'm only going to ask you
8 about a few of them. The first is conversation 15 which appears starting
9 at the bottom of page 1, and I'm just going to ask you if you would read
10 that conversation to yourself. And when you're at the bottom of the
11 page, please let the court clerk know and he'll change or he'll turn the
12 page for you electronically.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. There appears to be orders to fire at two neighbourhoods in
15 Sarajevo, Velesici and Bascarsija. And my question is: As a member of
16 the Australian army, when you receive or issue orders to fire how
17 specifically is the actual target identified in the orders?
18 A. The target is identified by a map reference, either a six-figure
19 or an eight-figure number which allows you to identify on the ground to
20 an accuracy of either a hundred metres or 10 metres, a hundred metres
21 being the maximum that you would ever give to an artillery unit to fire.
22 So you're being quite precise about where you want the rounds to land.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic.
24 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, although the
25 witness is well into his answer, my objection would be: Is he talking
1 now about facts concerning the shelling of Velesici or is he speaking
2 from the area of his expertise?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, he's telling facts he knows about his own
4 background; that is, how these matters are done in the Australian army,
5 how orders would be given there and would be received there. That's what
6 I understand the testimony is about. And those are facts, I take it.
7 It's not expert opinion about whether it's good what they do in Australia
8 or whether it's better what they do in Sarajevo. Yes, again apparently
9 the objection has been withdrawn.
10 Please proceed.
11 MS. BOLTON: Thank you.
12 Q. And what is the benefit of targeting or pin-pointing a target
13 with that degree of precision?
14 A. You're maximising the opportunity for accuracy and minimising the
15 danger of rounds landing where you don't want them to go.
16 Q. Can you explain what area fire is?
17 A. From time to time in a military operation you may wish to engage
18 an area as opposed to a specific target. It might be to keep the enemy's
19 head down while you're manoeuvring. It might be to inflict damage upon a
20 particular area. So from time to time, it is normal to engage an area,
21 but for economy of fire the normal practice is to be as accurate as you
22 can with what is essentially an area weapon.
23 Q. And have you ever issued an order for area fire in an urban
25 A. No.
1 Q. And why is that?
2 A. Because there is a great danger of collateral damage and of
3 civilian casualties, that in urban areas the emphasis is on achieving the
4 greatest accuracy you can and your selection of weapons is to ensure that
5 that accuracy is achieved.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Wilson, could I ask you: Have you ever been in
7 a situation where you were engaged in combat close to an urban
8 environment, where you were one of the parties to the conflict?
9 THE WITNESS: In a -- close to a village -- well, that's not
10 quite urban, but a rural village, yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I was wondering whether you were telling us at
12 this moment what you should do or what you had done and why you didn't do
13 it. Were you ever at a point that you were considering to fire into an
14 urban or a village area and then refrained from doing it for the reasons
15 you gave.
16 THE WITNESS: I've been questioned about doctrine under which I
17 was educated, and that's what I'm really responding to rather than
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, this of course comes close to expert evidence,
20 Ms. Bolton, and although you introduced the matter by what -- whether
21 this witness had ever done something, but it slipped into opinion rather
22 than that it stayed with the facts you were starting with.
23 MS. BOLTON: Right. And to the extent that it has, Your Honour,
24 my respectful submission would be that the jurisprudence of this Tribunal
25 has permitted persons with military expertise to express opinions on
1 matters of this nature.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You didn't hear me say that it was totally
3 inadmissible. What you heard me say is that you slipped from facts to
4 something else, and it became unclear whether the witness was testifying
5 about his experience or about his knowledge on a theoretical level and
6 that's what I wanted to be put clearly on the record.
7 Please proceed.
8 MS. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honour. And do you need me to
9 explore that any further or is it clear to the Tribunal?
10 JUDGE ORIE: We leave it to you, but we would have no further
11 need for clarification.
12 MS. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Could we please have page 3 in both English and B/C/S in this
14 document. And we'll be looking at conversation 3 which is at the bottom
15 of both pages.
16 Q. And again, if you could read the conversation and let the clerk
17 know when to turn the page for you, please.
18 A. I'm sorry, which conversation, 3?
19 Q. Conversation 3, please.
20 A. Thank you. Yes.
21 Q. Approximately halfway down the page - we're on page 4
22 now - you'll see there's a quote to:
23 "Fire at Velesici and at Pofalici where there aren't many Serb
24 inhabitants ."
25 And I believe the number 1 is ascribed to General Mladic. How
1 does that compare with what you were told by Colonel Cadjo was on the
2 recording that you listened to?
3 A. It confirms that General Mladic was identifying specific targets
4 to be attacked on the night of the 28th of May. He was personally
5 identifying specific areas.
6 Q. What about the reference to "where there aren't many Serb
7 inhabitants." Do you recall whether that was something that
8 Colonel Cadjo told you about?
9 A. No, I don't recall that.
10 MS. BOLTON: Could I have the -- could we scroll down the same
11 page, please, look at conversation 8.
12 Q. And here I just have some questions. There's a reference at
13 line 3 to 155's and multiple rocket launchers. What are 155's?
14 A. 155 is a medium artillery piece that has a range of about
15 30 kilometres and has a very large explosion when it lands. If it were
16 to hit a normal suburban concrete house, it would completely destroy it.
17 Rocket launchers fire multiple rockets, perhaps 30 at a time. They're an
18 area weapon. They're about 120-millimetre calibre. When they land, they
19 land as a group and have quite an impressive explosive effect upon the
20 ground. Once again, they'd be highly destructive in an urban area.
21 Q. And in your view appropriate to use in an urban environment where
22 there's civilians?
23 A. No, I don't believe they have the accuracy one would be seeking
24 in an urban area.
25 MS. BOLTON: Finally, could we have page 5 in English and 5 in
2 Q. I think the entirety of the conversation is visible on page 5 in
3 the B/C/S, but in the English you're going to have to read conversation
4 12 and then let, again, the clerk know when you've finished that page and
5 when he can turn the page for you.
6 A. Okay.
7 Q. Could we just go back to page 5 in English, please. Now, in this
8 conversation, General Wilson, there is a reference by one of the
9 gentlemen to the runway. Could you tell us whether there were
10 Bosnian Serb forces in proximity to the airport at that point in time?
11 A. At that time the Bosnian Serb forces controlled the Sarajevo
13 Q. And at the very beginning of the conversation the two speakers
14 are talking about multiple rocket launchers firing and 155's, and then
15 Private Cekovic refers to comets, "those comets, you know, comets
16 flashing on all sides." What do you take that to be a reference to?
17 A. I believe he's referring to the multiple rocket launchers. They
18 leave a trail of fire behind them as they move through the air.
19 Q. And there's also an indication approximately two-thirds of the
20 way down the page that the fire went on -- he says "we caused" -- I'm
21 looking at speaker number 1:
22 "It seems we caused bedlam. We caused -- you have no idea how
23 long the fire went on for, until 2.00 or 3.00."
24 Does that correspond with your recollection?
25 A. Yes, it does.
1 Q. There's also a reference further down the page --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpreters, please.
3 Thank you very much.
4 MS. BOLTON: My apologies.
5 Q. There is again Private Cekovic quoted as saying part-way through
6 the paragraph:
7 "You should have seen the chaos, fuck it, how they fired at them
8 with Pragas, how they fired at them. It was chaos."
9 What is a Pragas?
10 A. I don't know what a Pragas is.
11 Q. Could you tell me what the destructive fire is of an
12 anti-aircraft gun?
13 A. Yes, when it's employed in a ground role, it has a high volume of
14 fire. It fires typically an explosive round varying between 20 and
15 40 millimetres. And because it has such a rapid rate of fire and an
16 explosive effect at the other end, it can just tear buildings apart in a
17 very short period of time. It's a very impressive weapon when used in
18 the ground role.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MS. BOLTON: Could this document be admitted, please, as the next
21 exhibit marked for identification.
22 JUDGE ORIE: The number would be, Mr. Registrar ...?
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 65 ter 22234 will be P330 marked for
24 identification. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
1 Please proceed, Ms. Bolton.
2 MS. BOLTON: Yes. Could we please bring up Exhibit P00072 which
3 is part of 65 ter I think 22460 and -- the Court's indulgence.
4 I'm sorry -- no, that's fine. And I think it's -- is there a
5 sub (C) under that exhibit? If so, that's what we will want.
6 Q. In the meantime, I will ask General Wilson, in terms of the
7 artillery fire that you described from the evening of May 28th into
8 May 29th, could you tell us what kind of preparations you would have to
9 take before launching a barrage of this nature?
10 A. Certainly you would require the ammunition to be there and you
11 would need to pre-plan that. There was a vast quantity of ammunition
12 consumed on that night that would have require some planning to
13 preposition that ammunition. I doubt that they would have that sort of
14 on the gun-line on a routine basis. And then of course if one is being
15 serious about accuracy, one would pre-register targets. You actually
16 trial firing a few rounds so that you know exactly where they will land
17 and you've got the right data in your gun position so that when they
18 actually fire the target on the night it will be accurate. Following
19 that you would fire what is called an on-call target, I believe it is,
20 where you just fire into the general area and then adjust your fire as
21 you're going. But ideally you would have all your targets pre-registered
22 and ready to go.
23 Q. I'm going to play you a short clip.
24 MS. BOLTON: I can tell the Court that we're not relying on the
25 audio at all for the clip. It's just the images that we'll be asking the
1 witness to comment on. And the timing is from 14 to 32 seconds.
2 JUDGE ORIE: But if you do not rely on the text, may I take it
3 that you also do not want to tender the text in the transcript.
4 MS. BOLTON: I do not wish to tender the text in transcript. I
5 think it's already in evidence.
6 JUDGE ORIE: If that's the case, then of course you will
7 understand that I don't have a recollection of every single piece of
8 evidence at this moment.
9 Please proceed. The video needs to be played only once.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 MS. BOLTON:
12 Q. Could you tell us how the explosions and the fire -- artillery
13 fire that we saw in that clip compared to what you observed on the
14 28th/29th of May, 1992?
15 A. It's about 30 seconds of what went on in the city all night and
16 generally distributed around the city. What we could see there were
17 tracer bullets moving through the air. It's just a snap-shot of a very
18 small part of the city, but does reflect the intensity that was going on
19 really for hours and hours at a time.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MS. BOLTON: Could we now have Exhibit D00039, please, and I
22 would be asking for page 5 in both -- sorry, first page 1 in both
24 THE INTERPRETER: Once again, the interpreters are kindly
25 requesting the parties to please slow down and the witness to wait before
1 he answers - thank you very much - a little bit. Thanks.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Wilson, you've heard the request to take a short
3 break between the question and answer. And Ms. Bolton will do the same
4 between answer and question.
5 MS. BOLTON:
6 Q. All right, you should see before you now, General Wilson, a
7 conversation between Ratko Mladic and Potpara that is indicated was
8 intercepted on the 29th May, 1992. And could I now have page 5 in both
9 English and B/C/S, please. Sorry, I had the wrong page number in B/C/S.
10 It's page 4. And if we could scroll down to the bottom of the page in
11 both versions.
12 You see very near to the bottom of the page, General Wilson, that
13 General Mladic is quoted as saying:
14 "I agree. I want the same thing. If they want peace, they can
15 have it. I ordered yesterday evening as soon as I arrived, there was
16 that attack not only against the units but also against you. This
17 shooting, somehow I managed to calm down the men here, to get them under
18 control, to stop them from firing. This thing they are doing now, they
19 probably have good pantomimes or some good impressionists who probably
20 successfully imitated our voices, mine, yours, everybody's."
21 May I ask you what your response would be to a suggestion that
22 the voice on the radio intercepts that you were played during your
23 meeting with the Presidency was the voice of a mimic?
24 A. I can only say that the six officers from the JNA and the
25 Presidency who were there had no doubt that the voice in that tape
1 belonged to General Mladic.
2 MS. BOLTON: Could I ask, please, to go back to page 1 in both
3 versions of this document, please. And could you scroll down in the
4 English version and the B/C/S, please.
5 Q. The very last entry from Ratko Mladic on that page starts with
7 "... for you to know. First of all, they are listening in on
8 our conversations ..."
9 Who do you understand he would be talking about when he says
10 "they are listening in"?
11 A. I think he's referring to the Presidency military forces, to
12 their radio intercept people.
13 MS. BOLTON: May I now have 65 ter 09967.
14 Q. Could I ask you while that document's coming up, what was the
15 Secretary-General of the United Nations reaction to the bombardment of
16 Sarajevo on May 28th/29th?
17 A. He issued a call for the Serb parties to show restraint and ask
18 that representations be made to the Serb authorities to call for that
19 restraint. And I was asked by the force commander, General Nambiar, to
20 arrange a meeting with the local Serb political and military leadership
21 to pass the Secretary-General's concern and call for a restrain on.
22 Q. And do you recognise the document that's before you?
23 A. I do.
24 Q. And that appears to be a press release issued by the
25 Secretary-General relating to the bombardment?
1 A. Yes, it is.
2 MS. BOLTON: Could I ask that be marked as the next exhibit,
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 09967 will be Exhibit P331.
6 Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
8 MS. BOLTON: May I have 65 ter 11321, please.
9 Q. While that's coming up, you indicated that you received a plea of
10 sorts from the Secretary-General to call for restraint and you were asked
11 to arrange for a meeting. Did you, in fact, meet with General Mladic?
12 A. Yes, I met with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the
13 30th of May at Lukavica barracks. I passed on the appeal and the concern
14 of the Secretary-General at that time.
15 Q. Do you recognise the document that is before you, General Wilson?
16 A. I do, it's a cable authored and signed by me.
17 Q. And when you met with General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992,
18 did he deny that his forces were responsible for the bombardment the
19 evening before?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Did he acknowledge that they were responsible?
22 A. Yes, he did and his justification was that the standard
23 justification that that was simply defending the Serb people and Serb
24 neighbourhoods in Sarajevo from attack from the Presidency forces.
25 Q. Had you seen signs that there was an all-out attack by Presidency
1 forces throughout the city of Sarajevo on the 28th and 29th that they
2 would have needed to repel against?
3 A. No, I -- it was pretty much one-way traffic. I -- of course
4 because of the volume of fire that was going on that night, it was
5 virtually impossible to hear any outgoing fire, but if it was it would
6 have been minimal in comparison to the incoming fire.
7 Q. And at any point during your meeting with General Mladic on the
8 30th of May, 1992, did he suggest that there was some false propaganda
9 out there in terms of there being somebody mimicking him on an alleged
11 A. No, that point was never raised on the 30th of May nor at any
12 other time by General Mladic with me.
13 MS. BOLTON: Could that be marked as the next exhibit,
14 Your Honour, and that would be a convenient place for the morning break.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 11321 will be Exhibit P332.
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: P332 is admitted into evidence.
19 Ms. Bolton, could you give us a time estimate on how much time
20 you would still need.
21 MS. BOLTON: 20 minutes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: We'll verify how much time you used until now. I
25 expect that 20 minutes would just keep you within the time estimate you
1 gave at the beginning.
2 We first would like to have Mr. -- the witness to be escorted out
3 of the courtroom, Mr. Wilson.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break of 20 minutes and we'll resume at
6 ten minutes to 11.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bolton, please proceed. You have 20 minutes.
12 MS. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 May we have 65 ter 09966.
14 Q. And while that's coming up, General Wilson, when I was
15 questioning you earlier about Defence Exhibit 39 which was the intercept
16 where General Mladic was referring to pantomimes or mimics, in that
17 intercept I read you a portion about where he indicated that they may be
18 listening or they are listening to our conversations. Do you have any
19 knowledge about whether in May of 1992 the opposing forces were able to
20 listen to one another's conversations?
21 A. No, I didn't know definitively, but any soldier on operations
22 would expect that the opposing side is monitoring your communications.
23 That's normal practice.
24 Q. Thank you. Now you have before you a document dated
25 30th May 1992, which is a summary of a meeting with President Milosevic.
1 Do you recognise this document?
2 A. Yes, I do. I've seen it before.
3 Q. And were you in attendance at this meeting?
4 A. No, I was not.
5 Q. Were you briefed as to what occurred at this meeting?
6 A. I was. When Mr. Cedric Thornberry, the chief civil affairs
7 officer, arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June for the airport
8 negotiations, he briefed me on this meeting and other meetings which had
9 taken place which were a preamble to our negotiations on the opening of
10 the airport.
11 Q. And do you remember very briefly what Mr. Thornberry told you was
12 President Milosevic's position with respect to the bombardment on the
13 28th/29th of May, 1992?
14 A. In short he in no way supported or condoned it and thought that
15 General Mladic had grossly misbehaved.
16 Q. And does the contents of this document accord with the briefing
17 you received from Mr. Thornberry?
18 A. Yes, it does.
19 MS. BOLTON: Could that be introduced as the next exhibit,
20 please, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Your speed of speech, again, Ms. Bolton, was causing
22 some problems.
23 Yes, the next exhibit -- no, I was focusing on the -- on
24 listening to the other channels in order to find out whether the
25 interpretation was able to keep up. Therefore, I -- my attention was
1 distracted for a second.
2 Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter 09966 will be Exhibit P333.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: P333 is admitted into evidence.
6 MS. BOLTON: Thank you.
7 Q. Now, I understand from your statement, General Wilson, and this
8 is -- no need to go to it, but at paragraphs 84 to 92, that you were
9 involved in negotiations surrounding the opening of the Sarajevo airport
10 in early June 1992. Could you tell us when relative to those
11 negotiations -- first of all, do you recall the date when those or dates
12 when those negotiations took place?
13 A. The negotiations started on the 2nd of June when Mr. Thornberry
14 arrived from Belgrade and concluded with the signing of the agreement on
15 the 5th of June.
16 Q. And when relative to those negotiations did the evacuation of the
17 Marsal Tito barracks take place?
18 A. Marsal Tito barracks were evacuated during the negotiations. The
19 exact date I don't recall, but it was either the 3rd or 4th of June.
20 Q. And I think you've answered this already, what was the state of
21 artillery fire into Sarajevo during those evacuations?
22 A. There was absolute quiet in the city for the first time in many
23 days on the day that the Tito barracks were evacuated because both sides
24 wanted the cease-fire to work.
25 Q. And who agreed to the cease-fire?
1 A. The Serb political leadership and the Presidency political
2 leadership signed -- I'm sorry, the barracks?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. The JNA were the lead negotiators; that's General Boskovic, and
5 the BiH military representatives, Mr. Doko may have been replaced by
6 then. I'm just not exactly sure.
7 Q. And so who was it that indicated there wouldn't be artillery fire
8 during the evacuation?
9 A. All the parties agreed to that requirement, and in particular the
10 JNA and I assume with the agreement of General Mladic who ultimately
11 controlled artillery fire.
12 Q. And how did the evacuation of that barracks proceed?
13 A. Very smoothly and without hiccup.
14 Q. And once the evacuation was complete and the troops were safely
15 out of the barracks, what happened to the barracks?
16 A. The night that the -- the night of the evacuation, Serb artillery
17 engaged the barracks with white phosphorus incendiary ammunition and
18 basically burnt the barracks down with any of the contents that may have
19 remained at that time, including at least some of the heavy weapons that
20 were left behind.
21 Q. And can you describe how accurate or inaccurate the fire was by
22 the Serb artillery in respect of engaging the barracks?
23 A. It was very accurate and very effective.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No comments, no loud speaking.
25 MS. BOLTON:
1 Q. And after in the days following, was there any improvement in
2 terms of what you have previously described as periods of heavy sustained
3 shelling of the city of Sarajevo?
4 A. Immediately after the signing of the airport agreement on the
5 5th of June, heavy fighting resumed within the city, in particular around
6 the airport and the Dobrinja area and later around Grbavica, I think it's
7 pronounced, which is adjacent to the Marsal Tito barracks. There was
8 extremely heavy fighting took place then for a period of about seven days
9 and basically continued until I left the city on the 23rd of June.
10 MS. BOLTON: Could I have 65 ter 09380, please.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And could I ask one question.
12 You said the shelling of the Marsal Tito barracks was very
13 accurate, very, very precise. Now, it is my understanding that barracks,
14 including the Marsal Tito barracks, cover a certain area which is more
15 than one -- the size of one or two houses but is really a complex of
16 buildings perhaps with some yards. Now, what did you mean exactly by the
17 accuracy? Was it that they didn't hit the yard but only the buildings --
18 or, I mean to say it was very accurate? But if it's, well, let's say a
19 complex say the size of hundreds of metres, then how could you assess the
20 accuracy of the artillery attack?
21 THE WITNESS: The barracks was too far from the PTT for me to
22 actually observe the fire that night, and in any event we wouldn't be out
23 wandering around the city at night under the conditions that existed at
24 that time. But I did see the barracks in the couple of days afterwards
25 and I'm assessing that something like 80 per cent, 70, 80 per cent of all
1 the buildings were completely burnt out. But the area around had
2 suffered very little collateral damage and that's why I say it was
3 accurate and effective.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Now, there had been shelling all over the city in
5 the days before, isn't it? You said the damage was little in terms of
6 fire or how should I understand you --
7 THE WITNESS: You can see that buildings are shattered, broken.
8 Roofs have been removed, holes blown in walls, litter about the place and
9 area that has been attacked. Now, this area was not subjected to
10 artillery fire while the JNA were in there because the Serb forces would
11 have been concerned about collateral damage that may have been caused to
12 the barracks while they were still occupied. So prior to the evacuation
13 there was not a great deal of artillery directed in that area. A day or
14 two after the evacuation where there was no longer this concern, there
15 was little damage to the buildings in the area of the barracks, so the
16 fire that had produced the destruction of the barracks had to have been
17 accurate and basically confined largely to the area of the barracks.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, could I just try to imagine what has
19 happened and I now take a scenario which may be unrealistic, but then
20 please tell me. You fire a couple of incendiary projectiles on the
21 barracks, the fire spreads among the buildings but is limited to the
22 barracks because the distance to the adjacent construction outside the
23 barracks is too big for the fire to spread over there. Now, I know that
24 this is -- let me see why is my explanation of the situation not correct
25 and why is your explanation, which is a conclusion on the basis of what
1 you've seen the days after, why is that correct?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, you'll forgive me, it's 20 years ago
3 so I only have in my mind now an impression that the barracks were
4 surrounded by an open area, that there were not civilian buildings close
5 up to the barracks, that there was some distance. So a fire in the
6 barracks, in my recollection, is unlikely to have spread outside --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 THE WITNESS: -- to other areas. So your description is
10 JUDGE ORIE: So that is a possible explanation, apart from the
11 accuracy of the firing you just adopted as an explanation for the
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. But as I say, I could not observe any
14 damage to the buildings around from artillery or any significant damage
15 in comparison to the rest of the city.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not blaming you for what you could see or could
17 not see. What I'm trying to do is to see to what extent I can follow
18 your conclusions as compelling conclusions on the basis of what you'd
19 seen the day after. And you say: Well, my scenario, to say so, could
20 not be excluded.
21 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Bolton.
23 MS. BOLTON:
24 Q. Part of the scenario that His Honour just put to you was the
25 suggestion that the fire damage that you saw to 70 or 80 per cent of the
1 buildings within the barracks compound could have been the result of one
2 or two shells. Do you agree with that?
3 A. It's possible. It's more likely that there were multiple
4 incendiary rounds fired into the barracks to make sure the job was
5 correctly done. But as I've indicated, we were not in a position to
6 observe the fire, only the effect.
7 Q. I don't know if you can answer this question 20 years later, but
8 do you recall how -- what the spacing was like in between buildings
9 within the barracks compound at that point in time?
10 A. No, I can't.
11 Q. Sir, you should now have in front of you 09380, which is --
12 sorry, do you recognise this document?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. What is it?
15 A. It's a copy of the agreement signed by both the BH Presidency and
16 the -- and Mr. Karadzic for the opening of the Sarajevo airport.
17 Q. And if you look at paragraph 2 there is a reference to all
18 anti-aircraft weapons systems being withdrawn, and in subparagraph (B) to
19 systems being placed in concentrated areas agreed by UNPROFOR and subject
20 to UNPROFOR observation. Yesterday you gave evidence about concentration
21 areas for Serb weaponry. Is this what you were referring to or is this
22 something different?
23 A. This is what I was referring to.
24 MS. BOLTON: And if we could go to the final page in both B/C/S
25 and in English, please.
1 Q. You'll see that there's a signature and you told us this was an
2 agreement agreed to by both the Presidency and the Serb side, and I see
3 only Mr. Karadzic's signature; why is that?
4 A. Well, because during 1992 and 1993, to my knowledge at least, the
5 Bosnian Presidency refused to meet with the Serb political leadership,
6 nor to sign any documents that they had physically signed. So it was
7 necessary to have shuttle diplomacy between the two parties in different
8 rooms or different physical locations. And when documents were
9 presented, to have two copies, one for each party to sign.
10 MS. BOLTON: Could that be introduced as the next exhibit,
11 please, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 65 ter 09380 will be Exhibit P334.
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
16 MS. BOLTON: May I have 65 ter 19595, please.
17 Q. And I'm just going to change to the last subject matter I'm going
18 to ask you about, General Wilson, which is the issue of detention
19 facilities and allegations of ethnic cleansing. At paragraphs 94 and 95
20 of your statement you indicate that you started to receive reports of
21 ethnic cleansing commencing in March and April of 1992. Could you tell
22 us in what areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina those reported activities were
23 allegedly occurring?
24 A. The -- there was a belt across northern Bosnia just south of the
25 Sava River, but basically from Bihac right across to the Serbian border
1 and also in Drina valley. They were the main areas that we were
2 receiving reports about alleged ethnic cleansing.
3 Q. And what persons were being ethnically cleansed according to the
4 reports you were receiving?
5 A. Well, at that time the reports that we were receiving were only
6 Muslim people were being moved on, although later I was aware that really
7 all three nationalities suffered the same treatment.
8 Q. And could you tell us what the sources of your information were
9 about the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in the areas you've
10 referred to?
11 A. Primarily through the media but authoritatively through the ECMM
12 who were responsible for monitoring that type of activity and who
13 exchanged with us on a regular basis information and reports. We were
14 quite well informed about their activities and about their reporting.
15 Q. And you should see before you a document 19595. Do you recognise
16 this document?
17 A. I do.
18 Q. And what is it?
19 A. It's a letter from the Presidency to me highlighting concern
20 about ethnic cleansing which had taken place I think in the Prijedor
22 Q. Now, according to your statement, you had the opportunity to
23 visit area of Bijeljina, and at paragraph 97 you also include some
24 observations of paramilitary forces, including Arkan's men and the
25 White Eagles. And your observation was that the paramilitaries seem to
1 enjoy freedom of movement. Were the paramilitary forces armed?
2 A. The ones that I physically saw were armed, yes.
3 Q. And in areas controlled by what forces or entities did the
4 paramilitaries seem to enjoy freedom of movement?
5 A. I saw them specifically in Knin, in the Krajina, and also in
6 eastern Slavonia in the area of Vukovar.
7 Q. And who controlled those areas?
8 A. The Serb political authorities controlled those from a political
9 point of view, and Mr. -- General Mladic, at least in the area of Knin,
10 had been able to demonstrate his military authority in those areas also.
11 Q. You also discuss at paragraph 101 of your statement allegations
12 that the Bosnian Serb forces were engaging in a large-scale detention of
13 civilians, and you indicate that you raised this issue at airport talks.
14 And you record in your statement Mrs. Plavsic's reaction. Could you tell
15 us whether General Mladic participated in the airport talks?
16 A. He was present during the negotiations, yes.
17 Q. Can you recall, if at all, his reaction to this issue?
18 A. On those occasions, no. He was certainly present and heard the
19 conversations, but they were directed to Mrs. Plavsic. She represented
20 herself as having some responsibility for humanitarian affairs in the
21 Serbian political leadership.
22 Q. And what about the issue of allegations of ethnic cleansing, was
23 that brought up at all in the airport talks?
24 A. Not that I recall. They were very focused on opening the
25 airport, trying to keep all the distractions out of there as possible.
1 It was complicated and difficult enough without introducing other
3 Q. And in your statement you indicate at paragraphs 101 and 113 that
4 General Mladic sometimes attended meetings - and now this would be later
5 in time - of the ICFY and that Lord Owen frequently raised the issue of
6 claims of ethnic cleansing, POWs, and detention centres in those
7 meetings. Do you have any recollection of General Mladic's reaction to
8 any of those discussions?
9 A. No, I can't link General Mladic to any warning or discussion
10 involving Lord Owen and ethnic cleansing. He may or may not have been
11 present. I can't say he was.
12 MS. BOLTON: Could I have this document marked as the next
13 exhibit, please.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 19595 will be Exhibit P335.
16 Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
18 MS. BOLTON: And, finally, could I have Exhibit P00205, which is
19 a video, and the timing I'm going to be playing in a moment - again, we
20 don't rely on the audio - will be 6 minutes and 42 seconds to 6 minutes
21 and 49 seconds.
22 Q. And while that's being brought up, General, I'm going to remind
23 you that at paragraph 104 of your statement you gave evidence about
24 discussing a famous photograph of a man in a detention camp with
25 General Mladic. Do you recall that conversation with General Mladic?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. And I'm going to ask that we play this little bit of footage,
4 [Video-clip played]
5 MS. BOLTON: Will you stop, please. So we played from 6.42 to
6 6.47.5 seconds.
7 Q. There is an image of a gentleman that is now before you. Could
8 you tell me anything about this gentleman?
9 A. This was a photograph that was circulating in the media during
10 1992 and was alleged to have been taken of inmates of a concentration --
11 of a -- yes, a concentration camp which was being run by the Serbs to
12 hold prisoners. And the -- it was -- the media reports associated with
13 this photograph suggested that this was -- this individual was showing
14 signs of the sort of treatment that was dealt out to the inmates of those
16 Q. And is this an image of the gentleman that you refer to in
17 paragraph 104 of your statement or was that a different photograph?
18 A. No, that's the same photograph.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MS. BOLTON: I'm finished with that document and that brings me
21 to the end of my examination-in-chief except for the issue of the
22 associated exhibits that have not been discussed with the witness. Would
23 you like me to discuss that issue now, Your Honour?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps it's best to do that now so the Defence
25 knows during cross-examination where we stand.
1 MS. BOLTON: Thank you. I can indicate that of the exhibits
2 there are, I believe, eight associated exhibits that I didn't have the
3 opportunity to discuss with the witness. Two of those the Prosecution
4 isn't seeking to introduce. So the Prosecution is not seeking to
5 introduce 65 ter 10580 or 11095, as I believe the evidence the witness
6 has given in court plus his statement accurately covers the subject
7 matter. And I am seeking to introduce as associated exhibits the
8 remaining 65 ter numbers, which are --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you would call them one by one.
10 MS. BOLTON: 03287.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Receives, Mr. Registrar, number ... ?
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P336, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Next one, Ms. Bolton.
14 MS. BOLTON: Sorry, 03707.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Receives number ... ?
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P337, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Next one.
18 MS. BOLTON: 03905.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Receives number ... ?
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P338, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Next one.
22 MS. BOLTON: 10581.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Receives number ... ?
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P339, Your Honours.
25 MS. BOLTON: 10582.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Receives number ... ?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P340, Your Honours.
3 MS. BOLTON: 10789.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Receives number ... ?
5 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
6 MS. BOLTON: And Ms. Stewart's records and mine don't accord with
7 respect to Exhibit 03281. I thought I discussed that with the witness
8 and it was already introduced. Could ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: That is UNPROFOR cable, summary of meeting between
10 McKenzie, Morillon, and Auger dated 30th of May. I will consult with my
12 MS. BOLTON: May I just have a moment, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MS. BOLTON: Yes, if that could be given an exhibit number,
15 please, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours 65 ter 03281 will be Exhibit P342.
18 And for the clarification of transcript, 65 ter 10789 will be
19 Exhibit P341. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber, Ms. Bolton, has considered that the
23 number of associated exhibits which should be limited, the Chamber
24 accepts the number of seven associated exhibits. P336 up to and
25 including P342 are admitted into evidence.
1 Mr. Petrusic, are you ready to cross-examine Mr. Wilson?
2 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The Defence is
3 ready to begin with our cross-examination.
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrusic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon -- good morning, General. Sir, I
6 would like to begin with where you left off, or rather, where the
7 Prosecutor left off with the examination-in-chief. You were shown a
8 photograph and I won't really deal with that, but I would like to ask you
9 this: Do you have any information as to what these people looked like,
10 the people shown in this photograph before they entered the camp?
11 A. No, I don't.
12 Q. And just an additional question to deal with that: Do you know
13 whether this photograph of these people, these men, was made from inside
14 the camp or from outside the camp?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. General, sir, in paragraph 16 you talk about your mission upon
17 your arrival in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, Zagreb, and then in Sarajevo,
18 and you say that at this time Mr. Thornberry had a leading role and
19 General Nambiar to a lesser extent. You say also that at the time you
20 were just an actor in the organisational sense. Now, would you agree
21 with me that irrespective of this position that you state in this
22 paragraph, during your stay there in the first ten months you've actually
23 held a number -- a large number of meetings and had numerous contacts
24 with the two primary warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 A. I -- yes, counsellor, that's a true summary of my total time
1 there. But that paragraph is really talking about the period from
2 22 March until 16 or 17 May, when other people were more involved in the
3 more significant negotiations and I was a relatively junior commander and
4 staff officer, in that period, March to mid-May.
5 Q. After mid-May you had under your command - if I may put it that
6 way - a number of observers, UN observers?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Their job - as the name itself indicates - was to compile all
9 kinds of information relating to any developments within the warring
10 parties. Is that correctly -- would that be right to say?
11 A. Counsellor, that was one of their jobs. They had many other
12 roles and functions, but actually recording information and reporting it
13 was one of their more important roles.
14 Q. If we can focus just on the information that they gathered
15 relating to whatever was happening on either side of the warring parties,
16 no doubt they would have reported on that; right? Am I correct?
17 A. That's a very general question. They submitted regular reports
18 on what was happening in their area of interest, and they would submit
19 specific reports about individual actions or investigations.
20 Q. General, sir, your reports, were they drafted also based on the
21 information that you received from these observers when they were
22 submitting their reports?
23 A. Sometimes that's correct; sometimes my reports were based upon my
24 own experience and observations. It depends on the circumstances,
1 Q. You also talk in your statement about meetings that you had with
2 representatives of UNPROFOR. The information that you received from --
3 or, rather, you and UNPROFOR representatives, did you exchange
4 information between the two of you?
5 A. Yes, there was quite a sophisticated system of reporting and
6 exchange of information that existed within UNPROFOR. And I was
7 fortunate enough to be included in the most critical committees and
8 meetings. So I was very well informed about what was happening within
9 UNPROFOR in 1992 and then later in 1993 when I was in Geneva. I had
10 access to the most sensitive information within UNPROFOR.
11 Q. The information that you had access to also had to do with the
12 events in Sarajevo; correct?
13 A. Yes, but Sarajevo was only one area of interest for UNPROFOR.
14 There were many other areas also.
15 Q. In paragraph 38 you mention that you were absent between the
16 30th of April and the 13th of May, 1992, from the area. Now, would you
17 agree with me that after your return you were briefed on the developments
18 and the events that had happened in Sarajevo, at least the key events,
19 the key developments, that transpired while you were away?
20 A. It was a very short briefing from General McKenzie, who on the
21 15th of May when this briefing took place, perhaps it was on the 16th of
22 May, he had many other distractions and concerns so the briefing was
23 confined to essentials and not very detailed. But my staff who - that's
24 the military observers - did brief me in a bit more detail, but they were
25 not knowledgeable about the evacuation of the first JNA barracks. So
1 that's a hole in my information.
2 Q. So, General, sir, you're trying to say that you had no
3 information whatsoever about an attack on a column of privates and
4 officers that was withdrawing under the agreement from the command of the
5 2nd Military District, and this happened on the 3rd of May when this
6 column was attacked, and 42 soldiers and officers were killed on the
7 occasion; is that what you're saying?
8 A. I have only a general knowledge of that unfortunate incident.
9 Q. You also said yesterday that you had information about
10 Izetbegovic being taken as a hostage while you were away, and I'm telling
11 you now that it was on the 2nd of May. Did you have information, or
12 rather, were you -- was it reported to you -- were you told why
13 Mr. Izetbegovic was taken hostage?
14 A. If I was, I can't recall now.
15 Q. A few days after the briefing that you had with General McKenzie,
16 were you fully aware of the situation or the extent of the problems that
17 existed while these barracks were being evacuated? First of all, did you
18 know how many barracks there were in the town? And then could you also
19 tell me about what you knew about the extent of the problem?
20 A. I'm aware there were three barracks within the town that remained
21 to be evacuated in mid-May. There was a fourth barracks somewhere out of
22 town which had some officer cadets in it that I was at no time involved
23 with the evacuation of that barracks. And I'm aware that the barracks
24 were invested, surrounded, by the BiH force. And I'm also aware of the
25 difficult circumstances that the JNA faced in extracting their garrisons
1 out of Croatia during the war there and the very hard lessons they learnt
2 there. So I understand the JNA's concern to ensure the safe passage of
3 their soldiers out of the three Sarajevo garrisons, and in particular
4 with their experience in the evacuation, the first one, in early May.
5 Q. Did you know that in addition to soldiers and officers there were
6 also members of their families in those barracks, in other words,
8 A. Yes, I'm fully aware of that. And that's one of the reasons that
9 we took every action we possibly could to ensure the safe evacuation of
10 those barracks as a UN force.
11 Q. So when you arrived on the 14th of May, the situation you found
12 yourself in was that there were hostilities in the town and you described
13 this as happening in the immediate vicinity and sector of Dobrinja. Now,
14 General, sir, could you tell us who held Dobrinja, or rather, I withdraw
15 this question. I apologise.
16 Tell us first: Was Dobrinja a neighbourhood in Sarajevo town
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 Q. This is a neighbourhood that was, we could say, close to the
20 airport; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Do you know what forces held Dobrinja?
23 A. At the time we thought it was a disputed area which changed from
24 time to time, but it was our belief that it was held by the Serb forces.
25 Q. But this balance of power, do you know whether it changed
1 while -- during your stay there?
2 A. I never actually went inside Dobrinja after about the
3 14th of May, but from reports there was very heavy fighting in there,
4 particularly after the airport agreement. And while there were no big
5 changes of territory there, one side or the other was able to dominate by
6 fire, that's fire-power. But it was always a disputed area during 1992.
7 Q. General, sir, since we are talking about this, could you tell us:
8 Do you know who started the fighting on the 14th of May? Who started the
10 A. I don't know the answer to that, counsellor. The Presidency told
11 me that the Serb forces did, and the Serb authorities told me that the
12 Presidency forces started the fighting. This is a pretty typical
13 situation when you're trying to investigate circumstances in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.
15 Q. In the reports that you submitted when you defined the party that
16 was responsible for causing or provoking an attack, did you rely on one
17 source alone, either the Muslim or the Serb source?
18 A. No, never relied on one source, never stated it was fact unless I
19 could personally verify it with reliable witnesses or having observed
20 myself. I always found it very useful to ask one side then the other
21 what had happened. Sometimes one was able to find that the truth lay
22 somewhere in the middle. But never relied upon one source, counsellor.
23 Q. General, sir, can you agree with me that there were a lot of
24 sources in the media, a lot of information leaked -- was leaked through
25 the media to shape the public opinion, and the sources for that
1 information was rather unreliable, or rather, they were biased?
2 A. Information -- manipulation of information is one of the weapons
3 of war, both during the war in Bosnia and virtually every other conflict.
4 The accuracy of media reports is often questionable and needs to be
5 verified by reliable means before accepting it as fact, and this is what
6 we attempted to do.
7 Q. General, sir, in the fighting in Dobrinja, could you tell us to
8 the best of your recollection which forces took part in the fighting on
9 either side? Of course we all -- it is generally known that there were
10 Muslim and Serb forces. But could you define some military units or
11 formations in view of your experience, military experience, and also your
12 knowledge of the ground as it was?
13 A. Would you like to put a time-frame on that, counsellor, so I can
14 be specific?
15 Q. Absolutely. General, sir, I am always referring to the period
16 around the 14th of May, or rather, the fighting in Dobrinja, the conflict
17 in Dobrinja.
18 A. On the BiH side I've reported earlier in my evidence that there
19 were police involved and people dressed in civilian clothes and did not
20 appear to be very well organised. It was the early days in the
21 organisation of the BiH army. I also reported that I saw in Dobrinja on
22 the 14th/15th, thereabouts, of May very well organised Serb forces, so
23 well organised that I believe they're probably remnants of the JNA. They
24 were very well equipped and organised and were fighting professionally.
25 Q. When you talk about professional -- no, I withdraw this question.
1 General, considering that remnants of the JNA stayed behind
2 blocked in the barracks, do you know that in the territory of the
3 then-Republika Srpska there had been a mobilisation drive? All the
4 military-age able-bodied men were mobilised.
5 A. Yes, I've learnt that.
6 Q. Do you know also that this military-age population consisted of
7 men who had done their military service and that's what their entire
8 military knowledge boiled down to?
9 A. I don't fully understand the question, counsellor.
10 Q. General, all men between 18 and 27 in the former Yugoslavia were
11 subject to the so-called military obligation, meaning that they had to do
12 their military service for 12 or 18 months in the JNA. When the
13 mobilisation started in Republika Srpska, all these military
14 conscripts - in this case between 18 and 60 --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bolton.
16 MS. BOLTON: Sorry to interrupt, but my friend has a bit of a
17 habit of making a statement of a fact without asking the witness to
18 verify or not. So I think with respect to the "all men between 18 and 27
19 in the former Yugoslavia" being subject to this military obligation and
20 the length of the obligation, that that's not a fact that's in evidence.
21 If he wants the witness to comment on it, he should ask the witness to
22 comment on it.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I think there's reason to intervene for a short
24 moment. Let me try to understand what is going on at this moment. It
25 started with you, Mr. Wilson, saying that the Serb forces were well
1 organised, that you believed that they're probably remnants of the JNA.
2 That's where it all started. Did you intend to refer to the troops or to
3 the officers or the whole of the armed forces or did you have certain
4 elements in mind? You talked about equipment. Did you consider the
5 equipment to be -- or you believed probably to be JNA equipment. I see
6 you're nodding "yes." That's hereby on the transcript.
7 As far as the professional way of operating - that's how I
8 understand - did it give you the impression that all the foot soldiers
9 were JNA -- former JNA foot soldiers, remnants of the JNA; or did you
10 have in mind the higher-up positions? Could you please explain what made
11 you believe that this was probably remnants of the JNA?
12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, a competent military unit requires
13 individual training of the soldiers and the officers, they must be
14 individually competent. And then they must be collectively able to
15 operate as a unit which is -- requires a great deal of training. It's
16 not something you acquire overnight. You don't just put 30 people
17 together and expect them to be able to do it competently. And then
18 there's the level of equipment they've got. They should have an array of
19 equipment that allows them to do their job properly. The people I
20 observed appeared to be that complete package. They appeared to be
21 operating as individuals very professionally. The way they were moving,
22 their plan, their manoeuvre, indicated that this was an organisation that
23 had had some collective training together and they also had the array of
24 equipment that you would find in a normal professional organisation. So
25 if they were militias thrown together, they were very competent for their
1 level of training.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, do you have any knowledge of whether the
3 troops, the units, the lower-level military people, whether they were --
4 they had been in the JNA already for a longer period of time or that they
5 may have been recruited soon before you saw them perhaps being trained in
6 the past under their duty to serve in the military?
7 THE WITNESS: I don't have definitive knowledge of that, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.
9 Yes, before I say "please proceed," we need a break first.
10 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom. We'll have a
11 break of 20 minutes.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break and we'll resume at 17 minutes
14 past 12.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.19 a.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
18 Mr. Petrusic, could you carefully always consider when you put a
19 question to the witness what purpose it serves. For example, when you
20 asked whether the witness was aware of families being in the barracks as
21 well, that was a question that was put to the witness yesterday and that
22 was -- question was answered, that he was aware that there was family.
23 Similarly, the -- there was no suggestion of any knowledge by this
24 witness on the conditions of the prisoners in Trnopolje or -- he just
25 said a photograph was used. There was no suggestion. So I don't think,
1 as a matter of fact, that without any further examination on that matter
2 that the Chamber would ever think that the witness would have had any
3 personal knowledge of them. So that may have been superfluous questions.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Wilson, Mr. Petrusic was - I forgot to say
6 that - but you noticed that he was a member of the team of the Defence of
7 Mr. Mladic will now continue his cross-examination.
8 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I would like to call up
9 65 ter 11321.
10 Q. General, do you recognise your signature on this document?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. You also know what the topic of this meeting was. It was
13 30th May 1992 and we had occasion to hear earlier today about it. You
14 were asked some questions about it by the Prosecution. We can agree,
15 can't we, that the main topic on Mladic's mind at that time was the
16 Marsal Tito barracks. In that time-period did members of the
17 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina or those who held Sarajevo cut off water
18 and electricity to this and other barracks?
19 A. I believe they did. Whether they did it at this time, I can't
20 confirm. But certainly it was reported that in particular the barracks
21 at Marsal Tito was without electricity and water.
22 Q. In that time that we are discussing, that is, the month of May,
23 were the supply of water and electricity under the control of the
24 government, that is to say the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. I can't confirm that, no.
1 Q. Could you confirm whether this water and power supply was
2 released again to the barracks after this meeting?
3 A. No, I can't confirm. I can confirm that the Presidency had the
4 ability to either provide or deny electricity and water to the barracks,
5 but when they switched it on and when they switched it off I can't
7 Q. In paragraph 4 - we have to move to the second page in
8 English - General Mladic talks about the weapons in that barracks,
9 Marsal Tito barracks and he says that an agreement has been reached.
10 Now, in view of this meeting and your military experience I should like
11 to ask you: Was it a justified demand on the part of the commander to
12 ask for these weapons, bearing in mind the fact that they could be used
13 against him the next day?
14 A. He can certainly adopt the position that he's not prepared to
15 hand over the weapons, but whether that's legitimate or not depends upon
16 what his higher authorities' position was on the matter. Ultimately, the
17 JNA and Serb political leadership directed that the weapons be handed
19 Q. You also discussed paragraph 5, the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
20 What is your impression - although you've told us a few things about that
21 already - to what extent was General Mladic independent in order to be
22 able to make that decision?
23 A. What decision are we talking about, please, counsellor?
24 Q. General, would you please focus on paragraph 5 which deals with
25 the withdrawal of heavy weapons outside of range of Sarajevo. Can you
1 see that?
2 A. Yes, I can.
3 Q. My question is: To what extent was General Mladic independent in
4 making the decision to withdraw those weapons?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bolton.
6 MS. BOLTON: I don't think my friend's laid a basis that would
7 suggest that this witness would have any knowledge of the matters he's
8 asking about.
9 JUDGE ORIE: That's one issue. The other one is that the
10 language of the question - at least as translated - is ambiguous, whether
11 he was independent in making the decision, which leaves it open whether
12 he made that decision or whether he was in a position to make such a
14 But could you tell us anything about your knowledge of the
15 competence of General Mladic at the time to make decisions of the kind as
16 described in paragraph 5? Do you have any insight in that?
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I believe this is essentially a
18 political decision that General Mladic's political masters were to make.
19 He could certainly advise against such a move as a technical advisor,
20 military advisor, but it's not his -- I suspect it was never -- he never
21 had the authority to make that decision himself.
22 JUDGE ORIE: And you draw that conclusion on the basis of the
23 character of the subject matter; is that --
24 THE WITNESS: Well, General Mladic claimed that he was
25 subordinate to the political leadership of Mr. Karadzic. So this level
1 of strategic decision would have had to have been made by the political
2 masters, not by military men.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you say paragraph 5 even expresses that he
4 would not make that decision, so apart from dependence or independence,
5 that he would abide by any agreement made and you usually do not use that
6 language if you are talking about your own decisions?
7 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.
9 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Look at paragraph 7, please. General, sir -- I'm sorry, not
11 paragraph 7 of the statement but paragraph 7 of the document on the
12 screen. Did you at any time after the 30th of May learn that the forces
13 of the Army of Republika Srpska shelled Dubrovnik?
14 A. After the 30th of May; is that correct?
15 Q. After that time, did you learn that Serb forces shelled
17 A. I can't remember a specific incident, but I do recall that the
18 JNA did not withdraw from around Dubrovnik until September of 1992. And
19 there may or may not have been further firing after the 30th of May, but
20 at this meeting as recorded in paragraph 7 I'm raising the issue of a
21 particular event of which fire was directed upon the city from positions
22 recently vacated by the JNA.
23 Q. Did you have any knowledge that the forces of the
24 Army of Republika Srpska had taken over those positions?
25 A. As it was stated position of the JNA that they'd withdrawn from
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina with effect about the 20th of May, one presumes any
2 forces remaining directing fire from that area had to come under the
3 authority of General Mladic.
4 Q. But the military observer only informed you that Dubrovnik was
5 shelled from positions recently abandoned by the JNA. Are you aware, do
6 you have any knowledge, that this was done by forces under the command of
7 General Mladic?
8 A. No, and that is what I'm trying to clarify at this meeting. And
9 if he -- if they were forces under his command, to ask for restraint.
10 Q. At any rate, you are now speculating on this fact -- with this
12 JUDGE ORIE: What is the speculation exactly? What -- the
13 witness testified about a document which contains a question about who's
14 responsible for recent shelling of Dubrovnik. And then in the report it
15 says that the city was shelled from positions that were recently vacated
16 by the JNA without any further speculation of whatever kind. Now, you
17 asked the witness several times: Do you know whether this was taken by
18 the Serb forces? And then the witness says: Well, that sounds logical
19 but I do not know. That's at least how I understood your answer now,
20 Mr. Wilson.
21 So who is now speculating? Where is the speculation,
22 Mr. Petrusic?
23 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President, but I
24 obviously misheard or didn't hear that part of the answer when the
25 witness said "I don't know." I really apologise and, if necessary, I'll
1 apologise to the witness. And now we will move to another question.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The witness said "one presumes any forces
3 remaining," clearing stating that it's a presumption and nothing more
4 than that. But that is because you specifically asked him: After the
5 time did you learn that Serb forces shelled Dubrovnik? And then he says:
6 Can't remember, don't know, but from the position one can presume it was
7 done by the Serbs, but he doesn't express any clear view on it. I think
8 there's no speculation whatsoever in the answer of the witness. And
9 please check then whether the translation in B/C/S was accurate. Please
11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this
12 document -- oh, no, it is already an exhibit, 332.
13 JUDGE ORIE: It is, Mr. Petrusic. Please proceed.
14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I now ask for document
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, for those looking at the transcript at
17 a later stage, it's preferable if you refer to the exhibit number
18 assigned meanwhile to the document. 10789 has been admitted as P341.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I really apologise,
21 but in this short time I did not manage to re-number the documents under
22 65 ter that have received P numbers.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed. Apparently I'm able to look at it
24 on the basis of the Prosecution's list, but let's not spend time on it.
25 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. General, this document is also dated 30th May and relates to the
2 same meeting. When you were going to Lukavica barracks, did you always
3 announce your arrival?
4 A. At this time, yes, counsellor.
5 Q. Was fire ever opened at you or at the UNPROFOR vehicles by the
6 members of the VRS that controlled that road?
7 A. We were fired on on many occasions along that route, including
8 one occasion my vehicle was hit or two vehicles we were travelling in
9 convoy, we were hit 32 times and lost six of the eight tires in our
10 vehicle. Inevitably when we raised this with the two parties they would
11 say it was the other party or we have no control of that area. We never
12 successfully identified who was responsible for these attacks.
13 Q. General, in this situation did you have any reason to doubt the
14 sincerity of General Mladic when he said that Dobrinja was under Muslim
15 control and outside the zone of his influence and that it was obvious
16 that his forces had not done the shooting?
17 A. I had no reason to doubt General McKenzie -- General Mladic's
18 advice on this matter.
19 Q. General --
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I now call up 03287.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And that, Mr. Petrusic, is - let me just have a
22 look - P336, yes, a fax dated the 3rd of June.
23 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Could I ask you to focus, General, on this meeting of 3rd June,
25 1992, with the Presidency. Ganic, Sedarovic, and Mr. Somun and the
1 president himself were present, and also the Serbs, Karadzic, Plavsic,
2 and General Mladic. Isn't it the case in this situation as well that
3 separate meetings were held first with one delegation and then with the
5 A. That's true, counsellor, that the paragraph opens with
6 "meetings," plural, meaning there was more than one meeting and
7 General Nambiar would have been aware that there were separate meetings.
8 Q. Could you tell us what went on at that meeting, because we read
9 among other things -- it seems that the upcoming evacuation of 1.000
10 persons from Tito barracks could affect the situation, given the
11 emotionality of their situation and the irascibility and tiredness of
12 some of the players. And then there is a note which says this also has
13 territorial implications. Could you tell us what this actually means?
14 A. This cable was drafted by Mr. Thornberry and signed and released
15 by myself. So the precise wording is attributed to Mr. Thornberry. This
16 cable records the bargaining position of both parties at a particular
17 point in time of the negotiations. It's the 3rd of May, there no
18 agreement until the 5th of May. The positions outlined in this cable
19 remain essentially unchanged over the period of negotiation. The
20 Presidency are seeking for the withdrawal of heavy weapons, all heavy
21 weapons, from within 30 kilometres of Sarajevo. The Serb political
22 leadership is seeking a demilitarisation and division of Sarajevo
23 supervised by the United Nations. The negotiators are trying to open the
24 airport. That's basically what this cable says.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Wilson, you said it's the 3rd of May, whereas
1 I --
2 THE WITNESS: Sorry, 3rd of June.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Then 5th also of June, I take it.
4 THE WITNESS: 5th of June, yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Could you please take a look at paragraph 4. The president of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, on this occasion advocated military
10 intervention. Do you believe that military intervention was the only way
11 to have the airport opened?
12 A. No, I don't. And the airport was opened in the end through
14 Q. Did you have other meetings with Mr. Izetbegovic as well? I
15 apologise. During your mandate, during your term there in 1992?
16 A. We were meeting with President Izetbegovic on a daily basis
17 during these airport negotiations. And after I left Sarajevo on the
18 23rd of June, I don't believe I saw the president again until Geneva
19 sometime in December 1992.
20 Q. General, sir, this position on military intervention, was it
21 isolated, as it were, or did Mr. Izetbegovic ask for military
22 intervention several times?
23 A. Military intervention was a topic in the international media at
24 the time, given the events in Sarajevo. It was certainly, I believe, the
25 president's wish that he could attract international military
2 Q. So are you saying that he did advocate military intervention?
3 A. Yes, he would have welcomed it.
4 Q. One of the issues discussed at this meeting was control of the
5 airport. General, sir, were you aware that the Serb side had had the
6 airport and the area around it under its control?
7 A. Yes, I was.
8 Q. Finally, we will agree that ultimately the solution was found for
9 the airport and that the Army of Republika Srpska handed over the runway
10 and -- and -- and all auxiliary facilities, and they were then used by
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, is there any dispute about what this
13 all resulted in? I see Ms. Bolton is nodding "no." So therefore I
14 wonder why we have to take the time with the witness for these matters
15 which are not in dispute. Please proceed.
16 But I take it that you do not contradict what was suggested by
17 Mr. Petrusic?
18 THE WITNESS: Not at all, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, yesterday you said something about this. The Muslim
22 forces in town, did they have any artillery?
23 A. Yes, but very limited quantity.
24 Q. As for the positions they had outside the inner city, did Muslim
25 forces have artillery units as such?
1 A. I don't know.
2 Q. Did you ever tour the positions outside the city, those that were
3 under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Did you ever tour the positions that were controlled by the
6 Army of Republika Srpska?
7 A. Some part of it, about a third of the circle of Sarajevo, yes.
8 Q. Also you knew that from these mobile artillery pieces members of
9 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were targeting the positions of the
10 Army of Republika Srpska.
11 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
12 Q. Were they close to the buildings where your command was, where
13 your headquarters were?
14 A. As I gave evidence yesterday, counsellor, yes, on one occasion.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bolton.
16 MS. BOLTON: My friend, in asking the question of the witness,
17 suggested that the Bosnian forces were targeting the positions of the
18 Army of Republika Srpska from these "mobile artillery pieces," and,
19 first, I'm not sure if he's talking about the mobile mortar or something
20 else; and if he is talking about the mobile mortar, I believe the
21 witness's evidence was that he saw one mobile mortar, not multiple mobile
23 JUDGE ORIE: I was just trying to find the -- in yesterday's
24 transcript the source, Mr. Petrusic. Would you have it for me because
25 there's some challenge to what -- the way in which you presented
1 yesterday's evidence.
2 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Sir, I can resolve this -- I can
3 resolve this with the witness.
4 Q. General, you said that this mobile vehicle had been used with a
5 mobile mortar, that is. The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it have
6 several such mobile vehicles, or rather, mortars?
7 A. They may have, but I only ever saw one.
8 Q. Let us go back to this question of shelling.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, before we continue, if I ask you to
10 give me the source then to say: I can resolve it with the witness,
11 apparently you can resolve your problem. You have not resolved my
12 problem. I instructed you to give me the source. We'll find it, but
13 would you please next time not ignore my request.
14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Sir, General, did you know that members of the
16 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were close to your headquarters and were
17 firing at the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska from there?
18 A. I am aware they did that on one occasion with mortars and one
19 occasion with an anti-aircraft weapon.
20 Q. Did you lodge any protests with them because of this activity?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, does my recollection serve me well if
22 I seem to remember that a protest was discussed yesterday in the
23 examination-in-chief by Ms. Bolton and that they had -- after a protest
24 that they had been moved -- I think that is either in your statement or
25 it was discussed yesterday, Mr. Wilson.
1 THE WITNESS: That's correct, and that's what happened,
2 Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 Mr. Petrusic, if there are any specifics about the protest you
5 would like to ask, then please do so. But if it's just about whether a
6 protest was made and what was the result of that, then you may move on to
7 your next subject.
8 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Did you know, General, that from other locations that were close
10 to civilian buildings, Muslim forces were firing from these mobile
12 A. I can only comment only the conduct of one mortar. I have not
13 received any reports of any other truck-mounted mortars. I can only
14 comment on one particular situation, not multiple allegations.
15 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have document
17 JUDGE ORIE: Which is P340.
18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, this is your report that you sent to your government on
20 the 23rd of June, 1992. In paragraph 1 you say that a certain attack had
21 taken place and that it was supported by tanks and you say that a mortar
22 attack on a crowded old city street on the 22nd of June, 1992, resulted
23 in 14 dead and 35 wounded civilians. UNPROFOR headquarters building
24 sustained shrapnel damage from proximate artillery fire during the week.
25 General, do you stand by this to this day, that that's the way it was, as
1 you said in this report of yours?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Is that the situation that was well-known as the shelling of
4 civilians who were waiting in line for bread?
5 A. I believe that's a separate incident. There were a number of
6 these incidents over time. Unless in the drafting of this cable I've got
7 the wrong date, 22 June, it's referring to a separate incident. I can't
8 remember the detail at this range, counsellor.
9 Q. In paragraph 61 --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, before you continue could I seek one point of
12 One of the previous questions put to you, Mr. Wilson, was whether
13 you were aware of mortars being positioned close to civilian structures
14 and you said: No, I only know about this one incident which was close to
15 the PTT building. Yesterday you told us to have received reports, as you
16 said, of this happening and the question was about allegations that the
17 Presidency forces may have positioned mortars in proximity to hospitals
18 which in my view are civilian buildings as well. So I'm a bit confused
19 by you saying only that one incident, whereas yesterday you mentioned
20 another allegation which as you said was reported to you.
21 THE WITNESS: So the Defence counsel's question started out: Was
22 I aware of mortars, plural, a number -- use of a number of mortars. And
23 I said I could only authoritatively talk about one.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: And then the interview moved on before I'd
1 completed that -- the answer to that question of counsel. If he didn't
2 want to a follow-up question, that's entirely up to counsel.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Although you do not know whether the mortar position
4 close to the hospital was the same or a different one.
5 THE WITNESS: But I certainly received reports both in Sarajevo
6 and in other locations. It was not unusual for the Presidency forces to
7 position their fire units around sensitive civilian infrastructure.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.
10 MS. BOLTON: Sorry, Your Honour --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bolton.
12 MS. BOLTON: Could I just point out that my friend's question
13 actually at page 63, lines 23 to 25, was specific to Muslim forces firing
14 from mobile mortars.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that point but I think that -- I'm not
16 blaming anyone for not having followed the questions. What I wanted to
17 know was I wanted to clarify whether my impression that it happened only
18 on one occasion that perhaps under slightly different circumstances
19 similar events were reported. I thought that for myself to be important,
20 to have no doubt as to what the testimony of this witness was about that
22 Please proceed.
23 Mr. Petrusic, whenever I say "please proceed," it's often time
24 for a break so I should avoid doing that. We take a break of ...
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 [The witness stands down]
2 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break of 20 minutes and we'll resume --
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Groome.
5 MR. GROOME: Could I just take a few moments to ask the Chamber
6 to consider something over the break. The Prosecution is requesting an
7 additional day to file its submissions with respect to the associated
8 exhibits of Witness Tucker. The Chamber gave us 24 hours from yesterday.
9 We're asking for an additional day.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, any objection?
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: The request is granted.
13 MR. GROOME: Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we'll resume at 25 minutes past
16 --- Recess taken at 1.06 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, you may proceed.
21 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, sir, as for this incident on the 22nd of June, the one
23 that you are referring to in paragraph 1, did you report to your command
24 about that?
25 A. If you mean my command being UNPROFOR headquarters, I certainly
1 would have, although I don't have a copy of that report.
2 Q. In paragraph 61 of your statement you say that in Sarajevo on the
3 27th of May, 1992, people in a bread line were attacked. And you say: I
4 saw the incident recorded on Bosnian television. I saw this to be
5 another attack on civilians, admittedly a horrendous one, and I assumed
6 the Serbs to be responsible.
7 General, sir, you also informed UNPROFOR about that incident and
8 you say that you do not have any of your original notes relating to the
9 incident; is that correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. On the basis of what did you assume that it was the Serbs who
12 were responsible for this attack?
13 A. The vast majority of explosions within the city of Sarajevo were
14 the result of artillery and other forms of fire from the Serb forces into
15 the city. And in that context, it was most likely that the round fired
16 and causing these casualties was fired by the Serbs.
17 Q. This was a serious incident. Did it require checking several
18 sources? Did it require professional expert analysis?
19 A. At least one of these incidents was investigated by French
20 ballistic experts, and they submitted a report and I've, in my evidence,
21 indicated that they couldn't attribute with any great accuracy where the
22 round had been fired from. But, counsellor, you -- I have to emphasise
23 that at this time there were thousands of attacks by artillery on a daily
24 basis going on in the city. It was not possible to investigate all of
25 them and in many cases we couldn't even investigate the serious ones. We
1 were very small group of people with very limited mobility, and our
2 sources of information relied upon advice that both parties gave us.
3 What we saw and could confirm we reported. What was reported to us by
4 the parties, we identified the source.
5 Q. But you will agree, General, that where there were civilian
6 casualties, larger numbers of civilian casualties, that it was necessary
7 to carry out a more serious investigation?
8 A. My answer again, counsellor, is that we just didn't have the
9 resources or the expertise to do that.
10 Q. Further on in paragraph 63 you say that this investigation was
11 carried out by French soldiers. The French soldiers together with
12 Mr. McKenzie, did they have enough resources, including professional
13 resources, to carry out that investigation?
14 A. Yes, they did, but we're talking about another incident. This
15 is -- paragraph 62 refers to the 27th of May. The document on the screen
16 talks about the 22nd of June.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, if you would not have had the
18 resources, you would not have done the investigation, isn't it? The
19 question in relation to the statement answers itself.
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Now I'd like to move on to your report that you sent to your
22 command in Canberra to your own army in order to avoid any kind of
23 misunderstanding, and in paragraph 4 you say that you were being
25 JUDGE ORIE: Paragraph 4 of what exactly, Mr. Petrusic?
1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I've already said that in your
2 statement addressed to your government in Canberra, that is to say the
3 report sent on the 22nd of June, 1992.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and -- yes. Do we have that -- have you -- one
5 second -- yes. Please proceed.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was threatened on -- we received death
7 threats on a number of occasions from both the Serb side and also from
8 the Presidency side. The Serb side it was associated with the --
9 associated with the barracks evacuation and the casualties resulting from
10 that. UNPROFOR was seen to be held as responsible for the casualties
11 that occurred, particularly from the second barracks. And this was in
12 the background of the failure of the first evacuation back in May. There
13 was also the use by either the Bosnian Serb army or the JNA of UN-marked
14 vehicles to rescue Serb casualties. They went to the front and used UN
15 vehicles to remove casualties and this was portrayed to the general
16 population of Sarajevo as UNPROFOR participating and helping the Serbs in
17 the fight, when in fact we had absolutely nothing to do with it. On the
18 night of the 28th of May, Mr. Doko threatened to have me shot unless I
19 was able to stop General Mladic shelling the city. General Mladic was
20 equally angry with me because the Bosnian forces were shelling Lukavica.
21 It was just part of the territory of operating there at that time. But I
22 took them seriously and I took appropriate precautions.
23 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, sir, you will admit that the threats and the anger of
25 General Mladic's could not have the same level of intensity?
1 A. Not the same intensity, but the -- there was a certainty about
3 Q. General, sir, at the meetings that you attended, either at
4 Lukavica or at the airport, did you feel safe in the presence of the Serb
5 side, in the presence of Serb representatives?
6 A. Yes, they guaranteed my safety.
7 Q. General, sir, after December 1992 you left for Zagreb if I
8 understood that correctly?
9 A. No. In mid-November 1992 I departed Zagreb and went to Geneva,
10 appearing there in December after short leave in Australia.
11 Q. And after December 1992?
12 A. I remained with the peace conference there until December 1993 as
13 military advisor to the co-chairman of ICFY, I-C-F-Y.
14 Q. Did you have contacts with UNPROFOR representatives, or rather,
15 the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia, General Morillon, at the time -- at
16 that time, in early 1993?
17 A. No. My communication was directly with headquarters UNPROFOR
18 just located in Zagreb. On a number of occasions I had reason to call
19 General Morillon's Chief of Staff, I think a brigadier, Vere Hayes, but
20 generally my contact with UNPROFOR was with the headquarters in Zagreb.
21 I did meet General Morillon on a number of occasions when the co-chairman
22 visited Sarajevo.
23 Q. In those contacts with General Morillon, did you have any
24 information about the developments or events in Sarajevo?
25 A. In Geneva I was receiving a stream of routine and special reports
1 originating out of Sarajevo and General Morillon. So I was generally
2 aware of what was happening down there. And if I needed further
3 information, I was able to get it through headquarters UNPROFOR in
5 Q. And did you receive information from General Morillon where he
6 admonishes President Izetbegovic and warns him that he should not -- that
7 he should stop using civilian buildings as a location from which they
8 would open fire on Serb positions?
9 A. I don't recall such a representation, but it wouldn't surprise me
10 if it, in fact, had taken place.
11 Q. General, sir, let us briefly turn to the period of the spring
12 1992. Let's go back to March. Before the conflict escalated, do you
13 know that the warring parties negotiated and that there was a
14 Cutileiro Plan that was adopted for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
15 A. I'm broadly aware of the plan but not the detail.
16 Q. As you sit here, did you have information that that plan that was
17 to deal with the end to the conflict and a resolution to the conflict,
18 that all three parties in Bosnia had accepted the terms of that plan, the
19 Bosnian -- the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats?
20 A. No, I'm not aware of that and I -- earlier in your
21 cross-examination we established the fact that from 22nd of March until
22 some time in June that I was no longer in a key position of being aware
23 of these higher, more strategic sort of negotiations.
24 Q. General, sir, were you aware of the London Conference and how
25 that transpired? And again, this conference was dealing with the
1 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first hear the answer of the witness whether
3 he was aware of the London Conference, which could be understood only, I
4 think, in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 THE WITNESS: There are a number of London Conferences. If
6 counsel is talking about one in about September or August of 1992, I'm
7 aware of the outcome of that in detail.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then please put further questions. And,
9 Mr. Petrusic, could you be precise on which London Conference your
10 question is focusing.
11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The London Conference of
12 September, I believe the 20th of September, 1992.
13 THE WITNESS: I'm aware of that conference and the outcome, yes,
15 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. One of the items of that agreement was the cessation of
17 hostilities and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the confrontation
18 line. Was that, indeed, the case, General, sir?
19 A. Which confrontation line are we talking about?
20 Q. The confrontation line in Sarajevo.
21 A. My recollection is that there was an agreement that weapons would
22 be withdrawn from around four towns in the north of Bosnia, including
23 Jajce to be monitored by the UN, that we had prepared people to actually
24 go and perform this monitoring. But I was never successfully able to get
25 the Bosnian Serb army representative in Bihac to sign off on that
1 agreement at the military level. So the mission was never implemented,
2 and despite the fact that the UN actually sent additional resources to
3 the former Yugoslavia to perform that task, I was not involved in any
4 implementation in Sarajevo. That would have been undertaken by
5 General Morillon or his successor.
6 Q. General, sir, at this time, in September 1992, most of the
7 territory of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina including the parts around
8 Sarajevo was under the control of the Bosnian Serb army. Was that the
9 case in the field, on the ground?
10 A. It's true, most of the area was controlled by the Serb army, but
11 there was certainly some hotly disputed areas.
12 Q. Was it the interest of the Army of the Bosnian Serbs at that
13 point in time to end the hostilities and enter negotiations to end the
15 A. I can't speculate what the interests of the Bosnian Serb army
17 Q. General, sir, were you aware that during the frequent visits of
18 high representatives, both of the UN and the European Union, when they
19 arrived in Sarajevo, combat operations intensified and fire intensified
20 at the hands of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. It's certainly true that whenever there was an important visitor,
22 there was an increase in the intensity of military activity. I can't
23 attribute the cause of that.
24 Q. I did not hear your full answer, but you said ...
25 Well, let me ask you about your impression then. Did the Muslim
1 side - as far as you could observe the situation - represent itself as a
2 greater victim than it actually was?
3 A. I can certainly confirm that the Presidency argued that they were
4 victims. It's a value judgement as to whether they were exaggerating
5 that. I can't comment further on that, counsellor.
6 Q. General, sir, I would now like briefly to turn to sniping in
7 Sarajevo. Could you tell us, please, what you imply by the term
8 "sniping" in Sarajevo as far as the information that you have?
9 A. I think the word "sniping" was used in Sarajevo in a different
10 way to what I understand to be sniping. I think in the former Yugoslavia
11 people refer to fire by individual riflemen as sniper fire, when my
12 understanding of sniper fire is a highly trained marksman using
13 specialised equipment, engaging targets at long range. I think what was
14 happening in Sarajevo that was referred to as sniping was individual
15 riflemen of both sides engaging targets of opportunity in an urban area.
16 Q. Under this regular sniping or the sniping in the way it was
17 understood there, did that include infantry fire from weapons that were
18 in use there, which is AK-47 automatic rifles?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And just one last question about that. From your personal
21 military experience, was there a breach -- or rather, no. Were there any
22 wounds inflicted by sniper fire, or rather, when a person was wounded by
23 rifle fire or by sniper, that would be -- it would be possible to
24 determine that precisely based on expertise, professional expertise;
1 A. If that expertise existed, yes.
2 Q. General, sir, you describe in paragraph 48 of your statement the
3 deployment of artillery weapons and you say that Serbs had around 200
4 artillery pieces, artillery and mortars, that they could use to target
5 the town, the city. Could you tell us what the source of this
6 information was?
7 A. I believe I did that yesterday, but briefly it was based upon an
8 estimate on my part, taking into account the fire effect on the ground
9 and the number of fire units required to achieve that effect. And,
10 secondly, I had a map that I saw I had access to a map in the Bosnian --
11 in the BiH military headquarters which had plotted on it the Serb fire
12 positions that they had been able to identify, and it amounted to about
13 200 units. It was -- in summary, it was an estimate.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, again, yesterday the question was put
15 to the witness: Could you tell us how you came up to that number, about
16 the 200 artillery and mortar barrels. The witness answered that and the
17 question now today is: Could you tell us what the source of this
18 information was, which is exactly the same question and fortunately we do
19 get the same answer. Could you avoid to ask the same questions, and if
20 you wanted to have other details, then you should have phrased your
21 question in a different way.
22 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, if those 200 artillery and mortar weapons that
24 members of the Bosnian Serb army had, as far as you know, were deployed,
25 is it possible that they would have fired some 5- to 10.000 shells?
1 A. In a period of eight or 12 hours, which was routine for firing
2 into the city at that time, it doesn't take very long to -- if you work
3 out rounds per barrel, you can do that very quickly. That's why I think
4 5- to 10.000's actually quite conservative. Some days it might well have
5 been more. I don't know the exact number, but if my estimate is correct
6 you're only talking about a hundred rounds per gun would achieve a
7 dramatic effect on the ground, 20.000 rounds. Now, these guns can fire
8 two or three rounds a minute. It doesn't take very long to get through a
9 hundred rounds. I think my estimate's quite conservative.
10 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P326, please, on
11 the screens.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Just for me to know, Mr. Petrusic, trying to look at
13 these numbers, 10.000 in 12 hours, which would be - if I'm not
14 mistaken - four projectiles fired per barrel in one hour. Is it the
15 position that -- of the Defence that with -- that you couldn't fire four
16 or even a little bit more projectiles in one hour from one barrel; is
17 that your position? I'm just trying understand your question.
18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The Defence will deal with this
19 during the Defence case, but the question has to do with the correctness
20 of the information, that there were 200 weapons deployed there,
21 200 artillery pieces. But if we just look at the math, the arithmetic,
22 that is not in dispute here. Technically, that is quite feasible and I
23 understand that even as a lay person.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No loud talking. Mr. Mladic, no consultations.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just re-reading your question. Your question
3 "If those 200 artillery and mortar weapons were deployed ... is
4 it possible that they would have fired some 5- to 10.000 shells?"
5 So your question was limited to the capacity, not referring to
6 any further circumstances. And, therefore, I was wondering whether you
7 considered it perhaps to be an impossibility to fire on average four
8 rounds. In those circumstances, I think it should -- let's proceed.
9 You've clarified your position.
10 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, sir, this is your document. It is a record of
12 discussion with Mrs. Plavsic and General Mladic on the 25th of May.
13 Please take a look at paragraph 2, item 2. The predominant priority
14 question was that of barracks. Have you had occasion to read it now?
15 A. I've read the paragraph. I just don't understand the question.
16 Q. The question is: Did you or the representatives of the Muslim
17 authorities undertake anything by the 28th of May to resolve this
18 situation with the barracks, to enable the soldiers to leave that area?
19 A. There were negotiations continuing from the 25th of May through
20 the 28th and beyond about the evacuation of the barracks about which
21 General Mladic's view was presented at length. It was a question of
22 arriving at a plan that was acceptable to both sides. General Mladic
23 essentially refused to hand over weapons. The Presidency wouldn't
24 release the JNA from the barracks unless they got the weapons. The JNA
25 wanted to hand over the weapons. The barracks were not evacuated by the
1 28th of May, as General Mladic stated in paragraph 2 here, and he
2 followed up on his threat, that if they were not evacuated within three
3 days he would attack the city.
4 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was there a precise agreement on
5 the surrender of the barracks?
6 A. It was an oral agreement between the parties. I don't recall
7 ever seeing a written agreement. It was all very ad hoc, and in the case
8 of the first two barracks I was involved in, not very professional.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. -- General Wilson, but nonetheless it was
10 precise, was it not?
11 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour?
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Nonetheless, it was precise? The question was,
13 "was there a precise agreement?"
14 THE WITNESS: No, I haven't got to that, Your Honour. There was
15 a great deal of confusion and it was exactly a lack of precision. That
16 was the problem.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Was this imprecision due to General Boskovic who was on the side
20 of the JNA as their negotiator with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or
21 rather, the Presidency?
22 A. I believe he was partly responsible because he was leading the
23 JNA team, but also the Presidency representatives must share some
24 responsibility for agreeing to participate in a plan which was highly
25 risky, poorly thought out, lack of preparation, lack of professionalism.
1 Q. You did say something about that earlier today, but before the
2 evacuation of the Marsal Tito barracks, the Viktor Bubanj barracks was
3 evacuated and there was another one called Jusuf Dzonlic barracks that
4 was also evacuated. And while these negotiations were going on, a
5 barracks full of recruits was evacuated from Pazarici. That should not
6 be in dispute. You said yourself there were problems with the evacuation
7 of the use of Dzonlic barracks. There was skirmishes --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Would you mind to put a question to the witness,
9 Mr. Petrusic.
10 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, did you know that during the evacuation of the barracks
12 in Tuzla, another column of JNA soldiers came under fire and some were
14 A. As far as I'm aware, I believe that happened probably in March of
16 Q. General, sir, if I suggest to you that it was on 15 May and that
17 on that occasion --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Mladic again spoke loud under
19 circumstances. We've warned him several times. Mr. Mladic is hereby
20 removed from the courtroom. Could the curtains be down. Could we take a
21 brief break. Yes.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Break taken at 2.11 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 2.16 p.m.
25 [The accused not present]
1 JUDGE ORIE: The removal of the accused from the courtroom is for
2 the duration of the testimony of this witness.
3 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom again.
4 Therefore, it is important, since we have no other witness
5 tomorrow, that if any of the parties would like to raise anything apart
6 from the examination and cross-examination and re-examination of this
7 witness, that the Registry should be aware of it so as to give Mr. Mladic
8 full opportunity to attend the hearing after we've done with this
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrusic, it is time to adjourn for the day.
12 Could you inform us and Mr. Wilson would then also know how much time
13 you'll think you'll still need tomorrow.
14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will do my best
15 to finish within one session, possibly taking ten minutes or so from the
16 second session, but I'll really do my best.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Which means that as matters stand now that we would
18 finish certainly not later than at the end of the second session.
19 Ms. Bolton, I'm looking at you.
20 MS. BOLTON: Yes, I'd be very brief for re-examination as things
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 Then, Mr. Wilson, I'd like to instruct you again - as I did
24 yesterday - that you should not speak or communicate in any other way
25 with whomever about your testimony, whether already given or still to be
1 given. We'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in this same
2 courtroom. You may follow the usher.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE ORIE: I have to put something on the record, although we
6 expected that it would have been cured already, but page 40 of today's
7 transcript, line 11, and up to 13, the introduction by Ms. Bolton of what
8 then became P338 is not on the record. It was 65 ter number 03905, which
9 was presented by Ms. Bolton. Let me just check. Yes, that was the one.
10 That's hereby on the record.
11 We adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow, Friday, the
12 12th of October, at 9.30 in the morning in this same courtroom, I.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.20 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Friday, the 12th day of
15 October, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.