1 Tuesday, 30 October 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 The Chamber was not informed about any preliminaries. Therefore,
12 is the Prosecution ready to continue the examination of Ms. Hanson?
13 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could Ms. Hanson be escorted into the courtroom.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Ms. Hanson.
17 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by
19 the solemn declaration you've given yesterday at the beginning of your
20 testimony. And Ms. Bibles will now continue her examination.
21 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 WITNESS: DOROTHEA HANSON [Resumed]
23 Examination by Ms. Bibles: [Continued]
24 Q. Before we broke yesterday, you testified that in May 1992, there
25 were an increasing number of republic-level organs formalising the
1 Bosnian Serb state and establishing authority over other organs.
2 Could you highlight for us the most significant of these measures
3 as they relate to the municipal level Crisis Staff.
4 A. The first -- in late April, we have the prime minister of the
5 government issuing instructions to Crisis Staffs. Then on the 21st and
6 23rd of May, the RS government is discussing abolishing Crisis Staffs to
7 replace them with municipal war-time Presidencies. And on the
8 24th of May, we have the Presidency of the RS issuing instructions on the
9 work of municipal -- war -- municipal Presidencies.
10 Then -- I don't know where you want me to stop.
11 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I'd ask that the Court Officer call up
12 65 ter 11093.
13 Q. And while we're waiting for this document to come up, could you
14 describe for us the 24 May 1992 instruction.
15 A. This is an instruction signed by Biljana Plavsic for the
16 Presidency of the Republika Srpska, or a slightly different name at the
17 time, on the organisation and work of Presidencies in municipalities in
18 time of war.
19 The first item makes it clear the dual roles of the presidents --
20 municipal Presidencies.
21 JUDGE ORIE: We have it not yet on our screens yet. So what the
22 first item is, we cannot follow that.
23 THE WITNESS: Oh. I'm sorry, I have it on my screen.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, there it is. Please proceed.
25 THE WITNESS: It states that Presidencies shall be formed to
1 organise defence activities and to establish governmental power in the
2 municipalities. So it's establishing the state and organising defence.
3 Number 3 says that:
4 "The Presidencies shall provide all conditions for the work of
5 military organs and units defending the Serbian people."
6 As I indicate in my report, what that meant in terms of providing
7 the conditions varied from simply supplying recruits and logistical
8 support up to and including organising and commanding those units
10 This instruction is also significant because of the role it
11 emphasises for the person of the commissioner, "povjerenik," whose job is
12 to link the highest level of the Bosnian Serb state leadership to the
13 municipality and to ensure the constant co-ordination and implementation
14 of the policies of the republic state organs and the Main Staff of the
16 I see in the translation it just says "Main Staff of the Serbian
17 republic" but the original is the "Main Staff of the army of the Serbian
19 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I tender 65 ter 11093.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objection, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Document 11093 receives number P401,
23 Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
25 Would you please take care that we get a correct translation
1 where there are no mistakes and we'll hear about that, because we should
2 grant leave to replace the now-uploaded translation by a new one.
3 Please proceed.
4 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour.
5 Q. Can you describe for us the relationship between the instruction
6 we see on the screen and a subsequent decision on 31 May of 1992?
7 A. The decision of 31 May is also from the Presidency signed by
8 Karadzic as President of the Presidency.
9 It repeats this language from the last -- the penultimate
10 paragraph on the work of the commissioner, it repeats this language, I
11 believe, verbatim or at least very closely.
12 Q. If I could just -- I'll --
13 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I would ask at this time that the
14 Court Officer call up 65 ter 07323.
15 Q. All right. Could you please explain to us what's contained in
16 this 31 May 1992 decision.
17 A. The previous document, as we saw, was instructions. This is an
18 actual decision ordering the formation of municipal War Presidencies. It
19 is essentially the same in spirit as the previous one but it's a more
20 formal legal act, as I understand it, stating the makeup of the
21 War Presidency, the membership, and the -- the tasks which in Article 3,
22 as can you see, are the same as in Plavsic's instructions of the week
23 before. And Article 4 is the same language on the work of the
25 This is formalising the institution of the War Presidency, so
1 we're moving from the Crisis Staffs, which had started as party, secret
2 party organisations but with the same membership, the same tasks, now
3 being a formal state organ.
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I tender 65 ter 07323.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections.
6 Madam Registrar, the number would be?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 07323 becomes Exhibit P402,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
11 MS. BIBLES:
12 Q. Could you summarise for us the features of these measures that
13 brought closer control of the municipal organs to the republican-level
15 A. Well, first of all, the control is -- it's explicitly set up by
16 the leadership, but it's the person of the commissioner here who is the
17 link, the personal link, and he is to inform the municipal level of the
18 policies of the leadership and ensure their implementation and he is also
19 to inform the leadership of activities and events in the municipality.
20 Q. Based on your review of the materials, how effective was the role
21 of commissioner in bringing control and communication between the
22 municipal level and the republican level between June and December of
24 A. Very effective, according to those involved. At the assembly
25 discussion at the end of 1992, when the assembly is considering whether
1 to abolish commissioners, Krajisnik, who was the member of the Presidency
2 responsible for the work of commissioners, praised their efforts, said
3 that the commissioners kept him well-informed of all events in the
4 municipality and did their work very efficiently. And, similarly,
5 various commissioners at that assembly spoke up to say how they worked
6 and how they reported on their work.
7 Q. Can you briefly describe for us the patterns that you observed in
8 the relationships between the municipal-level Crisis Staffs and the
9 Bosnian Serb leadership from May into early June of 1992.
10 A. What we see is the Crisis Staffs and municipal War Presidencies
11 invoking the leadership, the Presidency, and the assembly, and the
12 government as their authority that they are -- they see themselves as
13 part of the Bosnian Serb state, and the Bosnian Serb leadership views
14 these organs as part of the state. They issue orders to Crisis Staffs as
15 a category, as well as to individual Crisis Staffs. They receive reports
16 from individual Crisis Staffs. The government extends financial support
17 to Crisis Staffs. So they're very much operating within the framework of
18 this Bosnian Serb state.
19 Q. I'd like to now to shift direction and discuss the relationship
20 between the municipal Crisis Staffs and the military units between April
21 and July of 1992.
22 Your report sets out patterns and examples of transition between
23 the military role with the Crisis Staffs. I'd like to first address the
24 time-period of late May of 1992.
25 Did you observe what role, if any, military commanders had in the
1 municipal-level Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies?
2 A. Yes. They were members of the Crisis Staffs and War
3 Presidencies, and at a minimum, the relationship was one of co-ordination
4 and co-operation.
5 The object of the Crisis Staff was to bring together all the
6 forces and resources essential in the municipality, and the military was
7 always included. And as we see, it is one of the central tasks of the
8 Crisis Staff.
9 Q. By June of 1992, what patterns did you observe with respect to
10 the various Bosnian Serb armed forces throughout the region?
11 A. What we see in June is that the VRS is being established and its
12 actual command structures and units put in place, and the Crisis Staffs
13 that had had their own units, TO units, are seeking to integrate them
14 into the VRS. It is not happening uniformly everywhere at the same time,
15 but the pattern is as the army -- as the VRS gets a more robust
16 structure, the TOs and local units are entered into it, form part of the
17 VRS, and the Crisis Staffs are handing over the command, in those cases
18 where they had it, of those units over to the VRS but emphasising the
19 joint tasks and continuing co-operation, the -- and co-ordination.
20 Q. Now, going back to the more transitional time-period between
21 April and early June of 1992, your report describes that there were
22 differences among the municipalities based on a number of factors. Could
23 you articulate for us what those factors would be in assessing these
25 A. Karadzic himself articulated it quite well in his assembly speech
1 in April 1995 when he said that the Crisis Staffs formed units, sometimes
2 with the JNA, sometimes without the JNA, sometimes in secret, hiding from
3 the JNA, depending on who was in command. Because the JNA, at that time,
4 still had its officer corps which was nominally -- or truly quite
5 Communist, members of the Communist party. Wasn't always trusted
6 everywhere. So the first element, was there even a JNA unit present in
7 the municipality in early April or -- and did the Crisis Staff, the local
8 Serb leadership trust that unit to act in the interests of the Serb
9 people or not.
10 Others, I think, it's a matter of personality. In some
11 Crisis Staffs, we seem to see people who really enjoyed commander -- or
12 were enthusiastic about commanding and other municipalities appear to be
13 more hands-off, wanting a professional staff. Also, the location of the
14 municipality itself must be different, must create different conditions.
15 Is it right around Sarajevo or a remote outpost? And how -- and the
16 population make-up, is it one where the Serbs are comfortably in the
17 majority and don't feel -- and can easily change the name or intentions
18 of the municipal government to be ruling in the interests of the Serb
19 people, or are they a minority and more likely to be in armed conflict at
20 the time.
21 Q. Let's now look at some of the specific municipalities from our
22 indictment to assess how these factors actually worked on the ground in
23 April -- between April and July of 1992.
24 First, are you familiar with the relationship between the
25 Crisis Staff ...
1 A. My apologies, I have a bit of a cold.
2 Q. Are you familiar with the relationship between the Crisis Staff
3 in Sanski Most and the military units that were in the region between
4 April and July of 1992?
5 A. I am familiar with several documents which indicate the evolving
6 role. I know as early as the 1st of April, the regular army command is
7 ordering the local commander, Basara, to establish closest possible ties
8 in co-ordination with the local authorities which, at that time, are the
9 Sanski Most Crisis Staff. However, there appear to have been some issues
10 over the question of the Serbian TO which the Crisis Staff had raised and
11 organised because I know in later April there was a meeting called to
12 discuss their relationship.
13 This seems to be a place, judging by the few documents that I
14 have, where there may have been some personality differences. I know in
15 April '95, Vlado Vrkes, member of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff in '92, is
16 looking back and he's saying that they didn't trust Basara at the time
17 because he was a Communist, but he told him, We're all going to be war
18 criminals together and basically we're all -- we were all in it together.
19 And we see by the end of May, clearly Basara is a member of the
20 Crisis Staff and they briefing each other, co-operating on military
21 matters, and there seems to be a seamless co-ordination there.
22 Q. Was this Colonel Basara who was a commander with the
23 6th Krajina Brigade, if you know?
24 A. Yes, I believe that's his position.
25 Q. And you've described that by the end of May, do you know -- or do
1 you -- have you reviewed documents which would show which dates in May,
2 Colonel Basara was involved in this kind of co-operation with the local
4 A. I have looked at many Sanski Most documents. At the moment, I
5 can't recall them all to say exactly which meetings he was present at or
6 not. I know -- I believe it's the 30th of May, there's a decision of the
7 Crisis Staff setting out the tasks of everybody and including
8 Colonel Basara in that.
9 Q. And then in subsequent meetings in the early part of June, are
10 you aware of any documents which would indicate the relationship between
11 Colonel Basara, the 6th Krajina Brigade and the local authorities?
12 A. I know that he was present at meetings, but I'm not recalling any
13 specific document from early June at the moment. I'm sorry.
14 Q. Are you familiar -- shifting gears to Prijedor. Are you familiar
15 with the relationship between the Crisis Staff in Prijedor and the
16 military between April and July of 1992?
17 A. Yes. There we see much more harmony from the start. Shortly
18 before the takeover in Prijedor, we do see the local leadership saying
19 that they would ask the regular army if they were prepared to assist them
20 in the takeover. If they weren't, the Crisis Staff was going do it
21 anyway. But in the event, it seems to have been very close assistance at
22 the time because we have the retrospective of Colonel Zeljaja who was a
23 Chief of Staff of the local unit. I'm sorry, I don't know the name or
24 number of the brigade, but he was the Chief of Staff and he boasted about
25 providing support to the SDS, advising them on the takeover. He explains
1 how they had a secret command. There was a public command which included
2 Muslims, a secret command to assist the SDS. They would burn orders that
3 they didn't like from the headquarters, including on the withdrawal of
4 weapons, in order to assist the Serbs and a retrospective account of the
5 takeover also praises Colonel Arsic, who was the commander of that
6 brigade at the time, on his assistance at the takeover.
7 So there we see clear harmony. We see in the decision on the
8 work of the Prijedor Crisis Staff a month later repeating the
9 instructions received from the leadership on assisting the units --
10 assisting the defence -- the armed forces for the defence, so I think we
11 see a very close harmony there.
12 Q. Shifting now to Kljuc, are you familiar with the relationship
13 between the Crisis Staff in Kljuc and the military and how that
14 relationship developed between April and July of 1992?
15 A. I know that the Kljuc Crisis Staff was very involved before the
16 outbreak of the conflict in forming, training, arming its own units, and
17 the local JNA commander became alarmed that the Crisis Staff president
18 was trying to form his own army or prevent men from serving in the
19 regular army. But that conflict seems to have been resolved, I think,
20 perhaps by the army changing its mind rather than the Crisis Staff, as it
22 On the 13th of May, the Kljuc Crisis Staff was briefed on the
23 decisions of the 12th of May assembly session, including the
24 transformation of the army and the strategic objectives, and from there
25 on, there seems to be -- there do not seem to be any conflicts in the
1 issue of who is in charge, as it were. Although the Kljuc Crisis Staff
2 is definitely one of the most robust and assertive ones, although they --
3 they state, for example, that the division would be the Crisis Staff
4 would tell the military units what to do but would not interfere in how
5 those orders were carried out, but they emphasise the close continuity,
6 close harmonization. They say that no important military matters were
7 resolved without the involvement of the Crisis Staff, that VRS commanders
8 regularly attended the sessions and worked very closely and well. But
9 there is a definite militarism in that Crisis Staff that even in July
10 they're wearing combat uniforms and carrying pistols. So they seem to be
11 one that likes a more assertive military attitude but they are working
12 closely and, as far as I can see, without conflict with the army.
13 Q. Looking specifically, what was the co-ordination and -- like
14 between the local unit commanders and the -- and the municipal-level
15 leaders by the 30th of May, 1992, in Kljuc?
16 A. By the 30th of May, they are working together to prepare combat
17 operations. We see in the minutes of the Crisis Staff that they're
18 planning together and warning the civilian Serbs and planning, as far as
19 I can see, operations together.
20 Q. And then by the 2nd of June, 1992, are you familiar with who was
21 giving reports to the municipal-level leaders about the actions that had
22 taken place?
23 A. We see reports from all those in charge of armed forces, the
24 police, the TO, and the regular army, reporting to the Crisis Staff on
25 operations. I am -- at the moment, I can't recall the name, I'm afraid,
1 but I know it is the commander of the brigade.
2 Q. Are you familiar with some of the actions in the Serbian
3 Autonomous Region of Romanija in May of 1992 with respect to the
4 Bosnian Serb leadership and the new VRS commander?
5 A. There was a meeting in Sokolac, in Romanija, on, I believe, the
6 17th of May, where Krajisnik, Karadzic, and Mladic met with the
7 leadership of both the Serbian Autonomous Region and also local
8 municipalities including Rogatica.
9 Q. Are you familiar with the time period between that meeting and
10 the attack on Rogatica?
11 A. I believe it was just a matter the days, the takeover followed a
12 matter of days after that meeting.
13 Q. Are you familiar with how the military and the local organs
14 worked together during the time-periods -- from 17 May 1992 forward?
15 A. Are you referring to Rogatica?
16 Q. Yes, I'm sorry.
17 A. Yes. Prior to that, we see in Rogatica a self-organised -- or a
18 TO unit organised by the Crisis Staff, commanded by Rajko Kusic who was a
19 member of the SDS main board, called himself commander of the Serbian TO
20 of Rogatica. Member of the Crisis Staff, obviously, of Rogatica. And
21 that unit appeared to be still under the Crisis Staff command as of early
22 June. I know on the 31 May, I believe, there's an order from the VRS for
23 operations and it specifies the forces of the Crisis Staff of Rogatica.
24 In early June, I know Mladic noted in a report that in that region in
25 Romanija, the integration of Crisis Staff forces into the army was
1 proceeding slowly or not at all. The army -- excuse me, the
2 Crisis Staff received instructions from the leadership to integrate the
3 forces into the VRS with the establishment of the VRS, and that
4 integration started in early June. But how -- I know from the report
5 of the Crisis Staff of the end of June, they noted it's a process, it's
6 taking its time, but the report stresses that the joint tasks remain the
7 same. We will continue to support the army in everything because we have
8 the same tasks even when the actual Crisis Staff unit is part of the VRS.
9 Q. Sort of shifting back to the larger picture, in terms of the role
10 of the municipal-level organs, did you see any examples in your research
11 of a municipal Crisis Staff or War Presidency disregarding or acting
12 against direction or instructions coming from the republican-level
13 leadership or the VRS?
14 A. No. I saw them as acting, and believing that they acted, within
15 the instructions and guide-lines of the leadership. There are moments
16 where they ask for clarification. There are moments of conflict with
17 other local leaders including, like, the local army commander. But I see
18 them as operating within -- or, I'm sorry, under the leadership of the
19 Bosnian Serb leadership.
20 Q. And, finally, I'd like to direct your attention to examples that
21 you have found of interactions between the accused and Crisis Staffs,
22 municipal-level Crisis Staffs, in May of 1992.
23 Where you cite intercepts in your report, have you actually
24 listened to those intercepts?
25 A. Yes. I have listened to many intercepts, and I would only
1 include them in my report if I had listened to them myself.
2 Q. Are you familiar with a 13 May 1992 conversation between Mladic
3 and a person whose last name is Unkovic?
4 A. Yes. I think that's a very illustrative intercept because
5 Unkovic is first calling Gagovic, who was -- had been a JNA commander,
6 was still the regular army commander of a unit in the Sarajevo area, and
7 Gagovic hands the phone over to Mladic and you can hear the relief in
8 Unkovic's voice, the joy at talking to Mladic. Mladic has just been
9 appointed and Mladic is hitting the ground running and assuming command,
10 and their interaction, I think, is -- shows well the relationship between
11 the local Crisis Staffs and Mladic himself.
12 Q. Let's back up a little bit. Who is Unkovic?
13 A. He ask a member of the Crisis Staff of Ilidza.
14 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours -- Your Honours, I would call up
15 65 ter 20759. And I will ask Ms. Stewart to play this audio twice, as I
16 understand the practice.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You have provided transcripts to the booth?
18 MS. BIBLES: We did, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 [Audiotape played]
21 MS. BIBLES: And now, we'll play it a second time.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any way that we can have, if only on our
23 own computers, the transcript visible? Because I see "courtroom message
24 English" nothing at this moment. "No page currently available."
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 MS. BIBLES: We do have hard copies we could distribute, if that
2 would help.
3 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please. If you have hard copies, that's
4 okay. If not, we'll find it.
5 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you could provide hard copies, that
7 would ...
8 MS. BIBLES: We have one more hard copy that we could provide,
9 Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: But is this the same -- oh, there are two here.
11 Yes, we received two hard copies of 20759. We'll share it. One
13 No, I received one of 65 ter 20810 and that's a different one.
14 MS. BIBLES: That's next, Your Honour. You should also have --
15 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to follow the present one. We'll share
16 one copy.
17 Please play it again so that we also receive translation.
18 [Audiotape played]
19 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover]:
20 "Gagovic: Yes.
21 "Unkovic: Good morning.
22 "Gagovic: Good morning.
23 "Unkovic: Is this Colonel Gagovic?
24 "Gagovic: Yes, it is.
25 "Unkovic: Colonel, this is Professor Unkovic from the
1 Crisis Staff.
2 "Gagovic: How can I help you?
3 "Unkovic: I just need one piece of information.
4 "Gagovic: Yes?
5 "Unkovic: Do you have any information on the airport? Will
6 there be any negotiations or something like that today?
7 "Gagovic: Negotiations over the airport today?
8 "Unkovic: Yes.
9 "Gagovic: There will be negotiations there but I don't know if
10 it's going to be over the airport only, but will you be there? Who is
11 representing your party?
12 "Unkovic: Well, no one invited us.
13 "Gagovic: No one invited you, eh?
14 "Unkovic: We have decided to take the airport.
15 "Gagovic: Pure transfer. (Talks to the people in the room).
16 "Unkovic: And decide on it.
17 "Gagovic: Unkovic here. (Talks to the people in the room
19 "Unkovic: Yes?
20 "Gagovic: Unkovic from Ilidza, this professor, doctor. (Talks
21 to the people in the room and listens to what they they're telling him).
22 Yes, your representatives will be there. But who will be there? No, I
23 don't know who is going to be there, but there will be someone. (He
24 listens to what the people in the room are telling him again). Here,
25 just a moment. Hello, hello?
1 "Unkovic: Yes? Yes?
2 "Gagovic: Just a moment.
3 "Mladic: Hello?
4 "Unkovic: How can I help you?
5 "Mladic: This is General Mladic here. How are you doing?
6 "Unkovic: Welcome to our house.
7 "Mladic: Thank you. May we have luck in our work.
8 "Unkovic: May great Lord help you.
9 "Mladic: Tell me, do you ... let me first tell you about what
10 you're interested in.
11 "Unkovic: Yes.
12 "Mladic: Koljevic will come. Koljevic.
13 "Unkovic: Mm-hm.
14 "Mladic: Ostojic and myself will represent our side.
15 "Unkovic: Excellent.
16 "Mladic: There. So there is no need for you to have a
17 representative as Ilidza. You can, however, join us and let us know
18 about our problems there, if it is safe for you to come. The most
19 important thing now is that all military formations, no matter who they
20 belong to, be put under the command of the 4th Corps under Gagovic.
21 "Unkovic: Yes?"
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave.
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note, we haven't finished
24 reading the transcript.
25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps you will allow us to do
1 in cross-examination but we had two occasions to listen to the
2 conversation and you had the transcript in front of you. Unfortunately,
3 I have to say it, that an important statement stated by Unkovic was not
4 entered in the transcript, so, in fact, the transcript does not reflect
5 what is being said in the intercept. Perhaps we should have an
6 opportunity now whilst the Prosecutor is still with the intercept, we may
7 rehear the recording and I will draw your attention to what I am
8 referring to. And this is an important issue which will have a serious
9 bearing on the intercept. And you will let me know if I should do it now
10 or perhaps you should give me guidance as to what the appropriate moment
11 would be for me to direct your attention to this important detail.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: We'd like to resolve this without delay.
14 Could you already indicate where approximately the problem lies,
15 Mr. Stojanovic? Because it's --
16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Not yet what it is, but at approximately what part
18 of the conversation?
19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] If you can follow me on the
20 transcript that we have in front of us, line 16, where the interlocutor
21 called Unkovic says: "We have decided that the airport," and then we
22 have three dots. And then Gagovic responds: "Pure transfer."
23 Now in this Unkovic's answer it reads: "We have decided that the
24 airport," and then we can hear that he says, "We have decided that we
25 should not hand the airport over and that we will be the ones deciding
1 about it."
2 And this is said by someone who is a member of the Crisis Staff.
3 This isn't part of the transcript, and it would be perhaps helpful to
4 hear the recording again and then we can say if I'm right or not. And
5 then I would have other issues that I would like to raise as well.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we could play it again. And could
7 I -- the whole procedure with our interpreters was that they would
8 carefully follow the text. Could you focus primarily at this moment on
9 whether there are any parts which do not appear in the transcript but
10 words that are spoken. And I think we can stop after approximately 45 or
11 50 seconds because it's all in the first part, and then we'll deal with
12 any other matter you'd like to raise, Mr. Stojanovic, after that.
13 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, it may be helpful to play -- it's a
14 fairly short intercept. If we could play it all the way through with the
15 translation and then try to address the issues all at once, perhaps.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But then we'd need to know what other issues
17 Mr. Stojanovic would have.
18 Mr. Stojanovic, any other matters you would like to raise in
19 relation to the intercept?
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Other issues will be for
21 cross-examination, Your Honour, because in the view of the Defence, this
22 intercept is precisely one of the examples that illustrate the
23 relationship between Mladic and the Crisis Staff, in terms of the powers
24 that the Crisis Staff members believed that they had.
25 JUDGE ORIE: The other issues are about the interpretation and
1 how to understand this conversation.
2 We now focus, then, exclusively on the accuracy of the
4 Could it be played again, and I think we can stop approximately
5 halfway when we have gone past this part. Perhaps where Koljevic comes
6 in -- where at least Koljevic is mentioned as someone who was present
7 during the meeting.
8 One second, please.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ORIE: And I also, while I was reading, I missed the -- the
11 comment by the interpreters that they had not yet finished reading.
12 So we'll then perhaps play the whole again, and then wait
13 patiently until you have finished the interpretation, which, of course,
14 is quite understandable that you cannot follow the speed of speech.
15 So we'll replay it entirely.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, but weren't the interpreters
17 supposed to listen to the relevant part before?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps that's the best. Let's -- we play it
19 first half, then we stop at approximately where Koljevic is mentioned.
20 And then we might later, after we have discussed this part, continue with
21 the remainder so that we have the whole of the translation on the
22 transcript, if that is a good way to proceed.
23 I'm looking at the interpreters and it seems that they agree.
24 So we first play the first half.
25 [Audiotape played]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Are there portions which are not transcribed? And I
2 think the focus is on the airport, approximately on from the 20th second.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, Unkovic, instead of what is
4 written in the transcript, "We have decided to take the airport," in fact
5 says, "We have decided not to give the airport."
6 JUDGE ORIE: Is there anything else there which is not
7 transcribed? The next we hear -- we see is: "Pure transfer."
8 And then: "Talks to people in the room." Is there any -- is
9 that audible? Is that complete?
10 THE INTERPRETER: It's not audible.
11 JUDGE ORIE: It's not audible. And perhaps the ... and then the
12 next which is transcribed is Unkovic: "And decide on it." Which, as a
13 stand-alone few words, is not easy to understand.
14 THE INTERPRETER: There was an overlap between Unkovic and
15 Gagovic and, in fact, Unkovic says: "We have decided not to give the
16 airport and we shall be the ones deciding about it."
17 JUDGE ORIE: So the gist of what Unkovic says is that: We're the
18 ones and we have decided not to give it.
19 Is that, Mr. Stojanovic, what you'd like to point at?
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely so. In view of the
21 fact that I know the language.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 Ms. Bibles, we'll need a new transcript anyhow. That may be
24 clear. Now, in order to have the latter part of the transcript
25 translated to us, I suggest that we start on from where we stopped and
1 that we'll then wait until full translation has -- appears on our today's
3 Please proceed.
4 [Audiotape played]
5 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover]:
6 "Mladic: Ostojic and myself will represent our side.
7 "Unkovic: Excellent.
8 "Mladic: There. So there is no need for you to have a
9 representative as Ilidza. You can, however, join us and let us know
10 about your problems there, if it is safe for you to come. The most
11 important thing now is that all military formations, no matter who they
12 belong to, be put under the command of the 4th Corps under Gagovic.
13 "Unkovic: Yes?
14 "Mladic: All this. Units shall be filled with men, formed
15 organised, and everything must be all right.
16 "Unkovic: Excellent.
17 "Mladic: Have you understood me?
18 "Unkovic: Yes.
19 "Mladic: I'll give you further instructions when we get
21 "Unkovic: Excellent.
22 "Mladic: There.
23 "Unkovic: One more question.
24 "Mladic: Yes?
25 "Unkovic: We have some of Arkan's Men here.
1 "Mladic: Yes?
2 "Unkovic: Are they under our command?
3 "Mladic: All are. All under arms are under my command if they
4 want to keep their heads on their shoulders.
5 "Unkovic: Excellent. Excellent.
6 "Mladic: So all shall be under our command. No one shall do
7 things on their own, and the five-day cease-fire must be observed.
8 "Unkovic: Yes.
9 "Mladic: But in case they attack you, approach you, then you
10 will destroy them.
11 "Unkovic: Of course.
12 "Mladic: There.
13 "Unkovic: Sure thing. Thank you, General.
14 "Mladic: Have a good one.
15 "Unkovic: Have a good one.
16 "Mladic: Bye."
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.
18 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Ms. Hanson, your report details other intercepts and other
20 communications with the accused and Crisis Staffs. Could you tell us
21 whether the communications between the commander of the VRS and the
22 Crisis Staff levels heard in those conversations, are they consistent
23 with your observations on the relationship between the VRS and
24 Crisis Staffs in the early Bosnian Serb state?
25 A. Yes. Because my conclusions were based on evidence such as that
1 intercept, those intercepts. We see Mladic, when he feels necessary,
2 getting on the phone and ordering Crisis Staff members. In the case of
3 the other intercept - you have the transcript of it - in Trnovo, ordering
4 a Crisis Staff member into a military operation. In this one we heard it
5 more an advising, but he is clearly, yeah, when necessary, asserting
6 authority and dealing with these municipal Crisis Staffs.
7 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I note that we're at or past the break
8 time. Would this be a good time to break?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Your estimate was one hour, isn't it?
10 MS. BIBLES: It is. And I'm very much at the end of that. I
11 will have just a few minutes when we come back.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Few minutes. Then we'll take a break and -- after
13 the witness has left the courtroom.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE ORIE: And we will resume at 5 minutes to 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
19 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, while --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles.
21 MS. BIBLES: -- while we wait for the witness to come in, I will
22 tender 65 ter 20759 or -- if we have it MFI'd so that once we correct the
23 translation, we can move for a formal admission.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's not only translation but transcription as
25 well. But any objection against it being MFI'd?
1 Madam Registrar, the number would be.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Document 20759 receives Exhibit P403 [Realtime
3 transcript read in error “P402”], Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, you may proceed.
7 MS. BIBLES: Thank you.
8 Q. Finally, Ms. Hanson, I will ask you if you could summarise for us
9 the nature of the relationship that you have observed in your research
10 between General Mladic and the municipal organs in May of 1992.
11 A. I did not look at that specifically as I started my research long
12 before I was involved in it -- for Mladic, so the documents I do see show
13 that once he was appointed as commander of the Bosnian Serb army, Mladic
14 met with a number of people at the regional and municipal level. He did
15 not have a lot of direct contact but, of course, he is at the highest
16 level himself, but I certainly see that the municipal level saw him as
17 the commander of the armed forces, and although there may have been some
18 local jealousies and possessiveness about their units, they saw
19 themselves and Mladic as sharing joint tasks and joint goals and working
20 together in the defence of Serbian interests.
21 Q. Did he -- did his appointment appear to have an impact on those
22 municipalities which had been developing their own armies?
23 A. The only place where I can really connect his appointment to --
24 to a local effect is in Kljuc where they were briefed, as I say, the day
25 after on his appointment. Whether it's his appointment itself or simply
1 the course of development of the army of the Bosnian Serbs or not,
2 it's -- what I definitely see as the trend over May and June is the
3 integration of these locally formed units into the army structure and a
4 recognition of the command structure of the VRS.
5 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, at this point I have no further
6 questions for this witness.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Bibles.
8 Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I hope I am, Your Honour, with
10 your leave.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hanson, once Mr. Stojanovic has found his
12 materials, he'll cross-examine you. Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for the
13 Prosecution -- for the Defence of Mr. Mladic.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Stojanovic switch on another
15 microphone, please.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, madam.
18 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
19 Q. I will be putting a few questions to you in relation to your
20 report. But before we move on to the documents specifically, I would
21 like us briefly to go through your CV.
22 It was my understanding that you do not have any legal training;
23 is that correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Will we agree that in your written report that you entitled:
1 "Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and War Commissions," for the most part
2 you dealt with the legal and normative framework regulating the question
3 of Crisis Staffs; is that correct?
4 A. I wouldn't say it was the most part of my report, no. I do look
5 at those, the normative documents, but a great deal of my report is
6 concerning the documents of the Crisis Staff themselves and what they
8 Q. As for this report, did any lawyers help you draw the conclusions
9 that have to do with the legal framework within which the Crisis Staffs
10 functioned and operated?
11 A. No. This work and its conclusions are all my own.
12 Q. While you wrote this report, you were a staff member at the OTP.
13 Am I correct?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. For many years now, you've been working as an analyst of
16 documents in the OTP, documents that are being made available to you; is
17 that correct?
18 A. Yes. Technically I'm a research officer not an analyst. But
19 it's very much what I'm doing is analysing documents, yes.
20 Q. So I would be right if I were to say that it's not only that you
21 research documents but you analyse them as well; is that correct? Also
22 you draw certain conclusions?
23 A. Yes, I would group research and analysis very much together, yes.
24 Q. Over the years while you've been working, it was my understanding
25 that you learnt B/C/S. So you are familiar with B/C/S and you can even
1 use the Cyrillic alphabet; is that correct?
2 A. I am familiar with B/C/S and I can use Cyrillic, but I learned it
3 long before I started working here. And I was hired because of my
4 knowledge of B/C/S. Not that I learned it here.
5 Q. For a while, you worked in Belgrade as a researcher attached to
6 the then-Army of Yugoslavia; is that correct?
7 A. I was not attached to the army. I was a Fulbright scholar funded
8 by the US government to do research for my dissertation. My research was
9 conducted in the military historical institute of the JNA, but I did
10 not -- I was not attached to the JNA. I was simply working in the
11 archives of the institute.
12 Q. Would you tell me whether at any point in time during your stay
13 in the then-Yugoslavia and in Belgrade you had any kind of previous
14 knowledge about Mr. Ratko Mladic?
15 A. Not that I recall now. I may have read of him in the newspapers
16 in -- in April or May 1992, but I certainly do not recall any specific
17 knowledge at the time.
18 Q. Specifically who entrusted this task to you, to work out this
20 A. I -- it was the team for prosecuting Momcilo Krajisnik and
21 Biljana Plavsic. However, I was not specifically briefed by any member
22 of that team. I was briefed by the then-head of my team, the Leadership
23 Research Team. So he must have spoken to the lawyers on the
24 Krajisnik-Plavsic team and then came to me and explained that I was to
25 research Crisis Staffs. Excuse me.
1 Q. Did you get any tasks at any point in time to testify as an
2 expert in the trial of Ratko Mladic?
3 A. Over the summer, I believe it was, I can't remember, maybe it was
4 earlier in the spring, I was told that I would be testifying in this
5 case. So fairly recently. And I was asked if I wanted to make any
6 changes to my report. At that time I didn't -- I was not asked to do any
7 further research. I simply made a few corrections on my report. But I
8 was tasked as a Crisis Staff expert many years before this trial started,
9 or before I was told that I would be involved in this trial.
10 Q. Did you get any order or instruction in writing as to what your
11 expert report in the Ratko Mladic case should contain? Yes or no?
12 A. No.
13 Q. You did not have any specific tasks as a staff member of the OTP
14 and an expert at the same time that pertained to the case of
15 Ratko Mladic. Am I right in saying that?
16 A. Only one minor one in the early days before I was identified as
17 an expert, I was asked to take a look at the section of the pre-trial
18 brief dealing with Crisis Staffs because it had been taken essentially
19 from the Karadzic brief, as I understood. I just cast my eye on it, but
20 it was based again on my contribution to the Karadzic case. Once I
21 realised that I would be an expert witness, I was removed from any
22 contact, further contact with the team, and no other taskings. From the
23 Mladic team.
24 Q. If I understand you properly, the entire text of the expert
25 report that we have before us, except for your remarks in paragraph 10 of
1 your report, is identical to the text that you prepared for the
2 Prosecution case against Radovan Karadzic. Am I right in saying that?
3 A. Unfortunately, my remarks in paragraph 10 are not changed. I
4 wish I had read them more carefully and I would have changed those
6 What -- I changed a few words, including the unfortunate omission
7 of the word "not" but it is -- except for perhaps four changes, minor in
8 the sense of a word or two, it is identical to the Karadzic text. And I
9 did not do any further original research for this between Karadzic and --
10 for -- for this testimony.
11 Q. Apart from the fact that you did not make any changes in the text
12 except for these four very minor changes, as you said, from the Karadzic
13 case up until the Ratko Mladic case, did you carry out a further analysis
14 of the documents that were accessible to you?
15 A. I am always looking at the documents -- any new documents coming
16 into me or reviewing other ones, but I did not conduct for this report or
17 this testimony any specific research.
18 Q. So I would be right if I say that technically, from the point of
19 view of the text of this report, and also in terms of the documents that
20 are accompanying your report, you do not have any alterations or
21 adjustments in relation to what did you in the Karadzic case. You did
22 not change this in any way to adapt to the Mladic case. Am I right in
23 saying that?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. I would be right also if I were to say that it would basically be
1 the identical expert report that you provided in terms of your assignment
2 related to the two cases before this international criminal court. Am I
3 correct in saying that?
4 A. The two cases meaning Karadzic and Mladic? Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, could you please help me resolve another
6 question and that is related to the documents that you used in your
8 This is what I'm asking you: In your database that the OTP made
9 available to you, over all of these years while you worked here, did the
10 OTP make available to you the documents of all the Crisis Staffs in
11 Republika Srpska or only the documents of a certain number of
12 Crisis Staffs?
13 A. I had at my disposal all the documents in the possession of the
14 OTP. That body of evidence is limited by what the OTP collected or
15 received, so I certainly do not have all the documents of all the
16 Crisis Staffs in Republika Srpska. That simply is not the case. But I
17 had the free use of anything in the possession of the OTP, which
18 included, for some municipalities, extensive documents of Crisis Staffs;
19 for many municipalities, very few.
20 Q. Will we agree that there weren't any documents whatsoever from
21 certain municipalities in relation to the constitution and operation of
22 the Crisis Staffs as such?
23 A. Yes. For some municipalities, there were no documents that I
24 could find.
25 Q. Now, during the direct examination you said that during your
1 research you came across documents that were exculpatory in your view.
2 Would you tell the Trial Chamber how you made that assessment? What it
3 was that would be exculpatory in the documents that you had.
4 A. Exculpatory are documents that indicate somebody -- another
5 individual or group was responsible for crimes. It would also be
6 exculpatory if I saw that crimes were investigated and prosecuted. I
7 know that a lot of Defences like to have documents that show the other
8 side was also conducting similar activities so I would note that.
9 I was not researching whether Crisis Staffs themselves were
10 guilty or innocent. That isn't the issue. The issue is what
11 Crisis Staffs were doing. So there were certainly plenty of documents
12 which showed Crisis Staffs were also acting as ordinary municipal
13 governments but that isn't exculpatory or inculpatory. It is simply they
14 were doing other things as well. But we would receive guide-lines on
15 what is considered exculpatory for each case and in general it's --
16 anything that would be looked at as helpful to the Defence would be noted
17 in -- and passed on to lawyers.
18 Q. But my key question would be the following: On the basis of what
19 level of your knowledge do you assess whether a document is -- is
20 exculpatory or not, in view of the answer you've provided, stating that
21 you do not have -- you have not had any legal training?
22 A. I don't make that assessment. I flag it. I pass it on to
23 lawyers to make that assessment.
24 Q. And then, on the basis of their assessment whether something is
25 exculpatory or not in terms of the documents that you studied, analysed,
1 and flagged, do they ultimately decide what is exculpatory? Ultimately,
2 out of all of that.
3 A. Yes. It's a lawyer's job.
4 Q. Do you know whether these documents, after such an assessment,
5 were provided to this Defence team of Mr. Mladic?
6 A. I am not familiar with the details of disclosure at all, but I
7 trust that I've done my bit and the rest of the OTP is doing their duty.
8 I don't know the details of disclosure, no.
9 Q. I'm going to conclude my questions on this topic with the
10 following: Over all these years, did you have the physical possibility
11 of visiting the areas of Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Sarajevo, Zvornik,
12 Bratunac? That is to say, the municipalities that you dealt with the
13 most on the basis of your report, or, rather, their Crisis Staffs.
14 A. I have not been to Kljuc or Sanski Most. I have been to
15 Prijedor, Sarajevo, Zvornik. I have not been to Bratunac.
16 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to ask us to take a look at P379
17 together in e-court. This is a report -- or, rather, this is the report
18 that you compiled. So let us focus on paragraph 4. Then I'm going to
19 put a question to you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Do you --
21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 4, please.
22 JUDGE ORIE: If it would be more convenient for you to have a
23 hard copy of your report there, because I see you staring there at your
24 screen, which is not always easy to -- then I take it that the Defence
25 would have no objection against providing a hard copy to the witness. If
1 you have one -- the one who is first.
2 MR. STOJANOVIC: Okay.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for your help.
5 Q. So it is paragraph 4, Ms. Hanson. In the second sentence of this
6 paragraph, you say, in terms of Crisis Staffs, you say that they:
7 "... supported armed units in the municipalities. They
8 supported, enabled and, in some cases, directed the armed units in the
10 Do you see that?
11 A. Yes, I see that.
12 Q. This is what my question is: At the time when the Crisis Staffs
13 functioned, appreciating the terms that you referred to during your
14 direct examination, what is it that you mean when you say "armed units"?
15 Who is that?
16 A. As I indicate, there's a variety of armed units. Some of them
17 are the regular army. That is the former JNA still in place in Bosnia.
18 Some of them are locally raised TO units. Sometimes part of the formal
19 TO structure. Sometimes secretly formed in armed units calling
20 themselves Serbian TO.
21 As I've indicated in my report, by the time we can speak of armed
22 units of the VRS itself, the Crisis Staffs command abilities are
23 shrinking or disappearing, and those units are part of the VRS structure.
24 It is very important to talk about which time-period as -- as I said in
25 my report and in my testimony. So if we're talking about April, we see
1 much more assertiveness by Crisis Staffs over armed units than we see in
2 late May or June.
3 Q. This is what I'd like to ask you. When you listed everything
4 that you considered to be armed units, is it your general conclusion that
5 you're drawing here in paragraph 4 that such a heterogenous structure --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Paragraph 4 is in the executive summary, which, of
7 course, loses a lot of details and doesn't give much information about
8 what it's really about. Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber would consider it
9 that -- considers that it would be better assisted by going into the --
10 the -- the real report rather than what may serve as a kind of general
11 introduction so that you know, more or less, what will follow. Executive
12 summaries are not -- do not contain the proper analysis of what is found
13 in the report.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will take this on
17 Q. Can you say, as you sit here today, that such heterogenous
18 structures of units that were active out in the field in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina had the same status before the Crisis Staffs, both in
20 terms of the JNA, paramilitary formations, Territorial Defence elements,
21 and local units established locally?
22 A. When you say the same status before the crisis units, you mean
23 did the crisis units have the same level of authority over all of them.
24 Is that what you mean?
25 Q. That is what I want to ask you about it. Was the level of
1 control exerted by the Crisis Staffs equal in all these cases? And if we
2 can, let us place it in the context of the time-periods.
3 A. No. I do not conclude that the status was equal for all those
4 sorts of units, either in -- over time or discussing the various kinds of
5 units or in various areas of Republika Srpska. I do not claim that it
6 was all the same.
7 Q. If you can differentiate between them, I would invite you to do
8 so and to tell Their Honours what the distinction is based on.
9 A. Well, the distinction is based on the evidence I find, the
10 documents. Obviously the regular army, the late JNA, had its own command
11 structure. I see the local -- the commander of any local regular army
12 units being a member of the Crisis Staff and co-ordinating operations
13 with the Crisis Staff, but I see in some cases the president of the
14 Crisis Staff being the commander of a locally formed unit. So it's a
15 very different relationship, for example.
16 And paramilitaries, we see the Crisis Staffs inviting them,
17 arming them, creating them, and sometimes -- claim -- putting them under
18 the control of the Crisis Staff but not a correct command or simply
19 paying them and giving them tasks. So it is various levels of control
20 and co-ordination.
21 Q. Let us then try and agree chronologically.
22 Can you tell Their Honours when the Army of Republika Srpska was
24 A. The 20 -- 21st, I believe, of May, was the decision on the
25 establishment, although at the assembly session on the 12th of May -- no,
1 Mladic was appointed as commander.
2 Q. And up until what point were Crisis Staffs formally functioning?
3 Bearing in mind the documents that you referred to and that were shown to
4 you by my learned friend during the direct examination.
5 A. Formally, the presidential decision of 31 May says Crisis Staffs
6 ceased to operate. But as I make clear in my report, in practical terms
7 that was not the case everywhere. Far from it.
8 Q. Therefore, if we can agree, and if we observe the formalism that
9 we referred to as far as the terms are concerned, and we will speak about
10 what it is that the Crisis Staffs grow out into, on the 21st of May, the
11 Army of Republika Srpska became operational, and ten days later, the
12 31st of May, Crisis Staffs cease to exist. Is that correct, that there
13 is an overlap of ten days between them?
14 A. I find it difficult to observe the formalism when the documents
15 show that the formalism was not observed. But if we're going simply by
16 these formal decrees, yes, there's an overlap of ten days.
17 Q. And we will agree that after the 31st of May, someone else, those
18 who took over the powers of the Crisis Staff, had a new relationship with
19 the newly established VRS, is that right? And in fact, we are going to
20 be discussing them precisely.
21 A. It was not someone else. The people who were on the
22 Crisis Staffs became the War Presidencies. It's a seamless -- a seamless
23 transition from Crisis Staff to War Presidency where we even see that
24 change of name. So it's not someone else at all.
25 Q. But am I right in saying that this isn't about semantics only,
1 because you did refer to the decision by Radovan Karadzic introducing the
2 construct of commissioners. You drew upon this to say that this marked
3 the formation of -- of closer ties between the newly established
4 War Presidency and the republican authorities; is that right?
5 A. No. The decision by Karadzic did not introduce the construct of
6 commissioners. We see that as early as 26 April, the instructions by
7 Branko Djeric. It's the 24 May instructions from Biljana Plavsic that
8 first really explicate the commissioners, so I don't say that Karadzic
9 introduced it. But I do say that the person of the commissioners created
10 a personal tie between the municipal authorities and the republican.
11 Q. Was it the case that formally the commission was established as
12 an institution in the decision published in the official journal of the
13 Assembly of Republika Srpska on the 31st of May, 1992? Yes or no?
14 A. No. The commissions were formed by the decision of the
15 10th of June. The 31 May is Presidency, "predsednistvo." The 10th of
16 June is commission, "povjerenistvo."
17 Q. We will agree that before the 31st of May, you didn't find
18 anywhere in your research that the War Presidency had been established
19 and commissioners appointed. All these decisions date post-31st May. Am
20 I right?
21 A. No. Because I do note some places where there were
22 War Presidencies before the 31st of May, and I'll have to check my
23 document, but I believe in Foca there may have been reference to a
24 commissioner before the 31st of May. But I'm not certain about that one.
25 But I agree that the 31st of May decision establishes
1 War Presidencies to be the formal term for these municipal collective
2 emergency bodies. Some places we see War Presidencies before then.
3 Q. Very well. I will proceed.
4 Staying with the same document, P379, let us look at
5 paragraph 20, where you speak of the formation of the Crisis Staffs,
6 pursuant to the instruction on the organisation and operation of the
7 organs of -- of Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a state of
8 emergency, dated the 19th December 1991.
9 This is my question: Based on your research, who authored these
10 instructions? Who issued the instructions?
11 A. The authorship is not clear. It is issued by the leadership of
12 the SDS. On the first page, it says: "Main Board of the SDS." The last
13 page says: "SDS Crisis Staff." The relationship between those two is
14 not clear. But it was distributed by the SDS leadership. The actual
15 authorship is not known.
16 Q. I am asking you this precisely because of my next question.
17 Although you stated as much in your written report, you say in
18 the latter part of paragraph 20 that the fact that these instructions
19 state that they were made by the SDS Crisis Staff, you say that it was
20 one of the first indications of the existence of a Crisis Staff at a
21 republican level. Can you see that?
22 A. I see that. But what I say in the original is slightly different
23 and it gives a different nuance. It is an early indication of a
24 republic-level Crisis Staff. I do not claim that there was constantly
25 one republic-level Crisis Staff but I see mention of one at various times
1 in 1991 and 1992. So this is -- the fact that it is signed by the
2 SDS BiH Crisis Staff indicates there was a Crisis Staff, apparently, at
3 this time. But I'm not saying the -- it was translated back as "the" and
4 I just want to emphasise that I'm not claiming there was one identifiable
5 republic-level Crisis Staff constantly.
6 Q. I must admit that I fail to understand what you're saying.
7 Are you referring now to the republican-level Crisis Staff with
8 reference to Republika Srpska only or in terms of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. At this point I'm talking about SDS. This is before the
10 formation of the Republika Srpska. I'm talking about an SDS
11 republican-level Crisis Staff. But, in fact, I avoid talking about such
12 a thing in my report. There are a few indications, references to such a
13 thing, but I don't have enough to claim -- I'm very far from claiming
14 that there was some permanent such -- or established such body.
15 Honestly, I think part of the -- our misunderstanding just is in
16 the translation from B/C/S without an article to the English question of
17 definite or indefinite article. That may be part of the trouble.
18 Q. To overcome this problem, let us look at document 65 ter 28386,
19 28386 in e-court, which is precisely the document we have been referring
20 to, the instructions for the organisation and activity of organs of the
21 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a state of emergency issued in
22 Sarajevo on the 19th of December, 1991.
23 Let us stay with the cover page for now. The preamble states
24 that it is a document issued by the Serbian Democratic Party of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, specifically its Main Board.
1 Was this the text that made you say that the document was issued
2 by the Main Board of the SDS, as you put it in paragraph 20 of your
4 A. This cover page, yes, say it's from the Main Board. And I have
5 many, many references from the Crisis Staffs formed saying that they were
6 formed on the instructions of the Main Board. So they perceived the
7 instructions as coming from the Main Board, and the instructions
8 themselves state "Main Board."
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page of the
10 text, please.
11 Q. You then went onto establish that -- at the end of the text, it
12 reads: "SDS Crisis Staff."
13 Hence, my question. Did your study at any point - and based on a
14 document, and if so, which - establish that December of 1991 there
15 existed a Crisis Staff at the level of the SDS Main Board?
16 A. This is the only reference I'm familiar with to such a high level
17 SDS Crisis Staff in December 1991. I have other references from other
18 times. This is the only one I have from December 1991.
19 Q. As an analyst, did you draw a conclusion based on this that there
20 did, nevertheless, exist a Crisis Staff in December of 1991? Because we
21 have both the signature and stamp and the author missing.
22 A. No. I'm reluctant to draw a conclusion of any importance that
23 there was such a Crisis Staff in operation. There may have been a small
24 group that called itself a Crisis Staff. But, no, on the basis of one --
25 one little -- one reference, I'm not going to draw any conclusions.
1 Q. Thank you. I will move on to the next paragraph. Can we go back
2 to your report again. Paragraph 21. Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit 379.
3 There, you say, analysing these instructions, that in Variant A
4 the laws of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were supposed to
5 no longer be followed and the orders of parallel Serb authorities was
6 supposed to be followed instead. Can you see that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. When you make such a generalised statement in your expert report,
9 it is my duty to ask you as follows. Which are the laws that under
10 Variant A the Crisis Staffs were supposed to stop abiding by and which
11 had been adopted in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? What
12 does that mean?
13 A. Well, we see many declarations in this time in late 1991 from
14 various SDS bodies that they will stop abiding by any SRBiH laws that are
15 not in accordance with the federal constitution. But the formation of
16 separate police stations and secret arming is presumably not in
17 accordance with SRBiH law.
18 Q. I think we have come to the crucial issue now.
19 Let us look at the instructions. This is 28386. This is the
20 65 ter number of the document. I think we have it before us.
21 Please look at item 1 on page 1 in both versions, which reads --
22 the following page. It reads, item 1 -- it's the very next page. I
23 would call it the preamble of the document, which reads:
24 "These instructions are being issued due to justified suspicion
25 that certain forces are working persistently, thoroughly and in an
1 organised manner to remove Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, and
2 thereby also its Serbian people. It elaborates the unified tasks,
3 measures and other activities that will be undertaken within the national
4 community of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aim of
5 implementing the plebescite decision of the Serbian people of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina to live in a single state, both in the existing
7 conditions and circumstances, and in all those that may arise, bearing in
8 mind the development of the overall political and security situation."
9 My question is: We're talking about December of 1991, the time
10 when the instructions were issued. Was this the point in time that was
11 described in item 1? Or, to put it more simply, was this the point in
12 time when we had a clearly expressed will of the three constituent
13 peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was completely different in terms of
14 whether they should continue living together in a single state of
16 A. I don't know how clearly expressed the will of the three
17 constituent peoples could be said -- whether we can say that the will was
18 clearly expressed at this point in December 1991. The plebescite had
19 been held only for Serbs with different questions for non-Serbs, and very
20 few non-Serbs participated. The elections had been held two year -- a
21 year earlier for a different purpose, for the -- not for the -- I mean,
22 for the Assembly of Bosnia, but not expressly on the issue of the future
23 in a single state.
24 It was certainly a -- there was an ongoing discussion on the
25 future of Bosnia at this time and the future of Yugoslavia. Obviously
1 that's true. But I hesitate on your expression of the clearly expressed
3 Q. Allow me, then, to avoid the field of semantics and ask you
4 instead: As an analyst, was this period of time - and I mean December
5 1991 - one where -- when there was a decision expressed by the Serbian
6 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a referendum not to leave the country
7 that they had been living in until that point? That's to say,
8 Yugoslavia. Yes or no?
9 A. There was such a plebescite in November, yes. And the
10 overwhelming majority was a yes vote to stay in -- for -- in Yugoslavia.
11 Q. Thank you. And will you agree with me when I say that four and a
12 half months later, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina took the decision
13 to step out of Yugoslavia and start the procedure of establishing the
14 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to Yugoslavia?
15 A. Yes. There was a referendum at the end of February for all
16 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the vote was for the independence
17 of Bosnia. But I'd say it was the leadership that took the decision to
18 step out. But, yes, there was a referendum.
19 Q. And now this is what I'm asking you, bearing in mind these two
20 absolutely divergent decisions that were plebiscitary, according to the
21 then-constitution of Yugoslavia, was it possible to carry out a cessation
22 that would have been based on the constitution and law, for it to be
24 A. I'm not a constitutional lawyer at all. No expert. There were
25 many discussions at the very highest levels on how it could be resolved.
1 And if they couldn't resolve it, I certainly am not going to offer any
2 analysis of the constitution, no.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber gets the impression that
4 you're attempting to elicit from this expert witness a judgement on
5 whether this was right or wrong or constitutional or legal or whatever.
6 Now, I do not think that the witness in her report has stated any
7 of such thing, and I think wisely has not done it because she does not
8 claim to be a legal expert. Apart from that, the way in which you phrase
9 the questions about plebescites, et cetera, would need a thorough
10 analysis of those aspects. That is not what this witness tasked herself
11 with, and she has not analysed that.
12 So, therefore, the Chamber wonders whether this is a line of
13 questioning which assists the Chamber and whether we could reasonably
14 expect the witness to assist the Chamber in the matters the Chamber will
15 have to determine.
16 At the same time, I'm looking at the clock. It's time for a
17 break. We'll take that break but could first the witness be escorted out
18 of the courtroom.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, after the witness --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Before we move on, I have one item. On the
22 transcript it appears as if document 20759 has been assigned
23 Exhibit P402, where it certainly was meant, whether the Registrar
24 misspoke or whether it was recorded wrongly, that this document was MFI'd
25 under number P403, and we're talking about the intercepted telephone
1 conversation between Professor Unkovic, Colonel Miroslav Gagovic and
2 General Ratko Mladic.
3 And the other matter, Ms. Bibles.
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, that resolves one question.
5 Before we move forward if I could just posit a question.
6 Yesterday Your Honours ruled on our request with respect to bar
7 table motions for expert witnesses, at T4139, lines 18 to 21, you
8 directed that a party calling an expert witness may tender materials
9 underlying the report after the witness testifies and has been
10 cross-examined. And particular issues have been challenged. I just want
11 to clarify whether in the Chamber's view we need to tender any such
12 documents on re-examination or whether, if appropriate, some of those
13 documents could be the subject of a subsequent bar table motion.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider your question over the break,
15 Ms. Bibles.
16 And we take a break, and we'll resume at 20 minutes past 12.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
20 The witness had asked during the break whether she could fetch
21 some materials you'd like to consult. The Chamber gave permission for
22 her to do so. But just to go to her office and then take them out,
23 without any further discussions.
24 Later on, the Chamber was informed that the witness would like to
25 have available to her the 19th of December instructions, and
1 Madam Registrar has offered, because they are, of course, known in the
2 e-court under a 65 ter number, offered to print them out for the witness,
3 and I invited Madam Registrar to do so. Just to keep you updated on ...
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And also I have to give some guidance,
7 Ms. Bibles, on your question.
8 One second, Ms. Hanson.
9 If there's any challenge to the conclusions of an expert witness
10 referring to source materials and if such source materials are used by
11 the opposing party, then, as we indicated, first of all, that it's
12 allowed to get to those source materials with the expert witness and then
13 for the Prosecution to -- to seek admission of -- of relevant material as
15 Now, if that material, as such, that questions should be put to
16 the witness about those materials, then - and that's the preferred way -
17 do it during re-examination. If, however, you would say, these five
18 documents to which the expert couldn't say anything, at least we're not
19 aware of her being familiar with those documents, but they shed light on
20 the issue raised in cross-examination, then upon a clear announcement
21 that you wish to tender five or seven or ten documents shedding
22 additional light on the matter raised during cross-examination, then we
23 would not exclude for the possibility that you would then be allowed to
24 make a bar table motion specific on that subject and then tender those
25 documents in that way. But we expected usually you would like to use
1 those with the witness and then it's best done in re-examination.
2 Then, Mr. Stojanovic, you may proceed. But before you do so,
3 Ms. Hanson, if you need any -- if you need to consult any material,
4 please, address the Court, and we allowed you to fetch some material
5 apparently you were seeking. I also understood that you wanted to
6 consult the 19th of December instructions, which have been printed out
7 for you from the 65 ter version and are available if you want to look at
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. That was the item I wished
10 to fetch, but since I was told it could be made available here, I didn't
11 go to my office. I just wanted to review it. I hadn't looked at it in a
12 while. That's all.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.
14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. I hope that you have the instruction with you now. If you don't,
16 then it is with pleasure, Your Honours, for practical purposes to provide
17 a copy to our present-day witness. I think that we'll move faster that
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, if you have printed out a
20 copy that could be provided to the witness.
21 THE REGISTRAR: I understood that a copy was provided by VWS
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I left it in the witness room, I'm sorry.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If you need it tell us. Otherwise, another one will
25 be printed --
1 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it's here on the -- it's on the screen. It's
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed. I see the Defence --
4 THE WITNESS: If you wish to give it to me, that would be handy.
5 Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's -- Mr. Usher, could you assist? Or
7 Madam Usher.
8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I'm providing
9 the English version so I don't think we should be having a problem with
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We leave it to the witness if she wants to consult
13 the original language. Then we could perhaps do that on the screen.
14 THE WITNESS: It's fine.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Q. If you remember, we were discussing paragraph 21 of your report
17 and your conclusion that, according to Variant A, the laws of the
18 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were no longer to be abided by
19 and that orders of parallel Serb authorities were to be followed.
20 Then I asked you something else.
21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, again, I will be
22 using the instructions now on the organisation and activity of the Serb
23 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to 65 ter. That is 28 --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you are really speaking too fast.
25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise. Instructions on
1 the activity of the Serb people in BH, 65 ter 28386. And now I would
2 like to ask you that we focus on the last page, section 3, paragraph 2,
3 both in B/C/S and in English.
4 Q. This is what is stated in that paragraph:
5 "In their work and activity, the organs of authority are obliged
6 to act in keeping with the federal constitution and federal laws and
7 other federal regulations, as well as the republican regulations which
8 are not contrary to the federal regulations."
9 Do you see that, Ms. Hanson?
10 A. Yes. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Will you agree with me that, according to this kind
12 of interpretation of the text of the instructions, the regulations of the
13 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not being annulled except
14 for those that are in contravention of federal regulations; is that
16 A. It is instructing the Bosnian Serbs to choose to ignore some
17 republican regulations.
18 Q. If a republican regulation is contrary to a federal regulation,
19 will you agree with me that it is the federal regulation that has
21 A. Yes, I agree with you on that issue.
22 Q. Are you aware of a single regulation - so if we're talking about
23 December 1991 - that was at that time in contravention of a federal
24 regulation? And I'm asking you all of this because you, in paragraph 21,
25 as you analyse this instruction, said that laws of the SRBiH laws were to
1 stop being abided by.
2 A. I am not aware of such a regulation, and such a regulation would
3 be presumably resolved at the level of the constitutional court which is
4 why I find it curious that so many SDS organs are constantly repeating
5 that refrain of not obeying any republic regulation that is not in
6 accordance with federal.
7 Given that we don't expect all these people named to be members
8 of the Crisis Staffs to be constitutional experts themselves, it gives, I
9 find, a certain leeway in interpretation. But I also -- I'm referring to
10 the instructions in a totality, such as setting up parallel organs,
11 taking over police stations, things like that, that are presumably not in
12 accordance with republican law.
13 Q. Is It precisely this theory of the takeover of police stations
14 that led you to say this in paragraph 21; namely that, according to
15 Variant A, Crisis Staffs were to stop abiding by SRBiH laws and follow
16 the orders of parallel Serb authorities? Yes or no?
17 A. As I say, it's the total effect of these instructions. It's the
18 instruction on police stations, and it's item 2 in the last section, on
19 which I base that conclusion.
20 Q. I'm going to go back to that preamble now and ask you the
21 following. Was it possible for someone at local level to reach a
22 decision to refuse call-up and to refuse to act in accordance with the
23 obligation of answering call-up that is based on federal law?
24 A. Of course, it was possible. Many people avoided call-up or
25 refused it. Whether -- if you're asking if it's possible. Yes, it is
2 Q. Would that have been legal?
3 A. No, as far as I know.
4 Q. Will you say that I'm right if I say that precisely in the period
5 that you analyse, that is to say, the second half of 1991 and 1992, the
6 Serb population -- or rather, the non-Serb population did not respond to
8 A. That's pretty far out of the ambit of my tasking as looking at
9 Crisis Staffs, but I'm certainly aware of that in general terms, yes.
10 It's not something that I've looked at specifically for this report, but
11 I'm aware of that in general.
12 Q. Thank you. Then I won't be dealing with this any longer, but
13 thank you for your assistance.
14 Now I'd like to draw your attention to a part of your analysis
15 that has to do with the structure of Crisis Staffs. You'll be needing
16 that document.
17 In paragraph 24, P379 - I'm saying that for the sake of the
18 transcript, that is your report - this is what you say. Could you please
19 follow what I'm reading, Ms. Hanson.
20 "According to that document" - you're actually referring to the
21 instruction - "the Crisis Staff was headed by the president of the
22 SDS Municipal Board, who in most Serb-majority municipalities was also
23 the president of the municipal assembly."
24 Do you see that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, again, I'd like to ask for the following. For the
2 transcript I'm saying this. This is 65 ter 28386. It's a Prosecution
3 document. It is the instruction on the organisation and activity of
4 organs dated the 19th of December. So could we please have a look at
5 this together. It's in e-court as well.
6 Let us look at the first chapter, Variant A, paragraph 3. It's
7 the third page in B/C/S, and I think it's the third page in English too.
8 So it is paragraph 3. We'll wait for a second now. Thank you.
9 This is what it says there. In paragraph 3, the members of the
10 Crisis Staff are referred to in terms of the office they hold. And then
11 it says:
12 "The commander of the Crisis Staff is the president of the
13 municipal assembly or the chairman of the municipal -- the -- the
14 Municipal Board."
15 Can you see that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. This is what I'm asking you now. As for the Crisis Staffs for
18 which you had access to their documents, the president of the assembly,
19 or the president of the Executive Council, was it, at the same time, the
20 president of the SDS?
21 A. Not in every municipality, no. It was a general pattern, but not
22 in every municipality.
23 Q. So will we agree that, according to these instructions, the
24 commander of the Crisis Staff is someone who holds two of the possible
25 offices, either the president of the -- either the president of the
1 assembly or the president of the Executive Board, not the president of
2 the SDS; is that correct?
3 A. That is correct for Variant A. However, in Variant A
4 municipalities, it was generally the pattern that the president of the
5 Municipal Board of the SDS was president of the assembly. It is not
6 everywhere. And I'm sure it's -- this -- orders are only for the Serb
7 people. So if it should be a municipality where the president of the
8 municipal assembly is not a Serb, he was not going to enter the Crisis
9 Staff. He was not going to be commander of the Crisis Staff.
10 Q. No, my question is a simple one, and now I'm talking about
11 Variant A.
12 Do we agree that, according to the instruction, the commander of
13 the Crisis Staff does not necessarily have to be the president of the
14 SDS. But he has to be either the president of the assembly or the
15 president of the Executive Board of the local community?
16 A. Yes, according to the instruction, that's how it reads.
17 Q. And then we're going back to paragraph 24 of your report, would
18 it be correct to say what you wrote here? Namely, that, according to
19 this document, the Crisis Staff was headed by the president of the SDS
20 Municipal Board?
21 A. I was trying to combine the general effect of Variant A and
22 Variant B together to give the general pattern. But, no, it would not be
23 correctly exactly as written in paragraph 24 because there could be cases
24 in which the president of the SDS Municipal Board was not the president
25 of the municipal assembly in a Serb-majority municipality and therefore
1 he would not be, according to this instruction, the commander of the
2 Crisis Staff. But there was always some local variations, depending on
3 personalities and other things. I'm trying to describe a general
4 pattern, and I -- as written in the sentence, yeah, the clauses should be
5 shifted around.
6 Q. I dealt with this for a long time. That's why I wanted to ask
7 you this.
8 This perplexed me. Look at the instruction now.
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is 28386.
10 Q. And this is what I'd like to focus your attention on. Chapter 2,
11 Variant B, paragraph 3. This is what it says there in Variant B, and
12 that is the establishment of Crisis Staffs in the municipality where the
13 Serb population is a minority. Namely, the commander of the Crisis Staff
14 is the president of the Municipal Board of the SDS.
15 Can you see that?
16 A. Yes, I see it.
17 Q. So the situation is an interesting one there. In Variant A, the
18 commander of the Crisis Staff is the president of the municipality or the
19 president of the Executive Board; but in Variant B, that is to say, where
20 the Serb population is a minority in the local community, it is
21 imperative that the commander of the Crisis Staff has to be the president
22 of the SDS.
23 Did you notice that?
24 A. It doesn't say "imperative" but it gives the instructions. Yes,
25 I see the distinction, and I agree. In my sentence I may have -- I
1 conflated the two separate instructions. But, once again, in a
2 Variant A, he was going -- the president of the municipality would almost
3 invariably be if not the president of the SDS, a high -- a member of it.
4 Q. Thank you. That is quite different now but I wanted us to
5 clarify this in respect of what you had said. However, I'd like to ask
6 you the following.
7 If you observed this difference in terms of the person who is the
8 commander of the Crisis Staff in Variant A and Variant B, as you dealt
9 with your research, were you in a position to draw a conclusion as to why
10 the author did something like that, like why did he in Variant B give
11 greater power to the president of the SDS in Variant B rather than in
12 Variant A where the local community has a majority Serb population?
13 A. In a Variant B municipality, the SDS did not hold all the
14 municipal leadership positions. So therefore, the positions on --
15 corresponding positions on the Crisis Staff are going to go to the SDS
16 candidates for those positions. In most municipalities, not all, but in
17 most, the SDS candidate for the position of municipal assembly president
18 would be the president of the SDS Municipal Board. Therefore, I see them
19 as parallel structures the -- between Variant A and B there is
20 considerable parallels and I don't see Variant A as lessening the power
21 of the SDS because it's clear that the Crisis Staff is to be formed
22 within the SDS with the leadership of the SDS Municipal Board. So I
23 don't see that Variant B is giving more power to the SDS than Variant A.
24 I don't see that.
25 Q. I put it to you that in 1991, in all municipalities and in all
1 local communities, there was a coalition between the ruling or among the
2 ruling nationalist -- national parties and that there was a certain key
3 according to which functions were distributed. And that in all the
4 municipalities that you studied, i.e., Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kljuc,
5 Bijeljina, Zvornik, Foca, Rajlovac, East Sarajevo, the power was
6 distributed among national parties, SDA, SDS, and HDZ. Am I right?
7 A. Yes. There was the national key and functions were distributed
8 among the national -- the winning parties which were generally the
9 national parties. Not in Rajlovac because that wasn't created until
10 February 1992 and it was a creation of the SDS so there were no non-SDS
11 people appointed, as far as I know.
12 But in the others, yes, the national key was followed. Who won
13 the most -- whichever party won the most in the local elections got
14 president of the municipal assembly or president of the Executive Board.
15 It was agreed. And yes, power was shared after the 1990 elections.
16 Q. Do you mean to say that you reached such a conclusion through
17 your analysis? But who within the system elected the commander of the
18 Crisis Staff, or was he appointed by the republican grassroots?
19 A. I'm sorry, your question doesn't make sense as translated.
20 "Appointed by the republican grassroots" doesn't make sense.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please rephrase your question,
22 Mr. Stojanovic.
23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I understand. I'll take it step
24 by step.
25 Q. Ms. Hanson, based on your analysis, who was it who elected the
1 president or commander of the Crisis Staff?
2 A. According to this, he is not elected. He is named by these
4 Q. That is precisely why I formulated my question as I did.
5 If both the president of the assembly and president of the
6 Executive Board are Serbs - I will assume that an SDS president will be a
7 Serb - who will be chosen to be the commander of the Crisis Staff?
8 A. I don't know. I would have to look at those municipalities where
9 both those positions were held by Serbs and then look at the
10 Crisis Staffs. I can't say off the top of my head the instructions don't
12 Q. Thank you. While we are still within the e-court system on this
13 65 ter document, 28386, let us look at chapter 1, Variant A, item 11.
14 Sub-item 2.
15 If I may, Ms. Hanson, I'll read it out. We're referring to the
16 first degree of Variant A, the functioning of the Crisis Staff, which
17 reads, item 11, make preparations for, and I quote:
18 "... the replenishment of war units according to JNA
19 specifications both with personnel and materiel, equipment, and livestock
20 from the mobilisation fund in keeping with federal regulations and on the
21 basis of the Serbian people's principles of justice and humanity, which
22 includes SDS officials and other leaders and people of standing among the
23 Serbian people serving as personal examples."
24 My question: This provision concerning the replenishment of war
25 units, which is in keeping with the federal regulations, is it something
1 that you find controversial in any way or is that an obligation that had
2 previously been laid down?
3 A. As far as I know, it would be a pre-existing obligation, so it is
4 not controversial, as far as I can see. Although it is clearly heading
5 towards the Serbianisation of the JNA units in that it's encouraging
6 Serbs to sign up and it's not saying anything about encouraging the rest
7 of the population. But by itself, it's the obligation, as far as I know.
8 Q. Let me ask this again. You mentioned, or at least I heard it in
9 interpretation, "Serbianisation of the JNA." Does it state anywhere here
10 in the first degree of Variant A that it applied to the Serb people only?
11 Or -- or let me stop here.
12 A. These instructions are clearly aimed at the Serb people only.
13 But, no, here -- in the reference to the JNA, it doesn't specify Serbs
14 only. But the instructions are for Serbs only.
15 Q. And would you find anything controversial in a person responding
16 to a legally determined obligation? Yes or no?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Thank you, Ms. Hanson.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, just for my understanding, you made
20 a quote from paragraph 11, and you asked the witness whether it's
21 controversial or not. Do I then understand that it is your
22 interpretation of paragraph 11 that to apply federal regulations and
23 Serbian people's principles of justice and humanity rather than all
24 people's principles of justice and humanity is not controversial. Is
25 that what I have to understand is the position of the Defence?
1 I mean, in paragraph 11, we have a reference to the principles of
2 justice and humanity of the Serbian people alone and not of any of the
3 other peoples. And therefore I'm wondering whether I fully understood
4 your questions or whether I fully understood what you wished to elicit as
5 evidence from this witness.
6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] With all due respect,
7 Your Honour, there is no justice or humanity that would belong to one
8 people only. It is a universal principle. This was a time in December.
9 And that is why a call was issued by the SDS and it addressed, above all,
10 the SDS members.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, you said above all SDS members. Did it
12 address anyone else than SDS members? I mean, I'm asking for the
13 position of the Defence.
14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence continues to
15 maintain that a general mobilisation call was a general call and was a
16 duty, an obligation established under law for all citizens of
18 JUDGE ORIE: Or when you when refer to "and that is why a call
19 was issued by the SDS," I understood that to be a reference to these
21 Now, in your answer, whether anyone else was addressed apart from
22 SDS members, you were referring to a mobilisation call, which confuses me
23 a bit, but if that is your answer, then I'll invite you to proceed.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Perhaps, in a way, it anticipated my next question. We're staying
1 with the same document; 65 ter 28386, the instructions. Let us now
2 direct our attention to step 2 of Variant A, item 2, where matters are
3 placed a bit differently, especially in light of Their Honours' question.
4 Q. It reads here that at the second stage of Variant A, it is
5 necessary to, as it reads:
6 "Mobilise all police forces from among the Serbian people, and in
7 co-operation with the JNA commands and staffs, gradually resubordinate
9 This is what I'm interested in. In the first step or stage of
10 Variant A, there was a call to mobilise people from among the Serbian
11 people, so did you analyse the difference in the status between the first
12 and second step, or stage, of Variant A?
13 A. Yes. I say that, first -- the first degree is the preparations,
14 and the second degree is the actual assumption of power.
15 Q. In the process of takeover of power, according to these
16 instructions, the police forces from the ranks of the Serb people are to
17 be mobilised. Is that the correct conclusion?
18 A. That's what it says here, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you explain for us now what do you mean by this:
20 "In co-operation with JNA commands and staffs, gradually
21 resubordinate them."
22 Who is supposed to be resubordinated to whom, according to these
24 A. The police forces, as I read it, are to be resubordinated to the
25 JNA commands and staffs.
1 Q. Bearing in mind the fact that the time is December 1991, I'd like
2 to know, up until April of 1992, did your analysis arrive at instances
3 where the police forces were resubordinated in this period before the
4 outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the JNA?
5 A. The second stage wasn't activated until the 14th of February,
6 1992. But I did not look at police forces and their resubordination to
7 the JNA. I simply didn't look at it.
8 Q. The fact that you didn't analyse it, would that mean that you
9 don't know whether at any point before April of 1992 there were any
10 police forces resubordinated by the JNA?
11 A. Yes. I don't know.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we look at your report again. For the
13 transcript, it's P379. And we will focus on paragraph 69 where you
14 say --
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] May I continue, Your Honour?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Where it says the military role of the Crisis Staffs - that's
19 chapter 69 - you say:
20 "The common denominator everywhere is co-ordination and support
21 by the Crisis Staff. The further end of the spectrum is the Crisis Staff
22 giving operational orders to armed units, and the head of the
23 Crisis Staff personally commanding armed units."
24 This is what I'd like to ask you about first. What sort of
25 function is that, head or chief of the Crisis Staff? Who do you consider
1 to be the head of the Crisis Staff who can personally issue orders to
2 armed units?
3 A. He was called either the president or, in some cases, the
4 commander of the Crisis Staff. That's who I refer to.
5 Q. So I'd be right in saying that, to you, the head of the
6 Crisis Staff is, according to the instructions, the commander of the
7 Crisis Staff; right?
8 A. The instructions of 19 December used the term "commander." I
9 more often see the term "president of the Crisis Staff" in the documents
10 themselves, but I do occasionally see the term "commander." But when I
11 said the head of the Crisis Staff, translated here as "nacelnik," I meant
12 the president or commander, whatever he calls himself.
13 Q. In your analysis of numerous documents seized from Crisis Staffs,
14 did you find the term "head of Crisis Staff" anywhere?
15 A. No. And I'm sorry if the translation gave the term "nacelnik"
16 which has, I realise, a more specific meaning in B/C/S. I may just have
17 been tired of writing "president" or "commander." I do not mean to say
18 any -- I never saw the term "nacelnik" and I don't mean to say that there
19 was -- I think I just didn't want to type out "president." Do you
20 understand? I'm not asserting there is such a position as "nacelnik" at
21 all. I mean "president" or "commander."
22 Q. Very well. Now we know who we are talking about.
23 Let me ask you this: Bearing in mind the time when the Army of
24 Republika Srpska was established, the 21st of May, 1992, the adoption of
25 the Law on the Army, was it in legal terms at all possible for someone,
1 be he commander or president of the Crisis Staff, to issue operational
2 orders to the Army of Republika Srpska?
3 A. As I said, I'm not a lawyer and I have not studied the Law on the
4 Army precisely. But these -- all these institutions were forming -- in
5 the process of formation and there was a great deal of improvisation
6 going on and the different groups and organs were writing their own rules
7 often enough. Legally, I don't know. I imagine not. What I see on the
8 ground is another matter.
9 Q. Let me now put a question which supports my own statement. And I
10 put it to you that it is impossible in a system of singleness of command
11 and subordination for someone who is a president or commander of the
12 Crisis Staff to issue orders to the army. In view of the numerous
13 documents that have passed through your hands, would you agree with me
14 that in terms of regulations, as they exist, it would be impossible?
15 A. There's what is allowed and not allowed and there's what's
16 possible or impossible, I'm sorry, but --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Let's try to keep matters clear.
18 Have you a formed an opinion, on the basis of your expertise, on
19 whether a president or commander of the Crisis Staff was formally
20 empowered to issue orders to the army? On the basis of the regulations,
21 the existing law, whatever, have you formed an opinion about that?
22 THE WITNESS: I have not examined the laws in such detail that I
23 could form a really informed opinion, but generally, my impression would
24 be no, he could not do it to the army.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now the next question is, because you made a
1 clear distinction between what you saw in the -- what the formal position
2 was and what happened on the ground, have you seen documents in which
3 presidents or commanders of the Crisis Staff issued orders to military
4 persons or units?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Operational orders.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: So what you say your impression, not more than that,
9 not an expert opinion about what would not be legal on paper, does not
10 match with what you saw in the documents you examined, to the extent that
11 it nevertheless happened on the ground, at least on paper again.
12 THE WITNESS: That's quite correct, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, please proceed.
14 When I say "please proceed," perhaps it's better to say let's
15 take a break.
16 We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 20 minutes to 2.00.
17 Could the witness first be escorted out of the courtroom.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 JUDGE ORIE: And could I inquire with you, Mr. Stojanovic, how
20 much more time you would need? I think your estimate was two hours.
21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I gave an estimate
22 of three hours, and I believe that I will stick to the estimate.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, when I misspoke, I apologise for that. If your
24 estimate was three hours in view of the material covered by this expert
25 report, you can use your full three hours.
1 We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 20 minutes to 2.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 1.17 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.43 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
5 Mr. Mladic. Mr. Mladic, no speaking aloud.
6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, if you are ready, please proceed.
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I would like to
12 thank Their Honours for the digression a moment ago, because those were
13 precisely the issues I wanted to put questions about to Ms. Hanson.
14 Q. If you remember, miss, one of -- one issue had to do with what
15 was possible with the Crisis Staffs in terms of law and, quite apart from
16 that, there were cases where you came across instances that Crisis Staffs
17 issued orders, and you talked about it to Their Honours. Do you recall
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What's more, as I read your report, I saw that you mentioned a
21 number of cases, including Bosanska Krupa, and the Crisis Staff there.
22 Do you recall that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. If my understanding is correct, in your CV, among other things,
25 you stated that you testified in the case against Klickovic --
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter isn't sure about the name.
2 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. -- before the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
4 A. Yes, the case of Gojko Klickovic, correct.
5 Q. He was the president of the Crisis Staff of Bosanska Krupa at the
6 time. Am I right?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. You mentioned the case where he, as the president of the
9 Crisis Staff and on behalf of the Crisis Staff, issued orders to the
10 1st Krajina Brigade on the 24th of April, 1992, about the use of that
11 military unit which had to do with the destruction of certain bridges.
12 Do you recall that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I would take the liberty to draw a conclusion, and I expect your
15 reaction to it.
16 The relationship between the army and the Crisis Staffs was
17 defined in law, and that's true, but it's also true that, at the time in
18 1992, and especially in March, April, and May of 1992, based on the
19 authority of the person heading the Crisis Staff and based on the
20 authority of the senior officer who headed the JNA unit present in the
21 area, it depended whether a JNA unit would, in fact, be used by
22 Crisis Staffs. Am I right?
23 A. That's absolutely correct, except for the first part of your
24 statement. I wouldn't say that the relationship between the army and the
25 Crisis Staff was defined in law before May of 1992 but absolutely the
1 second half, yes. One of the factors would be the authority of the
2 person heading the Crisis Staff, and the authority of the personality of
3 senior officer of the JNA. That's made clear in Karadzic's own words,
5 Q. Another issue that I'd like to ask you about is this: I put it
6 to you that, in terms of law, the composition of the Crisis Staffs did
7 not include the senior officers of the JNA at local level. Am I right?
8 A. What law are you referring to when you say "in terms of law"?
9 The problem is at what period of time are you talking about and what laws
11 Q. Let me be more specific. In the period between December 1991 and
12 end of May 1992, when the Crisis Staffs formally ceased to exist -- they
13 were formed and formally ceased to exist, the compositions of the
14 Crisis Staffs did not include the JNA senior officers present at that
15 level; is that right?
16 A. In some places they did. Zvornik, for example, names -- names
17 the JNA commanders already when they form the Crisis Staff, and in his --
18 at assembly speech in March 1992, Krajisnik says, Form Crisis Staffs with
19 JNA officers if you can. So I think the expectation would be, if
20 possible, include them.
21 Q. Let us now look at the instructions again together dated
22 19 December 1991. For the transcript, 65 ter number is 28386.
23 Let's focus on part 2 of Variant A, first degree, item 3, which
24 reads that the Crisis Staff shall be formed from, and then it lists
25 members of the SDS Municipal Board secretariat members. Can you follow
2 Then the holders of municipal offices. That's to say, president
3 of the assembly, or president of the Executive Board, chief of the public
4 security station, or commander of the police station, commander or chief
5 of the TO staff, secretary of the Municipal Secretariat of National
6 Defence, or other member of the secretariat who is a member of the SDS;
7 next, deputies in the Assembly of the Serbian People of BH and members of
8 the Main Board of the SDS from the area of the municipality concerned.
9 Can you see here that no commanders of JNA units are mentioned
10 here as members of the Crisis Staff?
11 A. I agree in this document from December 1991 it's not mentioned.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. The Zvornik Crisis Staff is mentioned as an exception where the
15 commander of the JNA -- of a JNA unit was appointed into the
16 Crisis Staff. Do you remember that?
17 A. I note also the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff invited battalion
18 commanders to the Crisis Staff meetings. So those are the two places
19 where I find it explicated before Karadzic's speech in March 27th.
20 That's where I find specific references, the only two places.
21 Q. Thank you. In order to establish this further, let's look at
22 65 ter document 28387. They are conclusions from the meeting of the SDS
23 Municipal Board in Zvornik held on the 22nd of December, 1991. In other
24 words, three days after the issuance of the instructions. The agenda of
25 which includes the election of the Crisis Staff. Do you see that,
1 Ms. Hanson?
2 A. Yes, I see it.
3 Q. The names of persons who are members of the Crisis Staff are
4 listed here. The last line reads:
5 "The Command Staff of the JNA of the municipality of Zvornik."
6 Is that the document based on which you concluded that it was one
7 of the exceptions to the instructions where a JNA commander was included
8 in the Crisis Staff?
9 A. Yes, this is the document I cite to in footnote 109.
10 Q. Do you have any other document which would show that the
11 Crisis Staff of the municipality of Zvornik included an officer of a JNA
13 A. I have very few documents of Zvornik before April 1992, so, no.
14 And I specify in my text that they list the Command Staff as members, but
15 assert that I have evidence that they were actively participating in
16 Crisis Staff meetings before we see Crisis Staff -- a few Crisis Staff
17 documents in April 1992.
18 Q. Thank you. Since I am not concerned with the JNA but, rather,
19 with the Army of Republika Srpska, my question will be placed in the
20 context of the indictment.
21 Did you find in any document evidence of the fact that any
22 commander of the Army of Republika Srpska was a member of a Crisis Staff
23 in the period up until Crisis Staffs ceased to exist in June of 1992?
24 A. Again, not all Crisis Staffs ceased to exist in June 1992, and if
25 you're limiting it to the commander of the VRS, we're limited to the
1 period -- do you mean to limit to the ten-day period between the
2 21st of May and the 31st of May? Yes. The answer is yes. We talked
3 about it in Sanski Most. Colonel Basara was a member of the Sanski Most
4 Crisis Staff. Kljuc, we see that. Many, many Crisis Staffs, we see
5 that. And through on into June. What I tend to see by July 1992 is not
6 the commander himself but a deputy, a representative of the command, and
7 that to me indicates the changing relationship. But in May and June,
8 yes, I certainly see commanders of the regular army unit in the
9 municipality on the Crisis Staffs.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 Microphone, please.
12 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. You mentioned Sanski Most. And now I'm going to ask that we look
14 at document 65 ter 06406.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, do you have any intention to -- to
16 tender the conclusions of the Zvornik Municipal Board of the 22nd of ...
17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, with all due
18 respect, because I was basically forced to use this document. Thank you.
19 May I proceed, Your Honour?
20 Q. These are conclusions from a meeting of the Crisis Staff held on
21 the 21st and 22nd of April, 1992. The Crisis Staff of the Serbian
22 municipality of Sanski Most. Do you see that before you, Ms. Hanson?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Since you mentioned Sanski Most as one of the examples of a
25 situation when an officer of the VRS was on the Crisis Staff, I'm going
1 to ask you to look at paragraph 6 so that we comment on it.
2 Again, I repeat, this is the 22nd of April, 1992. So this is
3 what it says in paragraph 6:
4 "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most
5 hereby adopts the conclusion that the Serb defence forces are to be
6 placed at the disposal of the commander of the Serb Territorial Defence
7 and be engaged as a special unit of the Serb Territorial Defence."
8 This is what I'm interested in now. To the best of your
9 knowledge, in terms of the analysis of these documents, what kind of
10 formations are these? Namely, the ones that the Crisis Staff of
11 Sanski Most is referring to in April 1992?
12 A. As far as I know, it was a locally formed force, whether you want
13 to call it volunteer, or paramilitary, or Serbian TO, there was a unit
14 called the Serbian Defence Force, or SOS.
15 But I note, as you said, this is April, so it's not relevant to
16 the question of a VRS commander being on the Crisis Staff.
17 Q. Then I'm going to ask you to look at 65 ter 06593. Let's take a
18 look at it together.
19 Also, this is a conclusion, or, rather, these are conclusions of
20 the Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality of Sanski Most, but this is a
21 month later, on the 22nd of May, 1992.
22 In 1(d) of these conclusions, it says, in order to protect vital
23 facilities of the town, above all the water supply system, the
24 transformer station, the silo, et cetera, the commander of the
25 6th Krajina Brigade, Colonel Basara, and the commander of the Serbian
1 Territorial Defence, Colonel Anicic, are hereby instructed to do that.
2 Do you see that?
3 A. Yes, I see it.
4 Q. On the basis of this document, do you draw the conclusion that
5 Colonel Basara and Colonel Anicic are members of the Crisis Staff?
6 A. On the basis of this alone, no. But I see other documents where
7 they are listed. The Crisis Staff is assigning various tasks.
8 Whether it is an order to an outside person or a tasking for a member of
9 the Crisis Staff, it's hard to tell from this one sentence. But it is
10 very common that the Crisis Staff in its conclusions assigns tasks to
11 various people, and this one is assigning that to Colonel Basara and
12 Anicic. But there are other documents in which Basara is listed.
13 Q. I'm going to ask you a specific question now. Do you have a
14 document that states that one of these two officers, as you say, of the
15 Army of Republika Srpska was appointed member of the Crisis Staff of
16 Sanski Most? Please take a look and do help us.
17 A. I don't have an appointment but a listing of him as a leader --
18 as a member, yes, footnote 77, 65 ter 06408.
19 Q. Could you tell us what this document says, 06408.
20 A. It lists the members --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could -- could we have a look at it. We have it.
22 THE WITNESS: To my recollection, it lists the members and their
23 various tasks. And Anicic is number 7 and Basara is number 10.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Please, let us take a look at this together. Let it be in
1 accordance with the document that we have before us now. Mr. Anicic, at
2 that point in time, that is to say, on the 30th of May, 1992, was he a
3 member of the VRS; or, as is stated, commander of the STS?
4 A. Is he listed here as a commander of the TO -- Serbian STO,
5 presumably Serbian TO. As we know, this is the period of transition and
6 the formation of the VRS. He is not listed here as a member of the VRS,
7 per se.
8 Q. Thank you. And now I'm going to ask that we go back to the
9 document that was marked 06593. That's the 65 ter number. A moment ago,
10 we looked at paragraph 1 (d) in that document, the conclusions of the
11 22nd of May, 1992.
12 And then let us please look at paragraph 4. Same document. It
13 says the following:
14 "As far as disarming paramilitary formations in Sanski Most is
15 concerned, as far as the practical side is concerned, Colonel Basara and
16 Colonel Anicic are in charge."
17 This is what I'm asking you now. This document and this
18 conclusion, did you use this at any point in time as a basis to reach the
19 conclusion that Anicic and Basara as members of the VRS are members of
20 the Crisis Staff?
21 A. My conclusions are based on the totality of documents. When I
22 had another one as of 30th of May listing him explicitly as a member of
23 the Crisis Staff, and this is not in contradiction to it, I would -- I
24 wouldn't say which document I based my conclusion on per se, but I
25 cite -- obviously I cite to the other document. So this is not my sole
1 source for such a statement.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Stojanovic, I'm very sorry to interrupt you.
3 May I put an additional question to the witness at this point in time.
4 According to this document, we have seen on the screen, Colonel
5 Basara was the commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade on the 30th of May.
6 Can you tell me to which army did this brigade, the 6th Krajina Brigade,
7 belong at this point in time.
8 THE WITNESS: At the 30th of May, to the VRS. According to the
9 establishment of the VRS. The JNA no longer existed by that time was my
10 understanding of it. The JNA ceased to exist effectively on the
11 27th of April, is my understanding, but the units were still there in
12 place, and with the establishment of the VRS, unless they were
13 withdrawing from Bosnia, they were part of the VRS.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I'm going to finish on this note.
17 If we agree that the commander of the unit from the VRS in
18 Sanski Most was on the Crisis Staff on the 30th of May, 1992, would that
19 be contrary to what the instructions of December 1991 say?
20 A. It would be very much in keeping with the spirit of the
21 instructions. However, I regard the Variant A and B as being superceded
22 by events by 30th of May, 1992. It would be in keeping with the
23 instructions of 26 April 1992. It would be keeping -- in keeping with
24 the instructions of 24 May 1992. But it is not explicated in
25 December 1991 that the commander would be a member, no.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, we have to stop anyhow. But I have
2 one question. There may be a translation issue, but I take it from your
3 last question that you consider it - but correct me when I'm wrong - but
4 it is your position that appointing a military commander would go against
5 the instruction of the 19th of December.
6 Is that your position? I see you're nodding yes, but ...
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour.
8 Precisely. Because it is contrary --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then we have to carefully look at the text of
10 the -- it's my recollection, but I'm doing it from the top of my head,
11 that the language, but there may be a translation issue, is that on the
12 formation of the Crisis Staff that members should include. From what I
13 remember, it doesn't say "the Crisis Staff are composed as follows" but
14 that "the following persons should be included in the Crisis Staff."
15 Which, of course -- I do not know if that is the issue you refer to, I'd
16 like to know that, or whether there's any other portion where it
17 apparently prohibits to have a member of the armed forces be appointed at
18 the Crisis Staff, or were you referring to the -- to the part of the
19 instructions I just referred to?
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, Your Honour,
21 I'm going to respond and tomorrow when we continue, again, we are going
22 to present paragraph A -- paragraph 3 of Variant A on the formation of
23 Crisis Staffs to compare it to this.
24 This is what our basic position is. As the distinguished witness
25 said today, we have two Crisis Staffs where she found members of the VRS
1 and those were exceptions. They were just --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but the issue was a different one. The issue
3 was whether it was inconsistent or it was contrary to the instructions to
4 appoint a military commander on the Crisis Staff. That was the issue.
5 Not on whether it was an exception or not. That's a different matter.
6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely. We're going to show
7 is that. Yes. We believe that it is contrary.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We'll then wait until tomorrow.
9 Before we adjourn -- and perhaps -- Ms. Hanson, we'd like to see
10 you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 but then in Courtroom I again.
11 THE WITNESS: May I ask, if it's not rude, just to know how long
12 to expect? It's just a question of my plans for later in the day.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Stojanovic, if you stick to your three
14 hours, then tomorrow you would have another 45 minutes approximately. So
15 let's say that if we can assume that you finish in the first session, is
16 that a correct expectation? Well, somewhere in --
17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: -- the end of the first session or early in the
19 second session.
20 Ms. Bibles, time for re-examination?
21 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I think should be able to finish, based
22 on what we have now, within the second session at the latest.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You -- you mean including possible ...
24 MS. BIBLES: Re-examination, yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Re-examination for you.
1 MS. BIBLES: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: So you take a full hour for re-examination.
3 MS. BIBLES: Assuming that cross may go into the end of the first
4 session or even into the second session, then I should be able to finish
5 within the second session.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Which means that we'll certainly finish
7 tomorrow. I would urge you to see whether we can -- re-examination of
8 one hour is relatively long, but we'll finish tomorrow morning. But
9 whether that will be at the end of the third session or at the end of the
10 fourth session, which goes until 2.15, is unclear at this moment.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I understand.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then, we'd like to see you back but I'd first like
13 to give you the same instructions that as I did yesterday not to
14 communicate in any way with anyone about your testimony.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you have not tendered anything yet.
19 First, the instructions, would you like to have them in evidence? We may
20 see them in the future many more times. And there are various versions
21 of that one, I think, with and without handwritten notes on it, et
22 cetera. Would you like to -- because this is one, yes, which is fully
23 legible. Would you like to tender that?
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. With your
25 leave, I would like to.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, 65 ter number 28386 would
2 receive number?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Number D78, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ORIE: D78 is admitted into evidence.
5 Any of the other documents you used?
6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter number 06593, conclusions
7 of the Crisis Staff of the Serb Municipality of Sanski Most of the
8 22nd of May, 1992.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Document 06593 becomes Exhibit D79, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: D79 is admitted into evidence.
12 Any other documents?
13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: May I suggest - but otherwise we could call it as a
15 Chamber exhibit - to have 06408 in evidence. I think I asked to look --
16 to be able to look at the document itself. If you -- I think you used
17 it. If you do not want to tender it, then there are other ...
18 I wrote ...
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just check whether I had the right number or
21 was it 6406. Madam Registrar, could you assist us which one it was that
22 we looked at.
23 THE REGISTRAR: I believe it was 06406, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then I misheard. Yes --
25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your leave, it
1 can also be our exhibit. And it is with pleasure that I will tender this
2 as a Defence exhibit. The document of the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most,
4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Document 06406 becomes Exhibit D80, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: D80 is admitted into evidence.
7 There may be one more, but we'll find out tomorrow. We'll not
8 further stress the patience of those who are assisting us. As always,
9 very loyal.
10 We adjourn for the day, and we will resume tomorrow, the -- is it
11 the -- yes. It's the 31st of October, at 9.30 in the morning, in
12 Courtroom I.
13 --- Where upon the hearing adjourned at 2.23 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 31st day of
15 October, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.