Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4313

 1                           Thursday, 1 November 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 8             This is the case IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             The Chamber was informed that the parties may have some

11     preliminaries.

12             Mr. Groome.

13             MR. GROOME:  Good morning, Your Honours.

14             Just briefly.  Yesterday I mentioned a Rule 70 document which we

15     had not had clearance to disclose.  Late last evening we did receive an

16     e-mail giving us permission.  The official correspondence hasn't come,

17     but on that basis we are authorised to disclose it.  We've done that.  We

18     will have printed copies made prior to it being uploaded into e-court

19     should Defence counsel wish to use it with the witness.

20             The only thing that remains, Your Honour, the Prosecution would

21     request the Chamber to instruct the witness.  The witness had been told

22     that there was no permission yet to discuss this document.  But would the

23     Chamber please advise the witness that the document that he was told not

24     to mention that clearance has been given and if asked questions about it,

25     he is free to answer.

Page 4314

 1             And one qualification, that the right to use and permission to

 2     use it is condition that it be done in private session.

 3             Thank you, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you Mr. Groome.

 5             If I address the witness in relation to this, perhaps I could do

 6     that best in private session anyhow.  That would be better.

 7             Any preliminaries from the Defence or not?

 8             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             We had slight miscommunication with the Detention Unit this

10     morning.  There are some medical doctors who were scheduled to examine

11     Mr. Mladic, and we ask the Detention Unit not to send him to the court

12     this morning, but, unfortunately, there was probably some

13     miscommunication and Mr. Mladic is with us this morning.  And we would

14     ask Your Honours kindly to ask Mr. Mladic to give his waiver and leave

15     the courtroom as soon as possible so that the doctors can continue their

16     work.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you can take instructions on behalf of

20     Mr. Mladic, and if he wishes to waive his right, you can [Overlapping

21     speakers] ...

22             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  And, please, if you consult with Mr. Mladic make

24     clear that, of course, he is entitled to attend the hearings.

25                           [Defence counsel confer]

Page 4315

 1             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour, I have a clear instruction from

 2     Mr. Mladic that he is waiving his right to be present today and tomorrow.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then Mr. Mladic can be escorted out of the

 4     courtroom.  I do not know how quickly transportation to the UNDU can be

 5     organised because that is in the hands of Registry together with the

 6     transport services of the Dutch authorities.

 7             MR. LUKIC:  And I will also kindly ask your permission to leave

 8     the courtroom because I have to organise a visit again.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand.

10             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic is still there as co-counsel.

12             Well, further conversations can be done outside of the courtroom.

13                           [The accused withdrew]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hochhauser, are you ready to continue your

15     examination?  I will ask that the witness could be escorted into the

16     courtroom.

17             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes, Your Honour, we're ready to proceed.

18             Actually, as the witness is being brought in, if I could ask --

19     I'd like to start with P429 on the -- up on the monitor.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Mole.  Please be seated.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, I'd like to remind you that you're still

24     bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your

25     testimony yesterday.

Page 4316

 1                           WITNESS:  RICHARD MOLE [Resumed]

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  And I'd like to move briefly into private session.

 4                           [Private session]

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

22             Ms. Hochhauser will now continue her examination.

23             Please proceed.

24             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25                           Examination by Ms. Hochhauser: [Continued]

Page 4317

 1        Q.   Good morning, Colonel Mole.

 2        A.   Good morning.

 3        Q.   We left off yesterday discussing the difference between an

 4     observation post and a weapons monitoring site and I think we sort of

 5     stopped mid-answer due to a translation problem.  So can you tell us just

 6     briefly what is an observation post?

 7        A.   An observation post was utilised so that we could gather

 8     information throughout the Sarajevo area, but it was very specifically

 9     orientated towards the Papa side.  As I was explaining yesterday, there

10     were less weapons for us to monitor in -- on Papa side, and, as a

11     consequence, we had manpower available for us to use within the city, to

12     observe the city, rather than to monitor the weapons, and I think, as I

13     mentioned yesterday, the weapon monitoring was mostly occurring on the

14     Lima side.  So we set up a number of observe posts which actually had

15     been arranged before I came to Sarajevo, and I adjusted some of them

16     during the course of my tour, but the aim was for those observation posts

17     to be on high ground, which, necessarily, placed them quite close to the

18     front line so that they could observe the whole of the city.

19        Q.   Now, if we could view for a moment, please, Exhibit P429, which

20     is referenced in paragraph 14 of your statement.

21             Now, the -- the triangle -- sorry, is it up on your screen?

22        A.   There's a map on the screen if that's what you mean.

23        Q.   Yes.  And the triangles that we see up on this map which are

24     designated with either an L and a number or a P and a number, do those

25     reflect only the observation posts or also the weapons monitoring sites?

Page 4318

 1        A.   It's both.

 2        Q.   And does this actually reflect where those were located during

 3     your time in Sarajevo?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now yesterday we discussed the standardised form used to collect

 6     the information from both of those types of sites.  If we could look for

 7     a moment, please, at Exhibit P427.

 8             And do you see that on your monitor now?

 9        A.   I do.

10        Q.   Okay.  P427 is marked on the top, designated on top as an increp

11     from the 3rd December 1992, and is this an example of the standardised

12     form that you were discussing in your statement and yesterday?

13        A.   It is.

14        Q.   Now, if you could just briefly illustrate for the Chamber what

15     information you were recording and how by going through the columns.  And

16     so I'm going to ask you first, this P5/1 in the first column on the left

17     of the document, labelled serial what is that -- what -- what information

18     is recorded there?

19        A.   P5 relates to where the observation was taken from, in this case

20     observation point Papa 5.  The slash follows and then the incident number

21     is indicated by the next number.

22        Q.   And just with again with reference to the prior exhibit that we

23     saw, P429, Papa 5 would have been designated on that map with a triangle

24     P5?

25        A.   Absolutely.

Page 4319

 1        Q.   Now, I think the date is the self-explanatory and the time.  Can

 2     you tell us what is recorded in activity details?

 3        A.   That would be as much detail as the observer could place that

 4     relates to the type of weapon that was presumed to have fired, where it

 5     landed and any other detail, numerics, i.e., how many rounds landed in

 6     that particular incident.

 7        Q.   And so, for an example, just -- if we can take this -- staying

 8     with the first entry could you interpret what is said -- what is recorded

 9     for us?

10        A.   I will do my best but bearing in mind it was other people's

11     hieroglyphics, not mine.  But I would guess that's artillery rounds for

12     IRTY; MR would be mortar rounds; AAA would be anti-aircraft weapon; and

13     5, I think that's got a squiggle there that says "tank."  So that would

14     be five tank rounds.

15        Q.   And you said you are deciphering other people's hieroglyphics.

16     Back when you were in Sarajevo, were you looking at these reports?

17        A.   No.  They would interpret those in a much more co-ordinated

18     fashion when they were sent through to me.

19        Q.   But is this an example of the -- of the type of form on which

20     they were recording them?

21        A.   Yes, it's the base document that recording was made.

22        Q.   Now - thank you - moving over to the remarks column -- I'm sorry

23     to the source of information column, which is the next column.  Can you

24     tell us what that records?

25        A.   Yes, para 5 would be the source or the presumed source of the

Page 4320

 1     incident which occurred in the previous paragraph.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, you've used the word -- you just used the word

 3     "presumed" and I think in your previous answer you also used the word

 4     "presumed" in describing the presumed type of artillery or type of

 5     weaponry.  Can you tell us was there a standard that was dictated by you

 6     to the UNMOs that had to be met before they would record something on a

 7     form like this?

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The court reporters asks for short breaks between

 9     question and answer an answer and question.

10             Please proceed.

11             THE WITNESS:  Could you just ask that question again.

12             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Sorry.  I'm sorry, I'll rephrase it.

13        Q.   Before one of your UN MOs would -- would record a round, can you

14     tell us was there a protocol for what -- what standard of information

15     they had to have in order to record it as a round observed?

16        A.   All UNMOs when they came into our sector were introduced to these

17     forms and instructed on how to fill them out, so that was a universal

18     training element for all UNMOs whether they be Lima or Papa side.  Part

19     of that training would have been what you've just asked.  They had to see

20     the impact of the round, and then they had to make an assessment as to

21     what the round was from what weapon it came, and, if possible, give an

22     indication of where that round came from.

23        Q.   And so when it says UNMO seen, is that an indication that the

24     recording UNMO actually observed the round landing?

25        A.   Absolutely.

Page 4321

 1        Q.   And in remarks where it says area Otes or Ilidza is that where --

 2     what is that?

 3        A.   Yes, that would be the area from -- of the source of the rounds

 4     which they've observed and the figures after that would be the

 5     four-figure grid reference.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And can we see briefly the second page of this document,

 7     please.  And can you explain to the Court what it is that we're looking

 8     at here?

 9        A.   What we see here is the obverse of the form that you've just been

10     looking at.  The particular date of that particular form was during the

11     Otes conflict, which you see Otes mentioned a number of times on the

12     form, on both sides.  But the conflict was so intense that quite clearly

13     the form was not fit for purpose, and so they had to turn over and

14     continue the recording.

15             So what you see are groups of five rounds and then the totals at

16     the end of each.

17        Q.   Now, Colonel, you had an opportunity to review the

18     Senior Military Observer's end-of-month of reports for October, November,

19     and December 1992, which are now in evidence respectively as

20     Exhibits P424, 425, and 426.

21             In addition to the information recorded on forms such as the one

22     that's on the monitor, can you tell the Chamber, were there other sources

23     of information that you used in compiling these end -- the end-of-month

24     reports?

25        A.   The end-of-month report was an assimilation of a considerable

Page 4322

 1     amount of detail which came to us from multiple sources.  Before I went

 2     to Sarajevo, I was fortunately exposed to a number of different areas

 3     within the theatre, and hopefully after this brief explanation it will

 4     make sense to answer your question.

 5             But I was in the UN protected area east operating from Erdut.  I

 6     was the chief operations officer for all of the UNMO group.  That allowed

 7     me to take information from reports such as you're asking me about from

 8     the Senior Military Observers in all UN protected areas and to assimilate

 9     and interpret them.  I visited all the UN protected areas and, as well as

10     that, I went to Bihac.

11             After that was when I was posted to Sarajevo, and as a

12     consequence I feel that I was well rounded in the information available

13     to me within the theatre.  Now I've explained that, you'll see that the

14     end-of-month report that I was submitting was just but one of a sequence

15     of reports that would come from all UN protected areas.  And it was a

16     two-way process.  So once that information went to Zagreb to the

17     Chief Military Observer, a co-ordinated report was then sent back out to

18     all the Senior Military Observers as to what was going on elsewhere in

19     theatre.

20             There were other agencies within Sarajevo.  The Red Cross weren't

21     there for very long.  UNHCR, three battalions, of course, of UNPROFOR.

22     And, primarily, my operations room was adjacent to and worked closely

23     with the operations room belonging to the sector headquarters with whom I

24     worked.  They, too, had sources of information which came from multiple

25     agencies.

Page 4323

 1             Where did we share this information?  We shared it daily at an

 2     O Group operations meeting in the morning.  There may be one in the

 3     afternoon when all elements of UNPROFOR at the PTT building came

 4     together, shared their knowledge, and looked to the future.

 5        Q.   Now, Colonel, I'm going to diverge from the route I was on for a

 6     moment and ask you as a follow-up to that question or that answer did

 7     you, all of the sources of information that you've just told us about and

 8     the sharing of information, were you able -- did you use that information

 9     in order to analyse and -- analyse what was happening in Sarajevo and

10     determine what your next steps would be there, and, if so, can you tell

11     us what the result of that was?

12        A.   Indeed.  The point of sharing the information was to give myself

13     and my UNMOs the best opportunity to achieve the tasks which I was

14     setting them or which I was set by the Chief Military Observer or,

15     indeed, the Sector Commander.  So I needed to interpret events throughout

16     the theatre, to see if they were going to have any direct effect on

17     Sarajevo as a sector.

18        Q.   Okay.  And when you say "throughout the theatre," can you define

19     what your -- what that means?

20        A.   The theatre, to me, would be all the UN protected areas both on

21     the edge of Bosnia, within Bosnia, Bihac, all UN protected areas.

22        Q.   And did you find -- did you find that events throughout all of

23     the other protected areas had a direct effect on Sarajevo?

24        A.   Absolutely.  Part of my analysis was a military one.  I applied

25     what knowledge I had from 24 years service in my military to interpret

Page 4324

 1     what was going on around me to people who haven't experienced such as a

 2     siege of a city.  It all looks somewhat chaotic.  But there was structure

 3     there, and it was that structure I was trying to interpret using the data

 4     which we're talking about.

 5             So, for example, when I was not in Sarajevo but the

 6     Chief Operations Officer, I was aware of the pressure point of Brcko.  It

 7     was significant for both sides, and I won't go into the detail about

 8     that, other than to say that if a threat to such a sensitive area of

 9     Bosnia was perceived by, for example, the Serb side throughout the

10     theatre, there was often a retaliation, or we would expect a retaliation

11     in Sarajevo.  And it was not accidental because my other experience of

12     having relationships with Colonel Galic, later General Galic, was such

13     that I had been told that there will be responses in Sarajevo should

14     things not go according to their plans elsewhere within the theatre.

15             So there was a marked relationship between events in the theatre

16     and those that we experienced in the city.

17        Q.   And Colonel you discuss this somewhat also in your statement.

18     And in your statement at paragraphs 35 to 36 you say that:

19             "The Serbs risked more by trying to take Sarajevo militarily than

20     the possible advantages gained by doing so.  The position they were

21     already in allowed them to achieve their political aims.  They could do

22     this by applying pressure to the city to achieve their aims elsewhere."

23             When you say "applying pressure," in that context, what is it

24     that you observed?

25        A.   Firstly, the city, as you will be aware, was in a siege

Page 4325

 1     condition.  The front line was about 65 kilometres right round the city,

 2     so militarily it was encircled.  And in my statements I have expressed

 3     that the Serb side were weapons-heavy, i.e., they had heavy weapons and

 4     they were light on artillery -- on infantry, I'm sorry.  The best way for

 5     them to respond - bearing in mind that to attempt to take any part of a

 6     city in an urban conflict is an infantry-orientated operation, and I've

 7     just said to you that they were not very strong with infantry - would be

 8     to respond with their heavy weapons.  That, we noticed, by virtue of the

 9     increased activity of increps, which we've discussed already, within the

10     city, as a result, and after events elsewhere within the theatre.

11        Q.   [Microphone not activated] And so, when you say -- thank you.

12     When you say:

13             "As a result and after events elsewhere within the theatre --

14     within the theatre," are you talking about fire into the city that was

15     not responsive to any fire at Serb positions?

16        A.   That begs another question which is to determine whether any

17     particular round or any particular fire mission had a military objective

18     or not.

19             I've explained the surrounding front line round the city, and you

20     would expect military activity within that zone.  You would expect that

21     with heavy weapons, the Serbs on Lima side would have the opportunity and

22     the capability to target military objectives within the city.

23             If you do that as a commander of artillery pieces, accepting it's

24     an indirect fire weapon, it's an area weapon, it's not hugely accurate,

25     but you can lay down a fire mission which is concentrated.  And that

Page 4326

 1     would be the natural response to a military target.

 2             So, when you look at the shelling in Sarajevo, we then need to

 3     decide what all the other rounds were that were impacting on the city.

 4     It is that element, the element which it is difficult to determine that

 5     there was a military target which had preempted that action that we would

 6     call indiscriminate.  Because we know that the Serb side had the

 7     capability of creating an effective fire mission on a very concentrated

 8     part of the city because the exhibit that's still up in front of me of

 9     Papa 5, the increp, indicates exactly that:  An effective fire mission

10     from a number of weapon sites.

11        Q.   Colonel, I'm going to interrupt you there for a second.  First of

12     all, can you tell us what -- what is the definition that you're using for

13     "fire mission," and then after that can you also -- can you tell us how

14     you know that they were capable of doing it, an effective fire mission?

15        A.   The document we see in front of us are the effects of a fire

16     missions, but if you go to the other end, and that is, say, the weapons

17     site, the gun placement, the commander would be given instructions as to

18     what target he had, how many rounds he would be expected to support his

19     commander with, and he would have a range map, and he would know

20     precisely what his target was.  He would make up his own fire plan from

21     the request from his commander.  And bearing in mind his own capability

22     and the range of his weapon and the amount of ammunition he has, he would

23     make his plan up based on that information that he had been given and

24     instructed to execute.

25             Does that answer the question on the fire plan?

Page 4327

 1        Q.   I think it answers the question on the fire mission.  When you

 2     said that you could see from the increp that's still on the screen

 3     that -- that the Serb forces around Sarajevo were capable of doing an

 4     effective fire mission, targeted mission, can you tell us what is it

 5     that's in this increp that tells you that?

 6        A.   We've got a mixture of weapons which were annotated in the

 7     incidents on the other side of this piece of paper, which indicates that

 8     the rounds came from a number of different weapon sites, but they all

 9     impacted in the same place.  So that shows the effectiveness of a fire

10     plan co-ordinated beyond the weapon sites, up the chain of command.

11        Q.   Now, in paragraph 22 of your amalgamated statement of P421, you

12     describe how you encouraged the UNMOs under your command to develop a

13     relationship with the local commanders.  And you conclude that

14     paragraph by noting:

15             "Sometimes the mere fact that they would ask what the battery

16     commander was doing would result in a reduced level of engagement."

17             Can you explain what you mean by that, in light of what we've

18     just been talking about?

19        A.   I would like to extricate my response here from what we were

20     talking about, because where specifically we're talking about a fire

21     mission, that required co-ordination and instruction from up the chain of

22     command.  That element of the statement which you've just read out was

23     directed more at the following situation.

24             The UN Military Observers on Lima side were on gun-sites, and the

25     gun-sites were not always employed in fire missions; but every now and

Page 4328

 1     again, the weapons would be fired.  So it would be irrelevant and

 2     unseemly for an UN Military Observer, in a well-organised fire mission,

 3     to approach the commander of the weapons.  And he would know that.  He

 4     would be appreciative of the fact that it was part of a larger operation.

 5     But if just his weapon site was being employed and rounds were fired from

 6     the weapons that he was monitoring, he would talk to the gun commanders.

 7     He would ask to see the range map.  He would ask what the targets were,

 8     the perceived targets were, where that information had come from, and

 9     what they were intending to achieve by firing their weapons.

10             You can imagine that if anybody from this court just walked up to

11     talk to a local commander and ask him those questions without a

12     relationship he would probably be marched off the site.  The point was

13     the UN Military Observers had built up a sort of relationship with these

14     commanders.  In my statements from before, I explained that I tried to

15     stop a frequent movement of UN Military Observers on rotation because it

16     broke that important link with local commanders.

17             Does that answer the question?

18        Q.   Well, what I'd like to know is -- what I'd like to know is

19     focussing on this -- the latter part of the statement, when it -- when

20     you say that fostering these relations resulted in a reduced level of

21     engagement, and so I'd like to know if can you explain to the Chamber how

22     is that that it resulted in a reduced level of engagement?  What was it

23     that your UNMOs were finding when they engaged with these commanders?

24        A.   The effect of that relationship and the effect of the discussion

25     which you would engage in as a UN Military Observer on a weapons site

Page 4329

 1     would be to elicit the information which I have already described.

 2             Now, sometimes some of the answers that were received were not

 3     particularly militarily orientated, and I have in my statements before

 4     expressed my personal experience on a gun-site when I've asked why the

 5     weapons were being fired, and on one occasion at a mortar site I was

 6     instructed that the barrels were being warmed --

 7        Q.   Sir, I'm sorry.  I'm just going to interrupt you for one second

 8     again, because the Chamber is in possession of your statement, and so --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I see whether I can cut this short.  Let me

10     first see whether I understood your question well and then to see whether

11     from what you told us, Mr. Mole, whether I understood, more or less, your

12     position.

13             Was it the case that when there was intense firing, or whatever,

14     that because your observers knew meanwhile those on the firing positions

15     that they would say, Hey, what are you doing?  And that, as a result of

16     that, that the intensity of the fire or the direction of the fire would

17     be less.  Is that more or less what you wanted to tell us?

18             THE WITNESS:  It would be affected that way but there are

19     conditions to that.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but just -- I think you were trying to find

21     out, Ms. Hochhauser, what the gist of the answer was.

22             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes.  And I was also just going to point the

23     Chamber, I think, to paragraph 80 of the witness's statement in which I

24     think that you write about the story that you were -- it contains the

25     story I think you were just going to tell us about the warming of the

Page 4330

 1     barrels.  So we can move on to a different topic.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  You said it was conditioned, Mr. Mole.  If you can

 3     explain that in one or two lines, you're invited to do so.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5             MS. HOCHHAUSER:

 6        Q.   If -- do you want to explain it in one or two lines or ...

 7        A.   I think from what I've heard that the statement covers it.

 8        Q.   Okay.  So I'm now going to move on to a different document,

 9     please.

10             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  If I could have 65 ter 2353 on the monitor.  And

11     specifically starting at e-court page 9 in the English, which I believe

12     is the middle of e-court page 13 in the B/C/S.

13        Q.   Now, Colonel, you had the opportunity to read the statement of

14     Radovan Karadzic regarding the fifth strategic objective which begins in

15     the last two sentences of e-court page 9 in the English and continues

16     through the end of the first full paragraph on e-court page 10 prior to

17     coming to court today; is that right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And I'll ask if -- once we've had the opportunity to read those

20     last two sentences, if we can just move to page 10 in the English.  Once

21     you've had an opportunity to review it again, just let me know and I'll

22     ask the next question.

23        A.   Thank you.

24        Q.   Now, at paragraphs 35 to 36 of your statement, you discuss what

25     you labelled as a policy of containment in Sarajevo and what you observed

Page 4331

 1     about that policy of containment during your time there.  In light of

 2     that, I'd like to ask for your comment on the portion of 65 ter 2353 in

 3     which Radovan Karadzic says:

 4             "In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps the fighting away

 5     from the Krajina far from the Semberija, far from the Drina, far away

 6     from all those areas where we could possibly have conflicts with

 7     Muslims."

 8             I'd like to ask for your comment based on your own observations

 9     and experience in Sarajevo.

10        A.   My statements about the containment of Sarajevo were originally

11     formalised by understanding the military situations within the city and

12     around it in my first two months there.  I've already indicated that

13     events elsewhere in Bosnia would have an effect on Sarajevo.  I had never

14     seen this document before, but it is really interesting that I had come

15     to the conclusions that I had and to see it confirmed like this - I think

16     this is an assembly document - was, to me, quite a revelation and fitted

17     in with what I've already described to you by virtue of travelling around

18     the UN protected areas.  The major impact of the war had left those UN

19     protected areas and were now concentrated around Sarajevo.

20             So this document confirmed everything that I had determined for

21     myself by the various sources I described and my experience in Sarajevo.

22        Q.   Now, Colonel Mole, did you ever encounter Mr. Mladic during your

23     time in Sarajevo?

24        A.   We had imposed upon us an organisation called the mixed military

25     working group.  It meet frequently from, I think, the

Page 4332

 1     5th of November, 1992, was the first one that I recall, and it met

 2     frequently but not regularly for the next two months.  It would be within

 3     that meeting that I met General Mladic, yes.

 4        Q.   And just briefly, the purpose of those mixed military working

 5     groups was what?

 6        A.   Can I explain that we had a sector headquarters within Bosnia,

 7     but we also had the second-in-command of UNPROFOR was General Morillon,

 8     and he was tasked with setting up BiH command, i.e., UNPROFOR command not

 9     in Zagreb but nearby in Kiseljak near Sarajevo.  It was that

10     headquarters's initiative to have a mixed military working group, the

11     idea being to bring together the various elements, the combative

12     elements, at a meeting to try and negotiate a cease-fire and a

13     demilitarisation.

14        Q.   And are you able to tell the Chamber precisely when or how many

15     times Mr. Mladic attended that meeting while you were also there?

16        A.   I recall him being there a number of times.  I recall we had

17     lunches, but I wouldn't put dates on those events.  But I did note that I

18     had in a previous statement mentioned that I had taken a message from

19     General Morillon and handed it to General Mladic.

20        Q.   And do you -- if you're able to, do you recall when -- when

21     Mr. Mladic would attend those meetings, would he be the sole

22     representative of the VRS there or would Galic be with him or -- if you

23     recall?

24        A.   That element changed significantly with each meeting.  We set up

25     a -- a working group where the principals were not present but staff

Page 4333

 1     officers were, or within the aegis of the mixed military working group.

 2     So sometimes he would be there.  Sometimes General Gvero would be there

 3     representing that side.  Sometimes Galic would be there.  And it was a

 4     very variable feast.  Sometimes, of course, some people couldn't get

 5     there by virtue of military activity.

 6        Q.   Now at paragraph 58 of your statement which is page 14 in e-court

 7     you state that the SRK's ability, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps's ability

 8     to communicate with elements outside the corps which you observed

 9     indicated that the corps itself was under command.  Drawing your

10     attention to that statement I would like to ask you if you made any such

11     observations about the command structure over the

12     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

13        A.   I visited the operations room in the barracks with General Galic

14     and was able to view that and saw all the components that I would expect

15     of a headquarters which allowed communication, both to subunits and

16     elsewhere, within the theatre.

17             Did what General Galic do and what happened around Sarajevo with

18     the Romanija Corps, was it affected by what went on elsewhere?  Well, it

19     must do.  I'm going to have to ask you now precisely what the question

20     is, because, otherwise, depends where I'm going with the explanation.

21     Are you saying -- are you asking me, did I physically see or do something

22     to make me understand that there was -- the Romanija Corps was under

23     command.

24        Q.   Well, what I'm asking is:  Based on your own personal

25     observations based on anything General Galic or anybody else in that

Page 4334

 1     command said to you, and also your observations of how the command was

 2     operating.

 3        A.   Understood.  So I've already described how I saw Sarajevo and the

 4     Romanija Corps operating within the context of the theatre of Bosnia, and

 5     it was obvious to me that there would be limitations and, indeed,

 6     instructions passed to General Galic as to how he would achieve his

 7     objective because he wasn't working alone.  We know that because I've

 8     already described that events elsewhere in Bosnia impacted seriously upon

 9     the city, and that sort of information flow had to come from somewhere

10     else, and it's natural it would come through the chain of command.  But

11     from my own personal experience as a logistician what ammunition,

12     manpower, weapons, and so on, were allocated to the task for Sarajevo for

13     the Romanija Corps would be just part of what the overall operation was

14     and cannot be separated from the overall operation within Bosnia.

15             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honour, would now be the right time for a

16     break?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let me say something about these breaks.  We

18     have these short sessions and short breaks mainly because that was the

19     wish of Mr. Mladic.  Therefore we either could take the break now and

20     follow the usual schedule.  We also could continue for a while.

21             But I'm also addressing the witness.  Mr. Mole, it may be that

22     you prefer to have a break now.  Then we'll take that break as well.  But

23     if at any other point in time you would think it would be better for you

24     to have a break, don't hesitate to address me.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

Page 4335

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I have no preference, Your Honour.  It is

 3     entirely up to the Court.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  You have no preference.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  We're at Your Honours' pleasure.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then I suggest that we follow the usual

 7     procedure and take the break now and stick to the short breaks.

 8             We'll take a break of 20 minutes.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

13             Ms. Hochhauser, as far as time is concerned, your estimate was

14     one hour and 15 minutes.

15             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes, Your Honour.  It has become clear I think

16     that I will need a little more time than that.  I don't think that will

17     affect our schedule for the week since we're down a witness.  I hope to

18     be done in 15 minutes.  I hope to use an additional 15 minutes.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And we are at this moment at one hour and

20     15 minutes.

21             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Right, so 15 to 20 minutes.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, so then I expect you -- yes, perhaps the more

23     focussed your questions are, the more focused answers you can expect.

24     And if the witness nevertheless delves in various directions, it's up to

25     you to get him back on the right track.

Page 4336

 1             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes.  Thank you.

 2                           [The witness takes the stand]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, Ms. Hochhauser will now continue her

 4     examination.  May I invite you to focus very much on the very precise

 5     answers [sic] she'll ask you.

 6             THE WITNESS:  I'll do my best, sir.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             Please proceed, Ms. Hochhauser.

 9             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

10        Q.   In your last answer, Colonel Mole, you began to talk about

11     logistics, such as ammunition and manpower, weapons.  And I would ask you

12     to please to take a look if we could have 65 ter 28456.

13             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Although, actually, it comes to mind,

14     Your Honours, that we've now come to the first of the two documents which

15     the Prosecution in its motion sought to -- sought leave to add to the

16     65 ter exhibit list.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  So I raise that with you now.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, any specific objections on this specific

20     document?  I mean, not the -- what you have already submitted in writing,

21     but any specifics on this document?

22             MR. IVETIC:  I think apart from what we've submitted in writing,

23     we don't have anything further to say as to this specific document.  At

24     this point in time, we'll see what the answers to the questions that are

25     asked and if the witness is appropriate for entering this document into

Page 4337

 1     the evidence.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll -- adding to the 65 ter list is not --

 4     is -- consent is given by the Chamber.  Let's then hear what questions

 5     you have and whether it causes any problems to the Defence.

 6             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 7        Q.   So, Colonel, looking at 65 ter 28456, this is a 26 November order

 8     for further activities, signed by Stanislav Galic.  You had the

 9     opportunity to review this document before today; is that right?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   And does this document also address the time-period of the Otes

12     offensive that you have been telling us about or you touched upon in your

13     testimony?

14        A.   Yes, it just precedes that.

15        Q.   Now, can you tell us, does this document comport with the

16     activities of the RSK -- SRK - excuse me - that you observed during the

17     time that you were in Sarajevo?

18        A.   The document I think explains what we knew as Operation Envelope

19     which was a response by the Serb side to military activities on the

20     Presidency side.

21        Q.   And can you -- turning to paragraph 13 which is in e-court

22     page -- sorry.  Have I written it here as 23.  Is that -- could that be

23     correct?

24             Yes, and I apologise to counsel.  I actually did not note the

25     B/C/S page, corresponding page, entitled -- words logistical support.

Page 4338

 1     Can you relate what is in that portion of the document about logistical

 2     support to what you were just telling us about logistics in your own

 3     observations of the SRK and control over the SRK in Sarajevo?

 4        A.   When I first saw this document, it linked well with my

 5     understanding of logistics, being that I was a logistics officer.

 6     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was but part of the army command in Bosnia on the

 7     Serb side.  So any army commander would obviously have limitations to his

 8     theatre of operations, based on available manpower, weapons, and

 9     ammunition, primarily.

10             As I say, Romanija Corps was just part of the overall army

11     command, so the balance of how much logistics support was given to

12     Romanija Corps in relation to other units competing for finite resources

13     within the military in Bosnia, this document accords to that process.

14        Q.   And specifically in terms of what you observed at the functioning

15     of the Romanija Corps while you were there can you tell us what your --

16     what your thoughts are about this 50 per cent expenditure rate that we

17     see there for ammunition.

18        A.   It indicates that the local commander has operational freedom for

19     50 per cent of the held ammunition, for example.  And, therefore, he has

20     considerable latitude to do with that as he will.  But principally here,

21     the other 50 per cent is not within the local commander's gift.

22        Q.   Okay.  And the operational freedom is that given from -- given

23     from whom?

24        A.   Yes, that would be given from the army headquarters, staff

25     officers, I assume, working on behalf of the commander.

Page 4339

 1        Q.   Now, at -- excuse me, sorry.

 2             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  So, Your Honours, I would just ask to mark this

 3     for identification at this point, this document.  I don't want ask to

 4     tender it given the length of the document and the small portion of which

 5     the witness has commented on.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And you want then to later -- is it because

 7     you have not quoted any part of it.  You just -- I mean, for those who

 8     read the transcript later, it will be unclear exactly what the document

 9     said, which the witness had looked at before.

10             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Sorry, let me clear that up.

11             The document that we are referring to is the 26 November order

12     for further activities signed by Stanislav --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's not the problem.

14             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Sorry.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  It's about content.  I mean, you asked the witness

16     to comment on something without the portion having been read and if you

17     don't tender it then there will be a big puzzle for those who later read

18     the transcript.

19             Now, what is your intention not to tender it at all?  That would

20     create this problem.  Or do you intend to tender at a later stage a

21     smaller portion of this document?

22             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Actually, Your Honour, I'm sorry.  I'll actually

23     tender the whole document at this stage.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honours, I believe that the parts that

Page 4340

 1     the witness has testified about rightly do become part of the record.  I

 2     don't actually even know what's in the entirety of the 23 pages here, but

 3     I don't think that the witness can authenticate or provide us with the

 4     information on that so ...

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll have it marked for identification and the

 6     parties are invited to sit together to see what is the relevant portion,

 7     and if at any other point in time we would need the entire document then,

 8     of course, the parties could exchange views on that and see whether there

 9     would be an objection at this moment to have the whole of the document

10     admitted into evidence --

11             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  And --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  The importance of that would be that we do not have

13     one document page 7, three lines here in evidence, page 10 somewhere else

14     in evidence.  So if you could sit together and see whether you could

15     reach agreement on what and how we should admit this document into

16     evidence.

17             It will be marked for identification.

18             Madam Registrar, the number would be ...

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 28456 will receive number P430, MFI'd,

20     Your Honours.

21             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  And --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think you have not yet tendered the previous

23     document which that was 02353.  That was the session -- and that's also a

24     very long document so I also wonder how to deal with that document.  But

25     you used only a very small portion of it.

Page 4341

 1             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes, Your Honours, I would -- I would tender

 2     that document as well.  We can, of course, handle that will the same

 3     way --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Then it will be marked for identification for the

 5     time being.

 6             Madam Registrar, the number would be ...

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 2353 becomes Exhibit P431, MFI'd,

 8     Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Could the Chamber hear from the parties not

10     later than tomorrow close of business.

11             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes, and also to just address the hole in the

12     record that Your Honour correctly pointed out to me, in case the document

13     doesn't come in, I would like to read the first paragraph of the -- that

14     I was referring to that I asked the witness about, which is under

15     logistic support.  I had referred the witness to the paragraph that

16     reads:

17             "The approved ammunition expenditure and fuel consumption per

18     unit is a maximum of 50 per cent of the quantity originally found in the

19     units.  The units must make sure that the remaining 50 per cent is not

20     spent and will be kept solely as precious reserve."

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, at least the portion you have drawn the

22     attention of the witness to is now on the record.

23             Yes, Ms. Hochhauser, you said you would like to do that and

24     instead of waiting for the Chamber to do say --

25             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I'm sorry.

Page 4342

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  -- that this is the appropriate way of proceeding,

 2     you did it --

 3             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I apologise.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  -- just as before when you said, I need another 15

 5     minutes.  You didn't ask for another 15 minutes but you said you needed

 6     another 15 minutes.  I will not make a drama out of it, but that's good

 7     manners in the courtroom.

 8             Then it has been read into the record.  Please proceed.

 9             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  If we could please have 65 ter 11354 on the

10     monitor.

11        Q.   And this is the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document number 10/74695

12     a regular combat report signed by Stanislav Galic, dated the 2nd December

13     1992.

14             And, sir, have you had an opportunity to look at this document

15     prior to coming to court today?

16        A.   Yes, I have.  Thank you.

17        Q.   And again, does this document reflect what you observed at that

18     time in Sarajevo and particularly in the advancement of the Otes

19     offensive as of the date of the document?

20        A.   Yes.  I can see down to paragraph 4, and that's correct.

21             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Perhaps if -- thank you.  We can see the whole

22     document.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, yes.

24             MS. HOCHHAUSER:

25        Q.   And, sir, can you comment on this document in terms of the

Page 4343

 1     logistics and command and control observations that we've been

 2     discussing?

 3        A.   The operation on Otes would not be one that was decided upon by a

 4     local commander because, as I've already suggested, resources were

 5     limited throughout theatre and the army commander would obviously

 6     allocate resources where he wanted them to be allocated.  So the

 7     operation was done under the instruction of the army command.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And just to be clear, the army command at what level?

 9        A.   The commander of the army, General Mladic, I would assume, would

10     sanction the operation.

11        Q.   And in terms of logistics, is there anything remarkable to you

12     even in the sentence that refers to the winter gear provided?

13        A.   It links back to what I was referring to shortly a few moments

14     ago, relating to ammunition, trained manpower, weapons, and it includes,

15     obviously, rations, winter gear, and they would be a theatre resource.

16     They wouldn't be a resource which an individual commander could

17     necessarily deal with.  He would be making requests upon the army command

18     for those items.

19             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, if I might I'd like to tender this

20     document at this time.

21             MR. IVETIC:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 11354 becomes Exhibit P432,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

Page 4344

 1             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Okay.  And, Your Honours, we come to the second

 2     of the two documents that were subject of the motion to add, which is

 3     65 ter -- what we've assigned, pending your permission, 65 ter 28457.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Leave is granted to add it to your 65 ter

 5     list.  We'll decide on admission once we've dealt with it.

 6             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  And if we could see that document, please, on

 7     the screen.

 8        Q.   And, Colonel, this is a document dated 4 December 1992, also from

 9     the SRK command.  And I have the same question for you as to this

10     document that I had for the previous two, which is:  Can you comment on

11     it in terms whether it comports with what you saw during that time in

12     Sarajevo, as well as with what you observed the command and control with

13     regard to the SRK?  And, I'm sorry, and specifically with logistics.

14        A.   Paragraph 6 is clearly a demand for combat rations.  The army

15     land forces are being requested.  And it supports what I said a few

16     moments ago, that requests for logistical support are coming through the

17     chain of command.

18             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, I would tender this document at

19     this time.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Any further specifics, Mr. --

21             MR. IVETIC:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 28457 becomes Exhibit P433,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

Page 4345

 1             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   And, sir, Colonel, if you can tell us also of your observations

 3     and interactions with the individual commanders on the ground in Sarajevo

 4     during the time you were there.  Did you see that they were, in fact,

 5     supplied by the command?

 6        A.   In previous statements, I have indicated that I saw resupply on

 7     many of the gun-sites on Lima side.  I mentioned that I had seen

 8     stockpiles of ammunition at the weapon sites.  I connect that to the

 9     operation at Otes that we've been discussing, and the demands upon, for

10     example, ammunition would have been intense and would have had to have

11     been requested through the chain of command and certainly was not

12     available to the local commander throughout the remainder of my tour that

13     I saw; i.e., the stocks I saw on a day-to-day basis would have to be

14     enhanced significantly for a fire mission that we watched unfold during

15     the course of the Otes conflict.

16        Q.   And, sir, we keep referring back to the Otes conflict I think as

17     an example of an effective fire mission, but the concepts that we've been

18     talking about are applicable also -- are they applicable also during the

19     time-period that there wasn't such a mission occurring in Sarajevo?

20        A.   Absolutely.  The extraordinary extreme of the Otes one is what

21     captures our attention, but, of course, what one might term as standard

22     resupply happened continually throughout the time I was there.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hochhauser, you earlier indicated 15 to

24     20 minutes.  We're at now more than 20 minutes.

25             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Okay.  With the Court's permission, I have one

Page 4346

 1     last question.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Please put that last question to the witness.

 3             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes.  Which is about Exhibit P425.  If we could

 4     see that on the screen, please.

 5        Q.   And, as it's coming up, I just -- I have a question about this

 6     Senior Military Observer's end-of-month report.  The one we're looking at

 7     is for December but consistently through the end-of-month reports we see

 8     that in the daily entries there are discrepancies between the number of

 9     rounds recorded as outgoing from a particular side and the number of

10     corresponding rounds recorded as incoming from the other side.  And I

11     just -- if you can give us, please, a brief explanation as to what

12     factored into those discrepancies?

13        A.   We didn't monitor all the weapons within the range of Sarajevo,

14     only those that were selectively given to us as a result of the airport

15     agreement.  So consequently weapons were brought into the theatre -- into

16     the area and used and moved away and there were others that were static

17     in the location but we still didn't monitor those, nor did he have UN

18     Military Observers sufficient to do so.

19             And then there is the fall of shot, i.e., not always do we know

20     what the target is of the weapons that we're not monitoring and we don't

21     know where that fall of shot is.  So, yes, there was a discrepancy

22     between the two sets of figures.

23             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, that concludes my examination.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Ms. Hochhauser.

25             Mr. Ivetic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?

Page 4347

 1             MR. IVETIC:  I am, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, you will now be cross-examined by

 3     Mr. Ivetic.  Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Mladic Defence team.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

 6        Q.   Good day, Colonel.  I'd like to remind you that since we do speak

 7     the same language we have to try and ensure a pause between question and

 8     answer so as to assist the interpreters and the court reporter in doing

 9     their tasks today.

10        A.   Thank you.

11        Q.   Colonel, prior to your deployment to Sarajevo as SMO on

12     16 September 1992, did you have occasion to receive any instruction or

13     training relative to the military structure or operative rules of either

14     the JNA, the VRS, or the Army of BiH?

15        A.   You'll appreciate that it was early in the conflict and the

16     knowledge base for the question you've just asked wasn't good.  There was

17     some instruction, but, to be fair, you would have to find out for

18     yourself on your deployment the answer to some of the questions, quite a

19     lot of the questions, that you pose.

20        Q.   Fair enough, sir.  And you yourself personally had no prior

21     familiarity with either the SFRY or its armed forces; that is to say, you

22     had not studied them as part of your formal education or your military

23     education; is that right?

24        A.   We had studied the eastern bloc so there was a significance there

25     relating to weaponry but, of course, each country organises themselves

Page 4348

 1     totally differently.  And since we were talking about the origin of three

 2     components which were new on the world stage, your statement is accurate.

 3        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'd like to clear up something that you just

 4     discussed.  For that purpose, I would ask for Exhibit P430 to be called

 5     up on e-court.  And if we could focus on the first page for the moment

 6     and we'll wait for the English to come up.

 7             Sir, I would direct your attention to the -- to the sender of the

 8     document which is reflected in the upper left corner.  Would you agree

 9     with me that this is, in fact, an order sent by the command of the

10     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And if you recall, this is the document that has - I believe,

13     page 23 in e-court in the English.  I'm not sure of the B/C/S page - but

14     has the selection giving what you said was operational freedom over

15     50 per cent of the stocks of munitions, and I believe that you had

16     identified this as coming from the -- from the Main Staff.  Would you

17     agree that if this is an order from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, it would

18     be Commander Galic giving this freedom to his subordinates rather than

19     the Main Staff giving this freedom?

20        A.   Within my many statements that I've made in evidence in these

21     courts, I have explained in some detail the equivalent logistic

22     expressions that we used in the British Army, and it's a unit called the

23     daily ammunition expenditure rete.  That was an indicator, a planning

24     guide that was imposed upon you as a commander to indicate how much you

25     could hold, how much you would use on a daily basis.  You would exceed

Page 4349

 1     that if you went into an operation which you were commanded to do.  And

 2     you would be allocated, maybe, one, two, or more, DAERs to fulfil that

 3     obligation.  It matters not that this was an instruction downwards in the

 4     chain of command.  What it indicates is that there is one that is

 5     throughout the chain of command.  It would be pointless.  He was

 6     expressing that 50 per cent which is close to a DAER if he wasn't having

 7     one imposed upon him.

 8             So it's an indicator that there is a chain of command and that

 9     this is part of it.

10        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Would you agree with me that the UNMO mission

11     was not there on the ground to count shells in and out; that is to say,

12     it was not within the remit of the UNMO group to investigate all rounds

13     that were fired, impact areas, nor to assess the rights or wrongs of the

14     conflict on the front lines?

15        A.   Just one moment, please, and I'll read that question, if I may.

16        Q.   Yes.

17        A.   No, that's not correct.  What the UNMO mission was there to

18     facilitate, amongst many other aspects, was to find a level of truth as

19     to what was happening so that interpretation of that could be then

20     briefed to the world through the United Nations and the secretariat.

21             So to identify our tasks specifically just to count rounds in and

22     out, is to be extremely simplistic.  We were determining the events and

23     interpreting them, and it was a neutral observation as opposed to taking

24     the word of the combatants.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, if you would allow me to go back to the

Page 4350

 1     previous question because I do not know for sure whether I understood

 2     your answer.

 3             That was about the chain of command and General Galic giving

 4     orders downwards.

 5             Did I understand your answer well that you would say it would be

 6     pointless to impose such a 50 per cent rule, if I could say so, if not, a

 7     similar thing happened in the chain of command above you.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Exactly, sir.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, then I have understood your rather lengthy

10     answer but --

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, but some of them are.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

13             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

14             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  If I can follow up on the question that

15     I had asked and the answer that the Colonel had received, if we can call

16     up 1D390 in e-court and it will be the 11th page in e-court.

17        Q.   Sir, this is the transcript of your testimony from the Karadzic

18     proceedings, and the selection that I'm calling up is transcript

19     page 5890, 12 to 18, and it was the bases for my question.

20             I'd like to focus on lines 12 through 18 of that transcript.  And

21     there, as I understood your answer to the question that was posed by

22     Mr. Karadzic's time was:

23             "The UNMO mission was not there to count shells in and out.  It

24     was there to assess situations, provide humanitarian support, and the

25     other tasks that I've already outlined, part of which would be observing

Page 4351

 1     the conflict as it developed.  It was not within the remit of the UNMO

 2     group to investigate all rounds that were fired, impact areas, and so on,

 3     nor was it the UNMO's task to assess the rights or wrongs of conflict on

 4     the front line."

 5             Sir, do you recall this testimony that you gave in the Karadzic

 6     proceedings, and do you stand by it?

 7        A.   Absolutely.  It expresses exactly what I am still trying to

 8     explain.  It is too simplistic to assume that because we're counting

 9     shells in and out that we're not doing anything with that information.

10     And that paragraph slightly out of context was an attempt to resolve that

11     disconnect.  It wasn't sufficient just to count the rounds in and out.

12     What we were attempting to do was to, as I have explained in that

13     paragraph, interpret it, not assess the rights and wrongs, but give

14     impressions from what -- our observations to the world as to what was

15     going on in Sarajevo.

16             Part of that was to watch what rounds were fired by whom, where,

17     so that we could better answer observations made by the combatants who

18     would make complaint to the UN about what had happened, and we would have

19     a neutral source from whence we could make our decisions.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that in so far as it was not within the

21     remit of the UNMO mission to assess right or wrong, that any assessments

22     that may be considered to do that within your testimony or your

23     statement, that is to say, qualify a shelling as either legitimate or

24     wrongful, must be considered with regard to that caveat that such

25     conclusions were beyond the remit of the UNMO mission that you were there

Page 4352

 1     to perform?

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hochhauser.

 3             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I object to that question.  I don't think

 4     that -- I don't think -- I think that it's a mixing of terms in terms of

 5     right and wrong from one piece of prior testimony and legitimacy and not

 6     legitimacy.  I think it is phrased in a little bit of an unfair way to

 7     the witness and I would ask that it be rephrased.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please rephrase, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Absolutely.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  And one of the problems with the previous quote you

11     gave, lines 12 to 18, is that you have not drawn the attention of witness

12     and our attention to the question which preceded that answer.  It's

13     impossible, I think, to understand that question without looking at a

14     question, which amounts more to a speech than to a question in which is

15     found in the lines 2 to 9.

16             But please rephrase your question and proceed.

17             MR. IVETIC:

18        Q.   Sir, would you agree that any assessments that may be considered

19     as expressing an opinion that artillery fire was right or wrong from your

20     testimony or your statement must be considered with this caveat that this

21     would be -- such determination were beyond the remit of the UNMO mission

22     that you were in Sarajevo to perform?

23             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I'm sorry --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You have rephrased it but the substance is

25     exactly the same.

Page 4353

 1             Could you please rephrase it again.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Well, I believe, Your Honours, the objection was for

 3     me mixing the words right and wrong with legitimate and unlegitimate.  So

 4     I'm using the exact same words that the witness used in his answer in the

 5     Karadzic proceedings.  I don't know how other to rephrase it without

 6     going away from the testimony of the witness that he just affirmed that

 7     it was beyond the remit of the UNMO mission to assess right or wrong.

 8     And I'm simply asking whether that is something that should be considered

 9     in conjunction with any conclusions in his witness statement or his

10     testimony where he attempts to assert right or wrong to actions of

11     artillery attack or fire mission.

12             THE WITNESS:  Could I help here, sir?  I'm quite happy to --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Although it's not a common way of proceeding,

14     but if you can assist the parties and the Chamber, it might help.

15             THE WITNESS:  The statement on the screen is rights or wrongs of

16     conflict on the front line.  You are co-joining that expression with

17     whether rounds were targeted or whether they were not.  The two are

18     totally separate.

19             When I say the rights and wrongs of the conflict on the front

20     line, I'm not evaluating whether somebody is or isn't right, to react or

21     act in a certain way.  But when it comes to rounds landing within an

22     area, we were trying to determine whether they were targeted against

23     military targets, or whether they were not.  That is not the same as

24     right and wrong on the front line.

25             MR. IVETIC:

Page 4354

 1        Q.   Fair enough.  Here you also say that it was not within the remit

 2     of the UNMO group to investigate all rounds that were fired and impact

 3     areas.  Would you also agree that you did not have access to any of the

 4     target grids or maps or other intel being used by either side to direct

 5     their fire?

 6        A.   Can I take the first part of your question, where you say:  Here

 7     you also say that it was not within the remit of the UNMO group to

 8     investigate all rounds that were fired at impact areas.

 9             Now, that is correct.  Because one would only investigate in

10     detail if there was an incident of one or two rounds in a day, but we

11     were in a war zone.  You have seen from my testimony before what a quiet

12     day, what a normal day and what a busy day was and the number of impacts

13     in the city.  So to forensically determine the detail you've just

14     described for all that military activity, I'm not saying it wasn't within

15     our remit.  It was not possible to do that.  Because you're assuming that

16     we would go to an impact and investigate it in a forensic military police

17     fashion.  That definitely was not within our remit.

18             As to the second part of your question that relates to target

19     grids or maps, I'm sorry to say that you're wrong there.  I visited the

20     operations rooms of both sides, and in previous testimonies, I have

21     stated that.  I asked both sides what they thought the other side was

22     doing to obtain the information that I required.

23             I've also described to you that UNMOs definitely did look at

24     range maps on the gun-sites that they were monitoring.

25        Q.   Did any of the range maps that you saw have any improper targets

Page 4355

 1     that would not be considered legitimate military targets on them?

 2        A.   I've just stated that UN Military Observers would look at range

 3     maps which were those being used by weapons site commanders.  I wasn't a

 4     weapons site commander, nor was I an UNMO on a weapons site.

 5        Q.   If we can look at paragraph 72 of your amalgamated statement,

 6     which is P421.  And this will be page 17 in the English, page 18 in the

 7     B/C/S.  And here, as we wait for it, the -- should be the prior page.

 8     There we go.

 9             And here, sir, you describe efforts to try and identify military

10     installations to try and rationalise your observations and to corroborate

11     or dispute justifications the Serbs provided.  You indicate that it was

12     never within the mandate of the UNMO mission to maintain a list of,

13     quote/unquote, "military targets on either side."  Would you agree with

14     me that even apart from the mandate, the very ability of the UNMO mission

15     to identify or list military targets was severely limited due to several

16     factors, including the limited personnel and the war conditions in

17     Sarajevo?

18        A.   I'm not totally sure of your question.  Could you repeat the

19     question, please.

20        Q.   Sure.  Would you agree with me that even apart from the lack of a

21     mandate, the very ability of the UNMO mission to identify or list

22     military targets was limited by the lack of personnel and the war-time

23     conditions in Sarajevo; that is to say that you were prevented from

24     keeping an accurate list of any military targets by these factors?

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May I --

Page 4356

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Can we split it up?  First, whether the witness

 2     agrees or not that there were limits in the possibilities to establish

 3     military targets.  And then the second is what may have been the causes

 4     of -- if there are such limits.

 5             And then that was the question apparently.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I just wanted to say that as transcribed, the

 7     question says "very ability."  And I think the question -- what you were

 8     saying, Mr. Ivetic, was "variability."  So, sir, just so the witness

 9     understands the question probably, I think "variability," not "very

10     ability."

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we seek -- first of all, did you say

12     "variability" or did you say the "very ability?"

13             MR. IVETIC:  The very ability.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Very ability.  So it's transcribed as you meant it.

15             So the first part of the question or at least a simple question,

16     Mr. Mole, were you limited in establishing what military targets may have

17     been there?

18             THE WITNESS:  The section I'll address is the ability of the UNMO

19     mission to identify or list conditions in Sarajevo.  You, presumably, are

20     making an assumption that the UNMO mission was in a vacuum but we were

21     part of a sector that had three battalions.  We had a sector

22     headquarters, we had the UNMO mission, we had UNHCR, and many other

23     agencies upon which we drew for our information.  So, of course, with

24     only 60 officers, I'm not suggesting that it was an easy task.  But I

25     think within the context of what I've just said our sources were somewhat

Page 4357

 1     greater than those that you give us credit for.

 2             Does that answer that part of that question?

 3             MR. IVETIC:

 4        Q.   So are you telling me then that you did have a complete and

 5     accurate list of all military targets in an area --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  This -- this seems to be a --

 7             I'm addressing both you, Mr. Ivetic, and you, Mr. Mole.  You are

 8     rather indirect in your questions.  Mr. Ivetic asked you whether there

 9     were limitations in establishing the existence of military targets and to

10     list them.  And then apparently hearing in the question that -- and

11     that's, of course, what Mr. Ivetic did, saying short of personnel,

12     et cetera, to be the reasons, and then you start explaining that your

13     sources may not have been as limited as suggested, although not expressed

14     clearly by Mr. Ivetic.

15             Now let me then try to put the question quite simply.  Do you

16     allow for the possibility that you may have missed military targets in

17     your observations and on the basis of the information you had received?

18     Or did you have a complete picture.

19             THE WITNESS:  We had a fairly understandable picture.  It wasn't

20     recorded --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Let me say, so it was not a complete picture.

22             THE WITNESS:  Of course, not.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  That's the simple thing we are establishing.

24             Please proceed.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

Page 4358

 1        Q.   Would you --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  By the way, if I could say, your answer therefore is

 3     not complete but not too bad.  That's more or less --

 4             THE WITNESS:  Now, if that's the question, yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  That's the simple language we are using at

 6     this moment.

 7             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:

 9        Q.   Would you agree, Colonel, that especially the Bosnian Muslim

10     Presidency side had a strong incentive to camouflage and keep hidden its

11     military installations within Sarajevo itself.

12        A.   Both sides did that.  But I agree with your statement.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And would you agree in so far as you have highlighted

14     here the concern of the other side from finding out information from UNMO

15     as to locations that the Bosnian Presidency forces had a strong incentive

16     to keep some military sites unknown to the UNMO mission as well?

17        A.   Yes.  Both sides would do that.

18        Q.   And just to finish up, at paragraph 71 and 72 of this amalgamated

19     statement you discuss the issue of military targets and the odd round, I

20     believe, coming in.  Would it be important to keep in mind the

21     Bosnian Presidency forces tactic of using mobile mortars mounted on

22     civilian vehicles which could be deployed essentially anywhere within the

23     city which is not discussed in these paragraphs.

24        A.   Yes.  You must always recall that in my statements I have made

25     specific mention of those issues.

Page 4359

 1        Q.   And we'll get to that later.  Can we also agree that the

 2     artillery that we're talking about, the heavy weapons that were in use in

 3     and around Sarajevo on both sides of the conflict line were not the

 4     high-tech so-called smart artillery used by NATO allies in recent years

 5     but rather was the more inferior or average grade conventional weapons?

 6        A.   Absolutely.

 7        Q.   Would you agree with me that the accuracy of such older

 8     generation artillery weapons as was available in the Sarajevo theatre is

 9     generally less than the newer generation artillery?

10        A.   That was well understood.

11        Q.   Would that include a lesser degree of accuracy which would

12     increase the potential for collateral damage?

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   Okay.  Based on your experience and knowledge within the British

15     armed forces would you agree with me that the -- some NATO countries such

16     as the United States have standard operating procedures to try and ensure

17     there's no more than a 10 per cent chance of non-combatant injury, death

18     or damage from any given military action?

19        A.   I wouldn't put a figure on it, but your principle is correct.

20        Q.   That's fair enough.  Could you tell us if you are familiar with

21     the military term failed positive identification of a target and what

22     that means.

23        A.   I wasn't an artillery person myself.  It's a term that I've never

24     used.

25        Q.   Fair enough.

Page 4360

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Are you familiar with it?

 2             THE WITNESS:  No.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 4             Please proceed.

 5             MR. IVETIC:

 6        Q.   Now for those who are unfamiliar with the terminology that you

 7     did use, can you briefly explain for us what is a range map or perhaps a

 8     firing table, if you're familiar with that term?

 9        A.   It would be a acetate overlay onto a regular map.  It would

10     indicate ranges.  It could indicate targets.

11             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to Exhibit P3 on e-court, and it

12     would be page 47 in e-court.

13        Q.   And, sir, while we wait for this to come up, I will preface my

14     comments by saying that this has been represented by the Prosecution to

15     be a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps plan for artillery combat, the date of

16     which, unfortunately, is not part of the document.  Should be page 47 in

17     e-court.  It's page 41 in the book.

18             There we go.

19             Sir, looking at this map would this appear to be the type of a

20     map that you had earlier indicated that you had seen in operations rooms

21     on both -- on either side of the conflict line?

22        A.   More so on the Serb side than the Presidency, yes.

23        Q.   Okay.  And does it appear to have information on it that you

24     would expect to see for a map of this nature; that is, a plan for

25     artillery combat.

Page 4361

 1        A.   I can't really see much detail, but I understand your question,

 2     and, yes, I would expect at a distance that that would be the sort of

 3     information.

 4        Q.   If we could turn to page 49 which I believe is a close-up of some

 5     of the boxes that we cannot see precisely on this page.  I think we'll

 6     see that this is titled as a firing table when we get to that page.  And

 7     if we could rotate the -- oh, in the book -- I apologise, it's

 8     paragraph -- page 43 in the book.

 9             And, sir, if I can direct your attention to these two tables that

10     appear to be for a 122-millimetre Howitzer and a 155-mm Howitzer, and is

11     this the kind of information that you were discussing earlier about

12     identified targets and ranges, et cetera?

13        A.   I would expect that that sort of map, that sort of information,

14     to be available to a commander inside an operations room.  I can't say

15     that I recall seeing such.

16        Q.   We're looking at something now on the screen.  I'm asking you

17     about this one that's before us on the screen.  Is that the kind of

18     information that you would expect for an artillery fire mission to be

19     available to a commander at which level I don't know, but at some -- at

20     some level of the operation?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22        Q.   And do you know whether these types of tables were available to

23     your UNMO observers to assist in determining the outgoing shot's intended

24     targets.

25        A.   My UNMOs would only tell me information which they saw as

Page 4362

 1     pertinent.  I don't recall ever seeing any of these tables.  I don't

 2     recall ever speaking to an UNMO about such tables.  My expectation would

 3     be that this would be in a headquarters rather than on a weapons site.

 4     But I may be wrong.

 5        Q.   Would it be your expectation that these targets would be

 6     identified by such means as observation, intelligence, et cetera, to

 7     locate and determine the co-ordinates, the dimensions, et cetera?

 8        A.   I see this as a determination for that.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Would you agree with me that if there is an error in the

10     identification of targets before they are put on this table for whatever

11     reason that that would cause considerable problems in terms of targeting

12     by those artillery officers following such a table?

13        A.   Of course.

14        Q.   Okay.  Looking at all of the targets listed on this sample that

15     we have before us and the dimension details for the same, would you agree

16     that these are all apparently reasonable military targets?

17        A.   I'm sorry, the print is not quite big enough.

18             MR. IVETIC:  If we could zoom in on the English version, perhaps

19     that can assist.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The upper or the lower table?

21             MR. IVETIC:  Let's do the upper first.  Maybe that might be

22     easier.

23             THE WITNESS:  All those under target type dimension fulfil what

24     you've just said.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

Page 4363

 1        Q.   And now if we could look at the second table, the lower table.

 2     And, again, I'll ask you for the same comments, sir.

 3        A.   Yes, I agree.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I'm finished with that document.  Thank you.  If we

 5     can call up 65 ter 1D387.  And while we wait for this, Colonel, I will

 6     give you the heads up that this is a statement which you gave to the

 7     Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal in 1997, and the first question

 8     I will have for you is, when it comes up, to look at the first page to

 9     confirm that in fact that is -- your signature is one of the signatures

10     on this page?

11        A.   Yes, that's right.

12        Q.   I'd like to now turn to the middle of the 13th page in the

13     English version, which should amount to the bottom of page 11 in the

14     B/C/S version.  And, unfortunately, these paragraphs are not numbered,

15     sir, but I would direct your attention to the selection that reads as

16     follows:

17             "My own feeling of the shelling by the Bosnian Serbs was that

18     generally the local commanders did not take much notice of a range map.

19     If they hit Sarajevo ... that was sufficient."

20             First of all, sir, does this accurately reflect the position?

21     And do you still hold that position that the local commanders were at

22     fault for not using a range map?

23        A.   There were incidents where what I have stated there are correct.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at the clock.

Page 4364

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Oh, I apologise.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We're close to the time for a break.

 3             After the break, the first thing I'd like to do is to re-visit

 4     one of your previous questions, especially what it means if you ask

 5     whether these are reasonable military targets, because that is a rather

 6     unclear concept in this context.

 7             But we'll do that after the break.

 8             We'll take a break and resume at 20 minutes past 12.00.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- Recess taken at 11.58 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, I said I would raise a matter after the

15     break.

16             You were asked, "Looking at all of the targets listed on this

17     sample," and that was the previous document.  It was P3.  And I know that

18     the hard copy --

19             MR. IVETIC:  Page 47 -- page 47 in e-court.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  47 in e-court.

21             MR. IVETIC:  49 in e-court, I think.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes:

23             "Looking at all of the targets listed on the sample that we have

24     before us and the dimension details for the same, would you agree that

25     these are all apparently reasonable military targets?"

Page 4365

 1             Now, what did you understand to be a -- because you -- your

 2     answer was all those and the target type, dimensions fulfil what you

 3     said.

 4             What did you understand to be reasonable targets?  Is that the

 5     dimensions fit the description or that using a Howitzer 155-millimetre

 6     would be a reasonable -- reasonably be used against these kind of

 7     targets?  Whether the reasonability is depending whether a mortar is an

 8     urban area or somewhere outside.  I had some difficulties in

 9     understanding exactly reasonable military targets are.  And I'm also

10     looking at it and sees that sometimes mortars get -- mortars and weapons,

11     and whatever those weapons are, 100 by 100, I take it metres, whereas

12     sometimes for weapons you get 100 by 100 but sometimes -- I'm looking at

13     entry 4, for example, sometimes I see mortars, 200 by 100.

14             What does it exactly mean?  What did you agree to in relation to

15     the question put to you by Mr. Ivetic?

16             THE WITNESS:  My understanding was the target type was -- were

17     they military targets, and I agreed to that.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So you would say a Howitzer is a -- could

19     be -- reasonably would be a military target.

20             THE WITNESS:  Absolutely.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And the same for weapons.  But it doesn't say

22     anything about the appropriateness of using the 150-millimetre Howitzer

23     against these targets irrespective where they are situated.  So it was

24     just a Howitzer, seems to be a military target.

25             THE WITNESS:  That was my interpretation, and, hence, my answer.

Page 4366

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             That's clear to me now.

 3             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  For sake the continuity, if we can

 5     return to 1D387, page 13 in the English, and page 11 in the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   And, Colonel, I believe before the break you had affirmed the

 7     quotation from your 1997 statement as still being accurate.

 8             If you could help us better understand this section that I read

 9     out, that you affirmed, to help us understand it better, would

10     you premise -- would the premise behind this be that the problem wasn't

11     in the orders that were being sent down but rather from the extralisation

12     [sic] of the orders whether by lack of care or ineptness on the part of

13     the local commanders?

14        A.   Yes, I understand.  Your latter point could well be the case.  My

15     point throughout my testimony, however, relates to ammunition

16     expenditure.  And as a commander, I would wish to know how my ammunition

17     was being used.  So if we take your last point that a local commander

18     wasn't accurate in terms of how much ammunition he fired, he exceeded, if

19     there was limit, if he didn't have specific targets, I, as his commander,

20     would want to know why he is doing what he is doing.

21        Q.   Fair enough, sir.  I'd like to flush this out some more by

22     walking through some of your testimony in the Karadzic proceedings with

23     you.  If we can call up now 1D00390 and it should be page 22 in the

24     e-court.  And this would be transcript page 5901 from that trial.

25             And, sir, once this comes up, the question and answer that I

Page 4367

 1     would like to discuss is from lines 5 through 12 of the relevant page.

 2     And for the sake of being on the same page and allowing our

 3     B/C/S-speaking public to follow, the question was as follows:

 4             "Do you agree that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had inherited

 5     territorial and municipal armies that were already in existence, and

 6     everyone from General Sipcic to General Milosevic had great problems

 7     establishing a unified command structure over these local units?

 8             "A.  It was certainly a significant difficulty which I observed

 9     that both sides had.  This was not a unique experience from the Serb

10     side.  So I understand what you're saying.  I was sympathetic to that

11     situation, and I agree with your overall assessment."

12             Do you affirm that this portion of your testimony that I've just

13     quoted is accurate and truthful?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And would you agree with me that such a situation would have an

16     effect upon understanding or explaining what we were discussing before,

17     namely, that local commanders you felt were not paying attention to range

18     maps and the shelling resulting therefrom?

19        A.   This could be the case, yes.

20        Q.   And if we could scroll down to the bottom portion of the page,

21     line 19 and down further, and I apologise, but your answer will be on the

22     next page, but if we can follow along.

23             The question was -- and they're talking about a document:

24             "Q.  This is from the time of General Sipcic -- no, it was

25     already General Galic.  Colonel Marcetic writes here that the local

Page 4368

 1     leaders and their supporters are out of control in certain areas, and

 2     these difficulties are encountered all the time, starting with Sipcic who

 3     found the worse situation because it was early days.  The VRS had just

 4     been set up.  But even in November, the corps command is encountering the

 5     same problem.  Is this consistent with what you confirmed earlier? "

 6             And, again, your answer is on the next page of the transcript:

 7             "A.  Thank you.  I've never seen the document, obviously, but

 8     it's fully in accord with what we understood to be the case.  So, yes, I

 9     understand your point."

10             Now do you affirm the accuracy and truthfulness of this portion

11     of the trial record that I have read to you from the Karadzic

12     proceedings?

13        A.   I do.

14        Q.   And when you identify here that this situation was in full accord

15     with what quote/unquote, "we understood the case to be."  Who is the

16     "we?"  Are you referring to the UNMO mission?

17        A.   I'm sorry, where did you get the "we?"

18        Q.   It is in your answer.

19        A.   Yes, understood.  Yes, correct.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that such a situation would have an

21     effect on understanding or explaining what we were discussing before, the

22     local commanders that you felt were not paying attention to range maps?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Okay.  Moving along to another topic --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask one follow-up question in this respect.

Page 4369

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, you described here, or you agree to the

 3     description of inherited, not unified structures and the problems that

 4     caused.

 5             Now, what you saw happening on the ground, would that be mainly

 6     explained by these flaws or shortcomings?  I mean, in terms of intensity

 7     of fire.  Would you say, Well, this is what explains all this; or would

 8     you consider this to be a major part of the explanation, a minor part of

 9     the explanation?  And if it does not fully explain, what would then

10     additionally explain what you saw happening on the ground?

11             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  I answered the question as posed, which

12     was, Was it contributory to.  Yes, it was.  Does it satisfy the

13     observations that we made in terms of the quantity of munitions landing

14     on Sarajevo?  No, it doesn't.

15             What I've always tried to do is to relate those rounds which we

16     could not explain, not too forensically, because when anything up to 6-

17     or 800 rounds are coming in on a day, it's not possible to do that.  But

18     what I'm stating is that as a commander, I would want to know why my

19     subcommanders are firing and what they are firing at because munitions,

20     like the other logistic elements, are a finite resource.  So there is a

21     responsibility upon the chain of command to know what is going on on the

22     ground and why it's going on on the ground.

23             The point that is being made relating to local commanders, of

24     course, there will be an element of that.  It's difficult to quantify

25     because on one day you might get 200 rounds, on one day you might get

Page 4370

 1     1600 rounds.  I'm not going to put a percentage figure onto that.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, one more question in relation to this.

 3             You said, I, as a commander would like to know how my ammunition

 4     was used.

 5             Would that also mean that a reasonable and responsible commander

 6     would improve the situation considerably if he would have noticed that

 7     mistakes as described were made?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I would expect the commander to impress upon his

 9     sub-commanders fire control.  That really answers your questions.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And did you see change over the time, where,

11     of course, the inheritance in the beginning was, I would say an urgent

12     one.  It was -- did you see any such thing happen over time, as far as

13     the accuracy of the firing was concerned?

14             THE WITNESS:  Throughout my tour, which, in the overall period of

15     the siege, is relatively small but intense in that three months, there

16     wasn't a significant change within that period.  But we tried to make a

17     difference by approaching commanders and asking them to reduce fire if we

18     didn't better receive that it was of a military -- with a military

19     objective, and we were successful in that regard.

20             So on a daily basis, we made a difference.  But the difference

21     that you're discussing relating to the proficiency of the services, we

22     didn't notice a very significant change in the three months.  But it is

23     only a very small window.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

25             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

Page 4371

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   Colonel, as I was saying, I was ready to move on to another

 3     topic, the airport agreement.

 4             Would you agree with me that the so-called airport agreement

 5     which was actually entered into before your tour of duty to -- as -- as a

 6     SMO in Sector Sarajevo?  While this agreement collected the heavy weapons

 7     that were in the possession of the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Serb forces,

 8     it did not call or cause these weapons to be taken out of engagement?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   And just so that we're clear that would mean that either side was

11     free to utilise these heavy weapons from within the identified geographic

12     areas covered by the agreement without being in violation of the

13     agreement?

14        A.   Correct.

15             MR. IVETIC:  I'd like to return to 1D387, which again is the

16     statement from 1997.  And this time, if we can turn to the bottom of page

17     5 in the English and the middle of page five in the B/C/S.  And it should

18     be the last paragraph on this page that I am interested in and I will now

19     read out for everyone:

20              "The airport agreement of June 1992 was but a small step taken

21     in the attempt to separate the factions in the city.  This was a

22     significant agreement to the Serb side as it gave up a considerable

23     tactical advantage that it had won.  By the same token, the decision and

24     agreement to have UNMOs on heavy weapon sites on both sides was of

25     greater significance to the Serbs than it ever was or could be to the

Page 4372

 1     weapon-light Presidency side.  One must, therefore, appreciate that from

 2     the outset the Serbs being tactically in the ascendency were always the

 3     ones expected to give up more in any agreement.  This certainly coloured

 4     their opinions and views in any negotiation on any topic.  It was a

 5     common theme that I soon appreciated, but was not appreciated by others

 6     outside the UNMO group.  The Serbs were, and still are, regarded as the

 7     perpetrators of the worse excesses, and their military advantage was

 8     always interpreted as demonstrating their aggression.  While not

 9     defending their actions, there is a balance to be found."

10        Q.   First of all, Colonel, could you stand by what you said in your

11     statement and what I've read here now as being truthful and accurate?

12        A.   I do, sir, yes.

13        Q.   And if you can explain for us one aspect.  Was it your

14     understanding that the persons you identify as, quote/unquote, "others"

15     in this selection, that they tended to lean on the Serbs harder than on

16     the Bosnian Muslim Presidency side in terms of negotiations?

17        A.   I'm sorry, are you asking me to identify those persons?

18        Q.   Not yet, no.  I'm asking you if it was your understanding that

19     these persons whom you have coined as others would lean on the Serb side

20     harder in negotiations than on the Bosnian Presidency side?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And now are you able to better define others and I'm willing to

23     take any qualifications, general terms.  I leave it to you as to what you

24     can give us in terms of a better idea of who these others would be.

25        A.   I think within UNPROFOR there was a general appreciation of the

Page 4373

 1     statement that you've just read out because they had first-hand

 2     experience of negotiations, and they, like the UNMO group, appreciated

 3     the overall situation.  But I specify UNMO group there, because I'm not

 4     in a position to speak for other people.

 5             However, I personally had negotiations, discussions with others

 6     from my country, politicians, military people, who I don't want to name,

 7     but that was where, and I think in world terms, where the statement that

 8     I've made is true.  And that was the balance that I was trying to

 9     redress.

10        Q.   Fair enough.  I will not push you to name names.  That answers --

11        A.   Thank you.

12        Q.   -- my question sufficiently.  I'd now like to turn to a similar

13     topic and the testimony from the Karadzic proceedings at 65 ter 1D389,

14     and this will be page 78 in the e-court.  And this, for the record, is

15     transcript 5878 from the Karadzic proceedings.  And the question starts

16     at line 2 on this page, and I will again present to you the entirety of

17     the question and answer and then ask for your comments:

18             "And I see that, too, were very critical of the media and their

19     reporting.  I see in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 134, relates

20     to the not-always-accurate reporting by the media.

21             "MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation]

22             "Q.  Do you confirm that?

23             "A.  Yes.  I feel very strongly about the interpretation of

24     events, as I saw them, from a position of comparative strengths.  I think

25     by virtue of the officers who worked for me, the knowledge I was able to

Page 4374

 1     gather, and the military and civilian interpretation that I applied was

 2     based on good evidence.  I was always concerned that the evidence base

 3     that was used by certain agencies, and in this regard, I refer to news

 4     agencies, was extremely weak.  I am, in my own mind, convinced that there

 5     was a considerable anti-Serb approach to the conflict within the press

 6     and, indeed, beyond it to some quite senior politicians who I met and

 7     talked with in Sarajevo."

 8             Can you confirm the truth and accuracy of the excerpt of your

 9     testimony as recorded in this transcript which I have now presented for

10     you?

11        A.   Yes, thank you.

12        Q.   And with regard to the last part that the -- the persons coined

13     as "quite senior politicians."

14             First of all, I'm not going to ask you to name names.  Are we

15     talking about the same general group of people that was the answer to the

16     previous question?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And would you describe at least some of them as being persons

19     with decision-making authority?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Now, as far as the press is concerned, at paragraphs 133 through

22     134 of your amalgamated statement, which is P421, page 30 in the English

23     and page 32 the B/C/S, you have already identified for us concerns about

24     the reporting that you thought was unsubstantiated or anti-Serb, and you

25     include a specific reference to the fabrication of a story by I believe

Page 4375

 1     it was BBC journalists.

 2             The question I have for you is to expand upon that.  Did you have

 3     occasion to personally witness or have knowledge of journalists from

 4     other agencies that you could either identify or confirm being guilty of

 5     the same type of misdeeds, as these BBC journalists?

 6        A.   Firstly, it was one single individual.  I had an excellent

 7     relationships with other elements of the same group, to the extent that I

 8     managed to place them in locations they would not otherwise have gone to,

 9     if it had not been for my inviting them to come with me.  So this is

10     about one specific journalist.

11             In answer to your question about other journalists, I think I

12     have mentioned in my testimony before I encouraged none of the UNMOs to

13     discuss anything with the press, and if any discussion was to be had with

14     the press, then it would be through myself.  And I recall only ever

15     speaking to the BBC.  So, no, there were no other media agencies that I

16     recall speaking to.

17        Q.   Fair enough.  And do you feel comfortable identifying for us the

18     journalist whom you -- since we do have some that are coming to testify

19     I'd like to make sure it is not one of them.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Perhaps in private session.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps to be dealt with in private session.  And

22     also, if it would be a journalist still to appear, that he is not yet

23     already aware of -- of the criticism.

24             We move into private session.

25                           [Private session]

Page 4376

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12                           [Open session]

13             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

15             MR. IVETIC:

16        Q.   I'd like to return for a moment back to the -- to something that

17     you discussed in your prior testimony in the Karadzic.  So this would be

18     1D390 in e-court and the relevant portion will be -- well, the answer is

19     on page 3.  Once we get that section up, perhaps ... I apologise.  This

20     should be -- can I see the page at the -- I'm sorry.  It's the previous

21     page - I apologise - page 2, I guess, it is in e-court.  Should be at

22     line 4.

23             And the answer that you gave to a question that presented to you

24     about complaints that General Morillon and Mr. Henneberry had about the

25     media because of the biased positions that the media held and the same

Page 4377

 1     being hindrance for peace, your answer was as follows:

 2             "These opinions of which you speak which were held by the press,

 3     from our perception, certainly made it extremely more difficult for us to

 4     fulfil our mission, the details of which I'm sure you're aware, and will

 5     have made it difficult for the warring factions to proceed when their

 6     intentions, certainly from the Serb side, seemed to be warped and twisted

 7     by press reports."

 8             First of all, sir, do you stand by the selected portion of your

 9     testimony from the Karadzic case as being truthful and accurate, to the

10     best of your recollection?

11        A.   I do.

12        Q.   And I take it now here we are talking generally about press

13     reports, not about specific journalists that you had encounters with.  Is

14     that accurate?

15        A.   Yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, one follow-up question there.

17             Did you follow the press reports of the whole of the world or the

18     western world or Asia or Africa?  What did you have access to and what

19     were you able to read so as to form your opinion as expressed here?

20             THE WITNESS:  European.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  European.

22             THE WITNESS:  Put it simply, yes.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  European means the whole of Europe including Russia,

24     including --

25             THE WITNESS:  No, western European.

Page 4378

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Western European.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you gain any impression about the reporting

 4     in -- even if not personally following it, were you ever receiving any

 5     reports about how the media were covering the situation, media you had no

 6     direct access to yourself?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I did.  Because there were a mixture of

 8     battalions in Sarajevo, Egyptian, Ukrainian and French, one obviously

 9     picked up, not substantiated, but picked up the essence of what you are

10     speaking about, how they were interpreting and at home, yes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  More specifically, Serbia, Russia, China, Indonesia,

12     did you have any --

13             THE WITNESS:  Out of that list, Russia.  I had been -- I think

14     I've explained in sector east with a Russian battalion and of course then

15     we had the Ukrainian battalion in Sarajevo.  But, no, not to the others.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Were they similarly distorting the good

17     intentions of the Serbian side?

18             THE WITNESS:  The Russian element and the Ukrainian element were

19     very much in favour of the Serb situation.  I would therefore -- if I had

20     to delineate it, say that the western media was generally the other way

21     with the Serbs.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. IVETIC:

25        Q.   And, Colonel, could you expand for us on this understanding -- on

Page 4379

 1     your understanding of how this biased reporting, I guess, was making it

 2     difficult for you to fulfil your mission?

 3        A.   When you consider the various tasks which we were trying to

 4     achieve there, I would want to focus, to answer your question, on the

 5     military elements, none of the others, because we were talking of

 6     hopefully a cease-fire, hopefully a disengagement.  And once you start

 7     talking with the various sides about achieving that objective, and even

 8     going as far as trying to find local cease-fires to allow us to fulfil

 9     various utility missions, the response of -- from discussing these things

10     with the warring factions they will have been affected by the issues of

11     which we speak.  And so as a consequence, they would come to the

12     proceedings with a somewhat hardened attitude, a less forgiving one, and

13     it would make negotiation that much harder to exercise.

14             Have I made myself clear?

15        Q.   You have.  Now I'd like to move a little bit beyond that.  We

16     talked about senior politicians and others in -- in a previous question.

17     Do you feel that the approach or stance they had which I believe you

18     described to be not understanding of the Serbs.  Do you believe that that

19     also affected the ability of negotiators to fulfil their mission in a

20     same manner; that is to say, that it affected the parties and hardened

21     their attitudes in negotiations?

22        A.   Besides just one small correction which I would make, you -- you

23     state, described to be not understanding of the Serbs.  I would go

24     further.  I would say there wasn't a great comprehension of the

25     complexities of the issues we were dealing with, not specifically Serbs.

Page 4380

 1     After that, I agree with you.

 2        Q.   Thank you for that clarification and we can move on.  Am I

 3     correct that with respect to Bosnian Muslim or Presidency forces, as far

 4     as they're concerned, when they utilised heavy weapons that were within

 5     the monitoring zone, that is, within the Papa side, the UNMOs would not

 6     necessarily have a clear indication of where that fire was directed.  You

 7     could only present the statistical half picture if it landed somewhere

 8     near a Lima observer post in Serb territory; is that right?

 9        A.   Can you just let me read that, please.

10        Q.   Absolutely.

11        A.   Okay.  The numbers of heavy weapons on the Presidency side that

12     we monitored was so small and the ammunition available to them so

13     limited.  I'll add a rider immediately.  We didn't have all of them but

14     those that we did have were seldom fired that I recall, so I can't answer

15     your question relating to that because we were not monitoring the weapons

16     they were using.

17             Can I just give an example?  There were three tanks.  One fell

18     off the road very quickly and was demobilised on the way to the airport.

19     The other two I don't recall being used, because of the ammunition.

20        Q.   Fair enough.  Can we focus on those weapons that you were not

21     monitoring but which were being used, am I correct then that in that

22     instance you would only have in terms of the statistics a record of where

23     that shot landed potentially if it happened to land near a Lima position,

24     because you did not obviously have the same coverage on the Lima side as

25     you had on the Papa side.  Is that accurate?

Page 4381

 1        A.   That's absolutely correct.

 2        Q.   And if it was a -- I won't even use the term position because it

 3     could have been mobile, but if it was a site that was unmonitored you

 4     cannot exclude the possibility that it undershot or overshot a target and

 5     therefore landed on Papa territory?

 6        A.   No.  We wouldn't necessarily know where the fall-off shot was.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  If we can call up in e-court 65 ter number 1D393 for

 9     a continuation of this type of discussion.

10        Q.   While we wait for the document I will let you know, sir, that

11     this is an incident report for period 20 December 1992 to

12     21 December 1992 that bears your name at the bottom of the document.

13     First of all, sir, having a chance to look at this one-page document can

14     you confirm that you are familiar with this document?

15        A.   Yes, I am.

16        Q.   And if we look at the monitored weapons section in the upper half

17     of the document, we see that the Bosnia Presidency positions are listed

18     at number 2.  For this period it is reflected that not a single shot was

19     witnessed to be outgoing from the Presidency side.

20             Am I correctly interpreting this part of the form?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And if we can look at the increps which is at number 4, first of

23     all, let's look at number 3.  This records the amount of incoming rounds

24     observed at the monitored sites of the Serb areas.  And we see here a

25     significant amount, that is, 16 artillery and 125 mortar shots incoming.

Page 4382

 1             Am I correct that this is precisely demonstrating what you have

 2     already told us that the Bosnian Muslim Presidency forces had artillery

 3     that was not monitored by your mission?

 4        A.   Yes.  When I was talking previously I was being quite specific

 5     about within Sarajevo.  This picture is the whole of that area, so it

 6     includes other locations beyond the city.

 7        Q.   And when you say "other locations beyond the city," would we

 8     include Mount Igman and Hrasnica as among other places as two points that

 9     were rather significant in terms of the artillery that was available to

10     the Presidency forces which was outside of Sarajevo, outside of the Papa

11     side of the confrontation line?

12        A.   Yes.  And remembering that artillery is a mobile function.

13        Q.   Fair enough.  If I could just return to this document for a

14     moment.  So we are clear, do you permit the possibility that the incoming

15     rounds suffered by the Serb-controlled areas could actually be in excess

16     of what is reflected on this form, again because of the lack of the

17     coverage of the entirety of the Serb-controlled areas by the UNMO mission

18     which was mainly monitoring weapons on that side of the line?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And with regard now moving to the Mount Igman location in

21     particular, am I correct that you were persistent but unsuccessful in

22     trying to place observers at Igman, at the Presidency positions there?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And would you agree that a significant factor relating to

25     discrepancies in the various reports of this nature would be due to the

Page 4383

 1     fact that UNMO had no insight as to the outgoing fire from Mount Igman?

 2        A.   We did actually have some insight.  Because within my

 3     statements - I can't recall exactly where - a UN military observer did go

 4     up onto Mount Igman and he did count the weapons, which I can't recall

 5     instantly that I stated at the time.  So with a snap-shot of this

 6     particular event, it gives you an indication of the weapons available to

 7     the Presidency side on Mount Igman.

 8        Q.   I promise you I will not ask you for instant recall for those

 9     figures.  I do know that I have them somewhere in my questions so we will

10     get to them, and I will be fair enough to provide you the relevant

11     portion of your statement so we do not have to guess.

12             But for the time being, with respect to Mount Igman itself, would

13     you agree that this was a significant geographical feature and also a

14     feature of military significance?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And focussing now on the time of your tour in Sarajevo, the three

17     months that you were there, am I correct that this location, this

18     feature, was held by the Presidency forces throughout that time?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And do you recall if this feature had a residential nature to it

21     or was it purely military, Mount Igman?

22        A.   Well, I never went there, so I can't answer that question.

23        Q.   Fair enough.  Would Mount Igman and the forces situated there

24     have had an unobstructed view of the entirety of the city of Sarajevo?

25        A.   I would imagine so from the geographical layout, yes.

Page 4384

 1        Q.   And as such, would these forces have the ability to target any of

 2     the Serb or Presidency-held areas of the city itself?

 3        A.   Dependant on the type of weapon that they had there at any one

 4     time.

 5        Q.   And the range --

 6        A.   The ranges that the weapon; hence, yes.

 7        Q.   Would you agree with me that the Lima or Serb artillery shooting

 8     at the BiH forces on Igman would be recorded as outgoing but would not be

 9     recorded on the forms as incoming, in so far as there were no observers

10     near Igman?

11        A.   Absolutely.

12        Q.   And likewise, outgoing fire from Igman that overshot targets or

13     undershot targets that could potentially land on Presidency-held

14     territory, it, too, would not be identifiable as coming from Igman, if

15     you can understand that.

16        A.   I understand what you mean.  But since we don't know what was

17     there and whether it was the source of the fire, we're only looking at an

18     impact and, of course, that could have come from anywhere.  But I do

19     understand what you are saying.

20        Q.   Let me simply it.

21        A.   Okay.

22        Q.   Am I correct that the monitors on the Papa side recording

23     incoming shot would not be able to distinguish between fire that

24     potentially came from Igman or potentially came from both monitored and

25     unmonitored Serb positions?

Page 4385

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree with me that it was not only likely

 3     but in fact a certainty that the Serb artillery was targeting Igman and

 4     either engaging in offensive or counter-offensive fire with the forces on

 5     Igman?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And would such fire, whether offensive or defensive counter-fire

 8     be military justified or legitimate, in your opinion or estimation?

 9        A.   That seems to be acceptable.

10        Q.   With respect to all the reports and the various incident forms

11     that we have discussed or that you discussed in your statement and

12     testimony, am I correct that we should keep in mind that the number of

13     outgoing shoots -- shots from the Serb artillery included or could

14     include shot that was directed at Igman rather than upon the Papa side or

15     the Papa zone?

16        A.   Yes, it could.

17        Q.   Okay.  And from this document, at least for this time-period, the

18     Serb positions suffered more incoming shot directed at them than did the

19     Papa or Presidency side have incoming shot directed at them?

20        A.   From this document?

21        Q.   Yes.  Looking at items 3 and 4.

22        A.   Yes.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, at this time I would ask for this

24     document that's on the screen to be tendered into evidence and given the

25     next available exhibit number.

Page 4386

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That is 1D393?

 2             MR. IVETIC:  That's correct.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, the number would be ...

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Document receives number D83, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 6             I'm looking at the clock, Mr. Ivetic.  Would this be a suitable

 7     time?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  It is, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We'll take a break, and we resume at 25

10     minutes to 2.00.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Recess taken at 1.13 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

17             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

18        Q.   Colonel, as promised, I have located the portion of your

19     statement dealing with the recon of the Igman location.  If we can call

20     up in e-court in 1D387 and this will be pages 11 in the English and 10 in

21     the B/C/S.

22             And while we wait for that, sir, I would like to see if I can

23     verify something else with you.  In respect of the Presidency forces that

24     would have been located at the Mount Igman location, would you agree that

25     there was both infantry and artillery at this location?

Page 4387

 1        A.   No, I can't confirm that.

 2        Q.   Fair enough.  And if we look at bottom of the page in English

 3     that we have before us of 1D387, and I will read out for you the

 4     selection so that hopefully you can locate the same:

 5             "I was later able to substantiate by way of a rec conducted by

 6     two of my UNMOs that the Presidency forces on Igman had two times APCs;

 7     one time 130-millimetre Howitzer; four times 105-millimetre field guns;

 8     two times 122-millimetre field guns; and six times 120-millimetre

 9     mortars."

10             Does this accurately and truthfully represent the recon

11     information you had about the artillery available to the Presidency

12     forces at the Mount Igman location?

13        A.   That's the memory I had, yes.

14        Q.   And do you also recall of receiving constant complaints from the

15     Serb side that precisely these Presidency forces on the Mount Igman

16     location were conducting fire upon civilian areas in the Serb-held

17     portions of Sarajevo, particularly the Ilidza suburb?

18        A.   Yes, we received complaints on many occasions, and I think they

19     are recorded in my statement for General Galic, as it is stated in my

20     statement from General Galic that he threatened to return fire on

21     Sarajevo if it continued.

22        Q.   And you previously talked about the Bosnian Presidency forces

23     within the Papa zone, that is to say, within the inner parts of the city,

24     as having lack or minimal ammunition.  Would you agree with me that the

25     forces at the Mount Igman location were not subject to the same

Page 4388

 1     difficulties in resupply that the forces in the Papa zone had?

 2        A.   That's accurate.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Am I correct that in addition to the Mount Igman location

 4     the Bosnian Presidency forces held several other points of high ground

 5     outside of the city where forces and heavy weapons were located?

 6        A.   There were other locations that heavy weapons could be brought to

 7     bear from the Presidency, yes.  My personal experience of them though is

 8     not.  I have none.

 9        Q.   Fair enough.  Would you agree with me that we cannot view the

10     UNMO statistics as an exact representation of the fire from Serb

11     artillery into the city, but rather that it can be only viewed as an

12     inexact attempt to indicate levels of activity rather than assess where

13     all shots came from or went?

14        A.   Wherever we could, we would make a relationship between outgoing

15     fire from the Lima side to incoming fire on the Presidency side, and as

16     we've seen, there are variations which are not explained by the pure

17     statistics.  So, yes, it was not an exact science, something I've said I

18     think a number of times in my various statements.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I was about to say that the witness has

20     explained this various times, but he himself did it as well.

21             Please proceed.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, sir.  If I could call up in e-court

23     number 1D00394.

24        Q.   And while we wait for the document, sir, I'd like to advise you

25     that it is dated the 10th of December, 1992, and appears to be a report

Page 4389

 1     authored by Lieutenant Commander Rees on your behalf send to the CMO

 2     UNPROFOR in Zagreb.  Can you verify for us or recognise this document as

 3     being one that was prepared or on your bequest or with your knowledge?

 4        A.   Yes, I've signed it so that is acceptable.

 5        Q.   And if we look at the section entitled "general situation," we

 6     see that it states for the period 9 to 10 December 1992 the following:

 7             "Medium to low level of activity today with 35 rounds incoming to

 8     Presidency side and 91 rounds incoming to Serb side.  Total rounds

 9     recorded outgoing from Serb positions 189, from Presidency positions," I

10     believe it's a 50 or a 53, I can't tell, "and shelling widely dispersed

11     throughout the city."

12             Would you agree with me that on this date, too, the Serb

13     positions were enduring three times more incoming shots than the

14     Presidency positions?

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic that is now the second time that you

16     apparently think that what is reported here that the Chamber is unable to

17     establish that the 189 is three times approximately 50 or 53.  Earlier

18     you asked the witness whether the one had more incoming fire than the

19     other side.  This Chamber, perhaps not good in mathematics, but these

20     basics are really within our -- within our competence.

21             MR. IVETIC:  And, Your Honour, these are public proceedings and

22     the Office of the Prosecutor has been allowed to present a summary of the

23     witness's testimony, which is for the public's information, and we

24     believe that material that contradicts that or provides more information

25     and a more complete picture -- for the public to know the full aspects of

Page 4390

 1     this witness's available testimony and of the circumstances in Sarajevo

 2     during the relevant time-period are necessary.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm not blaming you for reading that

 4     there were 35 rounds incoming and, et cetera, I'm not blaming you for

 5     mentioning it.  But then to say whether 150 is three times 50, that, of

 6     course, is in addition to putting the figures and is really totally

 7     unnecessary.  That's what my point is.  Not -- and I didn't blame you for

 8     pointing at the numbers.  I blamed you for the question that you put to

 9     the witness which seems to assume that the Chamber is -- and the public

10     is unable to establish that 189 is more than three times 50 or 53.

11             Please proceed.

12             MR. IVETIC:

13        Q.   Would you agree with me that the bulk of the incoming fire or --

14     strike that.  Would you suspect that some of the incoming fire on the

15     Serb positions would be precisely from unmonitored BiH Presidency

16     artillery or heavy weapons whether on Mount Igman or elsewhere?

17        A.   The figures suggest that.

18        Q.   And would you consider it reasonable or likely that the Serb

19     positions, if taking incoming fire from these Presidency positions, would

20     fire outward towards these BiH Presidency positions to counter or

21     neutralise the threat?

22        A.   That's a reasonable expectation.

23        Q.   And would such outgoing fire be militarily justified?

24        A.   On the premise of the target, yes.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would ask that this document be

Page 4391

 1     admitted into evidence with the next available Defence exhibit.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

 3             Madam Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D387 becomes Exhibit D84, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is it 387 or 394?

 7             MR. IVETIC:  3 --

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I think it's 394.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  394, your correct.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  So Exhibit 1D394 received D84, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

12             MR. IVETIC:  If we could take a look at 1D392 in e-court.

13        Q.   And, sir, again while we're waiting for the document I can advise

14     that you it is dated the 19th of November, 1992, and appears to have been

15     prepared by Major Rosenroll, and perhaps can you verify if it in fact has

16     been signed by you?

17        A.   Yes, it was.

18        Q.   And if we look at the time-period covered by 18 to

19     19 November 1992, we see that under item 1 with the low to medium

20     activity only one shot fell in Presidency territory whereas 16 shots fell

21     onto Serb territory.  And here you explain that the Serbs were firing 57

22     rounds although only one landed on the territory of the Presidency forces

23     that you monitored.

24        A.   Yes, I -- I highlight that clearly, I think, the limitations.

25        Q.   Okay.  Would you agree that this document and your explanation

Page 4392

 1     contained therein perhaps most drastically explains the point we were

 2     discussing previously as to the limitations as to these statistics?

 3        A.   Yes.  As I've explained in the document.

 4        Q.   And here there appears to have been a cease-fire that has failed.

 5     Do you recall based upon the fact that the Zuc and Nedzarici locations

 6     are mentioned, and the fact that only one shot was incoming to the BiH

 7     side if this was a cease-fire that the Presidency forces would have

 8     broken?

 9        A.   I can't make a judgement.

10        Q.   Fair enough.

11             MR. IVETIC:  I would like to tender this document into evidence

12     as the next available Defence exhibit number.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection.

14             Madam Registrar.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D392 becomes Exhibit D85, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

17             MR. IVETIC:

18        Q.   Colonel, on the topic of cease-fires at paragraph 29 of your

19     amalgamated statement, Exhibit P241, and it would be the eighth page in

20     English and the sixth page in the B/C/S, at this paragraph once it comes

21     up - I'll wait for that - I would direct your attention to the conclusory

22     statement at the end of this paragraph, which starts as follows:

23             "Throughout my tenure, the level of activity always exceeded our

24     ability to respond to every incident as there was never an effective

25     cease-fire."

Page 4393

 1             Would you agree with me that all parties to the conflict in

 2     Sarajevo were responsible for such a situation that they all violated

 3     cease-fires at various times?

 4        A.   You can only violate a cease-fire if you have one.  I don't

 5     recall one.

 6        Q.   Would you agree with me, generally speaking, that the Presidency

 7     side was more reluctant to enter into a general or universal cease-fire

 8     in the negotiations?

 9        A.   Thinking back to the negotiations that I was party to, both on an

10     individual basis and with the individuals who I worked closely with on

11     both sides, and at the mixed military working group, I don't recall that

12     they were any more likely to object to a cease-fire.  I sensed that their

13     position meant that they would welcome it by virtue of the weight of

14     weaponry that was ranged against them.  But, no, I don't think there was

15     any greater emphasis on the Presidency side, working from memory.

16        Q.   Fair enough.  Then can I move on to the issue of utilities.  At

17     paragraphs 10 and 11 of your amalgamated statement - that would be 3 and

18     4 in the English - you identify utility works and repairs as an item that

19     the UNMO mission was tasked with.  I'd like to focus up -- focus on that

20     for a moment, but, first, I'd like to present to you what another

21     witness, Mr. Pyers Tucker, testified to in the Galic case and which he

22     affirmed here a few weeks ago.  So if we can please have 1D367 up on the

23     screen, and this is the transcript pages 10029 to 10031 from the Galic

24     case beginning at line 12.

25             To be fair, I will provide you the entirety of the exchange

Page 4394

 1     before asking you to comment on particular items:

 2             "Q.  The last question is you have told us about one of the tasks

 3     performed was to discuss issues of restoring utilities:  Gas, water

 4     supply, electricity.  Could you tell us whether the parties were

 5     co-operative if it came to restoring these utilities, whether both

 6     parties behaved similarly or differently?  Could you elaborate a bit more

 7     on that?

 8             "A.  Utilities were something which General Morillon considered

 9     very important, and at the meetings at which utility repair was

10     discussed, both sides were entirely co-operative.  These meetings were

11     very complex because you needed to bring to one place, at one time, both

12     technicians who had the right knowledge and a cease-fire that was agreed

13     by both sides, and the technicians needed to know a safe route through

14     the minefields in order to reach the area that they needed to carry out

15     repairs.

16             "When we looked at what happened on the ground, the

17     co-operation," and now we have to go to the next page of the transcript,

18     "the co-operation which we received from the Bosnian Serb authorities was

19     generally of a high order.  The co-operation we received from the Bosniak

20     local commanders varied considerably, and it was our belief that in some

21     areas where the Presidency authorities had high control, things generally

22     went well.  But there were other areas where the local commanders were

23     radical, and from the perspective of general discipline and obedience,

24     were unreliable, that all sorts of tricks were used in order to prevent

25     the repairs from taking place.

Page 4395

 1             "JUDGE ORIE:  I'm trying to understand this.  The supplies of

 2     water, electricity and gas also served their own population.  What was

 3     the specific reason why they would play tricks which would result in not

 4     restoring the supplies when their own population would suffer from it?

 5     Do you have any explanation about that?

 6             "A.  I do have an explanation and it is as follows:  There were

 7     elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to

 8     take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that

 9     could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by

10     the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia which was not possible at

11     that time because of the arms embargo.  Those people believed that the

12     only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the

13     situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community

14     would be -- would be willing to intervene.  Therefore, it was not in

15     their interest to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo.  It

16     was not in their interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian

17     population improve.  To put it bluntly, the more suffering, the better,

18     because that...,"  and if we turn to the last page for the last two

19     lines, "... because that played to the television cameras and would

20     ultimately lead to the pressure that they wanted in order to achieve

21     international intervention."

22             Now, I'd like to first ask you about the first part of

23     Mr. Tucker's testimony regarding the difficulties of negotiating joint

24     repair missions to the utilities.  Does that accord with your

25     recollection of the situation and, indeed, that at least some sort of

Page 4396

 1     local cease-fire was necessary to effectuate these missions?

 2        A.   Could we return to that page, please.

 3        Q.   That would be the first page, page 1 in e-court.  And, by all

 4     means, there's something that has been omitted by Mr. Tucker as to

 5     difficulties, you could add to that.

 6        A.   It such a lengthy element of the document that there are so many

 7     issues in there, it's almost difficult to know where to start.  Are you

 8     going to specifically ask me a question about a specific part of it?

 9        Q.   I'm asking about the specific part from lines 18 to 24 on the

10     screen right now.

11        A.   Okay.

12        Q.   And does that comport with your recollection of the difficulties

13     of getting repair missions to the utilities during the time-period when

14     you were at Sarajevo.

15        A.   Can I give a little background before I answer your question --

16        Q.   Briefly, yes --

17        A.   -- because it is very pertinent.

18        Q.   -- if you can, if you can.

19        A.   Okay.  General Morillon was BiH commander.  Major Tucker worked

20     for him, a British officer whom I knew very well.  General Morillon and

21     Major Tucker would know as much about the utility missions as they

22     gleaned from the various situation reports that I wrote.  Before I went

23     to Sarajevo, there were no utility missions.  I instigated them.  I ran

24     every single one.  It is therefore quite difficult for me to read what

25     somebody else thinks about them when actually they had no direct contact

Page 4397

 1     with the utility missions whatsoever.

 2             So within the lengthy paragraph, there are elements which are

 3     true, but there are also areas where there is confusion.

 4             The meetings were complex, yes, I did them.  They took many days

 5     to ensure that by virtue of their location, more often than not on the

 6     front line, both sides knew what was happening, where it was happening,

 7     and, indeed, the technicians that we required to fulfil that mission.

 8             To achieve it, I did considerable amount of negotiating myself,

 9     and I had a particular officer who looked after most missions, and he

10     also did negotiations.  Therefore, it was right down the chain of

11     command, from General Galic on the one side, to Mr. Siber on the other

12     side, right down to local commanders.  Where some of these failed, I

13     wouldn't put a figure on as to whether it was one side, nor the other.

14     Because the important point from my perspective was that if it wasn't

15     safe for the technicians and the UN -- UNPROFOR people who were there,

16     then I wouldn't do it.

17             Earlier on in the day, we talked about blame one way or the

18     other.  I wasn't interested in blame, and I worry a little that this

19     document and this statement seems to give an emphasise more on one side

20     than the other.  For every single mission that we sent out, and I think

21     eventually we had a success rate of about 65 per cent, which in the

22     circumstances was phenomenally successful, it indicates that actually

23     there was a willingness on both sides to achieve what we were trying to

24     achieve.  But this was war.  Elsewhere in my statements I recall clearly

25     stating that I think I said the water didn't come on one side so they

Page 4398

 1     shelled the electricity substation --

 2        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

 3        A.   -- and that was typical.  So I think those first few lines there

 4     are elements of truth about it, but I think my explanation is slightly

 5     more accurate, and so it should be.  I ran them.

 6        Q.   That's why I asked you.  And did you share the view of Mr. Tucker

 7     that at times it appeared that segments of the Bosnian Presidency

 8     leadership or perhaps local commanders seemed to be reluctant to assist

 9     in the utilities due to their desire to obtain either intervention or to

10     effectuate an end to the arms embargo?

11        A.   I think that's mixing up too many features.  We had difficulty

12     completing utility missions from both sides, for multiple reasons.  It

13     wasn't our task to analyse why it failed.  What we did do was try to

14     learn so that if we could manage the same utility mission another time,

15     or something similar, then we would have learnt from that experience.  We

16     didn't go as far as analysing it.

17             Can I say where I think the failures really occurred?  And it was

18     common wherever we did these missions.  And it was on the local basis.

19     That is very true and that is the common feature through -- that I have

20     with this particular statement.

21        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And now I can leave that document and go to

22     1D391, which, while we wait for it, sir, is again a report that emanated

23     from your mission, I believe; albeit in a different format.  It appears

24     to be dated the 17th of October, 1992.  Can you take a look at this and

25     at least from the first page can you tell whether this is something that

Page 4399

 1     would have emanated from your position, from your office?

 2             If you like, we can also go to the next page.

 3        A.   Sorry, did you say 17th of September?  Because that is dated the

 4     4th of October.

 5        Q.   I thought it was 17th of October, but I could be ...

 6        A.   Okay.  17th of October.  Sorry.  I thought you said

 7     September which would be the day after I arrived.  So, yes, I'm with you.

 8        Q.   Okay, you're with me.  Now, does this appear to be a message or

 9     report that would have been -- emanated from your position?

10        A.   Yes, from SMO Sarajevo.

11        Q.   And, first, if we look at item 1 since it's up on the screen,

12     we -- we see that the statistics demonstrate that more shot was falling

13     on to the Serb-controlled territories than was falling on the

14     Presidency-controlled territories, at least for this period covered by

15     this sitrep.  Would you agree with me - now that we've gone through

16     several of these reports - that there were times when the incoming fire

17     was heavier against the Serbs than against the city parts controlled by

18     the Presidency forces, even though I don't think that that was identified

19     in your statement?

20        A.   Yes.  You just have to look at the figures for that, yes.

21        Q.   And now I'd like to focus on the part of the document that is

22     entitled "continuous affairs."  We have to scroll down just a little bit.

23     The middle of the page.  Right there is fine.

24             And here precisely you are discussing problems with local

25     commanders in terms of -- on both sides actually, with respect to some

Page 4400

 1     three utility missions that were planned for the day.  Is that -- is that

 2     accurate?

 3        A.   Yes, I can see that, yes.

 4        Q.   And does this accurately memorialise some of the general items

 5     that you had just testified about?  Does this give a specific indication

 6     of a particular instance?

 7        A.   Yes, it clearly relates to those three utility missions, yes.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would at this time tender this

 9     document as the next available Defence exhibit number.

10             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I'm sorry, I don't have necessarily an objection

11     to this but just as to the date.  I think counsel is referring on top to

12     a date that's printed on the top there.  I'm not sure that that

13     17 October date is the actual date of the document.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  If I can assist the parties.  The language used at

15     the top line is "afgedrukt" on the 17th, which means printed on the 17th.

16             Then, yes, if we agree all on that, that it's just the date of

17     the print.

18             MR. IVETIC:  That's fine.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  No objection.

20             Madam Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D391 becomes Exhibit D86, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

23             Mr. Ivetic, we have only three minutes left.  I would like to

24     already excuse the witness for the day and continue tomorrow, and I would

25     like to address one or two issues.

Page 4401

 1             MR. IVETIC:  That's fine, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mole, we'll adjourn for the day, soon.  We'd

 3     like to see you back tomorrow morning, and I again instruct you that you

 4     should not speak or communicate in any other way with any other person

 5     about your testimony irrespective of whether already given or still to be

 6     given.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I understand, sir.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  You may follow the usher.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Time is too limited.  But, Mr. Ivetic, there are a

12     few documents you have used and not tendered, you may have intentionally

13     done so, a lot was read into the record, but please be aware there are

14     four documents of that kind.

15             Then, second, I earlier said something about that the Chamber is

16     able to make its own math.  But then, unfortunately, I took the wrong

17     portion, because your question was about the incoming fire, so your

18     question was about whether 91 is three times 35, and now not that that is

19     a more complex calculation than the one I mentioned, because the Chamber

20     is able both to establish that 91 is -- and that's the incoming fire on

21     the Serb side, was three times what was incoming on the Presidency side,

22     and the Chamber was also able to calculate that the outgoing fire from

23     the Serb side, 189, was more than three times the outgoing fire from the

24     Presidency side.

25             But that's hereby corrected.

Page 4402

 1             The other matter I'd like to briefly raise is scheduling.

 2             Could you tell us approximately how much time you would need.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I anticipate another hour, 15; hour, 20.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  As matters stand at this moment,

 5     Ms. Hochhauser, could you give an indication as to how much you think you

 6     would need in re-examination.

 7             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  As matters stand at this moment, I have about

 8     four questions.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Which means that the next witness scheduled

10     tomorrow that we'll easily conclude his examination-in-chief tomorrow

11     somewhere during the second session most likely.  I wondered to what

12     extent it would be possible to condense the cross-examination of the next

13     witness in such a way that he could be excused before the weekend.

14             Would you seriously consider that and see to what extent that is

15     possible.

16             MR. LUKIC:  Is it the next witness after this one, Your Honour?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I mean, he is scheduled for half an hour, as I

18     understand it, and for -- I think you scheduled him for three hours.  Now

19     if you --

20             MR. LUKIC:  [Microphone not activated] Two and a half.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Two and a half hours, which makes all together three

22     hours.  We have -- I'm not saying that you should, but if it would be

23     possible to -- to accommodate the witness by -- yes.

24             MR. LUKIC:  We are a bit unclear at this moment, Your Honour,

25     because we just learned during the last break that that witness is coming

Page 4403

 1     tomorrow, so we are not clear yet how to proceed.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me see.

 3             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I think there may be some confusion.

 4     The witness has no protective measures so it's the witness Elvir Pasic

 5     who has been on the schedule for some time now.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  He is scheduled for 30 minutes.

 7             MR. LUKIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 8             MR. GROOME:  No, I think that's the witness.  I know Mr. Lukic

 9     has been dealing with the matter of the Detention Unit.  Perhaps I can

10     speak with him at the break and clarify some of the recent developments

11     with respect to the witness that we had considered moving forward but

12     ultimately did not.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But as matters stand now, we expect the next

14     witness to be called to be Mr. Pasic.

15             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So we're wondering whether there be -- whether

17     it would be possible by both parties using the time in the most -- in the

18     most efficient way, whether we could achieve that the witness could be

19     excused before the weekend.  If not, of course, we'll --

20             MR. LUKIC:  Your Honour, I think you are aware by now that we do

21     our best to comply with your orders.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  No, well, first of all, this was not an order,

23     but I think we -- we share our concern about the well-being and how to

24     best to accommodate witnesses and that's -- the Chamber appreciates that

25     both parties are always very much attentive to that.

Page 4404

 1             We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow, Friday, the

 2     2nd of November, at 9.30 in this same courtroom, I.

 3                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 2nd day of

 5                           November, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.