1 Thursday, 1 November 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
8 This is the case IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 The Chamber was informed that the parties may have some
12 Mr. Groome.
13 MR. GROOME: Good morning, Your Honours.
14 Just briefly. Yesterday I mentioned a Rule 70 document which we
15 had not had clearance to disclose. Late last evening we did receive an
16 e-mail giving us permission. The official correspondence hasn't come,
17 but on that basis we are authorised to disclose it. We've done that. We
18 will have printed copies made prior to it being uploaded into e-court
19 should Defence counsel wish to use it with the witness.
20 The only thing that remains, Your Honour, the Prosecution would
21 request the Chamber to instruct the witness. The witness had been told
22 that there was no permission yet to discuss this document. But would the
23 Chamber please advise the witness that the document that he was told not
24 to mention that clearance has been given and if asked questions about it,
25 he is free to answer.
1 And one qualification, that the right to use and permission to
2 use it is condition that it be done in private session.
3 Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you Mr. Groome.
5 If I address the witness in relation to this, perhaps I could do
6 that best in private session anyhow. That would be better.
7 Any preliminaries from the Defence or not?
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
9 We had slight miscommunication with the Detention Unit this
10 morning. There are some medical doctors who were scheduled to examine
11 Mr. Mladic, and we ask the Detention Unit not to send him to the court
12 this morning, but, unfortunately, there was probably some
13 miscommunication and Mr. Mladic is with us this morning. And we would
14 ask Your Honours kindly to ask Mr. Mladic to give his waiver and leave
15 the courtroom as soon as possible so that the doctors can continue their
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you can take instructions on behalf of
20 Mr. Mladic, and if he wishes to waive his right, you can [Overlapping
21 speakers] ...
22 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: And, please, if you consult with Mr. Mladic make
24 clear that, of course, he is entitled to attend the hearings.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, I have a clear instruction from
2 Mr. Mladic that he is waiving his right to be present today and tomorrow.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then Mr. Mladic can be escorted out of the
4 courtroom. I do not know how quickly transportation to the UNDU can be
5 organised because that is in the hands of Registry together with the
6 transport services of the Dutch authorities.
7 MR. LUKIC: And I will also kindly ask your permission to leave
8 the courtroom because I have to organise a visit again.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic is still there as co-counsel.
12 Well, further conversations can be done outside of the courtroom.
13 [The accused withdrew]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hochhauser, are you ready to continue your
15 examination? I will ask that the witness could be escorted into the
17 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes, Your Honour, we're ready to proceed.
18 Actually, as the witness is being brought in, if I could ask --
19 I'd like to start with P429 on the -- up on the monitor.
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Mole. Please be seated.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, I'd like to remind you that you're still
24 bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your
25 testimony yesterday.
1 WITNESS: RICHARD MOLE [Resumed]
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: And I'd like to move briefly into private session.
4 [Private session]
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
22 Ms. Hochhauser will now continue her examination.
23 Please proceed.
24 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Examination by Ms. Hochhauser: [Continued]
1 Q. Good morning, Colonel Mole.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. We left off yesterday discussing the difference between an
4 observation post and a weapons monitoring site and I think we sort of
5 stopped mid-answer due to a translation problem. So can you tell us just
6 briefly what is an observation post?
7 A. An observation post was utilised so that we could gather
8 information throughout the Sarajevo area, but it was very specifically
9 orientated towards the Papa side. As I was explaining yesterday, there
10 were less weapons for us to monitor in -- on Papa side, and, as a
11 consequence, we had manpower available for us to use within the city, to
12 observe the city, rather than to monitor the weapons, and I think, as I
13 mentioned yesterday, the weapon monitoring was mostly occurring on the
14 Lima side. So we set up a number of observe posts which actually had
15 been arranged before I came to Sarajevo, and I adjusted some of them
16 during the course of my tour, but the aim was for those observation posts
17 to be on high ground, which, necessarily, placed them quite close to the
18 front line so that they could observe the whole of the city.
19 Q. Now, if we could view for a moment, please, Exhibit P429, which
20 is referenced in paragraph 14 of your statement.
21 Now, the -- the triangle -- sorry, is it up on your screen?
22 A. There's a map on the screen if that's what you mean.
23 Q. Yes. And the triangles that we see up on this map which are
24 designated with either an L and a number or a P and a number, do those
25 reflect only the observation posts or also the weapons monitoring sites?
1 A. It's both.
2 Q. And does this actually reflect where those were located during
3 your time in Sarajevo?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now yesterday we discussed the standardised form used to collect
6 the information from both of those types of sites. If we could look for
7 a moment, please, at Exhibit P427.
8 And do you see that on your monitor now?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. Okay. P427 is marked on the top, designated on top as an increp
11 from the 3rd December 1992, and is this an example of the standardised
12 form that you were discussing in your statement and yesterday?
13 A. It is.
14 Q. Now, if you could just briefly illustrate for the Chamber what
15 information you were recording and how by going through the columns. And
16 so I'm going to ask you first, this P5/1 in the first column on the left
17 of the document, labelled serial what is that -- what -- what information
18 is recorded there?
19 A. P5 relates to where the observation was taken from, in this case
20 observation point Papa 5. The slash follows and then the incident number
21 is indicated by the next number.
22 Q. And just with again with reference to the prior exhibit that we
23 saw, P429, Papa 5 would have been designated on that map with a triangle
25 A. Absolutely.
1 Q. Now, I think the date is the self-explanatory and the time. Can
2 you tell us what is recorded in activity details?
3 A. That would be as much detail as the observer could place that
4 relates to the type of weapon that was presumed to have fired, where it
5 landed and any other detail, numerics, i.e., how many rounds landed in
6 that particular incident.
7 Q. And so, for an example, just -- if we can take this -- staying
8 with the first entry could you interpret what is said -- what is recorded
9 for us?
10 A. I will do my best but bearing in mind it was other people's
11 hieroglyphics, not mine. But I would guess that's artillery rounds for
12 IRTY; MR would be mortar rounds; AAA would be anti-aircraft weapon; and
13 5, I think that's got a squiggle there that says "tank." So that would
14 be five tank rounds.
15 Q. And you said you are deciphering other people's hieroglyphics.
16 Back when you were in Sarajevo, were you looking at these reports?
17 A. No. They would interpret those in a much more co-ordinated
18 fashion when they were sent through to me.
19 Q. But is this an example of the -- of the type of form on which
20 they were recording them?
21 A. Yes, it's the base document that recording was made.
22 Q. Now - thank you - moving over to the remarks column -- I'm sorry
23 to the source of information column, which is the next column. Can you
24 tell us what that records?
25 A. Yes, para 5 would be the source or the presumed source of the
1 incident which occurred in the previous paragraph.
2 Q. Okay. Now, you've used the word -- you just used the word
3 "presumed" and I think in your previous answer you also used the word
4 "presumed" in describing the presumed type of artillery or type of
5 weaponry. Can you tell us was there a standard that was dictated by you
6 to the UNMOs that had to be met before they would record something on a
7 form like this?
8 JUDGE ORIE: The court reporters asks for short breaks between
9 question and answer an answer and question.
10 Please proceed.
11 THE WITNESS: Could you just ask that question again.
12 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Sorry. I'm sorry, I'll rephrase it.
13 Q. Before one of your UN MOs would -- would record a round, can you
14 tell us was there a protocol for what -- what standard of information
15 they had to have in order to record it as a round observed?
16 A. All UNMOs when they came into our sector were introduced to these
17 forms and instructed on how to fill them out, so that was a universal
18 training element for all UNMOs whether they be Lima or Papa side. Part
19 of that training would have been what you've just asked. They had to see
20 the impact of the round, and then they had to make an assessment as to
21 what the round was from what weapon it came, and, if possible, give an
22 indication of where that round came from.
23 Q. And so when it says UNMO seen, is that an indication that the
24 recording UNMO actually observed the round landing?
25 A. Absolutely.
1 Q. And in remarks where it says area Otes or Ilidza is that where --
2 what is that?
3 A. Yes, that would be the area from -- of the source of the rounds
4 which they've observed and the figures after that would be the
5 four-figure grid reference.
6 Q. Okay. And can we see briefly the second page of this document,
7 please. And can you explain to the Court what it is that we're looking
8 at here?
9 A. What we see here is the obverse of the form that you've just been
10 looking at. The particular date of that particular form was during the
11 Otes conflict, which you see Otes mentioned a number of times on the
12 form, on both sides. But the conflict was so intense that quite clearly
13 the form was not fit for purpose, and so they had to turn over and
14 continue the recording.
15 So what you see are groups of five rounds and then the totals at
16 the end of each.
17 Q. Now, Colonel, you had an opportunity to review the
18 Senior Military Observer's end-of-month of reports for October, November,
19 and December 1992, which are now in evidence respectively as
20 Exhibits P424, 425, and 426.
21 In addition to the information recorded on forms such as the one
22 that's on the monitor, can you tell the Chamber, were there other sources
23 of information that you used in compiling these end -- the end-of-month
25 A. The end-of-month report was an assimilation of a considerable
1 amount of detail which came to us from multiple sources. Before I went
2 to Sarajevo, I was fortunately exposed to a number of different areas
3 within the theatre, and hopefully after this brief explanation it will
4 make sense to answer your question.
5 But I was in the UN protected area east operating from Erdut. I
6 was the chief operations officer for all of the UNMO group. That allowed
7 me to take information from reports such as you're asking me about from
8 the Senior Military Observers in all UN protected areas and to assimilate
9 and interpret them. I visited all the UN protected areas and, as well as
10 that, I went to Bihac.
11 After that was when I was posted to Sarajevo, and as a
12 consequence I feel that I was well rounded in the information available
13 to me within the theatre. Now I've explained that, you'll see that the
14 end-of-month report that I was submitting was just but one of a sequence
15 of reports that would come from all UN protected areas. And it was a
16 two-way process. So once that information went to Zagreb to the
17 Chief Military Observer, a co-ordinated report was then sent back out to
18 all the Senior Military Observers as to what was going on elsewhere in
20 There were other agencies within Sarajevo. The Red Cross weren't
21 there for very long. UNHCR, three battalions, of course, of UNPROFOR.
22 And, primarily, my operations room was adjacent to and worked closely
23 with the operations room belonging to the sector headquarters with whom I
24 worked. They, too, had sources of information which came from multiple
1 Where did we share this information? We shared it daily at an
2 O Group operations meeting in the morning. There may be one in the
3 afternoon when all elements of UNPROFOR at the PTT building came
4 together, shared their knowledge, and looked to the future.
5 Q. Now, Colonel, I'm going to diverge from the route I was on for a
6 moment and ask you as a follow-up to that question or that answer did
7 you, all of the sources of information that you've just told us about and
8 the sharing of information, were you able -- did you use that information
9 in order to analyse and -- analyse what was happening in Sarajevo and
10 determine what your next steps would be there, and, if so, can you tell
11 us what the result of that was?
12 A. Indeed. The point of sharing the information was to give myself
13 and my UNMOs the best opportunity to achieve the tasks which I was
14 setting them or which I was set by the Chief Military Observer or,
15 indeed, the Sector Commander. So I needed to interpret events throughout
16 the theatre, to see if they were going to have any direct effect on
17 Sarajevo as a sector.
18 Q. Okay. And when you say "throughout the theatre," can you define
19 what your -- what that means?
20 A. The theatre, to me, would be all the UN protected areas both on
21 the edge of Bosnia, within Bosnia, Bihac, all UN protected areas.
22 Q. And did you find -- did you find that events throughout all of
23 the other protected areas had a direct effect on Sarajevo?
24 A. Absolutely. Part of my analysis was a military one. I applied
25 what knowledge I had from 24 years service in my military to interpret
1 what was going on around me to people who haven't experienced such as a
2 siege of a city. It all looks somewhat chaotic. But there was structure
3 there, and it was that structure I was trying to interpret using the data
4 which we're talking about.
5 So, for example, when I was not in Sarajevo but the
6 Chief Operations Officer, I was aware of the pressure point of Brcko. It
7 was significant for both sides, and I won't go into the detail about
8 that, other than to say that if a threat to such a sensitive area of
9 Bosnia was perceived by, for example, the Serb side throughout the
10 theatre, there was often a retaliation, or we would expect a retaliation
11 in Sarajevo. And it was not accidental because my other experience of
12 having relationships with Colonel Galic, later General Galic, was such
13 that I had been told that there will be responses in Sarajevo should
14 things not go according to their plans elsewhere within the theatre.
15 So there was a marked relationship between events in the theatre
16 and those that we experienced in the city.
17 Q. And Colonel you discuss this somewhat also in your statement.
18 And in your statement at paragraphs 35 to 36 you say that:
19 "The Serbs risked more by trying to take Sarajevo militarily than
20 the possible advantages gained by doing so. The position they were
21 already in allowed them to achieve their political aims. They could do
22 this by applying pressure to the city to achieve their aims elsewhere."
23 When you say "applying pressure," in that context, what is it
24 that you observed?
25 A. Firstly, the city, as you will be aware, was in a siege
1 condition. The front line was about 65 kilometres right round the city,
2 so militarily it was encircled. And in my statements I have expressed
3 that the Serb side were weapons-heavy, i.e., they had heavy weapons and
4 they were light on artillery -- on infantry, I'm sorry. The best way for
5 them to respond - bearing in mind that to attempt to take any part of a
6 city in an urban conflict is an infantry-orientated operation, and I've
7 just said to you that they were not very strong with infantry - would be
8 to respond with their heavy weapons. That, we noticed, by virtue of the
9 increased activity of increps, which we've discussed already, within the
10 city, as a result, and after events elsewhere within the theatre.
11 Q. [Microphone not activated] And so, when you say -- thank you.
12 When you say:
13 "As a result and after events elsewhere within the theatre --
14 within the theatre," are you talking about fire into the city that was
15 not responsive to any fire at Serb positions?
16 A. That begs another question which is to determine whether any
17 particular round or any particular fire mission had a military objective
18 or not.
19 I've explained the surrounding front line round the city, and you
20 would expect military activity within that zone. You would expect that
21 with heavy weapons, the Serbs on Lima side would have the opportunity and
22 the capability to target military objectives within the city.
23 If you do that as a commander of artillery pieces, accepting it's
24 an indirect fire weapon, it's an area weapon, it's not hugely accurate,
25 but you can lay down a fire mission which is concentrated. And that
1 would be the natural response to a military target.
2 So, when you look at the shelling in Sarajevo, we then need to
3 decide what all the other rounds were that were impacting on the city.
4 It is that element, the element which it is difficult to determine that
5 there was a military target which had preempted that action that we would
6 call indiscriminate. Because we know that the Serb side had the
7 capability of creating an effective fire mission on a very concentrated
8 part of the city because the exhibit that's still up in front of me of
9 Papa 5, the increp, indicates exactly that: An effective fire mission
10 from a number of weapon sites.
11 Q. Colonel, I'm going to interrupt you there for a second. First of
12 all, can you tell us what -- what is the definition that you're using for
13 "fire mission," and then after that can you also -- can you tell us how
14 you know that they were capable of doing it, an effective fire mission?
15 A. The document we see in front of us are the effects of a fire
16 missions, but if you go to the other end, and that is, say, the weapons
17 site, the gun placement, the commander would be given instructions as to
18 what target he had, how many rounds he would be expected to support his
19 commander with, and he would have a range map, and he would know
20 precisely what his target was. He would make up his own fire plan from
21 the request from his commander. And bearing in mind his own capability
22 and the range of his weapon and the amount of ammunition he has, he would
23 make his plan up based on that information that he had been given and
24 instructed to execute.
25 Does that answer the question on the fire plan?
1 Q. I think it answers the question on the fire mission. When you
2 said that you could see from the increp that's still on the screen
3 that -- that the Serb forces around Sarajevo were capable of doing an
4 effective fire mission, targeted mission, can you tell us what is it
5 that's in this increp that tells you that?
6 A. We've got a mixture of weapons which were annotated in the
7 incidents on the other side of this piece of paper, which indicates that
8 the rounds came from a number of different weapon sites, but they all
9 impacted in the same place. So that shows the effectiveness of a fire
10 plan co-ordinated beyond the weapon sites, up the chain of command.
11 Q. Now, in paragraph 22 of your amalgamated statement of P421, you
12 describe how you encouraged the UNMOs under your command to develop a
13 relationship with the local commanders. And you conclude that
14 paragraph by noting:
15 "Sometimes the mere fact that they would ask what the battery
16 commander was doing would result in a reduced level of engagement."
17 Can you explain what you mean by that, in light of what we've
18 just been talking about?
19 A. I would like to extricate my response here from what we were
20 talking about, because where specifically we're talking about a fire
21 mission, that required co-ordination and instruction from up the chain of
22 command. That element of the statement which you've just read out was
23 directed more at the following situation.
24 The UN Military Observers on Lima side were on gun-sites, and the
25 gun-sites were not always employed in fire missions; but every now and
1 again, the weapons would be fired. So it would be irrelevant and
2 unseemly for an UN Military Observer, in a well-organised fire mission,
3 to approach the commander of the weapons. And he would know that. He
4 would be appreciative of the fact that it was part of a larger operation.
5 But if just his weapon site was being employed and rounds were fired from
6 the weapons that he was monitoring, he would talk to the gun commanders.
7 He would ask to see the range map. He would ask what the targets were,
8 the perceived targets were, where that information had come from, and
9 what they were intending to achieve by firing their weapons.
10 You can imagine that if anybody from this court just walked up to
11 talk to a local commander and ask him those questions without a
12 relationship he would probably be marched off the site. The point was
13 the UN Military Observers had built up a sort of relationship with these
14 commanders. In my statements from before, I explained that I tried to
15 stop a frequent movement of UN Military Observers on rotation because it
16 broke that important link with local commanders.
17 Does that answer the question?
18 Q. Well, what I'd like to know is -- what I'd like to know is
19 focussing on this -- the latter part of the statement, when it -- when
20 you say that fostering these relations resulted in a reduced level of
21 engagement, and so I'd like to know if can you explain to the Chamber how
22 is that that it resulted in a reduced level of engagement? What was it
23 that your UNMOs were finding when they engaged with these commanders?
24 A. The effect of that relationship and the effect of the discussion
25 which you would engage in as a UN Military Observer on a weapons site
1 would be to elicit the information which I have already described.
2 Now, sometimes some of the answers that were received were not
3 particularly militarily orientated, and I have in my statements before
4 expressed my personal experience on a gun-site when I've asked why the
5 weapons were being fired, and on one occasion at a mortar site I was
6 instructed that the barrels were being warmed --
7 Q. Sir, I'm sorry. I'm just going to interrupt you for one second
8 again, because the Chamber is in possession of your statement, and so --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could I see whether I can cut this short. Let me
10 first see whether I understood your question well and then to see whether
11 from what you told us, Mr. Mole, whether I understood, more or less, your
13 Was it the case that when there was intense firing, or whatever,
14 that because your observers knew meanwhile those on the firing positions
15 that they would say, Hey, what are you doing? And that, as a result of
16 that, that the intensity of the fire or the direction of the fire would
17 be less. Is that more or less what you wanted to tell us?
18 THE WITNESS: It would be affected that way but there are
19 conditions to that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but just -- I think you were trying to find
21 out, Ms. Hochhauser, what the gist of the answer was.
22 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes. And I was also just going to point the
23 Chamber, I think, to paragraph 80 of the witness's statement in which I
24 think that you write about the story that you were -- it contains the
25 story I think you were just going to tell us about the warming of the
1 barrels. So we can move on to a different topic.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You said it was conditioned, Mr. Mole. If you can
3 explain that in one or two lines, you're invited to do so.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
5 MS. HOCHHAUSER:
6 Q. If -- do you want to explain it in one or two lines or ...
7 A. I think from what I've heard that the statement covers it.
8 Q. Okay. So I'm now going to move on to a different document,
10 MS. HOCHHAUSER: If I could have 65 ter 2353 on the monitor. And
11 specifically starting at e-court page 9 in the English, which I believe
12 is the middle of e-court page 13 in the B/C/S.
13 Q. Now, Colonel, you had the opportunity to read the statement of
14 Radovan Karadzic regarding the fifth strategic objective which begins in
15 the last two sentences of e-court page 9 in the English and continues
16 through the end of the first full paragraph on e-court page 10 prior to
17 coming to court today; is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And I'll ask if -- once we've had the opportunity to read those
20 last two sentences, if we can just move to page 10 in the English. Once
21 you've had an opportunity to review it again, just let me know and I'll
22 ask the next question.
23 A. Thank you.
24 Q. Now, at paragraphs 35 to 36 of your statement, you discuss what
25 you labelled as a policy of containment in Sarajevo and what you observed
1 about that policy of containment during your time there. In light of
2 that, I'd like to ask for your comment on the portion of 65 ter 2353 in
3 which Radovan Karadzic says:
4 "In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps the fighting away
5 from the Krajina far from the Semberija, far from the Drina, far away
6 from all those areas where we could possibly have conflicts with
8 I'd like to ask for your comment based on your own observations
9 and experience in Sarajevo.
10 A. My statements about the containment of Sarajevo were originally
11 formalised by understanding the military situations within the city and
12 around it in my first two months there. I've already indicated that
13 events elsewhere in Bosnia would have an effect on Sarajevo. I had never
14 seen this document before, but it is really interesting that I had come
15 to the conclusions that I had and to see it confirmed like this - I think
16 this is an assembly document - was, to me, quite a revelation and fitted
17 in with what I've already described to you by virtue of travelling around
18 the UN protected areas. The major impact of the war had left those UN
19 protected areas and were now concentrated around Sarajevo.
20 So this document confirmed everything that I had determined for
21 myself by the various sources I described and my experience in Sarajevo.
22 Q. Now, Colonel Mole, did you ever encounter Mr. Mladic during your
23 time in Sarajevo?
24 A. We had imposed upon us an organisation called the mixed military
25 working group. It meet frequently from, I think, the
1 5th of November, 1992, was the first one that I recall, and it met
2 frequently but not regularly for the next two months. It would be within
3 that meeting that I met General Mladic, yes.
4 Q. And just briefly, the purpose of those mixed military working
5 groups was what?
6 A. Can I explain that we had a sector headquarters within Bosnia,
7 but we also had the second-in-command of UNPROFOR was General Morillon,
8 and he was tasked with setting up BiH command, i.e., UNPROFOR command not
9 in Zagreb but nearby in Kiseljak near Sarajevo. It was that
10 headquarters's initiative to have a mixed military working group, the
11 idea being to bring together the various elements, the combative
12 elements, at a meeting to try and negotiate a cease-fire and a
14 Q. And are you able to tell the Chamber precisely when or how many
15 times Mr. Mladic attended that meeting while you were also there?
16 A. I recall him being there a number of times. I recall we had
17 lunches, but I wouldn't put dates on those events. But I did note that I
18 had in a previous statement mentioned that I had taken a message from
19 General Morillon and handed it to General Mladic.
20 Q. And do you -- if you're able to, do you recall when -- when
21 Mr. Mladic would attend those meetings, would he be the sole
22 representative of the VRS there or would Galic be with him or -- if you
24 A. That element changed significantly with each meeting. We set up
25 a -- a working group where the principals were not present but staff
1 officers were, or within the aegis of the mixed military working group.
2 So sometimes he would be there. Sometimes General Gvero would be there
3 representing that side. Sometimes Galic would be there. And it was a
4 very variable feast. Sometimes, of course, some people couldn't get
5 there by virtue of military activity.
6 Q. Now at paragraph 58 of your statement which is page 14 in e-court
7 you state that the SRK's ability, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps's ability
8 to communicate with elements outside the corps which you observed
9 indicated that the corps itself was under command. Drawing your
10 attention to that statement I would like to ask you if you made any such
11 observations about the command structure over the
12 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
13 A. I visited the operations room in the barracks with General Galic
14 and was able to view that and saw all the components that I would expect
15 of a headquarters which allowed communication, both to subunits and
16 elsewhere, within the theatre.
17 Did what General Galic do and what happened around Sarajevo with
18 the Romanija Corps, was it affected by what went on elsewhere? Well, it
19 must do. I'm going to have to ask you now precisely what the question
20 is, because, otherwise, depends where I'm going with the explanation.
21 Are you saying -- are you asking me, did I physically see or do something
22 to make me understand that there was -- the Romanija Corps was under
24 Q. Well, what I'm asking is: Based on your own personal
25 observations based on anything General Galic or anybody else in that
1 command said to you, and also your observations of how the command was
3 A. Understood. So I've already described how I saw Sarajevo and the
4 Romanija Corps operating within the context of the theatre of Bosnia, and
5 it was obvious to me that there would be limitations and, indeed,
6 instructions passed to General Galic as to how he would achieve his
7 objective because he wasn't working alone. We know that because I've
8 already described that events elsewhere in Bosnia impacted seriously upon
9 the city, and that sort of information flow had to come from somewhere
10 else, and it's natural it would come through the chain of command. But
11 from my own personal experience as a logistician what ammunition,
12 manpower, weapons, and so on, were allocated to the task for Sarajevo for
13 the Romanija Corps would be just part of what the overall operation was
14 and cannot be separated from the overall operation within Bosnia.
15 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honour, would now be the right time for a
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me say something about these breaks. We
18 have these short sessions and short breaks mainly because that was the
19 wish of Mr. Mladic. Therefore we either could take the break now and
20 follow the usual schedule. We also could continue for a while.
21 But I'm also addressing the witness. Mr. Mole, it may be that
22 you prefer to have a break now. Then we'll take that break as well. But
23 if at any other point in time you would think it would be better for you
24 to have a break, don't hesitate to address me.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I have no preference, Your Honour. It is
3 entirely up to the Court.
4 JUDGE ORIE: You have no preference.
5 MR. IVETIC: We're at Your Honours' pleasure.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then I suggest that we follow the usual
7 procedure and take the break now and stick to the short breaks.
8 We'll take a break of 20 minutes.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
13 Ms. Hochhauser, as far as time is concerned, your estimate was
14 one hour and 15 minutes.
15 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes, Your Honour. It has become clear I think
16 that I will need a little more time than that. I don't think that will
17 affect our schedule for the week since we're down a witness. I hope to
18 be done in 15 minutes. I hope to use an additional 15 minutes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And we are at this moment at one hour and
20 15 minutes.
21 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Right, so 15 to 20 minutes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, so then I expect you -- yes, perhaps the more
23 focussed your questions are, the more focused answers you can expect.
24 And if the witness nevertheless delves in various directions, it's up to
25 you to get him back on the right track.
1 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes. Thank you.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, Ms. Hochhauser will now continue her
4 examination. May I invite you to focus very much on the very precise
5 answers [sic] she'll ask you.
6 THE WITNESS: I'll do my best, sir.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 Please proceed, Ms. Hochhauser.
9 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. In your last answer, Colonel Mole, you began to talk about
11 logistics, such as ammunition and manpower, weapons. And I would ask you
12 to please to take a look if we could have 65 ter 28456.
13 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Although, actually, it comes to mind,
14 Your Honours, that we've now come to the first of the two documents which
15 the Prosecution in its motion sought to -- sought leave to add to the
16 65 ter exhibit list.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MS. HOCHHAUSER: So I raise that with you now.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, any specific objections on this specific
20 document? I mean, not the -- what you have already submitted in writing,
21 but any specifics on this document?
22 MR. IVETIC: I think apart from what we've submitted in writing,
23 we don't have anything further to say as to this specific document. At
24 this point in time, we'll see what the answers to the questions that are
25 asked and if the witness is appropriate for entering this document into
1 the evidence.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll -- adding to the 65 ter list is not --
4 is -- consent is given by the Chamber. Let's then hear what questions
5 you have and whether it causes any problems to the Defence.
6 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 Q. So, Colonel, looking at 65 ter 28456, this is a 26 November order
8 for further activities, signed by Stanislav Galic. You had the
9 opportunity to review this document before today; is that right?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. And does this document also address the time-period of the Otes
12 offensive that you have been telling us about or you touched upon in your
14 A. Yes, it just precedes that.
15 Q. Now, can you tell us, does this document comport with the
16 activities of the RSK -- SRK - excuse me - that you observed during the
17 time that you were in Sarajevo?
18 A. The document I think explains what we knew as Operation Envelope
19 which was a response by the Serb side to military activities on the
20 Presidency side.
21 Q. And can you -- turning to paragraph 13 which is in e-court
22 page -- sorry. Have I written it here as 23. Is that -- could that be
24 Yes, and I apologise to counsel. I actually did not note the
25 B/C/S page, corresponding page, entitled -- words logistical support.
1 Can you relate what is in that portion of the document about logistical
2 support to what you were just telling us about logistics in your own
3 observations of the SRK and control over the SRK in Sarajevo?
4 A. When I first saw this document, it linked well with my
5 understanding of logistics, being that I was a logistics officer.
6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was but part of the army command in Bosnia on the
7 Serb side. So any army commander would obviously have limitations to his
8 theatre of operations, based on available manpower, weapons, and
9 ammunition, primarily.
10 As I say, Romanija Corps was just part of the overall army
11 command, so the balance of how much logistics support was given to
12 Romanija Corps in relation to other units competing for finite resources
13 within the military in Bosnia, this document accords to that process.
14 Q. And specifically in terms of what you observed at the functioning
15 of the Romanija Corps while you were there can you tell us what your --
16 what your thoughts are about this 50 per cent expenditure rate that we
17 see there for ammunition.
18 A. It indicates that the local commander has operational freedom for
19 50 per cent of the held ammunition, for example. And, therefore, he has
20 considerable latitude to do with that as he will. But principally here,
21 the other 50 per cent is not within the local commander's gift.
22 Q. Okay. And the operational freedom is that given from -- given
23 from whom?
24 A. Yes, that would be given from the army headquarters, staff
25 officers, I assume, working on behalf of the commander.
1 Q. Now, at -- excuse me, sorry.
2 MS. HOCHHAUSER: So, Your Honours, I would just ask to mark this
3 for identification at this point, this document. I don't want ask to
4 tender it given the length of the document and the small portion of which
5 the witness has commented on.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you want then to later -- is it because
7 you have not quoted any part of it. You just -- I mean, for those who
8 read the transcript later, it will be unclear exactly what the document
9 said, which the witness had looked at before.
10 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Sorry, let me clear that up.
11 The document that we are referring to is the 26 November order
12 for further activities signed by Stanislav --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's not the problem.
14 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Sorry.
15 JUDGE ORIE: It's about content. I mean, you asked the witness
16 to comment on something without the portion having been read and if you
17 don't tender it then there will be a big puzzle for those who later read
18 the transcript.
19 Now, what is your intention not to tender it at all? That would
20 create this problem. Or do you intend to tender at a later stage a
21 smaller portion of this document?
22 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Actually, Your Honour, I'm sorry. I'll actually
23 tender the whole document at this stage.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
25 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, I believe that the parts that
1 the witness has testified about rightly do become part of the record. I
2 don't actually even know what's in the entirety of the 23 pages here, but
3 I don't think that the witness can authenticate or provide us with the
4 information on that so ...
5 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have it marked for identification and the
6 parties are invited to sit together to see what is the relevant portion,
7 and if at any other point in time we would need the entire document then,
8 of course, the parties could exchange views on that and see whether there
9 would be an objection at this moment to have the whole of the document
10 admitted into evidence --
11 MS. HOCHHAUSER: And --
12 JUDGE ORIE: The importance of that would be that we do not have
13 one document page 7, three lines here in evidence, page 10 somewhere else
14 in evidence. So if you could sit together and see whether you could
15 reach agreement on what and how we should admit this document into
17 It will be marked for identification.
18 Madam Registrar, the number would be ...
19 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28456 will receive number P430, MFI'd,
20 Your Honours.
21 MS. HOCHHAUSER: And --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think you have not yet tendered the previous
23 document which that was 02353. That was the session -- and that's also a
24 very long document so I also wonder how to deal with that document. But
25 you used only a very small portion of it.
1 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes, Your Honours, I would -- I would tender
2 that document as well. We can, of course, handle that will the same
3 way --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then it will be marked for identification for the
5 time being.
6 Madam Registrar, the number would be ...
7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 2353 becomes Exhibit P431, MFI'd,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could the Chamber hear from the parties not
10 later than tomorrow close of business.
11 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes, and also to just address the hole in the
12 record that Your Honour correctly pointed out to me, in case the document
13 doesn't come in, I would like to read the first paragraph of the -- that
14 I was referring to that I asked the witness about, which is under
15 logistic support. I had referred the witness to the paragraph that
17 "The approved ammunition expenditure and fuel consumption per
18 unit is a maximum of 50 per cent of the quantity originally found in the
19 units. The units must make sure that the remaining 50 per cent is not
20 spent and will be kept solely as precious reserve."
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, at least the portion you have drawn the
22 attention of the witness to is now on the record.
23 Yes, Ms. Hochhauser, you said you would like to do that and
24 instead of waiting for the Chamber to do say --
25 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I'm sorry.
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- that this is the appropriate way of proceeding,
2 you did it --
3 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I apologise.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- just as before when you said, I need another 15
5 minutes. You didn't ask for another 15 minutes but you said you needed
6 another 15 minutes. I will not make a drama out of it, but that's good
7 manners in the courtroom.
8 Then it has been read into the record. Please proceed.
9 MS. HOCHHAUSER: If we could please have 65 ter 11354 on the
11 Q. And this is the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document number 10/74695
12 a regular combat report signed by Stanislav Galic, dated the 2nd December
14 And, sir, have you had an opportunity to look at this document
15 prior to coming to court today?
16 A. Yes, I have. Thank you.
17 Q. And again, does this document reflect what you observed at that
18 time in Sarajevo and particularly in the advancement of the Otes
19 offensive as of the date of the document?
20 A. Yes. I can see down to paragraph 4, and that's correct.
21 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Perhaps if -- thank you. We can see the whole
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, yes.
24 MS. HOCHHAUSER:
25 Q. And, sir, can you comment on this document in terms of the
1 logistics and command and control observations that we've been
3 A. The operation on Otes would not be one that was decided upon by a
4 local commander because, as I've already suggested, resources were
5 limited throughout theatre and the army commander would obviously
6 allocate resources where he wanted them to be allocated. So the
7 operation was done under the instruction of the army command.
8 Q. Okay. And just to be clear, the army command at what level?
9 A. The commander of the army, General Mladic, I would assume, would
10 sanction the operation.
11 Q. And in terms of logistics, is there anything remarkable to you
12 even in the sentence that refers to the winter gear provided?
13 A. It links back to what I was referring to shortly a few moments
14 ago, relating to ammunition, trained manpower, weapons, and it includes,
15 obviously, rations, winter gear, and they would be a theatre resource.
16 They wouldn't be a resource which an individual commander could
17 necessarily deal with. He would be making requests upon the army command
18 for those items.
19 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours, if I might I'd like to tender this
20 document at this time.
21 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Document 11354 becomes Exhibit P432,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
1 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Okay. And, Your Honours, we come to the second
2 of the two documents that were subject of the motion to add, which is
3 65 ter -- what we've assigned, pending your permission, 65 ter 28457.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Leave is granted to add it to your 65 ter
5 list. We'll decide on admission once we've dealt with it.
6 MS. HOCHHAUSER: And if we could see that document, please, on
7 the screen.
8 Q. And, Colonel, this is a document dated 4 December 1992, also from
9 the SRK command. And I have the same question for you as to this
10 document that I had for the previous two, which is: Can you comment on
11 it in terms whether it comports with what you saw during that time in
12 Sarajevo, as well as with what you observed the command and control with
13 regard to the SRK? And, I'm sorry, and specifically with logistics.
14 A. Paragraph 6 is clearly a demand for combat rations. The army
15 land forces are being requested. And it supports what I said a few
16 moments ago, that requests for logistical support are coming through the
17 chain of command.
18 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours, I would tender this document at
19 this time.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Any further specifics, Mr. --
21 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28457 becomes Exhibit P433,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
1 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Thank you.
2 Q. And, sir, Colonel, if you can tell us also of your observations
3 and interactions with the individual commanders on the ground in Sarajevo
4 during the time you were there. Did you see that they were, in fact,
5 supplied by the command?
6 A. In previous statements, I have indicated that I saw resupply on
7 many of the gun-sites on Lima side. I mentioned that I had seen
8 stockpiles of ammunition at the weapon sites. I connect that to the
9 operation at Otes that we've been discussing, and the demands upon, for
10 example, ammunition would have been intense and would have had to have
11 been requested through the chain of command and certainly was not
12 available to the local commander throughout the remainder of my tour that
13 I saw; i.e., the stocks I saw on a day-to-day basis would have to be
14 enhanced significantly for a fire mission that we watched unfold during
15 the course of the Otes conflict.
16 Q. And, sir, we keep referring back to the Otes conflict I think as
17 an example of an effective fire mission, but the concepts that we've been
18 talking about are applicable also -- are they applicable also during the
19 time-period that there wasn't such a mission occurring in Sarajevo?
20 A. Absolutely. The extraordinary extreme of the Otes one is what
21 captures our attention, but, of course, what one might term as standard
22 resupply happened continually throughout the time I was there.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hochhauser, you earlier indicated 15 to
24 20 minutes. We're at now more than 20 minutes.
25 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Okay. With the Court's permission, I have one
1 last question.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Please put that last question to the witness.
3 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes. Which is about Exhibit P425. If we could
4 see that on the screen, please.
5 Q. And, as it's coming up, I just -- I have a question about this
6 Senior Military Observer's end-of-month report. The one we're looking at
7 is for December but consistently through the end-of-month reports we see
8 that in the daily entries there are discrepancies between the number of
9 rounds recorded as outgoing from a particular side and the number of
10 corresponding rounds recorded as incoming from the other side. And I
11 just -- if you can give us, please, a brief explanation as to what
12 factored into those discrepancies?
13 A. We didn't monitor all the weapons within the range of Sarajevo,
14 only those that were selectively given to us as a result of the airport
15 agreement. So consequently weapons were brought into the theatre -- into
16 the area and used and moved away and there were others that were static
17 in the location but we still didn't monitor those, nor did he have UN
18 Military Observers sufficient to do so.
19 And then there is the fall of shot, i.e., not always do we know
20 what the target is of the weapons that we're not monitoring and we don't
21 know where that fall of shot is. So, yes, there was a discrepancy
22 between the two sets of figures.
23 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours, that concludes my examination.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Hochhauser.
25 Mr. Ivetic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
1 MR. IVETIC: I am, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, you will now be cross-examined by
3 Mr. Ivetic. Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Mladic Defence team.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
6 Q. Good day, Colonel. I'd like to remind you that since we do speak
7 the same language we have to try and ensure a pause between question and
8 answer so as to assist the interpreters and the court reporter in doing
9 their tasks today.
10 A. Thank you.
11 Q. Colonel, prior to your deployment to Sarajevo as SMO on
12 16 September 1992, did you have occasion to receive any instruction or
13 training relative to the military structure or operative rules of either
14 the JNA, the VRS, or the Army of BiH?
15 A. You'll appreciate that it was early in the conflict and the
16 knowledge base for the question you've just asked wasn't good. There was
17 some instruction, but, to be fair, you would have to find out for
18 yourself on your deployment the answer to some of the questions, quite a
19 lot of the questions, that you pose.
20 Q. Fair enough, sir. And you yourself personally had no prior
21 familiarity with either the SFRY or its armed forces; that is to say, you
22 had not studied them as part of your formal education or your military
23 education; is that right?
24 A. We had studied the eastern bloc so there was a significance there
25 relating to weaponry but, of course, each country organises themselves
1 totally differently. And since we were talking about the origin of three
2 components which were new on the world stage, your statement is accurate.
3 Q. Thank you, sir. I'd like to clear up something that you just
4 discussed. For that purpose, I would ask for Exhibit P430 to be called
5 up on e-court. And if we could focus on the first page for the moment
6 and we'll wait for the English to come up.
7 Sir, I would direct your attention to the -- to the sender of the
8 document which is reflected in the upper left corner. Would you agree
9 with me that this is, in fact, an order sent by the command of the
10 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And if you recall, this is the document that has - I believe,
13 page 23 in e-court in the English. I'm not sure of the B/C/S page - but
14 has the selection giving what you said was operational freedom over
15 50 per cent of the stocks of munitions, and I believe that you had
16 identified this as coming from the -- from the Main Staff. Would you
17 agree that if this is an order from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, it would
18 be Commander Galic giving this freedom to his subordinates rather than
19 the Main Staff giving this freedom?
20 A. Within my many statements that I've made in evidence in these
21 courts, I have explained in some detail the equivalent logistic
22 expressions that we used in the British Army, and it's a unit called the
23 daily ammunition expenditure rete. That was an indicator, a planning
24 guide that was imposed upon you as a commander to indicate how much you
25 could hold, how much you would use on a daily basis. You would exceed
1 that if you went into an operation which you were commanded to do. And
2 you would be allocated, maybe, one, two, or more, DAERs to fulfil that
3 obligation. It matters not that this was an instruction downwards in the
4 chain of command. What it indicates is that there is one that is
5 throughout the chain of command. It would be pointless. He was
6 expressing that 50 per cent which is close to a DAER if he wasn't having
7 one imposed upon him.
8 So it's an indicator that there is a chain of command and that
9 this is part of it.
10 Q. Thank you, sir. Would you agree with me that the UNMO mission
11 was not there on the ground to count shells in and out; that is to say,
12 it was not within the remit of the UNMO group to investigate all rounds
13 that were fired, impact areas, nor to assess the rights or wrongs of the
14 conflict on the front lines?
15 A. Just one moment, please, and I'll read that question, if I may.
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. No, that's not correct. What the UNMO mission was there to
18 facilitate, amongst many other aspects, was to find a level of truth as
19 to what was happening so that interpretation of that could be then
20 briefed to the world through the United Nations and the secretariat.
21 So to identify our tasks specifically just to count rounds in and
22 out, is to be extremely simplistic. We were determining the events and
23 interpreting them, and it was a neutral observation as opposed to taking
24 the word of the combatants.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if you would allow me to go back to the
1 previous question because I do not know for sure whether I understood
2 your answer.
3 That was about the chain of command and General Galic giving
4 orders downwards.
5 Did I understand your answer well that you would say it would be
6 pointless to impose such a 50 per cent rule, if I could say so, if not, a
7 similar thing happened in the chain of command above you.
8 THE WITNESS: Exactly, sir. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, then I have understood your rather lengthy
10 answer but --
11 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, but some of them are.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
14 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. If I can follow up on the question that
15 I had asked and the answer that the Colonel had received, if we can call
16 up 1D390 in e-court and it will be the 11th page in e-court.
17 Q. Sir, this is the transcript of your testimony from the Karadzic
18 proceedings, and the selection that I'm calling up is transcript
19 page 5890, 12 to 18, and it was the bases for my question.
20 I'd like to focus on lines 12 through 18 of that transcript. And
21 there, as I understood your answer to the question that was posed by
22 Mr. Karadzic's time was:
23 "The UNMO mission was not there to count shells in and out. It
24 was there to assess situations, provide humanitarian support, and the
25 other tasks that I've already outlined, part of which would be observing
1 the conflict as it developed. It was not within the remit of the UNMO
2 group to investigate all rounds that were fired, impact areas, and so on,
3 nor was it the UNMO's task to assess the rights or wrongs of conflict on
4 the front line."
5 Sir, do you recall this testimony that you gave in the Karadzic
6 proceedings, and do you stand by it?
7 A. Absolutely. It expresses exactly what I am still trying to
8 explain. It is too simplistic to assume that because we're counting
9 shells in and out that we're not doing anything with that information.
10 And that paragraph slightly out of context was an attempt to resolve that
11 disconnect. It wasn't sufficient just to count the rounds in and out.
12 What we were attempting to do was to, as I have explained in that
13 paragraph, interpret it, not assess the rights and wrongs, but give
14 impressions from what -- our observations to the world as to what was
15 going on in Sarajevo.
16 Part of that was to watch what rounds were fired by whom, where,
17 so that we could better answer observations made by the combatants who
18 would make complaint to the UN about what had happened, and we would have
19 a neutral source from whence we could make our decisions.
20 Q. Would you agree with me that in so far as it was not within the
21 remit of the UNMO mission to assess right or wrong, that any assessments
22 that may be considered to do that within your testimony or your
23 statement, that is to say, qualify a shelling as either legitimate or
24 wrongful, must be considered with regard to that caveat that such
25 conclusions were beyond the remit of the UNMO mission that you were there
1 to perform?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hochhauser.
3 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I object to that question. I don't think
4 that -- I don't think -- I think that it's a mixing of terms in terms of
5 right and wrong from one piece of prior testimony and legitimacy and not
6 legitimacy. I think it is phrased in a little bit of an unfair way to
7 the witness and I would ask that it be rephrased.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please rephrase, Mr. Ivetic.
9 MR. IVETIC: Absolutely.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And one of the problems with the previous quote you
11 gave, lines 12 to 18, is that you have not drawn the attention of witness
12 and our attention to the question which preceded that answer. It's
13 impossible, I think, to understand that question without looking at a
14 question, which amounts more to a speech than to a question in which is
15 found in the lines 2 to 9.
16 But please rephrase your question and proceed.
17 MR. IVETIC:
18 Q. Sir, would you agree that any assessments that may be considered
19 as expressing an opinion that artillery fire was right or wrong from your
20 testimony or your statement must be considered with this caveat that this
21 would be -- such determination were beyond the remit of the UNMO mission
22 that you were in Sarajevo to perform?
23 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I'm sorry --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You have rephrased it but the substance is
25 exactly the same.
1 Could you please rephrase it again.
2 MR. IVETIC: Well, I believe, Your Honours, the objection was for
3 me mixing the words right and wrong with legitimate and unlegitimate. So
4 I'm using the exact same words that the witness used in his answer in the
5 Karadzic proceedings. I don't know how other to rephrase it without
6 going away from the testimony of the witness that he just affirmed that
7 it was beyond the remit of the UNMO mission to assess right or wrong.
8 And I'm simply asking whether that is something that should be considered
9 in conjunction with any conclusions in his witness statement or his
10 testimony where he attempts to assert right or wrong to actions of
11 artillery attack or fire mission.
12 THE WITNESS: Could I help here, sir? I'm quite happy to --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although it's not a common way of proceeding,
14 but if you can assist the parties and the Chamber, it might help.
15 THE WITNESS: The statement on the screen is rights or wrongs of
16 conflict on the front line. You are co-joining that expression with
17 whether rounds were targeted or whether they were not. The two are
18 totally separate.
19 When I say the rights and wrongs of the conflict on the front
20 line, I'm not evaluating whether somebody is or isn't right, to react or
21 act in a certain way. But when it comes to rounds landing within an
22 area, we were trying to determine whether they were targeted against
23 military targets, or whether they were not. That is not the same as
24 right and wrong on the front line.
25 MR. IVETIC:
1 Q. Fair enough. Here you also say that it was not within the remit
2 of the UNMO group to investigate all rounds that were fired and impact
3 areas. Would you also agree that you did not have access to any of the
4 target grids or maps or other intel being used by either side to direct
5 their fire?
6 A. Can I take the first part of your question, where you say: Here
7 you also say that it was not within the remit of the UNMO group to
8 investigate all rounds that were fired at impact areas.
9 Now, that is correct. Because one would only investigate in
10 detail if there was an incident of one or two rounds in a day, but we
11 were in a war zone. You have seen from my testimony before what a quiet
12 day, what a normal day and what a busy day was and the number of impacts
13 in the city. So to forensically determine the detail you've just
14 described for all that military activity, I'm not saying it wasn't within
15 our remit. It was not possible to do that. Because you're assuming that
16 we would go to an impact and investigate it in a forensic military police
17 fashion. That definitely was not within our remit.
18 As to the second part of your question that relates to target
19 grids or maps, I'm sorry to say that you're wrong there. I visited the
20 operations rooms of both sides, and in previous testimonies, I have
21 stated that. I asked both sides what they thought the other side was
22 doing to obtain the information that I required.
23 I've also described to you that UNMOs definitely did look at
24 range maps on the gun-sites that they were monitoring.
25 Q. Did any of the range maps that you saw have any improper targets
1 that would not be considered legitimate military targets on them?
2 A. I've just stated that UN Military Observers would look at range
3 maps which were those being used by weapons site commanders. I wasn't a
4 weapons site commander, nor was I an UNMO on a weapons site.
5 Q. If we can look at paragraph 72 of your amalgamated statement,
6 which is P421. And this will be page 17 in the English, page 18 in the
7 B/C/S. And here, as we wait for it, the -- should be the prior page.
8 There we go.
9 And here, sir, you describe efforts to try and identify military
10 installations to try and rationalise your observations and to corroborate
11 or dispute justifications the Serbs provided. You indicate that it was
12 never within the mandate of the UNMO mission to maintain a list of,
13 quote/unquote, "military targets on either side." Would you agree with
14 me that even apart from the mandate, the very ability of the UNMO mission
15 to identify or list military targets was severely limited due to several
16 factors, including the limited personnel and the war conditions in
18 A. I'm not totally sure of your question. Could you repeat the
19 question, please.
20 Q. Sure. Would you agree with me that even apart from the lack of a
21 mandate, the very ability of the UNMO mission to identify or list
22 military targets was limited by the lack of personnel and the war-time
23 conditions in Sarajevo; that is to say that you were prevented from
24 keeping an accurate list of any military targets by these factors?
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Can we split it up? First, whether the witness
2 agrees or not that there were limits in the possibilities to establish
3 military targets. And then the second is what may have been the causes
4 of -- if there are such limits.
5 And then that was the question apparently.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I just wanted to say that as transcribed, the
7 question says "very ability." And I think the question -- what you were
8 saying, Mr. Ivetic, was "variability." So, sir, just so the witness
9 understands the question probably, I think "variability," not "very
11 JUDGE ORIE: Could we seek -- first of all, did you say
12 "variability" or did you say the "very ability?"
13 MR. IVETIC: The very ability.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Very ability. So it's transcribed as you meant it.
15 So the first part of the question or at least a simple question,
16 Mr. Mole, were you limited in establishing what military targets may have
17 been there?
18 THE WITNESS: The section I'll address is the ability of the UNMO
19 mission to identify or list conditions in Sarajevo. You, presumably, are
20 making an assumption that the UNMO mission was in a vacuum but we were
21 part of a sector that had three battalions. We had a sector
22 headquarters, we had the UNMO mission, we had UNHCR, and many other
23 agencies upon which we drew for our information. So, of course, with
24 only 60 officers, I'm not suggesting that it was an easy task. But I
25 think within the context of what I've just said our sources were somewhat
1 greater than those that you give us credit for.
2 Does that answer that part of that question?
3 MR. IVETIC:
4 Q. So are you telling me then that you did have a complete and
5 accurate list of all military targets in an area --
6 JUDGE ORIE: This -- this seems to be a --
7 I'm addressing both you, Mr. Ivetic, and you, Mr. Mole. You are
8 rather indirect in your questions. Mr. Ivetic asked you whether there
9 were limitations in establishing the existence of military targets and to
10 list them. And then apparently hearing in the question that -- and
11 that's, of course, what Mr. Ivetic did, saying short of personnel,
12 et cetera, to be the reasons, and then you start explaining that your
13 sources may not have been as limited as suggested, although not expressed
14 clearly by Mr. Ivetic.
15 Now let me then try to put the question quite simply. Do you
16 allow for the possibility that you may have missed military targets in
17 your observations and on the basis of the information you had received?
18 Or did you have a complete picture.
19 THE WITNESS: We had a fairly understandable picture. It wasn't
20 recorded --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let me say, so it was not a complete picture.
22 THE WITNESS: Of course, not.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's the simple thing we are establishing.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
1 Q. Would you --
2 JUDGE ORIE: By the way, if I could say, your answer therefore is
3 not complete but not too bad. That's more or less --
4 THE WITNESS: Now, if that's the question, yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's the simple language we are using at
6 this moment.
7 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
8 MR. IVETIC:
9 Q. Would you agree, Colonel, that especially the Bosnian Muslim
10 Presidency side had a strong incentive to camouflage and keep hidden its
11 military installations within Sarajevo itself.
12 A. Both sides did that. But I agree with your statement.
13 Q. Thank you. And would you agree in so far as you have highlighted
14 here the concern of the other side from finding out information from UNMO
15 as to locations that the Bosnian Presidency forces had a strong incentive
16 to keep some military sites unknown to the UNMO mission as well?
17 A. Yes. Both sides would do that.
18 Q. And just to finish up, at paragraph 71 and 72 of this amalgamated
19 statement you discuss the issue of military targets and the odd round, I
20 believe, coming in. Would it be important to keep in mind the
21 Bosnian Presidency forces tactic of using mobile mortars mounted on
22 civilian vehicles which could be deployed essentially anywhere within the
23 city which is not discussed in these paragraphs.
24 A. Yes. You must always recall that in my statements I have made
25 specific mention of those issues.
1 Q. And we'll get to that later. Can we also agree that the
2 artillery that we're talking about, the heavy weapons that were in use in
3 and around Sarajevo on both sides of the conflict line were not the
4 high-tech so-called smart artillery used by NATO allies in recent years
5 but rather was the more inferior or average grade conventional weapons?
6 A. Absolutely.
7 Q. Would you agree with me that the accuracy of such older
8 generation artillery weapons as was available in the Sarajevo theatre is
9 generally less than the newer generation artillery?
10 A. That was well understood.
11 Q. Would that include a lesser degree of accuracy which would
12 increase the potential for collateral damage?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Okay. Based on your experience and knowledge within the British
15 armed forces would you agree with me that the -- some NATO countries such
16 as the United States have standard operating procedures to try and ensure
17 there's no more than a 10 per cent chance of non-combatant injury, death
18 or damage from any given military action?
19 A. I wouldn't put a figure on it, but your principle is correct.
20 Q. That's fair enough. Could you tell us if you are familiar with
21 the military term failed positive identification of a target and what
22 that means.
23 A. I wasn't an artillery person myself. It's a term that I've never
25 Q. Fair enough.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Are you familiar with it?
2 THE WITNESS: No.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. IVETIC:
6 Q. Now for those who are unfamiliar with the terminology that you
7 did use, can you briefly explain for us what is a range map or perhaps a
8 firing table, if you're familiar with that term?
9 A. It would be a acetate overlay onto a regular map. It would
10 indicate ranges. It could indicate targets.
11 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to Exhibit P3 on e-court, and it
12 would be page 47 in e-court.
13 Q. And, sir, while we wait for this to come up, I will preface my
14 comments by saying that this has been represented by the Prosecution to
15 be a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps plan for artillery combat, the date of
16 which, unfortunately, is not part of the document. Should be page 47 in
17 e-court. It's page 41 in the book.
18 There we go.
19 Sir, looking at this map would this appear to be the type of a
20 map that you had earlier indicated that you had seen in operations rooms
21 on both -- on either side of the conflict line?
22 A. More so on the Serb side than the Presidency, yes.
23 Q. Okay. And does it appear to have information on it that you
24 would expect to see for a map of this nature; that is, a plan for
25 artillery combat.
1 A. I can't really see much detail, but I understand your question,
2 and, yes, I would expect at a distance that that would be the sort of
4 Q. If we could turn to page 49 which I believe is a close-up of some
5 of the boxes that we cannot see precisely on this page. I think we'll
6 see that this is titled as a firing table when we get to that page. And
7 if we could rotate the -- oh, in the book -- I apologise, it's
8 paragraph -- page 43 in the book.
9 And, sir, if I can direct your attention to these two tables that
10 appear to be for a 122-millimetre Howitzer and a 155-mm Howitzer, and is
11 this the kind of information that you were discussing earlier about
12 identified targets and ranges, et cetera?
13 A. I would expect that that sort of map, that sort of information,
14 to be available to a commander inside an operations room. I can't say
15 that I recall seeing such.
16 Q. We're looking at something now on the screen. I'm asking you
17 about this one that's before us on the screen. Is that the kind of
18 information that you would expect for an artillery fire mission to be
19 available to a commander at which level I don't know, but at some -- at
20 some level of the operation?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. And do you know whether these types of tables were available to
23 your UNMO observers to assist in determining the outgoing shot's intended
25 A. My UNMOs would only tell me information which they saw as
1 pertinent. I don't recall ever seeing any of these tables. I don't
2 recall ever speaking to an UNMO about such tables. My expectation would
3 be that this would be in a headquarters rather than on a weapons site.
4 But I may be wrong.
5 Q. Would it be your expectation that these targets would be
6 identified by such means as observation, intelligence, et cetera, to
7 locate and determine the co-ordinates, the dimensions, et cetera?
8 A. I see this as a determination for that.
9 Q. Okay. Would you agree with me that if there is an error in the
10 identification of targets before they are put on this table for whatever
11 reason that that would cause considerable problems in terms of targeting
12 by those artillery officers following such a table?
13 A. Of course.
14 Q. Okay. Looking at all of the targets listed on this sample that
15 we have before us and the dimension details for the same, would you agree
16 that these are all apparently reasonable military targets?
17 A. I'm sorry, the print is not quite big enough.
18 MR. IVETIC: If we could zoom in on the English version, perhaps
19 that can assist.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The upper or the lower table?
21 MR. IVETIC: Let's do the upper first. Maybe that might be
23 THE WITNESS: All those under target type dimension fulfil what
24 you've just said.
25 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
1 Q. And now if we could look at the second table, the lower table.
2 And, again, I'll ask you for the same comments, sir.
3 A. Yes, I agree.
4 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document. Thank you. If we
5 can call up 65 ter 1D387. And while we wait for this, Colonel, I will
6 give you the heads up that this is a statement which you gave to the
7 Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal in 1997, and the first question
8 I will have for you is, when it comes up, to look at the first page to
9 confirm that in fact that is -- your signature is one of the signatures
10 on this page?
11 A. Yes, that's right.
12 Q. I'd like to now turn to the middle of the 13th page in the
13 English version, which should amount to the bottom of page 11 in the
14 B/C/S version. And, unfortunately, these paragraphs are not numbered,
15 sir, but I would direct your attention to the selection that reads as
17 "My own feeling of the shelling by the Bosnian Serbs was that
18 generally the local commanders did not take much notice of a range map.
19 If they hit Sarajevo ... that was sufficient."
20 First of all, sir, does this accurately reflect the position?
21 And do you still hold that position that the local commanders were at
22 fault for not using a range map?
23 A. There were incidents where what I have stated there are correct.
24 Q. Okay.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at the clock.
1 MR. IVETIC: Oh, I apologise.
2 JUDGE ORIE: We're close to the time for a break.
3 After the break, the first thing I'd like to do is to re-visit
4 one of your previous questions, especially what it means if you ask
5 whether these are reasonable military targets, because that is a rather
6 unclear concept in this context.
7 But we'll do that after the break.
8 We'll take a break and resume at 20 minutes past 12.00.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Recess taken at 11.58 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, I said I would raise a matter after the
16 You were asked, "Looking at all of the targets listed on this
17 sample," and that was the previous document. It was P3. And I know that
18 the hard copy --
19 MR. IVETIC: Page 47 -- page 47 in e-court.
20 JUDGE ORIE: 47 in e-court.
21 MR. IVETIC: 49 in e-court, I think.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes:
23 "Looking at all of the targets listed on the sample that we have
24 before us and the dimension details for the same, would you agree that
25 these are all apparently reasonable military targets?"
1 Now, what did you understand to be a -- because you -- your
2 answer was all those and the target type, dimensions fulfil what you
4 What did you understand to be reasonable targets? Is that the
5 dimensions fit the description or that using a Howitzer 155-millimetre
6 would be a reasonable -- reasonably be used against these kind of
7 targets? Whether the reasonability is depending whether a mortar is an
8 urban area or somewhere outside. I had some difficulties in
9 understanding exactly reasonable military targets are. And I'm also
10 looking at it and sees that sometimes mortars get -- mortars and weapons,
11 and whatever those weapons are, 100 by 100, I take it metres, whereas
12 sometimes for weapons you get 100 by 100 but sometimes -- I'm looking at
13 entry 4, for example, sometimes I see mortars, 200 by 100.
14 What does it exactly mean? What did you agree to in relation to
15 the question put to you by Mr. Ivetic?
16 THE WITNESS: My understanding was the target type was -- were
17 they military targets, and I agreed to that.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you would say a Howitzer is a -- could
19 be -- reasonably would be a military target.
20 THE WITNESS: Absolutely.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the same for weapons. But it doesn't say
22 anything about the appropriateness of using the 150-millimetre Howitzer
23 against these targets irrespective where they are situated. So it was
24 just a Howitzer, seems to be a military target.
25 THE WITNESS: That was my interpretation, and, hence, my answer.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 That's clear to me now.
3 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
4 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. For sake the continuity, if we can
5 return to 1D387, page 13 in the English, and page 11 in the B/C/S.
6 Q. And, Colonel, I believe before the break you had affirmed the
7 quotation from your 1997 statement as still being accurate.
8 If you could help us better understand this section that I read
9 out, that you affirmed, to help us understand it better, would
10 you premise -- would the premise behind this be that the problem wasn't
11 in the orders that were being sent down but rather from the extralisation
12 [sic] of the orders whether by lack of care or ineptness on the part of
13 the local commanders?
14 A. Yes, I understand. Your latter point could well be the case. My
15 point throughout my testimony, however, relates to ammunition
16 expenditure. And as a commander, I would wish to know how my ammunition
17 was being used. So if we take your last point that a local commander
18 wasn't accurate in terms of how much ammunition he fired, he exceeded, if
19 there was limit, if he didn't have specific targets, I, as his commander,
20 would want to know why he is doing what he is doing.
21 Q. Fair enough, sir. I'd like to flush this out some more by
22 walking through some of your testimony in the Karadzic proceedings with
23 you. If we can call up now 1D00390 and it should be page 22 in the
24 e-court. And this would be transcript page 5901 from that trial.
25 And, sir, once this comes up, the question and answer that I
1 would like to discuss is from lines 5 through 12 of the relevant page.
2 And for the sake of being on the same page and allowing our
3 B/C/S-speaking public to follow, the question was as follows:
4 "Do you agree that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had inherited
5 territorial and municipal armies that were already in existence, and
6 everyone from General Sipcic to General Milosevic had great problems
7 establishing a unified command structure over these local units?
8 "A. It was certainly a significant difficulty which I observed
9 that both sides had. This was not a unique experience from the Serb
10 side. So I understand what you're saying. I was sympathetic to that
11 situation, and I agree with your overall assessment."
12 Do you affirm that this portion of your testimony that I've just
13 quoted is accurate and truthful?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And would you agree with me that such a situation would have an
16 effect upon understanding or explaining what we were discussing before,
17 namely, that local commanders you felt were not paying attention to range
18 maps and the shelling resulting therefrom?
19 A. This could be the case, yes.
20 Q. And if we could scroll down to the bottom portion of the page,
21 line 19 and down further, and I apologise, but your answer will be on the
22 next page, but if we can follow along.
23 The question was -- and they're talking about a document:
24 "Q. This is from the time of General Sipcic -- no, it was
25 already General Galic. Colonel Marcetic writes here that the local
1 leaders and their supporters are out of control in certain areas, and
2 these difficulties are encountered all the time, starting with Sipcic who
3 found the worse situation because it was early days. The VRS had just
4 been set up. But even in November, the corps command is encountering the
5 same problem. Is this consistent with what you confirmed earlier? "
6 And, again, your answer is on the next page of the transcript:
7 "A. Thank you. I've never seen the document, obviously, but
8 it's fully in accord with what we understood to be the case. So, yes, I
9 understand your point."
10 Now do you affirm the accuracy and truthfulness of this portion
11 of the trial record that I have read to you from the Karadzic
13 A. I do.
14 Q. And when you identify here that this situation was in full accord
15 with what quote/unquote, "we understood the case to be." Who is the
16 "we?" Are you referring to the UNMO mission?
17 A. I'm sorry, where did you get the "we?"
18 Q. It is in your answer.
19 A. Yes, understood. Yes, correct.
20 Q. Would you agree with me that such a situation would have an
21 effect on understanding or explaining what we were discussing before, the
22 local commanders that you felt were not paying attention to range maps?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay. Moving along to another topic --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one follow-up question in this respect.
1 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, you described here, or you agree to the
3 description of inherited, not unified structures and the problems that
5 Now, what you saw happening on the ground, would that be mainly
6 explained by these flaws or shortcomings? I mean, in terms of intensity
7 of fire. Would you say, Well, this is what explains all this; or would
8 you consider this to be a major part of the explanation, a minor part of
9 the explanation? And if it does not fully explain, what would then
10 additionally explain what you saw happening on the ground?
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I answered the question as posed, which
12 was, Was it contributory to. Yes, it was. Does it satisfy the
13 observations that we made in terms of the quantity of munitions landing
14 on Sarajevo? No, it doesn't.
15 What I've always tried to do is to relate those rounds which we
16 could not explain, not too forensically, because when anything up to 6-
17 or 800 rounds are coming in on a day, it's not possible to do that. But
18 what I'm stating is that as a commander, I would want to know why my
19 subcommanders are firing and what they are firing at because munitions,
20 like the other logistic elements, are a finite resource. So there is a
21 responsibility upon the chain of command to know what is going on on the
22 ground and why it's going on on the ground.
23 The point that is being made relating to local commanders, of
24 course, there will be an element of that. It's difficult to quantify
25 because on one day you might get 200 rounds, on one day you might get
1 1600 rounds. I'm not going to put a percentage figure onto that.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Now, one more question in relation to this.
3 You said, I, as a commander would like to know how my ammunition
4 was used.
5 Would that also mean that a reasonable and responsible commander
6 would improve the situation considerably if he would have noticed that
7 mistakes as described were made?
8 THE WITNESS: I would expect the commander to impress upon his
9 sub-commanders fire control. That really answers your questions.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And did you see change over the time, where,
11 of course, the inheritance in the beginning was, I would say an urgent
12 one. It was -- did you see any such thing happen over time, as far as
13 the accuracy of the firing was concerned?
14 THE WITNESS: Throughout my tour, which, in the overall period of
15 the siege, is relatively small but intense in that three months, there
16 wasn't a significant change within that period. But we tried to make a
17 difference by approaching commanders and asking them to reduce fire if we
18 didn't better receive that it was of a military -- with a military
19 objective, and we were successful in that regard.
20 So on a daily basis, we made a difference. But the difference
21 that you're discussing relating to the proficiency of the services, we
22 didn't notice a very significant change in the three months. But it is
23 only a very small window.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Colonel, as I was saying, I was ready to move on to another
3 topic, the airport agreement.
4 Would you agree with me that the so-called airport agreement
5 which was actually entered into before your tour of duty to -- as -- as a
6 SMO in Sector Sarajevo? While this agreement collected the heavy weapons
7 that were in the possession of the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Serb forces,
8 it did not call or cause these weapons to be taken out of engagement?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And just so that we're clear that would mean that either side was
11 free to utilise these heavy weapons from within the identified geographic
12 areas covered by the agreement without being in violation of the
14 A. Correct.
15 MR. IVETIC: I'd like to return to 1D387, which again is the
16 statement from 1997. And this time, if we can turn to the bottom of page
17 5 in the English and the middle of page five in the B/C/S. And it should
18 be the last paragraph on this page that I am interested in and I will now
19 read out for everyone:
20 "The airport agreement of June 1992 was but a small step taken
21 in the attempt to separate the factions in the city. This was a
22 significant agreement to the Serb side as it gave up a considerable
23 tactical advantage that it had won. By the same token, the decision and
24 agreement to have UNMOs on heavy weapon sites on both sides was of
25 greater significance to the Serbs than it ever was or could be to the
1 weapon-light Presidency side. One must, therefore, appreciate that from
2 the outset the Serbs being tactically in the ascendency were always the
3 ones expected to give up more in any agreement. This certainly coloured
4 their opinions and views in any negotiation on any topic. It was a
5 common theme that I soon appreciated, but was not appreciated by others
6 outside the UNMO group. The Serbs were, and still are, regarded as the
7 perpetrators of the worse excesses, and their military advantage was
8 always interpreted as demonstrating their aggression. While not
9 defending their actions, there is a balance to be found."
10 Q. First of all, Colonel, could you stand by what you said in your
11 statement and what I've read here now as being truthful and accurate?
12 A. I do, sir, yes.
13 Q. And if you can explain for us one aspect. Was it your
14 understanding that the persons you identify as, quote/unquote, "others"
15 in this selection, that they tended to lean on the Serbs harder than on
16 the Bosnian Muslim Presidency side in terms of negotiations?
17 A. I'm sorry, are you asking me to identify those persons?
18 Q. Not yet, no. I'm asking you if it was your understanding that
19 these persons whom you have coined as others would lean on the Serb side
20 harder in negotiations than on the Bosnian Presidency side?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And now are you able to better define others and I'm willing to
23 take any qualifications, general terms. I leave it to you as to what you
24 can give us in terms of a better idea of who these others would be.
25 A. I think within UNPROFOR there was a general appreciation of the
1 statement that you've just read out because they had first-hand
2 experience of negotiations, and they, like the UNMO group, appreciated
3 the overall situation. But I specify UNMO group there, because I'm not
4 in a position to speak for other people.
5 However, I personally had negotiations, discussions with others
6 from my country, politicians, military people, who I don't want to name,
7 but that was where, and I think in world terms, where the statement that
8 I've made is true. And that was the balance that I was trying to
10 Q. Fair enough. I will not push you to name names. That answers --
11 A. Thank you.
12 Q. -- my question sufficiently. I'd now like to turn to a similar
13 topic and the testimony from the Karadzic proceedings at 65 ter 1D389,
14 and this will be page 78 in the e-court. And this, for the record, is
15 transcript 5878 from the Karadzic proceedings. And the question starts
16 at line 2 on this page, and I will again present to you the entirety of
17 the question and answer and then ask for your comments:
18 "And I see that, too, were very critical of the media and their
19 reporting. I see in your amalgamated statement, paragraph 134, relates
20 to the not-always-accurate reporting by the media.
21 "MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 "Q. Do you confirm that?
23 "A. Yes. I feel very strongly about the interpretation of
24 events, as I saw them, from a position of comparative strengths. I think
25 by virtue of the officers who worked for me, the knowledge I was able to
1 gather, and the military and civilian interpretation that I applied was
2 based on good evidence. I was always concerned that the evidence base
3 that was used by certain agencies, and in this regard, I refer to news
4 agencies, was extremely weak. I am, in my own mind, convinced that there
5 was a considerable anti-Serb approach to the conflict within the press
6 and, indeed, beyond it to some quite senior politicians who I met and
7 talked with in Sarajevo."
8 Can you confirm the truth and accuracy of the excerpt of your
9 testimony as recorded in this transcript which I have now presented for
11 A. Yes, thank you.
12 Q. And with regard to the last part that the -- the persons coined
13 as "quite senior politicians."
14 First of all, I'm not going to ask you to name names. Are we
15 talking about the same general group of people that was the answer to the
16 previous question?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And would you describe at least some of them as being persons
19 with decision-making authority?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, as far as the press is concerned, at paragraphs 133 through
22 134 of your amalgamated statement, which is P421, page 30 in the English
23 and page 32 the B/C/S, you have already identified for us concerns about
24 the reporting that you thought was unsubstantiated or anti-Serb, and you
25 include a specific reference to the fabrication of a story by I believe
1 it was BBC journalists.
2 The question I have for you is to expand upon that. Did you have
3 occasion to personally witness or have knowledge of journalists from
4 other agencies that you could either identify or confirm being guilty of
5 the same type of misdeeds, as these BBC journalists?
6 A. Firstly, it was one single individual. I had an excellent
7 relationships with other elements of the same group, to the extent that I
8 managed to place them in locations they would not otherwise have gone to,
9 if it had not been for my inviting them to come with me. So this is
10 about one specific journalist.
11 In answer to your question about other journalists, I think I
12 have mentioned in my testimony before I encouraged none of the UNMOs to
13 discuss anything with the press, and if any discussion was to be had with
14 the press, then it would be through myself. And I recall only ever
15 speaking to the BBC. So, no, there were no other media agencies that I
16 recall speaking to.
17 Q. Fair enough. And do you feel comfortable identifying for us the
18 journalist whom you -- since we do have some that are coming to testify
19 I'd like to make sure it is not one of them.
20 MR. IVETIC: Perhaps in private session.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps to be dealt with in private session. And
22 also, if it would be a journalist still to appear, that he is not yet
23 already aware of -- of the criticism.
24 We move into private session.
25 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
15 MR. IVETIC:
16 Q. I'd like to return for a moment back to the -- to something that
17 you discussed in your prior testimony in the Karadzic. So this would be
18 1D390 in e-court and the relevant portion will be -- well, the answer is
19 on page 3. Once we get that section up, perhaps ... I apologise. This
20 should be -- can I see the page at the -- I'm sorry. It's the previous
21 page - I apologise - page 2, I guess, it is in e-court. Should be at
22 line 4.
23 And the answer that you gave to a question that presented to you
24 about complaints that General Morillon and Mr. Henneberry had about the
25 media because of the biased positions that the media held and the same
1 being hindrance for peace, your answer was as follows:
2 "These opinions of which you speak which were held by the press,
3 from our perception, certainly made it extremely more difficult for us to
4 fulfil our mission, the details of which I'm sure you're aware, and will
5 have made it difficult for the warring factions to proceed when their
6 intentions, certainly from the Serb side, seemed to be warped and twisted
7 by press reports."
8 First of all, sir, do you stand by the selected portion of your
9 testimony from the Karadzic case as being truthful and accurate, to the
10 best of your recollection?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. And I take it now here we are talking generally about press
13 reports, not about specific journalists that you had encounters with. Is
14 that accurate?
15 A. Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, one follow-up question there.
17 Did you follow the press reports of the whole of the world or the
18 western world or Asia or Africa? What did you have access to and what
19 were you able to read so as to form your opinion as expressed here?
20 THE WITNESS: European.
21 JUDGE ORIE: European.
22 THE WITNESS: Put it simply, yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: European means the whole of Europe including Russia,
24 including --
25 THE WITNESS: No, western European.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Western European.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Did you gain any impression about the reporting
4 in -- even if not personally following it, were you ever receiving any
5 reports about how the media were covering the situation, media you had no
6 direct access to yourself?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. Because there were a mixture of
8 battalions in Sarajevo, Egyptian, Ukrainian and French, one obviously
9 picked up, not substantiated, but picked up the essence of what you are
10 speaking about, how they were interpreting and at home, yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: More specifically, Serbia, Russia, China, Indonesia,
12 did you have any --
13 THE WITNESS: Out of that list, Russia. I had been -- I think
14 I've explained in sector east with a Russian battalion and of course then
15 we had the Ukrainian battalion in Sarajevo. But, no, not to the others.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Were they similarly distorting the good
17 intentions of the Serbian side?
18 THE WITNESS: The Russian element and the Ukrainian element were
19 very much in favour of the Serb situation. I would therefore -- if I had
20 to delineate it, say that the western media was generally the other way
21 with the Serbs.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. And, Colonel, could you expand for us on this understanding -- on
1 your understanding of how this biased reporting, I guess, was making it
2 difficult for you to fulfil your mission?
3 A. When you consider the various tasks which we were trying to
4 achieve there, I would want to focus, to answer your question, on the
5 military elements, none of the others, because we were talking of
6 hopefully a cease-fire, hopefully a disengagement. And once you start
7 talking with the various sides about achieving that objective, and even
8 going as far as trying to find local cease-fires to allow us to fulfil
9 various utility missions, the response of -- from discussing these things
10 with the warring factions they will have been affected by the issues of
11 which we speak. And so as a consequence, they would come to the
12 proceedings with a somewhat hardened attitude, a less forgiving one, and
13 it would make negotiation that much harder to exercise.
14 Have I made myself clear?
15 Q. You have. Now I'd like to move a little bit beyond that. We
16 talked about senior politicians and others in -- in a previous question.
17 Do you feel that the approach or stance they had which I believe you
18 described to be not understanding of the Serbs. Do you believe that that
19 also affected the ability of negotiators to fulfil their mission in a
20 same manner; that is to say, that it affected the parties and hardened
21 their attitudes in negotiations?
22 A. Besides just one small correction which I would make, you -- you
23 state, described to be not understanding of the Serbs. I would go
24 further. I would say there wasn't a great comprehension of the
25 complexities of the issues we were dealing with, not specifically Serbs.
1 After that, I agree with you.
2 Q. Thank you for that clarification and we can move on. Am I
3 correct that with respect to Bosnian Muslim or Presidency forces, as far
4 as they're concerned, when they utilised heavy weapons that were within
5 the monitoring zone, that is, within the Papa side, the UNMOs would not
6 necessarily have a clear indication of where that fire was directed. You
7 could only present the statistical half picture if it landed somewhere
8 near a Lima observer post in Serb territory; is that right?
9 A. Can you just let me read that, please.
10 Q. Absolutely.
11 A. Okay. The numbers of heavy weapons on the Presidency side that
12 we monitored was so small and the ammunition available to them so
13 limited. I'll add a rider immediately. We didn't have all of them but
14 those that we did have were seldom fired that I recall, so I can't answer
15 your question relating to that because we were not monitoring the weapons
16 they were using.
17 Can I just give an example? There were three tanks. One fell
18 off the road very quickly and was demobilised on the way to the airport.
19 The other two I don't recall being used, because of the ammunition.
20 Q. Fair enough. Can we focus on those weapons that you were not
21 monitoring but which were being used, am I correct then that in that
22 instance you would only have in terms of the statistics a record of where
23 that shot landed potentially if it happened to land near a Lima position,
24 because you did not obviously have the same coverage on the Lima side as
25 you had on the Papa side. Is that accurate?
1 A. That's absolutely correct.
2 Q. And if it was a -- I won't even use the term position because it
3 could have been mobile, but if it was a site that was unmonitored you
4 cannot exclude the possibility that it undershot or overshot a target and
5 therefore landed on Papa territory?
6 A. No. We wouldn't necessarily know where the fall-off shot was.
7 Q. Okay.
8 MR. IVETIC: If we can call up in e-court 65 ter number 1D393 for
9 a continuation of this type of discussion.
10 Q. While we wait for the document I will let you know, sir, that
11 this is an incident report for period 20 December 1992 to
12 21 December 1992 that bears your name at the bottom of the document.
13 First of all, sir, having a chance to look at this one-page document can
14 you confirm that you are familiar with this document?
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. And if we look at the monitored weapons section in the upper half
17 of the document, we see that the Bosnia Presidency positions are listed
18 at number 2. For this period it is reflected that not a single shot was
19 witnessed to be outgoing from the Presidency side.
20 Am I correctly interpreting this part of the form?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And if we can look at the increps which is at number 4, first of
23 all, let's look at number 3. This records the amount of incoming rounds
24 observed at the monitored sites of the Serb areas. And we see here a
25 significant amount, that is, 16 artillery and 125 mortar shots incoming.
1 Am I correct that this is precisely demonstrating what you have
2 already told us that the Bosnian Muslim Presidency forces had artillery
3 that was not monitored by your mission?
4 A. Yes. When I was talking previously I was being quite specific
5 about within Sarajevo. This picture is the whole of that area, so it
6 includes other locations beyond the city.
7 Q. And when you say "other locations beyond the city," would we
8 include Mount Igman and Hrasnica as among other places as two points that
9 were rather significant in terms of the artillery that was available to
10 the Presidency forces which was outside of Sarajevo, outside of the Papa
11 side of the confrontation line?
12 A. Yes. And remembering that artillery is a mobile function.
13 Q. Fair enough. If I could just return to this document for a
14 moment. So we are clear, do you permit the possibility that the incoming
15 rounds suffered by the Serb-controlled areas could actually be in excess
16 of what is reflected on this form, again because of the lack of the
17 coverage of the entirety of the Serb-controlled areas by the UNMO mission
18 which was mainly monitoring weapons on that side of the line?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And with regard now moving to the Mount Igman location in
21 particular, am I correct that you were persistent but unsuccessful in
22 trying to place observers at Igman, at the Presidency positions there?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And would you agree that a significant factor relating to
25 discrepancies in the various reports of this nature would be due to the
1 fact that UNMO had no insight as to the outgoing fire from Mount Igman?
2 A. We did actually have some insight. Because within my
3 statements - I can't recall exactly where - a UN military observer did go
4 up onto Mount Igman and he did count the weapons, which I can't recall
5 instantly that I stated at the time. So with a snap-shot of this
6 particular event, it gives you an indication of the weapons available to
7 the Presidency side on Mount Igman.
8 Q. I promise you I will not ask you for instant recall for those
9 figures. I do know that I have them somewhere in my questions so we will
10 get to them, and I will be fair enough to provide you the relevant
11 portion of your statement so we do not have to guess.
12 But for the time being, with respect to Mount Igman itself, would
13 you agree that this was a significant geographical feature and also a
14 feature of military significance?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And focussing now on the time of your tour in Sarajevo, the three
17 months that you were there, am I correct that this location, this
18 feature, was held by the Presidency forces throughout that time?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And do you recall if this feature had a residential nature to it
21 or was it purely military, Mount Igman?
22 A. Well, I never went there, so I can't answer that question.
23 Q. Fair enough. Would Mount Igman and the forces situated there
24 have had an unobstructed view of the entirety of the city of Sarajevo?
25 A. I would imagine so from the geographical layout, yes.
1 Q. And as such, would these forces have the ability to target any of
2 the Serb or Presidency-held areas of the city itself?
3 A. Dependant on the type of weapon that they had there at any one
5 Q. And the range --
6 A. The ranges that the weapon; hence, yes.
7 Q. Would you agree with me that the Lima or Serb artillery shooting
8 at the BiH forces on Igman would be recorded as outgoing but would not be
9 recorded on the forms as incoming, in so far as there were no observers
10 near Igman?
11 A. Absolutely.
12 Q. And likewise, outgoing fire from Igman that overshot targets or
13 undershot targets that could potentially land on Presidency-held
14 territory, it, too, would not be identifiable as coming from Igman, if
15 you can understand that.
16 A. I understand what you mean. But since we don't know what was
17 there and whether it was the source of the fire, we're only looking at an
18 impact and, of course, that could have come from anywhere. But I do
19 understand what you are saying.
20 Q. Let me simply it.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. Am I correct that the monitors on the Papa side recording
23 incoming shot would not be able to distinguish between fire that
24 potentially came from Igman or potentially came from both monitored and
25 unmonitored Serb positions?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me that it was not only likely
3 but in fact a certainty that the Serb artillery was targeting Igman and
4 either engaging in offensive or counter-offensive fire with the forces on
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And would such fire, whether offensive or defensive counter-fire
8 be military justified or legitimate, in your opinion or estimation?
9 A. That seems to be acceptable.
10 Q. With respect to all the reports and the various incident forms
11 that we have discussed or that you discussed in your statement and
12 testimony, am I correct that we should keep in mind that the number of
13 outgoing shoots -- shots from the Serb artillery included or could
14 include shot that was directed at Igman rather than upon the Papa side or
15 the Papa zone?
16 A. Yes, it could.
17 Q. Okay. And from this document, at least for this time-period, the
18 Serb positions suffered more incoming shot directed at them than did the
19 Papa or Presidency side have incoming shot directed at them?
20 A. From this document?
21 Q. Yes. Looking at items 3 and 4.
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, at this time I would ask for this
24 document that's on the screen to be tendered into evidence and given the
25 next available exhibit number.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That is 1D393?
2 MR. IVETIC: That's correct.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be ...
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document receives number D83, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
6 I'm looking at the clock, Mr. Ivetic. Would this be a suitable
8 MR. IVETIC: It is, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll take a break, and we resume at 25
10 minutes to 2.00.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Recess taken at 1.13 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
17 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
18 Q. Colonel, as promised, I have located the portion of your
19 statement dealing with the recon of the Igman location. If we can call
20 up in e-court in 1D387 and this will be pages 11 in the English and 10 in
21 the B/C/S.
22 And while we wait for that, sir, I would like to see if I can
23 verify something else with you. In respect of the Presidency forces that
24 would have been located at the Mount Igman location, would you agree that
25 there was both infantry and artillery at this location?
1 A. No, I can't confirm that.
2 Q. Fair enough. And if we look at bottom of the page in English
3 that we have before us of 1D387, and I will read out for you the
4 selection so that hopefully you can locate the same:
5 "I was later able to substantiate by way of a rec conducted by
6 two of my UNMOs that the Presidency forces on Igman had two times APCs;
7 one time 130-millimetre Howitzer; four times 105-millimetre field guns;
8 two times 122-millimetre field guns; and six times 120-millimetre
10 Does this accurately and truthfully represent the recon
11 information you had about the artillery available to the Presidency
12 forces at the Mount Igman location?
13 A. That's the memory I had, yes.
14 Q. And do you also recall of receiving constant complaints from the
15 Serb side that precisely these Presidency forces on the Mount Igman
16 location were conducting fire upon civilian areas in the Serb-held
17 portions of Sarajevo, particularly the Ilidza suburb?
18 A. Yes, we received complaints on many occasions, and I think they
19 are recorded in my statement for General Galic, as it is stated in my
20 statement from General Galic that he threatened to return fire on
21 Sarajevo if it continued.
22 Q. And you previously talked about the Bosnian Presidency forces
23 within the Papa zone, that is to say, within the inner parts of the city,
24 as having lack or minimal ammunition. Would you agree with me that the
25 forces at the Mount Igman location were not subject to the same
1 difficulties in resupply that the forces in the Papa zone had?
2 A. That's accurate.
3 Q. Okay. Am I correct that in addition to the Mount Igman location
4 the Bosnian Presidency forces held several other points of high ground
5 outside of the city where forces and heavy weapons were located?
6 A. There were other locations that heavy weapons could be brought to
7 bear from the Presidency, yes. My personal experience of them though is
8 not. I have none.
9 Q. Fair enough. Would you agree with me that we cannot view the
10 UNMO statistics as an exact representation of the fire from Serb
11 artillery into the city, but rather that it can be only viewed as an
12 inexact attempt to indicate levels of activity rather than assess where
13 all shots came from or went?
14 A. Wherever we could, we would make a relationship between outgoing
15 fire from the Lima side to incoming fire on the Presidency side, and as
16 we've seen, there are variations which are not explained by the pure
17 statistics. So, yes, it was not an exact science, something I've said I
18 think a number of times in my various statements.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I was about to say that the witness has
20 explained this various times, but he himself did it as well.
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, sir. If I could call up in e-court
23 number 1D00394.
24 Q. And while we wait for the document, sir, I'd like to advise you
25 that it is dated the 10th of December, 1992, and appears to be a report
1 authored by Lieutenant Commander Rees on your behalf send to the CMO
2 UNPROFOR in Zagreb. Can you verify for us or recognise this document as
3 being one that was prepared or on your bequest or with your knowledge?
4 A. Yes, I've signed it so that is acceptable.
5 Q. And if we look at the section entitled "general situation," we
6 see that it states for the period 9 to 10 December 1992 the following:
7 "Medium to low level of activity today with 35 rounds incoming to
8 Presidency side and 91 rounds incoming to Serb side. Total rounds
9 recorded outgoing from Serb positions 189, from Presidency positions," I
10 believe it's a 50 or a 53, I can't tell, "and shelling widely dispersed
11 throughout the city."
12 Would you agree with me that on this date, too, the Serb
13 positions were enduring three times more incoming shots than the
14 Presidency positions?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic that is now the second time that you
16 apparently think that what is reported here that the Chamber is unable to
17 establish that the 189 is three times approximately 50 or 53. Earlier
18 you asked the witness whether the one had more incoming fire than the
19 other side. This Chamber, perhaps not good in mathematics, but these
20 basics are really within our -- within our competence.
21 MR. IVETIC: And, Your Honour, these are public proceedings and
22 the Office of the Prosecutor has been allowed to present a summary of the
23 witness's testimony, which is for the public's information, and we
24 believe that material that contradicts that or provides more information
25 and a more complete picture -- for the public to know the full aspects of
1 this witness's available testimony and of the circumstances in Sarajevo
2 during the relevant time-period are necessary.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm not blaming you for reading that
4 there were 35 rounds incoming and, et cetera, I'm not blaming you for
5 mentioning it. But then to say whether 150 is three times 50, that, of
6 course, is in addition to putting the figures and is really totally
7 unnecessary. That's what my point is. Not -- and I didn't blame you for
8 pointing at the numbers. I blamed you for the question that you put to
9 the witness which seems to assume that the Chamber is -- and the public
10 is unable to establish that 189 is more than three times 50 or 53.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. IVETIC:
13 Q. Would you agree with me that the bulk of the incoming fire or --
14 strike that. Would you suspect that some of the incoming fire on the
15 Serb positions would be precisely from unmonitored BiH Presidency
16 artillery or heavy weapons whether on Mount Igman or elsewhere?
17 A. The figures suggest that.
18 Q. And would you consider it reasonable or likely that the Serb
19 positions, if taking incoming fire from these Presidency positions, would
20 fire outward towards these BiH Presidency positions to counter or
21 neutralise the threat?
22 A. That's a reasonable expectation.
23 Q. And would such outgoing fire be militarily justified?
24 A. On the premise of the target, yes.
25 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would ask that this document be
1 admitted into evidence with the next available Defence exhibit.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
3 Madam Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D387 becomes Exhibit D84, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it 387 or 394?
7 MR. IVETIC: 3 --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think it's 394.
9 MR. IVETIC: 394, your correct.
10 THE REGISTRAR: So Exhibit 1D394 received D84, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
12 MR. IVETIC: If we could take a look at 1D392 in e-court.
13 Q. And, sir, again while we're waiting for the document I can advise
14 that you it is dated the 19th of November, 1992, and appears to have been
15 prepared by Major Rosenroll, and perhaps can you verify if it in fact has
16 been signed by you?
17 A. Yes, it was.
18 Q. And if we look at the time-period covered by 18 to
19 19 November 1992, we see that under item 1 with the low to medium
20 activity only one shot fell in Presidency territory whereas 16 shots fell
21 onto Serb territory. And here you explain that the Serbs were firing 57
22 rounds although only one landed on the territory of the Presidency forces
23 that you monitored.
24 A. Yes, I -- I highlight that clearly, I think, the limitations.
25 Q. Okay. Would you agree that this document and your explanation
1 contained therein perhaps most drastically explains the point we were
2 discussing previously as to the limitations as to these statistics?
3 A. Yes. As I've explained in the document.
4 Q. And here there appears to have been a cease-fire that has failed.
5 Do you recall based upon the fact that the Zuc and Nedzarici locations
6 are mentioned, and the fact that only one shot was incoming to the BiH
7 side if this was a cease-fire that the Presidency forces would have
9 A. I can't make a judgement.
10 Q. Fair enough.
11 MR. IVETIC: I would like to tender this document into evidence
12 as the next available Defence exhibit number.
13 JUDGE ORIE: No objection.
14 Madam Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D392 becomes Exhibit D85, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
17 MR. IVETIC:
18 Q. Colonel, on the topic of cease-fires at paragraph 29 of your
19 amalgamated statement, Exhibit P241, and it would be the eighth page in
20 English and the sixth page in the B/C/S, at this paragraph once it comes
21 up - I'll wait for that - I would direct your attention to the conclusory
22 statement at the end of this paragraph, which starts as follows:
23 "Throughout my tenure, the level of activity always exceeded our
24 ability to respond to every incident as there was never an effective
1 Would you agree with me that all parties to the conflict in
2 Sarajevo were responsible for such a situation that they all violated
3 cease-fires at various times?
4 A. You can only violate a cease-fire if you have one. I don't
5 recall one.
6 Q. Would you agree with me, generally speaking, that the Presidency
7 side was more reluctant to enter into a general or universal cease-fire
8 in the negotiations?
9 A. Thinking back to the negotiations that I was party to, both on an
10 individual basis and with the individuals who I worked closely with on
11 both sides, and at the mixed military working group, I don't recall that
12 they were any more likely to object to a cease-fire. I sensed that their
13 position meant that they would welcome it by virtue of the weight of
14 weaponry that was ranged against them. But, no, I don't think there was
15 any greater emphasis on the Presidency side, working from memory.
16 Q. Fair enough. Then can I move on to the issue of utilities. At
17 paragraphs 10 and 11 of your amalgamated statement - that would be 3 and
18 4 in the English - you identify utility works and repairs as an item that
19 the UNMO mission was tasked with. I'd like to focus up -- focus on that
20 for a moment, but, first, I'd like to present to you what another
21 witness, Mr. Pyers Tucker, testified to in the Galic case and which he
22 affirmed here a few weeks ago. So if we can please have 1D367 up on the
23 screen, and this is the transcript pages 10029 to 10031 from the Galic
24 case beginning at line 12.
25 To be fair, I will provide you the entirety of the exchange
1 before asking you to comment on particular items:
2 "Q. The last question is you have told us about one of the tasks
3 performed was to discuss issues of restoring utilities: Gas, water
4 supply, electricity. Could you tell us whether the parties were
5 co-operative if it came to restoring these utilities, whether both
6 parties behaved similarly or differently? Could you elaborate a bit more
7 on that?
8 "A. Utilities were something which General Morillon considered
9 very important, and at the meetings at which utility repair was
10 discussed, both sides were entirely co-operative. These meetings were
11 very complex because you needed to bring to one place, at one time, both
12 technicians who had the right knowledge and a cease-fire that was agreed
13 by both sides, and the technicians needed to know a safe route through
14 the minefields in order to reach the area that they needed to carry out
16 "When we looked at what happened on the ground, the
17 co-operation," and now we have to go to the next page of the transcript,
18 "the co-operation which we received from the Bosnian Serb authorities was
19 generally of a high order. The co-operation we received from the Bosniak
20 local commanders varied considerably, and it was our belief that in some
21 areas where the Presidency authorities had high control, things generally
22 went well. But there were other areas where the local commanders were
23 radical, and from the perspective of general discipline and obedience,
24 were unreliable, that all sorts of tricks were used in order to prevent
25 the repairs from taking place.
1 "JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying to understand this. The supplies of
2 water, electricity and gas also served their own population. What was
3 the specific reason why they would play tricks which would result in not
4 restoring the supplies when their own population would suffer from it?
5 Do you have any explanation about that?
6 "A. I do have an explanation and it is as follows: There were
7 elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to
8 take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that
9 could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by
10 the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia which was not possible at
11 that time because of the arms embargo. Those people believed that the
12 only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the
13 situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community
14 would be -- would be willing to intervene. Therefore, it was not in
15 their interest to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. It
16 was not in their interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian
17 population improve. To put it bluntly, the more suffering, the better,
18 because that...," and if we turn to the last page for the last two
19 lines, "... because that played to the television cameras and would
20 ultimately lead to the pressure that they wanted in order to achieve
21 international intervention."
22 Now, I'd like to first ask you about the first part of
23 Mr. Tucker's testimony regarding the difficulties of negotiating joint
24 repair missions to the utilities. Does that accord with your
25 recollection of the situation and, indeed, that at least some sort of
1 local cease-fire was necessary to effectuate these missions?
2 A. Could we return to that page, please.
3 Q. That would be the first page, page 1 in e-court. And, by all
4 means, there's something that has been omitted by Mr. Tucker as to
5 difficulties, you could add to that.
6 A. It such a lengthy element of the document that there are so many
7 issues in there, it's almost difficult to know where to start. Are you
8 going to specifically ask me a question about a specific part of it?
9 Q. I'm asking about the specific part from lines 18 to 24 on the
10 screen right now.
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. And does that comport with your recollection of the difficulties
13 of getting repair missions to the utilities during the time-period when
14 you were at Sarajevo.
15 A. Can I give a little background before I answer your question --
16 Q. Briefly, yes --
17 A. -- because it is very pertinent.
18 Q. -- if you can, if you can.
19 A. Okay. General Morillon was BiH commander. Major Tucker worked
20 for him, a British officer whom I knew very well. General Morillon and
21 Major Tucker would know as much about the utility missions as they
22 gleaned from the various situation reports that I wrote. Before I went
23 to Sarajevo, there were no utility missions. I instigated them. I ran
24 every single one. It is therefore quite difficult for me to read what
25 somebody else thinks about them when actually they had no direct contact
1 with the utility missions whatsoever.
2 So within the lengthy paragraph, there are elements which are
3 true, but there are also areas where there is confusion.
4 The meetings were complex, yes, I did them. They took many days
5 to ensure that by virtue of their location, more often than not on the
6 front line, both sides knew what was happening, where it was happening,
7 and, indeed, the technicians that we required to fulfil that mission.
8 To achieve it, I did considerable amount of negotiating myself,
9 and I had a particular officer who looked after most missions, and he
10 also did negotiations. Therefore, it was right down the chain of
11 command, from General Galic on the one side, to Mr. Siber on the other
12 side, right down to local commanders. Where some of these failed, I
13 wouldn't put a figure on as to whether it was one side, nor the other.
14 Because the important point from my perspective was that if it wasn't
15 safe for the technicians and the UN -- UNPROFOR people who were there,
16 then I wouldn't do it.
17 Earlier on in the day, we talked about blame one way or the
18 other. I wasn't interested in blame, and I worry a little that this
19 document and this statement seems to give an emphasise more on one side
20 than the other. For every single mission that we sent out, and I think
21 eventually we had a success rate of about 65 per cent, which in the
22 circumstances was phenomenally successful, it indicates that actually
23 there was a willingness on both sides to achieve what we were trying to
24 achieve. But this was war. Elsewhere in my statements I recall clearly
25 stating that I think I said the water didn't come on one side so they
1 shelled the electricity substation --
2 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...
3 A. -- and that was typical. So I think those first few lines there
4 are elements of truth about it, but I think my explanation is slightly
5 more accurate, and so it should be. I ran them.
6 Q. That's why I asked you. And did you share the view of Mr. Tucker
7 that at times it appeared that segments of the Bosnian Presidency
8 leadership or perhaps local commanders seemed to be reluctant to assist
9 in the utilities due to their desire to obtain either intervention or to
10 effectuate an end to the arms embargo?
11 A. I think that's mixing up too many features. We had difficulty
12 completing utility missions from both sides, for multiple reasons. It
13 wasn't our task to analyse why it failed. What we did do was try to
14 learn so that if we could manage the same utility mission another time,
15 or something similar, then we would have learnt from that experience. We
16 didn't go as far as analysing it.
17 Can I say where I think the failures really occurred? And it was
18 common wherever we did these missions. And it was on the local basis.
19 That is very true and that is the common feature through -- that I have
20 with this particular statement.
21 Q. Thank you, sir. And now I can leave that document and go to
22 1D391, which, while we wait for it, sir, is again a report that emanated
23 from your mission, I believe; albeit in a different format. It appears
24 to be dated the 17th of October, 1992. Can you take a look at this and
25 at least from the first page can you tell whether this is something that
1 would have emanated from your position, from your office?
2 If you like, we can also go to the next page.
3 A. Sorry, did you say 17th of September? Because that is dated the
4 4th of October.
5 Q. I thought it was 17th of October, but I could be ...
6 A. Okay. 17th of October. Sorry. I thought you said
7 September which would be the day after I arrived. So, yes, I'm with you.
8 Q. Okay, you're with me. Now, does this appear to be a message or
9 report that would have been -- emanated from your position?
10 A. Yes, from SMO Sarajevo.
11 Q. And, first, if we look at item 1 since it's up on the screen,
12 we -- we see that the statistics demonstrate that more shot was falling
13 on to the Serb-controlled territories than was falling on the
14 Presidency-controlled territories, at least for this period covered by
15 this sitrep. Would you agree with me - now that we've gone through
16 several of these reports - that there were times when the incoming fire
17 was heavier against the Serbs than against the city parts controlled by
18 the Presidency forces, even though I don't think that that was identified
19 in your statement?
20 A. Yes. You just have to look at the figures for that, yes.
21 Q. And now I'd like to focus on the part of the document that is
22 entitled "continuous affairs." We have to scroll down just a little bit.
23 The middle of the page. Right there is fine.
24 And here precisely you are discussing problems with local
25 commanders in terms of -- on both sides actually, with respect to some
1 three utility missions that were planned for the day. Is that -- is that
3 A. Yes, I can see that, yes.
4 Q. And does this accurately memorialise some of the general items
5 that you had just testified about? Does this give a specific indication
6 of a particular instance?
7 A. Yes, it clearly relates to those three utility missions, yes.
8 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would at this time tender this
9 document as the next available Defence exhibit number.
10 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I'm sorry, I don't have necessarily an objection
11 to this but just as to the date. I think counsel is referring on top to
12 a date that's printed on the top there. I'm not sure that that
13 17 October date is the actual date of the document.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If I can assist the parties. The language used at
15 the top line is "afgedrukt" on the 17th, which means printed on the 17th.
16 Then, yes, if we agree all on that, that it's just the date of
17 the print.
18 MR. IVETIC: That's fine.
19 JUDGE ORIE: No objection.
20 Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D391 becomes Exhibit D86, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
23 Mr. Ivetic, we have only three minutes left. I would like to
24 already excuse the witness for the day and continue tomorrow, and I would
25 like to address one or two issues.
1 MR. IVETIC: That's fine, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mole, we'll adjourn for the day, soon. We'd
3 like to see you back tomorrow morning, and I again instruct you that you
4 should not speak or communicate in any other way with any other person
5 about your testimony irrespective of whether already given or still to be
7 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Time is too limited. But, Mr. Ivetic, there are a
12 few documents you have used and not tendered, you may have intentionally
13 done so, a lot was read into the record, but please be aware there are
14 four documents of that kind.
15 Then, second, I earlier said something about that the Chamber is
16 able to make its own math. But then, unfortunately, I took the wrong
17 portion, because your question was about the incoming fire, so your
18 question was about whether 91 is three times 35, and now not that that is
19 a more complex calculation than the one I mentioned, because the Chamber
20 is able both to establish that 91 is -- and that's the incoming fire on
21 the Serb side, was three times what was incoming on the Presidency side,
22 and the Chamber was also able to calculate that the outgoing fire from
23 the Serb side, 189, was more than three times the outgoing fire from the
24 Presidency side.
25 But that's hereby corrected.
1 The other matter I'd like to briefly raise is scheduling.
2 Could you tell us approximately how much time you would need.
3 MR. IVETIC: I anticipate another hour, 15; hour, 20.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As matters stand at this moment,
5 Ms. Hochhauser, could you give an indication as to how much you think you
6 would need in re-examination.
7 MS. HOCHHAUSER: As matters stand at this moment, I have about
8 four questions.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Which means that the next witness scheduled
10 tomorrow that we'll easily conclude his examination-in-chief tomorrow
11 somewhere during the second session most likely. I wondered to what
12 extent it would be possible to condense the cross-examination of the next
13 witness in such a way that he could be excused before the weekend.
14 Would you seriously consider that and see to what extent that is
16 MR. LUKIC: Is it the next witness after this one, Your Honour?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I mean, he is scheduled for half an hour, as I
18 understand it, and for -- I think you scheduled him for three hours. Now
19 if you --
20 MR. LUKIC: [Microphone not activated] Two and a half.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Two and a half hours, which makes all together three
22 hours. We have -- I'm not saying that you should, but if it would be
23 possible to -- to accommodate the witness by -- yes.
24 MR. LUKIC: We are a bit unclear at this moment, Your Honour,
25 because we just learned during the last break that that witness is coming
1 tomorrow, so we are not clear yet how to proceed.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see.
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I think there may be some confusion.
4 The witness has no protective measures so it's the witness Elvir Pasic
5 who has been on the schedule for some time now.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. He is scheduled for 30 minutes.
7 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
8 MR. GROOME: No, I think that's the witness. I know Mr. Lukic
9 has been dealing with the matter of the Detention Unit. Perhaps I can
10 speak with him at the break and clarify some of the recent developments
11 with respect to the witness that we had considered moving forward but
12 ultimately did not.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But as matters stand now, we expect the next
14 witness to be called to be Mr. Pasic.
15 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So we're wondering whether there be -- whether
17 it would be possible by both parties using the time in the most -- in the
18 most efficient way, whether we could achieve that the witness could be
19 excused before the weekend. If not, of course, we'll --
20 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, I think you are aware by now that we do
21 our best to comply with your orders.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No, well, first of all, this was not an order,
23 but I think we -- we share our concern about the well-being and how to
24 best to accommodate witnesses and that's -- the Chamber appreciates that
25 both parties are always very much attentive to that.
1 We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow, Friday, the
2 2nd of November, at 9.30 in this same courtroom, I.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Friday, the 2nd day of
5 November, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.