Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5823

 1                           Thursday, 6 December 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 7     courtroom.

 8             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

10             This is case number IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus

11     Ratko Mladic.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

13             Could the witness be escorted in the courtroom.

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Fraser.

16             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by

18     the solemn declaration you've given yesterday at the beginning of your

19     testimony.

20             Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

22                           WITNESS:  DAVID FRASER [Resumed]

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

24        Q.   Good morning, General Fraser.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 5824

 1        Q.   General, yesterday at transcript page 5821 we started to talk

 2     about paragraph 27 of your consolidated statement, P576, page 12 in

 3     English, page 13 in the B/C/S.  I believe you still have a copy in front

 4     of you for your own use, and I'd like to start off there again.  And

 5     first of all I'd like to ask you, yesterday, at transcript page 5785, you

 6     talked with Ms. Bolton about a tunnel at Donji Kotorac where UNPROFOR had

 7     a check-point 200 metres away and UN personnel traversed in front of it,

 8     the entrance to the tunnel frequently.  Is that tunnel that you talked

 9     about yesterday the same tunnel that you described in paragraph 27 of

10     your statement as being used by both civilian and ABiH traffic?

11        A.   Yes, it is.

12        Q.   Was this tunnel pre-existing or was it something that was dug or

13     constructed while UNPROFOR was -- was present?

14        A.   It -- it was there when I arrived.  I couldn't tell you before

15     when it was constructed.

16        Q.   What knowledge did UNPROFOR have of weapons or ammunition being

17     shipped via that tunnel to the ABiH forces inside of Sarajevo itself?

18        A.   We knew that it was used by both the military and civilians; but

19     other details than that, I don't have any firm recollection at this

20     stage.

21        Q.   Did UNPROFOR ever protest to the Bosnian Muslim side about the

22     use of this airport tunnel for the transport of ABiH forces' supplies,

23     et cetera?

24        A.   It was something that was very sensitive with UNPROFOR, and we

25     did talk to both sides about the tunnel.

Page 5825

 1        Q.   To your knowledge, did UNPROFOR ever try to keep track of the

 2     amounts and types of material that were brought in by this route?

 3        A.   We did the best of our ability to keep the tunnel under

 4     observation, but you can appreciate the Muslims didn't want us to see

 5     very much about the tunnel, and so we just tried to watch what was going

 6     through there.

 7        Q.   Was there a suspicion that some black marketeering was going on

 8     with respect to the tunnel, in particular, with respect to

 9     Brigadier Fikret?

10        A.   We were aware of black marketeering in general.  We were aware of

11     Fikret and his activities, and we had conversations with Muslim

12     authorities about both.

13        Q.   And so you can clarify for us, Brigadier Fikret, was he a

14     commander of the ABiH forces around the airport?

15        A.   He was the commander of the BiH forces just on that other side of

16     the airport that went up into the Igman Mounts.

17        Q.   Would you agree with me that such a tunnel and any road used to

18     transport military personnel or military supplies, or weapons, was a

19     legitimate military target?

20        A.   It was complicated by the fact that it was also for civilian use.

21        Q.   Would you agree with me that Brigadier Fikret was essentially a

22     criminal thug who operated with a degree of independence and rose to be a

23     division commander in the ABiH by the end of your tour?

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, is that three questions in one or ...

25             I see a criminal, degree of independence, and how he rose.

Page 5826

 1     That's --

 2             MR. IVETIC:  I'll break it up, Your Honour.

 3        Q.   Would you agree with me that Brigadier Fikret was essentially a

 4     criminal thug?

 5        A.   We were aware of his criminal activities, and we protested

 6     against those criminal activities.

 7        Q.   Would you agree with me that he operated with a degree of

 8     independence within the ABiH?

 9        A.   We noted his latitude of action and commented on that with Muslim

10     authorities.

11        Q.   And, if you know, is it correct that he rose to be a division

12     commander within the ABiH by the end of your tour in -- at

13     Sector Sarajevo?

14        A.   That's something I -- I don't recall.

15        Q.   Yesterday at transcript page 5791, you were asked about UNMOs.  I

16     would like to take a look at paragraph 28 and 29 of your statement;

17     again, that's P576 and we should still be on page 10 in the English and

18     page 11 in the Serbian.  And here in these paragraphs you are talking

19     about the UNMO relationship vis-a-vis UNPROFOR.

20             First of all, sir, could you tell us, if you recall, who the SMO

21     of the UNMO mission in Sarajevo was during the period of your deployment?

22        A.   A Roy Thomas was there for a large part of my tour, another

23     Canadian.

24        Q.   I would like to show you another document now, 65 ter number

25     1D423, and if at first we can have the first page of that document in

Page 5827

 1     e-court.

 2             And, sir, as you could see from -- this first page of this

 3     document purports to be an information report from a proofing session

 4     between General Sir Michael Rose and the Office of the Prosecutor.  And

 5     it says that it's:

 6             "Information provided by General Sir Michael Rose to Mark Ierace,

 7     Chester Stamp, Jonathan Tait-Harris, Richard Philipps on 29 August 2003

 8     at Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom."

 9             If we could turn to page 4 in e-court of this proofing note, I'd

10     like to ask you about something General Rose says about the UNMO mission.

11     And here he says:

12             "The UNMO reports" --

13        A.   Where are you so I can just follow along?

14        Q.   It should be page 4, but I'm not seeing ...

15             Ah, the last paragraph, sir, of the English version which is on

16     the right side of your screen.

17             "The UNMO reports were completely useless.  It was a money

18     spinner.  They wrote shootreps and reports based on what they were told

19     by the local commanders.  Mainly were not technically competent and some

20     were sold out.  They were captured by the ones they were with."

21             Do you agree with General Rose's assessment, that many of the

22     UNMOs were not technically competent?

23        A.   That part I would agree with, but if I could go.

24        Q.   Go ahead.

25        A.   To say that the UNMO reports were completely useless I think is

Page 5828

 1     an over-characterisation of the statements of those reports.  I think

 2     some were useful.  Those UNMOs that came from countries with professional

 3     forces, with professional trained officers, Scandinavian countries, UK,

 4     US, Canada, had better-quality reports that were used by the UN.

 5        Q.   Do you agree with the assessment that UNMOs sided with whomever

 6     they were situated with and that reports were based on what local

 7     commanders told them rather than what they observed?

 8        A.   There were some examples, but it was not endemic across all the

 9     UNMOs.

10        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to now call up your 1997 statement again, that's

11     1D457, and page 14 in the English, page 15 in the B/C/S.  And I will be

12     focussing on the middle of the page, sir, which is the portion that is

13     the UNMOs.  And this is the 1997 report, sir, not the hard copy.  So it's

14     on the screen on the right-hand side.  And the part I'm interested in

15     says quote -- is under the title "UNMOs":

16             "UNMOs were attached to the sector.  In theory, they were

17     supposed to report to the sector, whereas in reality the sector did not

18     use them.  They were inconsistent, unreliable, and, in fact, they

19     reported first to Zagreb, which wasn't of such use to us.  When an

20     incident did happen, if the UNMOs were first on the scene, the sector

21     would try to get as much information form them as possible but would then

22     send in our backup team.  We relied on our own LOs, our units, rather

23     than the UNMOs.  My bosses, both sector commanders, were cordial with

24     them, but they used their own resources."

25             First of all, sir, with the comments that you made in relation to

Page 5829

 1     General Rose's proofing statement and this paragraph that I've read from

 2     your 1999 [sic] statement, do they truthfully and accurately reflect the

 3     totality of your evidence as to the UNMOs that you saw during your tenure

 4     in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   It's true, as I said, that they were inconsistent and many of

 6     them unreliable.  There were exceptions within them that they -- some of

 7     the reports they had were useful.  And in situations where they did

 8     arrive first, a pair of inconsistent, unreliable eyes is better than no

 9     eyes whatsoever, which was reinforced and backed up - as I say - by the

10     troops that the sector commander had under his command.  An imperfect

11     tool is better than no tool.

12        Q.   Am I correct, sir, that as far as the UNMOs were concerned, their

13     degree of reliability depended on the nationality of the particular

14     UNMOs, what nation they came from?

15        A.   That is true.

16        Q.   Is it also true that there was a national bias of sorts within

17     Sector Sarajevo as well?

18        A.   What do you mean by that?

19        Q.   Let me -- let me try and clarify that by looking at, again, your

20     1997 statement which is on the screen, and if we turn to page 4 in the

21     English and page 4 in the B/C/S.  I'm referring to the section that is in

22     the third paragraph from the top that I will read out for you, sir, and

23     then you can follow along from your -- from the screen.

24              "In Sector Sarajevo, there were two staff systems working, the

25     UN and the French.  It was the French staff who effectively ran

Page 5830

 1     Sector Sarajevo during the majority of the meaningful work.  The UN

 2     officers in the headquarters were essential 'window dressing.'  The

 3     French also wrote and maintained their own national reports.  This

 4     process became more complicated when the Russians imposed a Chief of

 5     Staff of their own on the Sector, but he was marginalised by the French."

 6             First of all, sir, can I ask you if you stand by the foregoing

 7     selection I have jest read as being truthful and accurate as to the

 8     situation in Sector Sarajevo Command during the time that you were the

 9     MA?

10        A.   That situation -- and I stand by my statement that the core of

11     this headquarters was French, they knew each other, they were

12     professional soldiers.  They could work very well together because they

13     understood each other.  They could work quickly, efficiently,

14     effectively, and other officers who were clipped on to their -- the core

15     of this headquarters had to catch up to where the French were.  They were

16     very professional and very good.  In a situation where there was a civil

17     war going on, they had to get action done quickly to protect and achieve

18     the mandate of the UN.  That said, not all the officers who came in from

19     other countries in the UN were as capable as the professional force.  And

20     also when are you in the midst of operations and you interpose a

21     different nationality, the Chief of Staff, he just had to catch up speed

22     and the French were moving quite quickly because at this time tensions

23     were rising, activity on the ground -- conflict was rising, and things

24     had to be done.  So the most expeditious way of doing it was -- quite

25     frankly, was the core way was with the French and up at General Rose and

Page 5831

 1     General Smith's headquarters a lot of -- a lot of work fell onto British

 2     soldiers too because that's just where the core was and Dutch and

 3     Canadians.  And that's just how things worked to get things done on the

 4     ground.

 5        Q.   And so you say that the Chief of Staff was -- had to catch up.

 6     In fact, wasn't he basically bypassed or marginalised in the process, cut

 7     out of the equation?

 8        A.   In part, because it came from a complete different culture, a

 9     completely different system, that he had to find time to get himself up

10     to speed.  He arrived at a time where, in fact, combat activities were

11     fairly intense, and it took him a while to get things going.

12        Q.   And could you verify for us that the French at Sector Sarajevo

13     maintained a secret red file of information that was for the viewing of

14     only French personnel?

15        A.   Every nation has their own national command chains with their own

16     national reports.  The French with their files were no different than any

17     other nation.  We all reported back to our national capitals as

18     representatives, so they had their own system.

19        Q.   Thank you.  While we have the 1997 statement before us, I'd like

20     to turn to page 5 in the English and page 6 in the B/C/S of the same.

21     And I'd like to ask you, sir, about the last paragraph in the English,

22     which is on the right-hand side of your screen, and your statement

23     records as follows:

24             "Protest letters were done and I drafted letters of protest for

25     the commanders.  The commander would tell me what he wanted, what the

Page 5832

 1     slant was, and I would draft the letters and give them back to him.

 2     Sometimes these letters really seemed like for the sake of form.  You

 3     always had to be careful with the letters you wrote, because they could

 4     turn things back at you."

 5             Now, General Fraser, first of all, can you confirm that these

 6     words from your 1997 statement are truthful and accurate?

 7        A.   They are.

 8        Q.   And I'd like to ask you, this paragraph uses the terminology

 9     "what the slant was."

10             Am I to take it from that that the sector commander would direct

11     you to slant a particular letter either for or against a particular side,

12     i.e., the Serbs or the Muslims?

13        A.   No.  He, in fact, would tell me what the theme and what the facts

14     and what type of message he wanted to relay to the affected party.  We

15     treated both sides equally and fairly.

16        Q.   And when you say "the letters really seemed like for the sake of

17     form," does that mean that decisions had already been made and it didn't

18     matter what either of the warring factions did in response to the letter,

19     UNPROFOR already had a course of action determined?

20        A.   No.  In fact, it was more a comment on the warring factions

21     despite our protestations of an incident that the warring factions in

22     many cases just ignored our -- our protests.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I'd like to now go into private

24     session to discuss the topic raised yesterday in private session.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

Page 5833

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Page 5834











11 Pages 5834-5836 redacted. Private session.















Page 5837

 1   (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

 5             MR. IVETIC:

 6        Q.   Sir, yesterday at transcript page 5805 you talked of freedom of

 7     movement for humanitarian aid.  I would like to turn to your consolidated

 8     statement which you have in front of you, P576, and I'm interested in the

 9     13th page in English and the 14th page in the B/C/S.  And I'm interested

10     in paragraph 42, which is the second paragraph from the top in the

11     English.

12             Here, you assert that the Serbs would rachet up pressure by

13     interfering with the humanitarian aid.  Now, I want to confirm first - I

14     think it's back at paragraph 14 of your statement, but I don't think we

15     need to turn to there unless you disagree with me - but the mandate of --

16     one of the mandates of UN Sector Sarajevo included ensuring freedom of

17     movement for humanitarian aid?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Would you agree with me that the impartially of the UN Sector

20     Sarajevo mission as to both sides in the conflict was essential to the

21     performance and success of the mission as to ensuring the movement of

22     humanitarian aid?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Now, what you've described as racheting up the pressure, in fact,

25     isn't this true that the Serbs had the legitimate concern to ensure that

Page 5838

 1     humanitarian aid being transported was not misused to clandestinely

 2     transport either military weapons or ammunition or other military

 3     supplies?

 4        A.   True.

 5        Q.   Now, in so far as the UN Sector Sarajevo's mission dealt with the

 6     movement of humanitarian aid, did Sector Sarajevo take steps to ensure

 7     that the aid convoys or transports were not misused in a manner to

 8     transport military materials or hardware for either side?

 9        A.   To the best of my knowledge, the UN did try to make sure that

10     those convoys were only for humanitarian aid, as under the auspices of

11     UNHCR.

12        Q.   Which organisation's responsibility was it to inspect cargo to

13     ensure that there was no contraband of a military nature onboard?

14        A.   In fact, a number of agencies looked at it:  The UNHCR, who had

15     the overall responsibility for the convoys, and then the military aspect

16     of the UN.  We also made sure that -- you know, through our sources that

17     those convoys were what they said they were, and that the freedom of

18     movement was for what it -- for the benefit of the civilians inside

19     Sarajevo and the enclaves.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that the inspection of these convoys by

21     the Serbs, by the VRS, was a legitimate and appropriate function to

22     determine if weapons or munitions or other contraband was present in the

23     same?

24        A.   Theoretically, but it never materialised that way.  Our

25     experience was - as I stand by my statement - the freedom of movement and

Page 5839

 1     those convoys, Serbs overplayed that comment that you just gave, that

 2     question.

 3        Q.   Could you help me to understand your answer.  You say "it never

 4     materialised that way."  Are you saying that there were never weapons

 5     found or military supplies found on aid convoys during the time-period

 6     that you were the MA at Sector Sarajevo?

 7        A.   I cannot recall of -- military weapons being found on -- on

 8     convoys.

 9        Q.   Would you agree with me that if weapons were found on convoys,

10     this would give the Serbs very legitimate gripes with the UN and would

11     give them a justification to be wary of future convoys and/or limit the

12     same?

13        A.   That's a hypothetical question that I just answered.  I did not

14     have any information of any contraband on those convoys.

15        Q.   Am I correct that during the time-period that you were with

16     Sector Sarajevo, there were some serious allegations that UN personnel

17     were even actively engaged in the smuggling of weapons or other criminal

18     activity on the side of the Bosnian Muslims [Realtime transcript read in

19     error "Serbs"]?

20        A.   There was only one incident that I know of and it was a

21     fallacious allegation of the UN transporting some ammunition, which was

22     for our own purposes and not for any other purpose.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, may I ask you a question -- you switched

24     in -- in -- among -- after one question you were talking whether it was

25     legitimate to inspect convoys.  And then the next question, you asked -

Page 5840

 1     that was the hypothetical question - whether they could limit it.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, I -- it's not entirely clear what position of

 4     the Defence is, that they were entitled to ask for these convoys to be

 5     inspected on the presence of military material; or whether they could

 6     limit it, limiting being a bit of an ambiguous expression.  It could also

 7     be you can do only two a week or once a month or -- it's unclear to me.

 8     You used different language, and I would like to understand fully what

 9     made you do this or whether it is indicative of the position of the

10     Defence in this respect.

11             MR. IVETIC:  I basically was talking about the inspection

12     regimes.  But I do know from prior witnesses that there were issues of

13     convoys that did not have the proper documentation or were not given

14     advance notice, could not be verified, and therefore would be limited

15     without being inspected until the paperwork was available.  So that would

16     be my answer to that, although I was asking this witness about just the

17     inspection regimes.  So I did misspeak when I added the -- limiting to

18     the second hypothetical.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Although you now use the word "would be

20     limited without being inspected."  So the position at this moment - and

21     that's the underlying thought of these questions - is that if there are

22     legitimate concerns about weapons being smuggled that the Serbs were

23     entitled to inspection; and if the paperwork was not correct, to then

24     stop the convoy until the inspection had been complete and the paperwork

25     was complete as well.

Page 5841

 1             Is that your position?

 2             MR. IVETIC:  It would be my position that either side, as I

 3     understand it, the Croats in -- in the other side of the country also had

 4     the same problems with weapons being smuggled --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, whether others had similar problems -- my

 6     question is, because you -- these questions were focussed on the Serbs in

 7     Sarajevo.  Is that your position?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  I'm trying to establish the factual backdrop that is

 9     relevant to the time-period in the indictment, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  But I asked you whether that was the Defence

11     position.  If you didn't limit it in time --

12             MR. IVETIC:  I thought I said that --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  If you say -- I take it that you're trying to give

14     evasive answers, where you actually want to say:  I want to discuss this

15     with lead counsel, isn't it?  Is that the situation?

16             MR. IVETIC:  Yeah.  Let's do that, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, whether you do it or not is not my concern.

18     But why not say immediately:  I would have to discuss that with lead

19     counsel before I answer your question?

20             Please proceed.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

22             MR. LUKIC:  Your Honour, if I may, I have to intervene only in

23     regard of the transcript.

24             Your Honour, if I may just intervene.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic.

Page 5842

 1             MR. LUKIC:  I just have to intervene in regard with the

 2     transcript.  Line -- page 17, line 3, says "Bosnian Serbs" and should be

 3     "Bosnian Muslims," and it changes the question drastically.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me check one second.  You said ...

 5             Could you again give the --

 6             MR. LUKIC:  17, 3.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  17, 3.  Let me have a look.

 8             MR. LUKIC:  Last two words.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I understood it to be "Bosnian Muslims."

10     That's -- I don't know whether -- Mr. Ivetic, I don't think, as a matter

11     of fact, that -- let me read again to you the question that was put and

12     that you started to answer.  Mr. Ivetic asked you:

13             "Am I correct that during the time-period that you were with

14     Sector Sarajevo there was some serious allegations that UN personnel were

15     even actively engaged in the smuggling of weapons or other criminal

16     activity on the side of the Bosnian" --

17             Did you then understand that the question was about Bosnian Serbs

18     or Bosnian Muslims?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, if you could just clarify which side you

20     wanted --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no.  You started answering.  You said:

22             "There was only one incident I know of."

23             Did you understand the question to be about Sector Sarajevo

24     siding with Bosnian Muslims?  If that's how you understand it, please,

25     tell us; if you understood it as the Sector Sarajevo siding with the

Page 5843

 1     Bosnian Serbs, tell us as well, so that we better understand your answer.

 2             THE WITNESS:  My under -- I interpreted and my understanding was

 3     siding with the Bosnian Muslims.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's how it was intended.  That is how I

 5     understood it.  That is how everyone apparently understood it.  So only

 6     one incident was -- one incident you knew of Bosnian Muslims involved in

 7     this type of activity?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

10             I think that clarifies the matter.  Whether it was a transcript

11     error or whether you misspoke, Mr. Ivetic, seems to be of less relevance.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Well, let's clarify --

13             MR. LUKIC:  It was a transcript error.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  You think it was a transcript error, yes.  I leave

15     it to the parties whether to take further action or whether we just

16     accept this to be the case, where the understanding is common among all

17     of us in this courtroom, witness, parties, and Bench.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I would like to turn to

20     1D00453, and I will be looking at page 40 in e-court of this document.

21        Q.   Sir, while we wait for it to come up on the screen, I can advise

22     you this is the transcript of 18 October 2010 from the Karadzic

23     proceedings.  And at page 40 we're looking at line 22.  And I will read

24     for you what is recorded as having been said and then ask for your input.

25             "Q.  Thank you.  In our conversation, you confirmed that you had

Page 5844

 1     knowledge -- or, rather, the UN had knowledge about the existence of the

 2     black market and the involvement on UN personnel in such transactions,

 3     and that there were even some investigations carried out about that."

 4             And if we can go to the next page for the continuation, at the

 5     top.

 6             "A.  The UN were conducting investigations of allegations of

 7     black-marketeering by the UN, and this was taken very seriously and

 8     investigated by a task force that came out of Zagreb.

 9             "Q.  There were even criminal vehicles that were blown up

10     illegally, and those were vehicles [as interpreted] by those who were

11     trying to prevent this.  A French officer who was trying to prevent this

12     was blown up; isn't that right?

13             "Let me rephrase this question.  Is it correct that a vehicle of

14     the commander of a French platoon, who was trying to prevent this

15     black-marketeering, was blown up, and that this had to do with his

16     activities aimed at countering the black-market activities?

17             "A.  There was a French military police platoon commander who had

18     his vehicle booby-trapped with a bomb.  He was in the process of

19     investigation -- investigating black-marketeering, and he did come to us

20     and we put him and the proper police authorities on to the allegations of

21     black-marketeering that he was looking into.

22             "Q.  At our meeting, you claimed that the booby-trapping of this

23     vehicle could have to do possibly with his activities against

24     black-marketeering; is that correct?

25             "A.  That's what I said, yes.

Page 5845

 1             "Q.  Thank you.  There was also UN personnel that was involved in

 2     prostitution rings in Sarajevo; is that correct?

 3             "A.  I've heard of those allegations and any -- any allegations

 4     that we would have heard about, we would have brought the proper

 5     investigative authorities in to address those allegations."

 6             First of all, sir, would you agree with me this selection of your

 7     testimony from the Karadzic case is both truthful and accurate as the

 8     matters you were asked about there?

 9        A.   Yes, it.

10        Q.   If you remember, how many of these type of investigations into

11     black-market smuggling or prostitution did the UN undertake during the

12     time-period that you were the MA at Sector Sarajevo?

13        A.   The sector commander convened one major investigation in-house

14     and tasked -- the headquarters in Zagreb had a major task force that came

15     down to investigate black marketeering as a whole.  So those -- those two

16     I know of.

17        Q.   To your knowledge, were any UN officers or employees ever

18     disciplined for their role in any such black-market activities?

19        A.   During the time that I was there, no, because the investigations

20     were ongoing when I left.

21        Q.   Were the matters that you were talking about in this section

22     complained of or brought to the attention of the UN by the Serbs?

23        A.   I don't recall.

24        Q.   If we can turn to the next page of the transcript, I'd like to

25     also ask you about the follow-up questions that you had.  It starts at

Page 5846

 1     page -- at line 1, I apologise.

 2             "Q.  Thank you.  You said, during our conversation, that the UN

 3     CIVPOL carried out a major investigation into the smuggling activities

 4     involving ammunition, weapons, vehicles, fuel, people, identity cards,

 5     and alcohol; is this correct?

 6             "A.  There was -- this was part of the UN task force on

 7     black-marketeering, and the sector conducted at least one major

 8     investigation on allegations of black-marketeering.

 9             "Q.  And this had to do with the smuggling of the articles that I

10     just referred to and that you also referred to during our conversation;

11     is that correct?

12             "A.  That is correct.

13             "Q.  Thank you.  You also agreed that because of this, Serbs did

14     have reason to be cautious in approving the entry of convoys into

15     Sarajevo, in light of the [sic] black-marketeering; is that correct?

16             "A.  I did not agree to that.  I would say that, in fact,

17     black-marketeering was an issue that all warring factions had to deal

18     with.  And the UN took it very seriously and dealt with it, and we raised

19     those issues with the appropriate side.

20             "Q.  But you would agree, would you not, that the Serbs had

21     reasons for increased caution and control of everything that was coming

22     into Sarajevo, in light of this information?

23             "A.  I would not agree that the Serbs had to have increased

24     control.  I would say that the Serbs, in co-operation with the UN, should

25     have looked at black-marketeering and to respect the UN mandate for

Page 5847

 1     freedom of movement."

 2             First of all, sir, can you confirm the accuracy and truthfulness

 3     of this section of your testimony from the Karadzic case as to this --

 4     these topics?

 5        A.   I stand by what I said.  They're correct.

 6        Q.   You say here that you think the Serbs should have co-operated

 7     with the UN to look into black-marketeering.  So I want to ask you:  In

 8     regards to the UN task force that you identify, were the Serbs included

 9     as part of that task force?

10        A.   I don't know.  You would have to ask the -- the organisation that

11     was running the investigation.

12        Q.   Which organisation ran the investigation?

13        A.   The UNCIVPOL from UN headquarters out of Zagreb.

14        Q.   Okay.  Did UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo ever, in writing, acknowledge

15     the serious problem of any black-marketeering or weapons smuggling, let

16     alone invite the Serbs to take part in any kind of joint efforts to try

17     and stop this?

18        A.   Again, I don't recall of any -- any letters that went out on that

19     subject, other than the -- the one in-house investigation we had on

20     black-marketeering.

21        Q.   Thank you, sir.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, we're at the one-hour mark.  We could

23     take a break, if Your Honours would like.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  It seems to be a suitable moment.

25             We will take a break of 20 minutes, but only after you've left

Page 5848

 1     the courtroom, Mr. Fraser.  Would you please follow the usher.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  We resume at 20 minutes past 10.00.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 9.59 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 10.30 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 7             MS. BOLTON:  Your Honour, while he is coming in, could I just

 8     address briefly a procedural issue?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please.

10             MS. BOLTON:  On -- a week ago Tuesday the Prosecution filed its

11     submissions on the admissibility of the associated exhibits with respect

12     to Mr. Roy Thomas, and earlier this week the Defence filed a response.

13     And I just wanted to alert the Trial Chamber that the Prosecution won't

14     be filing any reply to that.  So if that expedites the rendering of a

15     decision, that would assist us in terms of identifying exhibits for

16     future witnesses.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  While the exception would be that you would

18     intend to file a reply, whereas the normal situation is as you describe

19     it now -- I'm saying this because the Chamber has some concern about

20     requests for replies to be filed, seems to become now and then a routine

21     where it should not become a routine.  Having said this, we can continue

22     with the cross-examination of Mr. Fraser.

23                           [The witness entered court]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  But thank you anyway, Ms. Bolton, for informing the

25     Chamber.

Page 5849

 1             Mr. Ivetic.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 3        Q.   Sir, I forgot to ask you earlier, do you recall the name of the

 4     Russian Sector Sarajevo Chief of Staff whom we discussed earlier?

 5        A.   I've forgotten that now.

 6        Q.   That's fair enough.  We also talked earlier about how the French

 7     were running the affairs of Sector Sarajevo, and I want to take a look at

 8     another document, 1D474.

 9             And as we wait for it to come up, I believe this is a 12 May 1994

10     report of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps sent to the Main Staff of the VRS;

11     and if this date is accurate, this is about a month into your tour of

12     duty at Sector Sarajevo.  Is that accurate?

13        A.   That would be accurate.

14        Q.   If we can turn to page 1 in the B/C/S at the bottom and page 3 in

15     the English.  And we'll see here, sir, the information that:

16             "A BOV" armoured combat vehicle "of the French Battalion was

17     stopped at the check-point in Kasindolska Street.  And during the check

18     it was established that it was transporting seven cases of shells for the

19     82 MM MB" mortar "allegedly for their units in Rajlovac.

20             "Verification established that they had not even disclosed they

21     possess a weapon of" the above "calibre and the further resolution of

22     this problem is in progress.

23             "We had two members of UNPROFOR travelling in an off-road vehicle

24     without permission in the z/o of the 3 Spbr on the route Kosevo towards

25     Visojevici from where then intercepted and turned back."

Page 5850

 1             First of all, General Fraser what can you tell us about this

 2     incident, where it would appear that the French Battalion was

 3     transporting mines -- mortar mines for weapons that were not listed

 4     as being part of -- or not declared, I guess, as part of the arsenal in

 5     Rajlovac?

 6        A.   They were moving the ammunition for their own purposes.  And the

 7     weapons systems, whether or not they were disclosed to the Serbs or not,

 8     were used for the French to prosecute their operations under the UN

 9     mandate.

10        Q.   The document says that "further resolution of this problem is in

11     progress."

12             Do you know if there was a -- joint efforts by the Serbs and the

13     UNPROFOR to resolve this issue?

14        A.   This refers to the incident that I mentioned earlier, where the

15     Serbs raised it against the UN.  The UN, we - to the best of my

16     knowledge - acknowledged that this was ammunition for our own purposes,

17     nothing else.  And I would also add that I don't think under the mandate

18     we needed permission to be travelling.  Again, that was an example of

19     freedom -- restriction of our freedom of movement.

20        Q.   Was it often the case that French units were accused of engaging

21     in smuggling activities on behalf of the Bosnian Muslim forces?

22        A.   Not to my knowledge.

23        Q.   At transcript page 5809 and through 5810 yesterday, you talked

24     about P587, Mladic's order to restrict UNPROFOR and aid convoys.  If we

25     can call that up, first of all.  It should be P587.

Page 5851

 1             And just to be clear, by the time that this was issued, the 10th

 2     of April, 1994, UNPROFOR had just bombed the Serbs; is that accurate --

 3     pardon me, NATO had just bombed the Serbs.  Is that accurate?

 4        A.   Can you just go to the next page?

 5             Yes.

 6        Q.   If another party bombs a country - let's say Canada - is that

 7     considered an act of aggression or an act of war?

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Is -- are you asking for a legal opinion on this

 9     matter, Mr. Ivetic, or ...

10             Because isn't it true that the prohibition of aggression is a

11     rather complex matter?  It took them decades to define "aggression" at

12     the United Nations.  Isn't it true there is a kind of a tension between

13     bombing in self-defence, which would make it an act of war; bombing as an

14     aggressive act.  It is a rather complex legal matter you're raising with

15     the witness.  So would you please, instead of putting this question in

16     such a general way, further explore the details of the assumptions on

17     which such a question necessarily is based, context.

18             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honour, I have a gentleman here who,

19     based upon his experience as a Canadian -- member of the armed forces of

20     Canada as a general, has offered opinions --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             MR. IVETIC:  -- for the Prosecution on these very same topics as

23     to how to qualify actions of the parties on the ground in -- in Bosnia

24     and Herzegovina.  And I'm asking him now a hypothetical:  If anyone, a

25     force --

Page 5852

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me stop you there already.  All those

 2     opinions -- and perhaps needless to say that the Chamber is very cautious

 3     in making a distinction between what a witness testified in terms of

 4     facts he observed, reports he received, et cetera -- and let me be very

 5     candid to you, it was the last time during the last break that we were

 6     discussing the issue of opinions against facts.  This witness, when you

 7     asked him for opinion several times, reduced your questions to the facts

 8     he observed.  So he apparently is very aware of that as well.  But at

 9     least that was all in the context of a factual situation which existed in

10     Sarajevo.

11             You are now going one step further, asking opinion without any

12     context, apart from the general legal context.  That does not assist the

13     Chamber.  And whether the witness should be reminded of his duties or

14     not, that's a different matter.  But the Chamber primarily wants to

15     receive evidence which assists it in performing its task.  Could you

16     please keep that in mind.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. IVETIC:

19        Q.    Allow me to try to and give some context.  If we look at this

20     document, P587 - and I believe you have a second page in English -- yes,

21     you do - and if we read items 1 through 3, and 5, as a soldier, as a

22     general in the -- retired in the Canadian Armed Forces, do these items,

23     1, 2, 3, and 5, appear to be normal and what you would expect as a

24     response to an armed force being bombed by another armed force?

25        A.   In the context of this document, in relation to what was

Page 5853

 1     happening on the ground, no.  I had not arrived on the ground, but I was

 2     briefed on what was happening on the ground when I got there.  And the

 3     warnings went out to the Serbian forces to cease their operations or

 4     consequences would happen because of the civilians in the enclave; and,

 5     as a result, NATO was asked and attacked a target on the ground.  And

 6     this was the reaction to that set of circumstances.

 7        Q.   Let me take you through it step by step.  Since we have number 5

 8     up on the screen, let's start with number 5.

 9             Are you telling me, as a military officer, as a general in the

10     Canadian Armed Forces, that it is not expected or normal after being

11     bombed by a military force to instruct your forces to fire independently

12     in case of self-defence?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton.

14             MS. BOLTON:  I think, Your Honour, that we are, again, going into

15     a hypothetical situation of what occur if one country were attacked by

16     another country --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But I think at this moment you either object

18     to the question and then give the precise reasons for that, or let

19     Mr. Ivetic finish his question.  He is now not in general terms talk

20     anymore.  He is focussing specifically on what we find in paragraph 5.

21             You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

22             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, you asked me to --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton, I gave a ruling.

24             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, I thought you asked me to articulate

25     my -- whether I was objecting or not, Your Honour --

Page 5854

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  No --

 2             MS. BOLTON:  -- and I --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  -- I said that you had an opportunity to object on

 4     the question on specific grounds, and you started giving all kind of

 5     explanations.  And then I ruled that Mr. Ivetic can proceed.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  I object on the grounds of relevance for the record,

 7     Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton, isn't it clear to you that I gave a

 9     ruling?  I told you that twice.  Allow Mr. Ivetic to proceed.  And that I

10     do not expect you at that moment to just ignore what I said.  Is that

11     clear to you?  I hope it is.

12             Is it?

13             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, Your Honour.  I understand you made a ruling

14     and I was simply putting the Prosecution's position on the record --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not asking for further explanations.  I'm asking

16     whether it's clear what I said to you, that once I gave a ruling that

17     Mr. Ivetic may proceed, that you should not - certainly not twice -

18     ignore that ruling.

19             Is that clear to you?

20             MS. BOLTON:  I understand what you're saying, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  You have difficulties in admitting things, isn't it?

22     We noticed that yesterday as well when you were late with your

23     disclosure; you tried to soften it.  Instead of saying:  Apologies to the

24     Defence.  How can we remedy the situation we created?  That is a comment

25     I give now I refrained from giving yesterday.  I leave it to that.  And

Page 5855

 1     Mr. Ivetic is now allowed to proceed.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, Your Honour, may I have the opportunity to

 3     respond to the comment you made?

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  No, you do not have and it's now the third time that

 5     you apparently do not understand what a ruling in court means.

 6             Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   Sir, my question was:  Are you telling me, as a military officer,

 9     as a general in the Canadian Armed Forces, that it is not expected or

10     normal after being bombed by a military force to instruct --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps if I interrupt you.

12             Mr. Lukic, if you want to briefly consult with Mr. Mladic, you

13     have an opportunity to do so.  Keep your voices low, please.

14             MR. IVETIC:  I think for the sake of clarity, I'll start at the

15     beginning again, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Just ...

17             MR. IVETIC:  Oh.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, can we proceed?

19             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour, we can.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

21             Mr. Ivetic.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23        Q.   Sir, are you telling me as a military officer, as a general in

24     the Canadian Armed Forces, that it is not expected or normal after being

25     bombed by a military force to instruct your forces to fire independently

Page 5856

 1     in case of self-defence?

 2        A.   Section 5 of this document and what you said, that is legitimate.

 3        Q.   If we can turn to the previous page, which I believe would be

 4     page 2 in the English, and if we could focus in on number 1.

 5             As a military officer, as a general in the Canadian Armed Forces,

 6     is it not expected or normal, after being bombed by a military force, to

 7     instruct all commands and units of your army to be at full

 8     combat-readiness, to suspend leave of soldiers, and to call back soldiers

 9     who are already on leave?

10        A.   In the context of this document, no.  We were not in war with the

11     Serbian forces.  We were there as -- under the UN mandate, and our issues

12     were not with the Serbian forces per se.  And what that suggests to me --

13     that statement in and by itself, fine.  I have no issues with that.  But

14     the allegation that you are giving me is that we were going in conflict

15     with the Serbian forces; that was not our mandate.  And I want to talk

16     about this -- this document in the context of what was going on, on the

17     ground.

18        Q.   Let me ask you this:  In the context --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. -- could I just --

20             MR. IVETIC:  Yeah.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  -- make one very brief comment.  In your previous

22     question you introduced an element of self-defence which does not appear

23     in the document; it's your interpretation, Mr. Ivetic.

24             MR. IVETIC:  It does appear in the document, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, let me see.

Page 5857

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Number 5.  I'm sorry, it's the next page.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm sorry, that's -- then I missed that.  Let me

 3     just ...

 4             MR. IVETIC:  It should be the last line of item number 5.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let me check then.  It's now on my screen.

 6     Let me have a look.  Oh you -- yes, now I -- let me just check then.  One

 7     second, please.

 8             Yes, in case of self-defence.  If there would be any -- of

 9     course, that this requires to further define whether there exist or there

10     could exist a self-defence situation.  But that is an element which we

11     have to consider in this context, Mr. Ivetic.  But you're right, that's

12     what the document says.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

15        Q.   Sir, we were talking about the context of events.  Am I correct

16     that the entirety of your mission in Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslim side was

17     continually asking for military intervention from outside on its behalf

18     against the Bosnian Serbs?

19        A.   They asked and did not receive, yes.

20        Q.   Under that context, as a military commander, where the other side

21     is asking for military intervention, there has just been a form of

22     military action against you.  Are you saying that it would be illogical

23     to call up your forces and have them ready for combat-readiness, as a

24     precaution?

25        A.   The statement by itself, I -- I have -- there is no problem with

Page 5858

 1     that statement, what they were asking for.

 2        Q.   If we can go back to the prior page and look at item number 2, do

 3     you have a problem with what is being asked for in item number 2, again,

 4     in the context of the situation?

 5        A.   I do have a problem with it, in the sense that it's somewhat

 6     ambiguous.  They are to fire -- to be ready to fire immediately on

 7     targets in air-space, because under normal circumstances the fact that

 8     NATO aircraft are flying are not a threat to either side, but again the

 9     actions on the ground actually put the Serbian forces into a self-defence

10     mode because of a failure to communicate with the UN and stop what the UN

11     was asking the Serbians on the ground to do.

12        Q.   Sir, if I can --

13        A.   And that is the context that I answer your question, that when I

14     see they are to be ready to fire immediately on targets in the

15     air-space --

16        Q.   Read the rest of it.

17        A.   Yes.

18             "Fire on receiving an order to do so from the KM, command --

19     command post, of the GS VRS or independently in the case of an attack

20     from air-space."

21        Q.   It is very clearly limited to "in case of an attack" or on order;

22     isn't that correct, sir?

23        A.   That attack was precipitated by the actions of the ground forces

24     and the warning went out before that.  That is the context that I answer

25     that -- to that particular section.

Page 5859

 1        Q.   If we can look at item number 4.  It is specific about how the

 2     persons to be detained are to be treated.

 3             As a soldier, if you were to put yourself on the receiving end of

 4     a bombing, would you not agree that it would be prudent, in terms of

 5     safety -- and that members of the organisation or force that has just

 6     taken hostile action against you be detained and kept in a safe place,

 7     would you give a similar order if you were bombed?

 8        A.   No.  First of all, that section 4 says:

 9             "Immediately block all UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations'

10     convoys and their teams which happen to be in the RS, Republika Srpska,

11     territory."

12             There's no reason for doing that.  First of all, it's not even

13     specific to the area of conflict - it says "the general entire area" -

14     which is a violation of the UN mandate.

15        Q.   What is --

16        A.   And to:

17             "Remove and secure the convoys and bring the personnel and secure

18     them in a safe place.  Do not treat them roughly in the process."

19             It's heartening to have to tell people not to treat them roughly.

20     You shouldn't have to say at that.  It is a common course --

21        Q.   Actually, General, I put to you that in the military sense a

22     military commander who does not encourage his forces to abide by the

23     rules of engagement and by the laws of war is perhaps negligent in his

24     duties, as case law has found.

25             But I would like to ask you, sir, what is the standard operating

Page 5860

 1     procedure or protocol of the Canadian Armed Forces upon an attack by a

 2     third party as to nationals of that third party that are armed and on the

 3     territory of Canada?

 4             MS. BOLTON:  Objection, relevance.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton, you were on your feet.

 7             MS. BOLTON:  Yes.  I objected on the grounds of relevance what he

 8     would do on the basis of a Canadian -- sorry, we're missing part of the

 9     question which had to do with what he would do in a situation as a

10     Canadian soldier under attack.

11             MR. IVETIC:  I would be happy to withdraw the question and move

12     on, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes --

14             MR. IVETIC:  I think I made the point.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, when you addressed the witness several

16     times as a Canadian with a lot of military experience, I understood this

17     to be mainly to refer to the experience of the witness rather than being

18     a Canadian.  But one of the things that -- the situation we are finding

19     in this document is one which is complex, that is, that the starting

20     point is that there are NATO attacks, and it gives instructions as to how

21     to treat UNPROFOR people, humanitarian organisations, what to do with

22     that.

23             In order to assist the Chamber rather than asking the questions

24     you have put, it would require a thorough analysis of the starting point,

25     who is there, which party is linked to whom, if there is any legitimate

Page 5861

 1     reason to respond or to take action, against which party should that be

 2     done, or against which party it would be legitimate to do that, that

 3     requires first an analysis rather than to focus on the few lines of

 4     the -- this order, this very urgent order.

 5             That would assist the Chamber more if we would have that

 6     analysis.  Whether you want to make an analysis with the witness, yes or

 7     no, we leave that to you, but that is a comment on your line of

 8     questioning.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I apologise.  I thought it

11     was in the statement, but perhaps I'll just ask the witness to be clear.

12        Q.   The NATO bombings against the Serbs was at the request of your

13     superior officers in UNPROFOR; isn't that correct?

14        A.   That is correct.

15        Q.   Is it also correct that that -- strike that.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  This is one of the examples.  Do you have any

17     authority, what military action can take against a party who has asked

18     another military force to take military action, where the party

19     requesting it doesn't have the means perhaps or not sufficient means to

20     do that?  And that is -- these are all very complex matters.

21             MR. IVETIC:  I agree.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I think the Chamber is very much willing to analyse

23     them in detail together with the parties.  But, again, I'm asking:  Is

24     there any authority you could give us so as to assist us in understanding

25     the real issues?

Page 5862

 1             MR. IVETIC:  At this stage, no, Your Honours.  I was merely

 2     attempting to point out that the one explanation offered but the Office

 3     of the Prosecution on this witness in presenting this document is not

 4     clear-cut nor the only conclusion that can be reached for the same --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  If that is your purpose, then you have drawn our

 6     attention to that element.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 9        Q.   General, I would like to discussion sniping a bit more in detail.

10     And if we can turn to P576, your consolidated statement -- pardon me.

11             For your information, I'm talking about paragraphs 56 and onwards

12     of your consolidated statement, but I'd actually like to first start with

13     1D423, which, again, is the information sheet of the discussions of

14     General Rose with the Prosecution.  And I would like to turn to page 3 of

15     that document, of where -- where General Rose is -- is reported as

16     saying:

17             "I am sure that the Serbs were firing at the trams but I believe

18     Ganic also organised his secret police to snipe trams.  His sniper unit

19     sniped so that the angle of the shot matched the direction of the [sic]

20     Serb line.  During long cease-fires, I think that Ganic and the

21     Muslims ... were responsible for breaking the cease-fire.  This kept the

22     tension."

23             Sir, did you have the same information that Bosnian Presidency

24     secret police snipers were sniping at the trams in a way to mimic the

25     direction of the Serb line?

Page 5863

 1        A.   I did not have that information.  I was not aware of that.

 2        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to return to your 1997 statement to the OTP,

 3     that's 1D457.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, one question --

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  -- the information sheet or the proofing notes - I

 7     take it that you're talking about General Rose - do you intend to tender

 8     that?  Because there seems to be a quite a few sweeping statements in

 9     there which may be perfectly right but which might need further analysis

10     to better assess the -- if I could say the quality of those statements.

11     And of course, I do not know, is General Rose on the witness list?

12             MS. BOLTON:  He is, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then we can deal with it once he is there, and

14     I -- I'd forgotten about that.  But since you refer to it several times,

15     I wondered how we could process that instead of reading only small

16     portions to have a bit of a better idea.  Because we were able to read a

17     few more lines which may require further attention as to the accuracy of

18     the observations made by General Rose.

19             MR. IVETIC:  I'd be happy to tender it now, if the Prosecution

20     has no objection, since we have used it I think already five times in

21     these proceedings.

22             MS. BOLTON:  I would object, Your Honour.  I would prefer to deal

23     with the issue of the context in re-examination.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Let's wait until we have re-examination.  One

25     of the reasons I was just trying to -- it was on the screens so I read a

Page 5864

 1     few lines and I saw, for example, that General Rose gave a statement

 2     which may be easy to verify, that more people died in 1994 by crime in

 3     Washington than people died in Sarajevo.  That's a, I would say, a very

 4     verifiable fact on its accuracy, and that trigged me to ask you,

 5     Ms. Bolton, whether we should have that in evidence.  But we'll wait for

 6     Ms. Bolton.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 9             If we can have 1D457 called up on the screen.  And if we can look

10     at page 11 in both the English and the Serbian translation.

11        Q.   And I'm focussing now, sir, on the first paragraph, or the start

12     of the first subparagraph under the heading "Sniping," wherein you state:

13             "Both sides conducted sniper activity.  It was used mainly as a

14     terrorist type of activity.  During my tenure in Sarajevo, sniping ended

15     up in a tit-for-tat type of exchange.  If a Muslim shot a Serb, the Serbs

16     would say they'd shoot 10 Muslims.  Both sides were indiscriminate and

17     shot men, women, and children."

18             Sir, can you confirm the selection I have just read from your

19     1997 statement as being truthful and accurate?

20        A.   They are.

21        Q.   And is the crux of your -- well, strike that.

22             Would you agree with me that the party that benefitted most

23     politically from these sniping incidents was the Bosnian Muslim side?

24             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, Your Honour, I would like to object to that

25     question on the basis that it calls for an opinion in an area where, as a

Page 5865

 1     military person, we wouldn't expect him to have the ability to provide

 2     opinion evidence.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Objection is sustained.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 6        Q.   If we can focus on Snipers Alley for just a bit, am I correct

 7     that the Bosnian Muslims also had snipers situated and active in this

 8     area?

 9        A.   They did.

10        Q.   Yesterday at transcript page 5801 you talked of the Serbs having

11     reluctance to protect their trolley-bus line.  I'd like to focus on

12     Snipers Alley, and am I correct that UNPROFOR attempted to erect sniper

13     barriers to negate the ability of persons to be shot in the so-called

14     snipers area -- Snipers Alley?  Sorry.

15        A.   They did.

16        Q.   And am I correct that the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Sarajevo

17     either objected or did not agree with the erection of all the sniper

18     barriers that the UN was willing to put up?

19        A.   I don't -- I do not recall -- recall them objecting or not

20     agreeing to the erection of those barriers.

21        Q.   I'd like to call up 1D454, and if we can have page 26 in e-court.

22     This is the transcript, I believe, from the Karadzic proceedings.  It is.

23     If we can have page 26 -- well, yes, 26.  And if we can focus on item --

24     line number 5 and the question that was posed to you, sir, is as follows:

25             "Q.  Thank you.  Is it correct that the authorities in the Muslim

Page 5866

 1     part of Sarajevo did not agree, and that this effort to erect barricades

 2     was halted?  You can look at page 24 of your statement, if you like:

 3             [In English] 'The sector tried to improve the situation as

 4     regards the barriers by putting more.'

 5             [No interpretation].

 6             [In English] 'Sometimes the city wanted it; sometimes they

 7     didn't.'

 8             "A.  I won't dispute that.  And in every case, as I recall, the

 9     safety of the citizens was paramount, and we would do what we thought was

10     right to protect citizens."

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, when you are reading, your speed of

12     speech goes up.

13             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.  Do I need to repeat?

14             COURT REPORTER:  Wait, please.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, and I apologise to Madam Court Reporter.

16        Q.   Sir, does this selection from the Karadzic transcript refresh

17     your recollection as to whether the Muslim authorities did not agree to

18     all the barriers that the UN intended to put up in Snipers Alley?

19        A.   It refreshes my memory, and you can appreciate that after these

20     years not all the details would be immediately at the tip of my tongue.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Ivetic, I thought you said this refers to

22     Snipers Alley, but does this excerpt here refer to Snipers Alley?

23             MR. IVETIC:  I believe it does in the prior page of this

24     transcript.  But if we look at the top of -- the top of this page, items

25     1 through 3, the answer of the witness upon the question is:

Page 5867

 1             "We had a concerted effort to erect barricades to increase safety

 2     throughout the city where they were needed, not just simply on

 3     Snipers Alley."

 4             So he's talking Snipers Alley and other areas as well.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  So the answer is general, really.

 6             THE WITNESS:  I -- if I could --

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   Go ahead, sir.

 9        A.   I stand by my statement that I have there in front of me.  I

10     cannot recall all the specific details about what the city did or did not

11     agree to.  The UN had a concerted effort to have a passive barrier on

12     Sniper Alley which was the main effort.  The city was in agreement of

13     that because we had a substantial anti-sniping task force on that area.

14     A UN soldier was killed in -- there; another one was shot and severely

15     wounded there.  This was the main effort, and I do not recall specific

16     details if the city ever objected on Sniper Alley of the -- of the

17     measures that we took.  But I'll stand by, as a general statement, maybe

18     the city did not agree with all the places and it was a matter of

19     priority of where do we put our -- our resources?

20        Q.   Thank you, sir.  If we can turn to 65 ter number 10096.  This is

21     an UNPROFOR BH command sitrep, which I think we will see is dated the

22     27th of February, 1995.

23             First of all, sir, looking at the first page, are you able to

24     confirm that this is, in fact, a BH command sitrep dated

25     27 February 1995?

Page 5868

 1        A.   Yes, it is.

 2        Q.   If we can have page 10 of the document in e-court.  And I would

 3     focus on the part that starts:  "Assessment."  It's the third

 4     paragraph from the top, and I'd like to go through the first -- I guess,

 5     it's the sentence that deals with:

 6             "Although the number of firing incidents decreased, tension is

 7     likely to remain at an elevated level following the shooting incidents by

 8     uncontrolled elements at the airport and against the tram."

 9             Do you have knowledge and would you agree that during the

10     time-period that you were -- during this time-period, excuse me,

11     February 1995, the UN found that uncontrolled elements were sometimes the

12     source of the fire being experienced?

13        A.   The description of uncontrolled elements was a term used by both

14     warring factions to justify why actions took place.  And in the context

15     of this assessment, I'm not aware of the drafter or who released it,

16     whether or not that person is just using the terms given to the UN by the

17     effective warring faction or, in fact, if that was the case.

18             So if you could rephrase your question within that context, it

19     would probably help me.  Because this is the first time I have seen this

20     report, but I do know the term was used liberally to try explain

21     situations.

22        Q.   If we can call up, again, 1D454, and if we can turn to page 33 in

23     e-court and perhaps if we can have the English of the -- well, I'm sorry.

24     Never mind.  Page 33 in e-court of 1D454.  This is during the Karadzic

25     proceedings and is transcript page 8129 of that trial, and I'd like to

Page 5869

 1     focus on lines 20 through 25 of this page, which should be at the bottom.

 2     And it would appear to me, sir, that, here Mr. Karadzic was asking about

 3     this very same document in so far as lines 20 to 22 appear to have the

 4     same text that I have just read to you and the question that was posed to

 5     you at line 23 is:

 6             "Do you agree that the United Nations established that there was

 7     fire opened by uncontrolled elements?

 8             "A.  There was a degree of uncontrolled elements, yes."

 9             First of all, sir, are you able to tell us when you gave this

10     answer in the Karadzic proceedings, what was your understanding of

11     "uncontrolled elements" that the UN had established?

12        A.   There was a degree of uncontrolled elements, but it was also a

13     pivot that both warring factions tried to use multiple times.  The

14     situation on the ground was never black and white; it was always grey.

15     Notwithstanding that, the UN -- we spent a lot of time trying to advise

16     both parties to control the situation because the people most adversely

17     affected were non-combatants, civilians.

18        Q.   Okay.  We talked about Brigadier Fikret of the ABiH around the

19     airport area.  Would you consider him to be an uncontrolled element?

20        A.   Not completely.  No, he was under -- he was under control by

21     Muslim authorities.

22        Q.   Do you recall how numerous the personnel under his command were?

23        A.   I recall that he commanded a brigade during the time that I was

24     there, and it was the brigade in -- just -- just at the foot of the

25     Igman Mounts.

Page 5870

 1        Q.   At paragraph 66 of your consolidated statement - that would be,

 2     again, P576, for you to follow along, sir, in the hard copy, and it's the

 3     nineteenth page in the English - you talk about how trams were a

 4     favourite target of the Serb snipers and that in your opinion, trams

 5     could not be hit by accident.  In this regard I'd like to take a look at

 6     65 ter number 10096 again.  That was the sitrep of the 27th of February,

 7     1995.  And if we could have page 9 of 10096 in e-court.  I'd like to

 8     focus on the reporting of an incident from Sector Sarajevo.  At page 9 it

 9     says:

10             "A tram travelling between BP 90593 [sic] and BP 907592 was fired

11     at, reportedly resulting in one confirmed civilian casualty and possibly

12     three other casualties.  The confirmed casualty suffered a leg injury.

13     The estimated origin of fire was BP 907589.  Tramway service ceased

14     following the incident.  During the same time-period, both sides were

15     involved in a fire-fight 300 metres away in the area of the Vrbanja

16     Bridge (BP 912589).  An MG CFV has been attributed to both the BiH and

17     BSA for the event overall."

18             Now, sir, first of all, MG CFV, would that be a registered

19     violation of the -- of the cease-fire agreement that was in -- in place

20     at the time-period?

21        A.   Yes, it says a machine-gun cease-fire violation.

22        Q.   And --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. -- this all started with a quote from

24     paragraph 66, Mr. Ivetic.  You quoted it as --

25             MR. IVETIC:  That the trams could not be hit by accident, I

Page 5871

 1     believe, was the --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  What it says is that:

 3             "It's extremely unlikely that a professional sniper would hit a

 4     tram by accident given their skill levels.  Trams were a favourite target

 5     of Bosnian Serb snipers."

 6             Let's put the question directly to the witness.

 7             Would you exclude for the possibility that a tram could be hit by

 8     accident?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I would not exclude that.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  What you're saying in paragraph 66 is that the

11     frequency of trams being hit by snipers made you believe that they were

12     specifically targeted.

13             Is that what you wanted to say?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  And, Your Honours, I believe this

17     incident that is discussed in this document was G-14 which has been

18     removed from the indictment, but let me ask the witness.

19        Q.   With respect to the trams in Sarajevo and this particular tram

20     line, isn't it true that it ran very close to areas of active combat

21     between the Serb and Muslim forces?

22        A.   I recall that it did, and I also would reinforce that the UN, in

23     its reporting, did acknowledge when there were actions between two

24     warring factions and there was collateral damage and injuries, as it

25     reported here, "we said so."

Page 5872

 1             But going back to paragraph 66 of my statement, I'm talking about

 2     a sniper, and snipers do not use machine-guns.

 3        Q.   During your time-period at UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo, were you

 4     aware that the ABiH used several high-rise buildings for their snipers,

 5     including the Unis building and the Executive Assembly building?

 6        A.   We were aware of that.  And we protested that when there were

 7     examples of that against the Serbian side, against civilians.

 8        Q.   I'd like to turn to 1D457, and again this is your 1997 statement,

 9     which -- on the screen it will be page 18 in the English, page 20 in

10     the -- in the Serb.  And this is going to be the last paragraph on

11     page 18 that I'm asking you about, sir.  And it begins as follows:

12             "On September 18, Rose was not in Sarajevo.  Soubirou was the

13     acting commander.  There was another shooting incident.  The Muslims

14     fired four mortars out of the city, and the Bosnian Serbs replied by

15     firing into the city.  At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs threatened to

16     take their weapons out of Lukavica to counter what the Muslims had just

17     done.  Incoming rounds continued over some time.  We tried to contact

18     everyone to tell them to stop.  Rose sent a fax to both warring parties

19     and the press complaining about the violation, and how it was the

20     Bosnian Muslims had begun.  Rose stated that if they didn't stop, the UN

21     would attack each side equally with air."

22             First of all, sir, is this selection from your 1997 statement

23     truthful and accurate as to this occurrence?

24        A.   It is.

25        Q.   Would you agree with me that the action of the Bosnian Muslims

Page 5873

 1     was a violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and weapons

 2     exclusion zone that was in place at the time?

 3        A.   It was and that's why we protested against the Muslims for doing

 4     this.

 5        Q.   Did UNPROFOR actually go ahead and ask NATO to strike either

 6     the -- strike the Bosnian Muslims on this occasion?

 7        A.   It did not escalate to that level.

 8        Q.   But the Serbs were bombed on the 22nd September, several days

 9     later, by NATO at the request of UNPROFOR; is that correct?

10        A.   I believe so.

11        Q.   During your entire time-period at UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo, did

12     the UN -- the UNPROFOR mission ever request NATO to perform air-strikes

13     and bomb the Bosnian Muslim forces?

14        A.   The UN did not.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, I think we're at the time for the

17     break.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we are approximately at.  We had a bit of a

19     late start.

20             We take a break of 20 minutes.  Mr. Fraser, could you follow the

21     usher.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  We will resume at ten minutes to 12.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 11.28 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.53 a.m.

Page 5874

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 2                           [The witness takes the stand]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   I would like to, at this time, take a look at a document from the

 6     day before the 22 September bombing of the Serbs by NATO.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  If we can call up 1D471 in e-court.

 8        Q.   And while we wait for it, I'll just introduce, sir, that I think

 9     we'll see this to be a report from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to the VRS

10     Main Staff dated 21 September 1994.  And if we can look at the second

11     page, I guess, in English --

12             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, I thought my friend said this was a

13     document from the 21st of September.  This appears to be from March 1995?

14             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.  I'm looking at that now.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, yes.  And it's also not, I think, what

16     you said was a report but, rather --

17             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.  1D470.

18             And I thank Ms. Bolton for pointing out the error.  As I was -- I

19     would have spent much more time looking through the document to find the

20     selection.

21        Q.   If we can focus on the part, sir, here, where it's at the

22     beginning where it says:

23             "Any agreements with the Muslim forces or warnings by

24     General Rose are pointless.  They fire artillery pieces with calibre

25     larger than 12.7 mm from the exclusion zone on our positions and

Page 5875

 1     settlements, also in the exclusion zone."

 2             And if we could link this together with what's is on page 3 in

 3     the English and page 2 in the B/C/S, this would be item number 8,

 4     "Conclusions":

 5             "The enemy keeps firing in provocation and attacking all defence

 6     lines in the zone of responsibility of the SRK.  Despite the warnings by

 7     General Rose, they fired mortars and PAT on the Mrkovici sector from the

 8     area in Sarajevo city that is under Muslim control, the exclusion zone."

 9             Do you recall this incident where the Bosnian Muslims were firing

10     from within the exclusion zone at Serb positions?

11        A.   I'm not sure about this specific incident because I'm not sure

12     what -- where that is on the map.  But in the event that Muslims did fire

13     from the exclusion zone with weapons in contravention of the

14     cease-fire -- of the agreement, we protested that.  We spent a lot of

15     time chasing and trying to track down fire units in the city that were

16     doing this, that were in contravention.  We protested against the

17     Muslims.  And going back to your point, we never asked for an air mission

18     because there were no suitable targets to be found in a city.  And the

19     fact that they were firing at the Serbian positions -- if they were

20     firing at the Serbian conflict positions, we would argue against a

21     cease-fire violation but not at the fact they were firing at a position.

22     If it hit a civilian non-combatant area, we protested.  What the warring

23     factions did with each other, that was not part of the UN mandate, as

24     long as it followed the rules and the regulations, the agreements we had

25     within the TEZ and the DMZ.

Page 5876

 1             And the idea of Rose's warnings are meaningless, that is not

 2     true.  General Rose is a professional and he tried exceptionally hard

 3     with all parties to keep the situation under control.  And he was

 4     effective.

 5        Q.   Am I correct that UNPROFOR did not have a complete idea of where

 6     all the Bosnian Muslim weapons and forces were located because -- because

 7     the majority of the time was spent keeping track of the Serb positions?

 8        A.   No, that's not correct.  I mean, we tried to keep track of both

 9     sides and where the confrontation lines were, if -- where weapons systems

10     were.  And as I said just before, in the event where the Muslims did try

11     to fire from outside the city -- from -- from the city -- from within the

12     city on weapons that were in contravention of the cease-fire violation --

13     in contravention of the agreement, we would protest and we would try to

14     apprehend those weapons systems.  In one case it was a mortar that we

15     were trying to get.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, in your question, you present two facts

17     and the casual relationship.  It's always better to first establish each

18     of the facts and then consider the casual relationship, rather than to

19     put them in one bunch of -- please proceed.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  First of all, let me follow up on that

21     question and just ask --

22        Q.   Is it correct that UNPROFOR did not know where all the

23     Bosnian Muslim weapons and forces were located in Sarajevo?

24        A.   Not all the -- we knew where the confrontation line was.  We knew

25     where those units were.  Some of the weapons systems we did not know

Page 5877

 1     where they were.

 2        Q.   And would those be the weapons systems more in the interior of

 3     Sarajevo, in the depth of the territory behind the confrontation line?

 4        A.   In particular, the one that I referred to is the mortars that

 5     they moved around, we did not know where those were and we were always on

 6     the lookout for those.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, if you ask -- if the witness says that

 8     he didn't know the location of some weapons and then to ask him in the

 9     next question whether it was there and there, that is -- at least

10     ambiguous, and without further clarification as to telling where it was,

11     that he did know where it was.  That is -- at least raises some confusion

12     with me.

13             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.  Your Honour's reacting to the

14     witness's reference to the confrontation line, but I do see your point.

15        Q.   Sir, I'd like to turn to another topic.  If we can now have

16     number 1D451.  This is the transcript from the Dragomir Milosevic

17     proceedings, and I would like to have page 24 in e-court which should

18     correlate to 1778 of that case's transcript.  And I want to direct your

19     attention to line 17 onwards.  And here you indicated that you are aware

20     of two incidents and a third shelling incident, whereby the

21     Bosnian Muslim side had engaged in shooting at its own civilians in order

22     to generate press that would be favourable to their side.

23             I'd like to ask you about these incidents.  And I think the ---

24     for sake of efficiency, let's start first with the non-shelling

25     incidents, as it were.  Am I correct that there was an incident where

Page 5878

 1     some French soldiers related to the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo, that they

 2     had come across some Muslims filming a staged attack with children where

 3     no one was actually hurt, it was all staged, but that they were filming

 4     it and preparing to use it on TV against the Serbs?

 5        A.   I'm aware of that incident --

 6             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry.  There was just a number of questions asked

 7     all at once.  I wonder if that can be broken down.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  But the witness said that he was aware of the

 9     incident.

10             Mr. Ivetic, could you split it up.  And to the extent you're

11     interested in the details, to deal with them one by one.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

13        Q.   Could you tell me, sir, what is your knowledge of this incident

14     in regards to how the French soldiers came into this information?

15        A.   To the best of my recollection, they just came across the

16     situation.  They reported it.  And we would have brought it up to the

17     Muslim authorities.

18        Q.   And -- well, let's turn to the next page in the transcript,

19     that's page 27 of 1D451.

20             And if we can look at lines 13 through 19 of the same, sir.  I

21     think you will note and perhaps you already knew that but what I -- my

22     question was actually reading back to you your testimony from the

23     Dragomir Milosevic case which is at lines 16 through 19 of that

24     transcript page.

25             Apart from this information that I have now recited back to you,

Page 5879

 1     do you have any more specifics as to this incident that you could

 2     enlighten us with, or is that the totality of what you are able to say

 3     about this incident?

 4        A.   That is all I can say about this incident.

 5        Q.   Before we get to the shelling incident --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask the parties --

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  May I take that such an incident would be recorded

 9     somewhere?  It would be relevant for us to know what the report is.  The

10     witness apparently knows about the incident but has no further details,

11     and if the -- to make it relevant, of course, we would need such

12     information.

13             I'm looking at both parties at this moment.  Is there any report

14     about it?

15             MR. IVETIC:  At this time I don't know.  I know that the --

16     actually I should ask the witness.  But I believe the witness testified

17     in another case that he has not seen the video but that there was some

18     video that was in the possession of the French soldiers.

19        Q.   Am I correct about that?

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I encourage the parties to try and find that

21     material and see whether it gives further details.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

24        Q.   First of all, General, was I correct in recalling your testimony

25     from a prior proceeding, that you had not seen this video but that you

Page 5880

 1     believed there was a video that was said to be in the possession of the

 2     French UNPROFOR officials?

 3        A.   I had heard about it, never saw it, don't know anything more than

 4     what I've just said.

 5        Q.   Could you tell us about the second shooting incident?  That is to

 6     say, not the shelling incident which we'll deal with after.

 7        A.   So which shooting incident?

 8        Q.   You -- you had testified on the prior page of the transcript that

 9     you were, in fact, aware of two incidents and a third shelling incident

10     that was precipitated by the Serbs but finished off by the Bosnians, the

11     Muslims.  So we've now talked about one shooting incident.  I wanted to

12     know what was the other shooting incident that you had had in mind when

13     you identified those incidents.  Or perhaps it was an error and there's

14     only one incident.  I don't know.  That's why I'm asking you, sir.

15        A.   I'm a little -- I'm not sure.  The one thing I can talk about is

16     the shelling incident that started from the Serb side and finished on the

17     Muslim side.

18        Q.   And so we can get some more details about that shelling incident,

19     am I correct that the second shell which came from the -- was deemed to

20     have come from the Bosnian Muslim positions to a degree of certainty.  Is

21     that accurate?

22        A.   The incident started with a -- a shelling from the Serbs into the

23     city, causing civilian casualties.  And a short time thereafter, there

24     was a second shelling in the same area.  A joint investigation was

25     conducted by the UN and the Muslim authorities, and the conclusions of

Page 5881

 1     that investigation demonstrated where the first rounds came from, from

 2     the Serbian side; and where the seconds set of rounds came from, which

 3     was on the Muslim side.  And all of that was disclosed to the Muslim

 4     authorities.

 5        Q.   And am I correct that the second round from the Muslim side came

 6     at a time when people had congregated at the site of the first shelling,

 7     and, thus, the casualties were increased?

 8        A.   There was a congregation of people.  I'm not sure I would

 9     understand what your definition of "significantly increased."  There were

10     further casualties.

11        Q.   Okay.  You had indicated in an answer to a question a few moments

12     ago that the UN tried to track down these Bosnian Serb weapons positions

13     that were firing and to apprehend them.  Did you, in fact, apprehend or

14     confiscate any such weapons from the Bosnian Muslim forces?

15        A.   We were not.  We were -- we did not find those weapons systems,

16     not from a lack of trying.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, may I take it - and I'm also addressing

18     you, Ms. Bolton - that there must be reports about these incidents,

19     contemporaneous reports.  I mean, so that the Chamber is better able to

20     understand what is the area and how many casualties there were at that

21     time.  The Chamber again encourages the parties to find such reports and

22     to tender them so that we have more detailed information, that we are

23     better able to analysis what happened.

24             Please proceed.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, sir.

Page 5882

 1        Q.   General Fraser, I guess it goes without saying but with regards

 2     to these two incidents there were no air-strikes sought by UNPROFOR on

 3     the part of NATO against the Bosnian Muslims.  Is that accurate?

 4        A.   No NATO air-strikes were sought for either party.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Yesterday at transcript page 5773, when talking about

 6     Exhibit P578, you identified that the reason that the Serbs were

 7     subjected to air-strikes was specified in that document.  Am I correct,

 8     sir, that the press release, that P578, talked about incidents where the

 9     Bosnian Serb army opened fire on UN vehicles and personnel as being the

10     reason for the air-strikes that occurred in September -- in -- at that

11     time-period?

12        A.   I do believe it was in September of 1995; that is correct.

13        Q.   I would like to take a look at 1D00464, and it appears to be --

14     once this comes up, sir, I think you will see it appears to be dated

15     12 October 1994.  And if you can look at the first page, sir, and tell

16     me:  Does that appear to be your initials as the originator of this

17     memorandum?

18        A.   That -- that would be some -- those are my initials.

19        Q.   Can you tell us, sir, looking at paragraph 2 of the same, if you

20     recall that the investigation revealed that it was without a doubt the

21     BiH side that was responsible for attacking the airport on this occasion

22     with mortar fire?

23        A.   That's what the report states, yes.

24        Q.   And at that time the airport was where UNPROFOR was situated; is

25     that correct?  UNPROFOR had personnel and vehicles at the airport?

Page 5883

 1        A.   That is correct.

 2        Q.   Can we look at item 3 on the same.  And here it states:

 3             "This shelling clearly comes from the area controlled by

 4     General Fricket [as read] who is in opposition to the ongoing

 5     negotiations with his corps commander, General Karavelic, regarding the

 6     withdrawal of BiH troops from the DMZ.  This incident occurred ten

 7     minutes following a meeting with the COS Sector Sarajevo and

 8     representatives from the Bosnian 1st Corps and Romanija Corps.  It is

 9     believed that this incident was instigated by General Fikret in order to

10     disrupt the ongoing negotiations."

11             Sir, does this part of your memorandum comport fully and

12     accurately and truthfully with your recollection of this incident and the

13     findings made thereafter or the assessments?

14        A.   To the best of my recollection.  Based on what I've just read,

15     that is accurate and it would have resulted in a protest from UNPROFOR to

16     the Muslim authorities at the corps level.

17        Q.   And for clarity, this General Frickret, is that the same

18     Brigadier Fikret that we discussed earlier?

19        A.   He is one and the same.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Your honours, I would tender this document as the

21     next available 1D exhibit number.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 1D00464 will be Exhibit D106.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  In the absence of any objections, admitted into

25     evidence.

Page 5884

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  I would now like to turn to 65 ter

 2     number 1D00465 in e-court.

 3        Q.   And as we wait for this, I can let you know, sir, that it is

 4     dated 22nd of November, 1994.  And if it -- if we can turn to the --

 5     strike that.

 6             Let's first look at items 1 through 3 on the first page, sir,

 7     wherein it is detailed that fire was opened multiple times upon the

 8     vehicle of the sector commander who was returning from a meeting with

 9     Bosnian Muslim authorities and his vehicle was struck.

10             First of all, sir, do you recall this incident?

11             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honours.  It seems to me my friend

12     is paraphrasing, and if is he quoting from the document at page 2, it --

13     there's discussion about exchange of fire, not firing at the vehicle,

14     which I think is a little different.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  You are quoting from where, Mr. Ivetic?  Because we

16     are on page 1.  If you're quoting from page 1, then ...

17             MR. IVETIC:  Let's read it into the record.  I was going to

18     tender the document but, I mean, if we're going to split hairs let's read

19     it.

20             "On 22 November 1994 the sector commander was returning from a

21     meeting with General Karavelic, Brigadier Fikret, and Dr. Muratovic in

22     Hrasnica.  As he was returning to Sarajevo with Dr. Muratovic, the sector

23     commander's vehicles were engaged by small arms, resulting in several

24     impacts to the two vehicles.

25             "At approximately 2010 hours in the area of GR 845561 [sic], the

Page 5885

 1     three-vehicle convoy (police, sector commander Toyota, VBL) entered into

 2     an exchange of fire starting from the north to south and replied from

 3     south to north.  This exchange of fire was over the roofs of the sector

 4     commander and VBL vehicles.  It appeared that the firing came from very

 5     close because muzzle flashes were seen by the undersigned on the north

 6     side of the road 5 to 10 m away.

 7             "About 50 metres later, the convoy was once again engaged with

 8     three impacts hitting the sector commander's vehicle on the left side,

 9     north side of the road.  The VBL was hit several times in the rear.  Both

10     vehicles were struck by small arms.  There were no injuries."

11        Q.   And, sir, the question I had for you is, if you recall this

12     incident:  Where in three occasions the vehicle containing the sector

13     commander was exposed to fire?

14        A.   I do, because I was in the second vehicle.

15        Q.   And if we turn to the second page, the undersigned of this

16     report, would, in fact, be yourself; is that accurate?

17        A.   That is correct.

18        Q.   And if we look at item number 5 and the last -- the last -- I

19     guess the last sentence of the same:

20             "All shots appear to have originated from the BiH troops.

21     Because of the sound which would indicate it was from a short distance.

22     The flash seen by the author and the fact that trajectory could only have

23     come from the BiH (see diagram)."

24             Does this accord with your recollection of the assessment as to

25     the -- who was involved in the shooting at this incident?

Page 5886

 1        A.   It does.  We were travelling through this area, and it appeared

 2     to be just a bunch of soldiers in the middle of the night.  Isolated

 3     incident:  Somebody fired, somebody shot back, and they started shooting

 4     at our vehicles in the middle.  It was nothing more than an isolated

 5     incident.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender this document as the

 7     next available 1D exhibit number.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 1D00465 will be

10     Exhibit D107.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13        Q.   General, were there multiple other instances that you are aware

14     of during your time-period when Muslim forces fired upon UNPROFOR?

15        A.   I don't recall of any others.

16        Q.   And if I can refresh your recollection, I call up 1D451, which is

17     the Milosevic proceedings transcript of your testimony.  And if we can

18     have page 38 in the English -- 38 in the only version, I apologise.  That

19     will correlate to transcript page 1792.

20             And, sir, if I can direct your attention from line 5 onward where

21     you're answering the question directed to you I guess it was

22     Judge Robinson.  I can't see it on the screen right now, but it says

23     here:

24             The witness:  "Yes.  We could tell from which side they were

25     firing at.

Page 5887

 1             "To answer you and further explain, I think it was around the --

 2     in April of 1995, a French soldier was coming back from the airport.  He

 3     was shot and killed coming through the airport, and another French

 4     soldier was shot and killed by a sniper along Sniper Alley.  One of those

 5     snipers was a Serbian that we determined along Sniper Alley; the other

 6     one we determined -- we ascertained was probably a Muslim sniper, and

 7     that one was at the airport."

 8             Does this refresh your recollection as to at least one other

 9     incident where there was -- there was an assessment that a Muslim sniper

10     had shot and caused a fatality amongst an UNPROFOR member?

11        A.   This refreshes my memory now there were two incidents and think

12     it was on 14 and 15th of April.  On 14 one French soldier was killed.  It

13     precipitated the dispatch of the French chief of the defence staff to

14     meet with the French authorities in Sarajevo.  While a chief was en route

15     on the 15th, another French soldier was killed and precipitated the

16     dispatch of the minister of national defence to talk about the killing of

17     those two soldiers, one by the Serbs and one by the Muslims.

18        Q.   I'd like to move now to another topic.  Again, I'd like to look

19     at your 1997 statement, 1D457.  And this will be page 20 in the English;

20     page 21 in the B/C/S.  And it is the second paragraph on the page.  On

21     page 20 of the English.

22             And I'd like to ask you about this incident and let me just read

23     it how it is recited here.

24        A.   Which paragraph?

25        Q.   It's the second from the top.

Page 5888

 1             "On the morning of October 6, 1994, a raid by a Bosnian army team

 2     took place on a Bosnian Serb Bivouac situated on Mount Igman.  They left

 3     17 dead as a result of the attack.  Bosnian went through the DMZ to get

 4     there, in fact, over ground that Serbs had given up at the time of the

 5     February 1994 agreement.  A mixed team was tasked to go and investigate.

 6     A written report was given out, the bodies were removed.  We needed to

 7     show the Bosnian Serbs that the UN was taking quick action [sic] in order

 8     to calm the situation.  A strong protest was issued to the 1st Corps.  It

 9     read that all personnel in the DMZ must leave now.  The Force Commander

10     characterised it as a terrorist attack."

11             First off, sir, does this selection accurately and truthfully

12     reflect the basic facts of this incident as you know them?

13        A.   It does.  It reflects a warring faction attacking another warring

14     faction, which in itself would not be something that we would intervene.

15     The fact that the one warring faction, the Muslims, came through the DMZ

16     was a violation which we protested against the Muslims and reminded them

17     of the agreement and their responsibilities to leave that affected area.

18        Q.   The DMZ at issue - am I correct - that it had been handed over to

19     the UN and there were UN personnel situated thereupon?

20        A.   It was an area of continual dispute between both sides, as --

21     including the TEZ.

22        Q.   Now the date for this particular incident was the 6th of October.

23     I'd like to look at 1D00463.  And if we can look at the first page of the

24     document, first off, sir.  Can you confirm for me that this is a document

25     that you yourself signed and sent from Sarajevo to the BH command

Page 5889

 1     forward?

 2        A.   It is.

 3        Q.   And it is -- does it appear -- am I correct it's dated the 2nd of

 4     October; is that accurate?

 5        A.   That's correct.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And is this document -- it mentions a DMZ in item 1 on the

 7     first page.  Is this the same DMZ, the same area that we had just

 8     discussed, where, several days later, this attack occurred?

 9        A.   It is.  And, as I said before, this was -- these two areas were

10     continual issues raised by the UN with both parties regarding the

11     violation by both parties of weapons and activities inside both of these

12     areas.

13        Q.   If we can turn the page and look at items 2 and 3.

14             It reflects here that at issue - at least in number 2 and 3 -

15     there's only discussion about 200 soldiers from the 4th Brigade alleged

16     Muslim legion and the police who were in violation of the TEZ and DMZ

17     agreements and asked for them to be removed or if not -- if this was not

18     resolved, that a press statement would be issued.

19             Am I correct that at this time it was the Bosnian Muslim forces

20     that were solely in this area in violation of the TEZ and the DMZ?

21        A.   It is right that we were protesting against the Muslims, but your

22     assertion that they were solely responsible would be a generalisation.

23     Both parties were guilty of violations of the DMZ and TEZ.

24        Q.   Were the Serb forces that were killed located within the DMZ or

25     outside the DMZ?

Page 5890

 1        A.   In this incident, they were outside of the DMZ.  And the fact

 2     that the Muslims attacked them on that side was a -- an action between

 3     two warring parties.  We protested the fact of how they got there.

 4        Q.   Did UNPROFOR ask NATO for air-strikes against the Bosnian Muslim

 5     forces for the violations of the TEZ and the DMZ agreement at this time?

 6        A.   We did not, because there's no appropriate target.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  I'd like to tender this document as the next exhibit

 8     number, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 1D00463 will be Exhibit D108.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             If we can briefly turn to 65 ter number 1D00466.

14        Q.   And while we wait for that, sir, I can give you an introduction

15     again.  It appears to be a memorandum and appears to be dated the 23rd of

16     November, 1994.  And I would ask when you review the first page, can you

17     confirm that that is your initials signed as the originator of this

18     document?

19        A.   Those are my initials.

20        Q.   If we look at item number 1 on the first page, it would seem that

21     the Bosnian Serb army was still preoccupied with discussions on clearing

22     of the DMZ.  Is this, again, the same DMZ that we were talking about in

23     October?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Would you, therefore, agree with me that this situation of the

Page 5891

 1     presence of armed Bosnian Muslim troops in a DMZ that was supposed to be

 2     under the control of UNPROFOR forces continued for an excess of one

 3     month?  Actually, one and a half months, if it was the beginning of

 4     October.

 5        A.   It was the preoccupation of the UN to attempt to get the Muslims

 6     to comply with the agreement of the DMZ.

 7        Q.   Were any threats issued to the Bosnian Muslims?  Or was it more

 8     of a -- of -- of the UN asking them to undertake something of their own

 9     accord?

10        A.   I wouldn't phrase it as taking something under their own accord.

11     We reminded the Muslims of their obligation under the accord which they

12     had signed up to and under the UN mandate.  We kept reinforcing that

13     point with them to the authorities at the corps, and up higher.

14        Q.   To your knowledge, did anyone from the UN ever threaten the

15     Bosnian Muslims with military strikes if they did not comply with the

16     agreements that they had entered into?

17        A.   There was nothing that I recall of us threatening - using your

18     term, not mine - the Muslims.  And, again, appropriate targets would have

19     to be determined, and that is something that is difficult to determine

20     when you live and work in a city.

21        Q.   I'm not asking you if strikes were ever planned.  I'm asking you

22     a different question.

23             Were -- was the threat of strikes ever used to try to entice the

24     Muslim forces to abide by the agreements they had signed?

25        A.   You don't make threats unless you are prepared to follow through

Page 5892

 1     with them.  The UN did not make fallacious threats.  We only --

 2        Q.   Is there --

 3        A.   -- we only protested and did concrete action that we knew we

 4     could follow through with that could achieve the desired effect.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I just try to understand what's going on.

 6             The first question was - 66, line 17 - Did anyone from UN of

 7     threaten?  I make it short.

 8             "A.  There was nothing that I recalled of us threatening."

 9             So that is a no.

10             And next question:

11             "I'm not asking whether strikes were planned.  I'm asking a

12     different question, whether there were threat of strikes."

13             And then that answer does not repeat the previous answer, we only

14     protested.

15             It's -- from the answers, I take it that the witness has told us

16     twice that there were no threats.  If there would have been threats, that

17     you would only express threats if you would be willing to give it a

18     follow-up; but if there's no threats, then that is superfluous to tell

19     us, and then he told us what was going on.

20             I do not see what's -- I mean, did I understand your answer well,

21     that never threats were made to the Muslims?

22             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honour, we never threatened the Muslims.

23     We only protested.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

25             Please proceed.

Page 5893

 1             MR. IVETIC:

 2        Q.   Am I to take your answer that the UN was not prepared to consider

 3     the option of air-strikes against the Bosnian Muslims, even for multiple

 4     and repeated violations of the cease-fire and the TEZ and DMZ agreements,

 5     even if such violations were ongoing for a period of over a month?

 6        A.   The UN also considered the option of air-strikes, but the

 7     decision at the time was to protest against the Muslim authorities

 8     regarding the violations of the DMZ.  That was the action taken.  But it

 9     was ... that -- that's my answer.

10        Q.   Fair enough, sir.  I'm happy to move onto another topic.

11             Yesterday at transcript page 5783 and forwards, you discussed for

12     several pages the modified air bombs.  In particular, you talked about

13     the beaten zone for that weapon being of 500 metres and how you could not

14     control the point of impact.

15             First of all, sir, am I correct that you have never had any

16     training or experience in the use of such a weapons system?

17        A.   While I've not had training in that weapons system, 30 years in

18     the army, having commanded two Mortar Platoons, having commanded a

19     brigade using rockets, missiles, aircraft, and the basic training and the

20     continuous training that I have received, I am more than qualified to

21     provide commentary, and my opinion --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me stop you there.  The question was whether you

23     had any training.  I wondered what that question was about.  Because I

24     understood from your statement that it was at that moment that you for

25     the first time learned about the existence of such a weapon.  Is that --

Page 5894

 1             THE WITNESS:  That is true.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So whether you are trained in the use of a

 3     weapon, where the statement clearly says that you only learned about the

 4     existence of it at that moment, that needs, at least, some clarification,

 5     why to ask such a question.  And then you started answering, more or less

 6     defending yourself against what you considered might be an attack on your

 7     knowledge, where there was no need to do that.

 8             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  For the record, Your Honours, I was trying to find a

10     bases for the evidence elicited by the Prosecution yesterday at

11     transcript pages 5783 and onwards, where this witness said that one could

12     not control the point of impact of such a weapon.  And if he has not had

13     any training or experience in it, I'm wondering what the bases of that

14     conclusion is.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, perhaps analysis after you have seen

16     something, that's a possibility.  But the training question really is --

17     well, it seems to be a routine question more or less, were you --

18             MR. IVETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  -- trained in this?  Were you trained in that?  That

20     routine is not always necessary; I wanted to point that out.

21             Please proceed.

22             MR. IVETIC:

23        Q.   Would you agree with me that you have not consulted any books or

24     manuals about the beaten zone of that weapon or the schematics of that

25     weapon?

Page 5895

 1        A.   I have not.  All I have done is read the report from the

 2     artillery commander who gave the facts as to the potential beaten zone

 3     for that weapon.

 4        Q.   And am I correct that you've never seen such a weapons system

 5     since you left Bosnia?

 6        A.   I have not.

 7        Q.   And you've not performed any analysis since leaving Bosnia about

 8     the capabilities or schematics of such a weapons system?

 9        A.   I have not.

10        Q.   If we could call up P580.  That's the document that I believe you

11     have referenced.  And with all due respect to your military experience,

12     sir, isn't there a difference between beaten zone and the so-called

13     lethal zone or danger zone of an indirect fire weapon?

14        A.   They're part and parcel of the same thing, and perhaps you could

15     explain what you mean by "both" in your terms.

16        Q.   I'd prefer to direct you to Colonel John Hamill, a career

17     artillery officer who testified in this trial at transcript page 5519 and

18     5520, that a 500-metre danger zone applied to a 120-millimetre mortar

19     round.  Does that sound about right to you?

20        A.   That's probably right.

21        Q.   So would you agree with me, then, that one conclusion we can

22     reach from P580 is that the modified aerial bomb has the same approximate

23     danger zone as a 120-millimetre mortar?

24        A.   But that fails to take into consideration the ballistic

25     capability of that round as it travels through the air about where it

Page 5896

 1     will fall within that beaten zone, and within the beaten zone the lethal

 2     radius of that round.  You have to take into consideration both factors.

 3     And that's just a theoretical discussion about beaten zones and the

 4     lethal zone around the point of impact.

 5        Q.   And would you agree with me that this document, which seems to be

 6     concerned with potential injuries or perhaps fatalities, 200 and

 7     500 metres from the entrance of a target is only able to help us with

 8     respect to the lethal radius and the danger zone of this particular

 9     weapon?

10        A.   It starts to go in that direction - I would agree with that

11     much - but two numbers on a report just begs more questions.

12        Q.   I agree.  And you were very confident yesterday when you said

13     this shows the beaten zone to be thus and so.  Am I correct that this

14     document does not permit us to make any qualifications as to the beaten

15     zone of this particular weapons system?

16        A.   As a starting point, this document would allude to at least a

17     beaten zone of 500 metres, and I would like to go back and check on my --

18     how I responded to that question -- but as a start point, at least

19     500 metres.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll have to opportunity to do that after the

21     break, if there's any need to do it.

22             There is a procedural matter I'd like to raise, but we don't need

23     you for that, Mr. Fraser, so would you already follow the -- the usher.

24             Yes, and come back after approximately 20 minutes.

25                           [The witness stands down]

Page 5897

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  The matter the Prosecution would like to raise is

 2     appropriately raised in private session or in open session, Mr. Groome?

 3             MR. GROOME:  Private session, Your Honour, please.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

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Page 5898











11 Page 5898 redacted. Private session.















Page 5899

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11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

17             We'll take a break and resume at quarter past 1.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 12.55 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We turn into private session.

21                           [Private session]

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 5900











11 Pages 5900-5901 redacted. Private session.















Page 5902

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 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're in open session.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

13             Mr. Ivetic, could you give us a further impression as to how much

14     time you would need, assuming that you would use the next 15 minutes

15     today?

16             MR. IVETIC:  I'd need probably another 15 minutes, because I have

17     about half an hour left, which was the original estimate of four hours,

18     Your Honour.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, Mr. Fraser, could I first ask your

23     attention.

24             There may be some text on the screen.  I'd invite you not to read

25     it because that was part of private session and it's not relevant for

Page 5903

 1     your testimony, and it's even confidential.  So if you would not start

 2     reading the screen until -- if I talk for another five minutes then we

 3     would be there, but I will refrain from doing that.

 4             Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6        Q.   General, I'd like to ask you now with respect to this modified

 7     aerial bomb, first of all, we're talking about a 250-kilogramme bomb.  Is

 8     that your understanding?

 9        A.   Yes, it is.

10        Q.   Would you agree with me that a 250-kilogramme bomb landing on a

11     concrete or brick building might punch a hole in it but would be little

12     or no damage?

13        A.   I would agree.

14        Q.   Would you agree with me that landing on the ground it would have

15     a greater impact in the sense of sending up shrapnel and fragments but

16     that the radius would depend on whatever size the warhead contained in

17     the bomb is?

18        A.   And be a function of the type of ground it landed on.

19        Q.   Correct.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   With respect to this weapons system, do you agree that if tested

22     and fired and analysed, the performances of the weapons system can be

23     determined and a firing table for the same can be established?

24        A.   If all those conditions were met, yes.

25        Q.   And as you sit here today, you do not have access to any firing

Page 5904

 1     tables or analyses of any such test to assume that all those conditions

 2     were met or not?

 3        A.   I do not.  The only thing I have is that one report.

 4        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'd like to now to discuss an area that you

 5     spent considerable time on in your statement, proportionality, and I

 6     would like to explore some issues relative to the same.

 7             First of all, on this issue of proportionality of a military

 8     action, have you authored any articles, books, or treatises on this

 9     specific topic?

10        A.   Not authored, lectured.

11        Q.   Okay.  How many lectures?

12        A.   I can't remember, other than what I've taught at the Army

13     Staff College and the Canadian Forces College in Canada.

14        Q.   Have you ever served as an expert witness in any legal

15     proceeding, including court-martial proceedings, on the topic of whether

16     a particular military action was proportionate or disproportionate?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Correct me if I'm wrong, but your position is based primarily on

19     what you understand the Canadian military doctrine or standards of

20     proportionality to be?

21        A.   No.  The basis is Canadian but within the context of operating

22     within a coalition, that coalition be it the UN or another coalition like

23     NATO.  Each and every one of us who wears a uniform is based in that

24     particular country; but based on how operations are done normally as a

25     part of a bigger team, we have to make sure that we take what we come

Page 5905

 1     with and are able to apply and work together to achieve desired effects.

 2        Q.   You've brought up coalition within either NATO or the UN.  In

 3     regard to the situation in Bosnia during the time-period that you were

 4     there, when military air-strikes were sought against a party - we'll

 5     leave it general for now, although I understand your testimony that it

 6     was not ever sought against the Muslims - but in the instances when it

 7     was sought, who would select the targets for the air-strikes that were to

 8     be carried out?  Would it be the United Nations?  UNPROFOR?  NATO?  Or

 9     somebody else?

10        A.   It would start off with the UN determining a target, and then

11     there would be a dialogue between the UN, the recommending authority, and

12     the NATO to determine the suitability of platform and target.

13        Q.   Now if we can return to the Canadian military perspective, am I

14     correct that part of the analysis of a proportionate military action

15     involves attempting to minimise the cost or expenditure of the ordnance

16     of munitions to achieve a particular military objective?

17        A.   If I understand, you're talking about collateral damage?

18        Q.   No.

19        A.   Can you just re --

20        Q.   I'm talking about in terms of proportionality of a military fire

21     mission.  Is part of the analysis also, in terms of choosing which

22     ordnance or weapon to use, take into account an effort to minimise the

23     cost expenditures to use the minimum ordnance necessary to achieve a

24     military objective for a fire mission?

25        A.   Not cost expenditures but the weapon versus the target.  So if I

Page 5906

 1     can give an example.

 2        Q.   Go ahead, sir.

 3        A.   To -- if you have a sniper that you want to take out, using a --

 4     I'm -- just for illustrative purposes, a thousand-pound bomb would be

 5     disproportional for the sniper.  The ideal weapons system to take out a

 6     sniper would be another sniper; that would be proportional.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  But I think Mr. Ivetic did put a different question

 8     to you.  Could I, first of all, see whether I understood the question by

 9     rephrasing it.

10             If you would choose a weapon in a proportionate attack, would you

11     sometimes choose perhaps a weapon stronger than really needed for that

12     attack because it would be cheaper?

13             Is that more or less -- cheaper in terms of ... if this is not --

14             MR. IVETIC:  That's not -- that's actually a twist I had not

15     thought of, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then, please -- then apparently the question

17     at least was not clear to me.  Rephrase it in such a way what you mean by

18     "expenditure" in this context.

19             MR. IVETIC:  I will try to do that by focussing on what the

20     witness just said.

21        Q.   You said that the ideal weapons system would be another sniper.

22     Is that, in terms of the -- the costs of having a sniper as opposed to

23     some other ordnance, let's say, a mortar?  Is that part of the analysis

24     within the Canadian tradition, military tradition?

25        A.   It's the terminology that you use, "cost."  We don't -- I just

Page 5907

 1     don't understand when you say "cost," are you talking about a monetary

 2     cost?  Are you talking about a figurative cost of -- I just don't quite

 3     understand when you use the word "cost."

 4             When I say "proportionality" - and this is not just Canadian, it

 5     is -- it is common amongst the militaries that I have dealt and what is

 6     taught - is you try to match the target with a system that can actually

 7     deal with the effect that you want to achieve vis-a-vis that target.

 8     Sniper -- to take out a sniper, you use another sniper.  If you have a

 9     tank, ideally you probably want to use another tank to take out that

10     tank, if it was available.

11        Q.   Let me ask you this in your hypothetical of a sniper.

12             What -- if the ideal weapons system is not available, is it still

13     legitimate to use another weapons system to eliminate that military

14     objective, can it be?

15        A.   You then have to weigh escalating the weapons system that is

16     available against the target that you're trying to achieve that effect.

17     And you may get to a point in that analysis of proportionality where the

18     costs of achieving the desired effect become not sustainable, not

19     supportable.  That was only one factor in amongst a number of factors

20     when you talk about a target and what you want to achieve with that

21     target.  Hence, earlier, I said "collateral," which is another factor.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Would you agree with me that there were

23     Bosnian Muslim military units scattered throughout Sarajevo and that the

24     Muslims sometimes purposely intermixed them with civilian areas -- mixed

25     them into civilian areas?

Page 5908

 1        A.   Yes, they did.

 2        Q.   Am I correct that it is an obligation of an army or armed force

 3     to distinguish its soldiers and place insignia or markings on the

 4     uniforms to differentiate them from civilians?

 5        A.   That is true.

 6        Q.   Would you agree with me that the Bosnian Muslim armed forces in

 7     Sarajevo, in large part, did not wear proper uniforms but often had

 8     civilian clothing?

 9        A.   I'm not sure I could agree with that statement completely because

10     I don't have -- I don't have enough information that would suggest the

11     latter, i.e., that they -- you said "often had civilian clothing."  I

12     don't have a lot of information that would support that.

13        Q.   Fair enough.  Did you witness members of the Bosnian Muslim armed

14     forces performing their duties while wearing civilian clothing or at

15     least clothing without identifiable emblem or insignia?

16        A.   I don't recall seeing that, no.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at the clock.  We're one and

19     a half minutes from --

20             MR. IVETIC:  Then we should probably pull the plug here.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

22             Mr. Fraser, we'd like to see you back tomorrow.  We'll start at

23     9.30 in this -- not in same courtroom but in Courtroom III.  We'd like to

24     see you back.  You may follow the usher.  And I, again, instruct you that

25     you should not speak or communicate in any other way about your

Page 5909

 1     testimony.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow,

 4     Friday, the 7th of December, at 9.30 in the morning, in Courtroom III.

 5                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 7th day of

 7                           December, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.