Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6815

 1                           Wednesday, 16 January 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Before we start hearing the evidence, Judge Fluegge is, for a

12     mixed urgent personal and authorised Tribunal business, is unable to sit

13     this day, therefore is of short duration.  And Judge Moloto and myself

14     are satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to continue today.

15     So therefore we're sitting as it's colloquially called Rule 15 bis.

16             I was informed that there were no preliminaries, therefore the

17     witness could be escorted into the courtroom.  I, meanwhile, use the time

18     for the following:  On the 28th of December of last year, the Prosecution

19     filed their confidential 92 ter motion concerning Witness RM157.  The

20     Defence has requested on the 11th of January of this year an extension of

21     seven days to respond to the motion which was particularly voluminous,

22     215 pages.  And the witness is scheduled to testify in the week of the

23     28th of January, 2012 [sic], and the request is granted.

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mrs. Selmanovic.  Can you hear me in a

Page 6816

 1     language you understand?

 2             I'll speak a few words so that the system can be tested.

 3             THE USHER:  I hear it perfectly well.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Let's -- Mrs. Selmanovic, can you hear me in

 5     a language you understand?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Selmanovic, I'd like to remind you that the

 8     solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony is

 9     still binding upon you.

10                           WITNESS:  MUNIRA SELMANOVIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll continue where we were, but I think,

13     Mr. Traldi, the last thing we discussed was the addition of 65 ter 28614

14     to the 65 ter exhibit list.  I think we had dealt with 28613.

15             And, Mr. Stojanovic, you would consider your position again,

16     whether you'd still oppose this list of names to be added to the 65 ter

17     list?

18             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We will not object because we'll

19     be using that document, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

21             Then let me just try to -- you wanted to have it added to the

22     65 ter list and you wanted to tender it, Mr. Traldi, isn't it?

23             MR. TRALDI:  Yes, Your Honour, I'd renew my application to have

24     it admitted at this time.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, 65 ter 28614.

Page 6817

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Shall be assigned Exhibit P726, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 3             Mr. Traldi, you may proceed.

 4                           Examination by Mr. Traldi: [Continued]

 5        Q.   Good morning, ma'am.  Do you recall when we left off on Monday --

 6        A.   Good morning.

 7        Q.   Do you recall when we left off on Monday that we were discussing

 8     a list of names that you and your friend Muniba Colic had put together.

 9        A.   Yes, I recall it.

10        Q.   I just have one further question about that list for the clarity

11     of the record.  Did the two of you draft the list together before you met

12     with the Office of the Prosecutor or afterwards?

13        A.   Yes, that was before.

14             MR. TRALDI:  And, Your Honours, I'd ask that the court officer

15     please call up 65 ter 19610.  This is a document which identifies itself

16     as emanating from the cantonal court in Sarajevo and is dated

17     September 2000.

18        Q.   And, ma'am, before we discuss this document, in paragraph 23 of

19     P717 at page 7 of both the English and the B/C/S, you talk about the

20     exhumation of a grave-site at Ivan Polje.  Were you present for that

21     exhumation?

22        A.   Yes, I was present over three days.  For two days they kept

23     attempting to find something but nothing happened, but on the third day

24     toward the end of their work they started finding remains.  They were --

25     we were on the surface and once they had completed with their work, the

Page 6818

 1     people from the commission, they asked us to come up closer and they

 2     asked me, Now, first of all, Madam, can you tell me what your child wore?

 3     And my child had worn on that day a T-shirt which was striped red and

 4     white.  And then he had also jeans and a chain around his neck and then

 5     they said, Oh, all right then.  So then they took a body-bag.  They

 6     opened it.  They said, Don't anyone touch anything with their hands.  We

 7     will show you everything.  And then they showed me the clothes and I

 8     recognised them and then they kept searching for something, and then I

 9     asked them, Well, why is this bullet there?  And they said, Well, Madam,

10     you see this bullet here next to the T-shirt, you can see that it's torn

11     in the back so -- and then they told me, You know, your son was shot in

12     the head and in the chest and such-like.  And I really can't say much

13     more.  And I state here with full responsibility that that's how it was.

14        Q.   And, ma'am, at the bottom of page 2 in the English, this report

15     describes the scene at that grave-site.  I'm going to read to you three

16     brief excerpts.  I'd ask if they accurately describe what you were able

17     to observe that day.  The report says:

18             "Garbage is strewn everywhere."

19             It says:

20             "Part of the elongated round shape of a minaret can be seen among

21     the bodies."

22             And they conclude that:

23             "The remains of a destroyed mosque are located there."

24             And that's at Ivan Polje.  Does that accurately describe the

25     scene?

Page 6819

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we enlarge the portion you are referring to?

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yeah, we can't see it; that's why.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  It's too small.  And it looks as if not the same

 4     text is there in B/C/S.

 5             MR. TRALDI:  And, Your Honour, the text in the B/C/S starts at

 6     the bottom of page 2 but continues at the top of page 3.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             MR. TRALDI:

 9        Q.   And, ma'am, again for the record, does that accurately describe

10     what you saw that day?

11        A.   Yes, yes.  It's accurate.  There was some kind of meadow and that

12     was used as a garbage dump.  And they found parts of the mosque, some

13     debris, and a lot of time had passed.  We didn't know anything about what

14     had happened to them, but because my husband and son and the others were

15     there we reported to the commission that was searching for the people and

16     they tried to do their work.  And whenever we went to Sokolac we always

17     visited this site; it wasn't too far from the main road.  Yes, it's the

18     truth.  That's how it was.

19        Q.   And, ma'am, I have three more very specific questions for you

20     about this exhumation.  First, were the names of people in this

21     exhumation report read to you in preparation for your testimony?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And did you recognise them as people you last saw on

24     22 September 1992?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 6820

 1        Q.   And the report refers to someone named Osman Sestic.  Do you

 2     believe that person's name to be Osman Sestic as in your statement and in

 3     the list you provided to us?

 4        A.   There is Osman Sejtic [phoen] and there is also Osman Selmanovic,

 5     so please go ahead, just ask.

 6        Q.   Thank you, ma'am, I think that answers the question.

 7             MR. TRALDI:  Your Honours, I tender 65 ter 19610 for admission as

 8     the next Prosecution public exhibit.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

10             Mr. Registrar.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P727, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  P727 is admitted into evidence.

13             MR. TRALDI:

14        Q.   And finally, ma'am, I want to go back to what happened on

15     Metaljka on 22 September 1992.  On Monday you mentioned a soldier named

16     Milenko Koprivica.  Did any of the people from Novoseoci who were there

17     know him or his family?

18        A.   Milan you said but I didn't get the last name.  What did you say

19     it was.

20        Q.   Milenko Koprivica, ma'am.  I'm sorry if I'm pronouncing it

21     poorly.

22        A.   Milenko Koprivica -- Nikola Koprivica.

23        Q.   And did any of the people from Novoseoci know him or his family?

24        A.   No, we didn't know his family, but I knew him by site because I

25     went with my neighbour Namira Ocuz, and his son and this Namira woman's

Page 6821

 1     son, they went to school together.  So, she asked him, Please, my child

 2     is 15 years old, please go and get him.  And she mentioned Milenko

 3     Koprivica then.  She shook hands with him and that's how she asked him to

 4     do this favour for her.

 5        Q.   Her child was 15, is that Damir, who's mentioned in your

 6     statement?

 7        A.   Yes, Damir.

 8        Q.   And how old was your son at the time?

 9        A.   My son was 18.

10        Q.   And did you also ask to have him stay with you?

11        A.   I begged.  It didn't work.

12        Q.   Can you describe what happened for the Chamber in your own words?

13        A.   We were all there at Metaljka and we were supposed to be sent to

14     Sarajevo by bus.  They ordered and said that they would come and get us,

15     and I went to my child to get him with me.  But they said, No, Madam, you

16     have to go to Sarajevo, and your husband and your children and the

17     others, they will have to stay here for a work drive.

18        Q.   And then, Mrs. Selmanovic, you describe in paragraph 20 of P717

19     how after you got on the bus it took you to Hresa and then you walked to

20     Sarajevo.  Now, your father was on the bus too.  Was he capable of

21     walking to Sarajevo himself?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   And how did he arrive in Sarajevo?

24        A.   No, he couldn't walk because he had been beaten and he could not

25     move.  So when we got off the bus, we took him off the bus.  We carried

Page 6822

 1     him.  A woman and I carried him together but then we couldn't get very

 2     far.  And then a neighbour of mine, she had a blanket or something.  She

 3     gave it to us.  And there were some soldiers who escorted us.  They also

 4     brought some floor carpeting and we put him on that.  And then we tried

 5     to move on from Hresa, but they kept telling us, You can't leave this

 6     here.  You have to carry it with you.  Now they said to us, Don't you

 7     leave this here and you will reach barricades.  We didn't know anything

 8     about this, but there was something that was placed across the road.  We

 9     crossed that, some kind of barrier.  And then there was shooting but we

10     didn't -- we just fled everywhere, you know, all the way we knew how.

11     And there was shooting.  I was in the middle of the road.  There was a

12     neighbour who said, Why don't you -- I won't leave him, don't worry.

13     I'll stay here with you, although there was shooting all around.  And

14     then two soldiers came by.  I stayed there with my father for quite a

15     while.  Then two other soldiers came and then they helped us and brought

16     us -- carried us into a house.

17             Now, when they carried my father into the house, I saw that there

18     were some women, our women, there, with small children --

19        Q.   Ma'am --

20        A.   And then from there we took my father in a car because they came

21     with a car there.

22        Q.   Thank you, ma'am.  I have one very last specific question for

23     you, Mrs. Selmanovic.  Did your father continue to live in Sarajevo for

24     the rest of the war?

25        A.   My father died on the 12th day when I arrived there in 1992, in

Page 6823

 1     Sarajevo.

 2             MR. TRALDI:  Your Honours, this completes my examination.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Traldi.

 4             Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?

 5             Ms. Selmanovic, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Stojanovic.

 6     Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 8                           Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Mrs. Selmanovic, I only have a few questions for

10     you, but before I start I would like just to say on behalf of the entire

11     Defence team that we're deeply sorry for everything that you had gone

12     through and for your loss.  I would ask you to look at the document we

13     saw a moment ago together; that is, document P726 now.  And you will see

14     before you, Mrs. Selmanovic, a list that was discussed a little earlier.

15             Could you tell us how long after the exhumation in 2002 was this

16     list compiled.  Or, let me put it this way:  When did you compile this

17     list together with your friend?

18        A.   Well, I did it now, but I think I had it from -- I had another

19     one from before.  I couldn't remember all the names.  There was

20     Pasic, Celo; and Colic, Hasib; Adem Catic; Hodzic, Ismet Hodzic.  Those

21     four I could not remember right away.

22        Q.   But would you agree with me that after the exhumation on one

23     occasion you sent to the Prosecutor another list that did not include all

24     of these names; is that correct?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 6824

 1        Q.   And this list -- you drafted this list before you came to

 2     The Hague for this case; correct?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   The reason I ask this is so that you can help us.  Could you tell

 5     us who from this list was not from your village?

 6        A.   Well, that was Amir Selmanovic, the son of Memis.  There are two

 7     Selmanovics here, but I'm referring to the one who is the son of Memis.

 8        Q.   Perhaps we did not understand each other well.  Which of the

 9     people on this list were not from Novoseoci before the war?

10        A.   Of all the people here, they were all people who lived in

11     Novoseoci.  The Selmanovics, the Ocuz, the Karic, the Sestics, and the

12     Kabas.  The Pasic family, these are in-laws, sons-in-laws or

13     brothers-in-laws, our husbands' relatives, also Vatres, Bajro, who lived

14     with his sister.  They were all ...

15        Q.   Ismet Hodzic?

16        A.   Ismet Hodzic.

17        Q.   Was he with his family?

18        A.   Yes -- well, he was staying with the Karic family together with

19     his Colics.

20        Q.   Where did they live before 1992?

21        A.   They lived in Kovalj, where Nezim Colic was.  These were his

22     uncles and his relatives.

23        Q.   How far away is that village from Novoseoci?

24        A.   Well, perhaps some 8 to 10 kilometres.  I couldn't really tell

25     you exactly.  And this is in the direction of Rogatica, Kovani [phoen].

Page 6825

 1        Q.   Would you tell the Trial Chamber a little more about the

 2     exhumation site at Ivan Polje.

 3        A.   Well, it's on Ivan Polje.  If you go from our village, it's to

 4     the left towards Hrabro, and it's not far from the road, perhaps a

 5     hundred metres or so at most.

 6        Q.   How far is that site from Metaljka, the place where you parted

 7     from your dear ones?

 8        A.   About a kilometre or so.

 9        Q.   In addition to the body of your late husband, was there anyone

10     else from this list who had not been found in that mass grave?

11        A.   Well, my husband's remains were found, but on the other side of

12     this grave, and it was only last year.  But, yes, one more thing I want

13     to say:  Amir Selmanovic is the only one who is missing.

14        Q.   And his body has not been recovered to this day?

15        A.   Yes, that's correct, not to this day.

16        Q.   You don't know when those people were killed?

17        A.   We don't know when they were killed.

18        Q.   Nor do you know who killed them?

19        A.   No, it is not known.

20        Q.   The people who arrived in your village, whom you named to the

21     best of your recollection as having been there that day, were they

22     members of the police, of the reserve police, or the army?

23        A.   I saw soldiers.  As for the police, I'm not sure.

24        Q.   How do you tell such people apart?  How do you know someone was

25     from the army?

Page 6826

 1        A.   It's not as if I belong to the army.  I saw the army there that

 2     day.

 3        Q.   What did you base your conclusion on, to say that they were

 4     soldiers?

 5        A.   Because they had olive-drab and camouflage uniforms.

 6        Q.   Who is Momcilo Pajic and had you known him before the war?

 7        A.   I had.

 8        Q.   Who is he?

 9        A.   He was a surveyor in Sokolac before the war, land surveyor.

10        Q.   Did he leave his job at some point in time and left to Sokolac?

11        A.   When he gathered all of us together at the meadow near Metaljka,

12     that's when he went to Sokolac.

13        Q.   How long did he stay there?

14        A.   Between 20 and 30 minutes.

15        Q.   What I'm trying to ask you is this:  The 20 to 30 minutes during

16     which -- is that the time during which you went to fetch your father?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   When you returned with him, had the man you just mentioned

19     returned from Sokolac?

20        A.   Yes, he had.  He ordered that all women, children, and those

21     physically unfit were to go to Sarajevo, whereas all able-bodied men were

22     to remain behind for work.

23        Q.   After you received that information, how much later did the buses

24     arrive which took you to Hresa?

25        A.   After some 20 to 30 minutes, that's when the buses arrived.

Page 6827

 1        Q.   How long did you have to walk from the place you were at Metaljka

 2     to the place where the buses were?

 3        A.   We didn't -- well, we walked for less than 15 minutes.  It was

 4     close, but I had to support my father and another woman helped me.  Later

 5     on my husband helped me to put him in a wheelbarrow to carry him.

 6             [No interpretation]

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could there please be

 8     pauses between questions and answers.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, the interpreters asked for a pause

10     between question and answer.

11             And, Ms. Selmanovic, would you also wait for a second after

12     Mr. Stojanovic has finished his question before you answer it.  Could you

13     please repeat the last part of your answer.  What we read in the

14     transcript is:

15             "Later on my husband helped me to put him in a wheelbarrow to

16     carry him."

17             What did you say after that?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I brought my father to the bus --

19     we did, actually, and then he helped me put my father on the bus.

20             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Thank you.  Who told your husband that he wasn't allowed on the

22     bus with you?

23        A.   One of the soldiers, although I don't know him.  He had an

24     olive-drab uniform.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness kindly sit closer to the

Page 6828

 1     microphones, please.

 2             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Were those buses civilian --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Selmanovic, could you come a bit closer to the

 5     microphone, please.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   May we continue, Ms. Selmanovic?

 9             My question was this:  To the best of your recollection, were

10     those buses civilian?

11        A.   I don't remember whose buses they were.  I didn't presume they

12     were civilian.  I was in a state of shock.  We were just told to go on

13     and that the women and children should board, and we put my father on the

14     floor of the bus.  I sat in one of the seats and my father was beside me.

15             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P720 in

16     e-court.

17        Q.   While we are waiting for the document, let me ask you this,

18     Ms. Selmanovic:  Did your husband remain on the road once you set off or

19     was he taken away before the buses moved away?

20        A.   My husband stayed on the road.  He was kicked out of the bus and

21     that's the last I saw of him.

22        Q.   Before you is a death certificate which you handed over a short

23     while ago to the Prosecution.  I wanted to ask you this only:  In 1999,

24     what was the basis for this death certificate to be issued to you

25     concerning your husband?

Page 6829

 1        A.   My husband used to work and I was entitled to his pension.  I was

 2     trying to exercise that right.

 3        Q.   Do you remember whether there was an administrative procedure or

 4     proceedings before a court in order to declare him dead because at that

 5     time there were still no such documents in existence?

 6        A.   Yes.  There were proceedings.  We had to go back to the death

 7     register office, and only after we have obtained all the papers then I

 8     could conclude the procedure concerning his pension.

 9        Q.   In this document we have the date, month, and year, as well as

10     hour of death, the 22nd of September, 1992.  Do you see that?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Who provided that information to the court as the date of his

13     death?

14        A.   I did, alongside some witnesses.

15        Q.   At the time you didn't know if he was killed that day.  You

16     provided that piece of information based on the fact that you saw him on

17     that day for the last time?

18        A.   Yes.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Stojanovic, on the English version of the

20     certificate, I do not see the time.  Can you please guide us to where the

21     time is on that document?

22             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] In the B/C/S version,

23     Your Honour, it reads on the left-hand side:

24             "Date of death, day, month, year, and hour."

25             So we have "hour" in English instead of time.  However, the rest

Page 6830

 1     of that line does not specify the precise time.  We only have the date.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure, and I do see the word "hour," but I don't

 3     see what hour it was when he died.  But the question to the witness was:

 4     How do you -- you gave the hour of death to the authorities.  I'm saying

 5     what hour is this that she gave?  Do you have it in the B/C/S?  Is the

 6     hour mentioned in the B/C/S?

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, neither in the

 8     B/C/S nor in the English version --

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Previous translation continues]...

10             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] It is only in the left-hand side

11     column that I read out to you.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay, but you can't follow that question up

13     because, in any case, the hour is not given -- the hour of death is not

14     given.  Thank you.

15             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely, Your Honour.  Thank

16     you for your assistance and clarification.

17        Q.   I asked you, Ms. Selmanovic, whether you provided that piece of

18     information based on the fact that you saw him then for the last time?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   So many years after those tragic events, you still don't know

21     when he was killed precisely; is that correct?

22        A.   It is.

23        Q.   You also don't know or you have no information about whether he

24     was taken to work somewhere and then killed?

25        A.   I have no such information, whether he was taken to any kind of

Page 6831

 1     labour.  It's just that I saw him in 1992 for the last time, full stop.

 2        Q.   Ms. Selmanovic, the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily

 3     the prosecutor's office, did they summon you to provide a statement in

 4     the proceedings conducted against certain persons with relation to this

 5     event?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And you mentioned the people you saw on the

 8     22nd of September, 1992, in your village to them?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at one other document.

11             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P718,

12     Your Honours.  Could we have the second page in both versions, the last

13     paragraph of the document.

14        Q.   It is a document from the 2nd Romanija Brigade Command of the

15     22nd of August, 1992.  Mrs. Selmanovic, you were asked about it during

16     proofing.  In this report sent to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command by

17     the 2nd Romanija Brigade, it reads:

18             "Within this territory in the villages of Micivode, Raktitnica,

19     Kramer Selo and Novoseoci, there is a certain number of extremists who

20     are peaceful for now.  They are not causing problems to the Serbian

21     population but we are keeping them under control."

22             Let me ask you this first:  In the proximity of your village --

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Are the villages of Micivode, Raktitnica, and Kramer Selo close

25     to your village?

Page 6832

 1        A.   No, Micivode is towards Han Pijesak.  Raktitnica is towards

 2     Rogatica.  They are not close to our area.  The closest villages to ours

 3     are Jelosaljevici [phoen], Pavacici [phoen] and other Serb villages.

 4        Q.   Were you familiar with the type of guard that was held in the

 5     village in 1992?

 6        A.   I am familiar with it because my husband and others informed

 7     them.  They would come and see my father and tell him that there were no

 8     problems and that they could continue living and working there.  That's

 9     all I know.

10        Q.   Who organised the village guards, as far as you know?

11        A.   The village guards, I don't know if anyone stood guard.  They

12     just came and spoke to our people, telling them that there was no need to

13     go and to live there.  As for any guards, I'm not clear on that.

14        Q.   Was there any point in time when the authorities in Rogatica

15     asked that the military -- the men fit for military service be enlisted

16     into the army?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Your late husband, did he receive a draft call in 1992 at any

19     point of time?

20        A.   No, he didn't.

21        Q.   Let us look at document - it's a 65 ter document - number 06862.

22             MR. TRALDI:  Your Honours, I'd just put on the record at this

23     time that we haven't gotten a list of documents from the Defence to use

24     with this witness.  This was initially on our list so I won't object to

25     this one being used, but in the future it would be good if we got some

Page 6833

 1     notice.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic.

 3             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  In any case,

 4     Your Honour, if the omission was on our part, we accept that.  According

 5     to the information I am receiving, we informed the Prosecution that we

 6     will only be using such documents that are on their list.  Not a single

 7     document that we wanted to rely on was uploaded into e-court by us.  This

 8     document, too, is on the Prosecution list.  That's what we included in

 9     our e-mail sent to them, I believe.  If I am wrong, I stand to be

10     corrected of course.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Traldi, if documents are on your list, the

12     purpose of notifying the Prosecution about the use of certain documents

13     seems to fall away.

14             MR. TRALDI:  I agree, Your Honour, and that's why I hadn't

15     objected to this one.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             MR. TRALDI:  I didn't received the communication Mr. Stojanovic

18     mentions, but I'm sure it's a one-time occurrence.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And apart from that, apparently the Defence

20     does not intend to use any document that is not on your list.  Please

21     proceed.

22             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely, Your Honour.

23        Q.   Before us is a document of the SRK command dated the

24     27th of July, 1992.  Let us look at the second paragraph where, among

25     other things, we read:

Page 6834

 1             "In the village of Novoseoci to the south of Sokolac by some 5 to

 2     6 kilometres (Glasinacko Polje) there was a hand-over of arms and lethal

 3     assets by the Muslim population to representatives of the

 4     2nd Romanija Brigade.  The hand-over was conducted as previously agreed

 5     and it is believed that not all of the weapons had been handed over."

 6             Ms. Selmanovic, do you know anything about the existence of

 7     weapons in your village?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.  I know that they came and gathered all of the people.

 9     They discussed who had what weapons to hand over.  People had some

10     hunting rifles and that's what was handed over.  That's what my husband

11     told me.  The weapons were handed over.  I have nothing else to say.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender

14     this document as a Defence exhibit.  It's 65 ter 06862.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Traldi, any objections?

16             MR. TRALDI:  No objection, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D130, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  D130 is admitted into evidence.

20             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Ms. Selmanovic, I will end this with one additional question.

22     After the war and the implementation of the new laws, your house was

23     returned to you?

24        A.   Yes, it was, but it's in no shape of any sort.

25        Q.   Well, do you own that house?

Page 6835

 1        A.   Yes, and my children and I own it.

 2        Q.   Did people return to Novoseoci?

 3        A.   Well, the people of Novoseoci are asking for donations.  I don't

 4     know if they're doing this through the Sokolac municipality, but if you

 5     ask me whether anyone has returned to live there, reside there, no, they

 6     didn't.  They are just looking after their property there.

 7        Q.   Mrs. Selmanovic, thank you.  And I apologise if my questions

 8     caused you any sorrow.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Stojanovic.

10             Mr. Traldi, is there any need to -- for questions -- further

11     questions to the witness?

12             MR. TRALDI:  Just very briefly, Your Honour, and I'll be done in

13     just a couple of minutes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Traldi:

16        Q.   Ma'am, at temporary transcript page 20 today's transcript

17     Mr. Stojanovic asked you about weapons in Novoseoci.  I have just one

18     very simple question for you about this.  Did you know of any weapons

19     which were kept in your village after the surrender of weapons in

20     July 1992?

21        A.   No, I don't know anything about that.

22        Q.   At temporary transcript page 18, Mr. Stojanovic asked you about

23     guards and you responded discussing people who had come to your village

24     and said everything would be okay and people didn't have to leave.  When

25     you answered, were you discussing Serb guards or Bosniak guards?

Page 6836

 1        A.   I meant Serb guards, Serbs came, but I didn't say anything about

 2     guards or patrols.  I knew nothing of that.  I didn't know that there

 3     were any patrols.  I didn't know anything about that nor did I hear it

 4     from my husband nor anyone else.

 5        Q.   And at temporary transcript page 11, Mr. Stojanovic asked you if

 6     you knew when the men from Novoseoci had been killed or by whom.  Can you

 7     simply tell us, when you last saw your husband and son alive, were they

 8     free or were they under someone else's control?

 9        A.   To that I can only say this:  All of us, all the other villagers,

10     me and my child and my husband, we were all on a meadow together.  And

11     from there my child remained but my husband, his -- he helped my father,

12     but as for them, I know nothing of their fate after that.

13        Q.   When you last saw them, could they go freely wherever they chose

14     or was there someone restricting them?

15        A.   Their movement was up until some time in May when people still

16     worked.  Later on, we, the women, would go to Sokolac from time to time

17     but there were no obstacles.  Others would come and say --

18        Q.   I apologise for interrupting, ma'am, but I'm asking specifically

19     about when you last saw your husband and son on September 22nd.  And at

20     that time, were they free or were they under someone else's control?

21        A.   When I last saw my husband at Metaljka, this meadow, when he was

22     left there, how could I know whether he was free or not when there was --

23     there were troops all around him?

24             MR. TRALDI:  I have no further questions, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Traldi.

Page 6837

 1             Ms. Selmanovic, since the Chamber has no further questions for

 2     you and as I understand there's no request for further questions by the

 3     Defence, this concludes your testimony in this court.  I'd like to thank

 4     you very much for coming and having answered questions about past events

 5     which may have been difficult for you to think back of.  And I wish you a

 6     safe return home again.  You may follow the usher.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break.

 9             Is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness after the

10     break?

11             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break and we'll resume at ten minutes

13     to 11.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness?

17             MS. BIBLES:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Yes, we are ready to

18     call the next witness.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Then could the witness be escorted into the

20     courtroom.

21             Ms. Bibles, have you explained Rule 15 bis to the witness or not?

22             MS. BIBLES:  Yes, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, so the witness is aware that tomorrow there'll

24     be three Judges again?

25             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honour, I apologise, I was thinking of another

Page 6838

 1     Rule.  No, I did not advise him of that.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  You did not?  Then I'll briefly explain to him the

 3     situation.

 4             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, while the witness is being brought in,

 5     I will take up a quick matter, and that is we do intend to tender a

 6     reduced number of associated exhibits.  We would propose that it would be

 7     beneficial to defer that application until the conclusion of the

 8     witness's testimony if --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll deal with it at the end just as about the

10     admission of the 92 ter statement.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Rose.

13             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Before you give evidence, the Rules require that you

15     make a solemn declaration, the text of which is now handed out to you.

16     May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.

17             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

18     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL ROSE

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Rose.  Please be seated.  Mr. Rose,

21     if I address you as "Mr. Rose," that is because that is what the Chamber

22     does with all witnesses, that is, without titles, without ranks.  It is

23     not out of disrespect for the titles and the ranks you may hold.

24             Ms. Bibles, if you're ready, please start your examination of the

25     witness.

Page 6839

 1             MS. BIBLES:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2                           Examination by Ms. Bibles:

 3        Q.   Good morning.  Could you tell us your full name, please.

 4        A.   Hugh Michael Rose.

 5        Q.   And, General, you served as commander of the UNPROFOR forces in

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 5th of January, 1994, until the

 7     23rd of January, 1995?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   Based on your work in that time-period, have you previously

10     presented evidence regarding your observations and experiences here at

11     ICTY and at the International Court of Criminal Justice?

12        A.   On three separate occasions I have done so.

13        Q.   You have also authored a book about your experiences which is

14     titled:  "Fighting for Peace"?

15        A.   That is correct.

16        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to review a statement dated

17     26 March 2009 as well as certain associated exhibits which consolidates

18     the elements of your evidence into one statement?

19        A.   I have.

20        Q.   And since we're both native English speakers, I will attempt

21     myself to pause between question and answer and slow down and would ask

22     you to follow.

23             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, I'd ask that page 1 of the English

24     version of 65 ter 28619 be brought to our screens.

25        Q.   General, once the document is on the screen before you, I would

Page 6840

 1     ask that you view the signature at the bottom of the page and indicate

 2     whether you recognise that signature.

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   And whose signature is that?

 5        A.   That is mine.

 6             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, I would ask that we now go to page 53

 7     of the English document.

 8        Q.   And likewise, do you recognise the signature on this page?

 9        A.   I do.

10        Q.   And whose is that?

11        A.   That is mine.

12        Q.   As you reviewed the document, did you also note initials on every

13     page of this statement?

14        A.   I did indeed.

15        Q.   And whose initials are those?

16        A.   They are mine.

17        Q.   In reviewing the statement, did you note any changes or

18     corrections to the document?

19        A.   I did not.

20             MS. BIBLES:  And I would bring your attention, Your Honours, to

21     paragraphs 150, 151, and 167.

22        Q.   Did you note that there were paragraphs which had a date of 1992?

23        A.   Yeah, I didn't notice that at the time but obviously it should

24     read "1994."

25             MS. BIBLES:  And, Your Honours, I would simply note those

Page 6841

 1     corrections on those three paragraphs.  They appear to be typographical

 2     errors.

 3        Q.   With these corrections in mind, if you were asked about these

 4     matters, would you today give the same answers that are contained in the

 5     statement?

 6        A.   I would indeed.

 7        Q.   Having taken the solemn oath, do you affirm that the information

 8     in this document is accurate and truthful?

 9        A.   To the best of my knowledge, it is.

10             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, having established the foundational

11     requirements necessary, we do tender 28619 into evidence at this time.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  A number will be assigned to it.  In view of the

13     objections raised by the Defence the Chamber will decide at the end of

14     the testimony about admission.

15             Mr. Registrar, the number to be assigned to the witness statement

16     would be ... ?

17             THE REGISTRAR:  P728, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  P728 is marked for identification.

19             Please proceed.

20             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, may I read a brief public summary of

21     the witness's written testimony?

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so, Ms. Bibles.

23             MS. BIBLES:  General Sir Michael Rose was the commander of the

24     United Nations protection forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from

25     January 1994 through January of 1995.

Page 6842

 1             General Rose arrived in Sarajevo on the 23rd of January 1994 with

 2     a mission to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to attempt

 3     to bring a peaceful resolution of the war.  He found in Sarajevo a city

 4     that had no lights, water, or electricity.  He was briefed on the sniping

 5     and indiscriminate shelling by the Bosnian Serbs of civilians in the city

 6     centre, including the very recent deaths of children who had been out

 7     tobogganing in the snow.  During his tenure, General Rose met frequently

 8     with General Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and others in the Bosnian Serb

 9     leadership.  General Rose regularly raised issuing of sniping in Sarajevo

10     as well as issues of freedom of movement and access for humanitarian

11     convoys in these meetings.  General Rose observed that the Bosnian Serbs

12     blocked humanitarian aid or utilities as a means of achieving political

13     ends and/or in response to Bosnian or NATO actions elsewhere.

14             After the 5 February 1994 shelling of Markale Market in Sarajevo,

15     General Rose acted quickly to implement a cease-fire by setting a

16     20-kilometre Total Exclusion Zone for heavy weapons.  The cease-fire was

17     largely effective and held for most of the year.  Sniping continued but

18     in August of 1994 the factions agreed to an anti-sniping agreement which

19     was followed by a decrease in sniping for the following weeks.  As autumn

20     1994 came to an end, the situation in Bosnia deteriorated with an

21     increase in shelling and sniping incidents in Sarajevo and restrictions

22     on utilities and the flow of humanitarian aid until a cessation of

23     hostilities agreement was signed by the parties on the

24     31st of December 1994.

25             General Rose maintained a relationship with the Bosnian Serb army

Page 6843

 1     and General Mladic during which he observed that the decision-making in

 2     the Bosnian Serb army was done at the highest levels and that

 3     General Mladic and Karadzic were at the peak of the pyramid --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  It's only now that the French translation finished.

 5     Would you please slow down.

 6             MS. BIBLES:  I will, Your Honour.

 7             Were at the peak of the pyramid of control of the Bosnian Serb

 8     forces.  General Rose notes that General Mladic had the ability to

 9     control the shelling and sniping in Sarajevo and that the siege was used

10     by Bosnian Serb leaders to exert pressure on the United Nations, the

11     international community, and the Bosnian Muslims.  General Rose

12     recognised that nothing happened militarily without General Mladic's

13     knowledge or authorisation.

14             Your Honours, this concludes the summary.  May I proceed with

15     questions?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  You may, Ms. Bibles.

17             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, I will note that we estimated two

18     hours for direct; we will be substantially less than that.

19        Q.   General, let's first turn our attention to your meetings and

20     negotiations with the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership.

21     Could you please describe for us whether there were consistent topics

22     discussed throughout 1994 in these meetings.

23        A.   There were consistently the following subjects discussed:  The

24     demilitarisation of Sarajevo, following the withdrawal of heavy weapons;

25     the running of humanitarian aid convoys to the various enclaves,

Page 6844

 1     including Sarajevo; and the maintaining of the utilities to the various

 2     enclaves as well; and of course the ultimate aim was to bring about a

 3     cessation of hostilities long-term which would bring about a peace.

 4        Q.   As a result of your meetings and interactions on these topics,

 5     did you develop an overview of the political/military situation as it

 6     existed in the beginning of 1994?

 7        A.   I did indeed.  At that time the Serbs controlled approximately

 8     70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including territory

 9     which ran up to within 75 metres of the Bosnian government Presidency in

10     Sarajevo.  They were the dominant military force in that country

11     throughout 1994, and therefore they were in a position to control most of

12     the convoy runs to the 2.7 million people who were dependent on

13     humanitarian aid throughout that year.

14        Q.   During 1994, did the political and military situation change?

15        A.   The political and military situation changed dramatically in

16     1994, with the bringing about of an agreement known as the

17     Washington Accord between the Croatian warring party and the Bosnian

18     government warring party, say two out of the three warring parties had

19     now formed Federations, and that tilted the strategic balance, both

20     militarily and politically against the Bosnian Serbs.  And from that

21     moment on, it was evident to the United Nations - and indeed to the

22     Bosnian Serbs - that they were in a declining political and military

23     situation, deteriorating possibly I should say.

24        Q.   Given your experience in the meetings and negotiations during

25     this shift, did you develop an understanding of the ultimate territorial

Page 6845

 1     objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership?

 2        A.   I did indeed, and the conclusion we came to that they wished to

 3     have contiguous territory as part of the Republika Srpska; and secondly,

 4     that that should include parts of Sarajevo and that the total proportion

 5     would be 51 per cent in favour of the Serbs, 49 per cent in favour of the

 6     Federation.

 7        Q.   Did you determine whether there were areas in and around Sarajevo

 8     that the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to remain wholly Serb?

 9        A.   In particular, Globuvica [phoen].

10        Q.   Likewise, were there areas of Bosnia that you determined the

11     Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to be wholly Serb?

12        A.   They were determined to retain possession of Srebrenica, Zepa,

13     Gorazde.

14        Q.   You have described --

15             MS. BIBLES:  And, Your Honours, this would be paragraph 20 of the

16     statement.

17        Q.   -- that the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid was

18     a mission of UNPROFOR.  Did you observe whether it was in the

19     Bosnian Serb interests to facilitate these convoys in 1994?

20        A.   Well, the Bosnian Serbs clearly regarded the running of

21     humanitarian aid convoys to the enclaves as contrary to their strategic

22     aims of bringing political pressure to bear on the Bosnian government to

23     sign up to peace on Serb terms rather than on their terms, the Bosnian

24     government terms, so they were using the flow of aid very much as an

25     instrument with which to bring pressure to bear on the Bosnian government

Page 6846

 1     to sign up to peace.

 2        Q.   Did you observe what tactics were employed in this process?

 3        A.   Well, there were many tactics employed which ranged from the

 4     physical blocking of convoys on the road to bureaucratic measures which

 5     required the listing of the manifest down to the minutest detail.  And,

 6     of course, inevitably, if they discovered that, for example, there was

 7     one more tin of baked beans had been delivered than required - and this

 8     is an illustrative example - then the convoy would be turned back.  It

 9     was impossible basically to comply with all the requests that had been

10     laid upon the UN.

11        Q.   Did --

12        A.   Am I speaking too fast?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, you are close to that, and if you have some

14     compassion with transcribers and interpreters, I would invite you to slow

15     down.

16             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

17             MS. BIBLES:

18        Q.   Did you raise your concerns about these tactics in your meetings?

19        A.   Frequently.

20             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, if we could bring up 65 ter 08162, and

21     this would initially be page 1 of both versions.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  To the extent possible, could you also indicate in

23     relation to what part of the --

24             MS. BIBLES:  Statement --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  -- statement.

Page 6847

 1             MS. BIBLES:  Paragraph 182, Your Honours, I'm sorry.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 3             MS. BIBLES:

 4        Q.   Could you please look at this page and let us know if you

 5     recognise this document.

 6        A.   I do recognise it.

 7        Q.   I would specifically ask you to look at paragraph 3 before we

 8     pull up the next page.

 9        A.   Okay, I've read that.

10        Q.   With respect, and I believe it's on - thank you - page 2 of the

11     B/C/S version.  With respect to subsection (b), does this accurately

12     depict your statements as you recall?

13        A.   It does.

14        Q.   Could we now look at page 2 of the English version.  And again,

15     specifically directing your attention to the remainder of paragraph 3.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all extra

17     microphones be switched off, please.  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  Okay, I've read that.

19             MS. BIBLES:

20        Q.   Does this document accurately describe the discussion as you

21     recall it on the 12th of December?

22        A.   It does indeed.

23             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 08162.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Whom should I look at to know whether there are any

25     objections?  Mr. Lukic.

Page 6848

 1             MR. LUKIC:  No objection, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P729, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  P729 is admitted.

 5             MS. BIBLES:  We can remove the document from the screen at this

 6     time.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Given the situation that you describe with the convoys in this

 8     meeting towards the end of 1994, were you aware of what impact that was

 9     having on the people who lived in the enclaves, in the eastern enclaves?

10        A.   It was having a very negative impact.  They were daily dependent

11     on not only food but also medical supplies for their survival,

12     particularly during the winter months, and the halting of the convoys are

13     meant that they suffered almost immediately.

14        Q.   I'd like now to shift your attention to Sarajevo.  In

15     paragraph 201 of your statement, in the context of the shelling of

16     Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs you state:

17             "The usual response from the Bosnian Serb leadership to protest

18     of shelling was that they were responding to attacks by the

19     Bosnian Muslim army."

20             You acknowledge that the Bosnian forces were firing out from

21     within Sarajevo.  Then you state:

22             "The disproportionality of the Bosnian Serb response, however,

23     undermines the credibility of this justification."

24             General, could you please articulate why you considered the

25     Bosnian Serb response to be disproportionate?

Page 6849

 1        A.   One only had to look at a suburb like Dobrinja which had been

 2     totally destroyed.  People were living in the cellars in order to

 3     survive.  If even a cat walked across the street, it was engaged by

 4     artillery.  The response was demonstrably disproportionate.

 5        Q.   Could you describe --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bibles, may I take it that disproportionately

 7     should be disproportionality?

 8             MS. BIBLES:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That's then -- please proceed.

10             MS. BIBLES:

11        Q.   Could you describe for the Court how effective the February 1994

12     cease-fire was in reducing the shelling in Sarajevo for the remainder of

13     1994?

14        A.   The bringing about of the withdrawal of heavy weapons from

15     Sarajevo transformed the lives of the people of Sarajevo and gave them

16     some hope that there would be a return to long-term peace, a hope which

17     was sadly disappointed at the end of 1994.  But during the summer of

18     1994, electricity was restored.  Water was restored.  The trams started

19     to run again.  Major convoys came over land from Europe into Sarajevo to

20     replenish the warehouses and stocks of food.  Life seemed to be returning

21     to normal for the people of Sarajevo as a result of that cessation or

22     withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.

23        Q.   When negotiating either for this cease-fire, the February

24     cease-fire, or later the anti-sniping agreement, were you aware of what

25     level within the Bosnian Serb army made the decisions?

Page 6850

 1        A.   All decisions were made at the top in Pale by both the civil and

 2     the military side, one represented by Mr. Karadzic and the other by

 3     General Mladic.

 4        Q.   General, given what you've described, that the negotiations or

 5     the negotiating was at the highest level, did this allow you to form a

 6     judgement about the ability of the senior levels of the Bosnian Serb army

 7     command to control the level of sniping in Sarajevo?

 8        A.   In our view, there was absolute control of every single sniper

 9     and he would not have been allowed to open fire unless he'd been duly

10     authorised and the reverse was equally true.

11        Q.   In your statement, to go back to the cease-fire, in paragraph 44,

12     you describe reaching the agreement on the cease-fire.  You further

13     describe in the following paragraph, 45, that you tested the cease-fire

14     and that your observation was that the shelling stopped.  Can you,

15     however, briefly describe for us your degree of certainty both at the

16     time and with -- your perspective now, the degree of certainty in the

17     UN's ability to determine whether the heavy weapons were actually moved

18     out of the 20-kilometre area?

19        A.   Of course at the time the UN were under no illusion that both

20     sides had fully withdrawn heavy weapons out of the 20-kilometre circle

21     around Sarajevo or in the case of the Bosnian government forces taken

22     them out of use.  But the fact that they were not using them is what

23     mattered.  And of course, on the Bosnian Serb side, they merely handed in

24     the out-of-date weapons which they had ceased to require to the weapon

25     collecting points.  It was certain, and we had evidence by discovering at

Page 6851

 1     least one T55 tank hidden, that they had concealed most of their heavy

 2     weapons for future use.

 3             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, could we please bring 65 ter exhibit

 4     19674 to the screen.  And this would be page 1 in both versions.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  In relation to ... ?

 6             MS. BIBLES:  This is one of the non-associated exhibits that we

 7     indicated we would be using.

 8        Q.   In reviewing the first page of this document, it proposes methods

 9     of appearing to comply with the cease-fire and yet maintain heavy weapons

10     within the zone.  Are the terms of this proposal consistent with your

11     experiences that you've just described regarding the detection of

12     Bosnian Serb heavy weapons?

13        A.   That very much reflects our view.

14             MS. BIBLES:  And, Your Honours, I'll ask that we go to -- I

15     believe it's page -- well, that is the page.  Your Honours, I -- the

16     Prosecution tenders 19674.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P730, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  P730 is admitted into evidence.

20             MS. BIBLES:

21        Q.   Directing your attention now to the time-period of August 1994,

22     after the anti-sniping agreement was signed, was there an improvement in

23     sniping in Sarajevo?

24        A.   There was a distinct and immediate improvement, although in the

25     end that agreement was not adhered to by either side and the situation

Page 6852

 1     deteriorated.  But at least for a month there was a perceptible

 2     improvement.

 3        Q.   Shifting your attention now to the enclaves, in your

 4     statement - and this would be paragraphs 65 through 101 - you describe

 5     the Bosnian Serb offensive on Gorazde.  Could you describe for us where

 6     the negotiations for a global peace in the country were when this

 7     offensive began?

 8        A.   The UN at that time were engaged with both the warring parties

 9     about bringing about a long-term cessation of hostilities, and the

10     argument between the two parties was whether to make Gorazde and what was

11     happening there part of the global cease-fire plan or whether Gorazde

12     should be resolved first and then the global plan addressed.  The Bosnian

13     government side wanted Gorazde to be resolved before embarking on

14     long-term discussions about a permanent cease-fire.  The Serb side wanted

15     the opposite, and it was almost impossible to get any agreement.  And it

16     was at this point that presumably to put pressure on the Bosnian

17     government side that the Bosnian Serbs launched a [indiscernible]

18     offensive into the enclave of Gorazde.

19        Q.   Did you have opportunities to communicate with General Mladic

20     during the Gorazde operation?

21        A.   On a number of occasions we spoke by telephone.

22        Q.   Could you explain for us a little bit more - I believe it's in

23     paragraph 86 - how your calls to the Bosnian Serb leadership resulted in

24     your being on the phone with General Mladic?

25        A.   I think a little explanation may be required.  The Bosnian Serb,

Page 6853

 1     and indeed all Soviet Warsaw Pact countries tended to lay telephone wires

 2     as well as use radio communications.  And therefore all messages that we

 3     passed to General Mladic tended to go down the telephone communications

 4     and they laid wires to their front line.  And we discovered that whatever

 5     telephone number we dialled in Pale, somehow we always ended up talking

 6     directly to General Mladic and they had merely switched their exchange,

 7     telephone exchange to enable that to happen.

 8        Q.   Could you describe for us in these conversations with

 9     General Mladic if you could ascertain where he was physically located?

10        A.   Not really, but it was evident from TV coverage that he was

11     located around Gorazde itself leading the attack.

12        Q.   In your statement you've set out examples of General Mladic's

13     control of events on the ground and specifically I direct attention to

14     paragraph 85.  Did you have any examples indicating that General Mladic

15     had anything less than total control of the Bosnian Serb forces during

16     the Gorazde offensive?

17        A.   Absolutely not.  He was in total control, as one would have

18     expected.

19        Q.   Were you aware of whether or not General Mladic was in the

20     battle-field arena on the 10th of April of 1994?

21        A.   He certainly would have been.

22             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, could we please bring 65 ter 08996 to

23     our screens.  This is a one-page document.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Branko.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you know there should be no consultations

Page 6854

 1     during the hearing.  If you would approach Mr. Mladic and find out what

 2     causes him to ask for a time-out without further discussions, which

 3     should take place during the break.

 4                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, would you please report to the Chamber

 6     the situation.

 7             Yes, we'll continue.  Mr. Lukic --

 8             MR. LUKIC:  Just I was briefly instructed by my client --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes --

10             MR. LUKIC:  -- how to follow the testimony of General Rose.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And you know that --

12             MR. LUKIC:  I know.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  -- it should not be done during the hearing but

14     during the breaks.

15             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  This may be clear to Mr. Mladic now.  May I remind

17     him of the rules which apply in this courtroom.

18             Ms. Bibles, you may proceed.

19             MS. BIBLES:

20        Q.   Drawing your attention to General Mladic's statements in

21     paragraph 7 of this document, specifically where he describes his --

22     '"The Turks must disappear from these areas.'"  Is this position stated

23     in this document consistent with General Mladic in his stated intentions

24     to you with respect to the offensive?

25        A.   General Mladic at the time was telling us that he was recovering

Page 6855

 1     the lost territory which had previously been occupied by the Serbs and

 2     1993, I think, had been driven from their homes, that that was the limit

 3     of his aim.  And at the time we tended to believe that they only wanted

 4     to advance as far as the old Serb areas, not going into the Muslim parts

 5     of Gorazde.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bibles, could I seek clarification of one of the

 7     previous answers just before there was a short interruption.

 8             Mr. Rose, you were asked whether you were aware of whether or not

 9     General Mladic was in the battle-field arena on the 10th of

10     April of 1994.  Your answer was:

11             "He certainly would have been," which -- what makes you believe

12     or conclude that he was?

13             THE WITNESS:  The UN of course had no intelligence-gathering

14     capability and it was -- we were not being passed any intelligence either

15     by NATO.  Therefore, we had to assume a number of things, and it would be

16     characteristic of General Mladic to have personally led the attacks

17     himself and not to have absented himself when a major offensive was

18     taking place.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it was an assessment on the basis of you gained

20     experience with the way in which General Mladic exercised command and

21     control; is that --

22             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, sir.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS:  He preferred to lead from the front.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.

Page 6856

 1             MS. BIBLES:  Thank you.

 2             Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 08996.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P731, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Is admitted into evidence.

 6             MS. BIBLES:

 7        Q.   General, your statement sets out through several paragraphs,

 8     calling for NATO air-strikes in response to the Bosnian Serb offensive in

 9     Gorazde.  Did your working relationship with General Mladic change as a

10     result of those air-strikes?

11        A.   It changed dramatically for the following six weeks or maybe two

12     months.  Even during the discussions in Geneva where the Serb party was

13     involved he refused to speak directly to any UNPROFOR personnel and

14     channelled all his questions through Colonel Tolimir, who was his aid,

15     military aide.  Also, I think, they began to take the view that the UN

16     were now engaging in a war against Serbia, although we tried to persuade

17     them that we were merely enforcing passages of convoys, maintaining the

18     integrity of the withdrawal of heavy weapons agreement or the agreement

19     to demilitarise the zone on Mount Igman.  We were not waging war.  I

20     suspect that they began to see we, the international community, were

21     beginning to take sides at that point.

22        Q.   Could you tell us generally whether the Bosnian Serb forces took

23     action against UN employees and humanitarian workers as a result of the

24     air-strikes?

25        A.   Immediately following air-strikes, the Bosnian Serbs would halt

Page 6857

 1     all convoys, seize convoys that were on their territory at the time, and

 2     take hostages.  That was the normal practice following an air-strike.

 3             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, I would ask that 65 ter 14676 be

 4     brought to our screens.  And, Your Honours, 14676 pertains to

 5     paragraph 96 of the statement.

 6        Q.   Could you please review this document with particular attention

 7     to paragraph 4.

 8        A.   Mm-hmm.

 9        Q.   With respect to General Mladic's reference to the use of UNPROFOR

10     and humanitarian organisations for anti-aircraft combat, what do you

11     understand that to mean?

12        A.   Well, I guess that they by placing hostages around their

13     positions, military positions, they would hope to deter NATO air-strikes

14     against those positions.

15             MS. BIBLES:  And, Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 14676.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm trying to find a date on the document.

17             MS. BIBLES:  It appears to be undated, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P732, Your Honours.

20             THE WITNESS:  Can I set that document a little bit in context?

21     The UN never had any intention of carrying out massive air-strikes.  We

22     merely used minimum force to enforce the passage of a convoy, et cetera.

23     The intelligence that the Bosnian Serb side therefore had that NATO was

24     going to launch massive strikes was faulty.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for that explanation.

Page 6858

 1             MS. BIBLES:  We can remove this document from the screen,

 2     although, Your Honours, I will note that paragraph 1 of the order list

 3     the 19th of April of 1994.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Whether the document is of that date is

 5     different, but at least some context in terms of time is given here.

 6             Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ?  Oh, yes, no, you've

 7     given the number already.  It's P732 and is admitted into evidence.

 8             Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.

 9             MS. BIBLES:

10        Q.   Based on your experiences and observations, were you able to draw

11     conclusions as to General Mladic's ability to control the events on the

12     ground?

13        A.   Well certainly he would be central to the battle plan and

14     therefore in total control of what advance or retreat may be determined

15     on their side.

16        Q.   During your time, 1994, did you have an opportunity to observe

17     how General Mladic interacted with his military subordinates?

18        A.   We had many opportunities to see how he dealt with his

19     subordinates.  During our many meetings we had with him he was often

20     accompanied by his subordinates, and they showed complete respect and

21     clearly under total command of General Mladic.

22        Q.   Were you ever aware of a situation in which anyone within the

23     Bosnian Serb army acted contrary or in opposition to General Mladic?

24        A.   Never.

25             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, that concludes my examination.

Page 6859

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Ms. Bibles.

 2             We have another ten minutes left before the break, Mr. Lukic, but

 3     before I give you an opportunity to start your examination.

 4             Mr. Rose, you may be surprised to see only two Judges.  One of

 5     the Judges, Judge Fluegge, is for urgent reasons unable to sit today.  He

 6     will be with us tomorrow again and he has access to the full transcript

 7     and, if need be, even the audio and video of this hearing.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, if you're ready.

10             Mr. Rose, you'll be cross-examined now by Mr. Lukic.  Mr. Lukic

11     is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

14        A.   Good morning.

15        Q.   You have a hard copy of your statement before you, do you not?

16        A.   I do indeed.

17        Q.   It's just that I need to find one for myself.  Let us go to

18     paragraph 22.  That's where we will start.  There you say -- well, you

19     discuss Dobrinja, saying that the area of Dobrinja was virtually

20     surrounded.  As a matter of fact, there was an exit across Mojmilo hill,

21     whereby one could move between Dobrinja and the rest of Sarajevo; is that

22     correct?

23        A.   It could possibly be so.

24        Q.   Dobrinja also had access to other parts of territory under Muslim

25     control and that is proven by the fact that one side of the tunnel which

Page 6860

 1     went under the airport runway actually ended in Dobrinja.  Did you know

 2     that?

 3        A.   The UN had no knowledge of the tunnel, official knowledge, at the

 4     time.  Went to examine which areas were sounded and which areas were not,

 5     we would have to have a map in front of us.  So I cannot make a valid

 6     comment on how much Dobrinja was surrounded or how much it was not

 7     surrounded.

 8        Q.   You say you had no personal knowledge, official knowledge, of the

 9     existence of the tunnel.  But, as a matter of fact, you were aware of its

10     existence, were you not?  No one could have been ignorant of its

11     existence as long as they were in Sarajevo?

12        A.   There was certainly rumours to the effect that a tunnel existed,

13     but the Bosnian government side kept the knowledge of its whereabouts to

14     themselves.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Rose, may I ask you one clarification.  Your

17     answer was:

18             "There certainly were rumours to the effect that the tunnel

19     existed, but the Bosnian government side kept the knowledge of its

20     whereabouts to themselves."

21             These are two items, first the existence of a tunnel wherever --

22             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  -- second, where it was.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, did -- could I ask you to explain on both

Page 6861

 1     whether the Bosnian government also was silent on the existence.

 2             THE WITNESS:  It was silent on the existence of the tunnel.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  And therefore --

 4             THE WITNESS:  And therefore would not reveal its whereabouts.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

 6             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   In your reports -- actually, in the reports you received from

 8     your subordinates and the reports you authored, did you mention the

 9     existence of the tunnel under the runway?

10        A.   Not to my knowledge.

11        Q.   In paragraph 23 of your statement you say:

12             "The general view at this time, as I was briefed, was that there

13     was indiscriminate shelling of civilians within the city centre by the

14     Bosnian Serbs.  A number of incidents which occurred immediately prior to

15     my arrival and shortly afterwards supported that view.  For example..."

16             Actually, you go on to say that:

17             "It is also the case that of course shelling was going the other

18     way from time to time against the Bosnian Serbs," et cetera.  "Sniping

19     was also prevalent during this period, by both sides."

20             UNPROFOR was unaware of the strength and structure or disposition

21     of units, facilities, buildings, and commands of the

22     1st Corps of the BH Army in Sarajevo; is that correct?

23        A.   That is correct.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, sorry to interrupt again but I'd like to

25     seek clarification of the first line of paragraph 23.  It starts:

Page 6862

 1             "The general view at this time, as I was briefed ..."

 2             Now, I'm not a native English-speaking person, but should I

 3     understand this "the general view at this time," the time when I was

 4     briefed or the general view at this time according to how I was briefed?

 5     Which of the two?  And it may be that it's a wrong reading anyhow, that

 6     there's no ambiguity at all in the language, but could you please assist

 7     me.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Absolutely, sir.  As I arrived in Sarajevo in

 9     January 1994, I received, prior to arrival and after my arrival, many

10     briefings.  And the basis of those briefings were and the evidence were -

11     anyway, was all around to see - that Sarajevo had been for two years

12     under heavy shell fire.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, so you're --

14             THE WITNESS:  And continued to be under shell fire.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  So you're both referring here to the content of the

16     briefing and on what you observed at the time, although general view is

17     difficult to observe?

18             THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

20             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21        Q.   [Interpretation] General, would you agree that if UNPROFOR was

22     unaware of the disposition of units, facilities, buildings, and commands

23     of the 1st Corps of the BH Army, it also could not have known what it was

24     that the Serbs were targeting in Sarajevo, i.e., whether the shelling was

25     random or not; is that correct?

Page 6863

 1        A.   Again, putting that question in context, the United Nations'

 2     presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to facilitate the delivery of

 3     humanitarian aid.  They were there by agreement with initially three

 4     warring parties.  They were not there in a military capacity, therefore

 5     they did not have intelligence-gathering capabilities.  They were working

 6     with, albeit recalcitrant parties to try and deliver humanitarian aid and

 7     to bring about peace.  They were not in a position to have detailed

 8     military knowledge of the strength, deployments, intentions of any of the

 9     warring parties.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Since in this paragraph there is a brief mention of

11     snipers, on the 6th of October, 2010 -- well, could we please have 1D549

12     in e-court first.  It is the transcript from the Karadzic case.  We need

13     page 17 in e-court.  We need page 7336, lines 13 through 17.

14             General, you see Judge Kwon's question there.  He asked:

15             [In English] "General, you can confirm what is stated in this

16     information sheet; i.e., that you believe Ganic organised his secret

17     police to snipe trams?"

18             And your answer was:

19             "That was certainly our belief at that time, sir, yes."

20             [Interpretation] My question is this:  Do you still stand by this

21     part of your testimony?

22        A.   I certainly do.

23        Q.   Thank you.  At the time, as you say, there were three warring

24     parties.  During any of the briefings you received did anyone tell you

25     that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina made up one-third of the population

Page 6864

 1     and that before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina they also enjoyed the right

 2     to one-third of all positions within the authorities?

 3        A.   That did form part of my briefing, yes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, looking at the clock.  I do not know ...

 5             MR. LUKIC:  We can break now, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  We can break now.

 7             We'll take a break and we'll resume at quarter past 12.00 after

 8     the witness has left the courtroom.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- Recess taken at 11.52 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 12.16 p.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, if you're ready, you may continue.

15             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16        Q.   [Interpretation] May we continue, General?

17        A.   Indeed.

18        Q.   Now, why did I ask you about the percentage of Serbs and their

19     participation in power?  Is it correct that UNPROFOR treated only the

20     Bosnian or Muslim side as the official representative of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina?

22        A.   I think that was the case.

23        Q.   Serbs were at the time treated as rebels; is that correct?

24        A.   The United Nations had recognised the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina

25     in 1992.  They'd never recognised the existence of the Republika Srpska.

Page 6865

 1        Q.   [In English] At that time?

 2        A.   At that time.

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Thank you.  Is it true - and you refer to that

 4     at page 7322 on the 6th of October, 2012, when you testified in the

 5     Karadzic case - that the Western powers did not understand the nature of

 6     conflict as it developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 7        A.   I'd have to see that on the screen in context before I reply.

 8        Q.   Could we please have in e-court 1D549.  It should be page 41 in

 9     e-court.  We need page 7322 -- actually, 73 --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  It is -- the page you're mentioning is on e-court

11     page 3.

12             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour, obviously I stand corrected.  Yes.

13     We need the last row of this page -- actually, we need rows 16 to 19, I

14     apologise.

15        Q.   You'll see, General, on the screen it's saying:

16             "Is that what I said, that that was an observation of yours, that

17     there was a lack of understanding among Western governments, in terms of

18     the nature of the conflict?"

19             And your answer was:

20             "That is true."

21             Would you agree with this today as well, General?

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May I just ask Mr. Lukic to understand what is --

23     what the witness is being asked to answer to.  This question says -- is

24     asking the witness whether is that what I said.  And does the answer

25     "that's true" answer to the fact yes that's what you said, or does it

Page 6866

 1     answer to the fact that there was a lack of understanding among Western

 2     governments?  I'm not quite sure what he's being -- what the answer is

 3     responding to here.

 4             MR. LUKIC:

 5        Q.   So, General, can you explain this issue to Your Honours -- to

 6     His Honour?

 7        A.   My understanding today of that statement is that there were

 8     people in the West, NATO being America, who wished to use more force in

 9     resolving the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina than the United Nations felt was

10     appropriate to a peacekeeping mission and that there was this

11     misunderstanding about what a peacekeeping mission could do and what it

12     could not do with regards to the use of force.  And I think that's what I

13     was referring to.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I -- reading it, it seems that you are -- that

17     the parties were putting a part of your book to you in which certain

18     language is used and that you're invited to confirm that that is what

19     you -- your feelings or your thoughts were.

20             Now, Mr. Lukic, for the Chamber to fully understand such an

21     isolated item of the testimony, of course we would like to see also what

22     the relevant pages in the book say so that we have the context.  It's, I

23     do understand, page 3 of the book which in the very beginning, so it

24     might be an introductory observation.  For the Chamber to fully

25     understand this part of the testimony and the confirmation Mr. Rose has

Page 6867

 1     given today, the Chamber would like to have access to the previous pages,

 2     this was the third page of that day's session, perhaps the tow previous

 3     pages, and also the relevant portion of the book on which the witness

 4     then commented.

 5             MR. LUKIC:  Your Honours, for us this is enough what General said

 6     today because we are --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but as I said --

 8             MR. LUKIC:  [Overlapping speakers]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- we would like to have the context.  We need to

10     fully understand.  If it's enough for you it doesn't mean that it's

11     enough for us.  Could you please prepare that we receive in evidence the

12     previous two pages as well and that we -- I don't know to what extent we

13     still need 92 ter confirmations for that or attestations, but to take

14     care that the Chamber has the full context available of this portion of

15     the testimony including relevant pages of the book.

16             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour, we will do so.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.  Please proceed meanwhile.

18             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] General, let us focus on paragraph 28 of your

20     statement.  There reference is made to humanitarian aid being distributed

21     and brought in in different ways, primarily by airplane to Tuzla.  There

22     was a plan to open up the airport there so as to enable an easier

23     delivery of humanitarian aid.  You said that the airport was not opened

24     even a year later, which is when you left Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that

25     correct?

Page 6868

 1        A.   That is correct.

 2        Q.   When you say towards the end of this paragraph -- well, you say:

 3             "...President Izetbegovic was later to state that he was prepared

 4     to see 10.000 Bosnians die of starvation rather than accept a single Serb

 5     on Bosnian territory)."

 6             Is it correct that one of the main reasons for not re-opening the

 7     airport was that the Muslim side -- that there should be Serb controllers

 8     at the airport who would control the goings-on at the airport and what

 9     was being distributed from it?

10        A.   No, that's not precisely what the discussion was about.  The Serb

11     side wished to have inspectors, not controllers, to examine the air

12     cargos being brought in to ensure there were no weapons being brought in

13     to the Muslim side.  So there were inspectors not controllers, and that's

14     the objection that the Bosnian government had, they would not allow

15     inspectors from the Serb side.

16        Q.   What is the difference, if you may, between a controller and an

17     inspector?

18        A.   Well, I controller would be controlling the entire flow of aid

19     coming in to Tuzla.  An inspector merely inspects what is happening.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, the last two and a half minutes it was

22     pure repetition of what is found already in paragraph 28, apart from

23     additional confusion that was created by the difference between

24     "controller" and "inspector."  There's nothing new.  Cross-examination is

25     there to test the evidence and to bring new evidence which is relevant

Page 6869

 1     for your case, not to emphasise what you consider important or to repeat

 2     what is there already.

 3             You may proceed.

 4             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5        Q.   Did you believe the position of Alija Izetbegovic, as we've just

 6     heard, when he discussed a multi-ethnic Sarajevo which was a thesis put

 7     forth by the Muslim side at the time?

 8        A.   I'm not sure which statement by President Izetbegovic you're

 9     referring to.

10        Q.   We have just read in your statement that he was prepared to

11     sacrifice 10.000 Bosniaks to see them die of starvation rather than

12     accepting a single Serb in Bosnian territory.  And now I'm narrowing it

13     down to Sarajevo.  Is it true that the Muslim government in Sarajevo was

14     basically not in favour of a multi-ethnic society?  That is my question.

15        A.   There was never evidence to that effect.  The issue over the

16     inspector at Tuzla was, I think, one of sovereignty.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I try to keep focused Mr. Lukic?  I think I

18     understand what you'd like to ask the witness.  The last part is:

19             "... President Izetbegovic was later to state that he was

20     prepared to see 10.000 Bosnians die of starvation rather than accept a

21     single Serb on Bosnian territory )."

22             I think what Mr. Lukic would like to know whether you believed

23     President Izetbegovic to be serious in such a strong denial of any

24     multi-ethnicity in Sarajevo.

25             THE WITNESS:  President Izetbegovic I think when he made that

Page 6870

 1     statement was -- should have added "in this instance" on Serb

 2     territory -- on Bosnian territory.  What he was saying:  I would not

 3     accept any Serb inspector at Tuzla on Bosnian territory there.  He was

 4     not making a wider statement regarding his views on multi-ethnicity in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, is that what the question you would like

 7     to --

 8             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- you were seeking an answer to?

10             MR. LUKIC:  Yes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

12             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

13        Q.   [Interpretation] General, sir, did you come by information that

14     Serbs and Croats wanted to leave the part of Sarajevo that was under the

15     control of Muslim forces?

16        A.   We never had any evidence presented to us that either the Serbs

17     or Croats wanted to leave, although I think maybe some Croats did leave

18     without our knowledge.  Because once the Federation was created, they

19     were free to come and go; the Serbs of course were not.

20        Q.   Could we now please take a look at paragraph 30 of your

21     statement, the last portion or, in fact, the last sentence where it

22     reads:

23             "My concept of demilitarisation was that subsequent to a

24     cease-fire, weapons would be withdrawn beyond a certain agreed point by

25     both sides.  President Izetbegovic was generally not in favour of

Page 6871

 1     demilitarisation."

 2        A.   That is true.

 3        Q.   What about Ganic, Salajdzic?  In other words, the other top

 4     leadership within the Muslim lines, were they in favour of

 5     demilitarisation in Sarajevo?

 6        A.   None of them were.  Their view was that they were a sovereign

 7     nation recognised by the United Nations and they had every right to

 8     position soldiers where they wanted on their own territory and they would

 9     not accept demilitarisation.  Of course they were also worried that

10     demilitarisation would result in the freezing of the conflict line and

11     become de facto an international border.

12        Q.   We will get to that and spend some more time on that issue, but

13     at this point I'd just like to ask you this:  Is it correct that the

14     Muslim party was, in fact, interested in extending war operations and the

15     war?

16        A.   Sometime during 1994 I think that the Bosnian government side

17     abandoned the peace process because they were being armed by the

18     Americans and others and trained and were given hope of recovering their

19     lost territory by force of arms.  This was particularly advanced by the

20     forming of the Federation, which tilted the strategic military balance

21     against the Bosnian Serb side.  So it was in their interest, as they saw

22     it, to return to war.  In my view, of course, that was a wholly mistaken

23     view, that it would take decades before they were able to create

24     sufficient military strength to recover their lost territory by force of

25     arms.  And we pointed that out repeatedly to President Izetbegovic and

Page 6872

 1     Vice-President Ganic.

 2        Q.   I just want you to know that it's not that I'm not satisfied with

 3     your answer.  I'm just waiting for the interpretation to end.  Just this

 4     is to explain why I pause before I put the next question.

 5             And now paragraph 31, please.  You state here:

 6             "The Bosnian Serbs were in favour of general demilitarisation

 7     that would begin with the general demilitarisation of Sarajevo."

 8             And:

 9             "They suggested that UNPROFOR place monitors on the heavy weapons

10     on their side as a confidence-building measure and that this would be a

11     start to working towards a cease-fire?"

12             You've just explained a moment ago why the Muslims were against

13     the cease-fire and the demilitarisation of Sarajevo, but at that time,

14     did you have any specific information about what Mr. Warren Zimmermann

15     had promised Alija Izetbegovic?  Did UNPROFOR have any information about

16     the type of agreement reached between the Americans and the Muslim

17     government in Sarajevo?

18        A.   We were never so informed.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that the Croats, too, were in fact in

20     favour of a cessation of hostilities and an end to the war at the time

21     while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22        A.   Following the Washington Accord, I had very little dealings with

23     the Croatian side and I have no knowledge of what their position was.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know, because you said that you were aware of

25     the fact that the Americans were arming the Muslim side, were you privy

Page 6873

 1     to any information or did you have any information where these weapons

 2     were coming from?  Did you know whether the weapons were coming from

 3     Iran, the United States?  So did you have any information about the

 4     source of these weapons?

 5        A.   None at all.  And I should probably modify the word "aware."  We

 6     were aware of the rumours that this was happening and there was some

 7     circumstantial evidence, for example, the Bosnian soldiers started to

 8     appear in modern American-style uniforms, but how this equipment was

 9     getting to -- into Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had no knowledge at all.

10     Because of course NATO controlled the air-space and they were not passing

11     any information pertaining to that to us.

12        Q.   You did not have -- you did not control the land roads either so

13     you didn't know whether the weapons came in by road; correct?

14        A.   That is correct.  We were an organisation that was facilitating

15     the delivery of humanitarian aid.  We were not a military occupying

16     power.

17             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have in e-court document

18     65 ter 8137.

19        Q.   General, you know this type of document; correct?  You recognise

20     the format?

21        A.   I do indeed.

22        Q.   Who sent this fax?  Who sent this fax message and to whom?  Can

23     you tell from this?  It says the 31st of January, 1994.

24        A.   It looks as though it's a signal passing between Zagreb and

25     Belgrade and I'm not, as far as I can see, on the distribution list.

Page 6874

 1        Q.   Yes, that was a surprise to me too, but I just wanted to show you

 2     that you did not get this information either.  You hadn't received that

 3     fax, although it deals with a meeting between you, Dr. Radovan Karadzic,

 4     and General Mladic; correct?

 5             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2 for the benefit

 6     of the General, to show that he, too, was a member of this -- in this

 7     conversation.

 8        Q.   If we look at paragraphs 3 and 4 we see that this is in fact a

 9     reference to you; correct?

10        A.   That is correct and that I was certainly at that meeting.

11        Q.   In paragraph 4 we see that it reads -- well, it says that you

12     were the one who proposed that ways and means be provided to disengage

13     and separate forces and that Dr. Karadzic was enthusiastic about this but

14     doubted that the Muslim side would agree, as this ran counter to their

15     international propaganda strategy of portraying Sarajevo as the martyr

16     town.  And it goes on that General Mladic's reaction was also positive,

17     but he was more cautious and recommended a step-by-step approach.  This

18     is another instance where you proposed a cessation of hostilities in

19     Sarajevo.  Can you recall what the reaction of the representative of --

20     representatives of the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo was?

21        A.   I can't recall.  It was nearly 20 years ago, but the -- my view

22     now would be that they were -- would have been resistant to any such

23     suggestion because that was characteristic of their position of the

24     period.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Towards the bottom of the page we can see that --

Page 6875

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  [Previous translation continues]...

 2     interpretation, thank you.

 3             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   -- the airport in Tuzla is mentioned.  And reference is made to

 5     legitimate Serb's concerns and that they have to be taken into account,

 6     and these concerns were that without inspectors the airport could be used

 7     for funneling in weapons but also because the Serbs were concerned that

 8     the Muslim side could down a UN plane and then blame that on them.  As

 9     you sit here, can you recall what the outcome of these negotiations on

10     the Tuzla airport was?

11        A.   The end result, as you have already described, was negative.  We

12     never made any progress with opening Tuzla airport during the year that I

13     was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14        Q.   In paragraph 8 Dr. Karadzic proposes not just the re-opening of

15     the Tuzla but also of the Banja Luka airport; in other words, an airport,

16     too, that was under the control of the Serb forces.  Was the Banja Luka

17     airport ever open while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18        A.   No, it was not.

19        Q.   Let us move on to February 1994 and paragraph 35 of your

20     statement.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we do so, Mr. Lukic, I saw in the 92 ter

22     statement that one page is missing of this report.

23             What efforts were made - and I'm addressing you, Ms. Bibles - to

24     get a complete picture of this meeting?  I mean, just to say, Well, we

25     have a -- we have the minutes but not all of it is not very satisfactory.

Page 6876

 1             MS. BIBLES:  Your Honours, the short answer is that we don't know

 2     where the missing pages are.  It -- the document itself reflects that it

 3     would be paragraphs 1 and 2 of the minutes that are missing.  The witness

 4     in his statement verifies that what is present in this document is

 5     consistent with his recollection of the meeting itself.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  My question was:  What efforts were made to get the

 7     complete version?  If you can't answer that question right away, we'd

 8     like to be informed as soon as possible.

 9             MS. BIBLES:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I will do that.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

11             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12        Q.   In paragraph 35 you talk about the shelling of Dobrinja, a suburb

13     of Sarajevo, and you say that you went to the site after the attack and

14     that you ordered a crater analysis to be carried out and the results

15     showed conclusively that the rounds had been fired by Bosnian Serb

16     forces.  Many ballistics experts will testify on this.  And we have

17     discussed at length the findings here, but let me ask you, first of all:

18     Do you know that the -- that the findings have never been finalised, the

19     conclusion as to what had happened had never actually been finalised?

20        A.   It's particularly difficult to identify a precise firing point by

21     crater analysis.  When you have five mortar bombs in a particular line,

22     you can certainly tell the direction.  The distance may not be so easy to

23     define.  The more bombs, you have crater bombs, the easier it becomes.

24     And certainly our view at the time was that it had come from the Serb

25     side.  Balance -- it was, as you say, a balance of judgement.

Page 6877

 1        Q.   Do you personally know what the results of this analysis were?

 2     Do you know where these people obtained their information from and that

 3     they started this investigation 28 days after the incident?  Are you

 4     aware of that?

 5        A.   There were usually two levels of investigation.  First of all, an

 6     immediate one carried out by the French army engineers who had a certain

 7     experience in this area; and then, secondly, there would be a more

 8     detailed investigation from a team from Zagreb.  I cannot remember at

 9     this length of time when the team from Zagreb made an analysis or,

10     indeed, whether it ever did so.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now pull up 1D548 in e-court.  That is your

12     evidence of -- from October 2010 and could we have page 69, please, in

13     e-court.  That should be 7309, the transcript page, from the Karadzic

14     trial.  We have the right page.  Let's take a look at lines 4 to 7 and

15     then 11 through 18.  Have you read what your evidence was?  And I will

16     have a brief question about this once you've read it, and that is the

17     following:  UNPROFOR did not have good or modern up-to-date equipment and

18     it wasn't easy to conclude where the fire had come from; is that correct?

19        A.   We're talking about two periods of time, the time of the Markale

20     bombing and the Dobrinja mortar bomb.  There was no mortar-locating radar

21     deployed.  By the autumn the UN had deployed mortar-locating radars which

22     of course gave a great deal of precision in identifying the firing point.

23     At this time it was an imprecise art, as I described.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 36, General, of your statement you say,

25     speaking of Dobrinja, in the penultimate sentence:

Page 6878

 1             "The Serbs had it completely surrounded and were firing directly

 2     down into the suburb such that residents were forced to live in their

 3     basements."

 4             General, is it true that Dobrinja was at the same time a very

 5     strong stronghold of the Muslim forces, almost a bunker?

 6        A.   Not as far as I know.

 7        Q.   Is it correct that Dobrinja was surrounded on three sides and

 8     that there was no way the Serbs could capture that part of the

 9     settlement?  Half of Dobrinja was under Muslim control and the other half

10     by -- under Serb control.  Would it have been possible had it not been so

11     strongly fortified that the Serbs would not have been able to capture it?

12        A.   As I've explained, the UN was not in a position to make detailed,

13     strategic, or even tactical-level analysis as to the correlation of

14     forces on the ground.  As you already pointed out, the word "completely

15     surrounded" may have been a little extreme because there was a route, a

16     hidden route, through Dobrinja from the airport into the main part of

17     Sarajevo but it was a very narrow route indeed.  And effectively,

18     Dobrinja was surrounded.

19        Q.   Dobrinja was close to Mojmilo hill or adjacent to it which was

20     under Muslim control, and in fact Sarajevo was linked with Igman and the

21     roads that went across Igman via Dobrinja - is that correct? - through

22     the tunnel that ran across Dobrinja and then under the airport runway to

23     the part that was under the control of Muslim forces, Bosnian Muslim

24     forces?

25        A.   As I've said, we had no precise knowledge as to the hidden routes

Page 6879

 1     into Sarajevo at the time.  And what you're saying could well have been

 2     the case, but of course there were other negotiations and deals where

 3     stuff came across the line without the knowledge of the UN and this would

 4     have been an example of one of them.

 5        Q.   You were aware of the Igman routes that were also used by

 6     UNPROFOR; correct?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   Did you know that those routes were used by Muslim forces to

 9     supply their armed formations in the city of Sarajevo?

10        A.   Not to our knowledge.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let's go to paragraph 37.  There you say:

12             "On the following day, the 5th of February, 1994 ... there was a

13     massacre in Sarajevo ... a single mortar shell had been fired onto the

14     Markale market-place not far from the Presidency."

15             Markale and the single shell will be the subject of many

16     investigation expert testimony in this case by eye-witnesses and

17     ballistics experts.  I would rather not go into ballistics issues with

18     you but I would make a connection between this paragraph and the next

19     paragraph in your statement, paragraph 38, where you also stress that:

20             "General Milovanovic sent a fax message offering to form a mixed

21     commission of military experts to determine the provenance of the

22     attack."

23             The question is this:  Such a commission was never established;

24     is that correct?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 6880

 1        Q.   Was it considered to establish a joint commission comprising

 2     representatives of the Serb-Muslim side and UNPROFOR?  Was it considered

 3     at all, if you recall?

 4        A.   I don't really recall, but if it had been suggested to the

 5     Bosnian government side they would certainly have refused to accept Serb

 6     analysts on their territory.

 7        Q.   There were two commissions established in this regard.  One

 8     attended the scene straight away and the other arrived subsequently from

 9     Zagreb; is that correct?

10        A.   That is so.

11        Q.   During the first investigation there were representatives of the

12     Muslim authorities and they gathered evidence for the most part; is that

13     correct?

14        A.   I think that is true.

15        Q.   Thus, the second commission arriving from Zagreb relied on the

16     evidence gathered, or rather, immediately following the incident; is that

17     correct?

18        A.   Again, that would have been the case.

19        Q.   Do you know and did you object to the fact that parts of evidence

20     went missing or were removed immediately following the initial, the

21     first, investigation?

22        A.   I certainly remember discussing with the French engineers that

23     they had not been able to get hold of all the material because the

24     Bosnian government side had removed a number of items from the site

25     before they arrived.  Whether they subsequently got access to these

Page 6881

 1     items, I don't know.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Next you say in paragraph 40 of your statement, in

 3     the last sentence:

 4             "I suggested that we should take advantage of the situation and

 5     look towards introducing a 20-kilometre total exclusion zone (TEZ) for

 6     heavy weapons."

 7             It had to do with seizing the opportunity created by this event

 8     at Markale; is that correct?

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   After that -- actually, let me ask you something about something

11     before the total exclusion zone was introduced.  Before that and

12     afterwards, the balance in terms of number of personnel was in favour of

13     the Muslim side.  I don't know whether you were familiar with that piece

14     of information.  If you are not, please say so.

15        A.   I'm not.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo

17     actually was supposed to encompass the withdrawal of all armed

18     individuals as well from Sarajevo in order for Sarajevo to become an

19     unarmed city, and is it also correct that the Muslim side would not

20     accept that?

21        A.   I think you're conflating two issues.  The first issue was the

22     removal of heavy weapons which was agreed but not adhered to by both

23     sides; the second issue was the demilitarisation, which we have already

24     discussed, was resisted by the Bosnian Muslim side.

25        Q.   When you say that this agreement on collecting weapons was not

Page 6882

 1     implemented, are you saying that it was not implemented at all or that

 2     some parts of it were not implemented, i.e., that some pieces were not

 3     handed over at collection points?

 4        A.   It was certainly not implemented hundred per cent by either side.

 5     Both sides cheated on the agreement and hid heavy weapons within that

 6     zone.

 7        Q.   We'll get to that issue later on in more detail, but while we're

 8     on this topic let me ask you the following:  Serbs took, or rather, used

 9     the weapons from collection points when attacked by the Muslim forces;

10     correct?

11        A.   That was the claim made by the Bosnian Serbs when they came to

12     seize weapons back from the collecting points.

13        Q.   It was their assertion that they had no other weapons and

14     therefore had to use the ones that were there; correct?

15        A.   That was the assertion.  Of course it was more of a political

16     act, I think, than a military one, particularly as we suspected they had

17     hidden the affected weapons and could have used those.

18        Q.   Was it not dangerous for the Serbs to use those weapons that were

19     under the control of the UN?  Did they not expose themselves to the

20     danger of air-strikes by the NATO Alliance?

21        A.   They did indeed.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Let us discuss the demilitarisation of Sarajevo

23     briefly, so we will leave the area of collecting heavy weapons.  In

24     paragraph 42, you say:

25             "President Izetbegovic said he would never agree to the

Page 6883

 1     withdrawal of his infantry from Sarajevo ..."

 2             I'm trying to understand the following, and I would kindly ask

 3     for your explanation:  Did UNPROFOR accept that position by

 4     President Izetbegovic and what were further actions by UNPROFOR?  Was

 5     there any effort made towards demilitarisation or was it given up on?

 6        A.   We had to accept his position as it stood at that time, but we

 7     didn't relent on our efforts to try and demilitarise the situation which

 8     was a part of bringing about permanent peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   Did you ever threaten President Izetbegovic with air-strikes

10     against his forces?

11        A.   I did.

12        Q.   We'll get to that later on, when I will ask you whether you could

13     bring that about in fact or not, but I'm afraid we are at the end of this

14     part of our session and we need to have a break.

15             MR. LUKIC:  It's quarter past 12.00.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  It is a suitable moment for you.  It is

17     approximately the time one hour after we restarted.  We'll take a break

18     and resume at 25 minutes to 2.00 but only after the witness has left the

19     courtroom.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Recess taken at 1.13 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber would appreciate if you would stop your

24     loud conversations when the Chamber enters the courtroom, Mr. Mladic.

25             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

Page 6884

 1             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, could I take advantage of this time to

 2     inform the Chamber of two things?  I spoke with Mr. Lukic about RM009.

 3     Mr. Lukic's estimate is four hours for that witness and the Prosecution

 4     will reduce its examination by 15 minutes, so that's four hours and 15 --

 5     4 hours, 45 minutes for the witness.  We'll wait for the Chamber to

 6     direct us as how we might take care of the schedule.

 7             And, Your Honour, with respect to P723, it's a public exhibit

 8     from yesterday, the first page of that exhibit indicates where the

 9     videolink was from and the Prosecution is requesting, since it has no

10     evidential value to the case, that the Chamber order the court officer to

11     remove that first page.  Thank you.

12                           [The witness takes the stand]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  The Registry is hereby instructed to replace P723 by

14     the same document without the first page.

15             Mr. Lukic, are you ready to proceed?

16             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

18             MR. LUKIC:  Thanks.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] General, may we continue?

20        A.   Please do.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Please focus on paragraph 43 of your statement.

22     There you say you met with General Divjak, deputy commander of the

23     BH Army.  That is at the end of the paragraph, you continue:

24             "... to discuss the cease-fire.  Surprisingly, he also agreed to

25     observe the cease-fire."

Page 6885

 1             Could we please have 1D549 in e-court.  It is your testimony,

 2     General, of the 6th October 2010 in the Karadzic case in order to refresh

 3     your recollection.  We need page 20 towards the bottom starting with

 4     line 14.  We also need page 21, the first four lines just following this

 5     page.  Please, can we go back to the previous page.  My apologies.  Let

 6     us go to page 20 so that the General would have sufficient time to read

 7     it.

 8             We see here, General, that you said that General "...'Divjak was

 9     reluctant to sign up to a cease-fire, once again on the grounds that the

10     UN proposal was not linked to any long-term political settlement.'"  And

11     then we see that you --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, it looks at first sight to be a quote.

13     So this is part of a question and not -- perhaps we come to that, but you

14     introduced it as "you said," but apparently it is "you wrote," as quoted

15     by the accused in that case.  Is that --

16             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  My apologies.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed.

18             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

19        Q.   [Interpretation] General, following this introductory part you

20     provided on the 6th October 2010, you discuss further that you told

21     Divjak that the shell which hit Markale, the one that exploded on the

22     5th of February, 1994, came from the Muslim positions and that you were

23     able to establish that.  Automatically, he had a change of heart and

24     signed up to the agreement.  What was your impression?  Did he know that

25     indeed the shell had arrived from the Muslim positions?  Or did he have

Page 6886

 1     doubts regarding that?

 2        A.   Well, clearly he thought that if that information went public it

 3     would be very damaging to the Bosnia-Herzegovina side.  As I said

 4     previously, the initial investigation was incomplete, but that was the

 5     first view of the French analysts, that it could have well come from the

 6     Bosnian government side, i.e., been dropped off the building physically.

 7     But that view was later rescinded.  It was useful in that time in the

 8     end, it proved that pressure was such on Divjak that he signed up to the

 9     idea that they should have a cease-fire.

10        Q.   Thank you.  We said we won't go into the technical details of

11     this matter.  General --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I try to verify this and to be very precise.

13             What is quoted as what you've written in the book is that the

14     first investigation would reveal that it was fired from the Muslim side,

15     whereas your testimony today is the initial investigation was incomplete

16     and the first view of the French analysts was that it could have well

17     come from the Bosnian government side.  These two are not the same, at

18     least the one is it comes from the Muslim side, the other one is it may

19     have come from the Muslim side.  Now, which is the accurate presentation?

20     That the French analysts said it came from or that it may have come from?

21             THE WITNESS:  Well, my memory is certainly hazy on the subject,

22     but I guess if I wrote in the book that they were definite initially

23     about where it had come from, then that would have been the view I had at

24     that time.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

Page 6887

 1             THE WITNESS:  Subsequently it is no doubt it became far less

 2     certain where the bomb had been fired from.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, something came to my mind - addressing the

 4     parties - dealing with what the report would have stated, I take it that

 5     sooner or later we'll have all of that in evidence.  The same is with the

 6     Dobrinja shelling on the 4th of February, to the extent not portions are

 7     already in evidence but forgive me for not having on my mind every single

 8     piece of evidence where there are so many reports.

 9             MS. BIBLES:  The Chamber can look forward to additional evidence

10     with respect to these reports, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] General, please look at paragraph 46 next, where

15     you discuss the 12th of February, 1994:

16             "General Milovanovic sent a fax protesting the Bosnian government

17     breaches of the cease-fire ..."

18             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D552 in e-court.

19     We need --

20        Q.   You see -- well, you can see it in English.  It is a document of

21     the SRK command.  It's a regular combat report for the 9th

22     of April, 1994, that is to say a few days -- well, in April.  In

23     the B/C/S we need page 2, whereas in the English version we need page 4.

24             General, at the time did you have information that UN convoys

25     were transporting weapons and ammunition for the Muslim forces?

Page 6888

 1        A.   The allegation was often made, but to my knowledge the UN never

 2     moved weapons or ammunition for the Bosnian government forces.

 3        Q.   Here we see in this document that at around 8.30 p.m. on the

 4     8th of April, 1994, a humanitarian aid convoy for the city of Sarajevo

 5     was searched, seven trucks and one jeep, during which a large quantity of

 6     ammunition for Brownings and medical material were found that were not on

 7     the list of goods to be transported.

 8             At the time were you informed of this incident or allegation by

 9     the SRK command?

10        A.   To my knowledge, I was never made aware of this supposed

11     incident, and I'm sure I would have been made aware and I would have

12     remembered it now.

13        Q.   Please bear with me.  Would you agree with me that the situation

14     of the Muslim forces in 1994 improved drastically, not only due to the

15     Washington Agreement but also because those forces were constantly

16     receiving ever-larger amounts of weapons?

17        A.   We certainly detected that the Bosnian government forces were

18     improving their capability, but how they were doing that and where their

19     ammunition or equipment was coming from, as I say, we had no direct

20     knowledge.  Our role there was purely to facilitate humanitarian aid, not

21     to act as a guarantor of the arms embargo which of course was a

22     responsibility of NATO, not ourselves.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to move to March 1994.  Kindly look at

24     paragraph 55 of your statement.  On the 1st of March, 1994, a framework

25     Washington Agreement was signed creating the Federation of

Page 6889

 1     Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.  Nowhere in the documents was I able

 2     to find whether there was any contribution of yours to the signing of the

 3     Washington Agreement of the 18th of March, 1994.

 4        A.   I was the person that chaired the meeting near Zagreb where the

 5     two parties were brought together, and it was my wording that stood for

 6     that agreement, but of course it was a politically done deal.  I merely

 7     had to administer the cease-fire, the signing of the cease-fire, and then

 8     the separation of forces, et cetera, which follows any end of

 9     hostilities.

10        Q.   The territory controlled by Fikret Abdic, did it make part of the

11     Federation?

12        A.   No, it did not.

13        Q.   In that Federation there was no clear delineation of which part

14     of the territory belonged to which side, or am I mistaken?

15        A.   There was no clear delineation.

16        Q.   The signing of this agreement followed shortly a period of

17     fighting between Muslims and Croats; is that correct?

18        A.   I don't recall whether it did.  They certainly had been fighting

19     during the time that I had been in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was one

20     month roughly, maybe two.

21        Q.   The fighting between Muslims and Croats for the most part took

22     place in 1993 when you were not in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is probably

23     why you're not aware of any details and we will gladly accept that.  In

24     paragraph 56, you say:

25             "On the 3rd of March, 1994, I attended a meeting at

Page 6890

 1     Lukavica Barracks with General Mladic.  At the meeting he proposed that

 2     there should be a meeting with the Bosnian government over the

 3     establishment of a global peace agreement."

 4             My question is:  Is it true, is it correct, that it was neither

 5     the first nor the last time that such proposals arrived from

 6     General Mladic and the VRS?

 7        A.   That is true.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 59 you discuss the 7th of March and the

 9     opening of the bridge over the -- at Grbavica.  You said you "met with

10     Dr. Ganic, Mr. Muratovic, General Delic, and Brigadier-General Karavelic

11     at the Presidency.  Agreement was reached over opening the Grbavica

12     bridge ... as far as I know," the bridge, had been closed ever since the

13     beginning of the war.  Were there any problems on the Serb side with the

14     opening of the bridge?

15        A.   No, the objections came from Mr. Ganic.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Paragraph 61 next, please.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Can I meanwhile ask a question, Mr. Lukic?

18             You said that General Mladic had at very occasions proposed a --

19     or at least Bosnian Serb side had proposed a global peace agreement.  Was

20     that an open proposal:  Let's agree on peace?  Or was it related to the

21     status quo?  Or could you explain a bit more about how open that proposal

22     was, if you remember.

23             THE WITNESS:  It was a very open proposal.  It was a general

24     proposal that was always on the table whenever we met with the Serb side.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and without any conditions --

Page 6891

 1             THE WITNESS:  Without any --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  -- or suggestions about the content?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 5             Please proceed.

 6             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   I will just add on to what Judge Orie just said to ask you this:

 8     Irrespective of the reasons, was it your impression that the Serb side

 9     was honest in its proposals to end the war, it was sincere?

10        A.   I'm sure they wished to end the war when they were at the most

11     advantageous military and political position.  And after 1994 I think

12     they passed what Clausewitz would call the culminating point and that

13     position was bound to deteriorate so therefore it was in their interest

14     to seek and secure a peace at that time, in 1994.  And of course events

15     subsequently proved that assessment to be correct.

16        Q.   Now I would like to explore a bit more the issue that Judge Orie

17     has initiated.  You said this was an open proposal.  Does that mean that

18     there were no preconditions?

19        A.   Depending on when you're talking about.  At the time of the

20     attack into Gorazde and its aftermath, then of course the Serb side

21     wished the incident and the withdrawal of troops, et cetera, from around

22     Gorazde to be part of the global agreement, whereas the Bosnian Serbs say

23     that was a condition.  But on the Bosnian government side, then they

24     wished to be separate and be dealt with first before they moved on to any

25     more long-term agreement.

Page 6892

 1        Q.   Could you agree with me that at the time while you were in Bosnia

 2     and Herzegovina, almost all, if not all of, the offensive operations came

 3     from the Bosnian side and that this was the reason why the war continued?

 4        A.   I think that would be too extreme a view.  I think that there was

 5     attacks going on that we were possibly unaware of and elsewhere in

 6     Bosnia, not in the areas where we were deployed so I couldn't really make

 7     a substantive comment, but generally speaking the interests of the

 8     Bosnian Serbs was to secure peace and the interests of the Bosnian

 9     government side was to continue with the war.

10        Q.   Thank you, General.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, also Mr. Rose, I'm re-reading page 77,

12     line 2 and following, especially on line 3 where it says that after "the

13     attack into Gorazde, then of course the Serb side wished the incident and

14     the withdrawal of troops, et cetera, from around Gorazde to be part of

15     the global agreement, whereas the Bosnian Serbs say that was a

16     condition."

17             The "whereas" is confusing me.

18             THE WITNESS:  The Bosnian government side wished to treat the

19     Gorazde incident separately and deal with that before they moved on to

20     discussion about a global agreement, whereas I think I'm correct in

21     saying the Bosnian Serb side wished to just have a global agreement of

22     which Gorazde would form a part.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

24             THE WITNESS:  So it was sequential in the case of the Bosnian

25     government side but included within in part of the Bosnian Serb side and

Page 6893

 1     that was always the sticking point.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for that explanation.

 3             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, could we now please move on to paragraph 61 of your

 5     statement, that's another area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bihac namely.  You

 6     state, and this is on the 12th of March, 1994:

 7             "The French Battalion in Bihac asked for an immediate air-strike

 8     against the Serb T55 tank that was firing at the headquarters of the

 9     Bosnian Army 5th Corps in the centre of town."

10             Was there a request from NATO aviation to act as a result of

11     this?

12        A.   The request to bring in air-strikes always came from the

13     United Nations troops on the ground, never initiated by NATO.  The only

14     area in which NATO could fire a weapon without the authority of the

15     United Nations was that of self-defence.

16        Q.   Did an air attack follow?

17        A.   On this occasion, not.  A tank was moving in and out of cover and

18     NATO were unable to identify that tank and engage it.  So the mission was

19     finally called off.

20        Q.   According to you, was the headquarters of the 5th Corps a

21     legitimate target, military target?

22        A.   I guess in any war situation it would have been.

23        Q.   So could NATO air-strikes against Serb positions be called for or

24     requested even when the Serb positions targeted legitimate targets?

25        A.   Certainly, because they were firing into a built-up area and the

Page 6894

 1     enclaves were determined to be areas where fighting should not take

 2     place.  The fact that the headquarters was located there didn't

 3     necessitate -- mean that they were necessarily fighting themselves, this

 4     is the Bosnian government side, in that area, in the built-up area.

 5        Q.   This came immediately after a Muslim attack against Serb

 6     positions and then in a counter-attack the Serbs pushed back the Muslim

 7     forces, and as part of that counter-attack they opened fire on the

 8     headquarters.  Am I correct?

 9        A.   I don't think I can comment on that.  All I remember is that a

10     tank would come out of some cover, fire, and it seemed to be an isolated

11     incident to us at the time.

12        Q.   If the Muslim forces were to open fire from a built-up area at

13     Serb positions would the Serbs be justified in that event to open fire at

14     that particular point, even if it was in a built-up area?  What was the

15     UNPROFOR position?

16        A.   The UNPROFOR position of course was that no one should fire from

17     a built-up area and engage -- and end up engaging the civilian population

18     in combat, which is of course what happened far too many times in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But I guess, as I say, in any war you have the right

20     of return of fire and self-defence.  But the response has to be

21     proportionate.

22        Q.   Talking about proportionality, we saw that, for instance, in the

23     Afghanistan war, we saw British aircraft opening fire at a soldier

24     carrying a Kalashnikov, opening fire with a 500-kilogramme bomb.  Would

25     that -- could that be called proportionate?  And who is it that

Page 6895

 1     determines what proportionality actually entails?  What military rules

 2     guide the decision as to what proportionality is?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you are giving an example from a

 4     different armed conflict, and you're asking, I think, the witness to

 5     write a thesis on many matters.  Could you please focus the question, and

 6     I don't know whether you especially selected a British aircraft to fire

 7     on a soldier or not, but we are more interested in what happened in

 8     Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.

 9             I see Mr. Mladic is seeking contact with counsel.  The rules are

10     clear about consultations, but if there's any specific matter we'll

11     adjourn anyhow in four minutes.  This could have been written down.

12             Mr. Lukic, please proceed.

13             MR. LUKIC:  I think that the last part of my question was

14     actually what I wanted to ask:  Where was that described what was

15     proportionate?  If the General can help us.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, the proportionality principle, that's what you

17     are referring to, Mr. Lukic, where you find the sources for that and

18     the -- I take it also the considerations on what is proportionate and

19     what is not proportionate.

20             We have only three minutes left, Mr. Rose.

21             THE WITNESS:  Well, obviously each specific set of circumstances

22     you have to make a judgement.  But, for example, to call down an

23     artillery barrage in Sarajevo against one mortar that had fired out at

24     you would be disproportionate because you're inevitably going to cause

25     unnecessary civilian casualty.  If, for example, a mortar bomb was put on

Page 6896

 1     top of a hospital building and you called down fire and destroyed the

 2     hospital, that would be disproportionate.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May I just get clarity, Mr. Rose.  You're talking

 4     of a bomb on a hospital.  It looks like you're including in this concept

 5     some kind of collateral damage.  And I'm not quite sure whether you're

 6     talking about collateral damage or whether you're talking about

 7     proportionality.  The example given of the British 500-tonne [sic] bomb

 8     was against a soldier with a Kalashnikov without any collateral damage

 9     around him.  That would be a classic example, for me, of proportionality,

10     of a discussion of proportionality.  But once you put in there hospitals

11     or protected people, you seem to introduce the concept of collateral

12     damage and I'm not quite sure I understand you.

13             THE WITNESS:  I'm merely talking about collateral damage, sir --

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yeah --

15             THE WITNESS:  I mean, the decision to waste a 500-pound bomb on

16     an individual soldier, the end result is the same but that is

17     disproportionate use from the tax payer's point of view.  But if you're

18     talking about law, the law of war, and you're talking about moral issues

19     then you're talking about collateral damage.  And the example I gave,

20     again illustrative, if somebody put a single mortal tube on top of a

21     hospital and fired one mortar bomb and you replied with an artillery

22     barrage which caused a lot of civilian casualties, that would be

23     disproportionate.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, I said we had three minutes left; they

Page 6897

 1     are gone now.

 2             Mr. Lukic, I am -- I think you have used approximately -- you've

 3     left a little bit over four hours of the time you claimed which was six

 4     hours, as far as I remember.

 5             MR. LUKIC:  [Microphone not activated]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  I beg your pardon?

 7             MR. LUKIC:  I asked for seven, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  You asked for seven.  Which means we would not

 9     conclude the cross-examination tomorrow as matters stand now, but

10     certainly in the first session of the day after that then I take it?

11             MR. LUKIC:  Most probably, yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll adjourn for the day, Mr. Rose.  We'd like to

13     see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in the same courtroom, III.  And I

14     hope that you are prepared to stay for at least a part of another day

15     with us, the day after that.

16             THE WITNESS:  As long as it takes, sir, I shall be here.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  That's highly appreciated.  Could -- I would like to

18     instruct you that you should not speak with anyone or communicate in

19     whatever way about your testimony, irrespective of whether that is

20     testimony you have given today or testimony still to be given the

21     following days.

22             THE WITNESS:  Fully understood, sir.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please follow the usher.

24                           [The witness stands down]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we adjourn for the day and we will resume

Page 6898

 1     tomorrow, Thursday, the 17th of January, at 9.30 in the morning in this

 2     same courtroom, III.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.15 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of

 5                           January, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.