Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10535

 1                           Thursday, 2 May 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.  Madam Registrar, would

 6     you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 8     IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.  I hereby establish that

10     the Chamber is complete again and was informed that both parties have a

11     preliminary question to raise.

12             Defence first.

13             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  And good morning,

14     Your Honours.  We were warned by the Prosecution kindly this morning that

15     we missed two deadlines in responding to Prosecutor's 92 bis motions

16     number 14 and number 19.  We checked, and number 19 is dealing only with

17     one witness and we are not going to file the response to this 92 bis

18     motion, but we are -- we were a bit uncertain about the deadline for the

19     14th 92 bis motion and we could kindly ask for an extension as of today

20     for 21 days.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome?

22             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the Prosecution has no objection to

23     that.  Can I inquire with respect to the 19th motion is it that the

24     Defence has no objection or --

25             MR. LUKIC:  No objection.

Page 10536

 1             MR. GROOME:  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we grant the 21 days, Chamber would like to

 3     first verify when the deadline expired before we give -- grant additional

 4     time, if you would do so, but we will decide this in -- very soon but

 5     also not until after we've heard the Prosecution's view on the matter.

 6             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the Prosecution has a standing position

 7     that the Chamber feels that in the interests of justice the Defence

 8     should have whatever additional time is necessary to file a response, the

 9     Prosecution has no objection.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I believe that's what you said already,

11     I think, on page 1, line 21.  I missed that.

12             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, if my memory serves me correctly, the

13     response was due on the 8th of April.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We will consider the matter and we will let you know

15     today, Mr. Lukic.

16             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  That was the matter the Defence wanted to raise.

18             Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.

20     I wanted to alert you to what is going to be a unique filing today.  It

21     relates to two witnesses that -- could we go into private session

22     briefly?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)

Page 10537

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20   (redacted)

21                           [Open session]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  And could the witness be escorted into the

23     courtroom?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.  Mr. Lukic, some 40 more

Page 10538

 1     minutes to go.

 2                           [The witness takes the stand]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Witness.  Before we resume, I'd like

 4     to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've

 5     given at the beginning of your testimony.

 6                           WITNESS:  PAUL GROENEWEGEN [Resumed]

 7                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

 9             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

10                           Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Groenewegen.  I'd like to ask

12     you something about the night between the 12th and 13th of July, 1995.

13     Did you hear of any suicides in Potocari that night?

14        A.   Yes.  The next morning we heard about that, yes.

15        Q.   You don't know anything about the number of persons who actually

16     committed suicide?

17        A.   No, not as far as numbers are concerned.

18        Q.   Now we are going to move on to the 13th of July and I'm going to

19     ask you the following:  The men who had been separated were all put up in

20     the same house; is that correct?

21        A.   Yes.  As far as we heard and saw, that's correct.

22        Q.   What did the house look like?

23        A.   From what I remember, the house almost didn't have any walls on

24     the bottom floor.

25        Q.   So could one see into the house through these walls that were

Page 10539

 1     actually not there?

 2        A.   Yes, partially.

 3        Q.   When you testified in the Blagojevic case, is it correct that you

 4     were shown a video-clip and that you could not recognise that house?

 5        A.   That could very well be correct.

 6             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Now I would kindly ask for the video

 7     that the Prosecution tendered yesterday, P1164, so I would kindly ask

 8     Ms. Stewart to play the video for us.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, could we pause now?

11     Could we please restart with the audio because I heard that there is a

12     sound track from the very beginning of the clip.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   I don't know whether you can see yourself in this video-clip.

16        A.   I know that I must have been among them, but to this day I have

17     not recognised myself among the peacekeepers.

18        Q.   Did you know what General Mladic said at that moment on camera

19     and to the assembled civilians there?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Did you know, and through the translators there, did you find out

22     that civilians were discussing among themselves whether they would leave

23     or whether they would stay?

24        A.   No.  That was incomprehensible for us as well.

25        Q.   Do you know which day this was?

Page 10540

 1        A.   No.  As far as I can remember, this was the 12th but it could

 2     just as easily have been the 13th.

 3        Q.   You say that you saw General Mladic on the 13th in Potocari.  Can

 4     you tell us where you saw him in Potocari on the 13th?

 5        A.   As you just saw on the video, in that area.

 6        Q.   Who was with you from amongst your colleagues?  Who was in your

 7     immediate vicinity when you say that you saw General Mladic in Potocari

 8     on the 13th?

 9        A.   On the video, I actually recognise only two people.

10        Q.   How long did General Mladic stay there?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic.  Witness, you told us that you do not

12     know what you saw, whether it was on the 12th or the 13th.  Now, all the

13     questions are about the 13th and you refer to those images telling us --

14     give -- answering the questions about the 13th.  That confuses me a bit

15     because is it now your recollection that this must have been the 13th

16     or ...

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  As I just said, based on the

18     video images, I couldn't say specifically whether that was the 12th or

19     the 13th.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, you therefore also cannot rely on these video

21     images in answering questions about what happened on the 13th.  Would you

22     agree with me?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.  I'm trying to answer

24     the questions as best I can.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

Page 10541

 1             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] In your view, on the 13th of July as well, were

 3     cameramen there and were they filming what was happening?

 4        A.   Yes, absolutely.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now we are going to move on to some more general

 6     questions about the period before the 11th of July, 1995.  Is it correct

 7     that from your observation post, you could see Muslims leaving the

 8     enclave of Srebrenica, in order to smuggle food supplies and weapons?

 9     Also you could see them leaving the enclave and going into combat?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's take it one by one.  First whether they left,

11     second for the one purpose, third for the other purpose.

12             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13        Q.   [Interpretation] So did you see Muslims leaving the enclave of

14     Srebrenica?

15        A.   I never actually saw them leaving the enclave myself.

16        Q.   Did you have any reports to the effect that Muslims were leaving

17     the enclave, first of all to smuggle food supplies, but weapons as well?

18        A.   Well, no official reports, but we were told that that was the

19     case.

20        Q.   Did you hear that Muslims were leaving the enclave in order to

21     launch offensive operations against the Serb forces and civilians?

22        A.   That, too, is through hearsay.

23        Q.   Is it also correct that at your observation post, you were often

24     exposed to cross fire between the warring parties?

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 10542

 1        Q.   How close were the armed Muslims in the enclave to you?  What is

 2     the point where they were at the shortest distance compared to your

 3     observation post?

 4        A.   Speaking for myself personally, that was between 500 and

 5     1.000 metres was the closest.

 6        Q.   You personally never disarmed anyone in the enclave of

 7     Srebrenica; is that correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Also, you never had an opportunity to see anyone else disarming

10     anyone in the enclave of Srebrenica?

11        A.   That's correct.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, could I ask a bit of clarification.

13     Witness, did you also see Serb forces near to your observation post?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never until that time, no.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  And when you said you saw Muslim -- armed Muslims in

16     the enclave at a distance shortest between 500 and 1.000 metres, could

17     you describe in more detail what you exactly saw.  Were they in groups,

18     were they individuals, how could you see at that distance their arms, and

19     what kind of arms were there?  I take it one by one.  Individual or

20     groups?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  What kind of arms did they carry or have?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Pistols and what to us from a

24     distance -- what to us looked like long-distance firearms.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  What do you mean by "long-distance firearms"?

Page 10543

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Rifles.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Anything else than rifles?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I just follow up, please.  Now, did you

 6     observe these people 500 to 1.000 metres from your observation post?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  That was only during the

 8     patrols that we made of the area.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm not quite sure I understand you.  You said the

10     shortest distance to you was 500 to 1.000 metres.  Did you come any

11     closer than that to them?  Did you come and talk to them?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, absolutely.  One of our

13     assignments while on patrol was that if we encountered armed people, to

14     pursue them and try to disarm them.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And in disarming them did you have any exchange of

16     words with them to find out who they were and what nationality they

17     belonged to?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If during our patrols we could get

19     near the people that we saw were armed, either at that point they no

20     longer had their arms or we couldn't find them any more.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Then I must ask the question:  How did you make a

22     determination that they were Muslims?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To us, that was the way to

24     determine that they were walking around inside the enclave and did not

25     seem to be from the other side.

Page 10544

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But I'm confused, Witness.  I have just asked you

 2     if you had any exchange of words with them to -- and find out their

 3     nationality.  You said:  No, during our patrols when you get near the

 4     people that you saw armed, either at that point they no longer had their

 5     arms or you couldn't find them anymore.  If you can't find them, how do

 6     you make a determination what nationality they belonged to?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you specifically mean the

 8     individuals or groups that we saw and had the opportunity to find and

 9     speak with them, it was by using the very little we knew of that language

10     that we knew they were indeed the Muslim population.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

12             Yes, Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps I have one follow-up question:  Do

14     I understand your testimony well when I think that you're telling us that

15     armed men walking around or moving around within the enclave, in your

16     view, could not have been anything else than Muslims because Serb armed

17     forces were at that point in time, that's before the 11th of July, were

18     not moving around within the enclave?  Is that how I have to understand

19     your testimony?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, yes.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

22             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   [Interpretation] You told us, or you testified about the theft of

24     UN equipment and items that belonged to the Dutch Battalion, and you

25     mentioned an incident where some petrol cans were stolen.  Do you

Page 10545

 1     remember that?

 2        A.   Yes, absolutely.

 3        Q.   Someone broke into the warehouse where the petrol or the oil was

 4     and that was stolen; correct?

 5        A.   That's correct.

 6        Q.   On that occasion, the oil was stolen by the Muslims.  Is that

 7     something that was established?

 8        A.   To us, that was the most logical party that would have stolen it.

 9        Q.   Is it correct that you did not have to submit any reports to your

10     superiors about the deployments of the BH Army units in the territory

11     which was under your control, which you observed?

12        A.   No.  That's extremely unlikely.

13        Q.   What is the case, then?  Can you tell us, what is the truth?  Did

14     you submit reports?

15        A.   I did not do so personally but all these unusual particularities

16     would always need to be reported to higher ranks.

17        Q.   Is it an unusual incident when you run into or find an armed

18     group within the enclave?  Was that reported?

19        A.   As far as I know, that was reported, yes.

20        Q.   Did you report incidents of violations of cease-fire?

21        A.   We did indeed always communicate special details about parties

22     shooting.

23             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D909, please, in

24     e-court.

25        Q.   That is your evidence on April 15th 2010 in the Tolimir case.

Page 10546

 1             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We need page 21 in e-court, which

 2     should be 1186 of the transcript, page 1186.  We need lines 5 through 9.

 3             [In English] And I will read in English:

 4             "Q.  Well, let me clarify.  Did you have to send the report on

 5     where units of the BH Army were deployed in the territory that you were

 6     keeping under control and whether they were complying with the agreement

 7     on the cease-fire?

 8             "A.  In my personal experience, no."

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] So what you said in -- while testifying in the

10     Tolimir case, was that correct, or is what you said today in this trial

11     correct?

12        A.   All I can tell you is that I never had to make such reports.

13     I think the response "no" refers to that.

14        Q.   Were you ever present when such a report was submitted, either

15     orally or in writing?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   So how do you know that they were actually submitted?

18        A.   Every so often we would receive a briefing about unusual

19     incidents in the area, and what had been reported or not.

20        Q.   You, yourself, or your battalion never took any action in order

21     to prevent offensive operations launched from within the enclave; is that

22     correct?

23        A.   I can speak only on my own behalf on that, and that is indeed

24     correct.

25        Q.   Such operations by the Muslim army from within the enclave, you

Page 10547

 1     never received any reports; is that correct?

 2        A.   I can't remember anything about that, no.

 3        Q.   All you heard was rumours that there were such operations carried

 4     out; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  As far as concerns me personally, yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Groenewegen, for answering my questions.

 7             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] These are all the questions I had for

 8     this witness at this time.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

10             Ms. Hasan, any need for re-examination of the witness?

11             MS. HASAN:  Yes, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  How much time do you think you would need?

13             MS. HASAN:  I suspect I will take until the break and maybe a

14     little bit after the break.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Witness, you will now be re-examined by

16     Ms. Hasan.

17             Ms. Hasan, you may proceed.

18             MS. HASAN:  Good morning, everyone.

19             Could we have P1160 displayed, please.

20                           Re-examination by Ms. Hasan:

21        Q.   Witness, yesterday, and this is at transcript page 10513, you

22     were asked in cross-examination about belongings that the refugees left

23     behind and you confirmed that a few belongings were left behind in the

24     compound.  I'd like you to look at this aerial image and if we could just

25     zoom in a little bit closer, if that's possible, and take a look down

Page 10548

 1     towards the bottom of the screen, just right in the centre, if you can

 2     see there is a house there.  Do you see that there?  At the very bottom

 3     at the centre of the screen.  There is a line of buses and there appears

 4     to be one bus close to that house, and what looks like a tree.  Can you

 5     see that in the image?

 6        A.   Yes.  If you're referring to the bus that is positioned

 7     perpendicular to the long line of buses toward -- in the direction of the

 8     house, yes, I see that.

 9        Q.   Okay.  That is what I'm referring to.

10             MS. HASAN:  Now, this is, Your Honours, what we in this case

11     refer to as the "white house."

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, if you please put a question to the

13     witness.

14             MS. HASAN:  Yes, I'm about to.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             MS. HASAN:

17        Q.   Witness, were you positioned at any time on the 12th and 13th of

18     July in the vicinity of this house?

19        A.   I walked past it several times along the road.

20        Q.   Okay.  Do you have any -- do you have any recollection of what

21     you saw?

22        A.   All we saw was that men were being collected in there.

23        Q.   Do you recall when you saw that, whether it was the 12th or the

24     13th, or on both days?

25        A.   No.  It was only on the 13th.

Page 10549

 1        Q.   And, Witness, now, is that what you refer to as the unfinished

 2     house or is the unfinished house a separate building?

 3        A.   I couldn't say that based on these photographs.

 4        Q.   If I can just direct your attention, the -- in the centre of this

 5     image you've circled a house and you referred to that house as being a

 6     house where men were taken to.  Is that house what you refer to as the

 7     unfinished house or is this also a third house that you're referring to?

 8        A.   No.  As far as I know, that's the circle marked H.  From what

 9     I remember, it's a spot where the white house should have been.

10        Q.   And just to confirm, as far as you can recall, you saw men being

11     taken to the house that's circled and to the house that's at the bottom

12     of the screen?  Is that -- have I understood you correctly?

13             MR. LUKIC:  I have to object.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's try to avoid confusion, Mr. Lukic.

15             Witness, when you told us about men taken to an unfinished house,

16     was that the only house you remember men were taken, or were there more

17     houses, in your recollection?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  From my perception, there was

19     only one house.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  You described that house as an unfinished house.  Is

21     the unfinished house you described for us, is that the same house as you

22     refer to a minute ago as the white house?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that some confusion has

24     indeed arisen as to what the actual house was based on an aerial.  At the

25     time I circled the house designated H was from my perception the

Page 10550

 1     unfinished house.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And when a while ago you referred to the white

 3     house in one of your answers -- let me just see, I'll read exactly to you

 4     what you have said.  One second, please.  You said in one of your

 5     answers:

 6             "As far as I know, that's the circle marked H.  From what

 7     I remember, it's a spot where the white house should have been."

 8             Do we have to understand this, that when you're talking about the

 9     unfinished house and the white house, that you're referring to only one

10     single house, irrespective of where it is at this moment?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I mean the same house there.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, you may proceed.

13             MS. HASAN:  Okay.  Thank you.

14        Q.   Witness, we can get rid of this exhibit from the screen, please.

15     Witness, yesterday at transcript page 10504 in cross-examination, you

16     were asked about the separation of men and specifically asked about the

17     separation of men on the 12th of July, and in answer to counsel's

18     question, you said -- you were asked whether it was correct that on the

19     first day men and women were -- men were not separated from the women and

20     children, and your answer was:

21             "I stated that at the time.  Now I don't remember it as well.

22     But this must be correct."

23             And counsel had referred you to a statement you gave on the

24     29th of September, 1995.

25             During your Popovic testimony, you were asked the same question,

Page 10551

 1     and during that testimony - I'll just read out the excerpt - at page --

 2     transcript page 2972 in cross-examination, you were asked:

 3             "Q.  Can you explain the reason why you changed this statement of

 4     yours later saying that the separations took place that day as well, the

 5     separations of men?

 6             "A.  At each statement, I tried to describe the situation as

 7     close as possible to the truth.  If anything, I state -- if anything

 8     I stated is not entirely accurate, I would be happy to correct that.  As

 9     far as not separating the men, I've revised that."

10             And just a little bit further in the transcript, counsel asks you

11     in cross-examination:

12             "Q.  Did you give a correct statement on the

13     29th of September, 1995, that the refugees on the first day of the

14     evacuation were not separated?

15             "A.  That would not have been accurate."

16             Do you remember exactly what you said when you were -- when you

17     provided the Dutch debriefing statement?  And that statement is dated the

18     5th of September, 1995, so before you gave the statement to the Dutch

19     military police and the ICTY.  Do you recall exactly what you said at

20     that time?

21        A.   No.  I can't remember exactly what I stated about that time.

22        Q.   Okay.  Let me read that to you.  So on the 5th of September,

23     1995, you say, well, the statement provides:

24             "He saw that Muslims" --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, you're reading from what exactly at this

Page 10552

 1     moment?  Is it available to the Chamber?

 2             MS. HASAN:  Yes, it's 65 ter 28862.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, we are usually not roaming around in

 4     65 ter material but if we can have it on our screen, we can have a look

 5     at it.

 6             MS. HASAN:  65 ter 28862 at page 7 in English.  Perhaps we

 7     could --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  It can be put on our screens.

 9             MS. HASAN:  We have a hard copy in the Dutch version for the

10     witness, if it may be handed to him.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Is the Dutch version in e-court as well?  Yes.

12     Okay.  Then I'll try to find it.

13             MS. HASAN:  Okay.  I don't believe that's a correct page in the

14     B/C/S.  If we could go to page 8, please.  I'm sorry, it's page 9 in the

15     B/C/S and it's still page 7 in the English.  And I'll just read from the

16     very top of that -- of the English:

17             "He saw that Muslim men from 16 to 60 years were being captured

18     by the BSA units at a location 200 metres from the compound.  These men

19     were taken into a house.  He did not see the men go out of the house.  He

20     saw that men were regularly taken out from the group of refugees.  He saw

21     this take place repeatedly on 12 and 13 July."

22        Q.   Witness, does that refresh your recollection, then, of what you

23     said at the time?

24        A.   Yes, absolutely.

25        Q.   And is that correct?  Is the information correct?

Page 10553

 1        A.   I cannot answer that.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Witness, let's move on to another topic.  At yesterday's

 3     transcript page 10508 - we no longer need this statement - you were asked

 4     about whether you personally as a member of DutchBat helped with the

 5     evacuations of those who were gathered in Potocari, and you were asked

 6     whether it was your official role or did you do it of your own accord.

 7     In fact this was read to you from the Tolimir transcript.  It was

 8     questions you were asked by General Tolimir.  So I'd like to ask you

 9     about this participation in the evacuations.  Did you assist the refugees

10     in boarding the buses?

11        A.   Yes.  We were immediately present there.  I never actually placed

12     people on the bus, but I did help people right next to the bus.

13        Q.   And the tasks that you were engaged in on that day with respect

14     to these evacuations, could you explain what those were?

15        A.   No.  I don't remember exactly in words anymore what the specific

16     assignment was.

17             MS. HASAN:  Mr. President, I have no further questions for the

18     witness.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Ms. Hasan.

20             Mr. Lukic, have the questions in re-examination triggered any

21     need for further questions?

22             MR. LUKIC:  We have nothing further.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Nothing further.  Then, Witness, this concludes your

24     testimony.  I'd like to thank you very much for coming to this courtroom

25     and for having answered all the questions that were put to you, questions

Page 10554

 1     put to you by the Bench and questions put to you by the parties, and

 2     I wish you a safe return home again.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  You may follow the usher.

 5                           [The witness withdrew]

 6             MS. HASAN:  Mr. President, there was just a question you had

 7     yesterday about the initials of the witness on -- it was Exhibit P1159.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             MS. HASAN:  Can I address that now or after the break?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  No, perhaps it's better to address it now.

11             MS. HASAN:  Okay, the exhibit itself was created during the

12     Popovic case and at that time, the witness was asked first to mark the

13     execution point.  I have the transcript reference.  He was asked to mark

14     where the execution took place, and then the honourable Judge Agius asked

15     him to initial right next to it.  And there was some further discussion

16     and subsequently he was asked to mark the diagram -- the aerial image

17     again, this time showing the movement of the refugees as well as where

18     the VRS soldiers were standing closest to the refugees, and then the

19     honourable Judge Agius again asked him to initial it on the left-hand

20     side of the image, so that's the explanation for the two initials on the

21     photograph.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Explicit request by Judge Agius, yes.

23             MS. HASAN:  That's correct.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Does that raise any further questions?  If not, it

25     has been sufficiently explained where it comes from.  I take it,

Page 10555

 1     Mr. Lukic, that we don't have to receive any evidence on the sequence of

 2     events.

 3             MR. LUKIC:  No, Your Honour, we don't.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then I think it's time for a break.  We will

 5     take a break, and is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness after

 6     the break?  And that witness will also testify in his own language, if

 7     I understand it?

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  We will take a break and resume at 10 minutes to

10     11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

14                           [The witness entered court]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Nicolai, I presume.  Mr. Nicolai,

16     before you give evidence the Rules require that you make a solemn

17     declaration, the text of which is now handed out to you in English.  If

18     you prefer to make that solemn declaration in your own language, you are

19     free to do so.

20             THE WITNESS:  I can do it in English.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then please.

22             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

23     whole truth and nothing but the truth.

24                           WITNESS:  CORNELIS HENDRICK NICOLAI

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 10556

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated, Mr. Nicolai.

 2             Mr. Nicolai, you will first be examined by Mr. Vanderpuye.

 3     Mr. Vanderpuye is counsel for the Prosecution and you will find him to

 4     your right.

 5             You may proceed, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you very much Mr. President.  Good morning

 7     to you, Your Honours.

 8                           Examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

 9        Q.   Good morning to you, General.

10        A.   Good morning.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps I address you as Mr. Nicolai, Witness.  This

12     Chamber has the habit of not addressing people by rank or by title, and

13     it's not in any way an expression of depreciation for ranks and titles

14     but everyone appears before us as an individual person who gives

15     testimony of the truth.

16             Please proceed, Mr. Vanderpuye.

17             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you again, Mr. President.

18        Q.   Yes, General, if you could please state your full name for the

19     record.

20        A.   I'm Cornelis Hendrick Nicolai.

21        Q.   And sir, just by way of background, can you confirm that you have

22     given evidence before this Tribunal in the following cases:  The case of

23     Dragomir Milosevic back in January of 2007; the case of -- the Popovic

24     case, rather, in November of 2007; and the Tolimir case in August of

25     2010?

Page 10557

 1        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

 2        Q.   And for the purposes of these proceedings, can you confirm that

 3     you provided a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor dated

 4     18 November 1996?

 5        A.   Yes, I did that.

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  If we could please have 65 ter 28850 in e-court.

 7        Q.   Do you recognise the document that's on the screen, General?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.

 9        Q.   Is that the statement that you provided to the

10     Office of the Prosecutor on the 18th of November, 1996?

11        A.   That's correct.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  If we could just go to the last page, it should

13     be page 16 in e-court.

14        Q.   Is that your signature that appears underneath the witness

15     acknowledgement?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.

17        Q.   General, have you had a chance to review the statement prior to

18     testifying here today?

19        A.   Yes.  I still had a copy in my files, and an additional copy was

20     sent to me as well.

21        Q.   Can you confirm that the statement accurately reflects what you

22     said at the time and was true to your knowledge when you made it?

23        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

24        Q.   And were you to be asked the same questions related to the issues

25     discussed in your statement, would you in substance give the same

Page 10558

 1     answers?

 2        A.   Yes.  I would certainly do that.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I would move at this time to

 4     admit the General's statement 25 -- I'm sorry, I have the number.  28850,

 5     together with the associated exhibits that are listed in the exhibit

 6     sheet.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, subject to the objections that were set

 9     forth in our responsive filing to the Rule 92 ter motion filed on

10     2 April 2013, I have no further objections and those objections set forth

11     in that filing.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let me just check with you, Mr. Vanderpuye,

13     the associated exhibits, they do not include the ones you would like to

14     have added to your 65 ter list, or do they?

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  On the list, they are included, Mr. President.

16     They are 28851 through 28853.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And so I take it that before you want to

18     tender it, you are first seeking leave to add them to the 65 ter list.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Indeed, Mr. President, that's part of our 92 ter

20     application.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Ivetic, you objected to that?

22             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, we did, Your Honour, in our filing, the three

23     documents.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber grants leave to add the three documents

Page 10559

 1     to the 65 ter list and all the remainder will be MFI'd, the statement

 2     et cetera, and we will decide at the end of the testimony of this

 3     witness.  And perhaps, Madam Registrar, if you would prepare already a

 4     list of numbers for the associated exhibits included the three new ones.

 5     If you --

 6             JUDGE FLUGGE:  One correction for the transcript.

 7     Mr. Vanderpuye, at page 23, line 17, I think there is a mistake.  You

 8     said, "They are 28851 through 28853."  If that is correct then it should

 9     be corrected like that.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, otherwise we would have a different problem.

11             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you very much.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, the numbers reserved for those

13     documents are?

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, first maybe number for the

15     statement?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, for the statement and then just a range of

17     numbers for the associated exhibits.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  The statement, meaning document 65 ter 28850,

19     receives number P1165, while the associated exhibits documents received

20     numbers starting from P1166 up and including P1181, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And you prepare a chart with description and

22     65 ter numbers and provisionally assigned numbers.  They are all MFI'd

23     for the time being.

24             Mr. Vanderpuye, please proceed.

25             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.  I have a

Page 10560

 1     summary I'd like to read into the record.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please do so.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  The witness entered the Royal Netherlands Army

 4     in 1965.  In February 1995, he arrived in Bosnia as brigadier-general

 5     serving as chief of staff of UNPROFOR's BH command under

 6     Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith, until September 1995.  As

 7     Chief of Staff, General Nicolai was responsible for keeping the commander

 8     fully aware of current situations and dealt with day to day matters.  He

 9     followed the daily situation, ensured that reports were timely completed

10     and forwarded accordingly and made sure the command's functions were

11     carried out.

12             Throughout his tenure, General Nicolai had contact with BiH

13     political and military leaders.  He also dealt with military leaders from

14     the Bosnian Serb side, including VRS Main Staff Generals Mladic,

15     Milovanovic, Gvero and Tolimir.  General Nicolai was directly involved in

16     discussions concerning Sarajevo-related events, such as freedom of

17     movement, humanitarian aid, the use of Sarajevo airport, and firing and

18     shelling incidents.

19             He recalled particularly a letter of protest that he wrote to

20     General Mladic on or about 3 July concerning Bosnian Serb mortar fire

21     into UN headquarters, for which General Mladic denied VRS responsibility.

22     He also recounted a later request to General Mladic to investigate the

23     28 August 1995 shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo which Mladic

24     similarly denied.

25             As concerns the Srebrenica enclave, the witness had regular

Page 10561

 1     contact with DutchBat commander Colonel Karremans and was well informed

 2     about the worsening humanitarian situation.  Karremans informed

 3     General Nicolai about continuing problems faced by DutchBat because of

 4     convoy restrictions imposed by the VRS, these affected troop rotations

 5     and resupplies of equipment, parts, ammunition, food and especially fuel.

 6             In June, Karremans reported that these problems had become so

 7     severe that his unit could no longer effectively discharge its mandate.

 8     Convoy restrictions also severely affected humanitarian organisations.

 9     During the VRS attack on the enclave in July, General Nicolai spoke with,

10     among others, VRS Main Staff Generals Tolimir and Gvero on several

11     occasions between the 8th and 12th of July.  He repeatedly insisted that

12     the VRS desist and withdraw.  However both Main Staff generals, Gvero and

13     Tolimir, persistently and falsely denied the VRS offensive engagement.

14             On 9 July, UNPROFOR headquarters issued a written warning to

15     General Mladic in which General Nicolai took part.  This was based on the

16     VRS's firing into the safe area directly targeting UN facilities and

17     causing civilian deaths during the ongoing offensive.  Having reached

18     within one kilometre south of the town UNPROFOR headquarters warned that

19     the VRS should immediately withdraw at the risk of NATO close air

20     support.

21             When on 10 July VRS troops attacked UN blocking positions, close

22     air support was requested but could not be delivered until the early

23     afternoon of 11 July.  General Nicolai spoke with General Gvero later

24     that afternoon during which General Gvero falsely claimed that the VRS

25     was neither attacking UNPROFOR nor the civilian population.

Page 10562

 1             Gvero further threatened that if the air attacks did not stop

 2     immediately the witness would be held responsible for all further

 3     developments and the destiny of the UNPROFOR soldiers and the civilian

 4     population in Srebrenica.

 5             Ultimately close air support was called off as the VRS had taken

 6     Srebrenica and because it threatened to shell the Potocari compound at

 7     enormous risk to the civilians gathered there.  General Gobillard spoke

 8     with General Gvero that evening and Gvero said that once the civilians

 9     were on VRS territory, they would be totally safe and were welcome to

10     leave the enclave.  Mladic met with Colonel Karremans that night,

11     General Nicolai noted that Karremans had been instructed to stay with the

12     civilian population and to observe that international rules were followed

13     during the course of an evacuation made likely because there was no food,

14     there was not enough medical care or even protection from the weather for

15     the people there.  Following the removal of the Srebrenica population

16     from Potocari on 12th -- on the 12th and 13th of July, General Nicolai

17     remained engaged with the VRS Main Staff concerning the evacuation of the

18     wounded, remaining in Potocari and Bratunac, and concerning the

19     withdrawal of DutchBat from the enclave a few days later on 21 July.

20             Mr. President, that concludes my summary.  I have a number of

21     questions for the General.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, Mr. Vanderpuye.

23             I usually do not comment on summaries but if you want to give the

24     public a fair report about what is found in the evidence of the witness,

25     I think that is a malcommunication between UNPROFOR headquarters and the

Page 10563

 1     local command in Srebrenica and was part of the statement as well.  And

 2     also, you said if the air attacks did not stop, you had -- there was air

 3     support given.  That is also missing in your summary.  But for the public

 4     to know that that is part of the evidence as well.  And that's the

 5     purpose of all of it, that the public gets a fair picture of what the

 6     evidence in the 92 ter statement is about.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   General, as you know your statement is from 1996.  So if you

10     could just catch us up a little bit on what you've been up to.  First,

11     let me ask you, are you still a member of the Dutch military?

12        A.   No.  I'm no longer in active service.  In September 2004, I was

13     dismissed due to my age.  I was discharged due to my age.  From 1995

14     until I left the service, I subsequently held three positions:  First,

15     I was commander of the operations staff, so operations staff officer

16     within the army; next, I was commander of the 1st Division; and in

17     conclusion, I was in commander of the training command of the Dutch army.

18        Q.   Can you tell us what rank did you leave with, did you retire

19     with?

20        A.   I was general-major then --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Excuse me, major-general.

22             MR. VANDERPUYE:

23        Q.   If I could take you back a little while to Bosnia in 1995.  While

24     you were General Smith's Chief of Staff, in performing your functions,

25     did you make use of a military assistant?

Page 10564

 1        A.   Yes.  That's correct.  As my personal assistant, I had a military

 2     assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter.

 3        Q.   In your dealings with the VRS Main Staff and other officers, did

 4     you rely on the assistance of an interpreter?

 5        A.   Yes, because I don't have any command of Yugoslavian.

 6        Q.   Do you recall the name of the interpreter which you relied on

 7     during that period of time?

 8        A.   Yes, I remember her first name, Svetlana which was shortened to

 9     Lana.

10        Q.   I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about the humanitarian

11     aid in the enclave of Srebrenica and of course the issues facing

12     UNPROFOR, particularly resupply issues.  In your statement at

13     paragraph 39 you refer to resupply difficulties facing UNPROFOR.  And you

14     also talk about a particular convoy which left on the 28th of June and

15     was headed to the enclaves but arrived essentially stripped of its

16     material.  Also you note in your statement that humanitarian

17     organisations also experienced similar problems.  So with respect to

18     those humanitarian aid organisations, first, can you tell us what you

19     mean by that?  Because it's not indicated in your statement.  What

20     organisations?

21        A.   In most cases, these were UNHCR convoys because we did not have

22     much to do with convoys of civilian institutions, but we officially

23     requested permission to displace UNHCR convoys across Serb territory.

24     And to be complete, of course, also the UNPROFOR convoys, but those

25     convoys were intended to supply the military.  We had to request

Page 10565

 1     permission for those as well.  Often such permission was denied and in

 2     many case, after permission had been granted, the convoy would either be

 3     blocked en route or only partially allowed to pass.

 4        Q.   I just want to ask you if you can clarify something that's been

 5     interpreted into the record here.  And I'm not sure that I understand you

 6     so perhaps you can help me.  It says, page 29, looks like line 16 or 15,

 7     it says:

 8             "... we officially requested permission to displace UNHCR convoys

 9     across Serb territory."

10             And I'm not entirely clear on what that means.  Perhaps you can

11     clarify that a little bit.

12        A.   What it means is that we requested permission to move the

13     convoys.  The convoys needed permission to get to their destination.

14        Q.   Perhaps let me ask it this way:  Did you ask permission to escort

15     UNHCR or accompany UNHCR convoys of the Main Staff of the VRS?

16        A.   No.  Generally, I don't remember securing the UNHCR convoys with

17     UNPROFOR troops.  They moved on their own.

18        Q.   Okay.  But you were responsible for requesting permission for

19     their movement; is that correct?

20        A.   That's correct.  This happened for practical reasons because the

21     UNPROFOR HQ was in contact with the VRS contacts in Pale.

22        Q.   Okay.  With respect to the problems that were facing the

23     humanitarian aid organisations that you alluded to in your statement, can

24     you describe how severe, or maybe not severe, the problems were that they

25     faced?

Page 10566

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, before we seek an answer to that

 2     question, could the witness first explain the plural humanitarian aid

 3     organisations, where until now I think we've heard about the UNHCR but

 4     not of any other humanitarian aid organisation.  Were there other such

 5     organisations which were facing the same problem?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Aside from the UNHCR, assistance

 7     was provided by what were known as NGOs which is short for

 8     non-governmental organisations and they also brought supplies to the

 9     occupied areas.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Did they face the same problems?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assume they did but I can't state

12     that exactly because they didn't process their requests for movement

13     through our headquarters, so I didn't have a clear view of that.

14             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Sorry, Mr. President, are you -- okay.  Perhaps

15     it would be helpful to put that up on the screen.  It's 65 ter 28850.

16     P1165, I'm reminded.  And I think we will need to go to page 39 which

17     should be -- I mean paragraph 39, page 9 in the English and 9 in the

18     B/C/S.  It will only take a minute.

19        Q.   I'll just quickly refer you, if I could, to the second-to-last

20     sentence of paragraph 39, which says:

21             "At the same time, the humanitarian aid organisations were having

22     the same problems getting essential supplies into the enclaves."

23             Then you talk about fresh food.  Supplies being sent to the

24     enclaves were quite often ruined at the time that it reached its

25     destination due to the same restrictive practices being placed on them by

Page 10567

 1     the VRS.  So my question is with respect to this -- just this particular

 2     sentence, can you tell us what was the source of your information for

 3     that conclusion or that observation?

 4        A.   Yes.  I had no view of what was happening with the convoys

 5     en route, at least the ones that were not part of UNHCR or UNPROFOR but

 6     what we did have an impression of was in what measure convoys succeeded

 7     in reaching the enclaves.  That was subject to the observation of the

 8     present -- of the troops and UNMOs present so we could see what entered

 9     but I couldn't see what got stuck en route.

10        Q.   So with respect to this particular observation concerning

11     humanitarian aid organisations, the information that you relied on came

12     from where?

13        A.   As far as convoys were concerned that did not move under UN

14     supervision, the only information I had was from troops on the ground, so

15     those were troops present in the enclaves.

16        Q.   And how did you receive that information?  Was it in writing, was

17     it in -- by telephone?  Was there a reporting structure in place for you

18     to get that information?  If you could tell us just a little bit about

19     that.

20        A.   Yes.  What was most important of all was daily reporting.  That

21     happens in every army.  At the end of the day, a daily sit-rep is drafted

22     listing the most important events of the past day, and usually concluding

23     with an assessment of the near future, so the events expected in the near

24     future.  In those daily sit-reps, not only the daily fighting was stated

25     but also the most important information about the supply situation.

Page 10568

 1        Q.   Let me turn back to my question which was did you receive any

 2     information as to how severe, or perhaps not, the convoy situation was or

 3     the supply or humanitarian situation was in the enclave during the period

 4     of time that you were in Bosnia?  And I mean the Srebrenica enclave, just

 5     to be clear.

 6        A.   Yes.  The supply situation was tracked very closely.  And as a

 7     very clear example, in the very first week of my performance as

 8     Chief of Staff I was faced with the fact that DutchBat's food supplies in

 9     Srebrenica were nearly depleted.  The situation that arose was such that

10     even General Smith told the VRS commander that if no permission was

11     granted to allow food convoys to pass, he would have supplies delivered

12     via the air with all possible consequence that might ensue.  Later, in my

13     period, food convoys were generally allowed to pass with some regularity,

14     so that while the food situation was desperate but not such that the

15     troops were in danger of starvation.  It was a different situation with

16     munitions or fuel or spare parts.  Those were subject to very rigid

17     restrictions.  With fuel , for example, the last fuel convoy that reached

18     Srebrenica was in late February 1995.

19        Q.   I'll come back to that in just a minute.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, could I ask you to be very precise?

21     You started your questions about convoys which the witness was able to

22     tell us UNPROFOR and UNHCR.  Then you moved to the other organisations,

23     humanity organisations, where the witness told us that he couldn't say

24     what happened on the way.  Now, in your last question, you're asking

25     about how severe the convoy situation was, the witness said he couldn't

Page 10569

 1     tell us anything that happened.  The supply of humanity -- or humanity

 2     situation was in the enclave.  And then the witness started telling us

 3     again about the first series, that is supplies for UNPROFOR and not

 4     humanity organisations.  So I do not understand why you did not stop the

 5     witness there and say, My question was still focused on humanitarian

 6     organisations.  Let's try to keep things clear what we are talking about.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   I'll come back to the fuel and UNPROFOR supply issues in a moment

10     as I was about to say.  But in respect of the humanitarian situation,

11     that is the situation affecting the population of the enclaves

12     distinguishing from UNPROFOR, did you receive information as to the

13     impact of restrictions on humanitarian aid to the enclave with respect to

14     them?  That is with respect to the population, as opposed to UNPROFOR.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, it's implied more or less in your

16     question that the UNHCR was not given because you're still talking about

17     humanitarian organisations.  We should be very clear on what was

18     monitored by the witness and what he learned from the final result in the

19     enclave.  Are you including now in this last question UNHCR and the other

20     humanitarian organisations or are you focusing on one of the two?

21             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm focusing on the humanitarian situation as a

22     whole within the enclave which may involve UNHCR or a number of other

23     organisations.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  That should then be clear for the witness,

25     the humanitarian situation as a result of problems with convoys, either

Page 10570

 1     UNHCR or other humanitarian organisations.  That is what you're asking

 2     about.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, sir.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness answer the question.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  The local population in

 6     Srebrenica depended on aid from outside for its survival.  The enclave

 7     contained far more than the original population.  There was an estimated

 8     number of about 30.000 people in the enclave, and insufficient food was

 9     available in the enclave for them.  So they depended on aid from outside

10     for food, and most of that was brought in by UNHCR convoys and I assume

11     incidentally also by convoys pertaining to NGOs.  As for fuel and medical

12     supplies, they depended on outside aid as well.  Within the enclave, on

13     the DutchBat compound, a supply of fuel was available intended for the

14     local population.  That was actually part of the UNHCR supplies, and even

15     if no more convoys arrived, fuel was distributed from that supply to the

16     local population, medical supplies was a painful situation.  Wherever

17     possible DutchBat did its best it could to issue medical supplies to the

18     medical institutions present in the enclave from its own supplies, but

19     generally the shortage of food was a serious problem.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:

21        Q.   Thank you.  Between the time that you arrived in February of 1995

22     and July of 1995, when the enclave ultimately fell, did the humanitarian

23     situation improve in any way?

24        A.   No.  The contrary is true, because of the many restrictions on

25     moving convoys, the supply situation only deteriorated.

Page 10571

 1        Q.   I want to turn your attention, if I could, to some of the issues

 2     more directly affecting UNPROFOR, and at paragraph 40 of your statement,

 3     you discuss the problems facing or concerning, rather, troop rotations

 4     into the enclave from May onward.  And let me ask the same question:

 5     Between that period of time, May and July when the enclave fell, did the

 6     problem concerning troop rotations abate in any way?

 7        A.   No.  The contrary is the case.  Until May, there were not really

 8     any problems with relieving troops, I mean troops that had been to the

 9     Netherlands for a brief period of leave.  From May, problems did arise

10     there, and that's how it happened that a large number, I believe nearly

11     200 military troops, were not given permission to return to the enclave

12     after their leave.

13        Q.   And was there any action that was taken by UNPROFOR in order to

14     either stem or diminish the amount of troops that were not being allowed

15     to return; in other words, in order to prevent troops from leaving the

16     enclave and then not being able to return?

17        A.   Yes.  Of course, the very first thing that happened, and I think

18     that is fairly logical, is that when it turned out that our troops were

19     not receiving permission to return, we suspended the leaves of the troops

20     still present in the enclave.  So we did not issue any more leaves until

21     the other troops received permission to enter the enclave, and that

22     permission wasn't granted.  The second thing we did, of course at all

23     levels, was that we addressed requests to the HQ of the VRS to get those

24     troops back in after all.  But that did not receive a response.

25        Q.   Militarily what was the effect of not granting leave to the

Page 10572

 1     troops that were in the enclave?  What was the effect on morale or the

 2     effectiveness of the troops?

 3        A.   As for the impact on the morale of the troops I can't assess that

 4     very specifically.  Of course, it's unpleasant if you don't receive your

 5     leave, not only for the troops but also for those at home, but what's

 6     worse is that one-third of the manning strength of the troops was not

 7     able to return to the enclave, and if you have to perform tasks with

 8     one-third fewer troops, and originally there were about 650 troops in the

 9     enclave ultimately, only 400 were left, then you understand that to -- to

10     keep an enclave of that size under control in a very hilly terrain that's

11     difficult to see properly, you understand that that mission then becomes

12     almost impossible to carry out.  And we had great difficulty manning the

13     observation posts that were still present but you must understand that

14     there were 13 observation posts along the entire perimeter of the

15     enclave, and that means that you have only very limited control of what

16     is happening along those boundaries so you can't properly control who

17     enters or leaves the enclave.

18             And let me add something to that.  At the start of my period as

19     Chief of Staff, mobile patrols were carried out with APCs - those are

20     armoured personnel carriers - but due to the scarce fuel, these had to be

21     discontinued fairly quickly, and only patrols on foot were performed.

22     Clearly, of course, when the number of troops diminished so much,

23     carrying out foot patrols in addition to manning the observation posts

24     was reduced to virtually nil.

25        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you bring that or those concerns to the

Page 10573

 1     attention of the VRS Main Staff, and particularly to General Mladic?  And

 2     when I say "you," I mean either you or your command.

 3        A.   Yes.  This was raised at various moments.  There were moments

 4     when complaints arrived from the VRS headquarters accusing UNPROFOR of

 5     not doing enough first to demilitarise, and to disarm the Muslim troops

 6     within the enclave, and in addition that we were not properly supervising

 7     the fact that the Muslim troops were expected to remain within the

 8     enclave.  They complained about exfiltrations from the enclave and being

 9     attacked in Serb villages on Serb territory.

10        Q.   Let me show you, if I could, 65 ter 19 -- 19282, please.

11             MR. VANDERPUYE:  We will need to go to page 4 in the English and

12     it should be the same in the B/C/S if we've got all the pages uploaded.

13        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to look at this letter a little bit,

14     General?

15        A.   Yes, I have, and I recognise the letter.

16        Q.   And does it relate to what we've just been discussing concerning

17     the troop rotations affecting, or the limitations, rather, on troop

18     rotations affecting the Dutch Battalion?

19        A.   Yes.  This is not about the very last part of my previous

20     statement but what I stated before that, when I stated that we tried to

21     get permission at all levels of the VRS HQ to get these soldiers into the

22     enclave.  After all, this is one example of that.  It's a letter to

23     General Janvier, the commander of UNPF, so the highest of the commanders

24     in former Yugoslavia -- excuse me, a letter from General Janvier.  He's

25     referring to the consequences of the reduced manning strength and

Page 10574

 1     urgently appeals to the VRS HQ for permission to admit those 170 troops

 2     to the enclave after all.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.

 4             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President I move to admit this document.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  No objection.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, I will just make one correction

 8     considering that I reserved numbers up to P1181, well, one of the

 9     documents that numbers were reserved for was already admitted in

10     evidence.  Therefore, reserve numbers are up and including P1180.  So

11     consequently, the document 19282 will receive number P1181, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

13             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President, may I continue?

14             JUDGE ORIE:  You may.

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you.

16        Q.   Is this letter, for lack of a better term, typical of the type of

17     letters that would be sent to the Main Staff or to General Mladic

18     personally regarding issues affecting the Dutch Battalion or UNPROFOR?

19        A.   Yes.  That was done with some regularity.  Of course, the

20     subjects varied.  This concerned the rotation of troops who had been on

21     leave but the same held true for the supply situation, blocking convoys,

22     sometimes it was about fighting incidents.  If at a certain point serious

23     problems arose, this was handled not only orally over the phone but also

24     through letters or submission of protests or complaints that were

25     conveyed to the headquarters of the parties concerned.

Page 10575

 1        Q.   We can see in this document that General Janvier says that almost

 2     daily since 27 April there had been refusals to allow clearances for the

 3     rotations of UN personnel.  Does that comport with your recollection of

 4     the circumstances at the time this letter was issued?

 5        A.   Yes.  That corresponds with my recollections.

 6        Q.   Let me just go to the area of resupply that you spoke about a

 7     little bit earlier, and that was -- concerns statement paragraph 39.  You

 8     mentioned just now and also in your statement that the resupplies were

 9     affected by convoy restrictions including food, ammunition, equipment and

10     things like that.  Can you tell us in terms of the degree of the

11     restrictions, for example, what percentage would you say or could you say

12     of what was needed was actually getting through for the troops to be able

13     to carry out their duties effectively pursuant to their mandate?

14        A.   I can't give you an exact answer but from what I remember,

15     somewhat less than half of what was really needed entered the enclaves.

16        Q.   Let me ask you, in terms of fuel restrictions particularly, in

17     your statement at paragraph 38, you refer -- well you say, rather, that

18     you were in contact with Colonel Karremans and that fuel shortages were

19     in a desperate situation and denied right up until July.  And at a

20     certain point Colonel Karremans provided a report saying that his unit

21     had not become fully operational or, rather, could not become fully

22     operational because of them.  My question is:  Did you raise this

23     specific issue of fuel restrictions with General Mladic or the

24     VRS Main Staff?

25        A.   Yes.  As I've stated previously, that was raised on various

Page 10576

 1     occasions.  One excellent opportunity to do this was when the VRS HQ

 2     complained about UNPROFOR's poor performance of duties.  If they

 3     complained about attacks by Muslims on Serb territory, then of course we

 4     were able to reply that we had little view of that one because we didn't

 5     have freedom of movement, but especially because due to fuel shortages we

 6     were unable to patrol adequately and keep a clear view of movements

 7     within the enclave, so it was very difficult for us to check whether any

 8     Muslim troops left the enclave.

 9        Q.   Let me show you, if I could, 65 ter 17891.  And then I've got

10     just a couple of questions for you about this one.  First, do you

11     recognise your signature at the bottom of the page?

12        A.   Yes, that is my signature.

13        Q.   And we can see here that the addressee is General Ratko Mladic;

14     correct?

15        A.   Yes, yes.

16        Q.   And this letter is dated 26 June 1995.  I have just a couple of

17     questions regarding it.  The first relates to the very last sentence of

18     the first paragraph where you say:  I warned you of such consequences

19     several times before.  And in particular, you're referring to the effect

20     of fuel restrictions concerning the ability to effective patrolling --

21     the ability of DutchBat to effectively patrol the area.  When you refer

22     here in this letter to several times before, about how many times before

23     had you made this case to General Mladic?

24        A.   I really wouldn't know that.  I didn't keep an exact record, but

25     if you figure that there was almost weekly contact with VRS generals,

Page 10577

 1     then this subject came up in several of those contacts, but I couldn't

 2     give you exact numbers as to how many times that happened.

 3        Q.   Fair enough.  The second question that I have for you relates to

 4     the second paragraph, where you have asked for VRS troops to avoid or to

 5     cease basically targeting UNPROFOR OPs.  Do you see that there in the

 6     second-to-last or rather third-to-last sentence?  It starts with, "On the

 7     other hand ..."

 8        A.   Yes.  I've seen that.

 9        Q.   And to your recollection, it appears in the letter that there was

10     certain activity directed against UNPROFOR OPs by the VRS.  Can you tell

11     us what the result of your complaint, observation, was in this letter to

12     General Mladic?

13        A.   Well, as with most, or I could in fact say all complaints, the

14     response from the VRS was denying that UNPROFOR troops, as well as the

15     OPs, were attacked by VRS troops.  Nonetheless, they suffered regular

16     shellings, sometimes from grenades but also ground attacks, and until

17     11 June, this was denied very strongly by the contact persons concerned.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I would move to admit this

20     document as well.

21             MR. IVETIC:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 17891 receives number P1182,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

Page 10578

 1             Mr. Vanderpuye, I'm looking at the clock.  We are close to the

 2     moment where we should take a break.  Would that be --

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It would be a great time.  I'm about to go to a

 4     different topic.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I would first like to invite the witness to

 6     follow the usher and leave the courtroom.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We will take a break and we will resume at quarter

 9     past 12.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 11.54 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 12.21 p.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

13             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  As the witness is being brought in, I've looked

16     over the transcript and also looked at my outline and I wanted to let you

17     know that I'm running a bit slower than I anticipated.  I understand that

18     I've used about an hour.  I'll try to pick up the pace during this

19     session, but with your permission I would like to be able to update you

20     on what my situation is at the end of the session, so that I can give you

21     at least a reasonable approximation, if I'll need additional time.  But

22     in any event, I will not need a substantial amount of time, like another

23     hour or something, but I just want to let you know that ahead of time.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you're encouraged to see whether you can get

25     back on track again so that your report at the end of this session is of

Page 10579

 1     comfort to the Chamber rather than to alarm the Chamber, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 2     You may proceed.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, good afternoon, General.  At your

 6     statement, and this concerns the events the attack on the enclave which

 7     you indicated commenced on 6 July, at your statement in paragraph 43 you

 8     describe the surrounding attack, and you describe also the killing of a

 9     gunner, a Dutch gunner by the ABiH, when passing through ABiH Defence

10     lines.  First let me just ask you generally if you recall the event.

11        A.   Yes.  I still remember it like it happened yesterday.

12        Q.   Do you remember the name of the gunner, by any chance?

13        A.   Yes.  That was Raviv van Rensen.

14        Q.   You refer to a document which is a note of a conversation - if

15     I could have 65 ter 5747 in e-court, please - it's a conversation, a note

16     of that conversation, taken down by Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter.

17             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm sorry, it's P1170.  It's MFI'd, okay.  Thank

18     you, Janet.  All right.  I think we have it in e-court now.

19        Q.   Do you recognise the document, General?

20        A.   Yes, absolutely.

21        Q.   Okay.  And with respect to this document, we can see in the

22     paragraph, unfortunately we don't have a better copy of this, but the

23     paragraph just below the evidence registration number, towards the bottom

24     of the screen, and it refers to the BiH, LO, is that liaison officer?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 10580

 1        Q.   Okay.  Was interested in the exact locations of the OPs in

 2     subject.  And it refers to OP Foxtrot, OP Uniform, and OP Sierra.  With

 3     respect to the soldier, the gunner, that was killed, can you just tell us

 4     briefly what the relationship of that event was to these OPs as we see

 5     reflected in this third paragraph of this document?

 6        A.   Yes.  First I have to correct one thing, the time of the phone

 7     conversation indicated at the top is incorrect because the incident

 8     occurred in the course of Saturday afternoon so the conversation must

 9     have taken place after that time.  So it would more likely be 1830 hours

10     than 0830 hours.  So -- but otherwise, the text is entirely accurate.

11             The relationship between the various incidents is as follows:  On

12     Saturday afternoon OP Foxtrot was attacked, and was shot at with small

13     calibre arms and by tanks, it was shelled by tanks, so the commander of

14     the observation post for the safety of his soldiers, found it necessary

15     to leave the OP, he had permission to do so, he then retreated with the

16     crew on his vehicle and wanted to retreat to the compound in Potocari.

17     The BiH troops did not like it that UNPROFOR was leaving the observation

18     post and wanted to block the retreat of those soldiers, so they shot at

19     the vehicle en route to Potocari, and I believe that they even threw a

20     hand grenade at it, and as a consequence the gunner was hit and also died

21     en route to the compound.  Now, how this relates to the other OPs in the

22     immediate surroundings of Foxtrot Uniform were involved, these were not

23     fully equipped observation posts, as we had throughout the enclave up to

24     that point.  No, they were improvised positions nearby OP Foxtrot,

25     positions taken to be able to continue the tasks of OP Foxtrot from that

Page 10581

 1     place.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Did you bring to the attention of the VRS Main Staff the

 3     circumstances or rather, yes, the circumstances concerning the

 4     surrounding of the UN OPs and the death of the Dutch Battalion gunner,

 5     van Rensen?

 6        A.   Yes.  Of course, we explained that it was out of extreme

 7     necessity that there was a withdrawal from that observation post and we

 8     urgently requested that should this happen again elsewhere, that there be

 9     no shooting at the retreating troops.

10        Q.   We note again -- I just want to note for the record that in the

11     second paragraph of this document, it refers to 1515 hours attack

12     essentially on DutchBat APC from BSA fire, and I'd like to show you an

13     intercept dated 8 July 1995 and it's timed at 1530 hours.  It's

14     65 ter 25115.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, just for the record, this is listed as

16     being under seal on my list that I was provided by the Prosecution.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  For one reason or another, our computer screens

18     stopped functioning immediately, perhaps due to this but we have no

19     computer evidence on our screens.  Could that be fixed?  Yes.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, Mr. President, Mr. Ivetic is right, it

21     should be under seal.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then not to be shown to the public.

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you.  Okay.  There we have it.

24        Q.   General, this is the intercept I was referring to, and as you can

25     see, it's an intercept dated --

Page 10582

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we deal with this, could I ask one additional

 2     question?  Witness, you were asked whether you brought to the attention

 3     of the VRS Main Staff the circumstances concerning the surrounding of the

 4     operation -- of the observation posts and the death, and then you said of

 5     course we explained that it was -- you talked about necessity and that if

 6     it would happen again, that there be no shooting at the retreating

 7     troops.  But it was not the VRS that had shot at the retreating troops,

 8     wasn't it?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  It was the ABiH, the Muslim

10     troops, shot that gunner.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Did you bring it to their attention as well?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, the phone

13     conversation or the previous message displayed on the screen concerned

14     conversation with the BiH liaison officer.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  My attention is drawn to the fact that since

16     I'm listening to the Dutch channel, that sometimes I'm too quick in

17     answering.  Therefore, the transcript is not complete but I think nothing

18     essential is missing at this moment.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   General, first, do you recognise the conversation that is shown

22     in this intercept?  As you can see, it purports to be a recorded

23     conversation between UN [Realtime transcript read in error "you and"]

24     General Nicolai and one of General Mladic's deputies, 8 July, 1530 hours.

25             JUDGE FLUGGE:  Perhaps you misspoke, Mr. Vanderpuye, "between you

Page 10583

 1     and General Nicolai," you are recorded as having said.  Perhaps you

 2     should check that again.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't say that.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:

 6        Q.   Let me just clarify that.  This purports to be a conversation

 7     between UN General Nicolai and one of General Mladic's deputies, at

 8     1530 hours, July 8.  Does this conversation seem familiar to you?

 9        A.   Yes.  And as far as I can tell from that brief excerpt, it

10     corresponds with a conversation I had in the course of that afternoon

11     with, I believe, General Tolimir.

12        Q.   What I'd like to show you is page 2 of this document and it will

13     be just about six lines up from the bottom in the B/C/S, at the top of

14     the paragraph -- at the top of, rather, page 2 in the English, X, who you

15     believe is General Tolimir says:  I'm going to check what this is about,

16     I'm not informed about the problem the general was talking about, but in

17     the course of the day Muslim forces carried out attacks in that part of

18     the front towards us.

19             Can you tell us a little bit about this?  First, in the reference

20     here where General Tolimir says, I'm not informed about the problem the

21     general was talking about, who was he talking about?

22        A.   As far as I can remember, he raised the fact that the BiH Muslim

23     troops in the enclave were using six UNPROFOR armoured personnel

24     carriers.  Well, of course, that was entirely unknown to me because it

25     was such an absurd accusation that I couldn't possibly attribute any

Page 10584

 1     credibility to it, but the accusation was made, and I believe I said that

 2     we would inquire and investigate how this misunderstanding could arise,

 3     but I can still assert that it's absurd to assume that the UN would lend

 4     military equipment to one of the warring parties.

 5        Q.   During this conversation, if we go back to page 1 in the English,

 6     it refers right at the very first paragraph to Svetlana.  It says:  We

 7     could not hear General Nicolai and his interpreter Svetlana at all.

 8             Do you recall engaging in this conversation with General Tolimir

 9     through the use of the interpreter Svetlana that you referred to at the

10     beginning of your evidence?

11        A.   Yes.  All my conversations with the warring parties were with the

12     assistance of this interpreter.  Otherwise I wouldn't be able to

13     communicate with them.

14        Q.   And so where General Tolimir refers to "the general," "I want to

15     say to the general," or "the problem the general is talking about," is he

16     using that term because he's speaking to Svetlana and referring to you?

17        A.   Yes, that's correct.

18             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President I'd like to tender this document,

19     65 ter 25115 under seal.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, we maintain our objection to this

21     document as we do to the whole series of these types of intercepts.

22     There are many authenticity problems with the same that are evident from

23     the document itself including the fact that if they couldn't hear the

24     general and Svetlana, how do they know that it was the general and

25     Svetlana on the other line when it's not mentioned in the document.  Also

Page 10585

 1     the document purports to not be complete.  There is no conversation

 2     recorded from the side of the UNPROFOR and the closing part to this

 3     document indicates that it is not complete and some other individual is

 4     bringing this document.  So we stand by our objection as to these types

 5     of intercepts without having the individuals who actually recorded the

 6     intercepts to explain these anomalies.  They are not reliable and do not

 7     meet the standards for admission under Rule 89.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

 9             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  One of the reasons

10     why I had the General look at the document himself is because he's a

11     participant in the conversation.  There is probably no better form of

12     authenticity than to have a participant in the conversation attest to the

13     fact of the conversation and its circumstances.  So I think it is

14     admissible under Rule 89(C) whether it's complete or not, and certainly

15     that's a matter that Mr. Ivetic can address on cross-examination.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  It doesn't fix the incompleteness, does it,

17     Mr. Vanderpuye?

18             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, Mr. President, I think the witness said -

19     I'll have to find it in the transcript - but I think he said that it was

20     accurate to his recollection.  If you give me just a moment I'll look

21     that up and see if I can find it.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             The Chamber has decided it will MFI the document.

24             Madam Registrar.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 25115 receives number P1183 under seal,

Page 10586

 1     Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And it has the status of marked for identification

 3     and keeps that status for the time being.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thanks, Mr. President.  Just for the record, we

 6     have managed to locate something at least relevant to this issue and that

 7     is at page 47, lines 18 through 20.  The witness said:

 8             "As far as I can tell from the brief excerpt, it corresponds with

 9     a conversation I had in the course of that afternoon with, I believe,

10     General Tolimir."

11             I'll move on to the next document.  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   In your statement at paragraph 44, General, you indicate that

13     General Tolimir was the only officer available on 8 July.  So first,

14     I would like to know when you made the call at 1530 on 8 July, was it

15     General Tolimir that you were looking to speak to or someone else?

16        A.   Well, ordinarily, and this is how it happened, in 90 per cent of

17     the cases the conversation was from one Chief of Staff to the other

18     Chief of Staff, so ordinarily my regular counterpart at the VRS

19     headquarters was General Milovanovic, but he can't be present 24/7 so now

20     and then he was replaced by others.  I believe, from early July, I did

21     not reach General Milovanovic on the phone anymore and he was

22     consistently replaced by somebody else.  In this case, it was

23     General Tolimir but that mattered little to me.  What mattered was that

24     I had a counterpart at sufficient level so that at the other end I would

25     be given direct answers and decisions could be taken, and

Page 10587

 1     General Tolimir's rank was definitely sufficient for that.

 2        Q.   Okay.  The document that I just showed you, the intercept P1183,

 3     introduces the intercept saying that General Nicolai was looking for

 4     General Mladic and since he was not there a person X responded.  Does

 5     that comport with your recollection with respect to this specific

 6     intercept, that is the one at 1530 hours on 8 July 1995 that I was just

 7     showing?

 8        A.   Well, I believe that that Saturday, my only contact was with

 9     General Tolimir, and I don't remember -- which I do remember about 10

10     June when in the evening at a certain point I spoke over the phone with

11     somebody who was not a general.  But I think that on the 8th and the 9th,

12     I was consistently in contact first with General Tolimir and later on, on

13     the 11th, with General Gvero.  But that's easiest to check based on the

14     reports of the phone calls I had with those concerned because they list

15     exactly whom I spoke with.

16        Q.   Okay.  And those are the notes that Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter

17     took that are referred to in your statement; is that right?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.  In this period, when the situation became

19     so urgent, reports were drafted of all those phone conversations by my

20     personal staff officer.

21        Q.   All right.  If I could just quickly show you another intercept,

22     it is 65 ter 25116, it's dated 8 July also, and the time of this one is

23     1725 hours.  This should probably be under seal as well.  It should be.

24     This intercept is number 513 which by the way is the next in sequence

25     from the one I just showed you by the CSB, SDB Tuzla.  And it indicates

Page 10588

 1     here a time of 1725 hours and starts with someone from the UN was looking

 2     for Mladic and since he wasn't there another officer, X, from the

 3     aggressor army, responded.  About halfway down the page, we can see here

 4     a reference to van Rensen and it's written down with two Ss.  Do you see

 5     that, General?

 6        A.   Yes, I can see that, yes.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And do you recall first whether or not you were a

 8     participant in this conversation at the time?

 9        A.   Yes.  That afternoon, I conducted various phone conversations,

10     not only with LSO of the BiH but also with the VRS, that was

11     General Tolimir, of course about the events, the attack on the OP, but

12     also about its consequences, because after Private van Rensen had been

13     shot to death the problem arose as to how to evacuate his remains, and we

14     wanted to transport those remains back to the Netherlands as quickly as

15     possible but we wanted to evacuate them by helicopter to get them out of

16     the enclave, and of course I needed permission from the VRS HQ.  And

17     I think that that's what this phone call was about.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I would similarly tender this

20     intercept.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, we would also object to this one on the

22     same grounds.  Again, it is only half of a conversation.  We don't know

23     how the entity involved recorded this information.  And there is also on

24     the second page in the English again a discussion that the -- someone

25     from the UN who was completely inaudible, so we could state that the

Page 10589

 1     reliability and probative value of this document is put in question by

 2     these anomalies unless the persons who took these intercepts testify and

 3     explain the same to the satisfaction of the Chamber.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I do have also to

 6     tender with this document the audio, while there is an audio version of

 7     it.  It's the same intercept except it's the actual tape recording.  It's

 8     25116A.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, talking about these intercepts, is

10     my recollection well that they are part of a written motion for admission

11     from the bar table?  And if I am not mistaken, I signed a decision on

12     that motion this morning, and I see that 25115 and 25116 were part of

13     that motion.  Now I have to check whether we admitted them or not.  Of

14     course, the parties couldn't know, I take it that it is filed, but

15     therefore, that's perhaps not a reason not to decide on the matter at

16     this very moment and even for this one, not to assign a number depending

17     on whether that decision is filed or is not filed.  So therefore I'm a

18     bit hesitant, both for 25115 and 25116, to say anything further at this

19     moment until we have checked it.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm just wondering whether or not if it's marked

21     for identification -- you're right it would have to be assigned a number

22     in any event.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we would have to change the decision later.

24             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It's clear for the record with the 65 ter number

25     anyway.

Page 10590

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  There might be a need to vacate that number at a

 2     later stage.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, please proceed.  Meanwhile we will

 5     later verify whether P1183 should be vacated or not.

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   In your statement at paragraph 44, you describe a telephone

 8     conversation with the VRS headquarters of 1945 hours, also on

 9     8 July 1995.  As you indicated previously, this is indicated in a note of

10     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter which has a 65 ter number of 5591.  What I'd

11     like to do is to just put that into e-court just for a moment.  It's

12     P1167 MFI'd.  And once we've looked at that I'd like to show you another

13     intercept very quickly.  This is the note that you've indicated in your

14     statement.  And we can see here that this is an information that was

15     passed to the BSA or VRS headquarters by you at the time indicated

16     1945 hours on 8 July.  In it, there is a quote written down by

17     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter that:  I talked to General Tolimir this

18     afternoon about the BSA attack on OP Foxtrot.  Do you recall this

19     particular note and conversation?

20        A.   Yes.  I remember that.

21        Q.   All right.  Just for the Chamber's benefit, I would just like to

22     refer to a couple of items that I'd like us to keep in mind, and one is

23     the reference to the OP Foxtrot, the other to UNPROFOR positions, about

24     500 metres west of OP Foxtrot, because I'd like to show this intercept

25     now which is 65 ter 25051.  This is an intercept that was provided by

Page 10591

 1     Croatian authorities or from Croatian authorities, the military.  And in

 2     this particular intercept we can see that it refers to

 3     "General Micolai" - do you see that at the top? - and also to interpreter

 4     Svetlana.  Do you see that, General?

 5        A.   Yes, I can see that.

 6        Q.   And it says, S, meaning Svetlana, and it writes -- it says:

 7     I spoke to General Tolimir this afternoon regarding an attack you carried

 8     out at the observation post located at the south of the Srebrenica

 9     enclave close to Zeleni Jadar.  Do you recall -- do you recall this, one;

10     and, two, is the OP post located at the south of the Srebrenica enclave

11     OP Foxtrot?

12        A.   Well, it's difficult for me to answer all of that so

13     specifically.  If I look at the text, it corresponds almost exactly with

14     the notes that Colonel de Ruiter made of my conversation, so I think it's

15     the same message; that's my complaint that after OP Foxtrot was attacked

16     subsequently, the positions 500 metres to the west of that observation

17     post were also attacked because I was objecting strenuously to that.

18        Q.   Okay.  I'd just like to focus you on -- looks like it's about

19     10 or 15 lines right about the middle of the page where it says "so, your

20     forces circled two UNPROFOR positions."  Do you see that?

21             You'll have to answer yes for the record.

22        A.   Yes, I see that.

23        Q.   And as I read now from 65 ter 5591 I'd like you to take a look at

24     the intercept and it says:

25             "Although General Tolimir promised that UNPROFOR and UN positions

Page 10592

 1     would not be attacked, now two UNPROFOR positions about 500 metres west

 2     of OP Foxtrot have been surrounded by your troops."

 3        A.   Yes, I read that.

 4        Q.   The next thing Svetlana says in this intercept is -- in the

 5     intercept is, "It's happening again.  I strongly protest and ask you to

 6     withdraw your forces immediately."  In this reference to "it's happening

 7     again," what does that mean?

 8        A.   Well, in the afternoon, we protested about the attack of

 9     OP Foxtrot and now UN positions are being attacked again.  That's the

10     impression conveyed by it's happening again.

11        Q.   Okay.  And just for the record, Svetlana says, "I protest most

12     strongly and request that the troops withdraw from there immediately,"

13     which you can see in this intercept just at the line we have just been

14     reading where it says, "I strongly protest and ask you to withdraw your

15     forces from there immediately."

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I'm not sure how to deal with

17     this.  I have the same application, but to the extent that the motion is

18     being decided I think I'll leave it at that and move on to my next

19     document.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it part of that motion?

21             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I can't tell you off the top of my head,

22     Mr. President.  I apologise for that.  I can check it though at the

23     break.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The number was, the 65 ter number was?

25             MR. VANDERPUYE:  25051.

Page 10593

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll let you know in a second.  Please proceed

 2     meanwhile.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just for the record

 4     also, this intercept is timed at 1941 hours, 8 July; whereas 65 ter 5591,

 5     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter's note, is timed four minutes later, 1945

 6     hours.

 7        Q.   General, I'd like to take you to 9 July and very quickly at

 8     paragraph 46 of your statement, you refer to a report that

 9     Colonel Karremans sent to your command on or about 9 July.

10             MR. VANDERPUYE:  For the record that's 65 ter 5750.  If we could

11     have that in e-court very briefly.  I'm sorry, it was MFI'd as P1152.

12        Q.   General, do you recognise this document?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Is this the report that was sent to your command by

15     Colonel Karremans?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.

17        Q.   I'd like to go to page 2 in the English and the B/C/S, please.

18     In this document, you can see that Colonel Karremans provides background

19     information concerning the situation --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, in order to avoid any

21     misunderstandings, 65 ter 05750 was marked for identification as P1173,

22     not P1152.

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   General, in this document, you can see that Colonel Karremans

25     provides background of the situation, describes the attack at page 1, and

Page 10594

 1     then he talks about the situation on page 2 concerning the OP crews, the

 2     APCs that you refer to, and the situation around the enclave and

 3     describes the shelling of the Swedish shelter project in the south.  Does

 4     that all comport with your recollection of this -- of the events?

 5        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 6        Q.   At paragraph 9, which is what I'd like to refer you to

 7     specifically, Colonel Karremans writes of the BSA, or VRS, that if they

 8     manage to reach their objective, which in my opinion they can in due

 9     time, then two possible goals are left, firstly the conquest of the

10     entire enclave, and secondly the enhancement of the occupation of the

11     southern part.

12             So my questions are these:  One, did your command share

13     Colonel Karremans' assessment in this respect?

14        A.   Yes.  That's basically correct, but we spent some days guessing

15     at what the ultimate objective was of the attack by the VRS, and there

16     were two options:  One, the VRS would settle for merely occupying the

17     southern section of the enclave, which was crossed by an important supply

18     route; or they wanted to take the entire enclave, and that would yield

19     the benefit that they would no longer need any troops controlling the

20     surroundings of the enclave.  It's always very difficult to ascertain

21     what the actual objective is.  For a very long time we thought that the

22     VRS would settle for just the southern section of the enclave, but in

23     retrospect, we were mistaken.

24        Q.   Let me ask you with respect to paragraph 10 concerning

25     Colonel Karremans' assessment of the use of close air support which you

Page 10595

 1     can see he's indicated there that it was not feasible yet.  And he lays

 2     out a couple of reasons for that.  Did your command share his assessment

 3     with respect to the use of close air support at this particular time, and

 4     this is on 9 July?

 5        A.   Yes.  I'd like to remind you what Colonel Karremans based this

 6     assessment on.  When air force had been used previously by the UN - I'm

 7     referring to the incidents on 25 and 26 May - the VRS responded very

 8     violently to the air strikes, and all enclaves were heavily shelled and

 9     shot at by the VRS, specifically there was a blood bath in the city of

10     Tuzla in which over 80 civilians were killed and a few hundred injured.

11     Colonel Karremans was worried that if the UN were to use air power in

12     Srebrenica, similar response would follow and all the means available to

13     the VRS surrounding the enclave would be used to shoot at the enclave

14     with disastrous consequences for both the civilian population and

15     possibly the military troops within the enclave as well.  That's why he

16     said if we were to consider using air power, then we would need to attack

17     all -- attack and neutralise all positions surrounding the enclave

18     immediately to prevent such a response from being carried out.

19        Q.   And so was Lieutenant Karremans' assessment informed by the

20     policy undertaken by the UNPROFOR command concerning guidance following

21     these air strikes, that you refer to in paragraph 35 of your statement?

22     If you need to, I can put that up on the screen to help you remember, or

23     if you can remember, please let us know.

24        A.   I don't fully understand your question.  What I can say about

25     this is that as UNPROFOR staff, we understood this assessment by

Page 10596

 1     Karremans, but I might add immediately that close air support would

 2     exclude this opportunity to shoot all surrounding positions at the same

 3     time.  You can use close air support only against weapons being deployed

 4     at that time.  So you can use it retroactively but not preventively.  And

 5     then because otherwise you're not referring to close air support but air

 6     strikes, and that was not within the competence of UNPROFOR or UNPF to

 7     carry that out.  General Janvier could sanction close air support but

 8     only the UN HQ in New York could approve air strikes.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Thank you for that clarification.  At your statement, at

10     paragraph 47, you note a series of phone calls again with

11     General Tolimir, the first of which occurs at 1230, I believe, 9 July.

12     And in particular you refer to the note taken by

13     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter - which for the benefit of the Chamber is

14     65 ter 5748 - if we could have that up on the screen for just a moment.

15     It is MFI'd as P1171.  Okay.  First do you recognise this document?  It's

16     dated 9 July, timed at 1230 hours and signed by

17     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter.

18        A.   Yes.  I recognise the document, and I recognise the signature of

19     my military assistant.

20        Q.   And in this document, we can see that it refers to a telephone

21     conversation between you and General Tolimir and it refers to a number of

22     items that I'll quickly point out, one is General Tolimir expressing his

23     condolences for the death of the soldier in Srebrenica.  Is that

24     Mr. van Rensen as you indicated previously?

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 10597

 1        Q.   The second is in the third paragraph:  General Nicolai concluded

 2     that he expected his soldiers would be allowed to return to their base

 3     today.  Do you recall what that concerned?

 4        A.   Yes.  There were soldiers that had manned observation posts that

 5     had been attacked by the VRS, earlier on that day, when they were shot at

 6     by the BiH, that's the Muslim soldiers, when they were retreating, the

 7     soldiers preferred to surrender to the VRS, so to the Serbs, that

 8     happened in several cases.  Those soldiers were subsequently transported

 9     away, I believe, to Bratunac.  My request refers to that.  I ask

10     General Tolimir whether he could enable these soldiers to return as

11     quickly as possible to the compound in the Srebrenica enclave.

12        Q.   Okay.  And in the last paragraph we see two things I'd like to

13     note.  One is that General Tolimir responded that he was not aware of his

14     subordinate commanders obstructing the case evac or casualty evacuation

15     by road.  Does that refer to Mr. van Rensen?

16        A.   Yes.  An agreement had been reached about transporting the

17     remains of Private Rensen.  He would be brought to a spot where the

18     helicopter would land and during the transport, along the road, the

19     convoy was blocked and that's what this discussion with General Tolimir

20     is about, and he says that he'll check into that and will order that the

21     transport be continued.

22        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to show you an intercept, 25 -- no, I'm sorry,

23     let me give you the -- 25118.  That's the 65 ter number.  It's the same

24     date, 9 July, timed at 1240 hours, ten minutes later than the time

25     indicated on the note.  And here we can see that this is a -- should be

Page 10598

 1     under seal as well.  I'm sorry if I didn't mention that before.

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I apologise, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, we are close to a break anyhow.  I

 5     don't know how much time you need to start with this.  Otherwise we will

 6     take the break first.

 7             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It should take me two minutes, hopefully, to get

 8     through this, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we take those two minutes and take a break

10     then.

11             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   As you can see, General, this is an intercept timed at 1240 as

13     I indicated.  It says, once again, General Nicolai was inaudible.  If we

14     go to page 2 in the English, yes, then we will see X speaking and saying:

15     Good afternoon to you, greetings to you and General Nicolai too.  And the

16     next time you see your name in the transcript, about midway through, it

17     reads, the general -- I'm sorry:  Once more, regards to General Nicolai.

18     Please accept my condolences for the death of the UN staff member in

19     Srebrenica.  The last paragraph of the last five lines or so of the page

20     it says:  I'm not informed that my commanders prevented the evacuation of

21     the body by land and would ask general to send by land his team towards

22     Bratunac and I would immediately order that they are accepted and

23     escorted to Zvornik and says, as he does in the note, I'm going to issue

24     necessary orders immediately so that the Muslims cannot listen to it and

25     create obstacles.  Does this comport with your recollection of the

Page 10599

 1     conversation that is in the note recorded by

 2     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter, 1230, 9 July?

 3        A.   Yes.  That text corresponds almost exactly.  These transcriptions

 4     as are being projected now are likely to be the literal report, de Ruiter

 5     always drafted a summary of the contents of a conversation.  And the time

 6     is roughly the time at which the conversation took place.  If you wanted

 7     to be very precise, you would need to indicate the start and the end of

 8     the phone call, but for understandable reasons, that didn't happen.  So

 9     this corresponds with the message shown previously with respect to the

10     time as well.

11        Q.   Thank you, general.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President I indicated a little earlier that

13     I would need a little bit more time and I think I --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  How much more would you need?

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I would say probably not more than a half an

16     hour.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic one of the concerns that the Chamber

19     might have is whether we would be able to conclude the testimony of this

20     witness tomorrow.  If Mr. Vanderpuye would need another half an hour,

21     that would take, then, almost the whole of today's session.  Would you be

22     able to cross-examine the witness in tomorrow's session or would that not

23     be sufficient time?

24             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, I have four hours of cross-examination.

25     I believe that we do not have four hours tomorrow of court time.  I think

Page 10600

 1     the math is just under.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye, the Chamber grants you ten, at a

 4     maximum 15 minutes after the break, so therefore reorganise your further

 5     examination.  Witness, we take a break.  Mr. Nicolai, you may follow the

 6     usher.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Meanwhile, I put on the record that 65 ter 25115,

 9     25116, 25118, and 25051, that's four documents, are all part of the

10     decision which is meanwhile filed although not yet distributed, in which

11     these documents are -- it is distributed now as well, I do understand.

12     Therefore P1183 can be vacated.  Mr. Vanderpuye, you also talked about an

13     audio, 25116A.  I do not know -- as a matter of fact, I can't see whether

14     that's covered by the decision, most likely not.  So we'll check that

15     first and then the tendering of 25116A is pending.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I appreciate that.

17     I just wanted to know if there is a way for me to know -- never mind,

18     I'll sort it out.  Thank you very much.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We take a break and resume at 20 minutes to

20     2.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 1.23 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 1.41 p.m.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

24     Mr. Vanderpuye, I'll be rather strict.  Everyone is aware that we lost an

25     hour this week.  Everyone is also aware that Dutch interpreters are there

Page 10601

 1     for two days so we should all make serious efforts to stay well within

 2     the time limits.  Perhaps in this respect, Mr. Ivetic, also in relation

 3     to making use of our time, if a witness has not told us that he has

 4     received special training in VRS structures, et cetera, the Chamber will

 5     not assume that he will have, what has not been said by the witness, and

 6     it's a line of questioning which is repeatedly appearing.  Therefore, if

 7     it has not been positively established, the Chamber will not assume

 8     anything in that respect.  Mr. Vanderpuye, you have until 5 minutes to

 9     2.00.

10             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.

11                           [The witness takes the stand]

12        Q.   General, I'll skip up to 11 July.  We left off at 9 July and your

13     statement does mention a series of conversations that you had with the

14     members of the Main Staff but particularly General Tolimir and

15     General Gvero so let me move to the 11th of July very quickly.  In your

16     statement, at paragraph 35, you refer to a conversation that you had with

17     General Gvero, 1615 hours on the 11th.  In that paragraph of your

18     statement you say that:

19             "He threatened me by saying that I would be held responsible for

20     all further developments, the destiny of my men and the civilian

21     population in Srebrenica."

22             And you refer specifically to Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter's note

23     corresponding to that time.

24             I'll show you 65 ter 20918, which again is an intercepted

25     communication and should be under seal.  This intercept is, as you can

Page 10602

 1     see dated 11 July 1995.  The time indicated is 1610 hours, report number

 2     534, and it begins with an introduction of a conversation between

 3     General Gvero and General Nicolai who we did not hear.  And the

 4     conversation goes as follows:  The first thing I'd like to draw your

 5     attention to is General Gvero's statement that it's not true that our

 6     forces, meaning VRS forces, attacked UN soldiers.  Is that something that

 7     was consistent with your knowledge of events on the ground at the time

 8     that you had the conversation with General Gvero.  First, if you can

 9     confirm that you had the conversation as indicated in the intercept?

10        A.   Excuse me, yes, I conducted that conversation with General Gvero

11     and even now after 18 years I am still angry that there was a situation

12     that the UN had been attacked by VRS troops for five consecutive days and

13     still on the afternoon of the 11th, General Gvero firmly denied that that

14     was the case.

15        Q.   If you go a little bit further down the page in this intercept,

16     he says, that is General Gvero, it's not appropriate to look for excuses

17     like this to attack our forces unprovoked.  First, did the UN attack VRS

18     forces and second, was -- if there was such an attack, was it unprovoked,

19     according to your recollection of the events on the ground at the time?

20        A.   Yes.  General Gvero refers to the fact that General Rensen,

21     excuse me, Private Rensen was killed by the Muslims and he also alleges

22     that the soldiers that surrendered to the VRS, the soldiers that fled

23     their observation posts, he says that they were well treated by the VRS

24     and that's also true.  But he firmly denies that they were attacking and

25     shooting at observation posts for several days directly firing at them

Page 10603

 1     and with other arms.  It's not for nothing that they left the observation

 2     posts.  He is simply ignoring that.

 3        Q.   And lastly on this same page with respect to General Gvero's

 4     third point where he says in case General Nicolai doesn't order the

 5     bombing to stop and doesn't withdraw NATO air planes he will have

 6     personal responsibility for the further developments and the destiny of

 7     all people in the area.  First, did you have the power to order that

 8     bombings stop?

 9        A.   No.  I could exert some influence, but please remember that I was

10     the Chief of Staff, not the commanding officer.  In the absence of

11     General Smith, the highest-ranking general, and deputy commander at that

12     time was General Gobillard, who of course was in the same building where

13     I was present as well, so I could help with decision-make but I was not

14     the person who had the ultimate authority to that end.

15        Q.   And how did you understand General Gvero's threat as you

16     described it in your statement at paragraph 55?  How did you understand

17     it that he said you would be personally responsible for further

18     developments and the destiny of all people in the area?  How did you

19     understand that to be a threat, as you've characterised it?

20        A.   Yes, that I was being held personally responsible did not impress

21     me at all, but we did experience a threat.  I deliberately say we, both

22     General Gobillard and I, took that threat very seriously.  On the one

23     hand, threats were expressed in the enclave that were more specific than

24     those stated by General Gvero, but given the memory of the retaliation

25     acts at the end of May, it seemed very likely that if we did not desist

Page 10604

 1     from the air strikes, the enclave would come under heavy firing with all

 2     kinds of consequences for the massive concentration of refugees in and

 3     around the compound.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I would like to tender this

 6     particular intercept as I don't see that --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It's 2900, you're talking about 2918 is part of the

 8     decision and was admitted into evidence this morning.

 9             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.  I have only

10     one question.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  You have five minutes.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I have five minutes.  That's good to know.

13     Thank you.

14        Q.   General, with respect to your statement at paragraph 65, you

15     indicated that in your discussions with General Mladic, related to the

16     departure of Dutch Battalion on 21 July, that General Mladic agreed to

17     allow you to inspect the areas of Srebrenica and Bratunac.  Do you recall

18     that?

19        A.   You mean on the date that DutchBat was to leave the enclave, the

20     21st?

21        Q.   Yes, I believe so.  I could put your statement up if you'd like

22     to see it.  That might be more helpful.

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It's P1165.  We will have to go to page 15 in

24     the English and it should be at the bottom of page 14 on to page 15 in

25     B/C/S.  Okay.  If we go to the very top of the page, in the English,

Page 10605

 1     I think we will have to start at the bottom.  Yes, that's it in the

 2     B/C/S.

 3        Q.   We will see on 21 July, Dutch soldiers were to be evacuated from

 4     Srebrenica and says that this was a result of an agreement reached with

 5     Mladic and senior officers from both parties were to be represented at

 6     the event.  We can see that in the first couple of sentences in the

 7     paragraph.  It says:  On my way to Srebrenica I was stopped at a Serb

 8     check-point where Mladic was waiting for me.  We arrived at Srebrenica

 9     together, then we went to Bratunac just outside the enclave where we had

10     a meal and discussed the conditions of departure of DutchBat.  And then

11     it says:  Mladic offered during our discussions to let me make a tour of

12     Srebrenica and Bratunac so I can inspect the situation after DutchBat had

13     left.  That's what I'm referring to specifically.  Does that help you

14     recall the event?

15        A.   Yes.  I remember that entirely, but the weekend prior to that,

16     there was a conference in Zagreb attended by both General Smith and

17     General Mladic where various agreements were reached including DutchBat's

18     departure later on Wednesday, I believe, on the 18th.  That was confirmed

19     in a meeting between General Mladic and General Smith, and in that

20     encounter, it was agreed specifically that the UN parties present at that

21     departure would have the opportunity to look around Srebrenica and

22     Bratunac and to inspect the surroundings.

23        Q.   Did you have the opportunity to inspect Srebrenica, Bratunac

24     surroundings, as General Mladic had indicated that you would be allowed

25     to do?

Page 10606

 1        A.   Only partially.  After DutchBat's evacuation had taken place,

 2     General Mladic said that he was pressed for time and that he would only

 3     be able to show me Srebrenica and the immediate surroundings, but had no

 4     time to let me look around in Bratunac.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes.  Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  When you said I have one question, you're now

 8     putting the third question to the witness.  I said you have five minutes.

 9     Five minutes are over.  That's exactly what I was meaning.

10             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I apologise, Mr. President, it's just the

11     witness raised one issue with respect to General Mladic's conduct which

12     I thought would be of relevance to the Chamber, but I can leave that to

13     Mr. Ivetic or to redirect examination if you prefer.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.  Then, Witness, I

15     have to be strict on time.  You'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Ivetic.

16     Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Defence team of Mr. Mladic.  Mr. Ivetic you

17     may proceed.

18             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

20        Q.   Good day, General.  I would like to move immediately to my

21     questions for the sake of time.  To begin with, in your Rule 92 ter

22     statement, which is P1165 marked for identification, at paragraph 2,

23     which is page 2 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S, you describe that

24     you underwent both a training course in the Netherlands Institute of

25     International Relations on the background and history of the conflict as

Page 10607

 1     well as a military peacekeeping course.  The question I have for you is

 2     if these courses were offered by the same entity or if the second one was

 3     taught by some other entity?

 4        A.   There was also a course at the training centre for peace

 5     missions, and that also covered a bit about the history but the main

 6     training was at the Clingendael Institute.

 7        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And as I understand it, you were not a part of

 8     the DutchBat battalion; is that correct?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   And as I understand it, the training courses for DutchBat were

11     supposed to take one year of time before deployment whereas yours took

12     just about one month.  Is that also correct?

13        A.   Yes.  But I need to explain that.  I was being prepared

14     specifically to operate in a specific position, namely Chief of Staff,

15     within UNPROFOR.  I did not need training to be suitable for operating as

16     a general.  These DutchBat soldiers received comprehensive training,

17     first military training to act as military troops, plus additional

18     training to operate in specific peace missions, and that requires far

19     more than brief follow-up training targeting a specific position.

20        Q.   And, sir, once you became Chief of Staff of BH command in

21     Sarajevo, did you have occasion to verify or oversee if in fact the

22     DutchBat personnel in Srebrenica had all received the requisite one year

23     prior training prior to their deployment?

24        A.   No.  It wasn't necessary and that's not my responsibility.  It's

25     the responsibility of the Dutch commander to ensure that his troops had

Page 10608

 1     had received the required training prior to deployment.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to now ask you about the last line in this

 3     same paragraph, paragraph 2 of your Rule 92 ter statement, wherein you

 4     say:  Before I left for Bosnia I received a lot of reading material, and

 5     then you identify certain things.  I want to ask you from whom did you

 6     receive this material?  Was it from an official source or from an

 7     unofficial source?

 8        A.   I received the overwhelming majority from an official source.

 9     These are documents that were made available to me on behalf of the

10     commander of the ground forces, but I remember that in addition to that

11     I read books and the books that I did not own I received from friends.

12        Q.   Just one clarification, sir.  You say that you -- they were made

13     available to you on behalf of the commander of the ground forces.  Could

14     you identify which commander of which ground forces?

15        A.   There was only one commander of the ground forces, and that was

16     General Kuzi [phoen] at the time, but I admit that I did not speak

17     personally with General Kuzi but I did speak with his deputy, General van

18     Baal, and he ensured that on behalf of the operations staff -- these

19     documents were issued by the operations staff under his command.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, if I could ask you, sir, during the course of your

21     deployment to Sarajevo, did you or any of the other members of the

22     UNPROFOR BH command receive situation reports from NATO in addition to

23     the United Nations sit-reps?

24        A.   We did not receive sit-reps from NATO.  The sit-reps we received

25     were the sit-reps of sectors under UNPROFOR command, and we received

Page 10609

 1     copies of sit-reps drafted in Zagreb so the level above us so those were

 2     the documents we received officially but if I want to be truly complete,

 3     and this also concerns obtaining intelligence, there was some contact

 4     with NATO, especially G-2, that's the intelligent officer on the staff,

 5     who was in contact with the HQ in Naples as well as with the US fleet

 6     section in the Adriatic, and they received information about that.  So

 7     that was intelligence from NATO sources gathered by NATO air force.

 8        Q.   Let me try to break this down one item by one item.  First of

 9     all, you've identified a G-2 individual in the headquarters.  Am I

10     correct that we are talking about Lieutenant-Colonel Powers?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   And from which country did this individual come from prior to

13     serving as a member of the BH command of UNPROFOR?

14        A.   He came from the United States of America.

15        Q.   And am I correct that you identified him at the level of the HQ.

16     Am I correct that in addition to the BH command, that every unit in

17     UNPROFOR had an intelligence officer who maintained contact with, as you

18     said, the NATO HQ in Naples and had access to NATO satellite and other

19     reconnaissance just as the G-2 at the headquarters at the BH command?

20        A.   If I understand you correctly, I'll try to answer it as follows,

21     and if this isn't enough, please let me know.  Each level or NATO unit

22     had an intelligence officer, a staff officer responsible for gathering

23     intelligence, and that is G-2, or at lower levels the S-2.  To obtain

24     intelligence we had few resources available and depended on others.  At

25     the level of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, we were authorised to contact HQ in

Page 10610

 1     Naples as well several US units that I just mentioned.  This was not the

 2     case for the levels below UNPROFOR, so lower than UNPROFOR.  My G-2 was

 3     authorised to do this and I assumed that the G-2 in Zagreb was also

 4     authorised to this effect but levels below that did not have those

 5     sources.

 6        Q.   One point of clarification, sir.  You started off your answer by

 7     saying each level or NATO unit had an intelligence officer.  Did you in

 8     fact mean to say each level or UN unit had an intelligence officer?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct, that's what I mean.

10        Q.   And if you remember, who would have been the intelligence officer

11     or officers assigned and operating as part of the DutchBat in Srebrenica

12     during the time period of your deployment?

13        A.   I definitely don't remember a name of such a person and I was not

14     in contact with them.  It was two levels below UNPROFOR so it was already

15     remarkable that I was in contact with the DutchBat commander, certainly

16     not with his S-2.  It was probably a captain from his staff but

17     I definitely don't know his name.

18        Q.   And earlier, you said that -- you referred to your G-2.  Am I

19     correct that the intelligence service within the UNPROFOR BH command

20     designated as the G-2 branch came under your direct command as Chief of

21     Staff of the BH command?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   Now, am I correct that within your position, you had occasion to

24     deal with Generals Gobillard and Janvier, and that both of these generals

25     relied heavily on the use of English translators?

Page 10611

 1        A.   Yes.  General Gobillard hardly knew any English and

 2     General Janvier was a bit more proficient but not sufficiently proficient

 3     to operate without an interpreter.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  And am I also correct that the translator

 5     that you identified in direct examination, the individual named Svetlana,

 6     that you used this translator always when dealing with Serbo-Croat

 7     speakers, that it was always the same translator that you used?

 8        A.   Well, always might be an exaggeration, but I did in 90 per cent

 9     of the cases.  Very rarely if something happened at a time when Svetlana

10     was not present we would sometimes need to use one of the military

11     interpreters present at the HQ.

12        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And your military assistant,

13     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter, would he also be relying upon the same

14     translations that you were receiving from the translator, whether it was

15     Svetlana or somebody else?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.

17        Q.   With regard to the translator Svetlana am I correct that she was

18     ethnically of Croatian origin?

19        A.   Yes, that's correct as well.

20        Q.   And now, relation to potential problems with the translations

21     that you relied upon, I would like to revisit something you were asked to

22     testify about in the Popovic case.  First of all, do you recall being

23     asked about a conversation that you had with General Gvero and whether he

24     actually issued a threat to shell the Potocari UN compound if you do not

25     cease bombing the VRS with NATO planes?

Page 10612

 1        A.   Yes.  I remember that a question about this was asked when I was

 2     testifying.

 3        Q.   And do you recall, sir, that you were presented with the notes of

 4     Lieutenant-Colonel de Ruiter as well as a purported intercept of the

 5     conversation which did not, in fact, have the language of that threat as

 6     you had initially stated at that trial?

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

 8             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I don't see it in e-court.  I

 9     don't know if we have a line and page Mr. Ivetic can provide perhaps for

10     [overlapping speakers]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, a source?

12             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honours.  1D926 which is the

13     29th of November, 2007, transcript page 18513, it's page 69 in e-court.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

16        Q.   And if we can perhaps focus at line 18 and onwards, sir.  And

17     perhaps for purposes of the translation I will read the pertinent section

18     and it goes as follows:

19             "Mr. Josse:  We can put this on the ELMO, Your Honour.  It's

20     unmarked.

21             "A.  I've read it.

22             "Q.  General Gvero did not say to you that he would have the

23     compound at Potocari and the surrounding areas shelled, did he?

24             "A.  All I know is what Svetlana interpreted for me.  If these

25     transcriptions are correct, and I'm happy to assume that they are, then

Page 10613

 1     he did not say it in so many words during that conversation."

 2             And then we go to the next page.

 3             "Q.  If we go back, please, to page 1, at the bottom, it, the

 4     relevant part, would appear to be 'thirdly, in case General Nicolai

 5     doesn't order the bombing to stop, and doesn't withdraw NATO air planes,

 6     he will have personal responsibility for further developments and for the

 7     destiny of all people in the area.'

 8             "A.  Yes, that's correct.  That's how it reads and what

 9     I understood at the time.

10             "Q.  What was the threat in those words?

11             "A.  I've explained that as being shelling the compound and the

12     surroundings with the civilian population gathered there."

13             Now, sir, does this refresh your recollection and do you stand by

14     the testimony from the Popovic proceeding that I've just read out to you

15     as to -- as to this selection?

16        A.   Yes.  I certainly stand by this.  It corresponds with what

17     I answered in previous questions.  General Gvero did not state directly

18     in so many words that he would order bombings but he did say that I would

19     be held personally responsible for the subsequent course of events

20     concerning the persons in the enclave, and I interpreted that based in

21     part on the events at the end of May and threats that had apparently been

22     received in the enclave as well, that this would refer to bombings.

23        Q.   Now, General, with the benefit of hindsight that there was no

24     actual threat voiced by General Gvero, would you agree with me that this

25     notion of a threat did not come from anyone from the VRS but, rather, it

Page 10614

 1     was the result of being suggested to you either by the Croatian

 2     translator Svetlana or by the DutchBat commander, Colonel Karremans

 3     himself?

 4        A.   Well, I'm convinced that this had nothing to do with the quality

 5     of the translation by my interpreter Svetlana.  At that point throughout

 6     the day the city of Srebrenica had been shelled so it was not strange at

 7     all to assume that since the city had been abandoned by DutchBat that the

 8     firing would be transferred to the compound.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm looking at the clock.

12             MR. IVETIC:  I have just one follow-up question before we lose

13     this train of thought.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please ask the question.

15             MR. IVETIC:

16        Q.   Sir, apart from your Croatian translator Svetlana and

17     Colonel Karremans, did any VRS source ever voice a threat to shell the

18     Potocari compound to you directly?

19        A.   Well, I don't remember specifically but on that day, I did learn

20     from DutchBat that a threat had been received there, that something like

21     that might happen.  And that was communicated to me in some way.  And

22     that certainly didn't surprise me, given the experience that both the OPs

23     and the compound and the city of Srebrenica had regularly been shelled

24     and shot at earlier.

25        Q.   Thank you, sir.

Page 10615

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours we can have the break now.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Witness, we would adjourn for the day and

 3     I would like to instruct you that you should not speak with anyone or

 4     communicate in whatever way with whomever about your testimony, whether

 5     that is testimony given today or testimony still to be given tomorrow.

 6             We would like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in this

 7     same courtroom.

 8             You may now follow the usher.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  We will adjourn and resume tomorrow, Friday, 3rd of

12     May, 9.30 in the morning in this same courtroom, I.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 3rd day

15                           of May, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.