Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 12784

 1                           Monday, 17 June 2013

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Page 12785











11 Pages 12785-12798 redacted. Closed session.















Page 12799

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 7                           [Open session]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, you're the one who will examine the

 9     next witness, who I think started his career in this case as a 92 ter

10     witness but is now a viva voce witness.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President, that's correct.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.  I

13     apologise.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I just asked information from Mr. McCloskey

15     about the next witness.

16             Then the witness can be escorted into the courtroom.  No

17     protective measures, Mr. McCloskey?

18             An estimate of three hours.  I do understand that the Defence

19     requests four hours.  Now, usually if it is viva voce testimony, it is

20     one to one.

21             Mr. Lukic.

22             MR. LUKIC:  Our estimate was based on 92 ter testimony.  But

23     we'll see how it goes with the direct of the Prosecution, and I don't

24     know how many areas and how many documents they will cover now.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  No, let's wait and see.

Page 12800

 1             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise, Your Honour, I was just seeking to be

 4     excused to go tend to other matters.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You are excused.

 6                           [The witness entered court]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Keserovic.  Before you give

 8     evidence, the Rules require that you give a solemn declaration, the text

 9     of which is now handed out to you.  May I invite you to make that solemn

10     declaration.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

12     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR KESEROVIC

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Keserovic.  You may be seated.

16             Mr. Keserovic, you'll first be examined by Mr. McCloskey.  You'll

17     find Mr. McCloskey to your right and he's counsel for the Prosecution.

18             Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  And, Mr. President, if we could request --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- the caution that the witness is familiar with.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             Mr. Keserovic, I would like to inform you about the existence of

24     Rule 90(E) in this Tribunal.  Rule 90(E) states that a witness in this

25     case, that would be you, may object to making any statement which might

Page 12801

 1     tend to incriminate yourself.  We then, however, the Chamber, we can

 2     compel -- we may compel you to answer the question, but testimony

 3     compelled in this way shall not be used as evidence in a subsequent

 4     prosecution against you for any offence with an exception of the offence

 5     of false testimony.  Is that clear to you?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we -- Mr. McCloskey will now start his

 8     examination-in-chief.

 9             Mr. McCloskey.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good morning,

11     Your Honours, and everyone.

12                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey:

13        Q.   Could you state your full name, please, for the record.

14        A.   Dragomir Keserovic.

15        Q.   And did you retire from the VRS?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   At what rank?

18        A.   The rank of major-general.

19        Q.   And you were born in Bosnia?

20        A.   Yes, near Banja Luka.

21        Q.   What year?

22        A.   1957.

23        Q.   And it's true, is it not, that you were a career military officer

24     in the JNA before the war in Bosnia broke out?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 12802

 1        Q.   Can you briefly describe for us the -- when you first joined the

 2     VRS and where you were first assigned and just go through your different

 3     assignments and ranks up until the time that you left service, just

 4     briefly.

 5        A.   I joined the VRS on the 17th of June, 1992.  I exercised

 6     different duties starting with the chief of security of an armoured

 7     brigade, military police battalion commander in the East Bosnia Corps,

 8     military police battalion commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, desk

 9     clerk -- desk officer and chief of security department and the military

10     police department in the security administration of the security and

11     intelligence sector of the Main Staff of the VRS.  Lastly, I was

12     commander of an armoured brigade in the 1st Krajina Corps.  It lasted

13     until the end of the war.  After the war my duties -- my duty was the

14     chief of counter-intelligence in the security administration, chief of

15     security administration, Chief of Staff of the corps, then again chief of

16     security administration in the Ministry of Defence of the

17     VRS [as interpreted] and assistant minister for security in the

18     VRS [as interpreted].  On the 30th of June, 2004, I was removed by a

19     decision of the high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Ashdown.

20     This is where I stopped working within the defence system.

21        Q.   And what is your understanding of why Mr. Ashdown removed you?

22        A.   I'll try to paraphrase, or rather, present his explanation.  He

23     said that as for my functional title of chief of security, I did not

24     invest sufficient effort to have the suspects that were looked after --

25     that were sought by this Tribunal to be located and arrested --

Page 12803

 1             MR. LUKIC:  I'm sorry for interrupting.  Mr. --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic.

 3             MR. LUKIC:  I just have one intervention in regard of the

 4     transcript.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 6             MR. LUKIC:  Page 19, lines 13 and 14, twice it's mentioned

 7     ministry of VRS.  There is no ministry of VRS, it's RS.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes --

 9             MR. LUKIC:  It could be significant later.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I'd just like to check with the interpreters

11     whether the reference was made to the Ministry of Defence of the RS,

12     being Republika Srpska?

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Yes, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  That is hereby corrected.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   And you'd also said that after your war duties your duty was

18     the -- in the security administration the Chief of Staff of the corps; is

19     that correct?

20        A.   No.  Enumerating my positions, I said that I was Chief of Staff

21     of the corps and then after, again, I was the chief of security

22     administration in the Main Staff or the General Staff.  In the meantime

23     it was moved to the Ministry of Defence of the RS and I was head of that

24     administration and assistant defence minister of the RS at the same time.

25        Q.   And when you were chief of security of a corps, can you tell us

Page 12804

 1     what corps?

 2        A.   I was never chief of security of a corps.  I was Chief of Staff

 3     in a corps, that is a command position.

 4        Q.   I'm sorry.  Can you tell us which corps you were Chief of Staff

 5     in?

 6        A.   I was in the 1st Corps, the 1st Krajina Corps of the VRS.

 7        Q.   All right.  And you first testified at this Tribunal as an expert

 8     for the Blagojevic Defence; is that right?

 9        A.   Well, I was summoned by Defence representing Colonel Blagojevic

10     to appear as a fact witness.  However, the way my testimony developed

11     resulted in my being placed in a position where I needed to clarify many

12     things, especially regarding the security service, the military police,

13     and the relationship of command within the security service and the

14     military police.  So their mutual relationship.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, could I seek one clarification, also

16     in view of the correction that was made to the transcript earlier.

17             Do I understand you well that being chief of security

18     administration in the Main Staff or the General Staff that you were

19     holding a military function but at the same time that the structure fell

20     or became part of the Ministry of Defence, which is as I understand a

21     civilian structure, a government structure?  Is that well understood or

22     have I missed something?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In a certain period, the security

24     administration was an organisational unit of the main -- of the

25     General Staff, and it concerns a period of time after the war.  Then

Page 12805

 1     there was migration.  The administration was made part of the

 2     Ministry of Defence of the RS.  The chief of administration was also

 3     assistant defence minister.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  When you said "the administration was made part of

 5     the Ministry of Defence," does that mean that it was no longer an

 6     organisational unit of the Main Staff?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  So it was not simultaneously that you held these

 9     positions, but this position moved from army structures to civilian

10     government structures at a certain point in time?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:

15        Q.   And can -- is it correct that when you say "Main Staff" or

16     "Glavni Stab," that was the war time title and it changed in peacetime to

17     General Staff or "General Stab"?

18        A.   Yes, that is correct.

19        Q.   All right.  Let's go back to the war when you received a position

20     at the Main Staff.  And can you tell us when that was?

21        A.   This was in February 1995.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I believe it's break time, Mr. President, so

23     that might be a good time to stop.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  It is, Mr. McCloskey.  We take a break of

25     20 minutes, and you may follow the usher, Mr. Keserovic.

Page 12806

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We resume at ten minutes to 11.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 6                           [The witness takes the stand]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, you may continue.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 9        Q.   General, I noticed I failed to mention that you had been called

10     by the Prosecution in the Tolimir case as well; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes, that's correct.

12        Q.   And another question, what is your current position, if any, now?

13        A.   Now I am a professor at the faculty for security of the

14     university in Banja Luka, so I'm a professor of security sciences.

15        Q.   And which reminds me, our time is limited here.  I think I'll

16     call you "General" instead of professor, so try to be as specific as you

17     can, but you'll always have a chance, I believe the Chamber will allow

18     you to explain answers, but let's try to be brief and targeted.  Okay.

19             So we left off when you had been -- you had arrived in

20     February of 1995 to the Main Staff.  Can you remind us where were you

21     coming from and what position you'd had just before changing over to the

22     Main Staff of the VRS.

23        A.   Before I moved to the Main Staff, I was the commander of the

24     military police battalion in the 1st Krajina Corps.

25        Q.   And what was your rank at that time?

Page 12807

 1        A.   Lieutenant-colonel.

 2        Q.   And what position did you take at the Main Staff?

 3        A.   I took up the post of -- well, actually the order stated desk

 4     officer, but I was alone, so some places it said "chief" and in other

 5     places it said "desk officer" for the military police in the security

 6     administration.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Can you briefly describe for us the structure of the

 8     security administration in the Main Staff.  Who was its head and can you

 9     just outline its sections just briefly?

10        A.   There was a sector at the Main Staff for intelligence and

11     security affairs comprising two administrations, the security

12     administration and the intelligence administration.  Security

13     administration had four organisational units, four sections, and they

14     were counter-intelligence, analysis, military police, and

15     counter-intelligence -- the counter-intelligence group.

16        Q.   And you were in the military police part of that?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And who was the head of the sector for intelligence and security

19     in 1995?

20        A.   General Zdravko Tolimir.

21        Q.   And who was General Tolimir's superior, immediate superior?

22        A.   The commander of the Main Staff, General Mladic.

23        Q.   And going now to the two administrations within that sector, the

24     chief of security of the security administration, who was that in 1995?

25        A.   Naval Captain Ljubisa Beara.

Page 12808

 1        Q.   And that naval captain rank was equivalent to what army rank?

 2        A.   Colonel.

 3        Q.   And the chief of intelligence administration was who?

 4        A.   Colonel Petar Salapura.

 5        Q.   Now, can you tell us very briefly the difference between the

 6     intelligence administration and the security administration in the most

 7     fundamental way?

 8        A.   The most fundamental difference lies in the purpose, the security

 9     administration protects the armed forces from intelligence activities by

10     the enemy, whereas the intelligence administration does the opposite, it

11     strives to collect information about the opponent, the enemy.

12        Q.   And can the security administration, could that also include

13     protecting the forces from the internal threats within the VRS or RS

14     itself?

15        A.   From all threats directed against the Army of Republika Srpska,

16     regardless of whether they were internal or external.

17        Q.   All right.  And can you briefly describe General Tolimir's job?

18     What was his job?  Earlier I had made a mistake in your description and

19     you said:  Oh, you had a command position as opposed to the chief of

20     security.  Can you tell us, first of all, what is the difference between

21     a command position and General Tolimir's position, if any?

22        A.   General Tolimir did not have a command function.  He had an

23     administrative function, but he was also a part of the command, he was a

24     part of the Main Staff.  Other than being the chief of sector, he was

25     also the assistant of the commander of the Main Staff for intelligence

Page 12809

 1     and security affairs.  And in that sense, he took part in the work of the

 2     command or the Main Staff.

 3        Q.   Was General Tolimir an expert in intelligence, as you've

 4     described it, and in security issues?

 5        A.   According to the structure and other functions from which --

 6     where he served, General Tolimir mostly worked in the security organs, in

 7     the security service, those organs.  But in this post as chief of sector,

 8     he did both, the integrated work of the security sector and the

 9     intelligence sector.

10        Q.   How in particular did he assist General Mladic?  For example, was

11     his job to propose anything for General Mladic or did he act

12     independently, on his own?

13        A.   Just like others, other members of the Main Staff,

14     General Tolimir, in the process of planning and decision-making, provided

15     security assessments and conclusions based on security assessments and

16     proposed to the commander of the Main Staff, proposed to him the manner

17     of engaging the security service and the manner in which the unit of the

18     military police would be engaged, if that was the subject of a decision

19     that needed to be made.  His role was to put forward proposals.

20        Q.   And what would General Mladic do with those proposals?  Would

21     those get, for example, turned into -- careful, we hear you're scratching

22     on the mike.  Could those proposals get turned into orders?

23        A.   As the decision-making process continues, the commander when he

24     heard all the proposals would make the decision.  He would accept or not

25     accept or accept some parts or change the proposals given to him by

Page 12810

 1     members of the command, by his assistants.  But he would make the final

 2     decision based on all the proposals put forward to him.

 3        Q.   And if that decision resulted in a particular order in the field

 4     of security and intelligence, what would General Tolimir's responsibility

 5     be in seeing to it that that order was implemented?

 6        A.   After the decision is made, then it would be drafted, the person

 7     or the body that would draft the decision would be the Main Staff or the

 8     operations organ most often.  The decision would also have a whole range

 9     of attachments going by services and branches, defining the engagement of

10     the services and branches, and these proposals would be drafted by

11     professional organs, including General Tolimir.  Specifically,

12     General Tolimir would be responsible for drafting the plan of

13     counter-intelligence support, the plan of counter-intelligence protection

14     of facilities, actions, professional plans that would complement the main

15     decision by the commander.

16        Q.   And as orders came through from General Mladic relating to those

17     plans, what would General Tolimir's responsibilities be in implementing

18     those orders or seeing to it that they were carried out?

19        A.   Orders, rather, decisions would go through the subordinate

20     commanders who would be responsible for their implementation.

21     General Tolimir or the professional organs would have the role of

22     personnel who would monitor the implementation of those decisions,

23     provide possible clarifications on the matter of the decision, but they

24     could not make any corrective actions or change the actual decision.

25        Q.   Why not?

Page 12811

 1        A.   In the Army of Republika Srpska, the principle of singleness of

 2     command and subordination was in force.  The responsibility was set and

 3     hierarchically established in relation to subordinates.  So you would

 4     have a higher-ranking commander in relation to lower-ranking commanders.

 5     No one else could interfere in that relationship.

 6        Q.   All right.  And your position in the security and administration

 7     as part of the military police, first of all, who was your immediate

 8     superior?

 9        A.   The immediate superior was Colonel Beara.

10        Q.   And who was Colonel Beara's immediate superior?

11        A.   General Tolimir.

12        Q.   All right.  And what was your job basically in February, March,

13     April, May of 1995?

14        A.   The tasks of the security department or the police department

15     within the security administration involved professional military police

16     assignments ranging from assessing and monitoring the situation in units

17     of the military police, evaluating the personnel and the manning strength

18     of units of the military police, training senior officers in military

19     police units, drafting training plans for soldiers in units of the

20     military police, proposing the assignment of soldiers who complete

21     training for units of the military police, monitoring the situation of

22     the level of equipment and supplies in units of the military police, and

23     proposing procurement, deployment, and distribution of assets essential

24     for the operation of military police units.

25        Q.   Okay.  You mention military police units.  The Trial Chamber has

Page 12812

 1     heard evidence about a military police unit connected to the

 2     65th Protection Regiment located in Nova Kasaba.  They've heard a bit

 3     about some Drina Corps military police and some about the brigade

 4     military police, mostly related to Bratunac and Zvornik.  So when you say

 5     "military police units," do you include all of that group or just

 6     specific ones?  How does it work in relation to brigade, corps,

 7     Main Staff military police and your job?

 8        A.   I am speaking about all military police units in the

 9     Army of Republika Srpska, all units, all battalions, all companies, all

10     platoons, and sometimes squads of the military police, all units of the

11     military police in the Army of Republika Srpska.  This professional part

12     was part of the duties of the military police department within the

13     security administration.

14        Q.   Okay.  We -- in speaking of the security administration, the

15     security job, you've told us a bit about counter-intelligence and that

16     responsibility and you've spoken now a bit about the military police.

17     Can you tell us what is it about military police and their duties that

18     puts it in the security administration?

19        A.   If I understood the question correctly, what I want to say is

20     this:  Military police units are not within the security administration.

21     Only the tasks that I referred to are.  Units of the military police are

22     under the authority and the other responsibility of commanders in whose

23     units they are, just like any other units.  As for the other, the second

24     part of the question, why they would be under the security administration

25     in terms of the duties, there are tasks that military police units carry

Page 12813

 1     out which are not purely combat tasks.  And these tasks are planned and

 2     proposed by the security organs.  Primarily this refers to assignments in

 3     the support arms, of which there were seven that military police units

 4     were responsible for.  There were also assignments or tasks that a

 5     military police unit would carry out for military Tribunals and military

 6     prosecutor's offices which were a certain form of co-operation and also

 7     involved the security service.  So these were reasons why these

 8     professional tasks were placed under the -- in the remit of the security

 9     administration.

10        Q.   You mentioned seven areas that military police had responsibility

11     for.  Did that include issues related to prisoners of war?

12        A.   There isn't a special service that would deal with prisoners of

13     war, but there are services that do have responsibility for specific

14     activities in relation to prisoners of war.  At a certain point in time

15     the military police can be engaged through the security service as

16     security for prisoners of war, or rather, for locations where prisoners

17     of war are placed.  Through an escort they can ensure the transfer of

18     prisoners of war from one location to another.  There is also the crime

19     fighting service through which they can document possible crimes

20     committed by prisoners of war.  So there are responsibilities in certain

21     services regarding the treatment and matters relating to prisoners of

22     war.

23        Q.   All right.  So what I was -- military police can be involved in

24     treatment of, escorting of, securing of prisoners of war; correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 12814

 1        Q.   And I think you've spoken before of the professional control or

 2     oversight of the security officer, be it from the brigade or the corps or

 3     Main Staff.  What is the security officer's duty and job in relation to

 4     the professional control of the military police?

 5        A.   I don't think I necessarily used the term "professional."  In any

 6     case, the security organ has an obligation to follow or monitor the work

 7     of military police units.  As regards the services we mentioned, it can

 8     also decide on the engagement of those services in implementing certain

 9     tasks.

10        Q.   Can the security officer do that without the knowledge of their

11     commander, be it corps or brigade or higher, Main Staff?

12        A.   These tasks in the services are conveyed down the duty officer's

13     posts within the military police.  However, there is an obligation in

14     terms of receiving a task and implementing it, that service as needed and

15     at the latest includes it in daily reports in order to inform the

16     commander.  The commander need not provide approval for military police

17     units to do something, but he needs to be informed that military police

18     members from his unit are being engaged in providing certain services.

19        Q.   When military police are engaged in one of their standard

20     activities, for example, traffic control and/or picking up prisoners that

21     have left the line, the standard thing, is that what you're talking

22     about, the commander doesn't always need to order that?  Those standard

23     almost everyday tasks, but needs to be informed?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   What about things that aren't so standard?  For example, the

Page 12815

 1     capture of hundreds and hundreds of prisoners, their escort, their

 2     security, would a commander have to be involved in that or could that

 3     happen with the military police working without the knowledge or approval

 4     of their commanders?

 5        A.   The military police cannot do anything in that regard without the

 6     knowledge of its commander.  The commander of the military police unit

 7     cannot act without the knowledge and approval of the commander in whose

 8     unit he is.

 9        Q.   All right.  Let's with that foundation go to a couple of

10     practical documents to see if we can bring it out in a little more real

11     detail.  If we could go to 65 ter 5584.  This is a document that you've

12     talked about before.  And if I could just give you the three-page typed

13     version of it, it might be easier than having to sort out everything on

14     the computer all the time.  It's -- and I think the Defence has seen this

15     and -- thank you.

16             And it's not my intention to go through all of this document, but

17     we see if we could -- well, the last page of the document is -- says:

18             "For the commander Colonel Ratko Mladic."

19             If we could see that last page in both languages.  And this "za"

20     or "for" the commander, you've told us about that signature before.  Do

21     you recognise that signature?

22        A.   Yes, I do.  We identified it last time as General Tolimir's

23     signature.

24        Q.   And you stand by that today?

25        A.   As last time I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but if one goes by

Page 12816

 1     the basic elements of graphology, of handwriting, it should be

 2     General Tolimir's handwriting and signature.  I can't say anything

 3     100 per cent, though.

 4        Q.   Well, I'm not sure any of us can do anything 100 per cent, but

 5     you've seen a lot of his signatures, a lot of his initials over the

 6     months that you worked there, hadn't you?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Does this look like the signature you were used to seeing from

 9     him?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the first page again.  Now, I know you've

12     talked about this document, but when you were at the Main Staff in 1995

13     do you remember ever hearing of this document or seeing it in your work?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   But are you familiar with the rules associated with security and

16     intelligence and their work, as set out by the rules of the JNA?

17        A.   Yes, for the most part, because I worked in the security service

18     for the JNA too before the war.

19        Q.   And did the VRS adopt or use the JNA rules?

20        A.   Yes.  All of the rules were mostly carried over.  An explanation

21     was provided that the rules are being taken over and only certain formal

22     parts were changed, and it became the rules of work and service of the

23     security organs in the VRS instead of the JNA.  In any case, most of the

24     rules were taken over.

25        Q.   And as far as you know, did that include the entire war-time

Page 12817

 1     period, those JNA rules on the security service remained applicable

 2     throughout the war?

 3        A.   As far as I know, yes.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Let's just take a brief look at this.  We see it's called

 5     instructions for the field work of the security and intelligence organs.

 6     And it says under that in that first paragraph that it includes

 7     intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, which you have briefly

 8     described for us, depending on the situation make up about 80 per cent of

 9     the total engagement.  And then it says the remaining 20 per cent of

10     their engagement consists of administrative and staff, military police

11     and criminal/legal tasks and duties.  You've also spoken of that

12     particular part of security.  Does this 80/20 split, is that from the

13     JNA?

14        A.   There was a correction in terms of percentage that was made.  In

15     principle, the division is two-thirds to one-third of the time of

16     engagement for security organs.  I said then and I say now that I don't

17     know what the reason for the change was, although later in the

18     proceedings here we saw some documents and we could observe that the

19     security organs in that period of time were significantly removed from

20     their basic duties and tasks and that unit commanders used them for

21     different purposes.  That could be the reason why the percentage was

22     increased due to the seriousness of the situation the service was in.  In

23     the rules of the former JNA, it was divided between the thirds.  So it

24     was two-thirds as compared to only one-third.

25        Q.   And did General Mladic, in your view, have every right to change

Page 12818

 1     that percentage to meet the needs of the army and the country?

 2        A.   Well, the commander of the Main Staff did have the right and the

 3     possibility to issue instructions in order to determine positions within

 4     the system in greater detail; however, before that the percentage was

 5     slightly different.  As I said, it was two-thirds to one-third.  But in

 6     any case, instructions to this effect could be issued by the commander of

 7     the Main Staff.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to paragraph 2 which says the security and

 9     intelligence organs are directly commanded by the commander of the unit

10     or institution of which they form part.  Now, for the brigade that would

11     be the brigade commander, the corps the corps commander?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Okay.  And then it says:

14             "But with regard to professional activities, they're controlled

15     centrally by the security and intelligence organs of the superior

16     command."

17             Now, that was my reference to professional control.  It may have

18     been a translation issue because I'm not sure you liked my use of the

19     word "professional."  But as it's written here, can you explain what that

20     means, that the professional activities are controlled centrally by the

21     security and intelligence organ?

22        A.   Yes.  When it comes to professional affairs in terms of security

23     and intelligence and counter-intelligence, we also have operational

24     combination in -- at play in this paragraph.  Intelligence and

25     counter-intelligence tasks are usually followed by the application of

Page 12819

 1     operational methods.  Operational combination is a combined method of

 2     work, where several different methods are used within a single period of

 3     time to execute a particular task.  Basically, it has to do with the

 4     methods and means of work which deviate from --

 5        Q.   General, I'm sorry to interrupt.  Let me just try to cut to the

 6     chase.  I'm interested in the professional control of the security organs

 7     of the military police.  You have described that already somewhat.  Could

 8     you just briefly reiterate what this professional control that security

 9     officers have of the military police?

10        A.   Professional control, is that what you mean?

11        Q.   Yes.  Of the military police.

12        A.   Military police units carry out tasks assigned to them by the

13     commander of the unit that they are a part of.  At the same time, as per

14     services of the military police, for the needs of the security service

15     and security organs they also carry out certain tasks.  Those tasks are

16     issued to them by security organs and they are in charge of professional

17     supervision in terms of the military police executing them.  The military

18     police, as regards any of its services, can receive a task for a certain

19     day or a certain period.  For example, it is given a certain period of

20     time to implement a task, and then by way of a report it informs the

21     security organ which issued it.  The security organ monitors and assesses

22     the degree of implementation.  If needed, it acts in terms of making

23     professional amendments, corrections, to what was or may have been

24     omitted.  That is the sense of professional control in the units of the

25     military police, as per services under the remit of the security organ.

Page 12820

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this document into evidence.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 5584 receives number P1577,

 5     Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  P1577 is admitted into evidence.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 8        Q.   All right.  Let's get one more document related to the

 9     Main Staff's dealing with some of these issues just to bring us home.

10     The Court has heard about the brigades.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we go to 65 ter 25957.

12        Q.   And this is a document I would like to show you the original of

13     because there's some handwritten parts of it that you've seen before.

14     The document itself is very hard to make out in the Serbian.  The

15     original is not exactly easy to make out.  And it's not so much the

16     document that I'm -- the details that I'm interested in, but if we could

17     hand that original to the witness.  And the Defence may want to see it,

18     just the hand -- they may have seen it before but ...

19             And this is a document you've talked about before, and as I said

20     I don't want to go into a lot of details.  Can we go to the last page, it

21     should be page 13 in the English.  I think in both languages just so we

22     can see who this is from.  We see it's the Main Staff, Republika Srpska,

23     sector for security and intelligence, security administration,

24     18 March 1995.  If we could go to the back page.  And we see that this is

25     the chief, Colonel Ljubisa Beara.  We also see some initials there, DK.

Page 12821

 1     Do you know who those initials are, DK, and LJS?

 2        A.   Yes.  I produced this document for the most part.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And can you just tell us very briefly what it is?  I mean,

 4     we see it's entitled "analysis of the situation in military police units

 5     of the VRS."  Following and then on the second page -- sorry, that's on

 6     the first page.  And then it talks about an inspection that was done to

 7     create the report.  So can you just tell us what this report was designed

 8     to do?

 9        A.   Until February 1995 at the level of the security administration,

10     there was no one in the department for the military police, although it

11     had been made part of the establishment structure, the virtue of the

12     growth in the armed forces when a number of new units were created, new

13     military police units were established as well.  They were quite

14     different among themselves in terms of manning strength, adequate

15     commanding staff in terms of the tasks they performed and equipment they

16     had.  It was decided to gain a better insight into the functioning of the

17     military police units, and this was done in February and early

18     March 1995.  The most important pieces of information were contained in

19     this report or this analysis, and it included a number of proposals.  A

20     result of this document was an order that followed it later on which

21     imposed an obligation to improve the situation which obviously was not

22     satisfactory.

23        Q.   On order by who?

24        A.   By the commander of the Main Staff.

25        Q.   And is your involvement and Colonel Beara's involvement in this

Page 12822

 1     project a part of the professional responsibility over military police

 2     units?

 3        A.   This was part of the professional tasks of the security organ in

 4     the security administration vis-a-vis the military police.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we go now to page 3 in the English, should

 7     be page --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, there are some technical problems

 9     with e-court.  I therefore suggest that we take the break slightly

10     earlier and have it repaired during the break.  We cannot move within the

11     documents.  I'm not talking about LiveNote but about e-court.

12             We'll take a break ...

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break and -- yes, could the witness be

15     escorted out of the courtroom for 20 minutes.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll resume at five minutes past 12.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 11.46 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

21             There still seems to be a few ...

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  We still have some problems with the transcript in

25     e-court, but on LiveNote it works.  So I suggest that we focus for the

Page 12823

 1     time being on our left screen, at least for me it's the left one.

 2             I hope that work will be done to resolve the problem also for our

 3     e-court connections.  I think -- I reconnected again and now it's

 4     working.  Therefore, Mr. McCloskey, please proceed.

 5             Witness, we had some technical problems and it was still not

 6     fully resolved, but now it seems to be okay again.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 8        Q.   Okay.  General, we're at this -- the document that you drafted

 9     for the signature of Colonel Beara about the situation with the military

10     police units, and could you look at the -- it should be the second page

11     of the original in front of you, it's the handwritten part.  We can see

12     the handwritten part up on the screen now and it's -- we have the English

13     translation, the first part of it also on the screen.  And we see in the

14     handwritten part it says:

15             "Toso ..." and it's underlined.

16             Who is Toso?

17        A.   Toso is -- that was the nickname used for General Tolimir by

18     General Mladic.

19        Q.   And how did General Mladic refer to you, what nickname did he

20     give you?

21        A.   I didn't have a nickname.  We didn't have frequent contacts.  He

22     would address me in two ways.  As most senior officers he would call me

23     "sefe," "boss" or "chief" and Kesir.

24        Q.   Kesir is short for your name?  Okay, all right.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 12824

 1        Q.   All right.  Do you recognise the handwriting and especially after

 2     looking a bit at the text here we see that whoever's writing this starts

 3     out with saying:

 4             "It is a disgrace to have a soldier commanding a unit after three

 5     years ..."

 6             And then as we go through it - I won't read all of it - it says:

 7             "Ensure that every MP unit has an educated and trained officer by

 8     1 July 1995."

 9             So who is this that's entering these handwritten notes on this

10     document?

11        A.   Judging by everything that I know, this was written by

12     General Mladic.

13        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next page in English.  I think it should

14     be okay in the Serbian.  We see various numbered instructions:

15             "Ensure that every MP unit has its place and role and carries out

16     its task professionally."

17             And I won't read all of paragraph 3, but we can see that it says:

18             "No one has the right to either stop or delay let alone send to

19     the archives any case.  No one is or can be so wealthy to be above the

20     law.  Anyone who breaks the law and commits a crime must be held

21     responsible.  Commanders do not have the right to prevent security organs

22     and military policemen from doing their duties.  On the contrary, they

23     must assist them to the maximum ..." I guess I did read it all.

24             And these are the words of General Mladic?

25        A.   This is written probably by General Mladic and this transpires on

Page 12825

 1     the basis of the rules and regulations that were in force.

 2        Q.   Yes, General, given what's said here, the context of what is

 3     said, the handwriting is probably -- is this probably General Mladic or

 4     is it something else?

 5        A.   General Mladic emphasises the importance, in essence these are

 6     professional tasks that are involved here, also fighting against crime

 7     also in the case of military police, the crime fighting force in view of

 8     occurrences of criminal acts that were occurring.  General Mladic is

 9     accentuating the importance of those types of assignments.

10        Q.   So is this General Mladic writing these notes or is it just

11     probably General Mladic?

12        A.   Again, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but it's General Mladic.

13     He is writing this.

14        Q.   Okay.  So we have an inspection of military police units, you

15     draft this long report about improving them, it goes out under

16     Colonel Beara's name.  General Mladic reviews it, writes his notes

17     directly to General Tolimir.  Is this the system working as it should?

18        A.   Yes, because General Tolimir is the assistant and he's the most

19     responsible person in the Main Staff for security and intelligence

20     affairs and he is responsible or he answers to General Mladic.

21        Q.   All right.  And next point, number 4, it says:

22             "Reporting must take hold at all levels."

23             I won't go into that any further, but can you explain to us

24     briefly as you've done before what the reporting system was for the

25     military police units, and why don't you begin with the military police

Page 12826

 1     units from the corps.

 2        A.   First of all, I think this third word is not based on but it's to

 3     take root, "zasnivati," versus "zaziveti," since some units were not in

 4     the chain of regular daily reporting and so that is one of the

 5     assignments that were given to me, to make sure that this is implemented.

 6     Otherwise, military police units had duty service which was also at the

 7     corps level.  There were battalions of military police at the corps that

 8     had squads for military police services, and one of those services was to

 9     be on duty, work in shifts.  That service would compile all reports, all

10     information about the services in the course of the day, and then

11     overviews were made at a specific time, often that was at 17 or 1800

12     hours.  They would collate all of them and make a daily report that it

13     would send to the duty service of the unit in the superior command, and

14     at the same time a copy of the report would be sent to the security chief

15     of the command that it was a part of and to the unit commander.

16             It went to three addresses:  Superior duty service or the

17     military police unit at a higher level that also had its own duty

18     service, then it would go to the chief of the security organ and to the

19     head of the unit, and that is how the pyramid ended.  It narrowed at the

20     military police battalion in the protection regiment, which is a military

21     police unit of the Main Staff, where from the entire army, from all the

22     units of the military police, data about their activities would be

23     summarised and then there would be a collective summary report which

24     would now in the same way be sent to the commander of the Main Staff, the

25     chief of the intelligence and security sector, and to the commander of

Page 12827

 1     the military police battalion in the protection regiment.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Let me -- let's use the Drina Corps and so they assemble

 3     their daily activities, their reports, and where do they send their

 4     material to, the Drina Corps, and we're talking about July 1995, so a few

 5     months after your work.

 6        A.   The Drina Corps throughout the time, their duty operations

 7     service in the battalion of the military police of the Drina Corps was to

 8     have compiled information about the activities of all the services from

 9     their section, from that battalion, as well as information from

10     subordinate units, meaning brigades, make a summary report, and then that

11     report - if we are going by names, by functions - would go to the corps

12     commander at that time, to the chief of the security/intelligence affairs

13     at the time, and to the military police battalion in the protection

14     regiment, to their duty operations service as the service that would

15     finally compile data from all the corps and provide a report to the

16     Main Staff.

17        Q.   When you say the protection regiment, do you mean the military

18     police battalion of the protection regiment or to some place else in the

19     protection regiment?

20        A.   Battalion of the military police in the protection regiment.

21        Q.   So in July 1995 that would be the unit at Nova Kasaba?

22        A.   The command and the duty operations service were in Nova Kasaba.

23        Q.   And the commander of the military police unit of the protection

24     regiment was in July 1995 who?

25        A.   It was Major Zoran Malinic.

Page 12828

 1        Q.   Just so I'm clear, what did the protection regiment military

 2     police unit do with these compiled reports from the corps?

 3        A.   Based on all reports received from the corps, it made a summary

 4     report, it would collate everything, and this summary report would be

 5     sent to the Main Staff, to two addresses, a copy to the commander of the

 6     Main Staff and a copy to the chief of the security/intelligence sector.

 7     One copy would also go to the commander of the battalion of the military

 8     police in the protection regiment.

 9        Q.   Okay.  That's the MP reporting chain.  How about the security

10     units of the corps, what kind of daily reporting, if any, did they do to

11     their commander or up the chain?

12        A.   Reporting is not as strictly ordered in this way on levels

13     between the security organs.  It did proceed in the same way from the

14     subordinate up to the superior organ, but there were no daily reports.

15     Up until the level of the corps, the brigades were not duty-bound to send

16     reports every day, but the corps were the first instance that would send

17     daily reports to the security administration or the sector for

18     intelligence and security affairs.  Those sections from the corps would

19     send daily reports to the sector for security/intelligence affairs.  At

20     the same time in war time the corps commander was the first-level

21     officer, superior officer, who would be and should have been informed

22     about all kinds of information.  So a report of this type was also

23     received by the corps commander.  In this case these reports, when they

24     were sent to the sectors by the corps, they were not sent -- they didn't

25     each send one to the commander of the Main Staff, but in the sector for

Page 12829

 1     intelligence and security with the assistance of officers from the

 2     security administration, an analysis would be made of all that

 3     information and then the chief of the security/intelligence sector would

 4     send excerpts or original -- or directly report to the commander of the

 5     Main Staff on matters that he felt the commander should be informed

 6     about.  The commander of the staff did not get all the original reports

 7     that were arriving from the corps, but as needed the chief of sector

 8     would inform the commander.  Sometimes he would submit a written

 9     information and sometimes this information would be conveyed orally.

10        Q.   Okay.  And when you say "sector for security and intelligence

11     affairs," are you always referring to the Main Staff?

12        A.   Yes, yes.

13        Q.   And when you say "chief of the sector for intelligence and

14     security," you're referring to who?

15        A.   General Tolimir.

16        Q.   And you also mention that there is information conveyed orally.

17     What -- would that be urgent information or important information?

18        A.   Among other things, this would also apply to urgent information.

19     Then there would be no written report -- I mean, there could be one but

20     also the information could be reported verbally, information that were

21     not final, and they could possibly be augmented or amended in the coming

22     period.  The commander would in that case be informed that something was

23     happening and the final outcome would be reported to him when it was

24     complete.  So in such cases, too, the way to convey the information would

25     be to do it verbally.

Page 12830

 1        Q.   And would these communications have the ability to be encoded or

 2     encrypted in some way?

 3        A.   If it were to be sent in an encoded or encrypted form through

 4     radio communications with the option of encryption, then that would

 5     constitute a written report; however, at all levels there were manuals,

 6     secret command documents, and code books which both superior and

 7     subordinate officers had.  So by using this code book in conversation you

 8     could convey certain information in a protected manner.

 9        Q.   And those reports that went from the military police battalion at

10     Nova Kasaba to the Main Staff, were they done via what means?  How were

11     they transmitted or transported?

12        A.   When there was a lack of reliable technical means, then this

13     would be done by messenger.  A vehicle would take documents from

14     Nova Kasaba to the Main Staff.  Sometimes some documents or information

15     would be sent when somebody was going anyway, but if this was not the

16     case then they would be sent by a special vehicle.

17        Q.   Okay.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this document, 65 ter 25957,

19     into evidence.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar -- before we -- yes, Mr. Lukic.

21             MR. LUKIC:  I'm not clear whether this handwritten page is part

22     of the document, so maybe we should MFI it before I explore it or

23     Mr. McCloskey can explore it.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I can tell you we found it that way as part of

Page 12831

 1     the Drina Corps collection.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And is there -- is it on the back of the paper or

 3     following pages?  I haven't seen the --

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The original is what he has, it may have been

 5     mixed up a bit, but as an expert could you put it in the right order.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  We'd like to see it.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, as you know, we generally try

 9     to ERN things in the order we got them.  So each of these should have ERN

10     numbers on them.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will admit the document into evidence.

13             Madam Registrar, the number would be ... ?

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 25957 receives number P1578,

15     Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

17             Nevertheless, Mr. McCloskey, the Chamber would like to receive

18     more information as -- now you say it's found together, I don't know when

19     it was found, by whom it was found, whether it's the -- this apparently

20     is a photocopy.  Whether it's written on the back of the typed pages

21     or -- we'd like to receive as much information as possible so as to be

22     better able to assess what probative value it should be given in its

23     entirety.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, thank you.  And perhaps since this was --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well --

Page 12832

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- the General's document might be able to help

 2     us --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I'm not limiting you in any way to provide that

 4     information.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That is -- Mr. Blaszczyk's job to go over the

 6     collections in particular documents and because we had so much agreement

 7     with the Defence on most of it, but we can provide that for you very,

 8     very quickly.

 9        Q.   And, General, we know that you're the one that basically drafted

10     this.  Did this make its way back to you, General Mladic's comments?

11        A.   This handwritten sheet is not on the second page of this

12     document.  Maybe it was on the last page of the document that

13     General Mladic wrote it down, and then when the document was copied it

14     was somehow inserted between page 1 and 2.  So this was not part of the

15     document the way we created it.  Once General Mladic reviewed it, this

16     sheet was attached which we later received and relied on when drafting

17     our following instruction.  So it does belong here but not in the

18     sequence provided in the document.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  So if I can summarise to see if I fully understood.

20     The typed-out document was drafted, was then sent, and you received it

21     back with the handwritten part attached or as a last page attached to it,

22     and those handwritten comments were used to further draft whatever there

23     had to be drafted.  Is that well understood?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is well understood,

25     Mr. President.

Page 12833

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             Mr. Lukic, you said I do not know whether this is part of the

 3     document.  This is, as matters stand now, it is and is at the same time

 4     not part of the document.  It was added to the document when it was on

 5     its way.  Any further observations in this respect which the Chamber

 6     would have to consider?

 7             MR. LUKIC:  We will ask the witness about the document --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

 9             MR. LUKIC:  -- before but we do not object, but it's anyway too

10     late now since it's admitted into evidence already.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but of course there -- we -- but I said we

12     would have to assess the probative value to be given, a special look in

13     view of the handwriting, so to that extent it's never too late.  If

14     something is in evidence that it does necessarily mean that every single

15     element of a document is always fully probative, et cetera.  So therefore

16     don't start to become desperate in this matter.

17             Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we have the front page of this document on

19     just for one last question because I see a stamp on the front page and I

20     see some ...

21        Q.   Can you read this stamp at the bottom that's in -- it looks like

22     it's in blue.

23        A.   Yes, it reads command of the 65th Protection Mechanised Regiment.

24        Q.   And can you make out the date?

25        A.   The 28th of April, 1995.

Page 12834

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In the English we don't have the right page on

 2     the screen, which could be the second or the third page.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Oh, thank you, it's the third page.  I thought it

 4     was missing.

 5        Q.   And do you know whether this is -- what kind of stamp this is, is

 6     this a received stamp, a sent stamp, do you know?

 7        A.   This stamp was affixed when the document was logged into the

 8     books of the command of the 65th Protection Regiment, that is to say when

 9     they received it.

10        Q.   And we see if we go back to the first page of the English there's

11     a little handwritten part up in the right-hand corner, some of which we

12     couldn't make out.  I don't know if you can make out any of that up in

13     that handwritten part?  We see 76 and then we can't read under the 76.  I

14     don't know if you can.  And then we see that the original document was

15     sent to the military police battalion.  This is a photocopy for the

16     files.  Can you make out any of that faint writing that's above that

17     statement I just read?

18        A.   I can't, not the upper part.  It says at the bottom the report

19     was, and then it seems to have been signed by someone.  But I can't ...

20        Q.   Okay.  No problem.  I want to go to one other brief area before

21     we get into the events of July 1995, something I'd ask you about before,

22     can you tell us historically how did -- as far as you know, how did

23     General Mladic and Colonel Beara get to know each other?  What kind of

24     military history did they have prior to the start of the Main Staff in

25     May of 1992?  And just very briefly.

Page 12835

 1        A.   I can share with you what I heard without being able to testify

 2     as to the truthfulness.  When the war broke out in the former Yugoslavia,

 3     Colonel Beara was the chief of security of the Military Naval District

 4     headquartered in Split --

 5        Q.   Can you give us the year?

 6        A.   1991.  They were blockaded in the Lora harbour.  At the time

 7     General Mladic had a position in the Knin Corps, and he used his units to

 8     attempt to exert pressure along that axis in order to lift the blockade

 9     around the officers to have them pulled out.  Colonel Beara often

10     mentioned it, saying that it was those events and the efforts by

11     General Mladic had the decisive impact on their being freed by the

12     Croatian forces.  That is how he came to get out of the blockade for

13     which he was particularly grateful to General Mladic.  That is what I

14     know.  I don't know whether they had met before that.

15             As for General Tolimir, Colonel Beara was also -- actually,

16     General Tolimir was with Colonel Beara within the security organs of the

17     Military Naval District either in the Sibenik or Zadar garrison.  When

18     the blockade was lifted, he arrived in the Drina Corps where he met with

19     General Mladic.  It is possible that they had known each other

20     previously, but this is what I know and this is what I could hear.  I was

21     not witness to it.  It is what we heard in the VRS in terms of their

22     relationship.

23        Q.   From what you saw at the Main Staff during your time, was

24     Colonel Beara loyal to General Mladic?

25        A.   In order to provide an answer, one would need to analyse that

Page 12836

 1     carefully.  He was in a way -- and we all were, we all respected the

 2     commander.  Now, how loyal he was, he was a bit unpredictable.  One

 3     moment he was satisfied with his status, the next he wouldn't be.

 4     Sometimes he displayed his dissatisfaction, at other times he did not.

 5     So it is very difficult for me to assess the degree of his loyalty.

 6        Q.   All right.  Let's now go to July 1995, to the events that you

 7     have spoken of before.  And can you tell us when you actually arrived

 8     in -- the first time you arrived at the Main Staff in July of 1995 from

 9     somewhere else I recall.

10        A.   Yes.  I arrived in the afternoon or early evening on the

11     16th of July, 1995.

12        Q.   From where?

13        A.   I arrived from the western part of the theatre.  I was with the

14     1st Infantry Brigade Novi Grad, which at the time was part of, was it the

15     1st or the 2nd Krajina Corps, I'm not sure given the fact that it was

16     moved from one formation to the other.

17        Q.   What were you doing there?  Because you've already told us you

18     got moved to the Main Staff in February.  We saw the report you did.

19     So ...

20        A.   Given the fact that the seat of my department, the military

21     police department, was in Banja Luka, it was not part of the Main Staff

22     at Crna Rijeka in Han Pijesak, I was assigned together with another two

23     officers to co-operate with some corps officers in going to the area of

24     the brigade in Novi Grad in order to gauge the consequences of losing

25     some positions of that brigade to the 5th Corps of the

Page 12837

 1     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That was the task I was assigned for the

 2     ten days or so in the area.

 3        Q.   And when you came back to the VRS command, was anyone with you?

 4        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Dubovina travelled with me.  He was from the

 5     morale, legal, and religious affairs sector, as well as another officer

 6     from the operations administration.  I couldn't locate any trace of him

 7     or get information on who he was.  We were also accompanied by a driver

 8     as the fourth person.

 9        Q.   What's the driver's name?

10        A.   I think Novo Ranitovic.

11        Q.   And tell us where you actually arrived to when we say the

12     headquarters in the Main Staff, where in particular?

13        A.   In the usual way I reached the barracks at the command post where

14     the Main Staff organs were deployed.  There was a degree of tension.

15     There were very few officers.  I learned that in the course of the

16     previous few days there had been an attack on the Main Staff and that it

17     was for that reason that the work of the Main Staff for the most part was

18     moved to an underground facility, to the command post under Veliki Zep.

19        Q.   So when you say you went to the command, was that in that wooded

20     area called Crna Rijeka?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And I believe the Trial Chamber has heard some information about

23     two wooden huts that officers had their office -- that many of the senior

24     officers had offices in.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 12838

 1        Q.   All right.  But they weren't using those huts that day.  They'd

 2     gone into the underground command nearby; is that right?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic.

 4             MR. LUKIC:  I object, this is leading.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, would you then please rephrase your

 6     questions.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 8        Q.   You've mentioned this underground base.  Where was it in relation

 9     to these wooden huts where the offices were?

10        A.   It was perhaps 1 to 2 kilometres away along the road.  In any

11     case, it is on Veliki Zep, on the slopes of Veliki Zep, but significantly

12     higher, at a higher altitude than the place called Crna Rijeka which is

13     in a valley.

14        Q.   Aside from this Muslim attack that you mentioned, do you recall

15     any potential threat from NATO air power?

16        A.   I couldn't -- actually, I don't remember any specific threats.

17     What I do know is that over some time there had been announcements and

18     some intelligence information first and foremost that in a certain

19     situation there could be strikes by NATO forces against VRS positions.

20        Q.   And roughly what time did you get to the -- to this command post

21     area where -- and found out that most of the officers were in the bunker?

22        A.   I can't recall the hour, but I know that it was late in the

23     afternoon or early in the evening.

24        Q.   And tell us what you did and what occurred in the next few hours.

25        A.   I'd like to point out something I have mentioned frequently when

Page 12839

 1     testifying.  This is the fifth or sixth time that I testify.  I can't

 2     recall from memory whether it was that evening or the next evening;

 3     however, according to some documents that were shown to me here in

 4     different cases, it is possible that it was the same evening, the 16th,

 5     around 8.00 p.m. or around that time that I went to the underground

 6     command post.  I am not sure it was the 16th.  As far as I recall when I

 7     tried to reconstruct the events and in my first interview with Mr. Ruez

 8     back in 2000, I thought at the time I was actually sure that it was on

 9     the evening of the 17th.  However, cross-referencing a number of

10     documents, I can no longer say that with any certainty, whether it was

11     the 16th or the 17th in the evening.

12        Q.   All right.  Let me show you what you said in the Tolimir case,

13     and perhaps this will refresh your recollection.  And if we could go to

14     the Tolimir transcript, transcript page 13864 and that is the

15     10th of May, 2011, 28995.  And I'll slowly read this into the record

16     starting down at -- you start talking about documents you referred and

17     documents that the Prosecution showed you.  And then you're asked --

18     page 4 in e-court:

19             "Thank you.  You testified before, I believe, that you had a war

20     notebook and that you consulted before testifying in Blagojevic.  Were

21     you able to consult that war notebook recently on this issue?"

22             And your answer was:

23             "No.  I consulted that notebook and reviewed it before the

24     interview in the year 2000 with Mr. Ruez, and that helped me to establish

25     the timeline on what it was that I did on those days, those ten -- some

Page 12840

 1     ten days in July.  And since I still had that dilemma, whether it was on

 2     the 17th or 18th, after I returned from the Blagojevic testimony,

 3     testifying in that case, I went over that notebook again and the

 4     chronology of events and the dates that are noted there although there

 5     are -- some dates were skipped because there were no developments on

 6     those days, so based on that, my stay in Bratunac should have been the

 7     17th, actually."

 8             Do you stand by that?

 9        A.   Yes, undoubtedly I said so, and I did say it was following an

10     analysis of facts contained in the documents shown to me, but that I

11     simply cannot recall precisely whether it was so.

12        Q.   All right.  Tell us what happened that evening when you arrived.

13        A.   I arrived in the operations room or operations centre that

14     evening.  It is a spacious room.  At a certain moment I was talking to

15     General Miletic as well as some other officers who were there.

16     General Mladic appeared.

17        Q.   About what time?

18        A.   It was around 8.00 p.m., perhaps a bit later up until 9.00 p.m.

19        Q.   And what happened?

20        A.   When we greeted each other as always, General Mladic told me - as

21     far as I can remember - that I was welcome there; that in the area of the

22     Drina Corps an operation was underway against the 28th Division of the

23     ABiH; that it was organised that co-ordination was in the hands of the

24     Bratunac Brigade commander, Colonel Blagojevic; that it was not

25     developing as fast as it should and that Colonel Blagojevic was supposed

Page 12841

 1     to take another assignment; and that it was I who was supposed to take

 2     over command of the units involved in order to continue with the

 3     implementation of the operation in order to achieve its goal.  An order

 4     was to be issued to me by General Miletic which was supposed to contain

 5     more detail.  More or less, that is what General Mladic told me.

 6        Q.   What area were you supposed to take command of these units for?

 7     The Judges have heard that the Zepa operation was going on at the moment,

 8     but you're talking about Blagojevic.  So what area in the Drina Corps

 9     were you supposed to take command over?

10        A.   The area of operation or the first stage of the operation was in

11     the area to the west of Srebrenica, Bratunac, Konjevic Polje, and Milici,

12     that is to say the Drinjaca valley.  That was the area where the

13     operation was unfolding in order to block the 28th Division which set out

14     from Srebrenica to attempt a break through to join with the 2nd Corps in

15     Tuzla.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, we are about at the time of the

17     break, but if this is a suitable moment, if not then tell us when it

18     would be approximately.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  One last question.

20        Q.   If you could tell us what unit you were supposed to be commanding

21     according to what General Mladic told you?

22        A.   If I remember well, there were parts of different units of the

23     Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, the communications regiment, the

24     engineering regiment of the 5th Corps, parts of the military police

25     battalion, of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment, parts of, or

Page 12842

 1     rather, some units of the MUP, parts of the special brigade, and parts of

 2     the special and regular police units.  Those were the units that needed

 3     to be co-ordinated, as far as I could understand.

 4        Q.   You said an engineering battalion.  We got a translation of

 5     5th Corps.  Who did the engineering battalion belong to that you're

 6     talking about?

 7        A.   The engineering battalion of the Drina Corps.

 8        Q.   And you mentioned a communications, I think, regiment.  What --

 9     who did they belong to?

10        A.   The communications regiment was an independent unit of the

11     Main Staff.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, this would be a good time.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll take the break now.

15             Witness, you may follow the usher.  We'll resume in 20 minutes.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, after the break you have another

18     40 minutes which would leave you with 20 more minutes to go tomorrow.  Is

19     that -- you announced three hours?

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, at the pace it's going and the -- I can see

21     we'll be using every bit of that.  As you know, these are issues that

22     you've heard other people talk about and I -- hopefully 40 minutes will

23     do it though.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I said 40 and then another 20 for tomorrow.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Even better, yes --

Page 12843

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Of course if you could do it in 40 minutes, that

 2     would be appreciated.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would love to try.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  But you're not yet through your three hours.  We

 5     take a break and resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 1.14 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 1.35 p.m.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, you may proceed.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:

12        Q.   Okay, General, you've told us of the units that you were to

13     command.  Can you give us -- particularly what was this job, what was it

14     to entail, commanding all these units in this area you've described

15     around Konjevic Polje to do what?

16        A.   According to the task previously issued by General Mladic, I was

17     supposed to take over command of the operation that was underway.  And

18     these units to an extent participated in the blockade of the operation

19     zone.  And they also went and swept the zone in certain areas and also in

20     going after the units that were going ahead of them.  So both the

21     blockade and the sweeping of the terrain was being carried out, the

22     operation had already started, and I was supposed to continue to do the

23     same job.

24        Q.   What does sweeping the terrain mean?

25        A.   Sweeping the terrain is not a customary term, a military term.

Page 12844

 1     Sweeping the terrain does exist, but when we're talking about combat

 2     sweeping the terrain is not a term that is used for any specific action.

 3     In this case the term that is being used is "pretres terena," sweeping,

 4     searching, combing the terrain in order to find remnants, parts or

 5     complete units that were in that area.

 6        Q.   And to do what with them?

 7        A.   When any of those forces are encountered or reached, depending on

 8     the development of the situation, combat can be initiated against them or

 9     losses can occur on both sides or either side, capture and disarming may

10     also take place.  And then it's all regulated by rules of the command

11     staff combat service.

12        Q.   Or could it be regulated by what General Mladic wanted as opposed

13     to regulations and procedures?

14        A.   Well, I really cannot say what General Mladic wanted beyond the

15     scope of what he ordered or what was contained in the assignment.  There

16     were no other indications other than to continue with the blockade and

17     continue to sweep the terrain that were given, at least not to me.

18        Q.   General, my question was -- and you answered that after prisoners

19     were taken that it's all regulated by rules of command staff and combat

20     service.  And I think we're familiar with some of the rules on taking

21     prisoners of war and keeping them and protecting them and all those

22     regulations.  If General Mladic wanted to ignore those regulations and do

23     what he -- send the prisoners somewhere else against the regulations, he

24     could have done that, I take it, couldn't he have?

25        A.   Well, perhaps General Mladic could say something like that, but

Page 12845

 1     no member of the army should have or could have or dared to carry out

 2     anything that was in contravention of the rule, especially not anything

 3     that would imply the commission of a crime or the actual -- involve the

 4     actual commission of a crime, which means that anyone who issues an order

 5     that is in contravention of the rules according to the positive rules in

 6     force in the army, that order is not carried out.

 7        Q.   General, do you believe that thousands of men from Srebrenica

 8     were summarily executed after the fall of Srebrenica?

 9        A.   It's difficult to say whether I believe it or not.  The

10     circumstances and whether this happened in a summary manner is something

11     that I did not see.  I cannot really state any position on that.  The

12     events and the information that I received subsequently point to the fact

13     that there was unnecessary suffering by members of the 28th Division and

14     perhaps civilians who set off with them to break through.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat his last

16     sentence.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please repeat your last sentence.  You

18     said you received -- the information you "received subsequently point to

19     the fact that there was unnecessary suffering ..."  and could you

20     continue from there on.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said at the end that I don't know

22     what kind of procedure it was, whether it was a summary execution or

23     something else.  That is something that I cannot say anything about

24     because I was not an eye-witness of those events.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:

Page 12846

 1        Q.   So you won't say anything more than unnecessary suffering

 2     happened to people in Srebrenica?

 3        A.   I cannot.  It's not that I don't want to, it's that I cannot say

 4     anything about the nature of the suffering.  This is a completely

 5     different analysis and I repeat I'm not an eye-witness.  I did not see

 6     the circumstances of their capture or the circumstances of their

 7     detention or the status that they had in that period or the manner in

 8     which they died.  So for that reason I cannot say anything about the

 9     nature of the suffering.

10        Q.   Okay.  Let's get back to that evening.  After Mladic gives you

11     this job to sweep the terrain around Konjevic Polje, what happened later

12     on that evening?

13        A.   I tried immediately to tell General Mladic, the commander of the

14     Main Staff, that as far as I was concerned this was a militarily

15     unacceptable assignment and that there were many reasons why I should not

16     execute it.  It's true that General Mladic, in the way that he usually

17     does, said, "Never mind, Miletic will explain everything."  He turned and

18     left the room.  Then General Tolimir appeared or maybe he was already

19     there.  And then with General Tolimir and General Miletic, I tried to

20     clarify this new situation that I found myself in.  And as my superior

21     officer I asked General Tolimir to try to see if he could get a

22     correction or a change of this order from General Mladic which, as I

23     said, as far as I was concerned was militarily unacceptable.

24        Q.   Did you hear about another task that Mladic had given to some

25     other officers at the Main Staff at the same time?

Page 12847

 1        A.   I'm not sure if I heard about that then, but during this

 2     communication in this room at one point I found out or I learned - I'm

 3     not sure whether it was from General Mladic - that a group of officers,

 4     three of them, was supposed to go to the AOR of the Zvornik Brigade to

 5     see what the situation was there and to provide assistance to the

 6     commander if needed, or rather, to see what was going on there and to be

 7     there as some sort of help.  And that this should also be something that

 8     would be regulated by that same order.

 9        Q.   The same order that Mladic had given you to go to the Bratunac

10     AOR?

11        A.   Yes, I saw the document later that the same order contained

12     orders for me and for these other three officers.

13        Q.   I'm interested now in what you heard in that room.  You're

14     talking about the ops room that night.  So what did you hear that night

15     about this other job in the Zvornik AOR?

16        A.   I already said that in the previous answer; i.e., that three

17     officers would go to the AOR of the Zvornik Brigade to see what the

18     situation was there and possibly provide assistance to the commander and

19     the brigade command in their AOR.  I didn't know what sort of a situation

20     it was or what type of an assignment this could be at the time.

21        Q.   Which three officers did you learn about that night were going to

22     do this assignment?

23        A.   They were three colonels:  Sladojevic, Trkulja and Stankovic.

24        Q.   From what unit?

25        A.   They were officers from the Main Staff, Sladojevic was in the

Page 12848

 1     operations administration, he only just arrived; Trkulja was in the staff

 2     as chief of armoured units; and Stankovic was, I think, in the analysis

 3     department of the intelligence administration.

 4        Q.   Okay.  So now what happens?  You complained to Mladic, Tolimir

 5     gets involved, it's still the evening of that let's call it your first

 6     night there.  What happens?

 7        A.   General Mladic left and then after the conversation

 8     General Tolimir followed him out.  He told me there that he would try and

 9     see what he could do about this.  After a certain period of time, perhaps

10     a couple of hours, General Tolimir returned and told me that

11     General Mladic agreed that I should not take over command of those units,

12     but that I should go to the area or where the operation was being carried

13     out the following day, go to Colonel Blagojevic, gather information about

14     what was being done and how it was being done, and report about it when I

15     came back.

16        Q.   So if you weren't going to be commanding these forces, who were

17     you told that the Main Staff was commanding these forces?  Clearly you

18     must have had to report to them I would guess; is that right?  Who got

19     saddled with this job?

20        A.   The job was not given to anyone.  Again Colonel Blagojevic

21     continued with this assignment.  I really don't know if somebody else

22     later took over the assignment, but Blagojevic was the one who began to

23     implement the task and he continued with it.

24        Q.   Did you hear any information about where Beara was?

25        A.   I cannot specifically tell when it was, whether it was the

Page 12849

 1     evening or that morning that I heard from General Tolimir that

 2     Colonel Beara was somewhere.  I don't know if he was at the command or

 3     the Drina Corps AOR.

 4        Q.   Well, General, we know General [sic] Beara was somewhere.  What

 5     indication did you get, if any, on his general or specific location from

 6     anyone, Tolimir, Mladic, anyone while you were still at the command post

 7     either that night or the next morning?

 8        A.   Specifically, no, I don't recall getting any specific information

 9     other than that was at the Drina Corps.

10        Q.   The translation we got was "at the Drina Corps."  Do you mean the

11     Drina -- somewhere in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility or at the

12     Drina Corps headquarters?  Can you be a little more clear what you meant?

13     I don't need a specific area if you don't have it, but just tell us what

14     you meant by "at the Drina Corps."

15        A.   What I heard, if I remember correctly, was that I heard that he

16     was at the Drina Corps without specifying where that was exactly, whether

17     it was at a particular command post, the second forward command post, at

18     the command post of some brigade.  I really cannot be specific about it.

19     I have no recollection of this.

20        Q.   Will that include somewhere in the Drina Corps zone of

21     responsibility?

22        A.   Of course, of course.  Not outside the AOR of the Drina Corps.

23        Q.   And who did you hear this information from, that he was inside

24     the zone of the Drina Corps?

25        A.   From General Tolimir.

Page 12850

 1        Q.   Okay.  And so what do you do the next morning after getting this

 2     order from Mladic, as you say it was changed a bit?  What do you do the

 3     next morning?  Where do you wake up, first of all?

 4        A.   I spent the night in the huts in Crna Rijeka.  Besides the task

 5     issued by General Mladic, I received several other tasks from

 6     General Tolimir.  And I set off that morning towards Bratunac, or rather,

 7     towards the operations zone.

 8        Q.   What were your other tasks that Tolimir gave you that morning,

 9     just briefly?

10        A.   I was supposed to find Colonel Jankovic, convey to him that he

11     was supposed to go to the DutchBat command, and see with

12     Colonel Karremans or Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans about the evacuation of

13     the battalion that would not now proceed via the Sarajevo airport, but

14     would go through Serbia.  Also, some assets were supposed to be returned

15     to the DutchBat which the army, units of the Army of Republika Srpska

16     took from UNPROFOR while passing by the check-points, the UNPROFOR

17     check-points.  I was supposed to oversee the evacuation of the wounded,

18     the Muslim wounded from the medical centre in Bratunac.  These were these

19     additional assignments other than the one to see Blagojevic.

20        Q.   Who is this Colonel Jankovic that you were supposed to see?

21        A.   Colonel Jankovic was an officer who was assigned in the

22     intelligence administration.  I know that very often because he knew

23     languages he was used as a liaison officer and an interpreter even.  I

24     think that he was in the sector for analysis.

25        Q.   Intelligence admin sector analysis Main Staff?

Page 12851

 1        A.   No.  This was the analysis sector of the intelligence

 2     administration of the intelligence security department in the Main Staff.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, apparently moving away from the

 4     previous night.  I have a few questions on that.  But first a general

 5     question, Witness.  Could you tell us, has it often happened in your

 6     military career that you said that you did not want to execute an order

 7     given to you or an assignment?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is difficult to discuss myself,

 9     but I personally consider myself to have been a good soldier and a good

10     commander.  Any order that I did not consider to be realistic or

11     implementable is something that I would not accept readily.  There were

12     other cases when I did not refuse to carry out an order, but I tried to

13     have it amended.  I never crudely refused to implement and I rather tried

14     to influence my commanders to amend their orders.  So I would be part of

15     this group of officers which accepted their assignments and saw them

16     through to the end if in any way possible.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, you've told us that the -- you were asked to

18     take over the command of the sweeping operation, and you said you found

19     it militarily unacceptable.  Could you explain what there was militarily

20     unacceptable in that assignment which I do understand was already ongoing

21     and was continued by others?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was militarily unacceptable

23     because I was not the commander of any unit which participated in the

24     operation.  By the same token, I did not have my command or my staff or

25     my command post or a communications centre.  Simply put, I could not

Page 12852

 1     unify all of the elements contained in the concept of command and control

 2     when it comes to carrying out an operation.  The other reason was that I

 3     was supposed to go to the area for the first time.  I had never been

 4     there and I could not carry out any assessments of the terrain or of the

 5     units involved because I didn't know what they were, what their

 6     capabilities were.  So there were many reasons of military nature why I

 7     believed it at that point in time to be unacceptable on my part.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Now do I understand that you were supposed to go

 9     there alone without any staff not knowing who they were and to do a job

10     with your empty hands?  Is that really what General Mladic asked you to

11     do?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, partially it was so.  I was

13     told to go to the command post of a battalion, the battalion being the MP

14     battalion of the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment in Nova Kasaba and

15     that it was from there that I was to command all the units involved.  The

16     capacity and ability of a battalion command post is far below the minimum

17     needs required to execute command over a group of brigades or joint

18     tactical level units.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  First of all, the one who did the job at that time,

20     did he have everything you thought you would need and didn't have?  You

21     told us that the operation was already ongoing and you were just supposed

22     to continue to do the same job.  So therefore I take it that everything

23     one would need for such an operation was there because you were just

24     invited to continue, isn't it?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Colonel Blagojevic was the

Page 12853

 1     commander of the Bratunac Brigade.  He had his brigade, his staff, his

 2     command, his command post, his communications centre, so it was a

 3     functioning system.  He simply had some other units attached.  Had I been

 4     the commander of any unit, it would not have occurred to me to seek

 5     amendments to the order.  I would have simply carried it out.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  So therefore what I do understand that the order or

 7     the assignment was given to you was, let me say it friendly, totally

 8     idiotic.  Is that more of less what you're saying, telling us?  I mean,

 9     you don't get the means, you don't have the troops, you have nothing, and

10     someone asks you to do a job, that is pretty strange, isn't it?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's how it was.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And there was nothing else that kept you off from

13     accepting that order?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had no other reasons other than

15     military reasons.  The military reasons were problematic from the point

16     of view of implementation.  The operation was complex.  The activities

17     were complex and that is why preparations were needed, and yet I was

18     supposed to assume command at the same moment, the same morning, without

19     any preparation, without gaining any information, any reconnaissance.  It

20     would all have been customary in such situations.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Now the second thing you were asked to do was to go

22     to the Bratunac area of responsibility and there you also said, "I'm not

23     going there," isn't it?  Three others went.  You didn't want to go.

24     That's at least how I understood your testimony.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, Mr. President.  I'm afraid

Page 12854

 1     there was a misunderstanding.  As for the amended task of going to the

 2     area, I implemented it --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I mean the one you did not want to implement.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To assume command of the units?  I

 5     didn't carry it out and the order was amended.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I think you said - and I read part of your

 7     answer - that you were asked what you heard in that room, that you're

 8     talking about the operations room that night, what did you hear that

 9     night about this other job in the Zvornik area of responsibility.  Yes,

10     you say it was only asked to the other three and you were not bothered by

11     going there as the other three were.  Is that is that how I have to

12     understand?  That's good that it's clarified --

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  You said you were there, the others were sent there,

15     but you had no idea what kind of an assignment that was, what it could be

16     at that time.  Is that ...

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I didn't know what was going

18     on in the area of the Zvornik Brigade.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And you were never asked to go there with the same

20     assignment as Sladojevic, Trkulja and Stankovic finally had?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

23             I have no further questions at this moment about this.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I see it's time to break, but I might just

25     help with a clarification that may help some.

Page 12855

 1        Q.   So you aren't sent to Zvornik, but you did -- did you get some

 2     additional tasks related to the Bratunac area by Tolimir that morning

 3     before you left regarding Jankovic?

 4        A.   Yes.  I have mentioned it already concerning the Bratunac area.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  I think it's --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, perhaps I may not have fully understood, but

 8     that's the reason why I'm sometimes asking clarifying questions if it's

 9     not entirely clear to me.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No, much appreciated.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll adjourn for the day.  I have stolen ten

12     minutes from your time today, Mr. McCloskey, which would men that you

13     would have another 30 minutes left for tomorrow.  That --

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I hope we can get through then.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Witness, I would like to instruct you that you

16     should not speak with anyone or communicate in whatever other way with

17     whomever about your testimony, whether that is testimony you've given

18     today or whether that is testimony still to be given tomorrow or perhaps

19     even the day after tomorrow and we would like to see you back tomorrow

20     morning at 9.30 in this same courtroom.  You may follow the usher.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow,

24     Tuesday, the 18th of June, in this same courtroom, I, at 9.30 in the

25     morning.

Page 12856

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th day of

 3                           June, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.