1 Thursday, 22 August 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. There are a few matters
11 we have to deal with before the next witness enters the courtroom.
12 First is, as the parties were informed yesterday, that we would
13 deal with some matters we have to deal with before Mr. Donia enters the
15 The Chamber considers Robert Donia an expert for the purpose of
16 his anticipated evidence before the Chamber and therefore denies the
17 Defence's request to bar Witness Donia from presenting his evidence with
18 reasons to follow. Any Defence request for delayed cross-examination or
19 recalling of the witness or extended cross-examination will be dealt with
20 after the examination-in-chief of the witness. The Chamber grants the
21 Prosecution motion to add the reports and appendices to the Prosecution's
22 Rule 65 ter exhibit list, reasons to follow, and defers its decision on
23 admission into evidence of the tendered reports and appendices until
24 after the witness has completed his testimony.
25 This concludes this item.
1 Mr. Lukic, the Chamber was informed that the Defence intended to
2 raise a matter in relation to cross-examination of Witness Donia so
3 therefore I give you an opportunity first to make any submission.
4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Good morning, Your Honours.
5 First, I would like to correct something said yesterday on
6 page 15448. My learned friend Mr. Groome said that I received something
7 from my colleague Ivetic that I didn't receive. Actually I did receive,
8 only by my mistake I didn't open it. So for Your Honours it's the same.
9 I just want to --
10 JUDGE ORIE: You say in all fairness to Mr. Ivetic.
11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's appreciated.
13 MR. LUKIC: Second, we expected the decision this morning but we
14 also expected the decision to be with reasons regarding of Witness Donia
15 and now we see that it will be -- that the reasons would follow. And we
16 are afraid that if this witness testifies and reasons are given after
17 that, that, again, as many times before, our motion would be moot. So if
18 we anticipate if we are not satisfied with the reasonings, that we would
19 ask for a leave to appeal on this decision.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do not know whether it would really change
21 anything if the reasons would be there at this moment because an
22 anticipated -- an anticipated request for a certification to appeal would
23 not stop, certainly not automatically stop the hearing of the evidence of
24 Mr. Donia. So in that respect, it may not have any practical
1 MR. LUKIC: For us it's not possible to file leave to appeal
2 without reasons.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's perfectly clear but if you would have
4 done so -- if you would have had the reasons, you would have been able to
5 file such a request, then the Prosecution would have an opportunity to
6 respond to that. The Chamber would then decide, which usually takes one,
7 two weeks, at least, and sometimes even considerably more, which would
8 not have stopped us most likely from hearing the evidence of Mr. Donia.
9 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then, there is also a matter to be raised by the
11 Prosecution. Ms. Bibles, is it you who will deal with that matter?
12 MS. BIBLES: Yes, good morning, Your Honours --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning.
14 MS. BIBLES: -- and counsel. Your Honour, as indicated in an
15 e-mail last night, the Prosecution has discovered an error with a
16 document uploaded under P01790 and admitted through Witness Obradovic.
17 The description of the document is correct. However, the ERN, and
18 therefore the document itself, are wrong. We ask the Trial Chamber for
19 permission to replace the document and the English translation of the
20 document into e-court with the correct document.
21 MR. LUKIC: No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Leave is granted to replace the document uploaded as
23 P1790 by which one? Could you give us the ERN number exactly?
24 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour, the correct ERN is
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. That's hereby on the record.
2 There is one other matter. Yesterday, some -- there has been
3 some debate about disclosure, errata and memorandum. The Chamber has not
4 received the memorandum of which Mr. Lukic yesterday said that it changed
5 the report rather than that it clarified the report. Now, we leave it in
6 the hands of the parties at this moment, but if the parties would
7 consider it appropriate that the Chamber would see the memorandum so that
8 we are better able already to anticipate for any further decisions to be
9 taken in that respect, then of course we would need to receive it.
10 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, with your leave I may --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. LUKIC: Maybe I was misunderstood. It's not that the
13 memoranda changed the report. The memoranda changed --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, the memoranda --
15 MR. LUKIC: -- over time.
16 JUDGE ORIE: -- over time, yes.
17 MR. LUKIC: Yes, we received changed memoranda on the 15th of
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I leave it at this moment. If we don't
20 have it, we can't -- certainly not compare it with previous versions. So
21 we leave it in the hands of the parties, either you further discuss it
22 but then it would be wise that we have it, and if it is not urgent at
23 this moment, then we'll wait and see.
24 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I'll undertake to discuss this with
25 Mr. Lukic over the first break, and if we don't reach resolution, then we
1 will provide the Chamber with both the original memorandum and the
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Any other preliminary matters -- I think
4 I hinted already at it yesterday but I would like to put a bit more
5 detail on the record the following. The Chamber would like to remind the
6 Prosecution of the 30th of August, 2013, deadline to submit all remaining
7 92 bis and 92 quater filings as well as all, except one, bar table
8 motions. Since announcing this deadline on the 19th of July, the
9 Prosecution has only filed two of its announced nine Rule 92 bis motions,
10 four of its announced ten Rule 92 quater motions, and one of its
11 announced seven bar table motions. In order to give the Defence
12 sufficient time to respond to all of these motions, and ensure that they
13 are all decided upon before the end of the Prosecution's case, it is
14 important that the Prosecution files these motions within the time frame
15 agreed to previously.
16 Everyone remains quiet at the Prosecution side. May I take that
17 that you're confident that you will stick to the time limit?
18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, we do believe that we will be meeting
19 the time limit and there will be some -- some of these motions will be
20 filed today and tomorrow as well.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then that's then hereby again confirmed.
22 I think that we have no other preliminary matters.
23 Is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness?
24 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, there is one preliminary regarding
25 Dr. Donia. I would move to add a one-page errata to the highlights of
1 assembly report to the 65 ter list. It has been uploaded as
2 65 ter 30166A. And I would also move to add Dr. Donia's most current CV
3 to the 65 ter list which has been uploaded as 30165.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic?
5 MR. LUKIC: I leave it to Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think we have received the errata. We have
7 looked at it. It's mainly removing doubles from the highlights, some
8 identical portions, and typos, et cetera. It seems to have not much
9 substance. Therefore, leave is granted, the same is true for the updated
10 CV of Mr. Donia.
11 Mr. Groome?
12 MR. GROOME: There is one issue I'd like to raise with the
13 Chamber regarding the August 30th deadline. The Prosecution has some
14 pending applications for the addition of witnesses and while we do have
15 the 92 bis applications drafted, it's not our intention to file them
16 until the Chamber enters its decision. So I'm asking for an indication
17 from the Chamber whether we would want those filed by August 30th as
18 well, conditioned upon the Chamber's final determination of our
19 application to add the witness.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I'll let you know. The Chamber will have to
21 consider it.
22 MR. GROOME: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I know that a few drafts are at final stages.
24 Nothing else? Then could the witness be escorted into the
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Donia.
3 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Before you give evidence, I would invite you to make
5 a solemn declaration, the text of which is now handed out to you.
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
8 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Donia. Please be seated.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Donia, you'll first be examined by Ms. Bibles.
12 You'll find her to your right and you may be aware that she is counsel
13 for the Prosecution.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
16 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Examination by Ms. Bibles
18 Q. Would you please state your name, your full name for the record
19 as well as your occupation?
20 A. Robert J. Donia. I am a retired but formerly professor of
21 history and have also worked in the past in the financial services
23 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I would ask that the court officer
24 bring the first page of 65 ter 30165 to our screens.
25 Q. Have you prepared a curriculum vitae -- a current curriculum
1 vitae in preparation for your testimony here?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. As you look at the screen in front of you, can you tell us
4 whether this is the curriculum vitae you prepared?
5 A. Yes, it is.
6 MS. BIBLES: If the court officer could proceed to the final
7 page, which I believe is 6?
8 Q. Your curriculum vitae indicates that you received a masters and
9 Ph.D. in history from the University of Michigan. Was there an area of
10 history that you focused on in these advanced degrees?
11 A. Yes. I focused in my Ph.D. on the history of southeast Europe,
12 more specifically Yugoslavia and more specifically still Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina, particularly the social and political history of the
14 19th and 20th centuries and the history of war in the region.
15 Q. Can you tell us when you first visited Bosnia?
16 A. 1965.
17 Q. Approximately how many times have you been to Bosnia since 1965?
18 A. I'm not certain of the number. I estimate it at about 50.
19 Q. As a Fulbright Scholar in 1974 and 1975, where did you conduct
20 your research?
21 A. Principally in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Zagreb,
22 in Belgrade, Serbia, and also Vienna.
23 Q. Can you describe your command of Serbo-Croatian or B/C/S?
24 A. Yes. I speak the language well, not fluently, I would say, but
25 well. I read it with ease and write it haltingly, and particularly have
1 difficulty with reading the Cyrillic handwriting.
2 Q. And could you describe for us when you began to acquire your
3 language skills?
4 A. 1965, when I was first there, and then resumed again prior to my
5 visit in 1974-75.
6 Q. Could you describe for us, in the work that you did in the 1970s,
7 what types of documents did you use and review?
8 A. I reviewed largely archival documents but also referred to the
9 contemporary press, that is, the press at the time that I was doing
10 research on, and various written accounts by persons from that time.
11 Q. What did you notice in that work about the use of language in
12 different types of documents that you reviewed?
13 A. Well, I noted the, let's say, vocabulary and lexical practices
14 varied widely depending on the particular context of who was writing them
15 and what institution that person was associated with.
16 Q. Do you currently review materials from the region in the original
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. Since your academic work in or about the 1970s, you were engaged
20 in a full-time career managing brokerage offices. During that time, did
21 you continue to do some work in history?
22 A. In -- yes, I actually began work in the brokerage business,
23 financial services business, in 1981. For the first five, six years of
24 that was able to produce a few articles and also to kind of stay up with
25 the field but then that kind of came to an end and revived again starting
1 in the early 1990s.
2 Q. Have you maintained over time involvement with Bosnian academic
4 A. Yes, I have.
5 Q. And in terms of your overall research, has this included current
6 events as well as historical events?
7 A. Yes.
8 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, at this time I tender 65 ter 30165.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P1998, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic?
12 MR. LUKIC: We have the same objections we had before on this
14 JUDGE ORIE: We are talking about the CV at this moment,
15 Mr. Lukic.
16 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry, I'm a bit lost. No objections to the CV.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then P1998 is admitted into evidence.
18 MS. BIBLES:
19 Q. On the first three pages of your CV, we learn that you have
20 authored, co-authored or edited a series of books and articles relating
21 to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you describe for the Chamber how you assess
22 the value of a historical source when selecting materials for such works
23 or for reports to Trial Chambers?
24 A. Yes. I have four criteria that I use to assess the value of a
25 historical source. Number one is its source, its origin. Number two is
1 its veracity as verifiable by similar other documents in the same time
2 period that I already considered to be from sources that are reliable.
3 Third is relevance to the topic I'm addressing. And fourth, richness.
4 Richness meaning does this document say something significant about the
5 topic or topics that I am addressing.
6 Q. Your most recent work was a selection of excerpts, a book,
7 titled, "From the Republika Srpska Assembly 1991 to 1996." Because this
8 book is similar to one of the reports before the Chamber today, I will
9 ask some questions that apply to both.
10 First question is: How long have you been working with the
11 RS Assembly sessions as a source?
12 A. Since 2002.
13 Q. Can you describe the value of these Assembly session transcripts
14 and minutes, in terms of historical research?
15 A. I view them as having great value, in fact, being indispensable
16 sources for learning the motivations, intentions, perspectives and
17 generally understanding of the leaders of the Bosnian Serb national
19 Q. Your excerpts in the book and in your highlights report are
20 organised thematically. Could you describe for the Chamber how you
21 select materials in that fashion?
22 A. It is a somewhat subjective process but I simply go through the
23 transcript and/or minutes of a particular session and identify those
24 parts of it that I think best meet the criterion I have established and
25 then break them down into the eight thematic areas that I've discussed
1 and then present them within each of those areas chronologically.
2 Q. As you work with Assembly sessions, what types of context do you
3 consider in understanding these sessions?
4 A. I think I can address the individual excerpts in particular.
5 I think there are three, let's say, layers of context that are equally
6 important in evaluating these excerpts. First is the specific immediate
7 context, in terms of who spoke the words, in what forum, to whom, what
8 the conversation was about at that point in time, what it succeeded and
9 followed. The second level is the more general one of political and
10 social events, military events going on at the time. So whether it was
11 in peace or war, during a time of discussion of a peace plan or plans for
12 the future. And the third is what I would call the internal context of
13 the movement in question, in this case the Bosnian Serb national movement
14 consisting largely of members of the SDS and their, let's say, codes of
15 language, lexical codes, and the particular meanings that they may assign
16 to terms or significance to particular events and movements.
17 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer bring the
18 first page of 65 ter 30168 to the screen?
19 Q. I'd like to turn attention now to the two reports you've prepared
20 for the Chamber.
21 Is this the first page of the Sarajevo report that you have
22 drafted for this case?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You've described the manner in which you select sources. Are
25 there additional factors that you considered in preparing this particular
2 A. In this particular report, I was very interested in the various
3 perceptions of actors but also in establishing a kind of thematic account
4 of the causes, course and consequences of particular actions around the
5 time of and during the siege.
6 Q. And what consideration -- did you give additional consideration
7 to the role of the accused in this particular case?
8 A. Yes. This report, which is similar to one that I prepared for
9 earlier cases, was designed specifically to be tailored to the role and
10 perceptions, as he expressed them, of the accused in this case.
11 Q. Does the narrative of this report assume that the reader
12 understands something about Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. Yes. I assume that the reader will understand something about
14 Bosnia, about Sarajevo, and, for that matter, about the war there in the
16 Q. In the introduction to your Sarajevo report, I believe it's
17 pages 2 and 3, you explain that you use a constructive view of nations
18 and nationalistic movements in your report. How did that influence your
20 A. Using this framework, which makes essentially national identity a
21 variable rather than a fixed, eternally unmovable part of any person's
22 makeup, means that I do not in this report attribute any -- attribute to
23 ethnicity any particular action in and of itself. It is not a
24 motivation. It might become a motivation in conjunction with something
25 else. And then second, it means that I do not either give particular
1 credit -- credulity, nor do I discount the credulity of any statement
2 depending on the ethnicity or national identity of the person who made
4 Q. Could you briefly describe for us the organisation of the end
5 notes to this report?
6 A. The end notes are the text of the B/C/S original of statements
7 made by individuals or in publications, and they reflect the original of
8 the text solely for the purpose of those who are reading B/C/S, who read
9 B/C/S and are trying to, let's say, assess the accuracy of the
10 translation and the language that was used in the original B/C/S, and
11 they come at the very end of the report.
12 Q. Would you describe how the appendices are to be used in
13 conjunction with this report?
14 A. There are several appendices that -- to the report. They simply
15 give some visual, in the case of maps, or numerical substance to what
16 I've described in the text itself.
17 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer bring
18 65 ter 30167 to our screens?
19 Q. And while this is coming to our screens, could you describe
20 whether the appendices is comprised of five maps and a table?
21 A. Yes, it is, they are.
22 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, at this time, I would ask that both
23 30167 and 30168 be marked for identification.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?
25 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 30168 will be MFI P1999. And 30167
1 will be Exhibit -- MFI P2000.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will decide later on admission. Please
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer now bring
5 65 ter 30166 to the screen?
6 Q. Do you recognise the document on the screen?
7 A. Yes. This is the first page of the report that I have called the
8 highlights of deliberations in the Republika Srpska Assembly.
9 Q. Just briefly, could you describe how the excerpts are organised
10 in terms of topic?
11 A. Yes. They are, and I think the topics are listed on the second
12 page of the report, again broken into eight different themes or topics
13 within which there is a chronological presentation of excerpts.
14 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, if the court officer could bring up in
15 English first page 111 and in B/C/S page 152?
16 Q. With respect to highlights 258 and then 259, which is on the next
17 page of both, is there a correction that you would like to make to the
19 A. Yes. I provided the wrong date on those two sessions. It was
20 not 12 May of 1992 but, I believe, 15 to 16 May -- or July of that year.
21 Q. In preparation for your testimony, did you prepare -- review and
22 prepare a list of corrections?
23 A. Yes, I did.
24 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, if the court officer could bring
25 65 ter 30166A to our screens?
1 Q. When you look at the screen, is this the one-page errata that you
2 have prepared?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, at this time I would ask that both
5 30166A and 30166 be marked for identification.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, the number?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. 65 ter number 30166 will be
8 MFI P2001, and 65 ter number 30166A will be MFI P2002.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And will keep that status for the time being.
10 Could I seek clarification? Mr. Donia, you said you provided the
11 wrong date on the two sessions, that is, both the 20th session, which in
12 items 258 and 259 is the 12th of May, 1992. And you said, "but I believe
13 15 to 16 May or July." That sounds like Easter or Christmas.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is July, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, 15 to 16 July?
16 THE WITNESS: I frankly can't recall whether it's 15 to 16 or
17 16 to 17 July --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Which means --
19 THE WITNESS: -- of 1992.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- a two-day session in July.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
23 Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.
24 MS. BIBLES:
25 Q. Next area of discussion will involve the six strategic objectives
1 as of 12 May 1992.
2 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer bring
3 65 ter 03432 to our screens?
4 Q. Can you tell us what we are looking at?
5 A. Yes. In the left-hand column starting about a third, a quarter,
6 of the way down, we are looking at, at least on my screen, a B/C/S
7 version of the English that's appeared now on the right side which was
8 published in the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska on November --
9 in November of 1993. It refers, however, to an action taken on
10 12 May 1992, and then proceeds to list the strategic objectives or
11 priorities of the Serb people in Bosnia.
12 Q. Could you read for us the first strategic objective?
13 A. Yes, the demarcation of the state as separate from the other two
14 national communities.
15 Q. Could you tell us what significance, if any, there is to the
16 publication of the objectives in this gazette?
17 A. The documentary minutes and transcript of the 16th session on the
18 12th of May do not reflect that this set of strategic objectives were
19 formally adopted by the Assembly. This represents, then, the actual
20 publication which would mean they are officially recognised by the state
21 as normative without actually reporting further documentation that they
22 were adopted.
23 Q. Going back to the first strategic objective, is the meaning of
24 this first stated goal, regarding whether it's a state or political
25 boundary or a human-based boundary, obvious from a literal reading in the
1 original language?
2 A. To me, it is not. It is close, but the fact of the matter is
3 that the notion here kind of mixes two kinds of separation, one being a
4 demarcation of the state, which is normally thought of as simply drawing
5 a border on a map, and the second is one pertaining to separation from
6 national communities. To me it's ambiguous exactly what is meant in this
7 particular objective.
8 Q. As a historian, what did you look to to understand the intent and
9 meaning of this stated goal?
10 A. I looked at the language used to describe the goal by those
11 people who believed that it had been adopted on the 12th of May in -- and
12 they recited these strategic objectives, various people did, many times,
13 in the course of the Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions, so I looked to those
14 excerpts to better understand what that first strategic objective meant.
15 MS. BIBLES: Before we go to some of those sources, Your Honours,
16 I tender 65 ter 03432.
17 MR. LUKIC: No objections.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?
19 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 03432 will be Exhibit P2003.
20 JUDGE ORIE: P2003 is admitted into evidence.
21 MS. BIBLES:
22 Q. Now turning to some of the sources that you looked to in
23 determining the meaning behind this objective.
24 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer bring -- I
25 believe it became P2001, the highlights report.
1 JUDGE ORIE: While waiting for that, could I ask you one
2 question, Mr. Donia? If you look at comments of people on these six
3 strategic objectives, you told us that that would assist you in
4 understanding the meaning of it. Now, important texts are now and then
5 also abused by persons who use those texts to try to find support for
6 their own opinions rather than to express what the authors of that text
7 may have meant. This is said about important, for example, religious
8 documents like the Bible. Could you tell us how you can distinguish
9 between abuse and -- of the text and clarification of a text in later
10 words spoken by persons who may not be the authors of the text itself?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour, for the question.
12 I absolutely agree that this or any text can be abused by people who
13 would give it a meaning and serve a purpose that it was not actually
14 written to serve. However, it's important, I think, to look at the
15 context in which a particular proposal was made and adopted, and the way
16 that people understood it. And this is something that's done, for
17 example, all the time in, say, looking at the debates in the
18 Security Council before a resolution is adopted and looking at the
19 debate, for example, in any legislative body as a measure is introduced
20 and then passed or defeated. So it's a -- quite a different exercise
21 really in trying, without presuppositions, to go in and determine the
22 meaning of that in the sense of the intent of its drafters and
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.
25 MS. BIBLES: If we could turn to in English, page 11, and then
1 12, in the English version, and then page 13 in the B/C/S version.
2 Q. I'm directing your attention first to highlight 14. Is this one
3 of the sources that you consulted in your inquiry on this point?
4 A. Yes, I believe the 14th highlight is not yet visible in the
6 MS. BIBLES: I think it's e-court page 13, if that helps. I'll
7 note that in the English version, the second part of this excerpt is on
8 the next page.
9 Q. But before we turn to that, I'll ask if you could briefly explain
10 the context in which this statement was made on the 18th of March, 1992?
11 A. On that date, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims
12 and Bosnian Croats reached an agreement in principle, which is known as
13 the Lisbon Agreement or the Cutileiro Agreement. This was an agreement
14 in principle only. It was not signed nor finalised by any of the
15 parties, but it is to this agreement in principle that the --
16 Mr. Krajisnik is reacting at the 11th session, which was largely devoted
17 to discussion of that plan. And he is therefore trying to position that
18 agreement in the context of the values that the Bosnian Serb movement has
19 adopted. And of course in the first sentence here, he endorses the
20 fundamental notion of a division according to ethnic principles, and then
21 in the second paragraph, which as you noted is on the next page, he
22 proposes that that principle be implemented now.
23 Q. So what did you gather from this excerpt about the separation
25 A. It seems to me evidence that the separation goal was held by the
1 key leaders of the Bosnian Serb movement well before the actual adoption
2 of the -- or the discussion and putative adoption of the goals on the
3 12th of May.
4 Q. And then moving to the next excerpt, number 15 - just checking, I
5 believe all of this is depicted on both screens here - in what context
6 now on the 27th of March is this statement made?
7 A. This is a statement made several Assembly sessions later, at a
8 time when the -- Karadzic and the other leaders are figuring out ways to
9 get their strategic plans implemented as soon as possible, and it is in
10 this context then that Karadzic speaks about the, let's say,
11 fundamentality of the goal, its foundational character, and asserts that
12 it was, in fact, sort of a part of the very Serb essence for some time.
13 Q. Do you look sometimes at quotes made later in time for their
14 retrospective view?
15 A. Yes. I believe that those are -- can be very revealing. They
16 have to sometimes be treated with a certain caution because people don't
17 always remember exactly what they were thinking or saying previously, but
18 nonetheless, can have great value in illuminating the situation in prior
20 MS. BIBLES: And in that vein, if we could go to e-court page 23
21 in English and e-court page 31 in the B/C/S version?
22 Q. We are looking down the road now at 1944. I'd like to direct
23 your attention to highlight 46. Could you describe for us the context of
24 this statement?
25 A. Yes. I believe we are dealing with 1994, hopefully, not 1944.
1 But in this -- this is one of many reiterations that Karadzic makes in
2 Bosnian Assembly sessions in which he's trying to impart the essence of
3 the -- usually the first strategic goal and in which he very clearly here
4 states that it is a human boundary that is to be established by whatever
5 means are required.
6 Q. Based on your full rigorous examination in this area of the
7 meaning of the first strategic goal, what type of separation, in your
8 examination, is meant by the first objective?
9 A. I think looking at the various reiterations and the iteration
10 itself, one can conclude that what was intended here was both complete
11 political separation, separation of polities by a border, and coeternally
12 the same border would serve as a human separator between, on the one
13 side, Serbs and, on the other side, Croats and Muslims or others.
14 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I'm looking at the clock and I can
15 advise the Chamber that we are right on schedule with this examination.
16 I note that this is -- we are approaching a time for a break and this
17 would be an appropriate time to do so.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We will take the break now. Could I first ask the
19 usher to escort Mr. Donia out of the courtroom.
20 We take a break of 20 minutes, Mr. Donia.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we resume at 10 minutes to
25 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
3 Meanwhile I use the time for dealing with protective measures for
4 Witness RM021. On the 5th of December of last year, the Prosecution
5 sought to have the protective measures of pseudonym and closed session
6 granted to witness RM021 in Brdjanin rescinded. The Chamber granted this
7 request in its decision on the 9th motion to admit evidence pursuant to
8 Rule 92 bis which was issued on the 18th of July. In that decision, the
9 Chamber denied the admission of Witness RM021's evidence pursuant to
10 Rule 92 bis, and on the 19th of July, the Prosecution made an oral
11 application to change the 92 bis motion into a 92 ter motion and stated
12 that it was likely that the witness would request to have his protective
13 measures reinstated for his appearance in court. The Chamber invites the
14 Prosecution to make submissions as a matter of urgency on the reasons
15 behind reinstating the protective measures for Witness RM021 given the
16 witness is due to testify on Monday, the 26th of August of this year.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, Ms. D'Ascoli will be making those
18 submissions. Would you like me to have her here at the beginning of the
19 next session?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps that would be a good idea so that
21 we ...
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Donia, apologies for dealing with other matters
24 when you're coming into the courtroom.
25 THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles will now continue her
3 May I take it that you need another 45 minutes, Ms. Bibles? It
4 was scheduled for one hour and a half, if I'm not -- yes.
5 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour, and I should finish up within the
6 next 45 minutes or so.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, please proceed.
8 MS. BIBLES:
9 Q. Could you describe for us your understanding of the significance
10 of the first strategic goal with respect to the overall Bosnian Serb
11 nationalist movement?
12 A. Well, I think this first goal marked a transition with within the
13 Bosnian Serb movement from basing claims upon their habitation-based
14 claims, that is, lands on which Serbs live or lived in -- and may have
15 been removed by virtue of alleged genocide in the Second World War, and
16 movement to claims which were strategic in character and essentially
17 trumped any considerations of residence or habitation.
18 Q. As we've explored how you research and identify the excerpts,
19 you've indicated that one level of understanding must be appreciating the
20 internal context or lexicon used by the Bosnian Serb leadership. How do
21 you do this?
22 A. The one thing that works every time is to simply go through an
23 awful lot of the documentation and reports and note patterns of usage.
24 Often, there will be some sort of official policy annunciated about terms
25 that should be used or should not be used in particular contexts, but I
1 would say that's not always the case when searching for these lexical
2 conventions and usage conventions that I'm speaking of.
3 Q. Were there words or phrases used by the Bosnian Serb
4 nationalistic movement which had meanings beyond the literal reading?
5 A. Yes, certainly there were.
6 Q. Is the word "Turk" one of these terms?
7 A. Yes, it was.
8 Q. Could you briefly describe the history of the word and then how
9 it was used from 1992 through 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. In widespread usage in Europe and really all over the world, the
11 term was used, of course, in reference to the inhabitants or citizens of
12 the Republic of Turkey in the 20th century. It was also used to refer to
13 the Ottoman Empire, in place of the word Ottoman, and as such had really
14 no pejorative connotations for a long time. But in the course of the
15 20th century, and possibly even a little bit before, it began to be used
16 by those peoples who had lived under the Ottoman Empire pejoratively to
17 describe the empire that they regarded as having oppressed them in the
18 19th century and before. So that by the time the -- let's say the
19 elections of 1990 came along, the term "Turk" had acquired severe
20 pejorative connotations and Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats began to use
21 it to refer to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that then brought
22 with it the negative connotations of the Ottoman Empire's behaviour
23 toward other peoples and also associated the term with, broadly speaking,
24 Turkish ambitions which they believed existed in the region.
25 Q. So when the phrase was used either by the leadership or on the
1 street from 1992 to 1995 in Bosnia by a Bosnian Serb, what was the
2 connotation or the meaning behind that word?
3 A. Well, it was a pejorative term that implied enemy, an enemy that
4 posed a direct and immediate threat to the very existence of the Serb
6 Q. In reviewing the Assembly sessions, did you also make
7 observations regarding the use of the word "genocide"?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. Could you describe for us what observations you made?
10 A. In looking at the use of the word "genocide" in the course of
11 these Assembly sessions, I noted anecdotally at first that the term was
12 used almost exclusively in reference to deeds committed against Serbs by
13 members of other peoples, and only rarely was it used in reference to
14 deeds committed by Serbs against others. So I looked at the excerpts
15 report that is before us, highlights report, and noted that just judging
16 the usage of the term, it occurred 12 times in reference to deeds against
17 Serbs and only twice that I was able to find in deeds committed that --
18 that could be or potentially were committed by Serbs. I did a further
19 examination of 44 of the sessions which were searchable and found that
20 that numerical disproportionality even is greater when looking at that
21 broader set of sessions.
22 Q. What significance, if any, did you draw from that observation in
23 reviewing the Assembly sessions?
24 A. Well, the -- by consensus of the speakers in the Assembly
25 session, that genocide was a dirty word that Serbs were not capable of
1 engaging in and had not engaged in, and therefore, it should not be
2 employed in the discussions that were ongoing.
3 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could the court officer bring page --
4 well, out of P2001 in e-court, page 78 in the English, and page 108 in
5 the B/C/S to our screens?
6 JUDGE ORIE: And could I meanwhile ask a question to Mr. Donia.
7 Mr. Donia, you say there was a disproportionate use of the word
8 "genocide," it mainly being used in relation to what happened to the
9 Serbs rather than what Serbs would have done. Now, whether it's
10 disproportionate, would you agree with me that that depends on what the
11 reality would have been? If the facts were such that the acts referred
12 to were mainly committed against Serbs, would it then be disproportionate
13 to use it more often in that context?
14 THE WITNESS: It certainly would, if the facts, in fact, bore
15 that out. The facts, of course, are contested widely by historians and,
16 for that matter, populists, popular writers, and the -- I would not say
17 that would be true of the prospect of genocide being committed going
18 forward. That might not actually create a disproportionate use of the
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm asking you this question because you
21 referred to the disproportionateness only in numerical terms, where it
22 only becomes disproportionate if you look at the fact as well, not only
23 at the numerical use of the term.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, it could also become disproportional simply
25 by a decision of the leading lights in any given movement, to make this a
1 central part of their, say, ideological or propaganda appeal.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So numbers in itself do not -- are not the key
3 to whether it's disproportionate. That is just numbers?
4 THE WITNESS: If they were just numbers, yes, they could be very
5 important, however, in determining that but might not be at all.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
7 Please proceed Ms. Bibles.
8 MS. BIBLES:
9 Q. Based on your review and experience, looking at this issue, do
10 you have an opinion as to the significance of the disparity in those
11 numbers in this instance?
12 A. Well, I think the significance is that the Serbs, Serb
13 nationalists, believed that it was beyond the realm of their character,
14 their nature, to engage in genocide, and therefore could not possibly
15 have committed it.
16 MS. BIBLES: I would like to turn to excerpt 182. We are looking
17 at the end of 182 in the English version. We may need to go backwards in
18 the B/C/S version. If in the B/C/S version we could, then, go to the
19 next page, the quote we are looking at is actually on the next page.
20 Thank you.
21 Q. You've explained that there were, in the excerpts, only two
22 citations in which the word "genocide" was used in conjunction with
23 possibility of Bosnian Serb action. Are we looking at one of those two
24 quotes here in highlight 182?
25 A. Yes, in the last sentence, last paragraph of the item that you've
1 identified, yes.
2 Q. Who is speaking in this excerpt?
3 A. General Mladic is speaking here.
4 Q. And what date is this?
5 A. This is the 12th of May, 1992, at the 16th session.
6 Q. Could you describe the context in which this statement is made?
7 A. General Mladic has just prior to this made a number of statements
8 expressing his concern or alarm that the leaders of the -- civilian
9 leaders of the movement were formulating goals that couldn't possibly be
10 achieved by those who were supposed to implement them. And he
11 repeatedly, in fact, emphasises the point that the army can only do so
12 much and that there is a limited possibility of achieving this, both
13 because he felt that Serbs could not rule over areas where no Serbs
14 lived, and also because they didn't have the military wherewithal to
15 accomplish it. And so this stands out to me as a particularly harsh
16 warning against taking these actions and fearful of the consequences of
17 it, so that he is really using the word here almost for its shock value
18 because it just doesn't appear in very many other contexts with this
20 JUDGE ORIE: When you say a warning, a warning to the political
21 leadership, is that what you have in mind?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, a warning to -- yes, to all Serbs, really.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
24 MS. BIBLES:
25 Q. In reviewing this excerpt in the context in which you have the
1 backdrop, what do you understand the accused to be saying when he uses
2 the words: "People, that would be genocide"?
3 A. Well, he is assigning this term, which I -- again has a certain
4 shock value, to certain activities that he either believed were going on
5 or believed might go on through the -- this overly ambitious programme
6 that the leadership was advocating.
7 Q. Would you explain to us, in this lexicon or this manner of using
8 some terms or not using terms, what benefit, if any, the Bosnian Serb
9 nationalist leadership gained from this?
10 A. Well, in their use of the term, they certainly gained a broad
11 consensus and were able to persuade others outside the movement that the
12 Bosnian Serbs had suffered a great deal in the past from this existential
13 threat and furthermore that it would revive or could revive and be
14 re-enacted in the present or near future.
15 Q. Given the nature of the Assembly sessions, are there some
16 sessions in which it is more helpful in understanding the speakers, their
17 actions, their intent, to review the entire Assembly session?
18 A. Yes, I believe there are. Of course, I'd like to say they are
19 all critical but I think that there are a few sessions which -- these
20 would be the sessions at which I had difficulty drawing just a few
21 excerpts from, that are really very powerful explainers of the situation
22 or attitudes involved.
23 Q. Now, then, going back to the strategic objectives, with the
24 overall or overarching goal of the first strategic objective in mind,
25 what was the nature of the remaining strategic objectives?
1 A. The remaining five objectives were all specifically geographical
2 in character, defining the territory on which or within which the first
3 goal should be achieved.
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, with that in mind, we'd turn to the
5 map book, P178, page 6.
6 Q. And, Dr. Donia, I'm going to ask you to go through the strategic
7 goals with the map in mind. We will go through them one at a time.
8 MS. BIBLES: If I could have just a moment, Your Honour. If we
9 could turn to the next map, that must be page 7 in e-court.
10 Q. Turning your attention to the second strategic goal, could you
11 tell us what that was?
12 A. The second strategic goal was to create a corridor from east to
13 west, that is, from Semberija area to the Bosnian Krajina.
14 Q. Would you tell us whether, in 1991, there were multi-ethnic
15 communities in this corridor region?
16 A. Yes. The most multi-ethnic area of the projected corridor was
17 the areas to the east, to the right as we are looking at the map. The
18 one municipality which was Bijeljina, sort of right at the corner, right
19 at the north-east corner of Bosnia, had a Serb absolute majority of about
20 59 per cent. The next five municipalities going to the left or to the
21 west either had no majority group, no absolute majority group, or had a
22 Croat majority. So -- and one actually had a -- that was Brcko had a
23 Muslim plurality. And within those municipalities there was a great deal
24 of mixed population. So the multi-ethnicity was mainly in the eastern
25 part of this and became more solidly Serb as one moved west.
1 Q. Would you describe for us strategic goal number 3?
2 A. Third strategic goal was to establish a corridor in the
3 Drina Valley, that is, to eliminate the Drina as a state boundary between
4 Serb lands. That then pertained to the area on the very east side of
5 Bosnia, where the Drina River had essentially been the definition of the
6 boundary between the Serb -- between the Republic of Serbia on the right
7 side and Bosnia on the left side. And, again, those areas with the
8 exception of Bijeljina had -- the next four municipalities going down had
9 a Muslim plurality or absolute majority, thus again suggesting that this
10 strategic goal was overriding the habitation-based standards for land
12 Q. Would you describe for us the fourth strategic goal?
13 A. The fourth one is to me the -- maybe the most difficult to
14 explain, although it's very straightforward in text. The fourth goal is
15 to establish a border on the Una and Neretva rivers. Now, those two
16 rivers are marked on this map in blue and the -- I think they deserve
17 just a word of explanation as to what they mean. The Una River starts,
18 as you can see in the highlands right on the border between Croatia and
19 Bosnia and flows due north, then turns at the city of Bihac,
20 approximately, to the north-east and then eventually flows into the
21 Sava River at the village of Jasenovac where the blue line ends here.
22 What that boundary does is to draw a specific line which demarks on the
23 northwestern side two almost exclusively Muslim municipalities, that is,
24 Velika Kladusa and forgetting the name of the other, and then half,
25 approximately half of two other municipalities which also have
1 substantial Muslim populations but less overwhelmingly so. Consequently,
2 the idea there was to create a -- basically an enclave which the Serb
3 strategic aims did not penetrate into but they penetrated right to the
4 boundary of it including some lands that were then inhabited by Muslims.
5 The second river that's mentioned here is the Neretva. The
6 Neretva starts again in the highlands of Western Herzegovina, flows
7 northwest and then kind of turns around, flows south to -- south and
8 southwest to the Adriatic Sea and goes significantly right through the
9 city of Mostar. And based on the ethnic distribution in that area, one
10 can readily see that this border was to serve as a border between
11 Croat-inhabited lands to the left of the river looking at the map, and
12 areas of Serb and Muslim mixed population, in some cases more purely
13 Serb, to the right.
14 Q. Skipping the fifth goal for the moment, could you describe for us
15 the sixth strategic goal?
16 A. The sixth goal was access to the sea for the Republika Srpska,
17 something which existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself only in that small
18 area where it says access to the sea, looks like an anvil, upside-down
19 anvil. So this was to take some sort of territory that would grant
20 Republika Srpska an immediate outlet to the sea, to the Adriatic Sea.
21 Q. Thank you. We can close the map book at this point.
22 In your Sarajevo report - and just for reference pages 16 to 20
23 in both the English and B/C/S - you describe the setting, origins and
24 growth of Sarajevo. We won't go into those details but I would ask you
25 to describe for the Chamber what the fifth strategic objective meant for
1 the future of Sarajevo.
2 A. Sarajevo being a very ethnically mixed city in most of its areas,
3 this goal meant that there would have to be considerable separation,
4 movement of peoples from their current homes to some other location, and
5 the creation then also of two separate political regimes, one which was
6 preserved or supposed to be Serb and one which would be Muslim.
7 Q. Before we turn to the concrete aspects of implementing these
8 objectives, could you tell us whether there were critical points in time
9 that marked defining moments in the direction of the Bosnian Serb
10 nationalistic leadership to these objectives?
11 A. Yes. And I'll identify three early in the movement but recognise
12 that others might identify other high points. But to me, the most
13 significant high points in the movement, the Bosnian Serb national
14 movement, are, first of all, the elections of November 18, 1992 -- 1990,
15 which brought the three national parties to power and basically banished
16 the communist authorities, and indicated that ethnicity was now
17 politically salient in the political life of the republic.
18 Second would be the 15th of October, 1991, a point at which,
19 owing to the decisions of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
20 Serb party essentially gave up on the idea of remaining in Yugoslavia,
21 that all of Bosnia would remain in Yugoslavia, and instead started to
22 move toward defining strategies for creating a state of their own and a
23 takeover, seizure of power, in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to realise
24 that state.
25 Those -- and then the third one would be, in my view, the
1 adoption of the six strategic goals which moved this whole territorial
2 process from one based on residence and individual municipalities to the
3 broader strategic goals that were articulated.
4 Q. Let's direct attention to the 15 October 1991 date. Was there a
5 public forum in which these issues were discussed?
6 A. Yes. The 8th session of the Bosnian parliament which began, I
7 believe, on the 10th or 11th of October and concluded in the early
8 morning hours of the 15th of October, was the forum in which these issues
9 were debated.
10 Q. Are you familiar a speech given by Radovan Karadzic on the
11 15th of October, 1991, in that venue?
12 A. Yes. Again this is presumably in the very early morning hours of
13 the 15th, after a very long session. He did give a -- what has turned
14 out to be a memorable speech.
15 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, turn now to 65 ter 22722A, which is a
16 ten-minute video. However, at this time I would ask Ms. Stewart to play
17 just a segment of this video from 9 minutes 29 seconds to 9 minutes
18 56 seconds. It is my understanding that the transcription has been
19 provided to the booths.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could we please have a
21 page reference? Thank you.
22 MS. BIBLES: Yes, and my apologies. That reference would be
23 page 4 of 4 in the English version, and I believe the end of page 3 of 4
24 in the B/C/S version.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And we have to play it twice. First time
1 without, second time with, interpretation. That's a technical matter,
2 Mr. Donia. Let's proceed.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could we stop? I thought that when it was played
5 for the second time, that we were to receive the English translation.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We could not find it on
7 page 4 but now we have found it on page 3. Thank you.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Would you like it to be played for the first time
9 again or are you ready when it's replayed to provide us with the
10 translation -- the interpretation?
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We are ready. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then could it be played now second time with
14 [Video-clip played]
15 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
16 "Radovan Karadzic: It is not good what you are doing. This is
17 the road that you want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina to. The same highway
18 of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia went through. Don't
19 think you won't take Bosnia-Herzegovina to hell and Muslim people to
20 possible extinction because the Muslim people will not be able to defend
21 themselves if it comes to war here. Please ..."
22 MS. BIBLES: Thank you.
23 Q. Has Radovan Karadzic previously spoken about the Muslim
24 population in Bosnia in this manner publicly before this time?
25 A. Not to my knowledge, in public.
1 Q. From the date of this speech until the outbreak of war, could you
2 briefly describe the actions of the Bosnian Serb leadership?
3 A. They began immediately on this same day, in the evening, to plan
4 steps to move closer to creation of a Bosnian Serb state within Bosnia.
5 They subsequently convened a separate Bosnian Serb Assembly, the
6 transcripts of which we are dealing with here, and convened it for the
7 first time on the 24th of October in 1991. They then held a plebiscite
8 on an issue which they believed would authorise them to proceed with
9 forming a state. And they then engaged in some planning to
10 differentiate, within municipalities, between Serb and non-Serb areas and
11 mobilise local SDS members to take measures to take power in the Serbian
12 parts of those municipalities.
13 Q. By reference only, in pages 31 to 32 of your Sarajevo report, you
14 describe the SDS introduction of Variant A and B strategies to the
15 municipality structure. Could you describe how this fit into the
16 political development of the Bosnian Serb nationalistic movement?
17 A. It fit in as a specific plan which gave very detailed
18 instructions to lower level municipal -- or municipal leaders of the SDS
19 which was very much in accord with a resolution that they had passed at
20 the Assembly session just seven days before. So it was a further
21 implementation of the planning process in advance of whatever was going
22 to follow, either an actual takeover or the creation of a Serb state
23 within -- through diplomacy.
24 Q. In terms of Sarajevo, could you briefly describe how the
25 municipality strategy was implemented?
1 A. The -- Sarajevo was a bit different from many other areas of the
2 country, in that fairly early in the process, right around the, say
3 January, February, of 1992, the Bosnian Serb leaders created a new
4 municipality, which actually had been an existing one some decades
5 before, called Rajlovac, and rearranged all the boundaries of the -- or
6 much of the boundaries of the existing municipalities to sort of
7 correspond with the creation of that new Rajlovac municipality.
8 Q. We've largely discussed the political and ideological development
9 of the rise of the Bosnian Serb nationalistic agenda. Could you briefly
10 describe the role played in this by Radovan Karadzic?
11 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?
12 Q. Could you describe the role played in the political and
13 ideological development, the rise of the SDS and Bosnian Serb
14 nationalistic agenda by Radovan Karadzic?
15 A. Mr. Karadzic was elected president of the party of the SDS at its
16 founding Assembly in July of 1990, and led the party in the election
17 campaign prior to the elections of November 18th. Probably was their
18 principal ideological spokesman but not necessarily innovator of
19 ideology, and then continued to lead the party while never holding any
20 official office within the Bosnian government structure after the
21 elections right up until the outbreak of war -- and, well, and further
22 after that.
23 Q. In highlight 281, Radovan Karadzic describes that he asked for
24 Mladic and got him. Overall, could you tell us how well the accused,
25 Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Nikola Koljevic got along?
1 A. Based on discussions within the Bosnian Serb Assembly and some
2 additional press accounts outside of it, I would say that the top three
3 civilian leaders of the Bosnian Serb movement got along very well. That
4 would be Nikola Koljevic, who was a professor of English at the
5 University of Sarajevo and a long-time friend of Karadzic, and
6 Momcilo Krajisnik, also a long-term -- long-time friend of Karadzic.
7 That level of cohesiveness did not exist with General Mladic.
8 Q. Generally, how did they work together during the conduct of the
10 A. And whom?
11 Q. I'm sorry, the three of the political leaders with
12 General Mladic.
13 A. Well, the -- I think the three political leaders very often met
14 informally and sort of scripted what was going to happen in the various
15 decision-making bodies. And they acted as civilian leaders of a military
16 organisation, believed that it was their duty to set goals, to prescribe
17 policies, and that it was General Mladic's duty to carry them out.
18 Q. And, in fact, through the conduct of the war, did that happen?
19 A. Yes, it did, in the main. There was a great deal of, let's say,
20 heat generated between them about these policies, and in particular in
21 certain Assembly sessions these clashes became quite pronounced. But
22 looking at the overall policy implementation in general, General Mladic
23 did carry out those policies.
24 Q. We turn our attention finally to the implementation of the
25 strategic goals. Ratko Mladic officially, you note in your report,
1 officially first had a role in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 25th of April,
2 1992. In terms of implementing these six strategic goals, what role did
3 Ratko Mladic have in making these happen?
4 A. Well, he had the overwhelming burden of responsibility for
5 implementing them. I wouldn't say exclusively because there were other
6 security forces that were tasked to implement parts of these things, but
7 as commander of the army, or its Chief of Staff, General Staff, it was to
8 him that they turned to implement the actual strategic goals that had
9 been laid out.
10 Q. Have you seen any indication that, as of the 12th of May, 1992,
11 that Ratko Mladic had any misunderstanding as to what was expected of him
12 as commander of these forces?
13 A. No. I don't see any -- I don't have any instances or evidence
14 that he did not understand what those orders were.
15 Q. Is there a relationship between the six strategic objectives and
16 the military directives that were issued during the war?
17 A. Yes. The military objectives, in particular number 3 through 7,
18 were the specific means by which the strategic goals were achieved or
19 implemented by the -- both the civilian and the military leaders. There
20 are a couple of exceptions, I believe, when the specific operation was to
21 go beyond some of the boundaries laid out in the six strategic goals.
22 For example, for the purpose of creating disruption behind the lines of
23 the enemy. Things like that. But by and large, those goals were focused
24 on -- or the directives were focused on reaching the strategic goals.
25 Q. Ratko Mladic addressed several of the Assembly sessions. I'd
1 like to focus on the 37th Assembly session in January of 1994.
2 MS. BIBLES: While I ask the court officer to bring 65 ter 2388,
3 e-court page 49 in English and 36 in the original to the screen.
4 Q. I'll ask if you could briefly describe the context for this time
6 A. The 37th session was held immediately after the Vance-Owen Peace
7 Plan had been presented to all parties in, I believe it was Geneva and
8 the Assembly was debating whether this would -- is something that ought
9 to be accepted by the Bosnian Serbs or whether they ought to accept it or
10 whether they should reject it and seek further negotiations.
11 Q. And I'd like to direct your attention on the English version, we
12 see a 35 -- a number 35 in the middle of the screen --
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: They are both in English. Now the B/C/S appears.
14 MS. BIBLES: I believe actually in the original language we will
15 need to go to the next page, just above the 35. I'm sorry, it was the
16 page before.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Just above 35 means the last part of 34.
18 MS. BIBLES: The last part of 34, yes.
19 Q. In the last line before the 35, first, can you tell us who is
20 speaking here?
21 A. I cannot actually. It's not clear to -- I don't have that page
22 in front of me when the speech begins.
23 Q. Are you familiar with the quotation, "my concern is not that they
24 create a state, my concern is to have them vanish completely," during the
1 A. Yes, actually this speech was delivered by General Mladic at that
3 Q. And when he indicates that his concern is to have them vanish
4 completely, who is he referring to?
5 A. It's the enemy, and it isn't really clear whether that is
6 Muslims, Croats, all Muslims and Croats, or just one of the groups.
7 Q. Finally, in your review of the Assembly sessions, as you go
8 through the conduct of the war, could you characterise Ratko Mladic's
9 dedication to the strategic objectives?
10 A. I think in time, he became very dedicated to them, and said so on
11 several occasions. That represented, in the sense, a development from
12 his approach or his words at the 16th Assembly on the 12th of May in
13 which he expressed these reservations about the scope of them while still
14 embracing three of the concepts that were inherent in the goals.
15 Q. And to highlight, what were the three concepts that he embraced?
16 A. At the 12th -- on the 12th of May he spoke forcefully in favour
17 of delineation, establishing boundary, and also about the importance of
18 the corridor, the east-west corridor, and he also spoke in favour of
19 stronger military action in the Sarajevo theatre.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, approximately 50 minutes ago, you
21 conveyed to us that were you confident that you would finish in
22 45 minutes.
23 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours, I am now finished. I apologise
24 for that, I am apparently a tad rusty in estimating my time, but I am now
25 finished with direct examination.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. I should have left it to you to say that
2 instead of reminding you of the times.
3 MS. BIBLES: One final matter, Your Honour. I would tender
4 2272A, which is the video.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now you've played only half a minute, where it
6 is by far longer. I do understand approximately nine minutes.
7 MS. BIBLES: It is the full -- what we played was the end of the
8 speech of Radovan Karadzic. The ten-minute segment is the entire speech
9 that Radovan Karadzic made at that occasion which I would include
10 primarily for fairness and context to the words spoken at the end.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, do you consider it to be more fair to
12 have the whole ten minutes for context?
13 MR. LUKIC: I don't know. I leave it to the Prosecution,
14 whatever they deem necessary.
15 JUDGE ORIE: There is no objection against the whole ten minutes?
16 MR. LUKIC: No.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Registrar, the number of the video, the
18 entire video under that number would be?
19 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 22722A will be Exhibit P2004,
20 Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: P2004 is admitted into evidence.
22 Mr. Lukic, there would be approximately five minutes left before
23 the break. Would you prefer to take the break now and then start your
24 cross-examination or would you rather start your cross-examination now?
25 MR. LUKIC: If we first have a break, then I can organise myself
1 during the break.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll take the break. Yes, Ms. Bibles?
3 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, there is one additional matter. The
4 B/C/S translation for Dr. Donia's CV, which is P1998, has now been
5 uploaded into e-court under a doc ID number 0686-0156-B/C/S.
6 I request -- the Prosecution requests that the court officer be asked to
7 link the translation with the document.
8 JUDGE ORIE: The court officer is hereby instructed to attach it
9 to the -- and the Chamber should not have admitted it without a
10 translation. Could the parties always, if they submit any document for
11 admission, clearly announce if there is no translation.
12 Then we would first like Mr. Donia to be escorted out of the
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we will resume at ten minutes
16 past mid-day.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.47 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'd first like to apologise to the Prosecution where
20 I made it look more urgent than it really is when I said the witness
21 concerned would give his testimony on 26th. He's only the third witness
22 next week. But despite that, Ms. D'Ascoli, if you could address the
23 matter and I do not know whether you want to do it in open session or in
24 private session.
25 MS. D'ASCOLI: In private session, Your Honours, thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then we move into private session.
2 [Private session]
11 Page 15531 redacted. Private session.
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 You're excused, Ms. D'Ascoli.
11 MS. D'ASCOLI: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted into the
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Donia, you will now be cross-examined by
16 Mr. Lukic. Mr. Lukic is counsel for Mr. Mladic and you'll find him to
17 your left.
18 Mr. Lukic, please proceed.
19 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
21 Q. Good afternoon.
22 A. Good afternoon.
23 Q. I understand that for you it's the same if I ask you in either
24 B/C/S or English language and it's much easier for me to continue in
25 B/C/S but you'll probably follow in English?
1 A. Yeah, I would prefer that you -- well, if -- you can proceed as
2 you wish. I'll get it one way or the other.
3 Q. Okay.
4 JUDGE ORIE: You know that you can choose either to listen to the
5 B/C/S or the English translation.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, if I listen to the English I get a little bit
7 of the benefit of both so I'd like to listen to the English. Thank you.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Dr. Donia, you're already used to this. You got used to it in
10 the previous trials. However, since this is a different trial, we will
11 have to go through this exercise, if you will, so I'm going to ask you
12 something about the field that you provided your expert opinion in here.
13 First of all, for the transcript, let us establish that you are not a
14 political scientist and that you do not have any training in that field.
15 A. I am not a political scientist.
16 Q. You're not an anthropologist?
17 A. I am not an anthropologist.
18 Q. You're not a sociologist or a psychologist or a psychiatrist?
19 A. No, I am not.
20 Q. Also, you were not trained in the field of demography?
21 A. That's correct, I have not been.
22 Q. You're not a statistician either, right?
23 A. I'm not a statistician. I have had some training in statistics
24 but ...
25 Q. You're not a lawyer, especially not an expert in constitutional
1 law, right?
2 A. No, I'm not.
3 Q. And you're not a military expert either?
4 A. That's correct, I'm not.
5 Q. Thank you. I have to say that we received your CV on the
6 12th of August, 2013, and tomorrow we will probably have to go back to
7 certain aspects of it. However, today, I'm just going to ask you --
8 actually, you worked for Merrill Lynch for the longest period of time
9 from '81 to 2000; isn't that right? If we look at your career?
10 A. Yes, that's correct.
11 Q. You worked for this company full time; isn't that correct? Full
12 working hours?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you ever receive a salary as a historian?
15 A. As a professor of history and instructor of history, yes, I did.
16 Q. How many years would that be, if we look at your entire career?
17 A. I don't know. Around six or seven, perhaps, altogether.
18 Q. Thank you. Also, you're often asked and I'm going to deal with
19 this just very briefly, it's actually about your foundation that you
20 established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As you explained, there is this play
21 of words. In Donji Vakuf, you established the Donia Foundation; isn't
22 that right?
23 A. Yes, that's the best explanation of it I've heard anyone make,
25 Q. Who are the beneficiaries of this foundation, can you tell us?
1 A. There are none. The foundation doesn't exist anymore. It did
2 have beneficiaries in the past or, let's say, recipients of the
3 distributions from it. Those included the University of Michigan, the
4 St. Lawrence University, and a small NGO which was -- existed in the US
5 but its mission was to bring together business people in Bosnia in the
6 late 1990s.
7 Q. So was one of the functions of this foundation to be a religious
8 school or is that not the case? Because we find the word "Vakuf" in the
9 name of the foundation, and that is a Muslim religious school, isn't it?
10 A. It is, and the function of the foundation had nothing to do with
11 any religious school of any persuasion, other than the fact, if one could
12 call St. Lawrence University by virtue of its name a Christian
13 university, then perhaps.
14 Q. Now I'm going to move on to a completely different topic and I'm
15 going to ask you the following. You read the indictment against
16 General Mladic, right?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. One of your papers in this case is precisely based on the
19 indictment and is used as support to the indictment, and these are these
20 excerpts from the sessions of the Assembly of Republika Srpska; right?
21 A. Well, they could be used that way. I'm assuming that was one of
22 the purposes for which I was asked to bring the report together.
23 Q. Also, in the previous trials, and I must note that I observed
24 that too, very often you rely on newspapers, newspaper articles, books,
25 memoirs. Would you agree that these are primarily books of memoirs and
1 newspapers that write about other documents and that they are therefore
2 secondary sources?
3 A. No. I don't really use -- accept the designation or distinction
4 between primary and secondary sources anymore and, frankly, most
5 historians do not, have not probably for 50 years. So I would say the
6 character of those writings and memoirs that I have -- and documents that
7 I've used is very diverse. Some of them are in archives. Some of them
8 are in newspapers. Some of them are in secondary works of -- in the
9 sense that they are produced by a publisher and not -- I'm not looking at
10 the immediate original text. So they are very diverse.
11 Q. So am I understanding you correctly, namely that you did not
12 distinguish between primary and secondary sources in this body of work at
14 A. I just don't observe the distinction.
15 Q. Thank you. Now I shall primarily be referring to a report that
16 is called the background of the policy and strategies concerning
17 Sarajevo, 91-95.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
19 original title.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In this report --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
23 microphones please be switched off. We cannot hear Mr. Lukic because of
24 background noise. Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I didn't -- didn't hear the question.
1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. I shall repeat. I shall repeat. I hope that they hear me now.
3 They did not hear me because of background noise that sometimes occurs
4 when there are several microphones switched on at the same time.
5 So, in your work, did you find documentation itself upon which
6 you based this report, or did somebody offer this to you, or was it a mix
7 of the two?
8 A. A mix of the two.
9 Q. In your work in relation to Sarajevo and the siege of Sarajevo,
10 as you call it, did you look at documents of the SDA party?
11 A. Yes, I did.
12 Q. Can that be seen from this report?
13 A. I can't actually recall a specific footnote as you ask that
14 question but it's certainly reflected in many of the statements that are
15 in there.
16 Q. Did you review documents of military units of the SDA, and later,
17 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Did you review the documents of the MUP, that is to say, the
20 Ministry of the Interior in Sarajevo, in the territory under the control
21 of the Muslim forces?
22 A. I've looked at a few documents from the period prior to 19 --
23 prior to, let's say, April of 1992, yes.
24 Q. Just for the record, you did not look at MUP documents after that
25 period in Sarajevo?
1 A. No, I have not.
2 Q. Although you did not look at military documents, did you have an
3 idea of the strength of the military units in Sarajevo, that is to say,
4 the Muslim military units, as compared to the Serb military units around
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And what did you find out? What was the balance of power?
8 A. It depended on the time one speaks of. Certainly in 1991, the
9 JNA was much -- far the superior force over any police or military units
10 in Sarajevo, that really continued well into 1992, with the conversion of
11 the JNA to the VRS. At that point I think it started to change. The --
12 certainly the forces fighting in the name of the government gained
13 recruits, while the VRS was losing them, and also gained some heavy
15 Q. Now that you've mentioned this, now that you said government,
16 I should just like to deal with something very briefly. This government,
17 throughout the war, did it represent all the peoples of
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So the government in Sarajevo represented Serb interests in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and abroad? In your view or according to your
23 A. It had representatives in it of Serbs and at least in their view
24 they were in -- representing the Serb interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Q. Also, they represented Croatian interests after 1993, in your
1 view, after the war broke out between the Croats and the Muslims?
2 A. Yes. Obviously much less so after 1993, but, yes, there were
3 those who were in the government who believed they were representing
4 Croatian interests, certainly.
5 Q. When you're talking about members or representatives in the
6 government who represented Serbs, are you referring to Mirko Pejanovic?
7 A. Among others, yes.
8 Q. And what was the position that Mirko Pejanovic had in the
9 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. He was a member of the Presidency from about June 1992 until
11 nearly the end of the war.
12 Q. You will agree with me that Mirko Pejanovic was not an elected
13 member, that is to say, Serbs never voted for him so that he would be
14 able to represent them; right?
15 A. He competed and won votes in the election of 1990 and was
16 selected based on the number of votes that he received in that election,
17 by Serbs.
18 Q. What was this position that he was chosen for, selected?
19 A. Well, the Presidency, a member of the Presidency. He competed
20 for that position in the November 1990 elections, came in, I believe,
21 third or fourth, something like that, and then when numbers 1 and 2
22 resigned, he was invited to join the Presidency.
23 Q. Actually, he was used by Alija Izetbegovic, right? And the Serb
24 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina never acknowledged that he represented them
25 in any government. In your historical research, would you reach that
1 conclusion, or would you say that the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
2 agreed to having Mirko Pejanovic represent them?
3 A. Therefore several questions there.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I just wanted to invite Mr. Lukic to split them up.
5 The first question was whether he was used by Mr. Izetbegovic.
6 THE WITNESS: I know there are those who believe that but I don't
7 believe that he was.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Q. Is it correct, in your research, actually, did you come across
10 any information to the effect that the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 ever recognised or acknowledged anything that Mirko Pejanovic did as a
12 member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. Yes. The -- Pejanovic and a number of other people formed a
14 Serbian civic council in Sarajevo in 1994, and using that sort of as a
15 formal mechanism, represented the interests of the Serb people, Serbs in
16 the course of the peace talks, first of all, for the Federation and then
17 for Dayton. So, yeah, I think he -- there were -- I know a number of
18 Serbs or could probably name them, if I could come up with the names soon
19 enough, who felt that he was the best representative of the Serb people
20 in Bosnia.
21 Q. I have to admit to you that I truly am astonished by such views
22 of yours, but I'm sorry, this is a comment so I shall continue with my
24 JUDGE ORIE: And would you refrain from such comments?
25 MR. LUKIC: I'm trying to but I really couldn't at this point in
2 Q. [Interpretation] What did Mirko Pejanovic do for the five and a
3 half thousand civilians who were killed in Sarajevo, just because they
4 were Serbs? How did he represent their interests?
5 A. I -- you've cited a fact that is not in evidence and I don't
6 accept, so --
7 Q. Just a moment, please. I apologise. When you say that it is not
8 in evidence, you mean in this case of ours?
9 A. No, I don't mean in this case. I mean in, let's say, the public
10 domain, in terms of information that is reasonably verified and supported
11 by independent observers.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could I nevertheless try to avoid any confusion? In
13 your question, Mr. Lukic, you refer to five and a half thousand
14 civilians, just because they were Serbs. Now that is first a number and
15 second is the reason why they were killed. Could we split up and see
16 where the witness says that there is no evidence understood as evidence
17 in the public domain? Do you disagree with the number of five and a half
18 thousand and it is suggested by Mr. Lukic that those were Serbs, or is it
19 that you disagree with the fact that if there were five and a half
20 thousand Serbs killed, that it was just because they were Serbs? Could
21 you try to analyse a bit more in detail and to split up the various
22 aspects of the question Mr. Lukic put to you?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe the evidence supports that Serbs
24 were killed in Sarajevo because they were Serbs. Or at least because
25 they were engaging in some activity which was judged to be in support of
1 Serbian aims, let's say. I view the number of five and a half thousand
2 as unproven and very likely excessive. There have been some efforts to
3 determine that, and I have to say they have not been particularly
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And when we are talking about Sarajevo --
6 Mr. Mladic, you know that you are supposed to remain seated.
7 When we are talking about Sarajevo, what are we talking about,
8 the inner city of Sarajevo? I don't know, Mr. Lukic, whether you had any
9 specific geographical reference on your mind when you referred to
10 Sarajevo, area, city.
11 MR. LUKIC: Geographically the territory of the city of Sarajevo
12 under the control of the Muslim army.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So not any people that were killed from within
14 the city but died outside.
15 MR. LUKIC: No, no.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Because some people consider that to be part of
17 Sarajevo as well.
18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, maybe my question wasn't artfully posed but my
19 intention was exactly as you corrected me, that I think only killed on
20 the territory under control of Muslim forces.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And Mr. Donia says that what he learned from
22 studies is that it's likely an exaggeration to talk about five and a half
23 thousand. If you want to further explore, please go ahead. I'll step
24 out at this moment.
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you. Can I consult with Mr. Mladic for a
2 JUDGE ORIE: If you do it at low volume and short. Otherwise
3 you'll have to wait for the next break.
4 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
6 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Donia, in view -- in your view, how many
8 Serb civilians were killed in Sarajevo in the territory that was under
9 the control of the Muslim forces, since you are challenging or contesting
10 this figure of five and a half thousand?
11 A. I don't know that number. I certainly am aware that a very
12 thorough demographic study was done within the last six, seven years by
13 an agency in Sarajevo that had -- was funded by outside agencies that
14 concluded that the total number killed in Sarajevo during the war was
15 around 10.000. Now, I think it's highly implausible that over 5500 of --
16 5500 of those would be Serbs.
17 Some Serbs left at the beginning of the war. Some Muslims left
18 as well, and Croats. But the fact of the matter is that some Serbs were
19 killed because they were Serbs within the territory that you've described
20 as the Muslim territory, and some were killed by the fact that they were
21 simply in the city and under various kinds of assault for those four
23 Q. Thank you. However, we are yet to have a census in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina and then we are going to have information that is far
25 more precise. Would you agree with me that the Muslim authorities in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina for years tried to prevent a census of the population
2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina from taking place?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you know that already at the beginning of the conflict, the
5 Muslim forces attacked Pofalici, a Serb settlement, and expelled the
6 entire population from it? Of course, except for those who they had
8 A. I'm aware of the battle that took place for Pofalici in May of
9 1992, yes.
10 Q. Talking about Sarajevo, you will agree that it cannot be
11 perceived in isolation but it has to be looked at in the broader context
12 of the events taking place in the region or, rather, in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. What gave rise to the tensions that emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 at the time? Can you tell us something about that?
17 A. Many different factors contributed. Certainly the virtual
18 collapse of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its socialist version
19 was a part of the causal scene. The arming of factions or paramilitaries
20 under the leadership of various leaders from all three groups contributed
21 to this. The distribution of arms from the JNA to Serb operatives, SDS
22 members and others, in Bosnia contributed. The sharp disagreement over
23 the constitutional future of Bosnia, as we discussed earlier, was a part
24 of that. So deep distrust also contributed, I think, to these tensions
25 in the course of early 1992.
1 Q. Would you agree that the movements for independence in Croatia
2 and Slovenia were a contributing factor to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. Yes, I would. They contributed in some unexpected ways and some
4 perhaps expected ways, but, yes, they certainly were a factor in that
5 causal scenario.
6 Q. You mentioned the arming of paramilitary formations. Would you
7 agree that the first paramilitary formations were set up under the
8 auspices of Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action? And I'm
9 talking about the Green Berets and the Patriotic League.
10 A. No. Let me say I think it's difficult to establish who was first
11 in this, and certainly recognise that the Patriotic League and the
12 Green Berets were established no later than June of 1990 and were
13 certainly among the first paramilitaries to operate in Bosnia.
14 Q. These two formations were a military wing of Alija Izetbegovic's
15 SDA party; is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Just a moment, please.
18 So Yugoslavia broke up, and there was cohesion and links along
19 ethnic lines to a much greater extent than was the case before the war.
20 Would you agree with me?
21 A. Yes. I think those links sort of strengthened starting in the
22 very late 1980s and became stronger on the eve of and stronger yet during
23 the war.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have a look at P1999,
25 page 7 in e-court, in English, second paragraph, and also page 7 in the
1 B/C/S version? I asked for page 7 in e-court, not in the report itself.
2 We have it in English, what we need.
3 Q. And this is what you say:
4 "When we investigate the causes" --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We don't have it in
7 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters cannot find it in English. You're
8 reading from where exactly.
9 MR. LUKIC: It's the second paragraph, sorry, the second
10 paragraph on this page, the last paragraph.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me see whether I can -- I don't see the
12 text you're reading. Mr. Lukic, this is page 7 in e-court.
13 MR. LUKIC: And I'm reading from B/C/S version on the left-hand
14 side and it's same paragraph as in English version, the second paragraph.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could you have a look at the English and see whether
16 you can find what you intended to read?
17 MR. LUKIC: I can read in English, then I can ask my question.
18 "The literature of constructed identity challenges us to consider
19 the mutable, shifting structure of identity in examining the causes and
20 course of violent conflict. I have endeavoured to accept the challenge
21 in this report opening up the casual analysis of events to multiple and
22 contending explanation for the loyalties and identities of Sarajevans in
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, may I just correct? You pronounced "causal" as
25 "casual," and there is a difference between the two, but causal analysis
1 of events.
2 MR. LUKIC: Sorry.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
4 MR. LUKIC: My question was in connection only -- the sentence is
5 maybe a bit mixed up.
6 Q. [Interpretation] Doctor, my question is the following: This
7 annihilation of belonging or allegiance to a certain people, is that what
8 it is? Or do you understand it in some other way? How do you understand
10 A. I view it as a process that is always going on, which changes
11 both the -- occasionally actually loyalty and intensity of loyalty of any
12 given person over time. So this is a specific rejection of the idea that
13 this is an eternal, unchangeable, immutable quality that exists within a
14 person or for that matter that the group, the Serb people, is anything
15 more than an abstraction. Same would be true of the Muslim people or
16 Bosniak people, if you will.
17 Q. In your view, does that mean that the Serbs of Sarajevo were no
18 longer Serbs or was it something there that forced them to give up being
19 Serbs temporarily? Can you provide some more detailed explanation?
20 A. Well, I accept the notion that ethnicity or a national identity
21 is self-declared, self-determined and self-declared. Consequently, those
22 people who believed themselves to be Serb would presumably identify
23 themselves as Serb in the census and on other occasions. They might well
24 decide at some point in their life that because they were in a mixed
25 marriage or because they no longer wished to be considered a part of the
1 Serb corpus of people, that they declare themselves, for example, as
2 Yugoslavs or as other or as utterly indifferent. I've actually given a
3 couple of examples of that in the course of the report.
4 So do people decide to cease becoming Serbs? Yes, I think so.
5 Some of them, probably the most common movement that I'm speaking about
6 in this period is the migration of those who declared themselves
7 Yugoslavs in 1981, for example, to other specific identities in 1991, and
8 in the opinion of -- that was a consequential shift in the opinion of
9 Serb observers who felt that it was diminishing the number of Serbs and
10 also in the view of Muslim observers who believed that those Yugoslavs
11 were all actually Muslims.
12 Q. In your research, did you come across any information as to how
13 many Serbs were forcibly mobilised by the BH Army or how many of them
14 were engaged in digging trenches at the front lines for the BH Army?
15 A. No, not any reliable information, or that I would consider as
16 reliable. There were, in fact, many people forced into digging trenches
17 at the front lines. Some of them Serbs, some of them from other groups.
18 But the numbers of them, I have not come across anything that I consider
19 reliable that would tell me how many.
20 Q. You didn't deal with that matter; is that correct?
21 A. That's -- I don't think I dealt with that specific issue in this
22 report at all.
23 Q. You also did not deal with the number of the Serbs killed in
25 A. No. I have to say I did do that in an earlier report for another
1 case, but in this particular case, I did not address that issue.
2 Q. Okay. Well, then, I'm sorry, but I have to go back to asking you
3 if you reached any conclusion as to how many Serbs were killed in
4 Sarajevo to the extent that you address the issue?
5 A. It is -- I mean, my view is that it is at the very least in the
6 hundreds, probably the high hundreds, and I reached that number simply by
7 looking at the number of prisons that -- into which Serbs were thrown and
8 the type of violence to which they were all subjected, as -- determining
9 the number, as I said, the number, total number of Serbs who died,
10 I think is -- has been studied by the group, I can't think of the name of
11 it, in Sarajevo, that has given to every victim a name, place of death,
12 and an affiliation if possible, and that number, as I said, altogether,
13 is 10.000, give or take a little bit, and that includes, I think, the
14 sense of broader Sarajevo as it existed in 1991. But I don't recall what
15 number they assigned to the total Serb deaths in Sarajevo.
16 Q. Very well. So I'll take it that you did not address the issue of
17 this number. In your research, did you reach any conclusion as to
18 whether the Serbs were free to leave Sarajevo?
19 A. I tried. I think it's very difficult to know just exactly what
20 that situation was in the course of the war. Probably changed
21 considerably in the course of the war. My, say, general impression is
22 that it was very easy to get out of Sarajevo, and not only Serbs but
23 members of other groups did it, until May 2nd, roughly speaking, as a
24 dividing line, and thereafter the government made various efforts to
25 limit the exodus of Serb -- or of Sarajevo citizens or inhabitants.
1 Sometimes requiring too much documentation of them, in other cases
2 delaying their departure for a matter of days or weeks. I do have the
3 impression that at the end of the day, you don't have a lot of people
4 craving to get out who did not eventually make it out. That's my general
5 impression. But as I say, there certainly were various restrictions on
6 their departure from at least May 2nd on.
7 Q. When you say the 2nd of May, you're referring to the
8 2nd of May, 1992; is that right?
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. Before the break, tell me, have you heard that the Serbs had to
11 pay some money in order to be allowed to leave Sarajevo?
12 A. I have heard that in a few situations, yes.
13 MR. LUKIC: Dr. Donia, I think it's our time for a break.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and a break of 20 minutes.
15 Could Mr. Donia be escorted out of the courtroom.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 1.30.
18 --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
21 I'd like to reserve the last 12, 13 minutes of today's session
22 for a few procedural matters.
23 MR. LUKIC: Just informing my colleague Ivetic -- he was probably
24 more familiar, not probably, for sure more familiar, than me. So he'll
25 be here for the last 15 minutes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.
4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
5 [Interpretation] Can we please have page 8 in e-court, in the
6 same document that we have on our screens.
7 Q. This is your Sarajevo report, doctor. This is about the
8 transformation of the JNA, and you say at the beginning, in the chapter
9 dedicated to the transformation of the Yugoslav People's Army, which --
10 at the beginning it evolved from its origin into a multi-national force
11 as an instrument of Serb national interests.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please repeat his question.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're invited to repeat your question
14 for the interpreters.
15 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Thank you, sorry.
16 Q. [Interpretation] So is it true that the homogenisation of the JNA
17 occurred because the statutory mobilisation was ignored by members of the
18 Croatian and Muslim ethnic community?
19 A. That would be one of several causes, and probably not the most
20 important one. But certainly did take place, and it had an effect on --
21 in the direction of homogenising the force.
22 Q. In your work, did you come across any instructions issued by the
23 Muslim and Croatian authorities telling their compatriots not to respond
24 to the call-up of the JNA?
25 A. As I recall, I'm sure the instructions that you're referring to
1 didn't really tell them not to join the JNA but sort of gave them
2 permission not to, if they chose to. Those were the instructions of,
3 I think, 30 September 1991 that were issued by the Presidency of
5 Q. Do you know and did you find in your research that the JNA was
6 also clashing with a Serb armed formation?
7 A. Yes. Very occasionally. I believe I noted one instance of that,
8 if -- I don't think it's in the report but it's in my book.
9 Q. [In English] Not in this one.
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. [Interpretation] The next subtitle is, "The JNA's discreet tilt
12 towards nationalism." I'm going to read part of this paragraph so that
13 we know what we are talking about.
14 [No interpretation]
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There is no interpretation.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Lukic please say where he's reading
18 MR. LUKIC: I will repeat.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please -- but could you also tell the
20 interpreters where you're reading from?
21 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, I said the subtitle, "The JNA's discreet tilt
22 towards nationalism" is the subtitle of this paragraph.
23 JUDGE ORIE: That has been interpreted, and then you read from
24 where? Same page?
25 MR. LUKIC: Give me one second, I'm sorry.
1 [Interpretation] I thought this was immediately beneath the
2 subtitle, but it is actually line 4 in the paragraph right beneath the
3 subtitle, as it begins with, "In addition to bearing responsibility for
4 defending the homeland."
5 JUDGE ORIE: That's the fifth line of the paragraph in English.
6 MR. LUKIC: May I proceed?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
8 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
9 Q. [Interpretation] "In addition to bearing responsibility for
10 defending the homeland from foreign foes, the force was constitutionally
11 mandated to preserve the internal order of the Federal Socialist
12 Yugoslavia ..."
13 Dr. Donia, would you agree that the army could not possibly
14 ignore their role in preserving the internal order of the state?
15 A. Well, they could have, in principle. They certainly did not.
16 They took this mandate very seriously and so behaved.
17 Q. Is it possible to take the mandate of preserving a state, be
18 taken not seriously? For example, in the US, is it possible for a
19 policeman to preserve law and order of the country seriously or not
21 A. Well, I would argue that it is possible to do it either way.
22 Hopefully, those in positions of authority take it seriously and
23 implement it, follow it. But is it possible to treat it casually?
25 JUDGE ORIE: It seems to be a matter of language at this moment
1 and not a dispute about -- you wanted to ask whether they were allowed to
2 ignore it, and then I take it your answer would be that they were not
4 THE WITNESS: No, that's correct. That would be my answer, they
5 would not be allowed. By whom it's not clear.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's move on.
7 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Is it also true, throughout history, that in a
9 time of crisis, a firmer hand is required, and that when the times are
10 safe and peaceful, the government can act in a more lenient way?
11 A. Is that true throughout history? No. I wouldn't -- I'd say it's
12 true in most situations at most times but I don't want to make a blanket
13 statement that it's always and forever true.
14 Q. Very well. Thank you. You would agree with me that each and
15 every military officer who failed to carry out his duties must have and
16 should have been the subject of Prosecution by the military judiciary?
17 A. Must have and should have? Yes.
18 Q. In your paper - we now need page 9, line 3, in the e-court
19 version in English, and also page 9 in B/C/S - this is what you say:
20 "The JNA took measures to prevent its own disintegration along
21 republic borders and strengthening the idea of Yugoslavhood."
22 Would you agree with me that the idea of Yugoslavhood was the
23 strongest in the JNA throughout the existence of Yugoslavia after 1945?
24 A. If I understood your question correct, was the Yugoslav impulse
25 the strongest one after 1945?
1 Q. [In English] No, is the strongest one among the members of JNA.
2 A. Yes, it was.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Now I'd like to ask you the following: Would
4 you agree that there was no strengthening of that idea that took place?
5 Rather, the same tasks were continued, the same ideas, or, rather, the
6 idea of a common state?
7 A. By whom? It's kind of a vague question. Could you ask it --
8 maybe be more specific about what you're looking for?
9 Q. [In English] It is in line of your -- actually, I'm trying to say
10 that your finding here from -- in the third line and further in this
11 page, that the JNA took measures to prevent its own fragmentation along
12 republic lines and strengthen its own fealty to Yugoslavism?
13 A. If that's the question, the answer is yes.
14 Q. Okay. [Interpretation] Would you also agree that actually those
15 who work against that idea, actually do not accept togetherness?
16 A. No.
17 Q. You would not agree with me?
18 A. I would not agree with that, yes. I would not agree with that.
19 Q. So in your view, separatists are in favour of togetherness? Is
20 that your testimony?
21 A. They can be, certainly.
22 Q. Would you please explain that to us? I find that to be a bit
23 strange and hard to understand.
24 A. I think you're responding to your use of the word "togetherness"
25 and I think you're bringing into play the word "separatists" which is
1 very much a political concept as opposed to togetherness which can be
2 social or organisational or anything else. So that's why I responded to
3 your question that separatists can be in favour of togetherness. They
4 may object to the dominant power being too exclusionary and want to
5 restore a sense of togetherness. So the answer to your question is
6 I think I -- I'm not testifying that separatists are inherently in favour
7 of -- either in favour or opposed to togetherness.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could I take you and the witness back to one of the
9 previous questions? You started asking, Mr. Lukic, whether the witness
10 would agree that there was no strengthening of the idea of Yugoslavism
11 and then the witness asked a few things and you suggested that it was not
12 strengthening but just sticking to the same which had been there already.
13 Then you read the portion of the report where those words are used, that
14 is, that the JNA took measures to prevent its own fragmentation along
15 republican lines and strengthen its fealty to Yugoslavism. And then you
16 asked the witness -- then the witness said: "If that is the question,
17 the answer is yes."
18 Now, the question was whether it was rather than strengthening,
19 that it was keeping it on the same level. And after you had read this,
20 I was a bit surprised by the answer that the answer would be yes.
21 Because the portion read clearly says that they were also strengthening
22 Yugoslavism. So it's unclear to me whether you had fully understood the
23 question, or if you had, whether you could explain why despite the
24 language you used, you at the same time answered to the question that
25 there was no strengthening.
1 THE WITNESS: I think it's largely a matter of what period we are
2 talking about in trying to answer that question. I would point out that
3 in the 1980s, the JNA high command had a lot of discussions about whether
4 to permit the force to fragment or to divide along republic lines, and
5 essentially lay the foundation for, say, what happened in the
6 Soviet Union, which was that the army could, in fact, break into its
7 republican components and as the League of Communists did. They took
8 those measures forcefully to avoid that and at the same time they sought
9 to strengthen the Yugoslav component, the Yugoslav ideology of their
10 organisation, and for that matter, the public loyalty to it. It's a
11 little bit different story when you get into, I would say, 1991, in
12 Croatia, when the army takes a very different turn and then, of course,
13 into Bosnia in 1992 when it eventually divides itself into republic
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That clarifies the matter for me.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You said just now that they took violent measures to prevent
18 that. Could you actually take a look at line 18 on page 70? When you
19 say they took these measures forcefully and so on, what did you mean?
20 A. I did not mean violent. I meant forceful as in decisive
21 measures. I would not allege that they used violence to do that.
22 Q. These people who were working against the JNA, regardless of
23 whether they were members of the JNA or outside the JNA, were they doing
24 that in order to strengthen or weaken Yugoslavia? What did your research
1 A. Again, it's a matter of the period in question, but --
2 Q. [In English] 1991?
3 A. Yeah. In 1991, I think they were working to weaken Yugoslavia or
4 at least that part of Yugoslavia that they were a part of.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Although you're not a lawyer, we have
6 established that, in the course of your work, did you come across things
7 like these people being blamed against -- for working against the
8 constitution, against Yugoslavia, that is to say, these people wanting to
9 weaken the JNA and Yugoslavia?
10 A. Well, yes. I mention one such incident when the JNA military
11 prosecutors sought to gain punitive measures against the editors of
12 "Mladina" in Slovenia, failed to do so and these defendants sort of
13 emerged as national heroes from that process and the JNA's, let's say,
14 reputation suffered as a product of that, but that's exactly the
15 situation that you described, yes.
16 MR. LUKIC: Should we break at this moment with the
18 JUDGE ORIE: I don't think we need the full 17 minutes but if you
19 would feel --
20 MR. LUKIC: I can continue or whatever you order, Your Honour.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll conclude -- well, we'll not conclude but
23 we will interrupt the cross-examination now. We would like to see you
24 back tomorrow morning, Mr. Donia, at 9.30, in this same courtroom.
25 I instruct you that you should not speak with anyone or communicate in
1 whatever way with whomever about your testimony, whether that is
2 testimony you've given already or testimony still to be given.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then you may follow the usher.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 JUDGE ORIE: I would first like to deliver a decision. It is the
7 decision on the Prosecution's motion for leave to add 13 documents
8 related to Witness Turkusic to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter exhibit
10 On the 26th of July, 2013, the Prosecution filed its
11 92 ter motion in relation to Witness Emir Turkusic, in which it also
12 requested leave to add 13 documents to its Rule 65 ter exhibit list.
13 On the 9th of August, the Defence objected to the motion in its
15 In accordance with the Chamber's guidance on how the Chamber
16 deals with Rule 92 ter motions on transcript pages 2408 to 2410, the
17 Chamber will decide on the Rule 92 ter motion after the witness has
18 concluded his testimony. Therefore, the Chamber will now address only
19 the request for addition to the Prosecution's exhibit list of the
20 relevant documents, all of which relate to investigations by the
21 Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina into shelling incidents in
23 The Chamber considers that the Prosecution has failed to
24 demonstrate good cause for requesting the addition of these documents at
25 this stage of the proceedings. The Chamber finds, however, that the
1 documents are prima facie relevant and probative of the alleged shelling
2 incidents in Sarajevo charged in the indictment.
3 The Chamber also notes that four of these documents were
4 identified in the original 92 ter motion concerning this witness which
5 was filed on the 25th of January. The remaining nine were identified in
6 the present 92 ter motion filed 30 days in advance of the witness's
7 scheduled testimony. The Chamber considers, therefore, that this has
8 allowed sufficient time for the Defence to process them.
9 This is particularly the case given the relatively short length
10 of the documents which vary between one and six pages in their B/C/S
11 versions. For these reasons, the Chamber finds that the documents'
12 addition to the Rule 65 ter exhibit list will not unduly burden the
13 Defence in the preparation of its case.
14 Consequently, the Chamber finds the addition of documents bearing
15 Rule 65 ter numbers 29153 to 29165 to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter
16 exhibit list to be in the interests of justice, and grants this request.
17 And this concludes the Chamber's decision.
18 The other matter remaining is -- concerning the report of
19 Mr. Theunens.
20 On the 24th of January of this year, the Chamber requested the
21 Prosecution to correct a number of technical mistakes in the uploading of
22 the report of Mr. Theunens, also to explain the relevance of certain
23 sections of the report and review the report and redact any possible
24 overlap with adjudicated facts. The Prosecution dealt with these matters
25 through filings of the 14th of February of this year, the 15th of July of
1 this year, and the 26th of July. The Chamber therefore considers that
2 the time for the Defence to submit its Rule 94 bis notice is running.
3 The Chamber understands, however, from an informal communication of the
4 21st of August, 2013, that this has not been clear to the Defence. In
5 the light of this, the Chamber is inclined to grant the Defence two
6 additional weeks, until the 9th of September, 2013, for this submission.
7 That is the matter on the table.
8 Yes, Mr. Ivetic?
9 MR. IVETIC: If we could have one further clarification,
10 Your Honours. The 15th of February, 2013, the Chamber indicated that
11 180 pages of the Theunens report needed to be revisited whether they are
12 necessary. Do we have a ruling then of the Chamber, are those included
13 or excluded in the report so as to know what to respond to?
14 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that the Prosecution takes the view
15 that they are necessary.
16 Mr. Weber?
17 MR. WEBER: Yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: And therefore still are part of. Is that how I have
19 to --
20 MR. WEBER: Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic?
22 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: If that's clear, then, as I said, the Chamber is
24 inclined to grant the Defence two additional weeks. They are hereby
25 granted. They have time until the 9th of September of 2013 for the
1 submission under Rule 94 bis.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: As I said, we would need less than the 17 minutes we
5 had at the time.
6 Mr. Weber, you want to fill the time?
7 MR. WEBER: Not all 17 minutes, Your Honour. But since we are
8 here discussing Witness Theunens, I just wanted to again convey on the
9 record, I know I've done this through e-mail with Mr. Ivetic, but I see
10 in light of the tight turnaround possibly between the notice and then
11 when the witness is testifying that the Prosecution is available, I'm
12 personally available to work through with the Defence in advance of his
13 testimony related to any of the documents or content of the report.
14 I just wanted to put that on the record.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That offer is hereby on the record and is understood
16 by Mr. Ivetic.
17 There being nothing further to be discussed, we adjourn for the
18 day and will resume tomorrow, Friday, the 23rd of August, at 9.30 in the
19 morning, in this same courtroom, III.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.07 p.m.,
21 to be reconvened on Friday, the 23rd day of August,
22 2013, at 9.30 a.m.