1 Friday, 23 August 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours.
8 This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 I do understand that the translation of the transcript of the
11 video that was played yesterday has been attached. Thank you for that --
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, it was the CV. Yes. The translation of the CV
14 of the present witness was attached. Thank you for that, Mr. Registrar.
15 The Chamber was informed that the Prosecution had a preliminary
16 matter to raise.
17 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honours, and good morning.
18 It has to do with next week's schedule. For reasons which can I
19 explain in private session should the Chamber wish, Mr. Jose Baraybar
20 will be unable to be in The Hague next week as scheduled for his
21 testimony. That means that the -- the schedule for next week would be
22 RM174, followed by RM021. We are trying this morning to find an
23 alternative witness that we could call toward the end of next week. The
24 person that lives the closest and is most likely to be available would be
25 Mr. John Clark, but I wanted to raise that with the Chamber and the
1 Defence as to whether that would be a possibility. If it is, we will
2 contact Mr. Clark this morning and see if he can come.
3 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. I spoke with Mr. Groome
4 before this session and I informed him that for the next week we are
5 really not flexible in any way. Because Mr. Ivetic has to undergo some
6 surgery next week, and we cannot -- Mr. Stojanovic and I cannot cover any
7 new witness and prepare it sufficiently for cross-examination.
8 And also, I inform that in our schedule I cannot continue with
9 Mr. -- he was part -- this morning as RM074. It is my witness. And I
10 cannot continue immediately after when I finish Mr. Donia. I will have
11 to have to some break because we anticipated that Mr. Baraybar is coming,
12 then my witness, and then the third witness would be for Mr. Stojanovic
13 as well.
14 JUDGE ORIE: You were -- let me see ...
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ORIE: I have one 174. 074, you said.
17 MR. GROOME: It's 174, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. LUKIC: 174.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
23 [Private session]
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
25 Mr. Lukic, Dr. Donia was scheduled to conclude his testimony
1 today. Is there any chance that you would be able to finish his
3 MR. LUKIC: I cannot promise that but I will do my best.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because that would perhaps create extra time
5 for you. We could consider, for example, not to sit on Monday so as to
6 enable you to have better time to prepare for Witness 174.
7 MR. LUKIC: That would solve the problem if I have three days in
8 a row and I could prepare on the witness, and we can fill time next week
9 by giving me more time for my witness. I was preparing to ask
10 Your Honours maybe two additional hours to have eight instead of six
11 hours. So now when we have time I think it's pretty reasonable --
12 JUDGE ORIE: That would then be two witnesses in four days and
13 with some extra time for you for your witness, 174.
14 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, the Chamber is always hesitant to -- not
16 to start hearing testimony not knowing whether at the end of the week
17 we're short of 15 or 30 minutes. So then if we would work out a new
18 schedule for next week, without Mr. Baraybar, then the Chamber would very
19 much like to have a firm commitment of the parties that the programme, as
20 then agreed upon, would -- would materialise and that we would not have a
21 witness left over for the next weekend.
22 If you could perhaps further discuss this with Mr. Groome.
23 MR. LUKIC: Yes. And I think that the next week was scheduled
24 short anyways. I think 14 hours, something like that. So even with
25 Mr. Baraybar if we -- now it's -- it's, of course, open window but
1 without Mr. Baraybar, I'm sure that we don't have to -- if we don't work
2 on Monday we will still finish both witnesses next week.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If you would sit together with Mr. Groome and
4 work out a schedule to which the parties commit themselves.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I can say to the Chamber now without
6 Mr. Baraybar there is an estimate of ten and a half hours for next week.
7 So if Mr. Lukic is granted some additional time, it seems that it is
8 quite certain we will finish next week, if we do not sit Monday.
9 JUDGE ORIE: If we would not sit on Monday.
10 Yes. Let's -- let's try to proceed in that way then.
11 Then is -- could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
12 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Donia.
16 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps there's no need, but nevertheless, I would
18 like to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration
19 you've given at the beginning of your testimony.
20 And Mr. Lukic will now continue his cross-examination.
21 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, doctor.
24 A. Good morning.
25 Q. [In English] You were hesitant to answer in B/C/S; I saw that.
1 A. [Interpretation] Yes. Good day.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Now we're just going to go back to a few general
3 questions a bit. This is an area that I also found in the transcripts
4 that I reviewed, the transcripts of your previous testimony, that is.
5 And I noticed that you were asked to testify against an accused Serb or
6 against -- or against an accused Croat. You never testified against a
8 Is that correct?
9 A. [In English] That's correct.
10 JUDGE ORIE: May I just -- language used. May I take it that you
11 wanted to ask whether the witness testified in a case against an accused
12 Serb. Testimony is not against an accused. Testimony is to tell the
13 truth and -- may I take it that that is how you wanted to phrase --
14 MR. LUKIC: That the case was against, yeah.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The case. That is not the same as to testify
16 against. And I take it that your answer has to be understood in a
17 similar way.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's right.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In the past, you openly expressed your views, claiming that
22 Slobodan Milosevic was guilty of what he had been accused of; is that
24 A. I -- probably so. I don't have a specific recollection of saying
25 those words, but ... would not be surprised if I had.
1 Q. About 50-something persons were mentioned with whom a letter was
2 signed concerning the guilt of Slobodan Milosevic; do you remember that?
3 A. I remember signing a letter. I don't -- I don't specifically
4 recall the contents of that letter as including the conclusion that
5 Slobodan Milosevic was guilty.
6 Q. All right. Is it correct that in previous reports you wrote
7 about General Ratko Mladic? In the reports that were written for this
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Is it also correct that you believe that General Ratko Mladic is
11 guilty of what he stands accused of?
12 A. I don't know. That's not my judgement to make and would prefer
13 not to -- I won't make it.
14 Q. Very well. In your reports or, rather, when preparing your
15 reports, you did not talk to the main participants in what happened,
16 Alija Izetbegovic, Ejub Ganic, Radovan Karadzic?
17 A. Well, I -- I talked to Ganic a little bit briefly but not in
18 great detail.
19 But the other two persons, other than my 24 hours in court
20 conversing with Mr. Karadzic, did not speak to him or Mr. Milosevic.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, sorry to interrupt you.
22 You referred to a letter, and the witness said he didn't
23 remember. Do you intend to tender that letter or to --
24 MR. LUKIC: It's from the transcript. I don't have the actual
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because the -- the question is very suggestive
2 and nothing wrong with that. But then the Chamber, of course, would very
3 much like to see the content of that letter, in whatever way. Unless
4 there's any dispute about what is in the letter.
5 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, at this point I have no idea what
6 letter is being referred to.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Lukic, if you could, in one way or
8 another, provide the Chamber with content.
9 If not, then, of course, the questions are without a factual
11 MR. LUKIC: I will try to locate it in the transcript.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
14 Q. [Interpretation] Can we agree that you never talked to anyone --
15 that you never talked to anyone who represented the ideas of the SDS?
16 A. No, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't agree to that. And I am kind of
17 hard-pressed right now to think of who I have spoken with. I haven't,
18 for example, interviewed anyone of that -- formally interviewed anyone of
19 that viewpoint but I've spoken to a number of people who share it over
20 the years.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Lukic please
22 repeat his question and speak into the microphone. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're invited to repeat your question
24 and to speak into the microphone.
25 MR. LUKIC: Mm-hm.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Can you recall a name of a member of the SDS
2 that you talked to?
3 A. That's a different question from the one you've just asked about
4 those who share the SDS viewpoint. But in either case, as I say, I can't
5 recall a specific name right now, but I have heard that viewpoint
6 expressed personally a good number of times.
7 Q. Doctor, we saw that newspapers are a large share of your sources,
8 particularly "Oslobodjenje" from Sarajevo. Would you agree with me that
9 newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina were very biased, nationally
10 coloured, before the war and particularly during the war?
11 A. They -- I think most of them became nationally coloured in the
12 course of the war. I would not agree that they were nationally coloured
13 before the war. Some of them underwent this fairly obvious and even
14 radical transformation on the very eve of the war, such as the newspaper
15 "Glas" which became "Srpski Glas," and that was kind of a more, perhaps,
16 crystal-clear instance of the change in orientation. But virtually every
17 paper assumed some sort of colouration on the war, whether it was that of
18 a particular ethnic group or a multi-ethnic orientation.
19 Q. Is it correct that a branch, as it were, seceded from
20 "Oslobodjenje" and an "Oslobodjenje" was founded on Serb-held territory
21 and it is precisely because of the policy followed by "Oslobodjenje"
22 before the war?
23 A. I know there was a -- a "Srpsko Oslobodjenje" formed in Pale. I
24 think it was quite late in the war, if I'm not mistaken, maybe 1994 or
25 something like that. But I think that a hard -- I mean, it was clear at
1 that point that they were trying to imitate or benefit from the name
2 "Oslobodjenje" in the Sarajevo -- the paper in Sarajevo itself.
3 I think that given the number of Serb journalists who stayed with
4 the "Oslobodjenje" in Sarajevo throughout the war or part of the war
5 anyway, I would have to say I don't think that the reaction was an
6 exclusively national one on the part of these people who founded it.
7 Q. Would you agree that "Oslobodjenje" was the official newspaper of
8 the SDA, the party of Alija Izetbegovic?
9 A. No, it was not. It never was.
10 Q. In "Oslobodjenje," from that time, did you ever see an
11 affirmative article about a Serb, a favourable article about a Serb
13 A. Many of them. And I think it's just crystal-clear from going
14 through "Oslobodjenje" in the period particularly prior to, let's say,
15 April 6, 1992, that the purpose of the paper, that the commitment was to
16 give equal play to all three groups, to all three, let's say, national
17 parties. And, in some cases, those were done through commentators. Many
18 stories appeared in "Oslobodjenje" actually originated in "Tanjug" in
19 Belgrade and were simply printed word for word as is often the case with
20 wire service stories. So I don't have any problem finding many instances
21 of "Oslobodjenje" in the pre-war period giving balanced accounts of
22 leaders of all three groups.
23 Q. Which, of course, was not the case during the war; right?
24 A. The -- the orientation of "Oslobodjenje" shifted and shifted
25 quite radically starting in about April 6th. But it wasn't so much
1 anti-Serb as it was anti, let's say, SDS. It was something that was a
2 part of the general culture in Sarajevo that was deeply opposed to the
3 attacks and siege and favoured retaining the Sarajevo that people were
4 used to before the war.
5 Q. Every newspaper has an editorial policy as well, isn't that
6 right, and editorial policy, as a rule, is partial, not objective. Would
7 you agree with that?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Would you remember that you said, on one occasion, that you
10 thought that there is not a single newspaper whose editorial policy is
11 neutral and impartial?
12 A. No, I don't recall saying that.
13 Q. On page 10 of your report in e-court, you mention Stipe Mesic.
14 Can you tell us what the position was of Stipe Mesic, the last president
15 of the Presidency of Yugoslavia? What was his position vis-a-vis this
16 Yugoslavia? Did he favour the survival of that state, or, as president,
17 did he work on breaking it up?
18 A. Well, his position was opposed to the continuation of Yugoslavia.
19 He expressly stated, I think, in his book that he published that he --
20 you know, favoured destroying Yugoslavia.
21 I don't perceive his actions in the Presidency as directed toward
22 that goal or at least not that goal alone. He actually was -- it seems
23 to me, trying to work out some arrangements where at least if that
24 process were to go forward, it would do so peacefully.
25 Q. Due to Mesic's views, Serbia was against him being appointed as
1 the president of the state. However, that nevertheless happened due to
2 pressure coming from the European community; is that right?
3 A. It came about as a result of an agreement that was negotiated by
4 the European community, yes.
5 Q. European community was of the view that Mesic had to be the
6 president of that state; is that right?
7 A. Yes. The European community negotiators felt that the succession
8 as it had taken place for the past decade dictated that message be
9 confirmed in the position of the Presidency which, as you know, took
10 place, I think, on October 8th rather than on May 15th, as it had
11 originally happened in -- in prior years, when the Presidency --
12 president of the Presidency came up.
13 Q. We now need page 10 e-court of your report, D1999 [as
14 interpreted] --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: P1999.
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I think I said P. We don't have this many.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed.
18 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. So P1999, page 11 in English
19 version, and page 10 in B/C/S version.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Here, you write that in the majority -- in most
21 instances, the JNA would remain in control of contested territory or turn
22 it over to local Serbs.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where on page 7 are you reading, Mr. Lukic?
24 MR. LUKIC: Should be page 11 in English version in e-court --
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay --
1 MR. LUKIC: -- page 7 of the paper. It's the first line on that
3 "But in most instances, the JNA remained in control of contested
4 territory or turned it over to local Serbs, manifesting its gradual turn
5 toward Serb nationalism."
6 Q. [Interpretation] These territories that you call "contested"
7 here, were these instances of the JNA seizing Croatian villages, Croatian
8 land, and turning it over to the Serbs, or was this, in fact, Serb
9 villages and Serb land?
10 What do you mean by "contested territory"? And what were those
11 instances, if you could give us some examples, please.
12 A. I -- I don't think there was a instance in which it was not the
13 case that the JNA moved into these areas without an existing conflict
14 breaking out between the Croatian security forces and local Serb police,
15 or local Serb political leaders.
16 So they were, indeed, in the first instance, acting in accord
17 with their policy at the time, which was to separate the warring sides,
18 separate the disputing sides. So, naturally, in a lot of cases, most
19 cases that I know of here, the villages concerned were inhabited by
21 Q. In English version, on page 12 in e-court, in paragraph 3; in
22 B/C/S version, also page 12, paragraph 3. You say in the second line of
23 this paragraph:
24 "On the 25th of June, 1991, assemblies of both republics
25 simultaneously passed declarations of independence in a direct challenge
1 to both the JNA and the federal governing bodies."
2 In your research, did you come across any texts which claimed
3 that these declarations were illegal and anti-constitutional?
4 A. Of course, there's a plethora of texts issued by the Presidency
5 of -- of Yugoslavia that argued that these were unconstitutional and
6 illegal, became sort of a fundamental theme of the Serb relationship of
7 the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro with the negotiators. And,
8 likewise there were many tracts that argued they were fully legal and
9 authorised by virtue of the referenda that had taken place before them.
10 Those texts, of course, coming from the Croat and Slovene states.
11 Q. In the following sentence, you say:
12 "Two days later, the JNA moved to secure Slovenia's international
13 border-crossing points and airports ... claiming that they were under
14 federal jurisdiction."
15 Were these border-crossings and airport, indeed, under federal
17 A. Well, that -- at the end of the day, becomes a legal question and
18 one of competing constitutional claims on the part of the Slovenes and
19 Yugoslavia. So I -- I really would not want to try to resolve it.
20 If you mean by that, was it under, let's say, the administration
21 of federal authorities, I would say, yes, it was. It was under the
22 administration of federal authority, probably border guards and things
23 like this, that were a part of the federal security system rather than
24 Slovene ones.
25 Q. Actually, an operation of Slovene forces preceded this. Slovene
1 forces took up these border crossings; is that right?
2 A. That would be -- yes, that's correct.
3 Q. The war in Slovenia was short lived. In your research, did you
4 come across the fact that the JNA did not even issue proper ammunition to
5 its members?
6 A. I have read that allegation and have no reason to dispute it.
7 Q. Thank you. On page 12 in e-court in the B/C/S version, page 13
8 in the English version, paragraph 1, in line 1 in the English version,
9 you say:
10 "In the wake of its humiliation in Slovenia, the JNA in Croatia
11 abandoned its strategy of restraint and began to side overtly with Serb
13 Is it true that, at that time, there were already attacks against
14 JNA barracks under way?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The JNA did not go out of the barracks and attack anybody.
17 Rather, they remained within the barracks and defended themselves from
18 the barracks by opening fire on the Croatian forces who attacked the
19 barracks; is that right?
20 A. It -- it's kind of a multi-faceted answer to that question.
21 There were -- first of all, I'm trying to describe here the progression
22 of this policy change in the late summer -- summer to late summer of
24 The besieging of the barracks, of the JNA barracks by Croatian
25 security forces preceded that. In the cases where they were easily taken
1 by security -- by Croatian security force, in many cases they were, and
2 the weapons and ammunition was then seized by Croat forces, which, in the
3 opinion of many observers, was really what fueled their war capability in
4 that time.
5 The larger ones, of course, were not so much attacked as they
6 were besieged, encircled, and just kept encircled for a period of time,
7 rather than subject to a full-scale attack to try to conquer them.
8 Q. Doctor, you are familiar with the situation, and I'm not
9 dissatisfied with your answer. I'm simply waiting for the interruption
10 to conclude before putting my next question.
11 Is it true that, in those barracks which were under siege, water
12 and electricity supply were disconnected and they were also -- they --
13 the food supply was also cut off from them; is that right?
14 A. Interrupted intermittently, certainly, yes, and I think that's --
15 General Mladic himself stated those facts in -- before the Bosnian Serb
16 Assembly, and I accept that that was, indeed, the case.
17 Q. In your research, did you come across the fact that the JNA gave
18 weapons to all of those who responded to the call-up, regardless of their
20 A. Well, I -- I think you're referring to -- well, first of all, I
21 would want to know exactly what time-period you're talking about, if
22 you're talking about Bosnia or Croatia, and in what time-period.
23 Q. At any point in time. In 1991 and 1992. Before the war broke
24 out in Bosnia. Did the JNA refuse to issue weapons to anyone on the
25 basis that they were a Croat or a Muslim? Did you ever come across such
1 a fact?
2 A. No. I believe the -- I mean, the JNA distributed arms in two
4 One was to those reservists who were mobilised, and those
5 reservists who were mobilised were indeed -- included, particularly prior
6 to late full 1991, included a good number of Croats and Muslims.
7 It issued weapons freely to them regardless of their ethnicity or
9 The other process, though, that was going on, which was much
10 more, let's say, discreet, was the arming of local committees of the SDS
11 and arms that were specifically given to organised Serb entities, whether
12 they were political -- the political party itself, or even, in some
13 cases, the local, call them paramilitaries, or leaders.
14 Q. When it comes to arming the Serbs outside of the JNA
15 establishment, what was the purpose of that, if it was a well-known fact
16 that anybody could respond to the mobilisation and be issued with a
17 weapon by becoming a member of the JNA? Why would the JNA be organising
18 distribution of weapons when anybody could receive those weapons by
19 responding to the call-up?
20 A. Well, this was part of the plan or the, let's say, wish that
21 started, really in the -- with Belgrade authorities to provide arms to
22 local Serb forces outside of the JNA, to strengthen their ability to
23 resist or to actually take over areas from Croatian security forces. And
24 eventually to fuel the Serb forces in Bosnia.
25 So that was a very different process. The -- many local Serbs in
1 both Croatia and Bosnia were very suspicious of the JNA and wanted it to
2 become much more of a Serb army much faster than it did, and so that
3 distrust caused them to want weapons of their own, apart from the JNA and
4 that those requests were honoured and, in fact, sometimes stimulated by
5 authorities, both within the JNA and the governments of Serbia and
7 Q. Now page 14 in e-court, page 14 of your report, line 5 in the
8 English version, and the first paragraph on page 14 in the B/C/S.
9 You say that the presence of the Croat police in Kijevo and
10 Vrlika, the two small Croat majority towns on the road between Knin and
11 Sinj, was intolerable obstructions of the JNA's vital communications and
12 transportation links to the south.
13 I would like to ask you whether the mere existence of these
14 villages was the obstacles -- obstacle or was it the barricades on the
15 road which were, in fact, the obstacles preventing the JNA from having
16 normal communication with other parts and other units?
17 A. I think both. Not a -- and I would add a third factor which was
18 the buildup of the Croatian security forces which General Mladic reported
19 on in his diary, and all three factors, really, were considered threats
20 to the smooth functioning of that passageway to the JNA.
21 Q. However, you did find trace of the barricades around these two
22 settlements on the roads around there; right?
23 A. Yes. I mean, I'm relying on a number of accounts in this
24 section, including the work of Srdjan Radulovic and General Mladic
25 himself, and, you know, other observers, and they certainly all report
1 barricades being used, at least occasionally, in this area.
2 Q. Further on in e-court, on page 15 in both versions, paragraph 3
3 in the English and 2 in the B/C/S, you say:
4 "The JNA took over a new role as an initiating belligerent."
5 Would you agree that these attacks served to pull out people from
6 the barracks under siege?
7 A. Not this particular one, as I understand it. I don't think there
8 was anything under siege specifically in Kijevo, if that's what you're
9 referring to.
10 The -- these actions were not - at least as I can determine -
11 designed to lift the sieges of the JNA troops that were in the urban
12 barracks that were then under siege.
13 Q. However, would you agree that in urban areas, such as the
14 barracks in Zadar, the barracks in Split, one could not approach them if
15 the roads were blocked and there was no possibility to free the members
16 of the JNA who were under siege? In Zadar, for example.
17 A. Yes, I think that's the definition of "siege."
18 Q. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the whole issue about whether it was just
20 the mere existence of those two villages, if I carefully read the
21 paragraph, all the matters you asked the witness are answered in that
22 paragraph. It is about check-points. It is about not being able to
23 freely move. It is about the Croatian security forces.
24 It's all explained there. And then you ask: Was it the mere
25 existence of a village. Of course, that's not what the report says.
1 And, again, everything you asked, all the answers given, are -- well, if
2 not for the full 100 per cent, then at least for 80 or 90 per cent in
3 that paragraph.
4 So I'm just concerned about re-eliciting the same from what we
5 read already in the report. But please proceed and keep this in mind.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 The key issue for us was to explain the reasons for the attacks.
8 Those were not attacks aimed at taking up territory or anything of the
9 sort. They had a different purpose, and this is what we wanted to
10 explain, and this is something that cannot be found in this report.
11 JUDGE ORIE: The facts you asked for -- and you didn't ask
12 whether this explained it. The facts you asked for are found in the
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 Q. You go on to say that the military and strategic aims of the JNA
17 coincided with the political aims of the local armed Serbs. Would you
18 agree that there was, indeed, solely one purpose; namely, to maintain the
19 joint state and not allow it to fall apart?
20 A. No.
21 Q. You would not agree?
22 A. No. I think my view on that would be the quotation that I used
23 from General Kadijevic in describing this transition in the late summer
24 of 1991, in which he explained the relationship between the specific JNA
25 commitment to Yugoslavia and its transition to siding with the Serbs,
1 with the local Serb forces.
2 That, to me, is an extremely well expressed, very clear statement
3 of where the JNA was coming from.
4 Q. Are you trying to say that the Serbs and the JNA did not want to
5 preserve Yugoslavia? Your answer is not entirely clear to me.
6 A. Well, I think we could go to -- I can't locate it right here.
7 But the statement of General Kadijevic, in my view, accurately captures
8 that -- the answer to that question, and I have included it in this
10 Q. Then in another part, you speak about the attack on Dubrovnik.
11 What was the role of General Mladic in the attack on Dubrovnik? Did he
12 play any role in that?
13 A. I don't -- I don't know.
14 Q. You speak of combat around Vukovar. Would you also agree that
15 General Mladic played no part in that combat either?
16 A. I don't know.
17 Q. We went through 1991 in your report, and now, although the report
18 is entitled: "Sarajevo" --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic either is seeking contact with
20 Mr. Stojanovic or he indicates that it would be time for the break.
21 Perhaps it's the latter.
22 Perhaps we should take that break then now. Yes.
23 But, first, we'd like Mr. Donia to be escorted out of the
25 [The witness stands down]
1 JUDGE ORIE: We take the break and will resume at ten minutes
2 to 11.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, please proceed.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Q. Dr. Donia, before we move on to Sarajevo, we're just going to
10 briefly deal with the following.
11 You also worked on other reports, not only this one about
12 Sarajevo. In the course of your work, did you come across the following
13 information: How did the war break out in Bosnia? What happened in
14 Sijekovac in 1992?
15 A. Those are two different questions and may be tangentially
16 related. But to address the second one first, in Sijekovac on, I think,
17 the 29th of March, 1992, it might have been a day or two earlier or
18 after, a Croatian paramilitary group crossed the Drina -- or crossed the
19 Sava - Sijekovac is a community just across the border from Croatia - and
20 attacked the community with -- with -- with weapons, and killed a large
21 number of people, a significant number of people anyway, and then
22 returned back to the -- basically devastated the village. There has been
23 all sorts of debate since then about who exactly was targeted and who the
24 victims were and how many of them there were. It hasn't been established
25 to my satisfaction in anything that I have seen exactly what the
1 motivation for that was. It's certainly known that there were local,
2 kind of a low-level almost terrorist war going on between Serb and Croat
3 nationalists in the region with explosions directed against particularly
4 cultural institutions, one group of the other, and may have been an act
5 of retaliation for that. May have been caused by other forces. But it
6 was the -- unquestionably the Croatian paramilitary coming to this area
7 and launching that attack that you're referring to.
8 Now as to the second part of your question, what caused the war
9 in Bosnia? That's -- I mean, people have written so many volumes on this
10 topic, and it seems to me it's -- it's really hard to sort of encapsulate
11 that in any kind of reasonably brief period of time to your answer [sic].
12 But I would, I guess, say generally that you had a -- one overwhelmingly
13 large military force, overwhelming large military force in the JNA and a
14 number of political factions seeking to mobilise their followers to
15 promote the actual independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; whereas the
16 political objectives of the SDS and the Serb followers of that party was
17 to contest that and to carve out their own state and, for that purpose,
18 they essentially mobilised or allied with the JNA, eventually assumed
19 control of many of its units, and the hostilities reflected these things,
20 on the military side anyway, resulted from this asymmetry of forces and
21 the political ambitions [Realtime transcript read in error "ammunitions"]
22 of each side.
23 Q. Thank you for this lengthy answer.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I just interrupt. If I may interrupt you,
25 Mr. Lukic.
1 Mr. Donia, you did say "political ambitions of each side," or did
2 you say "ammunitions"? You are recorded as having said "ammunitions."
3 THE WITNESS: I did say "ambitions."
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Before this massacre in Sijekovac, were there any armed conflicts
7 in that area at all, or was it civilians who fell victim in Sijekovac?
8 A. Again, that's two questions.
9 The -- the first part of it, were there armed conflicts in the
10 area. There were. I would characterise the situation generally as
11 consisting of episodic armed conflicts dating back to the fall of 1991 in
12 Bosnia in those areas that were immediately adjacent to the Croatian war
13 zone. And then --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- could you switch off the microphone.
15 Mr. Mladic. Yes, and low volume.
16 Please proceed.
17 THE WITNESS: And then smaller episodes of assassinations and
18 terrorist acts and skirmishes that seemed to have accelerated, and also
19 barricades in various places. It kind of accelerated in the first three
20 months of 1992. So I think you can say there -- there were, indeed,
21 military activities and clashes going on, although not of particularly
22 high level.
23 And, I'm sorry, the second part of your question was?
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Were civilians killed in Sijekovac?
1 A. Absolutely, yes. Yes.
2 Q. Now, going to move on to this part where you talk about Sarajevo.
3 That is somehow the beginning.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 21, line 2, in the English
5 version. And that's what we need in e-court. The second paragraph on
6 page 20 in B/C/S.
7 Q. You provide a description for this street that has east and
8 westbound lanes and you say in its western half it was called the Street
9 of the Proletarian Brigades and Vojvoda Putnik Street in its eastern
10 portion closest to Marin Dvor.
11 These streets no longer bear these names, right, the names of
12 streets in Sarajevo were changed?
13 A. Yes. Virtually every street got a new name.
14 Q. That was done during the war, as far as back as that; right? It
15 started then. The process was not over then.
16 A. I think actually it was largely complete, at least for the centre
17 part of the city, by 1993. There's a map from 1993 which has many of the
18 new names on it. So -- and may have started as early as late 1991.
19 Q. All the names of streets that were Serb were changed; right?
20 A. All the street names were changed. A few actually received the
21 names of intellectual scholars, people who were Serbs, but basically all
22 the names that had existed before, who tended to be revolutionary heros
23 of the Second World War or period of socialism, were changed to various
24 types of names, names sometimes after units, sometimes after individuals
25 who were regarded highly in the history of Sarajevo, and sometimes for,
1 you know, any other institution or purpose.
2 Q. Would you agree that streets were named only after Muslims,
4 A. As I've said, no, I wouldn't agree that they were named only
5 after Muslims.
6 Q. Would we agree that blue boards bearing street names were
7 replaced by green boards or plaques? Or, rather, the colour used was the
8 colour that, in Bosnia, is affiliated with Muslim. So all of these
9 plaques bearing street names are green, Muslim green?
10 A. Well, green, yes. And I would further agree that green in Bosnia
11 and a whole bunch of other places is the colour that is used by Muslims
12 in flags and it -- it's essentially a symbol of Islam.
13 Q. Now I would like us to take a brief look at page 24 of your
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] In the English version, it's the last
16 paragraph. It is also page 24 in the B/C/S version, the last paragraph.
17 Q. You say to us there that the SDA candidate Ejub Ganic came
18 seventh in terms of the seats in the Presidency. He had identified
19 himself as Yugoslav in the 1981 census.
20 Ejub Ganic is one of the most extremist members of the SDA party.
21 Would you agree with me on that?
22 A. No, that would be your characterisation, not mine.
23 Q. Is it correct that the SDA party instructed its voters that --
24 or, rather, to do the following: To vote for Ejub Ganic, in terms of
25 this seventh seat?
1 A. Well, "instructed." All political -- all of the three national
2 party formations asked their members to vote for their particular
3 candidate for that seventh seat. So, for the Serbs, they actually
4 nominated a Jew, Ivan Ceresnjes. I forget who the Croats nominated, but
5 it was someone who, some way or another, met the criteria for this
6 category of other. So the answer to your question is, yes, they did.
7 The SDS -- SDA did request its members to vote for Ganic as the party's
9 Q. It became obvious there how this principle of one man, one vote
10 works in Bosnia; isn't that right? One could see that the Muslims could
11 outvote anyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless some other mechanisms were
12 used to protect national interest.
13 A. This election, to me, did not make that clear, no.
14 Q. You know of this constitutional category in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
15 constituent peoples, you read about that, didn't you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Today, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have this institute of
18 protecting basic national interests; isn't that right?
19 A. Are you referring to the parliamentary -- body in parliament,
21 Q. So before the war and after the war, the accepted principle was
22 that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there had to be some kind of control for the
23 democratic voting based on the principle of one man, one vote. You will
24 agree with me on that, won't you?
25 A. Yes. The -- I mean, the system of selecting members of the
1 Presidency clearly was not based on one man, one vote, and it's, I think,
2 arguable that the elections to the Assembly were, but certainly the
3 Presidency was already trifurcated by -- and, in fact, quadrifurcated by
4 national affiliation.
5 Q. On pages 29 through 31, you speak about different belligerent
6 statements made by Karadzic, Koljevic, about the division of Sarajevo and
7 the division the population. The period that you speak about here is up
8 until the 16th of April, 1992.
9 You will agree that, in that period, General Mladic was not in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina at all?
11 A. Yes. To my knowledge, he was not there ever, at that time.
12 Q. In your view, what was the crucial turning point that showed that
13 the conflict would start in Sarajevo?
14 A. Well, I -- I don't know that there was one, and depending on a
15 how one assesses these various -- the significance of these various
16 military operations, the conflict did not start in Sarajevo. It could be
17 said to have started in October 1991 in the village that was attacked by
18 the JNA over the border with Croatia. Could equally be said to have
19 started along a couple of other border incidents. Certainly could be
20 said to have begun on the April 1st with the first incursion of
21 paramilitaries into Bijeljina.
22 So I -- in fact, it's not really till the 6th of April that these
23 decisive events start to take place in Sarajevo and they are trailing a
24 number of other events that might be said to have started the war.
25 Q. Thank you. I'm going ask you about Sarajevo itself.
1 You are aware of that incident or, rather, the killing that took
2 place on the 1st of March, 1992, when the father of a bridegroom was
3 killed at a wedding in Sarajevo. Nikola Gardovic was killed.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. He was killed at his own son's wedding.
6 A. Yes. And I believe a clergyman, a Serbian Orthodox priest, was
8 Q. Exactly. Radenko Mitrovic, a clergyman, was wounded; and Nikola
9 Gardovic, who was killed, is also an Orthodox priest. You remember that,
10 don't you?
11 A. I didn't know that Gardovic was a priest, but certainly accept
12 that, yeah.
13 Q. Is it correct that Serb representatives in the MUP after this
14 incident asked for the killer to be apprehended? Did you find that in
15 various documents?
16 A. Not only MUP representatives but the political leadership of the
17 SDS vociferously demanded that he be arrested, and in fact, I believe a
18 warrant was put out for his arrest.
19 Q. We're going to discuss that a bit later.
20 But do you know that "Oslobodjenje" newspaper, or, rather,
21 Rasim Cerimagic, a journalist, wrote on the occasion of this killing:
22 What were the members of a Serb wedding party doing in Bascarsija in the
23 first place?
24 Did you see that?
25 A. I looked pretty carefully at the "Oslobodjenje" coverage of that
1 event, and it was -- it was extensive, a number of different stories over
2 the subsequent five days. I don't specifically recall that. I have --
3 that statement. I have heard other Bosnian Muslims raise that question
4 in exactly those terms.
5 Q. You did find in documents that the killer was Ramiz Delalic,
6 Celo; right?
7 A. Well, he certainly was the prime suspect and was actually finally
8 brought to court and charged with the murder in 2007. So long time
9 between the act and his being brought to justice, but before -- I think
10 after the very first day of the court, the trial, he was given a
11 provisional release and was killed by an assassin, who I believe turned
12 out to be Albanian, in a gang war dispute that had nothing to do with
13 this original crime.
14 So I think we can't definitively say that he was the killer, but
15 certainly on the basis of evidence presented at that first day of trial
16 and the assumption all along was that, yes, he was the -- he was the
18 Q. Did you have an opportunity of seeing TV programme on Sarajevo
19 state TV, August 1992, in which Ramiz Delalic, Celo, explained how it was
20 that he killed Nikola Gardovic?
21 A. I have not seen it. I know that it was admitted at the trial on
22 that first day in 2007.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, could I ask you, we have now listened
24 for many, many minutes to the details of the killing at the wedding party
25 in Bascarsija. Is there any dispute about these matters?
1 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I don't believe that there is.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, one simple question, or two simple
3 questions, could have sought the confirmation of this witness what seems
4 not be in dispute between the parties, if it is relevant at all.
5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, this report is about the beginning of
6 conflict --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. LUKIC: -- and we are trying to establish what was the
9 beginning of the conflict.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The witness has told us that it didn't start
11 in Sarajevo. And if you would have asked him -- and perhaps I could ask
12 you now: Did it trigger further violence in Sarajevo, this killing at
13 the wedding party?
14 THE WITNESS: Well, it coincided with it, because this was the
15 last day of the referendum on independence, in which the vast majority of
16 Croats and Muslims voted yes, and the Serbs boycotted it. And that --
17 the final hours of that voting seems to have been the precipitating
18 incident for the SDS erecting barricades throughout the city and
19 blockading -- cutting the city off from the outside and stopping traffic.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: So it -- it certainly coincided with that, and the
22 SDS tried to argue that this was a spontaneous response to the
23 killings -- or the killing in Bascarsija.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it may be clear from this question that
25 it is not that the Chamber is not interested in the role of that, but to
1 go over all kind of details seems not to be -- and just out from the
2 witness, put it to the witness, saying, Is it -- but please proceed.
3 This case is about more than what triggered the war to start.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Donia, for the answer that you provided to
6 His Honour Judge Orie. Those were the questions that we wanted to put,
7 the setting up of the barricades and the killing of Gardovic.
8 This man, Ramiz Delalic, Celo, was the commander of the military
9 police of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the municipality of
10 Stari Grad; is that correct?
11 A. Well, he was first and foremost a gangster and really one of
12 several very powerful and influential gangsters who took up the -- as
13 part of their gangsterism took up the defence of the city of Sarajevo and
14 entered into combat with the -- with the JNA and local Serb forces. Most
15 of those appointments -- actually, a couple of them held appointments
16 such as commander of police or something like that, and most of those
17 were extracted from the government kind of at the -- at the point of
18 great pressure because of the -- the advantages that that gave them in
19 their various activities, including the -- the combat for the defence of
20 the city.
21 Q. Thank you. You say that this video footage was shown at trial
22 when he spoke about the killing of Nikola Gardovic and he said that he
23 did not hide after the killing because he actually organised the killing,
24 together with the police in Sarajevo. He did that as well?
25 A. What's -- what's the question? I -- sorry.
1 Q. Do you know of this piece of information, that he himself
2 admitted that he organised the killing of Gardovic together with the
3 police, or rather, with the Muslim part of the police in Sarajevo?
4 A. I -- as I say, I haven't seen that video myself and I don't know
5 exactly what he represents in that. I know that he represented that he
6 was the killer. But beyond that, I'm not certain what he actually said.
7 Q. At that time, the MUP of the Ministry of the Interior was still a
8 joint organisation where both Serbs and Muslims, as well as Croats,
9 worked together.
10 A. Yes, that's -- that's the case.
11 Q. Is it also the case, have you come across that when researching
12 the documentation, that MUP, in fact, was the corps from which Muslim
13 armed forces later emerged, that the Serbs joined the JNA, whereas the
14 Muslims joined the MUP, and this is how they were predominantly armed.
15 Are you familiar with that?
16 A. Well, I think it would be organisationally proper to say that the
17 Territorial Defence was the core, was the basis on which the ARBiH, the
18 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was founded rather than the MUP. The MUP
19 certainly had a role particularly after it -- after the Serbs withdrew
20 from it on, I believe, March 30th, under the direction of the deputy
21 minister of MUP, Momcilo Mandic. But organisationally, I think it's more
22 the TO than the MUP that was the core of this new fighting force.
23 Q. Sarajevo, as a city, after the conflict broke out, split along
24 the ethnic lines; right?
25 A. Well, I would say it was split along ethnic lines by force. And
1 that process was sort of -- took some time and was accompanied by varying
2 degrees of violence. It didn't just spontaneously break into its -- into
3 ethnic components. No, it did not.
4 Q. Is it true that the Muslims also violently took those parts of
5 the city where they held majority? Is it also true that Serbs were
6 kicked out from certain SUPs where they were a minority, in parts of town
7 where Muslims were in majority?
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could I receive an explanation of the use of the
9 word "SUP" here. Certain SUPs. Or was it souks.
10 MR. LUKIC: SUP is a smaller organisational unit of MUP. It
11 covers usually one municipality but can cover more.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I -- now see, yes, I was a bit confused by
13 parts of the city and then a police structure which is -- the one is a
14 geographical reference, the other one is an organisational reference so
15 that confused me slightly.
16 But if the witness has understood the question, he may answer it.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, agree with what SUP was and the sort of local
18 MUP junior, the local level police.
19 I would say that's not a -- your question was not a good
20 characterisation of what happened. I would agree that there were places
21 in which Muslim forces dislocated Serbs, drove them out, and took
22 control. But, really, this took place, by and large -- the exception of
23 some overt military offensives in the western suburbs, as police stations
24 split up and one force or the other tried to consolidate territory within
25 the city. That was the more common problem of what you described as the
1 ethnic division of the city and what I said was accomplished by
2 considerable violence over a long period of time.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You said on page 35, English version, 37; B/C/S version 35, last
5 line, last paragraph. You will recognise the sentence:
6 Claiming the land on a which the Serbs lived which practically
7 surrounded the centre of the town, the SDS created a military base for --
8 or, rather, created a territorial base for the military siege of
10 The fact is that the land around Sarajevo was predominantly owned
11 by Serbs, the neighbouring, adjoining villages around Sarajevo. Isn't
12 that right?
13 A. No, it's not.
14 Q. So this sentence in your report is not true.
15 A. Well, I -- I'm -- I must say, looking at it now, my -- my
16 modifier is not terribly clear. And when I say -- what I meant to say in
17 this sentence is the SDS had thus established a territorial basis that
18 nearly encircled the city centre. It wasn't the Serb-inhabited lands
19 that nearly encircled the city centre and I, you know, regret that it is
20 subject to that interpretation.
21 But that was -- that was clearly not the case. As one went
22 through these various areas, just demographically looking at them as of
23 1991, there were some pure Serb areas, there were some pure Muslim areas,
24 and there were large areas which were settled by members of any and all
25 groups in large measure because of the growth of the -- the urban growth
1 of the city in the 1970s and 1980s, but also because of this practice of
2 building weekend cottages which was engaged in by everybody regardless of
3 their ethnicity.
4 So I think that's a -- it's not the case. I know it's one of the
5 founding myths of Bosnian Serb national belief that this -- there was a
6 Serb encirclement of the city with Muslim -- or with Serb villages and
7 it's just simply not the case.
8 Q. At the referendum on the 29th of February and the 1st of March,
9 the Croats and the Muslims voted for a cessation from Yugoslavia, that is
10 to say, for independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 In the historical context, how do you see that? Namely, that, on
12 the one hand, they did not wish to live with the Serbs from Serbia but
13 they allegedly wanted to live with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Are there perhaps two kinds of Serbs?
15 A. I don't see any -- any significant distinction there. The -- I
16 mean, the voting on the 30th -- 29th and 1st was for a political option
17 that -- you know, it was one that had been under discussion for a long
18 time and was supported by both the national parties of the Croats and
19 Muslims at that time.
20 I don't think that has anything to do with the wish of those
21 peoples to get along with and to co-operate with, to have among them,
22 Serbs. And, in fact, I think that both the Serbs, many of whom remained
23 in Sarajevo through the war, and the -- many of those Croats and Muslims
24 who voted still favoured continuation of the common life of all three
25 peoples in -- in Sarajevo.
1 Q. Naturally, we cannot speak of Sarajevo in this context alone. We
2 have to look at the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 On page 37, we have a title, which is quite specific. You say
4 simultaneous desire for independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina --
5 simultaneous pursuit of Bosnian independence and Serb separatism,
6 October 1991, April 1992.
7 You basically here see this as two different things: Pursuit of
8 Bosnian independence, on the one hand, and Serb separatism on the other
9 hand. Why do you see it as such? Why do you not see Serbs a part of
10 Bosnia? Why do you exclude them for opting for independent Bosnia?
11 A. Well, some -- a few did favour such independence, but I would say
12 in -- in the main, your -- the answer to your question is -- here is that
13 these two movements certainly interacted and in some sense reacted to the
14 other. And then one could argue which came first and which was the
15 initiator. But no question that the drive for independence which was
16 sponsored by the Croat and Muslim parties, was, in substantial measure, a
17 response to what they observed the Milosevic regime doing in trying to
18 expand its command or control of Yugoslavia. That was long-standing.
19 And then the, let's say, tendency of the Serbs of Bosnia, at
20 least the political SDS portion of it, to ally with that movement was a
21 further reason for them to consider moving toward independence. On the
22 other hand, as they discussed and moved toward this independence, it
23 spurred, as I indicated yesterday, it spurred the SDS to take actions to
24 form a specifically separate Serb state on Bosnian territory.
25 Q. In your report, you said that Serbs favoured status quo? Do you
1 remember that? In the early part.
2 A. I -- I don't know exactly -- if you could maybe give me a page
3 reference, I can ...
4 Q. I can't find it right now. But, trust me, you did say that in
5 the earlier stages, the Serbs favoured status quo. And the status quo
6 presupposed remaining in the same state. It presupposed there no -- that
7 there should be no changes and that the initiative for changes had to
8 come from Muslim and Croats because the Serbs favoured the status quo.
9 They did not want anything to change. Right?
10 A. As -- as a matter of reality, they did want something to change.
11 And as they began organising this -- this -- these divisive activities in
12 the course of, let's say, after October 15th, 1991. At one point, in an
13 Assembly session, when they were speaking about the strategy of carving
14 out these areas to remain in Yugoslavia, which was the ideological way
15 that they stated this, one delegate stood up and said, Why are we
16 withdrawing from anything? We don't have to do that. If we can favour
17 the status quo, we do nothing at all.
18 And of course, the leaders explained that they had to take these
19 actions urgently in order to save the Serb people.
20 Q. You did not answer my question --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Is it possible that there's any confusion, that
22 Mr. Lukic referred to the situation before the 15th of October, that the
23 Serbs were happy to stay within a Yugoslavia which comprised Serbia and
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina in a kind of a federative situation, and what your
25 answer is about, is the -- about the suggestion after the 15th of
1 October and after the events of the 15th of October, where someone said,
2 Could we not keep the status quo? And that, in that situation, the
3 leaders explained that they could not. That's --
4 Mr. Lukic, have I spotted a possible source of confusion?
5 MR. LUKIC: Expect the answer from me -- I'm sorry, I was more
6 concentrated on Mr. Mladic who obviously does not feel well --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. LUKIC: -- and he almost fell off the chair.
9 JUDGE ORIE: We can take a break now and see. We are a little
10 bit early than --
11 MR. LUKIC: Five minutes early.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Five minutes. Yes, a little bit early.
13 But could you think or perhaps re-read that part of the
14 transcript to see whether that caused the confusion.
15 First, could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and we will resume at five
18 minutes past 12.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 11.44 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.09 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're on your feet.
22 MR. LUKIC: Yes. I was informed that I should inform
23 Your Honours about the situation with the health of Mr. Mladic, and it's
24 really bad. At this moment, he has -- everything spins. Everything is
25 spinning. He cannot follow the trial at all. And his right hand and
1 right leg are becoming numb and he cannot -- he couldn't walk. He just
2 entered the courtroom with the help of guards.
3 So I don't think that he is in a state to continue.
4 JUDGE ORIE: We were informed that the doctor has seen him and
5 that the blood pressure was even a little bit lower than usual.
6 MR. LUKIC: It's too low. Yes, he says it is too low for him.
7 That's why everything is spinning.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Too low for him. And that was due to loss of
10 MR. LUKIC: Yes. That's what I was informed through the
11 communication from the UNDU.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, of course, if there was a medically
13 significant loss of weight, we would have expected it to be on the report
14 which we received. But let me see whether we ...
15 MR. LUKIC: I think in the last report it was noted.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see.
17 MR. LUKIC: I think. No?
18 JUDGE ORIE: The last report we have is from the 21st of August.
19 And ... I don't see anything there. Which, again, is surprising, if it
20 is significant for his present condition.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 [Defence counsel confer]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, we have listened to what you said, and
24 we've listened to Mr. Mladic says he feels. The simple question then is
25 if he is unable to further continue to attend, then we would stop unless
1 he would prefer that we would continue in his absence. I mean, it's his
2 right to be present during trial, and we take that right seriously.
3 MR. LUKIC: Can I talk to Mr. Mladic?
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes. Mr. Mladic told me that he cannot continue and
9 he would like -- he would like to hear the rest of the testimony of
10 Mr. Donia -- Dr. Donia. But he cannot follow the trial.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we'll have to stop. It's as simple as
13 We'll ask the witness to be escorted into the courtroom so that
14 we can explain to him. Then, Mr. Lukic, that grants some extra time for
15 you today to prepare for the next witness. The Chamber is willing, as I
16 said before, I don't know whether you further discussed the matter with
17 Mr. Groom, but is willing to start the next witness on Tuesday, not on
18 Monday, and it also give you an opportunity perhaps to review your --
19 your -- the scheduling of your own cross-examination.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And there's a fair expectation then that we
23 would finish the testimony of Dr. Donia on Monday. Unless, of course,
24 there was any new developments. And the Chamber, of course, would like
25 to receive a medical report on the shortest notice, that is, even if it
1 would be delivered only during the weekend, that we are aware of it.
2 MR. LUKIC: I will just propose one more thing since I consulted
3 with my colleague Stojanovic.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps first -- Dr. Donia, Mr. Mladic doesn't
5 feel well. We are discussing whether or not to proceed. It looks as if
6 we would not continue today.
7 My first question to you would be: Are you still available on
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I'm available Monday and Tuesday
10 of next week. And after that, I have obligations on the other side of
11 the Atlantic that beckon.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's good to know.
13 Mr. Lukic, you wanted to add something --
14 MR. LUKIC: Just to raise one issue, yes. My colleague told me
15 that he could, if it's possible to organise, have his witness, RM021,
16 after Dr. Donia since we will work on Monday or, as I understand it --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, to switch the two witnesses --
18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, and then I have some space in between Dr. Donia
19 and the next witness.
20 JUDGE ORIE: But then, of course, we have to ask the Prosecution
21 whether to switch Witness RM021 with Witness RM174 is a possibility.
22 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I am unable to say now. We will make
23 every effort to do that and I will notify Mr. Lukic and the Chamber
24 within the hour whether that is possible.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and if not, of course then the Chamber will
1 have decide on whether we would insist on starting on Tuesday the
2 testimony of Witness 174.
3 MR. LUKIC: It will be very hard for us. Even three days are
4 very tight.
5 JUDGE ORIE: You have one day off -- of course, if we discontinue
6 now, you would, I take it, not need the whole of the Monday but -- and,
7 of course, the Chamber also decided that we would, anyhow, start on
8 Tuesday with the next witness having carefully monitored the way in which
9 you cross-examined Dr. Donia. That is one of the elements which is
10 underlying our determination. Of course, it would be good and to be the
11 most convenient way, if the Prosecution would be able to -- to swap
12 Witness RM021 to 174 but there's no commitment at this moment from the
13 Chamber that if it is not possible, that you could start any later than
14 on Tuesday.
15 We will adjourn for the day after Mr. Donia has been escorted out
16 of the room.
17 We'd like to see you back, Mr. Donia, on Monday morning at 9.30.
18 THE WITNESS: Of course, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And I have to instruct you, as I did before, not to
20 speak or communicate in whatever way with whomever about your testimony,
21 whether given or still to be given.
22 THE WITNESS: That's acknowledged, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You may follow the usher.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we will resume on
1 Monday, the 26th of August, at 9.30 in the morning. I don't remember
2 whether it was in this courtroom -- I think it's in Courtroom III.
3 Mr. Groome, you’re on your feet.
4 MR. GROOME: Sorry to interrupt you -- your ending of the court
5 session but I do have information on our ability to switch, and we are
6 unable to. RM021 does not arrive until late Monday, so we would be
7 working with RM21 on Tuesday and be prepared to call that witness on
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Which -- well, we have to consider that. The
10 information is there at this moment.
11 We'll resume on Monday, the 26th, 9.30 in the morning.
12 We stand adjourned.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.21 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 26th day of August,
15 2013, at 9.30 a.m.