1 Wednesday, 4 September 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, and good morning, Your Honours. This
8 is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 I do understand that there is a preliminary matter you would like
11 to raise, Mr. McCloskey.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
13 everyone. Yeah, regarding that document with the handwriting on it on
14 the back, P2097, we have an original and if you'd like to look at it
15 it's -- I've got it here now in the binder. The only glitch that we
16 noticed that you recall I made reference to a stamp from the 65th
17 Protection Regiment, that was in the English translation. We cannot find
18 it - Mr. Ivetic and I both looked at this this morning and could not find
19 that and based on the ERN range it should be there if it existed. So we
20 may need to send this back for revision to remove that unless there's
21 something else that would explain what that is there for.
22 [Trial Chamber confers].
23 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has looked at it. I did understand that
24 you, Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Ivetic, have looked at it together as well.
25 Could I ask whether the objection on the basis of authenticity
1 stands or -- because that was.
2 MR. IVETIC: I don't believe that I objected to the document,
3 Your Honour. Your Honours had asked about the handwriting whether it was
4 on the back of one of the originals or whether it was a separate piece
5 that had been added to the document. That's my recollection.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it was my recollection there was an issue about
7 authenticity as well because it was of the Pecanac --
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's the next one which I'm about to get to.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. This one then -- we have MFI'd this one,
10 not -- it's in evidence. We have seen it now. It's clear now where the
11 handwriting comes from. Yes, it was admitted and I only then put that
12 question about the handwriting.
13 Yes, Mr. --
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: And the next one that you've just referred to,
15 the May 28th intel report on Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica from the
16 Pecanac collection, as I had recalled yesterday, it did become evidence
17 in the Tolimir case. It was tendered through Colonel Petar Salapura, the
18 chief of intelligence of the Main Staff. And, as you recall, he
19 testified 92 ter here and in our zeal we did not put that part of the
20 transcript in his 92 ter package. So that part where he speaks of this
21 and the document didn't come in through him this time, but it did come in
22 through him. He spoke of it briefly in Tolimir. And if I may go into
23 private session for a moment.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we move into private session.
25 [Private session]
11 Pages 16177-16178 redacted. Private session.
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
2 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
3 Meanwhile, I briefly address another matter, that is, D353 was
4 first MFI'd, one of the reasons being that there was no translation -- or
5 at that moment perhaps the reason to be that there was no translation.
6 Then the translation was uploaded but when, I think yesterday, I admitted
7 D353 into evidence, I overlooked that there was another issue, it was a
8 document which was prepared by the Defence and it had got something to do
9 with the entries in a log, I think it was, and there were objections on
10 the basis of the content of the document as well. So we'd like to
11 further hear the response of -- first of all, the -- now the translation
12 is there, to hear from the Prosecution exactly what the issue is and then
13 from the Defence a response to those objections.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: But that's not necessarily to be done immediately
16 but soon I would say.
17 Good morning, Mr. ...
18 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and awaiting that debate, D353 returns now and
20 is MFI'd again and we'll decide later on admission.
21 Good morning, Mr. Butler.
22 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Butler, I'd like to remind you that you're still
24 bound by the solemn declaration that you have given at the beginning of
25 your testimony. And Mr. McCloskey will now continue his
2 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir.
3 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
4 Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]
5 Q. Mr. Butler, I'd like to go back briefly to the May 28th intel
6 report from Pecanac, it's 65 ter 25996, and I -- as you've stated, you've
7 had a chance to go through that. Can you tell us how impressed or
8 unimpressed you were with the intelligence in this -- in this document?
9 In particular, can you tell us in your opinion what kind of sources would
10 have been used to gather this sort of intelligence?
11 A. I am -- I'm impressed, again as one intelligence professional to
12 another, in this case because it is clear that the intelligence organs of
13 the Army of the Republika Srpska did dedicate a significant amount of
14 time and effort to trying to gain as much clarity about the composition
15 of all of the forces in the three enclaves that existed there, to include
16 the forces of the ABiH as well as the composition of the UN forces there
17 performing their functions. I gather from both this document as well as
18 my knowledge of other practices by the VRS intelligence service at
19 various levels, many of these they would have gotten from physical
20 observations by command posts or at forward observation posts. They did
21 actively collect information from the various translators or individuals
22 who were working for the UN to try to get information. They -- as well
23 as the ABiH, where possible, they tried to intercept radio communications
24 of the opposing enemy forces in order to glean information from that
1 Q. All right. Let's go on in the narrative as we approach the
2 Srebrenica operation, and I would like us to go to a document the Court
3 has seen, P1153. This is an order from the Drina Corps command,
4 General Zivanovic. As we can see from the first page entitled: "Taking
5 physical control of the Zeleni Jadar facilities and asphalt road," 2
6 June. Can you briefly explain to us the -- any military importance you
7 have for this particular area. I think you've mentioned it briefly
8 before. And then I'll ask you one or two questions about this document.
9 A. Yes, sir. As I discussed yesterday, because of where the VRS
10 forces were arrayed outside of the enclave in May, they recognised that
11 before they could launch any operations towards the enclave, they would
12 have to undertake some preparatory operations in order to clear a
13 particular area in order to extend the road network into the enclave to
14 support their own forces in the future. This particular document is an
15 order from the Drina Corps to elements of the Bratunac Brigade as well as
16 elements of the Zvornik Brigade that would participate in that type of a
17 limited operation designed essentially to clear a road area and also as a
18 consequence to essentially remove one UN check-point from its present
19 location in the enclave.
20 Q. All right. And we -- as we look at this document we could go to
21 number -- page 2 in the English and then probably page 2 in the B/C/S
22 just to get a review of it. We see --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- before we do so, could we go back to page 1.
24 I see that it comes from the Drina Corps command forward command
25 post. It says: "Order," and apart from the Bratunac Brigade command
1 it's also addressed to the commander of the Drina Corps, which -- is that
2 really what it -- or do we -- should we read that as to the commander of
3 the Bratunac Brigade manoeuvre battalion of the Drina Corps? It's -- I'm
4 a bit surprised to see an order given by a forward command post of the
5 Drina Corps command to the Drina Corps command.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. This is an issue that's come
7 up before and I'm sure Mr. Butler can address it, I believe, as he has
8 before in my memory.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: I could just say that in the B/C/S there is not a
11 separate recipient identified as the commander of the Drina Corps.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I wondered whether "komandantu manevarskog
13 bataljona DK" whether that stands for something different as we find in
14 the translation.
15 THE WITNESS: You're correct, sir. It appears to be a bit of a
16 mistranslation. Obviously it is the corps commander who is at the IKM
17 who is writing this document and it's addressed to the Bratunac Brigade
18 command and the Bratunac Brigade manoeuvre battalion of the DK, which, if
19 you read into the article or the order, it's clearly the Drina Wolves
20 unit of the Zvornik Brigade.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Therefore, perhaps it would be better to have
22 a corrected translation uploaded.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Thank you. I think that's a good idea.
24 Q. But, Mr. Butler, have you seen sometimes high-ranking officers
25 sending documents to themselves or to their offices sometimes when
1 they're away from their normal headquarters?
2 A. Yes, sir. That is a pattern. There will be documents that we
3 look at down the line, for example, where an officer of the Main Staff
4 who happens to be at the Drina Corps headquarters on a certain day will
5 send an order out and will also make sure that a copy of that order goes
6 back to his headquarters for his staff, not only for them to see but also
7 so that he has a record of the actual order that he published.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. But that's a different situation
9 compared to this one?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 Please proceed. I think we were at page 2.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
14 Q. We can see from reeding this that General Zivanovic has given
15 particular directions on how to approach the UNPROFOR soldiers and OPs,
16 including, as we see on that first paragraph up in the English, well,
17 actually the third paragraph in that first cluster as, talks about firing
18 warning shots and then if they failed to follow the order one should fire
19 a Zolja hand-held rocket-launcher into the power generator. It goes on
20 to say in the next paragraph, under 2, the same thing, basically, when
21 they don't surrender, neutralise -- it says:
22 "Use a Zolja to neutralise the personnel carrier ..."
23 And I would just call your attention to that because they have a
24 reference in another document that I would -- that we'll get to.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: But I would offer this into -- I'm sorry, it's
1 already into evidence. So could we go now to the next document,
2 65 ter 19557.
3 Q. This again is from the Drina Corps command, the Pribicevac IKM,
4 it's the next day, the 3rd of June, this is a regular combat report in
5 the name of Major Milenko Jevdjevic. Do you recall who Jevdjevic is --
6 was back then?
7 A. Milenko Jevdjevic was the, I believe, a -- the commander of the
8 communications unit of the Drina Corps back in July of 1995.
9 Q. All right. And then we see this is to the Main Staff and under
10 the "enemy" section:
11 "After a successful operation and forceful expulsion of UNPROFOR
12 from the Zeleni Jadar post ..."
13 And then it goes on to talk about the enemy. In your view,
14 what -- does this have anything to do with the previous operation that we
15 saw and just discussed the -- Zivanovic's order?
16 A. Yes, sir, this is connected. This is the report from the
17 Drina Corps back to the higher headquarters, advising them of the results
18 of the operation.
19 Q. All right. And in your view, this -- would General Mladic --
20 should he have been aware of this information?
21 A. Yes, sir. He should have been made aware of this information.
22 Q. And as we look at the bottom of the first page in English, under
23 "our forces," it says:
24 "In a very precise and professional operation," then they're not
25 exactly sure what's said but it appears to be VRS forces "forced the
1 UNPROFOR check-point in Zeleni Jadar to withdraw in panic to
2 Srebrenica ..."
4 "They were stopped on the road in the sector of an elevation ..."
5 And then it notes that:
6 "Force was used but there were no injuries to the UN personnel."
7 And if we go to the next page in English, it's under paragraph 3
8 so we need to go on to the next page in B/C/S. We note there that it
9 states that:
10 "We have had no casualties. We have expended small amounts of
11 ammunition and three Zoljas."
12 Is this consistent with the order that Zivanovic gave?
13 A. Yes, sir, it's consistent in so much as his direction to use
14 those under certain circumstances. It would appear that at least three
15 of them were expended; again, however, I have not read the Dutch version
16 of this particular operation so I can't comment as to whether or not they
17 were used precisely as Colonel or General Zivanovic intended.
18 Q. And I bring this up to ask you, do we see anything in the attack
19 on the enclave itself that -- any attacks on the UN OPs by the VRS?
20 A. Yes, sir. When the Krivaja 95 operation begins, one of the
21 patterns that one sees with the advancing VRS forces as they come up to
22 these UN check-points is that they are operating under a great deal of
23 restraint. They do not want to engage the UN forces in combat
24 operations, yet they know that they need to get around those particular
25 check-points or otherwise bypass them. So there is a great deal of
1 manoeuvre and fire that's in the general direction of but not at the
2 UNPROFOR and those check-points in order to coerce them to leave the
3 positions under threat but not to actually attack them.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right, I'd offer this document in evidence.
5 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 19557 will be Exhibit P2100,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's now go to P1087, that's the map book. It
11 should be page 25.
12 Q. And this is a map I think the Trial Chamber is familiar with.
13 It's a map of the enclave from the VRS where General Mladic has signed it
14 up in the left-hand corner, saying "I approve." And it's entitled
15 "Krivaja 95." And we'll see from this page some of the other
16 translations. But, Mr. Butler, there is -- I think we'll acknowledge the
17 date on -- the only date we see here is 12 July where it's a handwritten
18 note noted that: "Completed - this was Serbian and it's now Serbian,
19 12 July," signed by General Mladic, but there is no other -- other date
20 on this approval document.
21 When, in your view, would a map like this be approved in relation
22 to an operation such as this?
23 A. Using the command and staff manual of the Yugoslav national army,
24 which the VRS did as part of their command and staff processes during the
25 war, it lays out in great detail the military staff process and the
1 deliberative planning process. Normally for complex operations, the
2 military practice is that the headquarters that was planning the
3 operation - in this particular case the Drina Corps - would brief their
4 higher headquarters and obtain the approval of the higher commander
5 before the operation was finalised and the orders were given out. Very
6 often, in order for everyone to be able to completely visualise all
7 aspects of the plan, this briefing would be given using the aid of a map
8 graphic, such as you see here. My examination of this document reflects
9 that it is the map graphic that would correspond to what is the
10 Krivaja 1995 plan.
11 On the lower right-hand corner, you have the signature of the
12 corps commander at the time, General Zivanovic, where he submits this
13 plan. And as per the military practice that the VRS undertook, on the
14 upper left-hand corner you have the approval of the superior commander,
15 in this case General Mladic. I understand from prior testimony in a
16 prior case, the origin of the writing on this particular map dated
17 12 July 1995, but it is my opinion that this actual map graphic minus
18 that writing on 12 July was actually produced as part of the
19 Drina Corps's presentation of the Krivaja 95 plan to the Main Staff.
20 Q. And can you give us -- we will see the plan itself, but can you
21 give us any kind of a date range or estimate regarding when you think
22 that would have been based on what -- your knowledge?
23 A. My understanding is that the plan itself was put on paper on
24 2 July, so I believe that the plan was actually briefed to the Main Staff
25 shortly before 2 July 1995. I think between late May and the first day
1 of -- or, I'm sorry, late June/first day of July, 1995. I believe that
2 some individuals associated with that have testified in previous
3 cases - they may have testified in this Trial Chamber as well.
4 Q. All right.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter number --
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we first move the map up a bit so that we can
7 see the lower right-hand side part of it. Thank you very much.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And now can we go to 65 ter 5691.
9 Q. And as we're getting to that, Mr. Butler, this will be a
10 Main Staff report to the president of the Republika Srpska dated 2 July,
11 where the -- it's basically the Main Staff version of the daily combat
12 reports which the Court has heard about to the various corps.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to page 3 in both languages
14 where we have the Drina Corps section --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we -- you deal with that document,
16 Mr. McCloskey, I see in your list of documents to be used that the map we
17 just looked at, P1087, is marked for identification.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Um --
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I don't remember why.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I believe that was the map book that was part of
21 the admin hearing that we had -- we had attempted to clear up at the
22 admin hearing that we both -- though, you may be actually ruling on that
23 still. Perhaps Mr. Ivetic recalls. I think that the ball may be in your
24 court on that.
25 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, if I may, this particular map was not
1 one of the ones that was objected to. The ones that were objected to
2 were in the A series of the map book at the beginning that were generated
3 by the Office of the Prosecutor based upon unknown information, and I
4 believe we are still awaiting a final decision on that. But this map
5 that was used, this particular page, I don't believe was subject to that
7 JUDGE ORIE: That refreshes my recollection as well, yes. We'll
8 pay attention to it.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President? I just missed your
10 last --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that it refreshes my recollection --
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ah --
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- and we'll pay attention to it.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Thank you. All right.
15 Q. Yes. So we're now at this Main Staff report for 2 July. It
16 should be at page 3, yes. And under the "Drina Corps - situation in the
17 corps," it says that:
18 "The corps units are in full combat readiness and are keeping a
19 strong hold on positions reached."
20 And then this is the part I want to ask you:
21 "Unengaged forces are being prepared for the forthcoming active
22 combat operations."
23 What in your view, if you have one, what operations are they
24 talking about there? They're not -- they don't tell us outwardly. They
25 don't tell the president outwardly.
1 A. No, sir. Given the date of this document and the context of
2 what's being discussed, they're talking about the Krivaja 95 operation,
3 which as part of the operation required units to disengage some forces
4 from their current positions and to move them towards the enclave.
5 Q. All right. And in this -- if we look at the -- we don't need to
6 but we'll see the last page of this, this is under General Miletic and --
7 standing in for Milovanovic who is at the Krajina. Is that your
9 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
10 Q. All right.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this document into evidence.
12 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 05691 will be Exhibit P2101,
15 Your Honours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: P2101 is admitted.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to P1465.
18 Q. This is a document the Trial Chamber has seen. It is the -- from
19 the command of the Drina Corps in the name of General Zivanovic dated
20 2 July entitled "Krivaja 95." And this is the attack order that you've
21 been referring to, is it not, Mr. Butler?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. All right. Let's go over some bits of this. The first part we
24 see is largely a discussion of the layout of the Muslim forces, though we
25 do see in paragraph 1 a reference to an order to cut the Drina Corps area
1 of responsibility in two, something I think we'll all recall hearing
2 before. Now let's go to page 3 in the English, it should be B/C/S
3 page 2, I want to take you to what's numbered 2. And it says:
4 "The Command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to Operations Directive
5 number 7 and 7/1 of the Main Staff, and on the basis of the situation in
6 the Corps area of responsibility, has tasks of carrying out offensive
7 activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as
8 possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica,
9 and to reduce them to their urban areas."
10 Now, first of all, can you tie-in this reference to 7 and 7/1 to
11 your opinion regarding whether 7/1 had replaced directive 7?
12 A. Yes, sir. As I testified yesterday, it is my view that
13 directive 7/1 supplemented directive 7 and it did not replace
14 directive 7. The fact that in this particular order they reference both
15 documents and not the most recent document, directive 7/1, again, it's
16 one of these -- it's this type of reference that I use to support my
17 opinion that directive 7 did -- was supplemented and not -- or basically
19 Q. All right. And then to that last part, the mention of splitting
20 apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, you've mentioned that before.
21 Is that the same analysis from your -- the previous references, or
22 because of this document is there any change in what you have said about
24 A. No, sir, I believe the guidance remains consistent with
25 directive 7 and 7/1.
1 Q. And you've already talked about what that meant. And this last
2 reference, "... and to reduce them to their urban areas."
3 First of all, what does that mean to you? We saw from the --
4 Pecanac's report that the enclave was roughly, I think, 150 square
5 kilometres, we've seen the map ourselves. So what's the urban area in
6 size, roughly, as far as you know, to Srebrenica?
7 A. My knowledge is it's approximately 1 kilometre by 3 kilometres.
8 So you're talking a very small area in the valley focused around the
9 immediate town of Srebrenica and its environs.
10 Q. So what do you believe this means, this reference to "reduce the
12 A. What it says. By reducing the enclave to that very small urban
13 area, at least militarily, it would be impossible for the
14 28th Infantry Division to remain, to hide in the enclave, or to conduct
15 any military-related activities there.
16 Q. What would you expect the civilian population to do upon the
18 A. I -- what I would expect is that, you know, given the background
19 and history of the area, the civilian population would flee towards
20 Srebrenica. They would not seek to remain where they were and,
21 essentially, find themselves in Bosnian Serb military-controlled
23 Q. So if the bulk of the population of the Srebrenica enclave fled
24 into the urban area of Srebrenica, what kind of situation would that
1 A. I believe it would create a situation analogous to that which
2 existed in late March/early April of 1993, where you had a rather large
3 civilian population essentially jammed into a small area that did not
4 have the ability to support that population and where you had, in
5 essence, you know, as that crisis wore on the United Nations forces were
6 moving thousands of civilians from Srebrenica.
7 Q. Are you referring to the time-period when General Morillon
8 stepped in, and we can see him on film amongst the crowd of Srebrenica,
9 in 1993?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. All right. Let's go down to paragraph -- the bottom of
12 paragraph 4, where it's under "objective." It says:
13 "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce the size of the
14 Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to improve the tactical position of the
15 forces in depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination
16 of the enclaves."
17 What does this mean, in your view, "create conditions for the
18 elimination of the enclaves"?
19 A. Again, this is consistent with the language of directive 7.
20 There was no intention, at least as far as the mili diary documents
21 reflect, that the VRS, even in the abstract event that the 28th Division
22 could somehow be militarily defeated, that they would still want the
23 enclave or a UN protected zone to exist there, even if it simply
24 consisted of civilians under UN protection. Their objective, as
25 articulated in many documents, was the elimination of the enclave, not
1 simply the elimination of the military threat of the 28th Division.
2 Q. Is this an order for an all-out attack on the enclave to take
3 them or something else?
4 A. No, sir. And that is the unique thing about both directive 7 and
5 this order. They did not order an attack to capture the town of
6 Srebrenica, effectively eliminating the enclave. They did not believe
7 that they could -- at least in the initial phase, it was clear that they
8 didn't believe that they could obtain that objective, particularly, you
9 know -- it was a prudent decision obviously in light of the perceived
10 strength of the 28th Division, the relative limited number of their own
11 friendly forces that could attack, as well as the unpredictable nature,
12 particularly after June of 1995, where NATO had actually bombed VRS
13 forces, the unpredictable nature and response that they may get out of
14 the UN or NATO. So they didn't believe at the early stages of this
15 operation that they could capture the town and they did not plan to.
16 They did, however, believe that they could launch offensive operations
17 and be successful to a point, which would then lead to a further set of
18 circumstances, again perhaps in the same vein as 1993, where the
19 United Nations themselves would choose to end the presence of the
20 enclaves and have the UN evacuate the population.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek some clarification of one of your
22 previous answers. You said:
23 "Their objective, as articulated in many documents, was the
24 elimination of the enclave, not simply the elimination of the military
25 threat of the 28th Division."
1 But the line before that you said that:
2 "... that they would still want the enclave or the UN protected
3 zone to exist there."
4 Now, eliminating the enclave and still wishing --
5 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, that's -- I don't believe I said that, I
6 hope I didn't say that.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that's -- therefore, I'm seeking
8 clarification. Perhaps you could --
9 THE WITNESS: To repeat, as envisioned in the military documents
10 that I've discussed, the VRS military leadership had always put in those
11 documents the elimination of the enclave. It is not a circumstance - at
12 least as far as I can tell from the documents - that the VRS ever would
13 envision a situation where the 28th Division was militarily defeated and
14 no longer a factor, yet there would still be a UN protected enclave deep
15 within the territory of the Republika Srpska.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Q. Let's go now right to July 9th, after some days of combat, and to
20 D288. This is a document from the Drina Corps forward command post at
21 Pribicevac dated 9 July from the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps,
22 General Krstic. And it describes the -- some of the combat and the
23 areas. And then in paragraph 3 entitled: "Decision for further
24 operations," he states:
25 "Taking advantage of the success achieved, regroup the forces and
1 carry out a vigorous and decisive attack towards Srebrenica."
2 And then as we go down to paragraph 4, it talks a bit about the
3 UNPROFOR check-points, and concludes that paragraph with:
4 "UNPROFOR forces from the base in Potocari village did not
5 intervene at the check-points or attack our forces."
6 Does General Krstic's interim combat report to the Main Staff and
7 the Drina Corps command, does that change the nature of this -- this
8 objective at this point?
9 A. Yes, sir, it does.
10 Q. And how so?
11 A. Based on the success of the combat operations, as envisioned or
12 as articulated in this interim report, General Krstic is advising his
13 superiors that they're going to continue combat operations towards the
14 town, not necessarily to capture the town. But he's certainly at this
15 juncture raising the prospect that that option may for the very first
16 time for the VRS be available. And as other documents that happened in
17 the future demonstrate, that then led to a decision predicated obviously
18 by discussions, where the objective of Krivaja 95 is then changed by the
19 president of the Republika Srpska to include the capture or the
20 liberation of the town of Srebrenica.
21 Q. Okay. Taking us briefly back to directive 7, where you'll recall
22 there's a reference after making life unbearable to starting a plan
23 should UNPROFOR leave the enclave, and then we see down here, as I just
24 read, that during these combat days Krstic is telling his command that
25 the UNPROFOR did not intervene in the check-points or attack the forces.
1 Would this have been -- the UNPROFOR's activity been a factor in the VRS
2 command and decision to go forward and change the objective?
3 A. I believe that with respect to what General Krstic thought it was
4 as well as the lack of any activity by NATO at the same time. The
5 perception, of course, that he had was that the UN was not going to
6 defend the enclave based on the activities of the UNPROFOR to date.
7 Q. All right. Now let's go to P1466, a document that the
8 Trial Chamber has seen, I believe, several times. And it is dated
9 9 July, very urgent, to the president of the Republika Srpska, for
10 information at Drina Corps IKM, Generals Gvero and Krstic personally, and
11 it's in the name of Zdravko Tolimir and notes, among other things, that:
12 "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of the
13 successful combat operations around Srebrenica ..." and the results
14 achieved. And then it says:
15 "The President of the Republic is satisfied with the results of
16 combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the continuation
17 of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica, disarming of the Muslim
18 terrorist gangs and complete demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave."
19 It goes on to say: Take care of the civilian population and
20 follow the Geneva Conventions, as we can see there.
21 What is your -- first of all, does this provide us an indication
22 of the whereabouts of any senior officers? We see this is in the name
23 from General Tolimir.
24 A. On this date -- I mean, one of the first things that's notable is
25 that General Gvero, a Main Staff officer, is present with General Krstic
1 at the Drina Corps forward command post, observing the operations. As I
2 testified yesterday, based off of the documents and how the Main Staff
3 operated, it was a relatively common practice for an officer of the
4 Main Staff to be at a subordinate formation during a significant event
5 like this, to be able to monitor the operations and, as necessary,
6 provide guidance from the Main Staff.
7 General Tolimir in this particular context, I believe he's at the
8 Main Staff headquarters at Han Pijesak on 9 July 1995 and that this
9 particular -- he was the one who drafted this based off of the results of
10 a meeting with the president of the republic. I don't know where that
11 meeting took place or who participated in that meeting, where the
12 president was briefed on the results of the operation to date and
13 presumably briefed by the military that the objective could now be
14 changed to include the taking of Srebrenica and offering that up for the
15 approval of President Karadzic.
16 Q. Well, you say that the objective could be changed. What does
17 this document do in your view?
18 A. This document is the manifestation of the order to change the
19 objective by the president of the republic.
20 Q. And this language, "the president of the republic is satisfied
21 with the results of the combat operations around Srebrenica and has
22 agreed with the continuation ..." what does the term "has agreed" -- what
23 meaning can you give to that?
24 A. Again, what this supposes in this context is that the military
25 officials who briefed General Karadzic [sic] of this plan obviously
1 briefed him on the military situation, briefed him on their capabilities,
2 but -- and made recommendations to the president of the republic as the
3 supreme commander of the armed forces. That -- as one looks at the
4 structure of the Republika Srpska Supreme Command body, again it bears
5 noting that while officers like General Mladic and General Milovanovic
6 advised that -- the Supreme Command and can make proposals to it, they
7 are not actually members of the Supreme Command; it is a strictly
8 civilian body. So in this particular context, it's the role of the
9 military to make proposals and ultimately the role of the
10 Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme Command - in this case the president of
11 the republic - to accept those proposals and make them as orders or to
12 modify those proposals and then they're transmitted back down through
13 those officers for implementation.
14 Q. One last question. You said the Supreme Command was a strictly
15 civilian body. Was there an army officer on that civil -- on the
16 Supreme Command, a minister of defence, or am I wrong on that?
17 A. The minister of defence -- there was not a VRS officer on it.
18 The Supreme Command consisted of both the minister of defence and the
19 minister of the interior, but there was not a member of the VRS
20 Main Staff who was a member of the Supreme Command.
21 Q. And the minister of defence, was that person a military man, if
22 you know?
23 A. I don't recall who the minister of defence was in 1995. I think
24 it was still Subotic who was nominally a colonel, but played more of a
25 role of a civilian than a military officer at that point.
1 Q. Okay. Thank you.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's a good time to take a break.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, before we do so, could I ask one question, just
4 whether I understood your testimony well. Was the plan always to reduce
5 the size of the enclave and in the long term for it to be eliminated but
6 not initially by taking over the town of Srebrenica itself? And that
7 only in this respect on the 9th of July plans were changed and that the
8 elimination on the long term changed more or less by taking over the
9 town? Is that how I have to understand the main line of what you told
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Again, looking at the Krivaja 95 order,
12 there is no mention of an objective being the capture or liberation.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah.
14 THE WITNESS: That -- the base plan was successfully executed and
15 only on the 9th of July, based on the success of the base plan was an
16 initial -- was a further objective then given to now, for the first time,
17 actually physically capture or liberate the town.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Which also would result in the immediate termination
19 of the existence of the enclave as such?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Because it was not reduced anymore, it wouldn't
22 exist any further?
23 THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
25 We take a break. Could you please follow the usher.
1 [The witness stands down]
2 JUDGE ORIE: We'll resume at ten minutes to 11.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
6 Meanwhile, I use the time to correct myself. I said a few things
7 this morning about D353 and I referred to it as a chart where there were
8 objections. Now, it -- what I said is actually related to D354, which is
9 MFI'd, which is a table that the Defence used during the
10 cross-examination of Witness Turkusic. Yesterday through an informal
11 communication, the Defence informed the Prosecution and the Chamber that
12 the translation for D354, MFI, had been uploaded into e-court and asked
13 for admission of the document.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: In an e-mail sent later yesterday, the Prosecution
16 objected to the admission of the document and the Chamber invites the
17 parties to put their submissions regarding D354, MFI, on the record.
18 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, now I know when you said it's 354, we
19 will propose to maintain this document MFI'd until our ballistics experts
20 are here. So actually we are not asking for this document to be admitted
21 yet only to -- that translation to be attached --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. LUKIC: -- to that document.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Leave is granted to attach it and we will wait and
25 see and D354 keeps the status of being marked for identification.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Butler, we were so impolite as to deal with
3 other matters when you entered the courtroom. Mr. McCloskey will,
4 however, correct this and continue his examination.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
6 Q. Okay. We now on July 10 -- excuse me, July 9. We have the
7 object changing and can you tell us were any special police and MUP
8 forces brought in to the Srebrenica operation after that decision to now
9 actually take the town itself?
10 A. Yes, sir. In light of the decision to take the town itself, an
11 acknowledgement that additional forces would be required to do that,
12 orders were given by the Ministry of the Interior to have a number of
13 special police units sent to Srebrenica.
14 Q. And can you tell us who was to be in command of that -- those
16 A. The commander of those particular units from the special police
17 forces, primarily from Jahorina, was Ljubisa Borovcanin.
18 Q. And the Trial Chamber has heard a bit about him, seen him on the
19 video with his forces around Sandici and in Kravica. And can you tell
20 us -- and we'll get into some documents, but can you just briefly tell us
21 in your view when Borovcanin and his forces arrived to the battle area,
22 whose -- under whose command were they?
23 A. In accordance with the Republika Srpska Law on the Ministry of
24 the Interior under a state of imminent threat of war or under a state of
25 war, when military -- when police forces are operating in a military
1 zone, they do fall under the command of the military commanders.
2 Q. And do you recall, are there some basic requirements of people
3 who have to make requests and approve these things?
4 A. Yes, sir. Many of the provisions under which the police will
5 serve under military command and control are outlined in this particular
7 Q. All right. Let's go to 65 ter 4048. And we can see that this is
8 from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior, cabinet of the minister.
9 It's dated 10 July. It comes out under the name of -- we have it Staff
10 Commander Tomislav Kovac. Do you recall his position at the time?
11 A. If I recall correctly, in July of 1995 at this time he was the
12 acting minister of the interior.
13 Q. All right. And we can see that it's to the commander of the
14 Special Police Brigade and various staffs of those forces, Trnovo,
15 Vogosca, Bijeljina, and then the Zvornik CJB and the Sarajevo CJB and the
16 Jahorina police training camp. Now, is this group a mixture of special
17 police forces and regular CJB, which are basically civilian police
19 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
20 Q. All right. And the first line we see underneath those folks is:
21 "Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Commander of the
22 Republika Srpska Armed Forces, and in order to crush the enemy offensive
23 being carried out from the safe area of Srebrenica."
24 We see that that would be Radovan Karadzic of course. And is
25 this -- is his approval required under the law, as you recall?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. All right. And then we see the order, I won't read it all, but
4 "Detach a part of RS MUP that are taking part in the combat
5 operations on the Sarajevo front and send them ... on the 11th ... to the
6 Srebrenica sector."
7 And it lists the group of units, Special Police Detachment
8 Sekovici, 1st Company of PJP. Without getting into the translation, are
9 PJP, are those civilian police officers?
10 A. We generally -- when we look at the acronym "PJP," we generally
11 associate that with the municipal police forces or, as Mr. McCloskey
12 says, the civilian police forces as separate from the special police
14 Q. And I know the Defence will agree, as they have many times, that
15 the translation of those units "special police unit" causes confusion.
16 So we just will stick with the "PJP" as opposed to the translation. It
17 also says:
18 "... a mixed company of the joint RSK, Serbian and RS MUP forces
19 and a company from the training camp at Jahorina."
20 Then it designates Borovcanin, the deputy commander of the
21 special police, as the commander of these MUP units. And then it
22 basically describes how he's supposed to leave the Trnovo battle-field
23 with the destination of the area to report to General Krstic. Now -- to
24 the Bratunac area.
25 As far as you know, were there any Serbian MUP units working with
1 Borovcanin at the Sarajevo-Trnovo front?
2 A. Yes, sir. I'm aware that there were.
3 Q. All right. And let's -- I want to come back to this important
4 document, but let's for now jump to 65 ter 40 --
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you do that, I would like to ask a
6 question in relation to item 5 of this order.
7 Mr. McCloskey has used the term "to report to General Krstic."
8 In the English translation it is -- there is another term "to make
9 contact with the Corps Chief of Staff, General Krstic."
10 What is your understanding of the word "to make contact," if that
11 is the right translation, bearing in mind that Mr. Borovcanin had a
12 certain rank, I don't know exactly, he was deputy commander of the
13 Special Police Brigade and to make contact with the general of the army.
14 What is your understanding what that means?
15 THE WITNESS: Again, going -- going to this particular paragraph,
16 at the time General Krstic is the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and
17 he's also known to be the actual commander of the forces involved in
18 Krivaja 1995. So he is the senior military person on the ground at the
19 time this order is written as far as the Ministry of the Interior people
20 know. So it would be normal for them to order Borovcanin to report to or
21 to make contact with the senior military officer so he can receive the
22 instructions as to what his units were supposed to do or how they were
23 supposed to integrate themselves into the conflict.
24 As it turns out and I believe as Mr. Borovcanin notes, by the
25 time he gets there and makes contact, in fact now General Mladic is
1 there. So as -- by custom, Borovcanin's going to report to the senior
2 officer, which is General Mladic, and receive his orders from that
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY:
6 Q. Yes. And I will get back and we'll get a little more detail on
7 that, but -- and if we could skip ahead and I move to 65 ter 4078. And
8 this is a document in the name of -- that Borovcanin has done entitled --
9 well, from the MUP, Special Police Brigade Trnovo. And we see that it's
10 talking -- it's dated 1 July and it's talking about various combat
11 activities on the -- at the Trnovo front. And it also makes a note, we
12 see on the third line of the English:
13 "... and two platoons from each of the Kajman, Plavi and Skorpija
14 detachments (the MUP of Serbia) have been attacking the Lucevik
15 feature ..."
16 This Skorpija MUP unit, are they the now-well-known unit involved
17 in the video of executions in the Trnovo area?
18 A. Yes, sir, I believe this is the same unit.
19 Q. And so -- so what's -- what's going on here with the special
20 police and these MUP units? They appear to be in combat together?
21 A. Yes, sir. One of -- things that it was customarily seen through
22 the conflict is that in some battle-field areas Serbian MUP units were
23 rotated into Bosnia and Herzegovina to fight alongside the
24 Republika Srpska MUP forces for a variety of reasons.
25 Q. All right.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: So now I would offer this document into evidence.
2 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04078 will be Exhibit P2102,
5 Your Honours.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: So let's go back --
7 JUDGE ORIE: P2102 is admitted.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me.
9 Q. Let's go back to 65 ter 4048, and as I'd noted earlier we saw
10 that there was a reference that Serbian MUP would be coming along with
11 Borovcanin. Has the investigation or have any of your documents revealed
12 any information on whether or not the Serbian MUP actually came to the
13 Srebrenica-Bratunac-Konjevic Polje battle area during the time-frame
15 A. No, sir. It was an area that both I looked at with respect to
16 the military documents and the investigation pursued, and I'm not aware
17 of any information that, you know, notwithstanding this order that they
18 accompany the forces, that they actually in fact did accompany those
19 forces and were in Srebrenica.
20 Q. All right. And getting back to paragraph 5, where we have that
22 "On arrival at his destination the unit commander is obliged to
23 make contact with the Corps Chief of Staff, General Krstic."
24 And you've referenced this regarding Judge Fluegge's question,
25 but can you tell us do you -- what is your interpretation of now any
1 command relationship between Borovcanin and Krstic?
2 A. In this context and in accordance with the RS law on the issue,
3 once Borovcanin makes contact or reports to the senior army commander, he
4 falls under that individual's command as well as the police units there
5 for the duration of the assigned mission.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I'd offer this document into
8 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04048 will be Exhibit P2103,
11 Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: P2103 is admitted.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY:
14 Q. And I'd like to take us to a document. You do have it cited in
15 your report, 65 ter 4387. It is from the Official Gazette of the
16 Republika Srpska and is a law, and I would like us to go to page 12 in
17 the English. It should be in the Serbian page 4 and 5. And it's
18 entitled: "The use of police units in combat operations." And I think
19 after reading the bottom of the page there in the Serbian, we can now go
20 to the next page in the Serbian.
21 But, Mr. Butler, looking here at these Articles 13, especially
22 Articles 14, where they're talking about the requirements of the command
23 when there's joint combat operations, is this the law you were talking
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. So can you clarify this to us, does -- what does Borovcanin
2 retain in terms of command when he is -- once he is under the command of
3 the army?
4 A. As -- particularly as listed in Article 14, once police forces
5 fall under command of the army, the army's control over them is not
6 absolute. For example, Borovcanin has been appointed as the commander of
7 that police unit. It is not under the army's authority to relieve
8 Colonel Borovcanin and then appoint him with somebody else. The army
9 cannot, for example, disband a police unit and then use the individual
10 soldiers of that unit to plus-up army units. So there are limits to what
11 the army can do with police units, and in most situations need limits to
12 the extent that the army can use police forces are known in advance to
13 the military and to the police commanders so there's no confusion in the
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document into evidence.
17 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04387 will be Exhibit P2104,
20 Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, we looked at a certain page, I think you
22 showed that, where the resubordination and the structure of police forces
23 in combat are dealt with. I see the totality of the document is 44
24 pages. Now, do we need all of that in this context?
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: My view, Mr. President, would be no, that the
1 first page and the two pages of the Serbian would be fine and the one
2 page of English would be fine as far as we're concerned. We normally
3 don't pick out the law like that, but I think it's -- I would fully agree
4 that we should simplify this and I have no problem with doing that.
5 JUDGE ORIE: For the Defence, is there any need for further
6 context, because what we looked at is specifically and I think
7 exclusively the command structure over police forces which are used for
8 combat operations.
9 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. I would like to defer until the
10 end of cross-examination as to the -- as to whether certain other
11 articles might be referred to or not, but I would agree with opposing
12 counsel, that there's no need for the entire -- the entire 65 ter number
13 to be -- that is in e-court to be admitted. It's just the ones that
14 would be used by the parties.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then for the time being, Exhibit P2104 as
16 uploaded in e-court is marked for identification. The parties are
17 invited to agree on what are the relevant pages we should look at, apart,
18 of course, from the first page which gives the necessary details of the
19 Official Gazette in which it was published. Yes, it is a photocopy of
20 the Official Gazette.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
22 Q. Mr. Butler, on -- continuing on this related issue and getting a
23 bit off our narrative, but I would like to keep this as clear as
24 possible. I would like to go to now P724 which is a document that I
25 think we sometimes refer to as Borovcanin's after-action report. It's a
1 document that is signed by Borovcanin that we've received from him, and
2 this is a document that you're familiar with, Mr. Butler?
3 A. Yes, sir, I am.
4 Q. And we see that it's dated 5 September 1995, but that we see in
5 the title of it under "report" that it was from the period of 11 July to
6 21 July. And I do not want to go through all the detail of it, but I do
7 want to ask you about a couple of details. I mean, we can see that it
8 starts out by providing the order 64/95 and that is the 10 July order
9 that we just referred to earlier and begins to provide a chronology. The
10 first thing I want to ask you about, it should be on page 2 in the
11 English. It may be page 3 in the B/C/S, and we see at the top of the
12 page in English he's talking about when he arrived in Bratunac on the
13 11th. He mentions Pribicevac and then going to Pribicevac. And he says
15 "... I contacted General Mladic who personally commanded over the
16 operation. On receipt of combat papers, he ordered me to go that same
17 day with all available manpower and equipment from the direction of
18 Zuti Most to Potocari and Milacevici ..."
19 Now, we saw in the 10 July document that he was to report to
20 Krstic, but I think you've explained that, that with Mladic present, he
21 would have reported to Mladic. Now, the fact that Mladic issued him this
22 order, does that clear up any issues of who's -- who he's under the
23 command of?
24 A. I think it's evidently clear that Borovcanin believes that he's
25 under the command of General Mladic.
1 Q. And that day, on the 11th, did he do -- did he actually -- was he
2 able to follow those orders and attack from Zuti Most or did that happen
4 A. As he notes, he -- his units weren't fully assembled at that
5 time, but, in fact, that course of action was taken, beginning the
6 morning of the 12th.
7 Q. All right. And going over to page 3 in the English, he's now
8 talking about the 12th and how they did advance. He gives estimates of
9 the people. Just the information that we're reading here on these days,
10 does it -- is it roughly consistent with the information in your reports
11 and in -- from the investigation?
12 A. Yes, sir, it is. There is one or two exceptions, but I think
13 you'll point those out.
14 Q. We see, for example:
15 "... we received information from state security employees that
16 12.000 to 15.000 able-bodied men, mostly armed Muslims, were moving from
17 Srebrenica towards Konjevic Polje ..."
18 Is that 12- to 15.000 men roughly consistent with the estimates
19 that we have been getting over the years?
20 A. Yes, sir, it is.
21 Q. Then he goes on to say:
22 "I received an order from General Mladic to send half of my men
23 and the available technical equipment to the axis so that to block the
24 area and fight the aforementioned formation."
25 Again, is this consistent with his troops on this day being under
1 the command of Mladic and the VRS?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And we're getting a bit ahead of ourselves in the chronology
4 here, but I just wanted to deal with that particular issue and that's
5 already in evidence so I'll go on to the next Borovcanin-related document
6 and that is 65 ter 20976A. This is an intercept you've spoken about many
7 times over the years. It's between Krstic and Borovcanin from the
8 Specials [Realtime transcript read in error "expeditiously"], according
9 to the intercept operator. And I won't read it all out. It's from the
10 13th of July, and Krstic is asking him if he has any problems. And
11 Borovcanin responds:
12 "It's going well."
13 And he confirms, again, to General Krstic that he does not have
14 any problems.
15 Can you put us in the chronology of the alleged criminal events.
16 At 2040 hours on the 13th of July, had Borovcanin been present in and
17 around any particular events, and I don't want us to conclude about any
18 involvement at this point or anything.
19 A. Yes, sir. As noted by the Petrovic video,
20 then-Colonel Borovcanin is at the Kravica warehouse at approximately
21 1700 hours on 13 July 1995.
22 Q. All right. And regarding the command issue, how would this --
23 this conversation fit into your view? Can you glean anything from any
24 kind of command relationship in a discussion like this?
25 A. Yes, sir. And in fact, this conversation occurs shortly after a
1 ceremony at the Drina Corps headquarters presided by General Mladic,
2 where General Krstic is promoted from the position of the Chief of Staff
3 to the position of the corps commander of the Drina Corps. So now in his
4 capacity as the corps commander, General Krstic is calling subordinates
5 and getting reports from them as to what the current situation is.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this into evidence.
7 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, the Defence would object, as we have
8 for these intercepts, that they have not been authenticated sufficiently
9 so as to be proven reliable. I -- looking at this one, I believe this
10 is -- no, I'm not sure that this is an ABiH intercept to which this
11 witness has testified about. So that would be an additional objection.
12 I believe this was from some other entity, although I'm not sure whether
13 we're allowed to talk about it in open court.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If not, do we have to -- do we need to go into
15 private session?
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't believe so, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Then you have an opportunity to respond to the
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this intercept is already in
20 evidence as P01294; however, it is the -- only the handwritten version of
21 the intercept, and therefore the date from, as you may recall, the
22 print-out of the intercept is not on the document that's in evidence. So
23 I've offered the 65 ter version of it with the appropriate print-out
24 version which gives the date and it's been blocked out in black, as was
25 the agreed procedure so that it would not be confused with other
1 intercepts. And we are endeavouring for these intercept issues to sort
2 them out so that you see the intercepts and you see the dates with them.
3 It's a rather complex issue that we're -- that I don't believe there's
4 really any -- I don't think we're contesting -- there's any contest about
5 that particular part of it. But that is a bit of the confusion why I
6 offer this particular intercept into evidence, so that we're getting the
7 print-out version, basically. The other part is really in evidence.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the substance is in evidence I do
9 understand and -- from McCloskey and the date, it's just -- the matter
10 apparently is how the Chamber will get acquainted with the dates rather
11 than whether.
12 Any further comments?
13 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. First of all, we have, I think,
14 even at the time that the other witnesses who came to testify about
15 intercepts, always maintained our objection, and I believe -- I can't
16 speak for this one because I believe it is a witness that I did not
17 cross, but the issue of whether -- what date is for a particular
18 intercept I think should have been addressed with that witness, not
19 through this witness. So again, I believe that for purposes of -- of the
20 intercepts, we maintain our objection from before. And I understand that
21 Your Honours have admitted certain intercepts for varying reasons into
22 evidence already, but I simply think that at this time through this
23 witness if -- you know, I don't know how he can provide information that
24 was not available when the other witnesses testified as to the
25 handwritten versions that were -- of this one that was introduced. I
1 don't have it in front of me now to be able to see if it's the exact
2 same, et cetera, but --
3 JUDGE ORIE: I think wisest thing to do would be to give you an
4 opportunity to again revisit the details, Mr. Ivetic, and then hear your
5 final position and we'll then decide.
6 MR. IVETIC: Fair enough.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar -- yes.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. McCloskey, could you just explain for me why
9 you are tendering this if it is already in evidence as P1294?
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, I'll -- it's probably best
11 that I show you. If we could go to P01294. And, by the way, I know
12 Mr. Butler is very --
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Not to be shown to the public because it's under
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. I know Mr. Butler is very familiar
17 with this -- all this material, but this is the document that came in
18 through the bar table in evidence. And as you can see, this is from the
19 handwritten notebook of the 2nd Corps which, as you may recall, is the --
20 we had the original handwritten notes. But you also may recall that the
21 dates were not always written in the notebook. Once they gave the
22 notebook to the typist, they typed out on an e-mail-type arrangement and
23 that always injected the date. And so this came in through the bar table
24 motion in an abbreviated format with just the page of the handwritten
25 notebook. If we go back through the notebook, you can eventually find a
1 date and then go forward to realise the date, but there's a lot of pages
2 and a lot of extra in that and it's really clearly established with the
4 So we have kept these to a minimum; however, in so doing, some of
5 the intercepts don't have the date. And so in order to avoid the problem
6 of not having a date and the record, we have been able to come up with
7 the date from the print-out in this case and put it in another format.
8 The dates of the intercepts have never been contested; the intercepts
9 themselves have. The records are very clear, and the only problem is in
10 our efforts to make this simpler it may have become a bit more complex
11 and we're working on that.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: But with respect, I still don't understand why
13 you're tendering something that is already in evidence.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Because there's no dates on the one that's in
15 evidence, there's no date.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could we see -- Mr. Ivetic, is there any chance that
17 the parties could stipulate that the date under which this handwritten --
18 this handwritten excerpt of the -- of these intercepts appears is the
19 date as we find it now, that is, the 13th of July if I'm not mistaken? I
20 mean, I'm not talking about anything else but the date to be found in
21 that handwritten version but not on this page. Would you consider that?
22 MR. IVETIC: I would consider that, Your Honour. We, of course,
23 maintain our position that we believe these intercepts are not generated
24 at the time that they are dated, but I believe that we could probably
25 agree that the text of two purported intercepts do appear to relate -- be
1 recorded as being a particular date, although we reserve objection to
2 that being the actual date at which time they were authored. And that
3 would perhaps --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but at least that what is written down in this
5 transcription of the intercept is a date, 13th of July. And let's see --
6 because if that would be a stipulation, Mr. -- would we still need --
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, the -- that's one way to resolve
8 it, but the -- while the handwritten materials are -- in a sense they're
9 the inked originals, it really is quite an analysis and sometimes to
10 going back through them to determine the date because --
11 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] --
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- as you recall the testimony, people wrote
13 dates sometimes and sometimes they didn't. So it's quite an analysis.
14 We've been through this in previous trials where each intercept operator
15 has testified. That's one of the reasons why many of these were in
16 evidence in previous cases already which is one of the justifications why
17 you've allowed them in evidence here. The best way to get the dates is
18 this print-out, the electronic print-out, that goes with many of them;
19 and where we don't have print-outs for a few, then we go through this
20 more complicated process of the handwritten version.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You're invited to seek agreement with the
22 Defence whether you could stipulate that the 13th of July is the date
23 which features in the document, perhaps on previous pages, and that this
24 therefore is covered by that date, true or not, but it's written down
25 there. In that case, we would need the new exhibit you are suggesting.
1 Therefore, it will be marked for identification at this moment and we'll
2 later decide, after you've talked to the Defence, whether the number can
3 be vacated.
4 Mr. Registrar, the number ...?
5 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 65 ter number 20976A will be
6 MFI P2105 [Realtime transcript read in error "P2103"] under seal.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And could we hear from you, let's say, later this
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, there will be
10 many more intercepts with a similar problem, but what Mr. Ivetic has said
11 gives me some hope that we can agree to argue over some things but not
12 perhaps the date. So we will get back to you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: On this -- in relation to this document, just one
15 observation in relation to the transcript, page 40, line -- lines 3 and
16 4, the sentence - this is a part of the submission by Mr. McCloskey -
17 should read "it's between Krstic and Borovcanin from the specials" and
18 not "expeditiously," because we can take that from the translation of the
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, thank you, that is what I said and that's,
21 of course, an important point.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's proceed.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed that is what you said.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Could we get a confirmation of the
25 MFI number? We see 2103 on the screen, is that correct, or was it 2105?
1 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. McCloskey, it's MFI P2105.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Ms. Stewart, for that.
3 Q. After a diversion into the special police and intercepts, let's
4 go back to the narrative chronology and if we could go to 65 ter 4168,
5 and as that's coming up on our screen we'll see that it's from the
6 Main Staff, second page in the English, it's from General Mladic and it's
7 an order to the commands of the Drina Corps and the 65th Protection
8 Regiment. And it says:
9 "Taking the defence line and improving the tactical position.
11 And it's basically talking about close the Zepa enclave.
12 Mr. Butler, briefly what is this and what does it show in your
13 view regarding General Mladic's knowledge of the battle-field situation
14 that we have on 10 July?
15 A. Well, clearly the Main Staff and in general and General Mladic in
16 particular have been keeping aware of the successes at Srebrenica and, as
17 they would normally be expected to do, they are already starting to
18 anticipate what those successes mean and what steps that they should be
19 taking in the future in order to continue to maintain the momentum. What
20 you see in this order is essentially on the 10th anticipating continued
21 success, he's ordering forces, some from the Drina Corps, some from the
22 65th Protection Regiment, to undertake or prepare to undertake operations
23 beginning on the 12th in order to take advantage of the continuing
24 favourable situation at Srebrenica.
25 Q. By the 10th of July, the -- they haven't even been into
1 Srebrenica yet. In your view, is this proper planning on the general's
2 part? Or is he really jumping ahead of the game when he should be
3 concentrating on the business at hand?
4 A. I would definitely have the opinion that he is properly doing
5 what he is supposed to be doing. It's -- on 10 July it's
6 General Krstic's job to fight the immediate battle at Srebrenica, and on
7 10 July it's General Mladic's job, as the next higher headquarters, to
8 set the stage and circumstances for the next operation. Generals are
9 taught as part of their professional training to not think in the
10 present; they need to think in the future. So the fact that
11 General Mladic is already thinking ahead for potential opportunities is
12 exactly what he should be doing as a function of his professional
13 training and his position.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I offer this into evidence.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Um --
16 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, the document consists of two orders.
18 It's -- in English it's a five-page document, the first is an order and
19 that in English takes two pages, I think in the B/C/S original only one
20 page. And then we have a page in the original almost completely
21 illegible apart from some text at the bottom. And then we have another
22 order. Is it your intention to tender both orders?
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you for pointing that out. It's my
24 understanding that they're identical orders, though we have writing on
25 the top of one and so that we gave you a translation of that second one
1 as well. And I didn't get into that.
2 Q. And then -- because we see that on page 4 of the English,
3 Mr. Butler, we will see that in the handwritten section of the second
4 copy of that first order it says:
5 "Prepare operationally our order, order sent on 11 July 1995,"
6 and it's signed by someone.
7 And we also see the "Operations Duty Officer, Predrag Jocic."
8 What can you tell us about that, if anything?
9 A. Yes, sir. Again, as was customary at the time, making sure
10 everyone that got the order, it looks from the various -- the way that
11 this is, that what essentially the Drina Corps did was essentially
12 re-transmit a portion of the order to the Drina Corps headquarters as
13 well as the IKM to personally ensure that the general saw it. Operations
14 Duty Officer Predrag Jocic is of the Drina Corps. So this simply looks
15 like a re-transmission, maybe a slight amplification, but making sure
16 it's directed to the two leadership officials of the Drina Corps,
17 General Zivanovic and General Krstic, to ensure that they personally
18 receive it.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So they're not exactly the same, but the one
20 was immediate follow-up to the other.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And thank you, Mr. President, for pointing
22 that out.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then, there were no objections.
24 Mr. Registrar, the number would be?
25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 65 ter number 04168 will be
1 Exhibit P2106.
2 JUDGE ORIE: P2106 is admitted into evidence.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we now go to 65 ter 04221.
4 Q. This is a daily combat report from the Bratunac Brigade under the
5 name of Commander Blagojevic. I believe you've actually made reference
6 to something like this. I would point out -- I'm sorry the B/C/S is so
7 difficult to read.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Perhaps the second paragraph in the Serbian could
9 be blown up, though we do have the handwritten version as well. If we
10 flip in the B/C/S to the handwritten version.
11 Q. Mr. Butler, can you explain how for Bratunac documents -- you've
12 actually looked at documents taken from the Bratunac Brigade. Can you
13 explain how it is there is a written and a handwritten?
14 A. Yes, sir. When we were processing the documents as a result of
15 the OTP's document seizure at Bratunac in 1998, one of the things that we
16 noted on many of the Bratunac Brigade orders was that they were initially
17 written by hand by the officer in question. They were then taken over to
18 the communications centre, where they were then typed on to the requisite
19 Teletype machine and sent. And what their filing process was, was that
20 they would actually physically staple the handwritten document to the
21 Teletype version of the document and put it in the files there. So what
22 you have with these Bratunac documents is you will have the handwritten
23 document by the original author, whoever it would be on any given day,
24 and you will also have the Teletype version of that document that was --
25 that was forwarded to whatever command the order or document was sent to.
1 So you'll always have in many -- where you have a handwritten one and
2 where you have a Teletype version, that explains why you have two
3 versions of the same order.
4 Q. And do you know -- if when we see a document like this, do you
5 know whether this was handwritten by the duty officer or the -- or
6 Blagojevic, whose name is under it?
7 A. Generally with daily combat reports, the author of the document
8 is the duty operations officer. That is one of his standard duties. He
9 will write the signature block of the commander, because obviously the
10 commander goes -- is responsible for the document and the duty operations
11 officer on that day is the commander's authorised representative. So
12 with documents like this, the fact that it says
13 "Commander Colonel Blagojevic," it doesn't necessarily mean that he wrote
14 that report and that the writing on the document will match his. It's
15 just this report is going out in the commander's name. It is -- it is
16 the commander's daily combat report.
17 Q. You say he should be responsible for it. In your view of reading
18 all these documents, were brigade commanders such as Blagojevic,
19 Vinko Pandurevic, did they keep abreast of what was going out in their
20 name as their daily combat reports and other documents and reports?
21 A. Yes, sir, they did. Obviously if you're a commander, you need to
22 be aware of reports that are going out in your name. If you weren't the
23 actual author of the report, what they would often do is at some point at
24 the end of the day, when they got back to their desk or from wherever
25 they returned from the field, there would be a series of documents that
1 were published by the brigade, such as daily combat reports and things of
2 that nature, so the commanders would have an opportunity to review them
3 and know what their brigade had sent to the higher headquarters.
4 Q. Okay. And then just looking at this particular document,
5 paragraph 2, it -- it's noted that:
6 "General Mladic, Major-General Zivanovic, Major-General Krstic,
7 and the commanders of the Corps brigades, which are participating in
8 offensive activities, are in the area of responsibility of the
9 1st Bratunac Brigade."
10 As we know the abbreviation to be. Is this what you mentioned
11 previously when you talked about indications of the whereabouts of
12 General Mladic on 10 July?
13 A. Yes, sir. And again not only General Mladic going to the
14 Drina Corps forward command post to observe operations, but
15 General Zivanovic, who is still at this time the corps commander. So you
16 have no mention now of General Gvero. The presumption is that
17 General Gvero has now departed since General Mladic is physically present
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: I offer this document into evidence.
20 MR. IVETIC: No objections to this one.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
22 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04221 will be Exhibit P2107,
23 Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: P2107 is admitted.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could now go to 65 ter 00380.
1 Q. This is another document from the command of the
2 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, again dated 10 July in the name
3 of -- it says actually "for the Commander Colonel Blagojevic."
4 And we can note here that it says:
5 "Pursuant to the order of the Commander of the Main Staff, the
6 Army of Republika Srpska, aimed at breaking the enemy offensive in
7 Bratunac and Srebrenica municipality areas, I hereby order ..."
8 And then we see it's an order to mobilise, compulsory work,
9 people and others. What does this indicate to you, aside from the
10 substance of the order itself, does this provide to you any indication of
11 General Mladic, where he is, what he's doing?
12 A. Yes, sir. Clearly as from -- evidenced by the prior document,
13 General Mladic is present on the ground and at the IKM, and as this
14 indicates, he is engaged with what is going on. At this point in time,
15 on 10 July, as the mission has been changed now to take or liberate the
16 town of Srebrenica, they realise they need additional manpower. And this
17 is one of a number of orders that goes out to the brigades to be sent to
18 the Ministry of Defence in order to mobilise additional soldiers who
19 currently were not on active duty because they are on compulsory work
20 obligation in the civilian economy. And I believe that you will see on
21 the second page of this document, where they list where these companies
22 are and how many soldiers that each of these companies is expected to
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we go there, the second page, both.
25 Okay. And I would offer this document into evidence.
1 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 00380 will be Exhibit P2108,
4 Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: P2108 is admitted into evidence.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we now have 65 ter 5816. And I apologise,
7 I can see from the English translation we have missed "Glavni Stab
8 Vojske," but we know that's the Main Staff of Republika Srpska, dated
9 11 July, and if we go to the second page in the English and further on in
10 the Serbian, we'll see that it's in the name of General Mladic. And
11 we'll also -- can we go to the Serbian. And in the Serbian we can see
12 that General Mladic in a stamp -- we don't see a signature, but we see
13 what I believe should be "SR" which didn't make it into the translation.
14 Q. Mr. Butler, what is your understanding of "SR"?
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: And we'll send this to have it revised,
16 Mr. President.
17 THE WITNESS: My understanding from the practice on -- that I've
18 seen on the military documents is that -- and again as I discussed
19 earlier how the signature blocks of the commanding officers would be
20 drafted by subordinates and oftentimes signed for them if they were
21 authorised to do so. When you see the abbreviation "SR" after the
22 signature, it's designed to let the reader know that that signature --
23 the signature is actually that of the commander or the authorised
24 individual and it's not of a subordinate.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY:
1 Q. All right. Let's go back to the -- just the front of this --
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What does "SR" stand for?
3 THE WITNESS: I don't recall, sir.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY:
5 Q. And can you just -- we see this 11 July order. Can you just
6 briefly tell us what you recollect this order to be about? I don't want
7 to read it all, but we can see it speaks for itself.
8 A. Yes, sir. As noted in this particular order and not previously
9 known to the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, a number of
10 individuals from the command of the 28th Infantry Division were actually
11 not in the enclave at the time the operation began, specifically the
12 commander of the 28th Division, Naser Oric, and I think upwards of 15 or
13 20 of his staff officials, they were actually in Tuzla and later in
14 Sarajevo, where they were undertaking planning of future military
15 operations against the Drina Corps. This document reflects the fact that
16 the Army of the Main Staff from, as they say, from verified information
17 is now warning their subordinates, the Drina Corps and other units, that
18 they have learned that Naser Oric and other command -- members of the
19 command of the main -- of the 28th Division were not in the enclave, and
20 further that they had information that they may very well be setting up a
21 military operation to try and break into the enclaves in order to relieve
22 the 28th Infantry Division. And further, based on this information,
23 they're ordering various units to start to prepare for that eventuality
24 and to take precautionary measures.
25 Q. And as far --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could we first look at this document a bit more
2 in detail. At the end of the English version I see that there is a box
3 which very much looks like a -- the kind of stamp filled in which is
4 missing in the original. So there seems to be something translated which
5 doesn't match with the original.
6 MR. IVETIC: That is correct, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And therefore, it seems that although the text may
8 be the same and, to that extent, the translation may be a reliable one,
9 that at least it's most likely taken from another version of, again,
10 likely the same document. You see that, Mr. McCloskey?
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. This is the second mystery stamp that's
12 appeared, and I appreciate you pointing that out. We'll sort this out at
13 the break.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Again, from what I see comparing the original
15 to the extent that I can decipher some of the words, it seems that
16 it's -- it's about the same more or less, but ...
17 Mr. Ivetic, apart from the stamp, is there any issue about the
18 English version to reflect the text of the original one?
19 MR. IVETIC: I believe, apart from the stamp and the associated
20 text that is part of the stamp, the translation does purport to the text
21 of the original. We do have an issue as to the authenticity of the
22 original, given the lack of a signature and other factors. But it has
23 not yet been tendered, I don't think.
24 JUDGE ORIE: It has not been tendered yet, but I would not be
25 surprised if it would soon.
1 Mr. McCloskey, if you sort this out, perhaps you can ...
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I will. And of course, we know that many,
3 many documents have no signature --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but that's --
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: [Overlapping speakers] --
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- a different matter. But we now see an English
7 translation with a huge stamp and a lot of text filled in as we often see
8 it which does not appear on the original.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, absolutely, we'll fix that.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. IVETIC: And just to -- so that counsel is aware of the full
12 nature of our objection. We now know that General Mladic was not at that
13 location the 11th of July, 1995, and so therefore we believe that he
14 could not have issued this order.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What do you mean by "that location"?
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. IVETIC: The Main Staff. The originator -- what is claimed
18 to be the origination of the document. I'm trying to open it back up on
19 my screen to get the first page since we only have the second page in
20 e-court. But it is said to originate from the Main Staff of the
21 Republika Srpska.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's have a look. That may be another matter.
23 MR. IVETIC: And then there's also some -- the handwritten --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes -- well, Mr. McCloskey, in view of the fact that
25 apparently the translation is not reflecting exactly what there is in the
1 original, the explanation that the "Glavni Stab Vojske" was by mistake
2 not being translated needs further attention as well. Apparently part of
3 the original which doesn't exist is translated and part of what is there
4 is not translated. That really needs further attention.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, we'll --
6 JUDGE ORIE: And you'll give it to it, I take it.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: We'll sort that out.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed meanwhile. Should we -- perhaps we
9 should mark it for identification but it's not tendered yet, but -- so
10 that we at least know what the whole discussion was about the last couple
11 of minutes.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Um, yeah, that's a very good idea. It's also
13 their special number 03/4-1616. That's the ID number on the document of
14 the VRS, but --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and that is there in the translation, although
16 it doesn't say "handwritten," which usually is the case.
17 Then there is another matter that is the handwriting in the
18 translation. On the top right corner it says "handwritten: 14878,"
19 whereas that seems not to appear in the original, where it reads: "65.2"
20 perhaps "motorised brigade," I do not know. But certainly the
21 translation is not in line with the original.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. --
23 JUDGE ORIE: You will sort that out. You have now I think two or
24 three problems to resolve in relation to this document.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Let's mark it for identification so that it's at
2 least on the record what we were talking about.
3 Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter number 05816 will be
5 MFI P2109.
6 JUDGE ORIE: And keeps that status.
7 Please proceed -- no, not perhaps proceed. We should take a
9 We ask the usher to escort the witness out of the courtroom.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we'll resume at 20 minutes past
13 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: The witness is escorted into the courtroom and we'll
16 wait for him to arrive.
17 Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I apologise, I have been tracking down
19 original documents. We'll sort this out with the Defence, Mr. President.
20 We do have several versions of this particular document from several
21 locations, the three from the Drina Corps collection, one from the
22 Banja Luka archives, which you've heard about. The one that we're using
23 now is from the Banja Luka archives, but we have three Teletypes from the
24 original Drina Corps collection. Various translations, none of which are
25 perfect, so we need to get that worked out and we'll concentrate tonight
1 and make sure that we resolve these significant issues.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have faith that this document is -- the
4 substance of which is translated well, though clearly the important
5 details are not.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, you may continue.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY:
8 Q. All right. Mr. Butler, you've talked about the substance of this
9 document and about the concern the VRS had the whereabouts of, you say,
10 Naser Oric and his crew. Was there any indication that Naser Oric and
11 his command staff did come back in strength or in any way to the
12 Srebrenica area, as was the subject matter of this document?
13 A. No, sir, they did not.
14 Q. All right. And can you explain this situation that we have here.
15 We have a document that is indicated from the Main Staff and it's in the
16 name of General Mladic with SR, and we know that for a good part, if not
17 most of the day or all day of the day and evening, General Mladic is --
18 of the 11th is in the Srebrenica-Bratunac area, where we see him on
19 video. How would it be that a document would go out like this?
20 A. I guess, as I've testified again in the case of the previous
21 Bratunac document, you know, the reality is that there were people at the
22 Main Staff that were authorised to sign documents in the name of the
23 general when the situation warranted. General Mladic might have been at
24 the IKM and, in fact, was at the IKM on that day, but he was not out of
25 communication with his higher headquarters and he was being briefed - as
1 a good general he would be - on the broader situation. You will see a
2 number of documents as we go down the line purporting to be orders or
3 directions from the commander of the Main Staff that will go out in the
4 name of General Miletic or General Gvero in one case. It's not
5 remarkable. I mean, the VRS is a highly professional -- or back then was
6 a highly professional army and had a well developed command and staff
7 process. The officers in this process, they knew what their authorities
8 were and I presume and may have testified in the past in various trials
9 that they were not going to sign orders or they're not going to issue
10 orders that they're by position not authorised to do. So when I'm
11 looking at, you know, an order like this signed in the name of
12 General Mladic as commander of the Main Staff, I would take that in the
13 same way that his subordinate formations would take that order as
14 receiving it, as an order of the commander of the Main Staff.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, before we continue, could I ask
16 clarification on one matter. Your previous question you said to
17 Mr. Butler that he had talked about the substance of the document and
18 about the concern the VRS had about Naser Oric and the presence. And
19 then -- your question was:
20 "Was there any indication that Naser Oric and his staff did come
21 back in strength or in any way to the Srebrenica area, as was the subject
22 matter of this document?"
23 Now, the answer was:
24 "No, sir, they did not."
25 That is not an answer to your question because you asked about
1 the existence of any indication, so the answer could have been there was
2 not or -- and at the same time, the document seems to express such a
3 concern. So could I seek a clarification from the witness what he
4 exactly wanted to tell us.
5 Mr. Butler.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
8 MR. IVETIC: He can go ahead and answer before we lose your
9 point. I have another issue about that, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: Again, the document here reflects the VRS's
12 understanding of the situation.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah.
14 THE WITNESS: Again, as I know from my role in the investigation
15 and my own research, they did not -- Naser Oric and his staff did not
16 seek to re-enter the enclave. In fact, they were active with the
17 24th Infantry Division several days later trying to do that. So I guess
18 for clarity's sake, the fact -- again, the fact that the VRS believed
19 that they would do that is the accurate perception of the VRS at that
20 time. As we know several days later from the historical record,
21 Naser Oric was not seeking to get into the enclave with his command group
22 here, but was in fact in the Tuzla area.
23 JUDGE ORIE: So "they did not" means then that they did not come
24 back to the Srebrenica area, but at the same time you say the document
25 shows that the VRS expected that he would?
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Is that -- okay.
3 THE WITNESS: And again, as you go to the first page of the
4 document, you know --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I've read that point --
6 THE WITNESS: -- the verified information again --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 THE WITNESS: -- that code for they're getting this and they
9 believe that it is reliable intelligence information.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Now your answer has been clarified.
11 Mr. Ivetic.
12 MR. IVETIC: And now I have to rise to say that this particular
13 paragraph, this particular sentence that we've now focused on, the
14 English translation is incorrect. It does not correlate to the B/C/S
15 original, which I just now noticed in reading -- in hearing the question
16 that was posed by Mr. McCloskey --
17 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest that since this document needs further
18 attention in many respects, that you inform Mr. McCloskey about your
19 concerns about the translation and that, as part of the exercise
20 Mr. McCloskey has to do anyhow, that he also includes a verification of
21 the relevant portion of the document. It may be that other versions are
22 better translated, we do not know yet, but you share that and it's hereby
23 on the record that you challenge the translation of the specific part we
24 looked at.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay.
3 Q. So this document is MFI'd, I take it, and we'll address those
5 Mr. Butler, you did mention Oric in Tuzla days later. Can you --
6 before that gets a bit hazy, what are you talking about?
7 A. Yes, sir. Again, as the historical record will note that the
8 column's ultimate objective when it leaves Srebrenica through the route
9 that I discussed yesterday -- I mean, they're attempting to break through
10 at the lines of Baljkovica and Nezuk in order to reach what they call
11 free territory, friendly territory. My understanding again from the
12 investigation and my research on those issues are that many members of
13 the 28th Division staff actively were working with their counterparts on
14 the 2nd -- with the 2nd Corps, 24th Division, in order to help the
15 24th Division make the breakthrough in the Baljkovica and Nezuk area to
16 allow the column to pass through. So that's what most of those
17 individuals were actively doing on those particular days.
18 Q. Thank you. And we do know that we will get to the 16th of July,
19 but not today.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 5759.
21 Q. And it's the -- a Main Staff report to the president from all the
22 corps. And if we could go to the Drina Corps section, which would be
23 page 3 of both languages regarding the last part of the English --
24 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. McCloskey, could you please repeat the
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: 5797. Thank you.
2 Q. Now, if we can go to page 3 in the English, page 3 in the B/C/S,
3 Drina Corps, you'll recall that these are supposed to go out in the
4 evening. And we note that the Main Staff is telling the president:
5 "In the Srebrenica enclave the enemy has been putting up fierce
6 resistance to VRS units. The NATO air force carried out strikes against
7 our forces" and it lists the sectors. "An interim report on the
8 situation in Srebrenica and the NATO air force is forthcoming."
9 And then it goes on to the next page in English.
10 "The corps units are in a state of full combat-readiness. The
11 main forces are being used to mount persistent defence, and part of the
12 forces are involved in offensive operations around the ... enclave. In
13 the course of the day, our forces entered the town of Srebrenica ..."
14 It talks a bit about the NATO members, the four Dutch F-16 that
15 took part in the Srebrenica action. Is this --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Do we have the right page in B/C/S?
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, it should be page 4 in B/C/S.
18 Q. Mr. Butler, is this information going to the president correct as
19 far as you know?
20 A. Yes, sir. By about 1500 on 12 July -- I'm sorry, 11 July 1995,
21 the VRS moves into the urban environment of Srebrenica town. I take it
22 that at some juncture, if the Court has not already seen it that they
23 will see a rather lengthy videotape which essentially shows
24 General Mladic as well as other VRS commanders walking through the town
25 of Srebrenica.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We've seen that.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY:
3 Q. All right. Now, let's get to the 12th of July, an intercept,
4 P1212. And at 0608 hours and ...
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, and I would like to offer the last
7 document into evidence, the Main Staff report, 5797.
8 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2110, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: P2110 is admitted.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY:
13 Q. And, Mr. Butler, we see this intercept in the early morning hours
14 of 12 July:
15 "From Jaglici towards Buzim up there, towards our neighbours on
16 the right. Let them know. They need to be warned. Do you understand?
18 "... a column."
19 What is your view of what this is about?
20 A. Well, sir, there is a bit of a story behind this and why this
21 particular intercept becomes significant. As indicated in other
22 documents --
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sorry for interrupting. It should not be
24 broadcast, I think.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. --
1 Your Honour.
2 THE WITNESS: As other individuals have provided information and,
3 in fact, as some of the documents that we've looked at before foreshadow,
4 the Army of the Republika Srpska forces in Srebrenica had anticipated
5 that in the event of attack and in the event that they were successful in
6 their operations against the 28th Infantry Division, that they would
7 withdraw towards the Zepa enclave. Again, as the historical record
8 notes, they did not do that. In fact, they came to an entirely different
9 decision on what they would do, that being to form a column and that to
10 breakout from Jaglici through the long -- smuggling -- the long-used
11 smuggling routes through the Zvornik area and out towards Baljkovica.
12 General Mladic, not knowing that obviously at this time and the
13 army staff had already started on the evening of 11 July to put in place
14 their combat preparations to send military forces towards an area known
15 as the Bandera Triangle towards the Zepa area on the morning of the 12th.
16 They had lost complete contact with the 28th Infantry Division and they
17 did not know where it was. They anticipated that they would again regain
18 contact with it in the Bandera-Suceska area and, in fact, it wasn't
20 What this particular intercept is and why it suddenly becomes
21 relevant is this is one of the first indications by people on the other
22 side of the enclave, the correspondents who are talking here from the
23 north -- the northern side of the enclave, that they are starting to see
24 Bosnian Muslim military forces arrayed in a column in a location that
25 they were not told to expect to anticipate those forces. So what you
1 have happening through the evening of the 11th and later on through the
2 morning hours and even early afternoon hours of the 12th is a growing
3 realisation, as it percolates -- this information percolates up to the
4 general officers, that the forces of the 28th Division are not where
5 they're expected to be but are, in fact, perhaps 12 to 15 kilometres
6 away. And by time they're learning of this information, many of the
7 initial lead elements of the column of the 28th Division have already
8 succeeded in breaking out over the road between Konjevic Polje and
9 Nova Kasaba and are already entering the zone of the Zvornik Infantry
11 So this sets in chain -- this sets in -- this sets the beginning
12 of a chain of events into place, where you start to have two competing
13 situations occurring with respect to Srebrenica and, of course, I'll get
14 into them in more detail as we go on.
15 Q. And on this particular point, you've also addressed that in your
16 narratives as well if we don't deal with some of the other things today?
17 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
18 Q. Okay.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to P1217.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should consider if that could be broadcast or
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I do not see any problem.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: E-court's got it as confidential. Let's leave it
25 that way for now.
1 Q. All right. We now see this as an intercept on 12 July. It's a
2 little bit later, 0735, between Krstic and Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic.
3 And it's talking about buses and various towns and the Bratunac stadium.
4 What is this about briefly, Mr. Butler? Just -- who are these people,
5 first of all?
6 A. The correspondent called Krstic is General Krstic, the -- still
7 at this point Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps.
8 Lieutenant-Colonel Krsmanovic is the chief of transportation services for
9 the Drina Corps.
10 Q. And what are they talking about, in your view?
11 A. During the late evening hours and the early morning hours of
12 12 July, a decision is made that it won't be UNPROFOR providing vehicles,
13 it will be the Republika Srpska that will provide all of these vehicles
14 to remove the population that is assembled at Potocari. What you see is
15 a series of both published orders from the army to the Ministry of
16 Defence requesting the requisition of civilian buses. You see orders
17 from army headquarters to other army units, telling them to send buses
18 and trucks to Potocari and Bratunac, and you see a series of intercepts,
19 where you have individuals who would normally be expected to be dealing
20 with these matters on the telephones, ensuring that orders are complied
21 with and that buses and trucks are sent to locations as rapidly as
23 One of the reasons why I use -- believe -- and believe this is
24 significant is that this is something that obviously was not planned for
25 in advance of the operation. Had it been done so, the ability to
1 assemble the buses and trucks and everything else would have been done
2 days in advance. It would not have been done on such a rapid and
3 haphazard way on the morning of 12 July 1995. I mean, it was an amazing
4 logistical feat that they were to assemble them when they needed to, but
5 it wasn't the preferred way that they would have done it had they been
6 given a choice.
7 Q. All right. Well, let's go over some of, perhaps, the documents
8 you've mentioned. Let's go to P1710. This is a document from the VRS
9 Main Staff, sector for mobilisation and personnel and it's to the
10 RS Ministry of Defence and it's talking about making buses available and
11 that 50 buses need to be mobilised to the Bratunac sports stadium. It's
12 under the name of Assistant Commander Major-General Petar Skrbic. And,
13 Mr. Butler, he has testified about this, the Judges have heard about it,
14 so I don't think we need to spend so much time on it, but was this one of
15 the documents that you were talking about regarding this getting together
16 buses to remove the population?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. All right. Let's go on to the next one, P1714. This is, again,
19 from the command of the Drina Corps, 12 July. This is -- has a stamp on
20 it of 10 hours and 1020 hours. It's to the Main Staff, among others, and
21 it's from General Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps. And it says:
22 "Pursuant to the VRS GS Commander's order to provide 50 buses for
23 evacuation from the Srebrenica ..." and it goes on. And what does this
24 indicate to you about General Mladic's involvement in this business of
1 A. Again, as evidenced by General Zivanovic, he's noting that the
2 order to -- for these units to send buses is coming from commander of the
3 Main Staff, General Mladic.
4 Q. All right. Let's go to another document, P1509. This is also in
5 evidence. I think it made a very brief appearance, so I'm -- our
6 recollections may not be as refreshed as others. But we see this is from
7 the Zvornik public security centre dated 12 July in the name of
8 Dragomir Vasic, the chief of the public security centre. So who is he?
9 What's this about? Very briefly.
10 A. Dragomir Vasic is the head of the sector for security and public
11 safety for the Zvornik region, which includes the Bratunac and now
12 Srebrenica municipalities. So he is essentially the chief of police for
13 about a five-municipality area that makes up the Zvornik sector.
14 Q. All right. And we can see this -- this report to the police
15 force staff and the office of the minister and others. It mentions
16 Miroslav Deronjic, but on paragraph 2:
17 "A meeting with General Mladic and General Krstic was held at the
18 Bratunac Brigade command at 0800 hours, at which tasks were assigned to
19 all participants."
20 What, if anything, does this tell you about General Mladic's
21 command and who he is commanding at this time?
22 A. It indicates, again, General Mladic is actively taking charge of
23 events and his physical presence there. He is in command and he is
24 acting as he is in command.
25 Q. And we see in 3:
1 "The military operation is continuing according to plan. The
2 Turks are fleeing towards Suceska, while the civilians have gathered in
3 Potocari ..."
4 This reference to the Muslims fleeing towards Suceska, can you
5 remind us where Suceska is?
6 A. Suceska is a region on the southern end of the enclave. Again,
7 as indicated in my earlier testimony on this, in fact, their information
8 is not correct or accurate to their knowledge yet and the column is on
9 the north end of the enclave.
10 Q. Okay. And it also talks about that:
11 "A meeting will begin at 1000 hours ..."
12 And in your view was that the meeting that has been seen on video
13 that the Court has previously seen?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. And in number 6:
16 "Joint police forces are advancing on Potocari with the aim of
17 taking UNPROFOR ..."
18 Is that related to Borovcanin's forces and the order he had
19 received from Mladic that you had mentioned?
20 A. Yes, sir, it is.
21 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next document, and this is a document we
22 will get a better copy of because in your understanding, Mr. Butler, who
23 is this document from, though I'm -- it says "chief of the CJB," but it's
24 not legible.
25 A. This document I believe is from Mr. Vlasic.
1 Q. Mr. --
2 A. Vasic, I'm sorry, not Vlasic.
3 Q. There's another Mr. Vlasic.
4 All right. Let's -- and we can see from this document, this is
5 basically the same report a bit later in the day?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And we see it says:
8 "At 1030 hours a meeting was held at the hotel in Bratunac
9 attended by the following" --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Do we have it on our screens already?
11 MR. IVETIC: I don't believe he gave the 65 ter number.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: 5818. Thank you. I will slow down. And I will
13 note that the previous document 1509 had an internal Zvornik CJB number
14 of 277. We can see that this one is number 278.
15 Q. And it notes:
16 "At 1030 hours a meeting was held at the hotel in Bratunac
17 attended by ..."
18 We can see that General Mladic is there, Vasic is there,
19 Miroslav Deronjic, Karremans, the Muslim representatives. Does this
20 reflect a reference to the meeting of -- that part of what is on the
21 video that's part of the investigation?
22 A. Yes, sir. This is what we call the third meeting at the
23 Hotel Fontana.
24 Q. All right. And you can see the information that they have there.
25 I just wanted to ask you about number 4:
1 "It was decided to grant their requests and with UNPROFOR
2 assistance (presence and provision of fuel for transportation) and the
3 trucks were provided, boarding of the vehicles will commence at
4 1400 hours and escort will be provided till Kladanj ..."
5 And as far as you know, did that basically happen on that
7 A. Yes, sir. I think the first convoys went out probably a little
8 earlier, maybe around noon, but ...
9 Q. All right. And it says:
10 "After the inspection, depending on Mladic's decision,
11 able-bodied men may be allowed to go in order to have the others from the
12 woods to surrender, since our command urged them to do so."
13 Can you tell us what you take this to mean and what you take it
14 to -- how you fit it into your analysis regarding Vasic's knowledge of
15 the situation at the time?
16 A. One of the key observations and, in fact, opinions that I have
17 historically made with respect to when an order was made to kill the
18 prisoners is that that order must have been given between the end of the
19 second meeting at the Hotel Fontana at 2200 hours on 11 July and before
20 the third meeting at the Hotel Fontana the next morning at 1000 hours,
21 based on my own constructive analysis of when other events started
22 occurring on the battle-field and along the broader crime base. One of
23 the issues that, of course, we have dealt with in previous proceedings
24 against other defendants is at what point news of the order that has been
25 issued reaches them, and you can see at various points in time various
1 officials who need to know of the order learn of it and that people who
2 don't need to know of the order don't learn of it until later when they
3 hear of it.
4 In this particular context, you know, Dragomir Vasic as the head
5 of CSB Zvornik is reporting in his document as though the able-bodied
6 men, you know, may be set or may be let free. It indicates that he has
7 not been read into the plan, which is actually that the able-bodied men
8 will be killed.
9 Q. All right. And we will go through the documents and the factors
10 and, of course, that ultimate determination of an order will be one for
11 the Trial Chamber.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this into evidence.
13 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 05818 will be Exhibit P2111,
16 Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: P2111 is admitted.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now P1232.
19 Q. This is an intercept from 12 July. It's a MUP -- confidential,
20 please. A MUP intercept. We can see that it's at 1220 hours and it's
21 between two unidentified people, X and Y. It's a mention of Miletic and
22 they're speaking about fuel and trucks leaving from various places. And
23 it makes a reference about 2 tonnes in Zvornik, there is nine, there is
24 no more. Can you tell us what you take this to mean and who you believe
25 Miletic would be in this context?
1 A. Miletic in this context is General Miletic, the chief of
2 operations for the Main Staff. The issue that they're talking about is
3 that with 50 and -- and as it turns out, even more than that buses and
4 trucks descending on Potocari and there were requirements to shuttle
5 people from Potocari, from there, to Kladanj, come back. The issue, of
6 course, at hand is that they're scrambling now to try and get enough fuel
7 for all of these buses and trucks to be able to remove the population
8 from Potocari as quickly as possible under the circumstances. There are
9 a number of intercepts where you see the issue of: Where is the fuel
10 coming from and how fast can we get it here? As a matter of importance
11 to the Drina Corps.
12 Q. Well, Miletic is not an uncommon name. Why would a general in
13 the Main Staff be dealing with fuel issues?
14 A. In July 1995, the Republika Srpska was suffering from a number of
15 embargoes, one of them was fuel in an effort to pressure them as well as
16 all of the parties to end the conflict. To us, 10.000 gallons of diesel
17 fuel does not sound like a large amount of fuel; but in the context of
18 the fuel shortage that is occurring, as well as the broader needs of the
19 army for fuel on any given day, 10.000 gallons of diesel fuel or
20 10.000 litres of diesel fuel even, here it's tonnes, this is a big deal
21 to the army. They have to be able to get this fuel, it has to be brought
22 in from some places. And the local units do not have anywhere near the
23 required amount of diesel fuel to make this happen. So it takes the
24 order of the Main Staff to the large logistics depots, who will have this
25 fuel, in order to have that fuel transferred down to the other units for
1 their use.
2 Q. And are there other intercepts and/or indications that
3 General Miletic is involved in this, some of which you may note in your
5 A. Yes, sir. General Miletic as the chief of operations is involved
6 in many of these aspects. He's involved in the fuel aspect and in the
7 coming days in terms of intercepts, you can also find intercepts where
8 he's monitoring the activities of the column and the military situation
9 as it's occurring.
10 Q. All right. Let's go to another intercept, P01233. And if you
11 could look at this as it comes up - confidential, please - as this is a
12 Bosnian -- this is a 2nd Corps intercept, where we have the print-out
13 associated with it. At 1240 hours. And have you studied this intercept,
14 do you know what date this intercept is?
15 A. Yes, sir, this is 12 July 1995.
16 Q. All right. And we see it says:
17 "We are starting the evacuation of those who want to go towards
19 Can you tell us, though --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one thing. You said it's the
21 12th of July. Now, we earlier had a discussion about dates of
22 intercepts. What's the basis for your knowledge that it's the
23 12th of July? Is that because you saw previous portions of the same
24 [overlapping speakers] --
25 THE WITNESS: Sir, again, I've been working with these intercepts
1 since 1998/1999, and as part of the corroboration of them and date-timing
2 of them, I've worked with these things before. I have these documented
3 in my report, what day and what time I believe that they are based on
4 that larger corroboration effort. I know this to be 12 July, put it in
5 my report as such. I'm sure that it's because that I also went back and
6 did the corresponding look at the 2 Corps what we call the larger dot
7 matrix document, the typed document, as well as I've been back and gone
8 through the books as well when I felt I needed to go back and corroborate
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY:
12 Q. We see at the top "inaudible" in parenthesis and then "Panorama"
13 and X and then Y and "barely audible." Can you tell us had your
14 investigation, your analysis revealed the identity of -- or what is this
16 A. Yes, sir. As part of the communication protocols that the VRS
17 used, various headquarters and various units were provided with a
18 telephonic identity. So you would potentially get on a telephone and be
19 able to identify what unit you are versus a code word that the other
20 correspondent would recognise, but if the communication was intercepted,
21 they wouldn't know who it was presumably. The problem was that these
22 guys never changed their telephonic code words. So it never changed and
23 ultimately anyone can figure out who it was. In this particular context,
24 "Panorama" was the telephonic code name for the Main Staff of the Army of
25 the Republika Srpska.
1 Q. Mr. Butler, "never" is a pretty big word. Can you narrow that
2 down for us? Do you know what time-periods were between changing or do
3 you stand by "never"?
4 A. Certainly within the context of the intercepts that I've worked
5 with, June, July, August, September of 1995, these telephonic code words
6 did not change, they remained the same with respect to this particular
7 communications network. So during the period that I discussed this in my
8 report, "Panorama" is always the telephonic code-name for the Main Staff
9 of the VRS.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any dispute as to "Panorama" standing for
11 the Main Staff of the ...
12 MR. IVETIC: I believe not.
13 JUDGE ORIE: We've heard this evidence before, Mr. McCloskey.
14 It's not disputed, so why spend further time on it.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's the first I've learned that it's not
16 disputed, so I'm very happy about that and I won't --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it was at least not challenged, I think,
18 during the cross-examination of the witness who testified about it. So
19 therefore that's not exactly the same but that's what made me ask the
20 question. Please proceed.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, thank you. That's very helpful.
22 Q. And while we're on that topic, can you tell us the code-name for
23 this time period for the Drina Corps?
24 A. That would be Zlatar, sir.
25 Q. And then --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Any dispute about that, Mr. Ivetic?
2 MR. IVETIC: That is correct.
3 JUDGE ORIE: No dispute about Zlatar being the code-name for the
4 Drina Corps? May I take it Drina Corps command?
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes -- yes, Mr. President.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 MR. IVETIC: As to July of 1995, there is no dispute.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY:
10 Q. And the Zvornik Brigade?
11 A. That would be Palma, sir.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Same question.
13 MR. IVETIC: No dispute.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY:
15 Q. And the Bratunac Brigade?
16 A. That would be Badem, sir.
17 MR. IVETIC: Again, no dispute.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY:
19 Q. Thank you. And in looking at this, we see that the barely
20 audible, unknown Y is saying:
21 "And reinforce ... with trucks and buses, and a water tank should
22 be sent, to give them water and food. This morning we organised it here,
23 we'll give them everything. I talked with them and we'll accept all the
24 civilians who want to and they can stay. Those who don't want to can
25 choose where they'll go."
1 Where do you think this information -- who -- would be coming
2 from and what have you made of this?
3 A. Again, in this particular case, this is an example of one of
4 those intercepts that I spoke about yesterday, where the authenticity of
5 the intercept I believe is without question; however, it is clear that at
6 least the correspondent Y talking on the intercept does not have
7 factually accurate information of the decision that has been made. He
8 does not know that at this point other orders have been given that
9 everyone will be going and that no one will be given a choice.
10 Q. All right. And do you have any backup to that statement?
11 A. I believe that there are other intercepts as well as other
12 evidence that it's been led - and I don't know it off the top of my head
13 at the moment - which reflects that despite public statements by the VRS,
14 that the reality was that the order had been given that everyone was
15 going to be removed from Potocari.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Does the witness know what evidence is led in this
17 case? Because that's what he suggests and, to some extent, refers to?
18 THE WITNESS: I have not followed the proceedings of this case,
19 so I am at somewhat of a disadvantage knowing what the Trial Chamber has
20 or has not heard yet.
21 JUDGE ORIE: You're not at a disadvantage. You just should
22 answer the questions and then not bother about --
23 THE WITNESS: Okay --
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- what other evidence we've heard.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to P1235. This is also confidential.
2 Q. This is a CSB state security Muslim intercept and this is at
3 1250 hours, ten minutes after the last one. And it's a conversation
4 identified by the intercept person as General Mladic and an unidentified
5 male, X. And we can see the first few lines about the buses -- have the
6 buses and trucks left is a question Mladic asks.
7 X says:
8 "They have?"
9 Mladic says:
11 X says:
12 "Ten minutes ago?"
13 Mladic says:
14 "Good, excellent. Continue to monitor the situation. Don't let
15 small groups of them sneak in. They've all capitulated and surrendered
16 and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who don't want
18 X says:
19 "I understand, General."
20 He goes on to say:
21 "Don't issue any statements and don't interrupt them over the"
22 something "station. We'll open a corridor towards Kladanj."
23 X can't be heard.
24 Mladic says:
25 "Indeed, let it pass there. Take a patrol of ours and wait on
1 the road and remove the mines and obstacles ... leave the territory."
2 X says:
3 "Yes, General."
4 What do you think General Mladic is referring to when he says
5 "and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who don't want
6 to" -- I should say preceded by "they've all capitulated and surrendered
7 and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who don't want
9 A. Those are the individuals who are at this point in Potocari.
10 Q. For your analysis, does that clear up any issue?
11 A. Again, in context with the other events that are occurring, it
12 supports my position that regardless of what some of the public
13 statements were, that the intention of General Mladic at this juncture
14 was that everyone would be removed from Potocari, that there was not a
15 realistic choice that people could stay.
16 Q. And by the end of 13 -- end of the day 13 July, did your
17 investigation reveal that any significant numbers of Muslim civilians
18 left in Potocari?
19 A. By the end of 13 July 1995, the VRS themselves are reporting --
20 several officers from the VRS Main Staff who are on the ground in
21 Bratunac and Potocari are reporting back through their chain of command
22 that everyone is gone and that there are not Bosnian Muslims remaining
24 Q. And do you know --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask.
1 "Don't let small groups of them sneak in."
2 Sneak in where in your understanding?
3 THE WITNESS: I try to stay away from putting too much of an
4 interpretation into that. I know what happened -- what's happening at
5 Potocari at this time, where the able-bodied men are being separated from
6 the women and children, but I wouldn't feel comfortable trying to impart
7 that General Mladic might be talking about that.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So that you -- and you have no idea what --
9 what else could have been --
10 THE WITNESS: I don't know of any alternative explanations which
11 would explain that.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And at the same time you don't feel confident to
13 link it to that event?
14 THE WITNESS: My general rule when interpreting the intercepts
15 and when looking at documents is to try and be as conservative with them
16 as possible, precisely because I don't -- again, where many of the
17 documents can be self-evident once you understand the military context
18 that's occurring, I feel somewhat uncomfortable trying to impart what
19 somebody really might mean and might mean down the line.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear. Thank you.
21 Mr. McCloskey, we are either now or it's in five minutes from now
22 that we have used one full hour, but if you consider this to be a more
23 suitable moment, we could take the break now.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Um --
25 JUDGE ORIE: I think we started at 20 minutes past 12.00 -- well,
1 as a matter of fact --
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: One answer to this --
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- a few minutes after 20 minutes past 12.00.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ah. I remember -- it must have been Ms. Stewart
5 that was late. I'm sorry. I'm sorry, that was a poor attempt at humour.
6 There's one other slight subject matter of this intercept which we could
7 clear up.
8 Q. And could you -- do you know what he's talking about when he
10 "We'll open a corridor towards Kladanj"?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. And he goes on to say:
13 "... remove mines and obstacles ..."
14 A. Yes, sir. The route that they intended to remove the population
15 ultimately goes -- is the road network that runs from Vlasenica to
16 Kladanj, that area is controlled by the Vlasenica Infantry Brigade and
17 there will be a subsequent intercept where I believe it is General Mladic
18 is calling the Vlasenica Brigade and instructing them to remove the
19 obstacles and that they should expect the first convoys in buses and
20 trucks to be arriving and giving them instructions.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: That was it.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted out of the
24 courtroom. We take a break of 20 minutes.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 JUDGE ORIE: We'll resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 1.16 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: We are waiting for the witness to enter the
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Let's go to P1236,
9 probably keep it confidential, not shown.
10 Q. And, Mr. Butler, you'll see that this is another intercept from a
11 notebook at 1305 hours between Krstic and Sobot and it says:
12 "Krsmanovic set off towards Krstic 15 minutes ago?"
13 We don't have a date on the notebook page here. Have you from
14 your analysis determined what date that this occurred?
15 A. Yes, sir, 12 July 1995.
16 Q. And I -- is it the same explanation as the last -- the last
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And was this the intercept you were referring to earlier?
20 A. Yes, this is a conversation between General Krstic and Major --
21 or he's looking for Major Kosoric, the commander of the
22 Vlasenica Brigade, and in fact ends up talking with Savo, who is, I
23 believe, Savo Sarkic who was the Chief of Staff of the Vlasenica Brigade.
24 Q. And what are they talking about, in your view?
25 A. They're talking about the route that the buses will take and
1 General Krstic is giving instructions about where people will be
2 disembarking, things of that nature.
3 Q. And the tunnel, where do you take that to mean?
4 A. That is the tunnel that at the time separated the territory under
5 the control of the Republika Srpska versus the ABiH along the road from
6 Vlasenica to Kladanj, so that's -- that tunnel is where the lines were.
7 Q. All right. And when Krstic near the bottom says:
8 "Take care, nothing must happen to any of them."
9 Who's he referring to, in your view?
10 A. I take that that he's referring to the people on the buses and
11 trucks, that they're -- when they disembark at the Tisca area, nothing is
12 to happen to them, allow them to walk through.
13 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document -- actually, I think
14 I'll skip one and go to 65 ter 4134. And this is from the command of the
15 Drina Corps intelligence department dated 12 July 1995, very urgent, to
16 the Main Staff, intelligence affairs sector, intelligence administration,
17 Bratunac IKM, personally to Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric. And it's from
18 Major Pavle Golic. Can you tell us who Golic and Kosoric are?
19 A. This Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric is the chief of intelligence for
20 the Drina Corps. Major Pavle Golic is his intelligence assistant, also
21 of the Drina Corps.
22 Q. All right. And we see the subject matter of this shows that
23 Golic is reporting that:
24 "Large enemy group which included soldiers, women and children,
25 about a thousand strong, was moving from the direction of Srebrenica
1 between Ravni Buljim ... and was somewhere around Boksin Potok."
2 Does this fit in to what you told us earlier about the direction
3 of the column of people that are moving at the time and the knowledge of
4 the VRS as they're becoming aware of this?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. And we also see as we go down the page a reference to the duty
7 officer of the Drina Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Jovicic, and the
8 operations officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic. Now we'll recall that
9 this 1994 document from the Bratunac Brigade commander was a
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic. Is this the same person?
11 A. Yes, sir, it is. At this point in time he's now an operations
12 officer with the Drina Corps command.
13 Q. All right.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this into evidence.
15 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04134 will be Exhibit P2112,
18 Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: 2112 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we have 65 ter 4223.
21 Q. And this is a -- from the command of the Bratunac Brigade, it's a
22 daily combat report under the name of Commander Blagojevic. We see a --
23 a time at the bottom of it, 1630. And number 1 we see what it says in
24 the direction of the enemy break through in the direction of
25 Jaglici-Bokcin Potok. Is that the direction you were talking about? So
1 at this time what does this tell us?
2 A. Yes, sir, by the late afternoon of 12 July 1995 at least the
3 command entities of the VRS and the Drina Corps and the subordinate
4 brigades have all finally accepted the idea that there is a large, as yet
5 to be undefined, number in that column of Bosnian Muslims who are trying
6 to break out of the former enclave along this particular route. What you
7 see as part of this particular aspect is that while now all of the
8 various commanders understand that there is a column breaking out, there
9 is a major disconnect, so to speak, between the assessments of the local
10 commanders on the ground who are providing extremely large numbers for
11 the column and the danger that it poses to the Zvornik area versus the
12 senior leaders of the Drina Corps and of the Main Staff who believe that
13 the number is far lower and the threat is correspondently much less. And
14 there are a series of documents and intercepts where you essentially have
15 local commanders requesting desperately for help and assistance because
16 of the pending military threat, and frankly their superiors believing
17 they are overreacting to this threat because the information they have is
18 that it can't be this big, the numbers that they're receiving are a lot
19 lower. So there is a corresponding period where the people most
20 threatened actually have the best picture of what's going on and their
21 commanders are continuing to underestimate the threats.
22 Q. And when this -- I'll jump ahead of time a bit on that point.
23 When this large column hit the rear of the 2nd Battalion up at Baljkovica
24 and the forces of Vinko Pandurevic, how many casualties -- how many Serb
25 soldiers died in that -- in that fighting?
1 A. I think the total numbers that were explained by Pandurevic - and
2 they're listed in his 18 July interim combat report - I think he says
3 something along the lines of between 20 -- approximately -- if I remember
4 correctly, and I know we have the document in here down the line, 20 dead
5 and maybe up to 80 injured. That does not include other casualties that
6 were taken by other elements. It was particularly fierce fighting for
7 that several-day period, some of the most fierce fighting of the war I
8 suspect in that particular area.
9 Q. All right. And number 7 in this document:
10 "The transport of the Turkish population (Muslim refugees from
11 the village of Potocari towards Kladanj) is in progress. A large number
12 (10.000) of refugees are expecting to be transported from Potocari to
14 Does that reflect what the investigation revealed?
15 A. Yes, sir. The convoys coming out of Potocari continued until
16 about sundown on 12 July 1995 because once the sun went down, the road
17 network between Bratunac, Konjevic Polje, and Nova Kasaba was no longer
18 secure because of course the column -- the rear elements of the column
19 kept trying to push across the road over the middle of the night.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I offer that document in evidence.
21 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04223 will be Exhibit P2113,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: P2113 is admitted.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to P1510.
2 Q. This is a document from Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic from the
3 Drina Corps IKM at Bratunac dated the 12th of July at 1730 hours to the
4 Main Staff, sector for intelligence and security affairs, command of the
5 Drina Corps and the security department. And:
6 "In the course of the day our forces and MUP forces did not have
7 any heavy exchange of fire with balijas. MUP forces entered Potocari in
8 the morning without combat."
9 It goes on to describe the remaining groups are going towards
10 Suceska and Ravni Buljim and contact with some of the enemy. This is one
11 of the many times we have seen in some official documents senior officers
12 referring to the enemy. Here Pandurevic -- excuse me, Popovic is
13 referring to the Muslims as balijas. We just saw Blagojevic's report
14 going out under the Turkish population. And we've seen General Tolimir,
15 General Mladic, and others referring to the term -- these sorts of terms.
16 What is your view -- what kind of -- what does this mean -- what kind of
17 message, if any, does this send to the -- to troops in a military?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. IVETIC: I would object to the witness being asked to explain
20 what it means. He has not been qualified for that. I don't believe that
21 he's identified that he's fluent in the language or that he has performed
22 any studies in literary -- not literary but I'm losing the word. In a
23 sense of -- a lingual sense.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: And my question was not meant in a lingual sense.
25 We're taking the CLSS and his knowledge that "balijas" is a derogatory
1 term for Muslims. I don't think that's -- that's common knowledge.
2 MR. IVETIC: I would object. The CLSS translations, in fact, is
3 an OTP translation, a draft translation, and I was going to object to
4 that very same fact that it's testifying not translating the document.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is it the position of the Defence that "balijas" is
6 not a derogatory term for Bosnian Muslims?
7 MR. IVETIC: We have had evidence at this trial, Your Honours,
8 that the warring parties called each other by different names. That the
9 Muslims called the fighters on the other side "Chetniks" and that the
10 Serbs called the fighters on the other sides Muslims -- "balijas," sorry.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So that's limited for fighters?
12 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Is it derogatory?
14 MR. IVETIC: In the sense you're talking about an enemy I mean --
15 you're asking me to testify, Your Honour?
16 JUDGE ORIE: No, I'm asking what the position of the Defence is.
17 MR. IVETIC: The position of the Defence is that this document
18 translated by the Prosecution is offering evidence rather than
19 translating the document.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I was asking your position on a question I did put
21 to you not to evade that question. My question was whether balijas --
22 whether that's the position of the Defence that it is a reference to
23 fighter of the --
24 MR. IVETIC: Oh, yes, yes --
25 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --
1 JUDGE ORIE: And whether it is derogatory --
2 MR. LUKIC: Being from Bosnia, maybe I could assist --
3 JUDGE ORIE: No -- well, whether --
4 MR. LUKIC: "Balija" is term, if you want a linguistical
5 explanation --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, I don't want that. I want the position of
7 the Defence on whether "balijas" is a derogatory expression, yes or no,
8 what your position is.
9 MR. LUKIC: What if we don't have a position?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then you have -- then say: We take no position.
11 MR. LUKIC: We take no position.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: I can lay a little better foundation if we need
14 to go there.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you put another question to the witness,
16 please do so.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY:
18 Q. Mr. Butler, as a military professional, have you become familiar
19 in both -- both in the United States military and other militaries that
20 soldiers and officers will refer to their enemy in derogatory terms?
21 A. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that phenomenon.
22 Q. And I won't go through the terms that are common parlance now
23 from World War II and from every war since that we know of. Have you
24 learned the various derogatory -- of any various derogatory terms that
25 the opposing sides use towards each other?
1 A. In this particular conflict, yes, sir.
2 Q. Have you heard the term "poturice"?
3 A. Yes, sir, I have.
4 Q. Is that a derogatory term?
5 A. I recognise it to be a -- it's considered to be a derogatory term
6 against Bosnian Muslims.
7 Q. And have you heard the phrase "fuck your balija mothers"?
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
9 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, as to the question of whether
10 it's a derogatory term based upon what? This witness has not been
11 qualified as a linguist or a historical expert to know about the
12 terminology in the region.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I think he was asked about how he experienced that
14 term to be used in the region, linguistically right or wrong is not the
15 issue, I think, which is part of the question.
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, line 10 says: Is that a derogatory
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is it to be understood linguistically. I
19 think Mr. McCloskey asked for the experience of the witness in conflicts,
20 including this conflict.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
22 Q. In your experience, do you see that term, "poturice," used in a
23 derogatory fashion by the Serb forces against the Muslims?
24 A. Yes, sir. It is often used in their military correspondence.
25 It's included in orders, it's included in reports.
1 Q. Is the -- is that also true of "Turks" and the term "balijas"?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. And have you heard many references in documents where Serb forces
4 are referring to Muslims in the context of "fuck your balija mothers"?
5 A. Less so in documents. Certainly in intercepts that phrase we'll
6 come across on a number of occasions.
7 Q. Yes, I meant not in -- not in documents, but in other further
8 sources. All right. So then I would get back to my question.
9 Having learned that, what is your view of the use of such terms
10 in official military documents, as we have seen them, by senior officers,
11 such as Popovic, Mladic, and Tolimir?
12 A. Certainly from the context of professional militaries, that type
13 of language is frowned upon, particularly in official correspondence
14 reports and documents, from senior leaders. It is a well-accepted
15 military fact of leadership that subordinate officers and subordinate
16 soldiers rely on their leaders and use them as role models. The fact
17 that senior officers would throw around these derogatory terms, in
18 effect, opens the door for junior officers and soldiers to come to
19 believe that their use of the same language will be condoned or at least
20 tolerated. So it is a significant military leadership and
21 professionalism issue when you're looking at official documents and
22 official correspondence, where you see the individuals or individual
23 ethnic groups that are described in derogatory manners like this. It is
24 ultimately part of a larger dehumanisation process, which is why, at
25 least within the context of the United States military, we frown upon
1 that and certainly while it happens it is not considered to be business
2 as usual.
3 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next page, page 2. We again see here
6 "Did not offer resistance and did not fire at our forces ..."
7 It also notes that:
8 "UNPROFOR soldiers are assisting in loading women and children
9 into the vehicles."
10 What I want to ask you about, we also see some of the other
11 numbers, does -- this information that is being noted here, is that
12 accurate as far as you know, roughly?
13 A. The numbers generally correspond to the numbers that -- again, as
14 I've testified before, we never see an exact number of people who were in
15 Potocari, but these numbers correspond to the known ranges.
16 Q. All right. And this last sentence or second to the last:
17 "We are separating men from 17 - 60 years of age and we are not
18 transporting them. We have about 70 of them so far and the security
19 organs and the state security are working with them."
20 Does this statement correspond to any -- any reported statement
21 of General Mladic on that day that was part of your analysis?
22 A. As you will recall, several hours prior to this in time,
23 General Mladic was noted in an intercept -- or not -- if I will recall
24 the intercept correctly, it was noted by at least one correspondent that
25 there is going to be a separation or a separation is occurring. So this
1 does, in fact, correspond to what is happening, which is at that point in
2 time men known to be or suspected to be of military age are not being
3 allowed to board the buses.
4 Q. And when it says that the so far -- the security organs and the
5 state security are working with them, what do you take that to mean?
6 A. Well, at face value, "working with them," I would suspect that at
7 that juncture individuals are at least being questioned. I know that
8 there has been reports related to members of the RDB who are present and
9 they're trying to interview individuals.
10 Q. And do you recall any documents that review -- that you have
11 reviewed related to the Bratunac MPs interviewing people, including a
12 person named Resid Sinanovic?
13 A. Yes, sir. There is -- as part of the collection of material that
14 was seized in Bratunac in the security office, there was handwritten
15 notations or handwritten documents, actually, which correspond to
16 interviews of individuals who were captured and interviewed by members of
17 the Bratunac Brigade for intelligence value on either 12 or 13 July 1995.
18 One of those individuals who was interviewed and provided not a statement
19 but obviously did provide information that was written down was Mr. Resid
21 Q. And in your time, were any of those individuals -- were their
22 names put through the ICRC missing list, do you recall?
23 A. I'm aware that Resid Sinanovic -- and I believe that all of these
24 individuals were put against the ICRC missing list. They are -- or at
25 the time my report was written, they were listed as missing. And I have
1 all of this documented in a specific component of my military narrative,
2 which lays this -- this whole set of circumstances out.
3 Q. All right. Let's go to another document, 65 ter 4224. This is
4 from the command of the Bratunac Brigade, 12 July, to the Drina Corps,
5 attention Major Golic, who -- you've told us about him. And it's from
6 Captain Pecanac. And it just provides information about the Muslims.
7 Where does that -- can you tell from this, is Captain Pecanac
8 involved in receiving intel in the Srebrenica events?
9 A. Yes, sir, he is. I mean, he is a Main Staff intelligence officer
10 or operative, as the case may be. And again, he's obtained this
11 information - it's not specific what the source is - and he's passing it
12 to Major Golic of the Drina Corps, so the Drina Corps and their
13 intelligence organs can be aware of this information.
14 Q. All right. Let's go to P1785.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: If I could, sorry, tender the last document into
17 MR. IVETIC: Um, we may have an objection depending on the
18 source. Is this also from the so called Pecanac collection or some other
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
21 MR. IVETIC: Then we would object to its authenticity based on
22 the source.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Oh, I'm sorry, the one that was from the -- not
24 to give you any ideas, but the one that was from the Pecanac collection
25 was the -- the Popovic document. This is actually from the
1 Bratunac Brigade collection.
2 MR. IVETIC: That's what I was asking. Then we do not have an
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04224 would be Exhibit P2114,
6 Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: P2114 is admitted.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could now go to P1785. This is a
9 Main Staff report to the president. And if we could go to page 4 in the
10 English and page 3 in the B/C/S just to keep up with our narrative.
11 Q. We see a report to the president from the Main Staff regarding
12 Krivaja 95, mentioning Potocari was liberated. The MUP is organising
14 Does this reflect what was happening?
15 A. Yes, sir. I mean, it -- again, it's reflecting a picture at a
16 point in time that is -- that is rapidly becoming worse for them but they
17 don't recognise it yet. But I mean, this is part of the normal
18 information reporting chain that's going up from the various units.
19 Q. And that also includes the information that we see under
20 "situation on the territory," that about 10.000 Muslims are estimated for
21 transport that day?
22 A. Correct, sir.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's now go to 65 ter 4135.
24 Q. This is a document with the Drina Corps -- from the Drina Corps
25 command, intelligence department, 12 July, to the Main Staff of the VRS,
1 sector for intelligence and security. And then a long list of other
2 people, including the MUP. And it's regarding the statement of a
3 prisoner of war named Izudin Bektic. We see that particular information
4 at the time. And you have spoken about this document before and it's --
5 I'm not so much considered at this point about the information in it, but
6 based on the content of this document and your knowledge of the
7 investigation, where do you think General Tolimir was, as we see from
8 page 2, was at the time that he wrote this? And we see stamps in the
9 later hours of 12 July.
10 A. Yes, sir. I --
11 Q. And the 13th --
12 A. -- I believe that at the time that this document is created,
13 General Tolimir is physically present at the Drina Corps headquarters in
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document into evidence.
17 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Will become Exhibit P2115, 65 ter number 4135.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now can we have 65 ter 4136, a very similar
22 document in Drina -- the command of the Drina Corps intelligence
23 department from General Tolimir. In fact, it is the following number.
24 The first one was their number 17/896 and this one is 17/897, dated
25 12 July with some late-night stamps on it, 2150, 2200 hours.
1 Q. And this -- we can see who it's to, including attention
2 General Krstic and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic. And going to page 2 in
3 the English, I want to ask you about this comment of General Tolimir's.
4 It says:
5 "Although it is very important to arrest as many members of the
6 shattered Muslim units as possible, or liquidate them if they resist, it
7 is equally important to note down the names of all men fit for military
8 service who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari."
9 What do you make of this document? What -- how does this fit
10 into your analysis and then, first of all, this reference to evacuation
11 of men from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari? What is that, in your view?
12 A. General Tolimir has not been to Potocari or Bratunac and does not
13 have first-hand knowledge of what's going on. Clearly at this point in
14 time, on 12 July, he understands that the plan should be, by normal
15 procedure for the VRS, that the males would be identified, the names of
16 the individuals who were captured or who were otherwise separated because
17 they were of military age would be documented, primarily for the purpose
18 of potentially trading them for Bosnian Serb soldiers who had been
19 captured and were under the custody of the ABiH. That was a
20 long-standing issue that the VRS had that they did not have as many
21 captured Muslim soldiers as the Muslims had of Serb soldiers; and as a
22 result, many VRS soldiers were languishing in detention facilities
23 because they could not be exchanged.
24 I also look at this - and again, I've talked about this
25 significantly in the Tolimir trial - with respect to the fact that at
1 this point in time, General Tolimir has not been read into the plan that
2 we're not separating these people for the purpose of potentially
3 exchanging them. The problem here, of course, you see is what happens
4 when that doesn't happen, you have General Tolimir providing guidance to
5 subordinates based on the fact that he doesn't know what the actual real
6 plan is. And so, somewhere in the intervening hours between the time
7 that he sends this to General Krstic and to Colonel Popovic, he'll give
8 another order later, I think approximately 24 hours later, where I
9 believe it becomes quite clear that he has then been told what the actual
10 plan is for these people.
11 Q. What is it about this paragraph I just read to you that makes you
12 think he is not read in on it, the plan to kill the Muslims?
13 A. When one looks at what has been happening already at Potocari by
14 this time, you already have, one, the separations are occurring; you have
15 the identity documents of Bosnian Muslims who are being separated at
16 various locations in Potocari being taken from them; and even though
17 there is supposedly a list of individuals who are of interest to at least
18 the Bratunac Brigade for their potential involvement in war crimes in
19 previous months or years of the conflict, nobody is actually vetting
20 these men against that potential list.
21 You also have a scenario that, of course, I believe that many of
22 the actual individuals from the Dutch Battalion have talked about, where
23 they start to begin to witness individual killings that will continue to
24 escalate through the day without anybody stopping them, and that will
25 continue to also occur on the 13th. So I take it that when you look at
1 the totality of information there, at this point in time at least the
2 people in Potocari are aware that there's no requirement to document any
3 of the prisoners that are being captured, they're not going to be vetted
4 against various lists because they're all going to be executed at some
5 point. And that at this point in time, General Tolimir, who's not been
6 to that region, does not know that.
7 Q. So is General Tolimir's instruction to note down names of men fit
8 for military service, is that consistent or inconsistent with the plan to
9 kill people, in your view?
10 A. It is inconsistent with the plan to kill people.
11 Q. Why?
12 A. One would think that the last thing that you would want is lists
13 of individuals who were known to be in your custody and who will later
14 end up missing. You're essentially proving to the outside world that you
15 did have custody of these individuals, that they were either prisoners or
16 civilian detainees who once you gained custody of them under law of the
17 RS and under the VRS procedures, they had various rights and
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, I'm looking at the clock.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I would just enter this and we're done for
21 the day.
22 MR. IVETIC: No objection to this one.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 04136 will be Exhibit P2116,
25 Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: P2116 is admitted into evidence.
2 Mr. Butler, I give you the same instructions as I gave to you
3 yesterday, that is, not to speak or communicate in whatever way with
4 whomever about your testimony, whether already given or still to be
5 given. And the Chamber would like to see you back tomorrow morning at
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I understand.
8 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, you are supposed to be halfway. Is
11 that ...
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's one binder. I have two more, but I --
13 it's hard to get started, but once we get started you see we are going
14 much quicker. So I hope to catch up. We'll definitely know more by the
15 next two or three hours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The only thing I establish at this moment is
17 that you've used five hours, where you indicated that you needed ten.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Correct. And I -- I'm worried, but I will try to
19 keep this as targeted and as brief as I can.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Overcome your worries and try to achieve what you
21 said -- what you estimated you thought you would achieve in ten hours.
22 We adjourn for the day and we will resume tomorrow, Thursday, the
23 5th of September, at 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of
1 September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.