Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16677

 1                           Friday, 13 September 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 8     IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             The Chamber was informed that some preliminaries were to be

11     expected.

12             Mr. McCloskey.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  Yes,

14     we have been reminded recently by the Trial Chamber that there was an

15     issue with Bill Haglund that was brought up in court on 24 July this

16     year, where the Prosecution had offered to allow in or put in any

17     cross-examination that the Defence felt they needed for Bill Haglund

18     particularly in the Popovic case.  The Defence has needed some time to

19     review that, and it's our understanding in speaking with Mr. Lukic that

20     they have decided not to use any cross-examination for Mr. Haglund -- any

21     prior cross-examination for Mr. Haglund.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I see that Mr. Lukic is not jumping up and

23     protesting so I take it that he agrees.  That's hereby on the record.

24             Mr. McCloskey.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And one other issue, we have a dead-line of

Page 16678

 1     16 September for the bar table for Sarajevo documents.  We've found

 2     recently we've been able to reduce some of those documents by reviewing

 3     the recent witnesses that have testified and the documents that have come

 4     in through them.  We have a few more witnesses coming and we expect to be

 5     able to reduce some of the documents then too, but in order to get you

 6     the best product possible we would like to request a dead-line extension

 7     to 30 September so we can both explain those documents and yet reduce

 8     them to try to get them to the smallest number necessary for you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, any objection?

10             MR. LUKIC:  We never object to any extension of time.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             Mr. McCloskey, apparently there are a number of documents you

13     know you'll skip already, others perhaps depending on what testimony will

14     be heard in the weeks to come.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's my understanding, yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             Wouldn't it then not be wise to already informally indicate which

18     ones you would drop so that the Defence, Chamber staff would not have to

19     bother about that at this very moment, but that would not be the definite

20     list then but still others could be dropped as well.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yeah, I'll see where we are precisely with lists

22     and what's dropped and get back -- get back soon with whatever help we

23     can provide in that.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Because that's how you introduced it, that you

25     had decided already to -- that some would be dropped, would be skipped,

Page 16679

 1     and perhaps more to follow.

 2             So then the Chamber would like to hear from you, and perhaps also

 3     from the Defence, on ...

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  But with this strong suggestion, the Chamber grants

 6     the request.

 7             Any other matter?  Not from the Prosecution.

 8             Any further issue to be raised by the Defence?  Not.  Then could

 9     the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

10             I would like to use the time for the following:

11             On the 28th of June, 2013, the Chamber, inter alia, admitted

12     portions of prior testimony of Witness Music pursuant to Rule 92 bis.  On

13     the 1st of August, the Prosecution sent an informal communication

14     requesting leave to add approximately 11 lines to the admitted portion.

15     The lines in question are transcript pages 12.833, line 21 -- oh, yes, I

16     apologise.  I re-start.  Page 12.832, line 21, until 12.833, line 6.

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber would like to know whether there's any

19     objection by the Defence to that request.  May I take it that you would

20     need to look at it first and that we would hear, either later today or

21     immediately after the weekend?

22             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour, we would appreciate that

23     opportunity since right now we're trying to figure out which -- which

24     witness that is exactly.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

Page 16680

 1             Then if you're ready to continue cross-examination, Mr. Ivetic,

 2     you're invited to proceed.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

 5                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

 6        Q.   Good morning, sir --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but of course I first --

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Butler, again we spent time on procedural issues

10     and we were not very polite when you entered the courtroom.  I would like

11     to remind you again, as I did before, that you are still bound by the

12     solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony --

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic will now continue.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

16        Q.   And good morning, sir.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   We left off talking about intercepts and I'd like to return

19     there.  Now, during the course of this trial we had a witness RM279 who

20     was knowledgeable about the ABiH's capabilities of intercepting the VRS

21     and he conceded they could not follow VRS communications through the HVT1

22     system, the SMC1306B, or the FM200 system, and this can be found at

23     transcript page 13.574 through 13.575.  Sir, was such information made

24     available to you at the time that you were making your assessments as to

25     the technical capabilities of the ABiH side to intercept communications?

Page 16681

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I apologise for interrupting.  It appears

 3     Mr. Ivetic would like Mr. Butler to know the identity of this person and

 4     if we could go into private session briefly.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  We could.  That's fine.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

Page 16682

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  What I was aware of was that they did

 2     not have the capability to collect on what was essentially data

 3     transmissions that were going over the various communication channels.

 4     They could only collect on voice communications.  So again, without

 5     looking at what each specific piece of equipment that you've listed, the

 6     actual technical specifications are, I can't comment on that.  But I did

 7     know generally that there were some military communications that was

 8     clearly beyond their capability at those sites to collect against.

 9             MR. IVETIC:

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did anyone at the OTP or yourself undertake to

11     identify for each intercept that you were relying upon what particular

12     type of radio relay device was said to be the source that was

13     intercepted?

14        A.   I know that many of the intercepts as written in the notebooks

15     will have notations on that, but I did not go to that effort.  I don't

16     know if anyone else did or not.

17        Q.   Now, without identifying the locations, which I will refer to as

18     just the northern and southern facilities, could you tell me if you were

19     made aware of the locations of both, such that you were able to confirm

20     the distance of those facilities from the communication relay hubs of the

21     VRS that were used to transmit communications by the VRS in the

22     Srebrenica area?

23        A.   I can tell you that I visited back in I believe it would be

24     either late 1998 or -- 1998, I'm pretty sure, one of the sites.  I cannot

25     tell you offhand if it was the northern or the southern site.  I also

Page 16683

 1     know that we were provided maps of where the sites where, and of course

 2     not only from the documents that the ABiH sites were located, we also had

 3     corresponding -- at that time we also had the corresponding documents

 4     from the Zvornik Brigade.  Many of those documents -- one of those

 5     documents that was particularly valuable was a copy of the Drina Corps

 6     communications plan, which actually laid out the VRS communications

 7     schematics and their locations as well.  So again, you know, not

 8     necessarily getting it directly from the individuals at the site how far

 9     they were, we could certainly calculate how far they were from the

10     various locations from the information that they provided as well as the

11     information that we had seized as part of the search at Zvornik.

12        Q.   Now again returning to some of the testimony that RM279 gave, at

13     transcript page 13.569 and onwards, he confirmed that for those radio

14     relay devices used by the VRS which he claimed they could intercept, the

15     manufacturer's longest optimal range at full power were 80 kilometres for

16     the RRU-800 and 30 kilometres for the RRU-1.  Did you have that type of

17     information available to you and was it considered at the time of making

18     your assessments as to the technical capabilities of the ABiH?

19        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, not only did I have general information like

20     that -- I mean, the reality is that, you know, I also -- I've given it

21     some thought as to how I could actually explain this, so let me try it

22     that way:  As you're aware from my resume, from 1989 to 1992, I was an

23     all-source intelligence technician in the 3rd Infantry Division.  It is

24     not classified, it's open source and you can find it on the internet,

25     that at that time the 3rd Infantry Division had a rather robust

Page 16684

 1     capability to conduct tactical signals intelligence collection.  We had

 2     what was known as the trail blazer system which allowed us to collect in

 3     the high-frequency range, the very high-frequency range, and ultra high

 4     frequencies.  And we had the quick-fix system which was a

 5     helicopter-mounted version of the same equipment.

 6             Now, I won't say that I'm obviously an expert; however, I would

 7     suggest that for me to be able to do my job in the division with a robust

 8     intelligence and signals intelligence collection capability, I at least

 9     had to have a functional knowledge, not only -- you know, at least on

10     signals intelligence collection.  And again, it won't be a secret that in

11     1989 through 1992 our primary target of collection was the military

12     forces of the former Soviet Union that were in East Germany who use a

13     communications network remarkably like the one used in Bosnia by the VRS

14     and in fairness remarkably like the systems that we used back then.  As

15     any radio enthusiast will understand, you know, the radio waves work the

16     same way for everybody and consequently we all in the military structure

17     our radio communications similarly.

18             So at least, again, the inference I'd like to draw on this one is

19     that while I'm not an expert, I certainly did have enough of a background

20     that when I looked at this --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Butler, could I stop you because there may be

22     some misunderstanding.

23             Please correct me, Mr. Ivetic, when I'm wrong.

24             It seems that Mr. Ivetic wants to know whether you verified on

25     the basis of the documentation of the equipment used that the distances

Page 16685

 1     over which communication was intercepted was beyond what this

 2     documentation said would be the range of coverage of that equipment.  Now

 3     Mr. Ivetic could have focused on that --

 4             THE WITNESS:  I agree, sir, and --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  -- perhaps directly -- that's --

 6             THE WITNESS:  -- and getting to that, because of this basis of

 7     knowledge that I have, I also understand that regardless of what the

 8     manufacturer says with respect of their radio range, you know, as a rule

 9     of thumb we understood from an intelligence collection perspective that

10     we had an ability to collect radio waves out further ranges of that.

11     There's a lot of factors that are involved with respect to radio wave

12     propagation that intelligence people look at, you know, even amateur

13     intelligence people like the ABiH back then, that go beyond the

14     manufacturer's recommended specifications for the radio usage.  So the

15     distance to me doesn't matter more than other technical factors, like

16     radiation power, condition of the antennas, and things of that nature

17     would, to determine whether or not the radio equipment that was

18     transmitting could be technically intercepted from a different location.

19             MR. IVETIC:

20        Q.   Sir, you mentioned the trail blazer device that could be placed

21     on a helicopter.  Do you know if the intercepts from the ABiH originated

22     from aircraft radio interception devices of a similar nature?

23        A.   No, sir, but again we put it on a helicopter to gain line of

24     sight.  The fact that they don't have a helicopter but they have a

25     mountaintop essentially accomplishes the same thing.

Page 16686

 1        Q.   Now, in the course of your research, did you determine that the

 2     JNA had a training doctrine or protocol in place of powering down the

 3     radio relay devices from full power when covering a distance shorter than

 4     the maximum manufacturer's recommended range, precisely so as to keep or

 5     limit the ability of others to intercept those communications?

 6        A.   Absolutely, and the same JNA radio protocols would have called

 7     also for them to place the radio receivers in locations where they would

 8     have terrain features blocking the radio propagation so it can't be

 9     collected by outside sites.  However, you know, in a perfect world if you

10     had enough equipment, I'm sure that the VRS would have really enjoyed the

11     ability to place a radio communications network in the valleys where it

12     would be completely secure for intercept, but since radio waves don't

13     bend corners and they don't have enough equipment to do multiple

14     stations, the option that they clearly chose was to use the few pieces of

15     equipment they had, put them on high terrain, and use them to

16     communicate.  They took a risk that their communications could be

17     intercepted, and the gain that they got was that they would actually be

18     able to communicate.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I put a question at this point, Mr. Ivetic.

20             Mr. Butler, Mr. Ivetic used term "manufacturer's recommended

21     range," and added to that "maximum manufacturer's recommended range."

22     What is your understanding about this recommended range by the

23     manufacturer?  Is it a guaranteed minimal range or is it a maximum range

24     in the understanding of the manufacturer?

25             THE WITNESS:  The -- when one -- in this particular sense, what

Page 16687

 1     they're referring to is the maximum range that the equipment will

 2     properly operate as the manufacturer intends it to operate.  Essentially

 3     what they're saying is if you place the radio stations at ranges beyond

 4     these certain rates, obviously the -- not equipment is subject to

 5     failure, but the radio wave propagation will be such that maybe the

 6     signal's distorted, you won't be able to operate the equipment

 7     effectively.  It doesn't mean that it can't be operated that way.  It

 8     doesn't mean that it can't be modified, but again when you're talking

 9     about what the manufacturer's recommended range is, this is the range by

10     which he guarantees, or the corporation that manufacture it guarantees,

11     that this equipment will perform according to the specifications that the

12     people who wanted the equipment built asked for.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

14             Mr. Ivetic.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16        Q.   Sir, I propose now to look at a photograph with you.  If we can

17     have in e-court D00309.  And, sir, I'd like to focus on the object in the

18     middle, that looks like a tube attached to a plate in the middle of the

19     photo.  Can you -- first of all, can you tell me if this appears

20     consistent with the antenna setup that you were shown when you toured one

21     of the ABiH facilities?

22        A.   I can't remember.  I'm assuming that there is a coil -- there's a

23     Yagi antenna in here.  I can't exactly tell what's inside the tube.

24        Q.   Okay --

25        A.   I see the dipole in the back, but I don't know if that's of

Page 16688

 1     consequence to what you're looking for.

 2        Q.   What I'm looking for is that in relation to this antenna, would

 3     you --

 4        A.   Well, again, if inside there's a Yagi configuration, it would be

 5     the standard antenna that one would use to intercept UHF range

 6     communications or to receive UHF range communications.

 7        Q.   In this configuration can it receive duplex, or would a dual

 8     helicoidal antenna be required?

 9        A.   I -- again, you're just about -- at that point you're now

10     starting to cross the line --

11        Q.   I understand.

12        A.   -- between, you know, my functional knowledge of it and expert

13     knowledge of it.

14        Q.   Understood.  Now if we can look at D00311.  And that is, I

15     believe, another picture from one of the other antennas in this same

16     cluster.  Sir, I can tell you in relation to this antenna that RM279

17     testified that the ABiH 2nd Corps made homemade antennas from stop signs

18     and toilet pipings such as this one.  Would that information have been

19     available to you when you analysed their capabilities, their technical

20     capabilities of intercepting radio communications?

21        A.   Yes, sir, they did tell us that and I did know that, absolutely.

22        Q.   Okay.  And now am I correct that as part of your March 1998

23     mission you interviewed an individual familiar with the VRS frequencies

24     that said that the frequencies used did not change during the course of

25     the war, which allowed the ABiH to fine-tune and intercept them easier?

Page 16689

 1        A.   Well, I'm sure that the individual frequencies may have changed,

 2     but the general radio bands that they were using did not.  As you are

 3     aware from multi-channel communication, it's not one single radio

 4     frequency.  It's a band of multiple frequencies that are in use.  Some

 5     stations are transmitting and some stations are receiving, that's why you

 6     get what sounds like a telephone conversation.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And are you familiar with the explanation given to you by

 8     an individual that you interviewed in March 1998, that the VRS

 9     frequencies did not change?

10        A.   That's what we said.  I take it that that's what he said.

11        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to look at 1D1243 and page 70 of the same in

12     e-court.  And if we could focus on line 8 through 15, sir.

13             The question posed during the -- again, I believe it's the

14     Popovic case reads as follows:

15             "Q.  Were you able to see the frequency plans of the VRS?

16             "A.  In the documents that we primarily use with respect to the

17     Zvornik Brigade, which we had seized first, and to the Bratunac Brigade,

18     I am not aware that there was a specific frequency plan with those

19     documents.  I don't know, having not gone through the entire Drina Corps

20     material, the new stuff, whether or not there is a frequency plan for

21     each of those networks in that, so the short version is:  No, I have not

22     seen a frequency plan for the radio relay."

23             Is the answer as reflected here accurate -- accurate as to how

24     you recall answering this question?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  Even in the documents that we did have that outline

Page 16690

 1     the radio backbone, I don't recall that there were individual frequency

 2     plans for each channel of the network.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  And I'd like to now pull up 65 ter number 19848 in

 4     e-court, a Prosecution document.  If we can zoom in on it so we can ...

 5        Q.   Did you have access to this type of document from the video

 6     communications schematic from the 1st Krajina Corps, I believe?

 7        A.   I don't know that I've ever seen this document.  Looking at the

 8     ERN number on it, given the ERN number, it appears that this is something

 9     that came into the OTP's possession after I left.

10        Q.   Okay.

11        A.   Or at least was put in the ERN system and got a number after I

12     left.

13        Q.   I put it to you that there's at least, I believe, one other

14     document that I've seen of a similar nature.  Would you permit the

15     possibility that if such documentation came to the Prosecution after you

16     left, that one could, as a preliminary step, look at the information

17     contained therein and then go back and check with the purported

18     intercepts to see if the -- if the frequencies match up and if all the

19     other information matches up, so as to reach a new determination of the

20     technical capabilities of the ABiH?

21        A.   Well, again, it's not -- it was not my job at the time of the --

22     that I worked here for a variety of reasons to authenticate the network

23     with respect to the intercepts for the Court.  That was obviously

24     something the intercept operators and those individuals who managed that

25     collection apparatus work do.  My understanding of the basis of a lot of

Page 16691

 1     these questions is -- relates to my -- the steps that I took in order to

 2     validate to myself at least the first foundational question of why I

 3     included the intercepts in my narrative and testified about them, which

 4     goes back to the question of whether or not the VRS telecommunications

 5     network as it existed in Eastern Bosnia in 1995, if it was subject to

 6     intercept and whether the ABiH had the technical capability to intercept

 7     it.  That, of course, was the first step of my analysis and nothing at

 8     this point has been offered that would make me change that conclusion.

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, drawing on your experiences as an all-source

10     intelligence officer, let me give you a hypothetical.  If the frequencies

11     that are recorded as having been used by a party do not match up to the

12     frequencies recorded by those claiming to intercept them, would that

13     reinforce or dissuade your skepticism in the reliability of the

14     intercepts had you known that information?

15        A.   I would say that it would be an indicator that the collection

16     take that they were receiving could -- might not be accurate.

17        Q.   By the way, did you consider the fact that if according to the

18     ABiH they were capable of intercepting the radio signals of the VRS, that

19     the ABiH would also be capable of interloping on the same VRS frequencies

20     and broadcasting their own false transmissions?

21        A.   Therein lies the difference between collection and electronic

22     warfare.  And as I suspect you are well aware, the power that you have to

23     push down range in order to interfere or essentially insert yourself

24     falsely into somebody else's communication network is far more than is

25     required to actually collect radio signals.  The radio equipment that I

Page 16692

 1     saw and that I'm aware the ABiH possessed at the time did not allow for

 2     the power wattage necessary to essentially bump the VRS's own signal X

 3     amount of kilometres away.

 4        Q.   I agree.  But could they broadcast on the same frequency as the

 5     VRS within their own territory so that their own troops or own

 6     intercepted locations much closer could hear those on those frequencies

 7     and mistake them for VRS transmissions, intentionally or not?

 8        A.   Sure.  I mean, in the abstract that is a possibility.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to look at one of the intercepts that

10     you and Mr. McCloskey dealt with during direct examination, P12 --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic --

12             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  -- you have shown a diagram to the witness.  I'm

14     not -- first of all, there's no English translation for that in e-court.

15     Now, I'm afraid that if you make an English translation you get the same

16     undecipherable series of letters and numbers.  I'm a bit lost about --

17     you don't want to -- the witness had never seen it before.  I don't know

18     what you want to do with it, what you want the Chamber to do with it.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honour, since the witness has not seen it

20     before, I don't think I have a basis for putting it into evidence through

21     the witness.  We do believe we'll have some -- I do believe we have a

22     translation now, if I'm reading correctly.  But I believe we'll have a

23     witness coming later who will be able to talk about this and the other

24     documents, the other diagrams.  I believe these are schematics of radio

25     networks, but I don't want to be testifying and to have the Chamber rely

Page 16693

 1     upon what I say; I'd rather have you rely upon what a qualified witness

 2     says.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Nevertheless, you asked questions about the

 4     document and what it would have allowed to do, et cetera, et cetera.  So,

 5     to that extent to say that it was not used in any way is not accurate,

 6     but let us leave it as it is for the time being.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

10             If we can look at P1235.

11        Q.   And this was discussed by you on the 4th of September at

12     transcript page 16.256.

13             MR. IVETIC:  We should not broadcast.  I apologise.

14        Q.   Now, looking at this intercept, it purports to be between

15     General Mladic and an unidentified person, X.  And you testified that

16     this supported your position that General Mladic is talking about

17     Potocari and that everyone needs to be evacuated whether they want to

18     leave or not.  Now, I propose to go through the B/C/S original with you.

19     The word I want to focus on is located in the middle of the page and is

20     spelled e-v-a-k-u-i-r-a-t c-c-e-m-o and it is pronounced

21     "evakuirat ccemo," which is two words, and I submit is in the Croatian

22     variant of the language.  The Serbian word would be one word and would be

23     e-v-a-k-u-i-s-a-c-c-e-m-o and would be "evakuisaccemo."  Now, I

24     understand that since you were working off the English translation this

25     difference would not be apparent to you, but to a B/C/S speaker it is.

Page 16694

 1     General Mladic is purported to be using this word, the Croatian

 2     vernacular variant.  Was this info known to you when assessing the

 3     intercepts?

 4        A.   No, sir.  Again, I work off the English-language versions.  I do

 5     not have any basis to be able to differentiate between an ethnic version

 6     of any of the B/C/S languages.

 7        Q.   Do you find it odd, sir, that a VRS officer, indeed,

 8     General Mladic would be speaking in the Croatian vernacular?

 9        A.   Again, it's not something that I could comment on, whether he

10     spoke it in the Croatian vernacular or whether or not the intercept

11     operator who may, for all I know, be ethnic Croatian working with the

12     ABiH wrote it that way.  I mean, I can't comment on that one way or

13     another.  I don't know.

14        Q.   Okay.  Now, did part of your analysis into the technical

15     capability of --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, has it a different meaning in the -- if

17     it would be -- you spelled it how it would be in the Serbian.  Would it

18     have a different meaning or is it just that you want to draw attention to

19     the fact that the way in which it is written down, that it's a Croatian

20     version of the language which you would be surprised as being used by

21     your client?

22             MR. IVETIC:  The latter, sir.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

24             MR. IVETIC:  The English translation of the words is the same.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 16695

 1             MR. IVETIC:

 2        Q.   Now, did part of your analysis into the technical capabilities of

 3     the ABiH take into account that the ABiH used a significant number of

 4     amateur ham radio operators, as it did not have a sufficient number of

 5     trained professional signals corpsmen?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, that is what they told us and that is what we also

 7     observed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  If we can take a look at number 1D1079 together.

 9        Q.   First of all, sir, are you familiar with the FMSO, the foreign

10     military studies office, within the -- as part of Fort Leavenworth,

11     Kansas?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Can you tell me the role or function of the FMSO within the US

14     system?

15        A.   They are -- the Foreign Military Studies Office is an office of

16     academics employed by the United States Army at Fort Leavenworth, which

17     is where our combined arms academy is.  Their job is to do in-depth

18     studies of various military-related topics, many of them are military

19     policy related, many of them are in-depth studies of what would be

20     potential military adversaries and their tactics.

21        Q.   Are you familiar with the lieutenant-colonel that is identified

22     as the author of this piece?

23        A.   No, sir.

24        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to turn to page 7 of the document with you in

25     e-court, where he has some observations as to events in the enclaves and

Page 16696

 1     the ham radio operators.  If we could focus on footnote or end note I

 2     guess is number 4.  And it reads as follows:

 3             "Rumours persist that the Bosnian Muslim government has hired

 4     some of these public relations firms to conduct media campaigns on their

 5     behalf in the US and Europe.  Former President Carter was berated when he

 6     noted that the American public only knew one side of the story in Bosnia,

 7     but his statement stands as a concise and astute summary of content

 8     analysis available in the press.  One of the best examples of Bosniak

 9     propaganda occurred during the battle for Gorazde in April 1994.  The

10     Bosnian Muslim government convinced the world that the BSA demolished the

11     town and inflicted numerous civilian casualties ..."

12             And then he lists a number of publications which I don't think I

13     need to repeat.  And then we continue:

14             "The international media dutifully interviewed and subsequently

15     printed accounts of refugees which government officials made available to

16     them.  Unfortunately, most of the media failed to corroborate these

17     stories.  The press also broadcast reports from a Bosnian Muslim

18     ham radio operator whom they insisted had to be authentic due to the

19     accuracy of his reports pertaining to the NATO bombings during the fight.

20     Verification of these events later proved this reporting to be highly

21     inaccurate, but the media had already moved on to further stories.  Most

22     of the damage that was done in the enclave had actually occurred almost

23     two years prior to the battle when Muslims had conducted their own ethnic

24     cleansing and burned out the Serbs' houses.  As for the ham radio

25     operator, no one who is holed up in a basement (as he claimed to be) can

Page 16697

 1     accurately describe events taking place on the battle-field.  Rather,

 2     this person simply monitored the unsecured radio transmissions of

 3     UNPROFOR personnel who were controlling the NATO air strikes.  He then

 4     mixed these elements of truth with his own propaganda to deceive the

 5     media.  In fact, no conclusive evidence exists that the ham radio

 6     operator was even based in Gorazde."

 7             Was this incident or any other incidents of this nature known to

 8     you at the time that you performed your analysis of the reliability of

 9     the intercepts of the ABiH?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That question presumes that there's

12     some sort of comparability between military operators on sites doing

13     military work and a person in a basement in the Gorazde enclave.  It's

14     just so far away from the work that we're doing --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  That's --

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- it has no relevance or value.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The objection is denied.

18             The witness may answer the question, whether you considered this

19     incident or other similar incidents, if -- whether you consider -- first

20     of all, were you aware of this incident?  Were you aware of other

21     incidents where ham radio operators were deceiving in their reports those

22     who were supposed to read it?

23             THE WITNESS:  No, I'm not aware of this incident and of course

24     I've never seen this article before.  In the broader sense - and again as

25     I've testified before - obviously we were aware that the ABiH was a party

Page 16698

 1     to the conflict and would -- given what happened in Srebrenica, would

 2     have a vested interest to try and potentially steer the investigation or

 3     slant facts.  That is why I said at the very beginning that -- by

 4     testimony that I looked at the material that was provided to us.  You

 5     know, I was very suspicious of it, precisely because of an awareness that

 6     the ABiH was not a neutral party.  They were an affected party.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  If we could move to 1D1243

 9     in e-court, page 65 of the same, and which should correlate to transcript

10     page 20.109.  And if we could start at line 14.

11        Q.   And before I begin reading, sir, I'd like to advise you and the

12     Court that 1D218 that is referenced in this transcript from the Popovic

13     case is indeed the document known as 65 ter number 25575 in the Mladic

14     case.  And then I begin with the questions and answers:

15             "Q.  Thank you.  Let us have a look now at 1D218.  It is a letter

16     of the State Security Service of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated the

17     24th of July, 1995.  It is very brief.  I am not sure whether this has

18     been translated, although it had been requested.  It is very brief.  I'll

19     read it out to you.

20             "In it, a request was made of the 2nd Corps -- well, it reads:

21             "'Given that in the latest offensive against the protected area

22     of Srebrenica, the aggressor committed genocide over the Bosniak people.

23     We kindly ask you that you require all phono material, audio material,

24     pertaining to Srebrenica, from the assistant chief for security.  The

25     audio material is needed in order to open a file that will be put at the

Page 16699

 1     disposal of the International Tribunal in The Hague.'"

 2             If we can go to the next page:

 3             "My question is this:  Did you ever see this document?

 4             "A.  No, sir, I don't recall that I did.

 5             "Q.  For you, as the expert, would this raise any doubts if even

 6     after such a request, the tapes with alleged conversations would be

 7     destroyed?

 8             "A.  Yes, sir, I mean it would -- it would continue to, you know,

 9     be a piece of the weighting of information particularly with respect to

10     my work on the intercepts, that, you know, would have continued to keep

11     in the front of my mind that I always had to be aware of the material

12     that I was working with that had been provided by these measures were a

13     form of disinformation or deception, yes, sir.  I had that in the front

14     of my mind going in, and this piece of information would have just

15     continued to pour weight on that."

16             Sir, does this transcript selection accurately record your

17     answers to these questions and are those answers truthful such that you

18     would repeat the same today?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours if we could tender 65 ter number 25575

21     at this time.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We would like to see it.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Absolutely.  Let's call it up on the screen.

24     65 ter number 25575.

25        Q.   Sir, just for purposes of connecting this testimony to the

Page 16700

 1     testimony that you gave in the Popovic case, looking at the document now,

 2     can I confirm that this was not a document that you had in your

 3     possession and that you considered at the time you reached your

 4     conclusions?

 5        A.   Again, sir, I don't recall having this document in my possession

 6     at the time I made my initial analysis on the intercepts.

 7        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender this document as the

 9     next available exhibit number.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No objection.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 25575 receives number D359,

13     Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would but I think the interpreters

17     would kill me if I tried to do a question in 30 seconds, so I suppose we

18     should take the break now.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  We certainly have to avoid that to happen,

20     Mr. Ivetic.

21             We'll take a break.  Could the witness be escorted out of the

22     courtroom.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break and we resume at ten minutes to

25     11.00.

Page 16701

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             If we can have in e-court number 1D1260.  And if we can have

 8     page 3 of that 65 ter number.  That should correlate to transcript

 9     page 20.123.  And if we can focus on line 3 and onwards.

10        Q.   Sir, I'd like to re-visit the Popovic transcript at this stage:

11             "Q.  Let us go back to the first paragraph of the first page

12     again.  Did you notice that there, the General Staff of the

13     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina state that all of the tapes they had in their

14     possession, referring to the events, they forwarded to the

15     Agency for Research and Documentation back in 1995?

16             "A.  Yes, sir, that's correct.  And to further clarify, now that

17     I've read this document in English, I can tell you that I have seen it at

18     an earlier date, probably around 1997, 1998.  So I can confirm now that I

19     did have access and I did see this document at the early part of my work.

20             "Q.  My last question pertaining to this document is that:  Did

21     this raise any doubts, this fact that the AID has not been forwarding any

22     tapes to you since 1995; although, they had them in their custody?

23             "A.  Yes, sir.  In fact, this, among other information, was, in

24     part, why I was prepared fully to not accept the broader body of

25     intercepts at face value until the work of the OTP could independently

Page 16702

 1     corroborate them.  This is just one of the many reasons."

 2             Sir, is your testimony accurately recorded and is the same

 3     truthful such that you would so testify again today?

 4        A.   Yes, sir, it is.  Again, in the context that we're discussing, I

 5     hope I've been abundantly clear about my initial skepticism about the

 6     intercepts.

 7        Q.   As an expert do you concede based upon some of the material that

 8     we've been going through the last hour or so that more investigation is

 9     required before placing undivided faith in the reliability and

10     authenticity of the purported ABiH intercepts?

11        A.   Sir, that is exactly why I undertook an initial investigation

12     before I included them in my reports in 1998 and 1999 and 2000.  My

13     position is that in 2013 I believe that their authenticity has been

14     adequately proven and -- again, not to belabour an issue here, but the

15     first part of my analysis was the technical issue.  Obviously I looked at

16     the intercepts from a broader analytical perspective and how they fit

17     into the overall context of our awareness or my awareness specifically of

18     what happened in July of 1995.  Because, again as I've noted in response

19     to both questions by all three parties here, deception was a possibility

20     and I also understand the issue related to deception, you know, what it's

21     meant to do at a point in time in the battle-field, just as the recent

22     document the Defence brought up showed that this person may have operated

23     and tried to deceive someone in 1994 and it was outed in 1995.  You know,

24     here you have a scenario where you get a body of information in 1997.

25     One would think if this was a broad-scale deception operation, you know,

Page 16703

 1     from the period of 1997 to 2013, that would be evident.  I believe that

 2     the opposite is true.  I believe that when one looks at the military

 3     documents that were seized by the VRS that were clearly not in the

 4     possession of the ABiH and one uses that to lay out a context and that

 5     one looks at the body of the intercepts, it's not a technical term, but

 6     if you have a context here and the intercepts weave that context

 7     together, they synchronise.  If it was a broad-scale deception operation,

 8     the reality as painted by the military documents on the one hand would

 9     run counter to the story being told by the intercepts.

10             So the intercepts as a body of information are corroborated to a

11     large degree by the military documents that were in the possession of the

12     VRS.  And when you look at specific vignettes like, for example,

13     17 July 1995, you will actually have intercepted references of military

14     documents that were later found in VRS military headquarters buildings.

15     The presumption I make obviously is not that an ABiH officer at some

16     point deposited documents inside a secure VRS headquarters hoping that

17     one day we would find that material.  So again, when one looks at

18     deception, the strength of a deception is highest at its initial point

19     and degrades over time.  We're now in 2013 which is, what, almost 16,

20     17 years after that initial deception was supposed to take place.  I

21     believe that's illogical.

22        Q.   Do you believe it's illogical that for every single one of the

23     intercepts you went through the other day, the audio even though it was

24     sought to be preserved does not exist, the audio recording?

25        A.   That question was asked.  We were told that they had a shortage

Page 16704

 1     of audiotapes for the systems.  It was a reasonable answer.

 2        Q.   Do you know what percentage of the intercepts that you relied

 3     upon in your report do not have audio recordings in the possession of the

 4     Office of the Prosecutor?

 5        A.   At the time that I put together the report and the intercepts

 6     that I used, I don't believe any of them have audio recordings.  I would

 7     certainly like to think that if we had an audio recording of that

 8     particular intercept, that we would have played it in court for that

 9     purpose.

10        Q.   And yet for other intercepts by the ABiH from the same

11     time-period, there do exist audio recordings?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Did you ever seek out an explanation from the ABiH authorities

14     why they withheld the audiotapes that they did turn over from the

15     Office of the Prosecutor for nearly three years?

16        A.   We asked that question on both the intercept notebooks as well as

17     the audiotapes.  Specifically with the question of the audiotapes, my

18     understanding is the answer they had gotten back was that the audiotapes

19     were forwarded to the military archive in Sarajevo.  The war ended and

20     they were essentially forgotten about.

21        Q.   Now --

22        A.   Again, not an unrealistic answer if you understand Sarajevo.

23        Q.   Let me ask you something else and whether it's realistic or not.

24     Wouldn't also if someone has taken text of intercepts and fiddled with

25     them, would it also not be realistic that they would get rid of the audio

Page 16705

 1     because that would reveal, as you said, the deception that was being

 2     played?

 3        A.   Again, sir, whether -- for me, it's not simply a question of

 4     looking at a particular intercept in isolation and determining whether or

 5     not an audio does or does not exist.  As I've indicated, there are other

 6     ways to corroborate the veracity of the intercept.  One of them obviously

 7     is comparing the intercept and the information purported to be contained

 8     in it to the actual context of events that it's claiming to record.

 9        Q.   And would you agree if one were to doctor-up the intercepts, get

10     rid of the original audio, one would probably be good enough to make sure

11     that it fit the context of events based upon information that was then

12     known in 1998 that would not have been known in 1995, for instance?

13        A.   For instance, the fact that in 1998 that the ABiH would have

14     knowledge of 500 litres of fuel going to Colonel Popovic when the only

15     document of that is a technical service rep?  I mean, again, it's not

16     that we did not explore -- I mean, personally I had to explore all of

17     these alternative thesises simply because since General Krstic claimed

18     that the entire body of intercepts were a deception or a montage, you

19     know, that was my Rule 68 obligation at the time.  And so, yes, I put on

20     my intellectual blinders and I took myself down all of those rabbit

21     holes, attempting to assemble information which would, in fact, support a

22     conclusion that the body of intercepts was false or fake or had been

23     planted.  My conclusion is that that body of evidence does not exist

24     simply because when you look at the intercepts in the broader context of

25     the events that occurred, knowing what the ABiH would have or would not

Page 16706

 1     have known at the time because they did not have access to the VRS

 2     documents clearly -- and again, I didn't know at the time.  Because until

 3     March of 1998, I didn't have access to the VRS documents or in April.  So

 4     again, the probabilities that two separate bodies of information created

 5     by two separate armies pertaining to one contextual situation that

 6     occurred in July of 1995, and when you look at them and see how they

 7     correlate to each other I believe that gives me the basis to make a

 8     strong conclusion that the body of intercepts that I've used is authentic

 9     and purports to be exactly what it is.

10        Q.   Now, I want to switch gears and move to a topic closely related

11     to the scrutiny of convoys and the distrust of UN and aid organisations

12     by the Serbs.

13             MR. IVETIC:  If we can please have 1D1240 in e-court, and it

14     should be page 1 of this document which is the transcript page 6671 from

15     the Perisic proceedings.  And if we can focus on line 15 and onwards.

16        Q.   And, sir, the questions and answers are as follows:

17             "Q.  We left each other last night having a brief conversation

18     with regard to the Mujahedin.  And I'd like to spend a few more moments

19     talking about some of the contextual issues that involving around the

20     time of July 1995.

21             "You had mentioned in your testimony that, I believe, that there

22     was also apart from the presence of the Mujahedin within the Muslim

23     Bosnian army, there was also smuggling occurring that went through Tuzla.

24     Correct?

25             "A.  Well, sir, the smuggling was the continuing effort to move

Page 16707

 1     manpower and supplies into particularly the eastern enclaves of

 2     Srebrenica and Zepa in order to keep the 28th Infantry Division supplied.

 3     I don't know how that has to deal with the Mujahedin, insomuch as I'm not

 4     aware of any of them in those eastern enclaves.

 5             "Q.  Very well.  With regard to the issue of smuggling, were you

 6     aware of a meeting that occurred in 1994 in Tuzla with various members of

 7     the United States air force and Bosnian Muslim army members concerning

 8     supplying ammunition and other necessary equipment to the army?

 9             "A.  No, sir.

10             "Q.  Okay.  In the research that you did, did you come across any

11     discussions about a secret airport or air strip that was being built in a

12     place called Visiko?

13             "A.  No, sir."

14             Do you stand by what is written here as accurately recording your

15     truthful answers to these questions?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  I did not have that knowledge at the time.  I still

17     don't have specific knowledge of those issues.  You know, my knowledge

18     obviously based on the fact that, you know, the United Nations report

19     does document it - I'm aware that they do - but I don't have first-hand

20     knowledge of any of that.

21        Q.   Okay, now dealing specifically with Srebrenica and Zepa, did you

22     have any indications of clandestine operations from France, United States

23     or other NATO country operating in and around these enclaves in the

24     time-period leading up to and including July 1995 as part of your

25     research?

Page 16708

 1        A.   I knew, for example, that -- well, not clandestine.  I knew that

 2     there was a group of I believe British military officers in the

 3     Srebrenica enclave, whose purpose it was to act as forward air

 4     controllers in order to guide in NATO aircraft during -- you know, at a

 5     point when bombing started on the 10th of July, 1995.  That's the extent

 6     of my knowledge.  I've always been very curious about the background

 7     voice speaking French but I haven't got to the end of that one either.

 8        Q.   Now I'd like to look at something with you, the Prosecution

 9     document number 09930.  This is a -- this is an UNPROFOR memorandum, I

10     guess, circulating an article written in November 1995 by a person

11     described as the ex-chief of the military information office of the UN in

12     Zagreb who is, himself, a UN intelligence officer from Belgium, talking

13     about his experiences in relation to the enclaves.  The name of the

14     individual is in the first paragraph, sir.  First of all, are you

15     familiar with either this document or the individual who is referenced

16     [overlapping speakers] --

17        A.   If I could ask the Registrar to expand the -- I'm sorry, even

18     though I'm wearing my glasses, my eyes are starting to go, expand the

19     size a little bit.

20        Q.   Don't worry, sir, I'm also working off the hard copy because I

21     can't see with my glasses either, so you're not the only one.

22        A.   The person you're talking about is this commandant Jan Segers?

23        Q.   Segers.  Segers, yes.

24        A.   I'm not aware of him.  No, sir, I don't believe I know him.

25        Q.   First enough.  I would like to look at some of the points he

Page 16709

 1     raises.  If we could have page 2 of the document in English and this will

 2     be page 4 of the Serbian and it's the fourth question on that page.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I just inquire, does this reflect the whole of

 4     the article or is it excerpts of the article written?  Because --

 5             MR. IVETIC:  My understanding of it is that it is a translation

 6     of the article that would have been distributed by UNPROFOR at some point

 7     in time.  I don't even know the date.  It would have been after -- the

 8     article is written in November -- it would have been after

 9     30 November 1995, but there's no date on it indicating when it would have

10     been transmitted.  The end -- the last page has the authors of the

11     article listed which seems to indicate that it would be the entire -- the

12     entirety of the article, but since we do not have the original text in

13     French for this Prosecution document, I cannot make any affirmative

14     representations on that, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

16             MR. IVETIC:  And if we could focus then on the fourth question

17     from the top.  I see it is on the screen.

18        Q.   I will read it to you so that hopefully the small text will be

19     overcome.  And this is how it goes:

20             "How can you explain the so long survey of Bihac?

21             "JS - thanks to the money that cams permanently, given by the

22     Arab countries or by the refugees installed in Europe.  Countless

23     suitcases full of German marks arrived by helicopter or by road, brought

24     in by locals or strangers.  We even catch two colleagues UNMO doing this

25     little traffic.  They had 50.000 German marks and two mobitel, they have

Page 16710

 1     been send back on the spot.  The 5th Corps sent for packages of money two

 2     times at night by helicopter.  It is believed that the amounts of money

 3     who came in pro week were around 10 millions of mark, a billion Belgian

 4     franc each month."

 5             First of all, Mr. Butler, am I correct that Bihac was another

 6     safe area or enclave like Srebrenica and Zepa?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, far north-western part of the country.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, we see here information about suitcases of cash being

 9     smuggled, including by UN staff that were caught and sent back.  Did you

10     come across such information in the course of your research and did you

11     rely upon or exclude the same for purposes of reaching your -- for

12     writing your reports and reaching your conclusions?

13        A.   I came across numerous instances where the UN forces were engaged

14     in extracurricular activities.  Again, I testified even, with respect,

15     closer to home with the Zepa enclave.  Obviously there's VRS documents

16     which talk about the fact that the Ukrainian peacekeepers there were

17     selling fuel to the VRS.  I suspect the UN was selling fuel to all three

18     sides.  It was certainly an issue that the VRS was concerned about, the

19     fact that, you know, the opponents that they were facing, you know, could

20     be getting illicit fuel and illicit support from UN sources.

21        Q.   If we could turn to page 3 in the English and page 6 in the

22     Serbian, it is the end of the fourth question on the page in the English

23     and it is the last line of page 6 in the B/C/S, going on to the next

24     page --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  There seems to be some sound on the English channel

Page 16711

 1     which -- oh, it's the reconstruction work one of my colleagues tells me.

 2     Then we have to bear it as it is.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I'll try perhaps speaking closer to the microphone,

 4     Your Honours, to try to minimise the interference.

 5        Q.   Again, we are looking at, if I could just -- yes, it is the

 6     middle of the response of the individual to the question that is -- that

 7     is the one, two, three, fourth from the top, and his response in the

 8     middle reads as follows:

 9             "I was doubting if they were intercepting our messages, but one

10     day I have the evidence.  A Croatian colonel told me one day:

11     'Yesterday, in your sitrep this information was correct but this one was

12     not.'  When I asked him if he had access to our reports, he told me:  'Of

13     course, yes.'  Without knowing it or without willing to know it, the UN

14     was working as a source of information for the Croats.  This is

15     unacceptable.  I know that the Americans are given them information, but

16     I think that the UN was doing an unpardonable mistake."

17             Did you have such information that resulted from your research

18     and was it considered by you that the US and perhaps others in the UN

19     were leaking information to the Croats who at the time were allied with

20     the ABiH?

21        A.   I can definitely tell you that when I was putting together my

22     reports, we had ample evidence that everybody was leaking to everybody.

23     The UNPROFOR was a pretty equal-opportunity source of information for all

24     three of the warring factions and all three of the warring factions did

25     actively seek to collect information from it that they could use to their

Page 16712

 1     advantage.

 2        Q.   And if we could go to the next page, the top question, it will

 3     still be the same page in the B/C/S, although we need to scroll down to

 4     the bottom of that page in the B/C/S.  And again, I'll read it so we

 5     don't have to strain our eyes:

 6             "Q.  It has been said that there are military American advisers

 7     at the Croatian side.

 8             "JS - why not?  It is clear that there are retired officers,

 9     Americans but also Germans, in direct support of the Croatian army.  They

10     are not representing their government, but they are there at official

11     request.  In Zagreb there is an office of 'consultancies,' a private

12     company directed by American generals, which is given his services to the

13     Croatian army.  One day in Sector West, I requested to see the Croatian

14     commander, a certain Djanko.  They told me he was absent because he was

15     visiting military installations in the United States.  The same happened

16     in Bosnia with the General Galvin, retired military chief of NATO, who

17     was officially in charge as adviser of the Croat Muslims troops.  Is this

18     a violation of the weapon embargo of ex-Yugoslavia?  I prefer not to

19     pronounce me.  One fact is clear, Croatia has bought modern weapons

20     coming from the arsenals of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries.  And to have

21     this money, they should have been used money coming from drugs dealing."

22             Did you have and consider such information that the US,

23     unofficially through retired officers, helped both the -- both in Croatia

24     and in Bosnia the opponents of the VRS to break the arms embargo?

25        A.   I had that -- I mean, obviously I was aware of the issue with

Page 16713

 1     what was known as MPRI, a consultancy that did that.  I was aware

 2     obviously from United Nations report about reports of US working with at

 3     least one side, the Bosnian Muslims, to violate the arms embargo.

 4     Obviously I knew all of this in my reports.  I just don't know how it's

 5     germane to what happened in July of 1995.

 6        Q.   Well, sir, let me see if I can help you with that.  With these

 7     things we've been talking about going on in the time-period leading up to

 8     July 1995, would they have given cause for the Serbs to pay particular

 9     attention to the convoys, irrespective if they were UNPROFOR or some

10     other source, in your opinion and based upon your knowledge?

11        A.   Yes, sir, and again as I've testified, you know, from the VRS's

12     own documents, you know, setting aside these types of documents, the VRS

13     believed that they had cause to want to ensure that equipment and

14     material that could potentially be diverted for military use by the

15     Bosnian Muslims in the enclave wasn't delivered.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, at this time I would tender

17     65 ter number 09930, the document that's up on the screen, into evidence.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yeah, I would -- Mr. President, I would like more

20     foundation for this document.  It is originally a Defence document.  It's

21     only got, like, four lines of purported UN type on it.  It's not like

22     anything I've ever seen.  It's from an article allegedly and this should

23     be independently findable from this Belgian newspaper.  So if we could

24     find out a bit more about where this came from and what it is before we

25     let it in.

Page 16714

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Just to be clear, it's a document on the

 2     Prosecution's 65 ter list.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And what --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey --

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So what?

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I take it that you must have an idea more

 7     about whether you'd -- 65 ter list means documents you consider to use as

 8     evidence --

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Not necessarily, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] well, that's what the 65 ter

11     list is for, isn't it ?

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Not completely, no.  I think fundamentally, yes.

13     But we put things on there to make sure they are visible available and we

14     might have the opportunity to use them.  They don't necessarily -- a

15     document like this -- the fact that it is on the 65 ter list is

16     certainly -- and I'm sure everyone would agree with me, does not mean

17     it's authentic.  The 65 ter list is designed as a notice issue, not as an

18     authentication issue.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but you would give notice that you may use a

20     document which you consider not to be authentic?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Absolutely, especially if the Defence brings it

22     up and causes it to be authentic.  It's not something that we would think

23     about that's part of this case, but just because it's on the 65 ter list

24     doesn't mean it's authentic.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you would like to have more -- you mean even to

Page 16715

 1     demonstrate efforts of deception might need evidence which would then

 2     result in tendering not authentic documents, authentic only for the

 3     purposes of deception.  Let's not at this moment try to -- one of my

 4     concerns - and I'm looking to both parties - is that some of the English

 5     is rather difficult to understand.  Apparently the original is in French.

 6     Second, the document starts saying that it is an article by Mr. Segers

 7     and apparently it is an interview with Mr. Segers, so whether it reflects

 8     his own words is another issue that everyone will have to consider.

 9     I ...

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber will MFI the document and urges the

12     parties to see whether the original French version is available; and if

13     not, then to further explore the origin of this document as presented

14     here.

15             Madam Registrar, the number would be?

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 09930 receives number D360,

17     Your Honours.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

21             I would now like to look at number 25915, which unfortunately is

22     a document with no translation so I'll have to switch to B/C/S to briefly

23     read the part of this order from 12 May 1995 from the Birac Brigade.  So

24     I give notice to the translators that I'll be switching languages and

25     hopefully my pronunciation will be sufficient to allow it to be

Page 16716

 1     translated into English.  I begin:

 2             [Interpretation] "Pursuant to available information, UNPROFOR

 3     members as well as of UNHCR and other international organisations are

 4     involved in illegal transport of fuel for the Muslims in the enclaves of

 5     Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.

 6             "They smuggled the fuel in reservoirs with double walls and

 7     larger reservoirs on combat and non-combat vehicles which are then

 8     emptied in the enclaves.  What they leave in the reservoirs are smaller

 9     quantities of fuel which are enough only to enable them to travel from

10     the enclaves to the territories of the SRJ and the RS."

11        Q.   [In English] Now, sir, have you had occasion -- have you had

12     occasion to run across such documentation in the course of your inquiry

13     into events in Srebrenica in 1995, even though it was -- would not have

14     been available in an English translation apparently?

15        A.   I can say that I have seen English-language documents from the

16     VRS which essentially say the same thing.  Their concern was that

17     basically the vehicles going in to the enclave with nearly full fuel

18     tanks would leave with nearly empty fuel tanks and that was viewed by the

19     VRS to be a potential means for fuel to be smuggled into the enclave.

20        Q.   Thank you, sir.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, this document has been used now I

22     think with two witnesses.  Can we get it MFI'd, and obviously it does

23     need a translation but I don't want it to get lost in the mix of the

24     trial record.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, the number for the document would

Page 16717

 1     be?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 25915 receives number D361,

 3     Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             At this time I'd like to look at Exhibit D00141.

 7        Q.   Sir, this is a situation report from the NorBat UNPROFOR which,

 8     it's my understanding, had among other places in Bosnia had some men

 9     based at Tuzla airfield.  I think we can agree that the first page

10     indicates this covers the period of 12 February 1995.  Do you believe

11     that you would have seen this document before?

12        A.   Again, I don't discount that I wouldn't have come across it.

13     It's -- I don't know why I would have considered it, you know, relevant

14     to -- again, what the focus of my report is on.

15        Q.   Well, let's turn to page 2 and see if it does in your opinion.

16     In the middle of the page within the "general overview" section there is

17     a reference to the following:

18             "Late Friday night an aircraft was observed flying at low

19     altitude over the area east of Tuzla, with every indication that it was

20     going to land.  It was assumed that this would happen at Tuzla east where

21     there is an extended highway strip.  The UN APCs which were sent out to

22     investigate the matter were prevented by the BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina

23     Army) from doing so.  It therefore cannot be confirmed whether the

24     aircraft actually landed or not or whether a load was dropped at low

25     altitude ..."

Page 16718

 1             Sir, you earlier mentioned knowledge of some involvement between

 2     the US and the ABiH in terms of weapons shipments.  Is this what you made

 3     reference to, that the weapons transfers were taking place at Tuzla?

 4        A.   What I was making reference to was the UN's report on Srebrenica

 5     where they discuss that particular issue.  I take it since this is a UN

 6     report, this is one of the sources they drew on to draw that conclusion.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Now I'd like to look at D00140 with you.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask the witness --

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- you said the UN's report on Srebrenica where they

11     discussed that particular issue, and you take it that since this is a UN

12     report that this is one of the sources, although it says something about

13     possibly having landed or a --

14             THE WITNESS:  What I can say is, again, if one looks at the

15     United Nations own report on Srebrenica, there is a discussion in that

16     report - and I couldn't tell you exactly what paragraph it is - but

17     certainly that report discusses and concludes the fact that there were

18     clandestine arms shipments that came in from that area.  Again, I take it

19     this is one of the documents, but certainly not all they would have drawn

20     a conclusion from.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, because it doesn't talk about weapons, at least

22     from what I see at this moment, but in the context with other evidence it

23     may be that this is indicative --

24             THE WITNESS:  And again I have no -- I take it as a matter of

25     fact I have no information that would dispute the UN's conclusion there

Page 16719

 1     and what I've learned obviously in the years since that is that in fact

 2     there is a body of evidence that supports this conclusion.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 4             Please proceed.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  If we can have -- pardon me,

 6     Exhibit D00140.  I see it's on the screen.

 7        Q.   We can see from the first page that this is a letter from

 8     General Mladic to General Smith dated 14th February, 1995, two days after

 9     the document from NorBat that we just looked at.  And if we can have the

10     next page, please, I'd like to introduce -- talk with you about the

11     letter to see if this was something you had access to.  So please bear

12     that in mind as I read the introductory part of this correspondence which

13     reads as follows:

14             "Dear General,

15             "We are gravely concerned over the frequent use of Tuzla airport

16     by the Muslim side.  The aircrafts are bringing weapons, ammunition, and

17     war materials for their needs.

18             "Unfortunately, this pirate activity of their aircraft is enabled

19     by the NATO airforce, and the Muslim army does not allow your forces to

20     control the loads.

21             "I am sure you share my opinion that these activities are

22     seriously jeopardising the signed agreements and represent a serious

23     breach of the truce and of relevant Security Council Resolutions.

24             "I ask you to take urgent measures to stop these

25     peace-threatening activities, otherwise we will be compelled to take the

Page 16720

 1     necessary measures regarding the Muslim side's violations of the Tuzla

 2     safe area, which is, in the presence of your forces, turning into a war

 3     base for Islamic countries."

 4             First of all, sir, do you believe that you had this letter and

 5     the information contained therein at your disposal when you were doing

 6     your research and reaching your conclusions?

 7        A.   I can't say that I've seen this letter, but again on the broader

 8     sense obviously I testified previously that I had a knowledge that during

 9     the conflict these types of things were occurring.

10        Q.   There is a truce mentioned in this letter.  Am I correct that

11     there was a cessation of hostilities agreement in place at the beginning

12     part of 1995?

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14        Q.   And in relation to the clandestine arms that were coming into

15     Tuzla, what is your information?  Were they -- was that their end point

16     or were they being transported from Tuzla to some other location?

17        A.   No, sir.  The information that -- and again, drawing from the

18     United Nations' own report, those weapons, some of them were in part

19     being smuggled into Srebrenica and subsequently to Zepa.

20        Q.   Okay.

21             MR. IVETIC:  If I could have D00142 in e-court.

22        Q.   I think we'll see when it comes up that it is another letter, a

23     protest, from General Mladic to UNPROFOR, this time to

24     General de Lapresle.  And let's look at the part that reads at the first

25     introductory, two paragraphs that read as follows:

Page 16721

 1             "On 23 February 1995, at about 2010 hours, a transport plane,

 2     with weapons and military equipment, landed again at Tuzla airport's

 3     secondary runway.  It was escorted by 2 NATO fighter aircraft which were

 4     protecting it during flight and off-loading.

 5             "Unfortunately, this has been repeated lately in front (within

 6     sight and hearing) of NATO and UNPROFOR forces both in the air and at

 7     Tuzla airport itself.  Those forces are doing nothing to prevent the

 8     violation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions prohibiting the

 9     import of weapons and military equipment."

10             Did you have information that NATO aircraft were involved in

11     these clandestine shipments into Tuzla?

12        A.   I don't know that I had specific information that it was NATO

13     aircraft.  But it was -- given the fact that NATO was policing the no-fly

14     zone over Bosnia, I'm quite comfortable with the assumption that if

15     they're not NATO-operated they're certainly operating with the knowledge

16     of at least some NATO partners.

17             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to 1D605 in e-court.

18        Q.   While we wait for that, I can tell you, sir, this is a document

19     that purports to be from the embassy of the Republic of BiH in Croatia.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we do so, could I have just a few small

21     questions.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  First, I noticed that the subject of this is

24     expressed as, "Protest letter for General Mladic."  I take it that it is

25     protest letter from General Mladic if that is at the top.

Page 16722

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Actually, I believe if you read the explanation,

 2     sir, it indicates that it was signed for General Mladic on behalf of.  I

 3     think "for" is meant on behalf of in the context of the note that says

 4     the signature is not General Mladic's.  BSA HQ only advised us that it is

 5     the signature of another general authorised by ...

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  The "for" then would stand for "signed on behalf

 7     of."  I thought it was a letter, although signed on behalf of, but still

 8     coming from General Mladic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Right.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  That's one.

11             Second, do I understand that well that this document is explained

12     to have been signed by General Mladic although someone else signs for him

13     without the usual "for" expressed in the document itself?

14             MR. IVETIC:  If we could turn to the last page --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes --

16             MR. IVETIC:  -- I really don't know.  Unfortunately, this

17     document is only in English, too, so I don't know whether it was written

18     in English or whether there was ever a B/C/S original.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, the -- this is the only thing we have, I see.

20     I noticed on the previous document as well there was a signature there --

21             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  -- and which I don't know whether that was

23     General Mladic's signature or whether the parties have any view on that

24     or whether it was similarly signed by someone else.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What --

Page 16723

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm talking about the previous document, the

 2     previous letter of protest.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  The previous document would have been 1 -- pardon

 4     me, D00140, I believe.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we then have a look at that one in the

 6     original.  Or was it the one before --

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Last page.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, last page.  Yes, there we see something at the

 9     bottom written.  Now, I don't know whether that is --

10             MR. IVETIC:  Perhaps if you can zoom in on it.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Is this -- how does the Chamber -- do the parties

12     have any view and the witness have any view on how we should understand

13     this handwriting?

14             THE WITNESS:  I have no particular comment on it.  I couldn't --

15     I don't know what that is.

16             MR. IVETIC:  It's my understanding that this would have been a

17     translation done by UNPROFOR so I don't know -- I mean, this is not

18     obviously the --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The originals are not available.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we have to live with that for the time being.

22             Please proceed.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I believe we were just

24     about to look at 1D605 in e-court.  This is from the embassy of the RBiH

25     in Croatia and it's a list of a bunch of military supplies being sent to

Page 16724

 1     Bihac, again, one of the other safe areas, and is dated 29 May 1993.  If

 2     we can turn to page 2 in the English and remain on page 1 in the original

 3     B/C/S, I think we will see it refers to the fact that these were sent via

 4     truck number UNHCR-10379.  Did you come across documentation like this in

 5     your research about specific inventories of military equipment being

 6     smuggled via trucks that were marked as being official UNHCR convoys?

 7        A.   Not only -- again, I've -- not simply documents.  I'm also aware

 8     of we have videotapes that were done by the Republika Srpska television

 9     company, RS TV station, you know, where the VRS is searching some

10     vehicles that are reported to be either UNPROFOR or other NGOs and where

11     they pull various weapons and ammunition out.  Again, certainly it was an

12     issue that the VRS was sensitive to.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender this document, 1D605,

14     as the next available exhibit number.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No objection.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D605 receives number D362,

18     Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  I was just wondering, it comes to my mind that I've

22     seen this document before.  Was that another version or was it not

23     admitted or tendered or ... ?

24             MR. IVETIC:  It was used, I believe, with General Rupert Smith

25     and at that time he did not have knowledge of it so I did not tender it.

Page 16725

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  So then, yes, then at least my recollection serves

 2     me well, but we now have it in evidence.

 3             Let's proceed.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  I would, Your Honour.  I think we are at the time

 5     for the break.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  We are at the time for the break.  Thank you for

 7     reminding me.

 8             Mr. Butler, we would like to see you back in 20 minutes from now.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break.  We resume at ten minutes past

12     12.00 and I would like to inform the parties that the Chamber would like

13     to have ten minutes at the end of the next session to deliver a decision.

14             We take the break.

15                           --- Recess taken at 11.52 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.13 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The witness will be escorted into the courtroom.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

21             If we can look together at 1D1246 in e-court, page 2 of the

22     electronic version, that should correlate to transcript page 20.506 of

23     the 28 January Popovic transcript from 2008.  If we can focus on line 7

24     and the following.

25        Q.   And, again, sir, follow along with me and I'll have some

Page 16726

 1     questions at the conclusion of this selection:

 2             "On the 15th of January, you mentioned the humanitarian convoys,

 3     and you said that your task was not to provide a comprehensive view on

 4     the policy regarding humanitarian convoys.  I would like, however, to ask

 5     you whether you conducted an analysis concerning the period going from

 6     March to July 1995 regarding the number of convoys that were announced

 7     and the number of convoys that were refused access.

 8             "A.  No, ma'am, I did not.

 9             "Q.  Throughout the same period, you did not, did you, conduct an

10     analysis about the number of convoys that were authorised access but

11     that, for another reason, never went to the enclave?

12             "A.  That's correct, ma'am, I did not do that.

13             "Q.  On the 15th of January, you stated that the policy of the

14     staff of the VRS, in terms of the convoys, was directly linked to

15     directive number 7.  Did you conduct an analysis of the policy of the

16     Republika Srpska and its army regarding the convoys before the directive

17     was passed; in other words, before March 1995?

18             "A.  No, ma'am, I did not.

19             "Q.  In that case, how can you say that the policy of the

20     Army of the Republika Srpska, in relation to the convoys, was linked to

21     directive number 7?  How can you say that?

22             "A.  Well, ma'am, it's pretty self-evident in directive 7 what

23     that policy is, so all I did at that juncture was then look at the convoy

24     documents to determine whether or not there was evidence that such

25     policies were being carried out.  Now, with respect to the

Page 16727

 1     Dutch Battalion and their effect in January and February and March, prior

 2     to that, I believe their testimony doesn't reflect the fact that their

 3     soldiers were not being permitted back into the enclaves or that they

 4     were not being seriously degraded in their -- the supplies that they were

 5     getting until approximately the March 1995 time-frame.  So, granted,

 6     while I did not take into account a statistical analysis of that, I did

 7     do it on a more anecdotal basis.

 8             "Q.  Is it correct that you do not know whether the percentage

 9     [Realtime transcript read in error, 'personage'] of convoys that were

10     refused after the directive was higher than before the directive?

11             "'Percentage.'  I was talking about percentage and I see in the

12     transcript that the word 'personage' has been included.

13             "A.  Yes, ma'am, you're correct, I cannot give you a statistical

14     break down."

15             Sir, are your answers accurately recorded here?

16        A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

17        Q.   And are those answers truthful such that you would so testify

18     today the same way?

19        A.   Yes, sir.  It remains the same today.  I have not done a

20     statistical analysis to determine the status of each and every convoy.

21        Q.   Okay.  And if we can scroll down on this page to take up where we

22     left off at line 20.

23             "Q.  Would you agree that the policy of Republika Srpska and the

24     policy of its army was the result of the abuse made of the convoys

25     because weapons had been transported in these convoys, as well as

Page 16728

 1     humanitarian aid for the ABiH?

 2             "A.  Yes, ma'am.  For the convoys, Bosnia-wide in general, the

 3     VRS was aware of situations where weapons and other illicit goods were

 4     being smuggled in on US -- UN vehicles, I should say, so certainly that

 5     is a consideration that the VRS would have taken into account.

 6             "Q.  Do you know that the procedure regarding to the

 7     authorisation for humanitarian aid convoys was different from the

 8     procedure regarding UNPROFOR convoys?

 9             "A.  Yes, ma'am, I believe that's correct.

10             "Q.  Are you aware that orders related to humanitarian aid

11     convoys existed right at the beginning of the war and that the procedure

12     did not change, was not modified, after the directive was passed?

13             "A.  I don't know that as a fact, so I'm just not familiar with

14     convoy operations in the early war years, so I can't tell you 'yes' or

15     'no.'"

16             Now, sir, is this select both accurately depicted and are the

17     answers contained therein truthful to the best of your knowledge?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, again when I talk about the issue of policy,

19     it's the general policies related to inspection.  I'm not meaning to

20     imply - and I hope I didn't in this particular context - that 7 --

21     directive 7 where it talks about strangling the enclave, you know, is

22     part of a broader policy of simply inspecting convoys to ensure fuel,

23     ammunition, and weapons don't get into the hands of other warring

24     parties.

25        Q.   Now, sir, in the direct examination that you gave I may have

Page 16729

 1     missed something, but I don't remember you ever mentioning the existence

 2     of a co-ordinating body during this time-period that had certain

 3     authority over convoys.  Am I right that such a co-ordinating body

 4     existed?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection, he's wrong that -- that was mentioned.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. McCloskey, you'll certainly be willing to

 7     assist Mr. Ivetic in -- where he missed something.  That happens to all

 8     of us now and then, isn't it?

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Of course, Mr. President.  And my only point was

10     that the question cannot inject an incorrect premise in it.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And that's why I say it was wrong.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not blaming you in any way for objecting to the

14     question, but as a next step I'm inviting you to assist Mr. Ivetic to

15     overcome his flaws in this respect.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Which I [overlapping speakers] -- in the question.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, we will listen and of course be supported in

18     all ways we can.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's why I dared to ask you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Ivetic was very careful putting his question:

21             "I don't remember you ever mentioning the existence ..."

22             And he added "I may have missed something ..."

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, perhaps you leave this for a moment

24     aside until you have found the source.  I'm quite willing to assist you

25     as well, if need be, and move on meanwhile.

Page 16730

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 2             If we can --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But the question was:  "

 4             Am I right that such a co-ordinating body existed?"

 5             And this question can be answered.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I mean, I think I recall talking about

 8     the fact that there is -- there was -- the Main Staff was directly

 9     responsible for approving the UNPROFOR convoys, and therefore other

10     humanitarian good-related convoys I believe we did discuss that there was

11     another co-ordinating body.  Obviously the Main Staff was part of it but

12     it was run by the civil side.

13             MR. IVETIC:

14        Q.   Okay.  In relation to that civil side, I'd like to look together

15     at another transcript reference, 1D1426, transcript page 20.509 -- oops.

16     One moment.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Could the counsel check if it's the correct

18     number, please.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Actually, I think I'm -- I can't verify that right

20     now so I'll move on to another question, so as to save time.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We think it may be 1246.

22             MR. IVETIC:  That's possible.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

24             MR. IVETIC:  But still I'd rather move on and come back to it

25     since I don't have the exact number in e-court.

Page 16731

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  1246 is the one on the screen.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Ah, I see.  I apologise, it is the bottom of that

 3     page.  We can go back to it then, focusing on line 10.

 4             Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're welcome.

 6             MR. IVETIC:

 7        Q.   And the discussion here is in relation to 5D605 in the Popovic

 8     case which is 1D01265 in our case.  And the questions to answers read as

 9     follows:

10             "Q.  My question is the following:  Would you agree that with

11     respect to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this order, approvals regarding

12     humanitarian convoys were issued by the co-ordinating body?

13             "A.  Yes, ma'am, they were the initial approval authority, but as

14     you can tell from the remainder of the body of the order, the fact that

15     they would initially approve a convoy, the Main Staff made it quite

16     clear, in the body of the order, that if it wasn't co-ordinated through

17     them, it still wasn't going through.

18             "Q.  But if you turn to paragraph 4 on this first page of the

19     document, we can see that the document says sent by the VRS Main Staff to

20     its subordinate units, was a notification, notification regarding the

21     convoys that had been approved and the convoys that had not been

22     approved?

23             "A.  What it's saying, at least to my reading, ma'am, is that

24     they're complaining that one of the problems that they have is that even

25     though convoys may have been approved by the co-ordinating body, they're

Page 16732

 1     aware that sometimes they're not getting notified and that these convoys

 2     are showing up unannounced at VRS check-points and it's causing a

 3     problem."

 4             If we can go to the -- yeah:

 5             "Q.  I don't want to argue with you.  At paragraph 3 on this same

 6     page, mention is made of the control of the VRS on the movement of

 7     convoys?

 8             "A.  Yes, ma'am.  It specifically states that the army has the

 9     obligation to check the teams and convoys passing through the territory."

10             Sir, do you agree that this testimony is accurately depicted and

11     that the underlying testimony by you is truthful?

12        A.   I would concur with respect to the fact that, you know, this is

13     what I said in response to the questions related to the document.  If

14     you're asking for me is -- do I still have the exact same view of the

15     document, I would ask you to put the document up so I can look at it.  I

16     would probably concur but I just wouldn't want to do so without looking

17     at the document if that's what you're asking me to comment on.

18             MR. IVETIC:  If we can pull up 1D01265.

19             THE WITNESS:  As you can tell from the text of the transcript, it

20     appears that I have a difference of opinion with Defence counsel on that

21     question.

22             MR. IVETIC:

23        Q.   Yes.  Please feel free to let the court staff to know if you need

24     to go to a different page of the document.  As I understand, it you

25     looked at paragraphs 1 and 2 and then paragraph 4 of the first page and

Page 16733

 1     then paragraph 3 on the same page.  So if the questions thus far related

 2     to the first page, but by all means if you need to turn to the others I'm

 3     not going to stand in your way.  And perhaps while you're reading this,

 4     could you tell us if this would have been a document you recall having

 5     had an opportunity to review for purposes of the report that you did?

 6        A.   Which one?  I -- as you will note from my earlier reports with

 7     the Srebrenica military narrative, I don't delve too deeply into the

 8     issue of convoy discussions because those weren't an area of legal

 9     concern during the Krstic and Blagojevic trials to the extent that they

10     are now.  I probably did deal with it more in the Main Staff report so,

11     again, I did have access to those documents for that particular report.

12        Q.   Thank you for clarifying that.

13        A.   Page 2, please.

14             Yes, sir.  To get back to your original question.  Yes, sir, I

15     mean, the answers that I gave with respect to that time and how they

16     reflect to this document are still valid.  It essentially is an order by

17     the Main Staff to its subordinates, noting the fact that even though they

18     don't have control with respect to the approval of a humanitarian convoy

19     by the co-ordinating body, if the co-ordinating body does not let the

20     Main Staff know in a timely manner that these convoys may be coming

21     through and what the cargo is, the Main Staff is telling them:  We

22     reserve the right to stop these convoys.  Again, there's a war going on.

23     The Main Staff has got to know about all these convoys, whether they're

24     UNPROFOR or whether humanitarian, in order to be able to inspect them,

25     check them out, and even, you know, in a more benign way to make sure

Page 16734

 1     that they're not walking into the middle of a fight.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I'd like to tender 1D01265, the document that is on

 4     the screen.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No objection.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D1265 will be number D363,

 8     Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

10             MR. IVETIC:  If we could return to 1D1246 and it should be, I

11     believe, page 7 of that document which should correlate to transcript

12     page 20.510 of the underlying Popovic transcript.  And if we focus on

13     line 8 onward.

14        Q.   This is -- it's in relation to the same order we just went

15     through:

16             "Q.  At point 1 of this order, convoys that had not been

17     announced were not allowed to go through?

18             "A.  Yes, ma'am, it's what it's saying, is that unless they

19     receive -- unless the subordinate formations receive authorisation in

20     writing from the Main Staff, they're not to permit the convoy to pass.

21             "Q.  In the remaining parts of this order, we have a list of the

22     controls that subordinated formations or units are supposed to conduct

23     when a convoy appears?

24             "A.  Yes, ma'am.

25             "Q.  Would you agree that these measures are precisely the same

Page 16735

 1     as the one that existed in 1995, provided of course you know what

 2     measures were to be followed in 1995?

 3             "A.  Well, yes, ma'am, with respect to the technical goods and

 4     humanitarian aid issues, it just seems to be the same type of order.  The

 5     fact that they're not to allow anything more that pass -- that's been

 6     authorised to pass, anything else will be confiscated, so in that sense

 7     it's correct.  This order obviously does not regulate anything with

 8     respect to the issue of UN or even international personnel who leave a

 9     particular area and what the policy is on allowing them to return.  So in

10     that respect it is different."

11             And is this accurately and truthfully reflected in the testimony

12     on these answers -- on these questions, I should say?

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14        Q.   And would you agree with respect to humanitarian convoys there

15     were several agreements that were entered into and concluded between the

16     UNPROFOR and the VRS as to those convoys?  Are you aware of that or not?

17        A.   I couldn't tell you that I'm specifically aware at the moment of

18     the various agreements pertaining convoy regulation between UNPROFOR and

19     VRS.

20        Q.   Okay.  I understand your answer.  Would I be correct that in

21     drafting your reports, in particular your Main Staff report, reaching

22     your opinions you did not have any specific knowledge about the technical

23     details of these agreements that existed between UNPROFOR and the VRS?

24        A.   Again, I may have at the time.  I just -- I don't recall them at

25     the moment now.  If I did, I would like to believe that I would have

Page 16736

 1     referenced them in the report, but I just -- I don't recall having

 2     knowledge of that.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And if we could turn to 1D1246, page 7, and line 10

 4     through 20.  I think I can refresh your recollection:

 5             "Q.  Have you had the opportunity to see the agreements passed

 6     between the VRS and UNPROFOR?

 7             "A.  For which particular time-frame, ma'am?

 8             "Q.  1995, and especially after the directive was passed.

 9             "A.  No, ma'am.  I don't believe I've seen any agreements or any

10     of the technical agreements with the UN with respect to those convoys for

11     post March 1995.

12             "Q.  But before March 1995?

13             "A.  I believe my association with those documents relates to

14     convoys passing between the VRS positions around Sarajevo.  They're not

15     directly related to Srebrenica."

16             Does that assist you, sir, to refresh your recollection as to if

17     you would have had the technical details of these agreements in mind when

18     you reached your conclusions and drafted your various written reports?

19        A.   At least -- again, I don't remember obviously - and I'm

20     consistent in at least not remembering - seeing anything post 1995 with

21     Srebrenica.  Again, it may very well be that I have seen some of the

22     technical agreement documents with Sarajevo that related to an earlier

23     period.  I certainly don't discount that I did; and again, if I did so,

24     hopefully it's marked in my Main Staff report or at least talked about in

25     my direct testimony.

Page 16737

 1        Q.   If we can please turn to page 9 of this transcript, focus on

 2     line 4 through 19:

 3              "MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown

 4     Exhibit 5D727.  It's in English.  Could we see the signature at the

 5     bottom of the document.  It's a letter sent by General Ratko Mladic to

 6     General Bernard Janvier.  If you turn to the text itself of the document,

 7     you'll see that reference is made to an agreement passed on the

 8     4th of June, 1995.

 9             "Q.  Have you had the opportunity to see this agreement of

10     4th of June, 1995?

11             "A.  I do not believe so, ma'am.

12             "Q.  This document mentions contacts between the liaison officers

13     in the enclaves with the local commanders of UNPROFOR.  Have you had

14     access to the material related to these contacts that apparently took

15     place on the 6th of June, 1995, if we are to believe this document?

16             "A.  No, ma'am.  With respect to Srebrenica, and Zepa, for that

17     matter, I am not aware of any meeting notes or things of that nature

18     that -- that would have occurred on 6 June 1995.  It certainly may very

19     well have happened, but I don't recall coming across any notes reflecting

20     that."

21             Does this accurately comport to your recollection of the

22     testimony and is said testimony truthful to the best of your knowledge

23     and information?

24        A.   Well, again, given it's a conversation between myself and

25     Ms. Fauveau disputing or at least looking at a particular document, may I

Page 16738

 1     please see the document.

 2        Q.   This one I don't have access to in our system or at least I have

 3     not yet pinned down which one it is.  All right.  Well, let me ask you

 4     this:  For purpose of your research and reaching conclusions in relation

 5     to the objectives of -- of the Serbs and the issue of humanitarian

 6     convoys post March 1995, would you agree that the existence or

 7     non-existence of contacts between the VRS and UNPROFOR and agreements

 8     that may or may not have been reached would be germane to your review or

 9     the type of review you were doing?

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And can we --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- I'm sure he meant Bosnian Serbs, but I don't

13     want the record to reflect that Mr. Butler is referring to all Serbs in

14     his answer.

15             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise, I meant Bosnian Serbs or VRS.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, the question moves from very concrete to

17     hypothetical.

18             THE WITNESS:  Abstract in a hurry.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I think for the Chamber to be fully able

20     to appreciate the evidence, we'd like to have a look at the document

21     itself as well and perhaps you may --

22             MR. IVETIC:  I think Mr. McCloskey --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I see Mr. McCloskey is so assisting today perhaps in

24     this respect as well.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Ms. Stewart has found it as 17520 in our

Page 16739

 1     case.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps we could have a look at it.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 5        Q.   While you're reading this, sir, perhaps keep in mind my first

 6     question will be:  Were you aware of this document or did you come across

 7     it in your research.

 8        A.   If I was aware of it, I don't know what I would make of it.  I've

 9     read the paragraph three times, at least the first paragraph, and I don't

10     know that I can make any sense out of what General Mladic is offering

11     here.

12        Q.   Well, let's try to simplify.  It does reference the existence of

13     an agreement entered into in June of 1995.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Everyone who can read can answer that question.

15     Next question, please.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

17        Q.   Did you have knowledge of any such agreements entered into in

18     June of 1995, relating specifically to Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and

19     Sarajevo?

20        A.   No, sir.

21        Q.   Okay.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask both parties:  Is there any document

23     which contains such an agreement because the line of questioning is very

24     much you should have considered that agreement.  I wonder whether there's

25     any source which gives us the text of that agreement.

Page 16740

 1             Mr. Ivetic.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Well, as Your Honours have seen, I did not even have

 3     access to this document at the time that [overlapping speakers] --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  So the simply answer is no?

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. McCloskey, do you have a 4th of June

 7     agreement?

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Not that I'm aware of.  But as you know, you can

 9     look --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, perhaps I should have asked Ms. Stewart.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I take -- no, I won't take too much offence to

12     that.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  If you could trace any text of such an agreement,

14     then we would know what we are talking about.

15             If you want to take instructions in this matter?

16             MR. IVETIC:  I would like to, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.  But you know at short, low volume.

18                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

21             If I can assist, I'm told there may not be a written document

22     from this encounter, but there may be a recording, a video of the

23     meeting.  We will investigate further and get back to the Chamber.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Wouldn't it have been easier just to have put

25     this document to the witness, Mr. Ivetic, instead of reading long

Page 16741

 1     portions -- because that seems to have become your technique, to read --

 2     if it is about whether what the witness said at the time is accurate or

 3     reflected in the transcript, why not give it in advance, ask him to read

 4     it, and ask us -- ask him to tell us whether he finds anything in the

 5     transcript which is not reflecting what he remembers he would have said.

 6     That saves such a lot of time, and this one as well.  Go to the core of

 7     your -- of the issue right away.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

10        Q.   Now, sir, would you agree with me that for purposes of your

11     review you did not do an extensive review of Ministry of the Interior

12     documents to determine what role the MUP or the Ministry of the Interior

13     of the Republika Srpska would have had in relation to authorisation of

14     convoys of humanitarian aid?

15        A.   I -- I would conclude that the MUP's participation with respect

16     to the humanitarian aid would be as a result of whatever participation

17     they took in the civilian co-ordinating body issue.  Again, my focus when

18     looking at the convoy documents was the practical application of those

19     convoys being able to move and under what circumstances.  And ultimately,

20     again as we've talked about in a previous document, it was the army

21     that -- whether they had a vote at the co-ordinating committee level or

22     not -- or co-ordinating body or not, the fact is it was the army that

23     controlled the roads in Eastern Bosnia or in access to Sarajevo.  And

24     they ultimately decided which convoys passed and under what

25     circumstances.

Page 16742

 1        Q.   And in relation to the MUP, I'd like to re-visit an issue from

 2     direct examination.  At transcript page 16.405, Mr. McCloskey asked you

 3     and -- about -- at lines 7 through 15 the question was in relation to a

 4     Mr. Karisik that you identified as being the head of the RDB, the

 5     Republika Srpska State Security Service.  In that relation I'd like to

 6     call up document 1D01259.  This is a dispatch dated 27 July 1995.  In

 7     B/C/S the header at the top reads:

 8             "MUP RS - RJB Bijeljina.

 9             [Interpretation] "Broj:  RJB-314/95."

10             [In English] And I believe we can see at the bottom of the screen

11     that it is signed by the [Interpretation] Head of the RJB,

12     Milenko Karisik.

13             [In English] Sir, is this the same person that you were

14     testifying about that you indicated was the head of the RDB or the

15     Republika Srpska State Security Service?

16        A.   Yes, sir, I believe it is.

17        Q.   Looking at the date of the document, are you -- does it refresh

18     your recollection that in fact he was head of public security at that

19     time?

20        A.   That may well be the case that I'm misremembered it.  My

21     recollection that he was head of the state security branch.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, I wanted to ask you, sir, one of the check-points

23     near Srebrenica known as the "Yellow Bridge," are you familiar with such

24     a feature or a location?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 16743

 1        Q.   Would you agree with me that this check-point existed from 1993

 2     onwards at this location, and thus could not have been said to be

 3     established subsequent to directive number 7?

 4        A.   The facility known or the check-point known as the Yellow Bridge

 5     was the long-established check-point which was where you entered the

 6     UN -- you know, you cross the bridge and you enter essentially the safe

 7     area of Srebrenica.  So yes, the establishment of a check-point at the

 8     Yellow Bridge was not a direct correlation to directive 7.

 9        Q.   And specifically in relation to the Zvornik Brigade, I believe

10     for purposes of your report you may have cited to two reports relating to

11     items confiscated from convoys.  Am I correct, you did not do a

12     comprehensive review of the Zvornik Brigade documents in relation to

13     locating all of them that dealt with convoys?

14        A.   No, sir.  Again, with respect to the Zvornik Brigade documents

15     and particularly my early work, I did not go back and look at all

16     Zvornik Brigade documents as they might relate to convoys through 1994

17     and 1995, particularly up to March of 1995.

18        Q.   In relation to the convoys, would you agree with me that there

19     was a requirement for the convoys to have an inventory listing the goods

20     being transported, both in terms of what they were and their quantity?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22        Q.   And in your opinion was such a provision entirely reasonable,

23     given the circumstances of the war and the acts of misuse of convoys that

24     we've discussed here today?

25        A.   What I have said about that issue is this:  Certainly the VRS

Page 16744

 1     from a military perspective had a right to inspect the convoys to ensure

 2     that goods that they considered to be military in nature or that might be

 3     diverted for military use would be, you know, either kept to a minimum

 4     because they were -- belonged to the UN or they were denied access in the

 5     enclaves.  The question as to whether restricting the amount of broader

 6     humanitarian goods and under what circumstances that activity was

 7     reasonable is a case-by-case basis.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  I'd like to call up 19596 in e-court.

 9        Q.   I think you will see when it comes up this is a

10     1st Zvornik Brigade command regular report to the Drina Corps dated

11     April 4, 1995.  If we could turn to the third page in the English, the --

12     I believe it should be the last page in the B/C/S.  Item number 10, sir,

13     talks about the crossing of various convoys.  We see two UNHCR convoys

14     and three MSF, or Doctors Without Borders, Medecins Sans Frontieres,

15     convoys that went through.  And apparently there was only one that was

16     stopped that material was seized and that's identified here at the bottom

17     of this page and the top of the next page.  And it would appear -- at

18     least there's no indication that other material was not allowed to pass

19     through.  Would you agree that for purposes of your research where items

20     were not on inventory, only the items that were not on inventory were

21     confiscated and the convoys were allowed to proceed with all other items?

22        A.   I don't know that that's the case.  Again, they're in this

23     particular document, it is an assumption that can be made, but again it

24     doesn't specifically -- if I remember this document correctly because

25     I've talked about it, this document does not specifically note the fact

Page 16745

 1     that these items were seized because they were not inventory items.

 2     They're noting that they were seized, no explanation.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  If we could tender this document as the next

 4     available exhibit number.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I think it's in evidence already as

 6     P2157.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.  And Your Honours said you needed ten

 8     minutes at the end of the session.  I believe we are just about there.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  We are close to that moment, yes.

10             Mr. Butler, your break will be a little bit longer than ours.  We

11     would like to see you back in 25 to 30 minutes from now.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  And I would deliver an oral decision which is an

15     oral decision on the Prosecution's motion for leave to amend its

16     Rule 65 ter witness list.

17             On the 26th of June of this year, the Prosecution filed a motion

18     for leave to amend its Rule 65 ter witness list, seeking the addition of

19     Witnesses RM096, RM097, RM098, RM099, RM182, RM378, and RM379.  The

20     Prosecution submits that these additions should be considered in light of

21     its 20th June 2013 notice of its intention to reduce the evidence it

22     adduces in support of its case.  The Prosecution states that the decrease

23     in both the total number of witnesses and live witnesses resulting from

24     its notice and from the motion constitutes good cause for adding the

25     witnesses to its Rule 65 ter witness list, as the Defence will require

Page 16746

 1     less preparation time for the remaining Prosecution witnesses and will

 2     not be prejudiced.  Further, the Prosecution submits that witnesses'

 3     evidence either addresses issues and potential defences raised during the

 4     trial or addresses with greater specificity issues related to the

 5     Prosecution's burden of proof.  The Prosecution submits that even if it

 6     lacks good cause, the witnesses' evidence is relevant and probative and

 7     it is in the interests of justice to grant the proposed additions.

 8             After being granted an additional 14 days in which to respond, on

 9     the 23rd of July, the Defence filed its response, objecting to the motion

10     in part.  It requests that the addition of Witness RM099 be denied and

11     objects only to the proposed mode of testimony of Witnesses RM096, RM098,

12     and RM378.  The Defence does not object to the addition of

13     Witnesses RM097, RM182, and RM379.

14             On the 30th of July, the Prosecution filed a request for leave to

15     reply, with its reply attached.  The Chamber grants the Prosecution's

16     request and considers the reply to be validly filed on the

17     30th of July, 2013.  In its reply, the Prosecution submits that the

18     Defence's objection to Witness RM099 was based on a mistaken premise,

19     that the witness had not previously testified before the Tribunal.  The

20     Prosecution states that the witness has, in fact, testified in two

21     previous cases before the Tribunal and that these testimonies were

22     disclosed to the Defence on the 3rd of July, 2013, before the response

23     was filed.

24             The Chamber recalls and refers to the applicable law concerning

25     amendments to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter witness list, as set out in

Page 16747

 1     its previous decision filed on the 22nd of August of this year.

 2             At the outset, the Chamber notes that the Defence's objections

 3     regarding the mode of testimony through which the witness will eventually

 4     testify are premature and misplaced.  Instead, the proper forum for such

 5     arguments would be in response to a motion tendering the evidence.

 6     Accordingly, those parts of the response dealing with the proposed mode

 7     of testimony will not be further considered in this decision.

 8             The Chamber further notes that the Defence has not objected to

 9     the addition of Witness RM096, RM097, and RM098, and Witness RM182,

10     RM378, and RM379 to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter witness list.  The

11     Chamber finds that it's in the interests of justice to add the

12     aforementioned witnesses to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter witness list.

13             With regard to Witness RM099, whilst the Chamber considers that

14     the Prosecution has not shown good cause for adding this witness to its

15     Rule 65 ter witness list at this stage of the proceedings, the Chamber

16     considers the witness's evidence to be prima facie relevant and of

17     probative value.  The Chamber finds that the addition of this witness

18     will result in a limited additional burden for the Defence given that the

19     witness will provide crime base evidence on Banja Luka and ARK topics,

20     upon which the Chamber has already heard evidence.  The Chamber reminds

21     the Defence that it has 14 days to respond to the Prosecution's Rule 92

22     quater motion relating to Witness RM099, a request that was granted by

23     the Chamber on the 19th of August of this year.  Should the Defence

24     require additional time to respond to the motion, the Chamber will

25     consider such a request.  In light of the aforementioned, the Chamber

Page 16748

 1     finds that it is in the interests of justice to allow the addition of the

 2     witnesses to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter witness list.  Further, the

 3     Chamber grants the Prosecution's request to exceed the word limit in the

 4     motion.

 5             And this concludes the Chamber's decision.  We take a break and

 6     we resume at 1.30.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 1.11 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.34 p.m.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  The witness will be escorted into the courtroom.

10             Meanwhile, there are a few requests for extensions of time

11     pending.

12             Mr. McCloskey, is there any objection to any of the requests?

13                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the request for the extension of time to

16     respond to the 34th motion to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis is

17     partially granted, the new dead-line being the 24th of September.  The

18     Defence motion to enlarge time to respond to the Prosecution's second UN

19     bar table motion is partially granted and the new dead-line is set at

20     11th of October, which means 30 days for the Defence from today.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  And finally the Defence motion to enlarge time to

23     respond to the Prosecution's 35th motion to admit evidence pursuant to

24     Rule 92 bis, that is about Witness RM275, the Defence had asked for

25     30 days.  21 days are granted, so you have until the 3rd of October,

Page 16749

 1     Mr. Lukic.

 2             If Mr. Ivetic is ready, we can continue.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I'm ready to proceed.

 4             I would ask that we call up exhibit -- document 1D01269 in

 5     e-court.

 6        Q.   We had left off by looking at a Zvornik Brigade report to the

 7     Drina Corps about the convoy from Doctors Without Borders.  We now have a

 8     report from the Drina Corps to the Main Staff from the same time-period,

 9     and if you could look at item number 3 I think we'll see that it says in

10     relation to the UNPROFOR convoys and teams:

11             "The situation is under control and all the planned UNPROFOR

12     convoys and teams crossed our territory without any holdups."

13             There is no mention in this document at least of any reporting

14     about the incident in relation to the convoy vehicle from

15     Doctors Without Borders.  Did you do any research to determine if, in

16     fact, incidents at -- in relation to goods being confiscated if they were

17     accurately reported upwards towards the Main Staff or not?

18        A.   No, sir, not in the sense that you're talking about, if I sought

19     to do that.  With respect to what the brigades were reporting related to

20     that and then through the corps and then to the Main Staff.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender 1D01269.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D01269 receives number D364,

25     Your Honours.

Page 16750

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Since there are no objections, D364 is admitted into

 2     evidence.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I would then call up 1D266 in e-court.

 4        Q.   This is a one-page report from the command of the

 5     1st Bratunac Brigade signed by a Captain Momir Nikolic and it gives some

 6     information.  I'd like to focus on the last two paragraphs which state:

 7             "I would like to inform you that the co-ordinator of the

 8     MFS/?MSF/ - Medecins Sans Frontieres organisation publicly apologised for

 9     the abuse of /trust of/ and /one of/ his members in Srebrenica and

10     publicly admitted that the Serbian side had behaved perfectly, correctly

11     when it confiscated the vehicle and smuggled goods.  This

12     delegate - Jean - was removed from the MFS/?MSF/ organisation and

13     returned to his country because of abuse /of trust/ and smuggling with

14     Muslims from Srebrenica and Naser Oric.

15             "The MFS/?MSF/ co-ordinator asked me to put this case behind us

16     and said that it should not affect the further co-operation between the

17     Serbian side and the above-mentioned humanitarian organisation."

18             Now, did you have access to and review this report for purposes

19     of reaching the conclusions that you did testify about in relation to

20     humanitarian convoys?

21        A.   Could you go back up first on this document so that I could look

22     at the ERN number.

23        Q.   Absolutely.  If you go in the original I think that would be --

24        A.   It's a relatively low ERN number, so I gather at some juncture I

25     may have had access to it.  I don't know whether I've seen it offhand.

Page 16751

 1        Q.   Do you have an independent recollection of this event, where the

 2     Doctors Without Borders made a --

 3        A.   No, sir, and that's why I wanted to read the whole document to

 4     see if it could refresh my memory as to whether I've seen this document

 5     or not.

 6        Q.   Fair enough.

 7        A.   Would you give me a minute, sir?

 8        Q.   Sure.

 9        A.   No, sir, I have not seen this document before; or if I did, it

10     didn't stick in memory.

11        Q.   Fair enough, sir.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender this as the next

13     available Defence exhibit number.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No objection.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D01266 receives number D365,

17     Your Honours.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  D365 is admitted into evidence.

19             Could I ask the parties whether there's any further information

20     available about incident of smuggling prior to the 11th of January so

21     that we know more or less what the seriousness of the issue was.  Is

22     there any -- could the parties see whether they can find anything on that

23     so --

24             MR. IVETIC:  Definitely, Your Honours --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  -- as to better enable the Chamber to understand the

Page 16752

 1     importance of this document.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May ...

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Of course I refer to 11th of January, 1995, which is

 6     the date of this document which was admitted a minute ago.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I go back to the question Mr. Ivetic put to

 8     the witness last.  It was:

 9             "Do you have an independent recollection of this event?"

10             This is a question which was not answered by you.

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  No, I do not.  I have no recollection

12     of that event whatsoever.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

14             THE WITNESS:  Or I should say I have no knowledge of that event.

15             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to document -- 65 ter number 1D01270.

16        Q.   This is a code restricted report on the implementation of the

17     cessation of hostilities agreement during March 1995.  If we could turn

18     to page 4 of the same, I believe that there is a section on humanitarian

19     aid at paragraph 7.  If we could zoom in on that and talks about the

20     proportion of aid that actually got into the enclaves during the

21     time-period, and it says the penultimate conclusion or end, I should say:

22             "Approximately 18.000 metric tons of aid were delivered in total,

23     compared to the monthly target of 22.800 metric tons.  This success ratio

24     breaks down as follows:

25             "Bihac - 29 per cent.

Page 16753

 1             "Sarajevo - 71 per cent.

 2             "Srebrenica - 93 per cent.

 3             "Zepa - 80 per cent.

 4             "Gorazde - 83 per cent."

 5             Now, sir, did you have access to this document or access to this

 6     type of information independent of this document at the time that you

 7     were performing your review and making your conclusions as to

 8     humanitarian aid convoys in the area of Srebrenica?

 9        A.   I don't believe I've ever seen this document before.  Again,

10     this -- I take it this is -- this is March of 1995, correct?  I mean --

11        Q.   That's correct.

12        A.   No, I don't recall seeing this document.

13        Q.   Okay.  If -- if I can ask you, apart from this document did you

14     have any data for the months up to March 1995 as to amounts of aid that

15     were projected -- that were supposed to get through and amounts of aid

16     that actually did get through to the enclaves when drafting your reports

17     and reaching your conclusions that you testified about?

18        A.   Again, sir, with respect to my reports the documents with respect

19     to the convoys are issues I've testified.  They aren't dealt with in my

20     reports, we didn't have these documents early on and I certainly didn't

21     look at them early on.  And again, as I've testified, I've not done a

22     broad statistical analysis with respect to how many convoys departed, how

23     many arrived, and what percentage of them were either turned around or

24     what percentage of cargo was taken off under the circumstances.

25        Q.   Okay.  Then I'd like to move to a different topic.  The first day

Page 16754

 1     of direct examination and several times thereafter you focused on the

 2     inclusion of civilian population in certain VRS military orders and have

 3     testified about what you think that means.  By way of refreshing

 4     everyone's memory, T -- transcript page 16141 is one such example in

 5     relation to P2095 and perhaps we can call up P2095 for purposes of the

 6     next few questions.

 7             Now, sir, in direct you focused on the language at item number 1

 8     that says:

 9             "Launch on attack using the main body of troops and major

10     equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust

11     them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim

12     local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and

13     Gorazde."

14             Now, if I'm correcting recalling your testimony you seemed to

15     imply that while it was okay to direct an attack on the enemy soldiers

16     and while you acknowledged the Bosnian Muslim soldiers withdrew their

17     support for the civilian population, you implied that this order was

18     illegitimate or demonstrated an attempt to violate international law

19     because of the inclusion of the Muslim local population.  Am I correctly

20     understanding your evidence, and if not please correct me.

21        A.   What I recall that I said was that -- it was -- I didn't pass

22     actually, I don't believe, a value judgement on that issue.  What I

23     believe I said was that it is inappropriate to target civilian population

24     or objects, make them the target of a military attack.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 16755

 1        A.   Ultimately the issue of lawfulness is a matter for the Court to

 2     decide, not me.

 3        Q.   And at transcript page 16.143, lines 17 to 18, in answering

 4     Judge Orie's follow-up question you elaborate by saying:

 5             "It is a recognition in my particular case that something can

 6     have military utility yet still be patently unlawful."

 7             Does that fresh your recollection if you were --

 8        A.   Yes, sir, it was my comment back to Judge Orie and his question.

 9     From a legal perspective obviously it's contradictory that something

10     could have military value or have a military utility as a tactic and yet

11     be unlawful.  The fact is that is the case.

12        Q.   Now, you'll agree with me, I think, that there is a stark

13     difference between a military temporarily removing a civilian population

14     from a zone of combat on the one hand and a military permanently removing

15     a population on the other hand, am I right?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  I would distinguish that.

17        Q.   Will you agree with me that where a party is intended to engage

18     in combat with an opposing force, the civilians usually leave the combat

19     zone of their own accord as the fighting gets close to them?

20        A.   I suspect the answer is that where possible civilians do not want

21     to find themselves in the line of fire, yes, sir.

22        Q.   Would you agree with me based on your military background,

23     experience, and expertise that the ABiH forces operating in this same

24     area had an affirmative obligation under international military law to

25     remove themselves from areas populated by civilians, so as to prevent the

Page 16756

 1     civilian population from becoming, in essence, a human shield exposed to

 2     potential combat?

 3        A.   Well, yes, sir.  My understanding is that all warring parties, to

 4     the degree that they can to take steps to ensure that they can conduct

 5     combat operations in a way that minimise the risk to civilians.

 6        Q.   In the case of combat, either initiated by or foreseen by the

 7     ABiH forces, would you agree that the ABiH forces in this area had an

 8     affirmative obligation to move civilians from amongst the combat zone to

 9     areas of safety?

10        A.   In abstract I would.  In the context of what was actually

11     happening, I guess the question that I would have is:  Where would you

12     move them to an area that the ABiH would be considered safe?  I mean in

13     this context again we are talking about a -- while rather large pocket,

14     it is one that is behind the lines of VRS territory.

15        Q.   And would you agree that the ABiH forces in this area had an

16     obligation not to locate their military structures, like headquarters,

17     weapons depots, and troop formations near civilian areas?

18        A.   Are we talking about November of 1992 or are we talking about

19     July of 1995?

20        Q.   We're talking about the 1992 for the time-period of the document.

21        A.   I'm not aware that the military forces of the ABiH that were

22     operating in the Cerska or Udrc regions at the time had weapons depots

23     and things of that nature.  Certainly the military forces would be under

24     an obligation to not set up military targets or, where possible, not use

25     populated villages as a key component of their defence lines where they

Page 16757

 1     could.  Again, it's a matter of practical aspect.  I mean, if the village

 2     is in the middle of the road and you need to fight over the road, the

 3     village is going to become a military object at some juncture.  Some

 4     things are not avoidable.

 5        Q.   Now, as to civilians that are caught in a combat zone, perhaps

 6     due to the ABiH's failures to live up to obligations, would you agree

 7     that the VRS has a legitimate incentive to engage in a tactic to attempt

 8     to modify the civilian-to-combatant ratio in that area so as to try to

 9     cure the ABiH's non-compliance and minimise collateral damage that would

10     have been expected from legitimate combat?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection, that's long and confusing and it also

13     assumes facts not in evidence.  It would have to be done as a

14     hypothetical, which I don't have a problem with a hypothetical --

15             MR. IVETIC:  It is a hypothetical.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, to some extent one of the seven questions

17     certainly puts some hypothesis under it.

18             But, Mr. Ivetic, could you please rephrase all of your seven

19     questions.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honours, and I could perhaps even cut them

21     down.

22        Q.   When a party is contemplating combat, isn't it a legitimate

23     tactic to attempt to modify the civilian-combatant ratio in that area so

24     as to try to minimise collateral damage that would be expected from such

25     legitimate combat?

Page 16758

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That's still three questions in one, and apart from

 2     that it's all hypothetical.  And of course a tactic -- whether a tactic

 3     is legitimate or not also depends, of course, which means are used in

 4     order to -- could you please be concrete, Mr. Ivetic, and put to the

 5     witness what apparently you want to suggest was the situation in

 6     July 1995.

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   Was the VRS entitled to engage in attempts to modify the

 9     civilian-combatant ratio in an area prior to engaging in combat to try to

10     minimise collateral damage?

11        A.   I guess what I am unclear about in your question is what you mean

12     by the phrase "modify the civilian-combatant ratio."

13        Q.   Modify the non-combatant to combatant ratio, sir.  It's a term of

14     art in the military, I believe, for reducing the number of civilians in

15     an area, so as to do your proportionality analysis to determine if a

16     military action with a military purpose, even with a risk for collateral

17     damage, is -- gets a green light or a go order.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If you -- if he's now defining this term of

20     reducing the Muslims in an area --

21             MR. IVETIC:  I didn't say "Muslims" --

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- you said a reducing of the number of

23     civilians.

24             MR. IVETIC:  Right.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Given how many civilians were forcibly

Page 16759

 1     transferred or murdered in this war, I think we should have a clear

 2     meaning of what he means by "reducing civilians."

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Getting them out of the area.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Which means -- or would you leave that entirely

 5     open.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  [Overlapping speakers] --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but it's a hypothetical question, Mr. --

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Mr. McCloskey asked me to make a hypothetical.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  If you say take a balloon and put them all in a

10     balloon and take them out, that might be different from loading them into

11     buses and driving them out and that may be different.  There are so many

12     options, so therefore to say -- to ask whether this would be legitimate

13     or not, let's try to stick to the facts as they were there rather than to

14     lose ourselves in the abstract possibilities.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just -- I was going to say what

18     Judge Orie is saying.  But I just want to look at this document that's on

19     the screen which is the source of all of these questions that are

20     hypothetical at this stage.  Mr. Ivetic, what you read to the witness

21     before you asked these questions is a passage that says:

22             "Launch an attack using the main body of troops and major

23     equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust

24     them, break them up or force them to surrender, and force the Muslim

25     local population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and

Page 16760

 1     Gorazde."

 2             Now, these are facts stated as not in hypotheses, just stating

 3     what should be done.  I thought if you confine yourself to what is said

 4     here we would understand your questions better.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  I realise that, Your Honour.  Unfortunately, the

 6     problem we have is the English translation of this document is not true

 7     to the B/C/S which is what I was getting to --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you ask for a better translation, but this does

 9     not -- is -- it's not an explanation on how you put your questions.

10             MR. IVETIC:  I will, Your Honour.  But I was under the impression

11     that he was a military expert, not that he's been --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I think the matter is clear to you now.

13             Mr. McCloskey, anything to add?

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just that we completely disagree on the

15     interpretation issue, so you know --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  If there is an interpretation issue which should be

17     resolved, the Chamber is always assisting in getting the best

18     translation, and finally the Chamber will have to interpret on the basis

19     of the best available translation what the document tells us yes or no.

20             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just one observation, this document is already in

23     evidence and when it was tendered it was not objected in relation to the

24     quality of the translation.  It is in evidence.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, it is, Your Honours.

Page 16761

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Again, if there's any serious translation problem,

 2     it would have been better to raise it, as suggested by Judge Fluegge,

 3     when it was admitted.  But if there is any thing that came up later, then

 4     please don't hesitate to have it all verified, but don't use it as an

 5     excuse for the way in which you are phrasing your questions at this

 6     moment.  You may proceed.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Well, let's go to very specific examples then.  Sir, would you

 9     agree that in the case of this region during that specific time-period,

10     it was not available to the VRS to drop warning leaflets to areas that

11     were going to be subjected to combat due to the no-fly zone that was

12     imposed on that region?

13        A.   That is one explanation, I guess.  I mean, I don't know from my

14     reading of the military documents that -- and again, with respect to

15     1992, I mean other people have studied that in more depth than I have.

16     I'm not aware that there was ever an intent to drop leaflets or documents

17     and that the issue of whether or not there was a no-fly zone or not had

18     any bearing on that.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Is there any dispute about the answer to this

20     question, that a no-fly zone would have prevented throwing leaflets?

21     Mr. McCloskey, I'm not asking you about the relevance of it; I'm asking

22     you whether there's any dispute about it.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I don't know.  I just don't know.  If the VRS had

24     asked for a special request so they could act like the US army acted in

25     Vietnam, whether that would have been approved or not, I don't know.

Page 16762

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  You don't know.

 2             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

 4        Q.   If done correctly, don't modern military forces use a concept of

 5     warning shots before a ground attack against combatants in an area as a

 6     means to minimise the presence of civilians when ground troops go in?

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry, Mr. Ivetic.  Again you are asking

 8     theory.  You are not asking what happened.  Were warning shots raised if

 9     they were -- warning shots were shot.  Put it to the witness that they

10     were shot at that time and let him say whether he knows or doesn't know

11     about that.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  Let's turn to his report number 04627,

13     page 36 in English, page 38 in B/C/S.

14        Q.   While we wait for that, sir, I can tell you this is in relation

15     to your Srebrenica narrative revised where you describe how the VRS

16     forces were able to move the Dutch UNPROFOR without actually targeting

17     them as such or creating injuries upon them.  It starts at 3.15:

18             "As the day wore on, the VRS forces continued to advance on Dutch

19     blocking positions using fire and manoeuvre tactics to force them back

20     without actually firing directly on Dutch troops.  Thus, despite the

21     intensity of the conflict, the Dutch did not suffer casualties as a

22     result of VRS fire ..."

23             Later on in this same paragraph you say:

24             "Using the same tactics of fire and manoeuvre tactics, the VRS

25     continued to force the Dutch back, until the blocking positions were in

Page 16763

 1     the town proper."

 2             Sir, would you agree with me that by not actually targeting the

 3     Dutch troops as such, the VRS had demonstrated an ability to effectively

 4     use fire and movement tactics to clear both combatants, non-combatants,

 5     and the DutchBat from an area without directly attacking them or causing

 6     unnecessary collateral damage?

 7        A.   No, sir.  What I said is what I meant, that when firing in the

 8     direction of the Dutch Battalion, that is the tactic they employed.  I

 9     have no information that suggests that that is the same tactic they

10     employed when firing at Bosnian Muslim military units in July of 1995.  I

11     limited that observation to the Dutch Battalion for those particular

12     days.

13        Q.   And what about the civilians that would have been near the

14     DutchBat according to the narrative and the evidence, would they also

15     have been moved in the same manner without injuries?

16        A.   Again, sir, as evidenced in my narrative - and I don't believe

17     that any additional information has come to the contrary, during the

18     actual several-day operation where the VRS attacked down into and towards

19     Srebrenica, I don't recall documents indicating that, you know, as they

20     were heading towards Srebrenica that they would otherwise not distinguish

21     between military and civilians.  I don't recall them deliberately

22     targeting civilians or being in a position to until potentially the 10th,

23     when they were actually in a position to fire on the town.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MR. IVETIC:  If we can get back to P2095 now.

Page 16764

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Would you kindly pause between questions and

 2     answers for the interpreters.  Thank you very much.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.

 4        Q.   If we can focus on the paragraph in question again, number 1.  In

 5     English it says:

 6             "An attack," in the Serbian attack would be "napadati" which is

 7     not found in that paragraph.  What is found are the words --

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I'm going to object to any of his

 9     off-the-cuff translation issues.  He's corrupting the system.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Should I read it in B/C/S?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Ivetic, you know that our

12     interpreters are not serving as translators.  And therefore, a

13     verification of the translation of a written document should be submitted

14     to CLSS and that procedure should not be replaced by either you telling

15     us what the words are and what they mean or to read them to the

16     interpreters.  And if there's any need on this specific matter to see

17     whether the translation should be revised, the Chamber will try to assist

18     you in order to have that urgently done.

19             Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, this has clearly been a deliberate

21     tactic to bring up translation issues to Mr. Butler at the last minute.

22     This document is clearly something that has been planned for.  Mr. Butler

23     does like to consider things counsel says and takes it seriously.  So I

24     think by not objecting to this -- this or other related intercepts at

25     this point he has waived his right to get into this issue.  And certainly

Page 16765

 1     not to drop his new versions on things.

 2             Now we can discuss, as we do, afterward and if there are

 3     documents, as we have recently done, that we can work an agreement on as

 4     we can, I'm open to do that, but this is really -- this is a deliberate

 5     snaggle.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Do I need to respond?

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic -- well, that the way in which you

 8     introduced the translation issue was not the most elegant one --

 9             MR. IVETIC:  I agree.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- I think you agree with that --

11             MR. IVETIC:  I've been on my feet for eight hours.  So, yes, I

12     agree, Your Honours, I'm not exactly the most elegant at times.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, you have an opportunity after the court

14     hearing to make any attempt to have the translation revised, and the

15     request of the observation by Mr. McCloskey that you've waived your right

16     is not adopted by the Chamber.  And I would invite you to use better

17     arguments than the one that you are eight hours on your feet.  Please

18     proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   Sir, are you familiar with the concept known as an undefended or

21     an open city as opposed to a defended city under the rubric of the

22     Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention and, more closely to home,

23     US army doctrines as first established by field manual 27-10.

24        A.   Yes, sir, I am.

25        Q.   And by undefended city, will you agree with me that the

Page 16766

 1     definition requires an undefended place within the meaning of Article 25

 2     HR or the Additional Protocols in the Geneva Convention, depending on

 3     which source one draws from, as being an inhabited place near or in a

 4     zone where opposing armed forces are in contact which is open for

 5     occupation by an adverse party without resistance.  In order to be

 6     considered as undefended the following conditions should be fulfilled:

 7     Armed forces and all other combatants as well as mobile weapons and

 8     mobile military equipment must have been evacuated or otherwise

 9     neutralised; no hostile use should be made of fixed military

10     installations or establishments; no acts of warfare shall be committed by

11     the authorities or by the population; and no activities in support of

12     military operations shall be undertaken.

13             Do you agree with that definition, sir?

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  What's the relevance of "undefended"?  I don't

16     know where -- what are we suggesting is undefended?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, could you inform the Chamber whether the

18     relevance is found in Srebrenica to be an undefended city?  Because then

19     we could first ask the witness whether he considers that that was the

20     case.  Is that --

21             MR. IVETIC:  That's the question I want to ask him whether he

22     considers this area --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay --

24             MR. IVETIC:  -- that was the subject of this order --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, let's then try not to waste too much time.

Page 16767

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  The first question is:  Did you consider, with your

 3     knowledge of international law, Srebrenica to be an undefended city?

 4             THE WITNESS:  In July of 1995?

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 6             THE WITNESS:  I've never defined it as an undefended city with

 7     respect to the protections that it was involved.  Even though there's

 8     obviously a substantial civilian presence and a United Nations presence,

 9     my understanding of an open city is that a party has to declare it as

10     such.  And I'm unaware of the Bosnian Muslim political or military

11     leadership making a declaration that Srebrenica is an open city.  So in

12     that respect, I've never considered it as such.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

14             MR. IVETIC:

15        Q.   In relation to this same area, would you define it as a defended

16     city under the same international instruments?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps you should give the witness some time to

18     think about --

19             MR. IVETIC:  Oh, I see that --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  -- the answer because it is time to adjourn.

21             I also put on the record that, Mr. Ivetic, you are now at

22     approximately eight hours and 35 minutes at this moment.

23             Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom, but I

24     again -- one second, Mr. Butler, one second.  I would like to instruct

25     you again not to speak or communicate with whomever about your testimony,

Page 16768

 1     which will continue early next week because we'd like to see you back on

 2     Monday morning at 9.30 in this same courtroom.  But before I ask you to

 3     leave.

 4             Mr. McCloskey, could you give us an indication now after a major

 5     part of the cross-examination having -- is behind us, whether -- how much

 6     time you approximately need for re-examination in seconds, please.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I've been thinking about that with the

 8     re-opening of directive 4, that opens up a big area, but I don't want to

 9     spend hours there so -- and I know that you don't either.  So right now I

10     see one session.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  One session, which means that most likely we'll not

12     conclude on Monday, but there's a fair chance that we would on Tuesday.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you may follow the usher.

15             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day and we'll resume Monday, the

18     16th of September, 2013, at 9.30 in the morning in this same

19     courtroom, I.

20                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 16th day of

22                           September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.