1 Thursday, 19 September 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Mr. Lukic, the Chamber was informed that there was a matter you'd
11 like to raise.
12 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning, Your Honours. There
13 is only one short matter I would like to raise this morning before the
14 witness is with us. We have a deadline to provide evidence D44 and we
15 are trying to get it from Radio TV of Serbia, who was allegedly in charge
16 of that, actually they produced it, but we haven't received any response
17 from this institution so if we can get some additional time. I was
18 informed last night but my -- actually two nights ago by my investigators
19 that they have not been able to acquire this video yet.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, any objection against some additional
22 MR. GROOME: No objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, just to not forget about it, it would be
24 good that we give ample extra time, let's say, four, six weeks, so that
25 we don't lose -- that we don't forget about it. So then you'll have to
1 provide that evidence -- well, let's say by the 10th of November.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Any other matter?
4 If not, then could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
5 Meanwhile, I'd like to make a corrigendum on behalf of the
6 Chamber to the 12th, 92 bis decision which was filed yesterday. In the
7 disposition under 6, Witness RM308 under (a), the second line says
8 transcript pages 5588, line 16, to 5518, line 18, and that should be
9 5588, line 16, to page 5588, line 18. To the extent that was not yet
10 clear because one usually reads forwards and not backwards, it's hereby
11 put on the record.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Milovanovic. Please be seated.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, I'd like to remind you that you're
16 still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of
17 your testimony, that is that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth and
18 nothing but the truth.
19 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic will now cross-examine you.
22 Mr. Lukic.
23 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If you're ready, please proceed.
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] General Milovanovic, good morning.
3 A. Good morning.
4 Q. I will start from some very general points that you are very
5 familiar with. I'm going to ask you about the role of UNPROFOR and NATO
6 in the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Would you agree with me
7 if I say that UNPROFOR was in charge of the situation in the territories
8 under its control?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who was Satish Nambiar?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Just already for the first question, to be in charge
12 of the situation, does that mean that you have to provide the weather
13 forecast or does that mean that you have to provide food to the
14 population, or that you have to keep an eye on the armament? I mean,
15 it's a -- even with yes as an answer, it doesn't say anything.
16 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, I have been reprimanded after the first question.
20 I hope that we will not continue in that way. When we said that UNPROFOR
21 was responsible for the situation in the territories under its control,
22 what does that imply?
23 A. One of the four mandates of UNPROFOR in the territory of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was exactly what you are talking about. When it comes
25 to the control of the situation on the ground, UNPROFOR effectively
1 mediated and it was supposed to do it objectively, between the warring
2 parties. UNPROFOR was supposed to organise negotiations, help the
3 warring parties achieve agreements on various things, and the basic
4 mandate of UNPROFOR was to safely conduct UNPROFOR convoys.
5 Q. Thank you. I asked you about Satish Nambiar. Who was he?
6 A. When I arrived in the theatre of war, Satish Nambiar, who was an
7 Indian general, was the UNPROFOR commander for the entire territory of
8 the former SFRY.
9 Q. Did there come a time when this gentleman left? Why did he
10 leave, if you know?
11 A. It is a well-known fact that Satish Nambiar resigned before his
12 mandate was over. I don't know how long his term of office was supposed
13 to be. In my conversation with General Mladic, I learned that Nambiar
14 had left because he had learned that reports by his subordinates, the
15 commander of UNPROFOR for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, reached the
16 Supreme Command of NATO before they reached the Security Council. I
17 believe that that was the main reason why he left.
18 Q. Could you please tell us what was the relationship between
19 UNPROFOR and NATO? How did things change over time, if they did?
20 A. During the war, that relationship changed. At first, UNPROFOR
21 had the mandate that I described, and it seemed to me that it did
22 function independently and honoured its mandates. However, yesterday
23 I mentioned a date, the 16th and 17th December 1992, when a decision was
24 made by the highest officers of NATO and the Western European union, and
25 I quote from that decision, according to which Republika Srpska would be
1 subject to bombardment if it didn't meet some of the demands by the
2 Security Council or international institutions.
3 That plan was given under the authority of the command of
4 UNPROFOR; i.e., the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina had the
5 right to decide whether he would seek NATO intervention or not. That was
6 interference; i.e., the mandate of UNPROFOR was extended beyond the
7 resolution of the Security Council. NATO launched its activities on the
8 11th of April, 1994. It was just a threat, but we were first bombarded
9 in Gorazde, but then that practice continued. Whenever we failed to meet
10 a requirement we would be given an ultimatum and it was NATO that
11 bombarded us, not UNPROFOR, not the local UNPROFOR that was deployed in
13 However, we knew that all officers and generals who worked for
14 UNPROFOR were actually members of NATO. They came from NATO. They were
15 affiliated with NATO.
16 Q. Did you perceive NATO as a neutral side in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. No. From the 17th December 1992 onwards I perceived NATO
18 alliance as an enemy, as I already told you yesterday. It was the fourth
19 enemy that Republika Srpska had.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I put a question to the witness? In your
21 previous answer you said, Mr. Milovanovic, "... all officers and generals
22 who worked for UNPROFOR were actually members of NATO." What about the
23 Ukrainian company in Zepa?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there may have been
25 exceptions, you know. However, all the generals hailed from NATO
1 members. I knew that there was a Ukrainian battalion which was later
2 joined by Russians, but those countries voluntarily joined efforts in the
3 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I don't think that there were any
4 high-ranking officers among them. When I said "all," you are free to
5 alter it into a majority, if you will.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for that clarification.
7 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. [Interpretation] General, when did you become aware of the plan
9 for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the principle
10 51 per cent in favour of the Federation of Croats and Muslims, and
11 49 per cent for Republika Srpska?
12 A. That -- the announcement of such a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 first appeared in the press, in Belgrade. I also heard a statement of
14 the then-president of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovic. I heard that there were
15 negotiations about that.
16 Q. Could you please tell us when that was, if you can remember? Was
17 it at the end of 1993 or perhaps the beginning of 1994?
18 A. I believe that that was towards the end of 1993.
19 Q. And now I'm going to ask you something about the protected areas.
20 As a matter of fact, I read your statements and while reading them
21 I discovered something that I didn't know before, although I had been
22 involved in these trials for a long time. There were only two protected
23 areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, which resulted from an agreement between the
24 Serbian and Muslim sides with the mediation of UNPROFOR; whereas all the
25 other protected areas were imposed and did not involve the warring
1 parties; is that correct?
2 A. First of all, Mr. Lukic, you are using a wrong term. You're
3 using the material "protected areas." No agreement was ever reached
4 about protected areas because this is an entirely different category
5 based on the Geneva Conventions. We should be talking about secure areas
6 and the difference is huge.
7 A protected area is an area which must not be attacked by any
8 side, and the third power guarantees that; whereas safe areas is based on
9 an agreement to stop combat in a certain area, and it is true that
10 negotiations with General Morillon started already on the
11 29th of January. I'm not sure of the date. You shouldn't hold me to it.
12 I heard of that safe areas for the first time when the
13 vice Prime Minister used it, Nikola Koljevic.
14 He told me that the areas of Srebrenica and Zepa should be
15 neutralised because according to General Philippe Morillon, about 64.000
16 refugees found shelter in Srebrenica. Among the 64.000 refugees, there
17 were about 12.500 armed men.
18 As for Zepa, which is a small settlement in Eastern Bosnia,
19 Morillon told me that about 32.000 refugees were sheltered there. First
20 he mentioned the figure of 38.000 and then he corrected himself and said
21 32.000. Koljevic asked me whether it should be good for these two places
22 to be blocked and demilitarised, and that armed forces should be excluded
23 from that -- from those two areas so that the civilian population could
24 live peacefully.
25 The UNHCR would provide food and all the other bare necessities
1 to the civilian population. And let me tell you this: That was the
2 conversation between the two of us, but I liked the idea because
3 I thought if the armed forces - I mean the Muslim armed forces - were
4 excluded from those areas, that would free our armed forces that had to
5 hold the areas in encirclement.
6 Finally on the 8th of May, General Mladic and
7 General Sefer Halilovic, under the patronage or under the supervision, if
8 you will, of General Philippe Morillon signed an agreement on the
9 demilitarisation of Srebrenica. A few days later, or more precisely, on
10 the 18th of May, the same agreement was signed for the area of Zepa. As
11 for Gorazde --
12 Q. Just a moment, please --
13 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, could you refer to the year in which
14 it happened? Second, if you take a breath now and then, the interpreters
15 can take a breath now and then as well.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. The year for
17 Srebrenica and Zepa was 1993.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. That was actually the reason for my intervention. We
20 didn't have the year and for the record, years are very important.
21 How many protected areas -- or I apologise, how many safe areas
22 were eventually established in Bosnia-Herzegovina apart from Srebrenica
23 and Zepa?
24 A. There was a total of six safe areas. For two of them, agreements
25 were signed. They were Srebrenica and Zepa. The Security Council
1 unilaterally proclaimed the following safe areas: Tuzla, Sarajevo,
2 Gorazde, Bihac. The sixth is missing, I believe.
3 Q. Sarajevo?
4 A. I believe that I said Sarajevo. Yes, I did.
5 Q. Yes, you did.
6 A. There was also the sixth safe area for which an agreement was
7 signed, and this is the area of Mount Igman and Bijelasnica, and that
8 happened in the second half of August 1994.
9 Q. We will come to that. In any case, there were those four and the
10 two for which the agreement was signed, so six in total; right?
11 A. There was an agreement for Gorazde as well but it was signed a
12 year later, in the second half of April 1994.
13 Q. Following the signing of the agreement which made Srebrenica a
14 safe area, a certain number of civilians and wounded were evacuated from
15 Srebrenica; right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you recall how many civilians were evacuated on this occasion?
18 A. Before the agreement on the safe area of Srebrenica was signed,
19 an agreement was reached with General Philippe Morillon, sometime in late
20 February, whereby the ill and the wounded would be evacuated from
21 Srebrenica, as well as a number of civilians who wished to be evacuated.
22 The Army of Republika Srpska took upon itself to create a corridor from
23 Srebrenica to Bratunac to Caparde and on to Tuzla to enable the people to
24 leave the area. In return, Morillon was to make sure that the Serbs in
25 Tuzla who wanted to leave that town would be enabled to do so.
1 By happenstance, it was I who was placed in charge of engaging in
2 these negotiations with General Morillon, in the presence of
3 General Zdravko Tolimir and I don't know who else, perhaps Rajko Balac
4 was there from the Main Staff. I alerted the attention of
5 General Morillon to the fact that this would be ethnic cleansing
6 regardless of the fact that the United Nations would be involved in it.
7 JUDGE ORIE: The simple question was how many civilians were
8 evacuated. You give us the full story of the evacuation and we are about
9 to hear what the weather conditions were, but the question was how many
10 civilians were evacuated. Could you please answer that question?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 12.500 civilians.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you, General. Nevertheless, I will ask you to continue
14 giving your answer because you have anticipated a great many questions
15 that I was to put to you. Did the Serbs leave Tuzla?
16 A. Not a single Serb left.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask a question.
18 MR. LUKIC: Sure.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: What became of those Serbs in Tuzla who didn't
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They stayed behind in Tuzla.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. If you know, if you discussed the issue with anyone, the fact
25 that the Serbs stayed in Tuzla, was it of their own free will? What
1 happened or what became of the Serbs in Tuzla after the end of the war?
2 A. I asked General Morillon why was it that he aborted the
3 evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica and why did the Serbs stay behind
4 in Tuzla? His answer was that the Serbs refused to leave Tuzla because
5 they would remain to protect their properties. Now, as for the question
6 why the evacuation of the people from Srebrenica was aborted, he had no
7 answer to give to me, although I divined it myself.
8 Q. Can you tell us what was the conclusion you reached as for the
9 fact that the evacuation of civilians from Tuzla was discontinued?
10 A. Among the 12.500, Morillon allowed the majority of the members of
11 the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to leave Srebrenica.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it seems that there is confusion. The
13 witness told us that 12 and a half thousand civilians left, were
14 evacuated. Then you asked about the evacuation of Serbs from Tuzla.
15 Your last question was about the evacuation of civilians from Tuzla and
16 what was the reason that it was discontinued. And then it seems that
17 from the answer that the witness refers to the evacuation of persons from
18 Srebrenica. And he again mentions the 12.500 which we heard earlier in
19 relation to the evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica. So there seems
20 to be a miscommunication. Could you please seek to clarify that.
21 MR. LUKIC: I think that you clarified and summarised it well.
22 And the witness would agree with you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then we would like to have an answer to
24 the question. The question was: What caused the evacuation of
25 civilians, in your view, to be discontinued from Tuzla?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no evacuation in Tuzla to
2 speak of, not a single Serb was pulled out, so you can't really speak of
3 something having been discontinued if it hasn't begun in the first place.
4 JUDGE ORIE: What caused them not to move out from Tuzla? And
5 I do understand that you did not agree with the explanation given by
6 General Morillon. What is your explanation?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my thinking, not an
8 explanation. I don't think that Morillon ever gave the opportunity to
9 the Serbs in Tuzla to leave the town. Out of 17.500 Serbs who were
10 present in Tuzla at the time, it is quite an impossibility that not a
11 single one would agree to leave the town.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I am a little confused, Mr. Milovanovic. I think
13 a little earlier you assert that Serbs in Tuzla did not want to leave
14 because they wanted to protect their properties. Now, when you now say
15 General Morillon did not give them that opportunity, I wonder whether
16 they didn't know at all that they had the option to leave, if they were
17 not given the opportunity, or were they given the opportunity but they
18 did not want to leave because they wanted to protect their property.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, I said that not a single Serb
20 left Tuzla. I asked General Morillon what the reason for this was, and
21 this is his explanation, i.e. that they refused to do so because they
22 preferred to stay behind in Tuzla to protect their properties. That was
23 Morillon's explanation. Now, my thinking was that they had not even been
24 offered the possibility to leave Tuzla because, I repeat, it is quite
25 impossible that out of 17.000 Serbs in Tuzla, not a single one would
1 agree to leave the town.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: And they wanted -- did they want to leave? Do you
3 know that?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I had to accept
5 General Morillon's explanation that they refused to leave Tuzla. I was
6 not able to verify that -- if that was indeed true.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
8 Yes, Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Q. General, in the course of your work, did you ever come by
11 information to the effect that the Serbs were killed in minefields in an
12 attempt to leave Tuzla or that they paid money to be able to get out of
14 A. I did not come by such information because the general area of
15 Tuzla was not within my sphere of interest. What was within my sphere of
16 interest was the theatres of war.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You've answered the question.
18 Next question, please.
19 MR. LUKIC: I'm moving to the next topic.
20 Q. [Interpretation] I'll be asking you now about the other protected
21 areas or, rather, safe areas, I apologise. General Mladic keeps
22 correcting me. I keep making the mistake over and over again. Let's
23 talk about Bihac because I think that it's an area that you're most
24 familiar with. Is it true that there were three brigades in Bihac which
25 was also declared a safe area, and I mean three brigades of the
1 Muslim 5th Corps?
2 A. That was the information we received from the BH command of
3 UNPROFOR, that the 5th Corps had the three brigades and that all the
4 three brigades were disarmed under Article 60 of Protocol I,
5 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
6 Q. Was the information sent out by UNPROFOR correct?
7 A. I don't know, or, rather, later on, it would become apparent that
8 it was not true. Just as in Srebrenica and Zepa, where agreements were
9 signed making those towns a safe area, we wanted to make the same
10 agreements in respect of Bihac. However, it was the Security Council
11 which unilaterally declared it a safe zone, and as an interested party we
12 were there simply to receive information from UNPROFOR.
13 Q. General, what happened on the 23rd of October, 1994, in relation
14 to Bihac?
15 A. On the 23rd of October, 1994, the commander of the 5th Corps of
16 the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Atif Dudakovic, came
17 out of the safe area of Bihac, across the Una River, launched an attack
18 against the VRS-controlled areas at the foot of the Grmec Mount. He
19 attacks radially from Bihac downstream the Una, in the direction of
20 Kulen Vakuf. Prior to that, that same 5th Corps defeated the forces
21 of -- well, I shouldn't call him rogue, really, but an independent unit
22 of --
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So he left Izetbegovic's army, that
25 is to say Fikret Abdic, but then Dudakovic managed to defeat
1 Fikret Abdic's forces and he locked around 72.000 civilians who were
2 followers of Fikret Abdic's army in a camp and defeated his army
3 numbering some 15.000 men. He must have been encouraged by this so he
4 took a unit of the corps numbering 25.000 men who had cutting-edge
5 technology, including rifles that weren't even in possession of Pentagon.
6 In the span of seven days he occupied, devastated, plundered,
7 250 square kilometres of Serb-held territory out of an area called --
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which means that the 1993 UNPROFOR
10 report was a false report. Under 2, in the span of a year or a year and
11 a half, weapons reached the safe area of Bihac. This means that somebody
12 violated the embargo that the Security Council imposed in one of its
13 resolutions prohibiting the shipments of weapons and ammunition into
14 Western Bosnia. I think that my answer went beyond your question.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Earlier you said:
16 "In the span of seven days he occupied, devastated, plundered
17 250 square kilometres of Serb-held territory out of an area called," and
18 what did you then say? The name you referred to.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The area of Grmec, Mount Grmec.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Lukic.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I think that what you said here was from the safe area. That's
23 what the Judge asked you. Is that what you said, 250 kilometres of
24 Serb-held territory from the area that was called?
25 A. I said, and I underlined, from the Bihac safe area, where there
1 were not supposed to be any armed persons.
2 Q. Thank you. How did UNPROFOR react to this wide-ranging offensive
3 from the Bihac area?
4 A. In no way whatsoever. They simply did not do or say anything.
5 Q. Do you have any specific examples, or is this just your general
6 knowledge, in relation to the growth of the 5th Corps in Bihac and its
8 A. I just had two facts that any lay person could compare. I had a
9 report from UNPROFOR from 1993, to the effect that the 5th Corps had been
10 disarmed, all three brigades. Also, I had the fact that I clashed with a
11 corps of 2 -- of 22.000 persons. I don't think that nothing should be
12 added to that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you one question? You referred to
14 disarmament of the -- I think from Bihac under Article 60 of Protocol I,
15 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Now, you earlier told
16 us that two safe areas were established on the basis of an agreement,
17 whereas the others were imposed by the Security Council. You added that
18 Mouth Igman was the third one where an agreement was reached later on as
19 well. Article 60 of Protocol I seems to me to deal mainly with agreed
20 safe areas, not imposed safe areas. Could you explain -- and the Chamber
21 has looked, I think, earlier at the underlying documents for Bihac --
22 could you explain why you think that Article 60 of Protocol I would apply
23 here, if there is no agreement?
24 And, Mr. Lukic, if we come to this, I have stressed that again
25 and again, if we are talking about this kind of instruments, we should
1 look at the text of those instruments and then analyse them carefully
2 rather than making loose references to it. Could you explain why you
3 think that, where you said it was imposed and not agreed, why Article 60
4 would nevertheless apply? If you don't know, please tell us, but ...
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I can just give my
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 Q. These weapons, could they have entered the area of Bihac without
10 the participation of UNPROFOR?
11 A. It was impossible without UNPROFOR knowing about it. As for
12 participation, I cannot claim anything, whether they did participate or
13 not, but it was impossible for UNPROFOR not to know about convoys of
14 weapons passing through.
15 Q. UNPROFOR stated beforehand that Bihac had been declared a safe
16 area. How did the Army of Republika Srpska react then?
17 A. We just took note of it because we did not have the right to ask
18 for a joint commission that would verify the extent of disarmament
19 because agreements had not been signed. Again, I am going back to the
20 fact that this was declared in a unilateral way by the Security Council,
21 and had UNPROFOR abided by Article 60 as referred to by the
22 Presiding Judge, had they not actually applied that, they would not have
23 informed us that the corps had been disarmed.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the same -- why would UNPROFOR have to
25 abide by Article 60 of the 1st protocol? I mean, it's a good analysis of
1 the legal situation, legal instruments, okay. But then, please, on the
2 basis of proper approach, that means texts, analysis of texts, and clear
3 questions and not sweeping statements.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, I'm not asking you to interpret legal documents for us.
7 Rather, I believe that you are telling us about what your experience was
8 in the field; right? Who informed you about that, namely that Bihac had
9 been declared a safe area, and who was informed?
10 A. The Main Staff was informed by our Supreme Command.
11 Q. Do you know -- all right. I'll leave that for now.
12 After the action taken by the 5th Corps from the Bihac safe area,
13 when this corps covered 250 square kilometres of territory that was
14 previously held by the Army of Republika Srpska, did the
15 Army of Republika Srpska at a particular point in time launch a
17 A. The Army of Republika Srpska, in the period from the
18 30th of October until the 3rd of November, stopped the offensive of the
19 Muslim army, and on the 4th of November they launched a counterattack.
20 Over the next 16 days, they returned the territories lost, regained them,
21 and then, until Jimmy Carter arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was
22 typical trench warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Q. Thank you. It is time for our break now so we will continue.
24 JUDGE ORIE: But before we take the break, Mr. Lukic, when
25 I commented on sweeping statements, I said Mr. Lukic. But perhaps it
1 would have been better in view of the question you put to the witness, to
2 directly address the witness because your question did not solicit any
3 sweeping statements or any such thing. I would like to put that on the
5 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I should have phrased it differently. The witness
7 may follow the usher. We take a break of 20 minutes.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 10 minutes to 11.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I'd like to deal with a few
13 procedural matters, and for the first one I'd like to move into private
15 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. I would like to briefly deal with a
2 translation issue which was related to document D290. On the 20th of May
3 of this year, document D290 was admitted into evidence with
4 Witness Mirko Trivic. On the same day, related to D290, a translation
5 issue was raised by the Defence. The question raised was whether, and
6 I quote, "Keep them under guard," is the accurate translation of the
7 original, and the Chamber would like the Defence to inform it whether it
8 submitted a verification request and if there is any follow-up
9 information on this issue.
10 I can imagine that you could not immediately answer, Mr. Lukic,
11 but could you --
12 MR. LUKIC: Actually, I can.
13 JUDGE ORIE: You can.
14 MR. LUKIC: We did ask for a checkup from CLSS and still I'm not
15 satisfied with the translation we received. So, somehow this has to be
17 JUDGE ORIE: So, CLSS considers it an accurate translation but
18 you still want to challenge that. Then we'll further hear from you.
19 [Defence counsel confer]
20 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, sorry, I just consulted with our
21 Case Manager. That's why he's here. And still I didn't know the full
22 information so we will have to check with them and I'll get back to you,
23 Your Honours, again.
24 JUDGE ORIE: But I do understand you well that the first result
25 of the request for verification is that the translation is accurate but
1 you are still not -- you still want to challenge that by whatever means.
2 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: That's hereby on the record.
4 Mr. Groome.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, with respect to the matter raised in
6 private session, the Chamber is correct, I think the matter of confusion
7 was that the tendering of the exhibit was done at a date different than
8 the date that the witness testified so there is no need to check. We
9 understand exactly what the Chamber wants.
10 JUDGE ORIE: No need to check. I have to praise Chamber's staff
11 for its accuracy.
12 Then before the witness enters the courtroom and perhaps halfway
13 I might invite the usher to already escort the witness into the courtroom
14 but I would like to deliver an oral decision.
15 The Chamber delivers its oral decision on the Prosecution's
16 motion for leave to amend its Rule 65 ter witness list to add
17 Witness RM184. On the 23rd of August, the Prosecution filed a
18 confidential motion seeking leave to add Witness RM184 to its Rule 65 ter
19 witness list as a proposed Rule 92 bis witness.
20 The Prosecution submits that this addition should be considered
21 in light of its 20th of June, 2013, notice of its intention to reduce the
22 evidence it adduces in support of its case.
23 The Prosecution submits that given the decrease in the number of
24 viva voce witnesses, and of the number of witnesses overall, resulting
25 from the notice and the motion, the Defence will require less preparation
1 time for the remaining Prosecution witnesses and will not be prejudiced,
2 which constitutes good cause for the addition and demonstrates that it is
3 in the interests of justice.
4 Further, the Prosecution submits that the proposed additional
5 evidence is needed due to recent developments in the case law of the
6 Tribunal and to practical difficulties in locating the witness.
7 The Prosecution submits that even if it lacks good cause, the
8 witness's evidence is relevant and of probative value and it's in the
9 interests of justice to grant the proposed addition.
10 On the 6th of September, the Defence filed its response,
11 objecting to the motion in its entirety on grounds that the Prosecution
12 has failed to establish good cause for the late addition of the witness
13 and that the addition would prejudice the accused's right to a fair
15 The Defence further objects to the motion based on the proposed
16 mode of testimony.
17 The Chamber recalls and refers to the applicable law concerning
18 amendments to the Prosecution's Rule 65 ter witness list as set out in
19 its previous decision filed on the 22nd of August, 2013.
20 The Chamber firstly notes, as it has done in the past, that the
21 Defence's objection regarding the mode of testimony through which
22 Witness RM184 is proposed to testify are premature and misplaced. The
23 proper forum for such objections is in response to a motion tendering the
24 evidence, not a motion for an addition to the 65 ter list. The Chamber
25 will thus not consider arguments concerning the proposed mode of
2 The Chamber considers that the witness's evidence, which relates
3 to the shelling of Sarajevo, is prima facie relevant and of probative
4 value and may therefore be of assistance to the Chamber in its
5 adjudication of the case. Considering further the difficulty experienced
6 by the Prosecution in locating the witness, the Chamber finds that the
7 Prosecution has demonstrated good cause for the late addition of this
8 witness to its Rule 65 ter witness list.
9 Taking into account the Prosecution's intention to tender
10 Witness RM184's evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis, and the possibility of
11 granting additional time to the Defence to respond to the Rule 92 bis
12 motion, should it so require, along with the Prosecution's submission
13 that it disclosed to the Defence the material related to Witness RM184 on
14 the 16th of August of this year, the Chamber finds that the late addition
15 of the witness does not place an undue burden on the Defence.
16 The Chamber therefore finds that it is in the interests of
17 justice to allow the addition of Witness RM184 to the Prosecution's
18 Rule 65 ter witness list and grants the motion.
19 This concludes the Chamber's decision.
20 Meanwhile, the witness may be escorted into the courtroom.
21 I think the usher is already on his way.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, we were on the topic of Bihac before the break. The
1 forces of NATO, did they bomb you on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of November
2 that year? Also, at that moment, were you advancing or were you standing
3 in place, if you will? I'm referring to the forces of the
4 Army of Republika Srpska.
5 A. Yes. They did strike at the time that you referred to, and
6 before that I had a few warnings from General Rose. We had almost
7 regained the territory lost and we were fighting above Bihac on this
8 mountain, and right now the name escapes me. Right above the hospital in
9 Bihac. I even remember the trig, 633. Rose called me and told me to
10 stop or he would strike. And I asked him, Where should I stop? And he
11 said, Stop at the border of the safe area. However, the safe areas of
12 Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo were not delimited. They had just been
13 declared. I said that, I don't know where the border is because there
14 isn't one. That conversation took place sometime on the
15 20th of November. He said to me that I would get a letter of intentions
16 from him. I didn't know what that meant. That is a political document,
17 and we are generals. Anyway, I did not stop. However, I received fire,
18 or rather our intelligence people had already told me that probably on
19 the next day there would be a strike, and the strike did take place in
20 the afternoon, sometime after 1400 hours.
21 During the night before the strike, I applied a regulation.
22 I got my infantry as close as possible to the Muslim infantry because I
23 knew that if he were to hit me, the Muslims could not remain unaffected,
24 and I knew that he could not hit the Muslims. Anyway, there was fire on
25 the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of November. I still hadn't received that letter
1 of intent and I would like to speak about that once you put that
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all unnecessary
4 microphones please be switched off and could the general please be asked
5 to speak closer to the microphone? Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you to come a bit closer to the
7 microphone? The interpreters have difficulties in hearing you.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, when were you informed about the borders of the Bihac
10 safe area? Before the bombing, after the bombing, when?
11 A. The day after the bombing, on the 24th of November, sometime in
12 the evening, that's when I got this letter of intent. Actually it was no
13 letter of intent. There was no text in there. It was just the border of
14 the safe area of Bihac. It exactly coincided with the front of the Serb
15 forces. That is to say that I had not infringed upon the safe area but
16 I was not supposed to go any further.
17 I was not bothered by that very much because the mission had been
18 accomplished. The territory that had been taken away from us had been
19 regained. It is interesting, this map on which I received the borders.
20 The map was signed on the morning of the 24th, and I received it in the
21 evening, about 2000 hours. Now, how it arrived from New York during that
22 period of time or whether it was done in Sarajevo, that is something I
23 don't know.
24 Q. Did I understand you correctly that your unit that was hit by
25 NATO had not actually infringed upon the borders of the Bihac safe area
1 as defined by the letter that you received, the letter of intent?
2 A. According to that map, I had not infringed upon the safe area
4 Q. Thank you. And now something else about the bringing in of
5 weapons into the safe areas. Did you know that international
6 humanitarian organisations violated the embargo and brought weapons to
7 the Muslim forces there?
8 A. Who was it who brought weapons into the enclaves? I don't know.
9 But it -- the weapons did arrive. In the month of January 1994, we
10 analysed the combat readiness of the Drina Corps, and I learned there
11 that when it came to the three safe areas, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde,
12 there were 16.500 armed men grouped into two divisions and an independent
13 brigade. The 28th Division was in Srebrenica, in the town of Srebrenica,
14 that is. It had about 6500 troops. In the Gorazde safe area, the
15 81st Muslim division was deployed and it had about 7500 men. In Zepa,
16 there was an independent brigade with about 1200 men in it. For both me
17 and the Main Staff, as well as for the Army of Republika Srpska, that was
18 proof that weapons did manage to enter the safe areas.
19 Second of all, armed people entered the safe areas, soldiers.
20 Before we learned about the numerical strength of those units, there were
21 several incursions out of Srebrenica and attacks on the surrounding
22 villages, and all that was aimed at plundering and getting food supplies.
23 Sometime in mid-March 1994, a lieutenant-colonel called
24 Sejdic [phoen] left Gorazde together with a unit with 750 men. He
25 plundered the Serbian villages on Semic [phoen] mountain which is between
1 Rogatica and Visegrad. Our forces forced him to return to the safe area.
2 This means that while he was exiting the safe area, he had to pass
3 through the UNPROFOR check-points or encirclement, and the same was true
4 when he went back.
5 In Srebrenica the same things happened. They would break out of
6 Srebrenica during the night. If there was opposition on the Serb side,
7 people would be killed and then they would return into Srebrenica in the
8 morning. This compelled us to step up control of humanitarian convoys.
9 Q. We'll come to humanitarian convoys and the controls that were
10 stepped up but I would like to speak in more general terms about
11 protected areas or, rather, safe areas.
12 In those areas, it is a fact and it is beyond dispute in this
13 trial that military installations and military units were mixed with the
14 civilian population. Do you know that the Muslim side was offered to
15 demilitarise, for example, for Sarajevo to be demilitarised? Do you know
16 anything about those offers, negotiations? Who was it who offered
17 things? Who was it who didn't want to accept them?
18 A. I knew from public appearances and from personal exchanges that
19 on several occasions President Karadzic insisted on cease-fire and that
20 Sarajevo was divided, or the other way around. First, Sarajevo was to be
21 divided and then there would be cease-fire in Sarajevo which would be
22 proclaimed an open city or an undefended city. According to that system,
23 there would be no armed men and no fire would be opened in the city. As
24 far as I know, the Muslim side always found some excuses or pretexts why
25 not to do it.
1 There were provocations from mortars which were mounted on
2 vehicles. For example, a vehicle would stop at a crossroads, it would
3 fire a few shells, and then it would hastily leave the area and that
4 would provoke Serbian observers to open fire on the place where the fire
5 had been opened from. However, before that, the vehicle would have
6 already been gone, so it would appear as if the Serbs were the one who
7 were opening uncontrolled or indiscriminate or non-selective fire, that
8 we were talking about yesterday.
9 I know that the last offer that was tabled -- or, rather, it was
10 President Karadzic's intervention, was on the eve of the signing of the
11 agreement of the withdrawal of weapons from Sarajevo, the artillery that
12 is. Karadzic offered the United Nations to have Sarajevo proclaimed an
13 open city.
14 Q. Just for the record, is it true that the Muslim side did not
15 accept that proposal?
16 A. They never accepted it. I am aware of a situation, there were
17 negotiations either in Geneva or London, I don't know where, it was a
18 conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a matter of fact. Haris Silajdzic
19 did not want to attend that session. He didn't want to listen to
20 Karadzic talking about reconciliation or a cease-fire. While he was
21 talking about that, Haris Silajdzic actually walked out of the room and
22 left the session.
23 Q. Now let me ask you about something about Srebrenica. Is it true
24 that the entire life in Srebrenica was militarised? Whatever social
25 fabric existed, it was actually controlled by the 28th Division and that
1 included the distribution of humanitarian aid and other such things?
2 A. I did not hear that from anybody. However, I could actually
3 experience it. I realised that Naser Oric had all the power in his
4 hands, humanitarian convoys, military authorities, civilian authorities.
5 When humanitarian convoys arrived it was the military that distributed
6 aid and not some other neutral organisation like the Red Cross or some
7 other such civilian body.
8 I must tell you one more thing. I've already shared with you the
9 contents of my conversations with General Philippe Morillon as regards
10 the number of refugees in these places. He said that there were 64.000
11 refugees in Srebrenica, and UNHCR had that figure in mind when planning
12 their humanitarian aid. However, we knew that there were 42.000 refugees
13 tops in Srebrenica, not more than that, which means that there was a
14 surplus of food, clothing, footwear and other things, for 20.000 more
15 people than actually were recorded in Srebrenica. And all that was for
16 the purpose of the army. The same thing was in Zepa. The official data
17 spoke about 32.000, whereas we were only aware of some 18.000 refugees
18 actually residing in Zepa. So there was a discrepancy in these figures.
19 Q. Tell us what period you are referring to? According to some
20 Muslim documents before the fall of Srebrenica, there were about
21 36 [as interpreted] inhabitants residing in Srebrenica. Are you talking
22 about a period preceding the summer of 1995?
23 A. I'm talking about the period between January and March 1993,
24 before the enclave fell.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is it correct what I see in the transcript, that
1 in your question you were referring to "36 inhabitants residing in
3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, according to the Muslim documents and it's part
4 of our evidence.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And now I would like to ask you something else about UNPROFOR.
8 Did it happen that UNPROFOR soldiers also acted as a human shield for
9 Muslim forces?
10 A. I cannot say that for a fact. However, they did collaborate.
11 They were their forward defence detachment as it were. For example,
12 UNPROFOR helicopter were used to transport the leadership of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e., Alija Izetbegovic, to Srebrenica, or the
14 Srebrenica authorities to various meetings which took place either in
15 Sarajevo and Tuzla.
16 Q. I meant to ask you actually --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I again revisit the issue of the inhabitants
18 where you said it is according to the Muslim documents. The number was
19 36, not 36.000? Just 36 persons?
20 MR. LUKIC: 36.000.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's what Judge Fluegge was seeking to
22 clarify but 36.000.
23 MR. LUKIC: Maybe I misspoke. A bit more than 36.000 actually.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then we are back on track. Please proceed.
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
1 Q. [Interpretation] General, is it true that General Morillon, in
2 February 1993, with 19 of his soldiers, protected Muslims by actually
3 having mingled with them, if you are at all aware of that situation?
4 A. I am well aware of that situation because our commander,
5 General Mladic, authorised me to be in charge of the negotiations with
6 Morillon and so on and so forth. That happened in February and March.
7 Sometime at the beginning of March, I believe that it was around the
8 9th or 10th of March, General Morillon took 19 of his soldiers, who were
9 his protection detail, and entered Srebrenica. I thought that it was his
10 regular activity, i.e., touring safe areas. However, General Morillon
11 did not leave Srebrenica for the next few days.
12 I believe that General Morillon was kept there by force, I don't
13 want to use the word "kidnapped," so as to have the UNPROFOR unit in the
14 centre of Srebrenica which deprived us of our legitimate right to pound
15 the Muslim army in Srebrenica.
16 General Mladic and President Karadzic did not really believe my
17 assessment. They thought that Morillon stayed there of his own will.
18 However, on the 13th of March, I received an invitation from Morillon to
19 meet him in Bratunac on the following day, on the 14th. Obviously
20 I sought approval from General Mladic. The general told me, Go and see
21 what he wants. I arrived in Bratunac on the following day. We were
22 supposed to meet at 1600 hours. A message or a courier arrived. I don't
23 know how the message actually arrived at the brigade command where I was
24 waiting for Morillon. According to that message, Morillon could not come
25 to Bratunac but, rather, he requested me to come to a feature called
1 Zuta Zemlja which is some about halfway between Bratunac and Srebrenica.
2 General Tolimir was also a member of my delegation as well as
3 Colonel Rajko Balac. At first, Tolimir tried to persuade me not to go.
4 However, the final decision was reached and we went. We arrived there
5 and we found Morillon in a garage. There was a house nearby. And
6 Colonel Balac observed the situation around that house and he realised
7 that the surrounding elevations were taken by Muslim soldiers. He asked
8 my approval to prepare artillery support while Morillon and I were
9 talking. Obviously I gave him my approval but he was not supposed to
10 open fire without my order.
11 Morillon gave me the impression that he had been kept by force.
12 The general is very pedantic normally but I saw him not very clean
13 shaven. His nails were dirty. He asked me for a cigarette. I know that
14 he was smoking some very thin cigarettes and that he rolled his own.
15 I gave him a pack of cigarettes. We talked and then I asked him,
16 General, are you being kept here by force or not? And the general said,
17 No, no, no I'm just doing my job. He told me that on the following day
18 he would leave Srebrenica to prove that he had not been kept by force.
19 We kept on talking about the same topic that we discussed back in January
20 and that was the withdrawal of the sick and wounded from Srebrenica. At
21 that moment I didn't mention Tuzla at all because I knew that it would
22 have been in vain.
23 We were engaged in a lengthy conversation about Srebrenica.
24 Look, that was on the 14th of March, and our forces had taken Cerska,
25 Kamenica, and we had reached as far as Konjevic Polje. On the southern
1 side or the south-eastern side, we came close to Guber Banja which is
2 some two kilometres away from Srebrenica.
3 There had already been a lot of talks about that in the
4 Main Staff. I accepted that but I did not take any decisions. I told
5 him that I would inform General Mladic and I would suggest that we should
6 accept his proposal because our forces would be free as a result of that.
7 That's how our conversation ended, and on the following day, Morillon
8 left Srebrenica.
9 Q. Thank you. Now Bihac briefly, please. Were you able to observe
10 Muslim troops acting behind UN APCs in the Bihac area?
11 A. No. But from the trig point 633, I was able to observe, in the
12 compound of the Bihac hospital, 11 APCs belonging to the UN because they
13 had a flag hoisted on the central APC, lined up. And I wasn't even able
14 to contemplate any strikes or fire upon the area surrounding the hospital
15 compound because I would be hitting the UN. It was on the 22nd or the
16 23rd of December that I was at this trig point for the last time, so it
17 was a month later, roughly, and the APCs were still parked there although
18 by that time we already had the so-called Carter truce in place.
19 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you about the agreement where you
20 took part, involving UNPROFOR participants. You mentioned it today.
21 It's the agreement to demilitarise Igman and Bjelasnica, the two mounts.
22 You did participate in the negotiations for the agreement, right?
23 A. Yes. General Mladic and Karadzic were attending one of the peace
24 conferences in Geneva, I believe. It was on the 11th or 12th of August,
25 in the morning, that I spoke to President Karadzic. He told me that I
1 had to withdraw the Serbian forces from Mounts Igman and Bjelasnica.
2 I was asking to be put through to General Mladic in order to receive that
3 order from him. General Mladic gave a categorical "no" and thus I found
4 myself between a rock and a hard stone, where the Supreme Commander
5 ordered that I should withdraw and my military commander that I should
6 not. I asked Karadzic that the two of them come to an agreement and get
7 back to me later on what I was supposed to be doing because the
8 withdrawal of the troops from mounts Igman and Bjelasnica, that we had
9 been advancing towards for the past four months, constituted a very risky
10 step for the commanding officer.
11 We were in touch again on the following morning. General Mladic
12 was a bit more flexible. He told me that I should do the best I can but
13 that I should not hand the territory over to the Muslims. But all right,
14 that was already a glimmer of hope, that I had a way out of the
15 situation. We met on the 12th of August, the British general,
16 David Hayes, the chief of UNPROFOR staff for the BH, and I. We spoke the
17 whole morning but were not able to find a way of withdrawing the
18 Serb army without allowing the Muslims to occupy mounts Igman and
19 Bjelasnica. That day ended without an agreement having been reached.
20 Nobody from the Muslim Supreme Command attended these negotiations. We
21 agreed that we would resume talks on the following day, in that same
22 place. I set off for Trnovo.
23 On the way, I received a call over the radio from
24 President Karadzic. The conversation began with some terrible shouting.
25 I do believe the Tribunal has a recording of it: Why didn't you
1 withdraw? You have to withdraw. There was a lot of shouting involved.
2 I asked to be put through to Mladic again. However, the line between
3 Karadzic and me broke off. I thought that Karadzic was the one who rang
4 off so as to prevent me from speaking to Mladic. Hayes and I met in that
5 same place and Hayes told me I would not like to be in your shoes,
6 general. How will you pull back the army that you kept pushing forward
7 from Visegrad towards Igman for several months? But, he said, I have a
8 proposal to make, should I accept it. Now, his proposal was that the
9 UNPROFOR forces would take positions along ten points on Igman and
10 Bjelasnica, and would thus take control of these areas. We would
11 withdraw the army and they would prevent the Muslims from occupying Igman
12 and Bjelasnica. This was some sort of way out.
13 We agreed, and we were supposed to go to Mount Igman to determine
14 precisely what the separation line would be. I found the commander of
15 Sarajevo Corps in -- stationed in Famos Hotel. However, instead of
16 reporting to me, upon seeing me, he attacked me, where have you been so
17 far? Mladic and Karadzic were looking for you. I was on the line again
18 with Karadzic. He started shouting and I said, President, we agreed, and
19 this will be implemented. He required that it be implemented by 1600
20 hours of that same day. We drafted the agreement there and then. Hayes
21 and I signed it. I went back to Crna Rijeka. Hayes told me he would
22 send me two copies of the agreement once the Muslim side had signed it.
23 He gave me a call in the evening and told me that Rasim Delic refused to
24 sign the agreement. Instead he was offering somebody else of your same
25 rank to sign it. That's to say the Chief of Staff. And I said, Fine,
1 let Sifer sign it. And that's how it was.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, we are six minutes away from the time of
3 the next break. Could we expect another question to the witness or is it
4 just that he freely tells and whatever comes to his mind seems to be
5 relevant or important for us to know? Is that your position? Then
6 examination of witness, I do understand, to be slightly different from
7 what happens at this moment.
8 Mr. Mladic wants to consult with you.
9 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic should remain seated and speak at low
12 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] General, the practice before this Tribunal is
15 somewhat different. We are expected to put questions to you more often,
16 and, well, the way you went on talking you've actually covered eight
17 pages of my questions. That's why I've been letting you expand the story
18 a bit further because it seems that we proceed faster that way. Sifer is
19 the Chief of Staff of the BH Army; right?
20 A. Deputy Chief of Staff.
21 Q. Right.
22 A. Their Chief of Staff was also the Commander-in-Chief.
23 Q. I found Sifer in your statements but would it possibly have been
25 A. Yes, Siber.
1 Q. The guarantor of the agreement was Hayes; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This is what interests me the most. What was the role that
4 General Hayes assumed between the BH Army and the VRS with respect to
5 this agreement?
6 A. UNPROFOR assumed the role of guarantor, that the Muslims would
7 not be taking up the mounts of Igman and Bjelasnica once we left. Hayes
8 said that following this agreement between the two of us, Rasim Delic
9 added three more points because we agreed on ten points, and Rasim Delic
10 added three more points and thus UNPROFOR took up 13 positions in all
11 from which they were able to have under their control what was formerly
12 our forward defence positions. So that was the role that he assumed.
13 Q. Did General Hayes sign the agreement, do you recall?
14 A. General Hayes signed it. And on the following day, the 14th,
15 Generals Hayes and Brinkman, UNPROFOR commander, handed the agreement to
17 Q. Because of some of the discussions we had earlier on, I want to
18 ask you this: With his signature on the document, would General Hayes be
19 taking upon himself some of the obligations? Was this your understanding
20 of the situation? And was this General Hayes's understanding of the
22 A. Yes. The agreement was that once he would take positions on all
23 the 13 points, I would start with the retreat of the Serbian army. And
24 that's how it was done.
25 Q. Do you recall, as you sit here today, the names of these various
1 points that UNPROFOR occupied?
2 A. I did give a statement to that effect. It was Bijelo Brdo,
3 Tresnjevo Brdo, the hills there, but I can't really enumerate them all.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, we are talking already for quite a while
5 about texts and signatures. Could you assist me. Is this in evidence?
6 And, if so, under what numbers so that we are better able to follow the
8 MR. LUKIC: We will try to locate it during the break which is in
9 five minutes, as I understand it.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, in five minutes, just as you -- I think
11 we resumed at ten minutes to 11.00. Five more minutes. Please proceed.
12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
13 Q. [Interpretation] UNPROFOR took positions on the 13 points and the
14 VRS handed them over. What happened next? What happened over the course
15 of the next 13 months, say?
16 A. The entire process was done in a month. UNPROFOR took positions
17 and the VRS units, that is to say the commander of the
18 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, withdrew the VRS troops. As the troops left the
19 last point occupied by UNPROFOR, a Muslim unit appeared out of nowhere
20 and literally slaughtered, cut the throats of 37 Serb soldiers and
21 wounded 34 of them. I lodged a protest with General Rose, UNPROFOR
22 commander, accompanied with threats. I don't know what he did in
23 response to that.
24 In the next three months, the Muslims captured these various
25 points from UNPROFOR, one by one, and I think that before the new years'
1 eve they had Igman and Bjelasnica under their control. I know that
2 General Hayes left his post before the end of his term because UNPROFOR
3 did not honour that particular item of the agreement to protect Igman and
5 MR. LUKIC: I'm leaving this area so it may be a good time for a
6 break and we will try to locate that document.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We take a break of 20 minutes.
8 Mr. Milovanovic, you may follow the usher.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we resume at quarter past 12.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.19 p.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would like to move into private session
14 for a couple of minutes.
15 [Private session]
11 Pages 17064-17066 redacted. Private session.
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 For the public record, the Chamber has, through an oral decision,
12 admitted 18 documents into evidence under seal when we were in
13 private session.
14 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. General, my mistake, but now thanks to the insistence of the
19 Trial Chamber, we are going to take a look at the agreement that we
20 discussed. We need P25 in e-court. The document has four pages in the
21 English version because there is a preceding UNPROFOR report.
22 We see that Brigadier Hayes authorised the sending or the release
23 of this document. Now we are going to move on to the first page and now,
24 actually, could we look at the third page, please? We will see the map
25 there. The points are marked on that map. This is a copy that has been
1 a bit cut off. So we see Major General Manojlo and then down there, we
2 see Brigadier Veer Hayes. And now page 4 in both languages, could we see
3 that? Can we see what it was that was agreed upon? Now, this is what it
4 says here. A -- military commanders agreed on the following. The
5 undersigned military commanders of representatives of the parties in the
6 conflict have agreed on the following, and then it says Article 1, the
7 line of confrontation. The line of confrontation as it existed on the
8 30th of July, 1993, and then there is something handwritten that was
9 added and that was signed by UNPROFOR. As defined by UNPROFOR is the
10 line marked on the attached map. Article 2, withdrawal of the forces
11 that were momentarily - at that moment, that is to say - under the
12 command of Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic. It says that forces would
13 withdraw to the east by the 14th of August, 1993, at 1600 hours. Article
14 3 envisaged the consolidation of the forces momentarily under command of
15 General Rasim Delic. And it says the forces momentary under command of
16 General Rasim Delic within the area as marked on the map will not move
17 from their locations to fill the area vacated by the Serbian forces. We
18 see the signatures here. We see that this was signed by Mr. Stjepan
19 Siber, Major-General Manojlo Milovanovic, witnessed by
20 Brigadier Veer Hayes. At the top of the page, we can see that it is an
21 agreement for withdrawal of forces from Igman and Bjelasnica.
22 General, is this the agreement that you testified about before we
23 took the break?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I don't know whether the
1 Trial Chamber has some additional questions for the witness. Otherwise
2 I'm done with the topic.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, to the extent that what brings it -- what we
4 did not know already. That would be my only question. I mean it is in
5 evidence. We heard the evidence not only about the agreement but also
6 about how it was violated, when and where and by whom. So, therefore,
7 I wondered what news we've learned in relation to this.
8 MR. LUKIC: I just wanted to abide by your -- Your Honour's
10 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, I see that we wanted to have a look at
11 the document itself because you were putting all kinds of questions to
12 the witness without even having the text available, but then the same
13 question remains: What do we know more now apart from that the witness
14 participated in the preparation of it?
15 MR. LUKIC: Well, now we know the personal insight of this
16 witness, who was part of this agreement, and who was part of a later
17 developments that were in a contradiction with the agreement. And we
18 have first-hand insight. We only through this witness we were able to
19 have the first-hand insight in this incident or the whole series of
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that's what you say. That's what you tell us.
22 Let's move on.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. General, now I'd like to move on to a different topic. The topic
25 will be the situation during the war and command. I won't have many
1 questions. However, what I would like to confirm with you that the war
2 was not declared at the very beginning of the war operations. You
3 already mentioned that, albeit indirectly.
4 A. Yes. The state of war was not declared in Republika Srpska. It
5 was just an immediate threat of war that was declared. Peacetime acts
6 and laws were still in effect and applied to defence. During the war, on
7 two occasions in parts of the territory of Republika Srpska, the state of
8 war was indeed declared and that was the first time in November 1994, due
9 to the situation surrounding Bihac that we already discussed. That was
10 to enable us to prevent desertion from the army. The second time it
11 happened during the Muslim offensive to de-block Sarajevo. That's what
12 they called the operation. And that operation lasted from the 16th to
13 the 25th of June.
14 Q. Thank you. You arrived in B and H after April. However, did you
15 learn subsequently, in the course of your work, what was proclaimed on
16 the 4th of April, 1992, by Alija Izetbegovic? Was that an immediate
17 threat of war? I'm talking about 4th of April then, do you know that?
18 A. On the 4th of April, Alija Izetbegovic declared an immediate
19 threat of war and he issued a communique about the general mobilisation
20 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 6th of April, the state of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina was recognised. On the 4th of August, 1992, the Muslim
22 authorities declared a state of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 Q. Now, I would like to ask you about Srebrenica, about the critical
24 time in Srebrenica. You were already asked about that but I believe that
25 the questions were rather hypothetical. Today, I would like to show you
1 a piece of evidence in this case. Dragan Obrenovic, the Chief of Staff
2 and the deputy commander --
3 MR. LUKIC: Can we move to private session for a short?
4 JUDGE ORIE: We move to private session.
5 [Private session]
11 Pages 17072-17074 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I would like call up P1469.
7 Q. Directive 7, with your accompanying letter, you've already spoken
8 about this in many details. My question is whether you would agree with
9 me that the process of the Supreme Command issuing orders to corps is
10 actually skipping a step in the chain of command, i.e., by-passing the
11 Main Staff, which should be in the middle between the two.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. General Miletic received all the guidelines to draft this
14 directive from the Supreme Commander; right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Would it also be true that he couldn't, and I'm referring to
17 General Miletic, or, rather, that he didn't have to consult the
18 assistance of the Main Staff commander because he had already received
19 all the guidelines that enabled him to draft the directive from the
20 Supreme Commander; right?
21 A. He didn't have to. However, if I'd been in his shoes, I would
22 have done that.
23 Q. Thank you. And now on to directive 7/1. That's the following
24 document, P1470.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, could I ask you the following:
1 You were asked whether General Miletic receives all the guidelines to
2 draft this directive from the Supreme Commander. You said yes. What is
3 the basis of this knowledge? What do you know about what Miletic
4 received from Mr. Karadzic?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard that when I was testifying
6 between the 29th of May and 1st of June, from General Miletic's Defence
8 JUDGE ORIE: So the real answer to the question is: I do not
9 know. I heard someone who is Defence counsel for Mr. Miletic to take a
10 certain position, and that's -- so you don't have any actual knowledge
11 about it, from whom he received guidelines in drafting that directive.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. You're right.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. I apologise. I pushed things too far. I came across this
16 information in the transcript. However, I thought that you might know
17 that directive 7, because you've already testified to that effect -- or,
18 rather, that directive 7/1 amended directive 7, primarily when it comes
19 to the tasks to be given to the Drina Corps; namely directive 7/1 does
20 not contain Operation Krivaja 95; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is it also true that directive 7/1, which I'm sure you've read on
23 a number of occasions, as well as the other one, does not reference
24 directive 7 anywhere. Can you confirm that?
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You say "as well as the other one." Which other
2 MR. LUKIC: Actually my question should be: Is it also true that
3 directive 7/1, which I'm sure you've read on a number of occasions, does
4 not reference directive 7 anywhere.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, directive 7/1 was
8 supposed to commence like this. Pursuant to directive 7 issued by the
9 Supreme Commander on such and such a date and then the text of the
10 directive would follow. So it should have been mentioned in the first
11 sentence. You are right that in his directive 7/1, General Mladic does
12 not invoke or refer to the directive issued by the Supreme Commander.
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. That particular action by the Drina Corps, namely Krivaja 95 --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could I take you back? Do I understand that the
16 question was whether any reference is made to directive 7 in
17 directive 7/1? Is that -- was that the question?
18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then let me have a look at page 2 in English.
20 I read there, just last line of paragraph 1:
21 "Other details of the intentions and possibilities of enemy
22 forces are in directive number 7 and daily intelligence reports of the
23 VRS Main Staff."
24 So I have some difficulties in understanding that no reference
25 was ever made to directive number 7 in this text after having read it
1 several times, as the witness said, where upon reading it now, not for
2 the first time but --
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps my question wasn't properly
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If you go to the next page in B/C/S.
6 MR. LUKIC: Let's see.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's the last line of paragraph 1. And then
8 the first line of paragraph 2 starts, "On the basis of directive number
9 7, the VRS has the task," et cetera. So I'm totally lost with evidence
10 saying that no reference was made in 7/1 to 7. But if you have any
11 further explanation, then -- or any further questions on the matter, I'd
12 be glad to hear such questions and the answers to them.
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, I think we understood each other but I'll reformulate.
15 The Main Staff did not adopt directive 7. Rather, it only took those
16 portions of it that it believed it should. We see that the intentions
17 and capabilities of the enemy are mentioned here, and this is something
18 that can be found in directive 7 as well. However, the tasks assigned to
19 the Drina Corps were not taken over from directive 7; is that right?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
21 MR. GROOME: If I could draw Mr. Lukic's attention to the third
22 reference on page 3 of the original and page 4 of the English
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we get page 3, please?
25 MR. GROOME: If I can assist further it says, "By carrying
1 out ...," quote:
2 "By carrying out planned combat battles and operations in
3 accordance with directive number 7 ..."
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] My question had to do with the
5 Drina Corps. The Drina Corps is mentioned only on page 5 of the
6 directive. I wasn't dealing with the east Bosnia corps or the other
8 Q. I apologise about the confusion, General. My question added to
9 it. I'll repeat what I said a moment ago: Is it true that the task
10 assigned to the Drina Corps in directive 7/1 was not taken over from
11 directive 7?
12 A. Yes. Two things were left out in directive 7/1 that can be read
13 in directive 7. The first is this controversial sentence that unbearable
14 conditions be created for the population. And what was also left out is
15 the sentence referring to the separation of Srebrenica and Zepa, or from
16 Zepa, by force.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Milovanovic, please clarify for me for better
18 understanding of the document. The reference to directive 7 is found at
19 the beginning of this document, and then we see on the screen, under
20 item 5, tasks of units. And then it starts with number 5.1,
21 1st Krajina Corps, and then the other corps. Do we see any reference to
22 directive 7 in the specific tasks given to the corps and the units of the
23 VRS? Or, do we see the reference at the beginning of the text, reference
24 to directive 7, which covers all the units listed later? What is your
25 understanding of the document?
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we see the first page there?
2 MR. LUKIC: Can I provide the general with a copy of
3 directive 7/1? Maybe it would be easier for him.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have it.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Oh, you have it.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer, Judges?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please. That was the reason why the question
8 was put to you.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Following the question put to me by
10 counsel, I said that directive 7/1 was not tied in with directive 7
11 because of that inappropriate start of text. The author of the text, and
12 I mean General Miletic, should have started by saying: Pursuant to
13 directive issued by the Supreme Commander number 7, of such and such a
14 date, and then the body of text should have followed. The author of
15 directive 7/1 was cutting down the volume of work for himself by doing
16 so, because he would say for certain situations, as stated in directive
17 7, because he knew that the general command sent copies of it to the
18 various corps.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let me interrupt you here. This is not what
20 I was asking for. The reference to directive 7 in directive 7/1, is to
21 be found in the first paragraphs, before the specific tasks to the
22 different units of the VRS were formulated. What is your understanding?
23 Does the reference then relate to all the tasks given to the different
24 units listed under item 5 or what was the basis for this reference?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, simply, it can be concluded
1 that directive 7/1 is, after all, connected with directive 7 by the very
2 fact that later on it is mentioned in the text. I only said that at the
3 beginning of the text, it was not tied in with directive 7.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You explained that earlier. Thank you.
5 Mr. Lukic.
6 MR. LUKIC: Obviously it was a mistake on my part because
7 I understood general's testimony differently, but now I'm clear too.
8 Thank you.
9 Q. [Interpretation] I'd like to ask you about humanitarian convoys
10 now. I saw in your earlier evidence that you said, in the west,
11 humanitarian convoys did not pass through the territory under the control
12 of your units; right? In the Bihac area; right?
13 A. Not in the territory of Republika Srpska, that's to say
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the convoys for the territory of the RSK,
15 the UNPA areas did pass, although they did not pass either during my time
17 Q. Were convoys able to reach the territory of Bihac from the areas
18 that were not under the control of the VRS?
19 A. Yes, across the territory of Croatia.
20 Q. Were you aware of containers that would be dropped from the air
21 in the area of Bihac?
22 A. I wasn't aware of that parachute operation in the area of Bihac,
23 but I did know of such operations taking place in east Bosnia.
24 Q. Were you aware of containers having been off-loaded from
1 A. I was not aware that there was such a line of supply.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: The last question about Eastern Bosnia or was it
4 about western?
5 MR. LUKIC: Western Bosnia. Western.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because the witness said he has no knowledge
7 about it. Okay. Please proceed.
8 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
9 Q. [Interpretation] In the territory under the control of the VRS,
10 was it true that convoys were checked by mixed groups of VRS and UNPROFOR
12 A. Initially, yes. Later on, when a committee was set up,
13 attached -- or, rather, I'm sorry, a commission attached to the
14 Republika Srpska government, it was only VRS personnel who checked these
15 convoys at check-points.
16 Q. Was it the case that in agreement with UNPROFOR, while the VRS
17 checked these convoys, it was agreed that weapons and ammunition were not
18 to be found in the cargo carried by these convoys?
19 A. Yes. It was agreed, and it was implemented with the passage of
20 every convoy. As for UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR personnel escorted these
21 convoys, and that was the reason why, once the commission was set up,
22 there was no need for mixed inspection groups any longer.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D1278 briefly.
24 Q. We'll see a document issued by the Main Staff of the VRS on
25 30th of September 1993. We'll see under 1, it is ordered that all the
1 motor vehicles belonging to humanitarian organisations leaving the
2 territory of Republika Srpska on the way to the Muslim territory and
3 returning, should be checked for the existing fuel quantity in their
4 tanks and that they should be checked on their way back as well. That's
5 in item 2.
6 General, what preceded this order?
7 A. The knowledge on the part of VRS personnel, especially those
8 manning these check-points, that more fuel was being shipped to the
9 enclaves than had been envisaged in the documentation. It probably
10 involved small-scale smuggling on the part of the drivers, who knows what
11 they did with that. Perhaps they sold the extra fuel in the enclaves.
12 No matter. But that was the reason why this measure whereby the level of
13 fuel present in the tanks of the vehicles passing was checked as the
14 vehicles were going in and coming back. Sometime after this document was
15 issued, double tankers, tanks, were discovered for fuel in these
16 vehicles. That was the way it was smuggled in.
17 Q. And was this the reason why this order was issued? I mean, fuel
19 A. Well, yes, but I don't think it was a mass-scale phenomenon. It
20 was, rather, the small-scale smuggling on the part of the drivers of
21 these vehicles of humanitarian convoys that brought aid to the enclave.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think it's the time for our break.
24 JUDGE ORIE: It's time for our break, but before doing so, the
25 order requires any detected incidents of fuel syphoning to be reported in
1 writing to the VRS Main Staff. Did you ever receive such reports in
2 writing about fuel syphoning?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Personally, I did not. However,
4 this was a justified request because we wanted to be able to lodge
5 protests with UNPROFOR for any malpractices.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Did you ever lodge any protests with UNPROFOR on the
7 basis of detected fuel syphoning?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Personally, I did not. Before the
9 commission for humanitarian aid was established, the one that was
10 attached to the RS government, it was General Tolimir in the Main Staff
11 who was in charge of these issues. He was later replaced in that
12 responsibility by Djurdjic, who was our representative.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that it was someone else's
14 responsibility. Have you concrete knowledge of any such an incident
15 happening after you issued this order?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And same question about the double tanks. Do you
18 have any concrete knowledge of the double tanks used to smuggle fuel?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally did not see any such
20 tank. However, there was such information that was heard within the
21 Main Staff.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Did you protest with UNPROFOR on these double tanks?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. At regular meetings with the
24 Chief of Staff for UNPROFOR for the BH, because we had to meet at least
25 once a month.
1 JUDGE ORIE: If there is any specific documentary evidence on
2 that, the Chamber would like to see it to the extent we have not seen it
4 MR. LUKIC: We are trying to locate. We think that there is.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll take a break. The witness may follow
6 the usher.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 JUDGE ORIE: And --
9 MR. GROOME: Your Honour?
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that we go into private session.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session. It must be an urgent
13 matter because it's the point of a break but --
14 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. We take a break and we
8 resume at quarter to 2.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 1.27 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 1.45 p.m.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Whilst the witness is being escorted into the
12 courtroom, could we briefly move, only for half a minute or a minute,
13 into private session?
14 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
8 Mr. Lukic.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please have
10 1D1024 in e-court?
11 [In English] I'm just trying to check if this document is in
12 evidence. It could be by now. I need page 2 in B/C/S, and the first
13 page in English.
14 Q. General, over the past few days, you have mentioned to us a body
15 that dealt with humanitarian aid. We see here, on our screens, a
16 decision on establishing a state committee for cooperation with the
17 United Nations and international humanitarian organisations.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 MR. LUKIC: I stand corrected. It's D336, so we can proceed with
20 this document only for the record that it's D336.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, did you have an opportunity to see Article 2 defines
24 that the committee is formed with the aim of improving cooperation with
25 the UN and also freely conducting humanitarian operations in the
1 territory of Republika Srpska? It says, in Article 6 -- could we please
2 take a look at paragraph -- Article 6 now? In B/C/S it's the same page,
3 at the bottom, yes, right there. It says that permits for the movement
4 of convoys and employees of the UN and humanitarian organisations in the
5 territory of Republika Srpska shall be issued by the coordinating body
6 for humanitarian operations.
7 The next decision, the same Official Gazette, is the decision on
8 the appointment of a president and vice-president and the members of this
9 committee. However, I'm going to ask you, so that we don't read all of
10 that out, whether it is correct that from the moment when this decision
11 was published and taken, on the establishment of this committee for
12 cooperation with the UN and international humanitarian organisations, the
13 Army of Republika Srpska was actually disburdened of this duty to provide
14 passes for convoys?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The Army of Republika Srpska was duty-bound to carry out the
17 orders of this committee; is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The army had the duty of taking the convoy through and checking
20 it; is that right?
21 A. The checks are correct. However, it was members of UNPROFOR that
22 took the convoys through.
23 Q. Thank you for this correction. Is it also correct that from that
24 moment onwards, that is to say from the date when this decision was
25 passed, and when it was published in the Official Gazette of
1 Republika Srpska on the 16th of March, 1995, no one from the army could
2 make decisions as to whether a convoy would pass through or not?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to deal with certain segments of
5 your direct examination. The day before yesterday, in your testimony,
6 you started explaining something and then you were interrupted. I'm
7 going to read out that part of the transcript for you and I'm going to
8 ask you kindly to finish what it was that you had wanted to say.
9 MR. LUKIC: We need the transcript from Tuesday, the 17th of
10 September, from our case. We need page 16897.
11 Q. In line 7, I'm going to read this out and then you will receive
12 the proper interpretation. I'm going to read outlines 7 through 10 so
13 then I'm going to ask you to finish your thought:
14 [In English] "General Mladic's conclusion was that the war is
15 inevitable in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it would follow the same
16 scenario as in Croatia, when the war broke out between the Croats and the
17 Serbs. Up to that time, Muslims --"
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: You still have a question following.
19 MR. LUKIC: That's exactly what I'm pointing -- that the question
20 actually interrupted the general in finishing his thought. I would
21 kindly ask the general to finish what he wanted to tell us in line 10.
22 Q. So, General, can you recall what it was that you wanted to say?
23 Can you finish your thought, if you can?
24 A. I wanted to read something out from the minutes of this session
25 in Banja Luka on the 12th of May. Somebody interrupted me so I cannot
1 finish what it was that I wanted to say. I wanted to finish reading.
2 Q. I do apologies. I thought that you wanted to say something
3 yourself. Let's move on, then.
4 On transcript page, from the same day, 16900, in lines 11 through
5 13, this is what you say. Again I'm going to read this out and then I'm
6 going to ask you something:
7 [In English] "I did not think about the ethnic makeup but what
8 I learned was that the 85.000 to 90.000 armed men were put inside
9 TO brigades in the municipalities around the
10 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
11 [Interpretation] I heard, I don't know if I'm right, that you
12 said in the municipalities along the borders of Republika Srpska. Am I
13 right? Or did you explain this to us later, that these were
14 municipalities along the borders of Republika Srpska? Did you ever
15 mention that these people were armed in the municipalities along the
16 borders of Republika Srpska?
17 A. Yes. I said that, in the municipalities along the borders of
18 Republika Srpska.
19 Q. What did you mean by that? Why were people armed in these
20 municipalities along the borders of Republika Srpska? Could you give us
21 a more detailed explanation of that now?
22 A. Because attacks started, attacks of the members of the
23 Muslim-Croat coalition, against villages, Serb villages in these
24 municipalities along the border, like Sijekovac, like Malovan Gornji,
25 Donji, Divoselo, villages around Kupres, then villages in Herzegovina.
1 So it is not only that I call this the municipalities along the border,
2 others do as well. And that is why these brigades were first established
3 in these areas.
4 Q. The Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina split along ethnic
5 lines, even before the war. Did you have information to that effect?
6 A. It's not that I only had information to that effect. I had
7 insight. On the 8th of April, Alija Izetbegovic, through some decree of
8 his, renamed the Territorial Defence of the Socialist Republic of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 He dismissed the commander until then, a Serb, I don't know the name, and
11 he appointed a Muslim, Colonel Hadziefendic. I don't know exactly what
12 his name was. So practically from this Territorial Defence of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina that had existed until then, Serbs were removed.
14 Q. Also, do you know that the arming of members of the TO was
15 actually carried out under the control of the Muslim authorities?
16 A. Whose Territorial Defence? Because now we have two in
18 Q. The Territorial Defence under the control of Alija Izetbegovic.
19 A. I don't know how they were armed but I do know that they already
20 had two military organisations that they had formed, the Patriotic League
21 and the Green Berets.
22 Q. What do you know about the organisation of Muslim armed
23 formations through the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of
24 Alija Izetbegovic? That is to say, before the war, through
25 municipalities that were under the control of the
1 Party of Democratic Action?
2 A. I know almost nothing, because I was in other parts of the SFRY.
3 Q. Thank you. Next page, where I found something that I believe you
4 did not manage to finish what it was that you had set out to say, so we
5 need the transcript of Tuesday again, the one that used to be on our
6 screens and is no longer here. We need page 16924. You were asked
7 whether Crisis Staffs had a role in commanding the units of the army.
8 And on this page -- I'd like to start with line 2, from the middle of the
9 page. 16925. This is what you say in your answer and now I'm going to
11 [In English] "The brigades, and later on when the VRS was
12 established, had strong links with their respective municipalities in
13 terms of food, supply, clothes and even fuel supply. Those people who
14 provided financial assistance believed that they had the right to command
15 the brigade that they supported."
16 [Interpretation] And we see from the question that my colleague,
17 Mr. Groome, apologised for interrupting you. So I think that perhaps you
18 could elaborate, briefly, on what it was that you wanted to add there, if
20 A. One of the conclusions of the Main Staff that night between the
21 11th and the 12th, I think it was the third conclusion, was exclude
22 Crisis Staffs from the system of command of the Army of Republika Srpska.
23 On the following day, that was accepted by the assembly too, as far as I
24 can remember the transcript. It was also accepted by the
25 Presidency of Republika Srpska, while it performed the role of the
1 Supreme Command and later on, as the Supreme Command. However, the
2 municipal authorities found it difficult to give up on this and that kind
3 of things that always happen that a president of a municipality or the
4 president of a municipal branch of the SDS would interfere in command,
5 specifically in Cajnice. During the first six months or so, we could not
6 deal with Dusko Kornjaca, the president of a municipality there. He was
7 the first brigade commander, but after this decision of ours, the brigade
8 was taken over by a professional, and during those six or seven months,
9 we changed six different military professionals as commanders of the
10 brigade there.
11 Once I met up with then-Colonel Milenko Zivanovic at
12 President Karadzic's office, I took Zivanovic to Karadzic for an official
13 meeting when somebody from the Main Staff informed me that Kornjaca, yet
14 again, wanted to change the commander. I complained to Karadzic then and
15 Karadzic took the receiver, phoned Kornjaca and issued an order to him.
16 He said roughly to him, Dusko we are physicians. We don't know how to
17 command in war. Let the professional command. And from then onwards, we
18 did not have any more problems with Crisis Staffs. There were attempts
19 made through assemblies, through different talks, as I started saying,
20 that some presidents of municipalities felt that they were in charge
21 because they were supporting their own brigade financially. However, the
22 Crisis Staffs were no longer in a position to command. That was ruled
24 Q. Yesterday you were shown a document, perhaps we could call it up
25 again, we have that much time, P2213. You spoke about that telephone
1 that had the number 155. [In English] That's in English -- I'm sorry, in
2 English it's the next page.
3 [Interpretation] This B/C/S version is not very legible.
4 However, look at the English translation, because there is your name
5 there, your rank and the number 155. This telephone was obviously
6 assigned to you. And we saw that in the report in which it is stated
7 that after the fall of Zepa, a report was found stating that these
8 telephones were found on the body of a fallen Serbian soldier. You said
9 that General Mladic used the same telephone extension number; right?
10 A. Yes. Plus 30 other men.
11 Q. What about 161? Are you familiar with that number? That's above
12 your name. Was that extension ever installed? Did the general ever use
13 it or not?
14 A. I don't know. When I wanted to talk to General Mladic, I would
15 first talk to his secretary. I wasn't the one who dialled the number.
16 Q. In any case, when you wanted to talk to General Mladic, you would
17 dial 155 or --
18 A. That's when I was outside of the Main Staff, but if I wanted to
19 talk to General Mladic in the building where he normally stayed and
20 rested I had a direct connection with his secretary. I don't know to
21 what number he would put me through. I'm not familiar with this number,
23 Q. Thank you.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one question in this context? You
25 shared a room where you were sitting opposite each other. Was there only
1 one telephone on those shared desk or desks? Or were there two or more?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just one, 155.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's a number. But I'm talking about a
4 telephone as an object, something which you can use, you can take in your
5 hands. Was there one or were there more?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Two. One was 155 and the other one
7 was for civilian connections through the postal office. There were two
8 instruments and they were both on a desk, which was not a desk, between
9 myself and General Mladic but the command desk.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Does that mean that when you were using the
11 telephone, that General Mladic had to wait until you had finished? Or
12 did you never simultaneously have telephone conversations with others?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That never happened. We never
14 needed the telephone at the same time. In any case, you used the 155
15 extension to reply to calls. If we wanted to contact a subordinate unit
16 we would just press a button on the telephone that was sitting on our
17 command desk, as we called it.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock.
19 Perhaps we should -- could have already addressed this question. How
20 much time you would think you would still need?
21 MR. LUKIC: Much less than I estimated.
22 JUDGE ORIE: And that means how much time would you still need
24 MR. LUKIC: Probably some time beyond the first session.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, a little bit over one hour.
1 MR. LUKIC: Over one hour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps that's good for Mr. Milovanovic as well to
3 know what to expect approximately tomorrow.
4 Mr. Milovanovic, I give you the same instructions as I did
5 before, that is not to communicate with whomever about your testimony.
6 We would like to see you back tomorrow morning in this same courtroom,
7 also at 9.30. You may follow the usher.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow,
10 Friday, the 20th of September, at 9.30 in the morning, in this same
11 Courtroom I.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Friday, the 20th day of
14 September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.