1 Friday, 20 September 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
12 Meanwhile, I use the opportunity to put the following on the
13 record. The Chamber recalls the Prosecution requests to use common
14 charts with upcoming witness, John Clark, and witness RM016DD and the
15 Chamber hereby grants the same.
16 Then a follow-up to the decision of the 14th Rule 92 bis motion.
17 Witness RM37's statements and associated exhibits were admitted on the
18 28th of June of this year on the condition that the Prosecution provide
19 the required attestation pursuant to Rule 92 bis B. The Chamber has
20 reviewed the attestation in the meantime, and hereby confirms admission
21 of P2227 up to and including P2229.
22 The last item I'd like to deal with is a short corrigendum. And
23 it's a follow-up to a decision on the Prosecution's 22nd motion
24 Rule 92 bis. The motion was filed on the 23rd of August of this year,
25 and one of the admitted transcript portions in the Chamber's decision for
1 Witness RM001 appears as 6422, lines 13 to 15, the decision should read,
2 lines 13 to 25. Furthermore all references in the decision to Rule 65
3 ter numbers 7701A and 7701B should be understood as referring to 6701A
4 and 6701B.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, when I said that the 22nd motion Rule 92 bis
8 motion was filed on the 23rd of August I made a mistake because it was
9 the decision which was filed on that day and it's a correction to that
11 Good morning, Mr. Milovanovic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Apologies for continuing with a procedural matter
14 when you entered the courtroom, but we'll now immediately start.
15 Mr. Lukic, if you're ready, and after I have reminded
16 Mr. Milovanovic that he is still bound by the solemn declaration he has
17 given at the beginning of his testimony, you may proceed.
18 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
23 A. Good morning.
24 MR. LUKIC: Can we call up in e-court P2219.
25 Q. General, you were shown this document. As we could see, the
1 translation is wrong. At this time, I should like to ask that a
2 translation be revised. We -- I think we do know the correct translation
3 of item 2 of page 17005, line 19. Therefore, on that page our --
4 transcript can we find the correct translation.
5 This is my question for you, General. My learned friend Groome
6 tied the issue of this document with the incident at Dobrinja and the
7 incident at Markale that we've referred to as Markale I of February 1994,
8 but I'll not be asking you about that specifically because this is a
9 matter for experts in ballistics to deal with.
10 I'll ask you this: Were you aware of the fact that the Muslim
11 authorities opened fire at their own population in order to gain the
12 sympathy of western countries and make NATO proceed with air-strikes?
13 A. There were stories to that effect all around, especially after
14 the incident of 27 May 1992, when those citizens lining up for bread or
15 water in Vase Miskina Street were killed.
16 The Serbs were accused. Now, the investigation into who was
17 responsible was discontinued because a Muslim delegation abandoned talks
18 for, I believe, Cutileiro Plan 2. The negotiations fell through. This
19 was especially much talked about after Markale I. I'm not that familiar
20 with the incident at Dobrinja, though I am familiar with Markale I. I
21 had several talks with the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR, General Ramsey.
22 On that first evening, blame was attached to the Serbs right
23 away, and this was aired. However, over the course of the following
24 several days, it turned out that it wasn't the sort of shell that he was
25 mentioning and then some other issues surfaced as well. So the incident
1 which was initially attributed to the Serb -- was open to doubt.
2 As for the Muslims, well, it was common knowledge that the
3 Muslims waged wars amongst themselves.
4 Q. You have answered my next question, in part. It is of a more
5 general nature.
6 Was it during and before the international conference and in the
7 course of a visit of a foreign delegation the case that civilians would
8 be killed on a massive scale in Sarajevo?
9 A. I can state quite responsibly that such incidents where Muslim
10 civilians would be killed on a massive scale would take place precisely
11 at the time or prior to certain negotiations. Or, if the Muslim side,
12 and this was something that they always aspired toward, prompted NATO to
13 engage in air-strikes against the Serbs. So they would be provoking the
14 Serbs, who would then respond, and that's how it would end.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, no time-frame, no specifics. Just
16 general statements which will not assist the Chamber. Whereas, the
17 Chamber would be interested in having detailed information about such
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, my question was general, and your answer was general,
22 too, then.
23 This is my next question: Do you know of any specific, say,
24 around Markale I, what conference was in course at the time, if you
1 A. I don't know which conference it was specifically. It was about
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I don't know the specific topic. General Mladic
3 and Karadzic were both present.
4 I think it was an attempt to stop the war in Sarajevo. It had to
5 do with a demilitarisation of Sarajevo.
6 Q. Following the incident at Markale, pressure was brought to bear
7 upon the Serbs to withdraw their armaments; right? And I mean around
9 A. Following Markale, NATO issued an ultimatum that we should
10 withdraw our artillery away from Sarajevo. At first, it was
11 30 kilometres; and then, as I said, in the agreement, 20 kilometres were
12 referred to. The Serbs were faced with a choice: Either to withdraw
13 their artillery, i.e., to fulfil the ultimatum; or to refuse to implement
14 the ultimatum and suffer bombs.
15 Q. Were any obligations imposed upon the Muslim side in situations
16 such as this one? Say, post-Markale, in terms of withdrawal of weaponry.
17 We heard that the Serbs were supposed to withdraw their weapons away from
18 Sarajevo. Was something of the nature imposed upon the Muslims?
19 A. I don't know that in the ultimatum NATO requested something of
20 the sort from the Muslims but I do know that commander of UNPROFOR
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Michael Rose, placed a similar requirement
22 upon the Muslims, that they should withdraw their weaponry.
23 Our counter-request was that, since we were more powerful and
24 withdrawing our artillery away from Sarajevo, the Muslims should withdraw
25 elements of their infantry from their positions into barracks, because
1 their infantry was powerful. The negotiations on the
2 9th of February arranged this, but this was never effected. We withdrew
3 our artillery, but the entire Muslim corps continued to occupy their
5 Q. You were shown two documents: P2200 and P2221. The question
6 that followed had to do with fuel air-bombs. Your -- you said that you
7 weren't familiar with those.
8 I'll explain to you now what it was that you were shown, in fact.
9 This sort of bombs used the blast effect to kill personnel rather than
10 damage buildings. Fuel air-bombs were used in Vietnam when the Americans
11 called them a specific name because they were used for the destruction of
12 forests and vegetation. They were called Daisy Mower.
13 Did the Serb army possess such bombs, to the best of your
15 A. No. I said over the past days that I only heard of these fuel
16 air-bombs in connection with my studies of the Vietnam war.
17 Q. You were next asked to describe the launchers of aerial bombs.
18 They were referred to as "skalamerija". The Greek word "skelanos" means
19 distorted. In our language, in slang it's a term that is used for any
20 sort of item that -- whose purpose isn't really known or to what use it
21 can be put. Any sort of contraption, really. Would this term of
22 "skalamerija" be an official term that is used?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
24 MR. GROOME: Just seems I let the previous question go. But now
25 this one question seems -- again, Mr. Lukic seems to be testifying or
1 providing evidence which I'm not sure it's the most appropriate way to
2 get this before the Chamber.
3 JUDGE ORIE: That came to my mind as well, Mr. Lukic.
4 MR. GROOME: Perhaps the Chamber might permit exceptionally the
5 interpreters just to explain to us what the word "skalamerija" means in
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It means "contraption."
8 MR. LUKIC: I think it's usually in this courtroom that we
9 sometimes have citations from vocabulary, or from -- from books, how they
10 are explained. So I wanted to ask General whether it's official name for
11 this weapon or some -- it's something -- what he used to name this
13 JUDGE ORIE: Ask questions of fact, Mr. -- yes, let me see.
14 Whether it's the official name of this weapon is one. But I'm just
15 looking at the -- what the witness said about this name at all.
16 Because -- let me check. I'm looking at page 17015.
17 Do you know what weapons Mr. Lukic is talking about? And did you
18 have a name for that weapon he refers to? What name did you use?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Over the past day, I referred to
20 this "skalamerija," "the contraption". In Serbian it means that it's an
21 item that was put together in a makeshift way, looks quite cumbersome,
22 but is useful. Colonel Rajko Balac, chief of artillery, and I referred
23 to it as "skalamerija" and it was called "skalamerija 94," in fact. It
24 was no official name for it. An official name for it would be "aerial
25 bomb launcher." I wasn't aware of any code-name for it, M94, or anything
1 of that kind. As for the piece itself, I only saw a model of it. I
2 never saw it in real life, in transport, or in combat.
3 JUDGE ORIE: The reason why I was a bit confused, Mr. Lukic, is
4 because the witness used the name "skalamerija" himself previously. So
5 apparently it's not an official name. I still am a bit lost where we are
6 going at this moment.
7 But put clear questions to the witness, and you might get me on
8 track again.
9 MR. LUKIC: I will move on. I had not dwell on this -- this
10 topic anymore.
11 Q. [Interpretation] General, I'd like to ask you questions about
12 President Karadzic now.
13 Did it so happen in the war-time years in Bosnia-Herzegovina that
14 you received orders directly from President Karadzic?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it's my recollection that the witness
16 said that this happened now and then and that he then told Mr. Karadzic
17 there was no use of doing it because he would always first verify with
18 Mr. Mladic.
19 So, therefore, I do not know if there's anything in addition to
20 that you'd like to know. Ask the witness, but he has told us quite a bit
21 about that.
22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. I wanted to specifically ask you about 1995, when problems emerge
24 in the western front, threatening entire municipalities in
25 Republika Srpska.
1 Can you describe the situation in more detail for us, please.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Are you still with -- receiving orders from
3 Mr. Karadzic directly?
4 MR. LUKIC: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Well, that's not clear from your question.
6 Could you tell us about direct orders you received in the -- at
7 the western front in approximately 1995, receiving direct orders from
8 Mr. Karadzic?
9 Did you receive such orders? First question.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did receive such orders in
11 July and August 1995 up until the time when General Mladic arrived on the
12 western front which was sometime in early August 1995. He attended a
13 meeting of the Supreme Command in Drvar and stayed by my side until the
15 However, despite the fact that General Mladic was present,
16 President Karadzic visited with me at the IKM of the Main Staff and tried
17 to give me orders. But I did tell him things that I told him before,
18 that this was duality of command, the introduction of parallel lines in
19 command. Specifically --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, you've told us that already.
21 Mr. Lukic, are you interested to know what orders, when, where,
22 what about? Okay. Let's ask.
23 Could you give us one of these orders: Given where, when, and
24 what about.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can just speak of
1 one. I cannot recall the places, times, and objectives as for others.
2 But, for instance, on the 3rd of August, 1995, Karadzic; Krajisnik; the
3 minister of defence, Ninkovic; the chief of state security,
4 Krnajic [phoen], stopped by at my staff, and also Karadzic's advisor,
5 General Subotic.
6 Karadzic started about speaking renaming the Main Staff into the
7 General Staff. I asked him -- actually, I asked him whether all of those
8 present should be listening, and he said that everybody else should leave
9 expect for Krajisnik, and then he said to me, General, we are renaming
10 the Main Staff into the General Staff. General Mladic will be replaced
11 and he will be the special advisor for defence for Republika Srpska and
12 the Republic of Serb Krajina. And I shot back by way of a response
13 saying that I would not be head of that General Staff.
14 Krajisnik added, Radovan, let him be now. This is an initial
15 action on the spur of the moment. As a soldier, he will have to receive
16 his orders. The order did arrive the next day. Again, I refused it even
17 in writing; that is to say, all generals of Republika Srpska refused and
18 signed a petition to the Assembly of Republika Srpska. It was the
19 Assembly that appointed Ratko Mladic as head of the Main Staff, so it is
20 only the Assembly that can relieve him of that duty, not the president.
21 MR. LUKIC: I would just intervene here for the sake of the
22 correct transcript. The witness didn't say the "president" but he said
23 the "Supreme Commander."
24 JUDGE ORIE: At least that's what you heard. It will be
1 But the president was the supreme commander. We do agree on
3 MR. LUKIC: It is the same person only --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, yes. No different, but Mr. Karadzic --
5 MR. LUKIC: It's a different term, yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Let me just ask you, what did you say? It was only the assembly
9 that could replace and not the president, or did you say it could only
10 have been the assembly, not the Supreme Commander, if you remember at all
11 what it was? It's the same person, of course.
12 A. Believe me, I don't remember whether I said Supreme Commander or
13 president. But I know for sure that I mentioned the name of
14 Radovan Karadzic irrespective of which term I used and his dual role is
15 something that everyone is well aware of.
16 Q. Very well. Thank you. Was there a clash, a conflict between
17 General Ratko Mladic and the president, the Supreme Commander,
18 Radovan Karadzic; and, if so, what did it consist of, and from when did
19 it date?
20 Could you tell us in a few sentences?
21 A. Throughout the war and especially after the war, there was a lot
22 of talk about that. However, I never saw the two of them quarrel, and I
23 never was present during anything like that. That there was this
24 conflict is something that I first of from Ms. Biljana Plavsic on
25 Saint Vitus Day, the 28th of June, 1993. A class of soldiers was being
1 sworn in on that occasion, and she delivered a speech to them. And she
2 started saying that the Supreme Command could not take General Mladic and
3 she turned to me, addressed me, in front of these masses, and she said,
4 General, I ask you to protect General Mladic. I tried somehow to caution
5 her about that but that did not go. However, when she said that, there
6 were 10.000 people there, parents, relatives of the young soldiers, and
7 there was applause all round.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the next
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between Mladic and Karadzic there
11 were other --
12 JUDGE ORIE: You said, "... there were 10.000 people, parents,
13 relatives of the young soldiers," and there was -- and then the
14 interpreters got lost. Could you repeat what you said after "parents,
15 relatives of the young soldiers, and ..."
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: What we can see in the
17 transcript was "applause all round." But then another sentence followed.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Then you said "applause all round," and then you
19 added something. Could you repeat what you then added after you said
20 "applause all round."
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried by way of a grimace to
22 caution Biljana Plavsic and to indicate to her that this was not the
23 place to discuss that. However, she went on, and I think that after
24 referring to the applause I said that I never saw or heard the two of
25 them quarrelling or squabbling. I attended sessions of the
1 supreme command when the two of them exchanged views in a tone that was a
2 bit sharper, also in terms of content, but I think that that is normal
3 dialogue of two -- of the two most responsible people in the army. So it
4 never looked like a quarrel to me.
5 As for an open misunderstanding, not between General Ratko Mladic
6 and Supreme Commander Karadzic, that happened at the 50th Session of the
7 National Assembly of Republika Srpska on 15th and 16th of June -- I'm
8 sorry, April, 1995. Karadzic and all deputies of the SDS rejected
9 Mladic's expose about the situation and the needs of the VRS. That was
10 made public, and I know that on the following day, in order to have a
11 shock absorber of this, if you will, the two of them toured the positions
12 of the 30th Division, the 1st Krajina Corps on Mount Vlasic. And then
13 that was recorded, pictures were taken, it was filmed, and so on. So it
14 was mitigated a bit.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm -- put your next question to the
16 witness, and please focussed. The witness gives very lengthy answers and
17 they have got often to do something far away with the question. Please
18 keep focussed.
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, now I'm going to ask you something about the situation
21 in the Army of Republika Srpska, and we can provide short and concise
22 answers with regard to that.
23 Is it true that the VRS had a shortage of fuel and in which
24 periods was this most pronounced, if that was the case at all?
25 A. Throughout the war, we had fuel shortages. We were using the
1 ammunition reserves that we had inherited from the JNA, and our materiel
2 resources went down from day to day. This culminate before the assembly
3 in Sanski Most.
4 Q. Was there a shortage of manpower in the VRS?
5 You can answer.
6 A. According to establishment of VRS, we did not have a shortage of
7 soldiers. We, however, had a lack of officers.
8 Q. The sanctions that Yugoslavia imposed against Republika Srpska,
9 how did they affect the situation in terms of the combat readiness of the
10 VRS. Please go ahead.
11 A. Now I see that I can go ahead. The sanctions that were imposed
12 on the 4th of August, 1994, well, I personally expected a catastrophe.
13 However, these were sanctions of the government of the
14 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, the government of Serbia.
15 However, these were not sanctions of the people of Serbia. One of the
16 measures included in these sanctions was, for example, prohibiting
17 politicians and generals of Republika Srpska to cross the Drina river.
18 Any time I had to cross the Drina river I would cross it without any
19 problems whatsoever at the border; that is to say that the persons who
20 were implementing this decision did not observe this decision of their
21 government. This national patriotism was at work among the Serbs on the
22 other side of the Drina. However, sanctions caused moral problems in the
23 commands of the Army of Republika Srpska in the Main Staff, in the corps
24 commands, because, until then, we always thought that we had a support in
25 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of what happened.
1 However, we lost that support after rejecting the plan of the
2 contact group. Especially when sanctions were imposed in real terms on
3 paper, we lost this one and only ally that had positive thoughts at least
4 about us, if nothing else. However, when we realised that the behaviour
5 of the people in Serbia was quite different from the behaviour of the
6 government, we calmed down and we continued the war.
7 Sorry, may I just conclude? So the imposition of sanctions by
8 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Republika Srpska did not
9 decrease the combat readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska.
10 Q. What about the balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina? How
11 was it affected by supplying the Muslim and Croat side with weapons?
12 Also pressures by NATO?
13 A. From the beginning of the war, our army was always on the losing
14 end as regards the balance of power. First of all, the Muslims had
15 Croats as their ally, then Croatia as ally. So not to go into the
16 actually balance, 4:1, 5:1, I can talk about specific operations. For
17 example, Operation Storm, 11:1 in manpower, 23:1 in equipment in that
18 particular operation. So every cannon, every piece of equipment that
19 crossed the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina went to the Muslim/Croat
20 coalition, not to the Serbs. So it's only natural that we lost our
21 power, and if you look at our warfare, you will see that in the second
22 half of the war, we strove for victory, in particular, directions so that
23 we would keep up the morale of the army and the people, like the
24 counter-attack in Bihac and right now I cannot remember, Spreca. That is
25 to say, small-scale operations that have to be efficient, though, in
1 order to keep up combat morale.
2 I will just give you one example: On the 31st of August, 1994,
3 the Muslim Supreme Command issued a public statement, saying that in the
4 fighting until then, during 29 months of war, they lost 235.627 soldiers.
5 My conclusion when I heard that was that they were trying to justify NATO
6 air-strikes against the Serbs that started on the 29th of August. And
7 the question is: How big their army was if they had that kind of losses,
8 a quarter of a million people. Eight per cent are world norms not -- or
9 standards. Not to go into that now. We'd have to be talking about the
10 Chinese army.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Approximately three minutes, the question started by
12 the affect by supplying the Muslim and Croat side with weapons. I've not
13 heard any specific reference to apart from all the weapons that entered
14 into Bosnia and pressure by NATO. I've heard about who tried to
15 influence NATO. But we are far away from the questions.
16 Mr. Lukic, you should keep in control of the examination of the
17 witness. And please keep that in mind by both putting clear, concise
18 questions, and by interrupting the witness if he moves away from what you
19 asked him.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, it's not clear yet. You said that 23:1 was the ratio in
22 terms of equipment. In whose favour in this operation that you referred
24 A. Of the Croat armed forces.
25 Q. Is it correct that the Main Staff was undermanned throughout as
1 well? It was manned by 33 per cent. That's the information I have.
2 Please go ahead.
3 A. Throughout the war, 36 per cent was the highest level of manning
4 reached. That was a conscious policy on the part of the head of the
5 Main Staff so that as many officers as possible would be on the front
6 line to command units, to lead units; whereas we, in the staff, took care
7 of staff work and usually one man would be doing two or three related
9 Q. Now briefly about units attached to the staff. You mentioned the
10 10th Sabotage Detachment, the 65th Regiment, and so on. When they were
11 sent to the front line, is it correct that, at the same time, they would
12 be resubordinated to the commander who would be heading that particular
13 operation or action, or did people from the Main Staff command them in
14 those situations when they would be sent into combat?
15 A. If the operation in question was not a complex one - in other
16 words, if not more than one or two corps were included - then parts of
17 those units were resubordinated, such as battalions. Seldom did it
18 happen that entire regiments or guards brigade would be subordinated.
19 However, if it was a complex operation headed by either the commander of
20 the Main Staff or myself, then that unit was placed under our command;
21 that is to say, under the command of someone from the Main Staff. So the
22 corps did not command the Protection Regiment which would be included in
23 their operation.
24 Q. So the corps only commanded parts of units, if they had been
25 resubordinated; correct?
1 A. Yes. But resubordination is always limited, in terms of time and
2 space. It has a beginning and an end, as well as two points in the
4 Q. Thank you. You also mentioned the equipment which remained in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it true that in the territory controlled by the
6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council, there were
7 still warehouses of the former JNA? And, if you know, can you tell us
8 which warehouses remained in their territory?
9 A. I do know that there were some, but I can't name any single
10 warehouse in the territory of the Federation. I wasn't there during the
11 war or in peacetime. But I do know what was left behind was the
12 ammunition factory called Igman near Konjic and a cartridge factory which
13 was taken from us in Gorazde called Pobeda. So they could continue
14 producing ammunition for the needs of the coalition armed forces.
15 Q. Thank you. We are nearing the end.
16 Let me ask you something about General Mladic next. We know that
17 following the meeting at which General Zivanovic had his going away
18 party, or farewell party, you went to the west again. It was sometime
19 after the 20th of July, 1993; correct?
20 A. I think it was the 23rd of July, 1995. I know because that
21 afternoon I returned to the western part.
22 Q. General Mladic, too, arrived in the western front - correct? - in
24 A. Yes, in early August.
25 Q. At the western front, did you discuss with him any events
1 concerning Srebrenica in July, or were you busy with something else?
2 A. I did not discuss Srebrenica with him because I was busy
3 preparing a session of the Supreme Command, which took place on the
4 1st of August, I believe.
5 Later, events became more turbulent. On the 4th of August, Knin
6 fell; on the 5th, Petrinja fell. Croats went further afield with
7 Operation Storm --
8 JUDGE ORIE: The question was focussed on whether you discussed
9 Srebrenica or whether you were busy with other things. I don't think
10 that Mr. Lukic would like to know exactly what other things you were busy
11 with. He was primarily interested in whether you discussed Srebrenica.
12 The answer has been given.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. As a matter of fact, I am interested in it and I'm sorry if it
16 wasn't reflected in my question. Save for Knin and Petrinja, which other
17 municipalities fell during that period and what was it that kept you
18 busy? You may begin answering.
19 A. I cannot enumerate them all, but during that time, between the
20 1st of August and the Supreme Command session, following that date,
21 11 municipalities in western Krajina fell, starting with Glamoc, and
22 there was another municipality which fell the same day as Glamoc.
23 Q. Was it Grahovo?
24 A. Yes. It fell in the morning, and that day I evacuated people
25 from Glamoc, so it wasn't lost in combat. Then there were other
1 municipalities which fell one after another. Even before the
2 1st of August, before Croats arrived in Knin, Drvar had been bombed. So
3 it was Drvar that fell, then Petrovac, then Kljuc, and all the way up to
4 the Ugar river. Eleven municipalities in total.
5 So I didn't care much to talk to General Mladic or to discuss
6 Srebrenica at the time.
7 Q. Did General Mladic ever tell you that he was in any way involved
8 in the killing of prisoners in Srebrenica?
9 A. No.
10 Q. As for your other colleagues from the Main Staff or in terms of
11 other possible sources in Republika Srpska, did you ever hear from any of
12 those that General Mladic was involved in either capturing or killing of
13 those prisoners in Srebrenica? You may answer.
14 A. No.
15 Q. Did General Ratko Mladic order you to have the people in
16 Srebrenica killed?
17 A. Order me?
18 Q. Yes, you.
19 A. No.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, they have not even discussed it. Why --
21 it's -- it goes without saying, I would say, that the whole context of
22 the testimony of this witness, that it's a totally superfluous question.
23 MR. LUKIC: We had a base for this question in the questions from
24 the Prosecution side, in direct.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Did the Prosecution claim in any of the questions
1 that Mr. Mladic would have ordered General Milovanovic to kill people in
3 Mr. Groome, is that ...
4 MR. GROOME: I certainly don't recall saying anything -- anything
5 like that.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Neither do I. But, if so, please take us to it,
7 because we may have missed something, Mr. Lukic.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. LUKIC: I just need two or three more minutes so maybe I
10 should continue.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then you're invited to conclude your
12 cross-examination in the next five minutes.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] We heard what General Mladic said on the
15 12th of May, 1992, when he contributed to the discussion in -- following
16 Kalenic's statement when he cautioned the politicians against engaging in
17 genocide. Could you conclude at any point in time that General Mladic
18 changed his position during the war? Please go ahead.
19 A. No. Until I went to the west in late October, General Mladic had
20 not changed his position in terms of waging war or his position vis-a-vis
21 the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. That was to be my next question, or at least part of it. Did
23 General Mladic during the war ever order to have civilians or captured
24 enemy soldiers tortured, to the best of your knowledge, or killed?
25 A. No. I did hear on Radio Sarajevo a statement made by
1 General Mladic. All of Bosnia-Herzegovina could hear it at the beginning
2 of the war that the Presidency building is to be targeted to stretch out
3 the Muslims.
4 Another thing which I heard was a conversation in jest between
5 him and Colonel Balac. Balac was sent to the environs of Srebrenica
6 where he established communication with the Main Staff or the other way
7 around. I don't know who called whom, but Tolimir, General Mladic and I
8 were in the office, as well as someone else, perhaps. When
9 General Mladic, through laughter, asked Balac, Klaso, are there any Turks
10 there? - Klaso meaning because of the fact that they were in the same
11 generation at the academy - he answered, Yes, there are as many as ants.
12 And Mr. Mladic laughed and he said, Fire at them. And then -- then
13 somebody in the office started waving at General Mladic to be careful
14 what he was saying over communication lines --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness repeat
16 the very end of his answer.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you repeat the very last part of your answer.
18 We have on the transcript that somebody started waving at
19 General Mladic to be careful what he was saying over communication lines.
20 What did you then say following that?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Tolimir tugged at his
22 sleeve. He was upset, telling him, Watch your mouth. We are probably
23 being listened to. And later on, we did find out that the telephone
24 conversation between the two of them was indeed intercepted, although I
25 don't know which armed force did, whether it was UNPROFOR or the Croats.
1 It was broadcast on a Radio Sarajevo for several days.
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. Did General Ratko Mladic order you anything, ever,
4 which you believed that was unlawful and contrary to the laws and customs
5 of war? Please go ahead.
6 A. No.
7 Q. Were you ever present when he ordered someone else to do
8 something that would be unlawful and contrary to the laws and customs of
9 war? Go ahead.
10 A. No.
11 Q. Tell us, in a few sentences, what kind and man and general was
12 General Ratko Mladic? And that would be my last question.
13 A. I can put it all in one sentence. During my service with
14 General Mladic, he was a charismatic person, a giant with a soft heart,
15 meaning that he did not hold things against people for long. He was a
16 just and fair commander. He protected his subordinates.
17 Q. Does that conclude your answer?
18 A. Yes, it does.
19 Q. And this concludes my questions, General. Thank you for
20 answering them.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
22 We'll take a break. But before doing that, Mr. Groome, could you
23 tell us how much time you would need to re-examine the witness.
24 MR. GROOME: I think about -- approximately 45 minutes,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Approximately 45 minutes.
2 Then you may already follow the usher.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break and we resume at 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, you'll now be re-examined by
10 Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: Thank you.
12 Re-examination by Mr. Groome:
13 Q. Good morning, General Milovanovic.
14 All the questions I'm going to ask you this morning are going to
15 be very precise and focussed. Could I ask you to limit your answers to
16 the precise piece of information that I'm seeking.
17 Yesterday at transcript 17088 to 89, Mr. Lukic asserted to you
19 "No one from the army could make decisions as to whether a convoy
20 would pass through or not."
21 And you replied, "Yes."
22 I want to explore that answer in a bit more detail.
23 Now, when we speak of convoys am I correct that there were two
24 categories of convoys, the first carrying humanitarian assistance into
25 the enclaves; and the second, convoys resupplying the UNPROFOR troops
1 stationed in the enclaves; is that correct?
2 You can answer whenever you're ready.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now with respect to the commission that Mr. Lukic inquired about
5 yesterday, the -- the commission of the RS government that only dealt
6 with humanitarian convoys, it had nothing to do with the UNPROFOR
7 resupply convoys; is that correct?
8 A. There was a committee for co-operation with foreign
9 intermediaries in the war. Primarily, UNPROFOR, UNHCR, et cetera.
10 Within that committee, there was a commission for the delivery of
11 humanitarian aid. It was that commission which took decisions.
12 The army did not take any decisions. It was supposed only to
13 make way for the convoy, and the issues that I detailed yesterday.
14 As for UNPROFOR resupply convoys, likewise the UNPROFOR commander
15 would go through that particular committee. We only received information
16 that an UNPROFOR convoy would take such and such a route, at such and
17 such a time, and these convoys were checked just as humanitarian convoys
19 Q. Now Exhibit P2222 is a chart of your comments regarding the
20 convoys. And in item 3 of that chart, you identify
21 Colonel Milos Djurdjic as the member of the Main Staff on this commission
22 or committee. Am I correct that the Main Staff was represented on this
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, General --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, the witness made a distinction between
2 the committee and the commission. In your last question you did put them
3 together again. Commission being within the committee.
4 MR. GROOME: Yes. And just so the Chamber knows why in
5 yesterday's question and answer it was the word "commission" that was
6 being used to refer to this body. So it may be a nuance in the
7 translation. But I believe it's clear what we're speaking about -- the
8 people who dealt with these convoys.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
10 MR. GROOME:
11 Q. General, is it not the case that, despite the existence of a
12 committee, which included a Main Staff officer, that the final say on
13 whether a humanitarian convoy was allowed to proceed was -- was made by
14 General Mladic?
15 A. Before the commission was formed, yes. But not after it was
17 Q. General, I want to read you a question and answer from the
18 Tolimir case and ask you whether it causes you to reconsider that answer.
19 It's evidence that was taken on the 17th of May, 2011, at
20 transcript page 14213.
21 The question put to you by Mr. McCloskey was:
22 "Who had final control? The commission or Mladic?
23 "A. Final control was in the hands of the army, Mladic at
25 Do you remember giving that answer and does that affect your
1 answer today?
2 A. I do remember and the answer given then does not affect in any
3 way the answer I gave a moment ago. You read out to me the term
4 "final control," which is the control of UNPROFOR at check-points,
5 whereas, your previous question had to do with a decision and who had the
6 final say, Mladic or the committee.
7 Q. If the commission said that a convoy should proceed and Mladic
8 said that the convoy should not proceed, would the convoys proceed into
9 the enclaves?
10 A. I don't know because I did not experience such a situation.
11 Q. I want to now turn back to directive 7/1. It's your evidence
12 this week that Mladic rescinded the portion of the order in directive 7
13 that you identified as being unlawful by not including the text in
14 directive 7/1.
15 My first question, in this regard, is whether Karadzic ever
16 complained that Mladic had dropped a portion of Directive 7?
17 A. I am not aware of that.
18 Q. Now, yesterday after the transcript recorded you as saying that
19 directive 7 was not mentioned in directive 7/1, the Chamber drew your
20 attention to two passages where it was. Having in mind those two
21 passages, would that be an indication that Mladic intended directive 7/1
22 to be read in conjunction with directive 7?
23 A. Yes. In the items where General Mladic refers back to directive
25 Q. Now, General, if a directive or order refers to another directive
1 or order, would I be correct that the subordinate receiving that document
2 would have the responsibility of reviewing the earlier directive or
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that P1470 be brought to our screens.
6 This is directive 7/1. And could I ask that we go to 3, page 3 in the
7 original, and 4 in the translation.
8 Q. On 3, can I draw your attention to the bottom of the page; and,
9 in the English it's the full -- the first full paragraph at the top of
10 the page.
11 Now, General, this paragraph is composed of a single, long
12 sentence. Am I correct in understanding that from this sentence that we
13 can see that the Sadejstvo 95 operation included operations around
14 Srebrenica and Zepa?
15 A. I am not clear about the question, really. Was it: Do I agree
16 with this or -- can you help me with it, please.
17 Q. Yes. The question is: Does Sadejstvo 95 include military
18 operations in the area of Srebrenica and Zepa, according to this?
19 A. I don't know. Nowhere is Srebrenica mentioned, and I am not
20 familiar with Operation Sadejstvo co-ordinated action 95. I heard about
21 the operation in another case, but it was not within my sights when I was
22 at the Bihac front line.
23 Q. Can I draw your attention to the bottom two lines in the
25 MR. GROOME: Perhaps if the usher could assist us by focussing in
1 on that.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see it well. There's no
3 need to zoom in on it.
4 MR. GROOME:
5 Q. So is it not clear from a plain reading of this document that
6 Operation Sadejstvo 95 includes operations - and I'm quoting - "around
7 Srebrenica-Zepa and Gorazde enclaves."
8 A. You're right. Those are the last words in that paragraph. So it
9 does include activity around Srebrenica.
10 Q. Now, in referring to this operation, Mladic states:
11 "By carrying out planned combat battles and operations in
12 accordance with directive number 7."
13 Is this not a clear reference to the planned operations in
14 accordance with directive number 7?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So do you agree with me that the phrase that you identified in
17 directive 7 as being unlawful has been incorporated into 7/1, by
19 A. Yes. I said, speaking to you, I believe, that the
20 Supreme Command acted inappropriately by sending directive 7 to
21 second-level units instead of sending it to the Main Staff only and the
22 Main Staff would then adapted it for the purposes of subordinate units.
23 Subordinate units would, in that case, on the basis of Mladic's
24 directive, rather than Karadzic's, be drafting their own orders.
25 Q. But, General, you just told us that a subordinate would have the
1 responsibility of looking at the documents referred to in an order or
2 directive. Wouldn't a person, an officer, reading this sentence from
3 directive 7, wouldn't they go back and look at directive 7 to find out
4 what were the planned combat battles and operations that are in accord
5 with directive number 7 [sic]?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, are we to understand that at line 20,
7 page 29, where you first referred to "directive 7," you want to say
8 "directive 7/1."
9 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Much obliged.
10 Q. General Milovanovic, may I repeat the question so there's no
11 confusion. I misspoke.
12 Given what you've told us about the responsibility of a
13 subordinate to go back and look at the earlier order or directive that's
14 referred to, wouldn't an officer, reading Mladic's statement here, or
15 order here, in directive 7/1, wouldn't they be obliged to go back to
16 directive 7 and within this sentence refer them to the order you said was
18 JUDGE ORIE: You may answer the question, Witness. You always
19 may answer the question when it's clear that Mr. Groome has finished it.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I still stand by this, the
21 distribution of directive 7 was inappropriately carried out by the
22 Supreme Commander --
23 JUDGE ORIE: That was not the question. The question was whether
24 someone reading the reference in directive 7.1 to directive 7 would have
25 to look at directive 7 in order that to be fully able to implement
1 directive 7.1. That's the question.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
3 MR. GROOME:
4 Q. And my next question is: Wouldn't this line from Mladic's order
5 in 7.1, by carrying out planned combat battles and operations in
6 accordance with directive 7, isn't that a specific reference to the line
7 of directive 7 that you testified the day before yesterday was unlawful?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Can you tell us what other planned operations in directive 7 this
10 could be a reference to?
11 A. I can't reproduce directive 7 off the top of my head now, but we
12 will avoid any confusion by saying that the author of directive 7/1,
13 that's to say General Mladic, aimed at cutting his directive short
14 because these details are already contained in directive 7. In order for
15 him to provide an assignment to subordinate units that would be clear and
16 precise, he said something that is normally used also by you lawyers,
17 pursuant to item such and such, to article such, of such and such a law.
18 And those who are reading the text are then obliged to go back to that
19 article or law that is cited and see what it is about.
20 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that P1468 be brought to our screens.
21 Q. It's an order for defence and active operations, operative
22 number 7, dated 20 March 1995 issued by Major-General Milenko Zivanovic,
23 who was at this time commander of the Drina Corps. So that there is no
24 confusion regarding the chronology, directive 7 was issued on the
25 8th of March, 1995, and transmitted by General Milovanovic on 17th of
1 March. P1468 is an order by Zivanovic dated the 20th of March, P1470.
2 Directive 7/1, was signed by Mladic on the 31st of March.
3 Now, General, in your testimony at page 16996, you referred to an
4 order in which Zivanovic copied the illegal phrase from directive 7. Can
5 I ask that we go to page 3 of the original and page 5 of the translation.
6 And if I can draw your attention to section 2, the tasks of the
7 Drina Corps.
8 And now if we turn to the next page of the translation, we can
9 see that Zivanovic writes:
10 "By planned and well thought out combat operations, create an
11 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
12 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
13 Is this the passage that you were referring to in your evidence
14 the last couple of days?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, according to your evidence, this order issued by Zivanovic
17 would be contrary to the wishes of the commander. Are you aware of any
18 order communicated to Zivanovic that, after 7.1 came out, this particular
19 passage in this order targeting the civilian population should have been
20 rescinded? Is there any explicit order to that effect?
21 A. It can be found in Karadzic's directive 7. Zivanovic copied this
22 from the original, which is directive 7. You yourself mentioned
23 chronology. The corps received Karadzic's directive sometime on the 17th
24 or 18th.
25 Q. I think that everyone here is clear of the chronology. So my
1 simple question to you is, is that this order came out before 7.1. Once
2 7.1 came out, was there ever an explicit order to Zivanovic to withdraw
3 this order that he had issued to his subordinate units?
4 A. That I don't know.
5 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that P1465 be brought to our screens.
6 Q. This is an order dated the 2nd of July, 1995, issued by the same
7 Major-General Milenko Zivanovic. Now, General, this order is several
8 months after the issuance of directive 7/1. Can I draw your attention to
9 item 2 in this order, and it can be found on 2 in the original and 3 in
10 the translation. The section starts with the phrase:
11 "The command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations
12 directive number 7 and 7/1 of the Main Staff of the VRS."
13 My first question to you is: Does this indicate that Zivanovic's
14 understanding of the relationship between directives 7 and 7/1 were that
15 they were -- they both remained in effect and must be considered in
16 conjunction with each other?
17 A. I can't comment on this because I don't know what Zivanovic had
18 on his mind when he was writing this. He referred to both directives,
19 but I don't know which one he gives precedence to. And under the command
20 system, it was directive 7/1 that he should have given preference to.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Witness, this -- the plain language of this
22 document doesn't give preference to either. They're treated equally, are
23 they not?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see that, but I stand by what
25 I said; that's to say, Zivanovic should have given a preference or
1 primacy to Mladic's directive.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And on what basis?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I say that on the basis of military
4 subordination within the system of VRS where certain authorities cannot
5 be sidestepped.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Is it sidestepping if Mr. Mladic himself refers to
7 directive 7 in the directives 7/1 he issued? That's not sidestepping. I
8 mean, Mr. Mladic gave it its place in 7/1. So, therefore, it's not
9 entirely clear to me what you mean.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The fact that General Mladic refers
11 to directive 7, Karadzic's directive, does not constitute any
12 sidestepping of authority because Karadzic sent the directive to Mladic
13 for implementation. Now it was up to Mladic to determine how he would
14 convey this on to the units.
15 And I did say that my previous evidence that Zivanovic made the
16 mistake of not waiting for Mladic's directive but drafting his order for
17 the defence effort on the basis of Karadzic's directive.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
19 MR. GROOME:
20 Q. General, again before I read you a passage of this let's keep in
21 mind that this document, this order, is several months after Mladic's
22 directive 7/1 and specifically references the two. So if we can go to
23 item 4 on page 2 in the original and 3 the translation. Halfway down
24 that paragraph, after the word "objective," we read:
25 "By a surprise attack to separate and reduce in size the
1 Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves to improve the tactical position of the
2 forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the
3 elimination of the enclaves."
4 Would it be a fair interpretation of this sentence that Zivanovic
5 understood that both the separation of Srebrenica and Zepa and the
6 removal of the civilian population from those enclaves, as indicated in
7 directive 7, were still in effect?
8 A. I may be mistaken. But in none of the directives, either 7 or
9 7/1, did I see the term "eliminate the enclaves." Nor can it be found in
10 the transcription of tasks - that's item 2 - where Zivanovic lists the
11 tasks of the corps.
12 Q. Can you read the sentence that starts:
13 "... by surprise attack, to separate and reduce ..."
14 Can you read that sentence for us, please.
15 A. "Objective: By a surprise attack fully separate and reduce in
16 size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, improve the tactical position of
17 the forces in the depth of the area, and create conditions for the
18 elimination of the enclaves."
19 Q. So I don't understand your evidence. Is your evidence that this
20 is not related to directive 7 and 7/1 and that it's something that
21 Zivanovic has done on his own accord?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And so it's your evidence that his reference to "elimination of
24 the enclaves" is substantively different than directive 7's order:
25 "By planned and well thought out combat operations create an
1 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
2 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
3 My question to you is: If that situation is created -- create a
4 situation of no hope for further survival or life in the enclaves, how is
5 that different than the elimination of the enclaves?
6 A. In the following way: The order issuing authority in
7 directive 7, that is to say, Karadzic, makes it incumbent upon the army
8 to create conditions of unbearability and Zivanovic spells that out in
9 concrete terms, says: Creates conditions for the elimination of
10 enclaves; that is to say Karadzic did not say why life conditions should
11 be made more difficult. That is understandable, presumably. And
12 Zivanovic thought that it meant elimination of enclaves and that's what
13 he wrote.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I think the witness has now been given
15 large opportunities not to testify about facts but about the
16 interpretation of documents which is the primary task of the Chamber.
17 Again, we have not stopped it, but ... there's one or more -- one or two
18 more questions fine. But let's not --
19 MR. GROOME: I'll move forward.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- stay with this forever.
21 MR. GROOME: I'll move forward.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please.
23 MR. GROOME: Can we please go to the last page on both versions.
24 Q. And General, when that comes up on your screen, can I draw your
25 attention to the type written text directly under Zivanovic's name. It
2 "Typed in two copies and delivered to: 1. Original in the
3 archive of the Drina Corps Command; 2. Main Staff of the VRS."
4 Does this indicate that Zivanovic sent a copy of this to the
5 Main Staff?
6 A. According to this, yes.
7 Q. Does this mean that the Main Staff approved this order?
8 A. I cannot conclude that on the basis of this document.
9 Q. I want to draw your attention to a portion of an interview that
10 you gave on the 24th of August, 2009, in which this very document was
12 On this topic, on this particular document, you were asked what
13 it means, this endorsement. Your response was:
14 "Original to archives, Drina Corps Command. You are right.
15 Number 2, Main Staff of Republika Srpska. That means that it's probably
16 been approved by the Main Staff."
17 Do you recall expressing that with respect to this document back
18 in 2009?
19 A. I do not recall, but I stand by what you said a moment ago.
20 Q. So it is your evidence today that this order of Zivanovic was
21 sent to the Main Staff and approved by ...
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you left out the word "probably" and --
23 MR. GROOME: Yeah --
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- therefore, could you please put the question
25 again to the witness.
1 MR. GROOME:
2 Q. So is it your evidence today that this order was probably sent to
3 the Main Staff --
4 JUDGE ORIE: It was probably approved, that's at least what you
5 read to us.
6 Mr. Groome would like to know whether your evidence is that the
7 reference to the Main Staff of the VRS means that the order is --
8 probably been approved by the Main Staff.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My final statement, if you will,
10 shall be as follows: From this document, I see that the document was
11 sent to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. But I do not
12 know what the reaction of the commander of the Main Staff was, whether he
13 approved it, whether he did not approve it. I cannot see that from this
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear. But apparently in your previous
16 interview -- or could you say, Unless there is a response by the
17 Main Staff that they disapprove it, that sending it and subsequent
18 silence on the matter would mean that it is approved?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not necessarily.
20 However, it is not impossible that General Mladic and Zivanovic
21 spoke and that he gave him approval in that way, just orally. Now
22 whether Zivanovic wrote that down somewhere, I don't know.
23 JUDGE ORIE: A simple question: If Mr. Mladic would not -- if
24 the Main Staff would not have approved and if Mr. Mladic would not have
25 approved, what would he have done in order to express such disapproval,
1 under normal circumstances?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He would have stopped the order,
3 and he would have given his own amendments, changes, et cetera. So he'd
4 order, Zivanovic, change such and such a thing in such and such a way,
5 and Zivanovic would be duty-bound to do that and to send it to
6 General Mladic again with those corrections.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Now, is there anything to your knowledge that this
8 action was taken; that is, stopping the order and giving his own
9 amendments, changes, et cetera?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I was on the other
11 end of Republika Srpska.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you may ...
13 MR. GROOME:
14 Q. General, yesterday at transcript page 17003 in response
15 between -- in response to a question put to you by Judge Fluegge
16 regarding directive 7, you said:
17 "No. I saw this directive for the first time in the Tribunal
18 building sometime around the 29th of May."
19 What year were you referring to?
20 A. I'm correcting the date and place when I first saw this. I saw
21 this directive, that is to say its top and the end, on the
22 18th of October, 2005, in Banja Luka. It was shown to me by
23 Prosecutor Peter McCloskey. I saw it again during my testimony on that
24 29th of May.
25 Q. And is it also your evidence or your belief that General Mladic
1 did not see directive 7 before Karadzic issued it?
2 A. That I don't know. But I do know that General Mladic appointed
3 General Miletic to form the directive. So he must have seen that.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, if I might just ask.
5 Mr. Milovanovic, you were asked by Mr. Groome what year of the
6 29th of May were you referring to. You have still not given that. Could
7 you please give us that?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 2007 is the year.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
10 Yes, Mr. Groome, you may proceed.
11 MR. GROOME:
12 Q. General, if it were to be that Miletic did not consult either you
13 or General Mladic about the contents of this directive, would that have
14 been a breach of the principles of command and control that you've given
15 evidence about during your testimony?
16 A. No. I said yesterday that I would have consulted everybody in
17 the Main Staff had I been in Miletic's shoes. Now whether Miletic did
18 consult someone, I don't know.
19 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that 17473A be brought to our screens.
20 Q. General, I'm going ask you to look at each page. The text is
21 very short.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Could I nevertheless go back to the previous
23 question, Mr. Groome.
24 The question was whether -- if Miletic would not have consulted
25 either you or General Mladic about the contents, whether that would have
1 been a breach of the principles of command and control.
2 Your answer was: I would have consulted everyone. Whether
3 Miletic did consult someone, you do not know.
4 Do I understand that Miletic was under a duty to consult with
5 Mr. Mladic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how Miletic behaved.
7 I've said several times already that I would have consulted both Mladic
8 and the entire staff.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you have done that because you
10 considered it your duty to do that under the system of command and
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome.
14 MR. GROOME:
15 Q. General Miletic was your direct subordinate. Did you ever
16 reprimand him for having done this?
17 A. No. Because I did not have an opportunity. I told you when I
18 was first in contact with this directive.
19 MR. GROOME: Can I now ask that 65 ter 17473A be brought to our
21 Q. And, again, General, this is a relatively short document. I'm
22 going to -- when you've had a chance to look at this page, please
23 indicate that, and we'll advance to the next page.
24 A. I've read it.
25 Q. Next page, please. I'm not terribly interested in the
1 handwritten text.
2 A. I've read it.
3 Q. Next one. General, having looked at these, does this refresh
4 your recollection that on the 17th of March, you not only transmitted
5 directive 7 to the 1st Krajina Corps but to the Drina Corps, the
6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the Herzegovina Corps? I've asked
7 Investigator Yarmah to be present in court with the originals if you
8 should care to see them.
9 A. There's no need for the originals. But these documents that you
10 showed me just now dispelled my dilemma about that document that we
11 discussed yesterday. It only went to the 1st Krajina Corps. So I
12 thought that with the regular sending to the other corps that that was --
13 that the head of office forgot. However, now, I see that it was sent to
14 all the corps on -- at the same time. My signature is there.
15 However, in relation to what I said yesterday, I can just say the
16 following: The directive went simultaneously to all the corps and we see
17 in the documents that they sent back when they received it. We saw that
18 one of them received it on the 18th. And then the Herzegovina Corps,
19 there is no confirmation on the document when he received it. I mean,
20 there is no stamp of the head of office of the Herzegovina Corps. So I
21 don't know when they received it.
22 Q. Can we return to page 1. Are you referring to the endorsement by
23 Zivanovic returning a signed copy of your transmittal letter, as
24 instructed in the letter itself? And it's at the bottom of that page.
25 Thank you.
1 A. Yes. But something is strange here now. I sent this on the
2 17th of March, 1995, via courier. And, ah, this is the 18th of March. I
3 thought that it was the 18th of September. That's what it said. So he
4 received it on the following day. Now I cannot remember the date when he
5 issued his combat order. You did refer to the chronology. I think it
6 was the 23rd?
7 Q. It was the 20th of March. But that's not the focus of this
8 particular inquiry. What I want to ask you is: In each of the four
9 transmittal letters signed by you that we've now seen the fact that
10 you're attaching a directive is clearly marked on the document; is that
11 not correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, General, the day before yesterday, you defined a directive
14 for us and you said that at transcript page 16974. You said:
15 "A directive in war time is the highest form of doctrinally
16 ordering or directing the activities of any military, including ours."
17 General, is it really your evidence that you, as the
18 deputy commander of the army, someone expected to take command of the
19 army in Mladic's absence, is it really your evidence that you did not
20 read the directive?
21 A. I did not read the directive. The directives were packed in
22 envelopes. And on the envelope, it said, directive number 7 of the
23 Supreme Command of the Army of Republika Srpska.
24 Since I was in the Main Staff in passing, I happened to be there.
25 I didn't read it. I stand by that. I've told you when I first came in
1 contact with that directive. I read it in greater detail when I
2 testified in May and June 2007.
3 Q. General, then can I ask you, you've testified a few minutes ago
4 that it is the obligation of a subordinate, when he receives a directive
5 of an order that refers to an earlier one, is the obligation of that
6 subordinate to go back and review that.
7 When you read 7/1 and saw that it referred to directive 7, why
8 did you not at that point go and read directive 7?
9 A. I saw directive 7/1 at the time when I saw directive 7, within
10 the indictment of General Miletic.
11 Q. So it -- it's your evidence today that as the deputy commander of
12 the VRS, you did not have sight of two directives prior to the date -- I
13 think you -- in 2005.
14 Is that your evidence?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I want to now switch to some evidence that Mr. Lukic dealt with
17 today regarding Sarajevo. And in answer to a question of his, you
18 described the -- the ultimatum by -- from NATO to withdraw artillery.
19 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that 65 ter 09714 be brought to our
21 Q. It is order issued by General Milovanovic on the
22 9th of February, 1992 [sic]. General, this order is issued -- I'm sorry.
23 This order is issued via teleprinter. Once you have a chance to look at
24 it, can I ask you to confirm that, in fact, it is an order of yours?
25 JUDGE ORIE: You think you said "1992," Mr. Groome.
1 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry.
2 JUDGE ORIE: But I take it you wanted to refer to "1994."
3 MR. GROOME: That's correct, I misspoke.
4 Q. So my first question is: Do you recall issuing this order.
5 Let me know when I can ask you a question.
6 A. Yes, go ahead.
7 Q. And do I fairly characterise this document by saying when faced
8 with the ultimatum, you issued an order for inoperable weapons to be
9 moved into Sarajevo so that they would be the ones that were moved back
10 in compliance with the ultimatum. Would that be a fair characterisation
11 of this?
12 A. Yes. Because I pointed out for as long as ultimatum-based
13 threats of bombing are still on.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution tenders 09714 as well
15 the previous exhibit, 65 ter 17473A.
16 JUDGE ORIE: In the absence of any objections, Madam Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document 17473A receives number P2248, and
18 document 09714 receives number P2249, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: P2248 and P2249 are admitted.
20 MR. GROOME:
21 Q. General, I only have a few more questions for you. Today at the
22 temporary transcript page 21, Mr. Lukic asked you:
23 "Did General Mladic during the war ever order to have civilians
24 or captured enemy soldiers tortured, to the best of your knowledge, or
1 Your answer was, "No."
2 MR. GROOME: Can I ask 65 ter 10635 be brought to our screens.
3 Q. This is a memoire written by General Milovanovic called: "My
4 View of the War in Bosnia: 1992 to 1995."
5 General, when you see the first page of the document, can you
6 tell us is it, in fact, the document I've just described?
7 A. Yes, this was the work material for my book that is now called:
8 "Truths and Delusions Concerning the War in Bosnia: 1992 to 1995."
9 Q. When did you write this book?
10 A. 2005.
11 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we now go to page 37 in both versions
12 of the document, and in the translation I would draw the Chamber to the
13 last few lines of the first full paragraph.
14 Q. I apologise, General Milovanovic, I'm not sure exactly where the
15 passage is in the original, but I will read the passage I am interested
16 in and you'll hear in the translation:
17 "The Muslim Supreme Command had ordered them to tie up our troops
18 so that we could not come to the aid of those of our forces fighting
19 against a major Muslim offensive in Sarajevo which had started on
20 16 June 1995. The response of the VRS to these raids by the Muslims led
21 to the tragic events in Srebrenica, where the Serbian forces did some
22 things that they should not have done and for which there had been no
23 military justification."
24 My question is simply: Do you still stand behind this passage?
25 A. Yes. That is my analytical approach to the problem after the
1 war, ten years after Srebrenica.
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I do intend to -- no, actually I've
3 read that into the transcript. There's no need to tender that.
4 Q. General, my last exhibit that I'm going to ask you to comment on
5 is a portion of an interview that you gave on the 7th and
6 8th of July, 2009. The transcript can be found at 65 ter 30269B. And
7 when that's up on the screen, I'm going to ask Ms. Stewart to play the
8 audio, and I'd ask you to listen carefully.
9 I do want General Milovanovic to be able to hear his voice, so
10 perhaps if we could not have translation and just rely on the transcript,
11 and if that could be played again, if that's suitable.
12 [Audio-tape played]
13 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that the transcript be put up on the
14 screen so that the General has the benefit of seeing the written text.
15 Q. General, was that, in fact, your voice that we just listened to?
16 A. Yes, it was.
17 Q. At the end you said:
18 "He came in and took over the command from Krstic. He was the
19 one to come in Srebrenica and it happened to him, what happened."
20 "... happened to him, what happened," were you referring to the
21 massacre of the men in Srebrenica?
22 A. It is stated explicitly here that I said "it happened to him."
23 So whatever fate befell him is -- was something of his own doing. He
24 ended up indicted.
25 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions.
1 Q. Thank you, General Milovanovic.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome.
3 We are already a bit late for the break.
4 Mr. Lukic, how much time would you need for further questions?
5 MR. LUKIC: I'll consult with my colleagues and the client. If
6 any, very short, very few.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because if it's a matter of one or two
8 minutes, we could consider to take those few minutes now. If it's more,
9 we should take the break --
10 MR. LUKIC: If I have to --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, please consult.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. LUKIC: We obviously are waiting for my response, only I do
15 not know what I have to respond to.
16 JUDGE ORIE: The question was how much time you would need, if
17 any at all.
18 MR. LUKIC: We will have to go through the re-direct
19 to [Overlapping speakers] ...
20 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... so you need the break to
21 find out.
22 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll take the break first.
24 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, could I simply tender the last exhibit,
1 JUDGE ORIE: The excerpt of the interview.
2 MR. GROOME: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just to clarify in that. At this
5 moment I don't have the audio.
6 JUDGE ORIE: You don't have the audio. Could we reserve a number
7 and already have the transcript under that number and MFI it until we
8 have the audio.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. Document 30269B receives
10 number P2250.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.
12 I asked to this, Mr. Groome, that where you earlier referred to
13 P2222, that is not yet admitted. It is marked for identification.
14 MR. GROOME: I stand corrected.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 Mr. Milovanovic, we take a break. You may follow the usher.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and resume at 12.30.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.31 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: We'll wait for the witness to be escorted into the
23 Mr. Lukic, could you give us any further indication.
24 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. It's zero seconds.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Zero seconds.
1 Then Mr. Groome.
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, with respect to 65 ter 30269B,
3 Ms. Stewart has provided the Registrar with a copy of the audio.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar had informed me about that. Which
5 means that the audio, now having been added - Mr. Lukic, I heard of no --
6 I think there were no objections - P2250 is therefore now admitted into
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, the Defence has just informed the
10 Chamber that there are no further questions for you, which means that
11 this -- your testimony is concluded. I'd like to thank you very much for
12 coming to The Hague and for answering all the questions that were put to
13 you by the parties and by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home
15 You're excused.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 JUDGE ORIE: While the next witness is to be prepared to be stand
20 by, I'd like to deliver a decision of the Chamber. It is a decision on
21 the Prosecution's motion to add Witness RM183 to the Prosecution's Rule
22 65 ter witness list.
23 On the 12th of July, 2013, the Prosecution filed a motion for
24 leave to add Witness RM183 to its Rule 65 ter list. The Prosecution
25 submits that the motion should be considered in light of its 20th of
1 June, 2013, notice of its intention to reduce the evidence it adduces in
2 support of its case. Given the decrease in total number of witnesses and
3 live witnesses resulting from the notice and the motion, the Prosecution
4 states that the Defence will require less preparation time and will not
5 be prejudiced such benefits constituting good cause to add the witness to
6 its Rule 65 ter witness list and demonstrating that the addition is in
7 the interests of justice.
8 On the 26th of July, the Defence filed its response objecting to
9 the motion in its entirety, based on the Prosecution not justifying its
10 late amendment to its Rule 65 ter witness list, its lack of showing good
11 cause, the proposed mode of testimony and the potential impact on the
12 fairness of the trial. The Chamber recalls and refers to the applicable
13 law concerning amendments to the Prosecution' Rule 65 ter witness list as
14 set out in its previous decision filed on the 22nd of August, 2013. At
15 the outset, the Chamber notes that the Defence's objections regarding the
16 mode of testimony through which Witness RM183 will eventually testify are
17 premature and misplaced. Instead, the proper forum for such arguments
18 would be in response to a motion tendering the evidence. Accordingly,
19 those parts of the response dealing with the proposed mode of testimony
20 will not be further considered in this decision.
21 The Chamber considers that the witness's evidence is prima facia
22 relevant and of probative value with regard to good cause the Chamber
23 considers that the Prosecution has not shown good cause to add the
24 witness to its Rule 65 ter witness list at this stage. However, the
25 Chamber finds that addition of the witness will result in a limited
1 additional burden for the Defence, in particular, given that the
2 witness's evidence deals with issues that have been raised with other
3 witnesses. In this respect, the Chamber has also considered that the
4 Prosecution proposes to tender the witness's evidence pursuant to
5 Rule 92 bis through a motion which is still to be filed. Should the
6 Defence require additional time to respond to such a motion, the Chamber
7 will consider such a request.
8 In light of the aforementioned, the Chamber finds that it's in
9 the interests of justice to allow the addition of Witness RM183 to the
10 Prosecution's 65 ter witness list, and this concludes the Chamber's
12 If the witness is ready he can be escorted into the courtroom.
13 Unless there are any preliminary -- any other matters to be raised before
14 we do that.
15 MS. HOCHHAUSER: No, Your Honour. In fact in speaking with
16 Mr. Stojanovic, we hope to conclude this witness's testimony today as
18 JUDGE ORIE: That ... .
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Soja. Before you give evidence,
21 the Rules require that you make a solemn declaration, the text of which
22 is now handed out to you.
23 May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon. I solemnly declare
25 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: MILOMIR SOJA
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated.
4 Mr. Soja, you'll first be examined by Ms. Hochhauser.
5 Ms. Hochhauser is counsel for the Prosecution. You find her to your
7 You may proceed, Ms. Hochhauser.
8 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Thank you.
9 Examination by Ms. Hochhauser:
10 Q. Good afternoon, Witness.
11 MS. HOCHHAUSER: And good afternoon to the Chamber.
12 Q. Can you please state your name.
13 A. My name is Milomir Soja.
14 Q. Mr. Soja, you gave a statement to the ICTY dated 24 July 2004,
15 and also testified in the trials of Dragomir Milosevic and
16 Radovan Karadzic; is that correct?
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 MS. HOCHHAUSER: If I could please have 65 ter 30264 on the
20 Q. And, Mr. Soja, when you're able to see something on the monitor
21 in front of you, can you tell us, please, is that the statement that you
22 gave to the ICTY in 2004?
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. And have you had the opportunity to review this statement?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. Can you confirm that it is both accurate and truthful?
2 A. I can.
3 Q. Have you also had the opportunity to listen to the audiotape of
4 your testimony from the Dragomir Milosevic case in your own language?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And can you confirm that that is also both accurate and truthful?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In regard to both the 2004 statement, that's now on the screen,
9 and your prior testimony from the Dragomir Milosevic case, can you tell
10 the Chamber whether, if asked the same questions today, you would
11 provide, in substance, the same information that you provided in that
12 statement and prior testimony?
13 A. Yes.
14 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours, with that, I tender 65 ter 30264
15 which is the statement as well as 30265, which is a selection of relevant
16 transcript from the Dragomir Milosevic case, along with one associated
17 exhibit which is a drawing prepared by Mr. Soja which has the
18 65 ter number 28333.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, no objections.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objections, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: First the 2004 statement.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Document 30264 receives number P2251.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and with the testimony.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Document 30265 receives number P2252.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And one associated exhibit.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28333 receives number P2253,
2 Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: P2251, P2252, and P2253 are admitted into evidence.
4 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honour, if I might proceed to a brief
5 summary of the witness's evidence for the public.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so and I take it that you have explained
7 to the witness what the purpose of it is.
8 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Yes. He is aware.
9 The witness is an electrical engineer. Before the outbreak of
10 the war, he was employed by Energoinvest in its power electronics
11 department. He was mobilised at the outbreak of the war in 1992. And
12 after his release from the armed forces in December of 1994, he took up
13 his work obligation in the company Energoinvest Automatika in Ilidza.
14 In the spring of 1995, Mr. Soja and one of his colleagues were
15 asked to go to the Pretis ammunition factory in Vogosca, Sarajevo,
16 regarding the modification of the ignition system for an air-bomb
17 launcher. They were accompanied by an officer from the Ilidza Brigade of
18 the VRS.
19 At Pretis, Mr. Soja met Major Krsmanovic, an officer of the
20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Krsmanovic told the witness that at that time
21 that in addition to the launcher of the Ilidza Brigade, there were two
22 functional air-bomb launchers, one in Vogosca and the other in Ilijas.
23 Mr. Soja subsequently learned that the SRK also had an air-bomb launcher
24 in Blazuj. And in case I've mispronounced that it's B-l-a-z-u-j.
25 Mr Soja reports that Major Krsmanovic was opposed to the
1 electronic modification of the launchers since this would have rendered
2 the equipment less reliable. However, the witness was asked to perform
3 modifications using electronic components as the Ilidza Brigade intended
4 to use this new system on their air-bomb launcher.
5 Twice the witness attended to malfunctioning modified air-bomb
6 launchers out in the field. On the second occasion in the summer of
7 1995, the witness was requested to attend the launching of an air-bomb,
8 targeting the cold storage plant in Stup from a launcher positioned close
9 to the witness's workplace. The first attempted launch failed. That
10 same evening, the witness observed the launch of the air-bomb from a
11 distance of about 150 metres. The air-bomb did not reach the cold
12 storage plant but exploded prematurely on the territory under the control
13 of the VRS.
14 During the relevant time, Mr. Soja heard the launching and
15 detonation of air-bombs about five to six times. And his evidence states
16 that there is a characteristic sound connecting with their launching and
18 Your Honours, that concludes my summary. I have two very brief
19 areas of questioning.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
21 MS. HOCHHAUSER: If I could please have 65 ter 09119 on the
23 Q. And as its coming up, I'll ask you, Mr. Soja, in your prior
24 testimony of what is now exhibit number P2252, beginning at the bottom of
25 e-court page 8 and into e-court page 9, you discuss how you learned of
1 the existence of modified air-bomb launchers in positions in Vogosca,
2 Ilijas, Ilidza and Blazuj. Can you tell us, looking at 09119, which is
3 now on the screen, and discusses the issuance of aerial bombs from the
4 Pretis factories. Do the brigades and commands listed therein comport
5 with your knowledge of the positions of modified air-bomb launchers in
6 and around Sarajevo?
7 A. The Ilidza Brigade, that figure tallies. With the Ilijas Brigade
8 it has to do with Blazuj. With the Igman Brigade the number is fine.
9 Although items 2 and 3 is something I'm not exactly aware of, I don't
10 know what it pertains to, so items 2 and 3 I'm not certain which brigades
11 those are.
12 Q. But items 1, 4, and 5 are consistent with the locations you
13 discuss in your statement?
14 A. Yes, based on what I could hear from the people I came in contact
15 with concerning the launchers.
16 Q. And just to be clear, the Igman Brigade covers the Blazuj
17 launcher that you were -- that you talked about; is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours I would tender 65 ter 09119, at
20 this point.
21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Document 09119 receives number P2254,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
1 MS. HOCHHAUSER: If I could please have 65 ter 03826 on the
3 Q. And, sir, as it's coming up, I'll ask you, you are familiar with
4 the mechanical elements of the modified air-bomb and launcher production.
5 Can you tell us about the materials listed here. Were these typical of
6 those used in the production of the launchers that you saw?
7 A. The materiel on the left were the mechanical components that
8 could be used for a launcher.
9 The list on the right-hand side has to do with the electrical
11 Q. And the electrical components, are those also consistent with
12 what you knew of the launchers that you saw?
13 A. The launcher I saw had a completely different type of electronics
14 of its ignition system than shown here. But such elements as the cables
15 and starter, all those could be used to devise electrical ignition of the
16 launcher which used aerial bombs.
17 Q. And to be -- the devising the electrical components of the
18 launcher is in fact the task that you were asked to work on in that
19 time-period; is that right?
20 A. In the factory I worked, where I was under work obligation, we
21 had a different solution to this. We used different electrical --
22 electronic components. In principle, it may well be the same but we went
23 about it another way. These are classical standard electrical components
24 whereas we relied on electronics more.
25 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honours, I would tender 03826 into
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Document 03826 receives number P2255,
4 Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
6 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Okay. I have no further questions, Your Honour.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the
10 Mr. Soja, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Stojanovic.
11 Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.
14 A. Good afternoon.
15 Q. I will try to conclude my examination by the end of the day
16 today, and let us try to be as focussed as possible.
17 Can we have Exhibit P2251 in e-court. Page 2 in the B/C/S and in
18 the English version of the witness's statement.
19 Let us focus on the last paragraph of item 2. My question has to
20 do with clarifying something in this part of your statement. You say
21 that while you served your military term with the JNA in Slovenia, in
22 Ribnica, you were trained to operate a multiple rocket-launcher. Please
23 tell us what kind of training it was and what kind of skills and
24 knowledge did you acquire in terms of this weapon's precision and use,
25 since you were trained as marksman?
1 A. In Ribnica, I was assigned to the unit of multi-rocket-launchers,
2 the so-called VBRs. I was there on secondment from the sabotage unit. I
3 was trained as a gunner of the 120-millimetre rocket-launcher. It was a
4 standard asset that JNA units had.
5 I cannot recall any specific details which had to do with the
6 weapon's precision, but the weapon did have its standard characteristics
7 such as range, sights, procedures, and everything else that was
8 prescribed for such standard assets. It also had appropriate precision.
9 I can't say that at distances of 5 kilometres, it could hit a target with
10 an error of minus or plus 5 metres. That's something I can't say any
11 longer. But we underwent the kind of training as planned and envisaged
12 within the units of the JNA.
13 Q. Thank you. I am waiting for the transcript - do not hold it
14 against me - so that we have everything in the transcript.
15 In the same document, let us look at page 3, the last
16 paragraph in the B/C/S. In the English version, it is also page 3,
17 item 4, paragraph 4.
18 You say that sometime in the spring of 1995, from Risto Ceranic,
19 your company's manager, you were notified that some work had to be done
20 on an aerial bomb launcher that was to be produced at Ilidza for the
21 needs of the Ilidza Brigade and you make reference to the Pretis factory.
22 Let me ask you this first: Can you provide us with any more
23 detail in terms of when it happened in the spring of 1995?
24 A. I really can't recall anything precisely when it was that spring.
25 Let's say in early spring. I really can't recall the date.
1 Q. I'm asking you this because of one incident in our indictment.
2 Was it before May 1995?
3 A. It is possible that it was before May. I think it was before
5 Q. You mention the Pretis factory. Let me ask you this: In terms
6 of your knowledge about the Pretis factory, do you know that even before
7 the war it was one of the largest factories for special-purpose
8 production in the former SFRY. It was a factory where the rocket
9 projectiles for the Orkan-type multiple rocket-launcher was produced and
10 also FAB-100 and -250 aerial booms were produced there?
11 A. The Pretis was a well-known factory in the former Yugoslavia. It
12 was a large one. It was best known as a car factory. It was also
13 well-known that all large factories in the former Yugoslavia had at least
14 a department each tasked with special-purpose production for the needs of
15 the JNA. To tell you the truth, I didn't know what the Pretis was
16 included in. What I did know was that they produced larger-calibre
17 ammunition, shells, in principle, rather than standard ammunition.
18 But I can't be any more specific than that. I don't know which
19 shells precisely they produced or whether they produced the aerial bombs
20 of this kind.
21 It is possible, because they did produce larger-calibre shells,
22 at least according to what I could hear.
23 Q. According to your statement, you were received - you and your
24 work-mate - by someone by the last name of Krsmanovic. And you referred
25 to it on page 4 in both versions of your statement. Apparently it was
1 your impression that he was the most senior in terms of rank of the
2 people involved in the project concerning aerial bombs.
3 Let me ask you this: Can you tell us anything in more detail, if
4 you have any knowledge, as to who Mr. Krsmanovic is?
5 A. I saw Mr. Krsmanovic twice in my life. The first time was when
6 we came to see what kind of requests they had in order to create our
7 variant of electrical launching system of aerial bombs. The second time
8 was when I attended a failed bomb launch which was supposed to target the
9 cold storage facility at Stup. As far as I recall, he had the rank of
10 major, and I have no other information about him. There was no one to
11 ask, and I didn't hear any such information. I simply have no other
12 information, save for what I stated.
13 Q. I'm asking you this because I'm interested in the following: In
14 any testimony thus far, were there any indications in your statement
15 which would show that it was an officer of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
16 A. Based on my impression and based on what I could see, I concluded
17 that he was an active-duty officer. I simply had no other knowledge,
18 either back then or now.
19 Now, whether he was an active officer with the SRK or whether he
20 had come from Yugoslavia to perform some specific tasks, that's something
21 I don't know. I think he was an active-duty officer.
22 Q. At which point did you see the launcher in real life, as well as
23 a modified aerial bomb?
24 A. I saw the launcher for the first time in the Energoinvest
25 factory, where the mechanical segment of the launcher was being
1 manufactured at the same time as the electronic part that we were
3 I must say that I had no idea that in this factory, Energoinvest,
4 which was an adjacent facility, something of the sort was being produced.
5 That was when I saw the launcher for the first time.
6 As for the modified aerial bomb, I saw it probably when I went
7 out for an intervention, and I was also able to see it when this failed
8 launching of the bomb took place aimed at the cold storage place in Stup.
9 Q. Do you know who was charged with designing and manufacturing the
10 launcher that you were referring to in Energoinvest?
11 A. I don't know who the constructor of the mechanical segment of the
12 launcher was. What I do know is that it was finally made in a factory
13 called Tat [phoen], which is a well-known factory.
14 Q. At that time was the launcher already on a mobile platform or was
15 it still on the plant floor, as it were?
16 A. The launcher was mounted on a -- a truck that was parked in the
17 factory. That was when I saw it for the first time.
18 Q. Can you help us with the technical components of it? The aerial
19 bomb would have rocket motors fitted on it, right, and they would be the
20 ones who would set the bomb in motion.
21 Is my reasoning correct?
22 A. If you mean to say that the rocket motors are fitted onto the
23 rear body of an aerial bomb, then you're right. Onto the rear of the
24 body of an aerial bomb.
25 Q. Can you tell us this: Where exactly were these rocket motors
1 fitted onto the rear part of the aerial bomb?
2 A. The aerial bomb that I saw on this particular occasion already
3 had rocket motors or engines fitted on to it. Where this was done, I
4 don't know, but quite possibly it could have taken place in the Pretis
5 factory. They were quite capable of doing this sort of job.
6 The area where I was at the time, well, it brings to mind Pretis,
7 as the most plausible candidate for such a job in this area that was
8 under the control of the Bosnian Serbs.
9 Q. Will you agree with me that in order for such a projectile to be
10 manufactured a multi-disciplinary approach was required. There had to be
11 electrical engineers, people versed in mechanical engineer, et cetera, in
12 order to come up with such a type of projectile?
13 A. Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, could I briefly take you back to one
15 of your previous questions.
16 You asked where exactly were these rocket motors fitted onto the
17 rear part of the aerial bomb?
18 I understood that, but I may be wrong, that you asked where
19 exactly those motors would be attached to the bomb, or is that
21 Yes, because the witness did not answer that question. The
22 witness did answer another question. That is, in what factory, in what
23 work-shop, et cetera, was this done, and that's, of course, a totally
24 different question from the one which I understood you to ask the
1 I just put it on the record. If you are satisfied with the other
2 answer, not to your question, then please proceed, if you want to receive
3 the answer please put the question again.
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe I
5 received an answer to my question. Since I -- my -- my -- my question --
6 the initial question was whether it was the rear part of the bomb where
7 the rocket engines were fitted, and I got an answer to that question
8 already at that point.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I think the witness told us that it was fitted on
10 the rear part. And then, I think, you then asked him where exactly
11 they -- on the rear part they were fitted.
12 Now, if you are satisfied with the answer that it was on the rear
13 part, then there was no need to put the question, because I think the
14 witness had answered that already.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. If you'll allow me to, I
16 will eliminate this ambiguity from the transcript.
17 Q. Witness, you heard this. Can you tell us which part of the body
18 of the aerial bomb were the rocket engines fitted onto?
19 A. The rocket engines were attached to the posterior part, or the
20 rear part, of the bomb.
21 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you this: If my understanding is
22 correct, there were two occasions when you were in person able to see
23 these modified air-bombs.
24 A. Yes, two times.
25 Q. Were you, on both of these occasions, able to see how many rocket
1 engines were attached to the rear part of the air-bomb?
2 A. There were three rocket engines.
3 Q. I'm asking you this because of a document I'll use later. Did
4 you, at any point, hear, if not see, that there were modified aerial
5 bombs with four rocket engines?
6 A. I heard that there were bombs with a single rocket engine. Were
7 there ones with more? Well, I'm sure there were.
8 Q. Thank you. And now let me ask you this in a technical sense.
9 The design and the part of job as you, as an engineer, had to allow for
10 the ignition of which engine or engines?
11 A. Well, we first had to make it possible for the fuse of the bomb
12 to be armed, and then for the ignition of the engine -- engines. So the
13 segment we were working on covered both these issues. First, we had to
14 make sure that the fuse would be armed; and then electricity had to reach
15 certain points of the rocket engine, from which the rocket engines would
16 be ignited.
17 Q. Technically speaking, did it also imply the ignition of all the
18 three rocket engines attached to the rear part of the aerial bomb at the
19 same time?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. These rockets, anti-hail rockets, that were supposed to counter
22 hail storms and that were supposed to get ignited all at once, where were
23 they obtained from?
24 A. In conversation with Major Krsmanovic, whom we mentioned earlier,
25 I heard that what was being used as rocket engines to ignite these aerial
1 bombs were -- that it was actually rocket engines used as anti-hail
2 rockets. And I heard that this came from Serbia. I don't know if there
3 was a plant in Bosnia-Herzegovina that produced such rocket engines.
4 Perhaps there was one, but I didn't hear of it.
5 Q. Thank you. And would you agree with me that at least in these
6 two cases that you yourself witnessed, these were ordinary anti-hail
7 rockets, original anti-hail rockets of the Grad type?
8 A. I was told that these were anti-hail rockets but I wasn't able
9 to -- or anti-grad rockets, but I did not see them and I did not hear of
10 anyone producing makeshift rocket engines so it had to be a standard
11 industry product.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that it may involve the
13 Grad rocket type, called G-r-a-d, which also means hail incidentally in
14 B/C/S. We're not sure.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you. Based on your training and experience such a rocket
17 engine industrially produced would have had to go through the usual
18 process of testing before it -- it is sent out onto the market?
19 A. At any rate, the rocket engines, including the ones used to
20 counter hail storms, had to go through certain testing before being put
21 to use. Anti-hail rockets are used in civilian situations. What I mean
22 to say is that the civilians would be the ones operating them so they had
23 to be standard engines and rockets used in countering hail storms
24 nowadays. At any rate, I think it's the same system that is being used.
25 Q. Thank you. Let me just remind you of this. I'd rather that we
1 not go into the document again. You were shown a document detailing
2 electronic parts that were used by the manufacturer, and you said that
3 this wasn't something that you normally used in your line of work.
4 My question is this: Would such electrical parts be in the
5 function of -- or in the service of igniting an engine of the anti-hail
6 rockets, just as these engines were fitted onto the bombs that you were
7 able to see?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If I understand you correctly, the principle and the objective
10 are the same, but the road taken to reach that objective was different
11 from the technical standards that you applied and the people who were
12 requesting the supply of that material there.
13 A. Yes. Those were classical electrical components. Whereas, we
14 used electronic components. But the principle is the same.
15 Q. Another technical question before we move onto documents. We
16 were also told that such an anti-hail rocket engine would be able to lift
17 the weight of a FAB-100. So I'd like to ask you this: Based on your
18 expertise, can confirm for us that such an engine would be able to lift
19 and set in motion such a bomb weighing 100 kilograms?
20 A. I don't have any specific knowledge of the characteristics of
21 these engines, but I did hear that the smaller bombs only had a single
22 engine. I did say that previously, that this was something I heard.
23 I have no knowledge, but I suppose that it's possible. If three
24 engines can lift a bomb that is two and a half times heavier then I'm
25 sure a single one would be able to lift a lighter bomb, a bomb as light
1 as this one.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps we should
4 now take the break if we plan to work until 2.15, and I do believe that
5 we will complete the examination of the witness today.
6 JUDGE ORIE: How much time would you still need, Mr. Stojanovic?
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I have four documents left and
8 three photographs. No more than 20 minutes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: That would then leave at least ten more minutes for
10 either re-examination or questions from the Bench.
11 We take the break, and we first ask the usher to escort the
12 witness out of the courtroom. We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE ORIE: And we will resume at a quarter to 2.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 1.24 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you may proceed.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Could we please -- oh, we already have it in e-court. So I don't
22 need to call up another document. P2251, page 4 B/C/S and English.
23 Q. And could you please help us with this, sir, and could you
24 explain an answer that you provided here. You say:
25 "During the summer of 1995," Your Honours, I am reading chapter
1 5, the third paragraph, "I heard a number of times a characteristic sound
2 of the air-bombs flying in the area. For the first time when I was at
3 home in Osijek, next time when I was in Stup. I also heard this sound
4 later but cannot remember where I was then."
5 Can you tell us, to the best of your recollection, how many times
6 did you have the opportunity of hearing this characteristic sound?
7 A. I cannot say exactly how many times I cannot be precise, but
8 five, six, or about ten times. I really don't know.
9 Q. Can you tell us when this was, which time-period, which year?
10 When did that happen?
11 A. That was roughly the beginning of the summer, when that last
12 fierce fighting took place around Sarajevo. Roughly in that period.
13 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you. The sound that you heard, does
14 that correspond to the time of intensive combat activity during the
15 summer of 1995?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And now please take a look at the next paragraph of your
18 statement. You say:
19 "I do not know if air-bombs were used against civilian objects."
20 Now I'm going to ask you whether, at any point in time, you had
21 any knowledge as to the objectives or, rather, the targets at which these
22 projectiles were fired?
23 A. As I've already said, I heard this characteristic sound several
24 times. It had to do with the flight of an air-bomb. However, I know
25 directly of this one case, when I was present during this failed attempt
1 to fire, and later on I was relatively nearby in Energoinvest when the
2 bomb was launched towards the cold storage plant. And then there's this
3 other case that everybody knows of, I think it was it was even the media,
4 that one of these bombs hit the building of radio television. As for
5 these other targets, I'm really not aware of the specific ones involved
6 or, rather, the places where the bombs fell.
7 Q. [No interpretation]
8 JUDGE ORIE: We are not receiving interpretation.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English now?
10 JUDGE ORIE: [Microphone not activated] we can.
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I shall repeat my question.
12 Q. Sir, in view of your military involvement throughout these years
13 of the war, can you tell us, can you -- or can you confirm for us whether
14 the facility of the Simis factory, the cold storage plant, was the place
15 from where the artillery of Bosnia-Herzegovina fired at the positions of
16 the Army of Republika Srpska?
17 A. That plant was certainly used by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
18 However, what kind of weapons and artillery pieces were used for activity
19 from there, I cannot confirm that. It is possible that there were
20 artillery pieces there too, but it is certain that very often there was
21 firing against -- against Ilidza and this other location where I spent
22 the last year of the war in my work obligation.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] And I would like to ask for P3.
25 In e-court, that is page 39.
1 Q. I would just like to ask you to help us with this, because I
2 assume that you are familiar with the terrain?
3 This is a photograph that you had see a bit later. It is one of
4 the three incidents from the indictment in this case, and it has to do
5 with something that, according to the indictment happened on the
6 26th of May, 1995.
7 Now this is what I'm asking you: In view of your place of
8 residence, can you recognise this part of Sarajevo?
9 A. I think that it is the neighbourhood opposite the radio
10 television and close to the bus depot of the Sarajevo Bus Company.
11 Q. Will you agree with me that the facility to the left of this
12 apartment building marked with a red circle, so this place with a red
13 roof, is that the police station in that part of Sarajevo?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Also, in view of the fact that you possibly are familiar with
16 this area, could you give us an estimate as to how far away this red
17 circle is from the mentioned police station?
18 A. Well, I cannot say exactly. Approximately it may be, say, about
19 100 metres. I really don't know.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: General guidance to the parties, distance are be to
22 be measured rather than to be estimated.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Together with the Prosecution, we are going to do that, as we did in two
1 other situations. May I just clarify this with the witness, the place
2 where the modified air-bomb fell.
3 Q. Can you give us an estimate as to how far away the building of
4 Radio TV Sarajevo is from the place where this projectile fell?
5 A. Well, it's roughly a couple of hundred metres.
6 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to ask that we look at P3, again,
7 together. So it is P3. In e-court, it would be page 40.
8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask the witness --
10 Do you know where the projectile fell, or is it on the basis of
11 the red circle that you gave your estimate?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the basis of the red circle.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, Mr. Stojanovic, only the red circle
14 covers at least 20, 30, if not more, metres. So, therefore, it doesn't
15 really help.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with all due
18 respect, this red circle is an agreed location on the basis of the
19 testimony of other witnesses and we have the exact location of where the
20 projectile fell. There is a document and the exact address of the place
21 where the projectile fell. So, I believe, that there is going to be no
22 dispute between us and the Prosecution with regard to that.
23 JUDGE ORIE: The only thing I said is that the red circle, I take
24 it, then, that the -- it's an agreed place where the projectile fell.
25 But the projectile does not -- is not 40 metres long but is 1 or 2, or 3
1 metres. And, therefore, there is an inherent inaccuracy already by using
2 a red circle rather than a very specific point to start your measurement.
3 But let's proceed. Please proceed.
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Q. Sir, could I now ask you, please, to take a look at this
6 photograph as well.
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is incident --
8 it is the incident that occurred on the 16th of June, 1995, and the
9 location is the square of international friendship and that's the
10 indictment reference.
11 Q. Sir, do you know this part of Sarajevo?
12 A. Well, not in great detail but I know a bit, like any other part
13 of Sarajevo. I cannot say.
14 Q. I would be interested in the facility across this road that goes
15 to Ilidza. The road is popularly known as Bitumenka. Do you see it in
16 this photograph?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. My question is as follows: How far away was Bitumenka from the
19 approximate location where the projectile fell, from this red circle?
20 A. Well, it's about 100 metres, or maybe a bit more,
21 100, 200 metres, roughly.
22 Q. Thank you. At any point in time, during the years of the war,
23 did you know whether the area known as Bitumenka was also used for the
24 needs of the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. I did not know about the use of these areas, and let me not
1 engage in guess-work. Now I do have an opinion of my own, but, no, I
2 don't know.
3 Q. During your involvement, did you have any direct or indirect
4 knowledge of such a modified weapon being tested?
5 A. I heard from Mr. Krsmanovic that they tested one launcher on the
6 hill of Zuc and that they had some problems then with these cables for
7 firing, and probably that's why he mentioned that testing to me.
8 Q. Did you have any knowledge as to whether the
9 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the summer of 1995, had the human
10 resources and technical resources -- in view of all the persons that you
11 had from before the war did they have the resources to make such a
13 A. From the point of view of technical and human remain resources, I
14 think they were certainly capable of making something like this.
15 Q. I'm going to conclude with the following question: In view of
16 your training in the JNA and your professional education and training,
17 can you tell us anything about the precision of such a weapon?
18 A. I really have no information about its precision. What I do know
19 for sure is that, on that launcher, there were some elements for
20 targeting. That is to say, taking a particular position in terms of
21 height and direction. So it was used for sighting. Now how close these
22 bombs fell in respect of the desired target, that is something that I
23 don't know about.
24 Q. Did you see who it was that used these sighting devices on the
25 mentioned launchers in those two cases when you were nearby? Were these
2 A. The first time I was there, no one used it because we came there
3 to repair a technical thing that went wrong.
4 Second time I'm not sure. Possibly the bomb had already mounted
5 on the launcher before it was in this position. But, at any rate, there
6 was an appropriate team there that was in charge of this launcher. And
7 they handled it. I, myself, do not remember seeing a man handling that
8 part of the mechanism. I really have no such recollection.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. I'm going finish with the following question.
10 Did you have any information, at any point in time, that the
11 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was in any way involved in
12 setting targets for the use of this modified weapon?
13 A. I have no knowledge about that. I personally do not.
14 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions for you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Before I give you an opportunity to put further
16 questions, I would have a few questions for the witness.
17 Questioned by the Court:
18 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, could you explain to us what the whole
19 purpose of this exercise with these modified air-bombs was? Was it the
20 huge explosive power in the body of the bomb, or was it a lack of other
21 ammunition? Or was it -- why did they use such a rather complicated way
22 of non-standardized production of projectiles?
23 What was the purpose of it, instead of using the standard rockets
24 through a standard rocket-launcher, or using other projectiles? If you
1 A. This is my opinion in that regard.
2 It is a fact that the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska at
3 this point in time in the war were very poorly supplied with ammunition.
4 That could have been one of the reasons.
5 Now, the second possible reason - these are just my assumptions,
6 that's what I'm telling you about now - is -- well, you said it was
7 complicated. But, actually, it was a very simple way of hitting a target
8 with an air-bomb, much simpler than doing it from an aircraft because you
9 need an aircraft and specialised pilots, and so on and so forth, so this
10 was a simple way of firing an air-bomb that, at any rate, was more
11 destructive than standard shells. I assume that all of this led to the
12 motivation for constructing this kind of weaponry.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that it's more easy, perhaps,
14 to fire it from the ground than to drop it from an aeroplane. But if you
15 say they're more destructive than standard shells, that is, that it would
16 cause more damage upon impact?
17 A. Certainly.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Now, the one time you observed that a modified
19 air-bomb was fired at the Simis cold storage facility, you said it landed
20 in VRS-controlled territory.
21 How far was that approximately from where the target was, the
22 target being the Simis cold storage?
23 A. According to my knowledge, the bomb did not fall and detonate,
24 but, rather, exploded in mid air. The device that I was working and was
25 actually put out of commission. It was no longer used in the development
1 of the asset due to that failure and I have no further contact with the
2 crew of that launcher. I never received any official information as to
3 what had happened.
4 As far as I know, as far as I heard, the bomb exploded in the
5 air. It had not fallen. It exploded in mid air before reaching the cold
6 storage facility. It never reached the target and for some reason
7 detonated in mid air.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now you told us that sometimes three
9 propelling rockets were mounted on the modified air-bombs, sometimes
10 more, sometimes one. You were specifically involved in the ignition
11 mechanisms. Could you tell us whether the precision of the
12 simultaneously igniting several propelling rockets mounted to such an
13 aerial bomb, whether that would have any possible impact on the accuracy
14 of the ballistics to be expected? That is, the trajectory you would
15 expect the bomb to fly.
16 A. Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would it be -- would the ballistic characteristics,
18 due to these technical issues, be better or worse than, I would say,
19 normal projectiles, such as mortars or other standard produced
21 A. In any case, there was a problem to deal with, which was the
22 simultaneously ignition of the rockets. If that problem is solved
23 appropriately and adequately, then, in principle, the asset would be on a
24 par, at the same level as the other artillery assets.
25 As far as I know, with mortars too you have additional charges
1 depending on the weight of the gun powder. It is that that determines
2 the place where the shell will land. Any artillery weapon, in principle
3 has potential difficulties with the system providing initial acceleration
4 to the shell.
5 In this case, specifically, it had to do with the simultaneous
6 ignition of the rocket engines.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Was that problem resolved so that it really
8 would -- that they would ignite all exactly at the same moment?
9 A. As regards the solution I attempted to reach, we used ultra quick
10 electronic starters to ignite the engines. As for standard solution,
11 according to the material I saw a moment ago, and according to my
12 knowledge, they relied on very simple solutions using simple starters,
13 simple switches. All engines were connected to a single starter. Once
14 contact is established, separate wiring is used to lead electrical
15 impulses to all the engines at the same time.
16 I don't think it amounted to a specific technical problem. The
17 length of wiring was the same from the starter to the ignition mechanism,
18 voltage is released simultaneously through the entire wiring system, and
19 the rest was up to the characteristics of the specific engines, in terms
20 whether they would, indeed, ignite at the same time or not.
21 JUDGE ORIE: If ignition would not be exactly at the same moment,
22 could that influence the trajectory by creating a disbalanced propelling
24 A. I have no experience and no knowledge so as to be able to speak
25 about any time delays in the ignition of engines.
1 Of course, the greatest problem would be if one or several
2 engines failed to ignite completely. That could be a problem. However,
3 I simply have no knowledge. If you bring the voltage simultaneously to
4 the entire circuit, well, then I can't really say what sort of delay we
5 could have in the different times of ignition in specific engines.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Last question: Did I understand you well that
7 you have no knowledge about the ballistic characteristics of these
8 modified air-bombs with the propelling rockets mounted to them?
9 A. If you have in mind precision and range, then, indeed, I have no
10 knowledge as to that, in terms of this weapon.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, I have no further questions.
12 Ms. Hochhauser.
13 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Just one.
14 Re-examination by Ms. Hochhauser:
15 Q. At page 77, line 23, in response to one of the Judge's questions
16 just now, you -- regarding the simultaneous ignition and finding a
17 solution, you said "as regards to the solution that I attempted to
18 reach," and I just want to be clear, the solution that you attempted was
19 never -- was never successful ; is that right?
20 A. There may have been a misinterpretation. We did reach a
21 solution, as for the problems in that solution had nothing do with the
22 launching of the rocket. To put it expertly a comparator device was too
23 sensitive which was involved in the process of arming the bomb and thus
24 disabled the launch. The bomb was not launched in the first place. In
25 order to perform a launch, as I mentioned at the beginning of my
1 testimony, one needed to arm the fuse. If that failed the electronic
2 system would not allow ignition. Such problems amounted to a failed
3 launch such as the case when I was present. But I did come up with a
5 Q. But, I guess, what I'm trying to ask is: Other than the failed
6 launch that you witnessed, you're not aware -- are you aware of whether
7 your solution was ever successfully utilised?
8 A. The launcher, with my solution, definitely fired air-bombs with
9 my device. It is just that such problems occurred too often, resulting
10 in a disability to launch, and that is why the solution, as envisaged by
11 me, was ultimately terminated.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And I do understand that you then returned to a
13 rather simple electric system compared to a more complex electronic
14 system you had -- you had drafted, you had ...
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The crew of the launcher, on
16 the day of the failed launch, came to see us at the factory, and we
17 produced appropriate cabling so that they could do it in the standard way
18 with a switch and a battery, as I have explained a moment ago.
19 MS. HOCHHAUSER: I have no further questions.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, no further questions.
21 This, then, concludes your testimony, Mr. Soja. I would like to
22 thank you very much for coming a long way to The Hague and for having
23 answered all the questions that were put to you by the parties and by the
24 Bench and I wish you a safe return home again. You are excused. You may
25 follow the usher.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 MS. HOCHHAUSER: Your Honour, if I may.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MS. HOCHHAUSER: There is just one issue, and I can raise it more
6 properly on Monday, if we're in a hurry to get out, about the adjudicated
7 fact that was redacted on page 4, an unredaction of that.
8 JUDGE ORIE: If would you not mind we would do that on Monday,
9 because we have taken already -- we've stolen already, six -- six or
10 seven minutes from those who are assisting us.
11 We adjourn until Monday, the 23rd of September, at 9.30 in the
12 morning, in this same courtroom, I.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.23 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of
15 September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.