1 Friday, 25 October 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 I do understand that there are a few preliminary matters to be
12 raised. The Prosecution has asked to be able to address in five minutes
13 an issue in relation to P1060.
14 Mr. Traldi.
15 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning. I request
16 that we go into private session.
17 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
18 [Private session]
11 Pages 18294-18298 redacted. Private session.
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
15 I'd like to briefly deal with two scheduling. On the
16 22nd of October of this year, the Appeals Chamber reversed the
17 Trial Chamber's decision on the sitting schedule, directing it,
18 inter alia, to sit four days a week until the end of the Prosecution's
19 case. The Chamber informed the parties on the 23rd of October, 2013,
20 about the dates it was inclined not to sit, and the Chamber would like to
21 know whether this meets any objections by the parties?
22 MS. BIBLES: No objection from the Prosecution, Your Honours.
23 MR. LUKIC: No objections from the Defence.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then the Chamber hereby decides not to sit on the
25 following days: The 30th of October, the 6th of November, the
1 15th of November, the 20th of November, and November 29.
2 The Prosecution is requested to inform the Defence and the
3 Chamber of its revised witness schedule by the end of the day. When
4 compiling the revised witness schedule, the Prosecution should also take
5 into account that a large amount of documents to be used with
6 Witness Tabeau, which are subject of the Prosecution's 11th motion to add
7 documents to its Rule 65 ter exhibit list, still do not appear to have
8 English translations available in e-court. This was communicated through
9 informal correspondence. The Prosecution cannot be granted leave to add
10 documents which are not available in an official language of the
11 Tribunal. Witness Tabeau is currently scheduled to appear in the week of
12 the 4th of November, 2013.
13 I take it that this will be -- that this issue will receive
14 proper attention from the Prosecution?
15 MS. BIBLES: It is, Your Honour. And I -- I can advise the Court
16 that we have extensive resources divested to doing nothing but uploading
17 those translations as they come in. It is a huge task. But we will be
18 addressing the issue with the scheduling as well, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that information.
20 Then no further preliminaries, therefore could the witness be
21 escorted into the courtroom. No protective measures, Mr. Jeremy?
22 MR. JEREMY: Good morning, Your Honours. That's correct, no
23 protective measures.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And the witness would be Jonathon Riley?
25 MR. JEREMY: Correct.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And could the witness be escorted into the
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning.
6 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Riley. Before you give evidence,
8 the Rules require that you make a solemn declaration. The text is now
9 handed out to you. May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.
10 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
11 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
12 WITNESS: JONATHON RILEY
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Riley. Please be seated.
14 Mr. Riley, you'll first be examined by Mr. Jeremy. Mr. Jeremy is
15 counsel for the Prosecution. You'll find him to your right.
16 Mr. Jeremy, you may proceed.
17 MR. JEREMY: Thank you, Your Honours.
18 Examination by Mr. Jeremy:
19 Q. Good morning, General Riley.
20 A. Good morning, Mr. Jeremy.
21 Q. Could you please state your full name for the record?
22 A. It's Jonathon Peter Riley.
23 Q. Do you recall providing a written statement to the Office of the
24 Prosecutor dated 15 April 1996?
25 A. I do.
1 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, could the court officer please bring
2 to our screens 65 ter 30421. This is a statement of this witness.
3 Q. Mr. Riley, once the document is on the screen before you, I'd ask
4 you to look at the bottom of the first page of the English version on the
5 right side of the screen. Do you see your signature there?
6 A. I do.
7 MR. JEREMY: Could we please go to the last page of the English
9 Q. Again, General Riley, do you recognise your signature there?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. Have you had an opportunity to read and review this statement in
12 preparation for your testimony here today?
13 A. I have.
14 Q. And I understand that you have two clarifications that you wish
15 to make to your statement.
16 MR. JEREMY: Could we first go to page 2 in each version.
17 Q. And focusing on paragraph 5, General Riley, I understand that you
18 wish to make a clarification to the third sentence there.
19 A. The -- yes, thank you. The paragraph states that the
20 Total Exclusion Zone of 3 kilometres outside of Gorazde applied to both
21 sides, that both sides were obliged to pull back their forces 3
22 kilometres and heavy weapons 20 kilometres. This requirement, in fact,
23 applied only to the Serb side, not to the Bosnian side.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. JEREMY: Could we go to e-court page 6 in the English and 7
1 in the B/C/S.
2 Q. And, General Riley, I understand you wish to make a clarification
3 to paragraph 30, and in particular to the fourth sentence there?
4 A. Yes, please. It says that on the 28th of August we received news
5 in the morning of the NATO air-strikes in Sarajevo. In fact, what we
6 received news of was that there had been shelling of Sarajevo market and
7 that this was likely to result in NATO air-strikes. The NATO air-strikes
8 had not at that point taken place.
9 Q. With these clarifications, do you affirm the truthfulness and
10 accuracy of this statement?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. And if you were today asked similar questions as you were asked
13 in the making of that statement, would you provide the same answers in
15 A. I would.
16 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I tender that statement as the next
17 Prosecution exhibit.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.
19 MR. LUKIC: No objections, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 30421 receives number P2543,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: P2543 is admitted into evidence.
24 MR. JEREMY:
25 Q. General Riley, you provided this statement in 1996. Now, I
1 understand you've been very professionally active since then, but for
2 now, could you inform the Chamber of the most senior position that you
3 have held in the army since then, please.
4 A. As deputy commanding general of all NATO forces in Afghanistan.
5 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I'd now like to read a short summary
6 of the witness's evidence, the purpose of which I've explained to the
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
9 MR. JEREMY: General Jonathon Riley commanded the 1st Battalion
10 of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers during their deployment to Gorazde from
11 February to August 1995 as part of UNPROFOR's peacekeeping mission.
12 Following NATO air-strikes on 25 and 26 May, the witness received
13 a radio message from the local commander, Radomir Furtula, saying that he
14 had been ordered by General Mladic that if NATO attacked the Serbs again,
15 he was to shell the BritBat camp as Britain was a NATO country. Two days
16 later, observation posts on the east and west banks of the Drina were
17 attacked by heavily armed Bosnian Serb soldiers and 33 of the witness's
18 battalion were taken hostage.
19 On the 28th of August, General Riley's battalion withdrew from
20 Gorazde, a withdrawal that was agreed at an earlier meeting between
21 General Smith, General Riley, and General Mladic.
22 That concludes the summary of the evidence, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. If you have any further questions for
24 the witness, you may proceed.
25 MR. JEREMY: Thank you.
1 Q. General Riley, in paragraph 14 of your written evidence, P2543,
2 e-court page 3 in English and 4 in the B/C/S, you state that, on May 26th
3 you were told by the local Bosnian Serb commander, through his
4 interpreter, that by the orders of General Mladic if any further NATO
5 air-strikes were to take place, your camp would be shelled. In
6 paragraphs 21 and 23, e-court page 5, you describe the circumstances in
7 which two days later, on the 28th of May, 1995, 33 of your battalion were
8 taken hostage by Bosnian Serb forces. Based on your observations at the
9 time, what did you consider to be the purpose of this hostage-taking?
10 A. I considered that it was a different tactic to achieve the same
11 end as the threat of shelling, which was to prevent further NATO
12 air-strikes against Serb forces.
13 Q. As battalion commander, following the subsequent release of the
14 33 of your men who were taken hostage, did you have an opportunity to
15 learn about their experiences while they were kept hostage?
16 A. I did. I met them all at Bugojno in Central Bosnia, where they
17 had been sent for further duty, and there I had the opportunity to read
18 their depositions and to speak to many of them, particularly officer and
19 the non-commissioned officers.
20 Q. And during these conversations, were you able to gain an
21 understanding of the locations where the 33 of these men were held?
22 A. I did -- I was. It seemed to me that they had been initially
23 kept together in two groups and that they had then been taken in
24 vehicles. Those that were taken on the west bank seem to have been taken
25 north; those that were taken on the east bank seemed to have been taken
1 south. And the officer and NCO in charge of both groups tried to pair
2 the soldiers up, a young soldier with an older soldier, in the event that
3 they were separated as a group. They were dropped off, according to
4 their own account, at a number of locations, the total spread of which
5 from north to south appeared to me to be about 200 kilometres all
7 Q. On the basis of that answer, I'd like to show you an exhibit.
8 MR. JEREMY: Could the court officer please bring to our screens
9 65 ter 19790. This is a demonstrative map showing the locations of where
10 the 33 members of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers were held captive.
11 Q. General Riley, do you recognise the annotated map on the screen
12 before you; and if so, can you explain to the Court what this is, and in
13 particular, what the solid black dots on this map represent?
14 A. Yes. This is a map of Eastern Bosnia. It shows the boundaries
15 of three VRS corps, and it shows the locations at which the hostages
16 reported that they had been dropped. The most furthest -- the most
17 southerly location was the group that had been taken on the eastern bank,
18 Bileca; and the northern group, from Visegrad through Rogatica and
19 northwards up as far as Zvornik, were those taken on the west bank.
20 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, on the basis of that answer, I tender
21 this exhibit as the next Prosecution exhibit.
22 MR. LUKIC: No objections.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Document 19790 receives number P2544,
25 Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
2 MR. JEREMY:
3 Q. General Riley, you've already mentioned the name of one of your
4 men who were taken -- who was taken hostage, Lieutenant Nightingale. Was
5 a Lance Corporal Cornish also one of your men who was taken hostage?
6 A. Lance Corporal Michael Cornish, yes.
7 MR. JEREMY: And, Your Honours, I would note for the record the
8 witness statements of Lieutenant Nightingale and Michael Cornish are in
9 evidence before the Chamber pursuant to your decision -- your 92 bis
10 decision dated 19 October 2012.
11 Q. General Riley, based on your answers to the previous questions
12 I'd like to show you another exhibit.
13 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, could the court officer please display
15 Q. This is an order from the VRS Main Staff signed by
16 General Milovanovic dated the 27th of May, 1995, relating to the
17 reception and redeployment of UNPROFOR members in the corps' area of
19 In the first paragraph, to paraphrase, there is a reference to a
20 NATO intention or supposed NATO intention to continue bombing warehouses
21 and other infrastructure installations in the RS territory. It goes on
22 to say in order to prevent NATO leaders from carrying out their
23 intentions. Then a series of orders follow and, General Riley, I'd like
24 to focus you on one of these orders which is contained in paragraph 5,
25 which is on the next page.
1 In paragraph 5 we see, among other things, that:
2 "The command of the Drina Corps shall place the captured UNPROFOR
3 troops and members of other humanitarian organisations at the
4 installations in its area of responsibility."
5 General Riley, is this consistent -- is this order consistent
6 with what actually happened with your men who were taken hostage on the
7 basis of what they said to you?
8 A. From the accounts that they gave me and their debriefing reports,
9 it was clear that they believed they had all been dropped off at military
10 installations in groups of varying size.
11 Q. On the basis of that answer I'd like to show you another exhibit.
12 MR. JEREMY: Could we please see 65 ter 05738A.
13 Q. This is a Drina Corps command order dated the 27th of May, 1995,
14 which specifically refers to the Main Staff order that we have just
15 looked at, P789.
16 MR. JEREMY: The B/C/S version isn't very legible, but we have
17 provided more legible hard copies to Defence and to the booths.
18 Q. General Riley, if I can refer you to the orders halfway down the
19 page in this document, paragraph 1 orders:
20 "The Command of the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade to
21 capture and disarm UN members blocked in the Sjenokos area."
22 Does this correspond with what happened to your OPs in this area?
23 A. Yes. Sjenokos is a mountain on the west bank of the Drina above
24 Gorazde, which is where the three observation posts which were taken
25 captive, held hostage, were located.
1 Q. And paragraph 3 directs the Command of the 5th Military Police
2 Battalion to take the various captured UN members and relocate them in
3 groups of different sizes, ranging from 1 to 4, to various different
5 Again, does this order correspond to the experiences of your men
6 on the basis of what they relayed to you?
7 A. Although the reports could not identify the units, which is how
8 the breakdown is made there, the distribution certainly reflects the
9 accounts given.
10 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I'd tender this as the next
11 Prosecution exhibit.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Document 05738A receives number P2545,
14 Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: P2545 is admitted.
16 MR. JEREMY:
17 Q. General Riley, on the same topic I'd like to show you a further
19 MR. JEREMY: Could we please see 65 ter 15412.
20 Q. This is a situation report from the VRS Main Staff dated
21 28 May 1995, sent to the president of Republika Srpska and the corps
23 MR. JEREMY: Could we go to page 6 in the English and page 3 in
24 the B/C/S.
25 Q. General Riley, I'd like you to focus at the paragraph at the top
1 of the page in the English and the corresponding paragraph in the B/C/S
2 is the penultimate paragraph. In the last sentence of this first
3 paragraph in the English version we read:
4 "During the day, the Drina Corps captured 27 members of UN forces
5 (Englishmen) and 4 armoured vehicles."
6 General Riley, can you -- can you comment on that particular
7 paragraph -- particular sentence, excuse me?
8 A. Yes, I'd make two comments. The first is that the majority of
9 those who were taken from my battalion were not English at all, they were
10 Welsh. And I'm sure they would be most offended having been described as
11 English. The disparity between the numbers, 33 and 27, I believe refers
12 to the fact that one of the four on the vehicles, when it was being
13 driven away, rolled off a mountain track and fell down the mountainside
14 and six soldiers inside it were injured. They were then taken to the VRS
15 hospital I think in Visegrad, and that would account for the disparity in
16 the numbers.
17 Q. That disparity being between the total number of --
18 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- the total number --
19 Q. -- your men who were taken hostage and the reference to 27 men
21 A. Indeed, 33 minus 27.
22 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I'd tender this document as the next
23 Prosecution exhibit.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Document 15412 receives number P2546,
1 Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: P2546 is admitted.
3 MR. JEREMY:
4 Q. General Riley, on the basis of your reference to these last six
5 soldiers, I'd like to show you a final document.
6 MR. JEREMY: Could we please see P2481 on our screens. This is
7 an order from General Mladic in respect to detained UNPROFOR soldiers
8 dated the 2nd of June, 1995. And we can stay on page 1 in the English
9 and I'd like to go to -- sorry, page 1 in the B/C/S, and I'd like to go
10 to page 2 in the English, please.
11 Q. General Riley, in paragraph 2 on this page we read:
12 "The Command of the Drina Corps shall release six detained
13 UNPROFOR members who are being treated at the hospital of the
14 GS VRS /Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska/ and five detained
15 UNPROFOR members who are held at the Vlasenica garrison and hand them
16 over to the MUP organs at Sokolac and the Vlasenica garrisons."
17 General Riley, do you see any connection between this particular
18 paragraph and those six soldiers you referred to in relation to the last
20 A. Yes, and perhaps if I may elaborate a little. I learned that the
21 six soldiers had been injured through radio conversations with
22 General Mladic's liaison officer in the Serb municipality of Gorazde, and
23 I asked that since they were injured that they should and could please be
24 released. And therefore, very soon afterwards I learned - as this
25 document says - that they had indeed been released, having been cared for
1 quite properly in the hospital. And, in fact, I would add that all of
2 the -- of those taken hostage reported that they had been -- they had
3 been correctly treated throughout.
4 Q. In paragraph 4 we read:
5 "Commands of other corps ... shall" -- goes on to say "shall
6 retain the detained UNPROFOR members in their zones of responsibility and
7 at locations where they are being held until further notice ..."
8 General Riley, today at the start of your testimony you indicated
9 that when the 33 of your men were initially taken hostage, you believed
10 that this was for the purpose of preventing further NATO air-strikes. As
11 the hostage-taking scenario played out on the ground, did you -- did you
12 maintain this view-point?
13 A. Yes, I did. There were no further air-strikes during that
14 period, and I did not know at the time but I learned subsequently that
15 discussions and negotiations had gone on to that effect.
16 Q. Thank you, General Riley.
17 MR. JEREMY: I have no further questions, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jeremy.
19 Did you learn anything about how the six were injured?
20 THE WITNESS: As far as I could tell and as far as I can
21 remember, Your Honour, they had been in the back of an armoured vehicle,
22 a lightly armoured vehicle, which had slid off a rough road --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
24 THE WITNESS: -- and it had tumbled as it fell --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: -- and they had been injured by equipment in the
2 vehicle flying around and hitting them.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear.
4 Mr. Lukic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
5 MR. LUKIC: I hope I am, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: So do we.
7 You'll now be cross-examined, Mr. Riley, by Mr. Lukic. Mr. Lukic
8 is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
9 You may proceed.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
12 A. [Interpretation] Good morning. How are you?
13 Q. Excellent. How are you?
14 A. [Interpretation] Excellent. Thank you.
15 Q. [In English] I saw in your previous statements that you do speak
17 A. [Interpretation] Just a little.
18 JUDGE ORIE: If we leave it to that and if we don't move to
19 Welsh, which I read is also within the series of languages the witness
20 speaks, then we can proceed and there's a fair chance that we would
21 conclude the evidence today.
22 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. But I don't think that I'll
23 move to Welsh. Unfortunately, I don't speak that.
24 Q. [Interpretation] General, I'm going to continue in the B/C/S.
25 Have you seen this 1994 agreement relating to Gorazde?
1 A. [In English] You mean the Total Exclusion Zone agreement?
2 Q. [In English] Yes.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. [Interpretation] According to this agreement, was there a
5 provision in it for the Muslim forces to withdraw from a specific area of
6 the enclave?
7 A. I don't have the agreement in front of me and -- and I would like
8 to see if I have it here.
9 MR. LUKIC: If we can have it on our screens. It's D131, please.
10 THE WITNESS: I do not recall at the moment that there was any
11 particular provision on the Bosnian side to withdraw, but it is 18 years
12 ago and I would like to, with the Court's agreement, look at the
13 document. As I remember it, the requirement for withdrawal was solely on
14 the Serb side.
15 MR. LUKIC: Can we see page 2, please.
16 Q. [Interpretation] General, you can see here item number 3, which
17 reads that:
18 "The BH commander commits himself to not undertake any offensive
19 action." And that "... only armed personnel in the shaded area on the
20 attached map will be those of UNPROFOR."
21 A. Indeed. Can we perhaps see the map with the shaded area.
22 Q. [In English] Yes.
23 MR. LUKIC: That's the next page, please.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Would you agree with me that on page 3 of this
25 document, this shaded area signifies the area from which the Muslim armed
1 personnel should withdraw, and did that happen in actuality?
2 A. Yes, it did. The black line that follows the inside of the
3 shaded area corresponds to the trench lines that were occupied by the
4 Bosnian forces. Beyond those trench lines and as far as the edge of the
5 3-kilometre circle were the UNPROFOR observation posts and check-points.
6 Q. This area that had remained under the control of the Muslim
7 forces was well armed, well fortified, and well defended. Would you
8 agree with that?
9 A. You mean to the area of the left of the shaded area as we look at
10 the map?
11 Q. [In English] Yes.
12 A. I would agree that the defences had been put into good condition.
13 There were extensive lines of trenches and there were minefields. As far
14 as being well armed goes, the soldiers on duty in the trenches had small
15 arms, but above the level of company, battalion, I saw very little on the
16 Bosnian side in the way of heavy weapons. During the whole time that I
17 was in Gorazde, I only saw one tank, I think two field artillery pieces,
18 and a number of mortars, which of course are relatively short range. So
19 speaking as a professional of then 20-years' service, I would have said
20 that they were quite lightly armed.
21 Q. Do you know that the forces of the 81st Division of BH Army
22 deployed in Gorazde expanded in relation to the situation when the area
23 was proclaimed protected area?
24 A. I was not in Gorazde at that time. That was more than six
25 months -- nine months, I think, before my arrival. All I can say is that
1 by the time I arrived, the 81st Division was well organised. It had five
2 ground-holding brigades, one manoeuvre brigade which they called a
3 special forces brigade, and it had, by my estimation, about 8 and a half
4 thousand soldiers in it. They had weapons for maybe 6 or 6 and a half
5 thousand. They were very well motivated and well led, but their ability
6 to communicate and pass orders and messages was poor.
7 Q. Were you aware of the plans to link up Gorazde and Sarajevo with
8 the use of military sources?
9 A. I was aware of no such plan.
10 Q. Were you aware of attacks launched on the Serbian positions from
12 A. During my tour of duty in Gorazde until the hostilities that
13 broke out on the 28th of May, I was not aware of any Bosnian attacks from
14 out of the area. Had I known of any such attacks, then I would have done
15 my best to prevent them.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now briefly see Prosecution
17 Exhibit 14667, please.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, is that -- when you say "exhibit," is
19 it a P or --
20 MR. LUKIC: It's 65 ter.
21 Q. [Interpretation] This is a document issued by the Main Staff of
22 the Republika Srpska dated 3rd March 1995.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I included this document at the last
24 minute and I hope we shall have proper pages. We need page 2 in the
25 B/C/S and I suppose it's page 3 in English. We need item number 5.
1 Q. Here at the top of the page in English you can see that it says
2 that on the Gorazde-Cajnice axis they fired infantry weapons at civilians
3 in Kazagici village. Would you agree with me that due to the size of
4 this enclave you were not able to be informed of all the actions of
5 BH Army, specifically of the 81st Division?
6 A. I would agree.
7 Q. Thank you. Now let us please take a look at point 6, so it's the
8 same page in the English version. What we see here is that it says under
9 (a) at the very end:
10 "In the morning, in the Gorazde enclave, the enemy opened fire
11 from the Radici village at an UNPROFOR patrol, when a Ukrainian soldier
12 was wounded."
13 Are you aware of this incident?
14 A. I'm afraid -- I'm sorry, I don't remember it at all.
15 Q. Did you have any intelligence to the effect that in the spring of
16 1995, a large-scale offensive of the Muslim forces was in the making? It
17 was supposed to include the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and,
18 among other things, it was supposed to lead to the break of the Siege of
20 A. Forgive me, I'm trying to remember what I knew 18 years ago and
21 what I've learned subsequently. Being a United Nations force, we did not
22 conduct intelligence-gathering activities in the way that a conventional
23 force would do because we were not engaged in the war. There was a war
24 going on; it was between two other parties. What we learned about either
25 side's intentions came from our own observations and conversations, from
1 the open media, and sometimes we would be provided with intelligence by
2 our own national authorities if it was necessary to protect ourselves.
3 I believe that we could see the signs that there was to be a
4 Bosnian offensive around Sarajevo. I believe -- I believe that I knew
5 that. Whether --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could you -- Mr. Mladic --
7 MR. LUKIC: It's --
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- no speaking that is audible --
9 MR. LUKIC: It's a break time so --
10 JUDGE ORIE: It's break time anyhow.
11 But perhaps we ask the witness to first complete this answer and
12 then take the break.
13 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: Sorry, to recap that, I think that we understood
15 that the Bosnian side intended to try to relieve the Siege of Sarajevo,
16 but the distances and the terrain and the strength of the VRS that lay
17 between the enclaves in the east and Sarajevo led me to believe that
18 there was little chance of them being able to succeed in any sort of
19 link-up and that this would not change our situation.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Would this be a suitable --
21 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- moment to have the break?
23 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
24 We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes, Mr. Riley.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
1 [The witness stands down]
2 MR. LUKIC: And before maybe this document is removed from the
3 screen, I would ask to tender it into the evidence.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. JEREMY: No objection, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: No objection.
7 Madam Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 14667 receives number D388,
9 Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: D388 is admitted into evidence.
11 We take a break and we'll resume at five minutes to 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could the -- Mr. Mladic, if -- Mr. Mladic, if I
15 speak there's no need to continue to speak aloud for you.
16 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
17 Meanwhile, I use the opportunity to deal with D245 and D246. On
18 the 26th of February, two video-clips used by the Defence with
19 Witness Overgard, the numbers I just mentioned were marked for
20 identification. The Chamber has considered the parties' position on this
21 as discussed in court on the 26th of February, the 25th, and the
22 26th of July, 2013, transcript pages T 9199 to T 9200; T 9214, ending on
23 that same page; T 15098; T 15148; and T 15182. And decides that the two
24 video-clips are now admitted into evidence.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, please proceed with your
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 1D1355, could we briefly take a look at that.
6 Q. General, as you can see --
7 MR. LUKIC: Is there an English translation for this document or
9 Q. Then I'll tell you what this is. [Interpretation] This is a
10 document of the Main Staff of the 16th of April, 1995. On its third
11 page, it says in the highlighted area in yellow that in the area of
12 Gorazde, the Muslims intensified their activities from the northern and
13 southern parts of the enclave, and the units from Gorazde were probably
14 taken to the area of Zorovici and Var [phoen] in order to launch an
15 attack against Grebak. It also says the UNPROFOR command in Gorazde
16 launched a protest because of the alleged endangerment of the population
17 and UNPROFOR in Gorazde and threatened with NATO air-strikes if these
18 activities do not stop. They want, thereby, to create more favourable
19 conditions for preparation for the Muslim forces for their planned
20 offensive activities.
21 Did you know that the Muslim forces from Gorazde were being taken
22 out and transferred to the territory from which they attacked Serb
24 A. I was certainly not aware of any such thing and I do not believe
25 it would have been possible. The Serb army surrounded the enclave. The
1 Muslim forces had no means of moving troops other than by walking. I --
2 I don't know what the basis for this statement is, but it seems to me to
3 be impossible. And as for the commander of UNPROFOR in Gorazde, this is
4 me making a protest and threatening NATO air-strikes. Well, I'm sorry, I
5 was not a NATO officer at that point. I had no authority to make such a
6 statement and I have absolutely no recollection of this having been the
8 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, is there any possibility that you have
9 mentioned or referred to NATO air-strikes as a possible consequence or
10 result of anything, even if you were not a NATO -- would there -- well,
11 even -- though you were not there as a NATO-commanded person?
12 THE WITNESS: It's possible, Your Honour, in the course of
13 conversation that this might have been a topic which arose. I certainly
14 have no recollection of it.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
16 THE WITNESS: And though I can only say I was just -- I was a
17 battalion commander, not under NATO control, with no authority to issue
18 any such threat.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic. And could you,
20 Mr. Lukic, tell us a bit more about what document we have. I -- you told
21 us that it's a Main Staff document. Well, that's the beginning of some
22 information about what the document is. I see apparently that it's --
23 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- issued by Salapura.
25 MR. LUKIC: Mm-hm.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Is it an order? Is it -- I've got no idea.
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] It says here that this is
3 intelligence information that was sent to the Ministry of the Interior
4 and to the state security sector. So this is just information that is
5 being sent from the military to the police.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do you want to tender it?
7 MR. LUKIC: Obviously we can only MFI it since there is no
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. LUKIC: But I would like to tender it, yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, this document would receive what
12 number under which it will be marked for identification.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D1355 will be MFI'd as document number
14 D389, Your Honours.
15 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
16 Q. [Interpretation] General --
17 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
18 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: D389 is marked for identification. Please proceed.
21 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. [Interpretation] Would you agree with me, General, that at the
23 time the Army of Republika Srpska was on the defensive and that it did
24 not have the strength or wish to launch an offensive and to capture new
1 A. Are you talking about the 16th of April?
2 Q. [In English] Yes.
3 A. On the 16th of April, the cessation of hostilities agreement
4 which had been brokered by Jimmy Carter was still in force and that
5 expired, I think, on the 1st of May. So given that the Serb side and the
6 Bosnian side had agreed to abide by this agreement, at that point, I
7 would agree with you that the Serb side was on the defensive at that
9 Q. [Interpretation] Throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, if you are
10 aware of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is it correct that the
11 Army of Republika Srpska was not on the offensive anywhere?
12 A. On the 16th of April?
13 Q. [In English] On the 16th of April, for example.
14 A. As far as I'm aware, they were not on the offensive anywhere in
15 Bosnia on the 16th of April.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Even in Sarajevo?
17 THE WITNESS: As -- as far as I'm aware, Your Honour, but I was
18 not in Sarajevo, so I'm sorry, I can't -- that's all I can say.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps the language may play a role. Being on the
21 offensive, does that mean at that moment undertaking offensive actions or
22 keeping positions which you have obtained through offensive actions? I
23 am not quite certain whether I fully understand what being on the
24 offensive means.
25 THE WITNESS: I would -- my professional opinion would be that it
1 would mean that a force was either moving forward in order to attack,
2 rather than just holding positions it had held, or that it was delivering
3 fire for offensive purposes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And delivering fire to keep a status quo is not
5 being on the offensive?
6 THE WITNESS: I think if it was, as there was, a cessation of
7 hostilities agreement in place, there should have been no firing on
8 either side of any sort.
9 JUDGE ORIE: What should have been and what --
10 THE WITNESS: And what was --
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- was is not always exactly the same. I don't know
12 whether you could briefly elaborate on that, whether the cessation of
13 hostilities was observed in every respect fully, completely.
14 THE WITNESS: I think generally --
15 JUDGE ORIE: To --
16 THE WITNESS: -- yes --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- to the extent you know.
18 THE WITNESS: To the extent that I knew, generally it was
19 observed in the area of Gorazde. There were breaches, but I've no
20 indication that these were part of a concerted plan by either side in --
21 in Gorazde. The Prosecutor asked me could I be aware of everything that
22 was going on around the area and my answer was no. The same must apply
23 to the commander of the 81st Bosnian Division or, indeed, the Serb
24 commanders on the other side and, indeed, General Mladic himself. They
25 may have signed up to the agreement.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 THE WITNESS: It does not mean that all their subordinates were
3 not doing things that they should not have been.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I would have to check, but was it the Prosecutor who
5 asked you whether you could be aware of everything or --
6 THE WITNESS: It was, sir, yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Now, yet again, let us go back to Gorazde. Did you know that
11 weapons were brought to the Muslim units in Gorazde by helicopter?
12 A. I had heard that before our arrival that there had been
13 helicopter flights in and out. I was aware of one much later on in my
14 time which crashed, killing a number of people; but what was on the
15 helicopter, I can't say.
16 Q. Very well. As for the town itself, do you know which military
17 facilities, military installations, military commands were in the town
18 itself and are you aware of their actual locations?
19 A. I was aware of the divisional headquarters building because I
20 used to go there for liaison purposes regularly, just as I went to the
21 Serb headquarters in the Serb municipality. I was aware of at least one
22 brigade headquarters, which my company commander would visit. And I was
23 aware of a pre-war munitions factory on the north side of the town, as
24 well, of course, as the defensive positions of trenches around the town.
25 Q. In the month of May, mid-May, you say that you were somewhat
1 familiar with the situation in Sarajevo and you know that a major
2 offensive was launched from Sarajevo in order to break-through the siege
3 and to link up with Gorazde. Another question all together is whether it
4 could have succeeded, but are you aware of the offensive in the first
6 A. I was aware that the offensive started. I was not aware that it
7 was intended to link up with Gorazde. That was never, as far as I can
8 recall, communicated to me in any way, and I do not have any recollection
9 that the Bosnian divisional commander in Gorazde thought that it was
10 possible that there could be a link-up.
11 Q. Are you familiar with the activities of the 81st Division of the
12 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to this offensive, that is to say,
13 breaking through the Siege of Sarajevo, which was supposed to drag the
14 Serb forces out?
15 A. I'm sorry, I don't think I quite understand your question,
16 Mr. Lukic. The bulk of the 81st Division was in and around the town of
17 Gorazde, which is on the opposite side of the enclave from that part of
18 it which faces towards Sarajevo. I'm not aware that the 81st Division
19 weakened its strength around the town in order to do anything else or go
20 anywhere else. It did not have the -- it did not have the means to do
21 so. It had neither the mobility nor the fire-power nor the manpower to
22 do it.
23 Q. Do you know that in Gorazde there was a factory called Pobjeda?
24 A. This is the factory on the northern side of the town, the pre-war
25 munitions factory?
1 Q. Do you know whether it manufactured ammunition during the war?
2 And, yes, it is that factory.
3 A. I never went inside it. I was not permitted to do so. But I am
4 quite sure that it did manufacture small arms ammunition for rifles and
5 machine-guns, and I'm certain that it manufactured anti-personnel and
6 anti-tank mines. I think it may also have manufactured mortar bombs.
7 Q. Thank you. And do you know that the nitrogen factory that also
8 existed there manufactured explosives; and if so, do you know which type,
9 if you're aware of them manufacturing that in the first place?
10 A. I was not aware of that, but I -- if you're going to manufacture
11 ammunition, clearly you must manufacture a propellant. It must have come
12 from somewhere, so I would not be surprised if that had been the case.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
14 THE WITNESS: But I'm not aware of any reason why this factory
15 should not have manufactured ammunition.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it seems that -- first of all, Mr. Mladic
17 should wait for a second.
18 It seems that an established practice of giving little notes to
19 the Defence in order to communicate slowly now is slipping into a
20 different practice, which is constant interruption, constant loud
22 Mr. Lukic, take care that Mr. Mladic returns to the -- all the
23 accepted practices and only exceptionally speaks and interrupts in that
24 way the testimony of witnesses. It seems that Mr. Mladic wants to
25 consult with you for a second. He can do so for a short consultation
1 and, again, only because permission is now given and at such low voice
2 that no one can hear him, apart from you.
3 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Lukic.
5 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. [Interpretation] General, I do apologise. I will just have to
7 put one more question to you in relation to ammunition. Did you hear of
8 vibration ammunition being manufactured in Gorazde, that is to say,
9 plastic ammunition, anti-aircraft -- anti-tank -- anti-armour?
10 A. No, I did not. And I do not recall having seen any anti-tank
11 weapons, other than a few RPG-7s.
12 Q. Did you have an opportunity to go to the warehouse or depot in
13 Kopaci, which was under the control of the 81st Division of BH Army in
15 A. I don't think so.
16 Q. It's an underground storage area?
17 A. No, no. I never went there. I think -- I'm not even sure if I
18 knew it existed, but rather like the ammunition factory, I'm quite
19 certain that the 81st Division would not have wished me to see it.
20 Q. Thank you. We're now going to look at a document, and I'm going
21 to ask you something about Gorazde but the document pertains to Sarajevo.
22 We marked it as 1D602. It's a document produced by the Army of the
23 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It comes from the command of the
24 1st Corps and the date is 16th May 1995.
25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] In e-court in English, as well as in
1 B/C/S, we need page 3. And we need item 4.1, which describes UNPROFOR
3 Q. We can see that it says here that UN members are not allowed to
4 come in or go out, according to the request of the 12th Division.
5 UN troops have left their check-points at Debelo Brdo and Hladnjaca
6 because of the fighting. A Chetnik tank in Grbavica, Petrovacka Street,
7 hit the UN observation post at Demino Brdo.
8 "Members of the 2nd French Battalion photographed the Zrak
9 factory but were detained by MUP members who confiscated their film. At
10 2230 hours last night, two members of the Ukrainian Battalion were
11 arrested at the Lipa check-point and were handed over to the
12 12th Division's security organs."
13 A. Can I just be clear that this is all related to Sarajevo.
14 Q. [In English] Sarajevo, yes.
15 [Interpretation] Now my question is the following: During this
16 period, did the Muslim forces restrict the movement of members of
17 UNPROFOR in Gorazde?
18 A. Could you tell me the date again, please, Mr. Lukic.
19 Q. The document is dated the 16th of May, 1995.
20 A. Not at that time. Much later they did, but not at that time.
21 Q. While you were in Gorazde, you were able to learn that around
22 12.500 Serbs used to live there. Except for the very few, all of them
23 were expelled from the area. Did you know anything about that?
24 A. I was aware from the pre-war census that more than
25 11.000 Serbs - and I have no reason to doubt your figure - had been in
1 the enclave and that, as the cleansing of different ethnic groups had
2 taken place throughout Eastern Bosnia by both parties, that Serbs had
3 indeed been thrown out and, in some cases, killed in Gorazde. Their
4 houses were shown to me. I was aware of, I think, only 11 ethnic Serbs
5 who were left inside the enclave at the time that I arrived.
6 Q. Thank you. At the time, in May of 1995, were there any prisons
7 for Serbian civilians in Gorazde?
8 A. I do not think so. I can't remember, but I do not think so.
9 Q. In your statement, P2543 -- by the way, do you have a hard copy
10 of your statement?
11 A. I do, thank you.
12 Q. [In English] Paragraph 14, please. It's page 3 in English and
13 page 4 in B/C/S.
14 [Interpretation] Here you talk about NATO air-strikes in May of
15 1995, and you said:
16 "I had been warned in advance of the NATO air-strikes which
17 occurred in late May."
18 When had you been warned that NATO strikes would take place in
19 late May?
20 A. I believe 24 hours before they happened, I believe.
21 Q. Was that standard procedure, for you to be warned prior to
22 air-strikes, so that you can undertake appropriate protective measures;
23 is that correct?
24 A. Well, as this was the first time in the time that I spent in
25 Gorazde that this had happened, there was no standard procedure, but I
1 think it was - what's the word? - I think it was General Smith being --
2 being careful, trying to make sure that we would take measures to protect
4 Q. Who exactly informed you about this? Was that General Smith
5 personally or was it some of his aides?
6 A. I'm afraid I can't remember. I expect that it was the
7 lieutenant-colonel who ran his office, but I -- I'm afraid I can't
8 remember. I think I would remember if it had been General Smith himself,
9 and therefore I think it probably wasn't.
10 Q. Based on the warning that meant that NATO strikes were
11 upcoming ...
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What is your question, Mr. Lukic?
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Based on the warning, according to which NATO strikes were to be
15 carried out ...
16 JUDGE ORIE: It's still unclear what your question is, Mr. Lukic.
17 You say: Based on the warning, what? Did you act? Or did you -- what
18 is your question?
19 MR. LUKIC: I now see that the translation is missing part of my
21 Q. [In English] Based on that warning, which side was supposed to be
22 hit by those NATO attacks?
23 A. The Serb side.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Were the Muslims notified about the upcoming
25 strikes? Do you know anything about that?
1 A. I can't remember. It would be surprising if they did not know
2 and that if liaison had not taken place in Sarajevo, but I'm afraid I
3 can't remember.
4 Q. Within your unit there were SAS members; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, there were two teams of four, making eight in total.
6 Q. Their role was to guide NATO aircraft to Serb positions; would
7 you agree with that?
8 A. One of their roles was to act as tactical air control parties in
9 order to direct aircraft on to any target that was designated as a
10 target. Their other role was to be a direct liaison function for
11 General Smith, the commander of UNPROFOR.
12 Q. These members of the SAS, were they members of UNPROFOR or of
14 A. They were members of UNPROFOR.
15 Q. According to you - and I'm asking you this as a soldier - a pilot
16 who is striking a Serb position, does he constitute a legitimate target
17 for the Serb defences?
18 A. If the -- if the aircraft was operating under the authority of
19 the United Nations to protect a peacekeeping mission, then no, it is not
20 a legitimate target because the United Nations was not engaged in the
21 war. And as far as I'm aware, at that time all air-strikes had to be
22 approved by the UN Special Representative and, therefore, taken as part
23 of the mission.
24 Q. Therefore, according to you, the Serbs should sit tight and just
25 wait to be killed by NATO aircraft?
1 A. The Serbs or, indeed, the other side would only attract the
2 attention of NATO aircraft which had been transferred to UNPROFOR if they
3 carried out actions that merited them being attacked. The way to avoid
4 that would not to have been -- to have carried out such actions.
5 Q. But that's not an answer to my question. According to you, all
6 the Serbs could do during NATO air-strikes was just to sit there and wait
7 to be killed by NATO aircraft without having the right to self-defence.
8 A. I see where you're headed. In a -- if you're in a war, of course
9 you have the right to self-defence, everybody does. But in this case,
10 the UNPROFOR forces were not part of the war; they were there because of
11 the war and they were there because of the mandate, and the mandate has
12 to be protected and it has to be protected and be -- and in an impartial
13 way. Being impartial does not mean that the force that's there behaves
14 in exactly the same way to both the parties. That is part of the UN's
15 own definition of impartiality. The Serb side had been told repeatedly
16 by General Smith not to do certain things and that there would be
17 consequences if they did. They continued to do them and they attracted
18 the consequences, and the consequence was to be bombed.
19 Q. In conclusion, according to you, the Serbs did not have the right
20 to defend themselves from NATO air-strikes?
21 A. The air-strikes came in defence of the UNPROFOR mission and its
22 troops. Now, I don't know what the legal -- what a lawyer would say
23 because I'm not a lawyer, but I can only repeat to you that the bombing
24 was to protect the NATO force and to protect the NATO -- sorry, to
25 protect UNPROFOR and its mission, which was as much as anything to
1 protect civilians who were being attacked. The Serb side had been told
2 not to do certain things; it did them and it attracted that response.
3 Q. Soldiers on the ground guiding the aircraft cannot be the target
4 of the Serb army as well, according to you; is that your position?
5 A. Well, no air-strikes -- no NATO air-strikes or UN-mandated
6 air-strikes took place in Gorazde during my time. So if you're asking me
7 to comment on Sarajevo, I'm afraid I was not there so I cannot comment on
9 Q. Now I'd like to ask you something about paragraph 14 of your
10 statement, where you say:
11 "There was no communication after that. The only exception was
12 that, on 26 May, I was told by the local commander, Radomir Furtula, that
13 by Mladic's orders if any further air-strikes were to take place, our
14 camp would be shelled. This message from him came in over the radio via
15 his Serb interpreter Natasa, whose voice I recognised immediately."
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Radomir Furtula was directly subordinated to the Drina Corps
18 command; is that correct?
19 A. As far as I'm aware.
20 Q. Did you know that in the Army of Republika Srpska there was some
21 skipping within the chain of command, as it were, and that at times
22 General Mladic issued orders directly to Radomir Furtula?
23 A. I did not know that, but I know that General Mladic had a liaison
24 officer present in Furtula's headquarters, Brane Suka. And so it would
25 not surprise me to learn that orders were passed directly through that
1 liaison officer, but I do not know it for a fact.
2 Q. Trust me, I tried to find out who Brane Suka is. This man has no
3 connection to General Mladic whatsoever. What was the basis on which you
4 drew a conclusion that General Mladic in a way had his own liaison
5 officer at the command with Mr. Furtula? Was that the case with all the
6 other units or was that a unique situation?
7 A. I -- I'm afraid I don't know about any other units. I believe
8 that I was told that Suka was this liaison officer. It seemed to be to
9 be borne out by two events --
10 JUDGE ORIE: May I interrupt you.
11 Mr. Mladic, laughing in response to a witness's answer, nodding
12 "yes," nodding "no," all that is strictly prohibited. If it happens
13 again, you'll be removed from the courtroom.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
15 THE WITNESS: Sorry, shall I continue, Your Honour?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you may continue.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 There were two sets of circumstances that seemed to me to confirm
19 this role. The first was that we would from time to time receive a
20 liaison visit from an officer called Colonel Popovic, who told me that he
21 came from Colonel Mladic's -- General Mladic's headquarters. And
22 whenever I met Popovic, Brane Suka would be present but Furtula was never
23 present. The second was that when I was called to meet -- when I was
24 called to meet General Smith and General Mladic in August of 1995,
25 Brane Suka was also at -- present at the meeting.
1 Q. When you say "Popovic," was his name Vujadin Popovic? Do you
2 know that?
3 A. I'm sorry, I can't remember. He was a young man, maybe my age as
4 I was then, mid-30s, not very tall, with dark hair, and a thoroughly
5 professional officer.
6 Q. Since there was a Popovic in the Drina Corps but there was no
7 Popovic in the Main Staff, and the presence of Vujadin Popovic at
8 Radomir Furtula's command headquarters could have led to the presence of
9 Brane Suka. But we are going to deal this matter later on probably with
10 some other witnesses. However, can we conclude that you had never
11 received this message directly from General Mladic; is that correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. There was no shelling of your camp. Is that also true?
14 A. That's also true.
15 Q. So if Natasa, Furtula's interpreter, whose voice you recognised,
16 told you the truth, then they disobeyed Ratko Mladic's order. Could that
17 be a valid conclusion?
18 A. Do you mean that because there was -- there was no shelling, they
19 disobeyed the order to shell? I believe that after the first round of
20 air-strikes, there were no -- there were no further air-strikes, so there
21 would have been no reason to shell. So it's not -- the question of
22 obedience or disobedience therefore does not enter into it.
23 Q. Did you check whether this message was actually conveyed from
24 General Ratko Mladic to Furtula?
25 A. The -- when I reported the exchange to General Smith's
1 headquarters, I was told that similar messages had been received in other
2 places, such as Tuzla and Sarajevo. So it seemed to me to fit within a
3 general pattern that was going on across Eastern Bosnia. But if you're
4 saying could I phone up General Mladic and say: Did you give this order?
5 Well, of course I couldn't.
6 Q. Let's move now to paragraph 21 of your statement, where you say:
7 "The prisoners meanwhile were allowed to collect their belongings
8 and were escorted in their vehicles to Visegrad. They remained in radio
9 communication until they passed out of range."
10 When you say that the prisoners were allowed to collect their
11 belongings, is it true that in actual fact they were allowed to keep
12 their personal weapons?
13 A. They certainly kept their personal weapons until they reached
14 Visegrad, as far as I'm aware.
15 Q. They were escorted in Visegrad as far as their cars or, rather,
16 military vehicles?
17 A. That's correct, and one of which, as we mentioned earlier, met
18 with an accident.
19 Q. Let's now look at paragraph 22. You say in this situation:
20 "I ordered the major in charge of B Company to defend the line if
21 attacked but be prepared to withdraw if the situation became untenable.
22 Soon after B Company was attacked. All that afternoon they fought the
24 Muslim forces were involved in this fight as well, is that
25 correct, meaning they were fighting the Serbs alongside with the other
2 A. No. Let's be quite clear about the sequence of actions. The
3 UNPROFOR troops were attacked on that bank, and I had ordered
4 Major Wesley, the company commander, to hold that ground as long as he
5 could. This ground was vital ground; whoever held it controlled the town
6 of Gorazde. And since my mission was all about the safety of the
7 civilian population, I had to be sure that that ground was not controlled
8 by anyone who would launch hostile fires or attacks from it. I,
9 therefore, held it. I passed a message to the commander of the
10 81st Division and told him that I would not be able to hold it for more
11 than a couple of hours because, as far as I could see, the disparity of
12 the ratio of forces was too great. As his troops were brought forward to
13 take over the positions, my troops broke contact and withdrew. They did
14 not fight alongside each other. They were not there -- my troops were
15 not there to do that and I would not have done so.
16 Q. But you did hand over that position to their units; is that
18 A. Certainly it was the duty of the 81st Division to defend its own
19 territory; and since the Total Exclusion Zone had been violated by the
20 attack, I believe that they were, therefore, entirely within their rights
21 to defend their territory.
22 Sorry, can I just add to that, Your Honour. The Total Exclusion
23 Zone was after all a control measure which had been agreed by both
24 parties. It was not imposed by the UN; it had been agreed. So if one or
25 both chose to set it aside, then it no longer had validity. And on this
1 occasion, the Serb side, it seemed to me, that what they had agreed to no
2 longer applied.
3 Q. As for observation post 3, is that the position that you refer
4 to? Is that actually observation post 3? Or rather, is this some other
6 A. Observation Post 3 was right on the top of Mala Biscerna.
7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we briefly take a look at
8 65 ter 18829, that is a Prosecution number.
9 Q. You are familiar with this document, aren't you?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Who gave this statement, do you know?
12 A. Yes, this is Captain Nick Lock who was the operations officer at
13 the time.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I need page 3 in English and page 4
15 in B/C/S as regards his statement. We need paragraph 13.
16 Q. It says here:
17 "The last OP on the East Bank, Op 3, was maintained until 1554
18 when the BiH troops advanced to the position. Serb troops also
19 approached and a fire-fight took place, won by the BiH."
20 In your view, the recap we see here, is it such that both your
21 forces and the forces of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina fought
22 against the Serb forces at the same time?
23 A. No. My troops had been fighting before the BiH troops arrived.
24 As the BiH troops came up behind them, my troops were effectively caught
25 between two warring parties who were both firing at each other. And at
1 that point, when it became clear that the Bosnian troops were about to
2 take over the position, my troops withdrew so that they would not be in
3 the line at the same time as the Bosnian troops.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock, it's time for a
6 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, would you please discuss also with
9 Mr. Mladic during the break that he apparently has not well heard what I
10 said before, which is little notes is the way of communication,
11 exceptionally a short consultation at low volume. It seems that the
12 little notes seem to have disappeared and that is not what the Chamber
13 expects to happen.
14 MR. LUKIC: That's still here, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. I see four where earlier I saw 25 in a
16 day, if not 30 or 40.
17 MR. LUKIC: Yes --
18 JUDGE ORIE: You understand what I mean --
19 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I do.
20 JUDGE ORIE: -- exceptionally now and then, an oral consultation
21 is will not cause a response, but we are really slipping in a different
22 way which the Chamber does not want to happen.
23 We take a break and we resume at quarter past 12.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.
1 JUDGE ORIE: While we are waiting for the witness to be escorted
2 into the courtroom, I deal with another matter.
3 On the 21st of October, 2013, the Prosecution was instructed to
4 provide further information within one week why the documents bearing
5 Rule 65 ter number 13375, admitted in the 20th Rule 92 bis decision
6 issued on the 25th of September of this year, should be kept
7 confidential. This can be found on transcript page 18199. The Chamber
8 is satisfied with the reasons the Prosecution provided through an
9 informal communication on the 22nd of October, 2013, and therefore
10 withdraws its instruction to the Registry to lift the status of this
11 exhibit which is to remain under seal. The Prosecution is instructed to
12 file a notification containing its e-mail dated the 22nd of October.
13 This concludes this matter.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 Q. General, are you ready?
18 A. [Interpretation] Yes, sir. I am.
19 Q. I am going to ask you once again something about the Gorazde
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all microphones
22 please be switched off. Thank you.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Did you know the exact confines, the exact borders, of the
25 Gorazde enclave?
1 A. [In English] I knew the exact perimeters on the map as I had them
2 plotted, and I tried to visit as much of the perimeter as I could early
3 on during the cessation of hostilities agreement. I don't think I
4 managed to get all the way around it but I got around at least
5 three-quarters of it.
6 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that there was no description of this
7 zone and that you never saw an exact description of what this area
8 actually encompassed?
9 A. Do you -- are you referring to the safe area or are you referring
10 to the enclave or both?
11 Q. I thought it was one and the same thing, but please do explain if
12 the two do not coincide or overlap.
13 A. As I've just explained, I was aware of the geographical
14 boundaries of the enclave. That was the area that was defended by the
15 Bosnian side. As -- and, of course, I was aware of the Total Exclusion
16 Zone, which was the circle of 3 kilometres from the central bridge in the
17 town, and the 20-kilometre heavy weapons exclusion zone. Those were
18 defined in documents.
19 The safe area was never geographically defined, either in Gorazde
20 or anywhere else. The only clarification that I ever had was from
21 General Smith who defined it in terms of its function and not its
22 geography. Its function, in his words, if I recall them correctly, were
23 that it was to protect the civilian population so far as it is possible
24 to do so in a war. And therefore, it was about people not territory.
25 And you could argue that, therefore, it encompassed the whole of the
1 enclave. But I had no means either to observe, deter, protect the whole
2 of the enclave.
3 Q. So you did not know the exact boundaries of this safe area?
4 A. They were never laid down. In practice, I took it to encompass
5 the area of the districts around the town of Gorazde and its surrounding
6 villages because that's where my presence was, but that was simply a
7 local interpretation and it has no particular validity. It was based on
8 what I was able to see and do.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask a follow-up question.
10 Would you agree with me that even where, for example, greater
11 London is not defined very strictly in terms of geographical boundaries,
12 that, nevertheless, you can establish that certain locations are within
13 that area. I think Trafalgar Square might not fall beyond that concept.
14 Would you agree with me that this is the kind of -- at least that this is
15 something to be observed if you're talking about a geographical area not
16 being very precisely defined?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I would, sir, yeah. It doesn't make it any
18 easier on the ground, and that's why I fell back on General Smith's
19 words, that this was about the civilian population --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: -- and therefore it applied to the civilian
22 population wherever I was able to do something about their welfare.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 THE WITNESS: But you could well argue that this encompassed the
25 whole of the enclave because it was called the safe area of Gorazde.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. For Trafalgar Square, it's still pretty
2 easy --
3 THE WITNESS: It is, yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- but for the outskirts becomes problematic.
5 THE WITNESS: It becomes very blurred.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry, I'm jumping from one topic to another, but
9 I was warned by Mr. Jeremy that there was -- might be some
10 misunderstanding in relation of the document 65 ter number 18829, so I
11 would kindly ask to have that one on the screen again. Yes, that's
12 the --
13 Q. [Interpretation] General, I asked you and perhaps I led you to
14 the wrong path, if you will, and I do apologise if that was the case.
15 You read the name on the first page and we established that that is the
16 statement of Captain Lock. However, please, let us take a look at the
17 last page of this document.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think that it's possible that there
19 might have been some confusion due to e-court. Then let's go further
20 ahead. We actually need the page where the signature is.
21 Q. At the end of this document we see your name typewritten, but do
22 you recognise your signature?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Then, or rather, during your proofing, did you see this document
25 and is this statement actually yours or Captain Lock's?
1 A. I don't think we looked at it during the proofing. As I -- I
2 think that Major Lock drafted it for my signature, but I would have gone
3 through it and checked that it accorded with my opinion at the time
4 before I signed it.
5 Q. Then let us correct this for the sake of the transcript. So this
6 is your statement, not Captain Lock's?
7 A. Agreed.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] And I hope that this resolved my
10 colleague's dilemmas too.
11 MR. JEREMY: It did. Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
12 MR LUKIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Now let us go back to your statement, P2423 [as interpreted],
14 paragraph 27, if we can see that now. You see, it is stated here yet
15 again that you successfully defended the east bank "until the Muslims
16 could mobilise and secure Mala Biscerna (the vital ground)," and save the
17 town. What I asked you was whether at the same time you were waging war
18 against the Serbs? You said no --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, "successfully" is not what I read in the
20 statement. Or am I mistaken? I'm looking at 27?
21 MR. LUKIC: Yes, yes, Your Honour. There is probably slight --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Lukic, please.
23 MR. LUKIC: -- difference in the translation.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Please switch on your microphone, Mr. Lukic.
25 MR. LUKIC: Yes, sorry. I think it might be a slight difference
1 in the translation because this word does appear in B/C/S version. It's
2 in the middle of the first line of paragraph 27, "uspjesno."
3 JUDGE ORIE: "Uspjesno" means "successfully"?
4 MR. LUKIC: Yes, and I was reading from B/C/S.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then the -- it may not be that important
6 to --
7 THE WITNESS: I think it -- if I may, Your Honour, I think it
8 does matter because I would say that the -- eventually the successful
9 defence of that ground lay with the Bosnian forces. What I was doing was
10 conducting a delaying operation to buy time. That was all. To keep the
11 ground until it could be held by those who had to defend it. So from
12 that -- to that extent it was successful.
13 I think, Mr. Lukic, if my memory serves me correctly, you asked
14 me if I was fighting on the same side as the Bosnians. You didn't ask me
15 if I was waging war on the Serbs, the two being slightly different.
16 MR. LUKIC:
17 Q. But at the same time --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could we understand that you were successful in
19 saving the town by keeping the attack off for a while and Muslims --
20 allowing the Muslims to take over your positions, and it was not
21 successful, however, in terms of pushing back the attacking Serbs?
22 THE WITNESS: I think that's -- I think that's a good summary,
23 Your Honour. I believed that that ground was vital to the safety of the
24 town and therefore the civilians in it, that I had to hold it; if I
25 couldn't hold, it must be held by those who would defend the town.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 Q. Now paragraph 29 of your statement, please, the very same
5 statement that we see before us.
6 "With the OP line gone and few convoys coming in, our usefulness
7 to the Muslims had disappeared. They became very restrictive ..."
8 When did that happen and what did that mean, that they became
9 very restrictive towards you? What do we have then, the situation that
10 we saw in that document?
11 A. I'm sorry, but which document? You've shown me quite a --
12 Q. Where it says --
13 A. You've shown me a lot of documents.
14 Q. [In English] Okay, sorry. The document, if we can have it --
15 let's -- first tell us --
16 A. Sorry, was this the 12th Division in Sarajevo?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Yes. Yes, indeed.
19 We're now talking, I think, about middle to late July, and the
20 fighting which grew up around the enclave in the aftermath of the
21 28th of May had subsided, but I was not able to re-occupy the OP line
22 because the TEZ had, to all intents and purposes, disappeared and the
23 lines had moved. And therefore, there was - as I now know - discussion
24 going on about whether we should stay or not and the British government
25 later announced that we would be brought out. And at this point, the
1 Bosnian forces began to try to restrict our movements, both locally
2 around the town and in and out of the enclave. Although once the
3 resupply convoys had restarted, both for ourselves and for UNHCR, they
4 did not obstruct those because it would not have been in their interest
5 to do so. But life certainly became -- and it had been difficult enough
6 before, it became very much more difficult when both sides were trying to
7 close us down. I guess that's impartiality.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask you something about
9 paragraph 30 that you changed today. Paragraph 30. You speak about your
10 withdrawal from the enclave. First I'd like to ask you when it was that
11 you received this message, to withdraw from the enclave of Gorazde?
12 A. The British government had issued instructions that we should
13 withdraw - and I'm sorry, I'm going to have to look up the date if you'll
14 forgive me, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could we know what you are consulting at this
16 moment, your statement?
17 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, sir. It's a book called "White Dragon,"
18 which was compiled from my diaries and other people's diaries at the
19 time --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, whenever you consult anything else than your
21 own statement, which approval was given that you would have it --
22 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- we'd like to know what you're consulting.
24 THE WITNESS: Certainly.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
1 THE WITNESS: No, I'm afraid I can't find the date but I believe
2 it was sometime --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you're only looking for the date itself, I do
5 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
7 THE WITNESS: It was -- the British government's decision I think
8 was sometime in early August, around about a month before our six-month
9 tour of duty was due to end. So that was the stated intention that we
10 would -- we would withdraw and not be replaced. And that was
11 communicated, as far as I understand, to both sides.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Next question, please, Mr. Lukic.
13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. According to this statement, you said to us in paragraph 30, that
15 in the morning you received news of the NATO air-strikes. Do you
16 remember when that happened in the morning when you heard the news of
17 NATO air-strikes?
18 JUDGE ORIE: But wasn't this part of the correction, Mr. Lukic?
19 The witness said, at least as far as I remember: We didn't hear about
20 the NATO air-strikes but we heard about a shelling incident which perhaps
21 likely or could have resulted in NATO air-strikes. That's how the
22 witness corrected his statement --
23 MR. LUKIC: In my question only the -- what matters is the
25 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
1 MR. LUKIC: At what time --
2 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine --
3 MR. LUKIC: -- he received the message.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. At what time then -- the question now is: At
5 what time did you receive the information about the shelling incident
6 which you considered to be at risk to trigger air-strikes?
7 THE WITNESS: To be exactly sure, I would have to consult the war
8 diary, which I don't have. But my recollection was that it was late
9 morning, around about 11.00, something like that.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I can't assist you.
11 Mr. Lukic, next question, please.
12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
13 Q. [Interpretation] How long did it take you to organise your unit
14 for withdrawal and when did you leave the Gorazde enclave?
15 A. The withdrawal had been going on for at least two weeks.
16 Following the meeting with General Mladic, we had removed as many
17 personnel vehicles and heavy equipment as was not immediately required.
18 We had distributed a good deal of furniture and food to the -- to the
19 hospitals on both sides -- on both the Serb and the Bosnian side. So by
20 the time we got to this date which you're referring about -- referring
21 to, there were only -- I think only 80 soldiers in total left in Gorazde
22 in the -- in the force with just sufficient vehicles to lift them and
23 only their personal weapons and ammunition. So with -- given that in
24 mind -- given that, it took me only an hour to -- to organise the final
1 Q. Did you know, did anyone inform you, that the decision to bomb
2 the Serbian positions was adopted on the London Conference on the
3 21st of July of 1995? This is at least according to General Smith's
5 A. I have seen the written message delivered by Air Marshal Ratan
6 [phoen] and others to the Serb side in Belgrade after the London
7 Conference, which warned the Serb side that if they attacked Gorazde and
8 put the lives of UN peacekeepers there at risk, then they would be
9 attacked with -- and I think the exact words were "substantial air
10 power," which would be delivered with enough resource to stop them
11 pushing forward their attack.
12 Q. Were you aware of the proposal of Western powers that
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be divided 49 Republika Srpska and 51 the
14 remainder of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is today the Federation? Were you
15 aware of these efforts of the Western Alliance at the time when you
16 arrived in Gorazde?
17 A. Mr. Lukic, I was a lieutenant-colonel commanding a battalion and
18 not really in the -- in the councils of the great. What I had -- what I
19 did know about was the Vance-Owen Plan, which had been accepted by the
20 Serb side, as I recall, but not by the other parties. But that, as far
21 as I was aware, was the only deal that was on the table at the moment. I
22 was not sufficiently senior, I think, to be aware of any other proposals
23 at the time.
24 Q. Do you know that Air Marshal Ratan, who you just mentioned,
25 issued an ultimatum relating to air-strikes?
1 A. I think as I just said in answer to your question, I've seen the
2 written warning. And it was a warning, I would say, not an ultimatum.
3 It did not say that we are going to attack you. It said that if you do
4 so --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, again, remain seated.
6 Mr. Lukic, my -- the patience of the Chamber is coming to an end.
7 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I check with the "White Dragon"
9 for a moment because I think it may have the text of the Ratan warning in
11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, before I -- Mr. Stojanovic nods that he has no
12 problems. Usually this is decided once the parties have expressed
13 themselves. You may have a look at the text.
14 Mr. Mladic, low voice.
15 Mr. Lukic, please, it's now the third or fourth time this morning
16 that I have to intervene.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. My client insists that I ask you the following: Do you know
20 anything about the meeting at which Air Marshal Ratan issued a warning,
21 as you put it, to General Mladic? And do you know who else attended this
23 A. I've only seen the text, the written text, of the warning. I
24 don't know Air Marshal Ratan. I might have met him once subsequently.
25 I'm not sure who else was there. The text of the message was sent to me,
1 there being no internet in those days, by fax. And I believe I still
2 have somewhere the original document.
3 JUDGE ORIE: You're referring to a meeting, that meeting being --
4 THE WITNESS: The meeting being with Air Marshal Ratan. I think
5 it was with the president of Yugoslavia and in Beograd.
6 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. In this same paragraph, number 30, you say:
10 "We were warned that we were facing a serious attack by
11 BH 'renegades,' who were redoubling their efforts to foil our retreat."
12 Under such circumstances, did any specific and direct attacks
13 occur against your forces by the Muslim forces?
14 A. Yes, we had been attacked two days before by the Bosnian forces.
15 I think this -- there are two possible reasons. One was to try to steal
16 weapons, food, ammunition, equipment. The other was that the local
17 Bosnian military commanders did not understand that the British
18 government's desire to withdraw its troops was a measure to -- for
19 protection and that the -- the protection that the United Nations could
20 afford to Gorazde would then be undertaken by air power rather than by
21 what was left of a battalion. They thought that the withdrawal of the
22 battalion meant that they were going to be abandoned, so I think that
23 their view was that if the Serbs could take hostages to achieve an end,
24 then so would they. So I think it was entirely possible that they were
25 playing at the same game, but they found us well prepared and the attack
1 was stopped.
2 We killed a number of their soldiers, and the following day, a
3 sniper shot one of my sentries, I think perhaps a family member of one of
4 the BiH soldiers who'd been shot. But that -- and I warned General --
5 Brigadier Barto [phoen], the commander of the 81st Division, that we
6 would continue to resist and defend ourselves if we were further
7 attacked. But even so, he thought it likely that there were those under
8 his command that he would not be able to control and that they might well
9 attack us again because they were desperate.
10 He himself had -- I should add to that by saying that he himself
11 had given orders that -- having received a directive, I believe from
12 President Izetbegovic, that our move was not to be obstructed, but he did
13 not feel confident that he could get everybody under his command to obey
15 Q. You mention a meeting that General Mladic had with you and
16 General Smith and at which he gave you guarantees that he would assist
17 you with your withdrawal and you said that he kept his word.
18 "Regardless of fierce Muslim attacks, whose aim was to block our
19 movement, we were able to pull out of Gorazde and cross the Serbian
20 territory without a single loss of life."
21 Now, in relation to this let me ask you the following. When did
22 this meeting between yourself, General Mladic, and General Smith take
24 A. Again, I'm afraid, off the top of my head, I can't remember the
25 exact date.
1 May I consult with the book, Your Honour, to verify the date if I
3 JUDGE ORIE: If it's just about the date, please do.
4 THE WITNESS: No, I'm sorry, I can't --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Could we perhaps --
6 THE WITNESS: -- find it.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps if you would try to find it during the next
8 break if it's that important. Meanwhile, answer the question.
9 THE WITNESS: It was sometime I think in early August.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you recall where the meeting took place, and apart from
12 General Smith and General Mladic and yourself, was anyone else present?
13 A. The meeting I think took place at Sokolac or somewhere near it.
14 It was certainly on a ranch. I remember there were a lot of horses.
15 Also the meeting really was between General Smith and General Mladic. I
16 was invited to attend. Also present I remember Major Richard Wesley.
17 Also there was another colonel called Popovic, not the same Popovic that
18 I referred to earlier on, and I remember General Mladic saying to this
19 officer: You will remain on the ground in the Serb municipality of
20 Gorazde and you will act as the point of contact and you will make
21 certain that the evacuation runs smoothly. The other person I remember
22 being there was Brane Suka, who I can assure you exists. And, in fact, I
23 remember meeting him in 1999, so he was still in the area then.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could I ask some -- it's a bit unclear to
25 me reading paragraph 30 when you're expressing that there was genuine
1 concern about the safety of you and your troops or whether it's the
2 assistance in withdrawing smoothly would also serve the interests of the
3 Bosnian Serb army who then have no presence -- your presence would then
4 be finished in the area.
5 Could you tell us how you experienced this?
6 THE WITNESS: This is the -- you're referring to the obstruction
7 from the Bosnian side, sir?
8 JUDGE ORIE: But also the assistance you got in order to overcome
9 such obstruction because, in paragraph 30, we see that you said that
10 General Mladic was true to his words that -- and that you were able to
11 extract from Gorazde without loss of a single life.
12 THE WITNESS: Indeed, sir, there were two phases to the
13 extraction on any one day. The first was to get out of the town of
14 Gorazde as far as the confrontation line and across the confrontation
15 line, which was territory controlled by the Bosnian army. So for the
16 first part we were -- we -- there was the potential for a fight with
17 them. And they had been obstructive, they had been told not to be
18 obstructive. So we had to overcome that part. A relatively short
19 distance from the town to -- of about 3 kilometres, corresponding with
20 the old TEZ.
21 Once across the confrontation line we were then into the
22 territory controlled by the VRS, Bosnian Serb army, which was where
23 General Mladic's authority ran. So --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Would you --
25 THE WITNESS: -- from there on we were in his hands, as it were.
1 JUDGE ORIE: When you said: So for the first part we were --
2 there was the potential fact for a fight with them, "them" being the --
3 THE WITNESS: The Bosnian side.
4 JUDGE ORIE: The Bosnian side.
5 THE WITNESS: With whom we'd had a fight three days before.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is obstructing you leaving that --
7 THE WITNESS: Yes --
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- territory.
9 THE WITNESS: Exactly so, sir, exactly so.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And my question was about -- I do see that you were
11 assisted later by the Bosnian Serb army not to be bothered when you went
12 through territory which was held by them.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: But I'm seeking your interpretation of whether the
15 primary concern was to get rid of you from that area or whether the
16 primary concern was genuine concern about your safety or the two of them?
17 Or how did you experience that?
18 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm -- sir, it's speculation on my part. But
19 I think we were, by this stage, more trouble than we were worth to either
20 side. And I think both of them just wanted us off their territory. The
21 other enclaves had disappeared, they'd been captured, and we were -- we
22 were now a historical accident, if you like.
23 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, I did hear in your answers that
24 the Muslim forces might want to keep you there. So to say that your
25 presence was not in the interest of neither party --
1 THE WITNESS: I think it depends at what level you're at on the
2 Muslim side, sir. As far as the Bosnian government and the military
3 command in the enclave was concerned, okay, we understand, leave. But
4 lower down, at -- the troops on the ground, they -- they did not
5 understand the bigger picture and were not -- and it was not explained to
6 them. All they could see was the Brits were leaving and we're being left
7 to stand up to the Serbs on our own.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
9 Mr. Lukic, please proceed.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. I would just briefly go back to your observation. It is not our
12 intention at all to invent --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please repeat the name.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please repeat the name you referred to.
15 Therefore, perhaps you start with: It's not your intention at all to
16 invent ...
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Brane Suka.
18 Q. Our assertion is that he had no direct relationship with
19 General Mladic. As far as we were able to reveal, he spoke English; is
20 that correct?
21 A. No, he did not speak English.
22 Q. Was he a liaison officer?
23 A. That's what I was led to believe. He was not a regular soldier;
24 he was a reservist. And he was still in the area in 1999, but he told me
25 in 1999 that he was thinking of emigrating to Canada which is perhaps why
1 you can't find him. Forgive me, I didn't mean to suggest that you
2 were -- that we were trying to invent anybody.
3 Q. Concerning the correction that you made in paragraph 30, I can
4 see that you often have to refer to your notes because you gave your
5 statement in 1996. You would agree with me that your memory was much
6 better in 1996 than it is today with regard to the events of 1995?
7 A. Certainly.
8 JUDGE ORIE: There is an underlying suggestion, Mr. Lukic - I
9 don't know whether you intended to convey that to the witness - you
10 talked about consulting notes.
11 Do you remember what -- when re-reading this, what made you
12 decide that it was wrong that you were informed about NATO air-strikes,
13 and that it was, rather, the shelling that you were informed about? Was
14 it after you had consulted notes or what after 20 years made you decide
15 that your statement is wrong and your testimony today is right?
16 THE WITNESS: In preparation for this hearing, Your Honour, I
17 re-read my diaries of the time and the published accounts of the
18 battalion's tour which were drawn from the war diary.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And the war diary predates your statement?
20 THE WITNESS: It does. It's contemporary.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
22 Please proceed.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. According to the reports that we received from the Prosecution as
25 proofing notes, you had not made this correction earlier. You did it for
1 the first time today or, perhaps, we were not informed about any
2 corrections you made during your proofing. We received two reports from
3 the Prosecution and none of them contains this correction.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jeremy.
5 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, the proofing notes contain additional
6 information coming from this witness. This particular clarification was
7 made during the witness's Karadzic testimony, and on that basis there is
8 no additional information and therefore it was not included in a proofing
9 note sent yesterday.
10 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore when Mr. Lukic said that the witness
11 had not made the correction earlier, you say it's to be found in the
12 Karadzic testimony?
13 MR. JEREMY: That's correct, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic --
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
16 JUDGE ORIE: -- please proceed.
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Would you agree with me that the perception of the Serbian side
19 on the 25th of May, that is to say, during NATO strikes on Serbian
20 positions, was that UNPROFOR forces and the Muslim forces were fighting
21 side by side, that is to say, on the same side. During proofing you have
22 been shown a document to that effect which says that in an order issued
23 by the Drina Corps on the 25th of May, it is said that it is to be
24 expected that the Muslim forces alongside UNPROFOR forces would continue
25 to target the positions of the Serb army?
1 A. I would agree with you that the perception could well be that,
2 but perception is not necessarily truth or reality.
3 Q. I found in a document the fact that vehicles confiscated from
4 your units were repainted in the colours of Republika Srpska. They did
5 not retain their original colours.
6 A. Yes, I saw one of these vehicles myself painted in camouflage,
7 and it had been modified by having a heavy-weapons turret mounted on it.
8 Q. After a year, all the confiscated equipment was returned to your
9 unit; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, it -- yes, it was. Certainly the things like helmets, body
11 armour, rifles were returned. I think it was some time later that the
12 vehicles came back, but the three that were undamaged came back.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Could -- do you know what triggered this material to
14 be returned?
15 THE WITNESS: As far as I can remember, Your Honour, this was
16 during the time that IFOR, the NATO Implementation Force, was in -- was
17 deployed. Now, this was a force that was there on a very different
18 mandate and it could enforce various matters, and it had the authority to
19 inspect stores and weapons caches. And I think it was during one of
20 their inspections that this equipment was found.
21 JUDGE ORIE: So it was not a spontaneous return to the former
23 THE WITNESS: Not as far as I'm aware, sir.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And this was after Dayton?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 Q. You showed us the map today which showed the deployment of your
4 men in Republika Srpska, or rather, people who were imprisoned in
5 Republika Srpska. Would you agree with me that prisoners of that sort
6 cannot be kept in one place all the time, but rather have to be moved
7 from one location to another?
8 A. You're referring to the soldiers taken hostage on the -- on
9 Sjenokos and the east bank?
10 Q. You are using the term "taken hostage" --
11 A. Yes, yes, I am.
12 Q. [In English] Have your soldiers ever told you that they were told
13 that they were prisoners of war?
14 A. At least one told me that he was led to believe that he was a
15 prisoner of war, and as far as I'm aware, they were treated as if they
16 were prisoners of war and I have no issue with the way that they were
17 treated. They were treated correctly throughout. That is not the point.
18 They were entitled to the protection of peacekeepers and should not have
19 been taken prisoner or hostage at all. And as to --
20 JUDGE ORIE: If you --
21 THE WITNESS: -- moving them around, I'm afraid that's neither
22 here nor there. If they shouldn't have been taken, then whether they're
23 moved or not is also neither here nor there.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If you say "treated correctly," could I ask you
25 whether you considered part of the correct treatment that they were put
1 close to possible military targets?
2 THE WITNESS: No, I do not. I was referring to their personal
3 welfare, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: They were fed. They were given medical treatment.
6 They were not threatened. But --
7 JUDGE ORIE: No, I do understand --
8 THE WITNESS: -- of course --
9 JUDGE ORIE: You have not included that part of their treatment
10 in your answer.
11 THE WITNESS: No, indeed, Your Honour, and thank you for
12 prompting me. But that is -- and, of course, they were as -- because
13 they were entitled to protection as peacekeepers, and indeed if they had
14 been prisoners of war, they should not have been placed in harm's way
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
17 By the way, I see that we are at the time for a break. Could you
18 tell us how much time you would still need.
19 MR. LUKIC: We will finish today.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but that does not only depend on you but also
21 on Mr. Jeremy. I don't know how much time Mr. Jeremy would still need,
22 but I would like to ask him after you have told us how much time you
23 would still need.
24 MR. LUKIC: As you know, I always have a lot, but I --
25 JUDGE ORIE: That's the reason why I'm asking you.
1 MR. LUKIC: Maybe you should ask Mr. Jeremy first and then I cut
2 my cross shorter as much as needed.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jeremy, as matters stand now and not knowing how
4 much Mr. Lukic still has when he's going through his papers.
5 MR. JEREMY: As matters stand, Your Honours, five, max ten
6 minutes, closer to five.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if --
8 MR. LUKIC: We'll finish this witness today.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And if you would finish even -- if you would leave
10 five more minutes, I could read a decision from the Chamber which the
11 parties might be interested to know.
12 Ms. Bibles.
13 MS. BIBLES: Could we release the next witness, Your Honour?
14 JUDGE ORIE: The next witness can be released -- but I thought he
15 was -- oh, yes, he was available.
16 Yes. Then could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE ORIE: I think you announced two and a half hours,
19 Mr. Lukic. You have used - and that's always net time - one hour and
20 54 minutes, which leaves a little bit over half an hour. So I would aim
21 at finishing at 2.00.
22 We take a break and we resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 1.17 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 1.38 p.m.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 THE WITNESS: Forgive me, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: You asked me to check some dates.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: And I can give you all those dates now if that will
8 be helpful because they will address Mr. Lukic's problem -- questions.
9 The date of the meeting with Air Marshal Ratan, according to my
10 information, in Beograd, was on the 23rd of July. The British
11 government's announcement that we would leave Gorazde and not be replaced
12 was the 18th of August. And the date that General Smith and
13 General Mladic met at Borike which I was present was the 20th of August.
14 MR. LUKIC:
15 Q. Thank you, General, for these informations.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have
17 65 ter 19790, that's a Prosecution number, could we please have that
18 briefly in e-court.
19 THE REGISTRAR: This is Exhibit P2544, Your Honours.
20 MR. LUKIC: This is the document I do not need. I will try with
21 another number. It's P1849, please.
22 Q. [Interpretation] General, we see a document here, a document of
23 the Army of Republika Srpska of the Main Staff, dated the 27th of May,
24 1995. It is stated here that there was some intelligence to the effect
25 that the NATO session was concluded on the 27th of May at around
1 1600 hours and that it was decided that massive NATO air-strikes against
2 VRS positions and features would continue. On the ground, did you
3 receive this information?
4 A. I've never seen that document before, so no, I did not receive
5 that information.
6 Q. I do apologise if I was not clear. Did you have information
7 about the NATO session and that it was decided at that session held on
8 the 27th of May to continue bombing Serb positions?
9 A. No, I did not know that.
10 Q. Today you said to us that members of your unit from the SAS
11 provided information to NATO aircraft about targets. Was that the
12 mandate of your unit, to provide information about targets to NATO
14 A. The mandate of my unit was to observe the TEZ and to deter
15 attacks on the safe area. The mandate would not specify such things as
16 you're talking about. These are procedures. They would -- they might be
17 referred to in the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement for the
18 Gorazde force were more robust than they were for UNPROFOR forces
19 elsewhere, and they allowed indirect fires, such as aircraft, to be used
20 in defence of the mission and in defence of the safe area. I provided a
21 copy of the rules of engagement during my evidence in the Karadzic trial.
22 Q. Was the Serb side informed about that part of your mandate and
23 did they know about that, namely, that members of your unit were guiding
24 NATO aircraft?
25 A. Well, first of all, can I restate that it's -- that a procedure
1 like that to employ a particular means is not -- would not be specified
2 under the mandate. The mandate was issued by the United Nations. And as
3 far as informing either side, no, I don't think I would have informed
4 either side exactly what my capabilities were. But in any case, as I
5 have already said, during my time in command in Gorazde no air-strikes
6 were launched or directed by those tactical air control parties under my
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Let us now take a look at P2481.
10 Q. This document was shown to you by my colleague, Mr. Jeremy. I
11 would just like to ask you to take a look at the introductory part, where
12 it says the president of Republika Srpska ordered, by way of his order,
13 that on the 2nd of June, 1995, 120 members of UNPROFOR should be
14 released. This document was signed by General --
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Actually, can we see the bottom of
16 the page and the signature, please.
17 Q. We have the name typewritten here, the name of
18 General Ratko Mladic.
19 Would you agree that in this case it only has to do with
20 conveying an order not actually issuing one?
21 A. You mean that the president had given an instruction and that the
22 General is therefore issuing a military order to carry out that
24 Q. Do you know that the supreme commander of the Army of
25 Republika Srpska at the time was Mr. Radovan Karadzic?
1 A. I do. I do.
2 Q. So he issues orders, doesn't he? He can issue orders as the
3 supreme commander. It wasn't an instruction. It was an order, as we can
4 see from this document. [In English] "By the order."
5 A. Yes, I see that.
6 Q. [Interpretation] So would you now agree that it has to do with
7 conveying an order rather than issuing it?
8 A. Yes, indeed.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I put a question at this point in time.
10 Mr. Riley, if you look at this -- the heading, it is said there:
11 "Release of prisoners of war from UNPROFOR, order."
12 Later we see that the prisoners should be released and handed
13 over together with their personal equipment and weapons in the Pale
14 sector to the MUP of the Republika Srpska, which will organise their
15 transport to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 Could you explain this procedure, handing over to the Ministry of
17 Interior in order to transport them to Yugoslavia?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, we can take issue with the term
19 "prisoners of war," which they were not but that's how they're being
20 described. I would -- in my professional opinion, they're being handed
21 over to the -- the Ministry of Interior police who would then relieve the
22 military of the responsibility for holding these hostages. And they
23 would organise the transportation, and in the case of the British
24 soldiers, I believe they went to Zvornik where they were met by the
25 British ambassador. The Ministry of Interior police would have the
1 authority and the means to move all these people across the various
2 boundaries of the army corps, and it would, I would guess, just be a
3 matter of making it more simple.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: But would you consider that as a release? A
5 release, a direct release would mean to set free so that they could
6 return to their original place of -- where they have been before.
7 THE WITNESS: There may be some linguistic issue here which I'm
8 not aware of, but I would take this to mean these prisoners are to be
9 released from the places of captivity where they are held into the --
10 into the custody or care of the Ministry of Interior police who will then
11 take charge of them and transport them further on. I don't think here
12 that they're being given their liberty; I think they're being released
13 from close confinement, but that's not the same thing as regaining their
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And they wouldn't be able to continue fulfilling
16 the task of UNPROFOR; is that correct?
17 THE WITNESS: Not at this point, no. Because although it says
18 that they will be handed over with their personal equipment and weapons,
19 I think all that they had was their personal belongings. They were not
20 robbed. And they had their clothes, but they did not have their weapons,
21 body armour, helmets, and other military equipment.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
23 THE WITNESS: Nor did they have any communications.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I have one additional question as well.
1 Mr. Lukic asked you about whether this was issuing an order by
2 General Mladic or whether it was just conveying an order. Now, the text
3 reads, and I'm reading from the last line of page 1:
4 "Pursuant to the order of the president of the Republika Srpska,
5 I hereby order ..."
6 Now, in normal military language, if you receive an order from
7 your superior which needs to be implemented in the organisation, would
8 you then say: I convey to you an order given by the president? Or would
9 you -- or would the normal military structure require that you then pass
10 on that order by issuing an order yourself?
11 THE WITNESS: I would incline myself to the latter. I would say
12 that if you are given an order, you must accept the responsibility of
13 carrying that order. Having accepted that responsibility, you then must
14 issue the more detailed orders to all of your subordinates from your own
15 authority which has come down to you from above.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would receive an illegal order, would
17 you take responsibility by then ordering it further down the line to your
18 subordinates? Would that make you responsible for the order --
19 THE WITNESS: If you accept an illegal order and pass it on, then
20 you are -- then you are, as an individual, culpable. Illegal orders
21 should not be obeyed.
22 JUDGE ORIE: You can't say: I just received this order --
23 THE WITNESS: No.
24 JUDGE ORIE: -- I convey it to you, it's --
25 THE WITNESS: Everyone is responsible for the consequences of
1 their actions, as I understand it.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 THE WITNESS: And if something's illegal, it's illegal. The law
4 is the law and the law is for everybody.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Now, apparently a lot of attention was paid to the
6 question whether the order was conveyed or whether an order was issued.
7 Is this a semantic issue or is it something of substance?
8 THE WITNESS: I don't see that it's a matter of substance. I
9 think the president is giving an order or an instruction - call it what
10 you will - to make this release. General Mladic is issuing a subsequent
11 order which implements it.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I'm getting close to the end now. Actually, first I'm going to
16 ask you something. At that moment when NATO aircraft are bombing Serb
17 positions, does UNPROFOR still maintain the peace in Bosnia?
18 A. You're talking about the air-strikes around Pale in May?
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. Yes, it does because it was mandated by the United Nations, and
21 I'm not aware, Mr. Lukic, of any higher authority in the world than that.
22 And if the United Nations says that UNPROFOR is there to carry out a
23 particular plan, then that should be the end of it.
24 Q. In your view, in your view, was UNPROFOR impartial at that
1 A. Impartiality does not mean that you have to treat both parties in
2 a conflict, or all parties, in exactly the same way. You may treat them
3 differently in order to make sure that your mandate is fulfilled. And
4 that is in accordance with the UN's own definition of impartiality.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] 1D911, could we please take a look at
6 that document now. This is an order of the commander of the Main Staff
7 of UNPROFOR, General Smith. We'd be interested in number 4 at the very
8 bottom of the page.
9 Q. According to General Smith, under (A), UNPROFOR no longer have a
10 peacekeeping relationship with the VRS. It has lost the consent of one
11 of the parties. And also, according to General Smith, under (B),
12 UNPROFOR is very close to being an ally of the Bosnian government. It is
13 very nearly no longer impartial.
14 Would you agree with me that your view of the role and
15 relationship of UNPROFOR does not tally with that of General Smith's?
16 A. You asked me about what was going on at the time of the
17 air-strikes. This document refers to the subsequent situation, after the
18 bombing, after hostage taking, and so on. I would suggest that you are
19 describing a changed situation, not the one you asked me about.
20 May I see the second page of this so I can see the context in
21 which those --
22 Q. This document has a few pages. We can take a look now. We can
23 look at point (C) on the next page, where it says that UNPROFOR resorted
24 to force in order to carry out its mandate. And then there was a
25 possibility of --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We can no longer see the
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have go back to page 1 in the English. (C) on
4 the bottom of the page.
5 MR. LUKIC: You heard Judge Fluegge, can we go to page 1?
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is on the screen.
7 JUDGE ORIE: We are -- it's on the screen now on the very bottom
9 MR. LUKIC: Okay, in English it is. I was watching B/C/S
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's all on the screen. You may proceed.
12 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. I should proceed?
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes. I just assisted you.
14 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Thank you.
15 Q. [Interpretation] So since this is a document dated 29th of May,
16 1995, do you believe, then, that on that date this is applicable and that
17 General Smith was right, that there was no peacekeeping relationship
18 between them and the army of the Bosnian Serbs and that UNPROFOR is very
19 close to becoming an ally of the Bosnian government?
20 A. Very close to but not having become, and in fact it never did, as
21 far as I'm concerned, during my time there. I'd also like to draw your
22 attention to the very first sentence. And there is General Smith telling
23 us what this paper is about. First of all, he says it is to give us an
24 idea about the debate that is going on, and the second is to direct our
25 actions. So we should not confuse the two things. But he was right to
1 say that in the aftermath of air-strikes and hostage taking, clearly
2 consent on one side had broken down. But consent, in my experience, is
3 not an absolute concept in peacekeeping operations. It is a relative,
4 and one of the ways it is relative is through time. It can break down at
5 times and it then can be re-established.
6 Q. Under item 4, General, we are nearing the end. I will not bother
7 you any longer. We see here in the last sentence, before sub-item (a),
8 it says UNPROFOR hold four BSA soldiers. According to you, are these
9 soldiers hostages or prisoners of war?
10 A. They were not held by me and I have no idea.
11 Q. You were ready to say that UNPROFOR captives were hostages. What
12 about the soldiers of the Serbian army? Were they hostages or were they
13 prisoners of war? Was UNPROFOR entitled to take hostages or to take
14 prisoners of war?
15 A. Well, perhaps you'd like to tell me the circumstances in which
16 they were taken and then I'll be able to answer you.
17 Q. I can tell you that they were taken prisoner on Vrbanja Most in
18 Sarajevo by UNPROFOR. At the time when the Bosnian Serb Army was taking
19 prisoner members of UNPROFOR, at the same moment, UNPROFOR took the four
20 BSA soldiers prisoner.
21 A. So what you're telling me is that the Bosnian Serb Army was
22 carrying out a wholly improper action, possibly criminal, attacking
23 peacekeeping troops in Sarajevo, during which those peacekeeping troops,
24 in defending themselves, took four of their attackers?
25 Q. No, no, no. Sorry. Just a moment. The French UNPROFOR members
1 attacked a check-point of the Army of Republika Srpska and took these
2 four soldiers prisoner.
3 A. That's not what you -- that's not what you said. You said this
4 was during the time when the Bosnian Serb Army was taking hostages,
5 taking prisoners, in your words.
6 Q. [In English] At the same time, but that what -- this is what
7 happened, that French UNPROFOR members attacked one observation post of
8 control point of Army of Republika Srpska and took four soldiers in their
9 custody. I'm asking you to compare those two situations.
10 A. I don't think there is any comparison. I have no means of
11 verifying whether what you say, in fact, was what happened on the ground.
12 I do recall that there was some serious fighting on that bridge and
13 around it, according to reports that I saw, between the French UNPROFOR
14 contingent and the VRS. And during -- and if during that exchange that's
15 where those soldiers were taken, then I would say that the UNPROFOR
16 troops, being as they were protected by the UN mandate, were protecting
17 themselves as they were entitled to do so.
18 Now, I don't know the specifics of exactly how those four
19 soldiers were taken, so I can't comment on the modalities of it.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I think you -- you gave it an effort to
21 explain to the witness what the situation was and asked him to make a
22 comparison, whereas this witness appears here to tell us about what he
23 personally observed and what he personally experienced. It not
24 surprisingly ends into a discussion: Give me more details, tell me
25 exactly what happened, et cetera. That should be dealt with by witnesses
1 who have personal knowledge about the situation. Therefore, I think
2 it's -- doesn't assist the Chamber to continue this feeding the witness
3 with more information and then him asking for further information. So
4 let's proceed.
5 MR. LUKIC: I would just like to tender this document into
6 evidence, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D911 receives number D390,
9 Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
11 Mr. Lukic --
12 MR. LUKIC: Just let me --
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- I'm looking at the clock --
14 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --
15 JUDGE ORIE: I will give up my intention to read the decision.
16 MR. LUKIC: I have one short --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jeremy, you said five to ten minutes. Where are
19 MR. JEREMY: Ten minutes, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ten minutes.
21 MR. LUKIC: I just have one more question.
22 JUDGE ORIE: One question. Okay. We'll count them.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, can you just tell us briefly, what happened to the
25 Ukrainian members of UNPROFOR in Gorazde?
1 A. The Ukrainian members were -- their camp was attacked by the
2 Bosnian army. They were -- they did not defend themselves. They were
3 stripped of their weapons and equipment. I had then to take them into my
4 care, and they were then removed at a later date by the Russian UNPROFOR
5 contingent. I was very angry about this indeed, very angry, but by the
6 time I became fully aware of the situation, I couldn't stop it.
7 Q. Thank you, General, for answering my questions. I have no
8 further questions for you. Thank you.
9 A. Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jeremy, any questions in re-examination?
11 MR. JEREMY: Yes, Your Honours. Thank you.
12 Re-examination by Mr. Jeremy:
13 Q. General Riley, in cross-examination today at temporary transcript
14 page 41, during a discussion of whether or not General Mladic ordered the
15 BritBat camp in Gorazde to be shelled if there were further air-strikes,
16 the following was put to you about Brane Suka, a man that you recall as a
17 VRS liaison officer, and this is at transcript page 42, lines 13 to 14:
18 "Trust me, I tried to find out who Brane Suka is. This man has
19 no connection to General Mladic whatsoever."
20 This was repeated again at temporary transcript page 65 today.
21 Now, in response you stated that when you were called to a meeting with
22 General Smith and General Mladic in August 1995, this man, Brane Suka,
23 was present. In connection with that answer I'd like to show you a
24 document, P345, and this is a -- this is the diary of General Mladic.
25 MR. JEREMY: And specifically I'd like to see page 310 in the
1 English and 314 in the B/C/S.
2 Q. General Riley, when this -- the English version is on the screen
3 before you, I would like you to focus on the second entry halfway down
4 the page. We see the location is Borike, dated the 22nd of August, 1995.
5 The title of the meeting is: "Meeting with General Smith." We see is
6 says: "Present: Smith, John, (Colonel)," and some other names. And we
7 see it says: "Our side," it says, "Colonel Djurdjic, Indjic, Kusic,
8 Krunic, Kosoric, Suka." And if we can go to the next page, please.
9 A. Kusic was the brigade commander at Rogatica and I think that the
10 meeting took place in his area of responsibility.
11 Q. We also see Popovic, Furtula, and I, and interpreter Tijana.
12 General Riley, is this the meeting that you attended in relation
13 to the withdrawal of your battalion from Gorazde?
14 A. I believe it is.
15 Q. And when --
16 A. And there is Suka present. And my clear recollection of that is
17 that General Mladic knew him and addressed him as if he knew him.
18 The -- I'm not quite sure why the -- there was an issue about
19 Brane Suka. Brane Suka was -- was a thoroughly good man, a patriot as he
20 saw it. He hated the war and would have done anything to see the
21 situation resolved.
22 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I'd like to show the witness one final
23 document, again in connection with Brane Suka. That's 65 ter 23892.
24 Q. General Riley, now that's on the screen we see it's a document
25 from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, sector for security
1 and intelligence, dated the 7th of May, 1995, addressed to the
2 Drina Corps command, also addressed to the 5th Light Infantry Brigade
3 command, and we see a reference to Captain Brane Suka personally.
4 MR. JEREMY: If we could also go to the second page in this
6 Q. I won't read it, but in the second paragraph again we see a
7 reference to Brane Suka. And in the fifth -- the fourth paragraph we see
8 a reference to:
9 "Our liaison officer, Captain Suka, will condition the medical
10 and social evacuation of release of captured Serbs in Gorazde ..."
11 Does that help you refresh your recollection or corroborate your
12 recollection about who this Captain Suka was?
13 A. Yes, and I recall the particular exchange and evacuation episode
14 concerned. And I can only reiterate what I said earlier, that Brane Suka
15 was based in the Serb municipality of Gorazde with Furtula's
16 headquarters, but I was always led to understand that he was there to
17 maintain liaison directly with General Mladic, which is what it seems
18 that these documents are saying.
19 MR. JEREMY: Your Honours, I'd like to tender that document as
20 the next Prosecution exhibit.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Document 23892 receives number P2547,
23 Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: P2547 is admitted.
25 MR. JEREMY:
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Riley.
2 MR. JEREMY: No further questions, Your Honours.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, as the re-examination triggered any need
5 for further questions?
6 If Mr. Mladic - we are at the very end - wants to consult with
7 you, of course you have an opportunity to -- yes.
8 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Voice down, please. Mr. -- voice down, I said, and
10 then I expect the volume to go down.
11 MR. LUKIC: No further questions, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: No further questions. Thank you.
13 Mr. Riley, this concludes your testimony. I'd like to thank you
14 very much for coming to The Hague and for having answered all the
15 questions that were put to you by the parties and/or by the Bench, and I
16 wish you a safe return home again.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.
19 [The witness withdrew]
20 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn for the day and we will resume
21 Monday, the 28th of October, 9.30 in the morning, Courtroom III. We
22 stand adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.16 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Monday, the 28th day of
25 October, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.